341 files changed, 125557 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..21d88df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+po/*gmo
+*~
+Makefile
+Makefile.in
+Makefile.in.in
+*.lo
+*.la
+*.o
+**/*.dirstamp
+.deps/
+.libs/
+src/cryptsetup
+src/veritysetup
+ABOUT-NLS
+aclocal.m4
+autom4te.cache/
+compile
+config.guess
+config.h
+config.h.in
+config.log
+config.rpath
+config.status
+config.sub
+configure
+cryptsetup
+cryptsetup-reencrypt
+depcomp
+install-sh
+integritysetup
+lib/libcryptsetup.pc
+libtool
+ltmain.sh
+m4/
+missing
+po/Makevars.template
+po/POTFILES
+po/Rules-quot
+po/*.pot
+po/*.header
+po/*.sed
+po/*.sin
+po/stamp-po
+scripts/cryptsetup.conf
+stamp-h1
+veritysetup
+tests/valglog.*
+*/*.dirstamp
+*-debug-luks2-backup*
+tests/api-test
+tests/api-test-2
+tests/differ
+tests/luks1-images
+tests/tcrypt-images
+tests/unit-utils-io
+tests/vectors-test
diff --git a/.travis-functions.sh b/.travis-functions.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dbb1444
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.travis-functions.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+#
+# .travis-functions.sh:
+#   - helper functions to be sourced from .travis.yml
+#   - designed to respect travis' environment but testing locally is possible
+#   - modified copy from util-linux project
+#
+
+if [ ! -f "configure.ac" ]; then
+	echo ".travis-functions.sh must be sourced from source dir" >&2
+	return 1 || exit 1
+fi
+
+## some config settings
+# travis docs say we get 1.5 CPUs
+MAKE="make -j2"
+DUMP_CONFIG_LOG="short"
+export TS_OPT_parsable="yes"
+
+function configure_travis
+{
+	./configure "$@"
+	err=$?
+	if [ "$DUMP_CONFIG_LOG" = "short" ]; then
+		grep -B1 -A10000 "^## Output variables" config.log | grep -v "_FALSE="
+	elif [ "$DUMP_CONFIG_LOG" = "full" ]; then
+		cat config.log
+	fi
+	return $err
+}
+
+function check_nonroot
+{
+	local cfg_opts="$1"
+
+	[ -z "$cfg_opts" ] && return
+
+	configure_travis \
+		--enable-cryptsetup-reencrypt \
+		--enable-internal-sse-argon2 \
+		"$cfg_opts" \
+		|| return
+
+	$MAKE || return
+
+	make check
+}
+
+function check_root
+{
+	local cfg_opts="$1"
+
+	[ -z "$cfg_opts" ] && return
+
+    configure_travis \
+		--enable-cryptsetup-reencrypt \
+		--enable-internal-sse-argon2 \
+		"$cfg_opts" \
+		|| return
+
+	$MAKE || return
+
+	# FIXME: we should use -E option here
+	sudo make check
+}
+
+function check_nonroot_compile_only
+{
+	local cfg_opts="$1"
+
+	[ -z "$cfg_opts" ] && return
+
+	configure_travis \
+		--enable-cryptsetup-reencrypt \
+		--enable-internal-sse-argon2 \
+		"$cfg_opts" \
+		|| return
+
+	$MAKE
+}
+
+function travis_install_script
+{
+	# install some packages from Ubuntu's default sources
+	sudo apt-get -qq update
+	sudo apt-get install -qq >/dev/null \
+		sharutils \
+		libgcrypt20-dev \
+		libssl-dev \
+		libdevmapper-dev \
+		libpopt-dev \
+		uuid-dev \
+		libsepol1-dev \
+		libtool \
+		dmsetup \
+		autoconf \
+		automake \
+		pkg-config \
+		autopoint \
+		gettext \
+		expect \
+		keyutils \
+		libjson-c-dev \
+		libblkid-dev \
+		|| return
+}
+
+function travis_before_script
+{
+	set -o xtrace
+
+	./autogen.sh
+	ret=$?
+
+	set +o xtrace
+	return $ret
+}
+
+function travis_script
+{
+	local ret
+	set -o xtrace
+
+	case "$MAKE_CHECK" in
+	gcrypt)
+		check_nonroot "--with-crypto_backend=gcrypt" && \
+		check_root "--with-crypto_backend=gcrypt"
+		;;
+	gcrypt_compile)
+		check_nonroot_compile_only "--with-crypto_backend=gcrypt"
+		;;
+	openssl)
+		check_nonroot "--with-crypto_backend=openssl" && \
+		check_root "--with-crypto_backend=openssl"
+		;;
+	openssl_compile)
+		check_nonroot_compile_only "--with-crypto_backend=openssl"
+		;;
+	kernel)
+		check_nonroot "--with-crypto_backend=kernel" && \
+		check_root "--with-crypto_backend=kernel"
+		;;
+	kernel_compile)
+		check_nonroot_compile_only "--with-crypto_backend=kernel"
+		;;
+	*)
+		echo "error, check environment (travis.yml)" >&2
+		false
+		;;
+	esac
+
+	ret=$?
+	set +o xtrace
+	return $ret
+}
+
+function travis_after_script
+{
+	return 0
+}
diff --git a/.travis.yml b/.travis.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..59e6802
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.travis.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+language: c
+
+sudo: required
+dist: trusty
+
+compiler:
+  - gcc
+
+env:
+  - MAKE_CHECK="gcrypt"
+  - MAKE_CHECK="openssl"
+  - MAKE_CHECK="kernel"
+
+branches:
+  only:
+    - master
+    - wip-luks2
+    - v2_0_x
+
+before_install:
+  - uname -a
+  - $CC --version
+  - which $CC
+  # workaround clang not system wide, fail on sudo make install
+  - export CC=`which $CC`
+  # workaround travis-ci issue #5301
+  - unset PYTHON_CFLAGS
+
+install:
+  - source ./.travis-functions.sh
+  - travis_install_script
+
+before_script:
+  - travis_before_script
+
+script:
+  - travis_script
+
+after_script:
+  - travis_after_script
diff --git a/AUTHORS b/AUTHORS
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..38c73fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/AUTHORS
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
diff --git a/COPYING b/COPYING
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..86289a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/COPYING
@@ -0,0 +1,354 @@
+                    GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
+                       Version 2, June 1991
+
+ Copyright (C) 1989, 1991 Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
+ 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA
+ Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies
+ of this license document, but changing it is not allowed.
+
+                            Preamble
+
+  The licenses for most software are designed to take away your
+freedom to share and change it.  By contrast, the GNU General Public
+License is intended to guarantee your freedom to share and change free
+software--to make sure the software is free for all its users.  This
+General Public License applies to most of the Free Software
+Foundation's software and to any other program whose authors commit to
+using it.  (Some other Free Software Foundation software is covered by
+the GNU Lesser General Public License instead.)  You can apply it to
+your programs, too.
+
+  When we speak of free software, we are referring to freedom, not
+price.  Our General Public Licenses are designed to make sure that you
+have the freedom to distribute copies of free software (and charge for
+this service if you wish), that you receive source code or can get it
+if you want it, that you can change the software or use pieces of it
+in new free programs; and that you know you can do these things.
+
+  To protect your rights, we need to make restrictions that forbid
+anyone to deny you these rights or to ask you to surrender the rights.
+These restrictions translate to certain responsibilities for you if you
+distribute copies of the software, or if you modify it.
+
+  For example, if you distribute copies of such a program, whether
+gratis or for a fee, you must give the recipients all the rights that
+you have.  You must make sure that they, too, receive or can get the
+source code.  And you must show them these terms so they know their
+rights.
+
+  We protect your rights with two steps: (1) copyright the software, and
+(2) offer you this license which gives you legal permission to copy,
+distribute and/or modify the software.
+
+  Also, for each author's protection and ours, we want to make certain
+that everyone understands that there is no warranty for this free
+software.  If the software is modified by someone else and passed on, we
+want its recipients to know that what they have is not the original, so
+that any problems introduced by others will not reflect on the original
+authors' reputations.
+
+  Finally, any free program is threatened constantly by software
+patents.  We wish to avoid the danger that redistributors of a free
+program will individually obtain patent licenses, in effect making the
+program proprietary.  To prevent this, we have made it clear that any
+patent must be licensed for everyone's free use or not licensed at all.
+
+  The precise terms and conditions for copying, distribution and
+modification follow.
+
+                    GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
+   TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR COPYING, DISTRIBUTION AND MODIFICATION
+
+  0. This License applies to any program or other work which contains
+a notice placed by the copyright holder saying it may be distributed
+under the terms of this General Public License.  The "Program", below,
+refers to any such program or work, and a "work based on the Program"
+means either the Program or any derivative work under copyright law:
+that is to say, a work containing the Program or a portion of it,
+either verbatim or with modifications and/or translated into another
+language.  (Hereinafter, translation is included without limitation in
+the term "modification".)  Each licensee is addressed as "you".
+
+Activities other than copying, distribution and modification are not
+covered by this License; they are outside its scope.  The act of
+running the Program is not restricted, and the output from the Program
+is covered only if its contents constitute a work based on the
+Program (independent of having been made by running the Program).
+Whether that is true depends on what the Program does.
+
+  1. You may copy and distribute verbatim copies of the Program's
+source code as you receive it, in any medium, provided that you
+conspicuously and appropriately publish on each copy an appropriate
+copyright notice and disclaimer of warranty; keep intact all the
+notices that refer to this License and to the absence of any warranty;
+and give any other recipients of the Program a copy of this License
+along with the Program.
+
+You may charge a fee for the physical act of transferring a copy, and
+you may at your option offer warranty protection in exchange for a fee.
+
+  2. You may modify your copy or copies of the Program or any portion
+of it, thus forming a work based on the Program, and copy and
+distribute such modifications or work under the terms of Section 1
+above, provided that you also meet all of these conditions:
+
+    a) You must cause the modified files to carry prominent notices
+    stating that you changed the files and the date of any change.
+
+    b) You must cause any work that you distribute or publish, that in
+    whole or in part contains or is derived from the Program or any
+    part thereof, to be licensed as a whole at no charge to all third
+    parties under the terms of this License.
+
+    c) If the modified program normally reads commands interactively
+    when run, you must cause it, when started running for such
+    interactive use in the most ordinary way, to print or display an
+    announcement including an appropriate copyright notice and a
+    notice that there is no warranty (or else, saying that you provide
+    a warranty) and that users may redistribute the program under
+    these conditions, and telling the user how to view a copy of this
+    License.  (Exception: if the Program itself is interactive but
+    does not normally print such an announcement, your work based on
+    the Program is not required to print an announcement.)
+
+These requirements apply to the modified work as a whole.  If
+identifiable sections of that work are not derived from the Program,
+and can be reasonably considered independent and separate works in
+themselves, then this License, and its terms, do not apply to those
+sections when you distribute them as separate works.  But when you
+distribute the same sections as part of a whole which is a work based
+on the Program, the distribution of the whole must be on the terms of
+this License, whose permissions for other licensees extend to the
+entire whole, and thus to each and every part regardless of who wrote it.
+
+Thus, it is not the intent of this section to claim rights or contest
+your rights to work written entirely by you; rather, the intent is to
+exercise the right to control the distribution of derivative or
+collective works based on the Program.
+
+In addition, mere aggregation of another work not based on the Program
+with the Program (or with a work based on the Program) on a volume of
+a storage or distribution medium does not bring the other work under
+the scope of this License.
+
+  3. You may copy and distribute the Program (or a work based on it,
+under Section 2) in object code or executable form under the terms of
+Sections 1 and 2 above provided that you also do one of the following:
+
+    a) Accompany it with the complete corresponding machine-readable
+    source code, which must be distributed under the terms of Sections
+    1 and 2 above on a medium customarily used for software interchange; or,
+
+    b) Accompany it with a written offer, valid for at least three
+    years, to give any third party, for a charge no more than your
+    cost of physically performing source distribution, a complete
+    machine-readable copy of the corresponding source code, to be
+    distributed under the terms of Sections 1 and 2 above on a medium
+    customarily used for software interchange; or,
+
+    c) Accompany it with the information you received as to the offer
+    to distribute corresponding source code.  (This alternative is
+    allowed only for noncommercial distribution and only if you
+    received the program in object code or executable form with such
+    an offer, in accord with Subsection b above.)
+
+The source code for a work means the preferred form of the work for
+making modifications to it.  For an executable work, complete source
+code means all the source code for all modules it contains, plus any
+associated interface definition files, plus the scripts used to
+control compilation and installation of the executable.  However, as a
+special exception, the source code distributed need not include
+anything that is normally distributed (in either source or binary
+form) with the major components (compiler, kernel, and so on) of the
+operating system on which the executable runs, unless that component
+itself accompanies the executable.
+
+If distribution of executable or object code is made by offering
+access to copy from a designated place, then offering equivalent
+access to copy the source code from the same place counts as
+distribution of the source code, even though third parties are not
+compelled to copy the source along with the object code.
+
+  4. You may not copy, modify, sublicense, or distribute the Program
+except as expressly provided under this License.  Any attempt
+otherwise to copy, modify, sublicense or distribute the Program is
+void, and will automatically terminate your rights under this License.
+However, parties who have received copies, or rights, from you under
+this License will not have their licenses terminated so long as such
+parties remain in full compliance.
+
+  5. You are not required to accept this License, since you have not
+signed it.  However, nothing else grants you permission to modify or
+distribute the Program or its derivative works.  These actions are
+prohibited by law if you do not accept this License.  Therefore, by
+modifying or distributing the Program (or any work based on the
+Program), you indicate your acceptance of this License to do so, and
+all its terms and conditions for copying, distributing or modifying
+the Program or works based on it.
+
+  6. Each time you redistribute the Program (or any work based on the
+Program), the recipient automatically receives a license from the
+original licensor to copy, distribute or modify the Program subject to
+these terms and conditions.  You may not impose any further
+restrictions on the recipients' exercise of the rights granted herein.
+You are not responsible for enforcing compliance by third parties to
+this License.
+
+  7. If, as a consequence of a court judgment or allegation of patent
+infringement or for any other reason (not limited to patent issues),
+conditions are imposed on you (whether by court order, agreement or
+otherwise) that contradict the conditions of this License, they do not
+excuse you from the conditions of this License.  If you cannot
+distribute so as to satisfy simultaneously your obligations under this
+License and any other pertinent obligations, then as a consequence you
+may not distribute the Program at all.  For example, if a patent
+license would not permit royalty-free redistribution of the Program by
+all those who receive copies directly or indirectly through you, then
+the only way you could satisfy both it and this License would be to
+refrain entirely from distribution of the Program.
+
+If any portion of this section is held invalid or unenforceable under
+any particular circumstance, the balance of the section is intended to
+apply and the section as a whole is intended to apply in other
+circumstances.
+
+It is not the purpose of this section to induce you to infringe any
+patents or other property right claims or to contest validity of any
+such claims; this section has the sole purpose of protecting the
+integrity of the free software distribution system, which is
+implemented by public license practices.  Many people have made
+generous contributions to the wide range of software distributed
+through that system in reliance on consistent application of that
+system; it is up to the author/donor to decide if he or she is willing
+to distribute software through any other system and a licensee cannot
+impose that choice.
+
+This section is intended to make thoroughly clear what is believed to
+be a consequence of the rest of this License.
+
+  8. If the distribution and/or use of the Program is restricted in
+certain countries either by patents or by copyrighted interfaces, the
+original copyright holder who places the Program under this License
+may add an explicit geographical distribution limitation excluding
+those countries, so that distribution is permitted only in or among
+countries not thus excluded.  In such case, this License incorporates
+the limitation as if written in the body of this License.
+
+  9. The Free Software Foundation may publish revised and/or new versions
+of the General Public License from time to time.  Such new versions will
+be similar in spirit to the present version, but may differ in detail to
+address new problems or concerns.
+
+Each version is given a distinguishing version number.  If the Program
+specifies a version number of this License which applies to it and "any
+later version", you have the option of following the terms and conditions
+either of that version or of any later version published by the Free
+Software Foundation.  If the Program does not specify a version number of
+this License, you may choose any version ever published by the Free Software
+Foundation.
+
+  10. If you wish to incorporate parts of the Program into other free
+programs whose distribution conditions are different, write to the author
+to ask for permission.  For software which is copyrighted by the Free
+Software Foundation, write to the Free Software Foundation; we sometimes
+make exceptions for this.  Our decision will be guided by the two goals
+of preserving the free status of all derivatives of our free software and
+of promoting the sharing and reuse of software generally.
+
+                            NO WARRANTY
+
+  11. BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO WARRANTY
+FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW.  EXCEPT WHEN
+OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES
+PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED
+OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  THE ENTIRE RISK AS
+TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU.  SHOULD THE
+PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING,
+REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
+
+  12. IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING
+WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MAY MODIFY AND/OR
+REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES,
+INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING
+OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED
+TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY
+YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER
+PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE
+POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
+
+                     END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS
+
+            How to Apply These Terms to Your New Programs
+
+  If you develop a new program, and you want it to be of the greatest
+possible use to the public, the best way to achieve this is to make it
+free software which everyone can redistribute and change under these terms.
+
+  To do so, attach the following notices to the program.  It is safest
+to attach them to the start of each source file to most effectively
+convey the exclusion of warranty; and each file should have at least
+the "copyright" line and a pointer to where the full notice is found.
+
+    <one line to give the program's name and a brief idea of what it does.>
+    Copyright (C) <year>  <name of author>
+
+    This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+    it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+    the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+    (at your option) any later version.
+
+    This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+    but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+    MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+    GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+    You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
+    with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
+    51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+
+Also add information on how to contact you by electronic and paper mail.
+
+If the program is interactive, make it output a short notice like this
+when it starts in an interactive mode:
+
+    Gnomovision version 69, Copyright (C) year name of author
+    Gnomovision comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY; for details type `show w'.
+    This is free software, and you are welcome to redistribute it
+    under certain conditions; type `show c' for details.
+
+The hypothetical commands `show w' and `show c' should show the appropriate
+parts of the General Public License.  Of course, the commands you use may
+be called something other than `show w' and `show c'; they could even be
+mouse-clicks or menu items--whatever suits your program.
+
+You should also get your employer (if you work as a programmer) or your
+school, if any, to sign a "copyright disclaimer" for the program, if
+necessary.  Here is a sample; alter the names:
+
+  Yoyodyne, Inc., hereby disclaims all copyright interest in the program
+  `Gnomovision' (which makes passes at compilers) written by James Hacker.
+
+  <signature of Ty Coon>, 1 April 1989
+  Ty Coon, President of Vice
+
+This General Public License does not permit incorporating your program into
+proprietary programs.  If your program is a subroutine library, you may
+consider it more useful to permit linking proprietary applications with the
+library.  If this is what you want to do, use the GNU Lesser General
+Public License instead of this License.
+
+-----
+In addition, as a special exception, the copyright holders give
+permission to link the code of portions of this program with the
+OpenSSL library under certain conditions as described in each
+individual source file, and distribute linked combinations
+including the two.
+
+You must obey the GNU General Public License in all respects
+for all of the code used other than OpenSSL.  If you modify
+file(s) with this exception, you may extend this exception to your
+version of the file(s), but you are not obligated to do so.  If you
+do not wish to do so, delete this exception statement from your
+version.  If you delete this exception statement from all source
+files in the program, then also delete it here.
diff --git a/COPYING.LGPL b/COPYING.LGPL
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7e354d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/COPYING.LGPL
@@ -0,0 +1,517 @@
+                  GNU LESSER GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
+                       Version 2.1, February 1999
+
+ Copyright (C) 1991, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA  02110-1301  USA
+ Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies
+ of this license document, but changing it is not allowed.
+
+[This is the first released version of the Lesser GPL.  It also counts
+ as the successor of the GNU Library Public License, version 2, hence
+ the version number 2.1.]
+
+                            Preamble
+
+  The licenses for most software are designed to take away your
+freedom to share and change it.  By contrast, the GNU General Public
+Licenses are intended to guarantee your freedom to share and change
+free software--to make sure the software is free for all its users.
+
+  This license, the Lesser General Public License, applies to some
+specially designated software packages--typically libraries--of the
+Free Software Foundation and other authors who decide to use it.  You
+can use it too, but we suggest you first think carefully about whether
+this license or the ordinary General Public License is the better
+strategy to use in any particular case, based on the explanations below.
+
+  When we speak of free software, we are referring to freedom of use,
+not price.  Our General Public Licenses are designed to make sure that
+you have the freedom to distribute copies of free software (and charge
+for this service if you wish); that you receive source code or can get
+it if you want it; that you can change the software and use pieces of
+it in new free programs; and that you are informed that you can do
+these things.
+
+  To protect your rights, we need to make restrictions that forbid
+distributors to deny you these rights or to ask you to surrender these
+rights.  These restrictions translate to certain responsibilities for
+you if you distribute copies of the library or if you modify it.
+
+  For example, if you distribute copies of the library, whether gratis
+or for a fee, you must give the recipients all the rights that we gave
+you.  You must make sure that they, too, receive or can get the source
+code.  If you link other code with the library, you must provide
+complete object files to the recipients, so that they can relink them
+with the library after making changes to the library and recompiling
+it.  And you must show them these terms so they know their rights.
+
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diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b6c11ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+Since version 1.6 this file is no longer maintained.
+
+See docs/*ReleaseNotes for release changes documentation.
+
+See version control history for full commit messages.
+  https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/commits/master
diff --git a/FAQ b/FAQ
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0d5cfa8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/FAQ
@@ -0,0 +1,2807 @@
+Frequently Asked Questions.
+
+Sections
+1. General Questions
+2. Setup
+3. Common Problems
+4. Troubleshooting
+5. Security Aspects
+6. Backup and Data Recovery
+7. Interoperability with other Disk Encryption Tools
+8. Issues with Specific Versions of cryptsetup
+9. The Initrd question
+10. References and Further Reading
+A. Contributors
+
+1. General Questions
+
+
+  * 1.1 What is this?
+
+  This is the FAQ (Frequently Asked Questions) for cryptsetup.  It
+  covers Linux disk encryption with plain dm-crypt (one passphrase, no
+  management, no metadata on disk) and LUKS (multiple user keys with
+  one master key, anti-forensic features, metadata block at start of
+  device, ...).  The latest version of this FAQ should usually be
+  available at
+  https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/FrequentlyAskedQuestions
+
+
+  * 1.2 WARNINGS
+
+  ATTENTION: If you are going to read just one thing, make it the
+  section on Backup and Data Recovery.  By far the most questions on
+  the cryptsetup mailing list are from people that managed to damage
+  the start of their LUKS partitions, i.e.  the LUKS header.  In most
+  cases, there is nothing that can be done to help these poor souls
+  recover their data.  Make sure you understand the problem and
+  limitations imposed by the LUKS security model BEFORE you face such a
+  disaster!  In particular, make sure you have a current header backup
+  before doing any potentially dangerous operations.
+
+  DEBUG COMMANDS: While the --debug option does not leak data, "strace"
+  and the like can leak your full passphrase.  Do not post an strace
+  output with the correct passphrase to a mailing-list or online!  See
+  Item 4.5 for more explanation.
+
+  SSDs/FLASH DRIVES: SSDs and Flash are different. Currently it is
+  unclear how to get LUKS or plain dm-crypt to run on them with the
+  full set of security features intact.  This may or may not be a
+  problem, depending on the attacker model.  See Section 5.19.
+
+  BACKUP: Yes, encrypted disks die, just as normal ones do.  A full
+  backup is mandatory, see Section "6.  Backup and Data Recovery" on
+  options for doing encrypted backup.
+
+  CLONING/IMAGING: If you clone or image a LUKS container, you make a
+  copy of the LUKS header and the master key will stay the same!  That
+  means that if you distribute an image to several machines, the same
+  master key will be used on all of them, regardless of whether you
+  change the passphrases.  Do NOT do this!  If you do, a root-user on
+  any of the machines with a mapped (decrypted) container or a
+  passphrase on that machine can decrypt all other copies, breaking
+  security.  See also Item 6.15.
+
+  DISTRIBUTION INSTALLERS: Some distribution installers offer to create
+  LUKS containers in a way that can be mistaken as activation of an
+  existing container. Creating a new LUKS container on top of an
+  existing one leads to permanent, complete and irreversible data loss. 
+  It is strongly recommended to only use distribution installers after
+  a complete backup of all LUKS containers has been made.
+
+  UBUNTU INSTALLER: In particular the Ubuntu installer seems to be
+  quite willing to kill LUKS containers in several different ways. 
+  Those responsible at Ubuntu seem not to care very much (it is very
+  easy to recognize a LUKS container), so treat the process of
+  installing Ubuntu as a severe hazard to any LUKS container you may
+  have.
+
+  NO WARNING ON NON-INTERACTIVE FORMAT: If you feed cryptsetup from
+  STDIN (e.g.  via GnuPG) on LUKS format, it does not give you the
+  warning that you are about to format (and e.g.  will lose any
+  pre-existing LUKS container on the target), as it assumes it is used
+  from a script.  In this scenario, the responsibility for warning the
+  user and possibly checking for an existing LUKS header is shifted to
+  the script.  This is a more general form of the previous item.
+
+  LUKS PASSPHRASE IS NOT THE MASTER KEY: The LUKS passphrase is not
+  used in deriving the master key.  It is used in decrypting a master
+  key that is randomly selected on header creation.  This means that if
+  you create a new LUKS header on top of an old one with exactly the
+  same parameters and exactly the same passphrase as the old one, it
+  will still have a different master key and your data will be
+  permanently lost.
+
+  PASSPHRASE CHARACTER SET: Some people have had difficulties with this
+  when upgrading distributions.  It is highly advisable to only use the
+  95 printable characters from the first 128 characters of the ASCII
+  table, as they will always have the same binary representation. 
+  Other characters may have different encoding depending on system
+  configuration and your passphrase will not work with a different
+  encoding.  A table of the standardized first 128 ASCII characters
+  can, e.g.  be found on http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ASCII
+
+  KEYBOARD NUM-PAD: Apparently some pre-boot authentication
+  environments (these are done by the distro, not by cryptsetup, so
+  complain there) treat digits entered on the num-pad and ones entered
+  regularly different.  This may be because the BIOS USB keyboard
+  driver is used and that one may have bugs on some computers.  If you
+  cannot open your device in pre-boot, try entering the digits over the
+  regular digit keys.
+
+
+  * 1.3 System specific warnings
+
+  - Ubuntu as of 4/2011: It seems the installer offers to create LUKS
+  partitions in a way that several people mistook for an offer to
+  activate their existing LUKS partition.  The installer gives no or an
+  inadequate warning and will destroy your old LUKS header, causing
+  permanent data loss.  See also the section on Backup and Data
+  Recovery.
+
+  This issue has been acknowledged by the Ubuntu dev team, see
+  here: http://launchpad.net/bugs/420080
+
+  Update 4/2013: I am still unsure whether this has been fixed by now,
+  best be careful.  They also seem to have added even more LUKS killer
+  functionality to the Ubuntu installer.  I can only strongly
+  recommended to not install Ubuntu on a system with existing LUKS
+  containers without complete backups.
+
+  Update 11/2014: There seem to be other problems with existing LUKS
+  containers and Ubuntu as well, be extra careful when using LUKS
+  on Ubuntu in any way, but exactly as the Ubuntu installer does.
+
+
+  * 1.4 My LUKS-device is broken! Help!
+
+  First: Do not panic! In many cases the data is still recoverable.
+  Do not do anything hasty! Steps:
+
+  - Take some deep breaths. Maybe add some relaxing music.  This may
+  sound funny, but I am completely serious.  Often, critical damage is
+  done only after the initial problem.
+
+  - Do not reboot. The keys may still be in the kernel if the device is
+  mapped.
+
+  - Make sure others do not reboot the system.
+
+  - Do not write to your disk without a clear understanding why this
+  will not make matters worse.  Do a sector-level backup before any
+  writes.  Often you do not need to write at all to get enough access
+  to make a backup of the data.
+
+  - Relax some more.
+
+  - Read section 6 of this FAQ.
+
+  - Ask on the mailing-list if you need more help.
+
+
+  * 1.5 Who wrote this?
+
+  Current FAQ maintainer is Arno Wagner <arno@wagner.name>. If you want
+  to send me encrypted email, my current PGP key is DSA key CB5D9718,
+  fingerprint 12D6 C03B 1B30 33BB 13CF B774 E35C 5FA1 CB5D 9718.
+
+  Other contributors are listed at the end. If you want to contribute,
+  send your article, including a descriptive headline, to the
+  maintainer, or the dm-crypt mailing list with something like "FAQ
+  ..." in the subject.  You can also send more raw information and have
+  me write the section.  Please note that by contributing to this FAQ,
+  you accept the license described below.
+
+  This work is under the "Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported"
+  license, which means distribution is unlimited, you may create
+  derived works, but attributions to original authors and this license
+  statement must be retained and the derived work must be under the
+  same license.  See http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/ for
+  more details of the license.
+
+  Side note: I did text license research some time ago and I think this
+  license is best suited for the purpose at hand and creates the least
+  problems.
+
+
+  * 1.6 Where is the project website?
+
+  There is the project website at
+  https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/ Please do not post
+  questions there, nobody will read them.  Use the mailing-list
+  instead.
+
+
+  * 1.7 Is there a mailing-list?
+
+  Instructions on how to subscribe to the mailing-list are at on the
+  project website.  People are generally helpful and friendly on the
+  list.
+
+  The question of how to unsubscribe from the list does crop up
+  sometimes.  For this you need your list management URL, which is sent
+  to you initially and once at the start of each month.  Go to the URL
+  mentioned in the email and select "unsubscribe".  This page also
+  allows you to request a password reminder.
+
+  Alternatively, you can send an Email to dm-crypt-request@saout.de
+  with just the word "help" in the subject or message body.  Make sure
+  to send it from your list address.
+
+  The mailing list archive is here:
+  https://marc.info/?l=dm-crypt
+
+
+  * 1.8 Unsubscribe from the mailing-list
+
+  Send mail to dm-crypt-unsubscribe@saout.de from the subscribed
+  account. You will get an email with instructions.
+
+  Basically, you just have to respond to it unmodified to get
+  unsubscribed.  The listserver admin functions are not very fast.  It
+  can take 15 minutes or longer for a reply to arrive (I suspect
+  greylisting is in use), so be patient.
+
+  Also note that nobody on the list can unsubscribe you, sending
+  demands to be unsubscribed to the list just annoys people that are
+  entirely blameless for you being subscribed.
+
+  If you are subscribed, a subscription confirmation email was sent to
+  your email account and it had to be answered before the subscription
+  went active.  The confirmation emails from the listserver have
+  subjects like these (with other numbers):
+
+    Subject: confirm 9964cf10.....
+
+  and are sent from dm-crypt-request@saout.de. You should check whether
+  you have anything like it in your sent email folder.  If you find
+  nothing and are sure you did not confirm, then you should look into a
+  possible compromise of your email account.
+
+
+2. Setup
+
+  * 2.1 LUKS Container Setup mini-HOWTO
+
+  This item tries to give you a very brief list of all the steps you
+  should go though when creating a new LUKS encrypted container, i.e. 
+  encrypted disk, partition or loop-file.
+
+  01) All data will be lost, if there is data on the target, make a
+  backup.
+
+  02) Make very sure you have the right target disk, partition or
+  loop-file.
+
+  03) If the target was in use previously, it is a good idea to wipe it
+  before creating the LUKS container in order to remove any trace of
+  old file systems and data.  For example, some users have managed to
+  run e2fsck on a partition containing a LUKS container, possibly
+  because of residual ext2 superblocks from an earlier use.  This can
+  do arbitrary damage up to complete and permanent loss of all data in
+  the LUKS container.
+
+  To just quickly wipe file systems (old data may remain), use
+
+    wipefs -a <target device>
+
+
+  To wipe file system and data, use something like
+
+    cat /dev/zero > <target device>
+
+
+  This can take a while. To get a progress indicator, you can use the
+  tool dd_rescue (->google) instead or use my stream meter "wcs"
+  (source here: http://www.tansi.org/tools/index.html) in the following
+  fashion:
+
+    cat /dev/zero | wcs > <target device>
+
+
+  Be very sure you have the right target, all data will be lost!
+
+  Note that automatic wiping is on the TODO list for cryptsetup, so at
+  some time in the future this will become unnecessary.
+
+  Alternatively, plain dm-crypt can be used for a very fast wipe with
+  crypto-grade randomness, see Item 2.19
+
+  04) Create the LUKS container:
+
+    cryptsetup luksFormat <target device>
+
+
+  Just follow the on-screen instructions.
+
+  Note: Passphrase iteration is determined by cryptsetup depending on
+  CPU power.  On a slow device, this may be lower than you want.  I
+  recently benchmarked this on a Raspberry Pi and it came out at about
+  1/15 of the iteration count for a typical PC.  If security is
+  paramount, you may want to increase the time spent in iteration, at
+  the cost of a slower unlock later.  For the Raspberry Pi, using
+
+    cryptsetup luksFormat -i 15000 <target device>
+
+  gives you an iteration count and security level equal to an average
+  PC for passphrase iteration and master-key iteration.  If in doubt,
+  check the iteration counts with
+
+    cryptsetup luksDump <target device>
+
+  and adjust the iteration count accordingly by creating the container
+  again with a different iteration time (the number after '-i' is the
+  iteration time in milliseconds) until your requirements are met.
+
+  05) Map the container. Here it will be mapped to /dev/mapper/c1:
+
+    cryptsetup luksOpen <target device> c1
+
+
+  06) (Optionally) wipe the container (make sure you have the right
+      target!): 
+
+    cat /dev/zero > /dev/mapper/c1
+
+
+  Note that this creates a small information leak, as an attacker can
+  determine whether a 512 byte block is zero if the attacker has access
+  to the encrypted container multiple times.  Typically a competent
+  attacker that has access multiple times can install a passphrase
+  sniffer anyways, so this leakage is not very significant.  For
+  getting a progress indicator, see step 03.
+
+  Note that at some time in the future, cryptsetup will do this for
+  you, but currently it is a TODO list item.
+
+  07) Create a file system in the mapped container, for example an
+  ext3 file system (any other file system is possible):
+
+    mke2fs -j /dev/mapper/c1
+
+
+  08) Mount your encrypted file system, here on /mnt:
+
+    mount /dev/mapper/c1 /mnt
+
+
+  Done. You can now use the encrypted file system to store data.  Be
+  sure to read though the rest of the FAQ, these are just the very
+  basics.  In particular, there are a number of mistakes that are easy
+  to make, but will compromise your security.
+
+
+  * 2.2 LUKS on partitions or raw disks?
+
+  This is a complicated question, and made more so by the availability
+  of RAID and LVM.  I will try to give some scenarios and discuss
+  advantages and disadvantages.  Note that I say LUKS for simplicity,
+  but you can do all the things described with plain dm-crypt as well. 
+  Also note that your specific scenario may be so special that most or
+  even all things I say below do not apply.
+
+  Be aware that if you add LVM into the mix, things can get very
+  complicated.  Same with RAID but less so.  In particular, data
+  recovery can get exceedingly difficult.  Only do so if you have a
+  really good reason and always remember KISS is what separates an
+  engineer from an amateur.  Of course, if you really need the added
+  complexity, KISS is satisfied.  But be very sure as there is a price
+  to pay for it.  In engineering, complexity is always the enemy and
+  needs to be fought without mercy when encountered.
+
+  Also consider using RAID instead of LVM, as at least with the old
+  superblock format 0.90, the RAID superblock is in the place (end of
+  disk) where the risk of it permanently damaging the LUKS header is
+  smallest and you can have your array assembled by the RAID controller
+  (i.e.  the kernel), as it should be.  Use partition type 0xfd for
+  that.  I recommend staying away from superblock formats 1.0, 1.1 and
+  1.2 unless you really need them.  Be aware that you lose
+  autodetection with them and have to fall back to some user-space
+  script to do it.
+
+  Scenarios:
+
+  (1) Encrypted partition: Just make a partition to your liking, and
+  put LUKS on top of it and a filesystem into the LUKS container.  This
+  gives you isolation of differently-tasked data areas, just as
+  ordinary partitioning does.  You can have confidential data,
+  non-confidential data, data for some specific applications,
+  user-homes, root, etc.  Advantages are simplicity as there is a 1:1
+  mapping between partitions and filesystems, clear security
+  functionality and the ability to separate data into different,
+  independent (!) containers.
+
+  Note that you cannot do this for encrypted root, that requires an
+  initrd.  On the other hand, an initrd is about as vulnerable to a
+  competent attacker as a non-encrypted root, so there really is no
+  security advantage to doing it that way.  An attacker that wants to
+  compromise your system will just compromise the initrd or the kernel
+  itself.  The better way to deal with this is to make sure the root
+  partition does not store any critical data and move that to
+  additional encrypted partitions.  If you really are concerned your
+  root partition may be sabotaged by somebody with physical access
+  (that would however strangely not, say, sabotage your BIOS, keyboard,
+  etc.), protect it in some other way.  The PC is just not set-up for a
+  really secure boot-chain (whatever some people may claim).
+
+  (2) Fully encrypted raw block device: For this, put LUKS on the raw
+  device (e.g.  /dev/sdb) and put a filesystem into the LUKS container,
+  no partitioning whatsoever involved.  This is very suitable for
+  things like external USB disks used for backups or offline
+  data-storage.
+
+  (3) Encrypted RAID: Create your RAID from partitions and/or full
+  devices.  Put LUKS on top of the RAID device, just if it were an
+  ordinary block device.  Applications are just the same as above, but
+  you get redundancy.  (Side note as many people seem to be unaware of
+  it: You can do RAID1 with an arbitrary number of components in
+  Linux.) See also Item 2.8.
+
+  (4) Now, some people advocate doing the encryption below the RAID
+  layer.  That has several serious problems.  One is that suddenly
+  debugging RAID issues becomes much harder.  You cannot do automatic
+  RAID assembly anymore.  You need to keep the encryption keys for the
+  components in sync or manage them somehow.  The only possible
+  advantage is that things may run a little faster as more CPUs do the
+  encryption, but if speed is a priority over security and simplicity,
+  you are doing this wrong anyways.  A good way to mitigate a speed
+  issue is to get a CPU that does hardware AES.
+
+
+  * 2.3 How do I set up encrypted swap?
+
+  As things that are confidential can end up in swap (keys,
+  passphrases, etc.  are usually protected against being swapped to
+  disk, but other things may not be), it may be advisable to do
+  something about the issue.  One option is to run without swap, which
+  generally works well in a desktop-context.  It may cause problems in
+  a server-setting or under special circumstances.  The solution to
+  that is to encrypt swap with a random key at boot-time.
+
+  NOTE: This is for Debian, and should work for Debian-derived
+  distributions.  For others you may have to write your own startup
+  script or use other mechanisms.
+
+  01) Add the swap partition to /etc/crypttab. A line like the
+  following should do it:
+
+    swap  /dev/<partition>  /dev/urandom   swap,noearly
+
+
+  Warning: While Debian refuses to overwrite partitions with a
+  filesystem or RAID signature on it, if your disk IDs may change
+  (adding or removing disks, failure of disk during boot, etc.), you
+  may want to take additional precautions.  Yes, this means that your
+  kernel device names like sda, sdb, ...  can change between reboots! 
+  This is not a concern if you have only one disk.  One possibility is
+  to make sure the partition number is not present on additional disks
+  or also swap there.  Another is to encapsulate the swap partition (by
+  making it a 1-disk RAID1 or by using LVM), so that it gets a
+  persistent identifier.  Specifying it directly by UUID does not work,
+  unfortunately, as the UUID is part of the swap signature and that is
+  not visible from the outside due to the encryption and in addition
+  changes on each reboot with this setup.
+
+  Note: Use /dev/random if you are paranoid or in a potential
+  low-entropy situation (embedded system, etc.).  This may cause the
+  operation to take a long time during boot.  If you are in a "no
+  entropy" situation, you cannot encrypt swap securely.  In this
+  situation you should find some entropy, also because nothing else
+  using crypto will be secure, like ssh, ssl or GnuPG.
+
+  Note: The "noearly" option makes sure things like LVM, RAID, etc. 
+  are running.  As swap is non-critical for boot, it is fine to start
+  it late.
+
+  02) Add the swap partition to /etc/fstab. A line like the following
+  should do it:
+
+    /dev/mapper/swap none swap sw 0 0
+
+
+  That is it. Reboot or start it manually to activate encrypted swap. 
+  Manual start would look like this:
+
+    /etc/init.d/crypdisks start
+    swapon /dev/mapper/swap
+
+
+
+  * 2.4 What is the difference between "plain" and LUKS format?
+
+  First, unless you happen to understand the cryptographic background
+  well, you should use LUKS.  It does protect the user from a lot of
+  common mistakes.  Plain dm-crypt is for experts.
+
+  Plain format is just that: It has no metadata on disk, reads all
+  parameters from the commandline (or the defaults), derives a
+  master-key from the passphrase and then uses that to de-/encrypt the
+  sectors of the device, with a direct 1:1 mapping between encrypted
+  and decrypted sectors.
+
+  Primary advantage is high resilience to damage, as one damaged
+  encrypted sector results in exactly one damaged decrypted sector. 
+  Also, it is not readily apparent that there even is encrypted data on
+  the device, as an overwrite with crypto-grade randomness (e.g.  from
+  /dev/urandom) looks exactly the same on disk.
+
+  Side-note: That has limited value against the authorities.  In
+  civilized countries, they cannot force you to give up a crypto-key
+  anyways.  In quite a few countries around the world, they can force
+  you to give up the keys (using imprisonment or worse to pressure you,
+  sometimes without due process), and in the worst case, they only need
+  a nebulous "suspicion" about the presence of encrypted data. 
+  Sometimes this applies to everybody, sometimes only when you are
+  suspected of having "illicit data" (definition subject to change) and
+  sometimes specifically when crossing a border.  Note that this is
+  going on in countries like the US and the UK, to different degrees
+  and sometimes with courts restricting what the authorities can
+  actually demand.
+
+  My advice is to either be ready to give up the keys or to not have
+  encrypted data when traveling to those countries, especially when
+  crossing the borders.  The latter also means not having any
+  high-entropy (random) data areas on your disk, unless you can explain
+  them and demonstrate that explanation.  Hence doing a zero-wipe of
+  all free space, including unused space, may be a good idea.
+
+  Disadvantages are that you do not have all the nice features that the
+  LUKS metadata offers, like multiple passphrases that can be changed,
+  the cipher being stored in the metadata, anti-forensic properties
+  like key-slot diffusion and salts, etc..
+
+  LUKS format uses a metadata header and 8 key-slot areas that are
+  being placed at the beginning of the disk, see below under "What does
+  the LUKS on-disk format looks like?".  The passphrases are used to
+  decrypt a single master key that is stored in the anti-forensic
+  stripes.
+
+  Advantages are a higher usability, automatic configuration of
+  non-default crypto parameters, defenses against low-entropy
+  passphrases like salting and iterated PBKDF2 passphrase hashing, the
+  ability to change passphrases, and others.
+
+  Disadvantages are that it is readily obvious there is encrypted data
+  on disk (but see side note above) and that damage to the header or
+  key-slots usually results in permanent data-loss.  See below under
+  "6.  Backup and Data Recovery" on how to reduce that risk.  Also the
+  sector numbers get shifted by the length of the header and key-slots
+  and there is a loss of that size in capacity (1MB+4096B for defaults
+  and 2MB for the most commonly used non-default XTS mode).
+
+
+  * 2.5 Can I encrypt an already existing, non-empty partition to use LUKS?
+
+  There is no converter, and it is not really needed. The way to do
+  this is to make a backup of the device in question, securely wipe the
+  device (as LUKS device initialization does not clear away old data),
+  do a luksFormat, optionally overwrite the encrypted device, create a
+  new filesystem and restore your backup on the now encrypted device. 
+  Also refer to sections "Security Aspects" and "Backup and Data
+  Recovery".
+
+  For backup, plain GNU tar works well and backs up anything likely
+  to be in a filesystem.
+
+
+  * 2.6 How do I use LUKS with a loop-device?
+
+  This can be very handy for experiments. Setup is just the same as
+  with any block device.  If you want, for example, to use a 100MiB
+  file as LUKS container, do something like this:
+
+    head -c 100M /dev/zero > luksfile  # create empty file
+    losetup /dev/loop0 luksfile        # map luksfile to /dev/loop0
+    cryptsetup luksFormat /dev/loop0   # create LUKS on loop device
+
+  Afterwards just use /dev/loop0 as a you would use a LUKS partition.
+  To unmap the file when done, use "losetup -d /dev/loop0".
+
+
+  * 2.7 When I add a new key-slot to LUKS, it asks for a passphrase
+    but then complains about there not being a key-slot with that
+    passphrase?
+
+  That is as intended. You are asked a passphrase of an existing
+  key-slot first, before you can enter the passphrase for the new
+  key-slot.  Otherwise you could break the encryption by just adding a
+  new key-slot.  This way, you have to know the passphrase of one of
+  the already configured key-slots in order to be able to configure a
+  new key-slot.
+
+
+  * 2.8 Encryption on top of RAID or the other way round?
+
+  Unless you have special needs, place encryption between RAID and
+  filesystem, i.e.  encryption on top of RAID.  You can do it the other
+  way round, but you have to be aware that you then need to give the
+  passphrase for each individual disk and RAID autodetection will not
+  work anymore.  Therefore it is better to encrypt the RAID device,
+  e.g.  /dev/dm0 .
+
+  This means that the typical layering looks like this:
+
+  Filesystem     <- top
+  |
+  Encryption
+  |
+  RAID
+  |
+  Raw partitions
+  |
+  Raw disks      <- bottom
+
+  The big advantage is that you can manage the RAID container just like
+  any RAID container, it does not care that what is in it is encrypted.
+
+
+  * 2.9 How do I read a dm-crypt key from file?
+
+  Use the --key-file option, like this:
+
+    cryptsetup create --key-file keyfile e1 /dev/loop0
+
+  This will read the binary key from file, i.e. no hashing or
+  transformation will be applied to the keyfile before its bits are
+  used as key.  Extra bits (beyond the length of the key) at the end
+  are ignored.  Note that if you read from STDIN, the data will still
+  be hashed, just as a key read interactively from the terminal.  See
+  the man-page sections "NOTES ON PASSPHRASE PROCESSING..." for more
+  detail.
+
+  * 2.10 How do I read a LUKS slot key from file?
+
+  What you really do here is to read a passphrase from file, just as
+  you would with manual entry of a passphrase for a key-slot.  You can
+  add a new passphrase to a free key-slot, set the passphrase of an
+  specific key-slot or put an already configured passphrase into a
+  file.  In the last case make sure no trailing newline (0x0a) is
+  contained in the key file, or the passphrase will not work because
+  the whole file is used as input.
+
+  To add a new passphrase to a free key slot from file, use something
+  like this:
+
+    cryptsetup luksAddKey /dev/loop0 keyfile
+
+
+  To add a new passphrase to a specific key-slot, use something
+  like this:
+
+    cryptsetup luksAddKey --key-slot 7 /dev/loop0 keyfile
+
+
+  To supply a key from file to any LUKS command, use the --key-file
+  option, e.g. like this:
+
+    cryptsetup luksOpen --key-file keyfile /dev/loop0 e1
+
+
+
+  * 2.11 How do I read the LUKS master key from file?
+
+  The question you should ask yourself first is why you would want to
+  do this.  The only legitimate reason I can think of is if you want to
+  have two LUKS devices with the same master key.  Even then, I think
+  it would be preferable to just use key-slots with the same
+  passphrase, or to use plain dm-crypt instead.  If you really have a
+  good reason, please tell me.  If I am convinced, I will add how to do
+  this here.
+
+
+  * 2.12 What are the security requirements for a key read from file?
+
+  A file-stored key or passphrase has the same security requirements as
+  one entered interactively, however you can use random bytes and
+  thereby use bytes you cannot type on the keyboard.  You can use any
+  file you like as key file, for example a plain text file with a human
+  readable passphrase.  To generate a file with random bytes, use
+  something like this:
+
+    head -c 256 /dev/random > keyfile
+
+
+
+  * 2.13 If I map a journaled file system using dm-crypt/LUKS, does
+    it still provide its usual transactional guarantees?
+
+  Yes, it does, unless a very old kernel is used. The required flags
+  come from the filesystem layer and are processed and passed onwards
+  by dm-crypt.  A bit more information on the process by which
+  transactional guarantees are implemented can be found here:
+
+  http://lwn.net/Articles/400541/
+
+  Please note that these "guarantees" are weaker than they appear to
+  be.  One problem is that quite a few disks lie to the OS about having
+  flushed their buffers.  Some other things can go wrong as well.  The
+  filesystem developers are aware of these problems and typically can
+  make it work anyways.  That said, dm-crypt/LUKS will not make things
+  worse.
+
+  One specific problem you can run into though is that you can get
+  short freezes and other slowdowns due to the encryption layer. 
+  Encryption takes time and forced flushes will block for that time. 
+  For example, I did run into frequent small freezes (1-2 sec) when
+  putting a vmware image on ext3 over dm-crypt.  When I went back to
+  ext2, the problem went away.  This seems to have gotten better with
+  kernel 2.6.36 and the reworking of filesystem flush locking mechanism
+  (less blocking of CPU activity during flushes).  It should improve
+  further and eventually the problem should go away.
+
+
+  * 2.14 Can I use LUKS or cryptsetup with a more secure (external)
+    medium for key storage, e.g. TPM or a smartcard?
+
+  Yes, see the answers on using a file-supplied key. You do have to
+  write the glue-logic yourself though.  Basically you can have
+  cryptsetup read the key from STDIN and write it there with your own
+  tool that in turn gets the key from the more secure key storage.
+
+  For TPM support, you may want to have a look at tpm-luks at
+  https://github.com/shpedoikal/tpm-luks.  Note that tpm-luks is not
+  related to the cryptsetup project.
+
+
+  * 2.15 Can I resize a dm-crypt or LUKS partition?
+
+  Yes, you can, as neither dm-crypt nor LUKS stores partition size.
+  Whether you should is a different question.  Personally I recommend
+  backup, recreation of the encrypted partition with new size,
+  recreation of the filesystem and restore.  This gets around the
+  tricky business of resizing the filesystem.  Resizing a dm-crypt or
+  LUKS container does not resize the filesystem in it.  The backup is
+  really non-optional here, as a lot can go wrong, resulting in partial
+  or complete data loss.  Using something like gparted to resize an
+  encrypted partition is slow, but typically works.  This will not
+  change the size of the filesystem hidden under the encryption though.
+
+  You also need to be aware of size-based limitations. The one
+  currently relevant is that aes-xts-plain should not be used for
+  encrypted container sizes larger than 2TiB.  Use aes-xts-plain64 for
+  that.
+
+
+  * 2.16 How do I Benchmark the Ciphers, Hashes and Modes?
+
+  Since version 1.60 cryptsetup supports the "benchmark" command. 
+  Simply run as root:
+
+    cryptsetup benchmark
+
+  It will output first iterations/second for the key-derivation
+  function PBKDF2 parameterized with different hash-functions, and then
+  the raw encryption speed of ciphers with different modes and
+  key-sizes.  You can get more than the default benchmarks, see the
+  man-page for the relevant parameters.  Note that XTS mode takes two
+  keys, hence the listed key sizes are double that for other modes and
+  half of it is the cipher key, the other half is the XTS key.
+
+
+  * 2.17 How do I Verify I have an Authentic cryptsetup Source Package?
+
+  Current maintainer is Milan Broz and he signs the release packages
+  with his PGP key.  The key he currently uses is the "RSA key ID
+  D93E98FC", fingerprint 2A29 1824 3FDE 4664 8D06 86F9 D9B0 577B D93E
+  98FC.  While I have every confidence this really is his key and that
+  he is who he claims to be, don't depend on it if your life is at
+  stake.  For that matter, if your life is at stake, don't depend on me
+  being who I claim to be either.
+
+  That said, as cryptsetup is under good version control, a malicious
+  change should be noticed sooner or later, but it may take a while. 
+  Also, the attacker model makes compromising the sources in a
+  non-obvious way pretty hard.  Sure, you could put the master-key
+  somewhere on disk, but that is rather obvious as soon as somebody
+  looks as there would be data in an empty LUKS container in a place it
+  should not be.  Doing this in a more nefarious way, for example
+  hiding the master-key in the salts, would need a look at the sources
+  to be discovered, but I think that somebody would find that sooner or
+  later as well.
+
+  That said, this discussion is really a lot more complicated and
+  longer as an FAQ can sustain.  If in doubt, ask on the mailing list.
+
+
+  * 2.18 Is there a concern with 4k Sectors?
+
+  Not from dm-crypt itself. Encryption will be done in 512B blocks, but
+  if the partition and filesystem are aligned correctly and the
+  filesystem uses multiples of 4kiB as block size, the dm-crypt layer
+  will just process 8 x 512B = 4096B at a time with negligible
+  overhead.  LUKS does place data at an offset, which is 2MiB per
+  default and will not break alignment.  See also Item 6.12 of this FAQ
+  for more details.  Note that if your partition or filesystem is
+  misaligned, dm-crypt can make the effect worse though.
+
+
+  * 2.19 How can I wipe a device with crypto-grade randomness?
+
+  The conventional recommendation if you want to not just do a
+  zero-wipe is to use something like
+
+    cat /dev/urandom >  <taget-device>
+
+  That is very slow and painful at 10-20MB/s on a fast computer.
+  Using cryptsetup and a plain dm-crypt device with a random key,
+  it is much faster and gives you the same level of security. The
+  defaults are quite enough.
+
+  For device set-up, do the following:
+
+    cryptsetup open --type plain -d /dev/urandom /dev/<block-device> to_be_wiped
+
+  This maps the container as plain under /dev/mapper/to_be_wiped with a
+  random password.  For the actual wipe you have several options. 
+  Simple wipe without progress-indicator:
+
+    cat /dev/zero > /dev/mapper/to_be_wiped
+
+  Progress-indicator by dd_rescue:
+
+    dd_rescue -w /dev/zero /dev/mapper/to_be_wiped
+
+  Progress-indicator by my "wcs" stream meter (available from
+  http://www.tansi.org/tools/index.html ):
+
+    cat /dev/zero | wcs > /dev/mapper/to_be_wiped
+
+
+  Remove the mapping at the end and you are done.
+
+  * 2.20 How to I wipe only the LUKS header?
+
+  This is not the emergency wipe procedure. That is in Item 5.4. This procedure
+  is intended to be used when the data should stay intact, e.g. when you change
+  your LUKS container to use a detached header and want to remove the old one.
+
+  Most safe way is this (backup is still a good idea):
+ 
+  01) Determine header size in 512 Byte sectors with "luksDump":
+
+     cryptsetup luksDump <device with LUKS container>
+
+->   ...
+     Payload offset: <number>
+     ...
+
+  02) Take the result number and write number * 512 zeros to the start of the
+      device, e.g. like this:
+
+     dd bs=512 count=<number> if=/dev/zero of=<device>
+
+  That is it.   
+
+
+3. Common Problems
+
+
+  * 3.1 My dm-crypt/LUKS mapping does not work! What general steps
+    are there to investigate the problem?
+
+  If you get a specific error message, investigate what it claims
+  first.  If not, you may want to check the following things.
+
+  - Check that "/dev", including "/dev/mapper/control" is there. If it
+  is missing, you may have a problem with the "/dev" tree itself or you
+  may have broken udev rules.
+
+  - Check that you have the device mapper and the crypt target in your
+  kernel.  The output of "dmsetup targets" should list a "crypt"
+  target.  If it is not there or the command fails, add device mapper
+  and crypt-target to the kernel.
+
+  - Check that the hash-functions and ciphers you want to use are in
+  the kernel.  The output of "cat /proc/crypto" needs to list them.
+
+
+  * 3.2 My dm-crypt mapping suddenly stopped when upgrading cryptsetup.
+
+  The default cipher, hash or mode may have changed (the mode changed
+  from 1.0.x to 1.1.x).  See under "Issues With Specific Versions of
+  cryptsetup".
+
+
+  * 3.3 When I call cryptsetup from cron/CGI, I get errors about
+    unknown features?
+
+  If you get errors about unknown parameters or the like that are not
+  present when cryptsetup is called from the shell, make sure you have
+  no older version of cryptsetup on your system that then gets called
+  by cron/CGI.  For example some distributions install cryptsetup into
+  /usr/sbin, while a manual install could go to /usr/local/sbin.  As a
+  debugging aid, call "cryptsetup --version" from cron/CGI or the
+  non-shell mechanism to be sure the right version gets called.
+
+
+  * 3.4 Unlocking a LUKS device takes very long. Why?
+
+  The iteration time for a key-slot (see Section 5 for an explanation
+  what iteration does) is calculated when setting a passphrase.  By
+  default it is 1 second on the machine where the passphrase is set. 
+  If you set a passphrase on a fast machine and then unlock it on a
+  slow machine, the unlocking time can be much longer.  Also take into
+  account that up to 8 key-slots have to be tried in order to find the
+  right one.
+
+  If this is problem, you can add another key-slot using the slow
+  machine with the same passphrase and then remove the old key-slot. 
+  The new key-slot will have an iteration count adjusted to 1 second on
+  the slow machine.  Use luksKeyAdd and then luksKillSlot or
+  luksRemoveKey.
+
+  However, this operation will not change volume key iteration count
+  (MK iterations in output of "cryptsetup luksDump").  In order to
+  change that, you will have to backup the data in the LUKS container
+  (i.e.  your encrypted data), luksFormat on the slow machine and
+  restore the data.  Note that in the original LUKS specification this
+  value was fixed to 10, but it is now derived from the PBKDF2
+  benchmark as well and set to iterations in 0.125 sec or 1000,
+  whichever is larger.  Also note that MK iterations are not very
+  security relevant.  But as each key-slot already takes 1 second,
+  spending the additional 0.125 seconds really does not matter.
+
+  * 3.5 "blkid" sees a LUKS UUID and an ext2/swap UUID on the same
+    device. What is wrong?
+
+  Some old versions of cryptsetup have a bug where the header does not
+  get completely wiped during LUKS format and an older ext2/swap
+  signature remains on the device.  This confuses blkid.
+
+  Fix: Wipe the unused header areas by doing a backup and restore of
+  the header with cryptsetup 1.1.x:
+
+    cryptsetup luksHeaderBackup --header-backup-file <file> <device>
+    cryptsetup luksHeaderRestore --header-backup-file <file> <device>
+
+
+
+  * 3.6 cryptsetup segfaults on Gentoo amd64 hardened ...
+
+  There seems to be some interference between the hardening and and the
+  way cryptsetup benchmarks PBKDF2.  The solution to this is currently
+  not quite clear for an encrypted root filesystem.  For other uses,
+  you can apparently specify USE="dynamic" as compile flag, see
+  http://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=283470
+
+
+4. Troubleshooting
+
+
+  * 4.1 I get the error "LUKS keyslot x is invalid." What does that mean?
+
+  This means that the given keyslot has an offset that points outside
+  the valid keyslot area.  Typically, the reason is a corrupted LUKS
+  header because something was written to the start of the device the
+  LUKS container is on.  Refer to Section "Backup and Data Recovery"
+  and ask on the mailing list if you have trouble diagnosing and (if
+  still possible) repairing this.
+
+
+  * 4.2 I cannot unlock my LUKS container! What could be the problem?
+
+  First, make sure you have a correct passphrase. Then make sure you
+  have the correct key-map and correct keyboard.  And then make sure
+  you have the correct character set and encoding, see also "PASSPHRASE
+  CHARACTER SET" under Section 1.2.
+
+  If you are sure you are entering the passphrase right, there is the
+  possibility that the respective key-slot has been damaged.  There is
+  no way to recover a damaged key-slot, except from a header backup
+  (see Section 6).  For security reasons, there is also no checksum in
+  the key-slots that could tell you whether a key-slot has been
+  damaged.  The only checksum present allows recognition of a correct
+  passphrase, but that only works if the passphrase is correct and the
+  respective key-slot is intact.
+
+  In order to find out whether a key-slot is damaged one has to look
+  for "non-random looking" data in it.  There is a tool that
+  automates this in the cryptsetup distribution from version 1.6.0
+  onwards.  It is located in misc/keyslot_checker/.  Instructions how
+  to use and how to interpret results are in the README file.  Note
+  that this tool requires a libcryptsetup from cryptsetup 1.6.0 or
+  later (which means libcryptsetup.so.4.5.0 or later).  If the tool
+  complains about missing functions in libcryptsetup, you likely have
+  an earlier version from your distribution still installed.  You can
+  either point the symbolic link(s) from libcryptsetup.so.4 to the new
+  version manually, or you can uninstall the distribution version of
+  cryptsetup and re-install that from cryptsetup >= 1.6.0 again to fix
+  this.
+
+
+  * 4.3 Can a bad RAM module cause problems?
+
+  LUKS and dm-crypt can give the RAM quite a workout, especially when
+  combined with software RAID.  In particular the combination RAID5 +
+  LUKS + XFS seems to uncover RAM problems that never caused obvious
+  problems before.  Symptoms vary, but often the problem manifest
+  itself when copying large amounts of data, typically several times
+  larger than your main memory.
+
+  Side note: One thing you should always do on large data
+  copy/movements is to run a verify, for example with the "-d" option
+  of "tar" or by doing a set of MD5 checksums on the source or target
+  with
+
+    find . -type f -exec md5sum \{\} \; > checksum-file
+
+  and then a "md5sum -c checksum-file" on the other side. If you get
+  mismatches here, RAM is the primary suspect.  A lesser suspect is an
+  overclocked CPU.  I have found countless hardware problems in verify
+  runs after copying or making backups.  Bit errors are much more
+  common than most people think.
+
+  Some RAM issues are even worse and corrupt structures in one of the
+  layers.  This typically results in lockups, CPU state dumps in the
+  system logs, kernel panic or other things.  It is quite possible to
+  have the problem with an encrypted device, but not with an otherwise
+  the same unencrypted device.  The reason for that is that encryption
+  has an error amplification property: You flip one bit in an encrypted
+  data block, and the decrypted version has half of its bits flipped. 
+  This is an important security property for modern ciphers.  With the
+  usual modes in cryptsetup (CBC, ESSIV, XTS), you get up to a
+  completely changed 512 byte block per bit error.  A corrupt block
+  causes a lot more havoc than the occasionally flipped single bit and
+  can result in various obscure errors.
+
+  Note that a verify run on copying between encrypted or unencrypted
+  devices will reliably detect corruption, even when the copying itself
+  did not report any problems.  If you find defect RAM, assume all
+  backups and copied data to be suspect, unless you did a verify.
+
+
+  * 4.4 How do I test RAM?
+
+  First you should know that overclocking often makes memory problems
+  worse.  So if you overclock (which I strongly recommend against in a
+  system holding data that has some worth), run the tests with the
+  overclocking active.
+
+  There are two good options. One is Memtest86+ and the other is
+  "memtester" by Charles Cazabon.  Memtest86+ requires a reboot and
+  then takes over the machine, while memtester runs from a root-shell. 
+  Both use different testing methods and I have found problems fast
+  with each one that the other needed long to find.  I recommend
+  running the following procedure until the first error is found:
+
+  - Run Memtest86+ for one cycle
+
+  - Run memtester for one cycle (shut down as many other applications
+    as possible)
+
+  - Run Memtest86+ for 24h or more
+
+  - Run memtester for 24h or more
+
+  If all that does not produce error messages, your RAM may be sound,
+  but I have had one weak bit that Memtest86+ needed around 60 hours to
+  find.  If you can reproduce the original problem reliably, a good
+  additional test may be to remove half of the RAM (if you have more
+  than one module) and try whether the problem is still there and if
+  so, try with the other half.  If you just have one module, get a
+  different one and try with that.  If you do overclocking, reduce the
+  settings to the most conservative ones available and try with that.
+
+
+  * 4.5 Is there a risk using debugging tools like strace?
+
+  There most definitely is. An dump from strace and friends can contain
+  all data entered, including the full passphrase.  Example with strace
+  and passphrase "test":
+
+    > strace cryptsetup luksOpen /dev/sda10 c1
+    ...
+    read(6, "test\n", 512)                  = 5
+    ...
+
+  Depending on different factors and the tool used, the passphrase may
+  also be encoded and not plainly visible.  Hence it is never a good
+  idea to give such a trace from a live container to anybody.  Recreate
+  the problem with a test container or set a temporary passphrase like
+  "test" and use that for the trace generation.  Item 2.6 explains how
+  to create a loop-file backed LUKS container that may come in handy
+  for this purpose.
+
+  See also Item 6.10 for another set of data you should not give to
+  others.
+
+
+5. Security Aspects
+
+
+  * 5.1 How long is a secure passphrase ?
+
+  This is just the short answer. For more info and explanation of some
+  of the terms used in this item, read the rest of Section 5.  The
+  actual recommendation is at the end of this item.
+
+  First, passphrase length is not really the right measure, passphrase
+  entropy is.  For example, a random lowercase letter (a-z) gives you
+  4.7 bit of entropy, one element of a-z0-9 gives you 5.2 bits of
+  entropy, an element of a-zA-Z0-9 gives you 5.9 bits and
+  a-zA-Z0-9!@#$%\^&:-+ gives you 6.2 bits.  On the other hand, a random
+  English word only gives you 0.6...1.3 bits of entropy per character. 
+  Using sentences that make sense gives lower entropy, series of random
+  words gives higher entropy.  Do not use sentences that can be tied to
+  you or found on your computer.  This type of attack is done routinely
+  today.
+
+  That said, it does not matter too much what scheme you use, but it
+  does matter how much entropy your passphrase contains, because an
+  attacker has to try on average
+
+    1/2 * 2^(bits of entropy in passphrase)
+
+  different passphrases to guess correctly.
+
+  Historically, estimations tended to use computing time estimates, but
+  more modern approaches try to estimate cost of guessing a passphrase.
+
+  As an example, I will try to get an estimate from the numbers in
+  http://it.slashdot.org/story/12/12/05/0623215/new-25-gpu-monster-devours-strong-passwords-in-minutes
+  More references can be found a the end of this document.  Note that
+  these are estimates from the defender side, so assuming something is
+  easier than it actually is is fine.  An attacker may still have
+  vastly higher cost than estimated here.
+
+  LUKS uses SHA1 for hashing per default. The claim in the reference is
+  63 billion tries/second for SHA1.  We will leave aside the check
+  whether a try actually decrypts a key-slot.  Now, the machine has 25
+  GPUs, which I will estimate at an overall lifetime cost of USD/EUR
+  1000 each, and an useful lifetime of 2 years.  (This is on the low
+  side.) Disregarding downtime, the machine can then break
+
+     N = 63*10^9 * 3600 * 24 * 365 * 2 ~ 4*10^18
+
+  passphrases for EUR/USD 25k. That is one 62 bit passphrase hashed
+  once with SHA1 for EUR/USD 25k.  Note that as this can be
+  parallelized, it can be done faster than 2 years with several of
+  these machines.
+
+  For plain dm-crypt (no hash iteration) this is it. This gives (with
+  SHA1, plain dm-crypt default is ripemd160 which seems to be slightly
+  slower than SHA1):
+
+    Passphrase entropy  Cost to break
+    60 bit              EUR/USD     6k
+    65 bit              EUR/USD   200K
+    70 bit              EUR/USD     6M
+    75 bit              EUR/USD   200M
+    80 bit              EUR/USD     6B
+    85 bit              EUR/USD   200B
+    ...                      ...
+
+
+  For LUKS, you have to take into account hash iteration in PBKDF2. 
+  For a current CPU, there are about 100k iterations (as can be queried
+  with ''cryptsetup luksDump''.
+
+  The table above then becomes:
+
+    Passphrase entropy  Cost to break
+    50 bit              EUR/USD   600k
+    55 bit              EUR/USD    20M
+    60 bit              EUR/USD   600M
+    65 bit              EUR/USD    20B
+    70 bit              EUR/USD   600B
+    75 bit              EUR/USD    20T
+    ...                      ...
+
+
+  Recommendation:
+
+  To get reasonable security for the  next 10 years, it is a good idea
+  to overestimate by a factor of at least 1000.
+
+  Then there is the question of how much the attacker is willing to
+  spend.  That is up to your own security evaluation.  For general use,
+  I will assume the attacker is willing to spend up to 1 million
+  EUR/USD.  Then we get the following recommendations:
+
+  Plain dm-crypt: Use > 80 bit. That is e.g. 17 random chars from a-z
+  or a random English sentence of > 135 characters length.
+
+  LUKS: Use > 65 bit. That is e.g. 14 random chars from a-z or a random
+  English sentence of > 108 characters length.
+
+  If paranoid, add at least 20 bit. That is roughly four additional
+  characters for random passphrases and roughly 32 characters for a
+  random English sentence.
+
+
+  * 5.2 Is LUKS insecure? Everybody can see I have encrypted data!
+
+  In practice it does not really matter. In most civilized countries
+  you can just refuse to hand over the keys, no harm done.  In some
+  countries they can force you to hand over the keys, if they suspect
+  encryption.  However the suspicion is enough, they do not have to
+  prove anything.  This is for practical reasons, as even the presence
+  of a header (like the LUKS header) is not enough to prove that you
+  have any keys.  It might have been an experiment, for example.  Or it
+  was used as encrypted swap with a key from /dev/random.  So they make
+  you prove you do not have encrypted data.  Of course that is just as
+  impossible as the other way round.
+
+  This means that if you have a large set of random-looking data, they
+  can already lock you up.  Hidden containers (encryption hidden within
+  encryption), as possible with Truecrypt, do not help either.  They
+  will just assume the hidden container is there and unless you hand
+  over the key, you will stay locked up.  Don't have a hidden
+  container?  Though luck.  Anybody could claim that.
+
+  Still, if you are concerned about the LUKS header, use plain dm-crypt
+  with a good passphrase.  See also Section 2, "What is the difference
+  between "plain" and LUKS format?"
+
+
+  * 5.3 Should I initialize (overwrite) a new LUKS/dm-crypt partition?
+
+  If you just create a filesystem on it, most of the old data will
+  still be there.  If the old data is sensitive, you should overwrite
+  it before encrypting.  In any case, not initializing will leave the
+  old data there until the specific sector gets written.  That may
+  enable an attacker to determine how much and where on the partition
+  data was written.  If you think this is a risk, you can prevent this
+  by overwriting the encrypted device (here assumed to be named "e1")
+  with zeros like this:
+
+    dd_rescue -w /dev/zero /dev/mapper/e1
+
+  or alternatively with one of the following more standard commands:
+
+    cat /dev/zero > /dev/mapper/e1
+    dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/mapper/e1
+
+
+
+  * 5.4 How do I securely erase a LUKS (or other) partition?
+
+  For LUKS, if you are in a desperate hurry, overwrite the LUKS header
+  and key-slot area.  This means overwriting the first (keyslots x
+  stripes x keysize) + offset bytes.  For the default parameters, this
+  is the 1'052'672 bytes, i.e.  1MiB + 4096 of the LUKS partition.  For
+  512 bit key length (e.g.  for aes-xts-plain with 512 bit key) this is
+  2MiB.  (The different offset stems from differences in the sector
+  alignment of the key-slots.) If in doubt, just be generous and
+  overwrite the first 10MB or so, it will likely still be fast enough. 
+  A single overwrite with zeros should be enough.  If you anticipate
+  being in a desperate hurry, prepare the command beforehand.  Example
+  with /dev/sde1 as the LUKS partition and default parameters:
+
+    head -c 1052672 /dev/zero > /dev/sde1; sync
+
+  A LUKS header backup or full backup will still grant access to most
+  or all data, so make sure that an attacker does not have access to
+  backups or destroy them as well.
+
+  If you have time, overwrite the whole LUKS partition with a single
+  pass of zeros.  This is enough for current HDDs.  For SSDs or FLASH
+  (USB sticks) you may want to overwrite the whole drive several times
+  to be sure data is not retained by wear leveling.  This is possibly
+  still insecure as SSD technology is not fully understood in this
+  regard.  Still, due to the anti-forensic properties of the LUKS
+  key-slots, a single overwrite of an SSD or FLASH drive could be
+  enough.  If in doubt, use physical destruction in addition.  Here is
+  a link to some current research results on erasing SSDs and FLASH
+  drives: http://www.usenix.org/events/fast11/tech/full_papers/Wei.pdf
+
+  Keep in mind to also erase all backups.
+
+  Example for a zero-overwrite erase of partition sde1 done with
+  dd_rescue:
+
+    dd_rescue -w /dev/zero /dev/sde1
+
+
+
+  * 5.5 How do I securely erase a backup of a LUKS partition or header?
+
+  That depends on the medium it is stored on. For HDD and SSD, use
+  overwrite with zeros.  For an SSD or FLASH drive (USB stick), you may
+  want to overwrite the complete SSD several times and use physical
+  destruction in addition, see last item.  For re-writable CD/DVD, a
+  single overwrite should also be enough, due to the anti-forensic
+  properties of the LUKS keyslots.  For write-once media, use physical
+  destruction.  For low security requirements, just cut the CD/DVD into
+  several parts.  For high security needs, shred or burn the medium. 
+  If your backup is on magnetic tape, I advise physical destruction by
+  shredding or burning, after overwriting .  The problem with magnetic
+  tape is that it has a higher dynamic range than HDDs and older data
+  may well be recoverable after overwrites.  Also write-head alignment
+  issues can lead to data not actually being deleted at all during
+  overwrites.
+
+
+  * 5.6 What about backup? Does it compromise security?
+
+  That depends. See item 6.7.
+
+
+  * 5.7 Why is all my data permanently gone if I overwrite the LUKS header?
+
+  Overwriting the LUKS header in part or in full is the most common
+  reason why access to LUKS containers is lost permanently. 
+  Overwriting can be done in a number of fashions, like creating a new
+  filesystem on the raw LUKS partition, making the raw partition part
+  of a raid array and just writing to the raw partition.
+
+  The LUKS header contains a 256 bit "salt" per key-slot and without
+  that no decryption is possible.  While the salts are not secret, they
+  are key-grade material and cannot be reconstructed.  This is a
+  cryptographically strong "cannot".  From observations on the
+  cryptsetup mailing-list, people typically go though the usual stages
+  of grief (Denial, Anger, Bargaining, Depression, Acceptance) when
+  this happens to them.  Observed times vary between 1 day and 2 weeks
+  to complete the cycle.  Seeking help on the mailing-list is fine. 
+  Even if we usually cannot help with getting back your data, most
+  people found the feedback comforting.
+
+  If your header does not contain an intact key-slot salt, best go
+  directly to the last stage ("Acceptance") and think about what to do
+  now.  There is one exception that I know of: If your LUKS container
+  is still open, then it may be possible to extract the master key from
+  the running system.  See Item "How do I recover the master key from a
+  mapped LUKS container?" in Section "Backup and Data Recovery".
+
+
+  * 5.8 What is a "salt"?
+
+  A salt is a random key-grade value added to the passphrase before it
+  is processed.  It is not kept secret.  The reason for using salts is
+  as follows: If an attacker wants to crack the password for a single
+  LUKS container, then every possible passphrase has to be tried. 
+  Typically an attacker will not try every binary value, but will try
+  words and sentences from a dictionary.
+
+  If an attacker wants to attack several LUKS containers with the same
+  dictionary, then a different approach makes sense: Compute the
+  resulting slot-key for each dictionary element and store it on disk. 
+  Then the test for each entry is just the slow unlocking with the slot
+  key (say 0.00001 sec) instead of calculating the slot-key first (1
+  sec).  For a single attack, this does not help.  But if you have more
+  than one container to attack, this helps tremendously, also because
+  you can prepare your table before you even have the container to
+  attack!  The calculation is also very simple to parallelize.  You
+  could, for example, use the night-time unused CPU power of your
+  desktop PCs for this.
+
+  This is where the salt comes in. If the salt is combined with the
+  passphrase (in the simplest form, just appended to it), you suddenly
+  need a separate table for each salt value.  With a reasonably-sized
+  salt value (256 bit, e.g.) this is quite infeasible.
+
+
+  * 5.9 Is LUKS secure with a low-entropy (bad) passphrase?
+
+  Note: You should only use the 94 printable characters from 7 bit
+  ASCII code to prevent your passphrase from failing when the character
+  encoding changes, e.g.  because of a system upgrade, see also the
+  note at the very start of this FAQ under "WARNINGS".
+
+  This needs a bit of theory. The quality of your passphrase is
+  directly related to its entropy (information theoretic, not
+  thermodynamic).  The entropy says how many bits of "uncertainty" or
+  "randomness" are in you passphrase.  In other words, that is how
+  difficult guessing the passphrase is.
+
+  Example: A random English sentence has about 1 bit of entropy per
+  character.  A random lowercase (or uppercase) character has about 4.7
+  bit of entropy.
+
+  Now, if n is the number of bits of entropy in your passphrase and t
+  is the time it takes to process a passphrase in order to open the
+  LUKS container, then an attacker has to spend at maximum
+
+    attack_time_max = 2^n * t
+
+  time for a successful attack and on average half that. There is no
+  way getting around that relationship.  However, there is one thing
+  that does help, namely increasing t, the time it takes to use a
+  passphrase, see next FAQ item.
+
+  Still, if you want good security, a high-entropy passphrase is the
+  only option.  For example, a low-entropy passphrase can never be
+  considered secure against a TLA-level (Three Letter Agency level,
+  i.e.  government-level) attacker, no matter what tricks are used in
+  the key-derivation function.  Use at least 64 bits for secret stuff. 
+  That is 64 characters of English text (but only if randomly chosen)
+  or a combination of 12 truly random letters and digits.
+
+  For passphrase generation, do not use lines from very well-known
+  texts (religious texts, Harry potter, etc.) as they are to easy to
+  guess.  For example, the total Harry Potter has about 1'500'000 words
+  (my estimation).  Trying every 64 character sequence starting and
+  ending at a word boundary would take only something like 20 days on a
+  single CPU and is entirely feasible.  To put that into perspective,
+  using a number of Amazon EC2 High-CPU Extra Large instances (each
+  gives about 8 real cores), this test costs currently about 50USD/EUR,
+  but can be made to run arbitrarily fast.
+
+  On the other hand, choosing 1.5 lines from, say, the Wheel of Time
+  is in itself not more secure, but the book selection adds quite
+  a bit of entropy. (Now that I have mentioned it here, don't use
+  tWoT either!) If you add 2 or 3 typos or switch some words around,
+  then this is good passphrase material.
+
+
+  * 5.10 What is "iteration count" and why is decreasing it a bad idea?
+
+  Iteration count is the number of PBKDF2 iterations a passphrase is
+  put through before it is used to unlock a key-slot.  Iterations are
+  done with the explicit purpose to increase the time that it takes to
+  unlock a key-slot.  This provides some protection against use of
+  low-entropy passphrases.
+
+  The idea is that an attacker has to try all possible passphrases. 
+  Even if the attacker knows the passphrase is low-entropy (see last
+  item), it is possible to make each individual try take longer.  The
+  way to do this is to repeatedly hash the passphrase for a certain
+  time.  The attacker then has to spend the same time (given the same
+  computing power) as the user per try.  With LUKS, the default is 1
+  second of PBKDF2 hashing.
+
+  Example 1: Lets assume we have a really bad passphrase (e.g. a
+  girlfriends name) with 10 bits of entropy.  With the same CPU, an
+  attacker would need to spend around 500 seconds on average to break
+  that passphrase.  Without iteration, it would be more like 0.0001
+  seconds on a modern CPU.
+
+  Example 2: The user did a bit better and has 32 chars of English
+  text.  That would be about 32 bits of entropy.  With 1 second
+  iteration, that means an attacker on the same CPU needs around 136
+  years.  That is pretty impressive for such a weak passphrase. 
+  Without the iterations, it would be more like 50 days on a modern
+  CPU, and possibly far less.
+
+  In addition, the attacker can both parallelize and use special
+  hardware like GPUs or FPGAs to speed up the attack.  The attack can
+  also happen quite some time after the luksFormat operation and CPUs
+  can have become faster and cheaper.  For that reason you want a bit
+  of extra security.  Anyways, in Example 1 your are screwed.  In
+  example 2, not necessarily.  Even if the attack is faster, it still
+  has a certain cost associated with it, say 10000 EUR/USD with
+  iteration and 1 EUR/USD without iteration.  The first can be
+  prohibitively expensive, while the second is something you try even
+  without solid proof that the decryption will yield something useful.
+
+  The numbers above are mostly made up, but show the idea.  Of course
+  the best thing is to have a high-entropy passphrase.
+
+  Would a 100 sec iteration time be even better? Yes and no. 
+  Cryptographically it would be a lot better, namely 100 times better. 
+  However, usability is a very important factor for security technology
+  and one that gets overlooked surprisingly often.  For LUKS, if you
+  have to wait 2 minutes to unlock the LUKS container, most people will
+  not bother and use less secure storage instead.  It is better to have
+  less protection against low-entropy passphrases and people actually
+  use LUKS, than having them do without encryption altogether.
+
+  Now, what about decreasing the iteration time? This is generally a
+  very bad idea, unless you know and can enforce that the users only
+  use high-entropy passphrases.  If you decrease the iteration time
+  without ensuring that, then you put your users at increased risk, and
+  considering how rarely LUKS containers are unlocked in a typical
+  work-flow, you do so without a good reason.  Don't do it.  The
+  iteration time is already low enough that users with entropy low
+  passphrases are vulnerable.  Lowering it even further increases this
+  danger significantly.
+
+
+  * 5.11 Some people say PBKDF2 is insecure?
+
+  There is some discussion that a hash-function should have a "large
+  memory" property, i.e.  that it should require a lot of memory to be
+  computed.  This serves to prevent attacks using special programmable
+  circuits, like FPGAs, and attacks using graphics cards.  PBKDF2 does
+  not need a lot of memory and is vulnerable to these attacks. 
+  However, the publication usually referred in these discussions is not
+  very convincing in proving that the presented hash really is "large
+  memory" (that may change, email the FAQ maintainer when it does) and
+  it is of limited usefulness anyways.  Attackers that use clusters of
+  normal PCs will not be affected at all by a "large memory" property. 
+  For example the US Secret Service is known to use the off-hour time
+  of all the office PCs of the Treasury for password breaking.  The
+  Treasury has about 110'000 employees.  Assuming every one has an
+  office PC, that is significant computing power, all of it with plenty
+  of memory for computing "large memory" hashes.  Bot-net operators
+  also have all the memory they want.  The only protection against a
+  resourceful attacker is a high-entropy passphrase, see items 5.9 and
+  5.10.
+
+
+  * 5.12 What about iteration count with plain dm-crypt?
+
+  Simple: There is none. There is also no salting. If you use plain
+  dm-crypt, the only way to be secure is to use a high entropy
+  passphrase.  If in doubt, use LUKS instead.
+
+
+  * 5.13 Is LUKS with default parameters less secure on a slow CPU?
+
+  Unfortunately, yes. However the only aspect affected is the
+  protection for low-entropy passphrase or master-key.  All other
+  security aspects are independent of CPU speed.
+
+  The master key is less critical, as you really have to work at it to
+  give it low entropy.  One possibility is to supply the master key
+  yourself.  If that key is low-entropy, then you get what you deserve. 
+  The other known possibility is to use /dev/urandom for key generation
+  in an entropy-starved situation (e.g.  automatic installation on an
+  embedded device without network and other entropy sources).
+
+  For the passphrase, don't use a low-entropy passphrase. If your
+  passphrase is good, then a slow CPU will not matter.  If you insist
+  on a low-entropy passphrase on a slow CPU, use something like
+  "--iter-time=10000" or higher and wait a long time on each LUKS
+  unlock and pray that the attacker does not find out in which way
+  exactly your passphrase is low entropy.  This also applies to
+  low-entropy passphrases on fast CPUs.  Technology can do only so much
+  to compensate for problems in front of the keyboard.
+
+  Also note that power-saving modes will make your CPU slower. This
+  will reduce iteration count on LUKS container creation.  It will keep
+  unlock times at the expected values though at this CPU speed.
+
+
+  * 5.14 Why was the default aes-cbc-plain replaced with aes-cbc-essiv?
+
+  Note: This item applies both to plain dm-crypt and to LUKS
+
+  The problem is that cbc-plain has a fingerprint vulnerability, where
+  a specially crafted file placed into the crypto-container can be
+  recognized from the outside.  The issue here is that for cbc-plain
+  the initialization vector (IV) is the sector number.  The IV gets
+  XORed to the first data chunk of the sector to be encrypted.  If you
+  make sure that the first data block to be stored in a sector contains
+  the sector number as well, the first data block to be encrypted is
+  all zeros and always encrypted to the same ciphertext.  This also
+  works if the first data chunk just has a constant XOR with the sector
+  number.  By having several shifted patterns you can take care of the
+  case of a non-power-of-two start sector number of the file.
+
+  This mechanism allows you to create a pattern of sectors that have
+  the same first ciphertext block and signal one bit per sector to the
+  outside, allowing you to e.g.  mark media files that way for
+  recognition without decryption.  For large files this is a practical
+  attack.  For small ones, you do not have enough blocks to signal and
+  take care of different file starting offsets.
+
+  In order to prevent this attack, the default was changed to
+  cbc-essiv.  ESSIV uses a keyed hash of the sector number, with the
+  encryption key as key.  This makes the IV unpredictable without
+  knowing the encryption key and the watermarking attack fails.
+
+
+  * 5.15 Are there any problems with "plain" IV? What is "plain64"?
+
+  First, "plain" and "plain64" are both not secure to use with CBC,
+  see previous FAQ item.
+
+  However there are modes, like XTS, that are secure with "plain" IV. 
+  The next limit is that "plain" is 64 bit, with the upper 32 bit set
+  to zero.  This means that on volumes larger than 2TiB, the IV
+  repeats, creating a vulnerability that potentially leaks some data. 
+  To avoid this, use "plain64", which uses the full sector number up to
+  64 bit.  Note that "plain64" requires a kernel 2.6.33 or more recent. 
+  Also note that "plain64" is backwards compatible for volume sizes of
+  maximum size 2TiB, but not for those > 2TiB.  Finally, "plain64" does
+  not cause any performance penalty compared to "plain".
+
+
+  * 5.16 What about XTS mode?
+
+  XTS mode is potentially even more secure than cbc-essiv (but only if
+  cbc-essiv is insecure in your scenario).  It is a NIST standard and
+  used, e.g.  in Truecrypt.  From version 1.6.0 of cryptsetup onwards,
+  aes-xts-plain64 is the default for LUKS.  If you want to use it with
+  a cryptsetup before version 1.6.0 or with plain dm-crypt, you have to
+  specify it manually as "aes-xts-plain", i.e.
+
+    cryptsetup -c aes-xts-plain luksFormat <device>
+
+  For volumes >2TiB and kernels >= 2.6.33 use "plain64" (see FAQ item
+  on "plain" and "plain64"):
+
+    cryptsetup -c aes-xts-plain64 luksFormat <device>
+
+  There is a potential security issue with XTS mode and large blocks. 
+  LUKS and dm-crypt always use 512B blocks and the issue does not
+  apply.
+
+
+  * 5.17 Is LUKS FIPS-140-2 certified?
+
+  No. But that is more a problem of FIPS-140-2 than of LUKS.  From a
+  technical point-of-view, LUKS with the right parameters would be
+  FIPS-140-2 compliant, but in order to make it certified, somebody has
+  to pay real money for that.  And then, whenever cryptsetup is changed
+  or extended, the certification lapses and has to be obtained again.
+
+  From the aspect of actual security, LUKS with default parameters
+  should be as good as most things that are FIPS-140-2 certified,
+  although you may want to make sure to use /dev/random (by specifying
+  --use-random on luksFormat) as randomness source for the master key
+  to avoid being potentially insecure in an entropy-starved situation.
+
+
+  * 5.18 What about Plausible Deniability?
+
+  First let me attempt a definition for the case of encrypted
+  filesystems: Plausible deniability is when you store data
+  inside an encrypted container and it is not possible to prove it is
+  there without  having a special passphrase. And at the same time
+  it must be "plausible" that there actually is no hidden data there.
+
+  As a simple entropy-analysis will show that here may be data there,
+  the second part is what makes it tricky.
+
+  There seem to  be a lot of misunderstandings what that
+  means, so let me make clear that this refers to the situation where 
+  the attackers can prove that there is data that may be random or 
+  may be part of a plausible-deniability scheme, they just cannot 
+  prove which one it is. Hence a plausible-deniability
+  scheme must hold up when the attackers know there is 
+  something potentially fishy. If you just hide data and rely on
+  it not being found, that is just simple deniability, not "plausible"
+  deniability and I am not talking about that in the following.
+  Simple deniability against a low-competence attacker may
+  be as simple as  renaming a file or putting data into an unused
+  part of a disk. Simple deniability against a high-skill attacker
+  with time to invest is usually pointless though unless you go
+  for advanced steganographic techniques, which have their own
+  drawbacks, such as low data capacity.
+
+  Now, the idea of plausible deniability is compelling and on first 
+  glance it seems possible to do it.  And from a cryptographic point 
+  of view, it actually is possible.
+
+  So, does it work in practice? No, unfortunately. The reasoning used
+  by its proponents is fundamentally flawed in several ways and the
+  cryptographic properties fail fatally when colliding with the real
+  world.
+
+  First, why should "I do not have a hidden partition" be any more
+  plausible than "I forgot my crypto key" or "I wiped that partition
+  with random data, nothing in there"?  I do not see any reason.
+
+  Second, there are two types of situations: Either they cannot force
+  you to give them the key (then you simply do not) or they can.  In the
+  second case, they can always do bad things to you, because they
+  cannot prove that you have the key in the first place!  This means
+  they do not have to prove you have the key, or that this random
+  looking data on your disk is actually encrypted data.  So the
+  situation will allow them to waterboard/lock-up/deport you anyways,
+  regardless of how "plausible" your deniability is.  Do not have a
+  hidden partition you could show to them, but there are indications
+  you may?  Too bad for you.  Unfortunately "plausible deniability"
+  also means you cannot prove there is no hidden data.
+
+  Third, hidden partitions are not that hidden. There are basically
+  just two possibilities: a) Make a large crypto container, but put a
+  smaller filesystem in there and put the hidden partition into the
+  free space.  Unfortunately this is glaringly obvious and can be
+  detected in an automated fashion.  This means that the initial
+  suspicion to put you under duress in order to make you reveal you
+  hidden data is given.  b) Make a filesystem that spans the whole
+  encrypted partition, and put the hidden partition into space not
+  currently used by that filesystem.  Unfortunately that is also
+  glaringly obvious, as you then cannot write to the filesystem without
+  a high risk of destroying data in the hidden container.  Have not
+  written anything to the encrypted filesystem in a while?  Too bad,
+  they have the suspicion they need to do unpleasant things to you.
+
+  To be fair, if you prepare option b) carefully and directly before
+  going into danger, it may work.  But then, the mere presence of
+  encrypted data may already be enough to get you into trouble in those
+  places were they can demand encryption keys.
+
+  Here is an additional reference for some problems with plausible
+  deniability: http://www.schneier.com/paper-truecrypt-dfs.pdf 
+  I strongly suggest you read it.
+
+  So, no, I will not provide any instructions on how to do it with
+  plain dm-crypt or LUKS.  If you insist on shooting yourself in the
+  foot, you can figure out how to do it yourself.
+
+
+ * 5.19 What about SSDs, Flash and Hybrid Drives?
+
+  The problem is that you cannot reliably erase parts of these devices,
+  mainly due to wear-leveling and possibly defect management.
+
+  Basically, when overwriting a sector (of 512B), what the device does
+  is to move an internal sector (may be 128kB or even larger) to some
+  pool of discarded, not-yet erased unused sectors, take a fresh empty
+  sector from the empty-sector pool and copy the old sector over with
+  the changes to the small part you wrote.  This is done in some
+  fashion so that larger writes do not cause a lot of small internal
+  updates.
+
+  The thing is that the mappings between outside-addressable sectors
+  and inside sectors is arbitrary (and the vendors are not talking). 
+  Also the discarded sectors are not necessarily erased immediately. 
+  They may linger a long time.
+
+  For plain dm-crypt, the consequences are that older encrypted data
+  may be lying around in some internal pools of the device.  Thus may
+  or may not be a problem and depends on the application.  Remember the
+  same can happen with a filesystem if consecutive writes to the same
+  area of a file can go to different sectors.
+
+  However, for LUKS, the worst case is that key-slots and LUKS header
+  may end up in these internal pools.  This means that password
+  management functionality is compromised (the old passwords may still
+  be around, potentially for a very long time) and that fast erase by
+  overwriting the header and key-slot area is insecure.
+
+  Also keep in mind that the discarded/used pool may be large.  For
+  example, a 240GB SSD has about 16GB of spare area in the chips that
+  it is free to do with as it likes.  You would need to make each
+  individual key-slot larger than that to allow reliable overwriting. 
+  And that assumes the disk thinks all other space is in use.  Reading
+  the internal pools using forensic tools is not that hard, but may
+  involve some soldering.
+
+  What to do?
+
+  If you trust the device vendor (you probably should not...) you can
+  try an ATA "secure erase" command for SSDs.  That does not work for
+  USB keys though and may or may not be secure for a hybrid drive.  If
+  it finishes on an SSD after a few seconds, it was possibly faked. 
+  Unfortunately, for hybrid drives that indicator does not work, as the
+  drive may well take the time to truly erase the magnetic part, but
+  only mark the SSD/Flash part as erased while data is still in there.
+
+  If you can do without password management and are fine with doing
+  physical destruction for permanently deleting data (always after one
+  or several full overwrites!), you can use plain dm-crypt or LUKS.
+
+  If you want or need all the original LUKS security features to work,
+  you can use a detached LUKS header and put that on a conventional,
+  magnetic disk.  That leaves potentially old encrypted data in the
+  pools on the disk, but otherwise you get LUKS with the same security
+  as on a magnetic disk.
+
+  If you are concerned about your laptop being stolen, you are likely
+  fine using LUKS on an SSD or hybrid drive.  An attacker would need to
+  have access to an old passphrase (and the key-slot for this old
+  passphrase would actually need to still be somewhere in the SSD) for
+  your data to be at risk.  So unless you pasted your old passphrase
+  all over the Internet or the attacker has knowledge of it from some
+  other source and does a targeted laptop theft to get at your data,
+  you should be fine.
+
+
+ * 5.20 LUKS is broken! It uses SHA-1!
+
+  No, it is not. SHA-1 is (academically) broken for finding collisions,
+  but not for using it in a key-derivation function.  And that
+  collision vulnerability is for non-iterated use only.  And you need
+  the hash-value in verbatim.
+
+  This basically means that if you already have a slot-key, and you
+  have set the PBKDF2 iteration count to 1 (it is > 10'000 normally),
+  you could (maybe) derive a different passphrase that gives you the
+  the same slot-key.  But if you have the slot-key, you can already
+  unlock the key-slot and get the master key, breaking everything.  So
+  basically, this SHA-1 vulnerability allows you to open a LUKS
+  container with high effort when you already have it open.
+
+  The real problem here is people that do not understand crypto and
+  claim things are broken just because some mechanism is used that has
+  been broken for a specific different use.  The way the mechanism is
+  used matters very much.  A hash that is broken for one use can be
+  completely secure for other uses and here it is.
+
+
+ * 5.21 Why is there no "Nuke-Option"?
+
+  A "Nuke-Option" or "Kill-switch" is a password that when entered upon
+  unlocking instead wipes the header and all passwords.  So when
+  somebody forces you to enter your password, you can destroy the data
+  instead.
+
+  While this sounds attractive at first glance, it does not make sense
+  once a real security analysis is done.  One problem is that you have
+  to have some kind of HSM (Hardware Security Module) in order to
+  implement it securely.  In the movies, a HSM starts to smoke and melt
+  once the Nuke-Option has been activated.  In reality, it just wipes
+  some battery-backed RAM cells.  A proper HSM costs something like
+  20'000...100'000 EUR/USD and there a Nuke-Option may make some sense. 
+  BTW, a chipcard or a TPM is not a HSM, although some vendors are
+  promoting that myth.
+
+  Now, a proper HSMs will have a wipe option but not a Nuke-Option,
+  i.e.  you can explicitly wipe the HSM, but by a different process
+  than unlocking it takes.  Why is that?  Simple: If somebody can force
+  you to reveal passwords, then they can also do bad things to you if
+  you do not or if you enter a nuke password instead.  Think locking
+  you up for a few years for "destroying evidence" or for far longer
+  and without trial for being a "terrorist suspect".  No HSM maker will
+  want to expose its customers to that risk.
+
+  Now think of the typical LUKS application scenario, i.e. disk
+  encryption.  Usually the ones forcing you to hand over your password
+  will have access to the disk as well, and, if they have any real
+  suspicion, they will mirror your disk before entering anything
+  supplied by you.  This neatly negates any Nuke-Option.  If they have
+  no suspicion (just harassing people that cross some border for
+  example), the Nuke-Option would work, but see above about likely
+  negative consequences and remember that a Nuke-Option may not work
+  reliably on SSD and hybrid drives anyways.
+
+  Hence my advice is to never take data that you do not want to reveal
+  into any such situation in the first place.  There is no need to
+  transfer data on physical carriers today.  The Internet makes it
+  quite possible to transfer data between arbitrary places and modern
+  encryption makes it secure.  If you do it right, nobody will even be
+  able to identify source or destination.  (How to do that is out of
+  scope of this document.  It does require advanced skills in this age
+  of pervasive surveillance.)
+
+  Hence, LUKS has not kill option because it would do much more harm
+  than good.
+
+  Still, if you have a good use-case (i.e. non-abstract real-world
+  situation) where a Nuke-Option would actually be beneficial, please
+  let me know.
+
+
+ * 5.22 Does cryptsetup open network connections to websites, etc. ?
+
+  This question seems not to make much sense at first glance, but here
+  is an example form the real world: The TrueCrypt GUI has a "Donation"
+  button.  Press it, and a web-connection to the TrueCrypt website is
+  opened via the default browser, telling everybody that listens that
+  you use TrueCrypt.  In the worst case, things like this can get
+  people tortured or killed.
+
+  So: Cryptsetup will never open any network connections except the
+  local netlink socket it needs to talk to the kernel crypto API.
+
+  In addition, the installation package should contain all
+  documentation, including this FAQ, so that you do not have to go to a
+  web-site to read it.  (If your distro cuts the docu, please complain
+  to them.) In security software, any connection initiated to anywhere
+  outside your machine should always be the result of an explicit
+  request for such a connection by the user and cryptsetup will stay
+  true to that principle.
+
+
+6. Backup and Data Recovery
+
+
+ * 6.1 Why do I need Backup?
+
+  First, disks die. The rate for well-treated (!) disk is about 5% per
+  year, which is high enough to worry about.  There is some indication
+  that this may be even worse for some SSDs.  This applies both to LUKS
+  and plain dm-crypt partitions.
+
+  Second, for LUKS, if anything damages the LUKS header or the
+  key-stripe area then decrypting the LUKS device can become
+  impossible.  This is a frequent occurrence.  For example an
+  accidental format as FAT or some software overwriting the first
+  sector where it suspects a partition boot sector typically makes a
+  LUKS partition permanently inaccessible.  See more below on LUKS
+  header damage.
+
+  So, data-backup in some form is non-optional.  For LUKS, you may also
+  want to store a header backup in some secure location.  This only
+  needs an update if you change passphrases.
+
+
+ * 6.2 How do I backup a LUKS header?
+
+  While you could just copy the appropriate number of bytes from the
+  start of the LUKS partition, the best way is to use command option
+  "luksHeaderBackup" of cryptsetup.  This protects also against errors
+  when non-standard parameters have been used in LUKS partition
+  creation.  Example:
+
+    cryptsetup luksHeaderBackup --header-backup-file <file> <device>
+
+  To restore, use the inverse command, i.e.
+
+    cryptsetup luksHeaderRestore --header-backup-file <file> <device>
+
+  If you are unsure about a header to be restored, make a backup of the
+  current one first! You can also test the header-file without restoring
+  it by using the --header option for a detached header like this:
+
+    cryptsetup --header <file> luksOpen <device> </dev/mapper/ -name>
+
+  If that unlocks your keys-lot, you are good. Do not forget to close
+  the device again.
+
+  Under some circumstances (damaged header), this fails. Then use the
+  following steps:
+
+  First determine the master-key size:
+
+    cryptsetup luksDump <device>
+
+  gives a line of the form
+
+    MK bits:        <bits>
+
+  with bits equal to 256 for the old defaults and 512 for the new
+  defaults.  256 bits equals a total header size of 1'052'672 Bytes and
+  512 bits one of 2MiB.  (See also Item 6.12) If luksDump fails, assume
+  2MiB, but be aware that if you restore that, you may also restore the
+  first 1M or so of the filesystem.  Do not change the filesystem if
+  you were unable to determine the header size!  With that, restoring a
+  too-large header backup is still safe.
+
+  Second, dump the header to file. There are many ways to do it, I
+  prefer the following:
+
+    head -c 1052672 <device>  >  header_backup.dmp
+
+  or
+
+    head -c 2M <device>  >  header_backup.dmp
+
+  for a 2MiB header. Verify the size of the dump-file to be sure.
+
+  To restore such a backup, you can try luksHeaderRestore or do a more
+  basic
+
+    cat header_backup.dmp  >  <device>
+
+
+
+  * 6.3 How do I test a LUKS header?
+
+  Use
+
+    cryptsetup -v isLuks <device>
+
+  on the device. Without the "-v" it just signals its result via
+  exit-status.  You can also use the more general test
+
+    blkid -p <device>
+
+  which will also detect other types and give some more info.  Omit
+  "-p" for old versions of blkid that do not support it.
+
+
+  * 6.4 How do I backup a LUKS or dm-crypt partition?
+
+  There are two options, a sector-image and a plain file or filesystem
+  backup of the contents of the partition.  The sector image is already
+  encrypted, but cannot be compressed and contains all empty space. 
+  The filesystem backup can be compressed, can contain only part of the
+  encrypted device, but needs to be encrypted separately if so desired.
+
+  A sector-image will contain the whole partition in encrypted form,
+  for LUKS the LUKS header, the keys-slots and the data area.  It can
+  be done under Linux e.g.  with dd_rescue (for a direct image copy)
+  and with "cat" or "dd".  Example:
+
+    cat /dev/sda10 > sda10.img
+    dd_rescue /dev/sda10 sda10.img
+
+  You can also use any other backup software that is capable of making
+  a sector image of a partition.  Note that compression is ineffective
+  for encrypted data, hence it does not make sense to use it.
+
+  For a filesystem backup, you decrypt and mount the encrypted
+  partition and back it up as you would a normal filesystem.  In this
+  case the backup is not encrypted, unless your encryption method does
+  that.  For example you can encrypt a backup with "tar" as follows
+  with GnuPG:
+
+    tar cjf - <path> | gpg --cipher-algo AES -c - > backup.tbz2.gpg
+
+  And verify the backup like this if you are at "path":
+
+    cat backup.tbz2.gpg | gpg - | tar djf -
+
+  Note: Always verify backups, especially encrypted ones!
+
+  There is one problem with verifying like this: The kernel may still
+  have some files cached and in fact verify them against RAM or may
+  even verify RAM against RAM, which defeats the purpose of the
+  exercise.  The following command empties the kernel caches:
+
+    echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
+
+  Run it after backup and before verify.
+
+  In both cases GnuPG will ask you interactively for your symmetric
+  key.  The verify will only output errors.  Use "tar dvjf -" to get
+  all comparison results.  To make sure no data is written to disk
+  unencrypted, turn off swap if it is not encrypted before doing the
+  backup.
+
+  Restore works like certification with the 'd' ('difference') replaced
+  by 'x' ('eXtract').  Refer to the man-page of tar for more
+  explanations and instructions.  Note that with default options tar
+  will overwrite already existing files without warning.  If you are
+  unsure about how to use tar, experiment with it in a location where
+  you cannot do damage.
+
+  You can of course use different or no compression and you can use an
+  asymmetric key if you have one and have a backup of the secret key
+  that belongs to it.
+
+  A second option for a filesystem-level backup that can be used when
+  the backup is also on local disk (e.g.  an external USB drive) is to
+  use a LUKS container there and copy the files to be backed up between
+  both mounted containers.  Also see next item.
+
+
+  * 6.5 Do I need a backup of the full partition? Would the header
+    and  key-slots not be enough?
+
+  Backup protects you against two things: Disk loss or corruption and
+  user error.  By far the most questions on the dm-crypt mailing list
+  about how to recover a damaged LUKS partition are related to user
+  error.  For example, if you create a new filesystem on a LUKS
+  partition, chances are good that all data is lost permanently.
+
+  For this case, a header+key-slot backup would often be enough.  But
+  keep in mind that a well-treated (!) HDD has roughly a failure risk
+  of 5% per year.  It is highly advisable to have a complete backup to
+  protect against this case.
+
+
+  * 6.6 What do I need to backup if I use "decrypt_derived"?
+
+  This is a script in Debian, intended for mounting /tmp or swap with a
+  key derived from the master key of an already decrypted device.  If
+  you use this for an device with data that should be persistent, you
+  need to make sure you either do not lose access to that master key or
+  have a backup of the data.  If you derive from a LUKS device, a
+  header backup of that device would cover backing up the master key. 
+  Keep in mind that this does not protect against disk loss.
+
+  Note: If you recreate the LUKS header of the device you derive from
+  (using luksFormat), the master key changes even if you use the same
+  passphrase(s) and you will not be able to decrypt the derived device
+  with the new LUKS header.
+
+
+  * 6.7 Does a backup compromise security?
+
+  Depends on how you do it. However if you do not have one, you are
+  going to eventually lose your encrypted data.
+
+  There are risks introduced by backups. For example if you
+  change/disable a key-slot in LUKS, a binary backup of the partition
+  will still have the old key-slot.  To deal with this, you have to be
+  able to change the key-slot on the backup as well, securely erase the
+  backup or do a filesystem-level backup instead of a binary one.
+
+  If you use dm-crypt, backup is simpler: As there is no key
+  management, the main risk is that you cannot wipe the backup when
+  wiping the original.  However wiping the original for dm-crypt should
+  consist of forgetting the passphrase and that you can do without
+  actual access to the backup.
+
+  In both cases, there is an additional (usually small) risk with
+  binary backups: An attacker can see how many sectors and which ones
+  have been changed since the backup.  To prevent this, use a
+  filesystem level backup method that encrypts the whole backup in one
+  go, e.g.  as described above with tar and GnuPG.
+
+  My personal advice is to use one USB disk (low value data) or three
+  disks (high value data) in rotating order for backups, and either use
+  independent LUKS partitions on them, or use encrypted backup with tar
+  and GnuPG.
+
+  If you do network-backup or tape-backup, I strongly recommend to go
+  the filesystem backup path with independent encryption, as you
+  typically cannot reliably delete data in these scenarios, especially
+  in a cloud setting.  (Well, you can burn the tape if it is under your
+  control...)
+
+
+  * 6.8 What happens if I overwrite the start of a LUKS partition or
+    damage the LUKS header or key-slots?
+
+  There are two critical components for decryption: The salt values in
+  the key-slot descriptors of the header and the key-slots.  If the
+  salt values are overwritten or changed, nothing (in the
+  cryptographically strong sense) can be done to access the data,
+  unless there is a backup of the LUKS header.  If a key-slot is
+  damaged, the data can still be read with a different key-slot, if
+  there is a remaining undamaged and used key-slot.  Note that in order
+  to make a key-slot unrecoverable in a cryptographically strong sense,
+  changing about 4-6 bits in random locations of its 128kiB size is
+  quite enough.
+
+
+  * 6.9 What happens if I (quick) format a LUKS partition?
+
+  I have not tried the different ways to do this, but very likely you
+  will have written a new boot-sector, which in turn overwrites the
+  LUKS header, including the salts, making your data permanently
+  irretrievable, unless you have a LUKS header backup.  You may also
+  damage the key-slots in part or in full.  See also last item.
+
+
+  * 6.10 How do I recover the master key from a mapped LUKS container?
+
+  This is typically only needed if you managed to damage your LUKS
+  header, but the container is still mapped, i.e.  "luksOpen"ed.  It
+  also helps if you have a mapped container that you forgot or do not
+  know a passphrase for (e.g.  on a long running server.)
+
+  WARNING: Things go wrong, do a full backup before trying this!
+
+  WARNING: This exposes the master key of the LUKS container.  Note
+  that both ways to recreate a LUKS header with the old master key
+  described below will write the master key to disk.  Unless you are
+  sure you have securely erased it afterwards, e.g.  by writing it to
+  an encrypted partition, RAM disk or by erasing the filesystem you
+  wrote it to by a complete overwrite, you should change the master key
+  afterwards.  Changing the master key requires a full data backup,
+  luksFormat and then restore of the backup.
+
+  First, there is a script by Milan that automates the whole process,
+  except generating a new LUKS header with the old master key (it
+  prints the command for that though):
+
+  https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/blob/master/misc/luks-header-from-active
+
+  You can also do this manually. Here is how:
+
+  - Get the master key from the device mapper.  This is done by the
+  following command.  Substitute c5 for whatever you mapped to:
+
+    # dmsetup table --target crypt --showkey /dev/mapper/c5
+
+    Result:
+    0 200704 crypt aes-cbc-essiv:sha256
+    a1704d9715f73a1bb4db581dcacadaf405e700d591e93e2eaade13ba653d0d09
+    0 7:0 4096
+
+  The result is actually one line, wrapped here for clarity.  The long
+  hex string is the master key.
+
+  - Convert the master key to a binary file representation.  You can do
+  this manually, e.g.  with hexedit.  You can also use the tool "xxd"
+  from vim like this:
+
+    echo "a1704d9....53d0d09" | xxd -r -p > <master-key-file>
+
+
+  - Do a luksFormat to create a new LUKS header.
+
+    NOTE: If your header is intact and you just forgot the passphrase,
+    you can just set a new passphrase, see next sub-item.
+
+  Unmap the device before you do that (luksClose). Then do
+
+    cryptsetup luksFormat --master-key-file=<master-key-file> <luks device>
+
+  Note that if the container was created with other than the default
+  settings of the cryptsetup version you are using, you need to give
+  additional parameters specifying the deviations.  If in doubt, try
+  the script by Milan.  It does recover the other parameters as well.
+
+  Side note: This is the way the decrypt_derived script gets at the
+  master key.  It just omits the conversion and hashes the master key
+  string.
+
+  - If the header is intact and you just forgot the passphrase, just
+  set a new passphrase like this:
+
+      cryptsetup luksAddKey --master-key-file=<master-key-file> <luks device>
+
+  You may want to disable the old one afterwards.
+
+
+  * 6.11 What does the on-disk structure of dm-crypt look like?
+
+  There is none. dm-crypt takes a block device and gives encrypted
+  access to each of its blocks with a key derived from the passphrase
+  given.  If you use a cipher different than the default, you have to
+  specify that as a parameter to cryptsetup too.  If you want to change
+  the password, you basically have to create a second encrypted device
+  with the new passphrase and copy your data over.  On the plus side,
+  if you accidentally overwrite any part of a dm-crypt device, the
+  damage will be limited to the area you overwrote.
+
+
+  * 6.12 What does the on-disk structure of LUKS look like?
+
+  A LUKS partition consists of a header, followed by 8 key-slot
+  descriptors, followed by 8 key slots, followed by the encrypted data
+  area.
+
+  Header and key-slot descriptors fill the first 592 bytes. The
+  key-slot size depends on the creation parameters, namely on the
+  number of anti-forensic stripes, key material offset and master key
+  size.
+
+  With the default parameters, each key-slot is a bit less than 128kiB
+  in size.  Due to sector alignment of the key-slot start, that means
+  the key block 0 is at offset 0x1000-0x20400, key block 1 at offset
+  0x21000-0x40400, and key block 7 at offset 0xc1000-0xe0400.  The
+  space to the next full sector address is padded with zeros.  Never
+  used key-slots are filled with what the disk originally contained
+  there, a key-slot removed with "luksRemoveKey" or "luksKillSlot" gets
+  filled with 0xff.  Due to 2MiB default alignment, start of the data
+  area for cryptsetup 1.3 and later is at 2MiB, i.e.  at 0x200000.  For
+  older versions, it is at 0x101000, i.e.  at 1'052'672 bytes, i.e.  at
+  1MiB + 4096 bytes from the start of the partition.  Incidentally,
+  "luksHeaderBackup" for a LUKS container created with default
+  parameters dumps exactly the first 2MiB (or 1'052'672 bytes for
+  headers created with cryptsetup versions < 1.3) to file and
+  "luksHeaderRestore" restores them.
+
+  For non-default parameters, you have to figure out placement
+  yourself.  "luksDump" helps.  See also next item.  For the most
+  common non-default settings, namely aes-xts-plain with 512 bit key,
+  the offsets are: 1st keyslot 0x1000-0x3f800, 2nd keyslot
+  0x40000-0x7e000, 3rd keyslot 0x7e000-0xbd800, ..., and start of bulk
+  data at 0x200000.
+
+  The exact specification of the format is here:
+     https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/Specification
+
+  For your convenience, here is the LUKS header with hex offsets. 
+  NOTE: The spec counts key-slots from 1 to 8, but the cryptsetup tool
+  counts from 0 to 7.  The numbers here refer to the cryptsetup
+  numbers.
+
+
+Refers to LUKS On-Disk Format Specification Version 1.2.1
+
+LUKS header:
+
+offset  length  name             data type  description
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------
+0x0000   0x06   magic            byte[]     'L','U','K','S', 0xba, 0xbe
+     0      6
+0x0006   0x02   version          uint16_t   LUKS version
+     6      3
+0x0008   0x20   cipher-name      char[]     cipher name spec.
+     8     32
+0x0028   0x20   cipher-mode      char[]     cipher mode spec.
+    40     32
+0x0048   0x20   hash-spec        char[]     hash spec.
+    72     32
+0x0068   0x04   payload-offset   uint32_t   bulk data offset in sectors
+   104      4                               (512 bytes per sector)
+0x006c   0x04   key-bytes        uint32_t   number of bytes in key
+   108      4
+0x0070   0x14   mk-digest        byte[]     master key checksum
+   112     20                               calculated with PBKDF2
+0x0084   0x20   mk-digest-salt   byte[]     salt for PBKDF2 when
+   132     32                               calculating mk-digest
+0x00a4   0x04   mk-digest-iter   uint32_t   iteration count for PBKDF2
+   164      4                               when calculating mk-digest
+0x00a8   0x28   uuid             char[]     partition UUID
+   168     40
+0x00d0   0x30   key-slot-0       key slot   key slot 0
+   208     48
+0x0100   0x30   key-slot-1       key slot   key slot 1
+   256     48
+0x0130   0x30   key-slot-2       key slot   key slot 2
+   304     48
+0x0160   0x30   key-slot-3       key slot   key slot 3
+   352     48
+0x0190   0x30   key-slot-4       key slot   key slot 4
+   400     48
+0x01c0   0x30   key-slot-5       key slot   key slot 5
+   448     48
+0x01f0   0x30   key-slot-6       key slot   key slot 6
+   496     48
+0x0220   0x30   key-slot-7       key slot   key slot 7
+   544     48
+
+
+Key slot:
+
+offset  length  name                  data type  description
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+0x0000   0x04   active                uint32_t   key slot enabled/disabled
+     0      4
+0x0004   0x04   iterations            uint32_t   PBKDF2 iteration count
+     4      4
+0x0008   0x20   salt                  byte[]     PBKDF2 salt
+     8     32
+0x0028   0x04   key-material-offset   uint32_t   key start sector
+    40      4                                    (512 bytes/sector)
+0x002c   0x04   stripes               uint32_t   number of anti-forensic
+    44      4                                    stripes
+
+
+
+  * 6.13 What is the smallest possible LUKS container?
+
+  Note: From cryptsetup 1.3 onwards, alignment is set to 1MB.  With
+  modern Linux partitioning tools that also align to 1MB, this will
+  result in alignment to 2k sectors and typical Flash/SSD sectors,
+  which is highly desirable for a number of reasons.  Changing the
+  alignment is not recommended.
+
+  That said, with default parameters, the data area starts at exactly
+  2MB offset (at 0x101000 for cryptsetup versions before 1.3).  The
+  smallest data area you can have is one sector of 512 bytes.  Data
+  areas of 0 bytes can be created, but fail on mapping.
+
+  While you cannot put a filesystem into something this small, it may
+  still be used to contain, for example, key.  Note that with current
+  formatting tools, a partition for a container this size will be 3MiB
+  anyways.  If you put the LUKS container into a file (via losetup and
+  a loopback device), the file needs to be 2097664 bytes in size, i.e. 
+  2MiB + 512B.
+
+  The two ways to influence the start of the data area are key-size and
+  alignment.
+
+  For alignment, you can go down to 1 on the parameter. This will still
+  leave you with a data-area starting at 0x101000, i.e.  1MiB+4096B
+  (default parameters) as alignment will be rounded up to the next
+  multiple of 8 (i.e.  4096 bytes) If in doubt, do a dry-run on a
+  larger file and dump the LUKS header to get actual information.
+
+  For key-size, you can use 128 bit (e.g. AES-128 with CBC), 256 bit
+  (e.g.  AES-256 with CBC) or 512 bit (e.g.  AES-256 with XTS mode). 
+  You can do 64 bit (e.g.  blowfish-64 with CBC), but anything below
+  128 bit has to be considered insecure today.
+
+  Example 1 - AES 128 bit with CBC:
+
+      cryptsetup luksFormat -s 128 --align-payload=8 <device>
+
+  This results in a data offset of 0x81000, i.e. 516KiB or 528384
+  bytes.  Add one 512 byte sector and the smallest LUKS container size
+  with these parameters is 516KiB + 512B or 528896 bytes.
+
+  Example 2 - Blowfish 64 bit with CBC (WARNING: insecure):
+
+      cryptsetup luksFormat -c blowfish -s 64 --align-payload=8 /dev/loop0
+
+  This results in a data offset of 0x41000, i.e. 260kiB or 266240
+  bytes, with a minimal LUKS container size of 260kiB + 512B or 266752
+  bytes.
+
+
+  * 6.14 I think this is overly complicated. Is there an alternative?
+
+  Not really. Encryption comes at a price. You can use plain dm-crypt
+  to simplify things a bit.  It does not allow multiple passphrases,
+  but on the plus side, it has zero on disk description and if you
+  overwrite some part of a plain dm-crypt partition, exactly the
+  overwritten parts are lost (rounded up to sector borders).
+
+  * 6.15 Can I clone a LUKS container?
+
+  You can, but it breaks security, because the cloned container has the
+  same header and hence the same master key.  You cannot change the
+  master key on a LUKS container, even if you change the passphrase(s),
+  the master key stays the same.  That means whoever has access to one
+  of the clones can decrypt them all, completely bypassing the
+  passphrases.
+
+  The right way to do this is to first luksFormat the target container,
+  then to clone the contents of the source container, with both
+  containers mapped, i.e.  decrypted.  You can clone the decrypted
+  contents of a LUKS container in binary mode, although you may run
+  into secondary issues with GUIDs in filesystems, partition tables,
+  RAID-components and the like.  These are just the normal problems
+  binary cloning causes.
+
+  Note that if you need to ship (e.g.) cloned LUKS containers with a
+  default passphrase, that is fine as long as each container was
+  individually created (and hence has its own master key).  In this
+  case, changing the default passphrase will make it secure again.
+
+
+7. Interoperability with other Disk Encryption Tools
+
+
+  * 7.1 What is this section about?
+
+  Cryptsetup for plain dm-crypt can be used to access a number of
+  on-disk formats created by tools like loop-aes patched into losetup. 
+  This sometimes works and sometimes does not.  This section collects
+  insights into what works, what does not and where more information is
+  required.
+
+  Additional information may be found in the mailing-list archives,
+  mentioned at the start of this FAQ document.  If you have a solution
+  working that is not yet documented here and think a wider audience
+  may be interested, please email the FAQ maintainer.
+
+
+  * 7.2 loop-aes: General observations.
+
+  One problem is that there are different versions of losetup around. 
+  loop-aes is a patch for losetup.  Possible problems and deviations
+  from cryptsetup option syntax include:
+
+  - Offsets specified in bytes (cryptsetup: 512 byte sectors)
+
+  - The need to specify an IV offset
+
+  - Encryption mode needs specifying (e.g. "-c twofish-cbc-plain")
+
+  - Key size needs specifying (e.g. "-s 128" for 128 bit keys)
+
+  - Passphrase hash algorithm needs specifying
+
+  Also note that because plain dm-crypt and loop-aes format does not
+  have metadata, and while the loopAES extension for cryptsetup tries
+  autodetection (see command loopaesOpen), it may not always work.  If
+  you still have the old set-up, using a verbosity option (-v) on
+  mapping with the old tool or having a look into the system logs after
+  setup could give you the information you need.  Below, there are also
+  some things that worked for somebody.
+
+
+  * 7.3 loop-aes patched into losetup on Debian 5.x, kernel 2.6.32
+
+  In this case, the main problem seems to be that this variant of
+  losetup takes the offset (-o option) in bytes, while cryptsetup takes
+  it in sectors of 512 bytes each.  
+
+  Example: The losetup command
+
+    losetup -e twofish -o 2560 /dev/loop0 /dev/sdb1
+    mount /dev/loop0 mount-point
+
+  translates to
+
+    cryptsetup create -c twofish -o 5 --skip 5 e1 /dev/sdb1
+    mount /dev/mapper/e1 mount-point
+
+
+
+  * 7.4 loop-aes with 160 bit key
+
+  This seems to be sometimes used with twofish and blowfish and
+  represents a 160 bit ripemed160 hash output padded to 196 bit key
+  length.  It seems the corresponding options for cryptsetup are
+
+    --cipher twofish-cbc-null -s 192 -h ripemd160:20
+
+
+
+  * 7.5 loop-aes v1 format OpenSUSE
+
+  Apparently this is done by older OpenSUSE distros and stopped working
+  from OpenSUSE 12.1 to 12.2.  One user had success with the following:
+
+    cryptsetup create <target> <device> -c aes -s 128 -h sha256
+
+
+
+  * 7.6 Kernel encrypted loop device (cryptoloop)
+
+  There are a number of different losetup implementations for using
+  encrypted loop devices so getting this to work may need a bit of
+  experimentation.
+
+  NOTE: Do NOT use this for new containers! Some of the existing
+  implementations are insecure and future support is uncertain.
+
+  Example for a compatible mapping:
+
+    losetup -e twofish -N /dev/loop0 /image.img
+
+  translates to
+
+    cryptsetup create image_plain /image.img -c twofish-cbc-plain -H plain
+
+  with the mapping being done to /dev/mapper/image_plain instead of
+  to /dev/loop0.
+
+  More details:
+
+  Cipher, mode and password hash (or no hash):
+
+  -e cipher [-N]        => -c cipher-cbc-plain -H plain [-s 256]
+  -e cipher             => -c cipher-cbc-plain -H ripemd160 [-s 256]
+
+
+  Key size and offsets (losetup: bytes, cryptsetuop: sectors of 512 bytes):
+
+  -k 128                 => -s 128
+  -o 2560                => -o 5 -p 5       # 2560/512 = 5
+
+
+  There is no replacement for --pass-fd, it has to be emulated using
+  keyfiles, see the cryptsetup man-page.
+
+
+8. Issues with Specific Versions of cryptsetup
+
+
+  * 8.1 When using the create command for plain dm-crypt with
+    cryptsetup 1.1.x, the mapping is incompatible and my data is not
+    accessible anymore!
+
+  With cryptsetup 1.1.x, the distro maintainer can define different
+  default encryption modes.  You can check the compiled-in defaults
+  using "cryptsetup --help".  Moreover, the plain device default
+  changed because the old IV mode was vulnerable to a watermarking
+  attack.
+
+  If you are using a plain device and you need a compatible mode, just
+  specify cipher, key size and hash algorithm explicitly.  For
+  compatibility with cryptsetup 1.0.x defaults, simple use the
+  following:
+
+    cryptsetup create -c aes-cbc-plain -s 256 -h ripemd160 <name> <dev>
+
+
+  LUKS stores cipher and mode in the metadata on disk, avoiding this
+  problem.
+
+
+  * 8.2 cryptsetup on SLED 10 has problems...
+
+  SLED 10 is missing an essential kernel patch for dm-crypt, which is
+  broken in its kernel as a result.  There may be a very old version of
+  cryptsetup (1.0.x) provided by SLED, which should also not be used
+  anymore as well.  My advice would be to drop SLED 10.
+
+
+  * 8.3 Gcrypt 1.6.x and later break Whirlpool
+
+  It is the other way round: In gcrypt 1.5.x, Whirlpool is broken and
+  it was fixed in 1.6.0 and later.  If you selected whirlpool as hash
+  on creation of a LUKS container, it does not work anymore with the
+  fixed library.  This shows one serious risk of using rarely used
+  settings.
+
+  Note that at the time this FAQ item was written, 1.5.4 was the latest
+  1.5.x version and it has the flaw, i.e.  works with the old Whirlpool
+  version.  Possibly later 1.5.x versions will work as well.  If not,
+  please let me know.
+
+  The only two ways to access older LUKS containers created with
+  Whirlpool are to either decrypt with an old gcrypt version that has
+  the flaw or to use a compatibility feature introduced in cryptsetup
+  1.6.4 and gcrypt 1.6.1 or later.  Version 1.6.0 cannot be used.
+
+  Steps:
+
+  - Make at least a header backup or better, refresh your full backup. 
+  (You have a full backup, right?  See Item 6.1 and following.)
+
+  - Make sure you have cryptsetup 1.6.4 or later and check the gcrypt
+    version:
+
+
+     cryptsetup luksDump <your luks device> --debug | grep backend
+
+
+  If gcrypt is at version 1.5.x or before:
+
+  - Reencrypt the LUKS header with a different hash. (Requires entering
+  all keyslot passphrases.  If you do not have all, remove the ones you
+  do not have before.):
+
+
+     cryptsetup-reencrypt --keep-key --hash sha256 <your luks device>
+
+
+  If gcrypt is at version 1.6.1 or later:
+
+  - Patch the hash name in the LUKS header from "whirlpool" to
+  "whirlpool_gcryptbug".  This activates the broken implementation. 
+  The detailed header layout is in Item 6.12 of this FAQ and in the
+  LUKS on-disk format specification.  One way to change the hash is
+  with the following command:
+
+
+     echo -n -e 'whirlpool_gcryptbug\0' | dd of=<luks device> bs=1 seek=72 conv=notrunc
+
+
+  - You can now open the device again. It is highly advisable to change
+  the hash now with cryptsetup-reencrypt as described above.  While you
+  can reencrypt to use the fixed whirlpool, that may not be a good idea
+  as almost nobody seems to use it and hence the long time until the
+  bug was discovered.
+
+
+9. The Initrd question
+
+* 9.1 My initrd is broken with cryptsetup or does now work as I want it to
+
+That is not nice! However the initrd is supplied by your distribution, not by
+the cryptsetup project and hence you should complain to them. We cannot 
+really do anything about it.
+
+* 9.2 CVE-2016-4484 says cryptsetup is broken!
+
+Not really. It says the initrd in some Debian versions have a behavior that 
+under some very special and unusual conditions may be considered
+a vulnerability. Incidentally, at this time (1-Jan-17) CVE-2016-4484 still says
+absolutely nothing, which means that the reporters could not be bothered
+do actually describe the problem so far and hence it cannot be that bad.
+If it were, you would expect that they would have a CVE description in
+there more than 30 days (!) after reporting the problem to the press.
+
+What happens is that you can trick the initrd to go to a rescue-shell
+if you enter the LUKS password wrongly in a specific way. But falling
+back to a rescue shell on initrd errors is a sensible default behavior
+in the first place. It gives you about as much access as booting
+a rescue system from CD or USB-Stick or as removing the disk would 
+give you. So this only applies when an attacker has physical access,
+but cannot boot anything else or remove the disk. These will be rare 
+circumstances indeed, and if you rely on the default distribution 
+initrd to keep you safe under these circumstances, than you have
+bigger problems than this somewhat expected behavior.
+
+My take is this was much more driven by some big egos that wanted
+to make a splash for self-aggrandizement, than by any actual 
+security concerns. Ignore it.
+
+* 9.3 How do I do my own initrd with cryptsetup?
+
+It depends on the distribution. Below, I give a very simple example
+and step-by-step instructions for Debian. With a bit of work, it
+should be possible to adapt this to other distributions. Note that
+the description is pretty general, so if you want to do other things
+with an initrd it provides an useful starting point for that too.
+
+01) Unpacking an existing initrd to use as template
+
+A Linux initrd is in gzip'ed cpio format. To unpack it, use something
+like this: 
+
+     md tmp; cd tmp; cat ../initrd | gunzip | cpio -id
+
+After this, you have the full initrd content in tmp/
+
+02) Inspecting the init-script
+The init-script is the only thing the kernel cares about. All activity 
+starts there. Its traditional location is /sbin/init on disk, but /init
+in an initrd. In an initrd unpacked as above it is tmp/init.
+
+While init can be a binary despite usually being called "init script",
+in Debian the main init on the root partition is a binary, but the
+init in the initrd (and only that one is called by the kernel) is a script
+and starts like this:
+
+    #!/bin/sh
+    ....
+
+The "sh" used here is in tmp/bin/sh as just unpacked, and in
+Debian it currently is a busybox.
+
+03) Creating your own initrd
+The two examples below should give you most of what is needed.
+
+Here is a really minimal example. It does nothing but set up some
+things and then drop to an interactive shell. It is perfect to try
+out things that you want to go into the init-script.
+
+!/bin/sh
+export PATH=/sbin:/bin
+[ -d /sys ] || mkdir /sys
+[ -d /proc ] || mkdir /proc
+[ -d /tmp ] || mkdir /tmp
+mount -t sysfs -o nodev,noexec,nosuid sysfs /sys
+mount -t proc -o nodev,noexec,nosuid proc /proc
+echo "initrd is running, starting BusyBox..."
+exec /bin/sh --login
+
+
+Here is an example that opens the first LUKS-partition it
+finds with the hard-coded password "test2" and then 
+mounts it as root-filesystem. This is intended to be 
+used on an USB-stick that after boot goes into a safe, 
+as it contains the LUKS-passphrase in plain text and is
+not secure to be left in the system. The script contains
+debug-output that should make it easier to see what
+is going on. Note that the final hand-over to the
+init on the encrypted root-partition is done 
+by "exec switch_root /mnt/root /sbin/init", after
+mounting the decrypted LUKS container 
+with "mount /dev/mapper/c1 /mnt/root". 
+The second argument of switch_root is relative to the
+first argument, i.e. the init started with this command
+is really /mnt/sbin/init before switch_root runs.
+
+!/bin/sh
+export PATH=/sbin:/bin
+[ -d /sys ] || mkdir /sys
+[ -d /proc ] || mkdir /proc
+[ -d /tmp ] || mkdir /tmp
+mount -t sysfs -o nodev,noexec,nosuid sysfs /sys
+mount -t proc -o nodev,noexec,nosuid proc /proc
+echo "detecting LUKS containers in sda1-10, sdb1-10"; sleep 1
+for i in a b
+do
+  for j in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
+  do
+    sleep 0.5
+    d="/dev/sd"$i""$j
+    echo -n $d
+    cryptsetup isLuks $d >/dev/null 2>&1
+    r=$?
+    echo -n "  result: "$r""
+    # 0 = is LUKS, 1 = is not LUKS, 4 = other error
+    if expr $r = 0 > /dev/null
+    then
+      echo "  is LUKS, attempting unlock"
+      echo -n "test2" | cryptsetup luksOpen --key-file=- $d c1
+      r=$?
+      echo "  result of unlock attempt: "$r""
+      sleep 2
+      if expr $r = 0 > /dev/null
+      then
+        echo "*** LUKS partition unlocked, switching root *** (waiting 30 seconds before doing that)"
+        mount /dev/mapper/c1 /mnt/root
+        sleep 30
+        exec switch_root /mnt/root /sbin/init
+      fi
+    else
+      echo "  is not LUKS"
+    fi
+  done
+done
+echo "FAIL finding root on LUKS, loading BusyBox..."; sleep 5
+exec /bin/sh --login
+
+
+04) What if I want a binary in the initrd, but libraries are missing?
+
+That is a bit tricky. One option is to compile statically, but that
+does not work for everything. Debian puts some libraries into
+lib/ and lib64/ which are usually enough. If you need more, you 
+can add the libraries you need there. That may or may not need a
+configuration change for the dynamic linker "ld" as well. 
+Refer to standard Linux documentation
+on how to add a library to a Linux system. A running initrd is
+just a running Linux system after all, it is not special in any way.
+
+05) How do I repack the initrd?
+
+Simply repack the changed directory. While in tmp/, do
+the following:
+
+find . | cpio --create --format='newc' | gzip > ../new_initrd
+
+Rename "new_initrd" to however you want it called (the name of
+the initrd is a kernel-parameter) and move to /boot. That is it.
+
+10. References and Further Reading
+
+  * Purpose of this Section
+
+  The purpose of this section is to collect references to all materials
+  that do not fit the FAQ but are relevant in some fashion.  This can
+  be core topics like the LUKS spec or disk encryption, but it can also
+  be more tangential, like secure storage management or cryptography
+  used in LUKS.  It should still have relevance to cryptsetup and its
+  applications.
+
+  If you want to see something added here, send email to the maintainer
+  (or the cryptsetup mailing list) giving an URL, a description (1-3
+  lines preferred) and a section to put it in.  You can also propose
+  new sections.
+
+  At this time I would like to limit the references to things that are
+  available on the web.
+
+  * Specifications
+
+  - LUKS on-disk format spec:
+    https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/Specification
+
+  * Code Examples
+
+  - Some code examples are in the source package under docs/examples
+
+  - LUKS AF Splitter in Ruby by John Lane: https://rubygems.org/gems/afsplitter
+
+  * Brute-forcing passphrases
+
+  - http://news.electricalchemy.net/2009/10/password-cracking-in-cloud-part-5.html
+
+  - http://it.slashdot.org/story/12/12/05/0623215/new-25-gpu-monster-devours-strong-passwords-in-minutes
+
+  * Tools
+
+  * SSD and Flash Disk Related
+
+  * Disk Encryption
+
+  * Attacks Against Disk Encryption
+
+  * Risk Management as Relevant for Disk Encryption
+
+  * Cryptography
+
+  * Secure Storage
+
+
+A. Contributors
+In no particular order:
+
+  - Arno Wagner
+
+  - Milan Broz
+
+___
diff --git a/INSTALL b/INSTALL
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..45ff9bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/INSTALL
@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+Copyright 1994, 1995, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Free Software
+Foundation, Inc.
+
+   This file is free documentation; the Free Software Foundation gives
+unlimited permission to copy, distribute and modify it.
+
+Basic Installation
+==================
+
+   These are generic installation instructions.
+
+   The `configure' shell script attempts to guess correct values for
+various system-dependent variables used during compilation.  It uses
+those values to create a `Makefile' in each directory of the package.
+It may also create one or more `.h' files containing system-dependent
+definitions.  Finally, it creates a shell script `config.status' that
+you can run in the future to recreate the current configuration, and a
+file `config.log' containing compiler output (useful mainly for
+debugging `configure').
+
+   It can also use an optional file (typically called `config.cache'
+and enabled with `--cache-file=config.cache' or simply `-C') that saves
+the results of its tests to speed up reconfiguring.  (Caching is
+disabled by default to prevent problems with accidental use of stale
+cache files.)
+
+   If you need to do unusual things to compile the package, please try
+to figure out how `configure' could check whether to do them, and mail
+diffs or instructions to the address given in the `README' so they can
+be considered for the next release.  If you are using the cache, and at
+some point `config.cache' contains results you don't want to keep, you
+may remove or edit it.
+
+   The file `configure.ac' (or `configure.in') is used to create
+`configure' by a program called `autoconf'.  You only need
+`configure.ac' if you want to change it or regenerate `configure' using
+a newer version of `autoconf'.
+
+The simplest way to compile this package is:
+
+  1. `cd' to the directory containing the package's source code and type
+     `./configure' to configure the package for your system.  If you're
+     using `csh' on an old version of System V, you might need to type
+     `sh ./configure' instead to prevent `csh' from trying to execute
+     `configure' itself.
+
+     Running `configure' takes a while.  While running, it prints some
+     messages telling which features it is checking for.
+
+  2. Type `make' to compile the package.
+
+  3. Optionally, type `make check' to run any self-tests that come with
+     the package.
+
+  4. Type `make install' to install the programs and any data files and
+     documentation.
+
+  5. You can remove the program binaries and object files from the
+     source code directory by typing `make clean'.  To also remove the
+     files that `configure' created (so you can compile the package for
+     a different kind of computer), type `make distclean'.  There is
+     also a `make maintainer-clean' target, but that is intended mainly
+     for the package's developers.  If you use it, you may have to get
+     all sorts of other programs in order to regenerate files that came
+     with the distribution.
+
+Compilers and Options
+=====================
+
+   Some systems require unusual options for compilation or linking that
+the `configure' script does not know about.  Run `./configure --help'
+for details on some of the pertinent environment variables.
+
+   You can give `configure' initial values for configuration parameters
+by setting variables in the command line or in the environment.  Here
+is an example:
+
+     ./configure CC=c89 CFLAGS=-O2 LIBS=-lposix
+
+   *Note Defining Variables::, for more details.
+
+Compiling For Multiple Architectures
+====================================
+
+   You can compile the package for more than one kind of computer at the
+same time, by placing the object files for each architecture in their
+own directory.  To do this, you must use a version of `make' that
+supports the `VPATH' variable, such as GNU `make'.  `cd' to the
+directory where you want the object files and executables to go and run
+the `configure' script.  `configure' automatically checks for the
+source code in the directory that `configure' is in and in `..'.
+
+   If you have to use a `make' that does not support the `VPATH'
+variable, you have to compile the package for one architecture at a
+time in the source code directory.  After you have installed the
+package for one architecture, use `make distclean' before reconfiguring
+for another architecture.
+
+Installation Names
+==================
+
+   By default, `make install' will install the package's files in
+`/usr/local/bin', `/usr/local/man', etc.  You can specify an
+installation prefix other than `/usr/local' by giving `configure' the
+option `--prefix=PATH'.
+
+   You can specify separate installation prefixes for
+architecture-specific files and architecture-independent files.  If you
+give `configure' the option `--exec-prefix=PATH', the package will use
+PATH as the prefix for installing programs and libraries.
+Documentation and other data files will still use the regular prefix.
+
+   In addition, if you use an unusual directory layout you can give
+options like `--bindir=PATH' to specify different values for particular
+kinds of files.  Run `configure --help' for a list of the directories
+you can set and what kinds of files go in them.
+
+   If the package supports it, you can cause programs to be installed
+with an extra prefix or suffix on their names by giving `configure' the
+option `--program-prefix=PREFIX' or `--program-suffix=SUFFIX'.
+
+Optional Features
+=================
+
+   Some packages pay attention to `--enable-FEATURE' options to
+`configure', where FEATURE indicates an optional part of the package.
+They may also pay attention to `--with-PACKAGE' options, where PACKAGE
+is something like `gnu-as' or `x' (for the X Window System).  The
+`README' should mention any `--enable-' and `--with-' options that the
+package recognizes.
+
+   For packages that use the X Window System, `configure' can usually
+find the X include and library files automatically, but if it doesn't,
+you can use the `configure' options `--x-includes=DIR' and
+`--x-libraries=DIR' to specify their locations.
+
+Specifying the System Type
+==========================
+
+   There may be some features `configure' cannot figure out
+automatically, but needs to determine by the type of machine the package
+will run on.  Usually, assuming the package is built to be run on the
+_same_ architectures, `configure' can figure that out, but if it prints
+a message saying it cannot guess the machine type, give it the
+`--build=TYPE' option.  TYPE can either be a short name for the system
+type, such as `sun4', or a canonical name which has the form:
+
+     CPU-COMPANY-SYSTEM
+
+where SYSTEM can have one of these forms:
+
+     OS KERNEL-OS
+
+   See the file `config.sub' for the possible values of each field.  If
+`config.sub' isn't included in this package, then this package doesn't
+need to know the machine type.
+
+   If you are _building_ compiler tools for cross-compiling, you should
+use the `--target=TYPE' option to select the type of system they will
+produce code for.
+
+   If you want to _use_ a cross compiler, that generates code for a
+platform different from the build platform, you should specify the
+"host" platform (i.e., that on which the generated programs will
+eventually be run) with `--host=TYPE'.
+
+Sharing Defaults
+================
+
+   If you want to set default values for `configure' scripts to share,
+you can create a site shell script called `config.site' that gives
+default values for variables like `CC', `cache_file', and `prefix'.
+`configure' looks for `PREFIX/share/config.site' if it exists, then
+`PREFIX/etc/config.site' if it exists.  Or, you can set the
+`CONFIG_SITE' environment variable to the location of the site script.
+A warning: not all `configure' scripts look for a site script.
+
+Defining Variables
+==================
+
+   Variables not defined in a site shell script can be set in the
+environment passed to `configure'.  However, some packages may run
+configure again during the build, and the customized values of these
+variables may be lost.  In order to avoid this problem, you should set
+them in the `configure' command line, using `VAR=value'.  For example:
+
+     ./configure CC=/usr/local2/bin/gcc
+
+will cause the specified gcc to be used as the C compiler (unless it is
+overridden in the site shell script).
+
+`configure' Invocation
+======================
+
+   `configure' recognizes the following options to control how it
+operates.
+
+`--help'
+`-h'
+     Print a summary of the options to `configure', and exit.
+
+`--version'
+`-V'
+     Print the version of Autoconf used to generate the `configure'
+     script, and exit.
+
+`--cache-file=FILE'
+     Enable the cache: use and save the results of the tests in FILE,
+     traditionally `config.cache'.  FILE defaults to `/dev/null' to
+     disable caching.
+
+`--config-cache'
+`-C'
+     Alias for `--cache-file=config.cache'.
+
+`--quiet'
+`--silent'
+`-q'
+     Do not print messages saying which checks are being made.  To
+     suppress all normal output, redirect it to `/dev/null' (any error
+     messages will still be shown).
+
+`--srcdir=DIR'
+     Look for the package's source code in directory DIR.  Usually
+     `configure' can determine that directory automatically.
+
+`configure' also accepts some other, not widely useful, options.  Run
+`configure --help' for more details.
+
diff --git a/Makefile.am b/Makefile.am
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..87cc0f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Makefile.am
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+EXTRA_DIST = COPYING.LGPL FAQ docs misc
+SUBDIRS = po tests
+CLEANFILES =
+DISTCLEAN_TARGETS =
+
+AM_CPPFLAGS = \
+	-include config.h \
+	-I$(top_srcdir)/lib \
+        -DDATADIR=\""$(datadir)"\"              \
+        -DLOCALEDIR=\""$(datadir)/locale"\"     \
+        -DLIBDIR=\""$(libdir)"\"                \
+        -DPREFIX=\""$(prefix)"\"                \
+        -DSYSCONFDIR=\""$(sysconfdir)"\"        \
+        -DVERSION=\""$(VERSION)"\"
+AM_CFLAGS = -Wall
+AM_LDFLAGS =
+
+tmpfilesddir = @DEFAULT_TMPFILESDIR@
+
+noinst_LTLIBRARIES =
+sbin_PROGRAMS =
+man8_MANS =
+tmpfilesd_DATA =
+
+include man/Makemodule.am
+
+include scripts/Makemodule.am
+
+if CRYPTO_INTERNAL_ARGON2
+include lib/crypto_backend/argon2/Makemodule.am
+endif
+include lib/crypto_backend/Makemodule.am
+include lib/Makemodule.am
+
+include src/Makemodule.am
+
+ACLOCAL_AMFLAGS = -I m4
+
+DISTCHECK_CONFIGURE_FLAGS = 	\
+	--with-tmpfilesdir=$$dc_install_base/usr/lib/tmpfiles.d \
+	--enable-internal-argon2 --enable-internal-sse-argon2
+
+distclean-local:
+	-find . -name \*~ -o -name \*.orig -o -name \*.rej | xargs rm -f
+	rm -rf autom4te.cache
+
+clean-local:
+	-rm -rf docs/doxygen_api_docs libargon2.la
diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..168617a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+See docs/* directory for Release Notes.
diff --git a/README b/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..613aa09
--- /dev/null
+++ b/README
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+
+                        cryptsetup
+
+setup cryptographic volumes for dm-crypt (including LUKS extension)
+
+WEB PAGE:
+
+      https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/
+
+FAQ:
+
+      https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/FrequentlyAskedQuestions
+
+MAILING LIST:
+
+      E-MAIL: dm-crypt@saout.de
+      URL:    http://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt
+
+DOWNLOAD:
+
+      https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/
+
+SOURCE CODE:
+
+      URL: https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/tree/master
+      Checkout: git clone https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.git
+
+NLS (PO TRANSLATIONS):
+
+      PO files are maintained by:
+          http://translationproject.org/domain/cryptsetup.html
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..043b58b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+![LUKS logo](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/luks-logo.png)
+
+What the ...?
+=============
+**Cryptsetup** is utility used to conveniently setup disk encryption based
+on [DMCrypt](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMCrypt) kernel module.
+
+These include **plain** **dm-crypt** volumes, **LUKS** volumes, **loop-AES**
+and **TrueCrypt** (including **VeraCrypt** extension) format.
+
+Project also includes **veritysetup** utility used to conveniently setup
+[DMVerity](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMVerity) block integrity checking kernel module
+and, since version 2.0,  **integritysetup** to setup
+[DMIntegrity](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMIntegrity) block integrity kernel module.
+
+
+LUKS Design
+-----------
+**LUKS** is the standard for Linux hard disk encryption. By providing a standard on-disk-format, it does not  
+only facilitate compatibility among distributions, but also provides secure management of multiple user passwords.  
+LUKS stores all necessary setup information in the partition header, enabling to transport or migrate data seamlessly.
+
+Last version of the LUKS format specification is
+[available here](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/LUKS_docs/on-disk-format.pdf).
+
+Why LUKS?
+---------
+ * compatibility via standardization,
+ * secure against low entropy attacks,
+ * support for multiple keys,
+ * effective passphrase revocation,
+ * free.
+
+[Project home page](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/).
+-----------------
+
+[Frequently asked questions (FAQ)](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/FrequentlyAskedQuestions)
+--------------------------------
+
+Download
+--------
+All release tarballs and release notes are hosted on [kernel.org](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/).
+
+**The latest cryptsetup version is 2.0.6**
+  * [cryptsetup-2.0.6.tar.xz](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.6.tar.xz)
+  * Signature [cryptsetup-2.0.6.tar.sign](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.6.tar.sign)
+    _(You need to decompress file first to check signature.)_
+  * [Cryptsetup 2.0.6 Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/v2.0.6-ReleaseNotes).
+
+Previous versions
+ * [Version 2.0.5](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.5.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.5.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/v2.0.5-ReleaseNotes).
+ * [Version 2.0.4](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.4.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.4.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/v2.0.4-ReleaseNotes).
+ * [Version 2.0.3](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.3.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.3.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/v2.0.3-ReleaseNotes).
+ * [Version 2.0.2](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.2.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.2.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/v2.0.2-ReleaseNotes).
+ * [Version 2.0.1](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.1.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.1.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/v2.0.1-ReleaseNotes).
+ * [Version 2.0.0](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.0.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.0.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/v2.0.0-ReleaseNotes).
+ * [Version 1.7.5](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.5.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.5.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/v1.7.5-ReleaseNotes).
+ * [Version 1.7.4](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.4.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.4.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/v1.7.4-ReleaseNotes).
+ * [Version 1.7.3](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.3.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.3.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/v1.7.3-ReleaseNotes).
+ * [Version 1.7.2](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.2.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.2.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/v1.7.2-ReleaseNotes).
+ * [Version 1.7.1](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.1.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.1.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/v1.7.1-ReleaseNotes).
+ * [Version 1.7.0](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.0.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.0.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/v1.7.0-ReleaseNotes).
+
+Source and API docs
+-------------------
+For development version code, please refer to [source](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/tree/master) page,
+mirror on [kernel.org](https://git.kernel.org/cgit/utils/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.git/) or [GitHub](https://github.com/mbroz/cryptsetup).
+
+For libcryptsetup documentation see [libcryptsetup API](https://mbroz.fedorapeople.org/libcryptsetup_API/) page.
+
+The libcryptsetup API/ABI changes are tracked in [compatibility report](https://abi-laboratory.pro/tracker/timeline/cryptsetup/).
+
+NLS PO files are maintained by [TranslationProject](http://translationproject.org/domain/cryptsetup.html).
+
+Help!
+-----
+Please always read [FAQ](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/FrequentlyAskedQuestions) first.
+For cryptsetup and LUKS related questions, please use the dm-crypt mailing list, [dm-crypt@saout.de](mailto:dm-crypt@saout.de).
+
+If you want to subscribe just send an empty mail to [dm-crypt-subscribe@saout.de](mailto:dm-crypt-subscribe@saout.de).
+
+You can also browse [list archive](http://www.saout.de/pipermail/dm-crypt/) or read it through
+[web interface](https://marc.info/?l=dm-crypt).
diff --git a/TODO b/TODO
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..58e5cc9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/TODO
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Please see issues tracked at https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/issues.
diff --git a/autogen.sh b/autogen.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..c6719f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/autogen.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# Run this to generate all the initial makefiles, etc.
+
+srcdir=`dirname $0`
+PKG_NAME="cryptsetup"
+
+DIE=0
+
+(autopoint --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 || {
+  echo
+  echo "**Error**: You must have autopoint installed."
+  echo "Download the appropriate package for your distribution,"
+  echo "or see http://www.gnu.org/software/gettext"
+  DIE=1
+}
+
+(autoconf --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 || {
+  echo
+  echo "**Error**: You must have autoconf installed to."
+  echo "Download the appropriate package for your distribution,"
+  echo "or get the source tarball at ftp://ftp.gnu.org/pub/gnu/"
+  DIE=1
+}
+
+(grep "^AM_PROG_LIBTOOL" $srcdir/configure.ac >/dev/null) && {
+  (libtool --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 || {
+    echo
+    echo "**Error**: You must have libtool installed."
+    echo "Get ftp://ftp.gnu.org/pub/gnu/"
+    echo "(or a newer version if it is available)"
+    DIE=1
+  }
+}
+
+(automake --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 || {
+  echo
+  echo "**Error**: You must have automake installed."
+  echo "Get ftp://ftp.gnu.org/pub/gnu/"
+  echo "(or a newer version if it is available)"
+  DIE=1
+  NO_AUTOMAKE=yes
+}
+
+
+# if no automake, don't bother testing for aclocal
+test -n "$NO_AUTOMAKE" || (aclocal --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 || {
+  echo
+  echo "**Error**: Missing aclocal.  The version of automake"
+  echo "installed doesn't appear recent enough."
+  echo "Get ftp://ftp.gnu.org/pub/gnu/"
+  echo "(or a newer version if it is available)"
+  DIE=1
+}
+
+if test "$DIE" -eq 1; then
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+echo
+echo "Generate build-system by:"
+echo "   autopoint:  $(autopoint --version | head -1)"
+echo "   aclocal:    $(aclocal --version | head -1)"
+echo "   autoconf:   $(autoconf --version | head -1)"
+echo "   automake:   $(automake --version | head -1)"
+echo "   libtoolize: $(libtoolize --version | head -1)"
+echo
+
+
+set -e
+autopoint --force $AP_OPTS
+libtoolize --force --copy
+aclocal -I m4 $AL_OPTS
+autoheader $AH_OPTS
+automake --add-missing --copy --gnu $AM_OPTS
+autoconf $AC_OPTS
+
+echo
+echo "Now type '$srcdir/configure' and 'make' to compile."
+echo
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..527602d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -0,0 +1,635 @@
+AC_PREREQ([2.67])
+AC_INIT([cryptsetup],[2.1.0])
+
+dnl library version from <major>.<minor>.<release>[-<suffix>]
+LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION=$(echo $PACKAGE_VERSION | cut -f1 -d-)
+LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_INFO=16:0:4
+
+AM_SILENT_RULES([yes])
+AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR(src/cryptsetup.c)
+AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR([m4])
+
+AC_CONFIG_HEADERS([config.h:config.h.in])
+
+# We do not want to run test in parallel. Really.
+# http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/automake/2013-01/msg00060.html
+
+# For old automake use this
+#AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(dist-xz subdir-objects)
+AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([dist-xz 1.12 serial-tests subdir-objects])
+
+if test "x$prefix" = "xNONE"; then
+	sysconfdir=/etc
+fi
+AC_PREFIX_DEFAULT(/usr)
+
+AC_CANONICAL_HOST
+AC_USE_SYSTEM_EXTENSIONS
+AC_PROG_CC
+AM_PROG_CC_C_O
+AC_PROG_CPP
+AC_PROG_INSTALL
+AC_PROG_MAKE_SET
+AC_ENABLE_STATIC(no)
+LT_INIT
+PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG
+
+dnl ==========================================================================
+dnl define PKG_CHECK_VAR for old pkg-config <= 0.28
+m4_ifndef([AS_VAR_COPY],
+[m4_define([AS_VAR_COPY],
+[AS_LITERAL_IF([$1[]$2], [$1=$$2], [eval $1=\$$2])])
+])
+m4_ifndef([PKG_CHECK_VAR], [
+AC_DEFUN([PKG_CHECK_VAR],
+[AC_REQUIRE([PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG])
+AC_ARG_VAR([$1], [value of $3 for $2, overriding pkg-config])
+
+_PKG_CONFIG([$1], [variable="][$3]["], [$2])
+AS_VAR_COPY([$1], [pkg_cv_][$1])
+
+AS_VAR_IF([$1], [""], [$5], [$4])
+])
+])
+dnl ==========================================================================
+
+AC_C_RESTRICT
+
+AC_HEADER_DIRENT
+AC_HEADER_STDC
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS(fcntl.h malloc.h inttypes.h sys/ioctl.h sys/mman.h \
+	sys/sysmacros.h sys/statvfs.h ctype.h unistd.h locale.h byteswap.h endian.h stdint.h)
+
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS(uuid/uuid.h,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the uuid library.])])
+AC_CHECK_HEADER(libdevmapper.h,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the device-mapper library.])])
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([keyring],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-keyring], [disable kernel keyring support and builtin kernel keyring token]),
+	[], [enable_keyring=yes])
+if test "x$enable_keyring" = "xyes"; then
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(linux/keyctl.h,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need Linux kernel headers with kernel keyring service compiled.])])
+
+	dnl ==========================================================================
+	dnl check whether kernel is compiled with kernel keyring service syscalls
+	AC_CHECK_DECL(__NR_add_key,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([The kernel is missing add_key syscall.])], [#include <syscall.h>])
+	AC_CHECK_DECL(__NR_keyctl,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([The kernel is missing keyctl syscall.])], [#include <syscall.h>])
+	AC_CHECK_DECL(__NR_request_key,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([The kernel is missing request_key syscall.])], [#include <syscall.h>])
+
+	dnl ==========================================================================
+	dnl check that key_serial_t hasn't been adopted yet in stdlib
+	AC_CHECK_TYPES([key_serial_t], [], [], [
+	AC_INCLUDES_DEFAULT
+	#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_KEYCTL_H
+	# include <linux/keyctl.h>
+	#endif
+	])
+
+	AC_DEFINE(KERNEL_KEYRING, 1, [Enable kernel keyring service support])
+fi
+AM_CONDITIONAL(KERNEL_KEYRING, test "x$enable_keyring" = "xyes")
+
+saved_LIBS=$LIBS
+AC_CHECK_LIB(uuid, uuid_clear, ,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the uuid library.])])
+AC_SUBST(UUID_LIBS, $LIBS)
+LIBS=$saved_LIBS
+
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([clock_gettime],[rt posix4])
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([posix_memalign clock_gettime posix_fallocate explicit_bzero])
+
+if test "x$enable_largefile" = "xno"; then
+  AC_MSG_ERROR([Building with --disable-largefile is not supported, it can cause data corruption.])
+fi
+
+AC_C_CONST
+AC_C_BIGENDIAN
+AC_TYPE_OFF_T
+AC_SYS_LARGEFILE
+AC_FUNC_FSEEKO
+AC_PROG_GCC_TRADITIONAL
+AC_FUNC_STRERROR_R
+
+dnl ==========================================================================
+
+AM_GNU_GETTEXT([external],[need-ngettext])
+AM_GNU_GETTEXT_VERSION([0.18.3])
+
+dnl ==========================================================================
+
+saved_LIBS=$LIBS
+AC_CHECK_LIB(popt, poptConfigFileToString,,
+	[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need popt 1.7 or newer to compile.])])
+AC_SUBST(POPT_LIBS, $LIBS)
+LIBS=$saved_LIBS
+
+dnl ==========================================================================
+dnl FIPS extensions
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([fips],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-fips], [enable FIPS mode restrictions]))
+if test "x$enable_fips" = "xyes"; then
+	AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_FIPS, 1, [Enable FIPS mode restrictions])
+
+	if test "x$enable_static" = "xyes" -o "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes" ; then
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([Static build is not compatible with FIPS.])
+	fi
+fi
+
+AC_DEFUN([NO_FIPS], [
+	if test "x$enable_fips" = "xyes"; then
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([This option is not compatible with FIPS.])
+	fi
+])
+
+dnl ==========================================================================
+dnl pwquality library (cryptsetup CLI only)
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([pwquality],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-pwquality], [enable password quality checking using pwquality library]))
+
+if test "x$enable_pwquality" = "xyes"; then
+	AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_PWQUALITY, 1, [Enable password quality checking using pwquality library])
+	PKG_CHECK_MODULES([PWQUALITY], [pwquality >= 1.0.0],,
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([You need pwquality library.]))
+
+	dnl FIXME: this is really hack for now
+	PWQUALITY_STATIC_LIBS="$PWQUALITY_LIBS -lcrack -lz"
+fi
+
+dnl ==========================================================================
+dnl passwdqc library (cryptsetup CLI only)
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([passwdqc],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-passwdqc@<:@=CONFIG_PATH@:>@],
+		       [enable password quality checking using passwdqc library (optionally with CONFIG_PATH)]))
+
+case "$enable_passwdqc" in
+	""|yes|no) use_passwdqc_config="" ;;
+	/*) use_passwdqc_config="$enable_passwdqc"; enable_passwdqc=yes ;;
+	*) AC_MSG_ERROR([Unrecognized --enable-passwdqc parameter.]) ;;
+esac
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PASSWDQC_CONFIG_FILE], ["$use_passwdqc_config"], [passwdqc library config file])
+
+if test "x$enable_passwdqc" = "xyes"; then
+	AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_PASSWDQC, 1, [Enable password quality checking using passwdqc library])
+
+	PASSWDQC_LIBS="-lpasswdqc"
+fi
+
+if test "x$enable_pwquality$enable_passwdqc" = "xyesyes"; then
+	AC_MSG_ERROR([--enable-pwquality and --enable-passwdqc are mutually incompatible.])
+fi
+
+dnl ==========================================================================
+dnl Crypto backend functions
+
+AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_GCRYPT], [
+	if test "x$enable_fips" = "xyes"; then
+		GCRYPT_REQ_VERSION=1.4.5
+	else
+		GCRYPT_REQ_VERSION=1.1.42
+	fi
+
+	dnl libgcrypt rejects to use pkgconfig, use AM_PATH_LIBGCRYPT from gcrypt-devel here.
+	dnl Do not require gcrypt-devel if other crypto backend is used.
+	m4_ifdef([AM_PATH_LIBGCRYPT],[
+	AC_ARG_ENABLE([gcrypt-pbkdf2],
+		dnl Check if we can use gcrypt PBKDF2 (1.6.0 supports empty password)
+		AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-gcrypt-pbkdf2], [force enable internal gcrypt PBKDF2]),
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xyes"; then
+			[use_internal_pbkdf2=0]
+		else
+			[use_internal_pbkdf2=1]
+		fi,
+		[AM_PATH_LIBGCRYPT([1.6.1], [use_internal_pbkdf2=0], [use_internal_pbkdf2=1])])
+	AM_PATH_LIBGCRYPT($GCRYPT_REQ_VERSION,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the gcrypt library.])])],
+	AC_MSG_ERROR([Missing support for gcrypt: install gcrypt and regenerate configure.]))
+
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([if internal cryptsetup PBKDF2 is compiled-in])
+	if test $use_internal_pbkdf2 = 0; then
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+	else
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+		NO_FIPS([])
+	fi
+
+	if test "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes"; then
+		saved_LIBS=$LIBS
+		LIBS="$saved_LIBS $LIBGCRYPT_LIBS -static"
+		AC_CHECK_LIB(gcrypt, gcry_check_version,,
+			AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot find static gcrypt library.]),
+			[-lgpg-error])
+		LIBGCRYPT_STATIC_LIBS="$LIBGCRYPT_LIBS -lgpg-error"
+		LIBS=$saved_LIBS
+        fi
+
+	CRYPTO_CFLAGS=$LIBGCRYPT_CFLAGS
+	CRYPTO_LIBS=$LIBGCRYPT_LIBS
+	CRYPTO_STATIC_LIBS=$LIBGCRYPT_STATIC_LIBS
+
+	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GCRYPT_REQ_VERSION, ["$GCRYPT_REQ_VERSION"], [Requested gcrypt version])
+])
+
+AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_OPENSSL], [
+	PKG_CHECK_MODULES([OPENSSL], [openssl >= 0.9.8],,
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([You need openssl library.]))
+	CRYPTO_CFLAGS=$OPENSSL_CFLAGS
+	CRYPTO_LIBS=$OPENSSL_LIBS
+	use_internal_pbkdf2=0
+
+	if test "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes"; then
+		saved_PKG_CONFIG=$PKG_CONFIG
+		PKG_CONFIG="$PKG_CONFIG --static"
+		PKG_CHECK_MODULES([OPENSSL_STATIC], [openssl])
+		CRYPTO_STATIC_LIBS=$OPENSSL_STATIC_LIBS
+		PKG_CONFIG=$saved_PKG_CONFIG
+	fi
+])
+
+AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_NSS], [
+	if test "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes"; then
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([Static build of cryptsetup is not supported with NSS.])
+	fi
+
+	AC_MSG_WARN([NSS backend does NOT provide backward compatibility (missing ripemd160 hash).])
+
+	PKG_CHECK_MODULES([NSS], [nss],,
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([You need nss library.]))
+
+	saved_CFLAGS=$CFLAGS
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS"
+	AC_CHECK_DECLS([NSS_GetVersion], [], [], [#include <nss.h>])
+	CFLAGS=$saved_CFLAGS
+
+	CRYPTO_CFLAGS=$NSS_CFLAGS
+	CRYPTO_LIBS=$NSS_LIBS
+	use_internal_pbkdf2=1
+	NO_FIPS([])
+])
+
+AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_KERNEL], [
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(linux/if_alg.h,,
+		[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need Linux kernel headers with userspace crypto interface.])])
+#	AC_CHECK_DECLS([AF_ALG],,
+#		[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need Linux kernel with userspace crypto interface.])],
+#		[#include <sys/socket.h>])
+	use_internal_pbkdf2=1
+	NO_FIPS([])
+])
+
+AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_NETTLE], [
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(nettle/sha.h,,
+		[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need Nettle cryptographic library.])])
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(nettle/version.h)
+
+	saved_LIBS=$LIBS
+	AC_CHECK_LIB(nettle, nettle_pbkdf2_hmac_sha256,,
+		[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need Nettle library version 2.6 or more recent.])])
+	CRYPTO_LIBS=$LIBS
+	LIBS=$saved_LIBS
+
+	CRYPTO_STATIC_LIBS=$CRYPTO_LIBS
+	use_internal_pbkdf2=0
+	NO_FIPS([])
+])
+
+dnl ==========================================================================
+saved_LIBS=$LIBS
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([static-cryptsetup],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-static-cryptsetup], [enable build of static version of tools]))
+if test "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes"; then
+	if test "x$enable_static" = "xno"; then
+		AC_MSG_WARN([Requested static cryptsetup build, enabling static library.])
+		enable_static=yes
+	fi
+fi
+AM_CONDITIONAL(STATIC_TOOLS, test "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes")
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([cryptsetup],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-cryptsetup], [disable cryptsetup support]),
+	[], [enable_cryptsetup=yes])
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTSETUP, test "x$enable_cryptsetup" = "xyes")
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([veritysetup],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-veritysetup], [disable veritysetup support]),
+	[], [enable_veritysetup=yes])
+AM_CONDITIONAL(VERITYSETUP, test "x$enable_veritysetup" = "xyes")
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([cryptsetup-reencrypt],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-cryptsetup-reencrypt], [disable cryptsetup-reencrypt tool]),
+	[], [enable_cryptsetup_reencrypt=yes])
+AM_CONDITIONAL(REENCRYPT, test "x$enable_cryptsetup_reencrypt" = "xyes")
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([integritysetup],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-integritysetup], [disable integritysetup support]),
+	[], [enable_integritysetup=yes])
+AM_CONDITIONAL(INTEGRITYSETUP, test "x$enable_integritysetup" = "xyes")
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([selinux],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-selinux], [disable selinux support [default=auto]]),
+	[], [enable_selinux=yes])
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([udev],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-udev], [disable udev support]),
+	[], [enable_udev=yes])
+
+dnl Try to use pkg-config for devmapper, but fallback to old detection
+PKG_CHECK_MODULES([DEVMAPPER], [devmapper >= 1.02.03],, [
+	AC_CHECK_LIB(devmapper, dm_task_set_name,,
+		[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the device-mapper library.])])
+	AC_CHECK_LIB(devmapper, dm_task_set_message,,
+		[AC_MSG_ERROR([The device-mapper library on your system is too old.])])
+	DEVMAPPER_LIBS=$LIBS
+])
+LIBS=$saved_LIBS
+
+LIBS="$LIBS $DEVMAPPER_LIBS"
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([dm_task_secure_data], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([dm_task_retry_remove], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([dm_task_deferred_remove], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([dm_device_has_mounted_fs], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([dm_device_has_holders], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([DM_UDEV_DISABLE_DISK_RULES_FLAG], [have_cookie=yes], [have_cookie=no], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
+if test "x$enable_udev" = xyes; then
+	if test "x$have_cookie" = xno; then
+		AC_MSG_WARN([The device-mapper library on your system has no udev support, udev support disabled.])
+	else
+		AC_DEFINE(USE_UDEV, 1, [Try to use udev synchronisation?])
+	fi
+fi
+LIBS=$saved_LIBS
+
+dnl Check for JSON-C used in LUKS2
+PKG_CHECK_MODULES([JSON_C], [json-c])
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([json_object_object_add_ex], [], [], [#include <json-c/json.h>])
+
+dnl Crypto backend configuration.
+AC_ARG_WITH([crypto_backend],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--with-crypto_backend=BACKEND], [crypto backend (gcrypt/openssl/nss/kernel/nettle) [openssl]]),
+	[], [with_crypto_backend=openssl])
+
+dnl Kernel crypto API backend needed for benchmark and tcrypt
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([kernel_crypto],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-kernel_crypto], [disable kernel userspace crypto (no benchmark and tcrypt)]),
+	[], [enable_kernel_crypto=yes])
+
+if test "x$enable_kernel_crypto" = "xyes"; then
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(linux/if_alg.h,,
+		[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need Linux kernel headers with userspace crypto interface. (Or use --disable-kernel_crypto.)])])
+	AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_AF_ALG, 1, [Enable using of kernel userspace crypto])
+fi
+
+case $with_crypto_backend in
+	gcrypt)  CONFIGURE_GCRYPT([]) ;;
+	openssl) CONFIGURE_OPENSSL([]) ;;
+	nss)     CONFIGURE_NSS([]) ;;
+	kernel)  CONFIGURE_KERNEL([]) ;;
+	nettle)  CONFIGURE_NETTLE([]) ;;
+	*) AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown crypto backend.]) ;;
+esac
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_BACKEND_GCRYPT,  test "$with_crypto_backend" = "gcrypt")
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_BACKEND_OPENSSL, test "$with_crypto_backend" = "openssl")
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_BACKEND_NSS,     test "$with_crypto_backend" = "nss")
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_BACKEND_KERNEL,  test "$with_crypto_backend" = "kernel")
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_BACKEND_NETTLE,  test "$with_crypto_backend" = "nettle")
+
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_INTERNAL_PBKDF2, test $use_internal_pbkdf2 = 1)
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(USE_INTERNAL_PBKDF2, [$use_internal_pbkdf2], [Use internal PBKDF2])
+
+dnl Argon2 implementation
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([internal-argon2],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-internal-argon2], [disable internal implementation of Argon2 PBKDF]),
+	[], [enable_internal_argon2=yes])
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([libargon2],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-libargon2], [enable external libargon2 (PHC) library (disables internal bundled version)]))
+
+if test "x$enable_libargon2" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(argon2.h,,
+		[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need libargon2 development library installed.])])
+	AC_CHECK_DECL(Argon2_id,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need more recent Argon2 library with support for Argon2id.])], [#include <argon2.h>])
+	PKG_CHECK_MODULES([LIBARGON2], [libargon2],,[LIBARGON2_LIBS="-largon2"])
+	enable_internal_argon2=no
+else
+	AC_MSG_WARN([Argon2 bundled (slow) reference implementation will be used, please consider to use system library with --enable-libargon2.])
+
+	AC_ARG_ENABLE([internal-sse-argon2],
+		AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-internal-sse-argon2], [enable internal SSE implementation of Argon2 PBKDF]))
+
+	if test "x$enable_internal_sse_argon2" = "xyes"; then
+		AC_MSG_CHECKING(if Argon2 SSE optimization can be used)
+		AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+			#include <emmintrin.h>
+			__m128i testfunc(__m128i *a, __m128i *b) {
+			  return _mm_xor_si128(_mm_loadu_si128(a), _mm_loadu_si128(b));
+			}
+		]])],,[enable_internal_sse_argon2=no])
+		AC_MSG_RESULT($enable_internal_sse_argon2)
+	fi
+fi
+
+if test "x$enable_internal_argon2" = "xyes"; then
+	AC_DEFINE(USE_INTERNAL_ARGON2, 1, [Use internal Argon2])
+fi
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_INTERNAL_ARGON2, test "x$enable_internal_argon2" = "xyes")
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_INTERNAL_SSE_ARGON2, test "x$enable_internal_sse_argon2" = "xyes")
+
+dnl Link with blkid to check for other device types
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([blkid],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-blkid], [disable use of blkid for device signature detection and wiping]),
+	[], [enable_blkid=yes])
+
+if test "x$enable_blkid" = "xyes"; then
+	PKG_CHECK_MODULES([BLKID], [blkid],[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_BLKID], 1, [Define to 1 to use blkid for detection of disk signatures.])],[LIBBLKID_LIBS="-lblkid"])
+
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(blkid/blkid.h,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need blkid development library installed.])])
+	AC_CHECK_DECL([blkid_do_wipe],
+		      [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_BLKID_WIPE], 1, [Define to 1 to use blkid_do_wipe.])
+			enable_blkid_wipe=yes
+		      ],,
+		      [#include <blkid/blkid.h>])
+	AC_CHECK_DECL([blkid_probe_step_back],
+		      [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_BLKID_STEP_BACK], 1, [Define to 1 to use blkid_probe_step_back.])
+			enable_blkid_step_back=yes
+		      ],,
+		      [#include <blkid/blkid.h>])
+	AC_CHECK_DECLS([ blkid_reset_probe,
+			 blkid_probe_set_device,
+			 blkid_probe_filter_superblocks_type,
+			 blkid_do_safeprobe,
+			 blkid_do_probe,
+			 blkid_probe_lookup_value
+		       ],,
+		       [AC_MSG_ERROR([Can not compile with blkid support, disable it by --disable-blkid.])],
+		       [#include <blkid/blkid.h>])
+fi
+AM_CONDITIONAL(HAVE_BLKID, test "x$enable_blkid" = "xyes")
+AM_CONDITIONAL(HAVE_BLKID_WIPE, test "x$enable_blkid_wipe" = "xyes")
+AM_CONDITIONAL(HAVE_BLKID_STEP_BACK, test "x$enable_blkid_step_back" = "xyes")
+
+dnl Magic for cryptsetup.static build.
+if test "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes"; then
+	saved_PKG_CONFIG=$PKG_CONFIG
+	PKG_CONFIG="$PKG_CONFIG --static"
+
+	LIBS="$saved_LIBS -static"
+	AC_CHECK_LIB(popt, poptGetContext,,
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot find static popt library.]))
+
+	dnl Try to detect needed device-mapper static libraries, try pkg-config first.
+	LIBS="$saved_LIBS -static"
+	PKG_CHECK_MODULES([DEVMAPPER_STATIC], [devmapper >= 1.02.27],,[
+		DEVMAPPER_STATIC_LIBS=$DEVMAPPER_LIBS
+		if test "x$enable_selinux" = "xyes"; then
+			AC_CHECK_LIB(sepol, sepol_bool_set)
+			AC_CHECK_LIB(selinux, is_selinux_enabled)
+			DEVMAPPER_STATIC_LIBS="$DEVMAPPER_STATIC_LIBS $LIBS"
+		fi
+	])
+	LIBS="$saved_LIBS $DEVMAPPER_STATIC_LIBS"
+	AC_CHECK_LIB(devmapper, dm_task_set_uuid,,
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot link with static device-mapper library.]))
+
+	dnl Try to detect uuid static library.
+	LIBS="$saved_LIBS -static"
+	AC_CHECK_LIB(uuid, uuid_generate,,
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot find static uuid library.]))
+
+	LIBS=$saved_LIBS
+	PKG_CONFIG=$saved_PKG_CONFIG
+fi
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([for systemd tmpfiles config directory])
+PKG_CHECK_VAR([systemd_tmpfilesdir], [systemd], [tmpfilesdir], [], [systemd_tmpfilesdir=no])
+AC_MSG_RESULT([$systemd_tmpfilesdir])
+
+AC_SUBST([DEVMAPPER_LIBS])
+AC_SUBST([DEVMAPPER_STATIC_LIBS])
+
+AC_SUBST([PWQUALITY_LIBS])
+AC_SUBST([PWQUALITY_STATIC_LIBS])
+
+AC_SUBST([PASSWDQC_LIBS])
+
+AC_SUBST([CRYPTO_CFLAGS])
+AC_SUBST([CRYPTO_LIBS])
+AC_SUBST([CRYPTO_STATIC_LIBS])
+
+AC_SUBST([JSON_C_LIBS])
+AC_SUBST([LIBARGON2_LIBS])
+AC_SUBST([BLKID_LIBS])
+
+AC_SUBST([LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION])
+AC_SUBST([LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_INFO])
+
+dnl ==========================================================================
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([dev-random],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-dev-random], [use /dev/random by default for key generation (otherwise use /dev/urandom)]))
+if test "x$enable_dev_random" = "xyes"; then
+	default_rng=/dev/random
+else
+	default_rng=/dev/urandom
+fi
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(DEFAULT_RNG, ["$default_rng"], [default RNG type for key generator])
+
+dnl ==========================================================================
+AC_DEFUN([CS_DEFINE],
+	[AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(DEFAULT_[]m4_translit([$1], [-a-z], [_A-Z]), [$2], [$3])
+])
+
+AC_DEFUN([CS_STR_WITH], [AC_ARG_WITH([$1],
+	[AS_HELP_STRING(--with-[$1], [default $2 [$3]])],
+	[CS_DEFINE([$1], ["$withval"], [$2])],
+	[CS_DEFINE([$1], ["$3"], [$2])]
+)])
+
+AC_DEFUN([CS_NUM_WITH], [AC_ARG_WITH([$1],
+	[AS_HELP_STRING(--with-[$1], [default $2 [$3]])],
+	[CS_DEFINE([$1], [$withval], [$2])],
+	[CS_DEFINE([$1], [$3], [$2])]
+)])
+
+AC_DEFUN([CS_ABSPATH], [
+	case "$1" in
+		/*) ;;
+		*) AC_MSG_ERROR([$2 argument must be an absolute path.]);;
+	esac
+])
+
+dnl ==========================================================================
+CS_STR_WITH([plain-hash],   [password hashing function for plain mode], [ripemd160])
+CS_STR_WITH([plain-cipher], [cipher for plain mode], [aes])
+CS_STR_WITH([plain-mode],   [cipher mode for plain mode], [cbc-essiv:sha256])
+CS_NUM_WITH([plain-keybits],[key length in bits for plain mode], [256])
+
+CS_STR_WITH([luks1-hash],   [hash function for LUKS1 header], [sha256])
+CS_STR_WITH([luks1-cipher], [cipher for LUKS1], [aes])
+CS_STR_WITH([luks1-mode],   [cipher mode for LUKS1], [xts-plain64])
+CS_NUM_WITH([luks1-keybits],[key length in bits for LUKS1], [256])
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([luks_adjust_xts_keysize], AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-luks-adjust-xts-keysize],
+	[XTS mode requires two keys, double default LUKS keysize if needed]),
+	[], [enable_luks_adjust_xts_keysize=yes])
+if test "x$enable_luks_adjust_xts_keysize" = "xyes"; then
+	AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_LUKS_ADJUST_XTS_KEYSIZE, 1, [XTS mode - double default LUKS keysize if needed])
+fi
+
+CS_STR_WITH([luks2-pbkdf],           [Default PBKDF algorithm (pbkdf2 or argon2i/argon2id) for LUKS2], [argon2i])
+CS_NUM_WITH([luks1-iter-time],       [PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS1 (in ms)], [2000])
+CS_NUM_WITH([luks2-iter-time],       [Argon2 PBKDF iteration time for LUKS2 (in ms)], [2000])
+CS_NUM_WITH([luks2-memory-kb],       [Argon2 PBKDF memory cost for LUKS2 (in kB)], [1048576])
+CS_NUM_WITH([luks2-parallel-threads],[Argon2 PBKDF max parallel cost for LUKS2 (if CPUs available)], [4])
+
+CS_STR_WITH([luks2-keyslot-cipher], [fallback cipher for LUKS2 keyslot (if data encryption is incompatible)], [aes-xts-plain64])
+CS_NUM_WITH([luks2-keyslot-keybits],[fallback key size for LUKS2 keyslot (if data encryption is incompatible)], [512])
+
+CS_STR_WITH([loopaes-cipher], [cipher for loop-AES mode], [aes])
+CS_NUM_WITH([loopaes-keybits],[key length in bits for loop-AES mode], [256])
+
+CS_NUM_WITH([keyfile-size-maxkb],[maximum keyfile size (in KiB)], [8192])
+CS_NUM_WITH([passphrase-size-max],[maximum keyfile size (in characters)], [512])
+
+CS_STR_WITH([verity-hash],       [hash function for verity mode], [sha256])
+CS_NUM_WITH([verity-data-block], [data block size for verity mode], [4096])
+CS_NUM_WITH([verity-hash-block], [hash block size for verity mode], [4096])
+CS_NUM_WITH([verity-salt-size],  [salt size for verity mode], [32])
+CS_NUM_WITH([verity-fec-roots],  [parity bytes for verity FEC], [2])
+
+CS_STR_WITH([tmpfilesdir], [override default path to directory with systemd temporary files], [])
+test -z "$with_tmpfilesdir" && with_tmpfilesdir=$systemd_tmpfilesdir
+test "x$with_tmpfilesdir" = "xno" || {
+	CS_ABSPATH([${with_tmpfilesdir}],[with-tmpfilesdir])
+	DEFAULT_TMPFILESDIR=$with_tmpfilesdir
+	AC_SUBST(DEFAULT_TMPFILESDIR)
+}
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTSETUP_TMPFILE, test -n "$DEFAULT_TMPFILESDIR")
+
+CS_STR_WITH([luks2-lock-path], [path to directory for LUKSv2 locks], [/run/cryptsetup])
+test -z "$with_luks2_lock_path" && with_luks2_lock_path=/run/cryptsetup
+CS_ABSPATH([${with_luks2_lock_path}],[with-luks2-lock-path])
+DEFAULT_LUKS2_LOCK_PATH=$with_luks2_lock_path
+AC_SUBST(DEFAULT_LUKS2_LOCK_PATH)
+
+CS_NUM_WITH([luks2-lock-dir-perms], [default luks2 locking directory permissions], [0700])
+test -z "$with_luks2_lock_dir_perms" && with_luks2_lock_dir_perms=0700
+DEFAULT_LUKS2_LOCK_DIR_PERMS=$with_luks2_lock_dir_perms
+AC_SUBST(DEFAULT_LUKS2_LOCK_DIR_PERMS)
+
+dnl Override default LUKS format version (for cryptsetup or cryptsetup-reencrypt format actions only).
+AC_ARG_WITH([default_luks_format],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--with-default-luks-format=FORMAT], [default LUKS format version (LUKS1/LUKS2) [LUKS2]]),
+	[], [with_default_luks_format=LUKS2])
+
+case $with_default_luks_format in
+	LUKS1) default_luks=CRYPT_LUKS1 ;;
+	LUKS2) default_luks=CRYPT_LUKS2 ;;
+	*) AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown default LUKS format. Use LUKS1 or LUKS2 only.]) ;;
+esac
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([DEFAULT_LUKS_FORMAT], [$default_luks], [default LUKS format version])
+
+dnl ==========================================================================
+
+AC_CONFIG_FILES([ Makefile
+lib/libcryptsetup.pc
+po/Makefile.in
+scripts/cryptsetup.conf
+tests/Makefile
+])
+AC_OUTPUT
diff --git a/docs/ChangeLog.old b/docs/ChangeLog.old
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a4027c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/ChangeLog.old
@@ -0,0 +1,887 @@
+2012-12-21  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Since version 1.6 This file is no longer maintained.
+	* See version control log http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/source/list
+
+2012-10-11  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Added keyslot checker (by Arno Wagner).
+	* Version 1.5.1.
+
+2012-09-11  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Add crypt_keyslot_area() API call.
+
+2012-08-27  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Optimize seek to keyfile-offset (Issue #135, thx to dreisner).
+	* Fix luksHeaderBackup for very old v1.0 unaligned LUKS headers.
+
+2012-08-12  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Allocate loop device late (only when real block device needed).
+	* Rework underlying device/file access functions.
+	* Create hash image if doesn't exist in veritysetup format.
+	* Provide better error message if running as non-root user (device-mapper, loop).
+
+2012-07-10  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Version 1.5.0.
+
+2012-06-25  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Add --device-size option for reencryption tool.
+	* Switch to use unit suffix for --reduce-device-size option.
+	* Remove open device debugging feature (no longer needed).
+	* Fix library name for FIPS check.
+
+2012-06-20  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Version 1.5.0-rc2.
+
+2012-06-18  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Introduce cryptsetup-reencrypt - experimental offline LUKS reencryption tool.
+	* Fix luks-header-from-active script (do not use LUKS header on-disk, add UUID).
+	* Add --test-passphrase option for luksOpen (check passphrase only).
+
+2012-06-11  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Introduce veritysetup for dm-verity target management.
+	* Version 1.5.0-rc1.
+
+2012-06-10  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Both data and header device can now be a file.
+	* Loop is automatically allocated in crypt_set_data_device().
+	* Require only up to last keyslot area for header device (ignore data offset).
+	* Fix header backup and restore to work on files with large data offset.
+
+2012-05-27  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Fix readonly activation if underlying device is readonly (1.4.0).
+	* Include stddef.h in libdevmapper.h (size_t definition).
+	* Version 1.4.3.
+
+2012-05-21  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Add --enable-fips for linking with fipscheck library.
+	* Initialize binary and library selfcheck if running in FIPS mode.
+	* Use FIPS RNG in FIPS mode for KEY and SALT (only gcrypt backend supported).
+
+2012-05-09  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Fix keyslot removal (wipe keyslot) for device with 4k hw block (1.4.0).
+	* Allow empty cipher (cipher_null) for testing.
+
+2012-05-02  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Fix loop mapping on readonly file.
+	* Relax --shared test, allow mapping even for overlapping segments.
+	* Support shared flag for LUKS devices (dangerous).
+	* Switch on retry on device remove for libdevmapper.
+	* Allow "private" activation (skip some udev global rules) flag.
+
+2012-04-09  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Fix header check to support old (cryptsetup 1.0.0) header alignment. (1.4.0)
+	* Version 1.4.2.
+
+2012-03-16  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Add --keyfile-offset and --new-keyfile-offset parameters to API and CLI.
+	* Add repair command and crypt_repair() for known LUKS metadata problems repair.
+	* Allow to specify --align-payload only for luksFormat.
+
+2012-03-16  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Unify password verification option.
+	* Support password verification with quiet flag if possible. (1.2.0)
+	* Fix retry if entered passphrases (with verify option) do not match.
+	* Support UUID=<LUKS_UUID> format for device specification.
+
+2012-02-11  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Add --master-key-file option to luksOpen (open using volume key).
+
+2012-01-12  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix use of empty keyfile.
+
+2011-11-13  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix error message for luksClose and detached LUKS header.
+	* Allow --header for status command to get full info with detached header.
+
+2011-11-09  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Version 1.4.1.
+
+2011-11-05  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Merge pycryptsetup (Python libcryptsetup bindings).
+	* Fix stupid typo in set_iteration_time API call.
+	* Fix cryptsetup status output if parameter is device path.
+
+2011-10-27  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix crypt_get_volume_key_size() for plain device.
+	* Fix FSF address in license text.
+
+2011-10-25  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Print informative message in isLuks only in verbose mode.
+	* Version 1.4.0.
+
+2011-10-10  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Version 1.4.0-rc1.
+
+2011-10-05  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Support Nettle 2.4 crypto backend (for ripemd160).
+	* If device is not rotational, do not use Gutmann wipe method.
+	* Add crypt_last_error() API call.
+	* Fix luksKillSLot exit code if slot is inactive or invalid.
+	* Fix exit code if passphrases do not match in luksAddKey.
+	* Add LUKS on-disk format description into package.
+
+2011-09-22  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Support key-slot option for luksOpen (use only explicit keyslot).
+
+2011-08-22  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Add more paranoid checks for LUKS header and keyslot attributes.
+	* Fix crypt_load to properly check device size.
+	* Use new /dev/loop-control (kernel 3.1) if possible.
+	* Enhance check of device size before writing LUKS header.
+	* Do not allow context format of already formatted device.
+
+2011-07-25  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Remove hash/hmac restart from crypto backend and make it part of hash/hmac final.
+	* Improve check for invalid offset and size values.
+
+2011-07-19  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Revert default initialisation of volume key in crypt_init_by_name().
+	* Do not allow key retrieval while suspended (key could be wiped).
+	* Do not allow suspend for non-LUKS devices.
+	* Support retries and timeout parameters for luksSuspend.
+	* Add --header option for detached metadata (on-disk LUKS header) device.
+	* Add crypt_init_by_name_and_header() and crypt_set_data_device() to API.
+	* Allow different data offset setting for detached header.
+
+2011-07-07  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Remove old API functions (all functions using crypt_options).
+	* Add --enable-discards option to allow discards/TRIM requests.
+	* Add crypt_get_iv_offset() function to API.
+
+2011-07-01  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Add --shared option for creating non-overlapping crypt segments.
+	* Add shared flag to libcryptsetup api.
+	* Fix plain crypt format parameters to include size option (API change).
+
+2011-06-08  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix return code for status command when device doesn't exists.
+
+2011-05-24  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Version 1.3.1.
+
+2011-05-17  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix keyfile=- processing in create command (1.3.0).
+	* Simplify device path status check.
+
+2011-05-03  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Do not ignore size argument for create command (1.2.0).
+
+2011-04-18  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix error paths in blockwise code and lseek_write call.
+	* Add Nettle crypto backend support.
+
+2011-04-05  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Version 1.3.0.
+
+2011-03-22  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Also support --skip and --hash option for loopaesOpen.
+	* Fix return code when passphrase is read from pipe.
+	* Document cryptsetup exit codes.
+
+2011-03-18  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Respect maximum keyfile size parameter.
+	* Introduce maximum default keyfile size, add configure option.
+	* Require the whole key read from keyfile in create command (broken in 1.2.0).
+	* Fix offset option for loopaesOpen.
+	* Lock memory also in luksDump command.
+	* Version 1.3.0-rc2.
+
+2011-03-14  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Version 1.3.0-rc1.
+
+2011-03-11  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Add loop manipulation code and support mapping of images in file.
+	* Add backing device loop info into status message.
+	* Add luksChangeKey command.
+
+2011-03-05  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Add exception to COPYING for binary distribution linked with OpenSSL library.
+	* Set secure data flag (wipe all ioctl buffers) if devmapper library supports it.
+
+2011-01-29  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix mapping removal if device disappeared but node still exists.
+	* Fix luksAddKey return code if master key is used.
+
+2011-01-25  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Add loop-AES handling (loopaesOpen and loopaesClose commands).
+	 (requires kernel 2.6.38 and above)
+
+2011-01-05  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix static build (--disable-static-cryptsetup now works properly).
+
+2010-12-30  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Add compile time crypto backends implementation
+	  (gcrypt, OpenSSL, NSS and userspace Linux kernel crypto api).
+	* Currently NSS is lacking ripemd160, cannot provide full plain compatibility.
+	* Use --with-crypto_backend=[gcrypt|openssl|nss|kernel] to configure.
+
+2010-12-20  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Version 1.2.0.
+
+2010-11-25  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix crypt_activate_by_keyfile() to work with PLAIN devices.
+	* Fix create command to properly handle keyfile size.
+
+2010-11-16  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Version 1.2.0-rc1.
+
+2010-11-13  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix password callback call.
+	* Fix default plain password entry from terminal in activate_by_passphrase.
+	* Add --dump-master-key option for luksDump to allow volume key dump.
+	* Allow to activate by internally cached volume key
+	  (format/activate without keyslots active - used for temporary devices).
+	* Initialize volume key from active device in crypt_init_by_name()
+	* Fix cryptsetup binary exitcodes.
+	* Increase library version (still binary compatible with 1.1.x release).
+
+2010-11-01  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* No longer support luksDelKey, reload and --non-exclusive.
+	* Remove some obsolete info from man page.
+	* Add crypt_get_type(), crypt_resize(), crypt_keyslot_max()
+	and crypt_get_active_device() to API.
+	* Rewrite all implementations in cryptsetup to new API.
+	* Fix luksRemoveKey to behave as documented (do not ask
+	for remaining keyslot passphrase).
+	* Add more regression tests for commands.
+	* Disallow mapping of device which is already in use (mapped or mounted).
+	* Disallow luksFormat on device in use.
+
+2010-10-27  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Rewrite cryptsetup luksFormat, luksOpen, luksAddKey to use new API
+	  to allow adding new features.
+	* Implement --use-random and --use-urandom for luksFormat to allow
+	  setting of RNG for volume key generator.
+	* Add crypt_set_rng_type() and crypt_get_rng_type() to API.
+	* Add crypt_set_uuid() to API.
+	* Allow UUID setting in luksFormat and luksUUID (--uuid parameter).
+	* Add --keyfile-size and --new-keyfile-size (in bytes) size and disallow overloading
+	  of --key-size for limiting keyfile reads.
+	* Fix luksFormat to properly use key file with --master-key-file switch.
+	* Fix possible double free when handling master key file.
+
+2010-10-17  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Add crypt_get_device_name() to API (get underlying device name).
+	* Change detection for static libraries.
+	* Fix pkg-config use in automake scripts.
+	* Remove --disable-shared-library switch and handle static library build
+	  by common libtool logic (using --enable-static).
+	* Add --enable-static-cryptsetup option to build cryptsetup.static binary
+	  together with shared build.
+
+2010-08-05  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Wipe iteration and salt after KillSlot in LUKS header.
+	* Rewrite file differ test to C (and fix it to really work).
+	* Switch to 1MiB default alignment of data.
+	  For more info see https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=621684
+	* Do not query non-existent device twice (cryptsetup status /dev/nonexistent).
+	* Check if requested hash is supported before writing LUKS header.
+
+2010-07-28  Arno Wagner <arno@wagner.name>
+	* Add FAQ (Frequently Asked Questions) file to distribution.
+
+2010-07-03  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix udev support for old libdevmapper with not compatible definition.
+	* Version 1.1.3.
+
+2010-06-01  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix device alignment ioctl calls parameters.
+	* Fix activate_by_* API calls to handle NULL device name as documented.
+
+2010-05-30  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Version 1.1.2.
+
+2010-05-27  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix luksFormat/luksOpen reading passphrase from stdin and "-" keyfile.
+	* Support --key-file/-d option for luksFormat.
+	* Fix description of --key-file and add --verbose and --debug options to man page.
+	* Add verbose log level and move unlocking message there.
+	* Remove device even if underlying device disappeared.
+	* Fix (deprecated) reload device command to accept new device argument.
+
+2010-05-23  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix luksClose operation for stacked DM devices.
+	* Version 1.1.1.
+
+2010-05-03  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix automatic dm-crypt module loading.
+	* Escape hyphens in man page.
+	* Version 1.1.1-rc2.
+
+2010-04-30  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Try to use pkgconfig for device mapper library.
+	* Detect old dm-crypt module and disable LUKS suspend/resume.
+	* Fix apitest to work on older systems.
+	* Allow no hash specification in plain device constructor.
+	* Fix luksOpen reading of passphrase on stdin (if "-" keyfile specified).
+	* Fix isLuks to initialise crypto backend (blkid instead is suggested anyway).
+	* Version 1.1.1-rc1.
+
+2010-04-12  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix package config to use proper package version.
+	* Avoid class C++ keyword in library header.
+	* Detect and use devmapper udev support if available (disable by --disable-udev).
+
+2010-04-06  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Prefer some device paths in status display.
+	* Support device topology detectionfor data alignment.
+
+2010-02-25  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Do not verify unlocking passphrase in luksAddKey command.
+	* Properly initialise crypto backend in header backup/restore commands.
+
+2010-01-17  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* If gcrypt compiled with capabilities, document workaround for cryptsetup (see lib/gcrypt.c).
+	* Version 1.1.0.
+
+2010-01-10  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix initialisation of gcrypt during luksFormat.
+	* Convert hash name to lower case in header (fix sha1 backward compatible header)
+	* Check for minimum required gcrypt version.
+
+2009-12-30  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix key slot iteration count calculation (small -i value was the same as default).
+	* The slot and key digest iteration minimum is now 1000.
+	* The key digest iteration # is calculated from iteration time (approx 1/8 of that).
+	* Version 1.1.0-rc4.
+
+2009-12-11  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix error handling during reading passhrase.
+
+2009-12-01  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Allow changes of default compiled-in cipher parameters through configure.
+	* Switch default key size for LUKS to 256bits.
+	* Switch default plain mode to aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 (default is backward incompatible!).
+
+2009-11-14  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Add CRYPT_ prefix to enum defined in libcryptsetup.h.
+	* Fix status call to fail when running as non-root user.
+	* Check in configure if selinux libraries are required in static version.
+	* Add temporary debug code to find processes locking internal device.
+	* Simplify build system, use autopoint and clean gettext processing.
+	* Use proper NLS macros and detection (so the message translation works again).
+	* Version 1.1.0-rc3.
+
+2009-09-30  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix exported symbols and versions in libcryptsetup.
+	* Do not use internal lib functions in cryptsetup.
+	* Add crypt_log to library.
+	* Fix crypt_remove_device (remove, luksClose) implementation.
+	* Move dm backend initialisation to library calls.
+	* Move duplicate Command failed message to verbose level (error is printed always).
+	* Add some password and used algorithms notes to man page.
+	* Version 1.1.0-rc2.
+
+2009-09-28  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Add luksHeaderBackup and luksHeaderRestore commands.
+	* Fail passphrase read if piped input no longer exists.
+	* Version 1.1.0-rc1.
+
+2009-09-15  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Initialize crypto library before LUKS header load.
+	* Fix manpage to not require --size which expands to device size by default.
+
+2009-09-10  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Clean up Makefiles and configure script.
+	* Version 1.1.0-test0.
+
+2009-09-08  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Use dm-uuid for all crypt devices, contains device type and name now.
+	* Try to read first sector from device to properly check that device is ready.
+
+2009-09-02  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Add luksSuspend (freeze device and wipe key) and luksResume (with provided passphrase).
+
+2009-08-30  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Require device device-mapper to build and do not use backend wrapper for dm calls.
+	* Move memory locking and dm initialization to command layer.
+	* Increase priority of process if memory is locked.
+	* Add log macros and make logging more consistent.
+	* Move command successful messages to verbose level.
+	* Introduce --debug parameter.
+	* Move device utils code and provide context parameter (for log).
+	* Keyfile now must be provided by path, only stdin file descriptor is used (api only).
+	* Do not call isatty() on closed keyfile descriptor.
+	* Run performance check for PBKDF2 from LUKS code, do not mix hash algorithms results.
+	* Add ability to provide pre-generated master key and UUID in LUKS header format.
+	* Add LUKS function to verify master key digest.
+	* Move key slot manipulation function into LUKS specific code.
+	* Replace global options struct with separate parameters in helper functions.
+	* Add new libcryptsetup API (documented in libcryptsetup.h).
+	* Implement old API calls using new functions.
+	* Remove old API code helper functions.
+	* Add --master-key-file option for luksFormat and luksAddKey.
+
+2009-08-17  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix PBKDF2 speed calculation for large passphrases.
+	* Allow using passphrase provided in options struct for LuksOpen.
+	* Allow restrict keys size in LuksOpen.
+
+2009-07-30  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix errors when compiled with LUKS_DEBUG.
+	* Print error when getline fails.
+	* Remove po/cryptsetup-luks.pot, it's autogenerated.
+	* Return ENOENT for empty keyslots, EINVAL will be used later for other type of error.
+	* Switch PBKDF2 from internal SHA1 to libgcrypt, make hash algorithm not hardcoded to SHA1 here.
+	* Add required parameters for changing hash used in LUKS key setup scheme.
+	* Do not export simple XOR helper now used only inside AF functions.
+	* Completely remove internal SHA1 implementation code, not needed anymore.
+	* Enable hash algorithm selection for LUKS through -h luksFormat option.
+
+2009-07-28  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Pad luks header to 512 sector size.
+	* Rework read/write blockwise to not split operation to many pieces.
+	* Use posix_memalign if available.
+
+2009-07-22  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix segfault if provided slot in luksKillslot is invalid.
+	* Remove unneeded timeout when remove of temporary device succeeded.
+
+2009-07-22  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* version 1.0.7
+
+2009-07-16  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Allow removal of last slot in luksRemoveKey and luksKillSlot.
+
+2009-07-11  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+
+	* Add --disable-selinux option and fix static build if selinux is required.
+	* Reject unsupported --offset and --skip options for luksFormat and update man page.
+
+2009-06-22  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+
+	* Summary of changes in subversion for 1.0.7-rc1:
+	* Various man page fixes.
+	* Set UUID in device-mapper for LUKS devices.
+	* Retain readahead of underlying device.
+	* Display device name when asking for password.
+	* Check device size when loading LUKS header. Remove misleading error message later.
+	* Add error hint if dm-crypt mapping failed.
+	* Use better error messages if device doesn't exist or is already used by other mapping.
+	* Fix make distcheck.
+	* Check if all slots are full during luksAddKey.
+	* Fix segfault in set_error.
+	* Code cleanups, remove precompiled pot files, remove unnecessary files from po directory
+	* Fix uninitialized return value variable in setup.c.
+	* Code cleanups. (thanks to Ivan Stankovic)
+	* Fix wrong output for remaining key at key deletion.
+	* Allow deletion of key slot while other keys have the same key information.
+	* Add missing AM_PROG_CC_C_O to configure.in
+	* Remove duplicate sentence in man page.
+	* Wipe start of device (possible fs signature) before LUKS-formatting.
+	* Do not process configure.in in hidden directories.
+	* Return more descriptive error in case of IO or header format error.
+	* Use remapping to error target instead of calling udevsettle for temporary crypt device.
+	* Check device mapper communication and warn user if device-mapper support missing in kernel.
+	* Fix signal handler to properly close device.
+	* write_lseek_blockwise: declare innerCount outside the if block.
+	* add -Wall to the default CFLAGS. fix some signedness issues.
+	* Error handling improvement.
+	* Add non-exclusive override to interface definition.
+	* Refactor key slot selection into keyslot_from_option.
+
+2007-05-01  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* lib/backends.c, man/cryptsetup.8: Apply patch from Ludwig Nussel
+	<ludwig.nussel@suse.de>, for old SuSE compat hashing.
+
+2007-04-16  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* Summary of changes in subversion:
+	Fix segfault for key size > 32 bytes.
+	Kick ancient header version conversion. 
+	Fix http://bugs.debian.org/403075
+	No passwort retrying for I/O errors.
+	Fix hang on "-i 0".
+	Fix parenthesization error that prevented --tries from working
+	correctly.
+
+2006-11-28  gettextize  <bug-gnu-gettext@gnu.org>
+
+	* m4/gettext.m4: Upgrade to gettext-0.15.
+	* m4/glibc2.m4: New file, from gettext-0.15.
+	* m4/intmax.m4: New file, from gettext-0.15.
+	* m4/inttypes-h.m4: New file, from gettext-0.15.
+	* m4/inttypes-pri.m4: Upgrade to gettext-0.15.
+	* m4/lib-link.m4: Upgrade to gettext-0.15.
+	* m4/lib-prefix.m4: Upgrade to gettext-0.15.
+	* m4/lock.m4: New file, from gettext-0.15.
+	* m4/longdouble.m4: New file, from gettext-0.15.
+	* m4/longlong.m4: New file, from gettext-0.15.
+	* m4/nls.m4: Upgrade to gettext-0.15.
+	* m4/po.m4: Upgrade to gettext-0.15.
+	* m4/printf-posix.m4: New file, from gettext-0.15.
+	* m4/signed.m4: New file, from gettext-0.15.
+	* m4/size_max.m4: New file, from gettext-0.15.
+	* m4/visibility.m4: New file, from gettext-0.15.
+	* m4/wchar_t.m4: New file, from gettext-0.15.
+	* m4/wint_t.m4: New file, from gettext-0.15.
+	* m4/xsize.m4: New file, from gettext-0.15.
+	* m4/Makefile.am: New file.
+	* configure.in (AC_OUTPUT): Add m4/Makefile.
+	(AM_GNU_GETTEXT_VERSION): Bump to 0.15.
+
+2006-10-22  David Härdeman  <david@hardeman.nu>
+
+	* Allow hashing of keys passed through stdin.
+
+2006-10-13  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* configure.in: 1.0.4 release
+
+2006-10-13  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* man/cryptsetup.8: Document --tries switch; patch by Jonas
+	Meurer.
+
+2006-10-13  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* lib/setup.c: Added terminal timeout rewrite as forwarded by
+	Jonas Meurer
+
+2006-10-04  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* Merged patch from Marc Merlin <marc@merlins.org> to allow user
+	selection of key slot.
+
+2006-09-26  gettextize  <bug-gnu-gettext@gnu.org>
+
+	* m4/codeset.m4: Upgrade to gettext-0.14.4.
+	* m4/gettext.m4: Upgrade to gettext-0.14.4.
+	* m4/glibc2.m4: New file, from gettext-0.14.4.
+	* m4/glibc21.m4: Upgrade to gettext-0.14.4.
+	* m4/iconv.m4: Upgrade to gettext-0.14.4.
+	* m4/intdiv0.m4: Upgrade to gettext-0.14.4.
+	* m4/intmax.m4: New file, from gettext-0.14.4.
+	* m4/inttypes.m4: Upgrade to gettext-0.14.4.
+	* m4/inttypes_h.m4: Upgrade to gettext-0.14.4.
+	* m4/inttypes-pri.m4: Upgrade to gettext-0.14.4.
+	* m4/isc-posix.m4: Upgrade to gettext-0.14.4.
+	* m4/lcmessage.m4: Upgrade to gettext-0.14.4.
+	* m4/lib-ld.m4: Upgrade to gettext-0.14.4.
+	* m4/lib-link.m4: Upgrade to gettext-0.14.4.
+	* m4/lib-prefix.m4: Upgrade to gettext-0.14.4.
+	* m4/longdouble.m4: New file, from gettext-0.14.4.
+	* m4/longlong.m4: New file, from gettext-0.14.4.
+	* m4/nls.m4: Upgrade to gettext-0.14.4.
+	* m4/po.m4: Upgrade to gettext-0.14.4.
+	* m4/printf-posix.m4: New file, from gettext-0.14.4.
+	* m4/progtest.m4: Upgrade to gettext-0.14.4.
+	* m4/signed.m4: New file, from gettext-0.14.4.
+	* m4/size_max.m4: New file, from gettext-0.14.4.
+	* m4/stdint_h.m4: Upgrade to gettext-0.14.4.
+	* m4/uintmax_t.m4: Upgrade to gettext-0.14.4.
+	* m4/ulonglong.m4: Upgrade to gettext-0.14.4.
+	* m4/wchar_t.m4: New file, from gettext-0.14.4.
+	* m4/wint_t.m4: New file, from gettext-0.14.4.
+	* m4/xsize.m4: New file, from gettext-0.14.4.
+	* Makefile.am (ACLOCAL_AMFLAGS): New variable.
+	* configure.in (AM_GNU_GETTEXT_VERSION): Bump to 0.14.4.
+
+2006-08-04  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* configure.in: 1.0.4-rc2
+
+2006-08-04  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* luks/Makefile.am: Add a few regression tests 
+
+2006-08-04  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* lib/setup.c (get_key): Applied patch from David Härdeman
+	<david@2gen.com> for reading binary keys from stdin using
+	the "-" as key file.
+
+2006-08-04  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* lib/setup.c (__crypt_luks_add_key): For checking options struct
+	(optionsCheck) filter out CRYPT_FLAG_VERIFY and
+	CRYPT_FLAG_VERIFY_IF_POSSIBLE, so that in no case password verification is done
+	for password retrieval.
+
+2006-08-04  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* configure.in: Merge Patch from http://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=132126 for sepol
+
+2006-07-23  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* Applied patches from David Härdeman <david@2gen.com> to fix 64
+	bit compiler warning issues.
+
+2006-05-19  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* Applied patches from Jonas Meurer
+	  - fix terminal status after timeout
+	  - add remark for --tries to manpage
+	  - allow more than 32 chars from standard input.
+	  - exit status fix for cryptsetup status.
+
+2006-05-06  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* src/cryptsetup.c (yesDialog): Fix getline problem for 64-bit archs. 
+
+2006-04-05  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* configure.in: Release 1.0.3.
+
+	* Applied patch by Johannes Weißl for more meaningful exit codes
+	and password retries
+
+2006-03-30  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* lib/setup.c (__crypt_create_device): (char *) -> (const char *)
+
+2006-03-30  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* Apply alignPayload patch from Peter Palfrader <weasel@debian.org>
+
+2006-03-15  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* configure.in: 1.0.3-rc3. Most displease release ever. 
+	* lib/setup.c (__crypt_create_device): More verbose error message.
+
+2006-02-26  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* lib/setup.c: Revert to 1.0.1 key reading.
+
+2006-02-25  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* man/cryptsetup.8: merge patch from Jonas Meurer
+
+2006-02-25  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* configure.in: 1.0.3-rc2
+
+2006-02-25  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* lib/libdevmapper.c (dm_create_device): Remove dup check here.
+	* lib/setup.c (__crypt_luks_open): Adopt same dup check as regular
+	create command.
+
+2006-02-22  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* configure.in: Spin 1.0.3-rc1
+
+2006-02-22  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* src/cryptsetup.c (action_create): Change defaulting.
+	(action_luksFormat): Change defaulting.
+
+	* lib/setup.c (parse_into_name_and_mode): Revert that default
+	change. This is FORBIDDEN here, as it will change cryptsetup
+	entire default. This is BAD in a non-LUKS world.
+
+2006-02-21  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* luks/keyencryption.c (setup_mapping): Add proper size restriction to mapping.	
+	(LUKS_endec_template): Add more verbose error message.
+
+2006-02-21  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* lib/libdevmapper.c (dm_query_device): Incorporate patch from
+	Bastian Blank
+	http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=344313
+
+2006-02-21  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* src/cryptsetup.c: Rename show_error -> show_status.
+
+2006-02-20  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* lib/libdevmapper.c (dm_create_device): Prevent existing mapping
+	from being removed when a mapping with the same name is added
+
+	* Add timeout patch from Jonas Meurer 
+
+	* src/cryptsetup.c: Remove conditional error printing to enable
+	printing the no-error msg (Command successful). Verify passphrase
+	for LUKS volumes.
+	(main): Add no-verify-passphrase
+
+	* lib/setup.c (parse_into_name_and_mode): Change default mode complition to essiv:sha256.
+
+2006-01-04  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* src/cryptsetup.c (help): Merge patch from Gentoo: change gettext(..) to _(..).
+
+2005-12-06  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* man/cryptsetup.8: Correct "seconds" to "microseconds" in the explanation for -i.
+
+2005-11-09  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* src/cryptsetup.c (main): Add version string.
+
+2005-11-08  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* lib/backends.c: compile fix. 
+
+2005-09-11  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* lib/setup.c (get_key): Fixed another incompatibility from my
+	get_key rewrite with original cryptsetup.
+
+2005-09-11  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* Merged changes from Florian Knauf's fk02 branch.
+
+2005-09-08  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* lib/setup.c (get_key): Fixed another incompatibility with
+	original cryptsetup.
+
+2005-08-20  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* Checked in a patch from Michael Gebetsroither <gebi@sbox.tugraz.at>
+	  to silent all confirmation dialogs.
+
+2005-06-23  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* src/cryptsetup.c (help): print PACKAGE_STRING
+
+2005-06-20  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* luks/keymanage.c (LUKS_set_key): Security check against header manipulation
+
+	* src/cryptsetup.c (action_luksDelKey): Safety check in luksDelKey
+
+	* luks/keymanage.c: Changed disk layout generation to align key material to 4k boundaries.
+	(LUKS_is_last_keyslot): Added LUKS_is_last_keyslot function.
+
+        * Applied patch from Bill Nottingham fixing a lot of prototypes.
+
+	* src/cryptsetup.c (action_luksOpen): Add support for -r flag.
+
+	* configure.in: Version bump 1.0.1
+
+2005-06-16  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* lib/setup.c (__crypt_luks_open): Remove mem leaking of dmCipherSpec.
+	(get_key): Fix missing zero termination for read string. 
+
+2005-06-12  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* luks/keyencryption.c (setup_mapping): Added CRYPT_FLAG_READONLY in case of O_RDONLY mode
+
+2005-06-11  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* configure.in: Version bump 1.0.1-pre
+
+2005-06-09  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* lib/utils.c: Added write_llseek_blocksize method to support sector wiping on sector_size != 512 
+	media
+
+2005-05-23  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* lib/setup.c (crypt_luksDelKey): Added missing return statement
+	(setup_leave): Added missing return statement
+
+	* luks/keyencryption.c (clear_mapping): Added missing return statement
+
+2005-05-19  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* lib/utils.c (write_blockwise, read_blockwise): Changed to soft bsize instead of SECTOR_SIZE
+
+	* luks/keymanage.c (wipe): Changed open mode to O_DIRECT | O_SYNC, and changed write 
+	to use the blockwise write helper
+
+2005-04-21  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* man/cryptsetup.8: Corrected an error, thanks to Dick Middleton.
+
+2005-04-09  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* luks/sha/hmac.c: Add 64 bit bug fix courtesy to 
+	Oliver Paukstadt <pstadt@sourcentral.org>.
+
+	* luks/pbkdf.c, luks/keyencryption.c, luks/keymanage.c, luks/af.c: Added a license 
+	disclaimer and remove option for "any future GPL versions".
+
+2005-03-25  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* configure.in: man page Makefile. Version bump 1.0.
+
+	* man/cryptsetup.8: finalize man page and move to section 8.
+
+	* src/cryptsetup.c (action_luksFormat): Add "are you sure" for interactive sessions.
+
+	* lib/setup.c (crypt_luksDump), src/cryptsetup.c: add LUKS dump command
+
+2005-03-24  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* src/cryptsetup.c, luks/Makefile.am (test), lib/setup.c (setup_enter): 
+	rename luksInit to luksFormat
+
+2005-03-12  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* man/cryptsetup.1: Add man page.
+
+	* lib/setup.c: Remove unnecessary LUKS_write_phdr call, so the
+	phdr is written after passphrase reading, so the user can change
+	his mind, and not have a partial written LUKS header on it's disk.
+
+2005-02-09  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
+
+	* luks/keymanage.c (LUKS_write_phdr): converted argument phdr to
+	pointer, and make a copy of phdr for conversion
+
+	* configure.in: Version dump.
+
+	* luks/keyencryption.c: Convert to read|write_blockwise.
+
+	* luks/keymanage.c: Convert to read|write_blockwise.
+
+	* lib/utils.c: Add read|write_blockwise functions, to use in
+	O_DIRECT file accesses. 
+
+2004-03-11 Thursday 15:52   Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+
+	* lib/blockdev.h: BLKGETSIZE64 really uses size_t as third
+	  argument, the rest is wrong.
+
+2004-03-10 Wednesday 17:50   Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+
+	* lib/: libcryptsetup.h, libdevmapper.c: Small fixes.
+
+2004-03-09 Tuesday 21:41   Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+
+	* lib/internal.h, lib/libcryptsetup.h, lib/libdevmapper.c,
+	  lib/setup.c, po/de.po, src/cryptsetup.c: Added internal flags to
+	  keep track of malloc'ed return values in struct crypt_options and
+	  add a function to free the memory. Also add a readonly flag to
+	  libcryptsetup.
+
+2004-03-09 Tuesday 16:03   Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+
+	* ChangeLog, configure.in, setup-gettext, lib/Makefile.am,
+	  lib/backends.c, lib/blockdev.h, lib/gcrypt.c, lib/internal.h,
+	  lib/libcryptsetup.h, lib/libdevmapper.c, lib/setup.c,
+	  lib/utils.c, po/de.po, src/Makefile.am, src/cryptsetup.c: More
+	  reorganization work.
+
+2004-03-08 Monday 01:38   Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+
+	* ChangeLog, Makefile.am, acinclude.m4, configure.in,
+	  lib/Makefile.am, lib/backends.c, lib/blockdev.h, lib/gcrypt.c,
+	  lib/libdevmapper.c, lib/setup.c, lib/utils.c, po/de.po,
+	  src/Makefile.am: BLKGETSIZE64 fixes and started modularity
+	  enhancements
+
+2004-03-04 Thursday 21:06   Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+
+	* Makefile.am, po/de.po, src/cryptsetup.c, src/cryptsetup.h: First
+	  backward compatible working version.
+
+2004-03-04 Thursday 00:42   Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+
+	* NEWS, AUTHORS, ChangeLog, Makefile.am, README, autogen.sh,
+	  configure.in, setup-gettext, po/ChangeLog, po/LINGUAS,
+	  po/POTFILES.in, po/de.po, src/cryptsetup.c, src/cryptsetup.h,
+	  src/Makefile.am (utags: initial): Initial checkin.
+
+2004-03-04 Thursday 00:42   Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+
+	* NEWS, AUTHORS, ChangeLog, Makefile.am, README, autogen.sh,
+	  configure.in, setup-gettext, po/ChangeLog, po/LINGUAS,
+	  po/POTFILES.in, po/de.po, src/cryptsetup.c, src/cryptsetup.h,
+	  src/Makefile.am: Initial revision
diff --git a/docs/Keyring.txt b/docs/Keyring.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bdcc838
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/Keyring.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+Integration with kernel keyring service
+---------------------------------------
+
+We have two different use cases for kernel keyring service:
+
+I) Volume keys
+
+Since upstream kernel 4.10 dm-crypt device mapper target allows loading volume
+key (VK) in kernel keyring service. The key offloaded in kernel keyring service
+is only referenced (by key description) in dm-crypt target and the VK is therefore
+no longer stored directly in dm-crypt target. Starting with cryptsetup 2.0 we
+load VK in kernel keyring by default for LUKSv2 devices (when dm-crypt with the
+feature is available).
+
+Currently cryptsetup loads VK in 'logon' type kernel key so that VK is passed in
+the kernel and can't be read from userspace afterward. Also cryptsetup loads VK in
+thread keyring (before passing the reference to dm-crypt target) so that the key
+lifetime is directly bound to the process that performs the dm-crypt setup. When
+cryptsetup process exits (for whatever reason) the key gets unlinked in kernel
+automatically. In summary, the key description visible in dm-crypt table line is
+a reference to VK that usually no longer exists in kernel keyring service if you
+used cryptsetup to for device activation.
+
+Using this feature dm-crypt no longer maintains a direct key copy (but there's
+always at least one copy in kernel crypto layer).
+
+II) Keyslot passphrase
+The second use case for kernel keyring is to allow cryptsetup reading the keyslot
+passphrase stored in kernel keyring instead. The user may load passphrase in kernel
+keyring and notify cryptsetup to read it from there later. Currently, cryptsetup
+cli supports kernel keyring for passphrase only via LUKS2 internal token
+(luks2-keyring). Library also provides a general method for device activation by
+reading passphrase from keyring: crypt_activate_by_keyring(). The key type
+for use case II) must always be 'user' since we need to read the actual key
+data from userspace unlike with VK in I). Ability to read keyslot passphrase
+from kernel keyring also allows easily auto-activate LUKS2 devices.
+
+Simple example how to use kernel keyring for keyslot passphrase:
+
+1) create LUKS2 keyring token for keyslot 0 (in LUKS2 device/image)
+cryptsetup token add --key-description my:key -S 0 /dev/device
+
+2) Load keyslot passphrase in user keyring
+read -s -p "Keyslot passphrase: "; echo -n $REPLY | keyctl padd user my:key @u
+
+3) Activate device using passphrase stored in kernel keyring
+cryptsetup open /dev/device my_unlocked_device
+
+4a) unlink the key when no longer needed by
+keyctl unlink %user:my:key @u
+
+4b) or revoke it immediately by
+keyctl revoke %user:my:key
+
+If cryptsetup asks for passphrase in step 3) something went wrong with keyring
+activation. See --debug output then.
diff --git a/docs/LUKS2-locking.txt b/docs/LUKS2-locking.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e401b61
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/LUKS2-locking.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+LUKS2 device locking overview
+=============================
+
+Why
+~~~
+
+LUKS2 format keeps two identical copies of metadata stored consecutively
+at the head of metadata device (file or bdev). The metadata
+area (both copies) must be updated in a single atomic operation to avoid
+header corruption during concurrent write.
+
+While with LUKS1 users may have clear knowledge of when a LUKS header is
+being updated (written to) or when it's being read solely the need for
+locking with legacy format was not so obvious as it is with the LUKSv2 format.
+
+With LUKS2 the boundary between read-only and read-write is blurry and what
+used to be the exclusively read-only operation (i.e., cryptsetup open command) may
+easily become read-update operation silently without user's knowledge.
+Major feature of LUKS2 format is resilience against accidental
+corruption of metadata (i.e., partial header overwrite by parted or cfdisk
+while creating partition on mistaken block device).
+Such header corruption is detected early on header read and auto-recovery
+procedure takes place (the corrupted header with checksum mismatch is being
+replaced by the secondary one if that one is intact).
+On current Linux systems header load operation may be triggered without user
+direct intervention for example by udev rule or from systemd service.
+Such clash of header read and auto-recovery procedure could have severe
+consequences with the worst case of having LUKS2 device unaccessible or being
+broken beyond repair.
+
+The whole locking of LUKSv2 device headers split into two categories depending
+what backend the header is stored on:
+
+I) block device
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+We perform flock() on file descriptors of files stored in a private
+directory (by default /run/lock/cryptsetup). The file name is derived
+from major:minor couple of affected block device. Note we recommend
+that access to private locking directory is supposed to be limited
+to superuser only. For this method to work the distribution needs
+to install the locking directory with appropriate access rights.
+
+II) regular files
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+First notable difference between headers stored in a file
+vs. headers stored in a block device is that headers in a file may be
+manipulated by the regular user unlike headers on block devices. Therefore
+we perform flock() protection on file with the luks2 header directly.
+
+Limitations
+~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+a) In general, the locking model provides serialization of I/Os targeting
+the header only. It means the header is always written or read at once
+while locking is enabled.
+We do not suppress any other negative effect that two or more concurrent
+writers of the same header may cause.
+
+b) The locking is not cluster aware in any way.
diff --git a/docs/doxyfile b/docs/doxyfile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a8c84db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/doxyfile
@@ -0,0 +1,313 @@
+# Doxyfile 1.8.8
+
+#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Project related configuration options
+#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+DOXYFILE_ENCODING      = UTF-8
+PROJECT_NAME           = "cryptsetup API"
+PROJECT_NUMBER         =
+PROJECT_BRIEF          = "Public cryptsetup API"
+PROJECT_LOGO           =
+OUTPUT_DIRECTORY       = doxygen_api_docs
+CREATE_SUBDIRS         = NO
+ALLOW_UNICODE_NAMES    = NO
+OUTPUT_LANGUAGE        = English
+BRIEF_MEMBER_DESC      = YES
+REPEAT_BRIEF           = YES
+ABBREVIATE_BRIEF       =
+ALWAYS_DETAILED_SEC    = NO
+INLINE_INHERITED_MEMB  = NO
+FULL_PATH_NAMES        = YES
+STRIP_FROM_PATH        =
+STRIP_FROM_INC_PATH    =
+SHORT_NAMES            = NO
+JAVADOC_AUTOBRIEF      = NO
+QT_AUTOBRIEF           = NO
+MULTILINE_CPP_IS_BRIEF = NO
+INHERIT_DOCS           = YES
+SEPARATE_MEMBER_PAGES  = NO
+TAB_SIZE               = 8
+ALIASES                =
+TCL_SUBST              =
+OPTIMIZE_OUTPUT_FOR_C  = YES
+OPTIMIZE_OUTPUT_JAVA   = NO
+OPTIMIZE_FOR_FORTRAN   = NO
+OPTIMIZE_OUTPUT_VHDL   = NO
+EXTENSION_MAPPING      =
+MARKDOWN_SUPPORT       = YES
+AUTOLINK_SUPPORT       = YES
+BUILTIN_STL_SUPPORT    = NO
+CPP_CLI_SUPPORT        = NO
+SIP_SUPPORT            = NO
+IDL_PROPERTY_SUPPORT   = YES
+DISTRIBUTE_GROUP_DOC   = NO
+SUBGROUPING            = YES
+INLINE_GROUPED_CLASSES = NO
+INLINE_SIMPLE_STRUCTS  = NO
+TYPEDEF_HIDES_STRUCT   = YES
+LOOKUP_CACHE_SIZE      = 0
+#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Build related configuration options
+#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+EXTRACT_ALL            = NO
+EXTRACT_PRIVATE        = NO
+EXTRACT_PACKAGE        = NO
+EXTRACT_STATIC         = NO
+EXTRACT_LOCAL_CLASSES  = YES
+EXTRACT_LOCAL_METHODS  = NO
+EXTRACT_ANON_NSPACES   = NO
+HIDE_UNDOC_MEMBERS     = NO
+HIDE_UNDOC_CLASSES     = NO
+HIDE_FRIEND_COMPOUNDS  = NO
+HIDE_IN_BODY_DOCS      = NO
+INTERNAL_DOCS          = NO
+CASE_SENSE_NAMES       = YES
+HIDE_SCOPE_NAMES       = NO
+SHOW_INCLUDE_FILES     = YES
+SHOW_GROUPED_MEMB_INC  = NO
+FORCE_LOCAL_INCLUDES   = NO
+INLINE_INFO            = YES
+SORT_MEMBER_DOCS       = YES
+SORT_BRIEF_DOCS        = NO
+SORT_MEMBERS_CTORS_1ST = NO
+SORT_GROUP_NAMES       = NO
+SORT_BY_SCOPE_NAME     = NO
+STRICT_PROTO_MATCHING  = NO
+GENERATE_TODOLIST      = YES
+GENERATE_TESTLIST      = YES
+GENERATE_BUGLIST       = YES
+GENERATE_DEPRECATEDLIST= YES
+ENABLED_SECTIONS       =
+MAX_INITIALIZER_LINES  = 30
+SHOW_USED_FILES        = YES
+SHOW_FILES             = YES
+SHOW_NAMESPACES        = YES
+FILE_VERSION_FILTER    =
+LAYOUT_FILE            =
+CITE_BIB_FILES         =
+#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Configuration options related to warning and progress messages
+#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+QUIET                  = NO
+WARNINGS               = YES
+WARN_IF_UNDOCUMENTED   = YES
+WARN_IF_DOC_ERROR      = YES
+WARN_NO_PARAMDOC       = NO
+WARN_FORMAT            = "$file:$line: $text"
+WARN_LOGFILE           =
+#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Configuration options related to the input files
+#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+INPUT                  = "doxygen_index.h" \
+                         "../lib/libcryptsetup.h"
+INPUT_ENCODING         = UTF-8
+FILE_PATTERNS          =
+RECURSIVE              = NO
+EXCLUDE                =
+EXCLUDE_SYMLINKS       = NO
+EXCLUDE_PATTERNS       =
+EXCLUDE_SYMBOLS        =
+EXAMPLE_PATH           = "examples"
+EXAMPLE_PATTERNS       =
+EXAMPLE_RECURSIVE      = NO
+IMAGE_PATH             =
+INPUT_FILTER           =
+FILTER_PATTERNS        =
+FILTER_SOURCE_FILES    = NO
+FILTER_SOURCE_PATTERNS =
+USE_MDFILE_AS_MAINPAGE =
+#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Configuration options related to source browsing
+#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+SOURCE_BROWSER         = NO
+INLINE_SOURCES         = NO
+STRIP_CODE_COMMENTS    = YES
+REFERENCED_BY_RELATION = NO
+REFERENCES_RELATION    = NO
+REFERENCES_LINK_SOURCE = YES
+SOURCE_TOOLTIPS        = YES
+USE_HTAGS              = NO
+VERBATIM_HEADERS       = YES
+CLANG_ASSISTED_PARSING = NO
+CLANG_OPTIONS          =
+#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Configuration options related to the alphabetical class index
+#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ALPHABETICAL_INDEX     = YES
+COLS_IN_ALPHA_INDEX    = 5
+IGNORE_PREFIX          =
+#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Configuration options related to the HTML output
+#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+GENERATE_HTML          = YES
+HTML_OUTPUT            = html
+HTML_FILE_EXTENSION    = .html
+HTML_HEADER            =
+HTML_FOOTER            =
+HTML_STYLESHEET        =
+HTML_EXTRA_STYLESHEET  =
+HTML_EXTRA_FILES       =
+HTML_COLORSTYLE_HUE    = 220
+HTML_COLORSTYLE_SAT    = 100
+HTML_COLORSTYLE_GAMMA  = 80
+HTML_TIMESTAMP         = YES
+HTML_DYNAMIC_SECTIONS  = NO
+HTML_INDEX_NUM_ENTRIES = 100
+GENERATE_DOCSET        = NO
+DOCSET_FEEDNAME        = "Doxygen generated docs"
+DOCSET_BUNDLE_ID       = org.doxygen.Project
+DOCSET_PUBLISHER_ID    = org.doxygen.Publisher
+DOCSET_PUBLISHER_NAME  = Publisher
+GENERATE_HTMLHELP      = NO
+CHM_FILE               =
+HHC_LOCATION           =
+GENERATE_CHI           = NO
+CHM_INDEX_ENCODING     =
+BINARY_TOC             = NO
+TOC_EXPAND             = NO
+GENERATE_QHP           = NO
+QCH_FILE               =
+QHP_NAMESPACE          = org.doxygen.Project
+QHP_VIRTUAL_FOLDER     = doc
+QHP_CUST_FILTER_NAME   =
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+#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Configuration options related to the preprocessor
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+#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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+# Configuration options related to the dot tool
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diff --git a/docs/doxygen_index.h b/docs/doxygen_index.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8bdf05f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/doxygen_index.h
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+/*! \mainpage Cryptsetup API
+ *
+ * <b>The</b> documentation covers public parts of cryptsetup API. In the following sections you'll find
+ * the examples that describe some features of cryptsetup API.
+ * For more info about libcryptsetup API versions see
+ * <a href="https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/ABI-tracker/timeline/libcryptsetup/index.html">API Tracker</a>.
+ *
+ * <OL type="A">
+ *	<LI>@ref cexamples "Cryptsetup API examples"</LI>
+ *	<OL type="1">
+ *		<LI>@ref cluks "crypt_luks_usage" - cryptsetup LUKS device type usage examples</LI>
+ *			<UL>
+ *				<LI>@ref cinit "crypt_init()"</LI>
+ *				<LI>@ref cformat "crypt_format()" - header and payload on mutual device</LI>
+ *				<LI>@ref ckeys "Keyslot operations" </LI>
+ *				<UL>
+ *					<LI>@ref ckeyslot_vol "crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key()"</LI>
+ *					<LI>@ref ckeyslot_pass "crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase()"</LI>
+ *				</UL>
+ *				<LI>@ref cload "crypt_load()"
+ *				<LI>@ref cactivate "crypt_activate_by_passphrase()"</LI>
+ *				<LI>@ref cactive_pars "crypt_get_active_device()"</LI>
+ *				<LI>@ref cinit_by_name "crypt_init_by_name()"</LI>
+ *				<LI>@ref cdeactivate "crypt_deactivate()"</LI>
+ *				<LI>@ref cluks_ex "crypt_luks_usage.c"</LI>
+ *			</UL>
+ *		<LI>@ref clog "crypt_log_usage" - cryptsetup logging API examples</LI>
+ *	</OL>
+ * </OL>
+ *
+ * @section cexamples Cryptsetup API examples
+ * 	@section cluks crypt_luks_usage - cryptsetup LUKS device type usage
+ *	 	@subsection cinit crypt_init()
+ *			Every time you need to do something with cryptsetup or dmcrypt device
+ *			you need a valid context. The first step to start your work is
+ *			@ref crypt_init call. You can call it either with path
+ *			to the block device or path to the regular file. If you don't supply the path,
+ *			empty context is initialized.
+ *
+ *		@subsection cformat crypt_format() - header and payload on mutual device
+ *	 		This section covers basic use cases for formatting LUKS devices. Format operation
+ *			sets device type in context and in case of LUKS header is written at the beginning
+ *			of block device. In the example below we use the scenario where LUKS header and data
+ *			are both stored on the same device. There's also a possibility to store header and
+ *			data separately.
+ *
+ *			<B>Bear in mind</B> that @ref crypt_format() is destructive operation and it
+ *			overwrites part of the backing block device.
+ *
+ *		@subsection ckeys Keyslot operations examples
+ *			After successful @ref crypt_format of LUKS device, volume key is not stored
+ *			in a persistent way on the device. Keyslot area is an array beyond LUKS header, where
+ *			volume key is stored in the encrypted form using user input passphrase. For more info about
+ *			LUKS keyslots and how it's actually protected, please look at
+ *			<A HREF="https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/Specification">LUKS specification</A>.
+ *			There are two basic methods to create a new keyslot:
+ *
+ *			@subsection ckeyslot_vol crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key()
+ *				Creates a new keyslot directly by encrypting volume_key stored in the device
+ *				context. Passphrase should be supplied or user is prompted if passphrase param is
+ *				NULL.
+ *
+ *			@subsection ckeyslot_pass crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase()
+ *				Creates a new keyslot for the volume key by opening existing active keyslot,
+ *				extracting volume key from it and storing it into a new keyslot
+ *				protected by a new passphrase
+ *
+ *		@subsection cload crypt_load()
+ *			Function loads header from backing block device into device context.
+ *
+ *		@subsection cactivate crypt_activate_by_passphrase()
+ *			Activates crypt device by user supplied password for keyslot containing the volume_key.
+ *			If <I>keyslot</I> parameter is set to <I>CRYPT_ANY_SLOT</I> then all active keyslots
+ *			are tried one by one until the volume key is found.
+ *
+ *	 	@subsection cactive_pars crypt_get_active_device()
+ *	 		This call returns structure containing runtime attributes of active device.
+ *
+ *	 	@subsection cinit_by_name crypt_init_by_name()
+ *	 		In case you need to do operations with active device (device which already
+ *	 		has its corresponding mapping) and you miss valid device context stored in
+ *	 		*crypt_device reference, you should use this call. Function tries to
+ *	 		get path to backing device from DM, initializes context for it and loads LUKS
+ *	 		header.
+ *
+ *			@subsection cdeactivate crypt_deactivate()
+ *			Deactivates crypt device (removes DM mapping and safely erases volume key from kernel).
+ *
+ *		@subsection cluks_ex crypt_luks_usage.c - Complex example
+ *			To compile and run use following commands in examples directory:
+ *
+ * @code
+ * make
+ * ./crypt_luks_usage _path_to_[block_device]_file
+ * @endcode
+ *			Note that you need to have the cryptsetup library compiled. @include crypt_luks_usage.c
+ *
+ *	@section clog crypt_log_usage - cryptsetup logging API example
+ *		Example describes basic use case for cryptsetup logging. To compile and run
+ * 		use following commands in examples directory:
+ *
+ * @code
+ * make
+ * ./crypt_log_usage
+ * @endcode
+ *		Note that you need to have the cryptsetup library compiled. @include crypt_log_usage.c
+ *
+ *		@example crypt_luks_usage.c
+ *		@example crypt_log_usage.c
+ */
diff --git a/docs/examples/Makefile b/docs/examples/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..845b6cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/examples/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+TARGETS=crypt_log_usage crypt_luks_usage
+CFLAGS=-O0 -g -Wall -D_GNU_SOURCE
+LDLIBS=-lcryptsetup
+CC=gcc
+
+all: $(TARGETS)
+
+crypt_log_usage: crypt_log_usage.o
+	$(CC) -o $@ $^ $(LDLIBS)
+
+crypt_luks_usage: crypt_luks_usage.o
+	$(CC) -o $@ $^ $(LDLIBS)
+
+clean:
+	rm -f *.o *~ core $(TARGETS)
+
+.PHONY: clean
diff --git a/docs/examples/crypt_log_usage.c b/docs/examples/crypt_log_usage.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1307d97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/examples/crypt_log_usage.c
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+/*
+ * An example of using logging through libcryptsetup API
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <libcryptsetup.h>
+
+/*
+ * This is an example of function that can be registered using crypt_set_log_callback API.
+ *
+ * Its prototype is void (*log)(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr) as defined
+ * in crypt_set_log_callback
+ */
+static void simple_syslog_wrapper(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr)
+{
+	const char *prefix = (const char *)usrptr;
+	int priority;
+
+	switch(level) {
+		case CRYPT_LOG_NORMAL:  priority = LOG_NOTICE; break;
+		case CRYPT_LOG_ERROR:   priority = LOG_ERR;    break;
+		case CRYPT_LOG_VERBOSE: priority = LOG_INFO;   break;
+		case CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG:   priority = LOG_DEBUG;  break;
+		default:
+			fprintf(stderr, "Unsupported log level requested!\n");
+			return;
+	}
+
+	if (prefix)
+		syslog(priority, "%s:%s", prefix, msg);
+	else
+		syslog(priority, "%s", msg);
+}
+
+int main(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	char usrprefix[] = "cslog_example";
+	int r;
+
+	if (geteuid()) {
+		printf("Using of libcryptsetup requires super user privileges.\n");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	openlog("cryptsetup", LOG_CONS | LOG_PID, LOG_USER);
+
+	/* Initialize empty crypt device context */
+	r = crypt_init(&cd, NULL);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		printf("crypt_init() failed.\n");
+		return 2;
+	}
+
+	/* crypt_set_log_callback() - register a log function for crypt context */
+	crypt_set_log_callback(cd, &simple_syslog_wrapper, (void *)usrprefix);
+
+	/* send messages ithrough the crypt_log() interface */
+	crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_NORMAL, "This is normal log message");
+	crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, "This is error log message");
+	crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_VERBOSE, "This is verbose log message");
+	crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG, "This is debug message");
+
+	/* release crypt context */
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	/* Initialize default (global) log function */
+	crypt_set_log_callback(NULL, &simple_syslog_wrapper, NULL);
+
+	crypt_log(NULL, CRYPT_LOG_NORMAL, "This is normal log message");
+	crypt_log(NULL, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, "This is error log message");
+	crypt_log(NULL, CRYPT_LOG_VERBOSE, "This is verbose log message");
+	crypt_log(NULL, CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG, "This is debug message");
+
+	closelog();
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/docs/examples/crypt_luks_usage.c b/docs/examples/crypt_luks_usage.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b2902e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/examples/crypt_luks_usage.c
@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+/*
+ * An example of using LUKS device through libcryptsetup API
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <inttypes.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <libcryptsetup.h>
+
+static int format_and_add_keyslots(const char *path)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	struct crypt_params_luks1 params;
+	int r;
+
+	/*
+	 * crypt_init() call precedes most of operations of cryptsetup API. The call is used
+	 * to initialize crypt device context stored in structure referenced by _cd_ in
+	 * the example. Second parameter is used to pass underlaying device path.
+	 *
+	 * Note:
+	 * If path refers to a regular file it'll be attached to a first free loop device.
+	 * crypt_init() operation fails in case there's no more loop device available.
+	 * Also, loop device will have the AUTOCLEAR flag set, so the file loopback will
+	 * be detached automatically.
+	 */
+
+	r = crypt_init(&cd, path);
+	if (r < 0 ) {
+		printf("crypt_init() failed for %s.\n", path);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	printf("Context is attached to block device %s.\n", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+
+	/*
+	 * So far no data were written on your device. This will change with call of
+	 * crypt_format() only if you specify CRYPT_LUKS1 as device type.
+	 */
+	printf("Device %s will be formatted to LUKS device after 5 seconds.\n"
+	       "Press CTRL+C now if you want to cancel this operation.\n", path);
+	sleep(5);
+
+
+	/*
+	 * Prepare LUKS format parameters
+	 *
+	 * hash parameter defines PBKDF2 hash algorithm used in LUKS header.
+	 * For compatibility reason we use SHA1 here.
+	 */
+	params.hash = "sha1";
+
+	/*
+	 * data_alignment parameter is relevant only in case of the luks header
+	 * and the payload are both stored on same device.
+	 *
+	 * if you set data_alignment = 0, cryptsetup will autodetect
+	 * data_alignment according to underlaying device topology.
+	 */
+	params.data_alignment = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * data_device parameter defines that no external device
+	 * for luks header will be used
+	 */
+	params.data_device = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * NULLs for uuid and volume_key means that these attributes will be
+	 * generated during crypt_format(). Volume key is generated with respect
+	 * to key size parameter passed to function.
+	 *
+	 * crypt_format() checks device size (LUKS header must fit there).
+	 */
+	r = crypt_format(cd,		/* crypt context */
+			 CRYPT_LUKS1,	/* LUKS1 is standard LUKS header */
+			 "aes",		/* used cipher */
+			 "xts-plain64",	/* used block mode and IV generator*/
+			 NULL,		/* generate UUID */
+			 NULL,		/* generate volume key from RNG */
+			 256 / 8,	/* 256bit key - here AES-128 in XTS mode, size is in bytes */
+			 &params);	/* parameters above */
+
+	if(r < 0) {
+		printf("crypt_format() failed on device %s\n", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The device now contains LUKS1 header, but there is
+	 * no active keyslot with encrypted volume key yet.
+	 */
+
+	/*
+	 * cryptt_kesylot_add_* call stores volume_key in encrypted form into keyslot.
+	 * Without keyslot you can't manipulate with LUKS device after the context will be freed.
+	 *
+	 * To create a new keyslot you need to supply the existing one (to get the volume key from) or
+	 * you need to supply the volume key.
+	 *
+	 * After format, we have volume key stored internally in context so add new keyslot
+	 * using this internal volume key.
+	 */
+	r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd,			/* crypt context */
+					    CRYPT_ANY_SLOT,	/* just use first free slot */
+					    NULL,		/* use internal volume key */
+					    0,			/* unused (size of volume key) */
+					    "foo",		/* passphrase - NULL means query*/
+					    3);			/* size of passphrase */
+
+	if (r < 0) {
+		printf("Adding keyslot failed.\n");
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	printf("The first keyslot is initialized.\n");
+
+	/*
+	 * Add another keyslot, now using the first keyslot.
+	 * It will decrypt volume key from the first keyslot and creates new one with another passphrase.
+	 */
+	r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase(cd,			/* crypt context */
+					    CRYPT_ANY_SLOT,	/* just use first free slot */
+					    "foo", 3,		/* passphrase for the old keyslot */
+					    "bar", 3);		/* passphrase for the new kesylot */
+	if (r < 0) {
+		printf("Adding keyslot failed.\n");
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	printf("The second keyslot is initialized.\n");
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int activate_and_check_status(const char *path, const char *device_name)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	struct crypt_active_device cad;
+	int r;
+
+	/*
+	 * LUKS device activation example.
+	 * It's sequence of sub-steps: device initialization, LUKS header load
+	 * and the device activation itself.
+	 */
+	r = crypt_init(&cd, path);
+	if (r < 0 ) {
+		printf("crypt_init() failed for %s.\n", path);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * crypt_load() is used to load the LUKS header from block device
+	 * into crypt_device context.
+	 */
+	r = crypt_load(cd,		/* crypt context */
+		       CRYPT_LUKS1,	/* requested type */
+		       NULL);		/* additional parameters (not used) */
+
+	if (r < 0) {
+		printf("crypt_load() failed on device %s.\n", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Device activation creates device-mapper devie mapping with name device_name.
+	 */
+	r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd,		/* crypt context */
+					 device_name,	/* device name to activate */
+					 CRYPT_ANY_SLOT,/* which slot use (ANY - try all) */
+					 "foo", 3,	/* passphrase */
+					 CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY); /* flags */
+	if (r < 0) {
+		printf("Device %s activation failed.\n", device_name);
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	printf("LUKS device %s/%s is active.\n", crypt_get_dir(), device_name);
+	printf("\tcipher used: %s\n", crypt_get_cipher(cd));
+	printf("\tcipher mode: %s\n", crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd));
+	printf("\tdevice UUID: %s\n", crypt_get_uuid(cd));
+
+	/*
+	 * Get info about active device (query DM backend)
+	 */
+	r = crypt_get_active_device(cd, device_name, &cad);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		printf("Get info about active device %s failed.\n", device_name);
+		crypt_deactivate(cd, device_name);
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	printf("Active device parameters for %s:\n"
+		"\tDevice offset (in sectors): %" PRIu64 "\n"
+		"\tIV offset (in sectors)    : %" PRIu64 "\n"
+		"\tdevice size (in sectors)  : %" PRIu64 "\n"
+		"\tread-only flag            : %s\n",
+		device_name, cad.offset, cad.iv_offset, cad.size,
+		cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY ? "1" : "0");
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int handle_active_device(const char *device_name)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	int r;
+
+	/*
+	 * crypt_init_by_name() initializes device context and loads LUKS header from backing device
+	 */
+	r = crypt_init_by_name(&cd, device_name);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		printf("crypt_init_by_name() failed for %s.\n", device_name);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	if (crypt_status(cd, device_name) == CRYPT_ACTIVE)
+		printf("Device %s is still active.\n", device_name);
+	else {
+		printf("Something failed perhaps, device %s is not active.\n", device_name);
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * crypt_deactivate() is used to deactivate device
+	 */
+	r = crypt_deactivate(cd, device_name);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		printf("crypt_deactivate() failed.\n");
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	printf("Device %s is now deactivated.\n", device_name);
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	if (geteuid()) {
+		printf("Using of libcryptsetup requires super user privileges.\n");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (argc != 2) {
+		printf("usage: ./crypt_luks_usage <path>\n"
+			"<path> refers to either a regular file or a block device.\n"
+			"       WARNING: the file or device will be wiped.\n");
+		return 2;
+	}
+
+	if (format_and_add_keyslots(argv[1]))
+		return 3;
+
+	if (activate_and_check_status(argv[1], "example_device"))
+		return 4;
+
+	if (handle_active_device("example_device"))
+		return 5;
+
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/docs/on-disk-format-luks2.pdf b/docs/on-disk-format-luks2.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f4ecda3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/on-disk-format-luks2.pdf
diff --git a/docs/on-disk-format.pdf b/docs/on-disk-format.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7f6e5e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/on-disk-format.pdf
diff --git a/docs/v1.0.7-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v1.0.7-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9288c60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v1.0.7-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+cryptsetup 1.0.7 Release Notes (2009-07-22)
+===========================================
+
+Changes since 1.0.7-rc1
+------------------------
+[committer name]
+
+ * Allow removal of last slot in luksRemoveKey
+and luksKillSlot. [Milan Broz]
+
+ * Add --disable-selinux option and fix static build if selinux
+is required. [Milan Broz]
+
+ * Reject unsupported --offset and --skip options for luksFormat
+and update man page. [Milan Broz]
+
+
+Changes since 1.0.6
+--------------------
+[committer name]
+
+* Various man page fixes. Also merged some Debian/Ubuntu man page
+fixes. (thanks to Martin Pitt) [Milan Broz]
+
+* Set UUID in device-mapper for LUKS devices. [Milan Broz]
+
+* Retain readahead of underlying device. [Milan Broz]
+
+* Display device name when asking for password. (thanks to Till
+Maas) [Milan Broz]
+
+* Check device size when loading LUKS header. Remove misleading
+error message later.  [Milan Broz]
+
+* Add error hint if dm-crypt mapping failed. (Key size and kernel
+version check for XTS and LRW mode for now.) [Milan Broz]
+
+* Use better error messages if device doesn't exist or is already
+used by other mapping. [Milan Broz]
+
+* Fix make distcheck. (thanks to Mike Kelly) [Milan Broz]
+
+* Check if all slots are full during luksAddKey. [Clemens Fruhwirth]
+
+* Fix segfault in set_error (thanks to Oliver Metz). [Clemens Fruhwirth]
+
+* Remove precompiled pot files. Fix uninitialized return value
+variable in setup.c. [Clemens Fruhwirth]
+
+* Code cleanups. (thanks to Ivan Stankovic) [Clemens Fruhwirth]
+
+* Remove unnecessary files from po directory. They will be
+regenerated by autogen.sh. [Clemens Fruhwirth]
+
+* Fix wrong output for remaining key at key deletion. Allow deletion
+of key slot while other keys have the same key information. [Clemens
+Fruhwirth]
+
+* Add missing AM_PROG_CC_C_O to configure.in [Milan Broz]
+
+* Remove duplicate sentence in man page (thanks to Till Maas).
+[Milan Broz]
+
+* Wipe start of device (possible fs signature) before
+LUKS-formatting. [Milan Broz]
+
+* Do not process configure.in in hidden directories. [Milan Broz]
+
+* Return more descriptive error in case of IO or header format
+error. [Milan Broz]
+
+* Use remapping to error target instead of calling udevsettle
+for temporary crypt device. [Milan Broz]
+
+* Check device mapper communication and warn user in case the
+communication fails. (thanks to Milan Broz) [Clemens Fruhwirth]
+
+* Fix signal handler to proper close device. (thanks to Milan Broz)
+[Clemens Fruhwirth]
+
+* write_lseek_blockwise: declare innerCount outside the if block,
+add -Wall to the default CFLAGS, * fix some signedness issues
+(thanks to Ivan Stankovic) [Clemens Fruhwirth]
+
+* Error handling improvement. (thanks to Erik Edin) [Clemens Fruhwirth]
+
+* Add non-exclusive override to interface definition. [Clemens
+Fruhwirth]
+
+* Refactor key slot selection into keyslot_from_option. Either
+autoselect next free keyslot or honor user choice (after checking).
+[Clemens Fruhwirth]
diff --git a/docs/v1.1.0-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v1.1.0-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7ee6dea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v1.1.0-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.1.0 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.0.7
+----------------------------
+
+Important changes:
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+ * IMPORTANT: the default compiled-in cipher parameters changed
+	plain mode: aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 (default is backward incompatible!).
+	LUKS mode: aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 (only key size increased)
+	In both modes is now default key size 256bits.
+
+	 * Default compiled-in parameters are now configurable through configure options:
+	   --with-plain-* / --with-luks1-* (see configure --help)
+
+	 * If you need backward compatible defaults for distribution use
+	   configure --with-plain-mode=cbc-plain --with-luks1-keybits=128
+
+	 Default compiled-in modes are printed in "cryptsetup --help" output.
+
+ * Change in iterations count (LUKS):
+	The slot and key digest iteration minimum count is now 1000.
+	The key digest iteration count is calculated from iteration time (approx 1/8 of req. time).
+	For more info about above items see discussion here: http://tinyurl.com/yaug97y
+
+ * New libcryptsetup API (documented in libcryptsetup.h).
+
+	The old API (using crypt_options struct) is still available but will remain
+	frozen and not used for new functions.
+	Soname of library changed to libcryptsetup.so.1.0.0.
+	(But only recompilation should be needed for old programs.)
+
+	The new API provides much more flexible operation over LUKS device for
+	applications, it is preferred that new applications will use libcryptsetup
+	and not wrapper around cryptsetup binary.
+
+ * New luksHeaderBackup and luksHeaderRestore commands.
+
+	These commands allows binary backup of LUKS header.
+	Please read man page about possible security issues with backup files.
+
+ * New luksSuspend (freeze device and wipe key) and luksResume (with provided passphrase).
+
+	luksSuspend wipe encryption key in kernel memory and set device to suspend
+	(blocking all IO) state. This option can be used for situations when you need
+	temporary wipe encryption key (like suspend to RAM etc.)
+	Please read man page for more information.
+
+ * New --master-key-file option for luksFormat and luksAddKey.
+
+	User can now specify pre-generated master key in file, which allows regenerating
+	LUKS header or add key with only master key knowledge.
+
+ * Uses libgcrypt and enables all gcrypt hash algorithms for LUKS through -h luksFormat option.
+
+	Please note that using different hash for LUKS header make device incompatible with
+	old cryptsetup releases.
+
+ * Introduces --debug parameter.
+
+	Use when reporting bugs (just run cryptsetup with --debug and attach output
+	to issue report.) Sensitive data are never printed to this log.
+
+ * Moves command successful messages to verbose level.
+
+ * Requires device-mapper library and libgcrypt to build.
+
+ * Uses dm-uuid for all crypt devices, contains device type and name now.
+
+ * Removes support for dangerous non-exclusive option
+	(it is ignored now, LUKS device must be always opened exclusive)
+
+Other changes:
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+ * Fixed localization to work again. Also cryptsetup is now translated by translationproject.org.
+ * Fix some libcryptsetup problems, including
+    * exported symbols and versions in libcryptsetup (properly use versioned symbols)
+    * Add crypt_log library function.
+    * Add CRYPT_ prefix to enum defined in libcryptsetup.h.
+ * Move duplicate Command failed message to verbose level (error is printed always).
+ * Fix several problems in build system
+    * use autopoint and clean gettext processing.
+    * Check in configure if selinux libraries are required in static version.
+    * Fix build for non-standard location of gcrypt library.
+ * Add temporary debug code to find processes locking internal device.
+ * Fix error handling during reading passphrase.
+ * Fail passphrase read if piped input no longer exists.
+ * Fix man page to not require --size which expands to device size by default.
+ * Clean up Makefiles and configure script.
+ * Try to read first sector from device to properly check that device is ready.
+ * Move memory locking and dm initialization to command layer.
+ * Increase priority of process if memory is locked.
+ * Add log macros and make logging more consistent.
+ * Keyfile now must be provided by path, only stdin file descriptor is used (api only).
+ * Do not call isatty() on closed keyfile descriptor.
+ * Move key slot manipulation function into LUKS specific code.
+ * Replace global options struct with separate parameters in helper functions.
+ * Implement old API calls using new functions.
+ * Allow using passphrase provided in options struct for LuksOpen.
+ * Allow restrict keys size in LuksOpen.
+ * Fix errors when compiled with LUKS_DEBUG.
+ * Print error when getline fails.
+ * Completely remove internal SHA1 implementation code, not needed anymore.
+ * Pad luks header to 512 sector size.
+ * Rework read/write blockwise to not split operation to many pieces.
+ * Use posix_memalign if available.
+ * Fix segfault if provided slot in luksKillslot is invalid.
+ * Remove unneeded timeout when remove of temporary device succeeded.
diff --git a/docs/v1.1.1-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v1.1.1-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e85107c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v1.1.1-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.1.1 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.1.1-rc2
+* Fix luksClose error if underlying device is LVM logical volume.
+
+Changes since version 1.1.1-rc1
+* Fix automatic dm-crypt module loading.
+
+Changes since version 1.1.0
+
+Important changes:
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Detects and use device-mapper udev support if available.
+
+  This should allow synchronisation with udev rules and avoid races with udev.
+
+  If package maintainer want to use old, direct libdevmapper device node creation,
+  use configure option --disable-udev.
+
+* Supports device topology detection for data alignment.
+
+  If kernel provides device topology ioctl calls, the LUKS data area
+  alignment is automatically set to optimal value.
+
+  This means that stacked devices (like LUKS over MD/LVM)
+  should use the most optimal data alignment.
+
+  (You can still overwrite this calculation using --align-payload option.)
+
+* Prefers some device paths in status display.
+  (So status command will try to find top level device name, like /dev/sdb.)
+
+* Fix package config file to use proper package version.
+
+Other changes:
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* Fix luksOpen reading of passphrase on stdin (if "-" keyfile specified).
+* Fix isLuks to initialise crypto backend (blkid instead is suggested anyway).
+* Properly initialise crypto backend in header backup/restore commands.
+* Do not verify unlocking passphrase in luksAddKey command.
+* Allow no hash specification in plain device constructor - user can provide volume key directly.
+* Try to use pkgconfig for device mapper library in configuration script.
+* Add some compatibility checks and disable LUKS suspend/resume if not supported.
+* Rearrange tests, "make check" now run all available test for package.
+* Avoid class C++ keyword in library header.
diff --git a/docs/v1.1.2-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v1.1.2-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9931f05
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v1.1.2-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+== Cryptsetup 1.1.2 Release Notes ==
+
+This release fixes a regression (introduced in 1.1.1 version) in handling
+key files containing new line characters (affects only files read from
+standard input).
+
+Cryptsetup can accept passphrase on stdin (standard input).
+
+Handling of new line (\n) character is defined by input specification:
+
+ * if keyfile is specified as "-" (using --key-file=- of by "-" positional argument
+   in luksFormat and luksAddKey, like cat file | cryptsetup --key-file=- <action>),
+   input is processed as normal binary file and no new line is interpreted.
+
+ * if there is no key file specification (with default input from stdin pipe
+   like echo passphrase | cryptsetup <action>) input is processed as input from terminal,
+   reading will stop after new line is detected.
+
+Moreover, luksFormat now understands --key-file (in addition to positional key
+file argument).
+
+N.B. Using of standard input and pipes for passphrases should be avoided if possible,
+cryptsetup have no control of used pipe buffers between commands in scripts and cannot
+guarantee that all passphrase/key-file buffers are properly wiped after use.
+
+=== changes since version 1.1.1 ===
+
+ * Fix luksFormat/luksOpen reading passphrase from stdin and "-" keyfile.
+ * Support --key-file/-d option for luksFormat.
+ * Fix description of --key-file and add --verbose and --debug options to man page.
+ * Add verbose log level and move unlocking message there.
+ * Remove device even if underlying device disappeared (remove, luksClose).
+ * Fix (deprecated) reload device command to accept new device argument.
diff --git a/docs/v1.1.3-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v1.1.3-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..94ee73e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v1.1.3-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+== Cryptsetup 1.1.3 Release Notes ==
+
+=== changes since version 1.1.2 ===
+
+* Fix device alignment ioctl calls parameters.
+  (Device alignment code was not working properly on some architectures like ppc64.) 
+
+* Fix activate_by_* API calls to handle NULL device name as documented.
+  (To enable check of passphrase/keyfile using libcryptsetup without activating the device.) 
+
+* Fix udev support for old libdevmapper with not compatible definition.
+
+* Added Polish translation file.
diff --git a/docs/v1.2.0-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v1.2.0-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f3061d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v1.2.0-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.2.0 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.2.0-rc1
+
+ * Fix crypt_activate_by_keyfile() to work with PLAIN devices.
+ * Fix plain create command to properly handle keyfile size.
+ * Update translations.
+
+Changes since version 1.1.3
+
+Important changes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+ * Add text version of *FAQ* (Frequently Asked Questions) to distribution.
+
+ * Add selection of random/urandom number generator for luksFormat
+ (option --use-random and --use-urandom).
+
+ (This affects only long term volume key in *luksFormat*,
+ not RNG used for salt and AF splitter).
+
+  You can also set the default to /dev/random during compilation with
+  --enable-dev-random. Compiled-in default is printed in --help output.
+
+  Be very careful before changing default to blocking /dev/random use here.
+
+ * Fix *luksRemoveKey* to not ask for remaining keyslot passphrase,
+ only for removed one.
+
+ * No longer support *luksDelKey* (replaced with luksKillSlot).
+  * if you want to remove particular passphrase, use *luksKeyRemove*
+  * if you want to remove particular keyslot, use *luksKillSlot*
+
+ Note that in batch mode *luksKillSlot* allows removing of any keyslot
+ without question, in normal mode requires passphrase or keyfile from
+ other keyslot.
+
+ * *Default alignment* for device (if not overridden by topology info)
+ is now (multiple of) *1MiB*.
+ This reflects trends in storage technologies and aligns to the same
+ defaults for partitions and volume management.
+
+ * Allow explicit UUID setting in *luksFormat* and allow change it later
+ in *luksUUID* (--uuid parameter).
+
+ * All commands using key file now allows limited read from keyfile using
+ --keyfile-size and --new-keyfile-size parameters (in bytes).
+
+ This change also disallows overloading of --key-size parameter which
+ is now exclusively used for key size specification (in bits.)
+
+ * *luksFormat* using pre-generated master key now properly allows
+ using key file (only passphrase was allowed prior to this update).
+
+ * Add --dump-master-key option for *luksDump* to perform volume (master)
+ key dump. Note that printed information allows accessing device without
+ passphrase so it must be stored encrypted.
+
+ This operation is useful for simple Key Escrow function (volume key and
+ encryption parameters printed on paper on safe place).
+
+ This operation requires passphrase or key file.
+
+ * The reload command is no longer supported.
+ (Use dmsetup reload instead if needed. There is no real use for this
+ function except explicit data corruption:-)
+
+ * Cryptsetup now properly checks if underlying device is in use and
+ disallows *luksFormat*, *luksOpen* and *create* commands on open
+ (e.g. already mapped or mounted) device.
+
+ * Option --non-exclusive (already deprecated) is removed.
+
+Libcryptsetup API additions:
+
+ * new functions
+  * crypt_get_type() - explicit query to crypt device context type
+  * crypt_resize() - new resize command using context
+  * crypt_keyslot_max() - helper to get number of supported keyslots
+  * crypt_get_active_device() - get active device info
+  * crypt_set/get_rng_type() - random/urandom RNG setting
+  * crypt_set_uuid() - explicit UUID change of existing device
+  * crypt_get_device_name() - get underlying device name
+
+ * Fix optional password callback handling.
+
+ * Allow to activate by internally cached volume key immediately after
+ crypt_format() without active slot (for temporary devices with
+ on-disk metadata)
+
+ * libcryptsetup is binary compatible with 1.1.x release and still
+ supports legacy API calls
+
+ * cryptsetup binary now uses only new API calls.
+
+ * Static compilation of both library (--enable-static) and cryptsetup
+ binary (--enable-static-cryptsetup) is now properly implemented by common
+ libtool logic.
+
+ Prior to this it produced miscompiled dynamic cryptsetup binary with
+ statically linked libcryptsetup.
+
+ The static binary is compiled as src/cryptsetup.static in parallel
+ with dynamic build if requested.
+
+Other changes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+ * Fix default plain password entry from terminal in activate_by_passphrase.
+ * Initialize volume key from active device in crypt_init_by_name()
+ * Fix cryptsetup binary exit codes.
+   0 - success, otherwise fail
+   1 - wrong parameters
+   2 - no permission
+   3 - out of memory
+   4 - wrong device specified
+   5 - device already exists or device is busy
+ * Remove some obsolete info from man page.
+ * Add more regression tests for commands.
+ * Fix possible double free when handling master key file.
+ * Fix pkg-config use in automake scripts.
+ * Wipe iteration and salt after luksKillSlot in LUKS header.
+ * Rewrite file differ test to C (and fix it to really work).
+ * Do not query non-existent device twice (cryptsetup status /dev/nonexistent).
+ * Check if requested hash is supported before writing LUKS header.
+ * Fix problems reported by clang scan-build.
diff --git a/docs/v1.3.0-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v1.3.0-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b7ae977
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v1.3.0-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.3.0 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.2.0
+
+Important changes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+ * Several userspace crypto backends support
+
+   cryptsetup now supports generic crypto backend interface which allows
+   compile package with various crypto libraries, these are already implemented:
+
+   * gcrypt (default, used in previous versions)
+   * OpenSSL
+   * NSS (because of missing ripemd160 it cannot provide full backward compatibility)
+   * kernel userspace API (provided by kernel 2.6.38 and above)
+     (Note that kernel userspace backend is very slow for this type of operation.
+      But it can be useful for embedded systems, because you can avoid userspace
+      crypto library completely.)
+
+   Backend is selected during configure time, using --with-crypto_backend option.
+
+   configure --with-crypto_backend=BACKEND (gcrypt/openssl/nss/kernel) [gcrypt]
+
+   Note that performance checked (iterations) in LUKS header will cause that
+   real iteration time will differ with different backends.
+   (There are huge differences in speed between libraries.)
+
+ * Cryptsetup now automatically allocates loopback device (/dev/loop) if device
+   argument is file and not plain device.
+
+   This require Linux kernel 2.6.25 and above (which implements loop autoclear flag).
+
+   You can see backing file in cryptsetup status output if underlying device is loopback.
+
+ * Introduce maximum default keyfile size, add configure option, visible in --help.
+
+   Cryptsetup now fails if read from keyfile exceeds internal limit.
+   You can always specify keyfile size (overrides limit) by using --keyfile-size option.
+
+ * Adds luksChangeKey command
+
+    cryptestup luksChangeKey --key-file <old keyfile> <new keyfile> [--key-slot X] 
+    cryptestup luksChangeKey [--key-slot X]  (for passphrase change)
+
+   This command allows passphrase/keyfile change in one step. If no key slot is
+   specified (and there is still free key slot on device) new slot is allocated before
+   the old is purged.
+
+   If --key-slot option is specified (or there is no free slot) command will overwrite
+   existing slot.
+   WARNING: Be sure you have another slot active or header backup when using explicit
+            key slot (so you can unlock the device even after possible media failure).
+
+ * Adds compatible support for loop-AES encryption type in loopaesOpen command.
+
+   Linux dm-crypt in 2.6.38 and above supports loop-AES compatible mapping
+   (including multi-key and special CBC mode, all three modes are supported).
+
+   If you have raw loop-AES keyfile (text file with uuencoded per-line keys), you can
+   access loop-AES volume using
+     cryptsetup loopaesOpen <device> <name> [--key-size 128] --key-file <key-file>
+
+   If you are using GPG encrypted keyfile
+     gpg --decrypt <key-file> | cryptsetup loopaesOpen --key-file=- <device> <name>
+
+   Do not forget to specify key size. Version and hash is automatically detected
+   according to number of lines in key file. For special configuration you can
+   override IV sector offset using --skip option, device offset with --offset
+   and hash algorithm using --hash, see man page for details.
+
+   Please note that loopAES dm-crypt mode is provided for compatibility reasons
+   (so you do not need to patch kernel and util-linux to map existing volumes)
+   but it is not, and never will be, optimized for speed.
+   It is experimental feature for now.
+
+ * Require the whole key read from keyfile in create command (regression in 1.2.0).
+
+ * WARNING: This is the last cryptsetup release which supports library with
+            old API (using struct crypt_options).
+            These calls are deprecated since 1.1.0 and AFAIK no application
+            is using it in recent distros. Removing compatible code will allow
+            new features to be implemented easily.
+
+Other changes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+ * Lock memory also in luksDump command.
+ * Fix return code when passphrase is read from pipe.
+ * Increase libcryptsetup version (loopAES change), still fully backward compatible.
+ * Fixes static build (--disable-static-cryptsetup now works properly).
+ * Supports secure data flag for device-mapper ioctl (will be in 2.6.39,
+   forcing kernel to wipe all ioctl buffers with possible key data).
+   To enable this flag you need new device-mapper library, in LVM2 2.02.84.
+ * Add copyright texts into some files and adds GPL exception allowing
+   to distribute resulting binaries linked with OpenSSL.
+ * Update FAQ.
+ * Fix message when locking memory fails.
+ * Fix luksAddKey return code if master key is used.
+ * Update some text files in distributions.
+ * Add docs directory with Release Notes archive.
+ * Do not hardcode loopback device name in tests, use internal loopback library.
diff --git a/docs/v1.3.1-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v1.3.1-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8b2d1dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v1.3.1-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.3.1 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.3.0
+
+ * Fix keyfile=- processing in create command (regression in 1.3.0).
+
+ * Simplify device path status check (use /sys and do not scan /dev).
+
+ * Do not ignore device size argument for create command (regression in 1.2.0).
+
+ * Fix error paths in blockwise code and lseek_write call.
+
+ * Add optional Nettle crypto backend support.
diff --git a/docs/v1.4.0-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v1.4.0-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bef4e74
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v1.4.0-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.4.0 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.3.1
+
+Important changes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+WARNING: This release removes old deprecated API from libcryptsetup
+         (all functions using struct crypt_options).
+
+         This require libcrypsetup version change and
+         rebuild of applications using cryptsetup library.
+         All new API symbols are backward compatible.
+
+* If device is not rotational disk, cryptsetup no longer tries
+  to wipe keyslot with Gutmann algorithm for magnetic media erase
+  but simply rewrites area once by random data.
+
+* The on-disk LUKS header can now be detached (e.g. placed on separate
+  device or in file) using new --header option.
+
+  This option is only relevant for LUKS devices and can be used in
+  luksFormat, luksOpen, luksSuspend, luksResume and resize commands.
+
+  If used with luksFormat the --align-payload option is taken
+  as absolute sector alignment on ciphertext device and can be zero.
+
+  Example:
+    Create LUKS device with ciphertext device on /dev/sdb and header
+    on device /dev/sdc. Use all space on /dev/sdb (no reserved area for header).
+
+          cryptsetup luksFormat /dev/sdb --header /dev/sdc --align-payload 0
+
+   Activate such device:
+          cryptsetup luksOpen /dev/sdb --header /dev/sdc test_disk
+
+   You can use file for LUKS header (loop device will be used while
+   manipulating with such detached header), just you have to create
+   large enough file in advance.
+
+          dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/luks_header bs=1M count=4
+          cryptsetup luksFormat /dev/sdb --header /mnt/luks_header --align-payload 0
+
+   Activation is the same as above.
+
+          cryptsetup luksOpen /dev/sdb --header /mnt/luks_header test_disk
+
+   All keyslot operations need to be run on _header_ not on ciphertext device,
+   an example:
+
+          cryptsetup luksAddKey /mnt/luks_header
+
+   If you do not use --align-payload 0, you can later restore LUKS header
+   on device itself (and use it as normal LUKS device without detached header).
+
+   WARNING: There is no possible check that specified ciphertext device
+            matches detached on-disk header. Use with care, it can destroy
+            your data in case of a mistake.
+
+   WARNING: Storing LUKS header in a file means that anti-forensic splitter
+            cannot properly work (there is filesystem allocation layer between
+            header and disk).
+
+* Support --allow-discards option to allow discards/TRIM requests.
+
+   Since kernel 3.1, dm-crypt devices optionally (not by default) support
+   block discards (TRIM) commands.
+   If you want to enable this operation, you have to enable it manually
+   on every activation using --allow-discards
+
+          cryptsetup luksOpen --allow-discards /dev/sdb test_disk
+
+   WARNING: There are several security consequences, please read at least
+            http://asalor.blogspot.com/2011/08/trim-dm-crypt-problems.html
+            before you enable it.
+
+* Add --shared option for creating non-overlapping crypt segments.
+
+   The --shared options checks that mapped segments are not overlapping
+   and allows non-exclusive access to underlying device.
+   Only plain crypt devices can be used in this mode.
+
+   Example - map 64M of device disk and following 32 M area as another disk.
+
+     cryptsetup create outer_disk /dev/sdb --offset 0 --size 65536
+     cryptsetup create inner_disk /dev/sdb --offset 65536 --size 32768 --shared
+
+ (It can be used to simulate trivial hidden disk concepts.)
+
+libcryptsetup API changes:
+  * Added options to support detached metadata device
+     crypt_init_by_name_and_header()
+     crypt_set_data_device()
+  * Add crypt_last_error() API call.
+  * Fix plain crypt format parameters to include size option.
+  * Add crypt_get_iv_offset() function.
+
+  * Remove old API functions (all functions using crypt_options).
+
+* Support key-slot option for luksOpen (use only explicit keyslot).
+
+   You can now specify key slot in luksOpen and limit checking
+   only to specified slot.
+
+* Support retries and timeout parameters for luksSuspend.
+  (The same way as in luksOpen.)
+
+* Add doxygen-like documentation (it will be available on project page later).
+  (To generate it manually run doxygen in docs directory.)
+
+Other changes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* Fix crypt_load to properly check device size.
+* Do not allow context format of already formatted device.
+* Do not allow key retrieval while suspended (key could be wiped).
+* Do not allow suspend for non-LUKS devices.
+* Fix luksKillSLot exit code if slot is inactive or invalid.
+* Fix exit code if passphrases do not match in luksAddKey.
+* Fix return code for status command when device doesn't exists.
+* Fix verbose messages in isLuks command.
+* Support Nettle 2.4 crypto backend (supports ripemd160).
+* Add LUKS on-disk format description into package.
+* Enhance check of device size before writing LUKS header.
+* Add more paranoid checks for LUKS header and keyslot attributes.
+* Use new /dev/loop-control (kernel 3.1) if possible.
+* Remove hash/hmac restart from crypto backend and make it part of hash/hmac final.
+* Improve check for invalid offset and size values.
+* Revert default initialisation of volume key in crypt_init_by_name().
+* Add more regression tests.
+* Add some libcryptsetup example files (see docs/examples).
diff --git a/docs/v1.4.1-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v1.4.1-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ea68cb8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v1.4.1-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.4.1 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.4.0
+
+* Merge experimental Python cryptsetup (pycryptsetup) binding.
+
+  This option is disabled by default, you can enable build of Python binding
+  with --enable--python configure switch.
+
+  Note that binding currently covers only partial libcryptsetup functions,
+  mainly LUKS device handling needed for Anaconda installer.
+  Until now provided separately as python-cryptsetup.
+  Thanks to Martin Sivak for the code.
+
+  See python subdirectory for more info.
+
+  Python binding code is experimental for now, no stable API guarantee.
+
+* Fix crypt_get_volume_key_size() for plain device.
+  (cryptsetup status reported zero key size for plain crypt devices).
+
+* Fix typo in set_iteration_time API call (old name remains for compatibility reasons).
+
+* Fix FSF address in license and add LGPL license text.
diff --git a/docs/v1.4.2-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v1.4.2-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9dbeb46
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v1.4.2-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.4.2 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.4.1
+
+* Add --keyfile-offset and --new-keyfile-offset parameters to API and CLI.
+  These options can be used to skip start of keyfile or device used as keyfile.
+
+* Add repair command and crypt_repair() for known LUKS metadata problems repair.
+
+  Some well-known LUKS metadata corruptions are easy to repair, this
+  command should provide a way to fix these problems.
+
+  Always create binary backup of header device before running repair,
+  (only 4kB - visible header) for example by using dd:
+     dd if=/dev/<LUKS header device> of=repair_bck.img bs=1k count=4
+
+  Then you can try to run repair:
+     cryptsetup repair <device>
+
+ Note, not all problems are possible to repair and if keyslot or some header
+ parameters are overwritten, device is lost permanently.
+
+* Fix header check to support old (cryptsetup 1.0.0) header alignment.
+  (Regression in 1.4.0)
+
+* Allow to specify --align-payload only for luksFormat.
+
+* Add --master-key-file option to luksOpen (open using volume key).
+
+* Support UUID=<LUKS_UUID> format for device specification.
+  You can open device by UUID (only shortcut to /dev/disk/by-uuid/ symlinks).
+
+* Support password verification with quiet flag if possible. (1.2.0)
+  Password verification can be still possible if input is terminal.
+
+* Fix retry if entered passphrases (with verify option) do not match.
+  (It should retry if requested, not fail.)
+
+* Fix use of empty keyfile.
+
+* Fix error message for luksClose and detached LUKS header.
+
+* Allow --header for status command to get full info with detached header.
diff --git a/docs/v1.4.3-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v1.4.3-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f084e06
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v1.4.3-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.4.3 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.4.2
+
+* Fix readonly activation if underlying device is readonly (1.4.0).
+
+* Fix loop mapping on readonly file.
+
+* Include stddef.h in libdevmapper.h (size_t definition).
+
+* Fix keyslot removal for device with 4k hw block (1.4.0).
+(Wipe keyslot failed in this case.)
+
+* Relax --shared flag to allow mapping even for overlapping segments.
+
+  The --shared flag (and API CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED flag) is now able
+  to map arbitrary overlapping area. From API it is even usable
+  for LUKS devices.
+  It is user responsibility to not cause data corruption though.
+
+  This allows e.g. scubed to work again and also allows some
+  tricky extensions later.
+
+* Allow empty cipher (cipher_null) for testing.
+
+  You can now use "null" (or directly cipher_null-ecb) in cryptsetup.
+  This means no encryption, useful for performance tests
+  (measure dm-crypt layer overhead).
+
+* Switch on retry on device remove for libdevmapper.
+  Device-mapper now retry removal if device is busy.
+
+* Allow "private" activation (skip some udev global rules) flag.
+  Cryptsetup library API now allows to specify CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE,
+  which means that some udev rules are not processed.
+  (Used for temporary devices, like internal keyslot mappings where
+  it is not desirable to run any device scans.)
+
+* This release also includes some Red Hat/Fedora specific extensions
+related to FIPS140-2 compliance.
+
+In fact, all these patches are more formal changes and are just subset
+of building blocks for FIPS certification. See FAQ for more details
+about FIPS.
+
+FIPS extensions are enabled by using --enable-fips configure switch.
+
+In FIPS mode (kernel booted with fips=1 and gcrypt in FIPS mode)
+
+  - it provides library and binary integrity verification using
+  libfipscheck (requires pre-generated checksums)
+
+  - it uses FIPS approved RNG for encryption key and salt generation
+  (note that using /dev/random is not formally FIPS compliant RNG).
+
+ - only gcrypt crypto backend is currently supported in FIPS mode.
+
+The FIPS RNG requirement for salt comes from NIST SP 800-132 recommendation.
+(Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation. Part 1: Storage Applications.
+http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-132/nist-sp800-132.pdf)
+LUKS should be aligned to this recommendation otherwise.
diff --git a/docs/v1.5.0-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v1.5.0-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..16a34cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v1.5.0-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.5.0 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+This release covers mainly inclusion of:
+
+  * Veritysetup tool (and related libcryptsetup extensions for dm-verity).
+
+  * Experimental cryptsetup-reencrypt tool (LUKS offline reencryption).
+
+Changes since version 1.5.0-rc2
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+  * Add --device-size option for reencryption tool.
+
+  * Switch to use unit suffix for --reduce-device-size option.
+
+  * Remove open device debugging feature (no longer needed).
+
+  * Fix library name for FIPS check.
+
+  * Add example of using reencryption inside dracut (see misc/dracut).
+
+Changes since version 1.5.0-rc1
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+Introduce cryptsetup-reencrypt - experimental offline LUKS reencryption tool.
+
+! cryptsetup-reencrypt tool is EXPERIMENTAL
+! ALWAYS BE SURE YOU HAVE RELIABLE BACKUP BEFORE USING THIS TOOL
+
+This tool tries to simplify situation when you need to re-encrypt the whole
+LUKS device in situ (without need to move data elsewhere).
+
+This can happen for example when you want to change volume (master) key,
+encryption algorithm, or other encryption parameter.
+
+Cryptsetup-reencrypt can even optionally shift data on device
+(reducing data device size - you need some free space at the end of device).
+
+In general, cryptsetup-reencrypt can be used to
+
+ - re-generate volume key
+ - change arbitrary encryption parameters
+ - add encryption to not yet encrypted drive
+
+Side effect of reencryption is that final device will contain
+only ciphertext (for all sectors) so even if device was not properly
+wiped by random data, after reencryption you cannot distinguish
+which sectors are used.
+(Reecryption is done always for the whole device.)
+
+There are for sure bugs, please TEST IT IN TEST ENVIRONMENT before
+use for your data.
+
+This tool is not resistant to HW and kernel failures - hw crash
+will cause serious data corruption.
+
+You can enable compilation of this tool with --enable-cryptsetup-reencrypt
+configure option (it is switched off by default).
+(Tool requires libcryptsetup 1.4.3 and later.)
+
+You have to provide all keyslot passphrases or use --keyslot-option
+(then all other keyslots will be disabled).
+
+EXAMPLES (from man page)
+
+Reencrypt /dev/sdb1 (change volume key)
+   # cryptsetup-reencrypt /dev/sdb1
+
+Reencrypt and also change cipher and cipher mode
+  # cryptsetup-reencrypt /dev/sdb1 -c aes-xts-plain64
+
+  Note: if you are changing key size, there must be enough space
+  for keyslots in header or you have to use --reduce-device size and
+  reduce fs in advance.
+
+Add LUKS encryption to not yet encrypted device
+  First, be sure you have space added to disk.
+  Or, alternatively, shrink filesystem in advance.
+
+  Here we need 4096 512-bytes sectors (enough for 2x128 bit key).
+
+  # fdisk -u /dev/sdb # move sdb1 partition end + 4096 sectors
+
+  # cryptsetup-reencrypt /dev/sdb1 --new --reduce-device-size 4096
+
+There are some options which can improve performance (depends on system),
+namely --use-directio (use direct IO for all operations) can be faster
+on some systems. See man page.
+
+Progress and estimated time is printed during reencryption.
+
+You can suspend reencryption (using ctrl+c or term signal).
+To continue reencryption you have to provide only
+the device parameter (offset is stored in temporary log file).
+
+Please note LUKS device is marked invalid during reencryption and
+you have to retain tool temporary files until reencryption finishes.
+
+Temporary files are LUKS-<uuid>.[log|org|new]
+
+Other changes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+  * Fix luks-header-from-active script (do not use LUKS header on-disk, add UUID).
+
+  * Add --test-passphrase option for luksOpen (check passphrase only).
+
+  * Fix parsing of hexadecimal string (salt or root hash) in veritysetup.
+
+Changes since version 1.4.3
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+Introduce veritysetup tool for dm-verity target management.
+
+The dm-verity device-mapper target was added to Linux kernel 3.4 and
+provides transparent integrity checking of block devices using a cryptographic
+digest provided by the kernel crypto API. This target is read-only.
+
+It is meant to be setup as part of a verified boot path (it was originally
+developed by Chrome OS authors as part of verified boot infrastructure).
+
+For deeper description please see http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/wiki/DMVerity
+and kernel dm-verity documentation.
+
+The libcryptsetup library was extended to support manipulation
+with dm-verity kernel module and new veritysetup CLI tool is added.
+
+There are no additional library requirements (it uses the same crypto
+backend as cryptsetup).
+
+If you want compile cryptsetup without veritysetup tool,
+use --disable-veritysetup configure option.
+For other configuration option see configure --help and veritysetup --help
+(e.g. default parameters).
+
+Supported libcryptsetup functions new CRYPT_VERITY type:
+  crypt_init
+  crypt_init_by_name
+  crypt_set_data device
+  crypt_get_type
+  crypt_format
+  crypt_load
+  crypt_get_active_device
+  crypt_activate_by_volume_key (volume key == root hash here)
+  crypt_dump
+and new introduced function
+  crypt_get_verity_info
+
+Please see comments in libcryptsetup.h and veritysetup.c as an code example
+how to use CRYPT_VERITY API.
+
+The veritysetup tool supports these operations:
+
+  veritysetup format <data_device> <hash_device>
+    Formats <hash_device> (calculates all hash areas according to <data_device>).
+    This is initial command to prepare device <hash_device> for later verification.
+
+  veritysetup create <name> <data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>
+    Creates (activates) a dm-verity mapping with <name> backed by device <data_device>
+    and using <hash_device> for in-kernel verification.
+
+  veritysetup verify <data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>
+    Verifies data in userspace (no kernel device is activated).
+
+  veritysetup remove <name>
+    Removes activated device from kernel (similar to dmsetup remove).
+
+  veritysetup status <name>
+    Reports status for the active kernel dm-verity device.
+
+  veritysetup dump <hash_device>
+    Reports parameters of verity device from on-disk stored superblock.
+
+For more info see veritysetup --help and veritysetup man page.
+
+Other changes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+  * Both data and header device can now be a file and
+    loop device is automatically allocated.
+
+  * Require only up to last keyslot area for header device, previously
+    backup (and activation) required device/file of size up to data start
+    offset (data payload).
+
+  * Fix header backup and restore to work on files with large data offset.
+    Backup and restore now works even if backup file is smaller than data offset.
+
+Appendix: Examples of veritysetup use
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
+
+ Format device using default parameters, info and final root hash is printed:
+ # veritysetup format /dev/sdb /dev/sdc
+ VERITY header information for /dev/sdc
+ UUID:                   fad30431-0c59-4fa6-9b57-732a90501f75
+ Hash type:              1
+ Data blocks:            52224
+ Data block size:        4096
+ Hash block size:        4096
+ Hash algorithm:         sha256
+ Salt:                   5cc52759af76a092e0c21829cd0ef6938f69831bf86926525106f92a7e9e3aa9
+ Root hash:              7aefa4506f7af497ac491a27f862cf8005ea782a5d97f6426945a6896ab557a1
+
+ Activation of device in-kernel:
+ # veritysetup create vr /dev/sdb /dev/sdc 7aefa4506f7af497ac491a27f862cf8005ea782a5d97f6426945a6896ab557a1
+ Note - if device is corrupted, kernel mapping is created but will report failure:
+ Verity device detected corruption after activation.
+
+ Userspace verification:
+ # veritysetup verify /dev/sdb /dev/sdc 7aefa4506f7af497ac491a27f862cf8005ea782a5d97f6426945a6896ab557a1
+  Verification failed at position 8192.
+  Verification of data area failed.
+
+ Active device status report:
+ # veritysetup status vr
+ /dev/mapper/vr is active.
+   type:        VERITY
+   status:      verified
+   hash type:   1
+   data block:  4096
+   hash block:  4096
+   hash name:   sha256
+   salt:        5cc52759af76a092e0c21829cd0ef6938f69831bf86926525106f92a7e9e3aa9
+   data device: /dev/sdb
+   size:        417792 sectors
+   mode:        readonly
+   hash device: /dev/sdc
+   hash offset: 8 sectors
+
+ Dump of on-disk superblock information:
+ # veritysetup dump /dev/sdc
+ VERITY header information for /dev/sdc
+ UUID:                   fad30431-0c59-4fa6-9b57-732a90501f75
+ Hash type:              1
+ Data blocks:            52224
+ Data block size:        4096
+ Hash block size:        4096
+ Hash algorithm:         sha256
+ Salt:                   5cc52759af76a092e0c21829cd0ef6938f69831bf86926525106f92a7e9e3aa9
+
+ Remove mapping:
+ # veritysetup remove vr
diff --git a/docs/v1.5.1-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v1.5.1-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7202a8c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v1.5.1-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.5.1 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.5.0
+
+* The libcryptsetup library now tries to initialize device-mapper backend and
+  loop devices only if they are really needed (lazy initializations).
+  This allows some operations to be run by a non-root user.
+
+  (Unfortunately LUKS header keyslot operations still require temporary dm-crypt
+  device and device-mapper subsystem is available only to superuser.)
+
+  Also clear error messages are provided if running as non-root user and
+  operation requires privileged user.
+
+* Veritysetup can be now used by a normal user for creating hash image to file
+  and also it can create hash image if doesn't exist.
+  (Previously it required pre-allocated space.)
+
+* Added crypt_keyslot_area() API call which allows external tools
+  to get exact keyslot offsets and analyse content.
+
+  An example of a tool that searches the keyslot area of a LUKS container
+  for positions where entropy is low and hence there is a high probability
+  of damage is in misc/kesylot_checker.
+  (Thanks to Arno Wagner for the code.)
+
+* Optimized seek to keyfile-offset if key offset is large.
+
+* Fixed luksHeaderBackup for very old v1.0 unaligned LUKS headers.
+
+* Various fixes for problems found by a several static analysis tools.
diff --git a/docs/v1.6.0-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v1.6.0-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fe8770d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v1.6.0-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,261 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.6.0 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.6.0-rc1
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+ * Change LUKS default cipher to to use XTS encryption mode,
+   aes-xts-plain64 (i.e. using AES128-XTS).
+
+   XTS mode becomes standard in hard disk encryption.
+
+   You can still use any old mode:
+    - compile cryptsetup with old default:
+      configure --with-luks1-cipher=aes --with-luks1-mode=cbc-essiv:sha256 --with-luks1-keybits=256
+    - format LUKS device with old default:
+      cryptsetup luksFormat -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 -s 256 <device>
+
+
+ * Skip tests and fix error messages if running on old systems (or with old kernel).
+
+ * Rename configure.in to configure.ac and fix issues with new automake and pkgconfig
+   and --disable-kernel_crypto option to allow compilation with old kernel headers.
+
+ * Allow repair of 512 bits key header.
+
+ * Fix status of device if path argument is used and fix double path prefix
+   for non-existent device path.
+
+
+Changes since version 1.5.1
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Important changes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+ * Cryptsetup and libcryptsetup is now released under GPLv2+
+   (GPL version 2 or any later).
+   Some internal code handling files (loopaes, verity, tcrypt
+   and crypto backend wrapper) are LGPLv2+.
+
+   Previously code was GPL version 2 only.
+
+
+ * Introducing new unified command open and close.
+
+   Example:
+      cryptsetup open --type plain|luks|loopaes|tcrypt <device> <name>
+      (type defaults to luks)
+
+   with backward-compatible aliases plainOpen, luksOpen, loopaesOpen,
+   tcryptOpen. Basically "open --type xyz" has alias "xyzOpen".
+
+   The "create" command (plain device create) is DEPRECATED but will
+   be still supported.
+   (This command is confusing because of switched arguments order.)
+
+   The close command is generic command to remove mapping and have
+   backward compatible aliases (remove, luksClose, ...) which behaves
+   exactly the same.
+
+   While all old syntax is still supported, I strongly suggest to use
+   new command syntax which is common for all device types (and possible
+   new formats added in future).
+
+
+ * cryptsetup now support directly TCRYPT (TrueCrypt and compatible tc-play)
+   on-disk format
+   (Code is independent implementation not related to original project).
+
+   Only dump (tcryptDump command) and activation (open --type tcrypt or tcryptOpen)
+   of TCRYPT device are supported. No header changes are supported.
+
+   It is intended to easily access containers shared with other operating systems
+   without need to install 3rd party software. For native Linux installations LUKS
+   is the preferred format.
+
+   WARNING: TCRYPT extension requires kernel userspace crypto API to be
+   available (introduced in Linux kernel 2.6.38).
+   If you are configuring kernel yourself, enable "User-space interface
+   for symmetric key cipher algorithms" in "Cryptographic API" section
+   (CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER .config option).
+
+   Because  TCRYPT  header  is encrypted, you have to always provide valid
+   passphrase and keyfiles. Keyfiles are handled exactly the same as in original
+   format (basically, first 1MB of every keyfile is mixed using CRC32 into pool).
+
+   Cryptsetup should recognize all TCRYPT header variants ever released, except
+   legacy  cipher chains  using LRW encryption mode with 64 bits encryption block
+   (namely Blowfish in LRW mode is not recognized, this is limitation of kernel
+   crypto API).
+
+   Device activation is supported only for LRW/XTS modes (again, limitation
+   of kernel dmcrypt which do not implements TCRYPT extensions to CBC mode).
+   (So old containers cannot be activated, but you can use libcryptsetup
+   for lost password search, example of such code is included in misc directory.)
+
+   Hidden header are supported using --tcrypt-hidden option, system encryption
+   using --tcrypt-system option.
+
+   For detailed description see man page.
+
+   EXAMPLE:
+     * Dump device parameters of container in file:
+
+     # cryptsetup tcryptDump tst
+       Enter passphrase: 
+
+     TCRYPT header information for tst
+     Version:        5
+     Driver req.:    7
+     Sector size:    512
+     MK offset:      131072
+     PBKDF2 hash:    sha512
+     Cipher chain:   serpent-twofish-aes
+     Cipher mode:    xts-plain64
+     MK bits:        1536
+
+     You can also dump master key using --dump-master-key.
+     Dump does not require superuser privilege.
+
+     * Activation of this container
+
+     # cryptsetup tcryptOpen tst tcrypt_dev
+       Enter passphrase: 
+      (Chain of dmcrypt devices is activated as /dev/mapper/tcrypt_dev.)
+
+     * See status of active TCRYPT device
+
+     # cryptsetup status tcrypt_dev
+
+     /dev/mapper/tcrypt_dev is active.
+     type:    TCRYPT
+     cipher:  serpent-twofish-aes-xts-plain64
+     keysize: 1536 bits
+     device:  /dev/loop0
+     loop:    /tmp/tst
+     offset:  256 sectors
+     size:    65024 sectors
+     skipped: 256 sectors
+     mode:    read/write
+
+    * And plaintext filesystem now ready to mount
+
+    # blkid /dev/mapper/tcrypt_dev
+    /dev/mapper/tcrypt_dev: SEC_TYPE="msdos" UUID="9F33-2954" TYPE="vfat"
+
+
+ * Add (optional) support for lipwquality for new LUKS passwords.
+
+   If password is entered through terminal (no keyfile specified)
+   and cryptsetup is compiled with --enable-pwquality, default
+   system pwquality settings are used to check password quality.
+
+   You can always override this check by using new --force-password option.
+
+   For more info about pwquality project see http://libpwquality.fedorahosted.org/
+
+
+ * Proper handle interrupt signals (ctrl+c and TERM signal) in tools
+
+   Code should now handle interrupt properly, release and explicitly wipe
+   in-memory key materials on interrupt.
+   (Direct users of libcryptsetup should always call crypt_free() when
+   code is interrupted to wipe all resources. There is no signal handling
+   in library, it is up to the tool using it.)
+
+ 
+ * Add new benchmark command
+
+   The "benchmark" command now tries to benchmark PBKDF2 and some block
+   cipher variants. You can specify you own parameters (--cipher/--key-size
+   for block ciphers, --hash for PBKDF2).
+
+   See man page for detailed description.
+
+   WARNING: benchmark command requires kernel userspace crypto API to be
+   available (introduced in Linux kernel 2.6.38).
+   If you are configuring kernel yourself, enable "User-space interface
+   for symmetric key cipher algorithms" in "Cryptographic API" section
+   (CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER .config option).
+
+   EXAMPLE:
+     # cryptsetup benchmark
+     # Tests are approximate using memory only (no storage IO).
+     PBKDF2-sha1       111077 iterations per second
+     PBKDF2-sha256      53718 iterations per second
+     PBKDF2-sha512      18832 iterations per second
+     PBKDF2-ripemd160   89775 iterations per second
+     PBKDF2-whirlpool   23918 iterations per second
+            #  Algorithm | Key | Encryption | Decryption
+          aes-cbc   128b  212.0 MiB/s  428.0 MiB/s
+      serpent-cbc   128b   23.1 MiB/s   66.0 MiB/s
+      twofish-cbc   128b   46.1 MiB/s   50.5 MiB/s
+          aes-cbc   256b  163.0 MiB/s  350.0 MiB/s
+      serpent-cbc   256b   23.1 MiB/s   66.0 MiB/s
+      twofish-cbc   256b   47.0 MiB/s   50.0 MiB/s
+          aes-xts   256b  190.0 MiB/s  190.0 MiB/s
+      serpent-xts   256b   58.4 MiB/s   58.0 MiB/s
+      twofish-xts   256b   49.0 MiB/s   49.5 MiB/s
+          aes-xts   512b  175.0 MiB/s  175.0 MiB/s
+      serpent-xts   512b   59.0 MiB/s   58.0 MiB/s
+      twofish-xts   512b   48.5 MiB/s   49.5 MiB/s
+
+     Or you can specify cipher yourself:
+     # cryptsetup benchmark --cipher cast5-cbc-essiv:sha256 -s 128
+     # Tests are approximate using memory only (no storage IO).
+     #  Algorithm | Key | Encryption | Decryption
+        cast5-cbc   128b   32.4 MiB/s   35.0 MiB/s
+
+     WARNING: these tests do not use dmcrypt, only crypto API.
+     You have to benchmark the whole device stack and you can get completely
+     different results. But is is usable for basic comparison.
+     (Note for example AES-NI decryption optimization effect in example above.)
+
+Features
+~~~~~~~~
+
+ * Do not maintain ChangeLog file anymore, see git log for detailed changes,
+   e.g. here http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/source/list
+
+ * Move change key into library, add crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase().
+   This change is useful mainly in FIPS mode, where we cannot
+   extract volume key directly from libcryptsetup.
+
+ * Add verbose messages during reencryption.
+
+ * Default LUKS PBKDF2 iteration time is now configurable.
+
+ * Add simple cipher benchmarking API.
+
+ * Add kernel skcipher backend.
+
+ * Add CRC32 implementation (for TCRYPT).
+
+ * Move PBKDF2 into crypto backend wrapper.
+   This allows use it in other formats, use library implementations and
+   also possible use of different KDF function in future.
+
+ * New PBKDF2 benchmark using getrusage().
+
+Fixes
+~~~~~
+
+ * Avoid O_DIRECT open if underlying storage doesn't support it.
+
+ * Fix some non-translated messages.
+
+ * Fix regression in header backup (1.5.1) with container in file.
+
+ * Fix blockwise read/write for end writes near end of device.
+   (was not used in previous versions)
+
+ * Ignore setpriority failure.
+
+ * Code changes to fix/ignore problems found by Coverity static analysis, including
+   - Get page size should never fail.
+   - Fix time of check/use (TOCTOU test) in tools
+   - Fix time of check/use in loop/wipe utils.
+   - Fix time of check/use in device utils.
+
+ * Disallow header restore if context is non-LUKS device.
diff --git a/docs/v1.6.1-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v1.6.1-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8fdc7d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v1.6.1-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.6.1 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.6.0
+
+* Fix loop-AES keyfile parsing.
+  Loop-AES keyfile should be text keyfile, reject keyfiles which
+  are not properly terminated.
+
+* Fix passphrase pool overflow for too long TCRYPT passphrase.
+ (Maximal TCRYPT passphrase length is 64 characters.)
+
+* Return EPERM (translated to exit code 2) for too long TCRYPT passphrase.
+
+* Fix deactivation of device when failed underlying node disappeared.
+
+* Fix API deactivate call for TCRYPT format and NULL context parameter.
+
+* Improve keyslot checker example documentation.
+
+* Report error message if deactivation fails and device is still busy.
+
+* Make passphrase prompts more consistent (and remove "LUKS" form prompt).
+
+* Fix some missing headers (compilation failed with alternative libc).
+
+* Remove not functional API UUID support for plain & loopaes devices.
+  (not persistent activation UUID).
+
+* Properly cleanup devices on interrupt in api-test.
+
+* Support all tests run if kernel is in FIPS mode.
diff --git a/docs/v1.6.2-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v1.6.2-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..192f4a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v1.6.2-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.6.2 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.6.1
+
+* Print error and fail if more device arguments are present for isLuks command.
+
+* Fix cipher specification string parsing (found by gcc -fsanitize=address option).
+
+* Try to map TCRYPT system encryption through partition
+  (allows to activate mapping when other partition on the same device is mounted).
+
+* Print a warning if system encryption is used and device is a partition.
+  (TCRYPT system encryption uses whole device argument.)
+
+* Disallow explicit small payload offset for LUKS detached header.
+  LUKS detached header only allows data payload 0 (whole data device is used)
+  or explicit offset larger than header + keyslots size.
+
+* Fix boundary condition for verity device that caused failure for certain device sizes.
+
+* Various fixes to documentation, including update FAQ, default modes
+  and TCRYPT description.
+
+* Workaround for some recent changes in automake (serial-tests).
diff --git a/docs/v1.6.3-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v1.6.3-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..24254b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v1.6.3-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.6.3 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.6.2
+
+* Fix cryptsetup reencryption tool to work properly
+  with devices using 4kB sectors.
+
+* Always use page size if running through loop device,
+  this fixes failures for external LUKS header and
+  filesystem requiring 4kB block size.
+
+* Fix TCRYPT system encryption mapping for multiple partitions.
+  Since this commit, one can use partition directly as device parameter.
+  If you need to activate such partition from image in file,
+  please first use map partitioned loop device (losetup -P)
+  on image.
+  (Cryptsetup require partition offsets visible in kernel sysfs
+  in this mode.)
+
+* Support activation of old TrueCrypt containers using CBC mode
+  and whitening (created in TrueCrypt version < 4.1).
+  This requires Linux kernel 3.13 or later.
+  (Containers with cascade CBC ciphers are not supported.)
+
+* Properly display keys in dump --dump-master-key command
+  for TrueCrypt CBC containers.
+
+* Rewrite cipher benchmark loop which was unreliable
+  on very fast machines.
+
+* Add warning if LUKS device was activated using non-cryptsetup
+  library which did not set UUID properly (e.g. cryptmount).
+  (Some commands, like luksSuspend, are not available then.)
+
+* Support length limitation also for plain (no hash) length.
+  This can be used for mapping problematic cryptosystems which
+  wipes some key (losetup sometimes set last 32 byte to zero,
+  which can be now configured as --hash plain:31 parameter).
+
+* Fix hash limit if parameter is not a number.
+  (The whole key was set to zero instead of command failure.)
+
+* Unify --key-slot behavior in cryptsetup_reencrypt tool.
+
+* Update dracut example scripts for system reencryption on first boot.
+
+* Add command line option --tcrypt-backup to access TCRYPT backup header.
+
+* Fix static compilation with OpenSSL.
diff --git a/docs/v1.6.4-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v1.6.4-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ebc71cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v1.6.4-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.6.4 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.6.3
+
+* Implement new erase (with alias luksErase) command.
+
+  The erase cryptsetup command can be used to permanently erase
+  all keyslots and make the LUKS container inaccessible.
+  (The only way to unlock such device is to use LUKS header backup
+  created before erase command was used.)
+
+  You do not need to provide any password for this operation.
+
+  This operation is irreversible.
+
+* Add internal "whirlpool_gcryptbug hash" for accessing flawed
+  Whirlpool hash in gcrypt (requires gcrypt 1.6.1 or above).
+
+  The gcrypt version of Whirlpool hash algorithm was flawed in some
+  situations.
+
+  This means that if you used Whirlpool in LUKS header and upgraded
+  to new gcrypt library your LUKS container become inaccessible.
+
+  Please refer to cryptsetup FAQ for detail how to fix this situation.
+
+* Allow to use --disable-gcrypt-pbkdf2 during configuration
+  to force use internal PBKDF2 code.
+
+* Require gcrypt 1.6.1 for imported implementation of PBKDF2
+  (PBKDF2 in gcrypt 1.6.0 is too slow).
+
+* Add --keep-key to cryptsetup-reencrypt.
+
+  This allows change of LUKS header hash (and iteration count) without
+  the need to reencrypt the whole data area.
+  (Reencryption of LUKS header only without master key change.)
+
+* By default verify new passphrase in luksChangeKey and luksAddKey
+  commands (if input is from terminal).
+
+* Fix memory leak in Nettle crypto backend.
+
+* Support --tries option even for TCRYPT devices in cryptsetup.
+
+* Support --allow-discards option even for TCRYPT devices.
+  (Note that this could destroy hidden volume and it is not suggested
+   by original TrueCrypt security model.)
+
+* Link against -lrt for clock_gettime to fix undefined reference
+  to clock_gettime error (introduced in 1.6.2).
+
+* Fix misleading error message when some algorithms are not available.
+
+* Count system time in PBKDF2 benchmark if kernel returns no self usage info.
+  (Workaround to broken getrusage() syscall with some hypervisors.)
diff --git a/docs/v1.6.5-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v1.6.5-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc9f525
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v1.6.5-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.6.5 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.6.4
+
+* Allow LUKS header operation handling without requiring root privilege.
+  It means that you can manipulate with keyslots as a regular user, only
+  write access to device (or image) is required.
+
+  This requires kernel crypto wrapper (similar to TrueCrypt device handling)
+  to be available (CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER kernel option).
+  If this kernel interface is not available, code fallbacks to old temporary
+  keyslot device creation (where root privilege is required).
+
+  Note that activation, deactivation, resize and suspend operations still
+  need root privilege (limitation of kernel device-mapper backend).
+
+* Fix internal PBKDF2 key derivation function implementation for alternative
+  crypto backends (kernel, NSS) which do not support PBKDF2 directly and have
+  issues with longer HMAC keys.
+
+  This fixes the problem for long keyfiles where either calculation is too slow
+  (because of internal rehashing in every iteration) or there is a limit
+  (kernel backend seems to not support HMAC key longer than 20480 bytes).
+
+  (Note that for recent version of gcrypt, nettle or openssl the internal
+  PBKDF2 code is not compiled in and crypto library internal functions are
+  used instead.)
+
+* Support for Python3 for simple Python binding.
+  Python >= 2.6 is now required. You can set Python compiled version by setting
+  --with-python_version configure option (together with --enable-python).
+
+* Use internal PBKDF2 in Nettle library for Nettle crypto backend.
+  Cryptsetup compilation requires Nettle >= 2.6 (if using Nettle crypto backend).
+
+* Allow simple status of crypt device without providing metadata header.
+  The command "cryptsetup status" will print basic info, even if you
+  do not provide detached header argument.
+
+* Allow to specify ECB mode in cryptsetup benchmark.
+
+* Add some LUKS images for regression testing.
+  Note that if image with Whirlpool fails, the most probable cause is that
+  you have old gcrypt library with flawed whirlpool hash.
+  Read FAQ section 8.3 for more info.
+
+Cryptsetup API NOTE:
+The direct terminal handling for passphrase entry will be removed from
+libcryptsetup in next major version (application should handle it itself).
+
+It means that you have to always either provide password in buffer or set
+your own password callback function trhough crypt_set_password_callback().
+See API documentation (or libcryptsetup.h) for more info.
diff --git a/docs/v1.6.6-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v1.6.6-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9d1fbee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v1.6.6-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.6.6 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.6.5
+
+* LUKS: Fix keyslot device access for devices which
+  do not support direct IO operations. (Regression in 1.6.5.)
+
+* LUKS: Fallback to old temporary keyslot device mapping method
+  if hash (for ESSIV) is not supported by userspace crypto
+  library. (Regression in 1.6.5.)
+
+* Properly activate device with discard (TRIM for SSDs)
+  if requested even if dm_crypt module is not yet loaded.
+  Only if discard is not supported by the old kernel then
+  the discard option is ignored.
+
+* Fix some static analysis build warnings (scan-build).
+
+* Report crypto lib version only once (and always add kernel
+  version) in debug output.
+
+Cryptsetup API NOTE:
+The direct terminal handling for passphrase entry will be removed from
+libcryptsetup in next major version (application should handle it itself).
+
+It means that you have to always either provide password in buffer or set
+your own password callback function through crypt_set_password_callback().
+See API documentation (or libcryptsetup.h) for more info.
diff --git a/docs/v1.6.7-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v1.6.7-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..edb73e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v1.6.7-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.6.7 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.6.6
+
+* Cryptsetup git and wiki are now hosted on GitLab.
+  https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup
+
+  Repository of stable releases remains on kernel.org site
+  https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/
+
+  For more info please see README file.
+
+* Cryptsetup TCRYPT mode now supports VeraCrypt devices (TrueCrypt extension).
+
+  The VeraCrypt extension only increases iteration count for the key
+  derivation function (on-disk format is the same as TrueCrypt format).
+
+  Note that unlocking of a VeraCrypt device can take very long time if used
+  on slow machines.
+
+  To use this extension, add --veracrypt option, for example
+    cryptsetup open --type tcrypt --veracrypt <container> <name>
+
+  For use through libcryptsetup, just add CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES flag.
+
+* Support keyfile-offset and keyfile-size options even for plain volumes.
+
+* Support keyfile option for luksAddKey if the master key is specified.
+
+* For historic reasons, hashing in the plain mode is not used
+  if keyfile is specified (with exception of --key-file=-).
+  Print a warning if these parameters are ignored.
+
+* Support permanent device decryption for cryptsetup-reencrypt.
+  To remove LUKS encryption from a device, you can now use --decrypt option.
+
+* Allow to use --header option in all LUKS commands.
+  The --header always takes precedence over positional device argument.
+
+* Allow luksSuspend without need to specify a detached header.
+
+* Detect if O_DIRECT is usable on a device allocation.
+  There are some strange storage stack configurations which wrongly allows
+  to open devices with direct-io but fails on all IO operations later.
+
+  Cryptsetup now tries to read the device first sector to ensure it can use
+  direct-io.
+
+*  Add low-level performance options tuning for dmcrypt (for Linux 4.0 and later).
+
+   Linux kernel 4.0 contains rewritten dmcrypt code which tries to better utilize
+   encryption on parallel CPU cores.
+
+   While tests show that this change increases performance on most configurations,
+   dmcrypt now provides some switches to change its new behavior.
+
+   You can use them (per-device) with these cryptsetup switches:
+      --perf-same_cpu_crypt
+      --perf-submit_from_crypt_cpus
+
+  Please use these only in the case of serious performance problems.
+  Refer to the cryptsetup man page and dm-crypt documentation
+  (for same_cpu_crypt and submit_from_crypt_cpus options).
+  https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMCrypt
+
+* Get rid of libfipscheck library.
+  (Note that this option was used only for Red Hat and derived distributions.)
+  With recent FIPS changes we do not need to link to this FIPS monster anymore.
+  Also drop some no longer needed FIPS mode checks.
+
+* Many fixes and clarifications to man pages.
+
+* Prevent compiler to optimize-out zeroing of buffers for on-stack variables.
+
+* Fix a crash if non-GNU strerror_r is used.
+
+Cryptsetup API NOTE:
+The direct terminal handling for passphrase entry will be removed from
+libcryptsetup in next major version (application should handle it itself).
+
+It means that you have to always either provide password in buffer or set
+your own password callback function through crypt_set_password_callback().
+See API documentation (or libcryptsetup.h) for more info.
diff --git a/docs/v1.6.8-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v1.6.8-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..43b4f2c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v1.6.8-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.6.8 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.6.7
+
+* If the null cipher (no encryption) is used, allow only empty password for LUKS.
+  (Previously cryptsetup accepted any password in this case.)
+
+  The null cipher can be used only for testing and it is used temporarily during
+  offline encrypting not yet encrypted device (cryptsetup-reencrypt tool).
+
+  Accepting only empty password prevents situation when someone adds another
+  LUKS device using the same UUID (UUID of existing LUKS device) with faked
+  header containing null cipher.
+  This could force user to use different LUKS device (with no encryption)
+  without noticing.
+  (IOW it prevents situation when attacker intentionally forces
+  user to boot into different system just by LUKS header manipulation.)
+
+  Properly configured systems should have an additional integrity protection
+  in place here (LUKS here provides only confidentiality) but it is better
+  to not allow this situation in the first place.
+
+  (For more info see QubesOS Security Bulletin QSB-019-2015.)
+
+* Properly support stdin "-" handling for luksAddKey for both new and old
+  keyfile parameters.
+
+* If encrypted device is file-backed (it uses underlying loop device),
+  cryptsetup resize will try to resize underlying loop device as well.
+  (It can be used to grow up file-backed device in one step.)
+
+* Cryptsetup now allows to use empty password through stdin pipe.
+  (Intended only for testing in scripts.)
+
+Cryptsetup API NOTE:
+
+Direct terminal handling and password calling callback for passphrase
+entry will be removed from libcryptsetup in next major (2.x) version
+(application should handle it itself).
+It means that application have to always provide password in API calls.
+
+Functions returning last error will be removed in next major version (2.x).
+These functions did not work properly for early initialization errors
+and application can implement better function easily using own error callback.
+
+See comments in libcryptsetup.h for more info about deprecated functions.
diff --git a/docs/v1.7.0-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v1.7.0-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cd568c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v1.7.0-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.7.0 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+The cryptsetup 1.7 release changes defaults for LUKS,
+there are no API changes.
+
+Changes since version 1.6.8
+
+* Default hash function is now SHA256 (used in key derivation function
+  and anti-forensic splitter).
+
+  Note that replacing SHA1 with SHA256 is not for security reasons.
+  (LUKS does not have problems even if collisions are found for SHA1,
+  for details see FAQ item 5.20).
+
+  Using SHA256 as default is mainly to prevent compatibility problems
+  on hardened systems where SHA1 is already be phased out.
+
+  Note that all checks (kernel crypto API availability check) now uses
+  SHA256 as well.
+
+* Default iteration time for PBKDF2 is now 2 seconds.
+
+  Increasing iteration time is in combination with PBKDF2 benchmark
+  fixes a try to keep PBKDF2 iteration count still high enough and
+  also still acceptable for users.
+
+  N.B. Long term is to replace PBKDF2 algorithm with Password Hashing
+  Competition winner - Argon2.
+
+  Distributions can still change these defaults in compilation time.
+
+  You can change iteration time and used hash function in existing LUKS
+  header with cryptsetup-reencrypt utility even without full reencryption
+  of device (see --keep-key option).
+
+* Fix PBKDF2 iteration benchmark for longer key sizes.
+
+  The previous PBKDF2 benchmark code did not take into account
+  output key length properly.
+
+  For SHA1 (with 160-bits output) and 256-bit keys (and longer)
+  it means that the final iteration value was higher than it should be.
+
+  For other hash algorithms (like SHA256 or SHA512) it caused
+  that iteration count was lower (in comparison to SHA1) than
+  expected for the requested time period.
+
+  The PBKDF2 benchmark code is now fixed to use the key size for
+  the formatted device (or default LUKS key size if running in informational
+  benchmark mode).
+
+  Thanks to A.Visconti, S.Bossi, A.Calo and H.Ragab
+  (http://www.club.di.unimi.it/) for point this out.
+  (Based on "What users should know about Full Disk Encryption
+  based on LUKS" paper to be presented on CANS2015).
+
+* Remove experimental warning for reencrypt tool.
+  The strong request for full backup before using reencryption utility
+  still applies :)
+
+* Add optional libpasswdqc support for new LUKS passwords.
+
+  If password is entered through terminal (no keyfile specified) and
+  cryptsetup is compiled with --enable-passwdqc[=/etc/passwdqc.conf],
+  configured system passwdqc settings are used to check password quality.
+
+* Update FAQ document.
+
+Cryptsetup API NOTE:
+
+Direct terminal handling and password calling callback for passphrase
+entry will be removed from libcryptsetup in next major (2.x) version
+(application should handle it itself).
+It means that application have to always provide password in API calls.
+
+Functions returning last error will be removed in next major version (2.x).
+These functions did not work properly for early initialization errors
+and application can implement better function easily using own error callback.
+
+See comments in libcryptsetup.h for more info about deprecated functions.
diff --git a/docs/v1.7.1-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v1.7.1-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..057c135
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v1.7.1-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.7.1 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.7.0
+
+* Code now uses kernel crypto API backend according to new
+  changes introduced in mainline kernel
+
+  While mainline kernel should contain backward compatible
+  changes, some stable series kernels do not contain fully
+  backported compatibility patches.
+  Without these patches  most of cryptsetup operations
+  (like unlocking device) fail.
+
+  This change in cryptsetup ensures that all operations using
+  kernel crypto API works even on these kernels.
+
+* The cryptsetup-reencrypt utility now properly detects removal
+  of underlying link to block device and does not remove
+  ongoing re-encryption log.
+  This allows proper recovery (resume) of reencrypt operation later.
+
+  NOTE: Never use /dev/disk/by-uuid/ path for reencryption utility,
+  this link disappears once the device metadata is temporarily
+  removed from device.
+
+* Cryptsetup now allows special "-" (standard input) keyfile handling
+  even for TCRYPT (TrueCrypt and VeraCrypt compatible) devices.
+
+* Cryptsetup now fails if there are more keyfiles specified
+  for non-TCRYPT device.
+
+* The luksKillSlot command now does not suppress provided password
+  in batch mode (if password is wrong slot is not destroyed).
+  Note that not providing password in batch mode means that keyslot
+  is destroyed unconditionally.
diff --git a/docs/v1.7.2-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v1.7.2-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6323430
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v1.7.2-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.7.2 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.7.1
+
+* Update LUKS documentation format.
+  Clarify fixed sector size and keyslots alignment.
+
+* Support activation options for error handling modes in Linux kernel
+  dm-verity module:
+
+  --ignore-corruption - dm-verity just logs detected corruption
+
+  --restart-on-corruption - dm-verity restarts the kernel if corruption is detected
+
+  If the options above are not specified, default behavior for dm-verity remains.
+  Default is that I/O operation fails with I/O error if corrupted block is detected.
+
+  --ignore-zero-blocks - Instructs dm-verity to not verify blocks that are expected
+  to contain zeroes and always return zeroes directly instead.
+
+  NOTE that these options could have security or functional impacts,
+  do not use them without assessing the risks!
+
+* Fix help text for cipher benchmark specification (mention --cipher option).
+
+* Fix off-by-one error in maximum keyfile size.
+  Allow keyfiles up to compiled-in default and not that value minus one.
+
+* Support resume of interrupted decryption in cryptsetup-reencrypt utility.
+  To resume decryption, LUKS device UUID (--uuid option) option must be used.
+
+* Do not use direct-io for LUKS header with unaligned keyslots.
+  Such headers were used only by the first cryptsetup-luks-1.0.0 release (2005).
+
+* Fix device block size detection to properly work on particular file-based
+  containers over underlying devices with 4k sectors.
diff --git a/docs/v1.7.3-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v1.7.3-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4a2757c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v1.7.3-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.7.3 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.7.2
+
+* Fix device access to hash offsets located beyond the 2GB device boundary in veritysetup.
+
+* Set configured (compile-time) default iteration time for devices created directly through
+  libcryptsetup (default was hardcoded 1 second, the configured value applied only
+  for cryptsetup application).
+
+* Fix PBKDF2 benchmark to not double iteration count for specific corner case.
+  If the measurement function returns exactly 500 ms, the iteration calculation loop
+  doubled iteration count but instead of repeating measurement it used this value directly.
+
+* OpenSSL backend: fix memory leak if hash context was repeatedly reused.
+
+* OpenSSL backend: add support for OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+* Fix several minor spelling errors.
diff --git a/docs/v1.7.4-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v1.7.4-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..73dbaa7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v1.7.4-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.7.4 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.7.3
+
+* Allow to specify LUKS1 hash algorithm in Python luksFormat wrapper.
+
+* Use LUKS1 compiled-in defaults also in Python wrapper.
+
+* OpenSSL backend: Fix OpenSSL 1.1.0 support without backward compatible API.
+
+* OpenSSL backend: Fix LibreSSL compatibility.
+
+* Check for data device and hash device area overlap in veritysetup.
+
+* Fix a possible race while allocating a free loop device.
+
+* Fix possible file descriptor leaks if libcryptsetup is run from a forked process.
+
+* Fix missing same_cpu_crypt flag in status command.
+
+* Various updates to FAQ and man pages.
diff --git a/docs/v1.7.5-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v1.7.5-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eec4315
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v1.7.5-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.7.5 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.7.4
+
+* Fixes to luksFormat to properly support recent kernel running in FIPS mode.
+
+  Cryptsetup must never use a weak key even if it is just used for testing
+  of algorithm availability. In FIPS mode, weak keys are always rejected.
+
+  A weak key is for example detected if the XTS encryption mode use
+  the same key for the tweak and the encryption part.
+
+* Fixes accesses to unaligned hidden legacy TrueCrypt header.
+
+  On a native 4k-sector device the old hidden TrueCrypt header is not
+  aligned with the hw sector size (this problem was fixed in later TrueCrypt
+  on-disk format versions).
+
+  Cryptsetup now properly aligns the read so it does not fail.
+
+* Fixes to optional dracut ramdisk scripts for offline re-encryption on initial boot.
diff --git a/docs/v2.0.0-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v2.0.0-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..779dcb0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v2.0.0-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,605 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.0.0 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable release with experimental features.
+
+This version introduces a new on-disk LUKS2 format.
+
+The legacy LUKS (referenced as LUKS1) will be fully supported
+forever as well as a traditional and fully backward compatible format.
+
+NOTE: This version changes soname of libcryptsetup library and increases
+major version for all public symbols.
+Most of the old functions are fully backward compatible, so only
+recompilation of programs should be needed.
+
+Please note that authenticated disk encryption, non-cryptographic
+data integrity protection (dm-integrity), use of Argon2 Password-Based
+Key Derivation Function and the LUKS2 on-disk format itself are new
+features and can contain some bugs.
+
+To provide all security features of authenticated encryption we need
+better nonce-reuse resistant algorithm in kernel (see note below).
+For now, please use authenticated encryption as experimental feature.
+
+Please do not use LUKS2 without properly configured backup or in
+production systems that need to be compatible with older systems.
+
+Changes since version 2.0.0-RC1
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* Limit KDF requested (for format) memory by available physical memory.
+  On some systems too high requested amount of memory causes OOM killer
+  to kill the process (instead of returning ENOMEM).
+  We never try to use more than half of available physical memory.
+
+* Ignore device alignment if it is not multiple of minimal-io.
+  Some USB enclosures seems to report bogus topology info that
+  prevents to use LUKS detached header.
+
+Changes since version 2.0.0-RC0
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Enable to use system libargon2 instead of bundled version.
+  Renames --disable-argon2 to --disable-internal-argon2 option
+  and adds --enable-libargon2 flag to allow system libargon2.
+
+* Changes in build system (Automake)
+  - The build system now uses non-recursive automake (except for tests).
+  (Tools binaries are now located in buildroot directory.)
+  - New --disable-cryptsetup option to disable build of cryptsetup tool.
+  - Enable build of cryptsetup-reencrypt by default.
+
+* Install tmpfiles.d configuration for LUKS2 locking directory.
+  You can overwrite this using --with-tmpfilesdir configure option.
+  If your distro does not support tmpfiles.d directory, you have
+  to create locking directory (/run/lock/cryptsetup) in cryptsetup
+  package (or init scripts).
+
+* Adds limited support for offline reencryption of LUKS2 format.
+
+* Decrease size of testing images (and the whole release archive).
+
+* Fixes for several memory leaks found by Valgrind and Coverity tools.
+
+* Fixes for several typos in man pages and error messages.
+
+* LUKS header file in luksFormat is now automatically created
+  if it does not exist.
+
+* Do not allow resize if device size is not aligned to sector size.
+
+Cryptsetup 2.0.0 RC0 Release Notes
+==================================
+
+Important features
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* New command integritysetup: support for the new dm-integrity kernel target.
+
+  The dm-integrity is a new kernel device-mapper target that introduces
+  software emulation of per-sector integrity fields on the disk sector level.
+  It is available since Linux kernel version 4.12.
+
+  The provided per-sector metadata fields can be used for storing a data
+  integrity checksum (for example CRC32).
+  The dm-integrity implements data journal that enforces atomic update
+  of a sector and its integrity metadata.
+
+  Integritysetup is a CLI utility that can setup standalone dm-integrity
+  devices (that internally check integrity of data).
+
+  Integritysetup is intended to be used for settings that require
+  non-cryptographic data integrity protection with no data encryption.
+  Fo setting integrity protected encrypted devices, see disk authenticated
+  encryption below.
+
+  Note that after formatting the checksums need to be initialized;
+  otherwise device reads will fail because of integrity errors.
+  Integritysetup by default tries to wipe the device with zero blocks
+  to avoid this problem. Device wipe can be time-consuming, you can skip
+  this step by specifying --no-wipe option.
+  (But note that not wiping device can cause some operations to fail
+  if a write is not multiple of page size and kernel page cache tries
+  to read sectors with not yet initialized checksums.)
+
+  The default setting is tag size 4 bytes per-sector and CRC32C protection.
+  To format device with these defaults:
+  $ integritysetup format <device>
+  $ integritysetup open <device> <name>
+
+  Note that used algorithm (unlike tag size) is NOT stored in device
+  kernel superblock and if you use different algorithm, you MUST specify
+  it in every open command, for example:
+  $ integritysetup format <device> --tag-size 32 --integrity sha256
+  $ integritysetup open <device> <name> --integrity sha256
+
+  For more info, see integrity man page.
+
+* Veritysetup command can now format and activate dm-verity devices
+  that contain Forward Error Correction (FEC) (Reed-Solomon code is used).
+  This feature is used on most of Android devices already (available since
+  Linux kernel 4.5).
+
+  There are new options --fec-device, --fec-offset to specify data area
+  with correction code and --fec-roots that set Redd-Solomon generator roots.
+  This setting can be used for format command (veritysetup will calculate
+  and store RS codes) or open command (veritysetup configures kernel
+  dm-verity to use RS codes).
+
+  For more info see veritysetup man page.
+
+* Support for larger sector sizes for crypt devices.
+
+  LUKS2 and plain crypt devices can be now configured with larger encryption
+  sector (typically 4096 bytes, sector size must be the power of two,
+  maximal sector size is 4096 bytes for portability).
+  Large sector size can decrease encryption overhead and can also help
+  with some specific crypto hardware accelerators that perform very
+  badly with 512 bytes sectors.
+
+  Note that if you configure such a larger sector of the device that does use
+  smaller physical sector, there is a possibility of a data corruption during
+  power fail (partial sector writes).
+
+  WARNING: If you use different sector size for a plain device after data were
+  stored,  the decryption will produce garbage.
+
+  For LUKS2, the sector size is stored in metadata and cannot be changed later.
+
+LUKS2 format and features
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+The LUKS2 is an on-disk storage format designed to provide simple key
+management, primarily intended for Full Disk Encryption based on dm-crypt.
+
+The LUKS2 is inspired by LUKS1 format and in some specific situations (most
+of the default configurations) can be converted in-place from LUKS1.
+
+The LUKS2 format is designed to allow future updates of various
+parts without the need to modify binary structures and internally
+uses JSON text format for metadata. Compilation now requires the json-c library
+that is used for JSON data processing.
+
+On-disk format provides redundancy of metadata, detection
+of metadata corruption and automatic repair from metadata copy.
+
+NOTE: For security reasons, there is no redundancy in keyslots binary data
+(encrypted keys) but the format allows adding such a feature in future.
+
+NOTE: to operate correctly, LUKS2 requires locking of metadata.
+Locking is performed by using flock() system call for images in file
+and for block device by using a specific lock file in /run/lock/cryptsetup.
+
+This directory must be created by distribution (do not rely on internal
+fallback). For systemd-based distribution, you can simply install
+scripts/cryptsetup.conf into tmpfiles.d directory.
+
+For more details see LUKS2-format.txt and LUKS2-locking.txt in the docs
+directory. (Please note this is just overview, there will be more formal
+documentation later.)
+
+LUKS2 use
+~~~~~~~~~
+
+LUKS2 allows using all possible configurations as LUKS1.
+
+To format device as LUKS2, you have to add "--type luks2" during format:
+
+ $ cryptsetup luksFormat --type luks2 <device>
+
+All commands issued later will recognize the new format automatically.
+
+The newly added features in LUKS2 include:
+
+* Authenticated disk (sector) encryption (EXPERIMENTAL)
+
+  Legacy Full disk encryption (FDE), for example, LUKS1, is a length-preserving
+  encryption (plaintext is the same size as a ciphertext).
+  Such FDE can provide data confidentiality, but cannot provide sound data
+  integrity protection.
+
+  Full disk authenticated encryption is a way how to provide both
+  confidentiality and data integrity protection. Integrity protection here means
+  not only detection of random data corruption (silent data corruption) but also
+  prevention of an unauthorized intentional change of disk sector content.
+
+  NOTE: Integrity protection of this type cannot prevent a replay attack.
+  An attacker can replace the device or its part of the old content, and it
+  cannot be detected.
+  If you need such protection, better use integrity protection on a higher layer.
+
+  For data integrity protection on the sector level, we need additional
+  per-sector metadata space. In LUKS2 this space is provided by a new
+  device-mapper dm-integrity target (available since kernel 4.12).
+  Here the integrity target provides only reliable per-sector metadata store,
+  and the whole authenticated encryption is performed inside dm-crypt stacked
+  over the dm-integrity device.
+
+  For encryption, Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) is used.
+  Every sector is processed as a encryption request of this format:
+
+   |----- AAD -------|------ DATA -------|-- AUTH TAG --|
+   | (authenticated) | (auth+encryption) |              |
+   | sector_LE |  IV |  sector in/out    |  tag in/out  |
+
+  AEAD encrypts the whole sector and also authenticates sector number
+  (to detect sector relocation) and also authenticates Initialization Vector.
+
+  AEAD encryption produces encrypted data and authentication tag.
+  The authenticated tag is then stored in per-sector metadata space provided
+  by dm-integrity.
+
+  Most of the current AEAD algorithms requires IV as a nonce, value that is
+  never reused. Because sector number, as an IV, cannot be used in this
+  environment, we use a new random IV (IV is a random value generated by system
+  RNG on every write). This random IV is then stored in the per-sector metadata
+  as well.
+
+  Because the authentication tag (and IV) requires additional space, the device
+  provided for a user has less capacity. Also, the data journalling means that
+  writes are performed twice, decreasing throughput.
+
+  This integrity protection works better with SSDs. If you want to ignore
+  dm-integrity data journal (because journalling is performed on some higher
+  layer or you just want to trade-off performance to safe recovery), you can
+  switch journal off with --integrity-no-journal option.
+  (This flag can be stored persistently as well.)
+
+  Note that (similar to integritysetup) the device read will fail if
+  authentication tag is not initialized (no previous write).
+  By default cryptsetup run wipe of a device (writing zeroes) to initialize
+  authentication tags. This operation can be very time-consuming.
+  You can skip device wipe using --integrity-no-wipe option.
+
+  To format LUKS2 device with integrity protection, use new --integrity option.
+
+  For now, there are very few AEAD algorithms that can be used, and some
+  of them are known to be problematic. In this release we support only
+  a few of AEAD algorithms (options are for now hard coded), later this
+  extension will be completely algorithm-agnostic.
+
+  For testing of authenticated encryption, these algorithms work for now:
+
+  1) aes-xts-plain64 with hmac-sha256 or hmac-sha512 as the authentication tag.
+     (Common FDE mode + independent authentication tag. Authentication key
+      for HMAC is independently generated. This mode is very slow.)
+     $ cryptsetup luksFormat --type luks2 <device> --cipher aes-xts-plain64 --integrity hmac-sha256
+
+  2) aes-gcm-random (native AEAD mode)
+     DO NOT USE in production! The GCM mode uses only 96-bit nonce,
+     and possible collision means fatal security problem.
+     GCM mode has very good hardware support through AES-NI, so it is useful
+     for performance testing.
+     $ cryptsetup luksFormat --type luks2 <device> --cipher aes-gcm-random --integrity aead
+
+  3) ChaCha20 with Poly1305 authenticator (according to RFC7539)
+     $ cryptsetup luksFormat --type luks2 <device> --cipher chacha20-random --integrity poly1305
+
+  To specify AES128/AES256 just specify proper key size (without possible
+  authentication key). Other symmetric ciphers, like Serpent or Twofish,
+  should work as well. The mode 1) and 2) should be compatible with IEEE 1619.1
+  standard recommendation.
+
+  There will be better suitable authenticated modes available soon
+  For now we are just preparing framework to enable it (and hopefully improve security of FDE).
+
+  FDE authenticated encryption is not a replacement for filesystem layer
+  authenticated encryption. The goal is to provide at least something because
+  data integrity protection is often completely ignored in today systems.
+
+* New memory-hard PBKDF
+
+  LUKS1 introduced Password-Based Key Derivation Function v2 as a tool to
+  increase attacker cost for a dictionary and brute force attacks.
+  The PBKDF2 uses iteration count to increase time of key derivation.
+  Unfortunately, with modern GPUs, the PBKDF2 calculations can be run
+  in parallel and PBKDF2 can no longer provide the best available protection.
+  Increasing iteration count just cannot prevent massive parallel dictionary
+  password attacks in long-term.
+
+  To solve this problem, a new PBKDF, based on so-called memory-hard functions
+  can be used. Key derivation with memory-hard function requires a certain
+  amount of memory to compute its output. The memory requirement is very
+  costly for GPUs and prevents these systems to operate effectively,
+  increasing cost for attackers.
+
+  LUKS2 introduces support for Argon2i and Argon2id as a PBKDF.
+  Argon2 is the winner of Password Hashing Competition and is currently
+  in final RFC draft specification.
+
+  For now, libcryptsetup contains the embedded copy of reference implementation
+  of Argon2 (that is easily portable to all architectures).
+  Later, once this function is available in common crypto libraries, it will
+  switch to external implementation. (This happened for LUKS1 and PBKDF2
+  as well years ago.)
+  With using reference implementation (that is not optimized for speed), there
+  is some performance penalty. However, using memory-hard PBKDF should still
+  significantly complicate GPU-optimized dictionary and brute force attacks.
+
+  The Argon2 uses three costs: memory, time (number of iterations) and parallel
+  (number of threads).
+  Note that time and memory cost highly influences each other (accessing a lot
+  of memory takes more time).
+
+  There is a new benchmark that tries to calculate costs to take similar way as
+  in LUKS1 (where iteration is measured to take 1-2 seconds on user system).
+  Because now there are more cost variables, it prefers time cost (iterations)
+  and tries to find required memory that fits. (IOW required memory cost can be
+  lower if the benchmarks are not able to find required parameters.)
+  The benchmark cannot run too long, so it tries to approximate next step
+  for benchmarking.
+
+  For now, default LUKS2 PBKDF algorithm is Argon2i (data independent variant)
+  with memory cost set to 128MB, time to 800ms and parallel thread according
+  to available CPU cores but no more than 4.
+
+  All default parameters can be set during compile time and also set on
+  the command line by using --pbkdf, --pbkdf-memory, --pbkdf-parallel and
+  --iter-time options.
+  (Or without benchmark directly by using --pbkdf-force-iterations, see below.)
+
+  You can still use PBKDF2 even for LUKS2 by specifying --pbkdf pbkdf2 option.
+  (Then only iteration count is applied.)
+
+* Use of kernel keyring
+
+  Kernel keyring is a storage for sensitive material (like cryptographic keys)
+  inside Linux kernel.
+
+  LUKS2 uses keyring for two major functions:
+
+   - To store volume key for dm-crypt where it avoids sending volume key in
+  every device-mapper ioctl structure. Volume key is also no longer directly
+  visible in a dm-crypt mapping table. The key is not available for the user
+  after dm-crypt configuration (obviously except direct memory scan).
+  Use of kernel keyring can be disabled in runtime by --disable-keyring option.
+
+   - As a tool to automatically unlock LUKS device if a passphrase is put into
+  kernel keyring and proper keyring token is configured.
+
+   This allows storing a secret (passphrase) to kernel per-user keyring by
+  some external tool (for example some TPM handler) and LUKS2, if configured,
+  will automatically search in the keyring and unlock the system.
+  For more info see Tokens section below.
+
+* Persistent flags
+  The activation flags (like allow-discards) can be stored in metadata and used
+  automatically by all later activations (even without using crypttab).
+
+  To store activation flags permanently, use activation command with required
+  flags and add --persistent option.
+
+  For example, to mark device to always activate with TRIM enabled,
+  use (for LUKS2 type):
+
+   $ cryptsetup open <device> <name> --allow-discards --persistent
+
+  You can check persistent flags in dump command output:
+
+  $ cryptsetup luksDump <device>
+
+* Tokens and auto-activation
+
+  A LUKS2 token is an object that can be described "how to get passphrase or key"
+  to unlock particular keyslot.
+  (Also it can be used to store any additional metadata, and with
+  the libcryptsetup interface it can be used to define user token types.)
+
+  Cryptsetup internally implements keyring token. Cryptsetup tries to use
+  available tokens before asking for the passphrase. For keyring token,
+  it means that if the passphrase is available under specified identifier
+  inside kernel keyring, the device is automatically activated using this
+  stored passphrase.
+
+  Example of using LUKS2 keyring token:
+
+  # Adding token to metadata with "my_token" identifier (by default it applies to all keyslots).
+  $ cryptsetup token add --key-description "my_token" <device>
+
+  # Storing passphrase to user keyring (this can be done by an external application)
+  $ echo -n <passphrase> | keyctl padd user my_token @u
+
+  # Now cryptsetup activates automatically if it finds correct passphrase
+  $ cryptsetup open <device> <name>
+
+  The main reason to use tokens this way is to separate possible hardware
+  handlers from cryptsetup code.
+
+* Keyslot priorities
+
+  LUKS2 keyslot can have a new priority attribute.
+  The default is "normal". The "prefer" priority tell the keyslot to be tried
+  before other keyslots. Priority "ignore" means that keyslot will never be
+  used if not specified explicitly (it can be used for backup administrator
+  passwords that are used only situations when a user forgets own passphrase).
+
+  The priority of keyslot can be set with new config command, for example
+  $ cryptsetup config <device> --key-slot 1 --priority prefer
+
+  Setting priority to normal will reset slot to normal state.
+
+* LUKS2 label and subsystem
+
+  The header now contains additional fields for label and subsystem (additional
+  label). These fields can be used similar to filesystem label and will be
+  visible in udev rules to possible filtering. (Note that blkid do not yet
+  contain the LUKS scanning code).
+
+  By default both labels are empty. Label and subsystem are always set together
+  (no option  means clear the label) with the config command:
+
+  $ cryptsetup config <device> --label my_device --subsystem ""
+
+* In-place conversion form LUKS1
+
+  To allow easy testing and transition to the new LUKS2 format, there is a new
+  convert command that allows in-place conversion from the LUKS1 format and,
+  if there are no incompatible options, also conversion back from LUKS2
+  to LUKS1 format.
+
+  Note this command can be used only on some LUKS1 devices (some device header
+  sizes are not supported).
+  This command is dangerous, never run it without header backup!
+  If something fails in the middle of conversion (IO error), the header
+  is destroyed. (Note that conversion requires move of keyslot data area to
+  a different offset.)
+
+  To convert header in-place to LUKS2 format, use
+  $ cryptsetup convert <device> --type luks2
+
+  To convert it back to LUKS1 format, use
+  $ cryptsetup convert <device> --type luks1
+
+  You can verify LUKS version with luksDump command.
+  $ cryptsetup luksDump <device>
+
+  Note that some LUKS2 features will make header incompatible with LUKS1 and
+  conversion will be rejected (for example using new Argon2 PBKDF or integrity
+  extensions). Some minor attributes can be lost in conversion.
+
+Other changes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Explicit KDF iterations count setting
+
+  With new PBKDF interface, there is also the possibility to setup PBKDF costs
+  directly, avoiding benchmarks. This can be useful if device is formatted to be
+  primarily used on a different system.
+
+  The option --pbkdf-force-iterations is available for both LUKS1 and LUKS2
+  format. Using this option can cause device to have either very low or very
+  high PBKDF costs.
+  In the first case it means bad protection to dictionary attacks, in the second
+  case, it can mean extremely high unlocking time or memory requirements.
+  Use only if you are sure what you are doing!
+
+  Not that this setting also affects iteration count for the key digest.
+  For LUKS1 iteration count for digest will be approximately 1/8 of requested
+  value, for LUKS2 and "pbkdf2" digest minimal PBKDF2 iteration count (1000)
+  will be used. You cannot set lower iteration count than the internal minimum
+  (1000 for PBKDF2).
+
+  To format LUKS1 device with forced iteration count (and no benchmarking), use
+  $ cryptsetup luksFormat <device> --pbkdf-force-iterations 22222
+
+  For LUKS2 it is always better to specify full settings (do not rely on default
+  cost values).
+  For example, we can set to use Argon2id with iteration cost 5, memory 128000
+  and parallel set 1:
+  $ cryptsetup luksFormat --type luks2 <device> \
+    --pbkdf argon2id --pbkdf-force-iterations 5 --pbkdf-memory 128000 --pbkdf-parallel 1
+
+* VeraCrypt PIM
+
+  Cryptsetup can now also open VeraCrypt device that uses Personal Iteration
+  Multiplier (PIM). PIM is an integer value that user must remember additionally
+  to passphrase and influences PBKDF2 iteration count (without it VeraCrypt uses
+  a fixed number of iterations).
+
+  To open VeraCrypt device with PIM settings, use --veracrypt-pim (to specify
+  PIM on the command line) or --veracrypt-query-pim to query PIM interactively.
+
+* Support for plain64be IV
+
+  The plain64be is big-endian variant of plain64 Initialization Vector. It is
+  used in some images of hardware-based disk encryption systems. Supporting this
+  variant allows using dm-crypt to map such images through cryptsetup.
+
+* Deferral removal
+
+  Cryptsetup now can mark device for deferred removal by using a new option
+  --deferred. This means that close command will not fail if the device is still
+  in use, but will instruct the kernel to remove the device automatically after
+  use count drops to zero (for example, once the filesystem is unmounted).
+
+* A lot of updates to man pages and many minor changes that would make this
+  release notes too long ;-)
+
+Libcryptsetup API changes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+These API functions were removed, libcryptsetup no longer handles password
+retries from terminal (application should handle terminal operations itself):
+	crypt_set_password_callback;
+	crypt_set_timeout;
+	crypt_set_password_retry;
+	crypt_set_password_verify;
+
+This call is removed (no need to keep typo backward compatibility,
+the proper function is crypt_set_iteration_time :-)
+	crypt_set_iterarion_time;
+
+These calls were removed because are not safe, use per-context
+error callbacks instead:
+	crypt_last_error;
+	crypt_get_error;
+
+The PBKDF benchmark was replaced by a new function that uses new KDF structure
+	crypt_benchmark_kdf; (removed)
+	crypt_benchmark_pbkdf; (new API call)
+
+These new calls are now exported, for details see libcryptsetup.h:
+	crypt_keyslot_add_by_key;
+	crypt_keyslot_set_priority;
+	crypt_keyslot_get_priority;
+
+	crypt_token_json_get;
+	crypt_token_json_set;
+	crypt_token_status;
+	crypt_token_luks2_keyring_get;
+	crypt_token_luks2_keyring_set;
+	crypt_token_assign_keyslot;
+	crypt_token_unassign_keyslot;
+	crypt_token_register;
+
+	crypt_activate_by_token;
+	crypt_activate_by_keyring;
+	crypt_deactivate_by_name;
+
+	crypt_metadata_locking;
+	crypt_volume_key_keyring;
+	crypt_get_integrity_info;
+	crypt_get_sector_size;
+	crypt_persistent_flags_set;
+	crypt_persistent_flags_get;
+	crypt_set_pbkdf_type;
+	crypt_get_pbkdf_type;
+
+	crypt_convert;
+	crypt_keyfile_read;
+	crypt_wipe;
+
+Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* There will be better documentation and examples.
+
+* There will be some more formal definition of the threat model for integrity
+  protection. (And a link to some papers discussing integrity protection,
+  once it is, hopefully, accepted and published.)
+
+* Offline re-encrypt tool LUKS2 support is currently limited.
+  There will be online LUKS2 re-encryption tool in future.
+
+* Authenticated encryption will use new algorithms from CAESAR competition
+  (https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar.html) once these algorithms are available
+  in kernel (more on this later).
+  NOTE: Currently available authenticated modes (GCM, Chacha20-poly1305)
+  in kernel have too small 96-bit nonces that are problematic with
+  randomly generated IVs (the collison probability is not negligible).
+  For the GCM, nonce collision is a fatal problem.
+
+* Authenticated encryption do not set encryption for dm-integrity journal.
+
+  While it does not influence data confidentiality or integrity protection,
+  an attacker can get some more information from data journal or cause that
+  system will corrupt sectors after journal replay. (That corruption will be
+  detected though.)
+
+* Some utilities (blkid, systemd-cryptsetup) have already support for LUKS
+  but not yet in released version (support in crypttab etc).
+
+* There are some examples of user-defined tokens inside misc/luks2_keyslot_example
+  directory (like a simple external program that uses libssh to unlock LUKS2
+  using remote keyfile).
+
+* The python binding (pycryptsetup) contains only basic functionality for LUKS1
+  (it is not updated for new features) and will be deprecated soon in favor
+  of python bindings to libblockdev library (that can already handle LUKS1 devices).
diff --git a/docs/v2.0.1-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v2.0.1-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0cc13b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v2.0.1-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.0.1 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable and bug-fix release with experimental features.
+
+This version introduces a new on-disk LUKS2 format.
+
+The legacy LUKS (referenced as LUKS1) will be fully supported
+forever as well as a traditional and fully backward compatible format.
+
+Please note that authenticated disk encryption, non-cryptographic
+data integrity protection (dm-integrity), use of Argon2 Password-Based
+Key Derivation Function and the LUKS2 on-disk format itself are new
+features and can contain some bugs.
+
+To provide all security features of authenticated encryption we need
+a better nonce-reuse resistant algorithm in the kernel (see note below).
+For now, please use authenticated encryption as an experimental feature.
+
+Please do not use LUKS2 without properly configured backup or in
+production systems that need to be compatible with older systems.
+
+Changes since version 2.0.0
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* To store volume key into kernel keyring, kernel 4.15 with dm-crypt 1.18.1
+  is required. If a volume key is stored in keyring (LUKS2 only),
+  the dm-crypt v1.15.0 through v1.18.0 contains a serious bug that may cause
+  data corruption for ciphers with ESSIV.
+  (The key for ESSIV is zeroed because of code misplacement.)
+  This bug is not present for LUKS1 or any other IVs used in LUKS modes.
+  This change is not visible to the user (except dmsetup output).
+
+* Increase maximum allowed PBKDF memory-cost limit to 4 GiB.
+  The Argon2 PBKDF uses 1GiB by default; this is also limited by the amount
+  of physical memory available (maximum is half of the physical memory).
+
+* Use /run/cryptsetup as default for cryptsetup locking dir.
+  There were problems with sharing /run/lock with lockdev, and in the early
+  boot, the directory was missing.
+  The directory can be changed with --with-luks2-lock-path and
+  --with-luks2-lock-dir-perms configure switches.
+
+* Introduce new 64-bit byte-offset *keyfile_device_offset functions.
+
+  The keyfile interface was designed, well, for keyfiles. Unfortunately,
+  there are user cases where a keyfile can be placed on a device, and
+  size_t offset can overflow on 32-bit systems.
+
+  New set of functions that allow 64-bit offsets even on 32bit systems
+  are now available:
+
+     - crypt_resume_by_keyfile_device_offset
+     - crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_device_offset
+     - crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset
+     - crypt_keyfile_device_read
+
+  The new functions have added the _device_ in name.
+  Old functions are just internal wrappers around these.
+
+  Also cryptsetup --keyfile-offset and --new-keyfile-offset now allows
+  64-bit offsets as parameters.
+
+* Add error hint for wrongly formatted cipher strings in LUKS1 and
+  properly fail in luksFormat if cipher format is missing required IV.
+  For now, crypto API quietly used cipher without IV if a cipher
+  algorithm without IV specification was used (e.g., aes-xts).
+  This caused fail later during activation.
+
+* Configure check for a recent Argon2 lib to support mandatory Argon2id.
+
+* Fix for the cryptsetup-reencrypt static build if pwquality is enabled.
+
+* Update LUKS1 standard doc (https links in the bibliography).
+
+
+Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* There will be better documentation and examples.
+
+* There will be some more formal definition of the threat model for integrity
+  protection. (And a link to some papers discussing integrity protection,
+  once it is, hopefully, accepted and published.)
+
+* Offline re-encrypt tool LUKS2 support is currently limited.
+  There will be online LUKS2 re-encryption tool in future.
+
+* Authenticated encryption will use new algorithms from CAESAR competition
+  (https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar.html) once these algorithms are
+  available in the kernel (more on this later).
+  NOTE: Currently available authenticated modes (GCM, Chacha20-poly1305)
+  in the kernel have too small 96-bit nonces that are problematic with
+  randomly generated IVs (the collision probability is not negligible).
+  For the GCM, nonce collision is a fatal problem.
+
+* Authenticated encryption do not set encryption for a dm-integrity journal.
+
+  While it does not influence data confidentiality or integrity protection,
+  an attacker can get some more information from data journal or cause that
+  system will corrupt sectors after journal replay. (That corruption will be
+  detected though.)
+
+* There are examples of user-defined tokens inside misc/luks2_keyslot_example
+  directory (like a simple external program that uses libssh to unlock LUKS2
+  using remote keyfile).
+
+* The python binding (pycryptsetup) contains only basic functionality for LUKS1
+  (it is not updated for new features) and will be deprecated soon in favor
+  of python bindings to the libblockdev library (that can already handle LUKS1
+  devices).
diff --git a/docs/v2.0.2-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v2.0.2-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a85a248
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v2.0.2-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.0.2 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable and bug-fix release with experimental features.
+
+Cryptsetup 2.x version introduces a new on-disk LUKS2 format.
+
+The legacy LUKS (referenced as LUKS1) will be fully supported
+forever as well as a traditional and fully backward compatible format.
+
+Please note that authenticated disk encryption, non-cryptographic
+data integrity protection (dm-integrity), use of Argon2 Password-Based
+Key Derivation Function and the LUKS2 on-disk format itself are new
+features and can contain some bugs.
+
+To provide all security features of authenticated encryption, we need
+a better nonce-reuse resistant algorithm in the kernel (see note below).
+For now, please use authenticated encryption as an experimental feature.
+
+Please do not use LUKS2 without properly configured backup or in
+production systems that need to be compatible with older systems.
+
+Changes since version 2.0.1
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Fix a regression in early detection of inactive keyslot for luksKillSlot.
+  It tried to ask for passphrase even for already erased keyslot.
+
+* Fix a regression in loopaesOpen processing for keyfile on standard input.
+  Use of "-" argument was not working properly.
+
+* Add LUKS2 specific options for cryptsetup-reencrypt.
+  Tokens and persistent flags are now transferred during reencryption;
+  change of PBKDF keyslot parameters is now supported and allows
+  to set precalculated values (no benchmarks).
+
+* Do not allow LUKS2 --persistent and --test-passphrase cryptsetup flags
+  combination. Persistent flags are now stored only if the device was
+  successfully activated with the specified flags.
+
+* Fix integritysetup format after recent Linux kernel changes that
+  requires to setup key for HMAC in all cases.
+  Previously integritysetup allowed HMAC with zero key that behaves
+  like a plain hash.
+
+* Fix VeraCrypt PIM handling that modified internal iteration counts
+  even for subsequent activations. The PIM count is no longer printed
+  in debug log as it is sensitive information.
+  Also, the code now skips legacy TrueCrypt algorithms if a PIM
+  is specified (they cannot be used with PIM anyway).
+
+* PBKDF values cannot be set (even with force parameters) below
+  hardcoded minimums. For PBKDF2 is it 1000 iterations, for Argon2
+  it is 4 iterations and 32 KiB of memory cost.
+
+* Introduce new crypt_token_is_assigned() API function for reporting
+  the binding between token and keyslots.
+
+* Allow crypt_token_json_set() API function to create internal token types.
+  Do not allow unknown fields in internal token objects.
+
+* Print message in cryptsetup that about was aborted if a user did not
+  answer YES in a query.
+
+Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* There will be better documentation and examples.
+
+* There will be some more formal definition of the threat model for integrity
+  protection. (And a link to some papers discussing integrity protection,
+  once it is, hopefully, accepted and published.)
+
+* Authenticated encryption will use new algorithms from CAESAR competition
+  https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar-submissions.html.
+  We plan to use AEGIS and MORUS, as CAESAR finalists.
+
+  NOTE: Currently available authenticated modes (GCM, Chacha20-poly1305)
+  in the kernel have too small 96-bit nonces that are problematic with
+  randomly generated IVs (the collision probability is not negligible).
+
+* Authenticated encryption do not set encryption for a dm-integrity journal.
+
+  While it does not influence data confidentiality or integrity protection,
+  an attacker can get some more information from data journal or cause that
+  system will corrupt sectors after journal replay. (That corruption will be
+  detected though.)
+
+* There are examples of user-defined tokens inside misc/luks2_keyslot_example
+  directory (like a simple external program that uses libssh to unlock LUKS2
+  using remote keyfile).
+
+* The python binding (pycryptsetup) contains only basic functionality for LUKS1
+  (it is not updated for new features) and will be deprecated in version 2.1
+  in favor of python bindings to the libblockdev library.
diff --git a/docs/v2.0.3-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v2.0.3-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..030a1b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v2.0.3-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.0.3 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable bug-fix release with new features.
+
+Cryptsetup 2.x version introduces a new on-disk LUKS2 format.
+
+The legacy LUKS (referenced as LUKS1) will be fully supported
+forever as well as a traditional and fully backward compatible format.
+
+Please note that authenticated disk encryption, non-cryptographic
+data integrity protection (dm-integrity), use of Argon2 Password-Based
+Key Derivation Function and the LUKS2 on-disk format itself are new
+features and can contain some bugs.
+
+To provide all security features of authenticated encryption, we need
+a better nonce-reuse resistant algorithm in the kernel (see note below).
+For now, please use authenticated encryption as an experimental feature.
+
+Please do not use LUKS2 without properly configured backup or in
+production systems that need to be compatible with older systems.
+
+Changes since version 2.0.2
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Expose interface to unbound LUKS2 keyslots.
+  Unbound LUKS2 keyslot allows storing a key material that is independent
+  of master volume key (it is not bound to encrypted data segment).
+
+* New API extensions for unbound keyslots (LUKS2 only)
+  crypt_keyslot_get_key_size() and crypt_volume_key_get()
+  These functions allow to get key and key size for unbound keyslots.
+
+* New enum value CRYPT_SLOT_UNBOUND for keyslot status (LUKS2 only).
+
+* Add --unbound keyslot option to the cryptsetup luksAddKey command.
+
+* Add crypt_get_active_integrity_failures() call to get integrity
+  failure count for dm-integrity devices.
+
+* Add crypt_get_pbkdf_default() function to get per-type PBKDF default
+  setting.
+
+* Add new flag to crypt_keyslot_add_by_key() to force update device
+  volume key. This call is mainly intended for a wrapped key change.
+
+* Allow volume key store in a file with cryptsetup.
+  The --dump-master-key together with --master-key-file allows cryptsetup
+  to store the binary volume key to a file instead of standard output.
+
+* Add support detached header for cryptsetup-reencrypt command.
+
+* Fix VeraCrypt PIM handling - use proper iterations count formula
+  for PBKDF2-SHA512 and PBKDF2-Whirlpool used in system volumes.
+
+* Fix cryptsetup tcryptDump for VeraCrypt PIM (support --veracrypt-pim).
+
+* Add --with-default-luks-format configure time option.
+  (Option to override default LUKS format version.)
+
+* Fix LUKS version conversion for detached (and trimmed) LUKS headers.
+
+* Add luksConvertKey cryptsetup command that converts specific keyslot
+  from one PBKDF to another.
+
+* Do not allow conversion to LUKS2 if LUKSMETA (external tool metadata)
+  header is detected.
+
+* More cleanup and hardening of LUKS2 keyslot specific validation options.
+  Add more checks for cipher validity before writing metadata on-disk.
+
+* Do not allow LUKS1 version downconversion if the header contains tokens.
+
+* Add "paes" family ciphers (AES wrapped key scheme for mainframes)
+  to allowed ciphers.
+  Specific wrapped ley configuration logic must be done by 3rd party tool,
+  LUKS2 stores only keyslot material and allow activation of the device.
+
+* Add support for --check-at-most-once option (kernel 4.17) to veritysetup.
+  This flag can be dangerous; if you can control underlying device
+  (you can change its content after it was verified) it will no longer
+  prevent reading tampered data and also it does not prevent silent
+  data corruptions that appear after the block was once read.
+
+* Fix return code (EPERM instead of EINVAL) and retry count for bad
+  passphrase on non-tty input.
+
+* Enable support for FEC decoding in veritysetup to check dm-verity devices
+  with additional Reed-Solomon code in userspace (verify command).
+
+Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* There will be better documentation and examples (planned for 2.0.4).
+
+* There will be some more formal definition of the threat model for integrity
+  protection. (And a link to some papers discussing integrity protection,
+  once it is, hopefully, accepted and published.)
+
+* Authenticated encryption will use new algorithms from CAESAR competition
+  https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar-submissions.html.
+  We plan to use AEGIS and MORUS, as CAESAR finalists.
+
+  NOTE: Currently available authenticated modes (GCM, Chacha20-poly1305)
+  in the kernel have too small 96-bit nonces that are problematic with
+  randomly generated IVs (the collision probability is not negligible).
+
+* Authenticated encryption do not set encryption for a dm-integrity journal.
+
+  While it does not influence data confidentiality or integrity protection,
+  an attacker can get some more information from data journal or cause that
+  system will corrupt sectors after journal replay. (That corruption will be
+  detected though.)
+
+* There are examples of user-defined tokens inside misc/luks2_keyslot_example
+  directory (like a simple external program that uses libssh to unlock LUKS2
+  using remote keyfile).
+
+* The python binding (pycryptsetup) contains only basic functionality for LUKS1
+  (it is not updated for new features) and will be REMOVED in version 2.1
+  in favor of python bindings to the libblockdev library.
+  See https://github.com/storaged-project/libblockdev/releases/tag/2.17-1 that
+  already supports LUKS2 and VeraCrypt devices handling through libcryptsetup.
diff --git a/docs/v2.0.4-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v2.0.4-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9731f59
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v2.0.4-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.0.4 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable bug-fix release with new features.
+
+Cryptsetup 2.x version introduces a new on-disk LUKS2 format.
+
+The legacy LUKS (referenced as LUKS1) will be fully supported
+forever as well as a traditional and fully backward compatible format.
+
+Please note that authenticated disk encryption, non-cryptographic
+data integrity protection (dm-integrity), use of Argon2 Password-Based
+Key Derivation Function and the LUKS2 on-disk format itself are new
+features and can contain some bugs.
+
+To provide all security features of authenticated encryption, we need
+a better nonce-reuse resistant algorithm in the kernel (see note below).
+For now, please use authenticated encryption as an experimental feature.
+
+Please do not use LUKS2 without properly configured backup or in
+production systems that need to be compatible with older systems.
+
+Changes since version 2.0.3
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Use the libblkid (blockid) library to detect foreign signatures
+  on a device before LUKS format and LUKS2 auto-recovery.
+
+  This change fixes an unexpected recovery using the secondary
+  LUKS2 header after a device was already overwritten with
+  another format (filesystem or LVM physical volume).
+
+  LUKS2 will not recreate a primary header if it detects a valid
+  foreign signature. In this situation, a user must always
+  use cryptsetup repair command for the recovery.
+
+  Note that libcryptsetup and utilities are now linked to libblkid
+  as a new dependence.
+
+  To compile code without blockid support (strongly discouraged),
+  use --disable-blkid configure switch.
+
+* Add prompt for format and repair actions in cryptsetup and
+  integritysetup if foreign signatures are detected on the device
+  through the blockid library.
+
+  After the confirmation, all known signatures are then wiped as
+  part of the format or repair procedure.
+
+* Print consistent verbose message about keyslot and token numbers.
+  For keyslot actions: Key slot <number> unlocked/created/removed.
+  For token actions: Token <number> created/removed.
+
+* Print error, if a non-existent token is tried to be removed.
+
+* Add support for LUKS2 token definition export and import.
+
+  The token command now can export/import customized token JSON file
+  directly from command line. See the man page for more details.
+
+* Add support for new dm-integrity superblock version 2.
+
+* Add an error message when nothing was read from a key file.
+
+* Update cryptsetup man pages, including --type option usage.
+
+* Add a snapshot of LUKS2 format specification to documentation
+  and accordingly fix supported secondary header offsets.
+
+* Add bundled optimized Argon2 SSE (X86_64 platform) code.
+
+  If the bundled Argon2 code is used and the new configure switch
+  --enable-internal-sse-argon2 option is present, and compiler flags
+  support required optimization, the code will try to use optimized
+  and faster variant.
+
+  Always use the shared library (--enable-libargon2) if possible.
+
+  This option was added because an enterprise distribution
+  rejected to support the shared Argon2 library and native support
+  in generic cryptographic libraries is not ready yet.
+
+* Fix compilation with crypto backend for LibreSSL >= 2.7.0.
+  LibreSSL introduced OpenSSL 1.1.x API functions, so compatibility
+  wrapper must be commented out.
+
+* Fix on-disk header size calculation for LUKS2 format if a specific
+  data alignment is requested. Until now, the code used default size
+  that could be wrong for converted devices.
+
+Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* Authenticated encryption will use new algorithms from CAESAR competition
+  https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar-submissions.html.
+  We plan to use AEGIS and MORUS (in kernel 4.18), as CAESAR finalists.
+
+  NOTE: Currently available authenticated modes (GCM, Chacha20-poly1305)
+  in the kernel have too small 96-bit nonces that are problematic with
+  randomly generated IVs (the collision probability is not negligible).
+
+  For more info about LUKS2 authenticated encryption, please see our paper
+  https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.00309
+
+* Authenticated encryption do not set encryption for a dm-integrity journal.
+
+  While it does not influence data confidentiality or integrity protection,
+  an attacker can get some more information from data journal or cause that
+  system will corrupt sectors after journal replay. (That corruption will be
+  detected though.)
+
+* There are examples of user-defined tokens inside misc/luks2_keyslot_example
+  directory (like a simple external program that uses libssh to unlock LUKS2
+  using remote keyfile).
+
+* The python binding (pycryptsetup) contains only basic functionality for LUKS1
+  (it is not updated for new features) and will be REMOVED in version 2.1
+  in favor of python bindings to the libblockdev library.
+  See https://github.com/storaged-project/libblockdev/releases that
+  already supports LUKS2 and VeraCrypt devices handling through libcryptsetup.
+
diff --git a/docs/v2.0.5-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v2.0.5-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..907d5aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v2.0.5-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.0.5 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable bug-fix release with new features.
+
+Cryptsetup 2.x version introduces a new on-disk LUKS2 format.
+
+The legacy LUKS (referenced as LUKS1) will be fully supported
+forever as well as a traditional and fully backward compatible format.
+
+Please note that authenticated disk encryption, non-cryptographic
+data integrity protection (dm-integrity), use of Argon2 Password-Based
+Key Derivation Function and the LUKS2 on-disk format itself are new
+features and can contain some bugs.
+
+Please do not use LUKS2 without properly configured backup or in
+production systems that need to be compatible with older systems.
+
+Changes since version 2.0.4
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Wipe full header areas (including unused) during LUKS format.
+
+  Since this version, the whole area up to the data offset is zeroed,
+  and subsequently, all keyslots areas are wiped with random data.
+  This ensures that no remaining old data remains in the LUKS header
+  areas, but it could slow down format operation on some devices.
+  Previously only first 4k (or 32k for LUKS2) and the used keyslot
+  was overwritten in the format operation.
+
+* Several fixes to error messages that were unintentionally replaced
+  in previous versions with a silent exit code.
+  More descriptive error messages were added, including error
+  messages if
+   - a device is unusable (not a block device, no access, etc.),
+   - a LUKS device is not detected,
+   - LUKS header load code detects unsupported version,
+   - a keyslot decryption fails (also happens in the cipher check),
+   - converting an inactive keyslot.
+
+* Device activation fails if data area overlaps with LUKS header.
+
+* Code now uses explicit_bzero to wipe memory if available
+  (instead of own implementation).
+
+* Additional VeraCrypt modes are now supported, including Camellia
+  and Kuznyechik symmetric ciphers (and cipher chains) and Streebog
+  hash function. These were introduced in a recent VeraCrypt upstream.
+
+  Note that Kuznyechik requires out-of-tree kernel module and
+  Streebog hash function is available only with the gcrypt cryptographic
+  backend for now.
+
+* Fixes static build for integritysetup if the pwquality library is used.
+
+* Allows passphrase change for unbound keyslots.
+
+* Fixes removed keyslot number in verbose message for luksKillSlot,
+  luksRemoveKey and erase command.
+
+* Adds blkid scan when attempting to open a plain device and warn the user
+  about existing device signatures in a ciphertext device.
+
+* Remove LUKS header signature if luksFormat fails to add the first keyslot.
+
+* Remove O_SYNC from device open and use fsync() to speed up
+  wipe operation considerably.
+
+* Create --master-key-file in luksDump and fail if the file already exists.
+
+* Fixes a bug when LUKS2 authenticated encryption with a detached header
+  wiped the header device instead of dm-integrity data device area (causing
+  unnecessary LUKS2 header auto recovery).
+
+Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* Authenticated encryption should use new algorithms from CAESAR competition
+  https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar-submissions.html.
+  AEGIS and MORUS are already available in kernel 4.18.
+
+  For more info about LUKS2 authenticated encryption, please see our paper
+  https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.00309
+
+  Please note that authenticated encryption is still an experimental feature
+  and can have performance problems for hish-speed devices and device
+  with larger IO blocks (like RAID).
+
+* Authenticated encryption do not set encryption for a dm-integrity journal.
+
+  While it does not influence data confidentiality or integrity protection,
+  an attacker can get some more information from data journal or cause that
+  system will corrupt sectors after journal replay. (That corruption will be
+  detected though.)
+
+* There are examples of user-defined tokens inside misc/luks2_keyslot_example
+  directory (like a simple external program that uses libssh to unlock LUKS2
+  using remote keyfile).
+
+* The python binding (pycryptsetup) contains only basic functionality for LUKS1
+  (it is not updated for new features) and will be REMOVED in version 2.1
+  in favor of python bindings to the libblockdev library.
+  See https://github.com/storaged-project/libblockdev/releases that
+  already supports LUKS2 and VeraCrypt devices handling through libcryptsetup.
diff --git a/docs/v2.0.6-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v2.0.6-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7fe276a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v2.0.6-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.0.6 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable bug-fix release.
+All users of cryptsetup 2.0.x should upgrade to this version.
+
+Cryptsetup 2.x version introduces a new on-disk LUKS2 format.
+
+The legacy LUKS (referenced as LUKS1) will be fully supported
+forever as well as a traditional and fully backward compatible format.
+
+Please note that authenticated disk encryption, non-cryptographic
+data integrity protection (dm-integrity), use of Argon2 Password-Based
+Key Derivation Function and the LUKS2 on-disk format itself are new
+features and can contain some bugs.
+
+Please do not use LUKS2 without properly configured backup or in
+production systems that need to be compatible with older systems.
+
+Changes since version 2.0.5
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Fix support of larger metadata areas in LUKS2 header.
+
+  This release properly supports all specified metadata areas, as documented
+  in LUKS2 format description (see docs/on-disk-format-luks2.pdf in archive).
+
+  Currently, only default metadata area size is used (in format or convert).
+  Later cryptsetup versions will allow increasing this metadata area size.
+
+* If AEAD (authenticated encryption) is used, cryptsetup now tries to check
+  if the requested AEAD algorithm with specified key size is available
+  in kernel crypto API.
+  This change avoids formatting a device that cannot be later activated.
+
+  For this function, the kernel must be compiled with the
+  CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD option enabled.
+  Note that kernel user crypto API options (CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API and
+  CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER) are already mandatory for LUKS2.
+
+* Fix setting of integrity no-journal flag.
+  Now you can store this flag to metadata using --persistent option.
+
+* Fix cryptsetup-reencrypt to not keep temporary reencryption headers
+  if interrupted during initial password prompt.
+
+* Adds early check to plain and LUKS2 formats to disallow device format
+  if device size is not aligned to requested sector size.
+  Previously it was possible, and the device was rejected to activate by
+  kernel later.
+
+* Fix checking of hash algorithms availability for PBKDF early.
+  Previously LUKS2 format allowed non-existent hash algorithm with
+  invalid keyslot preventing the device from activation.
+
+* Allow Adiantum cipher construction (a non-authenticated length-preserving
+  fast encryption scheme), so it can be used both for data encryption and
+  keyslot encryption in LUKS1/2 devices.
+
+  For benchmark, use:
+    # cryptsetup benchmark -c xchacha12,aes-adiantum
+    # cryptsetup benchmark -c xchacha20,aes-adiantum
+
+  For LUKS format:
+    # cryptsetup luksFormat -c xchacha20,aes-adiantum-plain64 -s 256 <device>
+
+  The support for Adiantum will be merged in Linux kernel 4.21.
+  For more info see the paper https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.
+
+Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* Authenticated encryption should use new algorithms from CAESAR competition
+  https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar-submissions.html.
+  AEGIS and MORUS are already available in kernel 4.18.
+
+  For more info about LUKS2 authenticated encryption, please see our paper
+  https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.00309
+
+  Please note that authenticated encryption is still an experimental feature
+  and can have performance problems for high-speed devices and device
+  with larger IO blocks (like RAID).
+
+* Authenticated encryption do not set encryption for a dm-integrity journal.
+
+  While it does not influence data confidentiality or integrity protection,
+  an attacker can get some more information from data journal or cause that
+  system will corrupt sectors after journal replay. (That corruption will be
+  detected though.)
+
+* There are examples of user-defined tokens inside misc/luks2_keyslot_example
+  directory (like a simple external program that uses libssh to unlock LUKS2
+  using remote keyfile).
+
+* The python binding (pycryptsetup) contains only basic functionality for LUKS1
+  (it is not updated for new features) and will be REMOVED in version 2.1
+  in favor of python bindings to the libblockdev library.
+  See https://github.com/storaged-project/libblockdev/releases that
+  already supports LUKS2 and VeraCrypt devices handling through libcryptsetup.
diff --git a/docs/v2.1.0-ReleaseNotes b/docs/v2.1.0-ReleaseNotes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..36d2247
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/v2.1.0-ReleaseNotes
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.1.0 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable release with new features and bug fixes.
+
+Cryptsetup 2.1 version uses a new on-disk LUKS2 format as the default
+LUKS format and increases default LUKS2 header size.
+
+The legacy LUKS (referenced as LUKS1) will be fully supported forever
+as well as a traditional and fully backward compatible format.
+
+When upgrading a stable distribution, please use configure option
+--with-default-luks-format=LUKS1 to maintain backward compatibility.
+
+This release also switches to OpenSSL as a default cryptographic
+backend for LUKS header processing. Use --with-crypto_backend=gcrypt
+configure option if you need to preserve legacy libgcrypt backend.
+
+Please do not use LUKS2 without properly configured backup or
+in production systems that need to be compatible with older systems.
+
+Changes since version 2.0.6
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* The default for cryptsetup LUKS format action is now LUKS2.
+  You can use LUKS1 with cryptsetup option --type luks1.
+
+* The default size of the LUKS2 header is increased to 16 MB.
+  It includes metadata and the area used for binary keyslots;
+  it means that LUKS header backup is now 16MB in size.
+
+  Note, that used keyslot area is much smaller, but this increase
+  of reserved space allows implementation of later extensions
+  (like online reencryption).
+  It is fully compatible with older cryptsetup 2.0.x versions.
+  If you require to create LUKS2 header with the same size as
+  in the 2.0.x version, use --offset 8192 option for luksFormat
+  (units are in 512-bytes sectors; see notes below).
+
+* Cryptsetup now doubles LUKS default key size if XTS mode is used
+  (XTS mode uses two internal keys). This does not apply if key size
+  is explicitly specified on the command line and it does not apply
+  for the plain mode.
+  This fixes a confusion with AES and 256bit key in XTS mode where
+  code used AES128 and not AES256 as often expected.
+
+  Also, the default keyslot encryption algorithm (if cannot be derived
+  from data encryption algorithm) is now available as configure
+  options --with-luks2-keyslot-cipher and --with-luks2-keyslot-keybits.
+  The default is aes-xts-plain64 with 2 * 256-bits key.
+
+* Default cryptographic backend used for LUKS header processing is now
+  OpenSSL. For years, OpenSSL provided better performance for PBKDF.
+
+  NOTE: Cryptsetup/libcryptsetup supports several cryptographic
+  library backends. The fully supported are libgcrypt, OpenSSL and
+  kernel crypto API. FIPS mode extensions are maintained only for
+  libgcrypt and OpenSSL. Nettle and NSS are usable only for some
+  subset of algorithms and cannot provide full backward compatibility.
+  You can always switch to other backends by using a configure switch,
+  for libgcrypt (compatibility for older distributions) use:
+  --with-crypto_backend=gcrypt
+
+* The Python bindings are no longer supported and the code was removed
+  from cryptsetup distribution. Please use the libblockdev project
+  that already covers most of the libcryptsetup functionality
+  including LUKS2.
+
+* Cryptsetup now allows using --offset option also for luksFormat.
+  It means that the specified offset value is used for data offset.
+  LUKS2 header areas are automatically adjusted according to this value.
+  (Note units are in 512-byte sectors due to the previous definition
+  of this option in plain mode.)
+  This option can replace --align-payload with absolute alignment value.
+
+* Cryptsetup now supports new refresh action (that is the alias for
+  "open --refresh").
+  It allows changes of parameters for an active device (like root
+  device mapping), for example, it can enable or disable TRIM support
+  on-the-fly.
+  It is supported for LUKS1, LUKS2, plain and loop-AES devices.
+
+* Integritysetup now supports mode with detached data device through
+  new --data-device option.
+  Since kernel 4.18 there is a possibility to specify external data
+  device for dm-integrity that stores all integrity tags.
+
+* Integritysetup now supports automatic integrity recalculation
+  through new --integrity-recalculate option.
+  Linux kernel since version 4.18 supports automatic background
+  recalculation of integrity tags for dm-integrity.
+
+Other changes and fixes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Fix for crypt_wipe call to allocate space if the header is backed
+  by a file. This means that if you use detached header file, it will
+  now have always the full size after luksFormat, even if only
+  a few keyslots are used.
+
+* Fixes to offline cryptsetup-reencrypt to preserve LUKS2 keyslots
+  area sizes after reencryption and fixes for some other issues when
+  creating temporary reencryption headers.
+
+* Added some FIPS mode workarounds. We cannot (yet) use Argon2 in
+  FIPS mode, libcryptsetup now fallbacks to use PBKDF2 in FIPS mode.
+
+* Rejects conversion to LUKS1 if PBKDF2 hash algorithms
+  in keyslots differ.
+
+* The hash setting on command line now applies also to LUKS2 PBKDF2
+  digest. In previous versions, the LUKS2 key digest used PBKDF2-SHA256
+  (except for converted headers).
+
+* Allow LUKS2 keyslots area to increase if data offset allows it.
+  Cryptsetup can fine-tune LUKS2 metadata area sizes through
+  --luks2-metadata-size=BYTES and --luks2-keyslots-size=BYTES.
+  Please DO NOT use these low-level options until you need it for
+  some very specific additional feature.
+  Also, the code now prints these LUKS2 header area sizes in dump
+  command.
+
+* For LUKS2, keyslot can use different encryption that data with
+  new options --keyslot-key-size=BITS and --keyslot-cipher=STRING
+  in all commands that create new LUKS keyslot.
+  Please DO NOT use these low-level options until you need it for
+  some very specific additional feature.
+
+* Code now avoids data flush when reading device status through
+  device-mapper.
+
+* The Nettle crypto backend and the userspace kernel crypto API
+  backend were enhanced to allow more available hash functions
+  (like SHA3 variants).
+
+* Upstream code now does not require libgcrypt-devel
+  for autoconfigure, because OpenSSL is the default.
+  The libgcrypt does not use standard pkgconfig detection and
+  requires specific macro (part of libgcrypt development files)
+  to be always present during autoconfigure.
+  With other crypto backends, like OpenSSL, this makes no sense,
+  so this part of autoconfigure is now optional.
+
+* Cryptsetup now understands new --debug-json option that allows
+  an additional dump of some JSON information. These are no longer
+  present in standard debug output because it could contain some
+  specific LUKS header parameters.
+
+* The luksDump contains the hash algorithm used in Anti-Forensic
+  function.
+
+* All debug messages are now sent through configured log callback
+  functions, so an application can easily use own debug messages
+  handling. In previous versions debug messages were printed directly
+  to standard output.)
+
+Libcryptsetup API additions
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+These new calls are now exported, for details see libcryptsetup.h:
+
+ * crypt_init_data_device
+ * crypt_get_metadata_device_name
+     functions to init devices with separate metadata and data device
+     before a format function is called.
+
+ * crypt_set_data_offset
+     sets the data offset for LUKS to the specified value
+     in 512-byte sectors.
+     It should replace alignment calculation in LUKS param structures.
+
+ * crypt_get_metadata_size
+ * crypt_set_metadata_size
+     allows to set/get area sizes in LUKS header
+     (according to specification).
+
+ * crypt_get_default_type
+     get default compiled-in LUKS type (version).
+
+ * crypt_get_pbkdf_type_params
+     allows to get compiled-in PBKDF parameters.
+
+ * crypt_keyslot_set_encryption
+ * crypt_keyslot_get_encryption
+     allows to set/get per-keyslot encryption algorithm for LUKS2.
+
+ * crypt_keyslot_get_pbkdf
+     allows to get PBKDF parameters per-keyslot.
+
+ and these new defines:
+ * CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG_JSON (message type for JSON debug)
+ * CRYPT_DEBUG_JSON (log level for JSON debug)
+ * CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE (dm-integrity recalculate flag)
+ * CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH (new open with refresh flag)
+
+All existing API calls should remain backward compatible.
+
+Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* Optional authenticated encryption is still an experimental feature
+  and can have performance problems for high-speed devices and device
+  with larger IO blocks (like RAID).
+
+* Authenticated encryption does not use encryption for a dm-integrity
+  journal. While it does not influence data confidentiality or
+  integrity protection, an attacker can get some more information
+  from data journal or cause that system will corrupt sectors after
+  journal replay. (That corruption will be detected though.)
+
+* The LUKS2 metadata area increase is mainly needed for the new online
+  reencryption as the major feature for the next release.
diff --git a/lib/Makemodule.am b/lib/Makemodule.am
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dccda01
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/Makemodule.am
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+pkgconfigdir = $(libdir)/pkgconfig
+pkgconfig_DATA = lib/libcryptsetup.pc
+
+lib_LTLIBRARIES = libcryptsetup.la
+
+noinst_LTLIBRARIES += libutils_io.la
+
+include_HEADERS = lib/libcryptsetup.h
+
+EXTRA_DIST += lib/libcryptsetup.pc.in lib/libcryptsetup.sym
+
+libutils_io_la_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS)
+
+libutils_io_la_SOURCES = \
+	lib/utils_io.c			\
+	lib/utils_io.h
+
+libcryptsetup_la_CPPFLAGS = $(AM_CPPFLAGS) \
+	-I $(top_srcdir)/lib/crypto_backend	\
+	-I $(top_srcdir)/lib/luks1		\
+	-I $(top_srcdir)/lib/luks2		\
+	-I $(top_srcdir)/lib/loopaes		\
+	-I $(top_srcdir)/lib/verity		\
+	-I $(top_srcdir)/lib/tcrypt		\
+	-I $(top_srcdir)/lib/integrity
+
+libcryptsetup_la_DEPENDENCIES = libutils_io.la libcrypto_backend.la lib/libcryptsetup.sym
+
+libcryptsetup_la_LDFLAGS = $(AM_LDFLAGS) -no-undefined \
+	-Wl,--version-script=$(top_srcdir)/lib/libcryptsetup.sym \
+	-version-info @LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_INFO@
+
+libcryptsetup_la_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) @CRYPTO_CFLAGS@
+
+libcryptsetup_la_LIBADD = \
+	@UUID_LIBS@		\
+	@DEVMAPPER_LIBS@	\
+	@CRYPTO_LIBS@		\
+	@LIBARGON2_LIBS@	\
+	@JSON_C_LIBS@		\
+	@BLKID_LIBS@		\
+	libcrypto_backend.la	\
+	libutils_io.la
+
+libcryptsetup_la_SOURCES = \
+	lib/setup.c			\
+	lib/internal.h			\
+	lib/bitops.h			\
+	lib/nls.h			\
+	lib/libcryptsetup.h		\
+	lib/utils.c			\
+	lib/utils_benchmark.c		\
+	lib/utils_crypt.c		\
+	lib/utils_crypt.h		\
+	lib/utils_loop.c		\
+	lib/utils_loop.h		\
+	lib/utils_devpath.c		\
+	lib/utils_wipe.c		\
+	lib/utils_fips.c		\
+	lib/utils_fips.h		\
+	lib/utils_device.c		\
+	lib/utils_keyring.c		\
+	lib/utils_keyring.h		\
+	lib/utils_device_locking.c	\
+	lib/utils_device_locking.h	\
+	lib/utils_pbkdf.c		\
+	lib/libdevmapper.c		\
+	lib/utils_dm.h			\
+	lib/volumekey.c			\
+	lib/random.c			\
+	lib/crypt_plain.c		\
+	lib/base64.h			\
+	lib/base64.c			\
+	lib/integrity/integrity.h	\
+	lib/integrity/integrity.c       \
+	lib/loopaes/loopaes.h		\
+	lib/loopaes/loopaes.c		\
+	lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.h		\
+	lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c		\
+	lib/luks1/af.h			\
+	lib/luks1/af.c			\
+	lib/luks1/keyencryption.c	\
+	lib/luks1/keymanage.c		\
+	lib/luks1/luks.h		\
+	lib/verity/verity_hash.c	\
+	lib/verity/verity_fec.c		\
+	lib/verity/verity.c		\
+	lib/verity/verity.h		\
+	lib/verity/rs_encode_char.c	\
+	lib/verity/rs_decode_char.c	\
+	lib/verity/rs.h                 \
+	lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_digest.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_digest_pbkdf2.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_token_keyring.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_token.c		\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_internal.h	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2.h		\
+	lib/utils_blkid.c		\
+	lib/utils_blkid.h
diff --git a/lib/base64.c b/lib/base64.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bb4dce8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/base64.c
@@ -0,0 +1,605 @@
+/* base64.c -- Encode binary data using printable characters.
+   Copyright (C) 1999-2001, 2004-2006, 2009-2018 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option)
+   any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.  */
+
+/* Written by Simon Josefsson.  Partially adapted from GNU MailUtils
+ * (mailbox/filter_trans.c, as of 2004-11-28).  Improved by review
+ * from Paul Eggert, Bruno Haible, and Stepan Kasal.
+ *
+ * See also RFC 4648 <https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4648.txt>.
+ *
+ * Be careful with error checking.  Here is how you would typically
+ * use these functions:
+ *
+ * bool ok = base64_decode_alloc (in, inlen, &out, &outlen);
+ * if (!ok)
+ *   FAIL: input was not valid base64
+ * if (out == NULL)
+ *   FAIL: memory allocation error
+ * OK: data in OUT/OUTLEN
+ *
+ * size_t outlen = base64_encode_alloc (in, inlen, &out);
+ * if (out == NULL && outlen == 0 && inlen != 0)
+ *   FAIL: input too long
+ * if (out == NULL)
+ *   FAIL: memory allocation error
+ * OK: data in OUT/OUTLEN.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+
+/* Get prototype. */
+#include "base64.h"
+
+/* Get malloc. */
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+/* Get UCHAR_MAX. */
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+/* C89 compliant way to cast 'char' to 'unsigned char'. */
+static unsigned char
+to_uchar (char ch)
+{
+  return ch;
+}
+
+static const char b64c[64] =
+  "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
+
+/* Base64 encode IN array of size INLEN into OUT array. OUT needs
+   to be of length >= BASE64_LENGTH(INLEN), and INLEN needs to be
+   a multiple of 3.  */
+static void
+base64_encode_fast (const char *restrict in, size_t inlen, char *restrict out)
+{
+  while (inlen)
+    {
+      *out++ = b64c[to_uchar (in[0]) >> 2];
+      *out++ = b64c[((to_uchar (in[0]) << 4) + (to_uchar (in[1]) >> 4)) & 0x3f];
+      *out++ = b64c[((to_uchar (in[1]) << 2) + (to_uchar (in[2]) >> 6)) & 0x3f];
+      *out++ = b64c[to_uchar (in[2]) & 0x3f];
+
+      inlen -= 3;
+      in += 3;
+    }
+}
+
+/* Base64 encode IN array of size INLEN into OUT array of size OUTLEN.
+   If OUTLEN is less than BASE64_LENGTH(INLEN), write as many bytes as
+   possible.  If OUTLEN is larger than BASE64_LENGTH(INLEN), also zero
+   terminate the output buffer. */
+void
+base64_encode (const char *restrict in, size_t inlen,
+               char *restrict out, size_t outlen)
+{
+  /* Note this outlen constraint can be enforced at compile time.
+     I.E. that the output buffer is exactly large enough to hold
+     the encoded inlen bytes.  The inlen constraints (of corresponding
+     to outlen, and being a multiple of 3) can change at runtime
+     at the end of input.  However the common case when reading
+     large inputs is to have both constraints satisfied, so we depend
+     on both in base_encode_fast().  */
+  if (outlen % 4 == 0 && inlen == outlen / 4 * 3)
+    {
+      base64_encode_fast (in, inlen, out);
+      return;
+    }
+
+  while (inlen && outlen)
+    {
+      *out++ = b64c[to_uchar (in[0]) >> 2];
+      if (!--outlen)
+        break;
+      *out++ = b64c[((to_uchar (in[0]) << 4)
+                       + (--inlen ? to_uchar (in[1]) >> 4 : 0))
+                      & 0x3f];
+      if (!--outlen)
+        break;
+      *out++ =
+        (inlen
+         ? b64c[((to_uchar (in[1]) << 2)
+                   + (--inlen ? to_uchar (in[2]) >> 6 : 0))
+                  & 0x3f]
+         : '=');
+      if (!--outlen)
+        break;
+      *out++ = inlen ? b64c[to_uchar (in[2]) & 0x3f] : '=';
+      if (!--outlen)
+        break;
+      if (inlen)
+        inlen--;
+      if (inlen)
+        in += 3;
+    }
+
+  if (outlen)
+    *out = '\0';
+}
+
+/* Allocate a buffer and store zero terminated base64 encoded data
+   from array IN of size INLEN, returning BASE64_LENGTH(INLEN), i.e.,
+   the length of the encoded data, excluding the terminating zero.  On
+   return, the OUT variable will hold a pointer to newly allocated
+   memory that must be deallocated by the caller.  If output string
+   length would overflow, 0 is returned and OUT is set to NULL.  If
+   memory allocation failed, OUT is set to NULL, and the return value
+   indicates length of the requested memory block, i.e.,
+   BASE64_LENGTH(inlen) + 1. */
+size_t
+base64_encode_alloc (const char *in, size_t inlen, char **out)
+{
+  size_t outlen = 1 + BASE64_LENGTH (inlen);
+
+  /* Check for overflow in outlen computation.
+   *
+   * If there is no overflow, outlen >= inlen.
+   *
+   * If the operation (inlen + 2) overflows then it yields at most +1, so
+   * outlen is 0.
+   *
+   * If the multiplication overflows, we lose at least half of the
+   * correct value, so the result is < ((inlen + 2) / 3) * 2, which is
+   * less than (inlen + 2) * 0.66667, which is less than inlen as soon as
+   * (inlen > 4).
+   */
+  if (inlen > outlen)
+    {
+      *out = NULL;
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+  *out = malloc (outlen);
+  if (!*out)
+    return outlen;
+
+  base64_encode (in, inlen, *out, outlen);
+
+  return outlen - 1;
+}
+
+/* With this approach this file works independent of the charset used
+   (think EBCDIC).  However, it does assume that the characters in the
+   Base64 alphabet (A-Za-z0-9+/) are encoded in 0..255.  POSIX
+   1003.1-2001 require that char and unsigned char are 8-bit
+   quantities, though, taking care of that problem.  But this may be a
+   potential problem on non-POSIX C99 platforms.
+
+   IBM C V6 for AIX mishandles "#define B64(x) ...'x'...", so use "_"
+   as the formal parameter rather than "x".  */
+#define B64(_)                                  \
+  ((_) == 'A' ? 0                               \
+   : (_) == 'B' ? 1                             \
+   : (_) == 'C' ? 2                             \
+   : (_) == 'D' ? 3                             \
+   : (_) == 'E' ? 4                             \
+   : (_) == 'F' ? 5                             \
+   : (_) == 'G' ? 6                             \
+   : (_) == 'H' ? 7                             \
+   : (_) == 'I' ? 8                             \
+   : (_) == 'J' ? 9                             \
+   : (_) == 'K' ? 10                            \
+   : (_) == 'L' ? 11                            \
+   : (_) == 'M' ? 12                            \
+   : (_) == 'N' ? 13                            \
+   : (_) == 'O' ? 14                            \
+   : (_) == 'P' ? 15                            \
+   : (_) == 'Q' ? 16                            \
+   : (_) == 'R' ? 17                            \
+   : (_) == 'S' ? 18                            \
+   : (_) == 'T' ? 19                            \
+   : (_) == 'U' ? 20                            \
+   : (_) == 'V' ? 21                            \
+   : (_) == 'W' ? 22                            \
+   : (_) == 'X' ? 23                            \
+   : (_) == 'Y' ? 24                            \
+   : (_) == 'Z' ? 25                            \
+   : (_) == 'a' ? 26                            \
+   : (_) == 'b' ? 27                            \
+   : (_) == 'c' ? 28                            \
+   : (_) == 'd' ? 29                            \
+   : (_) == 'e' ? 30                            \
+   : (_) == 'f' ? 31                            \
+   : (_) == 'g' ? 32                            \
+   : (_) == 'h' ? 33                            \
+   : (_) == 'i' ? 34                            \
+   : (_) == 'j' ? 35                            \
+   : (_) == 'k' ? 36                            \
+   : (_) == 'l' ? 37                            \
+   : (_) == 'm' ? 38                            \
+   : (_) == 'n' ? 39                            \
+   : (_) == 'o' ? 40                            \
+   : (_) == 'p' ? 41                            \
+   : (_) == 'q' ? 42                            \
+   : (_) == 'r' ? 43                            \
+   : (_) == 's' ? 44                            \
+   : (_) == 't' ? 45                            \
+   : (_) == 'u' ? 46                            \
+   : (_) == 'v' ? 47                            \
+   : (_) == 'w' ? 48                            \
+   : (_) == 'x' ? 49                            \
+   : (_) == 'y' ? 50                            \
+   : (_) == 'z' ? 51                            \
+   : (_) == '0' ? 52                            \
+   : (_) == '1' ? 53                            \
+   : (_) == '2' ? 54                            \
+   : (_) == '3' ? 55                            \
+   : (_) == '4' ? 56                            \
+   : (_) == '5' ? 57                            \
+   : (_) == '6' ? 58                            \
+   : (_) == '7' ? 59                            \
+   : (_) == '8' ? 60                            \
+   : (_) == '9' ? 61                            \
+   : (_) == '+' ? 62                            \
+   : (_) == '/' ? 63                            \
+   : -1)
+
+static const signed char b64[0x100] = {
+  B64 (0), B64 (1), B64 (2), B64 (3),
+  B64 (4), B64 (5), B64 (6), B64 (7),
+  B64 (8), B64 (9), B64 (10), B64 (11),
+  B64 (12), B64 (13), B64 (14), B64 (15),
+  B64 (16), B64 (17), B64 (18), B64 (19),
+  B64 (20), B64 (21), B64 (22), B64 (23),
+  B64 (24), B64 (25), B64 (26), B64 (27),
+  B64 (28), B64 (29), B64 (30), B64 (31),
+  B64 (32), B64 (33), B64 (34), B64 (35),
+  B64 (36), B64 (37), B64 (38), B64 (39),
+  B64 (40), B64 (41), B64 (42), B64 (43),
+  B64 (44), B64 (45), B64 (46), B64 (47),
+  B64 (48), B64 (49), B64 (50), B64 (51),
+  B64 (52), B64 (53), B64 (54), B64 (55),
+  B64 (56), B64 (57), B64 (58), B64 (59),
+  B64 (60), B64 (61), B64 (62), B64 (63),
+  B64 (64), B64 (65), B64 (66), B64 (67),
+  B64 (68), B64 (69), B64 (70), B64 (71),
+  B64 (72), B64 (73), B64 (74), B64 (75),
+  B64 (76), B64 (77), B64 (78), B64 (79),
+  B64 (80), B64 (81), B64 (82), B64 (83),
+  B64 (84), B64 (85), B64 (86), B64 (87),
+  B64 (88), B64 (89), B64 (90), B64 (91),
+  B64 (92), B64 (93), B64 (94), B64 (95),
+  B64 (96), B64 (97), B64 (98), B64 (99),
+  B64 (100), B64 (101), B64 (102), B64 (103),
+  B64 (104), B64 (105), B64 (106), B64 (107),
+  B64 (108), B64 (109), B64 (110), B64 (111),
+  B64 (112), B64 (113), B64 (114), B64 (115),
+  B64 (116), B64 (117), B64 (118), B64 (119),
+  B64 (120), B64 (121), B64 (122), B64 (123),
+  B64 (124), B64 (125), B64 (126), B64 (127),
+  B64 (128), B64 (129), B64 (130), B64 (131),
+  B64 (132), B64 (133), B64 (134), B64 (135),
+  B64 (136), B64 (137), B64 (138), B64 (139),
+  B64 (140), B64 (141), B64 (142), B64 (143),
+  B64 (144), B64 (145), B64 (146), B64 (147),
+  B64 (148), B64 (149), B64 (150), B64 (151),
+  B64 (152), B64 (153), B64 (154), B64 (155),
+  B64 (156), B64 (157), B64 (158), B64 (159),
+  B64 (160), B64 (161), B64 (162), B64 (163),
+  B64 (164), B64 (165), B64 (166), B64 (167),
+  B64 (168), B64 (169), B64 (170), B64 (171),
+  B64 (172), B64 (173), B64 (174), B64 (175),
+  B64 (176), B64 (177), B64 (178), B64 (179),
+  B64 (180), B64 (181), B64 (182), B64 (183),
+  B64 (184), B64 (185), B64 (186), B64 (187),
+  B64 (188), B64 (189), B64 (190), B64 (191),
+  B64 (192), B64 (193), B64 (194), B64 (195),
+  B64 (196), B64 (197), B64 (198), B64 (199),
+  B64 (200), B64 (201), B64 (202), B64 (203),
+  B64 (204), B64 (205), B64 (206), B64 (207),
+  B64 (208), B64 (209), B64 (210), B64 (211),
+  B64 (212), B64 (213), B64 (214), B64 (215),
+  B64 (216), B64 (217), B64 (218), B64 (219),
+  B64 (220), B64 (221), B64 (222), B64 (223),
+  B64 (224), B64 (225), B64 (226), B64 (227),
+  B64 (228), B64 (229), B64 (230), B64 (231),
+  B64 (232), B64 (233), B64 (234), B64 (235),
+  B64 (236), B64 (237), B64 (238), B64 (239),
+  B64 (240), B64 (241), B64 (242), B64 (243),
+  B64 (244), B64 (245), B64 (246), B64 (247),
+  B64 (248), B64 (249), B64 (250), B64 (251),
+  B64 (252), B64 (253), B64 (254), B64 (255)
+};
+
+#if UCHAR_MAX == 255
+# define uchar_in_range(c) true
+#else
+# define uchar_in_range(c) ((c) <= 255)
+#endif
+
+/* Return true if CH is a character from the Base64 alphabet, and
+   false otherwise.  Note that '=' is padding and not considered to be
+   part of the alphabet.  */
+bool
+isbase64 (char ch)
+{
+  return uchar_in_range (to_uchar (ch)) && 0 <= b64[to_uchar (ch)];
+}
+
+/* Initialize decode-context buffer, CTX.  */
+void
+base64_decode_ctx_init (struct base64_decode_context *ctx)
+{
+  ctx->i = 0;
+}
+
+/* If CTX->i is 0 or 4, there are four or more bytes in [*IN..IN_END), and
+   none of those four is a newline, then return *IN.  Otherwise, copy up to
+   4 - CTX->i non-newline bytes from that range into CTX->buf, starting at
+   index CTX->i and setting CTX->i to reflect the number of bytes copied,
+   and return CTX->buf.  In either case, advance *IN to point to the byte
+   after the last one processed, and set *N_NON_NEWLINE to the number of
+   verified non-newline bytes accessible through the returned pointer.  */
+static const char *
+get_4 (struct base64_decode_context *ctx,
+       char const *restrict *in, char const *restrict in_end,
+       size_t *n_non_newline)
+{
+  if (ctx->i == 4)
+    ctx->i = 0;
+
+  if (ctx->i == 0)
+    {
+      char const *t = *in;
+      if (4 <= in_end - *in && memchr (t, '\n', 4) == NULL)
+        {
+          /* This is the common case: no newline.  */
+          *in += 4;
+          *n_non_newline = 4;
+          return (const char *) t;
+        }
+    }
+
+  {
+    /* Copy non-newline bytes into BUF.  */
+    char const *p = *in;
+    while (p < in_end)
+      {
+        char c = *p++;
+        if (c != '\n')
+          {
+            ctx->buf[ctx->i++] = c;
+            if (ctx->i == 4)
+              break;
+          }
+      }
+
+    *in = p;
+    *n_non_newline = ctx->i;
+    return ctx->buf;
+  }
+}
+
+#define return_false                            \
+  do                                            \
+    {                                           \
+      *outp = out;                              \
+      return false;                             \
+    }                                           \
+  while (false)
+
+/* Decode up to four bytes of base64-encoded data, IN, of length INLEN
+   into the output buffer, *OUT, of size *OUTLEN bytes.  Return true if
+   decoding is successful, false otherwise.  If *OUTLEN is too small,
+   as many bytes as possible are written to *OUT.  On return, advance
+   *OUT to point to the byte after the last one written, and decrement
+   *OUTLEN to reflect the number of bytes remaining in *OUT.  */
+static bool
+decode_4 (char const *restrict in, size_t inlen,
+          char *restrict *outp, size_t *outleft)
+{
+  char *out = *outp;
+  if (inlen < 2)
+    return false;
+
+  if (!isbase64 (in[0]) || !isbase64 (in[1]))
+    return false;
+
+  if (*outleft)
+    {
+      *out++ = ((b64[to_uchar (in[0])] << 2)
+                | (b64[to_uchar (in[1])] >> 4));
+      --*outleft;
+    }
+
+  if (inlen == 2)
+    return_false;
+
+  if (in[2] == '=')
+    {
+      if (inlen != 4)
+        return_false;
+
+      if (in[3] != '=')
+        return_false;
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      if (!isbase64 (in[2]))
+        return_false;
+
+      if (*outleft)
+        {
+          *out++ = (((b64[to_uchar (in[1])] << 4) & 0xf0)
+                    | (b64[to_uchar (in[2])] >> 2));
+          --*outleft;
+        }
+
+      if (inlen == 3)
+        return_false;
+
+      if (in[3] == '=')
+        {
+          if (inlen != 4)
+            return_false;
+        }
+      else
+        {
+          if (!isbase64 (in[3]))
+            return_false;
+
+          if (*outleft)
+            {
+              *out++ = (((b64[to_uchar (in[2])] << 6) & 0xc0)
+                        | b64[to_uchar (in[3])]);
+              --*outleft;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+  *outp = out;
+  return true;
+}
+
+/* Decode base64-encoded input array IN of length INLEN to output array
+   OUT that can hold *OUTLEN bytes.  The input data may be interspersed
+   with newlines.  Return true if decoding was successful, i.e. if the
+   input was valid base64 data, false otherwise.  If *OUTLEN is too
+   small, as many bytes as possible will be written to OUT.  On return,
+   *OUTLEN holds the length of decoded bytes in OUT.  Note that as soon
+   as any non-alphabet, non-newline character is encountered, decoding
+   is stopped and false is returned.  If INLEN is zero, then process
+   only whatever data is stored in CTX.
+
+   Initially, CTX must have been initialized via base64_decode_ctx_init.
+   Subsequent calls to this function must reuse whatever state is recorded
+   in that buffer.  It is necessary for when a quadruple of base64 input
+   bytes spans two input buffers.
+
+   If CTX is NULL then newlines are treated as garbage and the input
+   buffer is processed as a unit.  */
+
+bool
+base64_decode_ctx (struct base64_decode_context *ctx,
+                   const char *restrict in, size_t inlen,
+                   char *restrict out, size_t *outlen)
+{
+  size_t outleft = *outlen;
+  bool ignore_newlines = ctx != NULL;
+  bool flush_ctx = false;
+  unsigned int ctx_i = 0;
+
+  if (ignore_newlines)
+    {
+      ctx_i = ctx->i;
+      flush_ctx = inlen == 0;
+    }
+
+
+  while (true)
+    {
+      size_t outleft_save = outleft;
+      if (ctx_i == 0 && !flush_ctx)
+        {
+          while (true)
+            {
+              /* Save a copy of outleft, in case we need to re-parse this
+                 block of four bytes.  */
+              outleft_save = outleft;
+              if (!decode_4 (in, inlen, &out, &outleft))
+                break;
+
+              in += 4;
+              inlen -= 4;
+            }
+        }
+
+      if (inlen == 0 && !flush_ctx)
+        break;
+
+      /* Handle the common case of 72-byte wrapped lines.
+         This also handles any other multiple-of-4-byte wrapping.  */
+      if (inlen && *in == '\n' && ignore_newlines)
+        {
+          ++in;
+          --inlen;
+          continue;
+        }
+
+      /* Restore OUT and OUTLEFT.  */
+      out -= outleft_save - outleft;
+      outleft = outleft_save;
+
+      {
+        char const *in_end = in + inlen;
+        char const *non_nl;
+
+        if (ignore_newlines)
+          non_nl = get_4 (ctx, &in, in_end, &inlen);
+        else
+          non_nl = in;  /* Might have nl in this case. */
+
+        /* If the input is empty or consists solely of newlines (0 non-newlines),
+           then we're done.  Likewise if there are fewer than 4 bytes when not
+           flushing context and not treating newlines as garbage.  */
+        if (inlen == 0 || (inlen < 4 && !flush_ctx && ignore_newlines))
+          {
+            inlen = 0;
+            break;
+          }
+        if (!decode_4 (non_nl, inlen, &out, &outleft))
+          break;
+
+        inlen = in_end - in;
+      }
+    }
+
+  *outlen -= outleft;
+
+  return inlen == 0;
+}
+
+/* Allocate an output buffer in *OUT, and decode the base64 encoded
+   data stored in IN of size INLEN to the *OUT buffer.  On return, the
+   size of the decoded data is stored in *OUTLEN.  OUTLEN may be NULL,
+   if the caller is not interested in the decoded length.  *OUT may be
+   NULL to indicate an out of memory error, in which case *OUTLEN
+   contains the size of the memory block needed.  The function returns
+   true on successful decoding and memory allocation errors.  (Use the
+   *OUT and *OUTLEN parameters to differentiate between successful
+   decoding and memory error.)  The function returns false if the
+   input was invalid, in which case *OUT is NULL and *OUTLEN is
+   undefined. */
+bool
+base64_decode_alloc_ctx (struct base64_decode_context *ctx,
+                         const char *in, size_t inlen, char **out,
+                         size_t *outlen)
+{
+  /* This may allocate a few bytes too many, depending on input,
+     but it's not worth the extra CPU time to compute the exact size.
+     The exact size is 3 * (inlen + (ctx ? ctx->i : 0)) / 4, minus 1 if the
+     input ends with "=" and minus another 1 if the input ends with "==".
+     Dividing before multiplying avoids the possibility of overflow.  */
+  size_t needlen = 3 * (inlen / 4) + 3;
+
+  *out = malloc (needlen);
+  if (!*out)
+    return true;
+
+  if (!base64_decode_ctx (ctx, in, inlen, *out, &needlen))
+    {
+      free (*out);
+      *out = NULL;
+      return false;
+    }
+
+  if (outlen)
+    *outlen = needlen;
+
+  return true;
+}
diff --git a/lib/base64.h b/lib/base64.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c2acdea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/base64.h
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+/* base64.h -- Encode binary data using printable characters.
+   Copyright (C) 2004-2006, 2009-2018 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+   Written by Simon Josefsson.
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option)
+   any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.  */
+
+#ifndef BASE64_H
+# define BASE64_H
+
+/* Get size_t. */
+# include <stddef.h>
+
+/* Get bool. */
+# include <stdbool.h>
+
+# ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+# endif
+
+/* This uses that the expression (n+(k-1))/k means the smallest
+   integer >= n/k, i.e., the ceiling of n/k.  */
+# define BASE64_LENGTH(inlen) ((((inlen) + 2) / 3) * 4)
+
+struct base64_decode_context
+{
+  unsigned int i;
+  char buf[4];
+};
+
+extern bool isbase64 (char ch) __attribute__ ((__const__));
+
+extern void base64_encode (const char *restrict in, size_t inlen,
+                           char *restrict out, size_t outlen);
+
+extern size_t base64_encode_alloc (const char *in, size_t inlen, char **out);
+
+extern void base64_decode_ctx_init (struct base64_decode_context *ctx);
+
+extern bool base64_decode_ctx (struct base64_decode_context *ctx,
+                               const char *restrict in, size_t inlen,
+                               char *restrict out, size_t *outlen);
+
+extern bool base64_decode_alloc_ctx (struct base64_decode_context *ctx,
+                                     const char *in, size_t inlen,
+                                     char **out, size_t *outlen);
+
+#define base64_decode(in, inlen, out, outlen) \
+        base64_decode_ctx (NULL, in, inlen, out, outlen)
+
+#define base64_decode_alloc(in, inlen, out, outlen) \
+        base64_decode_alloc_ctx (NULL, in, inlen, out, outlen)
+
+# ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+
+#endif /* BASE64_H */
diff --git a/lib/bitops.h b/lib/bitops.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a991687
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/bitops.h
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+/*
+ * No copyright is claimed.  This code is in the public domain; do with
+ * it what you wish.
+ *
+ * Written by Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
+ */
+#ifndef BITOPS_H
+#define BITOPS_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#if defined(HAVE_BYTESWAP_H)
+# include <byteswap.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_ENDIAN_H)
+#  include <endian.h>
+#elif defined(HAVE_SYS_ENDIAN_H)	/* BSDs have them here */
+#  include <sys/endian.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__OpenBSD__)
+# include <sys/types.h>
+# define be16toh(x) betoh16(x)
+# define be32toh(x) betoh32(x)
+# define be64toh(x) betoh64(x)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Fallbacks
+ */
+#ifndef bswap_16
+# define bswap_16(x)   ((((x) & 0x00FF) << 8) | \
+			(((x) & 0xFF00) >> 8))
+#endif
+
+#ifndef bswap_32
+# define bswap_32(x)   ((((x) & 0x000000FF) << 24) | \
+			(((x) & 0x0000FF00) << 8)  | \
+			(((x) & 0x00FF0000) >> 8)  | \
+			(((x) & 0xFF000000) >> 24))
+#endif
+
+#ifndef bswap_64
+# define bswap_64(x) ((((x) & 0x00000000000000FFULL) << 56) | \
+                      (((x) & 0x000000000000FF00ULL) << 40) | \
+                      (((x) & 0x0000000000FF0000ULL) << 24) | \
+                      (((x) & 0x00000000FF000000ULL) << 8)  | \
+                      (((x) & 0x000000FF00000000ULL) >> 8)  | \
+                      (((x) & 0x0000FF0000000000ULL) >> 24) | \
+                      (((x) & 0x00FF000000000000ULL) >> 40) | \
+                      (((x) & 0xFF00000000000000ULL) >> 56))
+#endif
+
+#ifndef htobe16
+# if !defined(WORDS_BIGENDIAN)
+#  define htobe16(x) bswap_16 (x)
+#  define htole16(x) (x)
+#  define be16toh(x) bswap_16 (x)
+#  define le16toh(x) (x)
+#  define htobe32(x) bswap_32 (x)
+#  define htole32(x) (x)
+#  define be32toh(x) bswap_32 (x)
+#  define le32toh(x) (x)
+#  define htobe64(x) bswap_64 (x)
+#  define htole64(x) (x)
+#  define be64toh(x) bswap_64 (x)
+#  define le64toh(x) (x)
+# else
+#  define htobe16(x) (x)
+#  define htole16(x) bswap_16 (x)
+#  define be16toh(x) (x)
+#  define le16toh(x) bswap_16 (x)
+#  define htobe32(x) (x)
+#  define htole32(x) bswap_32 (x)
+#  define be32toh(x) (x)
+#  define le32toh(x) bswap_32 (x)
+#  define htobe64(x) (x)
+#  define htole64(x) bswap_64 (x)
+#  define be64toh(x) (x)
+#  define le64toh(x) bswap_64 (x)
+# endif
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Byte swab macros (based on linux/byteorder/swab.h)
+ */
+#define swab16(x) bswap_16(x)
+#define swab32(x) bswap_32(x)
+#define swab64(x) bswap_64(x)
+
+#define cpu_to_le16(x) ((uint16_t) htole16(x))
+#define cpu_to_le32(x) ((uint32_t) htole32(x))
+#define cpu_to_le64(x) ((uint64_t) htole64(x))
+
+#define cpu_to_be16(x) ((uint16_t) htobe16(x))
+#define cpu_to_be32(x) ((uint32_t) htobe32(x))
+#define cpu_to_be64(x) ((uint64_t) htobe64(x))
+
+#define le16_to_cpu(x) ((uint16_t) le16toh(x))
+#define le32_to_cpu(x) ((uint32_t) le32toh(x))
+#define le64_to_cpu(x) ((uint64_t) le64toh(x))
+
+#define be16_to_cpu(x) ((uint16_t) be16toh(x))
+#define be32_to_cpu(x) ((uint32_t) be32toh(x))
+#define be64_to_cpu(x) ((uint64_t) be64toh(x))
+
+/*
+ * Bit map related macros. Usually provided by libc.
+ */
+#ifndef NBBY
+# define NBBY            CHAR_BIT
+#endif
+
+#ifndef setbit
+# define setbit(a,i)	((a)[(i)/NBBY] |= 1<<((i)%NBBY))
+# define clrbit(a,i)	((a)[(i)/NBBY] &= ~(1<<((i)%NBBY)))
+# define isset(a,i)	((a)[(i)/NBBY] & (1<<((i)%NBBY)))
+# define isclr(a,i)	(((a)[(i)/NBBY] & (1<<((i)%NBBY))) == 0)
+#endif
+
+#endif /* BITOPS_H */
diff --git a/lib/crypt_plain.c b/lib/crypt_plain.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..adc27aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypt_plain.c
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+/*
+ * cryptsetup plain device helper functions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "libcryptsetup.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+static int hash(const char *hash_name, size_t key_size, char *key,
+		size_t passphrase_size, const char *passphrase)
+{
+	struct crypt_hash *md = NULL;
+	size_t len;
+	int round, i, r = 0;
+
+	if (crypt_hash_init(&md, hash_name))
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	len = crypt_hash_size(hash_name);
+
+	for(round = 0; key_size && !r; round++) {
+		/* hack from hashalot to avoid null bytes in key */
+		for(i = 0; i < round; i++)
+			if (crypt_hash_write(md, "A", 1))
+				r = 1;
+
+		if (crypt_hash_write(md, passphrase, passphrase_size))
+			r = 1;
+
+		if (len > key_size)
+			len = key_size;
+
+		if (crypt_hash_final(md, key, len))
+			r = 1;
+
+		key += len;
+		key_size -= len;
+	}
+
+	crypt_hash_destroy(md);
+	return r;
+}
+
+#define PLAIN_HASH_LEN_MAX 256
+
+int crypt_plain_hash(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		     const char *hash_name,
+		     char *key, size_t key_size,
+		     const char *passphrase, size_t passphrase_size)
+{
+	char hash_name_buf[PLAIN_HASH_LEN_MAX], *s;
+	size_t hash_size, pad_size;
+	int r;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Plain: hashing passphrase using %s.", hash_name);
+
+	if (strlen(hash_name) >= PLAIN_HASH_LEN_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	strncpy(hash_name_buf, hash_name, PLAIN_HASH_LEN_MAX);
+	hash_name_buf[PLAIN_HASH_LEN_MAX - 1] = '\0';
+
+	/* hash[:hash_length] */
+	if ((s = strchr(hash_name_buf, ':'))) {
+		*s = '\0';
+		s++;
+		if (!*s || sscanf(s, "%zd", &hash_size) != 1) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Hash length is not a number");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		if (hash_size > key_size) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Hash length %zd > key length %zd",
+				hash_size, key_size);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		pad_size = key_size - hash_size;
+	} else {
+		hash_size = key_size;
+		pad_size = 0;
+	}
+
+	/* No hash, copy passphrase directly */
+	if (!strcmp(hash_name_buf, "plain")) {
+		if (passphrase_size < hash_size) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Too short plain passphrase.");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		memcpy(key, passphrase, hash_size);
+		r = 0;
+	} else
+		r = hash(hash_name_buf, hash_size, key, passphrase_size, passphrase);
+
+	if (r == 0 && pad_size)
+		memset(key + hash_size, 0, pad_size);
+
+	return r;
+}
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/Makemodule.am b/lib/crypto_backend/Makemodule.am
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..980eca5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/Makemodule.am
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+noinst_LTLIBRARIES += libcrypto_backend.la
+
+libcrypto_backend_la_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) @CRYPTO_CFLAGS@
+
+libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES = \
+	lib/crypto_backend/crypto_backend.h \
+	lib/crypto_backend/crypto_cipher_kernel.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/crypto_storage.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/pbkdf_check.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/crc32.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2_generic.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/cipher_generic.c
+
+if CRYPTO_BACKEND_GCRYPT
+libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES += lib/crypto_backend/crypto_gcrypt.c
+endif
+if CRYPTO_BACKEND_OPENSSL
+libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES += lib/crypto_backend/crypto_openssl.c
+endif
+if CRYPTO_BACKEND_NSS
+libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES += lib/crypto_backend/crypto_nss.c
+endif
+if CRYPTO_BACKEND_KERNEL
+libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES += lib/crypto_backend/crypto_kernel.c
+endif
+if CRYPTO_BACKEND_NETTLE
+libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES += lib/crypto_backend/crypto_nettle.c
+endif
+
+if CRYPTO_INTERNAL_PBKDF2
+libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES += lib/crypto_backend/pbkdf2_generic.c
+endif
+
+if CRYPTO_INTERNAL_ARGON2
+libcrypto_backend_la_DEPENDENCIES = libargon2.la
+libcrypto_backend_la_LIBADD = libargon2.la
+endif
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/LICENSE b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/LICENSE
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..de14cd2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/LICENSE
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+     CREATIVE COMMONS CORPORATION IS NOT A LAW FIRM AND DOES NOT PROVIDE LEGAL SERVICES. DISTRIBUTION OF THIS DOCUMENT DOES NOT CREATE AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP. CREATIVE COMMONS PROVIDES THIS INFORMATION ON AN "AS-IS" BASIS. CREATIVE COMMONS MAKES NO WARRANTIES REGARDING THE USE OF THIS DOCUMENT OR THE INFORMATION OR WORKS PROVIDED HEREUNDER, AND DISCLAIMS LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE USE OF THIS DOCUMENT OR THE INFORMATION OR WORKS PROVIDED HEREUNDER.
+
+Statement of Purpose
+
+The laws of most jurisdictions throughout the world automatically confer exclusive Copyright and Related Rights (defined below) upon the creator and subsequent owner(s) (each and all, an "owner") of an original work of authorship and/or a database (each, a "Work").
+
+Certain owners wish to permanently relinquish those rights to a Work for the purpose of contributing to a commons of creative, cultural and scientific works ("Commons") that the public can reliably and without fear of later claims of infringement build upon, modify, incorporate in other works, reuse and redistribute as freely as possible in any form whatsoever and for any purposes, including without limitation commercial purposes. These owners may contribute to the Commons to promote the ideal of a free culture and the further production of creative, cultural and scientific works, or to gain reputation or greater distribution for their Work in part through the use and efforts of others.
+
+For these and/or other purposes and motivations, and without any expectation of additional consideration or compensation, the person associating CC0 with a Work (the "Affirmer"), to the extent that he or she is an owner of Copyright and Related Rights in the Work, voluntarily elects to apply CC0 to the Work and publicly distribute the Work under its terms, with knowledge of his or her Copyright and Related Rights in the Work and the meaning and intended legal effect of CC0 on those rights.
+
+1. Copyright and Related Rights. A Work made available under CC0 may be protected by copyright and related or neighboring rights ("Copyright and Related Rights"). Copyright and Related Rights include, but are not limited to, the following:
+
+    the right to reproduce, adapt, distribute, perform, display, communicate, and translate a Work;
+    moral rights retained by the original author(s) and/or performer(s);
+    publicity and privacy rights pertaining to a person's image or likeness depicted in a Work;
+    rights protecting against unfair competition in regards to a Work, subject to the limitations in paragraph 4(a), below;
+    rights protecting the extraction, dissemination, use and reuse of data in a Work;
+    database rights (such as those arising under Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases, and under any national implementation thereof, including any amended or successor version of such directive); and
+    other similar, equivalent or corresponding rights throughout the world based on applicable law or treaty, and any national implementations thereof.
+
+2. Waiver. To the greatest extent permitted by, but not in contravention of, applicable law, Affirmer hereby overtly, fully, permanently, irrevocably and unconditionally waives, abandons, and surrenders all of Affirmer's Copyright and Related Rights and associated claims and causes of action, whether now known or unknown (including existing as well as future claims and causes of action), in the Work (i) in all territories worldwide, (ii) for the maximum duration provided by applicable law or treaty (including future time extensions), (iii) in any current or future medium and for any number of copies, and (iv) for any purpose whatsoever, including without limitation commercial, advertising or promotional purposes (the "Waiver"). Affirmer makes the Waiver for the benefit of each member of the public at large and to the detriment of Affirmer's heirs and successors, fully intending that such Waiver shall not be subject to revocation, rescission, cancellation, termination, or any other legal or equitable action to disrupt the quiet enjoyment of the Work by the public as contemplated by Affirmer's express Statement of Purpose.
+
+3. Public License Fallback. Should any part of the Waiver for any reason be judged legally invalid or ineffective under applicable law, then the Waiver shall be preserved to the maximum extent permitted taking into account Affirmer's express Statement of Purpose. In addition, to the extent the Waiver is so judged Affirmer hereby grants to each affected person a royalty-free, non transferable, non sublicensable, non exclusive, irrevocable and unconditional license to exercise Affirmer's Copyright and Related Rights in the Work (i) in all territories worldwide, (ii) for the maximum duration provided by applicable law or treaty (including future time extensions), (iii) in any current or future medium and for any number of copies, and (iv) for any purpose whatsoever, including without limitation commercial, advertising or promotional purposes (the "License"). The License shall be deemed effective as of the date CC0 was applied by Affirmer to the Work. Should any part of the License for any reason be judged legally invalid or ineffective under applicable law, such partial invalidity or ineffectiveness shall not invalidate the remainder of the License, and in such case Affirmer hereby affirms that he or she will not (i) exercise any of his or her remaining Copyright and Related Rights in the Work or (ii) assert any associated claims and causes of action with respect to the Work, in either case contrary to Affirmer's express Statement of Purpose.
+
+4. Limitations and Disclaimers.
+
+    No trademark or patent rights held by Affirmer are waived, abandoned, surrendered, licensed or otherwise affected by this document.
+    Affirmer offers the Work as-is and makes no representations or warranties of any kind concerning the Work, express, implied, statutory or otherwise, including without limitation warranties of title, merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, non infringement, or the absence of latent or other defects, accuracy, or the present or absence of errors, whether or not discoverable, all to the greatest extent permissible under applicable law.
+    Affirmer disclaims responsibility for clearing rights of other persons that may apply to the Work or any use thereof, including without limitation any person's Copyright and Related Rights in the Work. Further, Affirmer disclaims responsibility for obtaining any necessary consents, permissions or other rights required for any use of the Work.
+    Affirmer understands and acknowledges that Creative Commons is not a party to this document and has no duty or obligation with respect to this CC0 or use of the Work.
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/Makemodule.am b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/Makemodule.am
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6fef2f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/Makemodule.am
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+noinst_LTLIBRARIES += libargon2.la
+
+libargon2_la_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) -std=c89 -pthread -O3
+libargon2_la_CPPFLAGS = $(AM_CPPFLAGS) \
+	-I lib/crypto_backend/argon2 \
+	-I lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2
+
+libargon2_la_SOURCES = \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blake2b.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blake2.h \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blake2-impl.h \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/argon2.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/argon2.h \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/core.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/core.h \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/encoding.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/encoding.h \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/thread.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/thread.h
+
+if CRYPTO_INTERNAL_SSE_ARGON2
+libargon2_la_SOURCES += lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blamka-round-opt.h \
+			lib/crypto_backend/argon2/opt.c
+else
+libargon2_la_SOURCES += lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blamka-round-ref.h \
+			lib/crypto_backend/argon2/ref.c
+endif
+
+EXTRA_DIST += lib/crypto_backend/argon2/LICENSE
+EXTRA_DIST += lib/crypto_backend/argon2/README
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/README b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5376b52
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/README
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+This is bundled Argon2 algorithm library, copied from
+  https://github.com/P-H-C/phc-winner-argon2
+
+For more info see Password Hashing Competition site:
+  https://password-hashing.net/
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/argon2.c b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/argon2.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f748bcc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/argon2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,456 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "argon2.h"
+#include "encoding.h"
+#include "core.h"
+
+/* to silent gcc -Wcast-qual for const cast */
+#define CONST_CAST(x) (x)(uintptr_t)
+
+const char *argon2_type2string(argon2_type type, int uppercase) {
+    switch (type) {
+        case Argon2_d:
+            return uppercase ? "Argon2d" : "argon2d";
+        case Argon2_i:
+            return uppercase ? "Argon2i" : "argon2i";
+        case Argon2_id:
+            return uppercase ? "Argon2id" : "argon2id";
+    }
+
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int argon2_ctx(argon2_context *context, argon2_type type) {
+    /* 1. Validate all inputs */
+    int result = validate_inputs(context);
+    uint32_t memory_blocks, segment_length;
+    argon2_instance_t instance;
+
+    if (ARGON2_OK != result) {
+        return result;
+    }
+
+    if (Argon2_d != type && Argon2_i != type && Argon2_id != type) {
+        return ARGON2_INCORRECT_TYPE;
+    }
+
+    /* 2. Align memory size */
+    /* Minimum memory_blocks = 8L blocks, where L is the number of lanes */
+    memory_blocks = context->m_cost;
+
+    if (memory_blocks < 2 * ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS * context->lanes) {
+        memory_blocks = 2 * ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS * context->lanes;
+    }
+
+    segment_length = memory_blocks / (context->lanes * ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS);
+    /* Ensure that all segments have equal length */
+    memory_blocks = segment_length * (context->lanes * ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS);
+
+    instance.version = context->version;
+    instance.memory = NULL;
+    instance.passes = context->t_cost;
+    instance.memory_blocks = memory_blocks;
+    instance.segment_length = segment_length;
+    instance.lane_length = segment_length * ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS;
+    instance.lanes = context->lanes;
+    instance.threads = context->threads;
+    instance.type = type;
+
+    if (instance.threads > instance.lanes) {
+        instance.threads = instance.lanes;
+    }
+
+    /* 3. Initialization: Hashing inputs, allocating memory, filling first
+     * blocks
+     */
+    result = initialize(&instance, context);
+
+    if (ARGON2_OK != result) {
+        return result;
+    }
+
+    /* 4. Filling memory */
+    result = fill_memory_blocks(&instance);
+
+    if (ARGON2_OK != result) {
+        return result;
+    }
+    /* 5. Finalization */
+    finalize(context, &instance);
+
+    return ARGON2_OK;
+}
+
+int argon2_hash(const uint32_t t_cost, const uint32_t m_cost,
+                const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt, const size_t saltlen,
+                void *hash, const size_t hashlen, char *encoded,
+                const size_t encodedlen, argon2_type type,
+                const uint32_t version){
+
+    argon2_context context;
+    int result;
+    uint8_t *out;
+
+    if (pwdlen > ARGON2_MAX_PWD_LENGTH) {
+        return ARGON2_PWD_TOO_LONG;
+    }
+
+    if (saltlen > ARGON2_MAX_SALT_LENGTH) {
+        return ARGON2_SALT_TOO_LONG;
+    }
+
+    if (hashlen > ARGON2_MAX_OUTLEN) {
+        return ARGON2_OUTPUT_TOO_LONG;
+    }
+
+    if (hashlen < ARGON2_MIN_OUTLEN) {
+        return ARGON2_OUTPUT_TOO_SHORT;
+    }
+
+    out = malloc(hashlen);
+    if (!out) {
+        return ARGON2_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    context.out = (uint8_t *)out;
+    context.outlen = (uint32_t)hashlen;
+    context.pwd = CONST_CAST(uint8_t *)pwd;
+    context.pwdlen = (uint32_t)pwdlen;
+    context.salt = CONST_CAST(uint8_t *)salt;
+    context.saltlen = (uint32_t)saltlen;
+    context.secret = NULL;
+    context.secretlen = 0;
+    context.ad = NULL;
+    context.adlen = 0;
+    context.t_cost = t_cost;
+    context.m_cost = m_cost;
+    context.lanes = parallelism;
+    context.threads = parallelism;
+    context.allocate_cbk = NULL;
+    context.free_cbk = NULL;
+    context.flags = ARGON2_DEFAULT_FLAGS;
+    context.version = version;
+
+    result = argon2_ctx(&context, type);
+
+    if (result != ARGON2_OK) {
+        clear_internal_memory(out, hashlen);
+        free(out);
+        return result;
+    }
+
+    /* if raw hash requested, write it */
+    if (hash) {
+        memcpy(hash, out, hashlen);
+    }
+
+    /* if encoding requested, write it */
+    if (encoded && encodedlen) {
+        if (encode_string(encoded, encodedlen, &context, type) != ARGON2_OK) {
+            clear_internal_memory(out, hashlen); /* wipe buffers if error */
+            clear_internal_memory(encoded, encodedlen);
+            free(out);
+            return ARGON2_ENCODING_FAIL;
+        }
+    }
+    clear_internal_memory(out, hashlen);
+    free(out);
+
+    return ARGON2_OK;
+}
+
+int argon2i_hash_encoded(const uint32_t t_cost, const uint32_t m_cost,
+                         const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                         const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt,
+                         const size_t saltlen, const size_t hashlen,
+                         char *encoded, const size_t encodedlen) {
+
+    return argon2_hash(t_cost, m_cost, parallelism, pwd, pwdlen, salt, saltlen,
+                       NULL, hashlen, encoded, encodedlen, Argon2_i,
+                       ARGON2_VERSION_NUMBER);
+}
+
+int argon2i_hash_raw(const uint32_t t_cost, const uint32_t m_cost,
+                     const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                     const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt,
+                     const size_t saltlen, void *hash, const size_t hashlen) {
+
+    return argon2_hash(t_cost, m_cost, parallelism, pwd, pwdlen, salt, saltlen,
+                       hash, hashlen, NULL, 0, Argon2_i, ARGON2_VERSION_NUMBER);
+}
+
+int argon2d_hash_encoded(const uint32_t t_cost, const uint32_t m_cost,
+                         const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                         const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt,
+                         const size_t saltlen, const size_t hashlen,
+                         char *encoded, const size_t encodedlen) {
+
+    return argon2_hash(t_cost, m_cost, parallelism, pwd, pwdlen, salt, saltlen,
+                       NULL, hashlen, encoded, encodedlen, Argon2_d,
+                       ARGON2_VERSION_NUMBER);
+}
+
+int argon2d_hash_raw(const uint32_t t_cost, const uint32_t m_cost,
+                     const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                     const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt,
+                     const size_t saltlen, void *hash, const size_t hashlen) {
+
+    return argon2_hash(t_cost, m_cost, parallelism, pwd, pwdlen, salt, saltlen,
+                       hash, hashlen, NULL, 0, Argon2_d, ARGON2_VERSION_NUMBER);
+}
+
+int argon2id_hash_encoded(const uint32_t t_cost, const uint32_t m_cost,
+                          const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                          const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt,
+                          const size_t saltlen, const size_t hashlen,
+                          char *encoded, const size_t encodedlen) {
+
+    return argon2_hash(t_cost, m_cost, parallelism, pwd, pwdlen, salt, saltlen,
+                       NULL, hashlen, encoded, encodedlen, Argon2_id,
+                       ARGON2_VERSION_NUMBER);
+}
+
+int argon2id_hash_raw(const uint32_t t_cost, const uint32_t m_cost,
+                      const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                      const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt,
+                      const size_t saltlen, void *hash, const size_t hashlen) {
+    return argon2_hash(t_cost, m_cost, parallelism, pwd, pwdlen, salt, saltlen,
+                       hash, hashlen, NULL, 0, Argon2_id,
+                       ARGON2_VERSION_NUMBER);
+}
+
+static int argon2_compare(const uint8_t *b1, const uint8_t *b2, size_t len) {
+    size_t i;
+    uint8_t d = 0U;
+
+    for (i = 0U; i < len; i++) {
+        d |= b1[i] ^ b2[i];
+    }
+    return (int)((1 & ((d - 1) >> 8)) - 1);
+}
+
+int argon2_verify(const char *encoded, const void *pwd, const size_t pwdlen,
+                  argon2_type type) {
+
+    argon2_context ctx;
+    uint8_t *desired_result = NULL;
+
+    int ret = ARGON2_OK;
+
+    size_t encoded_len;
+    uint32_t max_field_len;
+
+    if (pwdlen > ARGON2_MAX_PWD_LENGTH) {
+        return ARGON2_PWD_TOO_LONG;
+    }
+
+    if (encoded == NULL) {
+        return ARGON2_DECODING_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    encoded_len = strlen(encoded);
+    if (encoded_len > UINT32_MAX) {
+        return ARGON2_DECODING_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    /* No field can be longer than the encoded length */
+    /* coverity[strlen_assign] */
+    max_field_len = (uint32_t)encoded_len;
+
+    ctx.saltlen = max_field_len;
+    ctx.outlen = max_field_len;
+
+    ctx.salt = malloc(ctx.saltlen);
+    ctx.out = malloc(ctx.outlen);
+    if (!ctx.salt || !ctx.out) {
+        ret = ARGON2_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ctx.pwd = CONST_CAST(uint8_t *)pwd;
+    ctx.pwdlen = (uint32_t)pwdlen;
+
+    ret = decode_string(&ctx, encoded, type);
+    if (ret != ARGON2_OK) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    /* Set aside the desired result, and get a new buffer. */
+    desired_result = ctx.out;
+    ctx.out = malloc(ctx.outlen);
+    if (!ctx.out) {
+        ret = ARGON2_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ret = argon2_verify_ctx(&ctx, (char *)desired_result, type);
+    if (ret != ARGON2_OK) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+fail:
+    free(ctx.salt);
+    free(ctx.out);
+    free(desired_result);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int argon2i_verify(const char *encoded, const void *pwd, const size_t pwdlen) {
+
+    return argon2_verify(encoded, pwd, pwdlen, Argon2_i);
+}
+
+int argon2d_verify(const char *encoded, const void *pwd, const size_t pwdlen) {
+
+    return argon2_verify(encoded, pwd, pwdlen, Argon2_d);
+}
+
+int argon2id_verify(const char *encoded, const void *pwd, const size_t pwdlen) {
+
+    return argon2_verify(encoded, pwd, pwdlen, Argon2_id);
+}
+
+int argon2d_ctx(argon2_context *context) {
+    return argon2_ctx(context, Argon2_d);
+}
+
+int argon2i_ctx(argon2_context *context) {
+    return argon2_ctx(context, Argon2_i);
+}
+
+int argon2id_ctx(argon2_context *context) {
+    return argon2_ctx(context, Argon2_id);
+}
+
+int argon2_verify_ctx(argon2_context *context, const char *hash,
+                      argon2_type type) {
+    int ret = argon2_ctx(context, type);
+    if (ret != ARGON2_OK) {
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    if (argon2_compare(CONST_CAST(uint8_t *)hash, context->out, context->outlen)) {
+        return ARGON2_VERIFY_MISMATCH;
+    }
+
+    return ARGON2_OK;
+}
+
+int argon2d_verify_ctx(argon2_context *context, const char *hash) {
+    return argon2_verify_ctx(context, hash, Argon2_d);
+}
+
+int argon2i_verify_ctx(argon2_context *context, const char *hash) {
+    return argon2_verify_ctx(context, hash, Argon2_i);
+}
+
+int argon2id_verify_ctx(argon2_context *context, const char *hash) {
+    return argon2_verify_ctx(context, hash, Argon2_id);
+}
+
+const char *argon2_error_message(int error_code) {
+    switch (error_code) {
+    case ARGON2_OK:
+        return "OK";
+    case ARGON2_OUTPUT_PTR_NULL:
+        return "Output pointer is NULL";
+    case ARGON2_OUTPUT_TOO_SHORT:
+        return "Output is too short";
+    case ARGON2_OUTPUT_TOO_LONG:
+        return "Output is too long";
+    case ARGON2_PWD_TOO_SHORT:
+        return "Password is too short";
+    case ARGON2_PWD_TOO_LONG:
+        return "Password is too long";
+    case ARGON2_SALT_TOO_SHORT:
+        return "Salt is too short";
+    case ARGON2_SALT_TOO_LONG:
+        return "Salt is too long";
+    case ARGON2_AD_TOO_SHORT:
+        return "Associated data is too short";
+    case ARGON2_AD_TOO_LONG:
+        return "Associated data is too long";
+    case ARGON2_SECRET_TOO_SHORT:
+        return "Secret is too short";
+    case ARGON2_SECRET_TOO_LONG:
+        return "Secret is too long";
+    case ARGON2_TIME_TOO_SMALL:
+        return "Time cost is too small";
+    case ARGON2_TIME_TOO_LARGE:
+        return "Time cost is too large";
+    case ARGON2_MEMORY_TOO_LITTLE:
+        return "Memory cost is too small";
+    case ARGON2_MEMORY_TOO_MUCH:
+        return "Memory cost is too large";
+    case ARGON2_LANES_TOO_FEW:
+        return "Too few lanes";
+    case ARGON2_LANES_TOO_MANY:
+        return "Too many lanes";
+    case ARGON2_PWD_PTR_MISMATCH:
+        return "Password pointer is NULL, but password length is not 0";
+    case ARGON2_SALT_PTR_MISMATCH:
+        return "Salt pointer is NULL, but salt length is not 0";
+    case ARGON2_SECRET_PTR_MISMATCH:
+        return "Secret pointer is NULL, but secret length is not 0";
+    case ARGON2_AD_PTR_MISMATCH:
+        return "Associated data pointer is NULL, but ad length is not 0";
+    case ARGON2_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR:
+        return "Memory allocation error";
+    case ARGON2_FREE_MEMORY_CBK_NULL:
+        return "The free memory callback is NULL";
+    case ARGON2_ALLOCATE_MEMORY_CBK_NULL:
+        return "The allocate memory callback is NULL";
+    case ARGON2_INCORRECT_PARAMETER:
+        return "Argon2_Context context is NULL";
+    case ARGON2_INCORRECT_TYPE:
+        return "There is no such version of Argon2";
+    case ARGON2_OUT_PTR_MISMATCH:
+        return "Output pointer mismatch";
+    case ARGON2_THREADS_TOO_FEW:
+        return "Not enough threads";
+    case ARGON2_THREADS_TOO_MANY:
+        return "Too many threads";
+    case ARGON2_MISSING_ARGS:
+        return "Missing arguments";
+    case ARGON2_ENCODING_FAIL:
+        return "Encoding failed";
+    case ARGON2_DECODING_FAIL:
+        return "Decoding failed";
+    case ARGON2_THREAD_FAIL:
+        return "Threading failure";
+    case ARGON2_DECODING_LENGTH_FAIL:
+        return "Some of encoded parameters are too long or too short";
+    case ARGON2_VERIFY_MISMATCH:
+        return "The password does not match the supplied hash";
+    default:
+        return "Unknown error code";
+    }
+}
+
+size_t argon2_encodedlen(uint32_t t_cost, uint32_t m_cost, uint32_t parallelism,
+                         uint32_t saltlen, uint32_t hashlen, argon2_type type) {
+  return strlen("$$v=$m=,t=,p=$$") + strlen(argon2_type2string(type, 0)) +
+         numlen(t_cost) + numlen(m_cost) + numlen(parallelism) +
+         b64len(saltlen) + b64len(hashlen) + numlen(ARGON2_VERSION_NUMBER) + 1;
+}
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/argon2.h b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/argon2.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fc8682c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/argon2.h
@@ -0,0 +1,437 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#ifndef ARGON2_H
+#define ARGON2_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#if defined(__cplusplus)
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* Symbols visibility control */
+#ifdef A2_VISCTL
+#define ARGON2_PUBLIC __attribute__((visibility("default")))
+#define ARGON2_LOCAL __attribute__ ((visibility ("hidden")))
+#elif _MSC_VER
+#define ARGON2_PUBLIC __declspec(dllexport)
+#define ARGON2_LOCAL
+#else
+#define ARGON2_PUBLIC
+#define ARGON2_LOCAL
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Argon2 input parameter restrictions
+ */
+
+/* Minimum and maximum number of lanes (degree of parallelism) */
+#define ARGON2_MIN_LANES UINT32_C(1)
+#define ARGON2_MAX_LANES UINT32_C(0xFFFFFF)
+
+/* Minimum and maximum number of threads */
+#define ARGON2_MIN_THREADS UINT32_C(1)
+#define ARGON2_MAX_THREADS UINT32_C(0xFFFFFF)
+
+/* Number of synchronization points between lanes per pass */
+#define ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS UINT32_C(4)
+
+/* Minimum and maximum digest size in bytes */
+#define ARGON2_MIN_OUTLEN UINT32_C(4)
+#define ARGON2_MAX_OUTLEN UINT32_C(0xFFFFFFFF)
+
+/* Minimum and maximum number of memory blocks (each of BLOCK_SIZE bytes) */
+#define ARGON2_MIN_MEMORY (2 * ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS) /* 2 blocks per slice */
+
+#define ARGON2_MIN(a, b) ((a) < (b) ? (a) : (b))
+/* Max memory size is addressing-space/2, topping at 2^32 blocks (4 TB) */
+#define ARGON2_MAX_MEMORY_BITS                                                 \
+    ARGON2_MIN(UINT32_C(32), (sizeof(void *) * CHAR_BIT - 10 - 1))
+#define ARGON2_MAX_MEMORY                                                      \
+    ARGON2_MIN(UINT32_C(0xFFFFFFFF), UINT64_C(1) << ARGON2_MAX_MEMORY_BITS)
+
+/* Minimum and maximum number of passes */
+#define ARGON2_MIN_TIME UINT32_C(1)
+#define ARGON2_MAX_TIME UINT32_C(0xFFFFFFFF)
+
+/* Minimum and maximum password length in bytes */
+#define ARGON2_MIN_PWD_LENGTH UINT32_C(0)
+#define ARGON2_MAX_PWD_LENGTH UINT32_C(0xFFFFFFFF)
+
+/* Minimum and maximum associated data length in bytes */
+#define ARGON2_MIN_AD_LENGTH UINT32_C(0)
+#define ARGON2_MAX_AD_LENGTH UINT32_C(0xFFFFFFFF)
+
+/* Minimum and maximum salt length in bytes */
+#define ARGON2_MIN_SALT_LENGTH UINT32_C(8)
+#define ARGON2_MAX_SALT_LENGTH UINT32_C(0xFFFFFFFF)
+
+/* Minimum and maximum key length in bytes */
+#define ARGON2_MIN_SECRET UINT32_C(0)
+#define ARGON2_MAX_SECRET UINT32_C(0xFFFFFFFF)
+
+/* Flags to determine which fields are securely wiped (default = no wipe). */
+#define ARGON2_DEFAULT_FLAGS UINT32_C(0)
+#define ARGON2_FLAG_CLEAR_PASSWORD (UINT32_C(1) << 0)
+#define ARGON2_FLAG_CLEAR_SECRET (UINT32_C(1) << 1)
+
+/* Global flag to determine if we are wiping internal memory buffers. This flag
+ * is defined in core.c and defaults to 1 (wipe internal memory). */
+extern int FLAG_clear_internal_memory;
+
+/* Error codes */
+typedef enum Argon2_ErrorCodes {
+    ARGON2_OK = 0,
+
+    ARGON2_OUTPUT_PTR_NULL = -1,
+
+    ARGON2_OUTPUT_TOO_SHORT = -2,
+    ARGON2_OUTPUT_TOO_LONG = -3,
+
+    ARGON2_PWD_TOO_SHORT = -4,
+    ARGON2_PWD_TOO_LONG = -5,
+
+    ARGON2_SALT_TOO_SHORT = -6,
+    ARGON2_SALT_TOO_LONG = -7,
+
+    ARGON2_AD_TOO_SHORT = -8,
+    ARGON2_AD_TOO_LONG = -9,
+
+    ARGON2_SECRET_TOO_SHORT = -10,
+    ARGON2_SECRET_TOO_LONG = -11,
+
+    ARGON2_TIME_TOO_SMALL = -12,
+    ARGON2_TIME_TOO_LARGE = -13,
+
+    ARGON2_MEMORY_TOO_LITTLE = -14,
+    ARGON2_MEMORY_TOO_MUCH = -15,
+
+    ARGON2_LANES_TOO_FEW = -16,
+    ARGON2_LANES_TOO_MANY = -17,
+
+    ARGON2_PWD_PTR_MISMATCH = -18,    /* NULL ptr with non-zero length */
+    ARGON2_SALT_PTR_MISMATCH = -19,   /* NULL ptr with non-zero length */
+    ARGON2_SECRET_PTR_MISMATCH = -20, /* NULL ptr with non-zero length */
+    ARGON2_AD_PTR_MISMATCH = -21,     /* NULL ptr with non-zero length */
+
+    ARGON2_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR = -22,
+
+    ARGON2_FREE_MEMORY_CBK_NULL = -23,
+    ARGON2_ALLOCATE_MEMORY_CBK_NULL = -24,
+
+    ARGON2_INCORRECT_PARAMETER = -25,
+    ARGON2_INCORRECT_TYPE = -26,
+
+    ARGON2_OUT_PTR_MISMATCH = -27,
+
+    ARGON2_THREADS_TOO_FEW = -28,
+    ARGON2_THREADS_TOO_MANY = -29,
+
+    ARGON2_MISSING_ARGS = -30,
+
+    ARGON2_ENCODING_FAIL = -31,
+
+    ARGON2_DECODING_FAIL = -32,
+
+    ARGON2_THREAD_FAIL = -33,
+
+    ARGON2_DECODING_LENGTH_FAIL = -34,
+
+    ARGON2_VERIFY_MISMATCH = -35
+} argon2_error_codes;
+
+/* Memory allocator types --- for external allocation */
+typedef int (*allocate_fptr)(uint8_t **memory, size_t bytes_to_allocate);
+typedef void (*deallocate_fptr)(uint8_t *memory, size_t bytes_to_allocate);
+
+/* Argon2 external data structures */
+
+/*
+ *****
+ * Context: structure to hold Argon2 inputs:
+ *  output array and its length,
+ *  password and its length,
+ *  salt and its length,
+ *  secret and its length,
+ *  associated data and its length,
+ *  number of passes, amount of used memory (in KBytes, can be rounded up a bit)
+ *  number of parallel threads that will be run.
+ * All the parameters above affect the output hash value.
+ * Additionally, two function pointers can be provided to allocate and
+ * deallocate the memory (if NULL, memory will be allocated internally).
+ * Also, three flags indicate whether to erase password, secret as soon as they
+ * are pre-hashed (and thus not needed anymore), and the entire memory
+ *****
+ * Simplest situation: you have output array out[8], password is stored in
+ * pwd[32], salt is stored in salt[16], you do not have keys nor associated
+ * data. You need to spend 1 GB of RAM and you run 5 passes of Argon2d with
+ * 4 parallel lanes.
+ * You want to erase the password, but you're OK with last pass not being
+ * erased. You want to use the default memory allocator.
+ * Then you initialize:
+ Argon2_Context(out,8,pwd,32,salt,16,NULL,0,NULL,0,5,1<<20,4,4,NULL,NULL,true,false,false,false)
+ */
+typedef struct Argon2_Context {
+    uint8_t *out;    /* output array */
+    uint32_t outlen; /* digest length */
+
+    uint8_t *pwd;    /* password array */
+    uint32_t pwdlen; /* password length */
+
+    uint8_t *salt;    /* salt array */
+    uint32_t saltlen; /* salt length */
+
+    uint8_t *secret;    /* key array */
+    uint32_t secretlen; /* key length */
+
+    uint8_t *ad;    /* associated data array */
+    uint32_t adlen; /* associated data length */
+
+    uint32_t t_cost;  /* number of passes */
+    uint32_t m_cost;  /* amount of memory requested (KB) */
+    uint32_t lanes;   /* number of lanes */
+    uint32_t threads; /* maximum number of threads */
+
+    uint32_t version; /* version number */
+
+    allocate_fptr allocate_cbk; /* pointer to memory allocator */
+    deallocate_fptr free_cbk;   /* pointer to memory deallocator */
+
+    uint32_t flags; /* array of bool options */
+} argon2_context;
+
+/* Argon2 primitive type */
+typedef enum Argon2_type {
+  Argon2_d = 0,
+  Argon2_i = 1,
+  Argon2_id = 2
+} argon2_type;
+
+/* Version of the algorithm */
+typedef enum Argon2_version {
+    ARGON2_VERSION_10 = 0x10,
+    ARGON2_VERSION_13 = 0x13,
+    ARGON2_VERSION_NUMBER = ARGON2_VERSION_13
+} argon2_version;
+
+/*
+ * Function that gives the string representation of an argon2_type.
+ * @param type The argon2_type that we want the string for
+ * @param uppercase Whether the string should have the first letter uppercase
+ * @return NULL if invalid type, otherwise the string representation.
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC const char *argon2_type2string(argon2_type type, int uppercase);
+
+/*
+ * Function that performs memory-hard hashing with certain degree of parallelism
+ * @param  context  Pointer to the Argon2 internal structure
+ * @return Error code if smth is wrong, ARGON2_OK otherwise
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2_ctx(argon2_context *context, argon2_type type);
+
+/**
+ * Hashes a password with Argon2i, producing an encoded hash
+ * @param t_cost Number of iterations
+ * @param m_cost Sets memory usage to m_cost kibibytes
+ * @param parallelism Number of threads and compute lanes
+ * @param pwd Pointer to password
+ * @param pwdlen Password size in bytes
+ * @param salt Pointer to salt
+ * @param saltlen Salt size in bytes
+ * @param hashlen Desired length of the hash in bytes
+ * @param encoded Buffer where to write the encoded hash
+ * @param encodedlen Size of the buffer (thus max size of the encoded hash)
+ * @pre   Different parallelism levels will give different results
+ * @pre   Returns ARGON2_OK if successful
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2i_hash_encoded(const uint32_t t_cost,
+                                       const uint32_t m_cost,
+                                       const uint32_t parallelism,
+                                       const void *pwd, const size_t pwdlen,
+                                       const void *salt, const size_t saltlen,
+                                       const size_t hashlen, char *encoded,
+                                       const size_t encodedlen);
+
+/**
+ * Hashes a password with Argon2i, producing a raw hash at @hash
+ * @param t_cost Number of iterations
+ * @param m_cost Sets memory usage to m_cost kibibytes
+ * @param parallelism Number of threads and compute lanes
+ * @param pwd Pointer to password
+ * @param pwdlen Password size in bytes
+ * @param salt Pointer to salt
+ * @param saltlen Salt size in bytes
+ * @param hash Buffer where to write the raw hash - updated by the function
+ * @param hashlen Desired length of the hash in bytes
+ * @pre   Different parallelism levels will give different results
+ * @pre   Returns ARGON2_OK if successful
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2i_hash_raw(const uint32_t t_cost, const uint32_t m_cost,
+                                   const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                                   const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt,
+                                   const size_t saltlen, void *hash,
+                                   const size_t hashlen);
+
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2d_hash_encoded(const uint32_t t_cost,
+                                       const uint32_t m_cost,
+                                       const uint32_t parallelism,
+                                       const void *pwd, const size_t pwdlen,
+                                       const void *salt, const size_t saltlen,
+                                       const size_t hashlen, char *encoded,
+                                       const size_t encodedlen);
+
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2d_hash_raw(const uint32_t t_cost, const uint32_t m_cost,
+                                   const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                                   const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt,
+                                   const size_t saltlen, void *hash,
+                                   const size_t hashlen);
+
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2id_hash_encoded(const uint32_t t_cost,
+                                        const uint32_t m_cost,
+                                        const uint32_t parallelism,
+                                        const void *pwd, const size_t pwdlen,
+                                        const void *salt, const size_t saltlen,
+                                        const size_t hashlen, char *encoded,
+                                        const size_t encodedlen);
+
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2id_hash_raw(const uint32_t t_cost,
+                                    const uint32_t m_cost,
+                                    const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                                    const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt,
+                                    const size_t saltlen, void *hash,
+                                    const size_t hashlen);
+
+/* generic function underlying the above ones */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2_hash(const uint32_t t_cost, const uint32_t m_cost,
+                              const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                              const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt,
+                              const size_t saltlen, void *hash,
+                              const size_t hashlen, char *encoded,
+                              const size_t encodedlen, argon2_type type,
+                              const uint32_t version);
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a password against an encoded string
+ * Encoded string is restricted as in validate_inputs()
+ * @param encoded String encoding parameters, salt, hash
+ * @param pwd Pointer to password
+ * @pre   Returns ARGON2_OK if successful
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2i_verify(const char *encoded, const void *pwd,
+                                 const size_t pwdlen);
+
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2d_verify(const char *encoded, const void *pwd,
+                                 const size_t pwdlen);
+
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2id_verify(const char *encoded, const void *pwd,
+                                  const size_t pwdlen);
+
+/* generic function underlying the above ones */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2_verify(const char *encoded, const void *pwd,
+                                const size_t pwdlen, argon2_type type);
+
+/**
+ * Argon2d: Version of Argon2 that picks memory blocks depending
+ * on the password and salt. Only for side-channel-free
+ * environment!!
+ *****
+ * @param  context  Pointer to current Argon2 context
+ * @return  Zero if successful, a non zero error code otherwise
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2d_ctx(argon2_context *context);
+
+/**
+ * Argon2i: Version of Argon2 that picks memory blocks
+ * independent on the password and salt. Good for side-channels,
+ * but worse w.r.t. tradeoff attacks if only one pass is used.
+ *****
+ * @param  context  Pointer to current Argon2 context
+ * @return  Zero if successful, a non zero error code otherwise
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2i_ctx(argon2_context *context);
+
+/**
+ * Argon2id: Version of Argon2 where the first half-pass over memory is
+ * password-independent, the rest are password-dependent (on the password and
+ * salt). OK against side channels (they reduce to 1/2-pass Argon2i), and
+ * better with w.r.t. tradeoff attacks (similar to Argon2d).
+ *****
+ * @param  context  Pointer to current Argon2 context
+ * @return  Zero if successful, a non zero error code otherwise
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2id_ctx(argon2_context *context);
+
+/**
+ * Verify if a given password is correct for Argon2d hashing
+ * @param  context  Pointer to current Argon2 context
+ * @param  hash  The password hash to verify. The length of the hash is
+ * specified by the context outlen member
+ * @return  Zero if successful, a non zero error code otherwise
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2d_verify_ctx(argon2_context *context, const char *hash);
+
+/**
+ * Verify if a given password is correct for Argon2i hashing
+ * @param  context  Pointer to current Argon2 context
+ * @param  hash  The password hash to verify. The length of the hash is
+ * specified by the context outlen member
+ * @return  Zero if successful, a non zero error code otherwise
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2i_verify_ctx(argon2_context *context, const char *hash);
+
+/**
+ * Verify if a given password is correct for Argon2id hashing
+ * @param  context  Pointer to current Argon2 context
+ * @param  hash  The password hash to verify. The length of the hash is
+ * specified by the context outlen member
+ * @return  Zero if successful, a non zero error code otherwise
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2id_verify_ctx(argon2_context *context,
+                                      const char *hash);
+
+/* generic function underlying the above ones */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2_verify_ctx(argon2_context *context, const char *hash,
+                                    argon2_type type);
+
+/**
+ * Get the associated error message for given error code
+ * @return  The error message associated with the given error code
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC const char *argon2_error_message(int error_code);
+
+/**
+ * Returns the encoded hash length for the given input parameters
+ * @param t_cost  Number of iterations
+ * @param m_cost  Memory usage in kibibytes
+ * @param parallelism  Number of threads; used to compute lanes
+ * @param saltlen  Salt size in bytes
+ * @param hashlen  Hash size in bytes
+ * @param type The argon2_type that we want the encoded length for
+ * @return  The encoded hash length in bytes
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC size_t argon2_encodedlen(uint32_t t_cost, uint32_t m_cost,
+                                       uint32_t parallelism, uint32_t saltlen,
+                                       uint32_t hashlen, argon2_type type);
+
+#if defined(__cplusplus)
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blake2-impl.h b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blake2-impl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e77ad92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blake2-impl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#ifndef PORTABLE_BLAKE2_IMPL_H
+#define PORTABLE_BLAKE2_IMPL_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#define BLAKE2_INLINE __inline
+#elif defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
+#define BLAKE2_INLINE __inline__
+#else
+#define BLAKE2_INLINE
+#endif
+
+/* Argon2 Team - Begin Code */
+/*
+   Not an exhaustive list, but should cover the majority of modern platforms
+   Additionally, the code will always be correct---this is only a performance
+   tweak.
+*/
+#if (defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) &&                                                \
+     (__BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__)) ||                           \
+    defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__) || defined(__ARMEL__) || defined(__MIPSEL__) || \
+    defined(__AARCH64EL__) || defined(__amd64__) || defined(__i386__) ||       \
+    defined(_M_IX86) || defined(_M_X64) || defined(_M_AMD64) ||                \
+    defined(_M_ARM)
+#define NATIVE_LITTLE_ENDIAN
+#endif
+/* Argon2 Team - End Code */
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE uint32_t load32(const void *src) {
+#if defined(NATIVE_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
+    uint32_t w;
+    memcpy(&w, src, sizeof w);
+    return w;
+#else
+    const uint8_t *p = (const uint8_t *)src;
+    uint32_t w = *p++;
+    w |= (uint32_t)(*p++) << 8;
+    w |= (uint32_t)(*p++) << 16;
+    w |= (uint32_t)(*p++) << 24;
+    return w;
+#endif
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE uint64_t load64(const void *src) {
+#if defined(NATIVE_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
+    uint64_t w;
+    memcpy(&w, src, sizeof w);
+    return w;
+#else
+    const uint8_t *p = (const uint8_t *)src;
+    uint64_t w = *p++;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 8;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 16;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 24;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 32;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 40;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 48;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 56;
+    return w;
+#endif
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE void store32(void *dst, uint32_t w) {
+#if defined(NATIVE_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
+    memcpy(dst, &w, sizeof w);
+#else
+    uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *)dst;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+#endif
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE void store64(void *dst, uint64_t w) {
+#if defined(NATIVE_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
+    memcpy(dst, &w, sizeof w);
+#else
+    uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *)dst;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+#endif
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE uint64_t load48(const void *src) {
+    const uint8_t *p = (const uint8_t *)src;
+    uint64_t w = *p++;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 8;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 16;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 24;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 32;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 40;
+    return w;
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE void store48(void *dst, uint64_t w) {
+    uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *)dst;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE uint32_t rotr32(const uint32_t w, const unsigned c) {
+    return (w >> c) | (w << (32 - c));
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE uint64_t rotr64(const uint64_t w, const unsigned c) {
+    return (w >> c) | (w << (64 - c));
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blake2.h b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blake2.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f97e1c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blake2.h
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#ifndef PORTABLE_BLAKE2_H
+#define PORTABLE_BLAKE2_H
+
+#include "../argon2.h"
+
+#if defined(__cplusplus)
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+enum blake2b_constant {
+    BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES = 128,
+    BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES = 64,
+    BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES = 64,
+    BLAKE2B_SALTBYTES = 16,
+    BLAKE2B_PERSONALBYTES = 16
+};
+
+#pragma pack(push, 1)
+typedef struct __blake2b_param {
+    uint8_t digest_length;                   /* 1 */
+    uint8_t key_length;                      /* 2 */
+    uint8_t fanout;                          /* 3 */
+    uint8_t depth;                           /* 4 */
+    uint32_t leaf_length;                    /* 8 */
+    uint64_t node_offset;                    /* 16 */
+    uint8_t node_depth;                      /* 17 */
+    uint8_t inner_length;                    /* 18 */
+    uint8_t reserved[14];                    /* 32 */
+    uint8_t salt[BLAKE2B_SALTBYTES];         /* 48 */
+    uint8_t personal[BLAKE2B_PERSONALBYTES]; /* 64 */
+} blake2b_param;
+#pragma pack(pop)
+
+typedef struct __blake2b_state {
+    uint64_t h[8];
+    uint64_t t[2];
+    uint64_t f[2];
+    uint8_t buf[BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES];
+    unsigned buflen;
+    unsigned outlen;
+    uint8_t last_node;
+} blake2b_state;
+
+/* Ensure param structs have not been wrongly padded */
+/* Poor man's static_assert */
+enum {
+    blake2_size_check_0 = 1 / !!(CHAR_BIT == 8),
+    blake2_size_check_2 =
+        1 / !!(sizeof(blake2b_param) == sizeof(uint64_t) * CHAR_BIT)
+};
+
+/* Streaming API */
+ARGON2_LOCAL int blake2b_init(blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen);
+ARGON2_LOCAL int blake2b_init_key(blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key,
+                     size_t keylen);
+ARGON2_LOCAL int blake2b_init_param(blake2b_state *S, const blake2b_param *P);
+ARGON2_LOCAL int blake2b_update(blake2b_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen);
+ARGON2_LOCAL int blake2b_final(blake2b_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen);
+
+/* Simple API */
+ARGON2_LOCAL int blake2b(void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen,
+                         const void *key, size_t keylen);
+
+/* Argon2 Team - Begin Code */
+ARGON2_LOCAL int blake2b_long(void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen);
+/* Argon2 Team - End Code */
+
+#if defined(__cplusplus)
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blake2b.c b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blake2b.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b8651f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blake2b.c
@@ -0,0 +1,392 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "blake2.h"
+#include "blake2-impl.h"
+
+void clear_internal_memory(void *v, size_t n);
+
+static const uint64_t blake2b_IV[8] = {
+    UINT64_C(0x6a09e667f3bcc908), UINT64_C(0xbb67ae8584caa73b),
+    UINT64_C(0x3c6ef372fe94f82b), UINT64_C(0xa54ff53a5f1d36f1),
+    UINT64_C(0x510e527fade682d1), UINT64_C(0x9b05688c2b3e6c1f),
+    UINT64_C(0x1f83d9abfb41bd6b), UINT64_C(0x5be0cd19137e2179)};
+
+static const unsigned int blake2b_sigma[12][16] = {
+    {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15},
+    {14, 10, 4, 8, 9, 15, 13, 6, 1, 12, 0, 2, 11, 7, 5, 3},
+    {11, 8, 12, 0, 5, 2, 15, 13, 10, 14, 3, 6, 7, 1, 9, 4},
+    {7, 9, 3, 1, 13, 12, 11, 14, 2, 6, 5, 10, 4, 0, 15, 8},
+    {9, 0, 5, 7, 2, 4, 10, 15, 14, 1, 11, 12, 6, 8, 3, 13},
+    {2, 12, 6, 10, 0, 11, 8, 3, 4, 13, 7, 5, 15, 14, 1, 9},
+    {12, 5, 1, 15, 14, 13, 4, 10, 0, 7, 6, 3, 9, 2, 8, 11},
+    {13, 11, 7, 14, 12, 1, 3, 9, 5, 0, 15, 4, 8, 6, 2, 10},
+    {6, 15, 14, 9, 11, 3, 0, 8, 12, 2, 13, 7, 1, 4, 10, 5},
+    {10, 2, 8, 4, 7, 6, 1, 5, 15, 11, 9, 14, 3, 12, 13, 0},
+    {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15},
+    {14, 10, 4, 8, 9, 15, 13, 6, 1, 12, 0, 2, 11, 7, 5, 3},
+};
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE void blake2b_set_lastnode(blake2b_state *S) {
+    S->f[1] = (uint64_t)-1;
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE void blake2b_set_lastblock(blake2b_state *S) {
+    if (S->last_node) {
+        blake2b_set_lastnode(S);
+    }
+    S->f[0] = (uint64_t)-1;
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE void blake2b_increment_counter(blake2b_state *S,
+                                                    uint64_t inc) {
+    S->t[0] += inc;
+    S->t[1] += (S->t[0] < inc);
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE void blake2b_invalidate_state(blake2b_state *S) {
+    clear_internal_memory(S, sizeof(*S));      /* wipe */
+    blake2b_set_lastblock(S); /* invalidate for further use */
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE void blake2b_init0(blake2b_state *S) {
+    memset(S, 0, sizeof(*S));
+    memcpy(S->h, blake2b_IV, sizeof(S->h));
+}
+
+int blake2b_init_param(blake2b_state *S, const blake2b_param *P) {
+    const unsigned char *p = (const unsigned char *)P;
+    unsigned int i;
+
+    if (NULL == P || NULL == S) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    blake2b_init0(S);
+    /* IV XOR Parameter Block */
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
+        S->h[i] ^= load64(&p[i * sizeof(S->h[i])]);
+    }
+    S->outlen = P->digest_length;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Sequential blake2b initialization */
+int blake2b_init(blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen) {
+    blake2b_param P;
+
+    if (S == NULL) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if ((outlen == 0) || (outlen > BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES)) {
+        blake2b_invalidate_state(S);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Setup Parameter Block for unkeyed BLAKE2 */
+    P.digest_length = (uint8_t)outlen;
+    P.key_length = 0;
+    P.fanout = 1;
+    P.depth = 1;
+    P.leaf_length = 0;
+    P.node_offset = 0;
+    P.node_depth = 0;
+    P.inner_length = 0;
+    memset(P.reserved, 0, sizeof(P.reserved));
+    memset(P.salt, 0, sizeof(P.salt));
+    memset(P.personal, 0, sizeof(P.personal));
+
+    return blake2b_init_param(S, &P);
+}
+
+int blake2b_init_key(blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key,
+                     size_t keylen) {
+    blake2b_param P;
+
+    if (S == NULL) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if ((outlen == 0) || (outlen > BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES)) {
+        blake2b_invalidate_state(S);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if ((key == 0) || (keylen == 0) || (keylen > BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES)) {
+        blake2b_invalidate_state(S);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Setup Parameter Block for keyed BLAKE2 */
+    P.digest_length = (uint8_t)outlen;
+    P.key_length = (uint8_t)keylen;
+    P.fanout = 1;
+    P.depth = 1;
+    P.leaf_length = 0;
+    P.node_offset = 0;
+    P.node_depth = 0;
+    P.inner_length = 0;
+    memset(P.reserved, 0, sizeof(P.reserved));
+    memset(P.salt, 0, sizeof(P.salt));
+    memset(P.personal, 0, sizeof(P.personal));
+
+    if (blake2b_init_param(S, &P) < 0) {
+        blake2b_invalidate_state(S);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    {
+        uint8_t block[BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES];
+        memset(block, 0, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES);
+        memcpy(block, key, keylen);
+        blake2b_update(S, block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES);
+        /* Burn the key from stack */
+        clear_internal_memory(block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES);
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static void blake2b_compress(blake2b_state *S, const uint8_t *block) {
+    uint64_t m[16];
+    uint64_t v[16];
+    unsigned int i, r;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) {
+        m[i] = load64(block + i * sizeof(m[i]));
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
+        v[i] = S->h[i];
+    }
+
+    v[8] = blake2b_IV[0];
+    v[9] = blake2b_IV[1];
+    v[10] = blake2b_IV[2];
+    v[11] = blake2b_IV[3];
+    v[12] = blake2b_IV[4] ^ S->t[0];
+    v[13] = blake2b_IV[5] ^ S->t[1];
+    v[14] = blake2b_IV[6] ^ S->f[0];
+    v[15] = blake2b_IV[7] ^ S->f[1];
+
+#define G(r, i, a, b, c, d)                                                    \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        a = a + b + m[blake2b_sigma[r][2 * i + 0]];                            \
+        d = rotr64(d ^ a, 32);                                                 \
+        c = c + d;                                                             \
+        b = rotr64(b ^ c, 24);                                                 \
+        a = a + b + m[blake2b_sigma[r][2 * i + 1]];                            \
+        d = rotr64(d ^ a, 16);                                                 \
+        c = c + d;                                                             \
+        b = rotr64(b ^ c, 63);                                                 \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#define ROUND(r)                                                               \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        G(r, 0, v[0], v[4], v[8], v[12]);                                      \
+        G(r, 1, v[1], v[5], v[9], v[13]);                                      \
+        G(r, 2, v[2], v[6], v[10], v[14]);                                     \
+        G(r, 3, v[3], v[7], v[11], v[15]);                                     \
+        G(r, 4, v[0], v[5], v[10], v[15]);                                     \
+        G(r, 5, v[1], v[6], v[11], v[12]);                                     \
+        G(r, 6, v[2], v[7], v[8], v[13]);                                      \
+        G(r, 7, v[3], v[4], v[9], v[14]);                                      \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+    for (r = 0; r < 12; ++r) {
+        ROUND(r);
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
+        S->h[i] = S->h[i] ^ v[i] ^ v[i + 8];
+    }
+
+#undef G
+#undef ROUND
+}
+
+int blake2b_update(blake2b_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen) {
+    const uint8_t *pin = (const uint8_t *)in;
+
+    if (inlen == 0) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Sanity check */
+    if (S == NULL || in == NULL) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Is this a reused state? */
+    if (S->f[0] != 0) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (S->buflen + inlen > BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES) {
+        /* Complete current block */
+        size_t left = S->buflen;
+        size_t fill = BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES - left;
+        memcpy(&S->buf[left], pin, fill);
+        blake2b_increment_counter(S, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES);
+        blake2b_compress(S, S->buf);
+        S->buflen = 0;
+        inlen -= fill;
+        pin += fill;
+        /* Avoid buffer copies when possible */
+        while (inlen > BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES) {
+            blake2b_increment_counter(S, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES);
+            blake2b_compress(S, pin);
+            inlen -= BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES;
+            pin += BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES;
+        }
+    }
+    memcpy(&S->buf[S->buflen], pin, inlen);
+    S->buflen += (unsigned int)inlen;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int blake2b_final(blake2b_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen) {
+    uint8_t buffer[BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES] = {0};
+    unsigned int i;
+
+    /* Sanity checks */
+    if (S == NULL || out == NULL || outlen < S->outlen) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Is this a reused state? */
+    if (S->f[0] != 0) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    blake2b_increment_counter(S, S->buflen);
+    blake2b_set_lastblock(S);
+    memset(&S->buf[S->buflen], 0, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES - S->buflen); /* Padding */
+    blake2b_compress(S, S->buf);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) { /* Output full hash to temp buffer */
+        store64(buffer + sizeof(S->h[i]) * i, S->h[i]);
+    }
+
+    memcpy(out, buffer, S->outlen);
+    clear_internal_memory(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+    clear_internal_memory(S->buf, sizeof(S->buf));
+    clear_internal_memory(S->h, sizeof(S->h));
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int blake2b(void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen,
+            const void *key, size_t keylen) {
+    blake2b_state S;
+    int ret = -1;
+
+    /* Verify parameters */
+    if (NULL == in && inlen > 0) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    if (NULL == out || outlen == 0 || outlen > BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    if ((NULL == key && keylen > 0) || keylen > BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    if (keylen > 0) {
+        if (blake2b_init_key(&S, outlen, key, keylen) < 0) {
+            goto fail;
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (blake2b_init(&S, outlen) < 0) {
+            goto fail;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (blake2b_update(&S, in, inlen) < 0) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+    ret = blake2b_final(&S, out, outlen);
+
+fail:
+    clear_internal_memory(&S, sizeof(S));
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* Argon2 Team - Begin Code */
+int blake2b_long(void *pout, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen) {
+    uint8_t *out = (uint8_t *)pout;
+    blake2b_state blake_state;
+    uint8_t outlen_bytes[sizeof(uint32_t)] = {0};
+    int ret = -1;
+
+    if (outlen > UINT32_MAX) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    /* Ensure little-endian byte order! */
+    store32(outlen_bytes, (uint32_t)outlen);
+
+#define TRY(statement)                                                         \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        ret = statement;                                                       \
+        if (ret < 0) {                                                         \
+            goto fail;                                                         \
+        }                                                                      \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+    if (outlen <= BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES) {
+        TRY(blake2b_init(&blake_state, outlen));
+        TRY(blake2b_update(&blake_state, outlen_bytes, sizeof(outlen_bytes)));
+        TRY(blake2b_update(&blake_state, in, inlen));
+        TRY(blake2b_final(&blake_state, out, outlen));
+    } else {
+        uint32_t toproduce;
+        uint8_t out_buffer[BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES];
+        uint8_t in_buffer[BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES];
+        TRY(blake2b_init(&blake_state, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES));
+        TRY(blake2b_update(&blake_state, outlen_bytes, sizeof(outlen_bytes)));
+        TRY(blake2b_update(&blake_state, in, inlen));
+        TRY(blake2b_final(&blake_state, out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES));
+        memcpy(out, out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES / 2);
+        out += BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES / 2;
+        toproduce = (uint32_t)outlen - BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES / 2;
+
+        while (toproduce > BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES) {
+            memcpy(in_buffer, out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES);
+            TRY(blake2b(out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, in_buffer,
+                        BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, NULL, 0));
+            memcpy(out, out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES / 2);
+            out += BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES / 2;
+            toproduce -= BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES / 2;
+        }
+
+        memcpy(in_buffer, out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES);
+        TRY(blake2b(out_buffer, toproduce, in_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, NULL,
+                    0));
+        memcpy(out, out_buffer, toproduce);
+    }
+fail:
+    clear_internal_memory(&blake_state, sizeof(blake_state));
+    return ret;
+#undef TRY
+}
+/* Argon2 Team - End Code */
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blamka-round-opt.h b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blamka-round-opt.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2c8942e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blamka-round-opt.h
@@ -0,0 +1,471 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#ifndef BLAKE_ROUND_MKA_OPT_H
+#define BLAKE_ROUND_MKA_OPT_H
+
+#include "blake2-impl.h"
+
+#include <emmintrin.h>
+#if defined(__SSSE3__)
+#include <tmmintrin.h> /* for _mm_shuffle_epi8 and _mm_alignr_epi8 */
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__XOP__) && (defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__))
+#include <x86intrin.h>
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(__AVX512F__)
+#if !defined(__AVX2__)
+#if !defined(__XOP__)
+#if defined(__SSSE3__)
+#define r16                                                                    \
+    (_mm_setr_epi8(2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 0, 1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 8, 9))
+#define r24                                                                    \
+    (_mm_setr_epi8(3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 0, 1, 2, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 8, 9, 10))
+#define _mm_roti_epi64(x, c)                                                   \
+    (-(c) == 32)                                                               \
+        ? _mm_shuffle_epi32((x), _MM_SHUFFLE(2, 3, 0, 1))                      \
+        : (-(c) == 24)                                                         \
+              ? _mm_shuffle_epi8((x), r24)                                     \
+              : (-(c) == 16)                                                   \
+                    ? _mm_shuffle_epi8((x), r16)                               \
+                    : (-(c) == 63)                                             \
+                          ? _mm_xor_si128(_mm_srli_epi64((x), -(c)),           \
+                                          _mm_add_epi64((x), (x)))             \
+                          : _mm_xor_si128(_mm_srli_epi64((x), -(c)),           \
+                                          _mm_slli_epi64((x), 64 - (-(c))))
+#else /* defined(__SSE2__) */
+#define _mm_roti_epi64(r, c)                                                   \
+    _mm_xor_si128(_mm_srli_epi64((r), -(c)), _mm_slli_epi64((r), 64 - (-(c))))
+#endif
+#else
+#endif
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE __m128i fBlaMka(__m128i x, __m128i y) {
+    const __m128i z = _mm_mul_epu32(x, y);
+    return _mm_add_epi64(_mm_add_epi64(x, y), _mm_add_epi64(z, z));
+}
+
+#define G1(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1)                                     \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        A0 = fBlaMka(A0, B0);                                                  \
+        A1 = fBlaMka(A1, B1);                                                  \
+                                                                               \
+        D0 = _mm_xor_si128(D0, A0);                                            \
+        D1 = _mm_xor_si128(D1, A1);                                            \
+                                                                               \
+        D0 = _mm_roti_epi64(D0, -32);                                          \
+        D1 = _mm_roti_epi64(D1, -32);                                          \
+                                                                               \
+        C0 = fBlaMka(C0, D0);                                                  \
+        C1 = fBlaMka(C1, D1);                                                  \
+                                                                               \
+        B0 = _mm_xor_si128(B0, C0);                                            \
+        B1 = _mm_xor_si128(B1, C1);                                            \
+                                                                               \
+        B0 = _mm_roti_epi64(B0, -24);                                          \
+        B1 = _mm_roti_epi64(B1, -24);                                          \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#define G2(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1)                                     \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        A0 = fBlaMka(A0, B0);                                                  \
+        A1 = fBlaMka(A1, B1);                                                  \
+                                                                               \
+        D0 = _mm_xor_si128(D0, A0);                                            \
+        D1 = _mm_xor_si128(D1, A1);                                            \
+                                                                               \
+        D0 = _mm_roti_epi64(D0, -16);                                          \
+        D1 = _mm_roti_epi64(D1, -16);                                          \
+                                                                               \
+        C0 = fBlaMka(C0, D0);                                                  \
+        C1 = fBlaMka(C1, D1);                                                  \
+                                                                               \
+        B0 = _mm_xor_si128(B0, C0);                                            \
+        B1 = _mm_xor_si128(B1, C1);                                            \
+                                                                               \
+        B0 = _mm_roti_epi64(B0, -63);                                          \
+        B1 = _mm_roti_epi64(B1, -63);                                          \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#if defined(__SSSE3__)
+#define DIAGONALIZE(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1)                            \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        __m128i t0 = _mm_alignr_epi8(B1, B0, 8);                               \
+        __m128i t1 = _mm_alignr_epi8(B0, B1, 8);                               \
+        B0 = t0;                                                               \
+        B1 = t1;                                                               \
+                                                                               \
+        t0 = C0;                                                               \
+        C0 = C1;                                                               \
+        C1 = t0;                                                               \
+                                                                               \
+        t0 = _mm_alignr_epi8(D1, D0, 8);                                       \
+        t1 = _mm_alignr_epi8(D0, D1, 8);                                       \
+        D0 = t1;                                                               \
+        D1 = t0;                                                               \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#define UNDIAGONALIZE(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1)                          \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        __m128i t0 = _mm_alignr_epi8(B0, B1, 8);                               \
+        __m128i t1 = _mm_alignr_epi8(B1, B0, 8);                               \
+        B0 = t0;                                                               \
+        B1 = t1;                                                               \
+                                                                               \
+        t0 = C0;                                                               \
+        C0 = C1;                                                               \
+        C1 = t0;                                                               \
+                                                                               \
+        t0 = _mm_alignr_epi8(D0, D1, 8);                                       \
+        t1 = _mm_alignr_epi8(D1, D0, 8);                                       \
+        D0 = t1;                                                               \
+        D1 = t0;                                                               \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+#else /* SSE2 */
+#define DIAGONALIZE(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1)                            \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        __m128i t0 = D0;                                                       \
+        __m128i t1 = B0;                                                       \
+        D0 = C0;                                                               \
+        C0 = C1;                                                               \
+        C1 = D0;                                                               \
+        D0 = _mm_unpackhi_epi64(D1, _mm_unpacklo_epi64(t0, t0));               \
+        D1 = _mm_unpackhi_epi64(t0, _mm_unpacklo_epi64(D1, D1));               \
+        B0 = _mm_unpackhi_epi64(B0, _mm_unpacklo_epi64(B1, B1));               \
+        B1 = _mm_unpackhi_epi64(B1, _mm_unpacklo_epi64(t1, t1));               \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#define UNDIAGONALIZE(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1)                          \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        __m128i t0, t1;                                                        \
+        t0 = C0;                                                               \
+        C0 = C1;                                                               \
+        C1 = t0;                                                               \
+        t0 = B0;                                                               \
+        t1 = D0;                                                               \
+        B0 = _mm_unpackhi_epi64(B1, _mm_unpacklo_epi64(B0, B0));               \
+        B1 = _mm_unpackhi_epi64(t0, _mm_unpacklo_epi64(B1, B1));               \
+        D0 = _mm_unpackhi_epi64(D0, _mm_unpacklo_epi64(D1, D1));               \
+        D1 = _mm_unpackhi_epi64(D1, _mm_unpacklo_epi64(t1, t1));               \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+#endif
+
+#define BLAKE2_ROUND(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1)                           \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        G1(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1);                                    \
+        G2(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1);                                    \
+                                                                               \
+        DIAGONALIZE(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1);                           \
+                                                                               \
+        G1(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1);                                    \
+        G2(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1);                                    \
+                                                                               \
+        UNDIAGONALIZE(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1);                         \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+#else /* __AVX2__ */
+
+#include <immintrin.h>
+
+#define rotr32(x)   _mm256_shuffle_epi32(x, _MM_SHUFFLE(2, 3, 0, 1))
+#define rotr24(x)   _mm256_shuffle_epi8(x, _mm256_setr_epi8(3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 0, 1, 2, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 8, 9, 10, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 0, 1, 2, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 8, 9, 10))
+#define rotr16(x)   _mm256_shuffle_epi8(x, _mm256_setr_epi8(2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 0, 1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 8, 9, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 0, 1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 8, 9))
+#define rotr63(x)   _mm256_xor_si256(_mm256_srli_epi64((x), 63), _mm256_add_epi64((x), (x)))
+
+#define G1_AVX2(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+    do { \
+        __m256i ml = _mm256_mul_epu32(A0, B0); \
+        ml = _mm256_add_epi64(ml, ml); \
+        A0 = _mm256_add_epi64(A0, _mm256_add_epi64(B0, ml)); \
+        D0 = _mm256_xor_si256(D0, A0); \
+        D0 = rotr32(D0); \
+        \
+        ml = _mm256_mul_epu32(C0, D0); \
+        ml = _mm256_add_epi64(ml, ml); \
+        C0 = _mm256_add_epi64(C0, _mm256_add_epi64(D0, ml)); \
+        \
+        B0 = _mm256_xor_si256(B0, C0); \
+        B0 = rotr24(B0); \
+        \
+        ml = _mm256_mul_epu32(A1, B1); \
+        ml = _mm256_add_epi64(ml, ml); \
+        A1 = _mm256_add_epi64(A1, _mm256_add_epi64(B1, ml)); \
+        D1 = _mm256_xor_si256(D1, A1); \
+        D1 = rotr32(D1); \
+        \
+        ml = _mm256_mul_epu32(C1, D1); \
+        ml = _mm256_add_epi64(ml, ml); \
+        C1 = _mm256_add_epi64(C1, _mm256_add_epi64(D1, ml)); \
+        \
+        B1 = _mm256_xor_si256(B1, C1); \
+        B1 = rotr24(B1); \
+    } while((void)0, 0);
+
+#define G2_AVX2(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+    do { \
+        __m256i ml = _mm256_mul_epu32(A0, B0); \
+        ml = _mm256_add_epi64(ml, ml); \
+        A0 = _mm256_add_epi64(A0, _mm256_add_epi64(B0, ml)); \
+        D0 = _mm256_xor_si256(D0, A0); \
+        D0 = rotr16(D0); \
+        \
+        ml = _mm256_mul_epu32(C0, D0); \
+        ml = _mm256_add_epi64(ml, ml); \
+        C0 = _mm256_add_epi64(C0, _mm256_add_epi64(D0, ml)); \
+        B0 = _mm256_xor_si256(B0, C0); \
+        B0 = rotr63(B0); \
+        \
+        ml = _mm256_mul_epu32(A1, B1); \
+        ml = _mm256_add_epi64(ml, ml); \
+        A1 = _mm256_add_epi64(A1, _mm256_add_epi64(B1, ml)); \
+        D1 = _mm256_xor_si256(D1, A1); \
+        D1 = rotr16(D1); \
+        \
+        ml = _mm256_mul_epu32(C1, D1); \
+        ml = _mm256_add_epi64(ml, ml); \
+        C1 = _mm256_add_epi64(C1, _mm256_add_epi64(D1, ml)); \
+        B1 = _mm256_xor_si256(B1, C1); \
+        B1 = rotr63(B1); \
+    } while((void)0, 0);
+
+#define DIAGONALIZE_1(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1) \
+    do { \
+        B0 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(B0, _MM_SHUFFLE(0, 3, 2, 1)); \
+        C0 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(C0, _MM_SHUFFLE(1, 0, 3, 2)); \
+        D0 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(D0, _MM_SHUFFLE(2, 1, 0, 3)); \
+        \
+        B1 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(B1, _MM_SHUFFLE(0, 3, 2, 1)); \
+        C1 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(C1, _MM_SHUFFLE(1, 0, 3, 2)); \
+        D1 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(D1, _MM_SHUFFLE(2, 1, 0, 3)); \
+    } while((void)0, 0);
+
+#define DIAGONALIZE_2(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+    do { \
+        __m256i tmp1 = _mm256_blend_epi32(B0, B1, 0xCC); \
+        __m256i tmp2 = _mm256_blend_epi32(B0, B1, 0x33); \
+        B1 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(tmp1, _MM_SHUFFLE(2,3,0,1)); \
+        B0 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(tmp2, _MM_SHUFFLE(2,3,0,1)); \
+        \
+        tmp1 = C0; \
+        C0 = C1; \
+        C1 = tmp1; \
+        \
+        tmp1 = _mm256_blend_epi32(D0, D1, 0xCC); \
+        tmp2 = _mm256_blend_epi32(D0, D1, 0x33); \
+        D0 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(tmp1, _MM_SHUFFLE(2,3,0,1)); \
+        D1 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(tmp2, _MM_SHUFFLE(2,3,0,1)); \
+    } while(0);
+
+#define UNDIAGONALIZE_1(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1) \
+    do { \
+        B0 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(B0, _MM_SHUFFLE(2, 1, 0, 3)); \
+        C0 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(C0, _MM_SHUFFLE(1, 0, 3, 2)); \
+        D0 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(D0, _MM_SHUFFLE(0, 3, 2, 1)); \
+        \
+        B1 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(B1, _MM_SHUFFLE(2, 1, 0, 3)); \
+        C1 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(C1, _MM_SHUFFLE(1, 0, 3, 2)); \
+        D1 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(D1, _MM_SHUFFLE(0, 3, 2, 1)); \
+    } while((void)0, 0);
+
+#define UNDIAGONALIZE_2(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+    do { \
+        __m256i tmp1 = _mm256_blend_epi32(B0, B1, 0xCC); \
+        __m256i tmp2 = _mm256_blend_epi32(B0, B1, 0x33); \
+        B0 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(tmp1, _MM_SHUFFLE(2,3,0,1)); \
+        B1 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(tmp2, _MM_SHUFFLE(2,3,0,1)); \
+        \
+        tmp1 = C0; \
+        C0 = C1; \
+        C1 = tmp1; \
+        \
+        tmp1 = _mm256_blend_epi32(D0, D1, 0x33); \
+        tmp2 = _mm256_blend_epi32(D0, D1, 0xCC); \
+        D0 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(tmp1, _MM_SHUFFLE(2,3,0,1)); \
+        D1 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(tmp2, _MM_SHUFFLE(2,3,0,1)); \
+    } while((void)0, 0);
+
+#define BLAKE2_ROUND_1(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+    do{ \
+        G1_AVX2(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+        G2_AVX2(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+        \
+        DIAGONALIZE_1(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1) \
+        \
+        G1_AVX2(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+        G2_AVX2(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+        \
+        UNDIAGONALIZE_1(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1) \
+    } while((void)0, 0);
+
+#define BLAKE2_ROUND_2(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+    do{ \
+        G1_AVX2(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+        G2_AVX2(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+        \
+        DIAGONALIZE_2(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+        \
+        G1_AVX2(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+        G2_AVX2(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+        \
+        UNDIAGONALIZE_2(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+    } while((void)0, 0);
+
+#endif /* __AVX2__ */
+
+#else /* __AVX512F__ */
+
+#include <immintrin.h>
+
+#define ror64(x, n) _mm512_ror_epi64((x), (n))
+
+static __m512i muladd(__m512i x, __m512i y)
+{
+    __m512i z = _mm512_mul_epu32(x, y);
+    return _mm512_add_epi64(_mm512_add_epi64(x, y), _mm512_add_epi64(z, z));
+}
+
+#define G1(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1) \
+    do { \
+        A0 = muladd(A0, B0); \
+        A1 = muladd(A1, B1); \
+\
+        D0 = _mm512_xor_si512(D0, A0); \
+        D1 = _mm512_xor_si512(D1, A1); \
+\
+        D0 = ror64(D0, 32); \
+        D1 = ror64(D1, 32); \
+\
+        C0 = muladd(C0, D0); \
+        C1 = muladd(C1, D1); \
+\
+        B0 = _mm512_xor_si512(B0, C0); \
+        B1 = _mm512_xor_si512(B1, C1); \
+\
+        B0 = ror64(B0, 24); \
+        B1 = ror64(B1, 24); \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#define G2(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1) \
+    do { \
+        A0 = muladd(A0, B0); \
+        A1 = muladd(A1, B1); \
+\
+        D0 = _mm512_xor_si512(D0, A0); \
+        D1 = _mm512_xor_si512(D1, A1); \
+\
+        D0 = ror64(D0, 16); \
+        D1 = ror64(D1, 16); \
+\
+        C0 = muladd(C0, D0); \
+        C1 = muladd(C1, D1); \
+\
+        B0 = _mm512_xor_si512(B0, C0); \
+        B1 = _mm512_xor_si512(B1, C1); \
+\
+        B0 = ror64(B0, 63); \
+        B1 = ror64(B1, 63); \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#define DIAGONALIZE(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1) \
+    do { \
+        B0 = _mm512_permutex_epi64(B0, _MM_SHUFFLE(0, 3, 2, 1)); \
+        B1 = _mm512_permutex_epi64(B1, _MM_SHUFFLE(0, 3, 2, 1)); \
+\
+        C0 = _mm512_permutex_epi64(C0, _MM_SHUFFLE(1, 0, 3, 2)); \
+        C1 = _mm512_permutex_epi64(C1, _MM_SHUFFLE(1, 0, 3, 2)); \
+\
+        D0 = _mm512_permutex_epi64(D0, _MM_SHUFFLE(2, 1, 0, 3)); \
+        D1 = _mm512_permutex_epi64(D1, _MM_SHUFFLE(2, 1, 0, 3)); \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#define UNDIAGONALIZE(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1) \
+    do { \
+        B0 = _mm512_permutex_epi64(B0, _MM_SHUFFLE(2, 1, 0, 3)); \
+        B1 = _mm512_permutex_epi64(B1, _MM_SHUFFLE(2, 1, 0, 3)); \
+\
+        C0 = _mm512_permutex_epi64(C0, _MM_SHUFFLE(1, 0, 3, 2)); \
+        C1 = _mm512_permutex_epi64(C1, _MM_SHUFFLE(1, 0, 3, 2)); \
+\
+        D0 = _mm512_permutex_epi64(D0, _MM_SHUFFLE(0, 3, 2, 1)); \
+        D1 = _mm512_permutex_epi64(D1, _MM_SHUFFLE(0, 3, 2, 1)); \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#define BLAKE2_ROUND(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1) \
+    do { \
+        G1(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1); \
+        G2(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1); \
+\
+        DIAGONALIZE(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1); \
+\
+        G1(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1); \
+        G2(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1); \
+\
+        UNDIAGONALIZE(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1); \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#define SWAP_HALVES(A0, A1) \
+    do { \
+        __m512i t0, t1; \
+        t0 = _mm512_shuffle_i64x2(A0, A1, _MM_SHUFFLE(1, 0, 1, 0)); \
+        t1 = _mm512_shuffle_i64x2(A0, A1, _MM_SHUFFLE(3, 2, 3, 2)); \
+        A0 = t0; \
+        A1 = t1; \
+    } while((void)0, 0)
+
+#define SWAP_QUARTERS(A0, A1) \
+    do { \
+        SWAP_HALVES(A0, A1); \
+        A0 = _mm512_permutexvar_epi64(_mm512_setr_epi64(0, 1, 4, 5, 2, 3, 6, 7), A0); \
+        A1 = _mm512_permutexvar_epi64(_mm512_setr_epi64(0, 1, 4, 5, 2, 3, 6, 7), A1); \
+    } while((void)0, 0)
+
+#define UNSWAP_QUARTERS(A0, A1) \
+    do { \
+        A0 = _mm512_permutexvar_epi64(_mm512_setr_epi64(0, 1, 4, 5, 2, 3, 6, 7), A0); \
+        A1 = _mm512_permutexvar_epi64(_mm512_setr_epi64(0, 1, 4, 5, 2, 3, 6, 7), A1); \
+        SWAP_HALVES(A0, A1); \
+    } while((void)0, 0)
+
+#define BLAKE2_ROUND_1(A0, C0, B0, D0, A1, C1, B1, D1) \
+    do { \
+        SWAP_HALVES(A0, B0); \
+        SWAP_HALVES(C0, D0); \
+        SWAP_HALVES(A1, B1); \
+        SWAP_HALVES(C1, D1); \
+        BLAKE2_ROUND(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1); \
+        SWAP_HALVES(A0, B0); \
+        SWAP_HALVES(C0, D0); \
+        SWAP_HALVES(A1, B1); \
+        SWAP_HALVES(C1, D1); \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#define BLAKE2_ROUND_2(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+    do { \
+        SWAP_QUARTERS(A0, A1); \
+        SWAP_QUARTERS(B0, B1); \
+        SWAP_QUARTERS(C0, C1); \
+        SWAP_QUARTERS(D0, D1); \
+        BLAKE2_ROUND(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1); \
+        UNSWAP_QUARTERS(A0, A1); \
+        UNSWAP_QUARTERS(B0, B1); \
+        UNSWAP_QUARTERS(C0, C1); \
+        UNSWAP_QUARTERS(D0, D1); \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#endif /* __AVX512F__ */
+#endif /* BLAKE_ROUND_MKA_OPT_H */
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blamka-round-ref.h b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blamka-round-ref.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b8f2cf4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blamka-round-ref.h
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#ifndef BLAKE_ROUND_MKA_H
+#define BLAKE_ROUND_MKA_H
+
+#include "blake2.h"
+#include "blake2-impl.h"
+
+/* designed by the Lyra PHC team */
+static BLAKE2_INLINE uint64_t fBlaMka(uint64_t x, uint64_t y) {
+    const uint64_t m = UINT64_C(0xFFFFFFFF);
+    const uint64_t xy = (x & m) * (y & m);
+    return x + y + 2 * xy;
+}
+
+#define G(a, b, c, d)                                                          \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        a = fBlaMka(a, b);                                                     \
+        d = rotr64(d ^ a, 32);                                                 \
+        c = fBlaMka(c, d);                                                     \
+        b = rotr64(b ^ c, 24);                                                 \
+        a = fBlaMka(a, b);                                                     \
+        d = rotr64(d ^ a, 16);                                                 \
+        c = fBlaMka(c, d);                                                     \
+        b = rotr64(b ^ c, 63);                                                 \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#define BLAKE2_ROUND_NOMSG(v0, v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6, v7, v8, v9, v10, v11,   \
+                           v12, v13, v14, v15)                                 \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        G(v0, v4, v8, v12);                                                    \
+        G(v1, v5, v9, v13);                                                    \
+        G(v2, v6, v10, v14);                                                   \
+        G(v3, v7, v11, v15);                                                   \
+        G(v0, v5, v10, v15);                                                   \
+        G(v1, v6, v11, v12);                                                   \
+        G(v2, v7, v8, v13);                                                    \
+        G(v3, v4, v9, v14);                                                    \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#endif
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/core.c b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/core.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8e0a2a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/core.c
@@ -0,0 +1,638 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+/*For memory wiping*/
+#ifdef _MSC_VER
+#include <windows.h>
+#include <winbase.h> /* For SecureZeroMemory */
+#endif
+#if defined __STDC_LIB_EXT1__
+#define __STDC_WANT_LIB_EXT1__ 1
+#endif
+#define VC_GE_2005(version) (version >= 1400)
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "core.h"
+#include "thread.h"
+#include "blake2/blake2.h"
+#include "blake2/blake2-impl.h"
+
+#ifdef GENKAT
+#include "genkat.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__clang__)
+#if __has_attribute(optnone)
+#define NOT_OPTIMIZED __attribute__((optnone))
+#endif
+#elif defined(__GNUC__)
+#define GCC_VERSION                                                            \
+    (__GNUC__ * 10000 + __GNUC_MINOR__ * 100 + __GNUC_PATCHLEVEL__)
+#if GCC_VERSION >= 40400
+#define NOT_OPTIMIZED __attribute__((optimize("O0")))
+#endif
+#endif
+#ifndef NOT_OPTIMIZED
+#define NOT_OPTIMIZED
+#endif
+
+/***************Instance and Position constructors**********/
+void init_block_value(block *b, uint8_t in) { memset(b->v, in, sizeof(b->v)); }
+
+void copy_block(block *dst, const block *src) {
+    memcpy(dst->v, src->v, sizeof(uint64_t) * ARGON2_QWORDS_IN_BLOCK);
+}
+
+void xor_block(block *dst, const block *src) {
+    int i;
+    for (i = 0; i < ARGON2_QWORDS_IN_BLOCK; ++i) {
+        dst->v[i] ^= src->v[i];
+    }
+}
+
+static void load_block(block *dst, const void *input) {
+    unsigned i;
+    for (i = 0; i < ARGON2_QWORDS_IN_BLOCK; ++i) {
+        dst->v[i] = load64((const uint8_t *)input + i * sizeof(dst->v[i]));
+    }
+}
+
+static void store_block(void *output, const block *src) {
+    unsigned i;
+    for (i = 0; i < ARGON2_QWORDS_IN_BLOCK; ++i) {
+        store64((uint8_t *)output + i * sizeof(src->v[i]), src->v[i]);
+    }
+}
+
+/***************Memory functions*****************/
+
+int allocate_memory(const argon2_context *context, uint8_t **memory,
+                    size_t num, size_t size) {
+    size_t memory_size = num*size;
+    if (memory == NULL) {
+        return ARGON2_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /* 1. Check for multiplication overflow */
+    if (size != 0 && memory_size / size != num) {
+        return ARGON2_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /* 2. Try to allocate with appropriate allocator */
+    if (context->allocate_cbk) {
+        (context->allocate_cbk)(memory, memory_size);
+    } else {
+        *memory = malloc(memory_size);
+    }
+
+    if (*memory == NULL) {
+        return ARGON2_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    return ARGON2_OK;
+}
+
+void free_memory(const argon2_context *context, uint8_t *memory,
+                 size_t num, size_t size) {
+    size_t memory_size = num*size;
+    clear_internal_memory(memory, memory_size);
+    if (context->free_cbk) {
+        (context->free_cbk)(memory, memory_size);
+    } else {
+        free(memory);
+    }
+}
+
+void NOT_OPTIMIZED secure_wipe_memory(void *v, size_t n) {
+#if defined(_MSC_VER) && VC_GE_2005(_MSC_VER)
+    SecureZeroMemory(v, n);
+#elif defined memset_s
+    memset_s(v, n, 0, n);
+#elif defined(__OpenBSD__)
+    explicit_bzero(v, n);
+#else
+    static void *(*const volatile memset_sec)(void *, int, size_t) = &memset;
+    memset_sec(v, 0, n);
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Memory clear flag defaults to true. */
+int FLAG_clear_internal_memory = 1;
+void clear_internal_memory(void *v, size_t n) {
+  if (FLAG_clear_internal_memory && v) {
+    secure_wipe_memory(v, n);
+  }
+}
+
+void finalize(const argon2_context *context, argon2_instance_t *instance) {
+    if (context != NULL && instance != NULL) {
+        block blockhash;
+        uint32_t l;
+
+        copy_block(&blockhash, instance->memory + instance->lane_length - 1);
+
+        /* XOR the last blocks */
+        for (l = 1; l < instance->lanes; ++l) {
+            uint32_t last_block_in_lane =
+                l * instance->lane_length + (instance->lane_length - 1);
+            xor_block(&blockhash, instance->memory + last_block_in_lane);
+        }
+
+        /* Hash the result */
+        {
+            uint8_t blockhash_bytes[ARGON2_BLOCK_SIZE];
+            store_block(blockhash_bytes, &blockhash);
+            blake2b_long(context->out, context->outlen, blockhash_bytes,
+                         ARGON2_BLOCK_SIZE);
+            /* clear blockhash and blockhash_bytes */
+            clear_internal_memory(blockhash.v, ARGON2_BLOCK_SIZE);
+            clear_internal_memory(blockhash_bytes, ARGON2_BLOCK_SIZE);
+        }
+
+#ifdef GENKAT
+        print_tag(context->out, context->outlen);
+#endif
+
+        free_memory(context, (uint8_t *)instance->memory,
+                    instance->memory_blocks, sizeof(block));
+    }
+}
+
+uint32_t index_alpha(const argon2_instance_t *instance,
+                     const argon2_position_t *position, uint32_t pseudo_rand,
+                     int same_lane) {
+    /*
+     * Pass 0:
+     *      This lane : all already finished segments plus already constructed
+     * blocks in this segment
+     *      Other lanes : all already finished segments
+     * Pass 1+:
+     *      This lane : (SYNC_POINTS - 1) last segments plus already constructed
+     * blocks in this segment
+     *      Other lanes : (SYNC_POINTS - 1) last segments
+     */
+    uint32_t reference_area_size;
+    uint64_t relative_position;
+    uint32_t start_position, absolute_position;
+
+    if (0 == position->pass) {
+        /* First pass */
+        if (0 == position->slice) {
+            /* First slice */
+            reference_area_size =
+                position->index - 1; /* all but the previous */
+        } else {
+            if (same_lane) {
+                /* The same lane => add current segment */
+                reference_area_size =
+                    position->slice * instance->segment_length +
+                    position->index - 1;
+            } else {
+                reference_area_size =
+                    position->slice * instance->segment_length +
+                    ((position->index == 0) ? (-1) : 0);
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        /* Second pass */
+        if (same_lane) {
+            reference_area_size = instance->lane_length -
+                                  instance->segment_length + position->index -
+                                  1;
+        } else {
+            reference_area_size = instance->lane_length -
+                                  instance->segment_length +
+                                  ((position->index == 0) ? (-1) : 0);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* 1.2.4. Mapping pseudo_rand to 0..<reference_area_size-1> and produce
+     * relative position */
+    relative_position = pseudo_rand;
+    relative_position = relative_position * relative_position >> 32;
+    relative_position = reference_area_size - 1 -
+                        (reference_area_size * relative_position >> 32);
+
+    /* 1.2.5 Computing starting position */
+    start_position = 0;
+
+    if (0 != position->pass) {
+        start_position = (position->slice == ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS - 1)
+                             ? 0
+                             : (position->slice + 1) * instance->segment_length;
+    }
+
+    /* 1.2.6. Computing absolute position */
+    absolute_position = (start_position + relative_position) %
+                        instance->lane_length; /* absolute position */
+    return absolute_position;
+}
+
+/* Single-threaded version for p=1 case */
+static int fill_memory_blocks_st(argon2_instance_t *instance) {
+    uint32_t r, s, l;
+
+    for (r = 0; r < instance->passes; ++r) {
+        for (s = 0; s < ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS; ++s) {
+            for (l = 0; l < instance->lanes; ++l) {
+                argon2_position_t position = {r, l, (uint8_t)s, 0};
+                fill_segment(instance, position);
+            }
+        }
+#ifdef GENKAT
+        internal_kat(instance, r); /* Print all memory blocks */
+#endif
+    }
+    return ARGON2_OK;
+}
+
+#if !defined(ARGON2_NO_THREADS)
+
+#ifdef _WIN32
+static unsigned __stdcall fill_segment_thr(void *thread_data)
+#else
+static void *fill_segment_thr(void *thread_data)
+#endif
+{
+    argon2_thread_data *my_data = thread_data;
+    fill_segment(my_data->instance_ptr, my_data->pos);
+    argon2_thread_exit();
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Multi-threaded version for p > 1 case */
+static int fill_memory_blocks_mt(argon2_instance_t *instance) {
+    uint32_t r, s;
+    argon2_thread_handle_t *thread = NULL;
+    argon2_thread_data *thr_data = NULL;
+    int rc = ARGON2_OK;
+
+    /* 1. Allocating space for threads */
+    thread = calloc(instance->lanes, sizeof(argon2_thread_handle_t));
+    if (thread == NULL) {
+        rc = ARGON2_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    thr_data = calloc(instance->lanes, sizeof(argon2_thread_data));
+    if (thr_data == NULL) {
+        rc = ARGON2_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    for (r = 0; r < instance->passes; ++r) {
+        for (s = 0; s < ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS; ++s) {
+            uint32_t l;
+
+            /* 2. Calling threads */
+            for (l = 0; l < instance->lanes; ++l) {
+                argon2_position_t position;
+
+                /* 2.1 Join a thread if limit is exceeded */
+                if (l >= instance->threads) {
+                    if (argon2_thread_join(thread[l - instance->threads])) {
+                        rc = ARGON2_THREAD_FAIL;
+                        goto fail;
+                    }
+                }
+
+                /* 2.2 Create thread */
+                position.pass = r;
+                position.lane = l;
+                position.slice = (uint8_t)s;
+                position.index = 0;
+                thr_data[l].instance_ptr =
+                    instance; /* preparing the thread input */
+                memcpy(&(thr_data[l].pos), &position,
+                       sizeof(argon2_position_t));
+                if (argon2_thread_create(&thread[l], &fill_segment_thr,
+                                         (void *)&thr_data[l])) {
+                    rc = ARGON2_THREAD_FAIL;
+                    goto fail;
+                }
+
+                /* fill_segment(instance, position); */
+                /*Non-thread equivalent of the lines above */
+            }
+
+            /* 3. Joining remaining threads */
+            for (l = instance->lanes - instance->threads; l < instance->lanes;
+                 ++l) {
+                if (argon2_thread_join(thread[l])) {
+                    rc = ARGON2_THREAD_FAIL;
+                    goto fail;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+#ifdef GENKAT
+        internal_kat(instance, r); /* Print all memory blocks */
+#endif
+    }
+
+fail:
+    if (thread != NULL) {
+        free(thread);
+    }
+    if (thr_data != NULL) {
+        free(thr_data);
+    }
+    return rc;
+}
+
+#endif /* ARGON2_NO_THREADS */
+
+int fill_memory_blocks(argon2_instance_t *instance) {
+	if (instance == NULL || instance->lanes == 0) {
+	    return ARGON2_INCORRECT_PARAMETER;
+    }
+#if defined(ARGON2_NO_THREADS)
+    return fill_memory_blocks_st(instance);
+#else
+    return instance->threads == 1 ?
+			fill_memory_blocks_st(instance) : fill_memory_blocks_mt(instance);
+#endif
+}
+
+int validate_inputs(const argon2_context *context) {
+    if (NULL == context) {
+        return ARGON2_INCORRECT_PARAMETER;
+    }
+
+    if (NULL == context->out) {
+        return ARGON2_OUTPUT_PTR_NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* Validate output length */
+    if (ARGON2_MIN_OUTLEN > context->outlen) {
+        return ARGON2_OUTPUT_TOO_SHORT;
+    }
+
+    if (ARGON2_MAX_OUTLEN < context->outlen) {
+        return ARGON2_OUTPUT_TOO_LONG;
+    }
+
+    /* Validate password (required param) */
+    if (NULL == context->pwd) {
+        if (0 != context->pwdlen) {
+            return ARGON2_PWD_PTR_MISMATCH;
+        }
+    }
+#if ARGON2_MIN_PWD_LENGTH > 0 /* cryptsetup: fix gcc warning */
+    if (ARGON2_MIN_PWD_LENGTH > context->pwdlen) {
+      return ARGON2_PWD_TOO_SHORT;
+    }
+#endif
+    if (ARGON2_MAX_PWD_LENGTH < context->pwdlen) {
+        return ARGON2_PWD_TOO_LONG;
+    }
+
+    /* Validate salt (required param) */
+    if (NULL == context->salt) {
+        if (0 != context->saltlen) {
+            return ARGON2_SALT_PTR_MISMATCH;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (ARGON2_MIN_SALT_LENGTH > context->saltlen) {
+        return ARGON2_SALT_TOO_SHORT;
+    }
+
+    if (ARGON2_MAX_SALT_LENGTH < context->saltlen) {
+        return ARGON2_SALT_TOO_LONG;
+    }
+
+    /* Validate secret (optional param) */
+    if (NULL == context->secret) {
+        if (0 != context->secretlen) {
+            return ARGON2_SECRET_PTR_MISMATCH;
+        }
+    } else {
+#if ARGON2_MIN_SECRET > 0 /* cryptsetup: fix gcc warning */
+        if (ARGON2_MIN_SECRET > context->secretlen) {
+            return ARGON2_SECRET_TOO_SHORT;
+        }
+#endif
+        if (ARGON2_MAX_SECRET < context->secretlen) {
+            return ARGON2_SECRET_TOO_LONG;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Validate associated data (optional param) */
+    if (NULL == context->ad) {
+        if (0 != context->adlen) {
+            return ARGON2_AD_PTR_MISMATCH;
+        }
+    } else {
+#if ARGON2_MIN_AD_LENGTH > 0 /* cryptsetup: fix gcc warning */
+        if (ARGON2_MIN_AD_LENGTH > context->adlen) {
+            return ARGON2_AD_TOO_SHORT;
+        }
+#endif
+        if (ARGON2_MAX_AD_LENGTH < context->adlen) {
+            return ARGON2_AD_TOO_LONG;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Validate memory cost */
+    if (ARGON2_MIN_MEMORY > context->m_cost) {
+        return ARGON2_MEMORY_TOO_LITTLE;
+    }
+#if 0 /* UINT32_MAX, cryptsetup: fix gcc warning */
+    if (ARGON2_MAX_MEMORY < context->m_cost) {
+        return ARGON2_MEMORY_TOO_MUCH;
+    }
+#endif
+    if (context->m_cost < 8 * context->lanes) {
+        return ARGON2_MEMORY_TOO_LITTLE;
+    }
+
+    /* Validate time cost */
+    if (ARGON2_MIN_TIME > context->t_cost) {
+        return ARGON2_TIME_TOO_SMALL;
+    }
+
+    if (ARGON2_MAX_TIME < context->t_cost) {
+        return ARGON2_TIME_TOO_LARGE;
+    }
+
+    /* Validate lanes */
+    if (ARGON2_MIN_LANES > context->lanes) {
+        return ARGON2_LANES_TOO_FEW;
+    }
+
+    if (ARGON2_MAX_LANES < context->lanes) {
+        return ARGON2_LANES_TOO_MANY;
+    }
+
+    /* Validate threads */
+    if (ARGON2_MIN_THREADS > context->threads) {
+        return ARGON2_THREADS_TOO_FEW;
+    }
+
+    if (ARGON2_MAX_THREADS < context->threads) {
+        return ARGON2_THREADS_TOO_MANY;
+    }
+
+    if (NULL != context->allocate_cbk && NULL == context->free_cbk) {
+        return ARGON2_FREE_MEMORY_CBK_NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (NULL == context->allocate_cbk && NULL != context->free_cbk) {
+        return ARGON2_ALLOCATE_MEMORY_CBK_NULL;
+    }
+
+    return ARGON2_OK;
+}
+
+void fill_first_blocks(uint8_t *blockhash, const argon2_instance_t *instance) {
+    uint32_t l;
+    /* Make the first and second block in each lane as G(H0||0||i) or
+       G(H0||1||i) */
+    uint8_t blockhash_bytes[ARGON2_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    for (l = 0; l < instance->lanes; ++l) {
+
+        store32(blockhash + ARGON2_PREHASH_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0);
+        store32(blockhash + ARGON2_PREHASH_DIGEST_LENGTH + 4, l);
+        blake2b_long(blockhash_bytes, ARGON2_BLOCK_SIZE, blockhash,
+                     ARGON2_PREHASH_SEED_LENGTH);
+        load_block(&instance->memory[l * instance->lane_length + 0],
+                   blockhash_bytes);
+
+        store32(blockhash + ARGON2_PREHASH_DIGEST_LENGTH, 1);
+        blake2b_long(blockhash_bytes, ARGON2_BLOCK_SIZE, blockhash,
+                     ARGON2_PREHASH_SEED_LENGTH);
+        load_block(&instance->memory[l * instance->lane_length + 1],
+                   blockhash_bytes);
+    }
+    clear_internal_memory(blockhash_bytes, ARGON2_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}
+
+void initial_hash(uint8_t *blockhash, argon2_context *context,
+                  argon2_type type) {
+    blake2b_state BlakeHash;
+    uint8_t value[sizeof(uint32_t)];
+
+    if (NULL == context || NULL == blockhash) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    blake2b_init(&BlakeHash, ARGON2_PREHASH_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+
+    store32(&value, context->lanes);
+    blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));
+
+    store32(&value, context->outlen);
+    blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));
+
+    store32(&value, context->m_cost);
+    blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));
+
+    store32(&value, context->t_cost);
+    blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));
+
+    store32(&value, context->version);
+    blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));
+
+    store32(&value, (uint32_t)type);
+    blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));
+
+    store32(&value, context->pwdlen);
+    blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));
+
+    if (context->pwd != NULL) {
+        blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)context->pwd,
+                       context->pwdlen);
+
+        if (context->flags & ARGON2_FLAG_CLEAR_PASSWORD) {
+            secure_wipe_memory(context->pwd, context->pwdlen);
+            context->pwdlen = 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    store32(&value, context->saltlen);
+    blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));
+
+    if (context->salt != NULL) {
+        blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)context->salt,
+                       context->saltlen);
+    }
+
+    store32(&value, context->secretlen);
+    blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));
+
+    if (context->secret != NULL) {
+        blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)context->secret,
+                       context->secretlen);
+
+        if (context->flags & ARGON2_FLAG_CLEAR_SECRET) {
+            secure_wipe_memory(context->secret, context->secretlen);
+            context->secretlen = 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    store32(&value, context->adlen);
+    blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));
+
+    if (context->ad != NULL) {
+        blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)context->ad,
+                       context->adlen);
+    }
+
+    blake2b_final(&BlakeHash, blockhash, ARGON2_PREHASH_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+}
+
+int initialize(argon2_instance_t *instance, argon2_context *context) {
+    uint8_t blockhash[ARGON2_PREHASH_SEED_LENGTH];
+    int result = ARGON2_OK;
+
+    if (instance == NULL || context == NULL)
+        return ARGON2_INCORRECT_PARAMETER;
+    instance->context_ptr = context;
+
+    /* 1. Memory allocation */
+    result = allocate_memory(context, (uint8_t **)&(instance->memory),
+                             instance->memory_blocks, sizeof(block));
+    if (result != ARGON2_OK) {
+        return result;
+    }
+
+    /* 2. Initial hashing */
+    /* H_0 + 8 extra bytes to produce the first blocks */
+    /* uint8_t blockhash[ARGON2_PREHASH_SEED_LENGTH]; */
+    /* Hashing all inputs */
+    initial_hash(blockhash, context, instance->type);
+    /* Zeroing 8 extra bytes */
+    clear_internal_memory(blockhash + ARGON2_PREHASH_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+                          ARGON2_PREHASH_SEED_LENGTH -
+                              ARGON2_PREHASH_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+
+#ifdef GENKAT
+    initial_kat(blockhash, context, instance->type);
+#endif
+
+    /* 3. Creating first blocks, we always have at least two blocks in a slice
+     */
+    fill_first_blocks(blockhash, instance);
+    /* Clearing the hash */
+    clear_internal_memory(blockhash, ARGON2_PREHASH_SEED_LENGTH);
+
+    return ARGON2_OK;
+}
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/core.h b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/core.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..78000ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/core.h
@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#ifndef ARGON2_CORE_H
+#define ARGON2_CORE_H
+
+#include "argon2.h"
+
+#define CONST_CAST(x) (x)(uintptr_t)
+
+/**********************Argon2 internal constants*******************************/
+
+enum argon2_core_constants {
+    /* Memory block size in bytes */
+    ARGON2_BLOCK_SIZE = 1024,
+    ARGON2_QWORDS_IN_BLOCK = ARGON2_BLOCK_SIZE / 8,
+    ARGON2_OWORDS_IN_BLOCK = ARGON2_BLOCK_SIZE / 16,
+    ARGON2_HWORDS_IN_BLOCK = ARGON2_BLOCK_SIZE / 32,
+    ARGON2_512BIT_WORDS_IN_BLOCK = ARGON2_BLOCK_SIZE / 64,
+
+    /* Number of pseudo-random values generated by one call to Blake in Argon2i
+       to
+       generate reference block positions */
+    ARGON2_ADDRESSES_IN_BLOCK = 128,
+
+    /* Pre-hashing digest length and its extension*/
+    ARGON2_PREHASH_DIGEST_LENGTH = 64,
+    ARGON2_PREHASH_SEED_LENGTH = 72
+};
+
+/*************************Argon2 internal data types***********************/
+
+/*
+ * Structure for the (1KB) memory block implemented as 128 64-bit words.
+ * Memory blocks can be copied, XORed. Internal words can be accessed by [] (no
+ * bounds checking).
+ */
+typedef struct block_ { uint64_t v[ARGON2_QWORDS_IN_BLOCK]; } block;
+
+/*****************Functions that work with the block******************/
+
+/* Initialize each byte of the block with @in */
+void init_block_value(block *b, uint8_t in);
+
+/* Copy block @src to block @dst */
+void copy_block(block *dst, const block *src);
+
+/* XOR @src onto @dst bytewise */
+void xor_block(block *dst, const block *src);
+
+/*
+ * Argon2 instance: memory pointer, number of passes, amount of memory, type,
+ * and derived values.
+ * Used to evaluate the number and location of blocks to construct in each
+ * thread
+ */
+typedef struct Argon2_instance_t {
+    block *memory;          /* Memory pointer */
+    uint32_t version;
+    uint32_t passes;        /* Number of passes */
+    uint32_t memory_blocks; /* Number of blocks in memory */
+    uint32_t segment_length;
+    uint32_t lane_length;
+    uint32_t lanes;
+    uint32_t threads;
+    argon2_type type;
+    int print_internals; /* whether to print the memory blocks */
+    argon2_context *context_ptr; /* points back to original context */
+} argon2_instance_t;
+
+/*
+ * Argon2 position: where we construct the block right now. Used to distribute
+ * work between threads.
+ */
+typedef struct Argon2_position_t {
+    uint32_t pass;
+    uint32_t lane;
+    uint8_t slice;
+    uint32_t index;
+} argon2_position_t;
+
+/*Struct that holds the inputs for thread handling FillSegment*/
+typedef struct Argon2_thread_data {
+    argon2_instance_t *instance_ptr;
+    argon2_position_t pos;
+} argon2_thread_data;
+
+/*************************Argon2 core functions********************************/
+
+/* Allocates memory to the given pointer, uses the appropriate allocator as
+ * specified in the context. Total allocated memory is num*size.
+ * @param context argon2_context which specifies the allocator
+ * @param memory pointer to the pointer to the memory
+ * @param size the size in bytes for each element to be allocated
+ * @param num the number of elements to be allocated
+ * @return ARGON2_OK if @memory is a valid pointer and memory is allocated
+ */
+int allocate_memory(const argon2_context *context, uint8_t **memory,
+                    size_t num, size_t size);
+
+/*
+ * Frees memory at the given pointer, uses the appropriate deallocator as
+ * specified in the context. Also cleans the memory using clear_internal_memory.
+ * @param context argon2_context which specifies the deallocator
+ * @param memory pointer to buffer to be freed
+ * @param size the size in bytes for each element to be deallocated
+ * @param num the number of elements to be deallocated
+ */
+void free_memory(const argon2_context *context, uint8_t *memory,
+                 size_t num, size_t size);
+
+/* Function that securely cleans the memory. This ignores any flags set
+ * regarding clearing memory. Usually one just calls clear_internal_memory.
+ * @param mem Pointer to the memory
+ * @param s Memory size in bytes
+ */
+void secure_wipe_memory(void *v, size_t n);
+
+/* Function that securely clears the memory if FLAG_clear_internal_memory is
+ * set. If the flag isn't set, this function does nothing.
+ * @param mem Pointer to the memory
+ * @param s Memory size in bytes
+ */
+void clear_internal_memory(void *v, size_t n);
+
+/*
+ * Computes absolute position of reference block in the lane following a skewed
+ * distribution and using a pseudo-random value as input
+ * @param instance Pointer to the current instance
+ * @param position Pointer to the current position
+ * @param pseudo_rand 32-bit pseudo-random value used to determine the position
+ * @param same_lane Indicates if the block will be taken from the current lane.
+ * If so we can reference the current segment
+ * @pre All pointers must be valid
+ */
+uint32_t index_alpha(const argon2_instance_t *instance,
+                     const argon2_position_t *position, uint32_t pseudo_rand,
+                     int same_lane);
+
+/*
+ * Function that validates all inputs against predefined restrictions and return
+ * an error code
+ * @param context Pointer to current Argon2 context
+ * @return ARGON2_OK if everything is all right, otherwise one of error codes
+ * (all defined in <argon2.h>
+ */
+int validate_inputs(const argon2_context *context);
+
+/*
+ * Hashes all the inputs into @a blockhash[PREHASH_DIGEST_LENGTH], clears
+ * password and secret if needed
+ * @param  context  Pointer to the Argon2 internal structure containing memory
+ * pointer, and parameters for time and space requirements.
+ * @param  blockhash Buffer for pre-hashing digest
+ * @param  type Argon2 type
+ * @pre    @a blockhash must have at least @a PREHASH_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes
+ * allocated
+ */
+void initial_hash(uint8_t *blockhash, argon2_context *context,
+                  argon2_type type);
+
+/*
+ * Function creates first 2 blocks per lane
+ * @param instance Pointer to the current instance
+ * @param blockhash Pointer to the pre-hashing digest
+ * @pre blockhash must point to @a PREHASH_SEED_LENGTH allocated values
+ */
+void fill_first_blocks(uint8_t *blockhash, const argon2_instance_t *instance);
+
+/*
+ * Function allocates memory, hashes the inputs with Blake,  and creates first
+ * two blocks. Returns the pointer to the main memory with 2 blocks per lane
+ * initialized
+ * @param  context  Pointer to the Argon2 internal structure containing memory
+ * pointer, and parameters for time and space requirements.
+ * @param  instance Current Argon2 instance
+ * @return Zero if successful, -1 if memory failed to allocate. @context->state
+ * will be modified if successful.
+ */
+int initialize(argon2_instance_t *instance, argon2_context *context);
+
+/*
+ * XORing the last block of each lane, hashing it, making the tag. Deallocates
+ * the memory.
+ * @param context Pointer to current Argon2 context (use only the out parameters
+ * from it)
+ * @param instance Pointer to current instance of Argon2
+ * @pre instance->state must point to necessary amount of memory
+ * @pre context->out must point to outlen bytes of memory
+ * @pre if context->free_cbk is not NULL, it should point to a function that
+ * deallocates memory
+ */
+void finalize(const argon2_context *context, argon2_instance_t *instance);
+
+/*
+ * Function that fills the segment using previous segments also from other
+ * threads
+ * @param context current context
+ * @param instance Pointer to the current instance
+ * @param position Current position
+ * @pre all block pointers must be valid
+ */
+void fill_segment(const argon2_instance_t *instance,
+                  argon2_position_t position);
+
+/*
+ * Function that fills the entire memory t_cost times based on the first two
+ * blocks in each lane
+ * @param instance Pointer to the current instance
+ * @return ARGON2_OK if successful, @context->state
+ */
+int fill_memory_blocks(argon2_instance_t *instance);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/encoding.c b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/encoding.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9de606e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/encoding.c
@@ -0,0 +1,462 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include "encoding.h"
+#include "core.h"
+
+/*
+ * Example code for a decoder and encoder of "hash strings", with Argon2
+ * parameters.
+ *
+ * This code comprises three sections:
+ *
+ *   -- The first section contains generic Base64 encoding and decoding
+ *   functions. It is conceptually applicable to any hash function
+ *   implementation that uses Base64 to encode and decode parameters,
+ *   salts and outputs. It could be made into a library, provided that
+ *   the relevant functions are made public (non-static) and be given
+ *   reasonable names to avoid collisions with other functions.
+ *
+ *   -- The second section is specific to Argon2. It encodes and decodes
+ *   the parameters, salts and outputs. It does not compute the hash
+ *   itself.
+ *
+ * The code was originally written by Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>,
+ * to whom comments and remarks may be sent. It is released under what
+ * should amount to Public Domain or its closest equivalent; the
+ * following mantra is supposed to incarnate that fact with all the
+ * proper legal rituals:
+ *
+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * This file is provided under the terms of Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * Public Domain Dedication. To the extent possible under law, the
+ * author (Thomas Pornin) has waived all copyright and related or
+ * neighboring rights to this file. This work is published from: Canada.
+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2015 Thomas Pornin
+ */
+
+/* ==================================================================== */
+/*
+ * Common code; could be shared between different hash functions.
+ *
+ * Note: the Base64 functions below assume that uppercase letters (resp.
+ * lowercase letters) have consecutive numerical codes, that fit on 8
+ * bits. All modern systems use ASCII-compatible charsets, where these
+ * properties are true. If you are stuck with a dinosaur of a system
+ * that still defaults to EBCDIC then you already have much bigger
+ * interoperability issues to deal with.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Some macros for constant-time comparisons. These work over values in
+ * the 0..255 range. Returned value is 0x00 on "false", 0xFF on "true".
+ */
+#define EQ(x, y) ((((0U - ((unsigned)(x) ^ (unsigned)(y))) >> 8) & 0xFF) ^ 0xFF)
+#define GT(x, y) ((((unsigned)(y) - (unsigned)(x)) >> 8) & 0xFF)
+#define GE(x, y) (GT(y, x) ^ 0xFF)
+#define LT(x, y) GT(y, x)
+#define LE(x, y) GE(y, x)
+
+/*
+ * Convert value x (0..63) to corresponding Base64 character.
+ */
+static int b64_byte_to_char(unsigned x) {
+    return (LT(x, 26) & (x + 'A')) |
+           (GE(x, 26) & LT(x, 52) & (x + ('a' - 26))) |
+           (GE(x, 52) & LT(x, 62) & (x + ('0' - 52))) | (EQ(x, 62) & '+') |
+           (EQ(x, 63) & '/');
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert character c to the corresponding 6-bit value. If character c
+ * is not a Base64 character, then 0xFF (255) is returned.
+ */
+static unsigned b64_char_to_byte(int c) {
+    unsigned x;
+
+    x = (GE(c, 'A') & LE(c, 'Z') & (c - 'A')) |
+        (GE(c, 'a') & LE(c, 'z') & (c - ('a' - 26))) |
+        (GE(c, '0') & LE(c, '9') & (c - ('0' - 52))) | (EQ(c, '+') & 62) |
+        (EQ(c, '/') & 63);
+    return x | (EQ(x, 0) & (EQ(c, 'A') ^ 0xFF));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert some bytes to Base64. 'dst_len' is the length (in characters)
+ * of the output buffer 'dst'; if that buffer is not large enough to
+ * receive the result (including the terminating 0), then (size_t)-1
+ * is returned. Otherwise, the zero-terminated Base64 string is written
+ * in the buffer, and the output length (counted WITHOUT the terminating
+ * zero) is returned.
+ */
+static size_t to_base64(char *dst, size_t dst_len, const void *src,
+                        size_t src_len) {
+    size_t olen;
+    const unsigned char *buf;
+    unsigned acc, acc_len;
+
+    olen = (src_len / 3) << 2;
+    switch (src_len % 3) {
+    case 2:
+        olen++;
+    /* fall through */
+    case 1:
+        olen += 2;
+        break;
+    }
+    if (dst_len <= olen) {
+        return (size_t)-1;
+    }
+    acc = 0;
+    acc_len = 0;
+    buf = (const unsigned char *)src;
+    while (src_len-- > 0) {
+        acc = (acc << 8) + (*buf++);
+        acc_len += 8;
+        while (acc_len >= 6) {
+            acc_len -= 6;
+            *dst++ = (char)b64_byte_to_char((acc >> acc_len) & 0x3F);
+        }
+    }
+    if (acc_len > 0) {
+        *dst++ = (char)b64_byte_to_char((acc << (6 - acc_len)) & 0x3F);
+    }
+    *dst++ = 0;
+    return olen;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decode Base64 chars into bytes. The '*dst_len' value must initially
+ * contain the length of the output buffer '*dst'; when the decoding
+ * ends, the actual number of decoded bytes is written back in
+ * '*dst_len'.
+ *
+ * Decoding stops when a non-Base64 character is encountered, or when
+ * the output buffer capacity is exceeded. If an error occurred (output
+ * buffer is too small, invalid last characters leading to unprocessed
+ * buffered bits), then NULL is returned; otherwise, the returned value
+ * points to the first non-Base64 character in the source stream, which
+ * may be the terminating zero.
+ */
+static const char *from_base64(void *dst, size_t *dst_len, const char *src) {
+    size_t len;
+    unsigned char *buf;
+    unsigned acc, acc_len;
+
+    buf = (unsigned char *)dst;
+    len = 0;
+    acc = 0;
+    acc_len = 0;
+    for (;;) {
+        unsigned d;
+
+        d = b64_char_to_byte(*src);
+        if (d == 0xFF) {
+            break;
+        }
+        src++;
+        acc = (acc << 6) + d;
+        acc_len += 6;
+        if (acc_len >= 8) {
+            acc_len -= 8;
+            if ((len++) >= *dst_len) {
+                return NULL;
+            }
+            *buf++ = (acc >> acc_len) & 0xFF;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If the input length is equal to 1 modulo 4 (which is
+     * invalid), then there will remain 6 unprocessed bits;
+     * otherwise, only 0, 2 or 4 bits are buffered. The buffered
+     * bits must also all be zero.
+     */
+    if (acc_len > 4 || (acc & (((unsigned)1 << acc_len) - 1)) != 0) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    *dst_len = len;
+    return src;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decode decimal integer from 'str'; the value is written in '*v'.
+ * Returned value is a pointer to the next non-decimal character in the
+ * string. If there is no digit at all, or the value encoding is not
+ * minimal (extra leading zeros), or the value does not fit in an
+ * 'unsigned long', then NULL is returned.
+ */
+static const char *decode_decimal(const char *str, unsigned long *v) {
+    const char *orig;
+    unsigned long acc;
+
+    acc = 0;
+    for (orig = str;; str++) {
+        int c;
+
+        c = *str;
+        if (c < '0' || c > '9') {
+            break;
+        }
+        c -= '0';
+        if (acc > (ULONG_MAX / 10)) {
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        acc *= 10;
+        if ((unsigned long)c > (ULONG_MAX - acc)) {
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        acc += (unsigned long)c;
+    }
+    if (str == orig || (*orig == '0' && str != (orig + 1))) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    *v = acc;
+    return str;
+}
+
+/* ==================================================================== */
+/*
+ * Code specific to Argon2.
+ *
+ * The code below applies the following format:
+ *
+ *  $argon2<T>[$v=<num>]$m=<num>,t=<num>,p=<num>$<bin>$<bin>
+ *
+ * where <T> is either 'd', 'id', or 'i', <num> is a decimal integer (positive,
+ * fits in an 'unsigned long'), and <bin> is Base64-encoded data (no '=' padding
+ * characters, no newline or whitespace).
+ *
+ * The last two binary chunks (encoded in Base64) are, in that order,
+ * the salt and the output. Both are required. The binary salt length and the
+ * output length must be in the allowed ranges defined in argon2.h.
+ *
+ * The ctx struct must contain buffers large enough to hold the salt and pwd
+ * when it is fed into decode_string.
+ */
+
+int decode_string(argon2_context *ctx, const char *str, argon2_type type) {
+
+/* check for prefix */
+#define CC(prefix)                                                             \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        size_t cc_len = strlen(prefix);                                        \
+        if (strncmp(str, prefix, cc_len) != 0) {                               \
+            return ARGON2_DECODING_FAIL;                                       \
+        }                                                                      \
+        str += cc_len;                                                         \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+/* optional prefix checking with supplied code */
+#define CC_opt(prefix, code)                                                   \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        size_t cc_len = strlen(prefix);                                        \
+        if (strncmp(str, prefix, cc_len) == 0) {                               \
+            str += cc_len;                                                     \
+            { code; }                                                          \
+        }                                                                      \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+/* Decoding prefix into decimal */
+#define DECIMAL(x)                                                             \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        unsigned long dec_x;                                                   \
+        str = decode_decimal(str, &dec_x);                                     \
+        if (str == NULL) {                                                     \
+            return ARGON2_DECODING_FAIL;                                       \
+        }                                                                      \
+        (x) = dec_x;                                                           \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+
+/* Decoding prefix into uint32_t decimal */
+#define DECIMAL_U32(x)                                                         \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        unsigned long dec_x;                                                   \
+        str = decode_decimal(str, &dec_x);                                     \
+        if (str == NULL || dec_x > UINT32_MAX) {                               \
+            return ARGON2_DECODING_FAIL;                                       \
+        }                                                                      \
+        (x) = (uint32_t)dec_x;                                                 \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+
+/* Decoding base64 into a binary buffer */
+#define BIN(buf, max_len, len)                                                 \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        size_t bin_len = (max_len);                                            \
+        str = from_base64(buf, &bin_len, str);                                 \
+        if (str == NULL || bin_len > UINT32_MAX) {                             \
+            return ARGON2_DECODING_FAIL;                                       \
+        }                                                                      \
+        (len) = (uint32_t)bin_len;                                             \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+    size_t maxsaltlen = ctx->saltlen;
+    size_t maxoutlen = ctx->outlen;
+    int validation_result;
+    const char* type_string;
+
+    /* We should start with the argon2_type we are using */
+    type_string = argon2_type2string(type, 0);
+    if (!type_string) {
+        return ARGON2_INCORRECT_TYPE;
+    }
+
+    CC("$");
+    CC(type_string);
+
+    /* Reading the version number if the default is suppressed */
+    ctx->version = ARGON2_VERSION_10;
+    CC_opt("$v=", DECIMAL_U32(ctx->version));
+
+    CC("$m=");
+    DECIMAL_U32(ctx->m_cost);
+    CC(",t=");
+    DECIMAL_U32(ctx->t_cost);
+    CC(",p=");
+    DECIMAL_U32(ctx->lanes);
+    ctx->threads = ctx->lanes;
+
+    CC("$");
+    BIN(ctx->salt, maxsaltlen, ctx->saltlen);
+    CC("$");
+    BIN(ctx->out, maxoutlen, ctx->outlen);
+
+    /* The rest of the fields get the default values */
+    ctx->secret = NULL;
+    ctx->secretlen = 0;
+    ctx->ad = NULL;
+    ctx->adlen = 0;
+    ctx->allocate_cbk = NULL;
+    ctx->free_cbk = NULL;
+    ctx->flags = ARGON2_DEFAULT_FLAGS;
+
+    /* On return, must have valid context */
+    validation_result = validate_inputs(ctx);
+    if (validation_result != ARGON2_OK) {
+        return validation_result;
+    }
+
+    /* Can't have any additional characters */
+    if (*str == 0) {
+        return ARGON2_OK;
+    } else {
+        return ARGON2_DECODING_FAIL;
+    }
+#undef CC
+#undef CC_opt
+#undef DECIMAL
+#undef BIN
+}
+
+int encode_string(char *dst, size_t dst_len, argon2_context *ctx,
+                  argon2_type type) {
+#define SS(str)                                                                \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        size_t pp_len = strlen(str);                                           \
+        if (pp_len >= dst_len) {                                               \
+            return ARGON2_ENCODING_FAIL;                                       \
+        }                                                                      \
+        memcpy(dst, str, pp_len + 1);                                          \
+        dst += pp_len;                                                         \
+        dst_len -= pp_len;                                                     \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#define SX(x)                                                                  \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        char tmp[30];                                                          \
+        sprintf(tmp, "%lu", (unsigned long)(x));                               \
+        SS(tmp);                                                               \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#define SB(buf, len)                                                           \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        size_t sb_len = to_base64(dst, dst_len, buf, len);                     \
+        if (sb_len == (size_t)-1) {                                            \
+            return ARGON2_ENCODING_FAIL;                                       \
+        }                                                                      \
+        dst += sb_len;                                                         \
+        dst_len -= sb_len;                                                     \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+    const char* type_string = argon2_type2string(type, 0);
+    int validation_result = validate_inputs(ctx);
+
+    if (!type_string) {
+      return ARGON2_ENCODING_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    if (validation_result != ARGON2_OK) {
+      return validation_result;
+    }
+
+
+    SS("$");
+    SS(type_string);
+
+    SS("$v=");
+    SX(ctx->version);
+
+    SS("$m=");
+    SX(ctx->m_cost);
+    SS(",t=");
+    SX(ctx->t_cost);
+    SS(",p=");
+    SX(ctx->lanes);
+
+    SS("$");
+    SB(ctx->salt, ctx->saltlen);
+
+    SS("$");
+    SB(ctx->out, ctx->outlen);
+    return ARGON2_OK;
+
+#undef SS
+#undef SX
+#undef SB
+}
+
+size_t b64len(uint32_t len) {
+    size_t olen = ((size_t)len / 3) << 2;
+
+    switch (len % 3) {
+    case 2:
+        olen++;
+    /* fall through */
+    case 1:
+        olen += 2;
+        break;
+    }
+
+    return olen;
+}
+
+size_t numlen(uint32_t num) {
+    size_t len = 1;
+    while (num >= 10) {
+        ++len;
+        num = num / 10;
+    }
+    return len;
+}
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/encoding.h b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/encoding.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7e83ec9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/encoding.h
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#ifndef ENCODING_H
+#define ENCODING_H
+#include "argon2.h"
+
+#define ARGON2_MAX_DECODED_LANES UINT32_C(255)
+#define ARGON2_MIN_DECODED_SALT_LEN UINT32_C(8)
+#define ARGON2_MIN_DECODED_OUT_LEN UINT32_C(12)
+
+/*
+* encode an Argon2 hash string into the provided buffer. 'dst_len'
+* contains the size, in characters, of the 'dst' buffer; if 'dst_len'
+* is less than the number of required characters (including the
+* terminating 0), then this function returns ARGON2_ENCODING_ERROR.
+*
+* on success, ARGON2_OK is returned.
+*/
+int encode_string(char *dst, size_t dst_len, argon2_context *ctx,
+                  argon2_type type);
+
+/*
+* Decodes an Argon2 hash string into the provided structure 'ctx'.
+* The only fields that must be set prior to this call are ctx.saltlen and
+* ctx.outlen (which must be the maximal salt and out length values that are
+* allowed), ctx.salt and ctx.out (which must be buffers of the specified
+* length), and ctx.pwd and ctx.pwdlen which must hold a valid password.
+*
+* Invalid input string causes an error. On success, the ctx is valid and all
+* fields have been initialized.
+*
+* Returned value is ARGON2_OK on success, other ARGON2_ codes on error.
+*/
+int decode_string(argon2_context *ctx, const char *str, argon2_type type);
+
+/* Returns the length of the encoded byte stream with length len */
+size_t b64len(uint32_t len);
+
+/* Returns the length of the encoded number num */
+size_t numlen(uint32_t num);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/opt.c b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/opt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f6c2052
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/opt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "argon2.h"
+#include "core.h"
+
+#include "blake2/blake2.h"
+#include "blake2/blamka-round-opt.h"
+
+/*
+ * Function fills a new memory block and optionally XORs the old block over the new one.
+ * Memory must be initialized.
+ * @param state Pointer to the just produced block. Content will be updated(!)
+ * @param ref_block Pointer to the reference block
+ * @param next_block Pointer to the block to be XORed over. May coincide with @ref_block
+ * @param with_xor Whether to XOR into the new block (1) or just overwrite (0)
+ * @pre all block pointers must be valid
+ */
+#if defined(__AVX512F__)
+static void fill_block(__m512i *state, const block *ref_block,
+                       block *next_block, int with_xor) {
+    __m512i block_XY[ARGON2_512BIT_WORDS_IN_BLOCK];
+    unsigned int i;
+
+    if (with_xor) {
+        for (i = 0; i < ARGON2_512BIT_WORDS_IN_BLOCK; i++) {
+            state[i] = _mm512_xor_si512(
+                state[i], _mm512_loadu_si512((const __m512i *)ref_block->v + i));
+            block_XY[i] = _mm512_xor_si512(
+                state[i], _mm512_loadu_si512((const __m512i *)next_block->v + i));
+        }
+    } else {
+        for (i = 0; i < ARGON2_512BIT_WORDS_IN_BLOCK; i++) {
+            block_XY[i] = state[i] = _mm512_xor_si512(
+                state[i], _mm512_loadu_si512((const __m512i *)ref_block->v + i));
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 2; ++i) {
+        BLAKE2_ROUND_1(
+            state[8 * i + 0], state[8 * i + 1], state[8 * i + 2], state[8 * i + 3],
+            state[8 * i + 4], state[8 * i + 5], state[8 * i + 6], state[8 * i + 7]);
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 2; ++i) {
+        BLAKE2_ROUND_2(
+            state[2 * 0 + i], state[2 * 1 + i], state[2 * 2 + i], state[2 * 3 + i],
+            state[2 * 4 + i], state[2 * 5 + i], state[2 * 6 + i], state[2 * 7 + i]);
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < ARGON2_512BIT_WORDS_IN_BLOCK; i++) {
+        state[i] = _mm512_xor_si512(state[i], block_XY[i]);
+        _mm512_storeu_si512((__m512i *)next_block->v + i, state[i]);
+    }
+}
+#elif defined(__AVX2__)
+static void fill_block(__m256i *state, const block *ref_block,
+                       block *next_block, int with_xor) {
+    __m256i block_XY[ARGON2_HWORDS_IN_BLOCK];
+    unsigned int i;
+
+    if (with_xor) {
+        for (i = 0; i < ARGON2_HWORDS_IN_BLOCK; i++) {
+            state[i] = _mm256_xor_si256(
+                state[i], _mm256_loadu_si256((const __m256i *)ref_block->v + i));
+            block_XY[i] = _mm256_xor_si256(
+                state[i], _mm256_loadu_si256((const __m256i *)next_block->v + i));
+        }
+    } else {
+        for (i = 0; i < ARGON2_HWORDS_IN_BLOCK; i++) {
+            block_XY[i] = state[i] = _mm256_xor_si256(
+                state[i], _mm256_loadu_si256((const __m256i *)ref_block->v + i));
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
+        BLAKE2_ROUND_1(state[8 * i + 0], state[8 * i + 4], state[8 * i + 1], state[8 * i + 5],
+                       state[8 * i + 2], state[8 * i + 6], state[8 * i + 3], state[8 * i + 7]);
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
+        BLAKE2_ROUND_2(state[ 0 + i], state[ 4 + i], state[ 8 + i], state[12 + i],
+                       state[16 + i], state[20 + i], state[24 + i], state[28 + i]);
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < ARGON2_HWORDS_IN_BLOCK; i++) {
+        state[i] = _mm256_xor_si256(state[i], block_XY[i]);
+        _mm256_storeu_si256((__m256i *)next_block->v + i, state[i]);
+    }
+}
+#else
+static void fill_block(__m128i *state, const block *ref_block,
+                       block *next_block, int with_xor) {
+    __m128i block_XY[ARGON2_OWORDS_IN_BLOCK];
+    unsigned int i;
+
+    if (with_xor) {
+        for (i = 0; i < ARGON2_OWORDS_IN_BLOCK; i++) {
+            state[i] = _mm_xor_si128(
+                state[i], _mm_loadu_si128((const __m128i *)ref_block->v + i));
+            block_XY[i] = _mm_xor_si128(
+                state[i], _mm_loadu_si128((const __m128i *)next_block->v + i));
+        }
+    } else {
+        for (i = 0; i < ARGON2_OWORDS_IN_BLOCK; i++) {
+            block_XY[i] = state[i] = _mm_xor_si128(
+                state[i], _mm_loadu_si128((const __m128i *)ref_block->v + i));
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
+        BLAKE2_ROUND(state[8 * i + 0], state[8 * i + 1], state[8 * i + 2],
+            state[8 * i + 3], state[8 * i + 4], state[8 * i + 5],
+            state[8 * i + 6], state[8 * i + 7]);
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
+        BLAKE2_ROUND(state[8 * 0 + i], state[8 * 1 + i], state[8 * 2 + i],
+            state[8 * 3 + i], state[8 * 4 + i], state[8 * 5 + i],
+            state[8 * 6 + i], state[8 * 7 + i]);
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < ARGON2_OWORDS_IN_BLOCK; i++) {
+        state[i] = _mm_xor_si128(state[i], block_XY[i]);
+        _mm_storeu_si128((__m128i *)next_block->v + i, state[i]);
+    }
+}
+#endif
+
+static void next_addresses(block *address_block, block *input_block) {
+    /*Temporary zero-initialized blocks*/
+#if defined(__AVX512F__)
+    __m512i zero_block[ARGON2_512BIT_WORDS_IN_BLOCK];
+    __m512i zero2_block[ARGON2_512BIT_WORDS_IN_BLOCK];
+#elif defined(__AVX2__)
+    __m256i zero_block[ARGON2_HWORDS_IN_BLOCK];
+    __m256i zero2_block[ARGON2_HWORDS_IN_BLOCK];
+#else
+    __m128i zero_block[ARGON2_OWORDS_IN_BLOCK];
+    __m128i zero2_block[ARGON2_OWORDS_IN_BLOCK];
+#endif
+
+    memset(zero_block, 0, sizeof(zero_block));
+    memset(zero2_block, 0, sizeof(zero2_block));
+
+    /*Increasing index counter*/
+    input_block->v[6]++;
+
+    /*First iteration of G*/
+    fill_block(zero_block, input_block, address_block, 0);
+
+    /*Second iteration of G*/
+    fill_block(zero2_block, address_block, address_block, 0);
+}
+
+void fill_segment(const argon2_instance_t *instance,
+                  argon2_position_t position) {
+    block *ref_block = NULL, *curr_block = NULL;
+    block address_block, input_block;
+    uint64_t pseudo_rand, ref_index, ref_lane;
+    uint32_t prev_offset, curr_offset;
+    uint32_t starting_index, i;
+#if defined(__AVX512F__)
+    __m512i state[ARGON2_512BIT_WORDS_IN_BLOCK];
+#elif defined(__AVX2__)
+    __m256i state[ARGON2_HWORDS_IN_BLOCK];
+#else
+    __m128i state[ARGON2_OWORDS_IN_BLOCK];
+#endif
+    int data_independent_addressing;
+
+    if (instance == NULL) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    data_independent_addressing =
+        (instance->type == Argon2_i) ||
+        (instance->type == Argon2_id && (position.pass == 0) &&
+         (position.slice < ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS / 2));
+
+    if (data_independent_addressing) {
+        init_block_value(&input_block, 0);
+
+        input_block.v[0] = position.pass;
+        input_block.v[1] = position.lane;
+        input_block.v[2] = position.slice;
+        input_block.v[3] = instance->memory_blocks;
+        input_block.v[4] = instance->passes;
+        input_block.v[5] = instance->type;
+    }
+
+    starting_index = 0;
+
+    if ((0 == position.pass) && (0 == position.slice)) {
+        starting_index = 2; /* we have already generated the first two blocks */
+
+        /* Don't forget to generate the first block of addresses: */
+        if (data_independent_addressing) {
+            next_addresses(&address_block, &input_block);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Offset of the current block */
+    curr_offset = position.lane * instance->lane_length +
+                  position.slice * instance->segment_length + starting_index;
+
+    if (0 == curr_offset % instance->lane_length) {
+        /* Last block in this lane */
+        prev_offset = curr_offset + instance->lane_length - 1;
+    } else {
+        /* Previous block */
+        prev_offset = curr_offset - 1;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(state, ((instance->memory + prev_offset)->v), ARGON2_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+    for (i = starting_index; i < instance->segment_length;
+         ++i, ++curr_offset, ++prev_offset) {
+        /*1.1 Rotating prev_offset if needed */
+        if (curr_offset % instance->lane_length == 1) {
+            prev_offset = curr_offset - 1;
+        }
+
+        /* 1.2 Computing the index of the reference block */
+        /* 1.2.1 Taking pseudo-random value from the previous block */
+        if (data_independent_addressing) {
+            if (i % ARGON2_ADDRESSES_IN_BLOCK == 0) {
+                next_addresses(&address_block, &input_block);
+            }
+            pseudo_rand = address_block.v[i % ARGON2_ADDRESSES_IN_BLOCK];
+        } else {
+            pseudo_rand = instance->memory[prev_offset].v[0];
+        }
+
+        /* 1.2.2 Computing the lane of the reference block */
+        ref_lane = ((pseudo_rand >> 32)) % instance->lanes;
+
+        if ((position.pass == 0) && (position.slice == 0)) {
+            /* Can not reference other lanes yet */
+            ref_lane = position.lane;
+        }
+
+        /* 1.2.3 Computing the number of possible reference block within the
+         * lane.
+         */
+        position.index = i;
+        ref_index = index_alpha(instance, &position, pseudo_rand & 0xFFFFFFFF,
+                                ref_lane == position.lane);
+
+        /* 2 Creating a new block */
+        ref_block =
+            instance->memory + instance->lane_length * ref_lane + ref_index;
+        curr_block = instance->memory + curr_offset;
+        if (ARGON2_VERSION_10 == instance->version) {
+            /* version 1.2.1 and earlier: overwrite, not XOR */
+            fill_block(state, ref_block, curr_block, 0);
+        } else {
+            if(0 == position.pass) {
+                fill_block(state, ref_block, curr_block, 0);
+            } else {
+                fill_block(state, ref_block, curr_block, 1);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/ref.c b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/ref.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ad1cf46
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/ref.c
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "argon2.h"
+#include "core.h"
+
+#include "blake2/blamka-round-ref.h"
+#include "blake2/blake2-impl.h"
+#include "blake2/blake2.h"
+
+
+/*
+ * Function fills a new memory block and optionally XORs the old block over the new one.
+ * @next_block must be initialized.
+ * @param prev_block Pointer to the previous block
+ * @param ref_block Pointer to the reference block
+ * @param next_block Pointer to the block to be constructed
+ * @param with_xor Whether to XOR into the new block (1) or just overwrite (0)
+ * @pre all block pointers must be valid
+ */
+static void fill_block(const block *prev_block, const block *ref_block,
+                       block *next_block, int with_xor) {
+    block blockR, block_tmp;
+    unsigned i;
+
+    copy_block(&blockR, ref_block);
+    xor_block(&blockR, prev_block);
+    copy_block(&block_tmp, &blockR);
+    /* Now blockR = ref_block + prev_block and block_tmp = ref_block + prev_block */
+    if (with_xor) {
+        /* Saving the next block contents for XOR over: */
+        xor_block(&block_tmp, next_block);
+        /* Now blockR = ref_block + prev_block and
+           block_tmp = ref_block + prev_block + next_block */
+    }
+
+    /* Apply Blake2 on columns of 64-bit words: (0,1,...,15) , then
+       (16,17,..31)... finally (112,113,...127) */
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
+        BLAKE2_ROUND_NOMSG(
+            blockR.v[16 * i], blockR.v[16 * i + 1], blockR.v[16 * i + 2],
+            blockR.v[16 * i + 3], blockR.v[16 * i + 4], blockR.v[16 * i + 5],
+            blockR.v[16 * i + 6], blockR.v[16 * i + 7], blockR.v[16 * i + 8],
+            blockR.v[16 * i + 9], blockR.v[16 * i + 10], blockR.v[16 * i + 11],
+            blockR.v[16 * i + 12], blockR.v[16 * i + 13], blockR.v[16 * i + 14],
+            blockR.v[16 * i + 15]);
+    }
+
+    /* Apply Blake2 on rows of 64-bit words: (0,1,16,17,...112,113), then
+       (2,3,18,19,...,114,115).. finally (14,15,30,31,...,126,127) */
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+        BLAKE2_ROUND_NOMSG(
+            blockR.v[2 * i], blockR.v[2 * i + 1], blockR.v[2 * i + 16],
+            blockR.v[2 * i + 17], blockR.v[2 * i + 32], blockR.v[2 * i + 33],
+            blockR.v[2 * i + 48], blockR.v[2 * i + 49], blockR.v[2 * i + 64],
+            blockR.v[2 * i + 65], blockR.v[2 * i + 80], blockR.v[2 * i + 81],
+            blockR.v[2 * i + 96], blockR.v[2 * i + 97], blockR.v[2 * i + 112],
+            blockR.v[2 * i + 113]);
+    }
+
+    copy_block(next_block, &block_tmp);
+    xor_block(next_block, &blockR);
+}
+
+static void next_addresses(block *address_block, block *input_block,
+                           const block *zero_block) {
+    input_block->v[6]++;
+    fill_block(zero_block, input_block, address_block, 0);
+    fill_block(zero_block, address_block, address_block, 0);
+}
+
+void fill_segment(const argon2_instance_t *instance,
+                  argon2_position_t position) {
+    block *ref_block = NULL, *curr_block = NULL;
+    block address_block, input_block, zero_block;
+    uint64_t pseudo_rand, ref_index, ref_lane;
+    uint32_t prev_offset, curr_offset;
+    uint32_t starting_index;
+    uint32_t i;
+    int data_independent_addressing;
+
+    if (instance == NULL) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    data_independent_addressing =
+        (instance->type == Argon2_i) ||
+        (instance->type == Argon2_id && (position.pass == 0) &&
+         (position.slice < ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS / 2));
+
+    if (data_independent_addressing) {
+        init_block_value(&zero_block, 0);
+        init_block_value(&input_block, 0);
+
+        input_block.v[0] = position.pass;
+        input_block.v[1] = position.lane;
+        input_block.v[2] = position.slice;
+        input_block.v[3] = instance->memory_blocks;
+        input_block.v[4] = instance->passes;
+        input_block.v[5] = instance->type;
+    }
+
+    starting_index = 0;
+
+    if ((0 == position.pass) && (0 == position.slice)) {
+        starting_index = 2; /* we have already generated the first two blocks */
+
+        /* Don't forget to generate the first block of addresses: */
+        if (data_independent_addressing) {
+            next_addresses(&address_block, &input_block, &zero_block);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Offset of the current block */
+    curr_offset = position.lane * instance->lane_length +
+                  position.slice * instance->segment_length + starting_index;
+
+    if (0 == curr_offset % instance->lane_length) {
+        /* Last block in this lane */
+        prev_offset = curr_offset + instance->lane_length - 1;
+    } else {
+        /* Previous block */
+        prev_offset = curr_offset - 1;
+    }
+
+    for (i = starting_index; i < instance->segment_length;
+         ++i, ++curr_offset, ++prev_offset) {
+        /*1.1 Rotating prev_offset if needed */
+        if (curr_offset % instance->lane_length == 1) {
+            prev_offset = curr_offset - 1;
+        }
+
+        /* 1.2 Computing the index of the reference block */
+        /* 1.2.1 Taking pseudo-random value from the previous block */
+        if (data_independent_addressing) {
+            if (i % ARGON2_ADDRESSES_IN_BLOCK == 0) {
+                next_addresses(&address_block, &input_block, &zero_block);
+            }
+            pseudo_rand = address_block.v[i % ARGON2_ADDRESSES_IN_BLOCK];
+        } else {
+            pseudo_rand = instance->memory[prev_offset].v[0];
+        }
+
+        /* 1.2.2 Computing the lane of the reference block */
+        ref_lane = ((pseudo_rand >> 32)) % instance->lanes;
+
+        if ((position.pass == 0) && (position.slice == 0)) {
+            /* Can not reference other lanes yet */
+            ref_lane = position.lane;
+        }
+
+        /* 1.2.3 Computing the number of possible reference block within the
+         * lane.
+         */
+        position.index = i;
+        ref_index = index_alpha(instance, &position, pseudo_rand & 0xFFFFFFFF,
+                                ref_lane == position.lane);
+
+        /* 2 Creating a new block */
+        ref_block =
+            instance->memory + instance->lane_length * ref_lane + ref_index;
+        curr_block = instance->memory + curr_offset;
+        if (ARGON2_VERSION_10 == instance->version) {
+            /* version 1.2.1 and earlier: overwrite, not XOR */
+            fill_block(instance->memory + prev_offset, ref_block, curr_block, 0);
+        } else {
+            if(0 == position.pass) {
+                fill_block(instance->memory + prev_offset, ref_block,
+                           curr_block, 0);
+            } else {
+                fill_block(instance->memory + prev_offset, ref_block,
+                           curr_block, 1);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/thread.c b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/thread.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e099a00
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/thread.c
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#if !defined(ARGON2_NO_THREADS)
+
+#include "thread.h"
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+#include <windows.h>
+#endif
+
+int argon2_thread_create(argon2_thread_handle_t *handle,
+                         argon2_thread_func_t func, void *args) {
+    if (NULL == handle || func == NULL) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+    *handle = _beginthreadex(NULL, 0, func, args, 0, NULL);
+    return *handle != 0 ? 0 : -1;
+#else
+    return pthread_create(handle, NULL, func, args);
+#endif
+}
+
+int argon2_thread_join(argon2_thread_handle_t handle) {
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+    if (WaitForSingleObject((HANDLE)handle, INFINITE) == WAIT_OBJECT_0) {
+        return CloseHandle((HANDLE)handle) != 0 ? 0 : -1;
+    }
+    return -1;
+#else
+    return pthread_join(handle, NULL);
+#endif
+}
+
+void argon2_thread_exit(void) {
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+    _endthreadex(0);
+#else
+    pthread_exit(NULL);
+#endif
+}
+
+#endif /* ARGON2_NO_THREADS */
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/thread.h b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/thread.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..49d8836
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/thread.h
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#ifndef ARGON2_THREAD_H
+#define ARGON2_THREAD_H
+
+#if !defined(ARGON2_NO_THREADS)
+
+/*
+        Here we implement an abstraction layer for the simpĺe requirements
+        of the Argon2 code. We only require 3 primitives---thread creation,
+        joining, and termination---so full emulation of the pthreads API
+        is unwarranted. Currently we wrap pthreads and Win32 threads.
+
+        The API defines 2 types: the function pointer type,
+   argon2_thread_func_t,
+        and the type of the thread handle---argon2_thread_handle_t.
+*/
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+#include <process.h>
+typedef unsigned(__stdcall *argon2_thread_func_t)(void *);
+typedef uintptr_t argon2_thread_handle_t;
+#else
+#include <pthread.h>
+typedef void *(*argon2_thread_func_t)(void *);
+typedef pthread_t argon2_thread_handle_t;
+#endif
+
+/* Creates a thread
+ * @param handle pointer to a thread handle, which is the output of this
+ * function. Must not be NULL.
+ * @param func A function pointer for the thread's entry point. Must not be
+ * NULL.
+ * @param args Pointer that is passed as an argument to @func. May be NULL.
+ * @return 0 if @handle and @func are valid pointers and a thread is successfully
+ * created.
+ */
+int argon2_thread_create(argon2_thread_handle_t *handle,
+                         argon2_thread_func_t func, void *args);
+
+/* Waits for a thread to terminate
+ * @param handle Handle to a thread created with argon2_thread_create.
+ * @return 0 if @handle is a valid handle, and joining completed successfully.
+*/
+int argon2_thread_join(argon2_thread_handle_t handle);
+
+/* Terminate the current thread. Must be run inside a thread created by
+ * argon2_thread_create.
+*/
+void argon2_thread_exit(void);
+
+#endif /* ARGON2_NO_THREADS */
+#endif
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/argon2_generic.c b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2_generic.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f7358d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2_generic.c
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 PBKDF2 library wrapper
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include "crypto_backend.h"
+#if HAVE_ARGON2_H
+#include <argon2.h>
+#else
+#include "argon2/argon2.h"
+#endif
+
+#define CONST_CAST(x) (x)(uintptr_t)
+
+int argon2(const char *type, const char *password, size_t password_length,
+	   const char *salt, size_t salt_length,
+	   char *key, size_t key_length,
+	   uint32_t iterations, uint32_t memory, uint32_t parallel)
+{
+#if !USE_INTERNAL_ARGON2 && !HAVE_ARGON2_H
+	return -EINVAL;
+#else
+	argon2_type atype;
+	argon2_context context = {
+		.flags = ARGON2_DEFAULT_FLAGS,
+		.version = ARGON2_VERSION_NUMBER,
+		.t_cost = (uint32_t)iterations,
+		.m_cost = (uint32_t)memory,
+		.lanes = (uint32_t)parallel,
+		.threads = (uint32_t)parallel,
+		.out = (uint8_t *)key,
+		.outlen = (uint32_t)key_length,
+		.pwd = CONST_CAST(uint8_t *)password,
+		.pwdlen = (uint32_t)password_length,
+		.salt = CONST_CAST(uint8_t *)salt,
+		.saltlen = (uint32_t)salt_length,
+	};
+	int r;
+
+	if (!strcmp(type, "argon2i"))
+		atype = Argon2_i;
+	else if(!strcmp(type, "argon2id"))
+		atype = Argon2_id;
+	else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	switch (argon2_ctx(&context, atype)) {
+	case ARGON2_OK:
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	case ARGON2_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR:
+	case ARGON2_FREE_MEMORY_CBK_NULL:
+	case ARGON2_ALLOCATE_MEMORY_CBK_NULL:
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		break;
+	default:
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+#endif
+}
+
+#if 0
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+struct test_vector {
+	argon2_type type;
+	unsigned int memory;
+	unsigned int iterations;
+	unsigned int parallelism;
+	const char *password;
+	unsigned int password_length;
+	const char *salt;
+	unsigned int salt_length;
+	const char *key;
+	unsigned int key_length;
+	const char *ad;
+	unsigned int ad_length;
+	const char *output;
+	unsigned int output_length;
+};
+
+struct test_vector test_vectors[] = {
+	/* Argon2 RFC */
+	{
+		Argon2_i, 32, 3, 4,
+		"\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01"
+		"\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01"
+		"\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01"
+		"\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01", 32,
+		"\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02"
+		"\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02", 16,
+		"\x03\x03\x03\x03\x03\x03\x03\x03", 8,
+		"\x04\x04\x04\x04\x04\x04\x04\x04"
+		"\x04\x04\x04\x04", 12,
+		"\xc8\x14\xd9\xd1\xdc\x7f\x37\xaa"
+		"\x13\xf0\xd7\x7f\x24\x94\xbd\xa1"
+		"\xc8\xde\x6b\x01\x6d\xd3\x88\xd2"
+		"\x99\x52\xa4\xc4\x67\x2b\x6c\xe8", 32
+	},
+	{
+		Argon2_id, 32, 3, 4,
+		"\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01"
+		"\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01"
+		"\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01"
+		"\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01", 32,
+		"\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02"
+		"\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02", 16,
+		"\x03\x03\x03\x03\x03\x03\x03\x03", 8,
+		"\x04\x04\x04\x04\x04\x04\x04\x04"
+		"\x04\x04\x04\x04", 12,
+		"\x0d\x64\x0d\xf5\x8d\x78\x76\x6c"
+		"\x08\xc0\x37\xa3\x4a\x8b\x53\xc9"
+		"\xd0\x1e\xf0\x45\x2d\x75\xb6\x5e"
+		"\xb5\x25\x20\xe9\x6b\x01\xe6\x59", 32
+	}
+};
+
+static void printhex(const char *s, const char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	printf("%s: ", s);
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+		printf("\\x%02x", (unsigned char)buf[i]);
+	printf("\n");
+	fflush(stdout);
+}
+
+static int argon2_test_vectors(void)
+{
+	char result[64];
+	int i, r;
+	struct test_vector *vec;
+	argon2_context context;
+
+	printf("Argon2 running test vectors\n");
+
+	for (i = 0; i < (sizeof(test_vectors) / sizeof(*test_vectors)); i++) {
+		vec = &test_vectors[i];
+		memset(result, 0, sizeof(result));
+		memset(&context, 0, sizeof(context));
+
+		context.flags = ARGON2_DEFAULT_FLAGS;
+		context.version = ARGON2_VERSION_NUMBER;
+		context.out = (uint8_t *)result;
+		context.outlen = (uint32_t)vec->output_length;
+		context.pwd = (uint8_t *)vec->password;
+		context.pwdlen = (uint32_t)vec->password_length;
+		context.salt = (uint8_t *)vec->salt;
+		context.saltlen = (uint32_t)vec->salt_length;
+		context.secret = (uint8_t *)vec->key;
+		context.secretlen = (uint32_t)vec->key_length;;
+		context.ad = (uint8_t *)vec->ad;
+		context.adlen = (uint32_t)vec->ad_length;
+		context.t_cost = vec->iterations;
+		context.m_cost = vec->memory;
+		context.lanes = vec->parallelism;
+		context.threads = vec->parallelism;
+
+		r = argon2_ctx(&context, vec->type);
+		if (r != ARGON2_OK) {
+			printf("Argon2 failed %i, vector %d\n", r, i);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		if (memcmp(result, vec->output, vec->output_length) != 0) {
+			printf("vector %u\n", i);
+			printhex(" got", result, vec->output_length);
+			printhex("want", vec->output, vec->output_length);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/cipher_generic.c b/lib/crypto_backend/cipher_generic.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..59f7472
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/cipher_generic.c
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+/*
+ * Linux kernel cipher generic utilities
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include "crypto_backend.h"
+
+struct cipher_alg {
+	const char *name;
+	const char *mode;
+	int blocksize;
+	bool wrapped_key;
+};
+
+/* FIXME: Getting block size should be dynamic from cipher backend. */
+static const struct cipher_alg cipher_algs[] = {
+	{ "cipher_null", NULL, 16, false },
+	{ "aes",         NULL, 16, false },
+	{ "serpent",     NULL, 16, false },
+	{ "twofish",     NULL, 16, false },
+	{ "anubis",      NULL, 16, false },
+	{ "blowfish",    NULL,  8, false },
+	{ "camellia",    NULL, 16, false },
+	{ "cast5",       NULL,  8, false },
+	{ "cast6",       NULL, 16, false },
+	{ "des",         NULL,  8, false },
+	{ "des3_ede",    NULL,  8, false },
+	{ "khazad",      NULL,  8, false },
+	{ "seed",        NULL, 16, false },
+	{ "tea",         NULL,  8, false },
+	{ "xtea",        NULL,  8, false },
+	{ "paes",        NULL, 16,  true }, /* protected AES, s390 wrapped key scheme */
+	{ "xchacha12,aes", "adiantum", 32, false },
+	{ "xchacha20,aes", "adiantum", 32, false },
+	{ NULL,          NULL,  0, false }
+};
+
+static const struct cipher_alg *_get_alg(const char *name, const char *mode)
+{
+	int i = 0;
+
+	while (name && cipher_algs[i].name) {
+		if (!strcasecmp(name, cipher_algs[i].name))
+			if (!mode || !cipher_algs[i].mode ||
+			    !strncasecmp(mode, cipher_algs[i].mode, strlen(cipher_algs[i].mode)))
+				return &cipher_algs[i];
+		i++;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+int crypt_cipher_ivsize(const char *name, const char *mode)
+{
+	const struct cipher_alg *ca = _get_alg(name, mode);
+
+	return ca ? ca->blocksize : -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int crypt_cipher_wrapped_key(const char *name, const char *mode)
+{
+	const struct cipher_alg *ca = _get_alg(name, mode);
+
+	return ca ? (int)ca->wrapped_key : 0;
+}
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/crc32.c b/lib/crypto_backend/crc32.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..332f383
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/crc32.c
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+/*
+ *  COPYRIGHT (C) 1986 Gary S. Brown.  You may use this program, or
+ *  code or tables extracted from it, as desired without restriction.
+ *
+ *  First, the polynomial itself and its table of feedback terms.  The
+ *  polynomial is
+ *  X^32+X^26+X^23+X^22+X^16+X^12+X^11+X^10+X^8+X^7+X^5+X^4+X^2+X^1+X^0
+ *
+ *  Note that we take it "backwards" and put the highest-order term in
+ *  the lowest-order bit.  The X^32 term is "implied"; the LSB is the
+ *  X^31 term, etc.  The X^0 term (usually shown as "+1") results in
+ *  the MSB being 1.
+ *
+ *  Note that the usual hardware shift register implementation, which
+ *  is what we're using (we're merely optimizing it by doing eight-bit
+ *  chunks at a time) shifts bits into the lowest-order term.  In our
+ *  implementation, that means shifting towards the right.  Why do we
+ *  do it this way?  Because the calculated CRC must be transmitted in
+ *  order from highest-order term to lowest-order term.  UARTs transmit
+ *  characters in order from LSB to MSB.  By storing the CRC this way,
+ *  we hand it to the UART in the order low-byte to high-byte; the UART
+ *  sends each low-bit to hight-bit; and the result is transmission bit
+ *  by bit from highest- to lowest-order term without requiring any bit
+ *  shuffling on our part.  Reception works similarly.
+ *
+ *  The feedback terms table consists of 256, 32-bit entries.  Notes
+ *
+ *      The table can be generated at runtime if desired; code to do so
+ *      is shown later.  It might not be obvious, but the feedback
+ *      terms simply represent the results of eight shift/xor opera-
+ *      tions for all combinations of data and CRC register values.
+ *
+ *      The values must be right-shifted by eight bits by the "updcrc"
+ *      logic; the shift must be unsigned (bring in zeroes).  On some
+ *      hardware you could probably optimize the shift in assembler by
+ *      using byte-swap instructions.
+ *      polynomial $edb88320
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "crypto_backend.h"
+
+
+static const uint32_t crc32_tab[] = {
+	0x00000000L, 0x77073096L, 0xee0e612cL, 0x990951baL, 0x076dc419L,
+	0x706af48fL, 0xe963a535L, 0x9e6495a3L, 0x0edb8832L, 0x79dcb8a4L,
+	0xe0d5e91eL, 0x97d2d988L, 0x09b64c2bL, 0x7eb17cbdL, 0xe7b82d07L,
+	0x90bf1d91L, 0x1db71064L, 0x6ab020f2L, 0xf3b97148L, 0x84be41deL,
+	0x1adad47dL, 0x6ddde4ebL, 0xf4d4b551L, 0x83d385c7L, 0x136c9856L,
+	0x646ba8c0L, 0xfd62f97aL, 0x8a65c9ecL, 0x14015c4fL, 0x63066cd9L,
+	0xfa0f3d63L, 0x8d080df5L, 0x3b6e20c8L, 0x4c69105eL, 0xd56041e4L,
+	0xa2677172L, 0x3c03e4d1L, 0x4b04d447L, 0xd20d85fdL, 0xa50ab56bL,
+	0x35b5a8faL, 0x42b2986cL, 0xdbbbc9d6L, 0xacbcf940L, 0x32d86ce3L,
+	0x45df5c75L, 0xdcd60dcfL, 0xabd13d59L, 0x26d930acL, 0x51de003aL,
+	0xc8d75180L, 0xbfd06116L, 0x21b4f4b5L, 0x56b3c423L, 0xcfba9599L,
+	0xb8bda50fL, 0x2802b89eL, 0x5f058808L, 0xc60cd9b2L, 0xb10be924L,
+	0x2f6f7c87L, 0x58684c11L, 0xc1611dabL, 0xb6662d3dL, 0x76dc4190L,
+	0x01db7106L, 0x98d220bcL, 0xefd5102aL, 0x71b18589L, 0x06b6b51fL,
+	0x9fbfe4a5L, 0xe8b8d433L, 0x7807c9a2L, 0x0f00f934L, 0x9609a88eL,
+	0xe10e9818L, 0x7f6a0dbbL, 0x086d3d2dL, 0x91646c97L, 0xe6635c01L,
+	0x6b6b51f4L, 0x1c6c6162L, 0x856530d8L, 0xf262004eL, 0x6c0695edL,
+	0x1b01a57bL, 0x8208f4c1L, 0xf50fc457L, 0x65b0d9c6L, 0x12b7e950L,
+	0x8bbeb8eaL, 0xfcb9887cL, 0x62dd1ddfL, 0x15da2d49L, 0x8cd37cf3L,
+	0xfbd44c65L, 0x4db26158L, 0x3ab551ceL, 0xa3bc0074L, 0xd4bb30e2L,
+	0x4adfa541L, 0x3dd895d7L, 0xa4d1c46dL, 0xd3d6f4fbL, 0x4369e96aL,
+	0x346ed9fcL, 0xad678846L, 0xda60b8d0L, 0x44042d73L, 0x33031de5L,
+	0xaa0a4c5fL, 0xdd0d7cc9L, 0x5005713cL, 0x270241aaL, 0xbe0b1010L,
+	0xc90c2086L, 0x5768b525L, 0x206f85b3L, 0xb966d409L, 0xce61e49fL,
+	0x5edef90eL, 0x29d9c998L, 0xb0d09822L, 0xc7d7a8b4L, 0x59b33d17L,
+	0x2eb40d81L, 0xb7bd5c3bL, 0xc0ba6cadL, 0xedb88320L, 0x9abfb3b6L,
+	0x03b6e20cL, 0x74b1d29aL, 0xead54739L, 0x9dd277afL, 0x04db2615L,
+	0x73dc1683L, 0xe3630b12L, 0x94643b84L, 0x0d6d6a3eL, 0x7a6a5aa8L,
+	0xe40ecf0bL, 0x9309ff9dL, 0x0a00ae27L, 0x7d079eb1L, 0xf00f9344L,
+	0x8708a3d2L, 0x1e01f268L, 0x6906c2feL, 0xf762575dL, 0x806567cbL,
+	0x196c3671L, 0x6e6b06e7L, 0xfed41b76L, 0x89d32be0L, 0x10da7a5aL,
+	0x67dd4accL, 0xf9b9df6fL, 0x8ebeeff9L, 0x17b7be43L, 0x60b08ed5L,
+	0xd6d6a3e8L, 0xa1d1937eL, 0x38d8c2c4L, 0x4fdff252L, 0xd1bb67f1L,
+	0xa6bc5767L, 0x3fb506ddL, 0x48b2364bL, 0xd80d2bdaL, 0xaf0a1b4cL,
+	0x36034af6L, 0x41047a60L, 0xdf60efc3L, 0xa867df55L, 0x316e8eefL,
+	0x4669be79L, 0xcb61b38cL, 0xbc66831aL, 0x256fd2a0L, 0x5268e236L,
+	0xcc0c7795L, 0xbb0b4703L, 0x220216b9L, 0x5505262fL, 0xc5ba3bbeL,
+	0xb2bd0b28L, 0x2bb45a92L, 0x5cb36a04L, 0xc2d7ffa7L, 0xb5d0cf31L,
+	0x2cd99e8bL, 0x5bdeae1dL, 0x9b64c2b0L, 0xec63f226L, 0x756aa39cL,
+	0x026d930aL, 0x9c0906a9L, 0xeb0e363fL, 0x72076785L, 0x05005713L,
+	0x95bf4a82L, 0xe2b87a14L, 0x7bb12baeL, 0x0cb61b38L, 0x92d28e9bL,
+	0xe5d5be0dL, 0x7cdcefb7L, 0x0bdbdf21L, 0x86d3d2d4L, 0xf1d4e242L,
+	0x68ddb3f8L, 0x1fda836eL, 0x81be16cdL, 0xf6b9265bL, 0x6fb077e1L,
+	0x18b74777L, 0x88085ae6L, 0xff0f6a70L, 0x66063bcaL, 0x11010b5cL,
+	0x8f659effL, 0xf862ae69L, 0x616bffd3L, 0x166ccf45L, 0xa00ae278L,
+	0xd70dd2eeL, 0x4e048354L, 0x3903b3c2L, 0xa7672661L, 0xd06016f7L,
+	0x4969474dL, 0x3e6e77dbL, 0xaed16a4aL, 0xd9d65adcL, 0x40df0b66L,
+	0x37d83bf0L, 0xa9bcae53L, 0xdebb9ec5L, 0x47b2cf7fL, 0x30b5ffe9L,
+	0xbdbdf21cL, 0xcabac28aL, 0x53b39330L, 0x24b4a3a6L, 0xbad03605L,
+	0xcdd70693L, 0x54de5729L, 0x23d967bfL, 0xb3667a2eL, 0xc4614ab8L,
+	0x5d681b02L, 0x2a6f2b94L, 0xb40bbe37L, 0xc30c8ea1L, 0x5a05df1bL,
+	0x2d02ef8dL
+};
+
+/*
+ * This a generic crc32() function, it takes seed as an argument,
+ * and does __not__ xor at the end. Then individual users can do
+ * whatever they need.
+ */
+uint32_t crypt_crc32(uint32_t seed, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+	uint32_t crc = seed;
+	const unsigned char *p = buf;
+
+	while(len-- > 0)
+		crc = crc32_tab[(crc ^ *p++) & 0xff] ^ (crc >> 8);
+
+	return crc;
+}
+
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_backend.h b/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_backend.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f7f16d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_backend.h
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+/*
+ * crypto backend implementation
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+#ifndef _CRYPTO_BACKEND_H
+#define _CRYPTO_BACKEND_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+struct crypt_device;
+struct crypt_hash;
+struct crypt_hmac;
+struct crypt_cipher;
+struct crypt_storage;
+
+int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx);
+void crypt_backend_destroy(void);
+
+#define CRYPT_BACKEND_KERNEL (1 << 0)	/* Crypto uses kernel part, for benchmark */
+
+uint32_t crypt_backend_flags(void);
+const char *crypt_backend_version(void);
+
+/* HASH */
+int crypt_hash_size(const char *name);
+int crypt_hash_init(struct crypt_hash **ctx, const char *name);
+int crypt_hash_write(struct crypt_hash *ctx, const char *buffer, size_t length);
+int crypt_hash_final(struct crypt_hash *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length);
+void crypt_hash_destroy(struct crypt_hash *ctx);
+
+/* HMAC */
+int crypt_hmac_size(const char *name);
+int crypt_hmac_init(struct crypt_hmac **ctx, const char *name,
+		    const void *key, size_t key_length);
+int crypt_hmac_write(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, const char *buffer, size_t length);
+int crypt_hmac_final(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length);
+void crypt_hmac_destroy(struct crypt_hmac *ctx);
+
+/* RNG (if fips parameter set, must provide FIPS compliance) */
+enum { CRYPT_RND_NORMAL = 0, CRYPT_RND_KEY = 1, CRYPT_RND_SALT = 2 };
+int crypt_backend_rng(char *buffer, size_t length, int quality, int fips);
+
+struct crypt_pbkdf_limits {
+	uint32_t min_iterations, max_iterations;
+	uint32_t min_memory, max_memory;
+	uint32_t min_parallel, max_parallel;
+};
+int crypt_pbkdf_get_limits(const char *kdf, struct crypt_pbkdf_limits *l);
+
+/* PBKDF*/
+int crypt_pbkdf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
+		const char *password, size_t password_length,
+		const char *salt, size_t salt_length,
+		char *key, size_t key_length,
+		uint32_t iterations, uint32_t memory, uint32_t parallel);
+int crypt_pbkdf_perf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
+		const char *password, size_t password_size,
+		const char *salt, size_t salt_size,
+		size_t volume_key_size, uint32_t time_ms,
+		uint32_t max_memory_kb, uint32_t parallel_threads,
+		uint32_t *iterations_out, uint32_t *memory_out,
+		int (*progress)(uint32_t time_ms, void *usrptr), void *usrptr);
+
+#if USE_INTERNAL_PBKDF2
+/* internal PBKDF2 implementation */
+int pkcs5_pbkdf2(const char *hash,
+		 const char *P, size_t Plen,
+		 const char *S, size_t Slen,
+		 unsigned int c,
+		 unsigned int dkLen, char *DK,
+		 unsigned int hash_block_size);
+#endif
+
+/* Argon2 implementation wrapper */
+int argon2(const char *type, const char *password, size_t password_length,
+	   const char *salt, size_t salt_length,
+	   char *key, size_t key_length,
+	   uint32_t iterations, uint32_t memory, uint32_t parallel);
+
+/* CRC32 */
+uint32_t crypt_crc32(uint32_t seed, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
+
+/* ciphers */
+int crypt_cipher_ivsize(const char *name, const char *mode);
+int crypt_cipher_wrapped_key(const char *name, const char *mode);
+int crypt_cipher_init(struct crypt_cipher **ctx, const char *name,
+		    const char *mode, const void *key, size_t key_length);
+void crypt_cipher_destroy(struct crypt_cipher *ctx);
+int crypt_cipher_encrypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
+			 const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
+			 const char *iv, size_t iv_length);
+int crypt_cipher_decrypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
+			 const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
+			 const char *iv, size_t iv_length);
+
+/* Check availability of a cipher */
+int crypt_cipher_check(const char *name, const char *mode,
+		       const char *integrity, size_t key_length);
+
+/* storage encryption wrappers */
+int crypt_storage_init(struct crypt_storage **ctx, uint64_t sector_start,
+		       const char *cipher, const char *cipher_mode,
+		       const void *key, size_t key_length);
+void crypt_storage_destroy(struct crypt_storage *ctx);
+int crypt_storage_decrypt(struct crypt_storage *ctx, uint64_t sector,
+			  size_t count, char *buffer);
+int crypt_storage_encrypt(struct crypt_storage *ctx, uint64_t sector,
+			  size_t count, char *buffer);
+
+/* Memzero helper (memset on stack can be optimized out) */
+static inline void crypt_backend_memzero(void *s, size_t n)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO
+	explicit_bzero(s, n);
+#else
+	volatile uint8_t *p = (volatile uint8_t *)s;
+	while(n--) *p++ = 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+#endif /* _CRYPTO_BACKEND_H */
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_cipher_kernel.c b/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_cipher_kernel.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8c29399
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_cipher_kernel.c
@@ -0,0 +1,291 @@
+/*
+ * Linux kernel userspace API crypto backend implementation (skcipher)
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include "crypto_backend.h"
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_AF_ALG
+
+#include <linux/if_alg.h>
+
+#ifndef AF_ALG
+#define AF_ALG 38
+#endif
+#ifndef SOL_ALG
+#define SOL_ALG 279
+#endif
+
+struct crypt_cipher {
+	int tfmfd;
+	int opfd;
+};
+
+/*
+ * ciphers
+ *
+ * ENOENT - algorithm not available
+ * ENOTSUP - AF_ALG family not available
+ * (but cannot check specifically for skcipher API)
+ */
+static int _crypt_cipher_init(struct crypt_cipher **ctx,
+			      const void *key, size_t key_length,
+			      struct sockaddr_alg *sa)
+{
+	struct crypt_cipher *h;
+
+	h = malloc(sizeof(*h));
+	if (!h)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	h->opfd = -1;
+	h->tfmfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
+	if (h->tfmfd < 0) {
+		crypt_cipher_destroy(h);
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+
+	if (bind(h->tfmfd, (struct sockaddr *)sa, sizeof(*sa)) < 0) {
+		crypt_cipher_destroy(h);
+		return -ENOENT;
+	}
+
+	if (setsockopt(h->tfmfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, key_length) < 0) {
+		crypt_cipher_destroy(h);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	h->opfd = accept(h->tfmfd, NULL, 0);
+	if (h->opfd < 0) {
+		crypt_cipher_destroy(h);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	*ctx = h;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_cipher_init(struct crypt_cipher **ctx, const char *name,
+		      const char *mode, const void *key, size_t key_length)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_alg sa = {
+		.salg_family = AF_ALG,
+		.salg_type = "skcipher",
+	};
+
+	if (!strcmp(name, "cipher_null"))
+		key_length = 0;
+
+	snprintf((char *)sa.salg_name, sizeof(sa.salg_name), "%s(%s)", mode, name);
+
+	return _crypt_cipher_init(ctx, key, key_length, &sa);
+}
+
+/* The in/out should be aligned to page boundary */
+static int crypt_cipher_crypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
+			 const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
+			 const char *iv, size_t iv_length,
+			 uint32_t direction)
+{
+	int r = 0;
+	ssize_t len;
+	struct af_alg_iv *alg_iv;
+	struct cmsghdr *header;
+	uint32_t *type;
+	struct iovec iov = {
+		.iov_base = (void*)(uintptr_t)in,
+		.iov_len = length,
+	};
+	int iv_msg_size = iv ? CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(*alg_iv) + iv_length) : 0;
+	char buffer[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(*type)) + iv_msg_size];
+	struct msghdr msg = {
+		.msg_control = buffer,
+		.msg_controllen = sizeof(buffer),
+		.msg_iov = &iov,
+		.msg_iovlen = 1,
+	};
+
+	if (!in || !out || !length)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if ((!iv && iv_length) || (iv && !iv_length))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
+
+	/* Set encrypt/decrypt operation */
+	header = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
+	if (!header)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	header->cmsg_level = SOL_ALG;
+	header->cmsg_type = ALG_SET_OP;
+	header->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(*type));
+	type = (void*)CMSG_DATA(header);
+	*type = direction;
+
+	/* Set IV */
+	if (iv) {
+		header = CMSG_NXTHDR(&msg, header);
+		header->cmsg_level = SOL_ALG;
+		header->cmsg_type = ALG_SET_IV;
+		header->cmsg_len = iv_msg_size;
+		alg_iv = (void*)CMSG_DATA(header);
+		alg_iv->ivlen = iv_length;
+		memcpy(alg_iv->iv, iv, iv_length);
+	}
+
+	len = sendmsg(ctx->opfd, &msg, 0);
+	if (len != (ssize_t)length) {
+		r = -EIO;
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	len = read(ctx->opfd, out, length);
+	if (len != (ssize_t)length)
+		r = -EIO;
+bad:
+	crypt_backend_memzero(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_cipher_encrypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
+			 const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
+			 const char *iv, size_t iv_length)
+{
+	return crypt_cipher_crypt(ctx, in, out, length,
+				  iv, iv_length, ALG_OP_ENCRYPT);
+}
+
+int crypt_cipher_decrypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
+			 const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
+			 const char *iv, size_t iv_length)
+{
+	return crypt_cipher_crypt(ctx, in, out, length,
+				  iv, iv_length, ALG_OP_DECRYPT);
+}
+
+void crypt_cipher_destroy(struct crypt_cipher *ctx)
+{
+	if (ctx->tfmfd >= 0)
+		close(ctx->tfmfd);
+	if (ctx->opfd >= 0)
+		close(ctx->opfd);
+	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+	free(ctx);
+}
+
+int crypt_cipher_check(const char *name, const char *mode,
+		       const char *integrity, size_t key_length)
+{
+	struct crypt_cipher *c = NULL;
+	char mode_name[64], tmp_salg_name[180], *real_mode = NULL, *cipher_iv = NULL, *key;
+	const char *salg_type;
+	bool aead;
+	int r;
+	struct sockaddr_alg sa = {
+		.salg_family = AF_ALG,
+	};
+
+	aead = integrity && strcmp(integrity, "none");
+
+	/* Remove IV if present */
+	if (mode) {
+		strncpy(mode_name, mode, sizeof(mode_name));
+		mode_name[sizeof(mode_name) - 1] = 0;
+		cipher_iv = strchr(mode_name, '-');
+		if (cipher_iv) {
+			*cipher_iv = '\0';
+			real_mode = mode_name;
+		}
+	}
+
+	salg_type = aead ? "aead" : "skcipher";
+	snprintf((char *)sa.salg_type, sizeof(sa.salg_type), "%s", salg_type);
+	memset(tmp_salg_name, 0, sizeof(tmp_salg_name));
+
+	/* FIXME: this is duplicating a part of devmapper backend */
+	if (aead && !strcmp(integrity, "poly1305"))
+		r = snprintf(tmp_salg_name, sizeof(tmp_salg_name), "rfc7539(%s,%s)", name, integrity);
+	else if (!real_mode)
+		r = snprintf(tmp_salg_name, sizeof(tmp_salg_name), "%s", name);
+	else if (aead && !strcmp(real_mode, "ccm"))
+		r = snprintf(tmp_salg_name, sizeof(tmp_salg_name), "rfc4309(%s(%s))", real_mode, name);
+	else
+		r = snprintf(tmp_salg_name, sizeof(tmp_salg_name), "%s(%s)", real_mode, name);
+
+	if (r <= 0 || r > (int)(sizeof(sa.salg_name) - 1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	memcpy(sa.salg_name, tmp_salg_name, sizeof(sa.salg_name));
+
+	key = malloc(key_length);
+	if (!key)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* We cannot use RNG yet, any key works here, tweak the first part if it is split key (XTS). */
+	memset(key, 0xab, key_length);
+	*key = 0xef;
+
+	r = _crypt_cipher_init(&c, key, key_length, &sa);
+	if (c)
+		crypt_cipher_destroy(c);
+	free(key);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+#else /* ENABLE_AF_ALG */
+int crypt_cipher_init(struct crypt_cipher **ctx, const char *name,
+		    const char *mode, const void *buffer, size_t length)
+{
+	return -ENOTSUP;
+}
+
+void crypt_cipher_destroy(struct crypt_cipher *ctx)
+{
+	return;
+}
+
+int crypt_cipher_encrypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
+			 const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
+			 const char *iv, size_t iv_length)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+int crypt_cipher_decrypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
+			 const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
+			 const char *iv, size_t iv_length)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+int crypt_cipher_check(const char *name, const char *mode,
+		       const char *integrity, size_t key_length)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_gcrypt.c b/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_gcrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c6ca5c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_gcrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,368 @@
+/*
+ * GCRYPT crypto backend implementation
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <gcrypt.h>
+#include "crypto_backend.h"
+
+static int crypto_backend_initialised = 0;
+static int crypto_backend_secmem = 1;
+static int crypto_backend_whirlpool_bug = -1;
+static char version[64];
+
+struct crypt_hash {
+	gcry_md_hd_t hd;
+	int hash_id;
+	int hash_len;
+};
+
+struct crypt_hmac {
+	gcry_md_hd_t hd;
+	int hash_id;
+	int hash_len;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Test for wrong Whirlpool variant,
+ * Ref: http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gcrypt-devel/2014-January/002889.html
+ */
+static void crypt_hash_test_whirlpool_bug(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_hash *h;
+	char buf[2] = "\0\0", hash_out1[64], hash_out2[64];
+	int r;
+
+	if (crypto_backend_whirlpool_bug >= 0)
+		return;
+
+	crypto_backend_whirlpool_bug = 0;
+	if (crypt_hash_init(&h, "whirlpool"))
+		return;
+
+	/* One shot */
+	if ((r = crypt_hash_write(h, &buf[0], 2)) ||
+	    (r = crypt_hash_final(h, hash_out1, 64))) {
+		crypt_hash_destroy(h);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* Split buf (crypt_hash_final resets hash state) */
+	if ((r = crypt_hash_write(h, &buf[0], 1)) ||
+	    (r = crypt_hash_write(h, &buf[1], 1)) ||
+	    (r = crypt_hash_final(h, hash_out2, 64))) {
+		crypt_hash_destroy(h);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	crypt_hash_destroy(h);
+
+	if (memcmp(hash_out1, hash_out2, 64))
+		crypto_backend_whirlpool_bug = 1;
+}
+
+int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
+{
+	if (crypto_backend_initialised)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED_P)) {
+		if (!gcry_check_version (GCRYPT_REQ_VERSION)) {
+			return -ENOSYS;
+		}
+
+/* FIXME: If gcrypt compiled to support POSIX 1003.1e capabilities,
+ * it drops all privileges during secure memory initialisation.
+ * For now, the only workaround is to disable secure memory in gcrypt.
+ * cryptsetup always need at least cap_sys_admin privilege for dm-ioctl
+ * and it locks its memory space anyway.
+ */
+#if 0
+		gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DISABLE_SECMEM);
+		crypto_backend_secmem = 0;
+#else
+
+		gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SUSPEND_SECMEM_WARN);
+		gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INIT_SECMEM, 16384, 0);
+		gcry_control (GCRYCTL_RESUME_SECMEM_WARN);
+#endif
+		gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED, 0);
+	}
+
+	crypto_backend_initialised = 1;
+	crypt_hash_test_whirlpool_bug();
+
+	snprintf(version, 64, "gcrypt %s%s%s",
+		 gcry_check_version(NULL),
+		 crypto_backend_secmem ? "" : ", secmem disabled",
+		 crypto_backend_whirlpool_bug > 0 ? ", flawed whirlpool" : ""
+		);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void crypt_backend_destroy(void)
+{
+	if (crypto_backend_initialised)
+		gcry_control(GCRYCTL_TERM_SECMEM);
+
+	crypto_backend_initialised = 0;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_backend_version(void)
+{
+	return crypto_backend_initialised ? version : "";
+}
+
+uint32_t crypt_backend_flags(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const char *crypt_hash_compat_name(const char *name, unsigned int *flags)
+{
+	const char *hash_name = name;
+
+	/* "whirlpool_gcryptbug" is out shortcut to flawed whirlpool
+	 * in libgcrypt < 1.6.0 */
+	if (name && !strcasecmp(name, "whirlpool_gcryptbug")) {
+#if GCRYPT_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010601
+		if (flags)
+			*flags |= GCRY_MD_FLAG_BUGEMU1;
+#endif
+		hash_name = "whirlpool";
+	}
+
+	return hash_name;
+}
+
+/* HASH */
+int crypt_hash_size(const char *name)
+{
+	int hash_id;
+
+	assert(crypto_backend_initialised);
+
+	hash_id = gcry_md_map_name(crypt_hash_compat_name(name, NULL));
+	if (!hash_id)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(hash_id);
+}
+
+int crypt_hash_init(struct crypt_hash **ctx, const char *name)
+{
+	struct crypt_hash *h;
+	unsigned int flags = 0;
+
+	assert(crypto_backend_initialised);
+
+	h = malloc(sizeof(*h));
+	if (!h)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	h->hash_id = gcry_md_map_name(crypt_hash_compat_name(name, &flags));
+	if (!h->hash_id) {
+		free(h);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (gcry_md_open(&h->hd, h->hash_id, flags)) {
+		free(h);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	h->hash_len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(h->hash_id);
+	*ctx = h;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void crypt_hash_restart(struct crypt_hash *ctx)
+{
+	gcry_md_reset(ctx->hd);
+}
+
+int crypt_hash_write(struct crypt_hash *ctx, const char *buffer, size_t length)
+{
+	gcry_md_write(ctx->hd, buffer, length);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_hash_final(struct crypt_hash *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
+{
+	unsigned char *hash;
+
+	if (length > (size_t)ctx->hash_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	hash = gcry_md_read(ctx->hd, ctx->hash_id);
+	if (!hash)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	memcpy(buffer, hash, length);
+	crypt_hash_restart(ctx);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void crypt_hash_destroy(struct crypt_hash *ctx)
+{
+	gcry_md_close(ctx->hd);
+	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+	free(ctx);
+}
+
+/* HMAC */
+int crypt_hmac_size(const char *name)
+{
+	return crypt_hash_size(name);
+}
+
+int crypt_hmac_init(struct crypt_hmac **ctx, const char *name,
+		    const void *key, size_t key_length)
+{
+	struct crypt_hmac *h;
+	unsigned int flags = GCRY_MD_FLAG_HMAC;
+
+	assert(crypto_backend_initialised);
+
+	h = malloc(sizeof(*h));
+	if (!h)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	h->hash_id = gcry_md_map_name(crypt_hash_compat_name(name, &flags));
+	if (!h->hash_id) {
+		free(h);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (gcry_md_open(&h->hd, h->hash_id, flags)) {
+		free(h);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (gcry_md_setkey(h->hd, key, key_length)) {
+		gcry_md_close(h->hd);
+		free(h);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	h->hash_len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(h->hash_id);
+	*ctx = h;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void crypt_hmac_restart(struct crypt_hmac *ctx)
+{
+	gcry_md_reset(ctx->hd);
+}
+
+int crypt_hmac_write(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, const char *buffer, size_t length)
+{
+	gcry_md_write(ctx->hd, buffer, length);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_hmac_final(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
+{
+	unsigned char *hash;
+
+	if (length > (size_t)ctx->hash_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	hash = gcry_md_read(ctx->hd, ctx->hash_id);
+	if (!hash)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	memcpy(buffer, hash, length);
+	crypt_hmac_restart(ctx);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void crypt_hmac_destroy(struct crypt_hmac *ctx)
+{
+	gcry_md_close(ctx->hd);
+	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+	free(ctx);
+}
+
+/* RNG */
+int crypt_backend_rng(char *buffer, size_t length, int quality, int fips)
+{
+	switch(quality) {
+	case CRYPT_RND_NORMAL:
+		gcry_randomize(buffer, length, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
+		break;
+	case CRYPT_RND_SALT:
+	case CRYPT_RND_KEY:
+	default:
+		gcry_randomize(buffer, length, GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM);
+		break;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int pbkdf2(const char *hash,
+		  const char *password, size_t password_length,
+		  const char *salt, size_t salt_length,
+		  char *key, size_t key_length,
+		  uint32_t iterations)
+{
+	const char *hash_name = crypt_hash_compat_name(hash, NULL);
+
+#if USE_INTERNAL_PBKDF2
+	return pkcs5_pbkdf2(hash_name, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
+			    iterations, key_length, key, 0);
+#else /* USE_INTERNAL_PBKDF2 */
+	int hash_id = gcry_md_map_name(hash_name);
+
+	if (!hash_id)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (gcry_kdf_derive(password, password_length, GCRY_KDF_PBKDF2, hash_id,
+	    salt, salt_length, iterations, key_length, key))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+#endif /* USE_INTERNAL_PBKDF2 */
+}
+
+/* PBKDF */
+int crypt_pbkdf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
+		const char *password, size_t password_length,
+		const char *salt, size_t salt_length,
+		char *key, size_t key_length,
+		uint32_t iterations, uint32_t memory, uint32_t parallel)
+{
+	if (!kdf)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(kdf, "pbkdf2"))
+		return pbkdf2(hash, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
+			      key, key_length, iterations);
+	else if (!strncmp(kdf, "argon2", 6))
+		return argon2(kdf, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
+			      key, key_length, iterations, memory, parallel);
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_kernel.c b/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_kernel.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..00c8a32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_kernel.c
@@ -0,0 +1,344 @@
+/*
+ * Linux kernel userspace API crypto backend implementation
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/utsname.h>
+#include <linux/if_alg.h>
+#include "crypto_backend.h"
+
+/* FIXME: remove later */
+#ifndef AF_ALG
+#define AF_ALG 38
+#endif
+#ifndef SOL_ALG
+#define SOL_ALG 279
+#endif
+
+static int crypto_backend_initialised = 0;
+static char version[256];
+
+struct hash_alg {
+	const char *name;
+	const char *kernel_name;
+	int length;
+	unsigned int block_length;
+};
+
+static struct hash_alg hash_algs[] = {
+	{ "sha1",      "sha1",        20,  64 },
+	{ "sha224",    "sha224",      28,  64 },
+	{ "sha256",    "sha256",      32,  64 },
+	{ "sha384",    "sha384",      48, 128 },
+	{ "sha512",    "sha512",      64, 128 },
+	{ "ripemd160", "rmd160",      20,  64 },
+	{ "whirlpool", "wp512",       64,  64 },
+	{ "sha3-224",  "sha3-224",    28, 144 },
+	{ "sha3-256",  "sha3-256",    32, 136 },
+	{ "sha3-384",  "sha3-384",    48, 104 },
+	{ "sha3-512",  "sha3-512",    64,  72 },
+	{ "stribog256","streebog256", 32,  64 },
+	{ "stribog512","streebog512", 64,  64 },
+	{ "sm3",       "sm3",         32,  64 },
+	{ NULL,        NULL,           0,   0 }
+};
+
+struct crypt_hash {
+	int tfmfd;
+	int opfd;
+	int hash_len;
+};
+
+struct crypt_hmac {
+	int tfmfd;
+	int opfd;
+	int hash_len;
+};
+
+static int crypt_kernel_socket_init(struct sockaddr_alg *sa, int *tfmfd, int *opfd,
+				    const void *key, size_t key_length)
+{
+	*tfmfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
+	if (*tfmfd < 0)
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+
+	if (bind(*tfmfd, (struct sockaddr *)sa, sizeof(*sa)) < 0) {
+		close(*tfmfd);
+		*tfmfd = -1;
+		return -ENOENT;
+	}
+
+	if (key && setsockopt(*tfmfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, key_length) < 0) {
+		close(*tfmfd);
+		*tfmfd = -1;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	*opfd = accept(*tfmfd, NULL, 0);
+	if (*opfd < 0) {
+		close(*tfmfd);
+		*tfmfd = -1;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
+{
+	struct utsname uts;
+	struct sockaddr_alg sa = {
+		.salg_family = AF_ALG,
+		.salg_type = "hash",
+		.salg_name = "sha256",
+	};
+	int tfmfd = -1, opfd = -1;
+
+	if (crypto_backend_initialised)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (uname(&uts) == -1 || strcmp(uts.sysname, "Linux"))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (crypt_kernel_socket_init(&sa, &tfmfd, &opfd, NULL, 0) < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	close(tfmfd);
+	close(opfd);
+
+	snprintf(version, sizeof(version), "%s %s kernel cryptoAPI",
+		 uts.sysname, uts.release);
+
+	crypto_backend_initialised = 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void crypt_backend_destroy(void)
+{
+	crypto_backend_initialised = 0;
+}
+
+uint32_t crypt_backend_flags(void)
+{
+	return CRYPT_BACKEND_KERNEL;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_backend_version(void)
+{
+	return crypto_backend_initialised ? version : "";
+}
+
+static struct hash_alg *_get_alg(const char *name)
+{
+	int i = 0;
+
+	while (name && hash_algs[i].name) {
+		if (!strcmp(name, hash_algs[i].name))
+			return &hash_algs[i];
+		i++;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/* HASH */
+int crypt_hash_size(const char *name)
+{
+	struct hash_alg *ha = _get_alg(name);
+
+	return ha ? ha->length : -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int crypt_hash_init(struct crypt_hash **ctx, const char *name)
+{
+	struct crypt_hash *h;
+	struct hash_alg *ha;
+	struct sockaddr_alg sa = {
+		.salg_family = AF_ALG,
+		.salg_type = "hash",
+	};
+
+	h = malloc(sizeof(*h));
+	if (!h)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ha = _get_alg(name);
+	if (!ha) {
+		free(h);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	h->hash_len = ha->length;
+
+	strncpy((char *)sa.salg_name, ha->kernel_name, sizeof(sa.salg_name)-1);
+
+	if (crypt_kernel_socket_init(&sa, &h->tfmfd, &h->opfd, NULL, 0) < 0) {
+		free(h);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	*ctx = h;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_hash_write(struct crypt_hash *ctx, const char *buffer, size_t length)
+{
+	ssize_t r;
+
+	r = send(ctx->opfd, buffer, length, MSG_MORE);
+	if (r < 0 || (size_t)r < length)
+		return -EIO;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_hash_final(struct crypt_hash *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
+{
+	ssize_t r;
+
+	if (length > (size_t)ctx->hash_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = read(ctx->opfd, buffer, length);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return -EIO;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void crypt_hash_destroy(struct crypt_hash *ctx)
+{
+	if (ctx->tfmfd >= 0)
+		close(ctx->tfmfd);
+	if (ctx->opfd >= 0)
+		close(ctx->opfd);
+	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+	free(ctx);
+}
+
+/* HMAC */
+int crypt_hmac_size(const char *name)
+{
+	return crypt_hash_size(name);
+}
+
+int crypt_hmac_init(struct crypt_hmac **ctx, const char *name,
+		    const void *key, size_t key_length)
+{
+	struct crypt_hmac *h;
+	struct hash_alg *ha;
+	struct sockaddr_alg sa = {
+		.salg_family = AF_ALG,
+		.salg_type = "hash",
+	};
+
+	h = malloc(sizeof(*h));
+	if (!h)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ha = _get_alg(name);
+	if (!ha) {
+		free(h);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	h->hash_len = ha->length;
+
+	snprintf((char *)sa.salg_name, sizeof(sa.salg_name),
+		 "hmac(%s)", ha->kernel_name);
+
+	if (crypt_kernel_socket_init(&sa, &h->tfmfd, &h->opfd, key, key_length) < 0) {
+		free(h);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	*ctx = h;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_hmac_write(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, const char *buffer, size_t length)
+{
+	ssize_t r;
+
+	r = send(ctx->opfd, buffer, length, MSG_MORE);
+	if (r < 0 || (size_t)r < length)
+		return -EIO;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_hmac_final(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
+{
+	ssize_t r;
+
+	if (length > (size_t)ctx->hash_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = read(ctx->opfd, buffer, length);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return -EIO;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void crypt_hmac_destroy(struct crypt_hmac *ctx)
+{
+	if (ctx->tfmfd >= 0)
+		close(ctx->tfmfd);
+	if (ctx->opfd >= 0)
+		close(ctx->opfd);
+	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+	free(ctx);
+}
+
+/* RNG - N/A */
+int crypt_backend_rng(char *buffer, size_t length, int quality, int fips)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/* PBKDF */
+int crypt_pbkdf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
+		const char *password, size_t password_length,
+		const char *salt, size_t salt_length,
+		char *key, size_t key_length,
+		uint32_t iterations, uint32_t memory, uint32_t parallel)
+{
+	struct hash_alg *ha;
+
+	if (!kdf)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(kdf, "pbkdf2")) {
+		ha = _get_alg(hash);
+		if (!ha)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		return pkcs5_pbkdf2(hash, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
+				    iterations, key_length, key, ha->block_length);
+	} else if (!strncmp(kdf, "argon2", 6)) {
+		return argon2(kdf, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
+			      key, key_length, iterations, memory, parallel);
+	}
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_nettle.c b/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_nettle.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6ad99d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_nettle.c
@@ -0,0 +1,385 @@
+/*
+ * Nettle crypto backend implementation
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <nettle/sha.h>
+#include <nettle/sha3.h>
+#include <nettle/hmac.h>
+#include <nettle/pbkdf2.h>
+#include "crypto_backend.h"
+
+#if HAVE_NETTLE_VERSION_H
+#include <nettle/version.h>
+#define VSTR(s) STR(s)
+#define STR(s) #s
+static const char *version = "Nettle "VSTR(NETTLE_VERSION_MAJOR)"."VSTR(NETTLE_VERSION_MINOR);
+#else
+static const char *version = "Nettle";
+#endif
+
+typedef void (*init_func) (void *);
+typedef void (*update_func) (void *, size_t, const uint8_t *);
+typedef void (*digest_func) (void *, size_t, uint8_t *);
+typedef void (*set_key_func) (void *, size_t, const uint8_t *);
+
+struct hash_alg {
+	const char *name;
+	int length;
+	init_func init;
+	update_func update;
+	digest_func digest;
+	update_func hmac_update;
+	digest_func hmac_digest;
+	set_key_func hmac_set_key;
+};
+
+/* Missing HMAC wrappers in Nettle */
+#define HMAC_FCE(xxx) \
+struct xhmac_##xxx##_ctx HMAC_CTX(struct xxx##_ctx); \
+static void xhmac_##xxx##_set_key(struct xhmac_##xxx##_ctx *ctx, \
+size_t key_length, const uint8_t *key) \
+{HMAC_SET_KEY(ctx, &nettle_##xxx, key_length, key);} \
+static void xhmac_##xxx##_update(struct xhmac_##xxx##_ctx *ctx, \
+size_t length, const uint8_t *data) \
+{xxx##_update(&ctx->state, length, data);} \
+static void xhmac_##xxx##_digest(struct xhmac_##xxx##_ctx *ctx, \
+size_t length, uint8_t *digest) \
+{HMAC_DIGEST(ctx, &nettle_##xxx, length, digest);}
+
+HMAC_FCE(sha3_224);
+HMAC_FCE(sha3_256);
+HMAC_FCE(sha3_384);
+HMAC_FCE(sha3_512);
+
+static struct hash_alg hash_algs[] = {
+	{ "sha1", SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		(init_func) sha1_init,
+		(update_func) sha1_update,
+		(digest_func) sha1_digest,
+		(update_func) hmac_sha1_update,
+		(digest_func) hmac_sha1_digest,
+		(set_key_func) hmac_sha1_set_key,
+	},
+	{ "sha224", SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		(init_func) sha224_init,
+		(update_func) sha224_update,
+		(digest_func) sha224_digest,
+		(update_func) hmac_sha224_update,
+		(digest_func) hmac_sha224_digest,
+		(set_key_func) hmac_sha224_set_key,
+	},
+	{ "sha256", SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		(init_func) sha256_init,
+		(update_func) sha256_update,
+		(digest_func) sha256_digest,
+		(update_func) hmac_sha256_update,
+		(digest_func) hmac_sha256_digest,
+		(set_key_func) hmac_sha256_set_key,
+	},
+	{ "sha384", SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		(init_func) sha384_init,
+		(update_func) sha384_update,
+		(digest_func) sha384_digest,
+		(update_func) hmac_sha384_update,
+		(digest_func) hmac_sha384_digest,
+		(set_key_func) hmac_sha384_set_key,
+	},
+	{ "sha512", SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		(init_func) sha512_init,
+		(update_func) sha512_update,
+		(digest_func) sha512_digest,
+		(update_func) hmac_sha512_update,
+		(digest_func) hmac_sha512_digest,
+		(set_key_func) hmac_sha512_set_key,
+	},
+	{ "ripemd160", RIPEMD160_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		(init_func) ripemd160_init,
+		(update_func) ripemd160_update,
+		(digest_func) ripemd160_digest,
+		(update_func) hmac_ripemd160_update,
+		(digest_func) hmac_ripemd160_digest,
+		(set_key_func) hmac_ripemd160_set_key,
+	},
+/* Nettle prior to version 3.2 has incompatible SHA3 implementation */
+#if NETTLE_SHA3_FIPS202
+	{ "sha3-224", SHA3_224_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		(init_func) sha3_224_init,
+		(update_func) sha3_224_update,
+		(digest_func) sha3_224_digest,
+		(update_func) xhmac_sha3_224_update,
+		(digest_func) xhmac_sha3_224_digest,
+		(set_key_func) xhmac_sha3_224_set_key,
+	},
+	{ "sha3-256", SHA3_256_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		(init_func) sha3_256_init,
+		(update_func) sha3_256_update,
+		(digest_func) sha3_256_digest,
+		(update_func) xhmac_sha3_256_update,
+		(digest_func) xhmac_sha3_256_digest,
+		(set_key_func) xhmac_sha3_256_set_key,
+	},
+	{ "sha3-384", SHA3_384_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		(init_func) sha3_384_init,
+		(update_func) sha3_384_update,
+		(digest_func) sha3_384_digest,
+		(update_func) xhmac_sha3_384_update,
+		(digest_func) xhmac_sha3_384_digest,
+		(set_key_func) xhmac_sha3_384_set_key,
+	},
+	{ "sha3-512", SHA3_512_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		(init_func) sha3_512_init,
+		(update_func) sha3_512_update,
+		(digest_func) sha3_512_digest,
+		(update_func) xhmac_sha3_512_update,
+		(digest_func) xhmac_sha3_512_digest,
+		(set_key_func) xhmac_sha3_512_set_key,
+	},
+#endif
+	{ NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, }
+};
+
+struct crypt_hash {
+	const struct hash_alg *hash;
+	union {
+		struct sha1_ctx sha1;
+		struct sha224_ctx sha224;
+		struct sha256_ctx sha256;
+		struct sha384_ctx sha384;
+		struct sha512_ctx sha512;
+		struct ripemd160_ctx ripemd160;
+		struct sha3_224_ctx sha3_224;
+		struct sha3_256_ctx sha3_256;
+		struct sha3_384_ctx sha3_384;
+		struct sha3_512_ctx sha3_512;
+	} nettle_ctx;
+};
+
+struct crypt_hmac {
+	const struct hash_alg *hash;
+	union {
+		struct hmac_sha1_ctx sha1;
+		struct hmac_sha224_ctx sha224;
+		struct hmac_sha256_ctx sha256;
+		struct hmac_sha384_ctx sha384;
+		struct hmac_sha512_ctx sha512;
+		struct hmac_ripemd160_ctx ripemd160;
+		struct xhmac_sha3_224_ctx sha3_224;
+		struct xhmac_sha3_256_ctx sha3_256;
+		struct xhmac_sha3_384_ctx sha3_384;
+		struct xhmac_sha3_512_ctx sha3_512;
+	} nettle_ctx;
+	size_t key_length;
+	uint8_t *key;
+};
+
+uint32_t crypt_backend_flags(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct hash_alg *_get_alg(const char *name)
+{
+	int i = 0;
+
+	while (name && hash_algs[i].name) {
+		if (!strcmp(name, hash_algs[i].name))
+			return &hash_algs[i];
+		i++;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void crypt_backend_destroy(void)
+{
+	return;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_backend_version(void)
+{
+	return version;
+}
+
+/* HASH */
+int crypt_hash_size(const char *name)
+{
+	struct hash_alg *ha = _get_alg(name);
+
+	return ha ? ha->length : -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int crypt_hash_init(struct crypt_hash **ctx, const char *name)
+{
+	struct crypt_hash *h;
+
+	h = malloc(sizeof(*h));
+	if (!h)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	h->hash = _get_alg(name);
+	if (!h->hash) {
+		free(h);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	h->hash->init(&h->nettle_ctx);
+
+	*ctx = h;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void crypt_hash_restart(struct crypt_hash *ctx)
+{
+	ctx->hash->init(&ctx->nettle_ctx);
+}
+
+int crypt_hash_write(struct crypt_hash *ctx, const char *buffer, size_t length)
+{
+	ctx->hash->update(&ctx->nettle_ctx, length, (const uint8_t*)buffer);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_hash_final(struct crypt_hash *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
+{
+	if (length > (size_t)ctx->hash->length)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ctx->hash->digest(&ctx->nettle_ctx, length, (uint8_t *)buffer);
+	crypt_hash_restart(ctx);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void crypt_hash_destroy(struct crypt_hash *ctx)
+{
+	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+	free(ctx);
+}
+
+/* HMAC */
+int crypt_hmac_size(const char *name)
+{
+	return crypt_hash_size(name);
+}
+
+int crypt_hmac_init(struct crypt_hmac **ctx, const char *name,
+		    const void *key, size_t key_length)
+{
+	struct crypt_hmac *h;
+
+	h = malloc(sizeof(*h));
+	if (!h)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+
+
+	h->hash = _get_alg(name);
+	if (!h->hash)
+		goto bad;
+
+	h->key = malloc(key_length);
+	if (!h->key)
+		goto bad;
+
+	memcpy(h->key, key, key_length);
+	h->key_length = key_length;
+
+	h->hash->init(&h->nettle_ctx);
+	h->hash->hmac_set_key(&h->nettle_ctx, h->key_length, h->key);
+
+	*ctx = h;
+	return 0;
+bad:
+	free(h);
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static void crypt_hmac_restart(struct crypt_hmac *ctx)
+{
+	ctx->hash->hmac_set_key(&ctx->nettle_ctx, ctx->key_length, ctx->key);
+}
+
+int crypt_hmac_write(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, const char *buffer, size_t length)
+{
+	ctx->hash->hmac_update(&ctx->nettle_ctx, length, (const uint8_t *)buffer);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_hmac_final(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
+{
+	if (length > (size_t)ctx->hash->length)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ctx->hash->hmac_digest(&ctx->nettle_ctx, length, (uint8_t *)buffer);
+	crypt_hmac_restart(ctx);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void crypt_hmac_destroy(struct crypt_hmac *ctx)
+{
+	memset(ctx->key, 0, ctx->key_length);
+	free(ctx->key);
+	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+	free(ctx);
+}
+
+/* RNG - N/A */
+int crypt_backend_rng(char *buffer, size_t length, int quality, int fips)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/* PBKDF */
+int crypt_pbkdf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
+		const char *password, size_t password_length,
+		const char *salt, size_t salt_length,
+		char *key, size_t key_length,
+		uint32_t iterations, uint32_t memory, uint32_t parallel)
+{
+	struct crypt_hmac *h;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!kdf)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(kdf, "pbkdf2")) {
+		r = crypt_hmac_init(&h, hash, password, password_length);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+
+		nettle_pbkdf2(&h->nettle_ctx, h->hash->hmac_update,
+			      h->hash->hmac_digest, h->hash->length, iterations,
+			      salt_length, (const uint8_t *)salt, key_length,
+			      (uint8_t *)key);
+		crypt_hmac_destroy(h);
+		return 0;
+	} else if (!strncmp(kdf, "argon2", 6)) {
+		return argon2(kdf, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
+			      key, key_length, iterations, memory, parallel);
+	}
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_nss.c b/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..62df2b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,333 @@
+/*
+ * NSS crypto backend implementation
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <nss.h>
+#include <pk11pub.h>
+#include "crypto_backend.h"
+
+#define CONST_CAST(x) (x)(uintptr_t)
+
+static int crypto_backend_initialised = 0;
+static char version[64];
+
+struct hash_alg {
+	const char *name;
+	SECOidTag oid;
+	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE ck_type;
+	int length;
+	unsigned int block_length;
+};
+
+static struct hash_alg hash_algs[] = {
+	{ "sha1",   SEC_OID_SHA1,   CKM_SHA_1_HMAC,  20,  64 },
+	{ "sha256", SEC_OID_SHA256, CKM_SHA256_HMAC, 32,  64 },
+	{ "sha384", SEC_OID_SHA384, CKM_SHA384_HMAC, 48, 128 },
+	{ "sha512", SEC_OID_SHA512, CKM_SHA512_HMAC, 64, 128 },
+//	{ "ripemd160", SEC_OID_RIPEMD160, CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC, 20, 64 },
+	{ NULL, 0, 0, 0 }
+};
+
+struct crypt_hash {
+	PK11Context *md;
+	const struct hash_alg *hash;
+};
+
+struct crypt_hmac {
+	PK11Context *md;
+	PK11SymKey *key;
+	PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+	const struct hash_alg *hash;
+};
+
+static struct hash_alg *_get_alg(const char *name)
+{
+	int i = 0;
+
+	while (name && hash_algs[i].name) {
+		if (!strcmp(name, hash_algs[i].name))
+			return &hash_algs[i];
+		i++;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
+{
+	if (crypto_backend_initialised)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (NSS_NoDB_Init(".") != SECSuccess)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+#if HAVE_DECL_NSS_GETVERSION
+	snprintf(version, 64, "NSS %s", NSS_GetVersion());
+#else
+	snprintf(version, 64, "NSS");
+#endif
+	crypto_backend_initialised = 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void crypt_backend_destroy(void)
+{
+	crypto_backend_initialised = 0;
+}
+
+uint32_t crypt_backend_flags(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_backend_version(void)
+{
+	return crypto_backend_initialised ? version : "";
+}
+
+/* HASH */
+int crypt_hash_size(const char *name)
+{
+	struct hash_alg *ha = _get_alg(name);
+
+	return ha ? ha->length : -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int crypt_hash_init(struct crypt_hash **ctx, const char *name)
+{
+	struct crypt_hash *h;
+
+	h = malloc(sizeof(*h));
+	if (!h)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	h->hash = _get_alg(name);
+	if (!h->hash) {
+		free(h);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	h->md = PK11_CreateDigestContext(h->hash->oid);
+	if (!h->md) {
+		free(h);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (PK11_DigestBegin(h->md) != SECSuccess) {
+		PK11_DestroyContext(h->md, PR_TRUE);
+		free(h);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	*ctx = h;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int crypt_hash_restart(struct crypt_hash *ctx)
+{
+	if (PK11_DigestBegin(ctx->md) != SECSuccess)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_hash_write(struct crypt_hash *ctx, const char *buffer, size_t length)
+{
+	if (PK11_DigestOp(ctx->md, CONST_CAST(unsigned char *)buffer, length) != SECSuccess)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_hash_final(struct crypt_hash *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
+{
+	unsigned char tmp[64];
+	unsigned int tmp_len;
+
+	if (length > (size_t)ctx->hash->length)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (PK11_DigestFinal(ctx->md, tmp, &tmp_len, length) != SECSuccess)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	memcpy(buffer, tmp, length);
+	crypt_backend_memzero(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+
+	if (tmp_len < length)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (crypt_hash_restart(ctx))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void crypt_hash_destroy(struct crypt_hash *ctx)
+{
+	PK11_DestroyContext(ctx->md, PR_TRUE);
+	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+	free(ctx);
+}
+
+/* HMAC */
+int crypt_hmac_size(const char *name)
+{
+	return crypt_hash_size(name);
+}
+
+int crypt_hmac_init(struct crypt_hmac **ctx, const char *name,
+		    const void *key, size_t key_length)
+{
+	struct crypt_hmac *h;
+	SECItem keyItem;
+	SECItem noParams;
+
+	keyItem.type = siBuffer;
+	keyItem.data = CONST_CAST(unsigned char *)key;
+	keyItem.len = (int)key_length;
+
+	noParams.type = siBuffer;
+	noParams.data = 0;
+	noParams.len = 0;
+
+	h = malloc(sizeof(*h));
+	if (!h)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+
+
+	h->hash = _get_alg(name);
+	if (!h->hash)
+		goto bad;
+
+	h->slot = PK11_GetInternalKeySlot();
+	if (!h->slot)
+		goto bad;
+
+	h->key = PK11_ImportSymKey(h->slot, h->hash->ck_type, PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+				   CKA_SIGN,  &keyItem, NULL);
+	if (!h->key)
+		goto bad;
+
+	h->md = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(h->hash->ck_type, CKA_SIGN, h->key,
+					   &noParams);
+	if (!h->md)
+		goto bad;
+
+	if (PK11_DigestBegin(h->md) != SECSuccess)
+		goto bad;
+
+	*ctx = h;
+	return 0;
+bad:
+	crypt_hmac_destroy(h);
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int crypt_hmac_restart(struct crypt_hmac *ctx)
+{
+	if (PK11_DigestBegin(ctx->md) != SECSuccess)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_hmac_write(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, const char *buffer, size_t length)
+{
+	if (PK11_DigestOp(ctx->md, CONST_CAST(unsigned char *)buffer, length) != SECSuccess)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_hmac_final(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
+{
+	unsigned char tmp[64];
+	unsigned int tmp_len;
+
+	if (length > (size_t)ctx->hash->length)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (PK11_DigestFinal(ctx->md, tmp, &tmp_len, length) != SECSuccess)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	memcpy(buffer, tmp, length);
+	crypt_backend_memzero(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+
+	if (tmp_len < length)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (crypt_hmac_restart(ctx))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void crypt_hmac_destroy(struct crypt_hmac *ctx)
+{
+	if (ctx->key)
+		PK11_FreeSymKey(ctx->key);
+	if (ctx->slot)
+		PK11_FreeSlot(ctx->slot);
+	if (ctx->md)
+		PK11_DestroyContext(ctx->md, PR_TRUE);
+	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+	free(ctx);
+}
+
+/* RNG */
+int crypt_backend_rng(char *buffer, size_t length, int quality, int fips)
+{
+	if (fips)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (PK11_GenerateRandom((unsigned char *)buffer, length) != SECSuccess)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* PBKDF */
+int crypt_pbkdf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
+		const char *password, size_t password_length,
+		const char *salt, size_t salt_length,
+		char *key, size_t key_length,
+		uint32_t iterations, uint32_t memory, uint32_t parallel)
+{
+	struct hash_alg *ha;
+
+	if (!kdf)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(kdf, "pbkdf2")) {
+		ha = _get_alg(hash);
+		if (!ha)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		return pkcs5_pbkdf2(hash, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
+				    iterations, key_length, key, ha->block_length);
+	} else if (!strncmp(kdf, "argon2", 6)) {
+		return argon2(kdf, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
+			      key, key_length, iterations, memory, parallel);
+	}
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_openssl.c b/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_openssl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..38d7d72
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_openssl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,337 @@
+/*
+ * OPENSSL crypto backend implementation
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ *
+ * In addition, as a special exception, the copyright holders give
+ * permission to link the code of portions of this program with the
+ * OpenSSL library under certain conditions as described in each
+ * individual source file, and distribute linked combinations
+ * including the two.
+ *
+ * You must obey the GNU Lesser General Public License in all respects
+ * for all of the code used other than OpenSSL.
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "crypto_backend.h"
+
+static int crypto_backend_initialised = 0;
+
+struct crypt_hash {
+	EVP_MD_CTX *md;
+	const EVP_MD *hash_id;
+	int hash_len;
+};
+
+struct crypt_hmac {
+	HMAC_CTX *md;
+	const EVP_MD *hash_id;
+	int hash_len;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Compatible wrappers for OpenSSL < 1.1.0 and LibreSSL < 2.7.0
+ */
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || \
+    (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x2070000fL)
+
+static void openssl_backend_init(void)
+{
+	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+}
+
+static const char *openssl_backend_version(void)
+{
+	return SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION);
+}
+
+static EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_new(void)
+{
+	EVP_MD_CTX *md = malloc(sizeof(*md));
+
+	if (md)
+		EVP_MD_CTX_init(md);
+
+	return md;
+}
+
+static void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *md)
+{
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(md);
+	free(md);
+}
+
+static HMAC_CTX *HMAC_CTX_new(void)
+{
+	HMAC_CTX *md = malloc(sizeof(*md));
+
+	if (md)
+		HMAC_CTX_init(md);
+
+	return md;
+}
+
+static void HMAC_CTX_free(HMAC_CTX *md)
+{
+	HMAC_CTX_cleanup(md);
+	free(md);
+}
+#else
+static void openssl_backend_init(void)
+{
+}
+
+static const char *openssl_backend_version(void)
+{
+    return OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION);
+}
+#endif
+
+int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
+{
+	if (crypto_backend_initialised)
+		return 0;
+
+	openssl_backend_init();
+
+	crypto_backend_initialised = 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void crypt_backend_destroy(void)
+{
+	crypto_backend_initialised = 0;
+}
+
+uint32_t crypt_backend_flags(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_backend_version(void)
+{
+	return openssl_backend_version();
+}
+
+/* HASH */
+int crypt_hash_size(const char *name)
+{
+	const EVP_MD *hash_id = EVP_get_digestbyname(name);
+
+	if (!hash_id)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return EVP_MD_size(hash_id);
+}
+
+int crypt_hash_init(struct crypt_hash **ctx, const char *name)
+{
+	struct crypt_hash *h;
+
+	h = malloc(sizeof(*h));
+	if (!h)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	h->md = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+	if (!h->md) {
+		free(h);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	h->hash_id = EVP_get_digestbyname(name);
+	if (!h->hash_id) {
+		EVP_MD_CTX_free(h->md);
+		free(h);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(h->md, h->hash_id, NULL) != 1) {
+		EVP_MD_CTX_free(h->md);
+		free(h);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	h->hash_len = EVP_MD_size(h->hash_id);
+	*ctx = h;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int crypt_hash_restart(struct crypt_hash *ctx)
+{
+	if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx->md, ctx->hash_id, NULL) != 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_hash_write(struct crypt_hash *ctx, const char *buffer, size_t length)
+{
+	if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx->md, buffer, length) != 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_hash_final(struct crypt_hash *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
+{
+	unsigned char tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+	unsigned int tmp_len = 0;
+
+	if (length > (size_t)ctx->hash_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx->md, tmp, &tmp_len) != 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	memcpy(buffer, tmp, length);
+	crypt_backend_memzero(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+
+	if (tmp_len < length)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (crypt_hash_restart(ctx))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void crypt_hash_destroy(struct crypt_hash *ctx)
+{
+	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->md);
+	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+	free(ctx);
+}
+
+/* HMAC */
+int crypt_hmac_size(const char *name)
+{
+	return crypt_hash_size(name);
+}
+
+int crypt_hmac_init(struct crypt_hmac **ctx, const char *name,
+		    const void *key, size_t key_length)
+{
+	struct crypt_hmac *h;
+
+	h = malloc(sizeof(*h));
+	if (!h)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	h->md = HMAC_CTX_new();
+	if (!h->md) {
+		free(h);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	h->hash_id = EVP_get_digestbyname(name);
+	if (!h->hash_id) {
+		HMAC_CTX_free(h->md);
+		free(h);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	HMAC_Init_ex(h->md, key, key_length, h->hash_id, NULL);
+
+	h->hash_len = EVP_MD_size(h->hash_id);
+	*ctx = h;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void crypt_hmac_restart(struct crypt_hmac *ctx)
+{
+	HMAC_Init_ex(ctx->md, NULL, 0, ctx->hash_id, NULL);
+}
+
+int crypt_hmac_write(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, const char *buffer, size_t length)
+{
+	HMAC_Update(ctx->md, (const unsigned char *)buffer, length);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_hmac_final(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
+{
+	unsigned char tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+	unsigned int tmp_len = 0;
+
+	if (length > (size_t)ctx->hash_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	HMAC_Final(ctx->md, tmp, &tmp_len);
+
+	memcpy(buffer, tmp, length);
+	crypt_backend_memzero(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+
+	if (tmp_len < length)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	crypt_hmac_restart(ctx);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void crypt_hmac_destroy(struct crypt_hmac *ctx)
+{
+	HMAC_CTX_free(ctx->md);
+	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+	free(ctx);
+}
+
+/* RNG */
+int crypt_backend_rng(char *buffer, size_t length, int quality, int fips)
+{
+	if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)buffer, length) != 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* PBKDF */
+int crypt_pbkdf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
+		const char *password, size_t password_length,
+		const char *salt, size_t salt_length,
+		char *key, size_t key_length,
+		uint32_t iterations, uint32_t memory, uint32_t parallel)
+
+{
+	const EVP_MD *hash_id;
+
+	if (!kdf)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(kdf, "pbkdf2")) {
+		hash_id = EVP_get_digestbyname(hash);
+		if (!hash_id)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (!PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(password, (int)password_length,
+		    (const unsigned char *)salt, (int)salt_length,
+	            (int)iterations, hash_id, (int)key_length, (unsigned char *)key))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		return 0;
+	} else if (!strncmp(kdf, "argon2", 6)) {
+		return argon2(kdf, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
+			      key, key_length, iterations, memory, parallel);
+	}
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_storage.c b/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_storage.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..16a20b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_storage.c
@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
+/*
+ * Generic wrapper for storage encryption modes and Initial Vectors
+ * (reimplementation of some functions from Linux dm-crypt kernel)
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2014-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include "bitops.h"
+#include "crypto_backend.h"
+
+#define SECTOR_SHIFT	9
+#define SECTOR_SIZE	(1 << SECTOR_SHIFT)
+
+/*
+ * Internal IV helper
+ * IV documentation: https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMCrypt
+ */
+struct crypt_sector_iv {
+	enum { IV_NONE, IV_NULL, IV_PLAIN, IV_PLAIN64, IV_ESSIV, IV_BENBI, IV_PLAIN64BE } type;
+	int iv_size;
+	char *iv;
+	struct crypt_cipher *essiv_cipher;
+	int benbi_shift;
+};
+
+/* Block encryption storage context */
+struct crypt_storage {
+	uint64_t sector_start;
+	struct crypt_cipher *cipher;
+	struct crypt_sector_iv cipher_iv;
+};
+
+static int int_log2(unsigned int x)
+{
+	int r = 0;
+	for (x >>= 1; x > 0; x >>= 1)
+		r++;
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int crypt_sector_iv_init(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx,
+			 const char *cipher_name, const char *mode_name,
+			 const char *iv_name, const void *key, size_t key_length)
+{
+	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+
+	ctx->iv_size = crypt_cipher_ivsize(cipher_name, mode_name);
+	if (ctx->iv_size < 8)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	if (!strcmp(cipher_name, "cipher_null") ||
+	    !strcmp(mode_name, "ecb")) {
+		if (iv_name)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		ctx->type = IV_NONE;
+		ctx->iv_size = 0;
+		return 0;
+	} else if (!iv_name) {
+		return -EINVAL;
+	} else if (!strcasecmp(iv_name, "null")) {
+		ctx->type = IV_NULL;
+	} else if (!strcasecmp(iv_name, "plain64")) {
+		ctx->type = IV_PLAIN64;
+	} else if (!strcasecmp(iv_name, "plain64be")) {
+		ctx->type = IV_PLAIN64BE;
+	} else if (!strcasecmp(iv_name, "plain")) {
+		ctx->type = IV_PLAIN;
+	} else if (!strncasecmp(iv_name, "essiv:", 6)) {
+		struct crypt_hash *h = NULL;
+		char *hash_name = strchr(iv_name, ':');
+		int hash_size;
+		char tmp[256];
+		int r;
+
+		if (!hash_name)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		hash_size = crypt_hash_size(++hash_name);
+		if (hash_size < 0)
+			return -ENOENT;
+
+		if ((unsigned)hash_size > sizeof(tmp))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (crypt_hash_init(&h, hash_name))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		r = crypt_hash_write(h, key, key_length);
+		if (r) {
+			crypt_hash_destroy(h);
+			return r;
+		}
+
+		r = crypt_hash_final(h, tmp, hash_size);
+		crypt_hash_destroy(h);
+		if (r) {
+			crypt_backend_memzero(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+			return r;
+		}
+
+		r = crypt_cipher_init(&ctx->essiv_cipher, cipher_name, "ecb",
+				      tmp, hash_size);
+		crypt_backend_memzero(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+		if (r)
+			return r;
+
+		ctx->type = IV_ESSIV;
+	} else if (!strncasecmp(iv_name, "benbi", 5)) {
+		int log = int_log2(ctx->iv_size);
+		if (log > SECTOR_SHIFT)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		ctx->type = IV_BENBI;
+		ctx->benbi_shift = SECTOR_SHIFT - log;
+	} else
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	ctx->iv = malloc(ctx->iv_size);
+	if (!ctx->iv)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int crypt_sector_iv_generate(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx, uint64_t sector)
+{
+	uint64_t val;
+
+	switch (ctx->type) {
+	case IV_NONE:
+		break;
+	case IV_NULL:
+		memset(ctx->iv, 0, ctx->iv_size);
+		break;
+	case IV_PLAIN:
+		memset(ctx->iv, 0, ctx->iv_size);
+		*(uint32_t *)ctx->iv = cpu_to_le32(sector & 0xffffffff);
+		break;
+	case IV_PLAIN64:
+		memset(ctx->iv, 0, ctx->iv_size);
+		*(uint64_t *)ctx->iv = cpu_to_le64(sector);
+		break;
+	case IV_PLAIN64BE:
+		memset(ctx->iv, 0, ctx->iv_size);
+		*(uint64_t *)&ctx->iv[ctx->iv_size - sizeof(uint64_t)] = cpu_to_be64(sector);
+		break;
+	case IV_ESSIV:
+		memset(ctx->iv, 0, ctx->iv_size);
+		*(uint64_t *)ctx->iv = cpu_to_le64(sector);
+		return crypt_cipher_encrypt(ctx->essiv_cipher,
+			ctx->iv, ctx->iv, ctx->iv_size, NULL, 0);
+		break;
+	case IV_BENBI:
+		memset(ctx->iv, 0, ctx->iv_size);
+		val = cpu_to_be64((sector << ctx->benbi_shift) + 1);
+		memcpy(ctx->iv + ctx->iv_size - sizeof(val), &val, sizeof(val));
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void crypt_sector_iv_destroy(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx)
+{
+	if (ctx->type == IV_ESSIV)
+		crypt_cipher_destroy(ctx->essiv_cipher);
+
+	if (ctx->iv) {
+		memset(ctx->iv, 0, ctx->iv_size);
+		free(ctx->iv);
+	}
+
+	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+}
+
+/* Block encryption storage wrappers */
+
+int crypt_storage_init(struct crypt_storage **ctx,
+		       uint64_t sector_start,
+		       const char *cipher,
+		       const char *cipher_mode,
+		       const void *key, size_t key_length)
+{
+	struct crypt_storage *s;
+	char mode_name[64];
+	char *cipher_iv = NULL;
+	int r = -EIO;
+
+	s = malloc(sizeof(*s));
+	if (!s)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	memset(s, 0, sizeof(*s));
+
+	/* Remove IV if present */
+	strncpy(mode_name, cipher_mode, sizeof(mode_name));
+	mode_name[sizeof(mode_name) - 1] = 0;
+	cipher_iv = strchr(mode_name, '-');
+	if (cipher_iv) {
+		*cipher_iv = '\0';
+		cipher_iv++;
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_cipher_init(&s->cipher, cipher, mode_name, key, key_length);
+	if (r) {
+		crypt_storage_destroy(s);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_sector_iv_init(&s->cipher_iv, cipher, mode_name, cipher_iv, key, key_length);
+	if (r) {
+		crypt_storage_destroy(s);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	s->sector_start = sector_start;
+
+	*ctx = s;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_storage_decrypt(struct crypt_storage *ctx,
+		       uint64_t sector, size_t count,
+		       char *buffer)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+	int r = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		r = crypt_sector_iv_generate(&ctx->cipher_iv, sector + i);
+		if (r)
+			break;
+		r = crypt_cipher_decrypt(ctx->cipher,
+					 &buffer[i * SECTOR_SIZE],
+					 &buffer[i * SECTOR_SIZE],
+					 SECTOR_SIZE,
+					 ctx->cipher_iv.iv,
+					 ctx->cipher_iv.iv_size);
+		if (r)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_storage_encrypt(struct crypt_storage *ctx,
+		       uint64_t sector, size_t count,
+		       char *buffer)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+	int r = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		r = crypt_sector_iv_generate(&ctx->cipher_iv, sector + i);
+		if (r)
+			break;
+		r = crypt_cipher_encrypt(ctx->cipher,
+					 &buffer[i * SECTOR_SIZE],
+					 &buffer[i * SECTOR_SIZE],
+					 SECTOR_SIZE,
+					 ctx->cipher_iv.iv,
+					 ctx->cipher_iv.iv_size);
+		if (r)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+void crypt_storage_destroy(struct crypt_storage *ctx)
+{
+	if (!ctx)
+		return;
+
+	crypt_sector_iv_destroy(&ctx->cipher_iv);
+
+	if (ctx->cipher)
+		crypt_cipher_destroy(ctx->cipher);
+
+	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+	free(ctx);
+}
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/pbkdf2_generic.c b/lib/crypto_backend/pbkdf2_generic.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cc3f95d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/pbkdf2_generic.c
@@ -0,0 +1,426 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of Password-Based Cryptography as per PKCS#5
+ * Copyright (C) 2002,2003 Simon Josefsson
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Free Software Foundation
+ *
+ * cryptsetup related changes
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <alloca.h>
+#include "crypto_backend.h"
+
+static int hash_buf(const char *src, size_t src_len,
+		    char *dst, size_t dst_len,
+		    const char *hash_name)
+{
+	struct crypt_hash *hd = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (crypt_hash_init(&hd, hash_name))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = crypt_hash_write(hd, src, src_len);
+
+	if (!r)
+		r = crypt_hash_final(hd, dst, dst_len);
+
+	crypt_hash_destroy(hd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * 5.2 PBKDF2
+ *
+ *  PBKDF2 applies a pseudorandom function (see Appendix B.1 for an
+ *  example) to derive keys. The length of the derived key is essentially
+ *  unbounded. (However, the maximum effective search space for the
+ *  derived key may be limited by the structure of the underlying
+ *  pseudorandom function. See Appendix B.1 for further discussion.)
+ *  PBKDF2 is recommended for new applications.
+ *
+ *  PBKDF2 (P, S, c, dkLen)
+ *
+ *  Options:        PRF        underlying pseudorandom function (hLen
+ *                             denotes the length in octets of the
+ *                             pseudorandom function output)
+ *
+ *  Input:          P          password, an octet string (ASCII or UTF-8)
+ *                  S          salt, an octet string
+ *                  c          iteration count, a positive integer
+ *                  dkLen      intended length in octets of the derived
+ *                             key, a positive integer, at most
+ *                             (2^32 - 1) * hLen
+ *
+ *  Output:         DK         derived key, a dkLen-octet string
+ */
+
+/*
+ * if hash_block_size is not zero, the HMAC key is pre-hashed
+ * inside this function.
+ * This prevents situation when crypto backend doesn't support
+ * long HMAC keys or it tries hash long key in every iteration
+ * (because of crypt_final() cannot do simple key reset.
+ */
+
+#define MAX_PRF_BLOCK_LEN 80
+
+int pkcs5_pbkdf2(const char *hash,
+			const char *P, size_t Plen,
+			const char *S, size_t Slen,
+			unsigned int c, unsigned int dkLen,
+			char *DK, unsigned int hash_block_size)
+{
+	struct crypt_hmac *hmac;
+	char U[MAX_PRF_BLOCK_LEN];
+	char T[MAX_PRF_BLOCK_LEN];
+	char P_hash[MAX_PRF_BLOCK_LEN];
+	int i, k, rc = -EINVAL;
+	unsigned int u, hLen, l, r;
+	size_t tmplen = Slen + 4;
+	char *tmp;
+
+	tmp = alloca(tmplen);
+	if (tmp == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	hLen = crypt_hmac_size(hash);
+	if (hLen == 0 || hLen > MAX_PRF_BLOCK_LEN)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (c == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (dkLen == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 *
+	 *  Steps:
+	 *
+	 *     1. If dkLen > (2^32 - 1) * hLen, output "derived key too long" and
+	 *        stop.
+	 */
+
+	if (dkLen > 4294967295U)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 *     2. Let l be the number of hLen-octet blocks in the derived key,
+	 *        rounding up, and let r be the number of octets in the last
+	 *        block:
+	 *
+	 *                  l = CEIL (dkLen / hLen) ,
+	 *                  r = dkLen - (l - 1) * hLen .
+	 *
+	 *        Here, CEIL (x) is the "ceiling" function, i.e. the smallest
+	 *        integer greater than, or equal to, x.
+	 */
+
+	l = dkLen / hLen;
+	if (dkLen % hLen)
+		l++;
+	r = dkLen - (l - 1) * hLen;
+
+	/*
+	 *     3. For each block of the derived key apply the function F defined
+	 *        below to the password P, the salt S, the iteration count c, and
+	 *        the block index to compute the block:
+	 *
+	 *                  T_1 = F (P, S, c, 1) ,
+	 *                  T_2 = F (P, S, c, 2) ,
+	 *                  ...
+	 *                  T_l = F (P, S, c, l) ,
+	 *
+	 *        where the function F is defined as the exclusive-or sum of the
+	 *        first c iterates of the underlying pseudorandom function PRF
+	 *        applied to the password P and the concatenation of the salt S
+	 *        and the block index i:
+	 *
+	 *                  F (P, S, c, i) = U_1 \xor U_2 \xor ... \xor U_c
+	 *
+	 *        where
+	 *
+	 *                  U_1 = PRF (P, S || INT (i)) ,
+	 *                  U_2 = PRF (P, U_1) ,
+	 *                  ...
+	 *                  U_c = PRF (P, U_{c-1}) .
+	 *
+	 *        Here, INT (i) is a four-octet encoding of the integer i, most
+	 *        significant octet first.
+	 *
+	 *     4. Concatenate the blocks and extract the first dkLen octets to
+	 *        produce a derived key DK:
+	 *
+	 *                  DK = T_1 || T_2 ||  ...  || T_l<0..r-1>
+	 *
+	 *     5. Output the derived key DK.
+	 *
+	 *  Note. The construction of the function F follows a "belt-and-
+	 *  suspenders" approach. The iterates U_i are computed recursively to
+	 *  remove a degree of parallelism from an opponent; they are exclusive-
+	 *  ored together to reduce concerns about the recursion degenerating
+	 *  into a small set of values.
+	 *
+	 */
+
+	/* If hash_block_size is provided, hash password in advance. */
+	if (hash_block_size > 0 && Plen > hash_block_size) {
+		if (hash_buf(P, Plen, P_hash, hLen, hash))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (crypt_hmac_init(&hmac, hash, P_hash, hLen))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		crypt_backend_memzero(P_hash, sizeof(P_hash));
+	} else {
+		if (crypt_hmac_init(&hmac, hash, P, Plen))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 1; (unsigned int) i <= l; i++) {
+		memset(T, 0, hLen);
+
+		for (u = 1; u <= c ; u++) {
+			if (u == 1) {
+				memcpy(tmp, S, Slen);
+				tmp[Slen + 0] = (i & 0xff000000) >> 24;
+				tmp[Slen + 1] = (i & 0x00ff0000) >> 16;
+				tmp[Slen + 2] = (i & 0x0000ff00) >> 8;
+				tmp[Slen + 3] = (i & 0x000000ff) >> 0;
+
+				if (crypt_hmac_write(hmac, tmp, tmplen))
+					goto out;
+			} else {
+				if (crypt_hmac_write(hmac, U, hLen))
+					goto out;
+			}
+
+			if (crypt_hmac_final(hmac, U, hLen))
+				goto out;
+
+			for (k = 0; (unsigned int) k < hLen; k++)
+				T[k] ^= U[k];
+		}
+
+		memcpy(DK + (i - 1) * hLen, T, (unsigned int) i == l ? r : hLen);
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	crypt_hmac_destroy(hmac);
+	crypt_backend_memzero(U, sizeof(U));
+	crypt_backend_memzero(T, sizeof(T));
+	crypt_backend_memzero(tmp, tmplen);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+#if 0
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+struct test_vector {
+	const char *hash;
+	unsigned int hash_block_length;
+	unsigned int iterations;
+	const char *password;
+	unsigned int password_length;
+	const char *salt;
+	unsigned int salt_length;
+	const char *output;
+	unsigned int output_length;
+};
+
+struct test_vector test_vectors[] = {
+	/* RFC 3962 */
+	{
+		"sha1", 64, 1,
+		"password", 8,
+		"ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn", 21,
+		"\xcd\xed\xb5\x28\x1b\xb2\xf8\x01"
+		"\x56\x5a\x11\x22\xb2\x56\x35\x15"
+		"\x0a\xd1\xf7\xa0\x4b\xb9\xf3\xa3"
+		"\x33\xec\xc0\xe2\xe1\xf7\x08\x37", 32
+	}, {
+		"sha1", 64, 2,
+		"password", 8,
+		"ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn", 21,
+		"\x01\xdb\xee\x7f\x4a\x9e\x24\x3e"
+		"\x98\x8b\x62\xc7\x3c\xda\x93\x5d"
+		"\xa0\x53\x78\xb9\x32\x44\xec\x8f"
+		"\x48\xa9\x9e\x61\xad\x79\x9d\x86", 32
+	}, {
+		"sha1", 64, 1200,
+		"password", 8,
+		"ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn", 21,
+		"\x5c\x08\xeb\x61\xfd\xf7\x1e\x4e"
+		"\x4e\xc3\xcf\x6b\xa1\xf5\x51\x2b"
+		"\xa7\xe5\x2d\xdb\xc5\xe5\x14\x2f"
+		"\x70\x8a\x31\xe2\xe6\x2b\x1e\x13", 32
+	}, {
+		"sha1", 64, 5,
+		"password", 8,
+		"\0224VxxV4\022", 8, // "\x1234567878563412
+		"\xd1\xda\xa7\x86\x15\xf2\x87\xe6"
+		"\xa1\xc8\xb1\x20\xd7\x06\x2a\x49"
+		"\x3f\x98\xd2\x03\xe6\xbe\x49\xa6"
+		"\xad\xf4\xfa\x57\x4b\x6e\x64\xee", 32
+	}, {
+		"sha1", 64, 1200,
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX", 64,
+		"pass phrase equals block size", 29,
+		"\x13\x9c\x30\xc0\x96\x6b\xc3\x2b"
+		"\xa5\x5f\xdb\xf2\x12\x53\x0a\xc9"
+		"\xc5\xec\x59\xf1\xa4\x52\xf5\xcc"
+		"\x9a\xd9\x40\xfe\xa0\x59\x8e\xd1", 32
+	}, {
+		"sha1", 64, 1200,
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX", 65,
+		"pass phrase exceeds block size", 30,
+		"\x9c\xca\xd6\xd4\x68\x77\x0c\xd5"
+		"\x1b\x10\xe6\xa6\x87\x21\xbe\x61"
+		"\x1a\x8b\x4d\x28\x26\x01\xdb\x3b"
+		"\x36\xbe\x92\x46\x91\x5e\xc8\x2a", 32
+	}, {
+		"sha1", 64, 50,
+		"\360\235\204\236", 4, // g-clef ("\xf09d849e)
+		"EXAMPLE.COMpianist", 18,
+		"\x6b\x9c\xf2\x6d\x45\x45\x5a\x43"
+		"\xa5\xb8\xbb\x27\x6a\x40\x3b\x39"
+		"\xe7\xfe\x37\xa0\xc4\x1e\x02\xc2"
+		"\x81\xff\x30\x69\xe1\xe9\x4f\x52", 32
+	}, {
+	/* RFC-6070 */
+		"sha1", 64, 1,
+		"password", 8,
+		"salt", 4,
+		"\x0c\x60\xc8\x0f\x96\x1f\x0e\x71\xf3\xa9"
+		"\xb5\x24\xaf\x60\x12\x06\x2f\xe0\x37\xa6", 20
+	}, {
+		"sha1", 64, 2,
+		"password", 8,
+		"salt", 4,
+		"\xea\x6c\x01\x4d\xc7\x2d\x6f\x8c\xcd\x1e"
+		"\xd9\x2a\xce\x1d\x41\xf0\xd8\xde\x89\x57", 20
+	}, {
+		"sha1", 64, 4096,
+		"password", 8,
+		"salt", 4,
+		"\x4b\x00\x79\x01\xb7\x65\x48\x9a\xbe\xad"
+		"\x49\xd9\x26\xf7\x21\xd0\x65\xa4\x29\xc1", 20
+	}, {
+		"sha1", 64, 16777216,
+		"password", 8,
+		"salt", 4,
+		"\xee\xfe\x3d\x61\xcd\x4d\xa4\xe4\xe9\x94"
+		"\x5b\x3d\x6b\xa2\x15\x8c\x26\x34\xe9\x84", 20
+	}, {
+		"sha1", 64, 4096,
+		"passwordPASSWORDpassword", 24,
+		"saltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsalt", 36,
+		"\x3d\x2e\xec\x4f\xe4\x1c\x84\x9b\x80\xc8"
+		"\xd8\x36\x62\xc0\xe4\x4a\x8b\x29\x1a\x96"
+		"\x4c\xf2\xf0\x70\x38", 25
+	}, {
+		"sha1", 64, 4096,
+		"pass\0word", 9,
+		"sa\0lt", 5,
+		"\x56\xfa\x6a\xa7\x55\x48\x09\x9d\xcc\x37"
+		"\xd7\xf0\x34\x25\xe0\xc3", 16
+	}, {
+	/* empty password test */
+		"sha1", 64, 2,
+		"", 0,
+		"salt", 4,
+		"\x13\x3a\x4c\xe8\x37\xb4\xd2\x52\x1e\xe2"
+		"\xbf\x03\xe1\x1c\x71\xca\x79\x4e\x07\x97", 20
+	}, {
+	/* Password exceeds block size test */
+		"sha256", 64, 1200,
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX", 65,
+		"pass phrase exceeds block size", 30,
+		"\x22\x34\x4b\xc4\xb6\xe3\x26\x75"
+		"\xa8\x09\x0f\x3e\xa8\x0b\xe0\x1d"
+		"\x5f\x95\x12\x6a\x2c\xdd\xc3\xfa"
+		"\xcc\x4a\x5e\x6d\xca\x04\xec\x58", 32
+	}, {
+		"sha512", 128, 1200,
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX", 129,
+		"pass phrase exceeds block size", 30,
+		"\x0f\xb2\xed\x2c\x0e\x6e\xfb\x7d"
+		"\x7d\x8e\xdd\x58\x01\xb4\x59\x72"
+		"\x99\x92\x16\x30\x5e\xa4\x36\x8d"
+		"\x76\x14\x80\xf3\xe3\x7a\x22\xb9", 32
+	}, {
+		"whirlpool", 64, 1200,
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX", 65,
+		"pass phrase exceeds block size", 30,
+		"\x9c\x1c\x74\xf5\x88\x26\xe7\x6a"
+		"\x53\x58\xf4\x0c\x39\xe7\x80\x89"
+		"\x07\xc0\x31\x19\x9a\x50\xa2\x48"
+		"\xf1\xd9\xfe\x78\x64\xe5\x84\x50", 32
+	}
+};
+
+static void printhex(const char *s, const char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	printf("%s: ", s);
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+		printf("\\x%02x", (unsigned char)buf[i]);
+	printf("\n");
+	fflush(stdout);
+}
+
+static int pkcs5_pbkdf2_test_vectors(void)
+{
+	char result[64];
+	unsigned int i, j;
+	struct test_vector *vec;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < (sizeof(test_vectors) / sizeof(*test_vectors)); i++) {
+		vec = &test_vectors[i];
+		for (j = 1; j <= vec->output_length; j++) {
+			if (pkcs5_pbkdf2(vec->hash,
+			    vec->password, vec->password_length,
+			    vec->salt, vec->salt_length,
+			    vec->iterations,
+			    j, result, vec->hash_block_length)) {
+				printf("pbkdf2 failed, vector %d\n", i);
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+			if (memcmp(result, vec->output, j) != 0) {
+				printf("vector %u\n", i);
+				printhex(" got", result, j);
+				printhex("want", vec->output, j);
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+			memset(result, 0, sizeof(result));
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/pbkdf_check.c b/lib/crypto_backend/pbkdf_check.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..db65eab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/pbkdf_check.c
@@ -0,0 +1,431 @@
+/*
+ * PBKDF performance check
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Ondrej Mosnacek
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include "crypto_backend.h"
+
+#define BENCH_MIN_MS 250
+#define BENCH_MIN_MS_FAST 10
+#define BENCH_PERCENT_ATLEAST 95
+#define BENCH_PERCENT_ATMOST 110
+#define BENCH_SAMPLES_FAST 3
+#define BENCH_SAMPLES_SLOW 1
+
+/* These PBKDF2 limits must be never violated */
+int crypt_pbkdf_get_limits(const char *kdf, struct crypt_pbkdf_limits *limits)
+{
+	if (!kdf || !limits)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(kdf, "pbkdf2")) {
+		limits->min_iterations = 1000; /* recommendation in NIST SP 800-132 */
+		limits->max_iterations = UINT32_MAX;
+		limits->min_memory     = 0; /* N/A */
+		limits->max_memory     = 0; /* N/A */
+		limits->min_parallel   = 0; /* N/A */
+		limits->max_parallel   = 0; /* N/A */
+		return 0;
+	} else if (!strcmp(kdf, "argon2i") || !strcmp(kdf, "argon2id")) {
+		limits->min_iterations = 4;
+		limits->max_iterations = UINT32_MAX;
+		limits->min_memory     = 32;
+		limits->max_memory     = 4*1024*1024; /* 4GiB */
+		limits->min_parallel   = 1;
+		limits->max_parallel   = 4;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static long time_ms(struct rusage *start, struct rusage *end)
+{
+	int count_kernel_time = 0;
+	long ms;
+
+	if (crypt_backend_flags() & CRYPT_BACKEND_KERNEL)
+		count_kernel_time = 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * FIXME: if there is no self usage info, count system time.
+	 * This seem like getrusage() bug in some hypervisors...
+	 */
+	if (!end->ru_utime.tv_sec && !start->ru_utime.tv_sec &&
+	    !end->ru_utime.tv_usec && !start->ru_utime.tv_usec)
+		count_kernel_time = 1;
+
+	ms = (end->ru_utime.tv_sec - start->ru_utime.tv_sec) * 1000;
+	ms += (end->ru_utime.tv_usec - start->ru_utime.tv_usec) / 1000;
+
+	if (count_kernel_time) {
+		ms += (end->ru_stime.tv_sec - start->ru_stime.tv_sec) * 1000;
+		ms += (end->ru_stime.tv_usec - start->ru_stime.tv_usec) / 1000;
+	}
+
+	return ms;
+}
+
+static long timespec_ms(struct timespec *start, struct timespec *end)
+{
+	return (end->tv_sec - start->tv_sec) * 1000 +
+	        (end->tv_nsec - start->tv_nsec) / (1000 * 1000);
+}
+
+static int measure_argon2(const char *kdf, const char *password, size_t password_length,
+			  const char *salt, size_t salt_length,
+			  char *key, size_t key_length,
+			  uint32_t t_cost, uint32_t m_cost, uint32_t parallel,
+			  size_t samples, long ms_atleast, long *out_ms)
+{
+	long ms, ms_min = LONG_MAX;
+	int r;
+	size_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < samples; i++) {
+		struct timespec tstart, tend;
+
+		/*
+		 * NOTE: We must use clock_gettime here, because Argon2 can run over
+		 * multiple threads, and thus we care about real time, not CPU time!
+		 */
+		if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW, &tstart) < 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		r = crypt_pbkdf(kdf, NULL, password, password_length, salt,
+		                salt_length, key, key_length, t_cost, m_cost, parallel);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+
+		if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW, &tend) < 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		ms = timespec_ms(&tstart, &tend);
+		if (ms < 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (ms < ms_atleast) {
+			/* early exit */
+			ms_min = ms;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (ms < ms_min) {
+			ms_min = ms;
+		}
+	}
+	*out_ms = ms_min;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#define CONTINUE 0
+#define FINAL   1
+static int next_argon2_params(uint32_t *t_cost, uint32_t *m_cost,
+			      uint32_t min_t_cost, uint32_t min_m_cost,
+			      uint32_t max_m_cost, long ms, uint32_t target_ms)
+{
+	uint32_t old_t_cost, old_m_cost, new_t_cost, new_m_cost;
+	uint64_t num, denom;
+
+	old_t_cost = *t_cost;
+	old_m_cost = *m_cost;
+
+	if (ms > target_ms) {
+		/* decreasing, first try to lower t_cost, then m_cost */
+		num = (uint64_t)*t_cost * (uint64_t)target_ms;
+		denom = (uint64_t)ms;
+		new_t_cost = (uint32_t)(num / denom);
+		if (new_t_cost < min_t_cost) {
+			num = (uint64_t)*t_cost * (uint64_t)*m_cost *
+			      (uint64_t)target_ms;
+			denom = (uint64_t)min_t_cost * (uint64_t)ms;
+			*t_cost = min_t_cost;
+			*m_cost = (uint32_t)(num / denom);
+			if (*m_cost < min_m_cost) {
+				*m_cost = min_m_cost;
+				return FINAL;
+			}
+		} else {
+			*t_cost = new_t_cost;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* increasing, first try to increase m_cost, then t_cost */
+		num = (uint64_t)*m_cost * (uint64_t)target_ms;
+		denom = (uint64_t)ms;
+		new_m_cost = (uint32_t)(num / denom);
+		if (new_m_cost > max_m_cost) {
+			num = (uint64_t)*t_cost * (uint64_t)*m_cost *
+			      (uint64_t)target_ms;
+			denom = (uint64_t)max_m_cost * (uint64_t)ms;
+			*t_cost = (uint32_t)(num / denom);
+			*m_cost = max_m_cost;
+			if (*t_cost <= min_t_cost) {
+				*t_cost = min_t_cost;
+				return FINAL;
+			}
+		} else if (new_m_cost < min_m_cost) {
+			*m_cost = min_m_cost;
+			return FINAL;
+		} else {
+			*m_cost = new_m_cost;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* do not continue if it is the same as in the previous run */
+	if (old_t_cost == *t_cost && old_m_cost == *m_cost)
+		return FINAL;
+
+	return CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int crypt_argon2_check(const char *kdf, const char *password,
+			      size_t password_length, const char *salt,
+			      size_t salt_length, size_t key_length,
+			      uint32_t min_t_cost, uint32_t min_m_cost, uint32_t max_m_cost,
+			      uint32_t parallel, uint32_t target_ms,
+			      uint32_t *out_t_cost, uint32_t *out_m_cost,
+			      int (*progress)(uint32_t time_ms, void *usrptr),
+			      void *usrptr)
+{
+	int r = 0;
+	char *key = NULL;
+	uint32_t t_cost, m_cost;
+	long ms;
+	long ms_atleast = (long)target_ms * BENCH_PERCENT_ATLEAST / 100;
+	long ms_atmost = (long)target_ms * BENCH_PERCENT_ATMOST / 100;
+
+	if (key_length <= 0 || target_ms <= 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (min_m_cost < (parallel * 8))
+		min_m_cost = parallel * 8;
+
+	if (max_m_cost < min_m_cost)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	key = malloc(key_length);
+	if (!key)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	t_cost = min_t_cost;
+	m_cost = min_m_cost;
+
+	/* 1. Find some small parameters, s. t. ms >= BENCH_MIN_MS: */
+	while (1) {
+		r = measure_argon2(kdf, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
+		                   key, key_length, t_cost, m_cost, parallel,
+		                   BENCH_SAMPLES_FAST, BENCH_MIN_MS, &ms);
+		if (!r) {
+			/* Update parameters to actual measurement */
+			*out_t_cost = t_cost;
+			*out_m_cost = m_cost;
+			if (progress && progress((uint32_t)ms, usrptr))
+				r = -EINTR;
+		}
+
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		if (ms >= BENCH_MIN_MS)
+			break;
+
+		if (m_cost == max_m_cost) {
+			if (ms < BENCH_MIN_MS_FAST)
+				t_cost *= 16;
+			else {
+				uint32_t new = (t_cost * BENCH_MIN_MS) / (uint32_t)ms;
+				if (new == t_cost)
+					break;
+
+				t_cost = new;
+			}
+		} else {
+			if (ms < BENCH_MIN_MS_FAST)
+				m_cost *= 16;
+			else {
+				uint32_t new = (m_cost * BENCH_MIN_MS) / (uint32_t)ms;
+				if (new == m_cost)
+					break;
+
+				m_cost = new;
+			}
+			if (m_cost > max_m_cost) {
+				m_cost = max_m_cost;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	/*
+	 * 2. Use the params obtained in (1.) to estimate the target params.
+	 * 3. Then repeatedly measure the candidate params and if they fall out of
+	 * the acceptance range (+-5 %), try to improve the estimate:
+	 */
+	do {
+		if (next_argon2_params(&t_cost, &m_cost, min_t_cost, min_m_cost,
+				       max_m_cost, ms, target_ms)) {
+			/* Update parameters to final computation */
+			*out_t_cost = t_cost;
+			*out_m_cost = m_cost;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		r = measure_argon2(kdf, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
+		                   key, key_length, t_cost, m_cost, parallel,
+		                   BENCH_SAMPLES_SLOW, ms_atleast, &ms);
+
+		if (!r) {
+			/* Update parameters to actual measurement */
+			*out_t_cost = t_cost;
+			*out_m_cost = m_cost;
+			if (progress && progress((uint32_t)ms, usrptr))
+				r = -EINTR;
+		}
+
+		if (r < 0)
+			break;
+
+	} while (ms < ms_atleast || ms > ms_atmost);
+out:
+	if (key) {
+		crypt_backend_memzero(key, key_length);
+		free(key);
+	}
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* This code benchmarks PBKDF and returns iterations/second using specified hash */
+static int crypt_pbkdf_check(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
+		      const char *password, size_t password_length,
+		      const char *salt, size_t salt_length,
+		      size_t key_length, uint32_t *iter_secs, uint32_t target_ms,
+		      int (*progress)(uint32_t time_ms, void *usrptr), void *usrptr)
+
+{
+	struct rusage rstart, rend;
+	int r = 0, step = 0;
+	long ms = 0;
+	char *key = NULL;
+	uint32_t iterations;
+	double PBKDF2_temp;
+
+	if (!kdf || !hash || key_length <= 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	key = malloc(key_length);
+	if (!key)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	*iter_secs = 0;
+	iterations = 1 << 15;
+	while (1) {
+		if (getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &rstart) < 0) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		r = crypt_pbkdf(kdf, hash, password, password_length, salt,
+				salt_length, key, key_length, iterations, 0, 0);
+
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		if (getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &rend) < 0) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		ms = time_ms(&rstart, &rend);
+		if (ms) {
+			PBKDF2_temp = (double)iterations * target_ms / ms;
+			if (PBKDF2_temp > UINT32_MAX)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			*iter_secs = (uint32_t)PBKDF2_temp;
+		}
+
+		if (progress && progress((uint32_t)ms, usrptr)) {
+			r = -EINTR;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (ms > 500)
+			break;
+
+		if (ms <= 62)
+			iterations <<= 4;
+		else if (ms <= 125)
+			iterations <<= 3;
+		else if (ms <= 250)
+			iterations <<= 2;
+		else
+			iterations <<= 1;
+
+		if (++step > 10 || !iterations) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+out:
+	if (key) {
+		crypt_backend_memzero(key, key_length);
+		free(key);
+	}
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_pbkdf_perf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
+		const char *password, size_t password_size,
+		const char *salt, size_t salt_size,
+		size_t volume_key_size, uint32_t time_ms,
+		uint32_t max_memory_kb, uint32_t parallel_threads,
+		uint32_t *iterations_out, uint32_t *memory_out,
+		int (*progress)(uint32_t time_ms, void *usrptr), void *usrptr)
+{
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_limits pbkdf_limits;
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!kdf || !iterations_out || !memory_out)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* FIXME: whole limits propagation should be more clear here */
+	r = crypt_pbkdf_get_limits(kdf, &pbkdf_limits);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	*memory_out = 0;
+	*iterations_out = 0;
+
+	if (!strcmp(kdf, "pbkdf2"))
+		r = crypt_pbkdf_check(kdf, hash, password, password_size,
+				      salt, salt_size, volume_key_size,
+				      iterations_out, time_ms, progress, usrptr);
+
+	else if (!strncmp(kdf, "argon2", 6))
+		r = crypt_argon2_check(kdf, password, password_size,
+				       salt, salt_size, volume_key_size,
+				       pbkdf_limits.min_iterations,
+				       pbkdf_limits.min_memory,
+				       max_memory_kb,
+				       parallel_threads, time_ms, iterations_out,
+				       memory_out, progress, usrptr);
+	return r;
+}
diff --git a/lib/integrity/integrity.c b/lib/integrity/integrity.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c4c3f56
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/integrity/integrity.c
@@ -0,0 +1,327 @@
+/*
+ * Integrity volume handling
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <uuid/uuid.h>
+
+#include "integrity.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+static int INTEGRITY_read_superblock(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				     struct device *device,
+				     uint64_t offset, struct superblock *sb)
+{
+	int devfd, r;
+
+	devfd = device_open(cd, device, O_RDONLY);
+	if(devfd < 0) {
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+		device_alignment(device), sb, sizeof(*sb), offset) != sizeof(*sb) ||
+	    memcmp(sb->magic, SB_MAGIC, sizeof(sb->magic)) ||
+	    (sb->version != SB_VERSION_1 && sb->version != SB_VERSION_2)) {
+		log_std(cd, "No integrity superblock detected on %s.\n",
+			device_path(device));
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	} else {
+		sb->integrity_tag_size = le16toh(sb->integrity_tag_size);
+		sb->journal_sections = le32toh(sb->journal_sections);
+		sb->provided_data_sectors = le64toh(sb->provided_data_sectors);
+		sb->recalc_sector = le64toh(sb->recalc_sector);
+		sb->flags = le32toh(sb->flags);
+		r = 0;
+	}
+
+	close(devfd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int INTEGRITY_read_sb(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_params_integrity *params)
+{
+	struct superblock sb;
+	int r;
+
+	r = INTEGRITY_read_superblock(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd), 0, &sb);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	params->sector_size = SECTOR_SIZE << sb.log2_sectors_per_block;
+	params->tag_size = sb.integrity_tag_size;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int INTEGRITY_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device, uint64_t offset)
+{
+	struct superblock sb;
+	int r;
+
+	r = INTEGRITY_read_superblock(cd, device, offset, &sb);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	log_std(cd, "Info for integrity device %s.\n", device_path(device));
+	log_std(cd, "superblock_version %d\n", (unsigned)sb.version);
+	log_std(cd, "log2_interleave_sectors %d\n", sb.log2_interleave_sectors);
+	log_std(cd, "integrity_tag_size %u\n", sb.integrity_tag_size);
+	log_std(cd, "journal_sections %u\n", sb.journal_sections);
+	log_std(cd, "provided_data_sectors %" PRIu64 "\n", sb.provided_data_sectors);
+	log_std(cd, "sector_size %u\n", SECTOR_SIZE << sb.log2_sectors_per_block);
+	if (sb.version == SB_VERSION_2 && (sb.flags & SB_FLAG_RECALCULATING))
+		log_std(cd, "recalc_sector %" PRIu64 "\n", sb.recalc_sector);
+	log_std(cd, "flags %s%s\n",
+		sb.flags & SB_FLAG_HAVE_JOURNAL_MAC ? "have_journal_mac " : "",
+		sb.flags & SB_FLAG_RECALCULATING ? "recalculating " : "");
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int INTEGRITY_data_sectors(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			   struct device *device, uint64_t offset,
+			   uint64_t *data_sectors)
+{
+	struct superblock sb;
+	int r;
+
+	r = INTEGRITY_read_superblock(cd, device, offset, &sb);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	*data_sectors = sb.provided_data_sectors;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int INTEGRITY_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *integrity)
+{
+	if (!integrity)
+		return 0;
+
+	//FIXME: use crypto backend hash size
+	if (!strcmp(integrity, "aead"))
+		return 0;
+	else if (!strcmp(integrity, "hmac(sha1)"))
+		return 20;
+	else if (!strcmp(integrity, "hmac(sha256)"))
+		return 32;
+	else if (!strcmp(integrity, "hmac(sha512)"))
+		return 64;
+	else if (!strcmp(integrity, "poly1305"))
+		return 0;
+	else if (!strcmp(integrity, "none"))
+		return 0;
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int INTEGRITY_tag_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		       const char *integrity,
+		       const char *cipher,
+		       const char *cipher_mode)
+{
+	int iv_tag_size = 0, auth_tag_size = 0;
+
+	if (!cipher_mode)
+		iv_tag_size = 0;
+	else if (!strcmp(cipher_mode, "xts-random"))
+		iv_tag_size = 16;
+	else if (!strcmp(cipher_mode, "gcm-random"))
+		iv_tag_size = 12;
+	else if (!strcmp(cipher_mode, "ccm-random"))
+		iv_tag_size = 8;
+	else if (!strcmp(cipher_mode, "ctr-random"))
+		iv_tag_size = 16;
+	else if (!strcmp(cipher, "aegis256") && !strcmp(cipher_mode, "random"))
+		iv_tag_size = 32;
+	else if (!strcmp(cipher_mode, "random"))
+		iv_tag_size = 16;
+
+	//FIXME: use crypto backend hash size
+	if (!integrity || !strcmp(integrity, "none"))
+		auth_tag_size = 0;
+	else if (!strcmp(integrity, "aead"))
+		auth_tag_size = 16; //FIXME gcm- mode only
+	else if (!strcmp(integrity, "cmac(aes)"))
+		auth_tag_size = 16;
+	else if (!strcmp(integrity, "hmac(sha1)"))
+		auth_tag_size = 20;
+	else if (!strcmp(integrity, "hmac(sha256)"))
+		auth_tag_size = 32;
+	else if (!strcmp(integrity, "hmac(sha512)"))
+		auth_tag_size = 64;
+	else if (!strcmp(integrity, "poly1305")) {
+		if (iv_tag_size)
+			iv_tag_size = 12;
+		auth_tag_size = 16;
+	}
+
+	return iv_tag_size + auth_tag_size;
+}
+
+int INTEGRITY_create_dmd_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		       const struct crypt_params_integrity *params,
+		       struct volume_key *vk,
+		       struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key,
+		       struct volume_key *journal_mac_key,
+		       struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd,
+		       uint32_t flags)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!dmd)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*dmd = (struct crypt_dm_active_device) {
+		.flags = flags,
+	};
+
+	r = INTEGRITY_data_sectors(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd),
+				   crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE, &dmd->size);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return dm_integrity_target_set(&dmd->segment, 0, dmd->size,
+			crypt_metadata_device(cd), crypt_data_device(cd),
+			crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd), crypt_get_data_offset(cd),
+			crypt_get_sector_size(cd), vk, journal_crypt_key,
+			journal_mac_key, params);
+}
+
+int INTEGRITY_activate_dmd_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		       const char *name,
+		       struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+{
+	int r;
+	uint32_t dmi_flags;
+	struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd->segment;
+
+	if (!single_segment(dmd) || tgt->type != DM_INTEGRITY)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Trying to activate INTEGRITY device on top of %s, using name %s, tag size %d, provided sectors %" PRIu64".",
+		device_path(tgt->data_device), name, tgt->u.integrity.tag_size, dmd->size);
+
+	r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->data_device, DEV_EXCL,
+				tgt->u.integrity.offset, NULL, &dmd->flags);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	if (tgt->u.integrity.meta_device) {
+		r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->u.integrity.meta_device, DEV_EXCL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+		if (r)
+			return r;
+	}
+
+	r = dm_create_device(cd, name, "INTEGRITY", dmd);
+	if (r < 0 && (dm_flags(cd, DM_INTEGRITY, &dmi_flags) || !(dmi_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_SUPPORTED))) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Kernel doesn't support dm-integrity mapping."));
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int INTEGRITY_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		       const char *name,
+		       const struct crypt_params_integrity *params,
+		       struct volume_key *vk,
+		       struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key,
+		       struct volume_key *journal_mac_key,
+		       uint32_t flags)
+{
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {};
+	int r = INTEGRITY_create_dmd_device(cd, params, vk, journal_crypt_key, journal_mac_key, &dmd, flags);
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = INTEGRITY_activate_dmd_device(cd, name, &dmd);
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int INTEGRITY_format(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		     const struct crypt_params_integrity *params,
+		     struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key,
+		     struct volume_key *journal_mac_key)
+{
+	uint32_t dmi_flags;
+	char tmp_name[64], tmp_uuid[40];
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmdi = {
+		.size = 8,
+		.flags = CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE, /* We always create journal but it can be unused later */
+	};
+	struct dm_target *tgt = &dmdi.segment;
+	int r;
+	uuid_t tmp_uuid_bin;
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+	uuid_generate(tmp_uuid_bin);
+	uuid_unparse(tmp_uuid_bin, tmp_uuid);
+
+	snprintf(tmp_name, sizeof(tmp_name), "temporary-cryptsetup-%s", tmp_uuid);
+
+	/* There is no data area, we can actually use fake zeroed key */
+	if (params && params->integrity_key_size)
+		vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(params->integrity_key_size, NULL);
+
+	r = dm_integrity_target_set(tgt, 0, dmdi.size, crypt_metadata_device(cd),
+			crypt_data_device(cd), crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd),
+			crypt_get_data_offset(cd), crypt_get_sector_size(cd), vk,
+			journal_crypt_key, journal_mac_key, params);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Trying to format INTEGRITY device on top of %s, tmp name %s, tag size %d.",
+		device_path(tgt->data_device), tmp_name, tgt->u.integrity.tag_size);
+
+	r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->data_device, DEV_EXCL, tgt->u.integrity.offset, NULL, NULL);
+	if (r < 0 && (dm_flags(cd, DM_INTEGRITY, &dmi_flags) || !(dmi_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_SUPPORTED))) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Kernel doesn't support dm-integrity mapping."));
+		r = -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+	if (r) {
+		dm_targets_free(cd, &dmdi);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	if (tgt->u.integrity.meta_device) {
+		r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->u.integrity.meta_device, DEV_EXCL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+		if (r) {
+			dm_targets_free(cd, &dmdi);
+			return r;
+		}
+	}
+
+	r = dm_create_device(cd, tmp_name, "INTEGRITY", &dmdi);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmdi);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	return dm_remove_device(cd, tmp_name, CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_FORCE);
+}
diff --git a/lib/integrity/integrity.h b/lib/integrity/integrity.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a4b4c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+/*
+ * Integrity header defitinion
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPTSETUP_INTEGRITY_H
+#define _CRYPTSETUP_INTEGRITY_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+struct crypt_device;
+struct device;
+struct crypt_params_integrity;
+struct volume_key;
+struct crypt_dm_active_device;
+
+/* dm-integrity helper */
+#define SB_MAGIC	"integrt"
+#define SB_VERSION_1	1
+#define SB_VERSION_2	2
+
+#define SB_FLAG_HAVE_JOURNAL_MAC	(1 << 0)
+#define SB_FLAG_RECALCULATING		(1 << 1) /* V2 only */
+
+struct superblock {
+	uint8_t magic[8];
+	uint8_t version;
+	int8_t log2_interleave_sectors;
+	uint16_t integrity_tag_size;
+	uint32_t journal_sections;
+	uint64_t provided_data_sectors;
+	uint32_t flags;
+	uint8_t log2_sectors_per_block;
+        uint8_t pad[3];
+        uint64_t recalc_sector; /* V2 only */
+} __attribute__ ((packed));
+
+int INTEGRITY_read_sb(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_params_integrity *params);
+
+int INTEGRITY_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device, uint64_t offset);
+
+int INTEGRITY_data_sectors(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			   struct device *device, uint64_t offset,
+			   uint64_t *data_sectors);
+int INTEGRITY_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		       const char *integrity);
+int INTEGRITY_tag_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		       const char *integrity,
+		       const char *cipher,
+		       const char *cipher_mode);
+
+int INTEGRITY_format(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		     const struct crypt_params_integrity *params,
+		     struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key,
+		     struct volume_key *journal_mac_key);
+
+int INTEGRITY_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		       const char *name,
+		       const struct crypt_params_integrity *params,
+		       struct volume_key *vk,
+		       struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key,
+		       struct volume_key *journal_mac_key,
+		       uint32_t flags);
+
+int INTEGRITY_create_dmd_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		       const struct crypt_params_integrity *params,
+		       struct volume_key *vk,
+		       struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key,
+		       struct volume_key *journal_mac_key,
+		       struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd,
+		       uint32_t flags);
+
+int INTEGRITY_activate_dmd_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		       const char *name,
+		       struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd);
+#endif
diff --git a/lib/internal.h b/lib/internal.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aa3227d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/internal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
+/*
+ * libcryptsetup - cryptsetup library internal
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef INTERNAL_H
+#define INTERNAL_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <inttypes.h>
+
+#include "nls.h"
+#include "bitops.h"
+#include "utils_blkid.h"
+#include "utils_crypt.h"
+#include "utils_loop.h"
+#include "utils_dm.h"
+#include "utils_fips.h"
+#include "utils_keyring.h"
+#include "utils_io.h"
+#include "crypto_backend.h"
+
+#include "libcryptsetup.h"
+
+/* to silent gcc -Wcast-qual for const cast */
+#define CONST_CAST(x) (x)(uintptr_t)
+
+#define SHIFT_4K		12
+#define SECTOR_SHIFT		9
+#define SECTOR_SIZE		(1 << SECTOR_SHIFT)
+#define MAX_SECTOR_SIZE		4096 /* min page size among all platforms */
+#define DEFAULT_DISK_ALIGNMENT	1048576 /* 1MiB */
+#define DEFAULT_MEM_ALIGNMENT	4096
+#define LOG_MAX_LEN		4096
+
+#define at_least(a, b) ({ __typeof__(a) __at_least = (a); (__at_least >= (b))?__at_least:(b); })
+
+#define MISALIGNED(a, b)	((a) & ((b) - 1))
+#define MISALIGNED_4K(a)	MISALIGNED((a), 1 << SHIFT_4K)
+#define MISALIGNED_512(a)	MISALIGNED((a), 1 << SECTOR_SHIFT)
+#define NOTPOW2(a)		MISALIGNED((a), (a))
+
+#ifndef ARRAY_SIZE
+# define ARRAY_SIZE(arr) (sizeof(arr) / sizeof((arr)[0]))
+#endif
+
+#define MOVE_REF(x, y) \
+	do { \
+		typeof (x) *_px = &(x), *_py = &(y); \
+		*_px = *_py; \
+		*_py = NULL; \
+	} while (0)
+
+struct crypt_device;
+
+struct volume_key {
+	size_t keylength;
+	const char *key_description;
+	char key[];
+};
+
+struct volume_key *crypt_alloc_volume_key(size_t keylength, const char *key);
+struct volume_key *crypt_generate_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd, size_t keylength);
+void crypt_free_volume_key(struct volume_key *vk);
+int crypt_volume_key_set_description(struct volume_key *key, const char *key_description);
+
+struct crypt_pbkdf_type *crypt_get_pbkdf(struct crypt_device *cd);
+int init_pbkdf_type(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		    const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf,
+		    const char *dev_type);
+int verify_pbkdf_params(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf);
+int crypt_benchmark_pbkdf_internal(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				   struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf,
+				   size_t volume_key_size);
+const char *crypt_get_cipher_spec(struct crypt_device *cd);
+
+/* Device backend */
+struct device;
+int device_alloc(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device **device, const char *path);
+int device_alloc_no_check(struct device **device, const char *path);
+void device_free(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device);
+const char *device_path(const struct device *device);
+const char *device_dm_name(const struct device *device);
+const char *device_block_path(const struct device *device);
+void device_topology_alignment(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			       struct device *device,
+			       unsigned long *required_alignment, /* bytes */
+			       unsigned long *alignment_offset,   /* bytes */
+			       unsigned long default_alignment);
+size_t device_block_size(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device);
+int device_read_ahead(struct device *device, uint32_t *read_ahead);
+int device_size(struct device *device, uint64_t *size);
+int device_open(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device, int flags);
+void device_disable_direct_io(struct device *device);
+int device_is_identical(struct device *device1, struct device *device2);
+int device_is_rotational(struct device *device);
+size_t device_alignment(struct device *device);
+int device_direct_io(const struct device *device);
+int device_fallocate(struct device *device, uint64_t size);
+void device_sync(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device, int devfd);
+int device_check_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		      struct device *device,
+		      uint64_t req_offset, int falloc);
+
+int device_open_locked(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device, int flags);
+int device_read_lock(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device);
+int device_write_lock(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device);
+void device_read_unlock(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device);
+void device_write_unlock(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device);
+
+enum devcheck { DEV_OK = 0, DEV_EXCL = 1 };
+int device_check_access(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			struct device *device,
+			enum devcheck device_check);
+int device_block_adjust(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			struct device *device,
+			enum devcheck device_check,
+			uint64_t device_offset,
+			uint64_t *size,
+			uint32_t *flags);
+size_t size_round_up(size_t size, size_t block);
+
+int create_or_reload_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+		     const char *type, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd);
+
+int create_or_reload_device_with_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+		     const char *type, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd,
+		     struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmdi);
+
+/* Receive backend devices from context helpers */
+struct device *crypt_metadata_device(struct crypt_device *cd);
+struct device *crypt_data_device(struct crypt_device *cd);
+
+int crypt_confirm(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *msg);
+
+char *crypt_lookup_dev(const char *dev_id);
+int crypt_dev_is_rotational(int major, int minor);
+int crypt_dev_is_partition(const char *dev_path);
+char *crypt_get_partition_device(const char *dev_path, uint64_t offset, uint64_t size);
+char *crypt_get_base_device(const char *dev_path);
+uint64_t crypt_dev_partition_offset(const char *dev_path);
+int lookup_by_disk_id(const char *dm_uuid);
+int lookup_by_sysfs_uuid_field(const char *dm_uuid, size_t max_len);
+
+size_t crypt_getpagesize(void);
+unsigned crypt_cpusonline(void);
+uint64_t crypt_getphysmemory_kb(void);
+
+int init_crypto(struct crypt_device *ctx);
+
+void logger(struct crypt_device *cd, int level, const char *file, int line, const char *format, ...) __attribute__ ((format (printf, 5, 6)));
+#define log_dbg(c, x...) logger(c, CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG, __FILE__, __LINE__, x)
+#define log_std(c, x...) logger(c, CRYPT_LOG_NORMAL, __FILE__, __LINE__, x)
+#define log_verbose(c, x...) logger(c, CRYPT_LOG_VERBOSE, __FILE__, __LINE__, x)
+#define log_err(c, x...) logger(c, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, __FILE__, __LINE__, x)
+
+int crypt_get_debug_level(void);
+
+int crypt_memlock_inc(struct crypt_device *ctx);
+int crypt_memlock_dec(struct crypt_device *ctx);
+
+int crypt_metadata_locking_enabled(void);
+
+int crypt_random_init(struct crypt_device *ctx);
+int crypt_random_get(struct crypt_device *ctx, char *buf, size_t len, int quality);
+void crypt_random_exit(void);
+int crypt_random_default_key_rng(void);
+
+int crypt_plain_hash(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		     const char *hash_name,
+		     char *key, size_t key_size,
+		     const char *passphrase, size_t passphrase_size);
+int PLAIN_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		     const char *name,
+		     struct volume_key *vk,
+		     uint64_t size,
+		     uint32_t flags);
+
+void *crypt_get_hdr(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *type);
+
+int crypt_wipe_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct device *device,
+	crypt_wipe_pattern pattern,
+	uint64_t offset,
+	uint64_t length,
+	size_t wipe_block_size,
+	int (*progress)(uint64_t size, uint64_t offset, void *usrptr),
+	void *usrptr);
+
+/* Internal integrity helpers */
+const char *crypt_get_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd);
+int crypt_get_integrity_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd);
+int crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(struct crypt_device *cd);
+
+int crypt_key_in_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd);
+void crypt_set_key_in_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd, unsigned key_in_keyring);
+int crypt_volume_key_load_in_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd, struct volume_key *vk);
+int crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(struct crypt_device *cd);
+void crypt_drop_keyring_key(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *key_description);
+
+static inline uint64_t version(uint16_t major, uint16_t minor, uint16_t patch, uint16_t release)
+{
+	return (uint64_t)release | ((uint64_t)patch << 16) | ((uint64_t)minor << 32) | ((uint64_t)major << 48);
+}
+
+int kernel_version(uint64_t *kversion);
+
+#endif /* INTERNAL_H */
diff --git a/lib/libcryptsetup.h b/lib/libcryptsetup.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..955aab2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/libcryptsetup.h
@@ -0,0 +1,2104 @@
+/*
+ * libcryptsetup - cryptsetup library
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * @file libcryptsetup.h
+ * @brief Public cryptsetup API
+ *
+ * For more verbose examples of LUKS related use cases,
+ * please read @ref index "examples".
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LIBCRYPTSETUP_H
+#define _LIBCRYPTSETUP_H
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+/**
+ * @defgroup crypt-init Cryptsetup device context initialization
+ * Set of functions for creating and destroying @e crypt_device context
+ * @addtogroup crypt-init
+ * @{
+ */
+
+struct crypt_device; /* crypt device handle */
+
+/**
+ * Initialize crypt device handle and check if the provided device exists.
+ *
+ * @param cd Returns pointer to crypt device handle
+ * @param device Path to the backing device.
+ * 	  If @e device is not a block device but a path to some file,
+ * 	  the function will try to create a loopdevice and attach
+ * 	  the file to the loopdevice with AUTOCLEAR flag set.
+ * 	  If @e device is @e NULL function it will initialize dm backend only.
+ *
+ * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note Note that logging is not initialized here, possible messages use
+ * 	 default log function.
+ */
+int crypt_init(struct crypt_device **cd, const char *device);
+
+/**
+ * Initialize crypt device handle with optional data device and check
+ * if devices exist.
+ *
+ * @param cd Returns pointer to crypt device handle
+ * @param device Path to the backing device or detached header.
+ * @param data_device Path to the data device or @e NULL.
+ *
+ * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note Note that logging is not initialized here, possible messages use
+ * 	 default log function.
+ */
+int crypt_init_data_device(struct crypt_device **cd,
+	const char *device,
+	const char *data_device);
+
+/**
+ * Initialize crypt device handle from provided active device name,
+ * and, optionally, from separate metadata (header) device
+ * and check if provided device exists.
+ *
+ * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ * @param cd returns crypt device handle for active device
+ * @param name name of active crypt device
+ * @param header_device optional device containing on-disk header
+ * 	  (@e NULL if it the same as underlying device on there is no on-disk header)
+ *
+ * @post In case @e device points to active LUKS device but header load fails,
+ * context device type is set to @e NULL and @e 0 is returned as if it were successful.
+ * Context with @e NULL device type can only be deactivated by crypt_deactivate
+ *
+ * @note @link crypt_init_by_name @endlink is equivalent to calling
+ * 	 crypt_init_by_name_and_header(cd, name, NULL);
+ */
+int crypt_init_by_name_and_header(struct crypt_device **cd,
+	const char *name,
+	const char *header_device);
+
+/**
+ * This is equivalent to call
+ * @ref crypt_init_by_name_and_header "crypt_init_by_name_and_header(cd, name, NULL)"
+ *
+ * @sa crypt_init_by_name_and_header
+ */
+int crypt_init_by_name(struct crypt_device **cd, const char *name);
+
+/**
+ * Release crypt device context and used memory.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ */
+void crypt_free(struct crypt_device *cd);
+
+/**
+ * Set confirmation callback (yes/no).
+ *
+ * If code need confirmation (like resetting uuid or restoring LUKS header from file)
+ * this function is called. If not defined, everything is confirmed.
+ *
+ * Callback function @e confirm should return @e 0 if operation is declined,
+ * other values mean accepted.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param confirm user defined confirm callback reference
+ * @param usrptr provided identification in callback
+ * @param msg Message for user to confirm
+ *
+ * @note Current version of cryptsetup API requires confirmation for UUID change and
+ *	 LUKS header restore only.
+ */
+void crypt_set_confirm_callback(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int (*confirm)(const char *msg, void *usrptr),
+	void *usrptr);
+
+/**
+ * Set data device
+ * For LUKS it is encrypted data device when LUKS header is separated.
+ * For VERITY it is data device when hash device is separated.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param device path to device
+ *
+ * @returns 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ */
+int crypt_set_data_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *device);
+
+/**
+ * Set data device offset in 512-byte sectors.
+ * Used for LUKS.
+ * This function is replacement for data alignment fields in LUKS param struct.
+ * If set to 0 (default), old behaviour is preserved.
+ * This value is reset on @link crypt_load @endlink.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param data_offset data offset in bytes
+ *
+ * @returns 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note Data offset must be aligned to multiple of 8 (alignment to 4096-byte sectors)
+ * and must be big enough to accommodate the whole LUKS header with all keyslots.
+ * @note Data offset is enforced by this function, device topology
+ * information is no longer used after calling this function.
+ */
+int crypt_set_data_offset(struct crypt_device *cd, uint64_t data_offset);
+
+/** @} */
+
+/**
+ * @defgroup crypt-log Cryptsetup logging
+ * Set of functions and defines used in cryptsetup for
+ * logging purposes
+ * @addtogroup crypt-log
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** normal log level */
+#define CRYPT_LOG_NORMAL 0
+/** error log level */
+#define CRYPT_LOG_ERROR  1
+/** verbose log level */
+#define CRYPT_LOG_VERBOSE  2
+/** debug log level - always on stdout */
+#define CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG -1
+/** debug log level - additional JSON output (for LUKS2) */
+#define CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG_JSON -2
+
+/**
+ * Set log function.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle (can be @e NULL to set default log function)
+ * @param log user defined log function reference
+ * @param usrptr provided identification in callback
+ * @param level log level below (debug messages can uses other levels)
+ * @param msg log message
+ */
+void crypt_set_log_callback(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	void (*log)(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr),
+	void *usrptr);
+
+/**
+ * Defines log function or use the default one otherwise.
+ *
+ * @see crypt_set_log_callback
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param level log level
+ * @param msg log message
+ */
+void crypt_log(struct crypt_device *cd, int level, const char *msg);
+/** @} */
+
+/**
+ * @defgroup crypt-set Cryptsetup settings (RNG, PBKDF, locking)
+ * @addtogroup crypt-set
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** CRYPT_RNG_URANDOM - use /dev/urandom */
+#define CRYPT_RNG_URANDOM 0
+/** CRYPT_RNG_RANDOM  - use /dev/random (waits if no entropy in system) */
+#define CRYPT_RNG_RANDOM  1
+
+/**
+ * Set which RNG (random number generator) is used for generating long term key
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param rng_type kernel random number generator to use
+ *
+ */
+void crypt_set_rng_type(struct crypt_device *cd, int rng_type);
+
+/**
+ * Get which RNG (random number generator) is used for generating long term key.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @return RNG type on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ */
+int crypt_get_rng_type(struct crypt_device *cd);
+
+/**
+ * PBKDF parameters.
+ */
+struct crypt_pbkdf_type {
+	const char *type;         /**< PBKDF algorithm  */
+	const char *hash;         /**< Hash algorithm */
+	uint32_t time_ms;         /**< Requested time cost [milliseconds] */
+	uint32_t iterations;      /**< Iterations, 0 or benchmarked value. */
+	uint32_t max_memory_kb;   /**< Requested or benchmarked  memory cost [kilobytes] */
+	uint32_t parallel_threads;/**< Requested parallel cost [threads] */
+	uint32_t flags;           /**< CRYPT_PBKDF* flags */
+};
+
+/** Iteration time set by crypt_set_iteration_time(), for compatibility only. */
+#define CRYPT_PBKDF_ITER_TIME_SET   (1 << 0)
+/** Never run benchmarks, use pre-set value or defaults. */
+#define CRYPT_PBKDF_NO_BENCHMARK    (1 << 1)
+
+/** PBKDF2 according to RFC2898, LUKS1 legacy */
+#define CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2   "pbkdf2"
+/** Argon2i according to RFC */
+#define CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2I  "argon2i"
+/** Argon2id according to RFC */
+#define CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2ID "argon2id"
+
+/**
+ * Set default PBKDF (Password-Based Key Derivation Algorithm) for next keyslot
+ * about to get created with any crypt_keyslot_add_*() call.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param pbkdf PBKDF parameters
+ *
+ * @return 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note For LUKS1, only PBKDF2 is supported, other settings will be rejected.
+ * @note For non-LUKS context types the call succeeds, but PBKDF is not used.
+ */
+int crypt_set_pbkdf_type(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	 const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf);
+
+/**
+ * Get PBKDF (Password-Based Key Derivation Algorithm) parameters.
+ *
+ * @param pbkdf_type type of PBKDF
+ *
+ * @return struct on success or NULL value otherwise.
+ *
+ */
+const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *crypt_get_pbkdf_type_params(const char *pbkdf_type);
+
+/**
+ * Get default PBKDF (Password-Based Key Derivation Algorithm) settings for keyslots.
+ * Works only with LUKS device handles (both versions).
+ *
+ * @param type type of device (see @link crypt-type @endlink)
+ *
+ * @return struct on success or NULL value otherwise.
+ *
+ */
+const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *crypt_get_pbkdf_default(const char *type);
+
+/**
+ * Get current PBKDF (Password-Based Key Derivation Algorithm) settings for keyslots.
+ * Works only with LUKS device handles (both versions).
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ *
+ * @return struct on success or NULL value otherwise.
+ *
+ */
+const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *crypt_get_pbkdf_type(struct crypt_device *cd);
+
+/**
+ * Set how long should cryptsetup iterate in PBKDF2 function.
+ * Default value heads towards the iterations which takes around 1 second.
+ * \b Deprecated, only for backward compatibility.
+ * Use @link crypt_set_pbkdf_type @endlink.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param iteration_time_ms the time in ms
+ *
+ * @note If the time value is not acceptable for active PBKDF, value is quietly ignored.
+ */
+void crypt_set_iteration_time(struct crypt_device *cd, uint64_t iteration_time_ms);
+
+/**
+ * Helper to lock/unlock memory to avoid swap sensitive data to disk.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle, can be @e NULL
+ * @param lock 0 to unlock otherwise lock memory
+ *
+ * @returns Value indicating whether the memory is locked (function can be called multiple times).
+ *
+ * @note Only root can do this.
+ * @note It locks/unlocks all process memory, not only crypt context.
+ */
+int crypt_memory_lock(struct crypt_device *cd, int lock);
+
+/**
+ * Set global lock protection for on-disk metadata (file-based locking).
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle, can be @e NULL
+ * @param enable 0 to disable locking otherwise enable it (default)
+ *
+ * @returns @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note Locking applied only for some metadata formats (LUKS2).
+ * @note The switch is global on the library level.
+ * 	 In current version locking can be only switched off and cannot be switched on later.
+ */
+int crypt_metadata_locking(struct crypt_device *cd, int enable);
+
+/**
+ * Set metadata header area sizes. This applies only to LUKS2.
+ * These values limit amount of metadata anf number of supportable keyslots.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle, can be @e NULL
+ * @param metadata_size size in bytes of JSON area + 4k binary header
+ * @param keyslots_size size in bytes of binary keyslots area
+ *
+ * @returns @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note The metadata area is stored twice and both copies contain 4k binary header.
+ * Only 16,32,64,128,256,512,1024,2048 and 4096 kB value is allowed (see LUKS2 specification).
+ * @note Keyslots area size must be multiple of 4k with maximum 128MB.
+ */
+int crypt_set_metadata_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	uint64_t metadata_size,
+	uint64_t keyslots_size);
+
+/**
+ * Get metadata header area sizes. This applies only to LUKS2.
+ * These values limit amount of metadata anf number of supportable keyslots.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param metadata_size size in bytes of JSON area + 4k binary header
+ * @param keyslots_size size in bytes of binary keyslots area
+ *
+ * @returns @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ */
+int crypt_get_metadata_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	uint64_t *metadata_size,
+	uint64_t *keyslots_size);
+
+/** @} */
+
+/**
+ * @defgroup crypt-type Cryptsetup on-disk format types
+ * Set of functions, \#defines and structs related
+ * to on-disk format types
+ * @addtogroup crypt-type
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** plain crypt device, no on-disk header */
+#define CRYPT_PLAIN "PLAIN"
+/** LUKS version 1 header on-disk */
+#define CRYPT_LUKS1 "LUKS1"
+/** LUKS version 2 header on-disk */
+#define CRYPT_LUKS2 "LUKS2"
+/** loop-AES compatibility mode */
+#define CRYPT_LOOPAES "LOOPAES"
+/** dm-verity mode */
+#define CRYPT_VERITY "VERITY"
+/** TCRYPT (TrueCrypt-compatible and VeraCrypt-compatible) mode */
+#define CRYPT_TCRYPT "TCRYPT"
+/** INTEGRITY dm-integrity device */
+#define CRYPT_INTEGRITY "INTEGRITY"
+
+/** LUKS any version */
+#define CRYPT_LUKS NULL
+
+/**
+ * Get device type
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @return string according to device type or @e NULL if not known.
+ */
+const char *crypt_get_type(struct crypt_device *cd);
+
+/**
+ * Get device default LUKS type
+ *
+ * @return string according to device type (CRYPT_LUKS1 or CRYPT_LUKS2).
+ */
+const char *crypt_get_default_type(void);
+
+/**
+ *
+ * Structure used as parameter for PLAIN device type.
+ *
+ * @see crypt_format
+ */
+struct crypt_params_plain {
+	const char *hash;     /**< password hash function */
+	uint64_t offset;      /**< offset in sectors */
+	uint64_t skip;        /**< IV offset / initialization sector */
+	uint64_t size;        /**< size of mapped device or @e 0 for autodetection */
+	uint32_t sector_size; /**< sector size in bytes (@e 0 means 512 for compatibility) */
+};
+
+/**
+ * Structure used as parameter for LUKS device type.
+ *
+ * @see crypt_format, crypt_load
+ *
+ * @note during crypt_format @e data_device attribute determines
+ * 	 if the LUKS header is separated from encrypted payload device
+ *
+ */
+struct crypt_params_luks1 {
+	const char *hash;        /**< hash used in LUKS header */
+	size_t data_alignment;   /**< data area alignment in 512B sectors, data offset is multiple of this */
+	const char *data_device; /**< detached encrypted data device or @e NULL */
+};
+
+/**
+ *
+ * Structure used as parameter for loop-AES device type.
+ *
+ * @see crypt_format
+ *
+ */
+struct crypt_params_loopaes {
+	const char *hash; /**< key hash function */
+	uint64_t offset;  /**< offset in sectors */
+	uint64_t skip;    /**< IV offset / initialization sector */
+};
+
+/**
+ *
+ * Structure used as parameter for dm-verity device type.
+ *
+ * @see crypt_format, crypt_load
+ *
+ */
+struct crypt_params_verity {
+	const char *hash_name;     /**< hash function */
+	const char *data_device;   /**< data_device (CRYPT_VERITY_CREATE_HASH) */
+	const char *hash_device;   /**< hash_device (output only) */
+	const char *fec_device;    /**< fec_device (output only) */
+	const char *salt;          /**< salt */
+	uint32_t salt_size;        /**< salt size (in bytes) */
+	uint32_t hash_type;        /**< in-kernel hashing type */
+	uint32_t data_block_size;  /**< data block size (in bytes) */
+	uint32_t hash_block_size;  /**< hash block size (in bytes) */
+	uint64_t data_size;        /**< data area size (in data blocks) */
+	uint64_t hash_area_offset; /**< hash/header offset (in bytes) */
+	uint64_t fec_area_offset;  /**< FEC/header offset (in bytes) */
+	uint32_t fec_roots;        /**< Reed-Solomon FEC roots */
+	uint32_t flags;            /**< CRYPT_VERITY* flags */
+};
+
+/** No on-disk header (only hashes) */
+#define CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER   (1 << 0)
+/** Verity hash in userspace before activation */
+#define CRYPT_VERITY_CHECK_HASH  (1 << 1)
+/** Create hash - format hash device */
+#define CRYPT_VERITY_CREATE_HASH (1 << 2)
+
+/**
+ *
+ * Structure used as parameter for TCRYPT device type.
+ *
+ * @see crypt_load
+ *
+ */
+struct crypt_params_tcrypt {
+	const char *passphrase;    /**< passphrase to unlock header (input only) */
+	size_t passphrase_size;    /**< passphrase size (input only, max length is 64) */
+	const char **keyfiles;     /**< keyfile paths to unlock header (input only) */
+	unsigned int keyfiles_count;/**< keyfiles count (input only) */
+	const char *hash_name;     /**< hash function for PBKDF */
+	const char *cipher;        /**< cipher chain c1[-c2[-c3]] */
+	const char *mode;          /**< cipher block mode */
+	size_t key_size;           /**< key size in bytes (the whole chain) */
+	uint32_t flags;            /**< CRYPT_TCRYPT* flags */
+	uint32_t veracrypt_pim;    /**< VeraCrypt Personal Iteration Multiplier */
+};
+
+/** Include legacy modes when scanning for header */
+#define CRYPT_TCRYPT_LEGACY_MODES    (1 << 0)
+/** Try to load hidden header (describing hidden device) */
+#define CRYPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_HEADER   (1 << 1)
+/** Try to load backup header */
+#define CRYPT_TCRYPT_BACKUP_HEADER   (1 << 2)
+/** Device contains encrypted system (with boot loader) */
+#define CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER   (1 << 3)
+/** Include VeraCrypt modes when scanning for header,
+ *  all other TCRYPT flags applies as well.
+ *  VeraCrypt device is reported as TCRYPT type.
+ */
+#define CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES      (1 << 4)
+
+/**
+ *
+ * Structure used as parameter for dm-integrity device type.
+ *
+ * @see crypt_format, crypt_load
+ *
+ */
+struct crypt_params_integrity {
+	uint64_t journal_size;               /**< size of journal in bytes */
+	unsigned int journal_watermark;      /**< journal flush watermark in percents */
+	unsigned int journal_commit_time;    /**< journal commit time in ms */
+	uint32_t interleave_sectors;         /**< number of interleave sectors (power of two) */
+	uint32_t tag_size;                   /**< tag size per-sector in bytes */
+	uint32_t sector_size;                /**< sector size in bytes */
+	uint32_t buffer_sectors;             /**< number of sectors in one buffer */
+	const char *integrity;               /**< integrity algorithm, NULL for LUKS2 */
+	uint32_t integrity_key_size;         /**< integrity key size in bytes, info only, 0 for LUKS2 */
+
+	const char *journal_integrity;       /**< journal integrity algorithm */
+	const char *journal_integrity_key;   /**< journal integrity key, only for crypt_load */
+	uint32_t journal_integrity_key_size; /**< journal integrity key size in bytes, only for crypt_load */
+
+	const char *journal_crypt;           /**< journal encryption algorithm */
+	const char *journal_crypt_key;       /**< journal crypt key, only for crypt_load */
+	uint32_t journal_crypt_key_size;     /**< journal crypt key size in bytes, only for crypt_load */
+};
+
+/**
+ * Structure used as parameter for LUKS2 device type.
+ *
+ * @see crypt_format, crypt_load
+ *
+ * @note during crypt_format @e data_device attribute determines
+ * 	 if the LUKS2 header is separated from encrypted payload device
+ *
+ */
+struct crypt_params_luks2 {
+	const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf; /**< PBKDF (and hash) parameters or @e NULL*/
+	const char *integrity;                /**< integrity algorithm or @e NULL */
+	const struct crypt_params_integrity *integrity_params; /**< Data integrity parameters or @e NULL*/
+	size_t data_alignment;   /**< data area alignment in 512B sectors, data offset is multiple of this */
+	const char *data_device; /**< detached encrypted data device or @e NULL */
+	uint32_t sector_size;    /**< encryption sector size */
+	const char *label;       /**< header label or @e NULL*/
+	const char *subsystem;   /**< header subsystem label or @e NULL*/
+};
+/** @} */
+
+/**
+ * @defgroup crypt-actions Cryptsetup device context actions
+ * Set of functions for formatting and manipulating with specific crypt_type
+ * @addtogroup crypt-actions
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Create (format) new crypt device (and possible header on-disk) but do not activate it.
+ *
+ * @pre @e cd contains initialized and not formatted device context (device type must @b not be set)
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param type type of device (optional params struct must be of this type)
+ * @param cipher (e.g. "aes")
+ * @param cipher_mode including IV specification (e.g. "xts-plain")
+ * @param uuid requested UUID or @e NULL if it should be generated
+ * @param volume_key pre-generated volume key or @e NULL if it should be generated (only for LUKS)
+ * @param volume_key_size size of volume key in bytes.
+ * @param params crypt type specific parameters (see @link crypt-type @endlink)
+ *
+ * @returns @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note Note that crypt_format does not create LUKS keyslot (any version). To create keyslot
+ *	 call any crypt_keyslot_add_* function.
+ * @note For VERITY @link crypt-type @endlink, only uuid parameter is used, other parameters
+ * 	are ignored and verity specific attributes are set through mandatory params option.
+ */
+int crypt_format(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *type,
+	const char *cipher,
+	const char *cipher_mode,
+	const char *uuid,
+	const char *volume_key,
+	size_t volume_key_size,
+	void *params);
+
+/**
+ * Convert to new type for already existing device.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param type type of device (optional params struct must be of this type)
+ * @param params crypt type specific parameters (see @link crypt-type @endlink)
+ *
+ * @returns 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note Currently, only LUKS1->LUKS2 and LUKS2->LUKS1 conversions are supported.
+ *	 Not all LUKS2 devices may be converted back to LUKS1. To make such a conversion
+ *	 possible all active LUKS2 keyslots must be in LUKS1 compatible mode (i.e. pbkdf
+ *	 type must be PBKDF2) and device cannot be formatted with any authenticated
+ *	 encryption mode.
+ *
+ * @note Device must be offline for conversion. UUID change is not possible for active
+ *	 devices.
+ */
+int crypt_convert(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *type,
+	void *params);
+
+/**
+ * Set new UUID for already existing device.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param uuid requested UUID or @e NULL if it should be generated
+ *
+ * @returns 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note Currently, only LUKS device type are supported
+ */
+int crypt_set_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *uuid);
+
+/**
+ * Set new labels (label and subsystem) for already existing device.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param label requested label or @e NULL
+ * @param subsystem requested subsystem label or @e NULL
+ *
+ * @returns 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note Currently, only LUKS2 device type is supported
+ */
+int crypt_set_label(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *label,
+	const char *subsystem);
+
+/**
+ * Enable or disable loading of volume keys via kernel keyring. When set to
+ * 'enabled' library loads key in kernel keyring first and pass the key
+ * description to dm-crypt instead of binary key copy. If set to 'disabled'
+ * library fallbacks to old method of loading volume key directly in
+ * dm-crypt target.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle, can be @e NULL
+ * @param enable 0 to disable loading of volume keys via kernel keyring
+ * 	  (classical method) otherwise enable it (default)
+ *
+ * @returns @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note Currently loading of volume keys via kernel keyring is supported
+ * 	 (and enabled by default) only for LUKS2 devices.
+ * @note The switch is global on the library level.
+ */
+int crypt_volume_key_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd, int enable);
+
+/**
+ * Load crypt device parameters from on-disk header.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param requested_type @link crypt-type @endlink or @e NULL for all known
+ * @param params crypt type specific parameters (see @link crypt-type @endlink)
+ *
+ * @returns 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ * @post In case LUKS header is read successfully but payload device is too small
+ * error is returned and device type in context is set to @e NULL
+ *
+ * @note Note that in current version load works only for LUKS and VERITY device type.
+ *
+ */
+int crypt_load(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *requested_type,
+	void *params);
+
+/**
+ * Try to repair crypt device LUKS on-disk header if invalid.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param requested_type @link crypt-type @endlink or @e NULL for all known
+ * @param params crypt type specific parameters (see @link crypt-type @endlink)
+ *
+ * @returns 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note For LUKS2 device crypt_repair bypass blkid checks and
+ * 	 perform auto-recovery even though there're third party device
+ * 	 signatures found by blkid probes. Currently the crypt_repair on LUKS2
+ * 	 works only if exactly one header checksum does not match or exactly
+ * 	 one header is missing.
+ */
+int crypt_repair(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *requested_type,
+	void *params);
+
+/**
+ * Resize crypt device.
+ *
+ * @param cd - crypt device handle
+ * @param name - name of device to resize
+ * @param new_size - new device size in sectors or @e 0 to use all of the underlying device size
+ *
+ * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note Most notably it returns -EPERM when device was activated with volume key
+ * 	 in kernel keyring and current device handle (context) doesn't have verified key
+ * 	 loaded in kernel. To load volume key for already active device use any of
+ * 	 @link crypt_activate_by_passphrase @endlink, @link crypt_activate_by_keyfile @endlink,
+ * 	 @link crypt_activate_by_keyfile_offset @endlink, @link crypt_activate_by_volume_key @endlink,
+ * 	 @link crypt_activate_by_keyring @endlink or @link crypt_activate_by_token @endlink with flag
+ * 	 @e CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY raised and @e name parameter set to @e NULL.
+ */
+int crypt_resize(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	uint64_t new_size);
+
+/**
+ * Suspend crypt device.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle, can be @e NULL
+ * @param name name of device to suspend
+ *
+ * @return 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note Only LUKS device type is supported
+ *
+ */
+int crypt_suspend(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name);
+
+/**
+ * Resume crypt device using passphrase.
+ *
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param name name of device to resume
+ * @param keyslot requested keyslot or CRYPT_ANY_SLOT
+ * @param passphrase passphrase used to unlock volume key
+ * @param passphrase_size size of @e passphrase (binary data)
+ *
+ * @return unlocked key slot number or negative errno otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note Only LUKS device type is supported
+ */
+int crypt_resume_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *passphrase,
+	size_t passphrase_size);
+
+/**
+ * Resume crypt device using key file.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param name name of device to resume
+ * @param keyslot requested keyslot or CRYPT_ANY_SLOT
+ * @param keyfile key file used to unlock volume key
+ * @param keyfile_size number of bytes to read from keyfile, 0 is unlimited
+ * @param keyfile_offset number of bytes to skip at start of keyfile
+ *
+ * @return unlocked key slot number or negative errno otherwise.
+ */
+int crypt_resume_by_keyfile_device_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *keyfile,
+	size_t keyfile_size,
+	uint64_t keyfile_offset);
+
+/**
+ * Backward compatible crypt_resume_by_keyfile_device_offset() (with size_t offset).
+ */
+int crypt_resume_by_keyfile_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *keyfile,
+	size_t keyfile_size,
+	size_t keyfile_offset);
+
+/**
+ * Backward compatible crypt_resume_by_keyfile_device_offset() (without offset).
+ */
+int crypt_resume_by_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *keyfile,
+	size_t keyfile_size);
+/** @} */
+
+/**
+ * @defgroup crypt-keyslot LUKS keyslots
+ * @addtogroup crypt-keyslot
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** iterate through all keyslots and find first one that fits */
+#define CRYPT_ANY_SLOT -1
+
+/**
+ * Add key slot using provided passphrase.
+ *
+ * @pre @e cd contains initialized and formatted LUKS device context
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param keyslot requested keyslot or @e CRYPT_ANY_SLOT
+ * @param passphrase passphrase used to unlock volume key
+ * @param passphrase_size size of passphrase (binary data)
+ * @param new_passphrase passphrase for new keyslot
+ * @param new_passphrase_size size of @e new_passphrase (binary data)
+ *
+ * @return allocated key slot number or negative errno otherwise.
+ */
+int crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *passphrase,
+	size_t passphrase_size,
+	const char *new_passphrase,
+	size_t new_passphrase_size);
+
+/**
+ * Change defined key slot using provided passphrase.
+ *
+ * @pre @e cd contains initialized and formatted LUKS device context
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param keyslot_old old keyslot or @e CRYPT_ANY_SLOT
+ * @param keyslot_new new keyslot (can be the same as old)
+ * @param passphrase passphrase used to unlock volume key
+ * @param passphrase_size size of passphrase (binary data)
+ * @param new_passphrase passphrase for new keyslot
+ * @param new_passphrase_size size of @e new_passphrase (binary data)
+ *
+ * @return allocated key slot number or negative errno otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note This function is just internal implementation of luksChange
+ * command to avoid reading of volume key outside libcryptsetup boundary
+ * in FIPS mode.
+ */
+int crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot_old,
+	int keyslot_new,
+	const char *passphrase,
+	size_t passphrase_size,
+	const char *new_passphrase,
+	size_t new_passphrase_size);
+
+/**
+* Add key slot using provided key file path.
+ *
+ * @pre @e cd contains initialized and formatted LUKS device context
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param keyslot requested keyslot or @e CRYPT_ANY_SLOT
+ * @param keyfile key file used to unlock volume key
+ * @param keyfile_size number of bytes to read from keyfile, @e 0 is unlimited
+ * @param keyfile_offset number of bytes to skip at start of keyfile
+ * @param new_keyfile keyfile for new keyslot
+ * @param new_keyfile_size number of bytes to read from @e new_keyfile, @e 0 is unlimited
+ * @param new_keyfile_offset number of bytes to skip at start of new_keyfile
+ *
+ * @return allocated key slot number or negative errno otherwise.
+ */
+int crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_device_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *keyfile,
+	size_t keyfile_size,
+	uint64_t keyfile_offset,
+	const char *new_keyfile,
+	size_t new_keyfile_size,
+	uint64_t new_keyfile_offset);
+
+/**
+ * Backward compatible crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_device_offset() (with size_t offset).
+ */
+int crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *keyfile,
+	size_t keyfile_size,
+	size_t keyfile_offset,
+	const char *new_keyfile,
+	size_t new_keyfile_size,
+	size_t new_keyfile_offset);
+
+/**
+ * Backward compatible crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_device_offset() (without offset).
+ */
+int crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *keyfile,
+	size_t keyfile_size,
+	const char *new_keyfile,
+	size_t new_keyfile_size);
+
+/**
+ * Add key slot using provided volume key.
+ *
+ * @pre @e cd contains initialized and formatted LUKS device context
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param keyslot requested keyslot or CRYPT_ANY_SLOT
+ * @param volume_key provided volume key or @e NULL if used after crypt_format
+ * @param volume_key_size size of volume_key
+ * @param passphrase passphrase for new keyslot
+ * @param passphrase_size size of passphrase
+ *
+ * @return allocated key slot number or negative errno otherwise.
+ */
+int crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *volume_key,
+	size_t volume_key_size,
+	const char *passphrase,
+	size_t passphrase_size);
+
+/** create keyslot with volume key not associated with current dm-crypt segment */
+#define CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT (1 << 0)
+
+/** create keyslot with new volume key and assign it to current dm-crypt segment */
+#define CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET (1 << 1)
+
+/**
+ * Add key slot using provided key.
+ *
+ * @pre @e cd contains initialized and formatted LUKS2 device context
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param keyslot requested keyslot or CRYPT_ANY_SLOT
+ * @param volume_key provided volume key or @e NULL (see note below)
+ * @param volume_key_size size of volume_key
+ * @param passphrase passphrase for new keyslot
+ * @param passphrase_size size of passphrase
+ * @param flags key flags to set
+ *
+ * @return allocated key slot number or negative errno otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note in case volume_key is @e NULL following first matching rule will apply:
+ * @li if cd is device handle used in crypt_format() by current process, the volume
+ *     key generated (or passed) in crypt_format() will be stored in keyslot.
+ * @li if CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT flag is raised the new volume_key will be
+ *     generated and stored in keyslot. The keyslot will become unbound (unusable to
+ *     dm-crypt device activation).
+ * @li fails with -EINVAL otherwise
+ *
+ * @warning CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET flag force updates volume key. It is @b not @b reencryption!
+ * 	    By doing so you will most probably destroy your ciphertext data device. It's supposed
+ * 	    to be used only in wrapped keys scheme for key refresh process where real (inner) volume
+ * 	    key stays untouched. It may be involed on active @e keyslot which makes the (previously
+ * 	    unbound) keyslot new regular keyslot.
+ */
+int crypt_keyslot_add_by_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *volume_key,
+	size_t volume_key_size,
+	const char *passphrase,
+	size_t passphrase_size,
+	uint32_t flags);
+
+/**
+ * Destroy (and disable) key slot.
+ *
+ * @pre @e cd contains initialized and formatted LUKS device context
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param keyslot requested key slot to destroy
+ *
+ * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note Note that there is no passphrase verification used.
+ */
+int crypt_keyslot_destroy(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot);
+/** @} */
+
+/**
+ * @defgroup crypt-aflags Device runtime attributes
+ * Activation flags
+ * @addtogroup crypt-aflags
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** device is read only */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY (1 << 0)
+/** only reported for device without uuid */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_UUID  (1 << 1)
+/** activate even if cannot grant exclusive access (DANGEROUS) */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED   (1 << 2)
+/** enable discards aka TRIM */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS (1 << 3)
+/** skip global udev rules in activation ("private device"), input only */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE (1 << 4)
+/** corruption detected (verity), output only */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CORRUPTED (1 << 5)
+/** use same_cpu_crypt option for dm-crypt */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT (1 << 6)
+/** use submit_from_crypt_cpus for dm-crypt */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS (1 << 7)
+/** dm-verity: ignore_corruption flag - ignore corruption, log it only */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION (1 << 8)
+/** dm-verity: restart_on_corruption flag - restart kernel on corruption */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION (1 << 9)
+/** dm-verity: ignore_zero_blocks - do not verify zero blocks */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS (1 << 10)
+/** key loaded in kernel keyring instead directly in dm-crypt */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY (1 << 11)
+/** dm-integrity: direct writes, do not use journal */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL (1 << 12)
+/** dm-integrity: recovery mode - no journal, no integrity checks */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECOVERY (1 << 13)
+/** ignore persistently stored flags */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_PERSISTENT (1 << 14)
+/** dm-verity: check_at_most_once - check data blocks only the first time */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CHECK_AT_MOST_ONCE (1 << 15)
+/** allow activation check including unbound keyslots (keyslots without segments) */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY (1 << 16)
+/** dm-integrity: activate automatic recalculation */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE (1 << 17)
+/** reactivate existing and update flags, input only */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH	(1 << 18)
+
+/**
+ * Active device runtime attributes
+ */
+struct crypt_active_device {
+	uint64_t offset;    /**< offset in sectors */
+	uint64_t iv_offset; /**< IV initialization sector */
+	uint64_t size;      /**< active device size */
+	uint32_t flags;     /**< activation flags */
+};
+
+/**
+ * Receive runtime attributes of active crypt device.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle (can be @e NULL)
+ * @param name name of active device
+ * @param cad preallocated active device attributes to fill
+ *
+ * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise
+ *
+ */
+int crypt_get_active_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	struct crypt_active_device *cad);
+
+/**
+ * Get detected number of integrity failures.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle (can be @e NULL)
+ * @param name name of active device
+ *
+ * @return number of integrity failures or @e 0 otherwise
+ *
+ */
+uint64_t crypt_get_active_integrity_failures(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name);
+/** @} */
+
+/**
+ * @defgroup crypt-pflags LUKS2 Device persistent flags and requirements
+ * @addtogroup crypt-pflags
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/**
+ * LUKS2 header requirements
+ */
+/** Unfinished offline reencryption */
+#define CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_OFFLINE_REENCRYPT	(1 << 0)
+/** unknown requirement in header (output only) */
+#define CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_UNKNOWN		(1 << 31)
+
+/**
+ * Persistent flags type
+ */
+typedef enum {
+	CRYPT_FLAGS_ACTIVATION, /**< activation flags, @see aflags */
+	CRYPT_FLAGS_REQUIREMENTS /**< requirements flags */
+} crypt_flags_type;
+
+/**
+ * Set persistent flags.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle (can be @e NULL)
+ * @param type type to set (CRYPT_FLAGS_ACTIVATION or CRYPT_FLAGS_REQUIREMENTS)
+ * @param flags flags to set
+ *
+ * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise
+ *
+ * @note Valid only for LUKS2.
+ *
+ * @note Not all activation flags can be stored. Only ALLOW_DISCARD,
+ * 	 SAME_CPU_CRYPT, SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPU and NO_JOURNAL can be
+ * 	 stored persistently.
+ *
+ * @note Only requirements flags recognised by current library may be set.
+ *	 CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_UNKNOWN is illegal (output only) in set operation.
+ */
+int crypt_persistent_flags_set(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	crypt_flags_type type,
+	uint32_t flags);
+
+/**
+ * Get persistent flags stored in header.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle (can be @e NULL)
+ * @param type flags type to retrieve (CRYPT_FLAGS_ACTIVATION or CRYPT_FLAGS_REQUIREMENTS)
+ * @param flags reference to output variable
+ *
+ * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise
+ */
+int crypt_persistent_flags_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	crypt_flags_type type,
+	uint32_t *flags);
+/** @} */
+
+/**
+ * @defgroup crypt-activation Device activation
+ * @addtogroup crypt-activation
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Activate device or check passphrase.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param name name of device to create, if @e NULL only check passphrase
+ * @param keyslot requested keyslot to check or @e CRYPT_ANY_SLOT
+ * @param passphrase passphrase used to unlock volume key
+ * @param passphrase_size size of @e passphrase
+ * @param flags activation flags
+ *
+ * @return unlocked key slot number or negative errno otherwise.
+ */
+int crypt_activate_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *passphrase,
+	size_t passphrase_size,
+	uint32_t flags);
+
+/**
+ * Activate device or check using key file.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param name name of device to create, if @e NULL only check keyfile
+ * @param keyslot requested keyslot to check or CRYPT_ANY_SLOT
+ * @param keyfile key file used to unlock volume key
+ * @param keyfile_size number of bytes to read from keyfile, 0 is unlimited
+ * @param keyfile_offset number of bytes to skip at start of keyfile
+ * @param flags activation flags
+ *
+ * @return unlocked key slot number or negative errno otherwise.
+ */
+int crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *keyfile,
+	size_t keyfile_size,
+	uint64_t keyfile_offset,
+	uint32_t flags);
+
+/**
+ * Backward compatible crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset() (with size_t offset).
+ */
+int crypt_activate_by_keyfile_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *keyfile,
+	size_t keyfile_size,
+	size_t keyfile_offset,
+	uint32_t flags);
+
+/**
+ * Backward compatible crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset() (without offset).
+ */
+int crypt_activate_by_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *keyfile,
+	size_t keyfile_size,
+	uint32_t flags);
+
+/**
+ * Activate device using provided volume key.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param name name of device to create, if @e NULL only check volume key
+ * @param volume_key provided volume key (or @e NULL to use internal)
+ * @param volume_key_size size of volume_key
+ * @param flags activation flags
+ *
+ * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note If @e NULL is used for volume_key, device has to be initialized
+ * 	 by previous operation (like @ref crypt_format
+ * 	 or @ref crypt_init_by_name)
+ * @note For VERITY the volume key means root hash required for activation.
+ * 	 Because kernel dm-verity is always read only, you have to provide
+ * 	 CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY flag always.
+ * @note For TCRYPT the volume key should be always NULL and because master
+ * 	 key from decrypted header is used instead.
+ */
+int crypt_activate_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	const char *volume_key,
+	size_t volume_key_size,
+	uint32_t flags);
+
+/**
+ * Activate device using passphrase stored in kernel keyring.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param name name of device to create, if @e NULL only check passphrase in keyring
+ * @param key_description kernel keyring key description library should look
+ *        for passphrase in
+ * @param keyslot requested keyslot to check or CRYPT_ANY_SLOT
+ * @param flags activation flags
+ *
+ * @return @e unlocked keyslot number on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note Keyslot passphrase must be stored in 'user' key type
+ * 	 and the key has to be reachable for process context
+ * 	 on behalf of which this function is called.
+ */
+int crypt_activate_by_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	const char *key_description,
+	int keyslot,
+	uint32_t flags);
+
+/** lazy deactivation - remove once last user releases it */
+#define CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED (1 << 0)
+/** force deactivation - if the device is busy, it is replaced by error device */
+#define CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_FORCE    (1 << 1)
+
+/**
+ * Deactivate crypt device. This function tries to remove active device-mapper
+ * mapping from kernel. Also, sensitive data like the volume key are removed from
+ * memory
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle, can be @e NULL
+ * @param name name of device to deactivate
+ * @param flags deactivation flags
+ *
+ * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ */
+int crypt_deactivate_by_name(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	uint32_t flags);
+
+/**
+ * Deactivate crypt device. See @ref crypt_deactivate_by_name with empty @e flags.
+ */
+int crypt_deactivate(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name);
+/** @} */
+
+/**
+ * @defgroup crypt-key Volume Key manipulation
+ * @addtogroup crypt-key
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Get volume key from crypt device.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param keyslot use this keyslot or @e CRYPT_ANY_SLOT
+ * @param volume_key buffer for volume key
+ * @param volume_key_size on input, size of buffer @e volume_key,
+ *        on output size of @e volume_key
+ * @param passphrase passphrase used to unlock volume key
+ * @param passphrase_size size of @e passphrase
+ *
+ * @return unlocked key slot number or negative errno otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note For TCRYPT cipher chain is the volume key concatenated
+ * 	 for all ciphers in chain.
+ */
+int crypt_volume_key_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	char *volume_key,
+	size_t *volume_key_size,
+	const char *passphrase,
+	size_t passphrase_size);
+
+/**
+ * Verify that provided volume key is valid for crypt device.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param volume_key provided volume key
+ * @param volume_key_size size of @e volume_key
+ *
+ * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ */
+int crypt_volume_key_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *volume_key,
+	size_t volume_key_size);
+/** @} */
+
+/**
+ * @defgroup crypt-devstat Crypt and Verity device status
+ * @addtogroup crypt-devstat
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Device status
+ */
+typedef enum {
+	CRYPT_INVALID,  /**< device mapping is invalid in this context */
+	CRYPT_INACTIVE, /**< no such mapped device */
+	CRYPT_ACTIVE,   /**< device is active */
+	CRYPT_BUSY      /**< device is active and has open count > 0 */
+} crypt_status_info;
+
+/**
+ * Get status info about device name.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle, can be @e NULL
+ * @param name crypt device name
+ *
+ * @return value defined by crypt_status_info.
+ *
+ */
+crypt_status_info crypt_status(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name);
+
+/**
+ * Dump text-formatted information about crypt or verity device to log output.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ *
+ * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ */
+int crypt_dump(struct crypt_device *cd);
+
+/**
+ * Get cipher used in device.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ *
+ * @return used cipher, e.g. "aes" or @e NULL otherwise
+ *
+ */
+const char *crypt_get_cipher(struct crypt_device *cd);
+
+/**
+ * Get cipher mode used in device.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ *
+ * @return used cipher mode e.g. "xts-plain" or @e otherwise
+ *
+ */
+const char *crypt_get_cipher_mode(struct crypt_device *cd);
+
+/**
+ * Get device UUID.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ *
+ * @return device UUID or @e NULL if not set
+ *
+ */
+const char *crypt_get_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd);
+
+/**
+ * Get path to underlaying device.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ *
+ * @return path to underlaying device name
+ *
+ */
+const char *crypt_get_device_name(struct crypt_device *cd);
+
+/**
+ * Get path to detached metadata device or @e NULL if it is not detached.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ *
+ * @return path to underlaying device name
+ *
+ */
+const char *crypt_get_metadata_device_name(struct crypt_device *cd);
+
+/**
+ * Get device offset in 512-bytes sectors where real data starts (on underlying device).
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ *
+ * @return device offset in sectors
+ *
+ */
+uint64_t crypt_get_data_offset(struct crypt_device *cd);
+
+/**
+ * Get IV offset in 512-bytes sectors (skip).
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ *
+ * @return IV offset
+ *
+ */
+uint64_t crypt_get_iv_offset(struct crypt_device *cd);
+
+/**
+ * Get size (in bytes) of volume key for crypt device.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ *
+ * @return volume key size
+ *
+ */
+int crypt_get_volume_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd);
+
+/**
+ * Get size (in bytes) of encryption sector for crypt device.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ *
+ * @return sector size
+ *
+ */
+int crypt_get_sector_size(struct crypt_device *cd);
+
+/**
+ * Get device parameters for VERITY device.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param vp verity device info
+ *
+ * @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ */
+int crypt_get_verity_info(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct crypt_params_verity *vp);
+
+/**
+ * Get device parameters for INTEGRITY device.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param ip verity device info
+ *
+ * @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ */
+int crypt_get_integrity_info(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct crypt_params_integrity *ip);
+/** @} */
+
+/**
+ * @defgroup crypt-benchmark Benchmarking
+ * Benchmarking of algorithms
+ * @addtogroup crypt-benchmark
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Informational benchmark for ciphers.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param cipher (e.g. "aes")
+ * @param cipher_mode (e.g. "xts"), IV generator is ignored
+ * @param volume_key_size size of volume key in bytes
+ * @param iv_size size of IV in bytes
+ * @param buffer_size size of encryption buffer in bytes used in test
+ * @param encryption_mbs measured encryption speed in MiB/s
+ * @param decryption_mbs measured decryption speed in MiB/s
+ *
+ * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note If encryption_buffer_size is too small and encryption time
+ *       cannot be properly measured, -ERANGE is returned.
+ */
+int crypt_benchmark(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *cipher,
+	const char *cipher_mode,
+	size_t volume_key_size,
+	size_t iv_size,
+	size_t buffer_size,
+	double *encryption_mbs,
+	double *decryption_mbs);
+
+/**
+ * Informational benchmark for PBKDF.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param pbkdf PBKDF parameters
+ * @param password password for benchmark
+ * @param password_size size of password
+ * @param salt salt for benchmark
+ * @param salt_size size of salt
+ * @param volume_key_size output volume key size
+ * @param progress callback function
+ * @param usrptr provided identification in callback
+ *
+ * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ */
+int crypt_benchmark_pbkdf(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf,
+	const char *password,
+	size_t password_size,
+	const char *salt,
+	size_t salt_size,
+	size_t volume_key_size,
+	int (*progress)(uint32_t time_ms, void *usrptr),
+	void *usrptr);
+/** @} */
+
+/**
+ * @addtogroup crypt-keyslot
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Crypt keyslot info
+ */
+typedef enum {
+	CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID,    /**< invalid keyslot */
+	CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE,   /**< keyslot is inactive (free) */
+	CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE,     /**< keyslot is active (used) */
+	CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST,/**< keylost is active (used)
+				 *  and last used at the same time */
+	CRYPT_SLOT_UNBOUND     /**< keyslot is active and not bound
+				 *  to any crypt segment (LUKS2 only) */
+} crypt_keyslot_info;
+
+/**
+ * Get information about particular key slot.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param keyslot requested keyslot to check or CRYPT_ANY_SLOT
+ *
+ * @return value defined by crypt_keyslot_info
+ *
+ */
+crypt_keyslot_info crypt_keyslot_status(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot);
+
+/**
+ * Crypt keyslot priority
+ */
+typedef enum {
+	CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_INVALID =-1, /**< no such slot */
+	CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_IGNORE  = 0, /**< CRYPT_ANY_SLOT will ignore it for open */
+	CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_NORMAL  = 1, /**< default priority, tried after preferred */
+	CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_PREFER  = 2, /**< will try to open first */
+} crypt_keyslot_priority;
+
+/**
+ * Get keyslot priority (LUKS2)
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param keyslot keyslot number
+ *
+ * @return value defined by crypt_keyslot_priority
+ */
+crypt_keyslot_priority crypt_keyslot_get_priority(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot);
+
+/**
+ * Set keyslot priority (LUKS2)
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param keyslot keyslot number
+ * @param priority priority defined in crypt_keyslot_priority
+ *
+ * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ */
+int crypt_keyslot_set_priority(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot, crypt_keyslot_priority priority);
+
+/**
+ * Get number of keyslots supported for device type.
+ *
+ * @param type crypt device type
+ *
+ * @return slot count or negative errno otherwise if device
+ * doesn't not support keyslots.
+ */
+int crypt_keyslot_max(const char *type);
+
+/**
+ * Get keyslot area pointers (relative to metadata device).
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param keyslot keyslot number
+ * @param offset offset on metadata device (in bytes)
+ * @param length length of keyslot area (in bytes)
+ *
+ * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ */
+int crypt_keyslot_area(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	uint64_t *offset,
+	uint64_t *length);
+
+/**
+ * Get size (in bytes) of stored key in particular keyslot.
+ * Use for LUKS2 unbound keyslots, for other keyslots it is the same as @ref crypt_get_volume_key_size
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param keyslot keyslot number
+ *
+ * @return volume key size or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ */
+int crypt_keyslot_get_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot);
+
+/**
+ * Get cipher and key size for keyslot encryption.
+ * Use for LUKS2 keyslot to set different encryption type than for data encryption.
+ * Parameters will be used for next keyslot operations.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param keyslot keyslot number of CRYPT_ANY_SLOT for default
+ * @param key_size encryption key size (in bytes)
+ *
+ * @return cipher specification on success or @e NULL.
+ *
+ * @note This is the encryption of keyslot itself, not the data encryption algorithm!
+ */
+const char *crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot, size_t *key_size);
+
+/**
+ * Get PBKDF parameters for keyslot.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param keyslot keyslot number
+ * @param pbkdf struct with returned PBKDF parameters
+ *
+ * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ */
+int crypt_keyslot_get_pbkdf(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot, struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf);
+
+/**
+ * Set encryption for keyslot.
+ * Use for LUKS2 keyslot to set different encryption type than for data encryption.
+ * Parameters will be used for next keyslot operations that create or change a keyslot.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param cipher (e.g. "aes-xts-plain64")
+ * @param key_size encryption key size (in bytes)
+ *
+ * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note To reset to default keyslot encryption (the same as for data)
+ *       set cipher to NULL and key size to 0.
+ */
+int crypt_keyslot_set_encryption(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *cipher,
+	size_t key_size);
+
+/**
+ * Get directory where mapped crypt devices are created
+ *
+ * @return the directory path
+ */
+const char *crypt_get_dir(void);
+
+/** @} */
+
+/**
+ * @defgroup crypt-backup Device metadata backup
+ * @addtogroup crypt-backup
+ * @{
+ */
+/**
+ * Backup header and keyslots to file.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param requested_type @link crypt-type @endlink or @e NULL for all known
+ * @param backup_file file to backup header to
+ *
+ * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ */
+int crypt_header_backup(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *requested_type,
+	const char *backup_file);
+
+/**
+ * Restore header and keyslots from backup file.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param requested_type @link crypt-type @endlink or @e NULL for all known
+ * @param backup_file file to restore header from
+ *
+ * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ */
+int crypt_header_restore(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *requested_type,
+	const char *backup_file);
+/** @} */
+
+/**
+ * @defgroup crypt-dbg Library debug level
+ * Set library debug level
+ * @addtogroup crypt-dbg
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** Debug all */
+#define CRYPT_DEBUG_ALL  -1
+/** Debug all with adidtional JSON dump (for LUKS2) */
+#define CRYPT_DEBUG_JSON  -2
+/** Debug none */
+#define CRYPT_DEBUG_NONE  0
+
+/**
+ * Set the debug level for library
+ *
+ * @param level debug level
+ *
+ */
+void crypt_set_debug_level(int level);
+/** @} */
+
+/**
+ * @defgroup crypt-keyfile Function to read keyfile
+ * @addtogroup crypt-keyfile
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Read keyfile
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param keyfile keyfile to read
+ * @param key buffer for key
+ * @param key_size_read size of read key
+ * @param keyfile_offset key offset in keyfile
+ * @param key_size exact key length to read from file or 0
+ * @param flags keyfile read flags
+ *
+ * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note If key_size is set to zero we read internal max length
+ * 	 and actual size read is returned via key_size_read parameter.
+ */
+int crypt_keyfile_device_read(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *keyfile,
+	char **key, size_t *key_size_read,
+	uint64_t keyfile_offset,
+	size_t key_size,
+	uint32_t flags);
+
+/**
+ * Backward compatible crypt_keyfile_device_read() (with size_t offset).
+ */
+int crypt_keyfile_read(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *keyfile,
+	char **key, size_t *key_size_read,
+	size_t keyfile_offset,
+	size_t key_size,
+	uint32_t flags);
+
+/** Read key only to the first end of line (\\n). */
+#define CRYPT_KEYFILE_STOP_EOL   (1 << 0)
+/** @} */
+
+/**
+ * @defgroup crypt-wipe Function to wipe device
+ * @addtogroup crypt-wipe
+ * @{
+ */
+/**
+ * Wipe pattern
+ */
+typedef enum {
+	CRYPT_WIPE_ZERO,           /**< Fill with zeroes */
+	CRYPT_WIPE_RANDOM,         /**< Use RNG to fill data */
+	CRYPT_WIPE_ENCRYPTED_ZERO, /**< Add encryption and fill with zeroes as plaintext */
+	CRYPT_WIPE_SPECIAL,        /**< Compatibility only, do not use (Gutmann method) */
+} crypt_wipe_pattern;
+
+/**
+ * Wipe/Fill (part of) a device with the selected pattern.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param dev_path path to device to wipe or @e NULL if data device should be used
+ * @param pattern selected wipe pattern
+ * @param offset offset on device (in bytes)
+ * @param length length of area to be wiped (in bytes)
+ * @param wipe_block_size used block for wiping (one step) (in bytes)
+ * @param flags wipe flags
+ * @param progress callback function called after each @e wipe_block_size or @e NULL
+ * @param usrptr provided identification in callback
+ *
+ * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note A @e progress callback can interrupt wipe process by returning non-zero code.
+ *
+ * @note If the error values is -EIO or -EINTR, some part of the device could
+ *       be overwritten. Other error codes (-EINVAL, -ENOMEM) means that no IO was performed.
+ */
+int crypt_wipe(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *dev_path, /* if null, use data device */
+	crypt_wipe_pattern pattern,
+	uint64_t offset,
+	uint64_t length,
+	size_t wipe_block_size,
+	uint32_t flags,
+	int (*progress)(uint64_t size, uint64_t offset, void *usrptr),
+	void *usrptr
+);
+
+/** Use direct-io */
+#define CRYPT_WIPE_NO_DIRECT_IO (1 << 0)
+/** @} */
+
+/**
+ * @defgroup crypt-tokens LUKS2 token wrapper access
+ *
+ * Utilities for handling tokens LUKS2
+ * Token is a device or a method how to read password for particular keyslot
+ * automatically. It can be chunk of data stored on hardware token or
+ * just a metadata how to generate the password.
+ *
+ * @addtogroup crypt-tokens
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** Iterate through all tokens */
+#define CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN -1
+
+/**
+ * Get content of a token definition in JSON format.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param token token id
+ * @param json buffer with JSON
+ *
+ * @return allocated token id or negative errno otherwise.
+ */
+int crypt_token_json_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int token,
+	const char **json);
+
+/**
+ * Store content of a token definition in JSON format.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param token token id or @e CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN to allocate new one
+ * @param json buffer with JSON or @e NULL to remove token
+ *
+ * @return allocated token id or negative errno otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note The buffer must be in proper JSON format and must contain at least
+ *       string "type" with slot type and an array of string names "keyslots".
+ *       Keyslots array contains assignments to particular slots and can be empty.
+ */
+int crypt_token_json_set(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int token,
+	const char *json);
+
+/**
+ * Token info
+ */
+typedef enum {
+	CRYPT_TOKEN_INVALID,          /**< token is invalid */
+	CRYPT_TOKEN_INACTIVE,         /**< token is empty (free) */
+	CRYPT_TOKEN_INTERNAL,         /**< active internal token with driver */
+	CRYPT_TOKEN_INTERNAL_UNKNOWN, /**< active internal token (reserved name) with missing token driver */
+	CRYPT_TOKEN_EXTERNAL,         /**< active external (user defined) token with driver */
+	CRYPT_TOKEN_EXTERNAL_UNKNOWN, /**< active external (user defined) token with missing token driver */
+} crypt_token_info;
+
+/**
+ * Get info for specific token.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param token existing token id
+ * @param type pointer for returned type string
+ *
+ * @return token status info. For any returned status (besides CRYPT_TOKEN_INVALID
+ * 	   and CRYPT_TOKEN_INACTIVE) and if type parameter is not NULL it will
+ * 	   contain address of type string.
+ *
+ * @note if required, create a copy of string referenced in *type before calling next
+ * 	 libcryptsetup API function. The reference may become invalid.
+ */
+crypt_token_info crypt_token_status(struct crypt_device *cd, int token, const char **type);
+
+/**
+ * LUKS2 keyring token parameters.
+ *
+ * @see crypt_token_builtin_set
+ *
+ */
+struct crypt_token_params_luks2_keyring {
+	const char *key_description; /**< Reference in keyring */
+};
+
+/**
+ * Create a new luks2 keyring token.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param token token id or @e CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN to allocate new one
+ * @param params luks2 keyring token params
+ *
+ * @return allocated token id or negative errno otherwise.
+ *
+ */
+int crypt_token_luks2_keyring_set(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int token,
+	const struct crypt_token_params_luks2_keyring *params);
+
+/**
+ * Get LUKS2 keyring token params
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param token existing luks2 keyring token id
+ * @param params returned luks2 keyring token params
+ *
+ * @return allocated token id or negative errno otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note do not call free() on params members. Members are valid only
+ * 	 until next libcryptsetup function is called.
+ */
+int crypt_token_luks2_keyring_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int token,
+	struct crypt_token_params_luks2_keyring *params);
+
+/**
+ * Assign a token to particular keyslot.
+ * (There can be more keyslots assigned to one token id.)
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param token token id
+ * @param keyslot keyslot to be assigned to token (CRYPT_ANY SLOT
+ * 	  assigns all active keyslots to token)
+ *
+ * @return allocated token id or negative errno otherwise.
+ */
+int crypt_token_assign_keyslot(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int token,
+	int keyslot);
+
+/**
+ * Unassign a token from particular keyslot.
+ * (There can be more keyslots assigned to one token id.)
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param token token id
+ * @param keyslot keyslot to be unassigned from token (CRYPT_ANY SLOT
+ * 	  unassigns all active keyslots from token)
+ *
+ * @return allocated token id or negative errno otherwise.
+ */
+int crypt_token_unassign_keyslot(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int token,
+	int keyslot);
+
+/**
+ * Get info about token assignment to particular keyslot.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param token token id
+ * @param keyslot keyslot
+ *
+ * @return 0 on success (token exists and is assigned to the keyslot),
+ *	   -ENOENT if token is not assigned to a keyslot (token, keyslot
+ *	   or both may be inactive) or other negative errno otherwise.
+ */
+int crypt_token_is_assigned(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int token,
+	int keyslot);
+
+/**
+ * Token handler open function prototype.
+ * This function retrieves password from a token and return allocated buffer
+ * containing this password. This buffer has to be deallocated by calling
+ * free() function and content should be wiped before deallocation.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param token token id
+ * @param buffer returned allocated buffer with password
+ * @param buffer_len length of the buffer
+ * @param usrptr user data in @link crypt_activate_by_token @endlink
+ */
+typedef int (*crypt_token_open_func) (
+	struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int token,
+	char **buffer,
+	size_t *buffer_len,
+	void *usrptr);
+
+/**
+ * Token handler buffer free function prototype.
+ * This function is used by library to free the buffer with keyslot
+ * passphrase when it's no longer needed. If not defined the library
+ * overwrites buffer with zeroes and call free().
+ *
+ * @param buffer the buffer with keyslot passphrase
+ * @param buffer_len the buffer length
+ */
+typedef void (*crypt_token_buffer_free_func) (void *buffer, size_t buffer_len);
+
+/**
+ * Token handler validate function prototype.
+ * This function validates JSON representation of user defined token for additional data
+ * specific for its token type. If defined in the handler, it's called
+ * during @link crypt_activate_by_token @endlink. It may also be called during
+ * @link crypt_token_json_set @endlink when appropriate token handler was registered before
+ * with @link crypt_token_register @endlink.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param json buffer with JSON
+ */
+typedef int (*crypt_token_validate_func) (struct crypt_device *cd, const char *json);
+
+/**
+ * Token handler dump function prototype.
+ * This function is supposed to print token implementation specific details. It gets
+ * called during @link crypt_dump @endlink if token handler was registered before.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param json buffer with token JSON
+ *
+ * @note dump implementations are advised to use @link crypt_log @endlink function
+ *	 to dump token details.
+ */
+typedef void (*crypt_token_dump_func) (struct crypt_device *cd, const char *json);
+
+/**
+ * Token handler
+ */
+typedef struct  {
+	const char *name;           /**< token handler name */
+	crypt_token_open_func open; /**< token handler open function */
+	crypt_token_buffer_free_func buffer_free; /**< token handler buffer_free function (optional) */
+	crypt_token_validate_func validate; /**< token handler validate function (optional) */
+	crypt_token_dump_func dump; /**< token handler dump function (optional) */
+} crypt_token_handler;
+
+/**
+ * Register token handler
+ *
+ * @param handler token handler to register
+ *
+ * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ */
+int crypt_token_register(const crypt_token_handler *handler);
+
+/**
+ * Activate device or check key using a token.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param name name of device to create, if @e NULL only check token
+ * @param token requested token to check or CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN to check all
+ * @param usrptr provided identification in callback
+ * @param flags activation flags
+ *
+ * @return unlocked key slot number or negative errno otherwise.
+ */
+int crypt_activate_by_token(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	int token,
+	void *usrptr,
+	uint32_t flags);
+/** @} */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif /* _LIBCRYPTSETUP_H */
diff --git a/lib/libcryptsetup.pc.in b/lib/libcryptsetup.pc.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f3d3fb1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/libcryptsetup.pc.in
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+prefix=@prefix@
+exec_prefix=@exec_prefix@
+libdir=@libdir@
+includedir=@includedir@
+
+Name: cryptsetup
+Description: cryptsetup library
+Version: @LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION@
+Cflags: -I${includedir}
+Libs: -L${libdir} -lcryptsetup
diff --git a/lib/libcryptsetup.sym b/lib/libcryptsetup.sym
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4abb822
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/libcryptsetup.sym
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+CRYPTSETUP_2.0 {
+	global:
+		crypt_init;
+		crypt_init_data_device;
+		crypt_init_by_name;
+		crypt_init_by_name_and_header;
+
+		crypt_set_log_callback;
+		crypt_set_confirm_callback;
+		crypt_set_iteration_time;
+		crypt_set_uuid;
+		crypt_set_label;
+		crypt_set_data_device;
+
+		crypt_memory_lock;
+		crypt_metadata_locking;
+		crypt_format;
+		crypt_convert;
+		crypt_load;
+		crypt_repair;
+		crypt_resize;
+		crypt_suspend;
+		crypt_resume_by_passphrase;
+		crypt_resume_by_keyfile;
+		crypt_resume_by_keyfile_offset;
+		crypt_resume_by_keyfile_device_offset;
+		crypt_free;
+
+		crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase;
+		crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase;
+		crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile;
+		crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_offset;
+		crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_device_offset;
+		crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key;
+		crypt_keyslot_add_by_key;
+
+		crypt_keyslot_set_priority;
+		crypt_keyslot_get_priority;
+
+		crypt_token_json_get;
+		crypt_token_json_set;
+		crypt_token_status;
+		crypt_token_luks2_keyring_get;
+		crypt_token_luks2_keyring_set;
+		crypt_token_assign_keyslot;
+		crypt_token_unassign_keyslot;
+		crypt_token_is_assigned;
+		crypt_token_register;
+
+		crypt_activate_by_token;
+
+		crypt_keyslot_destroy;
+		crypt_activate_by_passphrase;
+		crypt_activate_by_keyfile;
+		crypt_activate_by_keyfile_offset;
+		crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset;
+		crypt_activate_by_volume_key;
+		crypt_activate_by_keyring;
+		crypt_deactivate;
+		crypt_deactivate_by_name;
+		crypt_volume_key_get;
+		crypt_volume_key_verify;
+		crypt_volume_key_keyring;
+		crypt_status;
+		crypt_dump;
+		crypt_benchmark;
+		crypt_benchmark_pbkdf;
+		crypt_get_cipher;
+		crypt_get_cipher_mode;
+		crypt_get_integrity_info;
+		crypt_get_uuid;
+		crypt_set_data_offset;
+		crypt_get_data_offset;
+		crypt_get_iv_offset;
+		crypt_get_volume_key_size;
+		crypt_get_device_name;
+		crypt_get_metadata_device_name;
+		crypt_get_metadata_size;
+		crypt_set_metadata_size;
+		crypt_get_verity_info;
+		crypt_get_sector_size;
+
+		crypt_get_type;
+		crypt_get_default_type;
+		crypt_get_active_device;
+		crypt_get_active_integrity_failures;
+		crypt_persistent_flags_set;
+		crypt_persistent_flags_get;
+
+		crypt_set_rng_type;
+		crypt_get_rng_type;
+		crypt_set_pbkdf_type;
+		crypt_get_pbkdf_type;
+		crypt_get_pbkdf_type_params;
+		crypt_get_pbkdf_default;
+
+		crypt_keyslot_max;
+		crypt_keyslot_area;
+		crypt_keyslot_status;
+		crypt_keyslot_get_key_size;
+		crypt_keyslot_set_encryption;
+		crypt_keyslot_get_encryption;
+		crypt_keyslot_get_pbkdf;
+
+		crypt_get_dir;
+		crypt_set_debug_level;
+		crypt_log;
+
+		crypt_header_backup;
+		crypt_header_restore;
+
+		crypt_keyfile_read;
+		crypt_keyfile_device_read;
+
+		crypt_wipe;
+	local:
+		*;
+};
diff --git a/lib/libdevmapper.c b/lib/libdevmapper.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2c20546
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/libdevmapper.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2715 @@
+/*
+ * libdevmapper - device-mapper backend for cryptsetup
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <libdevmapper.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <uuid/uuid.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+#define DM_UUID_LEN		129
+#define DM_BY_ID_PREFIX		"dm-uuid-"
+#define DM_BY_ID_PREFIX_LEN	8
+#define DM_UUID_PREFIX		"CRYPT-"
+#define DM_UUID_PREFIX_LEN	6
+#define DM_CRYPT_TARGET		"crypt"
+#define DM_VERITY_TARGET	"verity"
+#define DM_INTEGRITY_TARGET	"integrity"
+#define DM_LINEAR_TARGET	"linear"
+#define RETRY_COUNT		5
+
+/* Set if DM target versions were probed */
+static bool _dm_ioctl_checked = false;
+static bool _dm_crypt_checked = false;
+static bool _dm_verity_checked = false;
+static bool _dm_integrity_checked = false;
+
+static int _quiet_log = 0;
+static uint32_t _dm_flags = 0;
+
+static struct crypt_device *_context = NULL;
+static int _dm_use_count = 0;
+
+/* Check if we have DM flag to instruct kernel to force wipe buffers */
+#if !HAVE_DECL_DM_TASK_SECURE_DATA
+static int dm_task_secure_data(struct dm_task *dmt) { return 1; }
+#endif
+
+/* Compatibility for old device-mapper without udev support */
+#if HAVE_DECL_DM_UDEV_DISABLE_DISK_RULES_FLAG
+#define CRYPT_TEMP_UDEV_FLAGS	DM_UDEV_DISABLE_SUBSYSTEM_RULES_FLAG | \
+				DM_UDEV_DISABLE_DISK_RULES_FLAG | \
+				DM_UDEV_DISABLE_OTHER_RULES_FLAG
+#define _dm_task_set_cookie	dm_task_set_cookie
+#define _dm_udev_wait		dm_udev_wait
+#else
+#define CRYPT_TEMP_UDEV_FLAGS	0
+static int _dm_task_set_cookie(struct dm_task *dmt, uint32_t *cookie, uint16_t flags) { return 0; }
+static int _dm_udev_wait(uint32_t cookie) { return 0; };
+#endif
+
+static int _dm_use_udev(void)
+{
+#ifdef USE_UDEV /* cannot be enabled if devmapper is too old */
+	return dm_udev_get_sync_support();
+#else
+	return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+__attribute__((format(printf, 4, 5)))
+static void set_dm_error(int level,
+			 const char *file __attribute__((unused)),
+			 int line __attribute__((unused)),
+			 const char *f, ...)
+{
+	char *msg = NULL;
+	va_list va;
+
+	va_start(va, f);
+	if (vasprintf(&msg, f, va) > 0) {
+		if (level < 4 && !_quiet_log) {
+			log_err(_context, "%s", msg);
+		} else {
+			/* We do not use DM visual stack backtrace here */
+			if (strncmp(msg, "<backtrace>", 11))
+				log_dbg(_context, "%s", msg);
+		}
+	}
+	free(msg);
+	va_end(va);
+}
+
+static int _dm_satisfies_version(unsigned target_maj, unsigned target_min, unsigned target_patch,
+				 unsigned actual_maj, unsigned actual_min, unsigned actual_patch)
+{
+	if (actual_maj > target_maj)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (actual_maj == target_maj && actual_min > target_min)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (actual_maj == target_maj && actual_min == target_min && actual_patch >= target_patch)
+		return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void _dm_set_crypt_compat(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				 unsigned crypt_maj,
+				 unsigned crypt_min,
+				 unsigned crypt_patch)
+{
+	if (_dm_crypt_checked || crypt_maj == 0)
+		return;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Detected dm-crypt version %i.%i.%i.",
+		crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch);
+
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 2, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch))
+		_dm_flags |= DM_KEY_WIPE_SUPPORTED;
+	else
+		log_dbg(cd, "Suspend and resume disabled, no wipe key support.");
+
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 10, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch))
+		_dm_flags |= DM_LMK_SUPPORTED;
+
+	/* not perfect, 2.6.33 supports with 1.7.0 */
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 8, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch))
+		_dm_flags |= DM_PLAIN64_SUPPORTED;
+
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 11, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch))
+		_dm_flags |= DM_DISCARDS_SUPPORTED;
+
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 13, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch))
+		_dm_flags |= DM_TCW_SUPPORTED;
+
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 14, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch)) {
+		_dm_flags |= DM_SAME_CPU_CRYPT_SUPPORTED;
+		_dm_flags |= DM_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS_SUPPORTED;
+	}
+
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 18, 1, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch))
+		_dm_flags |= DM_KERNEL_KEYRING_SUPPORTED;
+
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 17, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch)) {
+		_dm_flags |= DM_SECTOR_SIZE_SUPPORTED;
+		_dm_flags |= DM_CAPI_STRING_SUPPORTED;
+	}
+
+	_dm_crypt_checked = true;
+}
+
+static void _dm_set_verity_compat(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				  unsigned verity_maj,
+				  unsigned verity_min,
+				  unsigned verity_patch)
+{
+	if (_dm_verity_checked || verity_maj == 0)
+		return;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Detected dm-verity version %i.%i.%i.",
+		verity_maj, verity_min, verity_patch);
+
+	_dm_flags |= DM_VERITY_SUPPORTED;
+
+	/*
+	 * ignore_corruption, restart_on corruption is available since 1.2 (kernel 4.1)
+	 * ignore_zero_blocks since 1.3 (kernel 4.5)
+	 * (but some dm-verity targets 1.2 don't support it)
+	 * FEC is added in 1.3 as well.
+	 * Check at most once is added in 1.4 (kernel 4.17).
+	 */
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 3, 0, verity_maj, verity_min, verity_patch)) {
+		_dm_flags |= DM_VERITY_ON_CORRUPTION_SUPPORTED;
+		_dm_flags |= DM_VERITY_FEC_SUPPORTED;
+	}
+
+	_dm_verity_checked = true;
+}
+
+static void _dm_set_integrity_compat(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				     unsigned integrity_maj,
+				     unsigned integrity_min,
+				     unsigned integrity_patch)
+{
+	if (_dm_integrity_checked || integrity_maj == 0)
+		return;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Detected dm-integrity version %i.%i.%i.",
+		integrity_maj, integrity_min, integrity_patch);
+
+	_dm_flags |= DM_INTEGRITY_SUPPORTED;
+
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 2, 0, integrity_maj, integrity_min, integrity_patch))
+		_dm_flags |= DM_INTEGRITY_RECALC_SUPPORTED;
+
+	_dm_integrity_checked = true;
+}
+
+static int _dm_check_versions(struct crypt_device *cd, dm_target_type target_type)
+{
+	struct dm_task *dmt;
+	struct dm_versions *target, *last_target;
+	char dm_version[16];
+	unsigned dm_maj, dm_min, dm_patch;
+	int r = 0;
+
+	if (((target_type == DM_CRYPT || target_type == DM_LINEAR) && _dm_crypt_checked) ||
+	    (target_type == DM_VERITY    && _dm_verity_checked) ||
+	    (target_type == DM_INTEGRITY && _dm_integrity_checked) ||
+	    (_dm_crypt_checked && _dm_verity_checked && _dm_integrity_checked))
+		return 1;
+
+	/* Shut up DM while checking */
+	_quiet_log = 1;
+
+	/* FIXME: add support to DM so it forces crypt target module load here */
+	if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_LIST_VERSIONS)))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dm_task_run(dmt))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dm_task_get_driver_version(dmt, dm_version, sizeof(dm_version)))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!_dm_ioctl_checked) {
+		if (sscanf(dm_version, "%u.%u.%u", &dm_maj, &dm_min, &dm_patch) != 3)
+			goto out;
+		log_dbg(cd, "Detected dm-ioctl version %u.%u.%u.", dm_maj, dm_min, dm_patch);
+
+		if (_dm_satisfies_version(4, 20, 0, dm_maj, dm_min, dm_patch))
+			_dm_flags |= DM_SECURE_SUPPORTED;
+#if HAVE_DECL_DM_TASK_DEFERRED_REMOVE
+		if (_dm_satisfies_version(4, 27, 0, dm_maj, dm_min, dm_patch))
+			_dm_flags |= DM_DEFERRED_SUPPORTED;
+#endif
+	}
+
+	target = dm_task_get_versions(dmt);
+	do {
+		last_target = target;
+		if (!strcmp(DM_CRYPT_TARGET, target->name)) {
+			_dm_set_crypt_compat(cd, (unsigned)target->version[0],
+					     (unsigned)target->version[1],
+					     (unsigned)target->version[2]);
+		} else if (!strcmp(DM_VERITY_TARGET, target->name)) {
+			_dm_set_verity_compat(cd, (unsigned)target->version[0],
+					      (unsigned)target->version[1],
+					      (unsigned)target->version[2]);
+		} else if (!strcmp(DM_INTEGRITY_TARGET, target->name)) {
+			_dm_set_integrity_compat(cd, (unsigned)target->version[0],
+						 (unsigned)target->version[1],
+						 (unsigned)target->version[2]);
+		}
+		target = (struct dm_versions *)((char *) target + target->next);
+	} while (last_target != target);
+
+	r = 1;
+	if (!_dm_ioctl_checked)
+		log_dbg(cd, "Device-mapper backend running with UDEV support %sabled.",
+			_dm_use_udev() ? "en" : "dis");
+
+	_dm_ioctl_checked = true;
+out:
+	if (dmt)
+		dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+
+	_quiet_log = 0;
+	return r;
+}
+
+int dm_flags(struct crypt_device *cd, dm_target_type target, uint32_t *flags)
+{
+	_dm_check_versions(cd, target);
+	*flags = _dm_flags;
+
+	if (target == DM_UNKNOWN &&
+	    _dm_crypt_checked && _dm_verity_checked && _dm_integrity_checked)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (((target == DM_CRYPT || target == DM_LINEAR) && _dm_crypt_checked) ||
+	    (target == DM_VERITY    && _dm_verity_checked) ||
+	    (target == DM_INTEGRITY && _dm_integrity_checked))
+		return 0;
+
+	return -ENODEV;
+}
+
+/* This doesn't run any kernel checks, just set up userspace libdevmapper */
+void dm_backend_init(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!_dm_use_count++) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Initialising device-mapper backend library.");
+		dm_log_init(set_dm_error);
+		dm_log_init_verbose(10);
+	}
+}
+
+void dm_backend_exit(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (_dm_use_count && (!--_dm_use_count)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Releasing device-mapper backend.");
+		dm_log_init_verbose(0);
+		dm_log_init(NULL);
+		dm_lib_release();
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * libdevmapper is not context friendly, switch context on every DM call.
+ * FIXME: this is not safe if called in parallel but neither is DM lib.
+ */
+static int dm_init_context(struct crypt_device *cd, dm_target_type target)
+{
+	_context = cd;
+	if (!_dm_check_versions(cd, target)) {
+		if (getuid() || geteuid())
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot initialize device-mapper, "
+				      "running as non-root user."));
+		else
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot initialize device-mapper. "
+				      "Is dm_mod kernel module loaded?"));
+		_context = NULL;
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+static void dm_exit_context(void)
+{
+	_context = NULL;
+}
+
+/* Return path to DM device */
+char *dm_device_path(const char *prefix, int major, int minor)
+{
+	struct dm_task *dmt;
+	const char *name;
+	char path[PATH_MAX];
+
+	if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_STATUS)))
+		return NULL;
+	if (!dm_task_set_minor(dmt, minor) ||
+	    !dm_task_set_major(dmt, major) ||
+	    !dm_task_no_flush(dmt) ||
+	    !dm_task_run(dmt) ||
+	    !(name = dm_task_get_name(dmt))) {
+		dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s%s", prefix ?: "", name) < 0)
+		path[0] = '\0';
+
+	dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+
+	return strdup(path);
+}
+
+static void hex_key(char *hexkey, size_t key_size, const char *key)
+{
+	unsigned i;
+
+	for(i = 0; i < key_size; i++)
+		sprintf(&hexkey[i * 2], "%02x", (unsigned char)key[i]);
+}
+
+static size_t int_log10(uint64_t x)
+{
+	uint64_t r = 0;
+	for (x /= 10; x > 0; x /= 10)
+		r++;
+	return r;
+}
+
+#define CLEN    64   /* 2*MAX_CIPHER_LEN */
+#define CLENS  "63"  /* for sscanf length + '\0' */
+#define CAPIL  144   /* should be enough to fit whole capi string */
+#define CAPIS "143"  /* for sscanf of crypto API string + 16  + \0 */
+
+static int cipher_c2dm(const char *org_c, const char *org_i, unsigned tag_size,
+		       char *c_dm, int c_dm_size,
+		       char *i_dm, int i_dm_size)
+{
+	int c_size = 0, i_size = 0, i;
+	char cipher[CLEN], mode[CLEN], iv[CLEN+1], tmp[CLEN];
+	char capi[CAPIL];
+
+	if (!c_dm || !c_dm_size || !i_dm || !i_dm_size)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	i = sscanf(org_c, "%" CLENS "[^-]-%" CLENS "s", cipher, tmp);
+	if (i != 2)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	i = sscanf(tmp, "%" CLENS "[^-]-%" CLENS "s", mode, iv);
+	if (i == 1) {
+		memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
+		strncpy(iv, mode, sizeof(iv)-1);
+		*mode = '\0';
+		if (snprintf(capi, sizeof(capi), "%s", cipher) < 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else if (i == 2) {
+		if (snprintf(capi, sizeof(capi), "%s(%s)", mode, cipher) < 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!org_i) {
+		/* legacy mode: CIPHER-MODE-IV*/
+		i_size = snprintf(i_dm, i_dm_size, "%s", "");
+		c_size = snprintf(c_dm, c_dm_size, "%s", org_c);
+	} else if (!strcmp(org_i, "none")) {
+		/* IV only: capi:MODE(CIPHER)-IV */
+		i_size = snprintf(i_dm, i_dm_size, " integrity:%u:none", tag_size);
+		c_size = snprintf(c_dm, c_dm_size, "capi:%s-%s", capi, iv);
+	} else if (!strcmp(org_i, "aead") && !strcmp(mode, "ccm")) {
+		/* CCM AEAD: capi:rfc4309(MODE(CIPHER))-IV */
+		i_size = snprintf(i_dm, i_dm_size, " integrity:%u:aead", tag_size);
+		c_size = snprintf(c_dm, c_dm_size, "capi:rfc4309(%s)-%s", capi, iv);
+	} else if (!strcmp(org_i, "aead")) {
+		/* AEAD: capi:MODE(CIPHER))-IV */
+		i_size = snprintf(i_dm, i_dm_size, " integrity:%u:aead", tag_size);
+		c_size = snprintf(c_dm, c_dm_size, "capi:%s-%s", capi, iv);
+	} else if (!strcmp(org_i, "poly1305")) {
+		/* POLY1305 AEAD: capi:rfc7539(MODE(CIPHER),POLY1305)-IV */
+		i_size = snprintf(i_dm, i_dm_size, " integrity:%u:aead", tag_size);
+		c_size = snprintf(c_dm, c_dm_size, "capi:rfc7539(%s,poly1305)-%s", capi, iv);
+	} else {
+		/* other AEAD: capi:authenc(<AUTH>,MODE(CIPHER))-IV */
+		i_size = snprintf(i_dm, i_dm_size, " integrity:%u:aead", tag_size);
+		c_size = snprintf(c_dm, c_dm_size, "capi:authenc(%s,%s)-%s", org_i, capi, iv);
+	}
+
+	if (c_size < 0 || c_size == c_dm_size)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (i_size < 0 || i_size == i_dm_size)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cipher_dm2c(char **org_c, char **org_i, const char *c_dm, const char *i_dm)
+{
+	char cipher[CLEN], mode[CLEN], iv[CLEN], auth[CLEN];
+	char tmp[CAPIL], dmcrypt_tmp[CAPIL*2], capi[CAPIL+1];
+	size_t len;
+	int i;
+
+	if (!c_dm)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* legacy mode */
+	if (strncmp(c_dm, "capi:", 4)) {
+		if (!(*org_c = strdup(c_dm)))
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		*org_i = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* modes with capi: prefix */
+	i = sscanf(c_dm, "capi:%" CAPIS "[^-]-%" CLENS "s", tmp, iv);
+	if (i != 2)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	len = strlen(tmp);
+	if (len < 2)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (tmp[len-1] == ')')
+		tmp[len-1] = '\0';
+
+	if (sscanf(tmp, "rfc4309(%" CAPIS "s", capi) == 1) {
+		if (!(*org_i = strdup("aead")))
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	} else if (sscanf(tmp, "rfc7539(%" CAPIS "[^,],%" CLENS "s", capi, auth) == 2) {
+		if (!(*org_i = strdup(auth)))
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	} else if (sscanf(tmp, "authenc(%" CLENS "[^,],%" CAPIS "s", auth, capi) == 2) {
+		if (!(*org_i = strdup(auth)))
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	} else {
+		if (i_dm) {
+			if (!(*org_i = strdup(i_dm)))
+				return -ENOMEM;
+		} else
+			*org_i = NULL;
+		memset(capi, 0, sizeof(capi));
+		strncpy(capi, tmp, sizeof(capi)-1);
+	}
+
+	i = sscanf(capi, "%" CLENS "[^(](%" CLENS "[^)])", mode, cipher);
+	if (i == 2)
+		snprintf(dmcrypt_tmp, sizeof(dmcrypt_tmp), "%s-%s-%s", cipher, mode, iv);
+	else
+		snprintf(dmcrypt_tmp, sizeof(dmcrypt_tmp), "%s-%s", capi, iv);
+
+	if (!(*org_c = strdup(dmcrypt_tmp))) {
+		free(*org_i);
+		*org_i = NULL;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMCrypt */
+static char *get_dm_crypt_params(const struct dm_target *tgt, uint32_t flags)
+{
+	int r, max_size, null_cipher = 0, num_options = 0, keystr_len = 0;
+	char *params, *hexkey;
+	char sector_feature[32], features[512], integrity_dm[256], cipher_dm[256];
+
+	if (!tgt)
+		return NULL;
+
+	r = cipher_c2dm(tgt->u.crypt.cipher, tgt->u.crypt.integrity, tgt->u.crypt.tag_size,
+			cipher_dm, sizeof(cipher_dm), integrity_dm, sizeof(integrity_dm));
+	if (r < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS)
+		num_options++;
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT)
+		num_options++;
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS)
+		num_options++;
+	if (tgt->u.crypt.integrity)
+		num_options++;
+
+	if (tgt->u.crypt.sector_size != SECTOR_SIZE) {
+		num_options++;
+		snprintf(sector_feature, sizeof(sector_feature), " sector_size:%u", tgt->u.crypt.sector_size);
+	} else
+		*sector_feature = '\0';
+
+	if (num_options) {
+		snprintf(features, sizeof(features)-1, " %d%s%s%s%s%s", num_options,
+		(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS) ? " allow_discards" : "",
+		(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT) ? " same_cpu_crypt" : "",
+		(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS) ? " submit_from_crypt_cpus" : "",
+		sector_feature, integrity_dm);
+	} else
+		*features = '\0';
+
+	if (!strncmp(cipher_dm, "cipher_null-", 12))
+		null_cipher = 1;
+
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) {
+		keystr_len = strlen(tgt->u.crypt.vk->key_description) + int_log10(tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength) + 10;
+		hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(keystr_len);
+	} else
+		hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(null_cipher ? 2 : (tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength * 2 + 1));
+
+	if (!hexkey)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (null_cipher)
+		strncpy(hexkey, "-", 2);
+	else if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) {
+		r = snprintf(hexkey, keystr_len, ":%zu:logon:%s", tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength, tgt->u.crypt.vk->key_description);
+		if (r < 0 || r >= keystr_len) {
+			params = NULL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	} else
+		hex_key(hexkey, tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength, tgt->u.crypt.vk->key);
+
+	max_size = strlen(hexkey) + strlen(cipher_dm) +
+		   strlen(device_block_path(tgt->data_device)) +
+		   strlen(features) + 64;
+	params = crypt_safe_alloc(max_size);
+	if (!params)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = snprintf(params, max_size, "%s %s %" PRIu64 " %s %" PRIu64 "%s",
+		     cipher_dm, hexkey, tgt->u.crypt.iv_offset,
+		     device_block_path(tgt->data_device), tgt->u.crypt.offset,
+		     features);
+	if (r < 0 || r >= max_size) {
+		crypt_safe_free(params);
+		params = NULL;
+	}
+out:
+	crypt_safe_free(hexkey);
+	return params;
+}
+
+/* https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMVerity */
+static char *get_dm_verity_params(const struct dm_target *tgt, uint32_t flags)
+{
+	int max_size, r, num_options = 0;
+	struct crypt_params_verity *vp;
+	char *params = NULL, *hexroot = NULL, *hexsalt = NULL;
+	char features[256], fec_features[256];
+
+	if (!tgt || !tgt->u.verity.vp)
+		return NULL;
+
+	vp = tgt->u.verity.vp;
+
+	/* These flags are not compatible */
+	if ((flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION) &&
+	    (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION))
+		flags &= ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION;
+
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION)
+		num_options++;
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION)
+		num_options++;
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS)
+		num_options++;
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CHECK_AT_MOST_ONCE)
+		num_options++;
+
+	if (tgt->u.verity.fec_device) {
+		num_options += 8;
+		snprintf(fec_features, sizeof(fec_features)-1,
+			 " use_fec_from_device %s fec_start %" PRIu64 " fec_blocks %" PRIu64 " fec_roots %" PRIu32,
+			 device_block_path(tgt->u.verity.fec_device), tgt->u.verity.fec_offset,
+			 vp->data_size + tgt->u.verity.hash_blocks, vp->fec_roots);
+	} else
+		*fec_features = '\0';
+
+	if (num_options)
+		snprintf(features, sizeof(features)-1, " %d%s%s%s%s", num_options,
+		(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION) ? " ignore_corruption" : "",
+		(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION) ? " restart_on_corruption" : "",
+		(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS) ? " ignore_zero_blocks" : "",
+		(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CHECK_AT_MOST_ONCE) ? " check_at_most_once" : "");
+	else
+		*features = '\0';
+
+	hexroot = crypt_safe_alloc(tgt->u.verity.root_hash_size * 2 + 1);
+	if (!hexroot)
+		goto out;
+	hex_key(hexroot, tgt->u.verity.root_hash_size, tgt->u.verity.root_hash);
+
+	hexsalt = crypt_safe_alloc(vp->salt_size ? vp->salt_size * 2 + 1 : 2);
+	if (!hexsalt)
+		goto out;
+	if (vp->salt_size)
+		hex_key(hexsalt, vp->salt_size, vp->salt);
+	else
+		strncpy(hexsalt, "-", 2);
+
+	max_size = strlen(hexroot) + strlen(hexsalt) +
+		   strlen(device_block_path(tgt->data_device)) +
+		   strlen(device_block_path(tgt->u.verity.hash_device)) +
+		   strlen(vp->hash_name) + strlen(features) + strlen(fec_features) + 128;
+
+	params = crypt_safe_alloc(max_size);
+	if (!params)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = snprintf(params, max_size,
+		     "%u %s %s %u %u %" PRIu64 " %" PRIu64 " %s %s %s%s%s",
+		     vp->hash_type, device_block_path(tgt->data_device),
+		     device_block_path(tgt->u.verity.hash_device),
+		     vp->data_block_size, vp->hash_block_size,
+		     vp->data_size, tgt->u.verity.hash_offset,
+		     vp->hash_name, hexroot, hexsalt, features, fec_features);
+	if (r < 0 || r >= max_size) {
+		crypt_safe_free(params);
+		params = NULL;
+	}
+out:
+	crypt_safe_free(hexroot);
+	crypt_safe_free(hexsalt);
+	return params;
+}
+
+static char *get_dm_integrity_params(const struct dm_target *tgt, uint32_t flags)
+{
+	int r, max_size, num_options = 0;
+	char *params, *hexkey, mode;
+	char features[512], feature[256];
+
+	if (!tgt)
+		return NULL;
+
+	max_size = strlen(device_block_path(tgt->data_device)) +
+			(tgt->u.integrity.meta_device ? strlen(device_block_path(tgt->u.integrity.meta_device)) : 0) +
+			(tgt->u.integrity.vk ? tgt->u.integrity.vk->keylength * 2 : 0) +
+			(tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key ? tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key->keylength * 2 : 0) +
+			(tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key ? tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key->keylength * 2 : 0) +
+			(tgt->u.integrity.integrity ? strlen(tgt->u.integrity.integrity) : 0) +
+			(tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity ? strlen(tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity) : 0) +
+			(tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt ? strlen(tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt) : 0) +	128;
+
+	params = crypt_safe_alloc(max_size);
+	if (!params)
+		return NULL;
+
+	*features = '\0';
+	if (tgt->u.integrity.journal_size) {
+		num_options++;
+		snprintf(feature, sizeof(feature), "journal_sectors:%u ",
+			 (unsigned)(tgt->u.integrity.journal_size / SECTOR_SIZE));
+		strncat(features, feature, sizeof(features) - strlen(features) - 1);
+	}
+	if (tgt->u.integrity.journal_watermark) {
+		num_options++;
+		snprintf(feature, sizeof(feature), "journal_watermark:%u ",
+			 tgt->u.integrity.journal_watermark);
+		strncat(features, feature, sizeof(features) - strlen(features) - 1);
+	}
+	if (tgt->u.integrity.journal_commit_time) {
+		num_options++;
+		snprintf(feature, sizeof(feature), "commit_time:%u ",
+			 tgt->u.integrity.journal_commit_time);
+		strncat(features, feature, sizeof(features) - strlen(features) - 1);
+	}
+	if (tgt->u.integrity.interleave_sectors) {
+		num_options++;
+		snprintf(feature, sizeof(feature), "interleave_sectors:%u ",
+			 tgt->u.integrity.interleave_sectors);
+		strncat(features, feature, sizeof(features) - strlen(features) - 1);
+	}
+	if (tgt->u.integrity.sector_size) {
+		num_options++;
+		snprintf(feature, sizeof(feature), "block_size:%u ",
+			 tgt->u.integrity.sector_size);
+		strncat(features, feature, sizeof(features) - strlen(features) - 1);
+	}
+	if (tgt->u.integrity.buffer_sectors) {
+		num_options++;
+		snprintf(feature, sizeof(feature), "buffer_sectors:%u ",
+			 tgt->u.integrity.buffer_sectors);
+		strncat(features, feature, sizeof(features) - strlen(features) - 1);
+	}
+	if (tgt->u.integrity.integrity) {
+		num_options++;
+
+		if (tgt->u.integrity.vk) {
+			hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(tgt->u.integrity.vk->keylength * 2 + 1);
+			if (!hexkey) {
+				crypt_safe_free(params);
+				return NULL;
+			}
+			hex_key(hexkey, tgt->u.integrity.vk->keylength, tgt->u.integrity.vk->key);
+		} else
+			hexkey = NULL;
+
+		snprintf(feature, sizeof(feature), "internal_hash:%s%s%s ",
+			 tgt->u.integrity.integrity, hexkey ? ":" : "", hexkey ?: "");
+		strncat(features, feature, sizeof(features) - strlen(features) - 1);
+		crypt_safe_free(hexkey);
+	}
+
+	if (tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity) {
+		num_options++;
+
+		if (tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key) {
+			hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key->keylength * 2 + 1);
+			if (!hexkey) {
+				crypt_safe_free(params);
+				return NULL;
+			}
+			hex_key(hexkey, tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key->keylength,
+				tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key->key);
+		} else
+			hexkey = NULL;
+
+		snprintf(feature, sizeof(feature), "journal_mac:%s%s%s ",
+			 tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity, hexkey ? ":" : "", hexkey ?: "");
+		strncat(features, feature, sizeof(features) - strlen(features) - 1);
+		crypt_safe_free(hexkey);
+	}
+
+	if (tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt) {
+		num_options++;
+
+		if (tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key) {
+			hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key->keylength * 2 + 1);
+			if (!hexkey) {
+				crypt_safe_free(params);
+				return NULL;
+			}
+			hex_key(hexkey, tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key->keylength,
+				tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key->key);
+		} else
+			hexkey = NULL;
+
+		snprintf(feature, sizeof(feature), "journal_crypt:%s%s%s ",
+			 tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt, hexkey ? ":" : "", hexkey ?: "");
+		strncat(features, feature, sizeof(features) - strlen(features) - 1);
+		crypt_safe_free(hexkey);
+	}
+
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE) {
+		num_options++;
+		snprintf(feature, sizeof(feature), "recalculate ");
+		strncat(features, feature, sizeof(features) - strlen(features) - 1);
+	}
+
+	if (tgt->u.integrity.meta_device) {
+		num_options++;
+		snprintf(feature, sizeof(feature), "meta_device:%s ",
+			 device_block_path(tgt->u.integrity.meta_device));
+		strncat(features, feature, sizeof(features) - strlen(features) - 1);
+	}
+
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECOVERY)
+		mode = 'R';
+	else if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL)
+		mode = 'D';
+	else
+		mode = 'J';
+
+	r = snprintf(params, max_size, "%s %" PRIu64 " %d %c %d %s",
+		     device_block_path(tgt->data_device), tgt->u.integrity.offset,
+		     tgt->u.integrity.tag_size, mode,
+		     num_options, *features ? features : "");
+	if (r < 0 || r >= max_size) {
+		crypt_safe_free(params);
+		params = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return params;
+}
+
+static char *get_dm_linear_params(const struct dm_target *tgt, uint32_t flags)
+{
+	char *params;
+	int r;
+	int max_size = strlen(device_block_path(tgt->data_device)) + int_log10(tgt->u.linear.offset) + 3;
+
+	params = crypt_safe_alloc(max_size);
+	if (!params)
+		return NULL;
+
+	r = snprintf(params, max_size, "%s %" PRIu64,
+		     device_block_path(tgt->data_device), tgt->u.linear.offset);
+
+	if (r < 0 || r >= max_size) {
+		crypt_safe_free(params);
+		params = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return params;
+}
+
+/* DM helpers */
+static int _dm_remove(const char *name, int udev_wait, int deferred)
+{
+	int r = 0;
+	struct dm_task *dmt;
+	uint32_t cookie = 0;
+
+	if (!_dm_use_udev())
+		udev_wait = 0;
+
+	if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_REMOVE)))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
+		goto out;
+
+#if HAVE_DECL_DM_TASK_RETRY_REMOVE
+	if (!dm_task_retry_remove(dmt))
+		goto out;
+#endif
+#if HAVE_DECL_DM_TASK_DEFERRED_REMOVE
+	if (deferred && !dm_task_deferred_remove(dmt))
+		goto out;
+#endif
+	if (udev_wait && !_dm_task_set_cookie(dmt, &cookie, DM_UDEV_DISABLE_LIBRARY_FALLBACK))
+		goto out;
+
+	r = dm_task_run(dmt);
+
+	if (udev_wait)
+		(void)_dm_udev_wait(cookie);
+out:
+	dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _dm_simple(int task, const char *name)
+{
+	int r = 0;
+	struct dm_task *dmt;
+
+	if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(task)))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (name && !dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
+		goto out;
+
+	r = dm_task_run(dmt);
+out:
+	dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _dm_resume_device(const char *name, uint32_t flags);
+
+static int _error_device(const char *name, size_t size)
+{
+	struct dm_task *dmt;
+	int r = 0;
+
+	if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_RELOAD)))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
+		goto error;
+
+	if (!dm_task_add_target(dmt, UINT64_C(0), size, "error", ""))
+		goto error;
+
+	if (!dm_task_set_ro(dmt))
+		goto error;
+
+	if (!dm_task_no_open_count(dmt))
+		goto error;
+
+	if (!dm_task_run(dmt))
+		goto error;
+
+	if (_dm_resume_device(name, 0)) {
+		_dm_simple(DM_DEVICE_CLEAR, name);
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	r = 1;
+
+error:
+	dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int dm_error_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+
+	if (!name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_UNKNOWN))
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+
+	if (dm_query_device(cd, name, 0, &dmd) && _error_device(name, dmd.size))
+		r = 0;
+	else
+		r = -EINVAL;
+
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+
+	dm_exit_context();
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int dm_clear_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_UNKNOWN))
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+
+	if (_dm_simple(DM_DEVICE_CLEAR, name))
+		r = 0;
+	else
+		r = -EINVAL;
+
+	dm_exit_context();
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int dm_remove_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint32_t flags)
+{
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {};
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+	int retries = (flags & CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_FORCE) ? RETRY_COUNT : 1;
+	int deferred = (flags & CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED) ? 1 : 0;
+	int error_target = 0;
+	uint32_t dmt_flags;
+
+	if (!name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_UNKNOWN))
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+
+	if (deferred && !dm_flags(cd, DM_UNKNOWN, &dmt_flags) && !(dmt_flags & DM_DEFERRED_SUPPORTED)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Requested deferred flag is not supported."));
+		dm_exit_context();
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+
+	do {
+		r = _dm_remove(name, 1, deferred) ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+		if (--retries && r) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "WARNING: other process locked internal device %s, %s.",
+				name, retries ? "retrying remove" : "giving up");
+			sleep(1);
+			if ((flags & CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_FORCE) && !error_target) {
+				/* If force flag is set, replace device with error, read-only target.
+				 * it should stop processes from reading it and also removed underlying
+				 * device from mapping, so it is usable again.
+				 * Anyway, if some process try to read temporary cryptsetup device,
+				 * it is bug - no other process should try touch it (e.g. udev).
+				 */
+				if (!dm_query_device(cd, name, 0, &dmd)) {
+					_error_device(name, dmd.size);
+					error_target = 1;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	} while (r == -EINVAL && retries);
+
+	dm_task_update_nodes();
+	dm_exit_context();
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+#define UUID_LEN 37 /* 36 + \0, libuuid ... */
+/*
+ * UUID has format: CRYPT-<devicetype>-[<uuid>-]<device name>
+ * CRYPT-PLAIN-name
+ * CRYPT-LUKS1-00000000000000000000000000000000-name
+ * CRYPT-TEMP-name
+ */
+static int dm_prepare_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, const char *type,
+			    const char *uuid, char *buf, size_t buflen)
+{
+	char *ptr, uuid2[UUID_LEN] = {0};
+	uuid_t uu;
+	unsigned i = 0;
+
+	/* Remove '-' chars */
+	if (uuid) {
+		if (uuid_parse(uuid, uu) < 0) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Requested UUID %s has invalid format.", uuid);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		for (ptr = uuid2, i = 0; i < UUID_LEN; i++)
+			if (uuid[i] != '-') {
+				*ptr = uuid[i];
+				ptr++;
+			}
+	}
+
+	i = snprintf(buf, buflen, DM_UUID_PREFIX "%s%s%s%s%s",
+		type ?: "", type ? "-" : "",
+		uuid2[0] ? uuid2 : "", uuid2[0] ? "-" : "",
+		name);
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "DM-UUID is %s", buf);
+	if (i >= buflen)
+		log_err(cd, _("DM-UUID for device %s was truncated."), name);
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+int lookup_dm_dev_by_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *uuid, const char *type)
+{
+	int r;
+	char *c;
+	char dev_uuid[DM_UUID_LEN + DM_BY_ID_PREFIX_LEN] = DM_BY_ID_PREFIX;
+
+	if (!dm_prepare_uuid(cd, "", type, uuid, dev_uuid + DM_BY_ID_PREFIX_LEN, DM_UUID_LEN))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	c = strrchr(dev_uuid, '-');
+	if (!c)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* cut of dm name */
+	*c = '\0';
+
+	r = lookup_by_disk_id(dev_uuid);
+	if (r == -ENOENT) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Search by disk id not available. Using sysfs instead.");
+		r = lookup_by_sysfs_uuid_field(dev_uuid + DM_BY_ID_PREFIX_LEN, DM_UUID_LEN);
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _add_dm_targets(struct dm_task *dmt, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+{
+	const char *target;
+	struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd->segment;
+
+	do {
+		switch (tgt->type) {
+		case DM_CRYPT:
+			target = DM_CRYPT_TARGET;
+			break;
+		case DM_VERITY:
+			target = DM_VERITY_TARGET;
+			break;
+		case DM_INTEGRITY:
+			target = DM_INTEGRITY_TARGET;
+			break;
+		case DM_LINEAR:
+			target = DM_LINEAR_TARGET;
+			break;
+		default:
+			return -ENOTSUP;
+		}
+
+		if (!dm_task_add_target(dmt, tgt->offset, tgt->size, target, tgt->params))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		tgt = tgt->next;
+	} while (tgt);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void _destroy_dm_targets_params(struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+{
+	struct dm_target *t = &dmd->segment;
+
+	do {
+		crypt_safe_free(t->params);
+		t->params = NULL;
+		t = t->next;
+	} while (t);
+}
+
+static int _create_dm_targets_params(struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd->segment;
+
+	do {
+		if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT)
+			tgt->params = get_dm_crypt_params(tgt, dmd->flags);
+		else if (tgt->type == DM_VERITY)
+			tgt->params = get_dm_verity_params(tgt, dmd->flags);
+		else if (tgt->type == DM_INTEGRITY)
+			tgt->params = get_dm_integrity_params(tgt, dmd->flags);
+		else if (tgt->type == DM_LINEAR)
+			tgt->params = get_dm_linear_params(tgt, dmd->flags);
+		else {
+			r = -ENOTSUP;
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+		if (!tgt->params) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto err;
+		}
+		tgt = tgt->next;
+	} while (tgt);
+
+	return 0;
+err:
+	_destroy_dm_targets_params(dmd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _dm_create_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, const char *type,
+			     const char *uuid, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+{
+	struct dm_task *dmt = NULL;
+	struct dm_info dmi;
+	char dev_uuid[DM_UUID_LEN] = {0};
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+	uint32_t cookie = 0, read_ahead = 0;
+	uint16_t udev_flags = DM_UDEV_DISABLE_LIBRARY_FALLBACK;
+
+	if (dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE)
+		udev_flags |= CRYPT_TEMP_UDEV_FLAGS;
+
+	/* All devices must have DM_UUID, only resize on old device is exception */
+	if (!dm_prepare_uuid(cd, name, type, dmd->uuid, dev_uuid, sizeof(dev_uuid)))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_CREATE)))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dm_task_set_uuid(dmt, dev_uuid))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dm_task_secure_data(dmt))
+		goto out;
+	if ((dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY) && !dm_task_set_ro(dmt))
+		goto out;
+
+	r = _create_dm_targets_params(dmd);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = _add_dm_targets(dmt, dmd);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = -EINVAL;
+
+#ifdef DM_READ_AHEAD_MINIMUM_FLAG
+	if (device_read_ahead(dmd->segment.data_device, &read_ahead) &&
+	    !dm_task_set_read_ahead(dmt, read_ahead, DM_READ_AHEAD_MINIMUM_FLAG))
+		goto out;
+#endif
+	if (_dm_use_udev() && !_dm_task_set_cookie(dmt, &cookie, udev_flags))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dm_task_run(dmt))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (dm_task_get_info(dmt, &dmi))
+		r = 0;
+
+	if (_dm_use_udev()) {
+		(void)_dm_udev_wait(cookie);
+		cookie = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		_dm_remove(name, 1, 0);
+
+out:
+	if (cookie && _dm_use_udev())
+		(void)_dm_udev_wait(cookie);
+
+	if (dmt)
+		dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+
+	dm_task_update_nodes();
+
+	/* If code just loaded target module, update versions */
+	_dm_check_versions(cd, dmd->segment.type);
+
+	_destroy_dm_targets_params(dmd);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _dm_resume_device(const char *name, uint32_t flags)
+{
+	struct dm_task *dmt;
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+	uint32_t cookie = 0;
+	uint16_t udev_flags = DM_UDEV_DISABLE_LIBRARY_FALLBACK;
+
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE)
+		udev_flags |= CRYPT_TEMP_UDEV_FLAGS;
+
+	if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_RESUME)))
+		return r;
+
+	if (!dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (_dm_use_udev() && !_dm_task_set_cookie(dmt, &cookie, udev_flags))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (dm_task_run(dmt))
+		r = 0;
+out:
+	if (cookie && _dm_use_udev())
+		(void)_dm_udev_wait(cookie);
+
+	dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+
+	dm_task_update_nodes();
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _dm_reload_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+			     struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+{
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+	struct dm_task *dmt = NULL;
+	uint32_t read_ahead = 0;
+
+	/* All devices must have DM_UUID, only resize on old device is exception */
+	if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_RELOAD)))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dm_task_secure_data(dmt))
+		goto out;
+	if ((dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY) && !dm_task_set_ro(dmt))
+		goto out;
+
+	r = _create_dm_targets_params(dmd);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = _add_dm_targets(dmt, dmd);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = -EINVAL;
+
+#ifdef DM_READ_AHEAD_MINIMUM_FLAG
+	if (device_read_ahead(dmd->segment.data_device, &read_ahead) &&
+	    !dm_task_set_read_ahead(dmt, read_ahead, DM_READ_AHEAD_MINIMUM_FLAG))
+		goto out;
+#endif
+
+	if (dm_task_run(dmt))
+		r = 0;
+out:
+	if (dmt)
+		dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+
+	/* If code just loaded target module, update versions */
+	_dm_check_versions(cd, dmd->segment.type);
+
+	_destroy_dm_targets_params(dmd);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void crypt_free_verity_params(struct crypt_params_verity *vp)
+{
+	if (!vp)
+		return;
+
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)vp->hash_name);
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)vp->data_device);
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)vp->hash_device);
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)vp->fec_device);
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)vp->salt);
+	free(vp);
+}
+
+static void _dm_target_free_query_path(struct crypt_device *cd, struct dm_target *tgt)
+{
+	switch(tgt->type) {
+	case DM_CRYPT:
+		crypt_free_volume_key(tgt->u.crypt.vk);
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)tgt->u.crypt.cipher);
+		break;
+	case DM_INTEGRITY:
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)tgt->u.integrity.integrity);
+		crypt_free_volume_key(tgt->u.integrity.vk);
+
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity);
+		crypt_free_volume_key(tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key);
+
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt);
+		crypt_free_volume_key(tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key);
+
+		device_free(cd, tgt->u.integrity.meta_device);
+		break;
+	case DM_VERITY:
+		crypt_free_verity_params(tgt->u.verity.vp);
+		device_free(cd, tgt->u.verity.hash_device);
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)tgt->u.verity.root_hash);
+		/* fall through */
+	case DM_LINEAR:
+		break;
+	default:
+		log_err(NULL, "Unknown dm target type.");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	device_free(cd, tgt->data_device);
+}
+
+static void _dm_target_erase(struct crypt_device *cd, struct dm_target *tgt)
+{
+	if (tgt->direction == TARGET_QUERY)
+		_dm_target_free_query_path(cd, tgt);
+
+	if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT)
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)tgt->u.crypt.integrity);
+}
+
+void dm_targets_free(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+{
+	struct dm_target *t = &dmd->segment, *next = t->next;
+
+	_dm_target_erase(cd, t);
+
+	while (next) {
+		t = next;
+		next = t->next;
+		_dm_target_erase(cd, t);
+		free(t);
+	}
+
+	memset(&dmd->segment, 0, sizeof(dmd->segment));
+}
+
+int dm_targets_allocate(struct dm_target *first, unsigned count)
+{
+	if (!first || first->next || !count)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	while (--count) {
+		first->next = malloc(sizeof(*first));
+		if (!first->next)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		memset(first->next, 0, sizeof(*first));
+		first = first->next;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int check_retry(struct crypt_device *cd, uint32_t *dmd_flags, uint32_t dmt_flags)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	/* If discard not supported try to load without discard */
+	if ((*dmd_flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS) &&
+	    !(dmt_flags & DM_DISCARDS_SUPPORTED)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Discard/TRIM is not supported");
+		*dmd_flags = *dmd_flags & ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS;
+		ret = 1;
+	}
+
+	/* If kernel keyring is not supported load key directly in dm-crypt */
+	if ((*dmd_flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) &&
+	    !(dmt_flags & DM_KERNEL_KEYRING_SUPPORTED)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "dm-crypt doesn't support kernel keyring");
+		*dmd_flags = *dmd_flags & ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY;
+		ret = 1;
+	}
+
+	/* Drop performance options if not supported */
+	if ((*dmd_flags & (CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS)) &&
+	    !(dmt_flags & (DM_SAME_CPU_CRYPT_SUPPORTED | DM_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS_SUPPORTED))) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "dm-crypt doesn't support performance options");
+		*dmd_flags = *dmd_flags & ~(CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS);
+		ret = 1;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int dm_create_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+		     const char *type,
+		     struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+{
+	uint32_t dmt_flags = 0;
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!type || !dmd)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (dm_init_context(cd, dmd->segment.type))
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+
+	r = _dm_create_device(cd, name, type, dmd->uuid, dmd);
+
+	if (r < 0 && dm_flags(cd, dmd->segment.type, &dmt_flags))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (r && (dmd->segment.type == DM_CRYPT || dmd->segment.type == DM_LINEAR) && check_retry(cd, &dmd->flags, dmt_flags))
+		r = _dm_create_device(cd, name, type, dmd->uuid, dmd);
+
+	if (r == -EINVAL &&
+	    dmd->flags & (CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT|CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS) &&
+	    !(dmt_flags & (DM_SAME_CPU_CRYPT_SUPPORTED|DM_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS_SUPPORTED)))
+		log_err(cd, _("Requested dm-crypt performance options are not supported."));
+
+	if (r == -EINVAL && dmd->flags & (CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION|
+					  CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION|
+					  CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS|
+					  CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CHECK_AT_MOST_ONCE) &&
+	    !(dmt_flags & DM_VERITY_ON_CORRUPTION_SUPPORTED))
+		log_err(cd, _("Requested dm-verity data corruption handling options are not supported."));
+
+	if (r == -EINVAL && dmd->segment.type == DM_VERITY &&
+	    dmd->segment.u.verity.fec_device && !(dmt_flags & DM_VERITY_FEC_SUPPORTED))
+		log_err(cd, _("Requested dm-verity FEC options are not supported."));
+
+	if (r == -EINVAL && dmd->segment.type == DM_CRYPT) {
+		if (dmd->segment.u.crypt.integrity && !(dmt_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_SUPPORTED))
+			log_err(cd, _("Requested data integrity options are not supported."));
+		if (dmd->segment.u.crypt.sector_size != SECTOR_SIZE && !(dmt_flags & DM_SECTOR_SIZE_SUPPORTED))
+			log_err(cd, _("Requested sector_size option is not supported."));
+	}
+
+	if (r == -EINVAL && dmd->segment.type == DM_INTEGRITY && (dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE) &&
+	    !(dmt_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_RECALC_SUPPORTED))
+		log_err(cd, _("Requested automatic recalculation of integrity tags is not supported."));
+out:
+	dm_exit_context();
+	return r;
+}
+
+int dm_reload_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+		     struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd, unsigned resume)
+{
+	int r;
+	uint32_t dmt_flags;
+
+	if (!dmd)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (dm_init_context(cd, dmd->segment.type))
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+
+	if (dm_flags(cd, DM_INTEGRITY, &dmt_flags) || !(dmt_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_RECALC_SUPPORTED))
+		dmd->flags &= ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE;
+
+	r = _dm_reload_device(cd, name, dmd);
+
+	if (r == -EINVAL && (dmd->segment.type == DM_CRYPT || dmd->segment.type == DM_LINEAR)) {
+		if ((dmd->flags & (CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT|CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS)) &&
+	    !dm_flags(cd, DM_CRYPT, &dmt_flags) && !(dmt_flags & (DM_SAME_CPU_CRYPT_SUPPORTED|DM_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS_SUPPORTED)))
+			log_err(cd, _("Requested dmcrypt performance options are not supported."));
+		if ((dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS) &&
+		    !dm_flags(cd, DM_CRYPT, &dmt_flags) && !(dmt_flags & DM_DISCARDS_SUPPORTED))
+			log_err(cd, _("Discard/TRIM is not supported."));
+	}
+
+	if (!r && resume)
+		r = _dm_resume_device(name, dmd->flags);
+
+	dm_exit_context();
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int dm_status_dmi(const char *name, struct dm_info *dmi,
+			  const char *target, char **status_line)
+{
+	struct dm_task *dmt;
+	uint64_t start, length;
+	char *target_type, *params = NULL;
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_STATUS)))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dm_task_no_flush(dmt))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dm_task_run(dmt))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dm_task_get_info(dmt, dmi))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dmi->exists) {
+		r = -ENODEV;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	dm_get_next_target(dmt, NULL, &start, &length,
+			   &target_type, &params);
+
+	if (!target_type || start != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (target && strcmp(target_type, target))
+		goto out;
+
+	/* for target == NULL check all supported */
+	if (!target && (strcmp(target_type, DM_CRYPT_TARGET) &&
+			strcmp(target_type, DM_VERITY_TARGET) &&
+			strcmp(target_type, DM_INTEGRITY_TARGET) &&
+			strcmp(target_type, DM_LINEAR_TARGET)))
+		goto out;
+	r = 0;
+out:
+	if (!r && status_line && !(*status_line = strdup(params)))
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (dmt)
+		dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int dm_status_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct dm_info dmi;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	/* libdevmapper is too clever and handles
+	 * path argument differently with error.
+	 * Fail early here if parameter is non-existent path.
+	 */
+	if (strchr(name, '/') && stat(name, &st) < 0)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_UNKNOWN))
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	r = dm_status_dmi(name, &dmi, NULL, NULL);
+	dm_exit_context();
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return (dmi.open_count > 0) ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+int dm_status_suspended(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct dm_info dmi;
+
+	if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_UNKNOWN))
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	r = dm_status_dmi(name, &dmi, NULL, NULL);
+	dm_exit_context();
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return dmi.suspended ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+static int _dm_status_verity_ok(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct dm_info dmi;
+	char *status_line = NULL;
+
+	r = dm_status_dmi(name, &dmi, DM_VERITY_TARGET, &status_line);
+	if (r < 0 || !status_line) {
+		free(status_line);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Verity volume %s status is %s.", name, status_line ?: "");
+	r = status_line[0] == 'V' ? 1 : 0;
+	free(status_line);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int dm_status_verity_ok(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_VERITY))
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	r = _dm_status_verity_ok(cd, name);
+	dm_exit_context();
+	return r;
+}
+
+int dm_status_integrity_failures(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint64_t *count)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct dm_info dmi;
+	char *status_line = NULL;
+
+	if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_INTEGRITY))
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+
+	r = dm_status_dmi(name, &dmi, DM_INTEGRITY_TARGET, &status_line);
+	if (r < 0 || !status_line) {
+		free(status_line);
+		dm_exit_context();
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Integrity volume %s failure status is %s.", name, status_line ?: "");
+	*count = strtoull(status_line, NULL, 10);
+	free(status_line);
+	dm_exit_context();
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* FIXME use hex wrapper, user val wrappers for line parsing */
+static int _dm_target_query_crypt(struct crypt_device *cd, uint32_t get_flags,
+				  char *params, struct dm_target *tgt,
+				  uint32_t *act_flags)
+{
+	uint64_t val64;
+	char *rcipher, *rintegrity, *key_, *rdevice, *endp, buffer[3], *arg, *key_desc;
+	unsigned int i, val;
+	int r;
+	size_t key_size;
+	struct device *data_device = NULL;
+	char *cipher = NULL, *integrity = NULL;
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+	tgt->type = DM_CRYPT;
+	tgt->direction = TARGET_QUERY;
+	tgt->u.crypt.sector_size = SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+	r = -EINVAL;
+
+	rcipher = strsep(&params, " ");
+	rintegrity = NULL;
+
+	/* skip */
+	key_ = strsep(&params, " ");
+	if (!params)
+		goto err;
+	val64 = strtoull(params, &params, 10);
+	if (*params != ' ')
+		goto err;
+	params++;
+
+	tgt->u.crypt.iv_offset = val64;
+
+	/* device */
+	rdevice = strsep(&params, " ");
+	if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE) {
+		arg = crypt_lookup_dev(rdevice);
+		r = device_alloc(cd, &data_device, arg);
+		free(arg);
+		if (r < 0 && r != -ENOTBLK)
+			goto err;
+	}
+
+	r = -EINVAL;
+
+	/*offset */
+	if (!params)
+		goto err;
+	val64 = strtoull(params, &params, 10);
+	tgt->u.crypt.offset = val64;
+
+	tgt->u.crypt.tag_size = 0;
+
+	/* Features section, available since crypt target version 1.11 */
+	if (*params) {
+		if (*params != ' ')
+			goto err;
+		params++;
+
+		/* Number of arguments */
+		val64 = strtoull(params, &params, 10);
+		if (*params != ' ')
+			goto err;
+		params++;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < val64; i++) {
+			if (!params)
+				goto err;
+			arg = strsep(&params, " ");
+			if (!strcasecmp(arg, "allow_discards"))
+				*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS;
+			else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "same_cpu_crypt"))
+				*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT;
+			else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "submit_from_crypt_cpus"))
+				*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS;
+			else if (sscanf(arg, "integrity:%u:", &val) == 1) {
+				tgt->u.crypt.tag_size = val;
+				rintegrity = strchr(arg + strlen("integrity:"), ':');
+				if (!rintegrity)
+					goto err;
+				rintegrity++;
+			} else if (sscanf(arg, "sector_size:%u", &val) == 1) {
+				tgt->u.crypt.sector_size = val;
+			} else /* unknown option */
+				goto err;
+		}
+
+		/* All parameters should be processed */
+		if (params)
+			goto err;
+	}
+
+	/* cipher */
+	if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_CIPHER) {
+		r = cipher_dm2c(CONST_CAST(char**)&cipher,
+				CONST_CAST(char**)&integrity,
+				rcipher, rintegrity);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto err;
+	}
+
+	r = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (key_[0] == ':')
+		*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY;
+
+	if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE) {
+		/* we will trust kernel the key_string is in expected format */
+		if (key_[0] == ':') {
+			if (sscanf(key_ + 1, "%zu", &key_size) != 1)
+				goto err;
+		} else
+			key_size = strlen(key_) / 2;
+
+		vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(key_size, NULL);
+		if (!vk) {
+			r = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+		if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY) {
+			if (key_[0] == ':') {
+				/* :<key_size>:<key_type>:<key_description> */
+				key_desc = NULL;
+				endp = strpbrk(key_ + 1, ":");
+				if (endp)
+					key_desc = strpbrk(endp + 1, ":");
+				if (!key_desc) {
+					r = -ENOMEM;
+					goto err;
+				}
+				key_desc++;
+				crypt_volume_key_set_description(vk, key_desc);
+			} else {
+				buffer[2] = '\0';
+				for(i = 0; i < vk->keylength; i++) {
+					memcpy(buffer, &key_[i * 2], 2);
+					vk->key[i] = strtoul(buffer, &endp, 16);
+					if (endp != &buffer[2]) {
+						r = -EINVAL;
+						goto err;
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	memset(key_, 0, strlen(key_));
+
+	if (cipher)
+		tgt->u.crypt.cipher = cipher;
+	if (integrity)
+		tgt->u.crypt.integrity = integrity;
+	if (data_device)
+		tgt->data_device = data_device;
+	if (vk)
+		tgt->u.crypt.vk = vk;
+	return 0;
+err:
+	free(cipher);
+	free(integrity);
+	device_free(cd, data_device);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _dm_target_query_verity(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				   uint32_t get_flags,
+			           char *params,
+			           struct dm_target *tgt,
+				   uint32_t *act_flags)
+{
+	struct crypt_params_verity *vp = NULL;
+	uint32_t val32;
+	uint64_t val64;
+	ssize_t len;
+	char *str, *str2, *arg;
+	unsigned int i, features;
+	int r;
+	struct device *data_device = NULL, *hash_device = NULL, *fec_device = NULL;
+	char *hash_name = NULL, *root_hash = NULL, *salt = NULL, *fec_dev_str = NULL;
+
+	if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_VERITY_PARAMS) {
+		vp = malloc(sizeof(*vp));
+		if (!vp)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		memset(vp, 0, sizeof(*vp));
+	}
+
+	tgt->type = DM_VERITY;
+	tgt->direction = TARGET_QUERY;
+	tgt->u.verity.vp = vp;
+
+	/* version */
+	val32 = strtoul(params, &params, 10);
+	if (*params != ' ')
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (vp)
+		vp->hash_type = val32;
+	params++;
+
+	/* data device */
+	str = strsep(&params, " ");
+	if (!params)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE) {
+		str2 = crypt_lookup_dev(str);
+		r = device_alloc(cd, &data_device, str2);
+		free(str2);
+		if (r < 0 && r != -ENOTBLK)
+			return r;
+	}
+
+	r = -EINVAL;
+
+	/* hash device */
+	str = strsep(&params, " ");
+	if (!params)
+		goto err;
+	if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_VERITY_HASH_DEVICE) {
+		str2 = crypt_lookup_dev(str);
+		r = device_alloc(cd, &hash_device, str2);
+		free(str2);
+		if (r < 0 && r != -ENOTBLK)
+			goto err;
+	}
+
+	r = -EINVAL;
+
+	/* data block size*/
+	val32 = strtoul(params, &params, 10);
+	if (*params != ' ')
+		goto err;
+	if (vp)
+		vp->data_block_size = val32;
+	params++;
+
+	/* hash block size */
+	val32 = strtoul(params, &params, 10);
+	if (*params != ' ')
+		goto err;
+	if (vp)
+		vp->hash_block_size = val32;
+	params++;
+
+	/* data blocks */
+	val64 = strtoull(params, &params, 10);
+	if (*params != ' ')
+		goto err;
+	if (vp)
+		vp->data_size = val64;
+	params++;
+
+	/* hash start */
+	val64 = strtoull(params, &params, 10);
+	if (*params != ' ')
+		goto err;
+	tgt->u.verity.hash_offset = val64;
+	params++;
+
+	/* hash algorithm */
+	str = strsep(&params, " ");
+	if (!params)
+		goto err;
+	if (vp) {
+		hash_name = strdup(str);
+		if (!hash_name) {
+			r = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* root digest */
+	str = strsep(&params, " ");
+	if (!params)
+		goto err;
+	len = crypt_hex_to_bytes(str, &str2, 0);
+	if (len < 0) {
+		r = len;
+		goto err;
+	}
+	tgt->u.verity.root_hash_size = len;
+	if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_VERITY_ROOT_HASH)
+		root_hash = str2;
+	else
+		free(str2);
+
+	/* salt */
+	str = strsep(&params, " ");
+	if (vp) {
+		if (!strcmp(str, "-")) {
+			vp->salt_size = 0;
+			vp->salt = NULL;
+		} else {
+			len = crypt_hex_to_bytes(str, &str2, 0);
+			if (len < 0) {
+				r = len;
+				goto err;
+			}
+			vp->salt_size = len;
+			salt = str2;
+		}
+	}
+
+	r = -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Features section, available since verity target version 1.3 */
+	if (params) {
+		/* Number of arguments */
+		val64 = strtoull(params, &params, 10);
+		if (*params != ' ')
+			goto err;
+		params++;
+
+		features = (int)val64;
+		for (i = 0; i < features; i++) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			if (!params)
+				goto err;
+			arg = strsep(&params, " ");
+			if (!strcasecmp(arg, "ignore_corruption"))
+				*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION;
+			else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "restart_on_corruption"))
+				*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION;
+			else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "ignore_zero_blocks"))
+				*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS;
+			else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "check_at_most_once"))
+				*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CHECK_AT_MOST_ONCE;
+			else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "use_fec_from_device")) {
+				str = strsep(&params, " ");
+				str2 = crypt_lookup_dev(str);
+				if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_VERITY_HASH_DEVICE) {
+					r = device_alloc(cd, &fec_device, str2);
+					if (r < 0 && r != -ENOTBLK) {
+						free(str2);
+						goto err;
+					}
+				}
+				if (vp) {
+					free(fec_dev_str);
+					fec_dev_str = str2;
+				} else
+					free(str2);
+				i++;
+			} else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "fec_start")) {
+				val64 = strtoull(params, &params, 10);
+				if (*params)
+					params++;
+				tgt->u.verity.fec_offset = val64;
+				if (vp)
+					vp->fec_area_offset = val64 * vp->hash_block_size;
+				i++;
+			} else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "fec_blocks")) {
+				val64 = strtoull(params, &params, 10);
+				if (*params)
+					params++;
+				tgt->u.verity.fec_blocks = val64;
+				i++;
+			} else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "fec_roots")) {
+				val32 = strtoul(params, &params, 10);
+				if (*params)
+					params++;
+				if (vp)
+					vp->fec_roots = val32;
+				i++;
+			} else /* unknown option */
+				goto err;
+		}
+
+		/* All parameters should be processed */
+		if (params && *params) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto err;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (data_device)
+		tgt->data_device = data_device;
+	if (hash_device)
+		tgt->u.verity.hash_device = hash_device;
+	if (fec_device)
+		tgt->u.verity.fec_device = fec_device;
+	if (root_hash)
+		tgt->u.verity.root_hash = root_hash;
+	if (vp && hash_name)
+		vp->hash_name = hash_name;
+	if (vp && salt)
+		vp->salt = salt;
+	if (vp && fec_dev_str)
+		vp->fec_device = fec_dev_str;
+	return 0;
+err:
+	device_free(cd, data_device);
+	device_free(cd, hash_device);
+	device_free(cd, fec_device);
+	free(root_hash);
+	free(hash_name);
+	free(salt);
+	free(fec_dev_str);
+	free(vp);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _dm_target_query_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			     uint32_t get_flags,
+			     char *params,
+			     struct dm_target *tgt,
+			     uint32_t *act_flags)
+{
+	uint32_t val32;
+	uint64_t val64;
+	char c, *str, *str2, *arg;
+	unsigned int i, features, val;
+	ssize_t len;
+	int r;
+	struct device *data_device = NULL, *meta_device = NULL;
+	char *integrity = NULL, *journal_crypt = NULL, *journal_integrity = NULL;
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+	tgt->type = DM_INTEGRITY;
+	tgt->direction = TARGET_QUERY;
+
+	/* data device */
+	str = strsep(&params, " ");
+	if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE) {
+		str2 = crypt_lookup_dev(str);
+		r = device_alloc(cd, &data_device, str2);
+		free(str2);
+		if (r < 0 && r != -ENOTBLK)
+			return r;
+	}
+
+	r = -EINVAL;
+
+	/*offset */
+	if (!params)
+		goto err;
+	val64 = strtoull(params, &params, 10);
+	if (!*params || *params != ' ')
+		goto err;
+	tgt->u.integrity.offset = val64;
+
+	/* tag size*/
+	val32 = strtoul(params, &params, 10);
+	tgt->u.integrity.tag_size = val32;
+	if (!*params || *params != ' ')
+		goto err;
+
+	/* journal */
+	c = toupper(*(++params));
+	if (!*params || *(++params) != ' ' || (c != 'D' && c != 'J' && c != 'R'))
+		goto err;
+	if (c == 'D')
+		*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL;
+	if (c == 'R')
+		*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECOVERY;
+
+	tgt->u.integrity.sector_size = SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+	/* Features section */
+	if (params) {
+		/* Number of arguments */
+		val64 = strtoull(params, &params, 10);
+		if (*params != ' ')
+			goto err;
+		params++;
+
+		features = (int)val64;
+		for (i = 0; i < features; i++) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			if (!params)
+				goto err;
+			arg = strsep(&params, " ");
+			if (sscanf(arg, "journal_sectors:%u", &val) == 1)
+				tgt->u.integrity.journal_size = val * SECTOR_SIZE;
+			else if (sscanf(arg, "journal_watermark:%u", &val) == 1)
+				tgt->u.integrity.journal_watermark = val;
+			else if (sscanf(arg, "commit_time:%u", &val) == 1)
+				tgt->u.integrity.journal_commit_time = val;
+			else if (sscanf(arg, "interleave_sectors:%u", &val) == 1)
+				tgt->u.integrity.interleave_sectors = val;
+			else if (sscanf(arg, "block_size:%u", &val) == 1)
+				tgt->u.integrity.sector_size = val;
+			else if (sscanf(arg, "buffer_sectors:%u", &val) == 1)
+				tgt->u.integrity.buffer_sectors = val;
+			else if (!strncmp(arg, "internal_hash:", 14) && !integrity) {
+				str = &arg[14];
+				arg = strsep(&str, ":");
+				if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_INTEGRITY_PARAMS) {
+					integrity = strdup(arg);
+					if (!integrity) {
+						r = -ENOMEM;
+						goto err;
+					}
+				}
+
+				if (str) {
+					len = crypt_hex_to_bytes(str, &str2, 1);
+					if (len < 0) {
+						r = len;
+						goto err;
+					}
+
+					r = 0;
+					if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY) {
+						vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(len, str2);
+						if (!vk)
+							r = -ENOMEM;
+					} else if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE) {
+						vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(len, NULL);
+						if (!vk)
+							r = -ENOMEM;
+					}
+					crypt_safe_free(str2);
+					if (r < 0)
+						goto err;
+				}
+			} else if (!strncmp(arg, "meta_device:", 12) && !meta_device) {
+				if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE) {
+					str = crypt_lookup_dev(&arg[12]);
+					r = device_alloc(cd, &meta_device, str);
+					free(str);
+					if (r < 0 && r != -ENOTBLK)
+						goto err;
+				}
+			} else if (!strncmp(arg, "journal_crypt:", 14) && !journal_crypt) {
+				str = &arg[14];
+				arg = strsep(&str, ":");
+				if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_INTEGRITY_PARAMS) {
+					journal_crypt = strdup(arg);
+					if (!journal_crypt) {
+						r = -ENOMEM;
+						goto err;
+					}
+				}
+			} else if (!strncmp(arg, "journal_mac:", 12) && !journal_integrity) {
+				str = &arg[12];
+				arg = strsep(&str, ":");
+				if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_INTEGRITY_PARAMS) {
+					journal_integrity = strdup(arg);
+					if (!journal_integrity) {
+						r = -ENOMEM;
+						goto err;
+					}
+				}
+			} else if (!strcmp(arg, "recalculate")) {
+				*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE;
+			} else /* unknown option */
+				goto err;
+		}
+
+		/* All parameters should be processed */
+		if (params && *params) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto err;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (data_device)
+		tgt->data_device = data_device;
+	if (meta_device)
+		tgt->u.integrity.meta_device = meta_device;
+	if (integrity)
+		tgt->u.integrity.integrity = integrity;
+	if (journal_crypt)
+		tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt = journal_crypt;
+	if (journal_integrity)
+		tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity = journal_integrity;
+	if (vk)
+		tgt->u.integrity.vk = vk;
+	return 0;
+err:
+	device_free(cd, data_device);
+	device_free(cd, meta_device);
+	free(integrity);
+	free(journal_crypt);
+	free(journal_integrity);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _dm_target_query_linear(struct crypt_device *cd, struct dm_target *tgt,
+				   uint32_t get_flags, char *params)
+{
+	uint64_t val64;
+	char *rdevice, *arg;
+	int r;
+	struct device *device = NULL;
+
+	/* device */
+	rdevice = strsep(&params, " ");
+	if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE) {
+		arg = crypt_lookup_dev(rdevice);
+		r = device_alloc(cd, &device, arg);
+		free(arg);
+		if (r < 0 && r != -ENOTBLK)
+			return r;
+	}
+
+	r = -EINVAL;
+
+	/*offset */
+	if (!params)
+		goto err;
+	val64 = strtoull(params, &params, 10);
+
+	/* params should be empty now */
+	if (*params)
+		goto err;
+
+	tgt->type = DM_LINEAR;
+	tgt->direction = TARGET_QUERY;
+	tgt->data_device = device;
+	tgt->u.linear.offset = val64;
+
+	return 0;
+err:
+	device_free(cd, device);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * on error retval has to be negative
+ *
+ * also currently any _dm_target_query fn does not perform cleanup on error
+ */
+static int dm_target_query(struct crypt_device *cd, struct dm_target *tgt, const uint64_t *start,
+		    const uint64_t *length, const char *target_type,
+		    char *params, uint32_t get_flags, uint32_t *act_flags)
+{
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(target_type, DM_CRYPT_TARGET))
+		r = _dm_target_query_crypt(cd, get_flags, params, tgt, act_flags);
+	else if (!strcmp(target_type, DM_VERITY_TARGET))
+		r = _dm_target_query_verity(cd, get_flags, params, tgt, act_flags);
+	else if (!strcmp(target_type, DM_INTEGRITY_TARGET))
+		r = _dm_target_query_integrity(cd, get_flags, params, tgt, act_flags);
+	else if (!strcmp(target_type, DM_LINEAR_TARGET))
+		r = _dm_target_query_linear(cd, tgt, get_flags, params);
+
+	if (!r) {
+		tgt->offset = *start;
+		tgt->size = *length;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int dm_query_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+		    uint32_t get_flags, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+{
+	struct dm_target *t;
+	struct dm_task *dmt;
+	struct dm_info dmi;
+	uint64_t start, length;
+	char *target_type, *params;
+	const char *tmp_uuid;
+	void *next = NULL;
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_UNKNOWN))
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	if (!dmd)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	t = &dmd->segment;
+
+	memset(dmd, 0, sizeof(*dmd));
+
+	if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_TABLE)))
+		goto out;
+	if (!dm_task_secure_data(dmt))
+		goto out;
+	if (!dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
+		goto out;
+	r = -ENODEV;
+	if (!dm_task_run(dmt))
+		goto out;
+
+	r = -EINVAL;
+	if (!dm_task_get_info(dmt, &dmi))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dmi.exists) {
+		r = -ENODEV;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (dmi.target_count <= 0) {
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Never allow to return empty key */
+	if ((get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY) && dmi.suspended) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Cannot read volume key while suspended.");
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = dm_targets_allocate(&dmd->segment, dmi.target_count);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	do {
+		next = dm_get_next_target(dmt, next, &start, &length,
+	                                  &target_type, &params);
+
+		r = dm_target_query(cd, t, &start, &length, target_type, params, get_flags, &dmd->flags);
+		if (!r && t->type == DM_VERITY) {
+			r = _dm_status_verity_ok(cd, name);
+			if (r == 0)
+				dmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CORRUPTED;
+		}
+
+		if (r < 0) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Failed to query dm-%s segment."), target_type);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		dmd->size += length;
+		t = t->next;
+	} while (next && t);
+
+	if (dmi.read_only)
+		dmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+
+	tmp_uuid = dm_task_get_uuid(dmt);
+	if (!tmp_uuid)
+		dmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_UUID;
+	else if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_UUID) {
+		if (!strncmp(tmp_uuid, DM_UUID_PREFIX, DM_UUID_PREFIX_LEN))
+			dmd->uuid = strdup(tmp_uuid + DM_UUID_PREFIX_LEN);
+	}
+
+	dmd->holders = 0;
+#if (HAVE_DECL_DM_DEVICE_HAS_HOLDERS && HAVE_DECL_DM_DEVICE_HAS_MOUNTED_FS)
+	if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_HOLDERS)
+		dmd->holders = (dm_device_has_mounted_fs(dmi.major, dmi.minor) ||
+				dm_device_has_holders(dmi.major, dmi.minor));
+#endif
+
+	r = (dmi.open_count > 0);
+out:
+	if (dmt)
+		dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		dm_targets_free(cd, dmd);
+
+	dm_exit_context();
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _dm_message(const char *name, const char *msg)
+{
+	int r = 0;
+	struct dm_task *dmt;
+
+	if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_TARGET_MSG)))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!dm_task_secure_data(dmt))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (name && !dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dm_task_set_sector(dmt, (uint64_t) 0))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dm_task_set_message(dmt, msg))
+		goto out;
+
+	r = dm_task_run(dmt);
+out:
+	dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int dm_suspend_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_UNKNOWN))
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+
+	if (!_dm_simple(DM_DEVICE_SUSPEND, name))
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	else
+		r = 0;
+
+	dm_exit_context();
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int dm_suspend_and_wipe_key(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+	uint32_t dmt_flags;
+	int r = -ENOTSUP;
+
+	if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_CRYPT))
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+
+	if (dm_flags(cd, DM_CRYPT, &dmt_flags))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!(dmt_flags & DM_KEY_WIPE_SUPPORTED))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!_dm_simple(DM_DEVICE_SUSPEND, name)) {
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!_dm_message(name, "key wipe")) {
+		_dm_resume_device(name, 0);
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	r = 0;
+out:
+	dm_exit_context();
+	return r;
+}
+
+int dm_resume_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint32_t flags)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_UNKNOWN))
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+
+	r = _dm_resume_device(name, flags);
+
+	dm_exit_context();
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int dm_resume_and_reinstate_key(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+				const struct volume_key *vk)
+{
+	uint32_t dmt_flags;
+	int msg_size;
+	char *msg = NULL;
+	int r = -ENOTSUP;
+
+	if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_CRYPT) || dm_flags(cd, DM_CRYPT, &dmt_flags))
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+
+	if (!(dmt_flags & DM_KEY_WIPE_SUPPORTED))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (vk->key_description)
+		msg_size = strlen(vk->key_description) + int_log10(vk->keylength) + 18;
+	else
+		msg_size = vk->keylength * 2 + 10; // key set <key>
+
+	msg = crypt_safe_alloc(msg_size);
+	if (!msg) {
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	strcpy(msg, "key set ");
+	if (vk->key_description)
+		snprintf(msg + 8, msg_size - 8, ":%zu:logon:%s", vk->keylength, vk->key_description);
+	else
+		hex_key(&msg[8], vk->keylength, vk->key);
+
+	if (!_dm_message(name, msg) ||
+	    _dm_resume_device(name, 0)) {
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	r = 0;
+out:
+	crypt_safe_free(msg);
+	dm_exit_context();
+	return r;
+}
+
+const char *dm_get_dir(void)
+{
+	return dm_dir();
+}
+
+int dm_is_dm_device(int major, int minor)
+{
+	return dm_is_dm_major((uint32_t)major);
+}
+
+int dm_is_dm_kernel_name(const char *name)
+{
+	return strncmp(name, "dm-", 3) ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+int dm_crypt_target_set(struct dm_target *tgt, size_t seg_offset, size_t seg_size,
+	struct device *data_device, struct volume_key *vk, const char *cipher,
+	size_t iv_offset, size_t data_offset, const char *integrity, uint32_t tag_size,
+	uint32_t sector_size)
+{
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+
+	/* free on error */
+	char *dm_integrity = NULL;
+
+	if (tag_size) {
+		/* Space for IV metadata only */
+		dm_integrity = strdup(integrity ?: "none");
+		if (!dm_integrity) {
+			r = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err;
+		}
+	}
+
+	tgt->data_device = data_device;
+
+	tgt->type = DM_CRYPT;
+	tgt->u.crypt.vk = vk;
+	tgt->offset = seg_offset;
+	tgt->size = seg_size;
+
+	tgt->u.crypt.cipher = cipher;
+	tgt->u.crypt.integrity = dm_integrity;
+	tgt->u.crypt.iv_offset = iv_offset;
+	tgt->u.crypt.offset = data_offset;
+	tgt->u.crypt.tag_size = tag_size;
+	tgt->u.crypt.sector_size = sector_size;
+
+	return 0;
+err:
+	free(dm_integrity);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int dm_verity_target_set(struct dm_target *tgt, size_t seg_offset, size_t seg_size,
+	struct device *data_device, struct device *hash_device, struct device *fec_device,
+	const char *root_hash, uint32_t root_hash_size, uint64_t hash_offset_block,
+	uint64_t hash_blocks, struct crypt_params_verity *vp)
+{
+	if (!data_device || !hash_device || !vp)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	tgt->type = DM_VERITY;
+	tgt->direction = TARGET_SET;
+	tgt->offset = seg_offset;
+	tgt->size = seg_size;
+	tgt->data_device = data_device;
+
+	tgt->u.verity.hash_device = hash_device;
+	tgt->u.verity.fec_device = fec_device;
+	tgt->u.verity.root_hash = root_hash;
+	tgt->u.verity.root_hash_size = root_hash_size;
+	tgt->u.verity.hash_offset = hash_offset_block;
+	tgt->u.verity.fec_offset = vp->fec_area_offset / vp->hash_block_size;
+	tgt->u.verity.hash_blocks = hash_blocks;
+	tgt->u.verity.vp = vp;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int dm_integrity_target_set(struct dm_target *tgt, size_t seg_offset, size_t seg_size,
+			struct device *meta_device,
+		        struct device *data_device, uint64_t tag_size, uint64_t offset,
+			uint32_t sector_size, struct volume_key *vk,
+			struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key, struct volume_key *journal_mac_key,
+			const struct crypt_params_integrity *ip)
+{
+	if (!data_device)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	tgt->type = DM_INTEGRITY;
+	tgt->direction = TARGET_SET;
+	tgt->offset = seg_offset;
+	tgt->size = seg_size;
+	tgt->data_device = data_device;
+	if (meta_device != data_device)
+		tgt->u.integrity.meta_device = meta_device;
+	tgt->u.integrity.tag_size = tag_size;
+	tgt->u.integrity.offset = offset;
+	tgt->u.integrity.sector_size = sector_size;
+
+	tgt->u.integrity.vk = vk;
+	tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key = journal_crypt_key;
+	tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key = journal_mac_key;
+
+	if (ip) {
+		tgt->u.integrity.journal_size = ip->journal_size;
+		tgt->u.integrity.journal_watermark = ip->journal_watermark;
+		tgt->u.integrity.journal_commit_time = ip->journal_commit_time;
+		tgt->u.integrity.interleave_sectors = ip->interleave_sectors;
+		tgt->u.integrity.buffer_sectors = ip->buffer_sectors;
+		tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity = ip->journal_integrity;
+		tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt = ip->journal_crypt;
+		tgt->u.integrity.integrity = ip->integrity;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int dm_linear_target_set(struct dm_target *tgt, size_t seg_offset, size_t seg_size,
+	struct device *data_device, size_t data_offset)
+{
+	if (!data_device)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	tgt->type = DM_LINEAR;
+	tgt->direction = TARGET_SET;
+	tgt->offset = seg_offset;
+	tgt->size = seg_size;
+	tgt->data_device = data_device;
+
+	tgt->u.linear.offset = data_offset;
+
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/lib/loopaes/loopaes.c b/lib/loopaes/loopaes.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b9c0921
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/loopaes/loopaes.c
@@ -0,0 +1,253 @@
+/*
+ * loop-AES compatible volume handling
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "libcryptsetup.h"
+#include "loopaes.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+static const char *get_hash(unsigned int key_size)
+{
+	const char *hash;
+
+	switch (key_size) {
+		case 16: hash = "sha256"; break;
+		case 24: hash = "sha384"; break;
+		case 32: hash = "sha512"; break;
+		default: hash = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return hash;
+}
+
+static unsigned char get_tweak(unsigned int keys_count)
+{
+	switch (keys_count) {
+		case 64: return 0x55;
+		case 65: return 0xF4;
+		default: break;
+	}
+	return 0x00;
+}
+
+static int hash_key(const char *src, size_t src_len,
+		    char *dst, size_t dst_len,
+		    const char *hash_name)
+{
+	struct crypt_hash *hd = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (crypt_hash_init(&hd, hash_name))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = crypt_hash_write(hd, src, src_len);
+	if (!r)
+		r = crypt_hash_final(hd, dst, dst_len);
+
+	crypt_hash_destroy(hd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int hash_keys(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		     struct volume_key **vk,
+		     const char *hash_override,
+		     const char **input_keys,
+		     unsigned int keys_count,
+		     unsigned int key_len_output,
+		     unsigned int key_len_input)
+{
+	const char *hash_name;
+	char tweak, *key_ptr;
+	unsigned int i;
+	int r;
+
+	hash_name = hash_override ?: get_hash(key_len_output);
+	tweak = get_tweak(keys_count);
+
+	if (!keys_count || !key_len_output || !hash_name || !key_len_input) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Key processing error (using hash %s)."),
+			hash_name ?: "[none]");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	*vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key((size_t)key_len_output * keys_count, NULL);
+	if (!*vk)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < keys_count; i++) {
+		key_ptr = &(*vk)->key[i * key_len_output];
+		r = hash_key(input_keys[i], key_len_input, key_ptr,
+			     key_len_output, hash_name);
+		if (r < 0)
+			break;
+
+		key_ptr[0] ^= tweak;
+	}
+
+	if (r < 0 && *vk) {
+		crypt_free_volume_key(*vk);
+		*vk = NULL;
+	}
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int keyfile_is_gpg(char *buffer, size_t buffer_len)
+{
+	int r = 0;
+	int index = buffer_len < 100 ? buffer_len - 1 : 100;
+	char eos = buffer[index];
+
+	buffer[index] = '\0';
+	if (strstr(buffer, "BEGIN PGP MESSAGE"))
+		r = 1;
+	buffer[index] = eos;
+	return r;
+}
+
+int LOOPAES_parse_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			  struct volume_key **vk,
+			  const char *hash,
+			  unsigned int *keys_count,
+			  char *buffer,
+			  size_t buffer_len)
+{
+	const char *keys[LOOPAES_KEYS_MAX];
+	unsigned int key_lengths[LOOPAES_KEYS_MAX];
+	unsigned int i, key_index, key_len, offset;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Parsing loop-AES keyfile of size %zu.", buffer_len);
+
+	if (!buffer_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (keyfile_is_gpg(buffer, buffer_len)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Detected not yet supported GPG encrypted keyfile."));
+		log_std(cd, _("Please use gpg --decrypt <KEYFILE> | cryptsetup --keyfile=- ...\n"));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Remove EOL in buffer */
+	for (i = 0; i < buffer_len; i++)
+		if (buffer[i] == '\n' || buffer[i] == '\r')
+			buffer[i] = '\0';
+
+	offset = 0;
+	key_index = 0;
+	key_lengths[0] = 0;
+	while (offset < buffer_len && key_index < LOOPAES_KEYS_MAX) {
+		keys[key_index] = &buffer[offset];
+		key_lengths[key_index] = 0;;
+		while (offset < buffer_len && buffer[offset]) {
+			offset++;
+			key_lengths[key_index]++;
+		}
+		if (offset == buffer_len) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Unterminated key #%d in keyfile.", key_index);
+			log_err(cd, _("Incompatible loop-AES keyfile detected."));
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		while (offset < buffer_len && !buffer[offset])
+			offset++;
+		key_index++;
+	}
+
+	/* All keys must be the same length */
+	key_len = key_lengths[0];
+	for (i = 0; i < key_index; i++)
+		if (!key_lengths[i] || (key_lengths[i] != key_len)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Unexpected length %d of key #%d (should be %d).",
+				key_lengths[i], i, key_len);
+			key_len = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+
+	if (offset != buffer_len || key_len == 0 ||
+	   (key_index != 1 && key_index !=64 && key_index != 65)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Incompatible loop-AES keyfile detected."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Keyfile: %d keys of length %d.", key_index, key_len);
+
+	*keys_count = key_index;
+	return hash_keys(cd, vk, hash, keys, key_index,
+			 crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd), key_len);
+}
+
+int LOOPAES_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		     const char *name,
+		     const char *base_cipher,
+		     unsigned int keys_count,
+		     struct volume_key *vk,
+		     uint32_t flags)
+{
+	int r;
+	uint32_t req_flags, dmc_flags;
+	char *cipher = NULL;
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {
+		.flags = flags,
+	};
+
+	r = device_block_adjust(cd, crypt_data_device(cd), DEV_EXCL,
+				crypt_get_data_offset(cd), &dmd.size, &dmd.flags);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	if (keys_count == 1) {
+		req_flags = DM_PLAIN64_SUPPORTED;
+		r = asprintf(&cipher, "%s-%s", base_cipher, "cbc-plain64");
+	} else {
+		req_flags = DM_LMK_SUPPORTED;
+		r = asprintf(&cipher, "%s:%d-%s", base_cipher, 64, "cbc-lmk");
+	}
+	if (r < 0)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	r = dm_crypt_target_set(&dmd.segment, 0, dmd.size, crypt_data_device(cd),
+			vk, cipher, crypt_get_iv_offset(cd),
+			crypt_get_data_offset(cd), crypt_get_integrity(cd),
+			crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd), crypt_get_sector_size(cd));
+
+	if (r) {
+		free(cipher);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Trying to activate loop-AES device %s using cipher %s.",
+		name, cipher);
+
+	r = dm_create_device(cd, name, CRYPT_LOOPAES, &dmd);
+
+	if (r < 0 && !dm_flags(cd, DM_CRYPT, &dmc_flags) &&
+	    (dmc_flags & req_flags) != req_flags) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Kernel doesn't support loop-AES compatible mapping."));
+		r = -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+	free(cipher);
+
+	return r;
+}
diff --git a/lib/loopaes/loopaes.h b/lib/loopaes/loopaes.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2b6b5cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/loopaes/loopaes.h
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/*
+ * loop-AES compatible volume handling
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LOOPAES_H
+#define _LOOPAES_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+struct crypt_device;
+struct volume_key;
+
+#define LOOPAES_KEYS_MAX 65
+
+int LOOPAES_parse_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			  struct volume_key **vk,
+			  const char *hash,
+			  unsigned int *keys_count,
+			  char *buffer,
+			  size_t buffer_len);
+
+int LOOPAES_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		     const char *name,
+		     const char *base_cipher,
+		     unsigned int keys_count,
+		     struct volume_key *vk,
+		     uint32_t flags);
+#endif
diff --git a/lib/luks1/af.c b/lib/luks1/af.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..33431d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/luks1/af.c
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+/*
+ * AFsplitter - Anti forensic information splitter
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * AFsplitter diffuses information over a large stripe of data,
+ * therefore supporting secure data destruction.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Library General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "af.h"
+
+static void XORblock(const char *src1, const char *src2, char *dst, size_t n)
+{
+	size_t j;
+
+	for (j = 0; j < n; j++)
+		dst[j] = src1[j] ^ src2[j];
+}
+
+static int hash_buf(const char *src, char *dst, uint32_t iv,
+		    size_t len, const char *hash_name)
+{
+	struct crypt_hash *hd = NULL;
+	char *iv_char = (char *)&iv;
+	int r;
+
+	iv = be32_to_cpu(iv);
+	if (crypt_hash_init(&hd, hash_name))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if ((r = crypt_hash_write(hd, iv_char, sizeof(uint32_t))))
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((r = crypt_hash_write(hd, src, len)))
+		goto out;
+
+	r = crypt_hash_final(hd, dst, len);
+out:
+	crypt_hash_destroy(hd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * diffuse: Information spreading over the whole dataset with
+ * the help of hash function.
+ */
+static int diffuse(char *src, char *dst, size_t size, const char *hash_name)
+{
+	int r, hash_size = crypt_hash_size(hash_name);
+	unsigned int digest_size;
+	unsigned int i, blocks, padding;
+
+	if (hash_size <= 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	digest_size = hash_size;
+
+	blocks = size / digest_size;
+	padding = size % digest_size;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < blocks; i++) {
+		r = hash_buf(src + digest_size * i,
+			    dst + digest_size * i,
+			    i, (size_t)digest_size, hash_name);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+
+	if (padding) {
+		r = hash_buf(src + digest_size * i,
+			    dst + digest_size * i,
+			    i, (size_t)padding, hash_name);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Information splitting. The amount of data is multiplied by
+ * blocknumbers. The same blocksize and blocknumbers values
+ * must be supplied to AF_merge to recover information.
+ */
+int AF_split(struct crypt_device *ctx, const char *src, char *dst,
+	     size_t blocksize, unsigned int blocknumbers, const char *hash)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+	char *bufblock;
+	int r;
+
+	bufblock = crypt_safe_alloc(blocksize);
+	if (!bufblock)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* process everything except the last block */
+	for (i = 0; i < blocknumbers - 1; i++) {
+		r = crypt_random_get(ctx, dst + blocksize * i, blocksize, CRYPT_RND_NORMAL);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		XORblock(dst + blocksize * i, bufblock, bufblock, blocksize);
+		r = diffuse(bufblock, bufblock, blocksize, hash);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	/* the last block is computed */
+	XORblock(src, bufblock, dst + blocksize * i, blocksize);
+	r = 0;
+out:
+	crypt_safe_free(bufblock);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int AF_merge(struct crypt_device *ctx __attribute__((unused)), const char *src, char *dst,
+	     size_t blocksize, unsigned int blocknumbers, const char *hash)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+	char *bufblock;
+	int r;
+
+	bufblock = crypt_safe_alloc(blocksize);
+	if (!bufblock)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	for(i = 0; i < blocknumbers - 1; i++) {
+		XORblock(src + blocksize * i, bufblock, bufblock, blocksize);
+		r = diffuse(bufblock, bufblock, blocksize, hash);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	XORblock(src + blocksize * i, bufblock, dst, blocksize);
+	r = 0;
+out:
+	crypt_safe_free(bufblock);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* Size of final split data including sector alignment */
+size_t AF_split_sectors(size_t blocksize, unsigned int blocknumbers)
+{
+	size_t af_size;
+
+	/* data material * stripes */
+	af_size = blocksize * blocknumbers;
+
+	/* round up to sector */
+	af_size = (af_size + (SECTOR_SIZE - 1)) / SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+	return af_size;
+}
diff --git a/lib/luks1/af.h b/lib/luks1/af.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ba77af6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/luks1/af.h
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/*
+ * AFsplitter - Anti forensic information splitter
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * AFsplitter diffuses information over a large stripe of data,
+ * therefore supporting secure data destruction.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Library General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+#ifndef INCLUDED_CRYPTSETUP_LUKS_AF_H
+#define INCLUDED_CRYPTSETUP_LUKS_AF_H
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+/*
+ * AF_split operates on src and produces information split data in
+ * dst. src is assumed to be of the length blocksize. The data stripe
+ * dst points to must be capable of storing blocksize*blocknumbers.
+ * blocknumbers is the data multiplication factor.
+ *
+ * AF_merge does just the opposite: reproduces the information stored in
+ * src of the length blocksize*blocknumbers into dst of the length
+ * blocksize.
+ *
+ * On error, both functions return -1, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+
+int AF_split(struct crypt_device *ctx, const char *src, char *dst,
+	     size_t blocksize, unsigned int blocknumbers, const char *hash);
+int AF_merge(struct crypt_device *ctx, const char *src, char *dst, size_t blocksize,
+	     unsigned int blocknumbers, const char *hash);
+size_t AF_split_sectors(size_t blocksize, unsigned int blocknumbers);
+
+int LUKS_encrypt_to_storage(
+	char *src, size_t srcLength,
+	const char *cipher,
+	const char *cipher_mode,
+	struct volume_key *vk,
+	unsigned int sector,
+	struct crypt_device *ctx);
+
+int LUKS_decrypt_from_storage(
+	char *dst, size_t dstLength,
+	const char *cipher,
+	const char *cipher_mode,
+	struct volume_key *vk,
+	unsigned int sector,
+	struct crypt_device *ctx);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/lib/luks1/keyencryption.c b/lib/luks1/keyencryption.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e3ed8ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/luks1/keyencryption.c
@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
+/*
+ * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include "luks.h"
+#include "af.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+static void _error_hint(struct crypt_device *ctx, const char *device,
+			const char *cipher, const char *mode, size_t keyLength)
+{
+	char *c, cipher_spec[MAX_CIPHER_LEN * 3];
+
+	if (snprintf(cipher_spec, sizeof(cipher_spec), "%s-%s", cipher, mode) < 0)
+		return;
+
+	log_err(ctx, _("Failed to setup dm-crypt key mapping for device %s.\n"
+			"Check that kernel supports %s cipher (check syslog for more info)."),
+			device, cipher_spec);
+
+	if (!strncmp(mode, "xts", 3) && (keyLength != 256 && keyLength != 512))
+		log_err(ctx, _("Key size in XTS mode must be 256 or 512 bits."));
+	else if (!(c = strchr(mode, '-')) || strlen(c) < 4)
+		log_err(ctx, _("Cipher specification should be in [cipher]-[mode]-[iv] format."));
+}
+
+static int LUKS_endec_template(char *src, size_t srcLength,
+			       const char *cipher, const char *cipher_mode,
+			       struct volume_key *vk,
+			       unsigned int sector,
+			       ssize_t (*func)(int, size_t, size_t, void *, size_t),
+			       int mode,
+			       struct crypt_device *ctx)
+{
+	char name[PATH_MAX], path[PATH_MAX];
+	char cipher_spec[MAX_CIPHER_LEN * 3];
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {
+		.flags = CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE,
+	};
+	int r, devfd = -1;
+	size_t bsize, keyslot_alignment, alignment;
+
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Using dmcrypt to access keyslot area.");
+
+	bsize = device_block_size(ctx, crypt_metadata_device(ctx));
+	alignment = device_alignment(crypt_metadata_device(ctx));
+	if (!bsize || !alignment)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (bsize > LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS)
+		keyslot_alignment = LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS;
+	else
+		keyslot_alignment = bsize;
+	dmd.size = size_round_up(srcLength, keyslot_alignment) / SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+	if (mode == O_RDONLY)
+		dmd.flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+
+	if (snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "temporary-cryptsetup-%d", getpid()) < 0)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s", dm_get_dir(), name) < 0)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (snprintf(cipher_spec, sizeof(cipher_spec), "%s-%s", cipher, cipher_mode) < 0)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	r = device_block_adjust(ctx, crypt_metadata_device(ctx), DEV_OK,
+				sector, &dmd.size, &dmd.flags);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Device %s doesn't exist or access denied."),
+			device_path(crypt_metadata_device(ctx)));
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	if (mode != O_RDONLY && dmd.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot write to device %s, permission denied."),
+			device_path(crypt_metadata_device(ctx)));
+		return -EACCES;
+	}
+
+	r = dm_crypt_target_set(&dmd.segment, 0, dmd.size,
+			crypt_metadata_device(ctx), vk, cipher_spec, 0, sector,
+			NULL, 0, SECTOR_SIZE);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = dm_create_device(ctx, name, "TEMP", &dmd);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		if (r != -EACCES && r != -ENOTSUP)
+			_error_hint(ctx, device_path(crypt_metadata_device(ctx)),
+				    cipher, cipher_mode, vk->keylength * 8);
+		r = -EIO;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	devfd = open(path, mode | O_DIRECT | O_SYNC);
+	if (devfd == -1) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Failed to open temporary keystore device."));
+		r = -EIO;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = func(devfd, bsize, alignment, src, srcLength);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Failed to access temporary keystore device."));
+		r = -EIO;
+	} else
+		r = 0;
+ out:
+	dm_targets_free(ctx, &dmd);
+	if (devfd != -1)
+		close(devfd);
+	dm_remove_device(ctx, name, CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_FORCE);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int LUKS_encrypt_to_storage(char *src, size_t srcLength,
+			    const char *cipher,
+			    const char *cipher_mode,
+			    struct volume_key *vk,
+			    unsigned int sector,
+			    struct crypt_device *ctx)
+{
+
+	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx);
+	struct crypt_storage *s;
+	int devfd = -1, r = 0;
+
+	/* Only whole sector writes supported */
+	if (MISALIGNED_512(srcLength))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Encrypt buffer */
+	r = crypt_storage_init(&s, 0, cipher, cipher_mode, vk->key, vk->keylength);
+
+	if (r)
+		log_dbg(ctx, "Userspace crypto wrapper cannot use %s-%s (%d).",
+			cipher, cipher_mode, r);
+
+	/* Fallback to old temporary dmcrypt device */
+	if (r == -ENOTSUP || r == -ENOENT)
+		return LUKS_endec_template(src, srcLength, cipher, cipher_mode,
+					   vk, sector, write_blockwise, O_RDWR, ctx);
+
+	if (r) {
+		_error_hint(ctx, device_path(device), cipher, cipher_mode,
+			    vk->keylength * 8);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Using userspace crypto wrapper to access keyslot area.");
+
+	r = crypt_storage_encrypt(s, 0, srcLength / SECTOR_SIZE, src);
+	crypt_storage_destroy(s);
+
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	r = -EIO;
+
+	/* Write buffer to device */
+	devfd = device_open(ctx, device, O_RDWR);
+	if (devfd < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (write_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(ctx, device),
+				  device_alignment(device), src, srcLength,
+				  sector * SECTOR_SIZE) < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = 0;
+out:
+	if (devfd >= 0) {
+		device_sync(ctx, device, devfd);
+		close(devfd);
+	}
+	if (r)
+		log_err(ctx, _("IO error while encrypting keyslot."));
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int LUKS_decrypt_from_storage(char *dst, size_t dstLength,
+			      const char *cipher,
+			      const char *cipher_mode,
+			      struct volume_key *vk,
+			      unsigned int sector,
+			      struct crypt_device *ctx)
+{
+	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx);
+	struct crypt_storage *s;
+	struct stat st;
+	int devfd = -1, r = 0;
+
+	/* Only whole sector reads supported */
+	if (MISALIGNED_512(dstLength))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = crypt_storage_init(&s, 0, cipher, cipher_mode, vk->key, vk->keylength);
+
+	if (r)
+		log_dbg(ctx, "Userspace crypto wrapper cannot use %s-%s (%d).",
+			cipher, cipher_mode, r);
+
+	/* Fallback to old temporary dmcrypt device */
+	if (r == -ENOTSUP || r == -ENOENT)
+		return LUKS_endec_template(dst, dstLength, cipher, cipher_mode,
+					   vk, sector, read_blockwise, O_RDONLY, ctx);
+
+	if (r) {
+		_error_hint(ctx, device_path(device), cipher, cipher_mode,
+			    vk->keylength * 8);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Using userspace crypto wrapper to access keyslot area.");
+
+	/* Read buffer from device */
+	devfd = device_open(ctx, device, O_RDONLY);
+	if (devfd < 0) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot open device %s."), device_path(device));
+		crypt_storage_destroy(s);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(ctx, device),
+				 device_alignment(device), dst, dstLength,
+				 sector * SECTOR_SIZE) < 0) {
+		if (!fstat(devfd, &st) && (st.st_size < (off_t)dstLength))
+			log_err(ctx, _("Device %s is too small."), device_path(device));
+		else
+			log_err(ctx, _("IO error while decrypting keyslot."));
+
+		close(devfd);
+		crypt_storage_destroy(s);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	close(devfd);
+
+	/* Decrypt buffer */
+	r = crypt_storage_decrypt(s, 0, dstLength / SECTOR_SIZE, dst);
+	crypt_storage_destroy(s);
+
+	return r;
+}
diff --git a/lib/luks1/keymanage.c b/lib/luks1/keymanage.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e09f396
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/luks1/keymanage.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1243 @@
+/*
+ * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2013-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <uuid/uuid.h>
+
+#include "luks.h"
+#include "af.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+int LUKS_keyslot_area(const struct luks_phdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	uint64_t *offset,
+	uint64_t *length)
+{
+	if(keyslot >= LUKS_NUMKEYS || keyslot < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*offset = (uint64_t)hdr->keyblock[keyslot].keyMaterialOffset * SECTOR_SIZE;
+	*length = AF_split_sectors(hdr->keyBytes, LUKS_STRIPES) * SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* insertsort: because the array has 8 elements and it's mostly sorted. that's why */
+static void LUKS_sort_keyslots(const struct luks_phdr *hdr, int *array)
+{
+	int i, j, x;
+
+	for (i = 1; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++) {
+		j = i;
+		while (j > 0 && hdr->keyblock[array[j-1]].keyMaterialOffset > hdr->keyblock[array[j]].keyMaterialOffset) {
+			x = array[j];
+			array[j] = array[j-1];
+			array[j-1] = x;
+			j--;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+size_t LUKS_device_sectors(const struct luks_phdr *hdr)
+{
+	int sorted_areas[LUKS_NUMKEYS] = { 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 };
+
+	LUKS_sort_keyslots(hdr, sorted_areas);
+
+	return hdr->keyblock[sorted_areas[LUKS_NUMKEYS-1]].keyMaterialOffset + AF_split_sectors(hdr->keyBytes, LUKS_STRIPES);
+}
+
+size_t LUKS_keyslots_offset(const struct luks_phdr *hdr)
+{
+	int sorted_areas[LUKS_NUMKEYS] = { 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 };
+
+	LUKS_sort_keyslots(hdr, sorted_areas);
+
+	return hdr->keyblock[sorted_areas[0]].keyMaterialOffset;
+}
+
+static int LUKS_check_device_size(struct crypt_device *ctx, const struct luks_phdr *hdr, int falloc)
+{
+	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx);
+	uint64_t dev_sectors, hdr_sectors;
+
+	if (!hdr->keyBytes)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (device_size(device, &dev_sectors)) {
+		log_dbg(ctx, "Cannot get device size for device %s.", device_path(device));
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	dev_sectors >>= SECTOR_SHIFT;
+	hdr_sectors = LUKS_device_sectors(hdr);
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Key length %u, device size %" PRIu64 " sectors, header size %"
+		PRIu64 " sectors.", hdr->keyBytes, dev_sectors, hdr_sectors);
+
+	if (hdr_sectors > dev_sectors) {
+		/* If it is header file, increase its size */
+		if (falloc && !device_fallocate(device, hdr_sectors << SECTOR_SHIFT))
+			return 0;
+
+		log_err(ctx, _("Device %s is too small. (LUKS1 requires at least %" PRIu64 " bytes.)"),
+			device_path(device), hdr_sectors * SECTOR_SIZE);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int LUKS_check_keyslots(struct crypt_device *ctx, const struct luks_phdr *phdr)
+{
+	int i, prev, next, sorted_areas[LUKS_NUMKEYS] = { 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 };
+	uint32_t secs_per_stripes = AF_split_sectors(phdr->keyBytes, LUKS_STRIPES);
+
+	LUKS_sort_keyslots(phdr, sorted_areas);
+
+	/* Check keyslot to prevent access outside of header and keyslot area */
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++) {
+		/* enforce stripes == 4000 */
+		if (phdr->keyblock[i].stripes != LUKS_STRIPES) {
+			log_dbg(ctx, "Invalid stripes count %u in keyslot %u.",
+				phdr->keyblock[i].stripes, i);
+			log_err(ctx, _("LUKS keyslot %u is invalid."), i);
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		/* First sectors is the header itself */
+		if (phdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset * SECTOR_SIZE < sizeof(*phdr)) {
+			log_dbg(ctx, "Invalid offset %u in keyslot %u.",
+				phdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset, i);
+			log_err(ctx, _("LUKS keyslot %u is invalid."), i);
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		/* Ignore following check for detached header where offset can be zero. */
+		if (phdr->payloadOffset == 0)
+			continue;
+
+		if (phdr->payloadOffset <= phdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset) {
+			log_dbg(ctx, "Invalid offset %u in keyslot %u (beyond data area offset %u).",
+				phdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset, i,
+				phdr->payloadOffset);
+			log_err(ctx, _("LUKS keyslot %u is invalid."), i);
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		if (phdr->payloadOffset < (phdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset + secs_per_stripes)) {
+			log_dbg(ctx, "Invalid keyslot size %u (offset %u, stripes %u) in "
+				"keyslot %u (beyond data area offset %u).",
+				secs_per_stripes,
+				phdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset,
+				phdr->keyblock[i].stripes,
+				i, phdr->payloadOffset);
+			log_err(ctx, _("LUKS keyslot %u is invalid."), i);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* check no keyslot overlaps with each other */
+	for (i = 1; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++) {
+		prev = sorted_areas[i-1];
+		next = sorted_areas[i];
+		if (phdr->keyblock[next].keyMaterialOffset <
+		    (phdr->keyblock[prev].keyMaterialOffset + secs_per_stripes)) {
+			log_dbg(ctx, "Not enough space in LUKS keyslot %d.", prev);
+			log_err(ctx, _("LUKS keyslot %u is invalid."), prev);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+	/* do not check last keyslot on purpose, it must be tested in device size check */
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const char *dbg_slot_state(crypt_keyslot_info ki)
+{
+	switch(ki) {
+	case CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE:
+		return "INACTIVE";
+	case CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE:
+		return "ACTIVE";
+	case CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST:
+		return "ACTIVE_LAST";
+	case CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID:
+	default:
+		return "INVALID";
+	}
+}
+
+int LUKS_hdr_backup(const char *backup_file, struct crypt_device *ctx)
+{
+	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx);
+	struct luks_phdr hdr;
+	int r = 0, devfd = -1;
+	size_t hdr_size;
+	size_t buffer_size;
+	char *buffer = NULL;
+
+	r = LUKS_read_phdr(&hdr, 1, 0, ctx);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	hdr_size = LUKS_device_sectors(&hdr) << SECTOR_SHIFT;
+	buffer_size = size_round_up(hdr_size, crypt_getpagesize());
+
+	buffer = crypt_safe_alloc(buffer_size);
+	if (!buffer || hdr_size < LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS || hdr_size > buffer_size) {
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Storing backup of header (%zu bytes) and keyslot area (%zu bytes).",
+		sizeof(hdr), hdr_size - LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS);
+
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Output backup file size: %zu bytes.", buffer_size);
+
+	devfd = device_open(ctx, device, O_RDONLY);
+	if (devfd < 0) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."), device_path(device));
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (read_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(ctx, device), device_alignment(device),
+			   buffer, hdr_size) < (ssize_t)hdr_size) {
+		r = -EIO;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	close(devfd);
+
+	/* Wipe unused area, so backup cannot contain old signatures */
+	if (hdr.keyblock[0].keyMaterialOffset * SECTOR_SIZE == LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS)
+		memset(buffer + sizeof(hdr), 0, LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS - sizeof(hdr));
+
+	devfd = open(backup_file, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY, S_IRUSR);
+	if (devfd == -1) {
+		if (errno == EEXIST)
+			log_err(ctx, _("Requested header backup file %s already exists."), backup_file);
+		else
+			log_err(ctx, _("Cannot create header backup file %s."), backup_file);
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (write_buffer(devfd, buffer, buffer_size) < (ssize_t)buffer_size) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot write header backup file %s."), backup_file);
+		r = -EIO;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = 0;
+out:
+	if (devfd >= 0)
+		close(devfd);
+	crypt_memzero(&hdr, sizeof(hdr));
+	crypt_safe_free(buffer);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int LUKS_hdr_restore(
+	const char *backup_file,
+	struct luks_phdr *hdr,
+	struct crypt_device *ctx)
+{
+	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx);
+	int r = 0, devfd = -1, diff_uuid = 0;
+	ssize_t buffer_size = 0;
+	char *buffer = NULL, msg[200];
+	struct luks_phdr hdr_file;
+
+	r = LUKS_read_phdr_backup(backup_file, &hdr_file, 0, ctx);
+	if (r == -ENOENT)
+		return r;
+
+	if (!r)
+		buffer_size = LUKS_device_sectors(&hdr_file) << SECTOR_SHIFT;
+
+	if (r || buffer_size < LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Backup file doesn't contain valid LUKS header."));
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	buffer = crypt_safe_alloc(buffer_size);
+	if (!buffer) {
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	devfd = open(backup_file, O_RDONLY);
+	if (devfd == -1) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot open header backup file %s."), backup_file);
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (read_buffer(devfd, buffer, buffer_size) < buffer_size) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot read header backup file %s."), backup_file);
+		r = -EIO;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	close(devfd);
+	devfd = -1;
+
+	r = LUKS_read_phdr(hdr, 0, 0, ctx);
+	if (r == 0) {
+		log_dbg(ctx, "Device %s already contains LUKS header, checking UUID and offset.", device_path(device));
+		if(hdr->payloadOffset != hdr_file.payloadOffset ||
+		   hdr->keyBytes != hdr_file.keyBytes) {
+			log_err(ctx, _("Data offset or key size differs on device and backup, restore failed."));
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (memcmp(hdr->uuid, hdr_file.uuid, UUID_STRING_L))
+			diff_uuid = 1;
+	}
+
+	if (snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), _("Device %s %s%s"), device_path(device),
+		 r ? _("does not contain LUKS header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device.") :
+		     _("already contains LUKS header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."),
+		     diff_uuid ? _("\nWARNING: real device header has different UUID than backup!") : "") < 0) {
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!crypt_confirm(ctx, msg)) {
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Storing backup of header (%zu bytes) and keyslot area (%zu bytes) to device %s.",
+		sizeof(*hdr), buffer_size - LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS, device_path(device));
+
+	devfd = device_open(ctx, device, O_RDWR);
+	if (devfd < 0) {
+		if (errno == EACCES)
+			log_err(ctx, _("Cannot write to device %s, permission denied."),
+				device_path(device));
+		else
+			log_err(ctx, _("Cannot open device %s."), device_path(device));
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (write_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(ctx, device), device_alignment(device),
+			    buffer, buffer_size) < buffer_size) {
+		r = -EIO;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	close(devfd);
+	devfd = -1;
+
+	/* Be sure to reload new data */
+	r = LUKS_read_phdr(hdr, 1, 0, ctx);
+out:
+	if (devfd >= 0) {
+		device_sync(ctx, device, devfd);
+		close(devfd);
+	}
+	crypt_safe_free(buffer);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* This routine should do some just basic recovery for known problems. */
+static int _keyslot_repair(struct luks_phdr *phdr, struct crypt_device *ctx)
+{
+	struct luks_phdr temp_phdr;
+	const unsigned char *sector = (const unsigned char*)phdr;
+	struct volume_key *vk;
+	int i, bad, r, need_write = 0;
+
+	if (phdr->keyBytes != 16 && phdr->keyBytes != 32 && phdr->keyBytes != 64) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Non standard key size, manual repair required."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	/* cryptsetup 1.0 did not align to 4k, cannot repair this one */
+	if (LUKS_keyslots_offset(phdr) < (LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS / SECTOR_SIZE)) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Non standard keyslots alignment, manual repair required."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = LUKS_check_cipher(ctx, phdr->keyBytes, phdr->cipherName, phdr->cipherMode);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(phdr->keyBytes, NULL);
+
+	log_verbose(ctx, _("Repairing keyslots."));
+
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Generating second header with the same parameters for check.");
+	/* cipherName, cipherMode, hashSpec, uuid are already null terminated */
+	/* payloadOffset - cannot check */
+	r = LUKS_generate_phdr(&temp_phdr, vk, phdr->cipherName, phdr->cipherMode,
+			       phdr->hashSpec, phdr->uuid,
+			       phdr->payloadOffset * SECTOR_SIZE, 0, 0, ctx);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	for(i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; ++i) {
+		if (phdr->keyblock[i].active == LUKS_KEY_ENABLED)  {
+			log_dbg(ctx, "Skipping repair for active keyslot %i.", i);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		bad = 0;
+		if (phdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset != temp_phdr.keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset) {
+			log_err(ctx, _("Keyslot %i: offset repaired (%u -> %u)."), i,
+				(unsigned)phdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset,
+				(unsigned)temp_phdr.keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset);
+			phdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset = temp_phdr.keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset;
+			bad = 1;
+		}
+
+		if (phdr->keyblock[i].stripes != temp_phdr.keyblock[i].stripes) {
+			log_err(ctx, _("Keyslot %i: stripes repaired (%u -> %u)."), i,
+				(unsigned)phdr->keyblock[i].stripes,
+				(unsigned)temp_phdr.keyblock[i].stripes);
+			phdr->keyblock[i].stripes = temp_phdr.keyblock[i].stripes;
+			bad = 1;
+		}
+
+		/* Known case - MSDOS partition table signature */
+		if (i == 6 && sector[0x1fe] == 0x55 && sector[0x1ff] == 0xaa) {
+			log_err(ctx, _("Keyslot %i: bogus partition signature."), i);
+			bad = 1;
+		}
+
+		if(bad) {
+			log_err(ctx, _("Keyslot %i: salt wiped."), i);
+			phdr->keyblock[i].active = LUKS_KEY_DISABLED;
+			memset(&phdr->keyblock[i].passwordSalt, 0x00, LUKS_SALTSIZE);
+			phdr->keyblock[i].passwordIterations = 0;
+		}
+
+		if (bad)
+			need_write = 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * check repair result before writing because repair can't fix out of order
+	 * keyslot offsets and would corrupt header again
+	 */
+	if (LUKS_check_keyslots(ctx, phdr))
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	else if (need_write) {
+		log_verbose(ctx, _("Writing LUKS header to disk."));
+		r = LUKS_write_phdr(phdr, ctx);
+	}
+out:
+	if (r)
+		log_err(ctx, _("Repair failed."));
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+	crypt_memzero(&temp_phdr, sizeof(temp_phdr));
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _check_and_convert_hdr(const char *device,
+				  struct luks_phdr *hdr,
+				  int require_luks_device,
+				  int repair,
+				  struct crypt_device *ctx)
+{
+	int r = 0;
+	unsigned int i;
+	char luksMagic[] = LUKS_MAGIC;
+
+	if(memcmp(hdr->magic, luksMagic, LUKS_MAGIC_L)) { /* Check magic */
+		log_dbg(ctx, "LUKS header not detected.");
+		if (require_luks_device)
+			log_err(ctx, _("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."), device);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	} else if((hdr->version = ntohs(hdr->version)) != 1) {	/* Convert every uint16/32_t item from network byte order */
+		log_err(ctx, _("Unsupported LUKS version %d."), hdr->version);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	hdr->hashSpec[LUKS_HASHSPEC_L - 1] = '\0';
+	if (crypt_hmac_size(hdr->hashSpec) < LUKS_DIGESTSIZE) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Requested LUKS hash %s is not supported."), hdr->hashSpec);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Header detected */
+	hdr->payloadOffset      = ntohl(hdr->payloadOffset);
+	hdr->keyBytes           = ntohl(hdr->keyBytes);
+	hdr->mkDigestIterations = ntohl(hdr->mkDigestIterations);
+
+	for(i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; ++i) {
+		hdr->keyblock[i].active             = ntohl(hdr->keyblock[i].active);
+		hdr->keyblock[i].passwordIterations = ntohl(hdr->keyblock[i].passwordIterations);
+		hdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset  = ntohl(hdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset);
+		hdr->keyblock[i].stripes            = ntohl(hdr->keyblock[i].stripes);
+	}
+
+	if (LUKS_check_keyslots(ctx, hdr))
+		r = -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Avoid unterminated strings */
+	hdr->cipherName[LUKS_CIPHERNAME_L - 1] = '\0';
+	hdr->cipherMode[LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L - 1] = '\0';
+	hdr->uuid[UUID_STRING_L - 1] = '\0';
+
+	if (repair) {
+		if (r == -EINVAL)
+			r = _keyslot_repair(hdr, ctx);
+		else
+			log_verbose(ctx, _("No known problems detected for LUKS header."));
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void _to_lower(char *str, unsigned max_len)
+{
+	for(; *str && max_len; str++, max_len--)
+		if (isupper(*str))
+			*str = tolower(*str);
+}
+
+static void LUKS_fix_header_compatible(struct luks_phdr *header)
+{
+	/* Old cryptsetup expects "sha1", gcrypt allows case insensitive names,
+	 * so always convert hash to lower case in header */
+	_to_lower(header->hashSpec, LUKS_HASHSPEC_L);
+
+	/* ECB mode does not use IV but dmcrypt silently allows it.
+	 * Drop any IV here if ECB is used (that is not secure anyway).*/
+	if (!strncmp(header->cipherMode, "ecb-", 4)) {
+		memset(header->cipherMode, 0, LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L);
+		strcpy(header->cipherMode, "ecb");
+	}
+}
+
+int LUKS_read_phdr_backup(const char *backup_file,
+			  struct luks_phdr *hdr,
+			  int require_luks_device,
+			  struct crypt_device *ctx)
+{
+	ssize_t hdr_size = sizeof(struct luks_phdr);
+	int devfd = 0, r = 0;
+
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Reading LUKS header of size %d from backup file %s",
+		(int)hdr_size, backup_file);
+
+	devfd = open(backup_file, O_RDONLY);
+	if (devfd == -1) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot open header backup file %s."), backup_file);
+		return -ENOENT;
+	}
+
+	if (read_buffer(devfd, hdr, hdr_size) < hdr_size)
+		r = -EIO;
+	else {
+		LUKS_fix_header_compatible(hdr);
+		r = _check_and_convert_hdr(backup_file, hdr,
+					   require_luks_device, 0, ctx);
+	}
+
+	close(devfd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int LUKS_read_phdr(struct luks_phdr *hdr,
+		   int require_luks_device,
+		   int repair,
+		   struct crypt_device *ctx)
+{
+	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx);
+	ssize_t hdr_size = sizeof(struct luks_phdr);
+	int devfd = 0, r = 0;
+
+	/* LUKS header starts at offset 0, first keyslot on LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS */
+	assert(sizeof(struct luks_phdr) <= LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS);
+
+	/* Stripes count cannot be changed without additional code fixes yet */
+	assert(LUKS_STRIPES == 4000);
+
+	if (repair && !require_luks_device)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Reading LUKS header of size %zu from device %s",
+		hdr_size, device_path(device));
+
+	devfd = device_open(ctx, device, O_RDONLY);
+	if (devfd < 0) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot open device %s."), device_path(device));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (read_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(ctx, device), device_alignment(device),
+			   hdr, hdr_size) < hdr_size)
+		r = -EIO;
+	else
+		r = _check_and_convert_hdr(device_path(device), hdr, require_luks_device,
+					   repair, ctx);
+
+	if (!r)
+		r = LUKS_check_device_size(ctx, hdr, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Cryptsetup 1.0.0 did not align keyslots to 4k (very rare version).
+	 * Disable direct-io to avoid possible IO errors if underlying device
+	 * has bigger sector size.
+	 */
+	if (!r && hdr->keyblock[0].keyMaterialOffset * SECTOR_SIZE < LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS) {
+		log_dbg(ctx, "Old unaligned LUKS keyslot detected, disabling direct-io.");
+		device_disable_direct_io(device);
+	}
+
+	close(devfd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int LUKS_write_phdr(struct luks_phdr *hdr,
+		    struct crypt_device *ctx)
+{
+	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx);
+	ssize_t hdr_size = sizeof(struct luks_phdr);
+	int devfd = 0;
+	unsigned int i;
+	struct luks_phdr convHdr;
+	int r;
+
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Updating LUKS header of size %zu on device %s",
+		sizeof(struct luks_phdr), device_path(device));
+
+	r = LUKS_check_device_size(ctx, hdr, 1);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	devfd = device_open(ctx, device, O_RDWR);
+	if (devfd < 0) {
+		if (errno == EACCES)
+			log_err(ctx, _("Cannot write to device %s, permission denied."),
+				device_path(device));
+		else
+			log_err(ctx, _("Cannot open device %s."), device_path(device));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(&convHdr, hdr, hdr_size);
+	memset(&convHdr._padding, 0, sizeof(convHdr._padding));
+
+	/* Convert every uint16/32_t item to network byte order */
+	convHdr.version            = htons(hdr->version);
+	convHdr.payloadOffset      = htonl(hdr->payloadOffset);
+	convHdr.keyBytes           = htonl(hdr->keyBytes);
+	convHdr.mkDigestIterations = htonl(hdr->mkDigestIterations);
+	for(i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; ++i) {
+		convHdr.keyblock[i].active             = htonl(hdr->keyblock[i].active);
+		convHdr.keyblock[i].passwordIterations = htonl(hdr->keyblock[i].passwordIterations);
+		convHdr.keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset  = htonl(hdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset);
+		convHdr.keyblock[i].stripes            = htonl(hdr->keyblock[i].stripes);
+	}
+
+	r = write_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(ctx, device), device_alignment(device),
+			    &convHdr, hdr_size) < hdr_size ? -EIO : 0;
+	if (r)
+		log_err(ctx, _("Error during update of LUKS header on device %s."), device_path(device));
+
+	device_sync(ctx, device, devfd);
+	close(devfd);
+
+	/* Re-read header from disk to be sure that in-memory and on-disk data are the same. */
+	if (!r) {
+		r = LUKS_read_phdr(hdr, 1, 0, ctx);
+		if (r)
+			log_err(ctx, _("Error re-reading LUKS header after update on device %s."),
+				device_path(device));
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* Check that kernel supports requested cipher by decryption of one sector */
+int LUKS_check_cipher(struct crypt_device *ctx, size_t keylength, const char *cipher, const char *cipher_mode)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct volume_key *empty_key;
+	char buf[SECTOR_SIZE];
+
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Checking if cipher %s-%s is usable.", cipher, cipher_mode);
+
+	empty_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(keylength, NULL);
+	if (!empty_key)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* No need to get KEY quality random but it must avoid known weak keys. */
+	r = crypt_random_get(ctx, empty_key->key, empty_key->keylength, CRYPT_RND_NORMAL);
+	if (!r)
+		r = LUKS_decrypt_from_storage(buf, sizeof(buf), cipher, cipher_mode, empty_key, 0, ctx);
+
+	crypt_free_volume_key(empty_key);
+	crypt_memzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+	return r;
+}
+
+int LUKS_generate_phdr(struct luks_phdr *header,
+	const struct volume_key *vk,
+	const char *cipherName,
+	const char *cipherMode,
+	const char *hashSpec,
+	const char *uuid,
+	uint64_t data_offset,        /* in bytes */
+	uint64_t align_offset,       /* in bytes */
+	uint64_t required_alignment, /* in bytes */
+	struct crypt_device *ctx)
+{
+	int i, r;
+	size_t keyslot_sectors, header_sectors;
+	uuid_t partitionUuid;
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf;
+	double PBKDF2_temp;
+	char luksMagic[] = LUKS_MAGIC;
+
+	if (data_offset % SECTOR_SIZE || align_offset % SECTOR_SIZE ||
+	    required_alignment % SECTOR_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	memset(header, 0, sizeof(struct luks_phdr));
+
+	keyslot_sectors = AF_split_sectors(vk->keylength, LUKS_STRIPES);
+	header_sectors = LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS / SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++) {
+		header->keyblock[i].active = LUKS_KEY_DISABLED;
+		header->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset = header_sectors;
+		header->keyblock[i].stripes = LUKS_STRIPES;
+		header_sectors = size_round_up(header_sectors + keyslot_sectors,
+					       LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS / SECTOR_SIZE);
+	}
+	/* In sector is now size of all keyslot material space */
+
+	/* Data offset has priority */
+	if (data_offset)
+		header->payloadOffset = data_offset / SECTOR_SIZE;
+	else if (required_alignment) {
+		header->payloadOffset = size_round_up(header_sectors, (required_alignment / SECTOR_SIZE));
+		header->payloadOffset += (align_offset / SECTOR_SIZE);
+	} else
+		header->payloadOffset = 0;
+
+	if (header->payloadOffset && header->payloadOffset < header_sectors) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Data offset for LUKS header must be "
+			       "either 0 or higher than header size."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (crypt_hmac_size(hashSpec) < LUKS_DIGESTSIZE) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Requested LUKS hash %s is not supported."), hashSpec);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (uuid && uuid_parse(uuid, partitionUuid) == -1) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Wrong LUKS UUID format provided."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (!uuid)
+		uuid_generate(partitionUuid);
+
+	/* Set Magic */
+	memcpy(header->magic,luksMagic,LUKS_MAGIC_L);
+	header->version=1;
+	strncpy(header->cipherName,cipherName,LUKS_CIPHERNAME_L-1);
+	strncpy(header->cipherMode,cipherMode,LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L-1);
+	strncpy(header->hashSpec,hashSpec,LUKS_HASHSPEC_L-1);
+
+	header->keyBytes=vk->keylength;
+
+	LUKS_fix_header_compatible(header);
+
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Generating LUKS header version %d using hash %s, %s, %s, MK %d bytes",
+		header->version, header->hashSpec ,header->cipherName, header->cipherMode,
+		header->keyBytes);
+
+	r = crypt_random_get(ctx, header->mkDigestSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE, CRYPT_RND_SALT);
+	if(r < 0) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot create LUKS header: reading random salt failed."));
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	/* Compute master key digest */
+	pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf(ctx);
+	r = crypt_benchmark_pbkdf_internal(ctx, pbkdf, vk->keylength);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+	assert(pbkdf->iterations);
+
+	PBKDF2_temp = (double)pbkdf->iterations * LUKS_MKD_ITERATIONS_MS / pbkdf->time_ms;
+	if (PBKDF2_temp > (double)UINT32_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	header->mkDigestIterations = at_least((uint32_t)PBKDF2_temp, LUKS_MKD_ITERATIONS_MIN);
+
+	r = crypt_pbkdf(CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2, header->hashSpec, vk->key,vk->keylength,
+			header->mkDigestSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE,
+			header->mkDigest,LUKS_DIGESTSIZE,
+			header->mkDigestIterations, 0, 0);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot create LUKS header: header digest failed (using hash %s)."),
+			header->hashSpec);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+        uuid_unparse(partitionUuid, header->uuid);
+
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Data offset %d, UUID %s, digest iterations %" PRIu32,
+		header->payloadOffset, header->uuid, header->mkDigestIterations);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int LUKS_hdr_uuid_set(
+	struct luks_phdr *hdr,
+	const char *uuid,
+	struct crypt_device *ctx)
+{
+	uuid_t partitionUuid;
+
+	if (uuid && uuid_parse(uuid, partitionUuid) == -1) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Wrong LUKS UUID format provided."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (!uuid)
+		uuid_generate(partitionUuid);
+
+	uuid_unparse(partitionUuid, hdr->uuid);
+
+	return LUKS_write_phdr(hdr, ctx);
+}
+
+int LUKS_set_key(unsigned int keyIndex,
+		 const char *password, size_t passwordLen,
+		 struct luks_phdr *hdr, struct volume_key *vk,
+		 struct crypt_device *ctx)
+{
+	struct volume_key *derived_key;
+	char *AfKey = NULL;
+	size_t AFEKSize;
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf;
+	int r;
+
+	if(hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].active != LUKS_KEY_DISABLED) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Key slot %d active, purge first."), keyIndex);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* LUKS keyslot has always at least 4000 stripes according to specification */
+	if(hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes < 4000) {
+	        log_err(ctx, _("Key slot %d material includes too few stripes. Header manipulation?"),
+			keyIndex);
+	         return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Calculating data for key slot %d", keyIndex);
+	pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf(ctx);
+	r = crypt_benchmark_pbkdf_internal(ctx, pbkdf, vk->keylength);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+	assert(pbkdf->iterations);
+
+	/*
+	 * Final iteration count is at least LUKS_SLOT_ITERATIONS_MIN
+	 */
+	hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordIterations =
+		at_least(pbkdf->iterations, LUKS_SLOT_ITERATIONS_MIN);
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Key slot %d use %" PRIu32 " password iterations.", keyIndex,
+		hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordIterations);
+
+	derived_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(hdr->keyBytes, NULL);
+	if (!derived_key)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	r = crypt_random_get(ctx, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordSalt,
+		       LUKS_SALTSIZE, CRYPT_RND_SALT);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = crypt_pbkdf(CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2, hdr->hashSpec, password, passwordLen,
+			hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE,
+			derived_key->key, hdr->keyBytes,
+			hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordIterations, 0, 0);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/*
+	 * AF splitting, the masterkey stored in vk->key is split to AfKey
+	 */
+	assert(vk->keylength == hdr->keyBytes);
+	AFEKSize = AF_split_sectors(vk->keylength, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes) * SECTOR_SIZE;
+	AfKey = crypt_safe_alloc(AFEKSize);
+	if (!AfKey) {
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Using hash %s for AF in key slot %d, %d stripes",
+		hdr->hashSpec, keyIndex, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes);
+	r = AF_split(ctx, vk->key, AfKey, vk->keylength, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes, hdr->hashSpec);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Updating key slot %d [0x%04x] area.", keyIndex,
+		hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].keyMaterialOffset << 9);
+	/* Encryption via dm */
+	r = LUKS_encrypt_to_storage(AfKey,
+				    AFEKSize,
+				    hdr->cipherName, hdr->cipherMode,
+				    derived_key,
+				    hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].keyMaterialOffset,
+				    ctx);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Mark the key as active in phdr */
+	r = LUKS_keyslot_set(hdr, (int)keyIndex, 1, ctx);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = LUKS_write_phdr(hdr, ctx);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = 0;
+out:
+	crypt_safe_free(AfKey);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(derived_key);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* Check whether a volume key is invalid. */
+int LUKS_verify_volume_key(const struct luks_phdr *hdr,
+			   const struct volume_key *vk)
+{
+	char checkHashBuf[LUKS_DIGESTSIZE];
+
+	if (crypt_pbkdf(CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2, hdr->hashSpec, vk->key, vk->keylength,
+			hdr->mkDigestSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE,
+			checkHashBuf, LUKS_DIGESTSIZE,
+			hdr->mkDigestIterations, 0, 0) < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (memcmp(checkHashBuf, hdr->mkDigest, LUKS_DIGESTSIZE))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Try to open a particular key slot */
+static int LUKS_open_key(unsigned int keyIndex,
+		  const char *password,
+		  size_t passwordLen,
+		  struct luks_phdr *hdr,
+		  struct volume_key *vk,
+		  struct crypt_device *ctx)
+{
+	crypt_keyslot_info ki = LUKS_keyslot_info(hdr, keyIndex);
+	struct volume_key *derived_key;
+	char *AfKey;
+	size_t AFEKSize;
+	int r;
+
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Trying to open key slot %d [%s].", keyIndex,
+		dbg_slot_state(ki));
+
+	if (ki < CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	derived_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(hdr->keyBytes, NULL);
+	if (!derived_key)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	assert(vk->keylength == hdr->keyBytes);
+	AFEKSize = AF_split_sectors(vk->keylength, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes) * SECTOR_SIZE;
+	AfKey = crypt_safe_alloc(AFEKSize);
+	if (!AfKey) {
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_pbkdf(CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2, hdr->hashSpec, password, passwordLen,
+			hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE,
+			derived_key->key, hdr->keyBytes,
+			hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordIterations, 0, 0);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Reading key slot %d area.", keyIndex);
+	r = LUKS_decrypt_from_storage(AfKey,
+				      AFEKSize,
+				      hdr->cipherName, hdr->cipherMode,
+				      derived_key,
+				      hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].keyMaterialOffset,
+				      ctx);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = AF_merge(ctx, AfKey, vk->key, vk->keylength, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes, hdr->hashSpec);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = LUKS_verify_volume_key(hdr, vk);
+
+	/* Allow only empty passphrase with null cipher */
+	if (!r && !strcmp(hdr->cipherName, "cipher_null") && passwordLen)
+		r = -EPERM;
+out:
+	crypt_safe_free(AfKey);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(derived_key);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(int keyIndex,
+			   const char *password,
+			   size_t passwordLen,
+			   struct luks_phdr *hdr,
+			   struct volume_key **vk,
+			   struct crypt_device *ctx)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+	int r;
+
+	*vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(hdr->keyBytes, NULL);
+
+	if (keyIndex >= 0) {
+		r = LUKS_open_key(keyIndex, password, passwordLen, hdr, *vk, ctx);
+		return (r < 0) ? r : keyIndex;
+	}
+
+	for(i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++) {
+		r = LUKS_open_key(i, password, passwordLen, hdr, *vk, ctx);
+		if(r == 0)
+			return i;
+
+		/* Do not retry for errors that are no -EPERM or -ENOENT,
+		   former meaning password wrong, latter key slot inactive */
+		if ((r != -EPERM) && (r != -ENOENT))
+			return r;
+	}
+	/* Warning, early returns above */
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+int LUKS_del_key(unsigned int keyIndex,
+		 struct luks_phdr *hdr,
+		 struct crypt_device *ctx)
+{
+	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx);
+	unsigned int startOffset, endOffset;
+	int r;
+
+	r = LUKS_read_phdr(hdr, 1, 0, ctx);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	r = LUKS_keyslot_set(hdr, keyIndex, 0, ctx);
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Key slot %d is invalid, please select keyslot between 0 and %d."),
+			keyIndex, LUKS_NUMKEYS - 1);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	/* secure deletion of key material */
+	startOffset = hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].keyMaterialOffset;
+	endOffset = startOffset + AF_split_sectors(hdr->keyBytes, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes);
+
+	r = crypt_wipe_device(ctx, device, CRYPT_WIPE_SPECIAL, startOffset * SECTOR_SIZE,
+			      (endOffset - startOffset) * SECTOR_SIZE,
+			      (endOffset - startOffset) * SECTOR_SIZE, NULL, NULL);
+	if (r) {
+		if (r == -EACCES) {
+			log_err(ctx, _("Cannot write to device %s, permission denied."),
+				device_path(device));
+			r = -EINVAL;
+		} else
+			log_err(ctx, _("Cannot wipe device %s."),
+				device_path(device));
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	/* Wipe keyslot info */
+	memset(&hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordSalt, 0, LUKS_SALTSIZE);
+	hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordIterations = 0;
+
+	r = LUKS_write_phdr(hdr, ctx);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+crypt_keyslot_info LUKS_keyslot_info(struct luks_phdr *hdr, int keyslot)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if(keyslot >= LUKS_NUMKEYS || keyslot < 0)
+		return CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID;
+
+	if (hdr->keyblock[keyslot].active == LUKS_KEY_DISABLED)
+		return CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE;
+
+	if (hdr->keyblock[keyslot].active != LUKS_KEY_ENABLED)
+		return CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID;
+
+	for(i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++)
+		if(i != keyslot && hdr->keyblock[i].active == LUKS_KEY_ENABLED)
+			return CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE;
+
+	return CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST;
+}
+
+int LUKS_keyslot_find_empty(struct luks_phdr *hdr)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++)
+		if(hdr->keyblock[i].active == LUKS_KEY_DISABLED)
+			break;
+
+	if (i == LUKS_NUMKEYS)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return i;
+}
+
+int LUKS_keyslot_active_count(struct luks_phdr *hdr)
+{
+	int i, num = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++)
+		if(hdr->keyblock[i].active == LUKS_KEY_ENABLED)
+			num++;
+
+	return num;
+}
+
+int LUKS_keyslot_set(struct luks_phdr *hdr, int keyslot, int enable, struct crypt_device *ctx)
+{
+	crypt_keyslot_info ki = LUKS_keyslot_info(hdr, keyslot);
+
+	if (ki == CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	hdr->keyblock[keyslot].active = enable ? LUKS_KEY_ENABLED : LUKS_KEY_DISABLED;
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Key slot %d was %s in LUKS header.", keyslot, enable ? "enabled" : "disabled");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int LUKS1_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		   const char *name,
+		   struct volume_key *vk,
+		   uint32_t flags)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {
+		.flags = flags,
+		.uuid = crypt_get_uuid(cd),
+	};
+
+	r = dm_crypt_target_set(&dmd.segment, 0, dmd.size, crypt_data_device(cd),
+			vk, crypt_get_cipher_spec(cd), crypt_get_iv_offset(cd),
+			crypt_get_data_offset(cd), crypt_get_integrity(cd),
+			crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd), crypt_get_sector_size(cd));
+	if (!r)
+		r = create_or_reload_device(cd, name, CRYPT_LUKS1, &dmd);
+
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int LUKS_wipe_header_areas(struct luks_phdr *hdr,
+	struct crypt_device *ctx)
+{
+	int i, r;
+	uint64_t offset, length;
+	size_t wipe_block;
+
+	/* Wipe complete header, keyslots and padding areas with zeroes. */
+	offset = 0;
+	length = (uint64_t)hdr->payloadOffset * SECTOR_SIZE;
+	wipe_block = 1024 * 1024;
+
+	/* On detached header or bogus header, wipe at least the first 4k */
+	if (length == 0 || length > (LUKS_MAX_KEYSLOT_SIZE * LUKS_NUMKEYS)) {
+		length = 4096;
+		wipe_block = 4096;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Wiping LUKS areas (0x%06" PRIx64 " - 0x%06" PRIx64") with zeroes.",
+		offset, length + offset);
+
+	r = crypt_wipe_device(ctx, crypt_metadata_device(ctx), CRYPT_WIPE_ZERO,
+			      offset, length, wipe_block, NULL, NULL);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	/* Wipe keyslots areas */
+	wipe_block = 1024 * 1024;
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++) {
+		r = LUKS_keyslot_area(hdr, i, &offset, &length);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+
+		/* Ignore too big LUKS1 keyslots here */
+		if (length > LUKS_MAX_KEYSLOT_SIZE ||
+		    offset > (LUKS_MAX_KEYSLOT_SIZE - length))
+			continue;
+
+		if (length == 0 || offset < 4096)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		log_dbg(ctx, "Wiping keyslot %i area (0x%06" PRIx64 " - 0x%06" PRIx64") with random data.",
+			i, offset, length + offset);
+
+		r = crypt_wipe_device(ctx, crypt_metadata_device(ctx), CRYPT_WIPE_RANDOM,
+				offset, length, wipe_block, NULL, NULL);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int LUKS_keyslot_pbkdf(struct luks_phdr *hdr, int keyslot, struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf)
+{
+	if (keyslot >= LUKS_NUMKEYS || keyslot < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	pbkdf->type = CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2;
+	pbkdf->hash = hdr->hashSpec;
+	pbkdf->iterations = hdr->keyblock[keyslot].passwordIterations;
+	pbkdf->max_memory_kb = 0;
+	pbkdf->parallel_threads = 0;
+	pbkdf->time_ms = 0;
+	pbkdf->flags = 0;
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/lib/luks1/luks.h b/lib/luks1/luks.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1d42f5a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/luks1/luks.h
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+/*
+ * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef INCLUDED_CRYPTSETUP_LUKS_LUKS_H
+#define INCLUDED_CRYPTSETUP_LUKS_LUKS_H
+
+/*
+ * LUKS partition header
+ */
+
+#include "libcryptsetup.h"
+
+#define LUKS_CIPHERNAME_L 32
+#define LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L 32
+#define LUKS_HASHSPEC_L 32
+#define LUKS_DIGESTSIZE 20 // since SHA1
+#define LUKS_HMACSIZE 32
+#define LUKS_SALTSIZE 32
+#define LUKS_NUMKEYS 8
+
+// Minimal number of iterations
+#define LUKS_MKD_ITERATIONS_MIN  1000
+#define LUKS_SLOT_ITERATIONS_MIN 1000
+
+// Iteration time for digest in ms
+#define LUKS_MKD_ITERATIONS_MS 125
+
+#define LUKS_KEY_DISABLED_OLD 0
+#define LUKS_KEY_ENABLED_OLD 0xCAFE
+
+#define LUKS_KEY_DISABLED 0x0000DEAD
+#define LUKS_KEY_ENABLED  0x00AC71F3
+
+#define LUKS_STRIPES 4000
+
+// partition header starts with magic
+#define LUKS_MAGIC {'L','U','K','S', 0xba, 0xbe};
+#define LUKS_MAGIC_L 6
+
+/* Actually we need only 37, but we don't want struct autoaligning to kick in */
+#define UUID_STRING_L 40
+
+/* Offset to keyslot area [in bytes] */
+#define LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS 4096
+
+/* Maximal LUKS header size, for wipe [in bytes] */
+#define LUKS_MAX_KEYSLOT_SIZE 0x1000000 /* 16 MB, up to 32768 bits key */
+
+/* Any integer values are stored in network byte order on disk and must be
+converted */
+
+struct volume_key;
+struct device_backend;
+
+struct luks_phdr {
+	char		magic[LUKS_MAGIC_L];
+	uint16_t	version;
+	char		cipherName[LUKS_CIPHERNAME_L];
+	char		cipherMode[LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L];
+	char            hashSpec[LUKS_HASHSPEC_L];
+	uint32_t	payloadOffset;
+	uint32_t	keyBytes;
+	char		mkDigest[LUKS_DIGESTSIZE];
+	char		mkDigestSalt[LUKS_SALTSIZE];
+	uint32_t	mkDigestIterations;
+	char            uuid[UUID_STRING_L];
+
+	struct {
+		uint32_t active;
+
+		/* parameters used for password processing */
+		uint32_t passwordIterations;
+		char     passwordSalt[LUKS_SALTSIZE];
+
+		/* parameters used for AF store/load */
+		uint32_t keyMaterialOffset;
+		uint32_t stripes;
+	} keyblock[LUKS_NUMKEYS];
+
+	/* Align it to 512 sector size */
+	char		_padding[432];
+};
+
+int LUKS_verify_volume_key(const struct luks_phdr *hdr,
+			   const struct volume_key *vk);
+
+int LUKS_check_cipher(struct crypt_device *ctx,
+		      size_t keylength,
+		      const char *cipher,
+		      const char *cipher_mode);
+
+int LUKS_generate_phdr(struct luks_phdr *header,
+	const struct volume_key *vk,
+	const char *cipherName,
+	const char *cipherMode,
+	const char *hashSpec,
+	const char *uuid,
+	uint64_t data_offset,
+	uint64_t align_offset,
+	uint64_t required_alignment,
+	struct crypt_device *ctx);
+
+int LUKS_read_phdr(
+	struct luks_phdr *hdr,
+	int require_luks_device,
+	int repair,
+	struct crypt_device *ctx);
+
+int LUKS_read_phdr_backup(
+	const char *backup_file,
+	struct luks_phdr *hdr,
+	int require_luks_device,
+	struct crypt_device *ctx);
+
+int LUKS_hdr_uuid_set(
+	struct luks_phdr *hdr,
+	const char *uuid,
+	struct crypt_device *ctx);
+
+int LUKS_hdr_backup(
+	const char *backup_file,
+	struct crypt_device *ctx);
+
+int LUKS_hdr_restore(
+	const char *backup_file,
+	struct luks_phdr *hdr,
+	struct crypt_device *ctx);
+
+int LUKS_write_phdr(
+	struct luks_phdr *hdr,
+	struct crypt_device *ctx);
+
+int LUKS_set_key(
+	unsigned int keyIndex,
+	const char *password,
+	size_t passwordLen,
+	struct luks_phdr *hdr,
+	struct volume_key *vk,
+	struct crypt_device *ctx);
+
+int LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(
+	int keyIndex,
+	const char *password,
+	size_t passwordLen,
+	struct luks_phdr *hdr,
+	struct volume_key **vk,
+	struct crypt_device *ctx);
+
+int LUKS_del_key(
+	unsigned int keyIndex,
+	struct luks_phdr *hdr,
+	struct crypt_device *ctx);
+
+int LUKS_wipe_header_areas(struct luks_phdr *hdr,
+	struct crypt_device *ctx);
+
+crypt_keyslot_info LUKS_keyslot_info(struct luks_phdr *hdr, int keyslot);
+int LUKS_keyslot_find_empty(struct luks_phdr *hdr);
+int LUKS_keyslot_active_count(struct luks_phdr *hdr);
+int LUKS_keyslot_set(struct luks_phdr *hdr, int keyslot, int enable,
+		     struct crypt_device *ctx);
+int LUKS_keyslot_area(const struct luks_phdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	uint64_t *offset,
+	uint64_t *length);
+size_t LUKS_device_sectors(const struct luks_phdr *hdr);
+size_t LUKS_keyslots_offset(const struct luks_phdr *hdr);
+int LUKS_keyslot_pbkdf(struct luks_phdr *hdr, int keyslot,
+		       struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf);
+
+int LUKS1_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		   const char *name,
+		   struct volume_key *vk,
+		   uint32_t flags);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2.h b/lib/luks2/luks2.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..261d622
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/luks2/luks2.h
@@ -0,0 +1,388 @@
+/*
+ * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPTSETUP_LUKS2_ONDISK_H
+#define _CRYPTSETUP_LUKS2_ONDISK_H
+
+#include "libcryptsetup.h"
+
+#define LUKS2_MAGIC_1ST "LUKS\xba\xbe"
+#define LUKS2_MAGIC_2ND "SKUL\xba\xbe"
+#define LUKS2_MAGIC_L 6
+#define LUKS2_UUID_L 40
+#define LUKS2_LABEL_L 48
+#define LUKS2_SALT_L 64
+#define LUKS2_CHECKSUM_ALG_L 32
+#define LUKS2_CHECKSUM_L 64
+
+#define LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX       32
+#define LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX         32
+#define LUKS2_SEGMENT_MAX        32
+
+#define LUKS2_BUILTIN_TOKEN_PREFIX "luks2-"
+#define LUKS2_BUILTIN_TOKEN_PREFIX_LEN 6
+
+#define LUKS2_TOKEN_KEYRING LUKS2_BUILTIN_TOKEN_PREFIX "keyring"
+
+#define LUKS2_DIGEST_MAX 8
+
+#define CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT -1
+#define CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT 0
+#define CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT_STR "0"
+
+#define CRYPT_ANY_DIGEST -1
+
+/*
+ * LUKS2 header on-disk.
+ *
+ * Binary header is followed by JSON area.
+ * JSON area is followed by keyslot area and data area,
+ * these are described in JSON metadata.
+ *
+ * Note: uuid, csum_alg are intentionally on the same offset as LUKS1
+ * (checksum alg replaces hash in LUKS1)
+ *
+ * String (char) should be zero terminated.
+ * Padding should be wiped.
+ * Checksum is calculated with csum zeroed (+ full JSON area).
+ */
+struct luks2_hdr_disk {
+	char		magic[LUKS2_MAGIC_L];
+	uint16_t	version;	/* Version 2 */
+	uint64_t	hdr_size;	/* in bytes, including JSON area */
+	uint64_t	seqid;		/* increased on every update */
+	char		label[LUKS2_LABEL_L];
+	char		checksum_alg[LUKS2_CHECKSUM_ALG_L];
+	uint8_t		salt[LUKS2_SALT_L]; /* unique for every header/offset */
+	char		uuid[LUKS2_UUID_L];
+	char		subsystem[LUKS2_LABEL_L]; /* owner subsystem label */
+	uint64_t	hdr_offset;	/* offset from device start in bytes */
+	char		_padding[184];
+	uint8_t		csum[LUKS2_CHECKSUM_L];
+	char		_padding4096[7*512];
+	/* JSON area starts here */
+} __attribute__ ((packed));
+
+/*
+ * LUKS2 header in-memory.
+ */
+typedef struct json_object json_object;
+struct luks2_hdr {
+	size_t		hdr_size;
+	uint64_t	seqid;
+	unsigned int	version;
+	char		label[LUKS2_LABEL_L];
+	char		subsystem[LUKS2_LABEL_L];
+	char		checksum_alg[LUKS2_CHECKSUM_ALG_L];
+	uint8_t		salt1[LUKS2_SALT_L];
+	uint8_t		salt2[LUKS2_SALT_L];
+	char		uuid[LUKS2_UUID_L];
+	json_object	*jobj;
+};
+
+struct luks2_keyslot_params {
+	enum { LUKS2_KEYSLOT_AF_LUKS1 = 0 } af_type;
+	enum { LUKS2_KEYSLOT_AREA_RAW = 0 } area_type;
+
+	union {
+	struct {
+		char hash[LUKS2_CHECKSUM_ALG_L]; // or include luks.h
+		unsigned int stripes;
+	} luks1;
+	} af;
+
+	union {
+	struct {
+		char encryption[65]; // or include utils_crypt.h
+		size_t key_size;
+	} raw;
+	} area;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Supportable header sizes (hdr_disk + JSON area)
+ * Also used as offset for the 2nd header.
+ */
+#define LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN 0x4000
+
+#define LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN sizeof(struct luks2_hdr_disk)
+
+//#define LUKS2_DEFAULT_HDR_SIZE 0x400000  /* 4 MiB */
+#define LUKS2_DEFAULT_HDR_SIZE 0x1000000 /* 16 MiB */
+
+#define LUKS2_MAX_KEYSLOTS_SIZE 0x8000000 /* 128 MiB */
+
+#define LUKS2_HDR_OFFSET_MAX 0x400000 /* 4 MiB */
+
+/* Offsets for secondary header (for scan if primary header is corrupted). */
+#define LUKS2_HDR2_OFFSETS { 0x04000, 0x008000, 0x010000, 0x020000, \
+                             0x40000, 0x080000, 0x100000, 0x200000, LUKS2_HDR_OFFSET_MAX }
+
+int LUKS2_hdr_version_unlocked(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *backup_file);
+
+int LUKS2_hdr_read(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int repair);
+int LUKS2_hdr_write(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+int LUKS2_hdr_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+
+int LUKS2_hdr_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	const char *uuid);
+
+int LUKS2_hdr_labels(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	const char *label,
+	const char *subsystem,
+	int commit);
+
+void LUKS2_hdr_free(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+
+int LUKS2_hdr_backup(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		     struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+		     const char *backup_file);
+int LUKS2_hdr_restore(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		      struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+		      const char *backup_file);
+
+uint64_t LUKS2_hdr_and_areas_size(json_object *jobj);
+uint64_t LUKS2_keyslots_size(json_object *jobj);
+uint64_t LUKS2_metadata_size(json_object *jobj);
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_cipher_incompatible(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *cipher_spec);
+
+/*
+ * Generic LUKS2 keyslot
+ */
+int LUKS2_keyslot_open(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	int segment,
+	const char *password,
+	size_t password_len,
+	struct volume_key **vk);
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_store(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *password,
+	size_t password_len,
+	const struct volume_key *vk,
+	const struct luks2_keyslot_params *params);
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_wipe(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	int wipe_area_only);
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_dump(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot);
+
+crypt_keyslot_priority LUKS2_keyslot_priority_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot);
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_priority_set(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	crypt_keyslot_priority priority,
+	int commit);
+
+/*
+ * Generic LUKS2 token
+ */
+int LUKS2_token_json_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int token,
+	const char **json);
+
+int LUKS2_token_assign(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	int token,
+	int assign,
+	int commit);
+
+int LUKS2_token_is_assigned(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	int token);
+
+int LUKS2_token_create(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int token,
+	const char *json,
+	int commit);
+
+crypt_token_info LUKS2_token_status(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int token,
+	const char **type);
+
+int LUKS2_builtin_token_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int token,
+	const char *type,
+	void *params);
+
+int LUKS2_builtin_token_create(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int token,
+	const char *type,
+	const void *params,
+	int commit);
+
+int LUKS2_token_open_and_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+		int token,
+		const char *name,
+		uint32_t flags,
+		void *usrptr);
+
+int LUKS2_token_open_and_activate_any(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	const char *name,
+	uint32_t flags);
+
+int LUKS2_tokens_count(struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+
+/*
+ * Generic LUKS2 digest
+ */
+int LUKS2_digest_by_segment(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int segment);
+
+int LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int segment,
+	const struct volume_key *vk);
+
+void LUKS2_digests_erase_unused(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+
+int LUKS2_digest_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	struct volume_key *vk,
+	int keyslot);
+
+int LUKS2_digest_dump(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int digest);
+
+int LUKS2_digest_assign(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	int digest,
+	int assign,
+	int commit);
+
+int LUKS2_digest_segment_assign(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int segment,
+	int digest,
+	int assign,
+	int commit);
+
+int LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot);
+
+int LUKS2_digest_create(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *type,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	const struct volume_key *vk);
+
+/*
+ * LUKS2 generic
+ */
+int LUKS2_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	struct volume_key *vk,
+	uint32_t flags);
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_luks2_format(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *cipher,
+	size_t keylength);
+
+int LUKS2_generate_hdr(
+	struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	const struct volume_key *vk,
+	const char *cipherName,
+	const char *cipherMode,
+	const char *integrity,
+	const char *uuid,
+	unsigned int sector_size,
+	uint64_t data_offset,
+	uint64_t align_offset,
+	uint64_t required_alignment,
+	uint64_t metadata_size,
+	uint64_t keyslots_size);
+
+int LUKS2_check_metadata_area_size(uint64_t metadata_size);
+int LUKS2_check_keyslots_area_size(uint64_t keyslots_size);
+
+int LUKS2_wipe_header_areas(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+
+uint64_t LUKS2_get_data_offset(struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+int LUKS2_get_sector_size(struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+const char *LUKS2_get_cipher(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int segment);
+const char *LUKS2_get_integrity(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int segment);
+int LUKS2_keyslot_params_default(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	 struct luks2_keyslot_params *params);
+int LUKS2_get_volume_key_size(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int segment);
+int LUKS2_get_keyslot_stored_key_size(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot);
+const char *LUKS2_get_keyslot_cipher(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot, size_t *key_size);
+int LUKS2_keyslot_find_empty(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, const char *type);
+int LUKS2_keyslot_active_count(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int segment);
+int LUKS2_keyslot_for_segment(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot, int segment);
+crypt_keyslot_info LUKS2_keyslot_info(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot);
+int LUKS2_keyslot_area(struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	uint64_t *offset,
+	uint64_t *length);
+int LUKS2_keyslot_pbkdf(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot, struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf);
+
+/*
+ * Permanent activation flags stored in header
+ */
+int LUKS2_config_get_flags(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint32_t *flags);
+int LUKS2_config_set_flags(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint32_t flags);
+
+/*
+ * Requirements for device activation or header modification
+ */
+int LUKS2_config_get_requirements(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint32_t *reqs);
+int LUKS2_config_set_requirements(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint32_t reqs);
+
+int LUKS2_unmet_requirements(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint32_t reqs_mask, int quiet);
+
+int LUKS2_key_description_by_segment(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct volume_key *vk, int segment);
+int LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_keyslot(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct volume_key *vk, int keyslot);
+
+struct luks_phdr;
+int LUKS2_luks1_to_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			 struct luks_phdr *hdr1,
+			 struct luks2_hdr *hdr2);
+int LUKS2_luks2_to_luks1(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			 struct luks2_hdr *hdr2,
+			 struct luks_phdr *hdr1);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2_digest.c b/lib/luks2/luks2_digest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..246903c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/luks2/luks2_digest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,393 @@
+/*
+ * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, digest handling
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include "luks2_internal.h"
+
+extern const digest_handler PBKDF2_digest;
+
+static const digest_handler *digest_handlers[LUKS2_DIGEST_MAX] = {
+	&PBKDF2_digest,
+	NULL
+};
+
+const digest_handler *LUKS2_digest_handler_type(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *type)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS2_DIGEST_MAX && digest_handlers[i]; i++) {
+		if (!strcmp(digest_handlers[i]->name, type))
+			return digest_handlers[i];
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static const digest_handler *LUKS2_digest_handler(struct crypt_device *cd, int digest)
+{
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
+	json_object *jobj1, *jobj2;
+
+	if (digest < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!(hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2)))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!(jobj1 = LUKS2_get_digest_jobj(hdr, digest)))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj1, "type", &jobj2))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return LUKS2_digest_handler_type(cd, json_object_get_string(jobj2));
+}
+
+static int LUKS2_digest_find_free(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
+{
+	int digest = 0;
+
+	while (LUKS2_get_digest_jobj(hdr, digest) && digest < LUKS2_DIGEST_MAX)
+		digest++;
+
+	return digest < LUKS2_DIGEST_MAX ? digest : -1;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_digest_create(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *type,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	const struct volume_key *vk)
+{
+	int digest;
+	const digest_handler *dh;
+
+	dh = LUKS2_digest_handler_type(cd, type);
+	if (!dh)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	digest = LUKS2_digest_find_free(cd, hdr);
+	if (digest < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Creating new digest %d (%s).", digest, type);
+
+	return dh->store(cd, digest, vk->key, vk->keylength) ?: digest;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot)
+{
+	char keyslot_name[16];
+	json_object *jobj_digests, *jobj_digest_keyslots;
+
+	if (snprintf(keyslot_name, sizeof(keyslot_name), "%u", keyslot) < 1)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "digests", &jobj_digests);
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_digests, key, val) {
+		json_object_object_get_ex(val, "keyslots", &jobj_digest_keyslots);
+		if (LUKS2_array_jobj(jobj_digest_keyslots, keyslot_name))
+			return atoi(key);
+	}
+
+	return -ENOENT;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_digest_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	struct volume_key *vk,
+	int keyslot)
+{
+	const digest_handler *h;
+	int digest, r;
+
+	digest = LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(hdr, keyslot);
+	if (digest < 0)
+		return digest;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Verifying key from keyslot %d, digest %d.", keyslot, digest);
+	h = LUKS2_digest_handler(cd, digest);
+	if (!h)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = h->verify(cd, digest, vk->key, vk->keylength);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Digest %d (%s) verify failed with %d.", digest, h->name, r);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	return digest;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_digest_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, int digest)
+{
+	const digest_handler *h;
+
+	if (!(h = LUKS2_digest_handler(cd, digest)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return h->dump(cd, digest);
+}
+
+int LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int segment,
+	const struct volume_key *vk)
+{
+	const digest_handler *h;
+	int digest, r;
+
+	digest = LUKS2_digest_by_segment(hdr, segment);
+	if (digest < 0)
+		return digest;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Verifying key digest %d.", digest);
+
+	h = LUKS2_digest_handler(cd, digest);
+	if (!h)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = h->verify(cd, digest, vk->key, vk->keylength);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Digest %d (%s) verify failed with %d.", digest, h->name, r);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	return digest;
+}
+
+/* FIXME: segment can have more digests */
+int LUKS2_digest_by_segment(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int segment)
+{
+	char segment_name[16];
+	json_object *jobj_digests, *jobj_digest_segments;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "digests", &jobj_digests);
+
+	if (snprintf(segment_name, sizeof(segment_name), "%u", segment) < 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_digests, key, val) {
+		json_object_object_get_ex(val, "segments", &jobj_digest_segments);
+		if (!LUKS2_array_jobj(jobj_digest_segments, segment_name))
+			continue;
+
+		return atoi(key);
+	}
+
+	return -ENOENT;
+}
+
+static int assign_one_digest(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			     int keyslot, int digest, int assign)
+{
+	json_object *jobj1, *jobj_digest, *jobj_digest_keyslots;
+	char num[16];
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot %i %s digest %i.", keyslot, assign ? "assigned to" : "unassigned from", digest);
+
+	jobj_digest = LUKS2_get_digest_jobj(hdr, digest);
+	if (!jobj_digest)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "keyslots", &jobj_digest_keyslots);
+	if (!jobj_digest_keyslots)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%d", keyslot);
+	if (assign) {
+		jobj1 = LUKS2_array_jobj(jobj_digest_keyslots, num);
+		if (!jobj1)
+			json_object_array_add(jobj_digest_keyslots, json_object_new_string(num));
+	} else {
+		jobj1 = LUKS2_array_remove(jobj_digest_keyslots, num);
+		if (jobj1)
+			json_object_object_add(jobj_digest, "keyslots", jobj1);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_digest_assign(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			int keyslot, int digest, int assign, int commit)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_digests;
+	int r = 0;
+
+	if (digest == CRYPT_ANY_DIGEST) {
+		json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "digests", &jobj_digests);
+
+		json_object_object_foreach(jobj_digests, key, val) {
+			UNUSED(val);
+			r = assign_one_digest(cd, hdr, keyslot, atoi(key), assign);
+			if (r < 0)
+				break;
+		}
+	} else
+		r = assign_one_digest(cd, hdr, keyslot, digest, assign);
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	// FIXME: do not write header in nothing changed
+	return commit ? LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr) : 0;
+}
+
+static int assign_one_segment(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			     int segment, int digest, int assign)
+{
+	json_object *jobj1, *jobj_digest, *jobj_digest_segments;
+	char num[16];
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Segment %i %s digest %i.", segment, assign ? "assigned to" : "unassigned from", digest);
+
+	jobj_digest = LUKS2_get_digest_jobj(hdr, digest);
+	if (!jobj_digest)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "segments", &jobj_digest_segments);
+	if (!jobj_digest_segments)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%d", segment);
+	if (assign) {
+		jobj1 = LUKS2_array_jobj(jobj_digest_segments, num);
+		if (!jobj1)
+			json_object_array_add(jobj_digest_segments, json_object_new_string(num));
+	} else {
+		jobj1 = LUKS2_array_remove(jobj_digest_segments, num);
+		if (jobj1)
+			json_object_object_add(jobj_digest, "segments", jobj1);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_digest_segment_assign(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			int segment, int digest, int assign, int commit)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_digests;
+	int r = 0;
+
+	if (digest == CRYPT_ANY_DIGEST) {
+		json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "digests", &jobj_digests);
+
+		json_object_object_foreach(jobj_digests, key, val) {
+			UNUSED(val);
+			r = assign_one_segment(cd, hdr, segment, atoi(key), assign);
+			if (r < 0)
+				break;
+		}
+	} else
+		r = assign_one_segment(cd, hdr, segment, digest, assign);
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	// FIXME: do not write header in nothing changed
+	return commit ? LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr) : 0;
+}
+
+static int digest_unused(json_object *jobj_digest)
+{
+	json_object *jobj;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "segments", &jobj);
+	if (!jobj || !json_object_is_type(jobj, json_type_array) || json_object_array_length(jobj) > 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "keyslots", &jobj);
+	if (!jobj || !json_object_is_type(jobj, json_type_array))
+		return 0;
+
+	return json_object_array_length(jobj) > 0 ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+void LUKS2_digests_erase_unused(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_digests;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "digests", &jobj_digests);
+	if (!jobj_digests || !json_object_is_type(jobj_digests, json_type_object))
+		return;
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_digests, key, val) {
+		if (digest_unused(val)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Erasing unused digest %d.", atoi(key));
+			json_object_object_del(jobj_digests, key);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/* Key description helpers */
+static char *get_key_description_by_digest(struct crypt_device *cd, int digest)
+{
+	char *desc, digest_str[3];
+	int r;
+	size_t len;
+
+	if (!crypt_get_uuid(cd))
+		return NULL;
+
+	r = snprintf(digest_str, sizeof(digest_str), "d%u", digest);
+	if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(digest_str))
+		return NULL;
+
+	/* "cryptsetup:<uuid>-<digest_str>" + \0 */
+	len = strlen(crypt_get_uuid(cd)) + strlen(digest_str) + 13;
+
+	desc = malloc(len);
+	if (!desc)
+	       return NULL;
+
+	r = snprintf(desc, len, "%s:%s-%s", "cryptsetup", crypt_get_uuid(cd), digest_str);
+	if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= len) {
+	       free(desc);
+	       return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return desc;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_key_description_by_segment(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct volume_key *vk, int segment)
+{
+	char *desc = get_key_description_by_digest(cd, LUKS2_digest_by_segment(hdr, segment));
+	int r;
+
+	r = crypt_volume_key_set_description(vk, desc);
+	free(desc);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_keyslot(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct volume_key *vk, int keyslot)
+{
+	char *desc = get_key_description_by_digest(cd, LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(hdr, keyslot));
+	int r;
+
+	r = crypt_volume_key_set_description(vk, desc);
+	if (!r)
+		r = crypt_volume_key_load_in_keyring(cd, vk);
+
+	free(desc);
+	return r;
+}
diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2_digest_pbkdf2.c b/lib/luks2/luks2_digest_pbkdf2.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e4413ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/luks2/luks2_digest_pbkdf2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+/*
+ * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, PBKDF2 digest handler (LUKS1 compatible)
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include "luks2_internal.h"
+
+#define LUKS_DIGESTSIZE 20 // since SHA1
+#define LUKS_SALTSIZE 32
+#define LUKS_MKD_ITERATIONS_MS 125
+
+static int PBKDF2_digest_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int digest,
+	const char *volume_key,
+	size_t volume_key_len)
+{
+	char checkHashBuf[64];
+	json_object *jobj_digest, *jobj1;
+	const char *hashSpec;
+	char *mkDigest = NULL, mkDigestSalt[LUKS_SALTSIZE];
+	unsigned int mkDigestIterations;
+	size_t len;
+	int r;
+
+	/* This can be done only for internally linked digests */
+	jobj_digest = LUKS2_get_digest_jobj(crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2), digest);
+	if (!jobj_digest)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "hash", &jobj1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	hashSpec = json_object_get_string(jobj1);
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "iterations", &jobj1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	mkDigestIterations = json_object_get_int64(jobj1);
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "salt", &jobj1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	len = sizeof(mkDigestSalt);
+	if (!base64_decode(json_object_get_string(jobj1),
+			   json_object_get_string_len(jobj1), mkDigestSalt, &len))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (len != LUKS_SALTSIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "digest", &jobj1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	len = 0;
+	if (!base64_decode_alloc(json_object_get_string(jobj1),
+			   json_object_get_string_len(jobj1), &mkDigest, &len))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (len < LUKS_DIGESTSIZE ||
+	    len > sizeof(checkHashBuf) ||
+	    (len != LUKS_DIGESTSIZE && len != (size_t)crypt_hash_size(hashSpec))) {
+		free(mkDigest);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = -EPERM;
+	if (crypt_pbkdf(CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2, hashSpec, volume_key, volume_key_len,
+			mkDigestSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE,
+			checkHashBuf, len,
+			mkDigestIterations, 0, 0) < 0) {
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	} else {
+		if (memcmp(checkHashBuf, mkDigest, len) == 0)
+			r = 0;
+	}
+
+	free(mkDigest);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int PBKDF2_digest_store(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int digest,
+	const char *volume_key,
+	size_t volume_key_len)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_digest, *jobj_digests;
+	char salt[LUKS_SALTSIZE], digest_raw[128];
+	int hmac_size, r;
+	char *base64_str;
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_limits pbkdf_limits;
+	const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf_cd;
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_type pbkdf = {
+		.type = CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2,
+		.time_ms = LUKS_MKD_ITERATIONS_MS,
+	};
+
+	/* Inherit hash from PBKDF setting */
+	pbkdf_cd = crypt_get_pbkdf_type(cd);
+	if (pbkdf_cd)
+		pbkdf.hash = pbkdf_cd->hash;
+	if (!pbkdf.hash)
+		pbkdf.hash = DEFAULT_LUKS1_HASH;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Setting PBKDF2 type key digest %d.", digest);
+
+	r = crypt_random_get(cd, salt, LUKS_SALTSIZE, CRYPT_RND_SALT);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = crypt_pbkdf_get_limits(CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2, &pbkdf_limits);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (crypt_get_pbkdf(cd)->flags & CRYPT_PBKDF_NO_BENCHMARK)
+		pbkdf.iterations = pbkdf_limits.min_iterations;
+	else {
+		r = crypt_benchmark_pbkdf_internal(cd, &pbkdf, volume_key_len);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+
+	hmac_size = crypt_hmac_size(pbkdf.hash);
+	if (hmac_size < 0)
+		return hmac_size;
+
+	r = crypt_pbkdf(CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2, pbkdf.hash, volume_key, volume_key_len,
+			salt, LUKS_SALTSIZE, digest_raw, hmac_size,
+			pbkdf.iterations, 0, 0);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	jobj_digest = LUKS2_get_digest_jobj(crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2), digest);
+	jobj_digests = NULL;
+	if (!jobj_digest) {
+		hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2);
+		jobj_digest = json_object_new_object();
+		json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "digests", &jobj_digests);
+	}
+
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_digest, "type", json_object_new_string("pbkdf2"));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_digest, "keyslots", json_object_new_array());
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_digest, "segments", json_object_new_array());
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_digest, "hash", json_object_new_string(pbkdf.hash));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_digest, "iterations", json_object_new_int(pbkdf.iterations));
+
+	base64_encode_alloc(salt, LUKS_SALTSIZE, &base64_str);
+	if (!base64_str) {
+		json_object_put(jobj_digest);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_digest, "salt", json_object_new_string(base64_str));
+	free(base64_str);
+
+	base64_encode_alloc(digest_raw, hmac_size, &base64_str);
+	if (!base64_str) {
+		json_object_put(jobj_digest);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_digest, "digest", json_object_new_string(base64_str));
+	free(base64_str);
+
+	if (jobj_digests)
+		json_object_object_add_by_uint(jobj_digests, digest, jobj_digest);
+
+	JSON_DBG(cd, jobj_digest, "Digest JSON:");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int PBKDF2_digest_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, int digest)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_digest, *jobj1;
+
+	/* This can be done only for internally linked digests */
+	jobj_digest = LUKS2_get_digest_jobj(crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2), digest);
+	if (!jobj_digest)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "hash", &jobj1);
+	log_std(cd, "\tHash:       %s\n", json_object_get_string(jobj1));
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "iterations", &jobj1);
+	log_std(cd, "\tIterations: %" PRIu64 "\n", json_object_get_int64(jobj1));
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "salt", &jobj1);
+	log_std(cd, "\tSalt:       ");
+	hexprint_base64(cd, jobj1, " ", "            ");
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "digest", &jobj1);
+	log_std(cd, "\tDigest:     ");
+	hexprint_base64(cd, jobj1, " ", "            ");
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+const digest_handler PBKDF2_digest = {
+	.name   = "pbkdf2",
+	.verify = PBKDF2_digest_verify,
+	.store  = PBKDF2_digest_store,
+	.dump   = PBKDF2_digest_dump,
+};
diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c b/lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c6a121a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c
@@ -0,0 +1,769 @@
+/*
+ * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "luks2_internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * Helper functions
+ */
+json_object *parse_json_len(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *json_area,
+			    uint64_t max_length, int *json_len)
+{
+	json_object *jobj;
+	struct json_tokener *jtok;
+
+	 /* INT32_MAX is internal (json-c) json_tokener_parse_ex() limit */
+	if (!json_area || max_length > INT32_MAX)
+		return NULL;
+
+	jtok = json_tokener_new();
+	if (!jtok) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "ERROR: Failed to init json tokener");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	jobj = json_tokener_parse_ex(jtok, json_area, max_length);
+	if (!jobj)
+		log_dbg(cd, "ERROR: Failed to parse json data (%d): %s",
+			json_tokener_get_error(jtok),
+			json_tokener_error_desc(json_tokener_get_error(jtok)));
+	else
+		*json_len = jtok->char_offset;
+
+	json_tokener_free(jtok);
+
+	return jobj;
+}
+
+static void log_dbg_checksum(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			     const uint8_t *csum, const char *csum_alg, const char *info)
+{
+	char csum_txt[2*LUKS2_CHECKSUM_L+1];
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < crypt_hash_size(csum_alg); i++)
+		snprintf(&csum_txt[i*2], 3, "%02hhx", (const char)csum[i]);
+	csum_txt[i*2+1] = '\0'; /* Just to be safe, sprintf should write \0 there. */
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Checksum:%s (%s)", &csum_txt[0], info);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate hash (checksum) of |LUKS2_bin|LUKS2_JSON_area| from in-memory structs.
+ * LUKS2 on-disk header contains uniques salt both for primary and secondary header.
+ * Checksum is always calculated with zeroed checksum field in binary header.
+ */
+static int hdr_checksum_calculate(const char *alg, struct luks2_hdr_disk *hdr_disk,
+				  const char *json_area, size_t json_len)
+{
+	struct crypt_hash *hd = NULL;
+	int hash_size, r;
+
+	hash_size = crypt_hash_size(alg);
+	if (hash_size <= 0 || crypt_hash_init(&hd, alg))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Binary header, csum zeroed. */
+	r = crypt_hash_write(hd, (char*)hdr_disk, LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN);
+
+	/* JSON area (including unused space) */
+	if (!r)
+		r = crypt_hash_write(hd, json_area, json_len);
+
+	if (!r)
+		r = crypt_hash_final(hd, (char*)hdr_disk->csum, (size_t)hash_size);
+
+	crypt_hash_destroy(hd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare hash (checksum) of on-disk and in-memory header.
+ */
+static int hdr_checksum_check(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			      const char *alg, struct luks2_hdr_disk *hdr_disk,
+			      const char *json_area, size_t json_len)
+{
+	struct luks2_hdr_disk hdr_tmp;
+	int hash_size, r;
+
+	hash_size = crypt_hash_size(alg);
+	if (hash_size <= 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Copy header and zero checksum. */
+	memcpy(&hdr_tmp, hdr_disk, LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN);
+	memset(&hdr_tmp.csum, 0, sizeof(hdr_tmp.csum));
+
+	r = hdr_checksum_calculate(alg, &hdr_tmp, json_area, json_len);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	log_dbg_checksum(cd, hdr_disk->csum, alg, "on-disk");
+	log_dbg_checksum(cd, hdr_tmp.csum, alg, "in-memory");
+
+	if (memcmp(hdr_tmp.csum, hdr_disk->csum, (size_t)hash_size))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert header from on-disk format to in-memory struct
+ */
+static void hdr_from_disk(struct luks2_hdr_disk *hdr_disk1,
+			  struct luks2_hdr_disk *hdr_disk2,
+			  struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			  int secondary)
+{
+	hdr->version  = be16_to_cpu(hdr_disk1->version);
+	hdr->hdr_size = be64_to_cpu(hdr_disk1->hdr_size);
+	hdr->seqid    = be64_to_cpu(hdr_disk1->seqid);
+
+	memcpy(hdr->label, hdr_disk1->label, LUKS2_LABEL_L);
+	hdr->label[LUKS2_LABEL_L - 1] = '\0';
+	memcpy(hdr->subsystem, hdr_disk1->subsystem, LUKS2_LABEL_L);
+	hdr->subsystem[LUKS2_LABEL_L - 1] = '\0';
+	memcpy(hdr->checksum_alg, hdr_disk1->checksum_alg, LUKS2_CHECKSUM_ALG_L);
+	hdr->checksum_alg[LUKS2_CHECKSUM_ALG_L - 1] = '\0';
+	memcpy(hdr->uuid, hdr_disk1->uuid, LUKS2_UUID_L);
+	hdr->uuid[LUKS2_UUID_L - 1] = '\0';
+
+	if (secondary) {
+		memcpy(hdr->salt1, hdr_disk2->salt, LUKS2_SALT_L);
+		memcpy(hdr->salt2, hdr_disk1->salt, LUKS2_SALT_L);
+	} else {
+		memcpy(hdr->salt1, hdr_disk1->salt, LUKS2_SALT_L);
+		memcpy(hdr->salt2, hdr_disk2->salt, LUKS2_SALT_L);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert header from in-memory struct to on-disk format
+ */
+static void hdr_to_disk(struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			struct luks2_hdr_disk *hdr_disk,
+			int secondary, uint64_t offset)
+{
+	assert(((char*)&(hdr_disk->_padding4096) - (char*)&(hdr_disk->magic)) == 512);
+
+	memset(hdr_disk, 0, LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN);
+
+	memcpy(&hdr_disk->magic, secondary ? LUKS2_MAGIC_2ND : LUKS2_MAGIC_1ST, LUKS2_MAGIC_L);
+	hdr_disk->version     = cpu_to_be16(hdr->version);
+	hdr_disk->hdr_size    = cpu_to_be64(hdr->hdr_size);
+	hdr_disk->hdr_offset  = cpu_to_be64(offset);
+	hdr_disk->seqid       = cpu_to_be64(hdr->seqid);
+
+	strncpy(hdr_disk->label, hdr->label, LUKS2_LABEL_L);
+	hdr_disk->label[LUKS2_LABEL_L - 1] = '\0';
+	strncpy(hdr_disk->subsystem, hdr->subsystem, LUKS2_LABEL_L);
+	hdr_disk->subsystem[LUKS2_LABEL_L - 1] = '\0';
+	strncpy(hdr_disk->checksum_alg, hdr->checksum_alg, LUKS2_CHECKSUM_ALG_L);
+	hdr_disk->checksum_alg[LUKS2_CHECKSUM_ALG_L - 1] = '\0';
+	strncpy(hdr_disk->uuid, hdr->uuid, LUKS2_UUID_L);
+	hdr_disk->uuid[LUKS2_UUID_L - 1] = '\0';
+
+	memcpy(hdr_disk->salt, secondary ? hdr->salt2 : hdr->salt1, LUKS2_SALT_L);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sanity checks before checksum is validated
+ */
+static int hdr_disk_sanity_check_pre(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				     struct luks2_hdr_disk *hdr,
+				     size_t *hdr_json_size, int secondary,
+				     uint64_t offset)
+{
+	if (memcmp(hdr->magic, secondary ? LUKS2_MAGIC_2ND : LUKS2_MAGIC_1ST, LUKS2_MAGIC_L))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (be16_to_cpu(hdr->version) != 2) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Unsupported LUKS2 header version %u.", be16_to_cpu(hdr->version));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (offset != be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_offset)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "LUKS2 offset 0x%04x on device differs to expected offset 0x%04x.",
+			(unsigned)be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_offset), (unsigned)offset);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (secondary && (offset != be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_size))) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "LUKS2 offset 0x%04x in secondary header doesn't match size 0x%04x.",
+			(unsigned)offset, (unsigned)be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_size));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* FIXME: sanity check checksum alg. */
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "LUKS2 header version %u of size %u bytes, checksum %s.",
+		(unsigned)be16_to_cpu(hdr->version), (unsigned)be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_size),
+		hdr->checksum_alg);
+
+	*hdr_json_size = be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_size) - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read LUKS2 header from disk at specific offset.
+ */
+static int hdr_read_disk(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			 struct device *device, struct luks2_hdr_disk *hdr_disk,
+			 char **json_area, uint64_t offset, int secondary)
+{
+	size_t hdr_json_size = 0;
+	int devfd = -1, r;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Trying to read %s LUKS2 header at offset 0x%" PRIx64 ".",
+		secondary ? "secondary" : "primary", offset);
+
+	devfd = device_open_locked(cd, device, O_RDONLY);
+	if (devfd < 0)
+		return devfd == -1 ? -EIO : devfd;
+
+	/*
+	 * Read binary header and run sanity check before reading
+	 * JSON area and validating checksum.
+	 */
+	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+				 device_alignment(device), hdr_disk,
+				 LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN, offset) != LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN) {
+		close(devfd);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	r = hdr_disk_sanity_check_pre(cd, hdr_disk, &hdr_json_size, secondary, offset);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		close(devfd);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Allocate and read JSON area. Always the whole area must be read.
+	 */
+	*json_area = malloc(hdr_json_size);
+	if (!*json_area) {
+		close(devfd);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+				 device_alignment(device), *json_area, hdr_json_size,
+				 offset + LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN) != (ssize_t)hdr_json_size) {
+		close(devfd);
+		free(*json_area);
+		*json_area = NULL;
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	close(devfd);
+
+	/*
+	 * Calculate and validate checksum and zero it afterwards.
+	 */
+	if (hdr_checksum_check(cd, hdr_disk->checksum_alg, hdr_disk,
+				*json_area, hdr_json_size)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "LUKS2 header checksum error (offset %" PRIu64 ").", offset);
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+	memset(hdr_disk->csum, 0, LUKS2_CHECKSUM_L);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write LUKS2 header to disk at specific offset.
+ */
+static int hdr_write_disk(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			  struct device *device, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			  const char *json_area, int secondary)
+{
+	struct luks2_hdr_disk hdr_disk;
+	uint64_t offset = secondary ? hdr->hdr_size : 0;
+	size_t hdr_json_len;
+	int devfd = -1, r;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Trying to write LUKS2 header (%zu bytes) at offset %" PRIu64 ".",
+		hdr->hdr_size, offset);
+
+	/* FIXME: read-only device silent fail? */
+
+	devfd = device_open_locked(cd, device, O_RDWR);
+	if (devfd < 0)
+		return devfd == -1 ? -EINVAL : devfd;
+
+	hdr_json_len = hdr->hdr_size - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN;
+
+	hdr_to_disk(hdr, &hdr_disk, secondary, offset);
+
+	/*
+	 * Write header without checksum but with proper seqid.
+	 */
+	if (write_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+				  device_alignment(device), (char *)&hdr_disk,
+				  LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN, offset) < (ssize_t)LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN) {
+		close(devfd);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Write json area.
+	 */
+	if (write_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+				  device_alignment(device),
+				  CONST_CAST(char*)json_area, hdr_json_len,
+				  LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN + offset) < (ssize_t)hdr_json_len) {
+		close(devfd);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Calculate checksum and write header with checksum.
+	 */
+	r = hdr_checksum_calculate(hdr_disk.checksum_alg, &hdr_disk,
+				   json_area, hdr_json_len);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		close(devfd);
+		return r;
+	}
+	log_dbg_checksum(cd, hdr_disk.csum, hdr_disk.checksum_alg, "in-memory");
+
+	if (write_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+				  device_alignment(device), (char *)&hdr_disk,
+				  LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN, offset) < (ssize_t)LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN)
+		r = -EIO;
+
+	device_sync(cd, device, devfd);
+	close(devfd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert in-memory LUKS2 header and write it to disk.
+ * This will increase sequence id, write both header copies and calculate checksum.
+ */
+int LUKS2_disk_hdr_write(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct device *device)
+{
+	char *json_area;
+	const char *json_text;
+	size_t json_area_len;
+	int r;
+
+	if (hdr->version != 2) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Unsupported LUKS2 header version (%u).", hdr->version);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = device_check_size(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd), LUKS2_hdr_and_areas_size(hdr->jobj), 1);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	/*
+	 * Allocate and zero JSON area (of proper header size).
+	 */
+	json_area_len = hdr->hdr_size - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN;
+	json_area = malloc(json_area_len);
+	if (!json_area)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	memset(json_area, 0, json_area_len);
+
+	/*
+	 * Generate text space-efficient JSON representation to json area.
+	 */
+	json_text = json_object_to_json_string_ext(hdr->jobj,
+			JSON_C_TO_STRING_PLAIN | JSON_C_TO_STRING_NOSLASHESCAPE);
+	if (!json_text || !*json_text) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Cannot parse JSON object to text representation.");
+		free(json_area);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	if (strlen(json_text) > (json_area_len - 1)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "JSON is too large (%zu > %zu).", strlen(json_text), json_area_len);
+		free(json_area);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	strncpy(json_area, json_text, json_area_len);
+
+	/* Increase sequence id before writing it to disk. */
+	hdr->seqid++;
+
+	r = device_write_lock(cd, device);
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to acquire write device lock."));
+		free(json_area);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	/* Write primary and secondary header */
+	r = hdr_write_disk(cd, device, hdr, json_area, 0);
+	if (!r)
+		r = hdr_write_disk(cd, device, hdr, json_area, 1);
+
+	if (r)
+		log_dbg(cd, "LUKS2 header write failed (%d).", r);
+
+	device_write_unlock(cd, device);
+
+	/* FIXME: try recovery here? */
+
+	free(json_area);
+	return r;
+}
+static int validate_json_area(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *json_area,
+			      uint64_t json_len, uint64_t max_length)
+{
+	char c;
+
+	/* Enforce there are no needless opening bytes */
+	if (*json_area != '{') {
+		log_dbg(cd, "ERROR: Opening character must be left curly bracket: '{'.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (json_len >= max_length) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "ERROR: Missing trailing null byte beyond parsed json data string.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * TODO:
+	 *	validate there are legal json format characters between
+	 *	'json_area' and 'json_area + json_len'
+	 */
+
+	do {
+		c = *(json_area + json_len);
+		if (c != '\0') {
+			log_dbg(cd, "ERROR: Forbidden ascii code 0x%02hhx found beyond json data string at offset %" PRIu64,
+				c, json_len);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	} while (++json_len < max_length);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int validate_luks2_json_object(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj_hdr, uint64_t length)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	/* we require top level object to be of json_type_object */
+	r = !json_object_is_type(jobj_hdr, json_type_object);
+	if (r) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "ERROR: Resulting object is not a json object type");
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	r = LUKS2_hdr_validate(cd, jobj_hdr, length);
+	if (r) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Repairing JSON metadata.");
+		/* try to correct known glitches */
+		LUKS2_hdr_repair(cd, jobj_hdr);
+
+		/* run validation again */
+		r = LUKS2_hdr_validate(cd, jobj_hdr, length);
+	}
+
+	if (r)
+		log_dbg(cd, "ERROR: LUKS2 validation failed");
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static json_object *parse_and_validate_json(struct crypt_device *cd,
+					    const char *json_area, uint64_t max_length)
+{
+	int json_len, r;
+	json_object *jobj = parse_json_len(cd, json_area, max_length, &json_len);
+
+	if (!jobj)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/* successful parse_json_len must not return offset <= 0 */
+	assert(json_len > 0);
+
+	r = validate_json_area(cd, json_area, json_len, max_length);
+	if (!r)
+		r = validate_luks2_json_object(cd, jobj, max_length);
+
+	if (r) {
+		json_object_put(jobj);
+		jobj = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return jobj;
+}
+
+static int detect_device_signatures(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *path)
+{
+	blk_probe_status prb_state;
+	int r;
+	struct blkid_handle *h;
+
+	if (!blk_supported()) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Blkid probing of device signatures disabled.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = blk_init_by_path(&h, path))) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Failed to initialize blkid_handle by path.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* We don't care about details. Be fast. */
+	blk_set_chains_for_fast_detection(h);
+
+	/* Filter out crypto_LUKS. we don't care now */
+	blk_superblocks_filter_luks(h);
+
+	prb_state = blk_safeprobe(h);
+
+	switch (prb_state) {
+	case PRB_AMBIGUOUS:
+		log_dbg(cd, "Blkid probe couldn't decide device type unambiguously.");
+		/* fall through */
+	case PRB_FAIL:
+		log_dbg(cd, "Blkid probe failed.");
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	case PRB_OK: /* crypto_LUKS type is filtered out */
+		r = -EINVAL;
+
+		if (blk_is_partition(h))
+			log_dbg(cd, "Blkid probe detected partition type '%s'", blk_get_partition_type(h));
+		else if (blk_is_superblock(h))
+			log_dbg(cd, "blkid probe detected superblock type '%s'", blk_get_superblock_type(h));
+		break;
+	case PRB_EMPTY:
+		log_dbg(cd, "Blkid probe detected no foreign device signature.");
+	}
+	blk_free(h);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read and convert on-disk LUKS2 header to in-memory representation..
+ * Try to do recovery if on-disk state is not consistent.
+ */
+int LUKS2_disk_hdr_read(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			struct device *device, int do_recovery, int do_blkprobe)
+{
+	enum { HDR_OK, HDR_OBSOLETE, HDR_FAIL, HDR_FAIL_IO } state_hdr1, state_hdr2;
+	struct luks2_hdr_disk hdr_disk1, hdr_disk2;
+	char *json_area1 = NULL, *json_area2 = NULL;
+	json_object *jobj_hdr1 = NULL, *jobj_hdr2 = NULL;
+	unsigned int i;
+	int r;
+	uint64_t hdr_size;
+	uint64_t hdr2_offsets[] = LUKS2_HDR2_OFFSETS;
+
+	/* Skip auto-recovery if locks are disabled and we're not doing LUKS2 explicit repair */
+	if (do_recovery && do_blkprobe && !crypt_metadata_locking_enabled()) {
+		do_recovery = 0;
+		log_dbg(cd, "Disabling header auto-recovery due to locking being disabled.");
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Read primary LUKS2 header (offset 0).
+	 */
+	state_hdr1 = HDR_FAIL;
+	r = hdr_read_disk(cd, device, &hdr_disk1, &json_area1, 0, 0);
+	if (r == 0) {
+		jobj_hdr1 = parse_and_validate_json(cd, json_area1, be64_to_cpu(hdr_disk1.hdr_size) - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN);
+		state_hdr1 = jobj_hdr1 ? HDR_OK : HDR_OBSOLETE;
+	} else if (r == -EIO)
+		state_hdr1 = HDR_FAIL_IO;
+
+	/*
+	 * Read secondary LUKS2 header (follows primary).
+	 */
+	state_hdr2 = HDR_FAIL;
+	if (state_hdr1 != HDR_FAIL && state_hdr1 != HDR_FAIL_IO) {
+		r = hdr_read_disk(cd, device, &hdr_disk2, &json_area2, be64_to_cpu(hdr_disk1.hdr_size), 1);
+		if (r == 0) {
+			jobj_hdr2 = parse_and_validate_json(cd, json_area2, be64_to_cpu(hdr_disk2.hdr_size) - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN);
+			state_hdr2 = jobj_hdr2 ? HDR_OK : HDR_OBSOLETE;
+		} else if (r == -EIO)
+			state_hdr2 = HDR_FAIL_IO;
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * No header size, check all known offsets.
+		 */
+		for (r = -EINVAL,i = 0; r < 0 && i < ARRAY_SIZE(hdr2_offsets); i++)
+			r = hdr_read_disk(cd, device, &hdr_disk2, &json_area2, hdr2_offsets[i], 1);
+
+		if (r == 0) {
+			jobj_hdr2 = parse_and_validate_json(cd, json_area2, be64_to_cpu(hdr_disk2.hdr_size) - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN);
+			state_hdr2 = jobj_hdr2 ? HDR_OK : HDR_OBSOLETE;
+		} else if (r == -EIO)
+			state_hdr2 = HDR_FAIL_IO;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check sequence id if both headers are read correctly.
+	 */
+	if (state_hdr1 == HDR_OK && state_hdr2 == HDR_OK) {
+		if (be64_to_cpu(hdr_disk1.seqid) > be64_to_cpu(hdr_disk2.seqid))
+			state_hdr2 = HDR_OBSOLETE;
+		else if (be64_to_cpu(hdr_disk1.seqid) < be64_to_cpu(hdr_disk2.seqid))
+			state_hdr1 = HDR_OBSOLETE;
+	}
+
+	/* check header with keyslots to fit the device */
+	if (state_hdr1 == HDR_OK)
+		hdr_size = LUKS2_hdr_and_areas_size(jobj_hdr1);
+	else if (state_hdr2 == HDR_OK)
+		hdr_size = LUKS2_hdr_and_areas_size(jobj_hdr2);
+	else {
+		r = (state_hdr1 == HDR_FAIL_IO && state_hdr2 == HDR_FAIL_IO) ? -EIO : -EINVAL;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	r = device_check_size(cd, device, hdr_size, 0);
+	if (r)
+		goto err;
+
+	/*
+	 * Try to rewrite (recover) bad header. Always regenerate salt for bad header.
+	 */
+	if (state_hdr1 == HDR_OK && state_hdr2 != HDR_OK) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Secondary LUKS2 header requires recovery.");
+
+		if (do_blkprobe && (r = detect_device_signatures(cd, device_path(device)))) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Device contains ambiguous signatures, cannot auto-recover LUKS2.\n"
+				      "Please run \"cryptsetup repair\" for recovery."));
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+		if (do_recovery) {
+			memcpy(&hdr_disk2, &hdr_disk1, LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN);
+			r = crypt_random_get(cd, (char*)hdr_disk2.salt, sizeof(hdr_disk2.salt), CRYPT_RND_SALT);
+			if (r)
+				log_dbg(cd, "Cannot generate master salt.");
+			else {
+				hdr_from_disk(&hdr_disk1, &hdr_disk2, hdr, 0);
+				r = hdr_write_disk(cd, device, hdr, json_area1, 1);
+			}
+			if (r)
+				log_dbg(cd, "Secondary LUKS2 header recovery failed.");
+		}
+	} else if (state_hdr1 != HDR_OK && state_hdr2 == HDR_OK) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Primary LUKS2 header requires recovery.");
+
+		if (do_blkprobe && (r = detect_device_signatures(cd, device_path(device)))) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Device contains ambiguous signatures, cannot auto-recover LUKS2.\n"
+				      "Please run \"cryptsetup repair\" for recovery."));
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+		if (do_recovery) {
+			memcpy(&hdr_disk1, &hdr_disk2, LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN);
+			r = crypt_random_get(cd, (char*)hdr_disk1.salt, sizeof(hdr_disk1.salt), CRYPT_RND_SALT);
+			if (r)
+				log_dbg(cd, "Cannot generate master salt.");
+			else {
+				hdr_from_disk(&hdr_disk2, &hdr_disk1, hdr, 1);
+				r = hdr_write_disk(cd, device, hdr, json_area2, 0);
+			}
+			if (r)
+				log_dbg(cd, "Primary LUKS2 header recovery failed.");
+		}
+	}
+
+	free(json_area1);
+	json_area1 = NULL;
+	free(json_area2);
+	json_area2 = NULL;
+
+	/* wrong lock for write mode during recovery attempt */
+	if (r == -EAGAIN)
+		goto err;
+
+	/*
+	 * Even if status is failed, the second header includes salt.
+	 */
+	if (state_hdr1 == HDR_OK) {
+		hdr_from_disk(&hdr_disk1, &hdr_disk2, hdr, 0);
+		hdr->jobj = jobj_hdr1;
+		json_object_put(jobj_hdr2);
+	} else if (state_hdr2 == HDR_OK) {
+		hdr_from_disk(&hdr_disk2, &hdr_disk1, hdr, 1);
+		hdr->jobj = jobj_hdr2;
+		json_object_put(jobj_hdr1);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * FIXME: should this fail? At least one header was read correctly.
+	 * r = (state_hdr1 == HDR_FAIL_IO || state_hdr2 == HDR_FAIL_IO) ? -EIO : -EINVAL;
+	 */
+	return 0;
+err:
+	log_dbg(cd, "LUKS2 header read failed (%d).", r);
+
+	free(json_area1);
+	free(json_area2);
+	json_object_put(jobj_hdr1);
+	json_object_put(jobj_hdr2);
+	hdr->jobj = NULL;
+	return r;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_hdr_version_unlocked(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *backup_file)
+{
+	struct {
+		char magic[LUKS2_MAGIC_L];
+		uint16_t version;
+	}  __attribute__ ((packed)) hdr;
+	struct device *device = NULL;
+	int r = 0, devfd = -1, flags;
+
+	if (!backup_file)
+		device = crypt_metadata_device(cd);
+	else if (device_alloc(cd, &device, backup_file) < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!device)
+		return 0;
+
+	flags = O_RDONLY;
+	if (device_direct_io(device))
+		flags |= O_DIRECT;
+
+	devfd = open(device_path(device), flags);
+	if (devfd < 0)
+		goto err;
+
+	if ((read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+	     device_alignment(device), &hdr, sizeof(hdr), 0) == sizeof(hdr)) &&
+	    !memcmp(hdr.magic, LUKS2_MAGIC_1ST, LUKS2_MAGIC_L))
+		r = (int)be16_to_cpu(hdr.version);
+err:
+	if (devfd != -1)
+		close(devfd);
+
+	if (backup_file)
+		device_free(cd, device);
+
+	return r;
+}
diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2_internal.h b/lib/luks2/luks2_internal.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5fbb56e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/luks2/luks2_internal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+/*
+ * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPTSETUP_LUKS2_INTERNAL_H
+#define _CRYPTSETUP_LUKS2_INTERNAL_H
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <json-c/json.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "base64.h"
+#include "luks2.h"
+
+#define UNUSED(x) (void)(x)
+
+/* override useless forward slash escape when supported by json-c */
+#ifndef JSON_C_TO_STRING_NOSLASHESCAPE
+#define JSON_C_TO_STRING_NOSLASHESCAPE 0
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * On-disk access function prototypes
+ */
+int LUKS2_disk_hdr_read(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			struct device *device, int do_recovery, int do_blkprobe);
+int LUKS2_disk_hdr_write(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			 struct device *device);
+
+/*
+ * JSON struct access helpers
+ */
+json_object *LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot);
+json_object *LUKS2_get_token_jobj(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int token);
+json_object *LUKS2_get_digest_jobj(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int digest);
+json_object *LUKS2_get_segment_jobj(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int segment);
+json_object *LUKS2_get_tokens_jobj(struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+
+void hexprint_base64(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj,
+		     const char *sep, const char *line_sep);
+
+json_object *parse_json_len(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *json_area,
+			    uint64_t max_length, int *json_len);
+uint64_t json_object_get_uint64(json_object *jobj);
+uint32_t json_object_get_uint32(json_object *jobj);
+json_object *json_object_new_uint64(uint64_t value);
+int json_object_object_add_by_uint(json_object *jobj, unsigned key, json_object *jobj_val);
+void json_object_object_del_by_uint(json_object *jobj, unsigned key);
+
+void JSON_DBG(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj, const char *desc);
+
+/*
+ * LUKS2 JSON validation
+ */
+
+/* validation helper */
+json_object *json_contains(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj, const char *name,
+			   const char *section, const char *key, json_type type);
+
+int LUKS2_hdr_validate(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj, uint64_t json_size);
+int LUKS2_keyslot_validate(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj,
+			   json_object *hdr_keyslot, const char *key);
+int LUKS2_check_json_size(struct crypt_device *cd, const struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+int LUKS2_token_validate(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj,
+			 json_object *jobj_token, const char *key);
+void LUKS2_token_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, int token);
+
+/*
+ * LUKS2 JSON repair for known glitches
+ */
+void LUKS2_hdr_repair(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj_hdr);
+void LUKS2_keyslots_repair(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj_hdr);
+
+/*
+ * JSON array helpers
+ */
+struct json_object *LUKS2_array_jobj(struct json_object *array, const char *num);
+struct json_object *LUKS2_array_remove(struct json_object *array, const char *num);
+
+/*
+ * Plugins API
+ */
+
+/**
+ * LUKS2 keyslots handlers (EXPERIMENTAL)
+ */
+typedef int (*keyslot_alloc_func)(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot,
+				  size_t volume_key_len,
+				  const struct luks2_keyslot_params *params);
+typedef int (*keyslot_update_func)(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot,
+				   const struct luks2_keyslot_params *params);
+typedef int (*keyslot_open_func) (struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot,
+				  const char *password, size_t password_len,
+				  char *volume_key, size_t volume_key_len);
+typedef int (*keyslot_store_func)(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot,
+				  const char *password, size_t password_len,
+				  const char *volume_key, size_t volume_key_len);
+typedef int (*keyslot_wipe_func) (struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot);
+typedef int (*keyslot_dump_func) (struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot);
+typedef int (*keyslot_validate_func) (struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj_keyslot);
+typedef void(*keyslot_repair_func) (struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj_keyslot);
+
+/* see LUKS2_luks2_to_luks1 */
+int placeholder_keyslot_alloc(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	uint64_t area_offset,
+	uint64_t area_length,
+	size_t volume_key_len);
+
+/* validate all keyslot implementations in hdr json */
+int LUKS2_keyslots_validate(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj);
+
+typedef struct  {
+	const char *name;
+	keyslot_alloc_func alloc;
+	keyslot_update_func update;
+	keyslot_open_func  open;
+	keyslot_store_func store;
+	keyslot_wipe_func  wipe;
+	keyslot_dump_func  dump;
+	keyslot_validate_func validate;
+	keyslot_repair_func repair;
+} keyslot_handler;
+
+/**
+ * LUKS2 digest handlers (EXPERIMENTAL)
+ */
+typedef int (*digest_verify_func)(struct crypt_device *cd, int digest,
+				  const char *volume_key, size_t volume_key_len);
+typedef int (*digest_store_func) (struct crypt_device *cd, int digest,
+				  const char *volume_key, size_t volume_key_len);
+typedef int (*digest_dump_func)  (struct crypt_device *cd, int digest);
+
+typedef struct  {
+	const char *name;
+	digest_verify_func verify;
+	digest_store_func  store;
+	digest_dump_func   dump;
+} digest_handler;
+
+const digest_handler *LUKS2_digest_handler_type(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *type);
+
+/**
+ * LUKS2 token handlers (internal use only)
+ */
+typedef int (*builtin_token_get_func) (json_object *jobj_token, void *params);
+typedef int (*builtin_token_set_func) (json_object **jobj_token, const void *params);
+
+typedef struct {
+	/* internal only section used by builtin tokens */
+	builtin_token_get_func get;
+	builtin_token_set_func set;
+	/* public token handler */
+	const crypt_token_handler *h;
+} token_handler;
+
+int token_keyring_set(json_object **, const void *);
+int token_keyring_get(json_object *, void *);
+
+int LUKS2_find_area_gap(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			size_t keylength, uint64_t *area_offset, uint64_t *area_length);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c b/lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a2cd331
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c
@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
+/*
+ * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, LUKS2 header format code
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include "luks2_internal.h"
+#include <uuid/uuid.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+struct area {
+	uint64_t offset;
+	uint64_t length;
+};
+
+static size_t get_area_size(size_t keylength)
+{
+	//FIXME: calculate this properly, for now it is AF_split_sectors
+	return size_round_up(keylength * 4000, 4096);
+}
+
+static size_t get_min_offset(struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
+{
+	return 2 * hdr->hdr_size;
+}
+
+static size_t get_max_offset(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	return crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_find_area_gap(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			size_t keylength, uint64_t *area_offset, uint64_t *area_length)
+{
+	struct area areas[LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX], sorted_areas[LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX] = {};
+	int i, j, k, area_i;
+	size_t offset, length;
+
+	/* fill area offset + length table */
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX; i++) {
+		if (!LUKS2_keyslot_area(hdr, i, &areas[i].offset, &areas[i].length))
+			continue;
+		areas[i].length = 0;
+		areas[i].offset = 0;
+	}
+
+	/* sort table */
+	k = 0; /* index in sorted table */
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX; i++) {
+		offset = get_max_offset(cd) ?: UINT64_MAX;
+		area_i = -1;
+		/* search for the smallest offset in table */
+		for (j = 0; j < LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX; j++)
+			if (areas[j].offset && areas[j].offset <= offset) {
+				area_i = j;
+				offset = areas[j].offset;
+			}
+
+		if (area_i >= 0) {
+			sorted_areas[k].length = areas[area_i].length;
+			sorted_areas[k].offset = areas[area_i].offset;
+			areas[area_i].length = 0;
+			areas[area_i].offset = 0;
+			k++;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* search for the gap we can use */
+	offset = get_min_offset(hdr);
+	length = get_area_size(keylength);
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX; i++) {
+		/* skip empty */
+		if (sorted_areas[i].offset == 0 || sorted_areas[i].length == 0)
+			continue;
+
+		/* enough space before the used area */
+		if ((offset < sorted_areas[i].offset) && ((offset + length) <= sorted_areas[i].offset))
+			break;
+
+		/* both offset and length are already aligned to 4096 bytes */
+		offset = sorted_areas[i].offset + sorted_areas[i].length;
+	}
+
+	if (get_max_offset(cd) && (offset + length) > get_max_offset(cd)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("No space for new keyslot."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Found area %zu -> %zu", offset, length + offset);
+/*
+	log_dbg("Area offset min: %zu, max %zu, slots max %u",
+	       get_min_offset(hdr), get_max_offset(cd), LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX);
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX; i++)
+		log_dbg("SLOT[%02i]: %-8" PRIu64 " -> %-8" PRIu64, i,
+			sorted_areas[i].offset,
+			sorted_areas[i].length + sorted_areas[i].offset);
+*/
+	*area_offset = offset;
+	*area_length = length;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_check_metadata_area_size(uint64_t metadata_size)
+{
+	/* see LUKS2_HDR2_OFFSETS */
+	return (metadata_size != 0x004000 &&
+		metadata_size != 0x008000 && metadata_size != 0x010000 &&
+		metadata_size != 0x020000 && metadata_size != 0x040000 &&
+		metadata_size != 0x080000 && metadata_size != 0x100000 &&
+		metadata_size != 0x200000 && metadata_size != 0x400000);
+}
+
+int LUKS2_check_keyslots_area_size(uint64_t keyslots_size)
+{
+	return (MISALIGNED_4K(keyslots_size) ||
+		keyslots_size > LUKS2_MAX_KEYSLOTS_SIZE);
+}
+
+int LUKS2_generate_hdr(
+	struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	const struct volume_key *vk,
+	const char *cipherName,
+	const char *cipherMode,
+	const char *integrity,
+	const char *uuid,
+	unsigned int sector_size,  /* in bytes */
+	uint64_t data_offset,      /* in bytes */
+	uint64_t align_offset,     /* in bytes */
+	uint64_t required_alignment,
+	uint64_t metadata_size,
+	uint64_t keyslots_size)
+{
+	struct json_object *jobj_segment, *jobj_integrity, *jobj_keyslots, *jobj_segments, *jobj_config;
+	char cipher[128];
+	uuid_t partitionUuid;
+	int digest;
+
+	if (!metadata_size)
+		metadata_size = LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN;
+	hdr->hdr_size = metadata_size;
+
+	if (data_offset && data_offset < get_min_offset(hdr)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Requested data offset is too small."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Increase keyslot size according to data offset */
+	if (!keyslots_size && data_offset)
+		keyslots_size = data_offset - get_min_offset(hdr);
+
+	/* keyslots size has to be 4 KiB aligned */
+	keyslots_size -= (keyslots_size % 4096);
+
+	if (keyslots_size > LUKS2_MAX_KEYSLOTS_SIZE)
+		keyslots_size = LUKS2_MAX_KEYSLOTS_SIZE;
+
+	if (!keyslots_size) {
+		assert(LUKS2_DEFAULT_HDR_SIZE > 2 * LUKS2_HDR_OFFSET_MAX);
+		keyslots_size = LUKS2_DEFAULT_HDR_SIZE - get_min_offset(hdr);
+	}
+
+	/* Decrease keyslots_size if we have smaller data_offset */
+	if (data_offset && (keyslots_size + get_min_offset(hdr)) > data_offset) {
+		keyslots_size = data_offset - get_min_offset(hdr);
+		log_dbg(cd, "Decreasing keyslot area size to %" PRIu64
+			" bytes due to the requested data offset %"
+			PRIu64 " bytes.", keyslots_size, data_offset);
+	}
+
+	/* Data offset has priority */
+	if (!data_offset && required_alignment) {
+		data_offset = size_round_up(get_min_offset(hdr) + keyslots_size,
+					    (size_t)required_alignment);
+		data_offset += align_offset;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Formatting LUKS2 with JSON metadata area %" PRIu64
+		" bytes and keyslots area %" PRIu64 " bytes.",
+		metadata_size - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN, keyslots_size);
+
+	if (keyslots_size < (LUKS2_HDR_OFFSET_MAX - 2*LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN))
+		log_std(cd, _("WARNING: keyslots area (%" PRIu64 " bytes) is very small,"
+			" available LUKS2 keyslot count is very limited.\n"),
+			keyslots_size);
+
+	hdr->seqid = 1;
+	hdr->version = 2;
+	memset(hdr->label, 0, LUKS2_LABEL_L);
+	strcpy(hdr->checksum_alg, "sha256");
+	crypt_random_get(cd, (char*)hdr->salt1, LUKS2_SALT_L, CRYPT_RND_SALT);
+	crypt_random_get(cd, (char*)hdr->salt2, LUKS2_SALT_L, CRYPT_RND_SALT);
+
+	if (uuid && uuid_parse(uuid, partitionUuid) == -1) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Wrong LUKS UUID format provided."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (!uuid)
+		uuid_generate(partitionUuid);
+
+	uuid_unparse(partitionUuid, hdr->uuid);
+
+	if (*cipherMode != '\0')
+		snprintf(cipher, sizeof(cipher), "%s-%s", cipherName, cipherMode);
+	else
+		snprintf(cipher, sizeof(cipher), "%s", cipherName);
+
+	hdr->jobj = json_object_new_object();
+
+	jobj_keyslots = json_object_new_object();
+	json_object_object_add(hdr->jobj, "keyslots", jobj_keyslots);
+	json_object_object_add(hdr->jobj, "tokens", json_object_new_object());
+	jobj_segments = json_object_new_object();
+	json_object_object_add(hdr->jobj, "segments", jobj_segments);
+	json_object_object_add(hdr->jobj, "digests", json_object_new_object());
+	jobj_config = json_object_new_object();
+	json_object_object_add(hdr->jobj, "config", jobj_config);
+
+	digest = LUKS2_digest_create(cd, "pbkdf2", hdr, vk);
+	if (digest < 0) {
+		json_object_put(hdr->jobj);
+		hdr->jobj = NULL;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (LUKS2_digest_segment_assign(cd, hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, digest, 1, 0) < 0) {
+		json_object_put(hdr->jobj);
+		hdr->jobj = NULL;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	jobj_segment = json_object_new_object();
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_segment, "type", json_object_new_string("crypt"));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_segment, "offset", json_object_new_uint64(data_offset));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_segment, "iv_tweak", json_object_new_string("0"));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_segment, "size", json_object_new_string("dynamic"));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_segment, "encryption", json_object_new_string(cipher));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_segment, "sector_size", json_object_new_int(sector_size));
+
+	if (integrity) {
+		jobj_integrity = json_object_new_object();
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_integrity, "type", json_object_new_string(integrity));
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_integrity, "journal_encryption", json_object_new_string("none"));
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_integrity, "journal_integrity", json_object_new_string("none"));
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_segment, "integrity", jobj_integrity);
+	}
+
+	json_object_object_add_by_uint(jobj_segments, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, jobj_segment);
+
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_config, "json_size", json_object_new_uint64(metadata_size - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_config, "keyslots_size", json_object_new_uint64(keyslots_size));
+
+	JSON_DBG(cd, hdr->jobj, "Header JSON:");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_wipe_header_areas(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
+{
+	int r;
+	uint64_t offset, length;
+	size_t wipe_block;
+
+	/* Wipe complete header, keyslots and padding areas with zeroes. */
+	offset = 0;
+	length = LUKS2_get_data_offset(hdr) * SECTOR_SIZE;
+	wipe_block = 1024 * 1024;
+
+	if (LUKS2_hdr_validate(cd, hdr->jobj, hdr->hdr_size - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* On detached header wipe at least the first 4k */
+	if (length == 0) {
+		length = 4096;
+		wipe_block = 4096;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Wiping LUKS areas (0x%06" PRIx64 " - 0x%06" PRIx64") with zeroes.",
+		offset, length + offset);
+
+	r = crypt_wipe_device(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd), CRYPT_WIPE_ZERO,
+			      offset, length, wipe_block, NULL, NULL);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	/* Wipe keyslot area */
+	wipe_block = 1024 * 1024;
+	offset = get_min_offset(hdr);
+	length = LUKS2_keyslots_size(hdr->jobj);
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Wiping keyslots area (0x%06" PRIx64 " - 0x%06" PRIx64") with random data.",
+		offset, length + offset);
+
+	return crypt_wipe_device(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd), CRYPT_WIPE_RANDOM,
+				 offset, length, wipe_block, NULL, NULL);
+}
diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c b/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..de8d018
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1935 @@
+/*
+ * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Ondrej Kozina
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include "luks2_internal.h"
+#include "../integrity/integrity.h"
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <uuid/uuid.h>
+
+#define LUKS_STRIPES 4000
+
+struct interval {
+	uint64_t offset;
+	uint64_t length;
+};
+
+void hexprint_base64(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj,
+		     const char *sep, const char *line_sep)
+{
+	char *buf = NULL;
+	size_t buf_len;
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	if (!base64_decode_alloc(json_object_get_string(jobj),
+				 json_object_get_string_len(jobj),
+				 &buf, &buf_len))
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < buf_len / 2; i++)
+		log_std(cd, "%02hhx%s", buf[i], sep);
+	log_std(cd, "\n\t%s", line_sep);
+	for (i = buf_len / 2; i < buf_len; i++)
+		log_std(cd, "%02hhx%s", buf[i], sep);
+	log_std(cd, "\n");
+	free(buf);
+}
+
+void JSON_DBG(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj, const char *desc)
+{
+	if (desc)
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG_JSON, desc);
+	crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG_JSON, json_object_to_json_string_ext(jobj,
+		JSON_C_TO_STRING_PRETTY | JSON_C_TO_STRING_NOSLASHESCAPE));
+}
+
+/*
+ * JSON array helpers
+ */
+struct json_object *LUKS2_array_jobj(struct json_object *array, const char *num)
+{
+	struct json_object *jobj1;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < (int) json_object_array_length(array); i++) {
+		jobj1 = json_object_array_get_idx(array, i);
+		if (!strcmp(num, json_object_get_string(jobj1)))
+			return jobj1;
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+struct json_object *LUKS2_array_remove(struct json_object *array, const char *num)
+{
+	struct json_object *jobj1, *jobj_removing = NULL, *array_new;
+	int i;
+
+	jobj_removing = LUKS2_array_jobj(array, num);
+	if (!jobj_removing)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/* Create new array without jobj_removing. */
+	array_new = json_object_new_array();
+	for (i = 0; i < (int) json_object_array_length(array); i++) {
+		jobj1 = json_object_array_get_idx(array, i);
+		if (jobj1 != jobj_removing)
+			json_object_array_add(array_new, json_object_get(jobj1));
+	}
+
+	return array_new;
+}
+
+/*
+ * JSON struct access helpers
+ */
+json_object *LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot)
+{
+	json_object *jobj1, *jobj2;
+	char keyslot_name[16];
+
+	if (!hdr || keyslot < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (snprintf(keyslot_name, sizeof(keyslot_name), "%u", keyslot) < 1)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "keyslots", &jobj1))
+		return NULL;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj1, keyslot_name, &jobj2);
+	return jobj2;
+}
+
+json_object *LUKS2_get_tokens_jobj(struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_tokens;
+
+	if (!hdr || !json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "tokens", &jobj_tokens))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return jobj_tokens;
+}
+
+json_object *LUKS2_get_token_jobj(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int token)
+{
+	json_object *jobj1, *jobj2;
+	char token_name[16];
+
+	if (!hdr || token < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	jobj1 = LUKS2_get_tokens_jobj(hdr);
+	if (!jobj1)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (snprintf(token_name, sizeof(token_name), "%u", token) < 1)
+		return NULL;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj1, token_name, &jobj2);
+	return jobj2;
+}
+
+json_object *LUKS2_get_digest_jobj(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int digest)
+{
+	json_object *jobj1, *jobj2;
+	char digest_name[16];
+
+	if (!hdr || digest < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (snprintf(digest_name, sizeof(digest_name), "%u", digest) < 1)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "digests", &jobj1))
+		return NULL;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj1, digest_name, &jobj2);
+	return jobj2;
+}
+
+json_object *LUKS2_get_segment_jobj(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int segment)
+{
+	json_object *jobj1, *jobj2;
+	char segment_name[16];
+
+	if (!hdr || segment < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (snprintf(segment_name, sizeof(segment_name), "%u", segment) < 1)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "segments", &jobj1))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj1, segment_name, &jobj2))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return jobj2;
+}
+
+/*
+ * json_type_int needs to be validated first.
+ * See validate_json_uint32()
+ */
+uint32_t json_object_get_uint32(json_object *jobj)
+{
+	return json_object_get_int64(jobj);
+}
+
+/* jobj has to be json_type_string and numbered */
+static json_bool json_str_to_uint64(json_object *jobj, uint64_t *value)
+{
+	char *endptr;
+	unsigned long long tmp;
+
+	errno = 0;
+	tmp = strtoull(json_object_get_string(jobj), &endptr, 10);
+	if (*endptr || errno) {
+		*value = 0;
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	*value = tmp;
+	return TRUE;
+}
+
+uint64_t json_object_get_uint64(json_object *jobj)
+{
+	uint64_t r;
+	return json_str_to_uint64(jobj, &r) ? r : 0;
+}
+
+json_object *json_object_new_uint64(uint64_t value)
+{
+	/* 18446744073709551615 */
+	char num[21];
+	int r;
+	json_object *jobj;
+
+	r = snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%" PRIu64, value);
+	if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(num))
+		return NULL;
+
+	jobj = json_object_new_string(num);
+	return jobj;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Validate helpers
+ */
+static json_bool numbered(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, const char *key)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; key[i]; i++)
+		if (!isdigit(key[i])) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "%s \"%s\" is not in numbered form.", name, key);
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+	return TRUE;
+}
+
+json_object *json_contains(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj, const char *name,
+			   const char *section, const char *key, json_type type)
+{
+	json_object *sobj;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj, key, &sobj) ||
+	    !json_object_is_type(sobj, type)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "%s \"%s\" is missing \"%s\" (%s) specification.",
+			section, name, key, json_type_to_name(type));
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return sobj;
+}
+
+/* use only on already validated 'segments' object */
+static uint64_t get_first_data_offset(json_object *jobj_segs, const char *type)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_offset, *jobj_type;
+	uint64_t tmp, min = UINT64_MAX;
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_segs, key, val) {
+		UNUSED(key);
+
+		if (type) {
+			json_object_object_get_ex(val, "type", &jobj_type);
+			if (strcmp(type, json_object_get_string(jobj_type)))
+				continue;
+		}
+
+		json_object_object_get_ex(val, "offset", &jobj_offset);
+		tmp = json_object_get_uint64(jobj_offset);
+
+		if (!tmp)
+			return tmp;
+
+		if (tmp < min)
+			min = tmp;
+	}
+
+	return min;
+}
+
+static json_bool validate_json_uint32(json_object *jobj)
+{
+	int64_t tmp;
+
+	errno = 0;
+	tmp = json_object_get_int64(jobj);
+
+	return (errno || tmp < 0 || tmp > UINT32_MAX) ? FALSE : TRUE;
+}
+
+static json_bool validate_keyslots_array(struct crypt_device *cd,
+					 json_object *jarr, json_object *jobj_keys)
+{
+	json_object *jobj;
+	int i = 0, length = (int) json_object_array_length(jarr);
+
+	while (i < length) {
+		jobj = json_object_array_get_idx(jarr, i);
+		if (!json_object_is_type(jobj, json_type_string)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Illegal value type in keyslots array at index %d.", i);
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+
+		if (!json_contains(cd, jobj_keys, "", "Keyslots section",
+				   json_object_get_string(jobj), json_type_object))
+			return FALSE;
+
+		i++;
+	}
+
+	return TRUE;
+}
+
+static json_bool validate_segments_array(struct crypt_device *cd,
+					 json_object *jarr, json_object *jobj_segments)
+{
+	json_object *jobj;
+	int i = 0, length = (int) json_object_array_length(jarr);
+
+	while (i < length) {
+		jobj = json_object_array_get_idx(jarr, i);
+		if (!json_object_is_type(jobj, json_type_string)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Illegal value type in segments array at index %d.", i);
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+
+		if (!json_contains(cd, jobj_segments, "", "Segments section",
+				   json_object_get_string(jobj), json_type_object))
+			return FALSE;
+
+		i++;
+	}
+
+	return TRUE;
+}
+
+static json_bool segment_has_digest(const char *segment_name, json_object *jobj_digests)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_segments;
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_digests, key, val) {
+		UNUSED(key);
+		json_object_object_get_ex(val, "segments", &jobj_segments);
+		if (LUKS2_array_jobj(jobj_segments, segment_name))
+			return TRUE;
+	}
+
+	return FALSE;
+}
+
+static json_bool validate_intervals(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				    int length, const struct interval *ix,
+				    uint64_t metadata_size, uint64_t keyslots_area_end)
+{
+	int j, i = 0;
+
+	while (i < length) {
+		if (ix[i].offset < 2 * metadata_size) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Illegal area offset: %" PRIu64 ".", ix[i].offset);
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+
+		if (!ix[i].length) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Area length must be greater than zero.");
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+
+		if ((ix[i].offset + ix[i].length) > keyslots_area_end) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Area [%" PRIu64 ", %" PRIu64 "] overflows binary keyslots area (ends at offset: %" PRIu64 ").",
+				ix[i].offset, ix[i].offset + ix[i].length, keyslots_area_end);
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+
+		for (j = 0; j < length; j++) {
+			if (i == j)
+				continue;
+			if ((ix[i].offset >= ix[j].offset) && (ix[i].offset < (ix[j].offset + ix[j].length))) {
+				log_dbg(cd, "Overlapping areas [%" PRIu64 ",%" PRIu64 "] and [%" PRIu64 ",%" PRIu64 "].",
+					ix[i].offset, ix[i].offset + ix[i].length,
+					ix[j].offset, ix[j].offset + ix[j].length);
+				return FALSE;
+			}
+		}
+
+		i++;
+	}
+
+	return TRUE;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_validate(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj, json_object *hdr_keyslot, const char *key)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_key_size;
+
+	if (!json_contains(cd, hdr_keyslot, key, "Keyslot", "type", json_type_string))
+		return 1;
+	if (!(jobj_key_size = json_contains(cd, hdr_keyslot, key, "Keyslot", "key_size", json_type_int)))
+		return 1;
+
+	/* enforce uint32_t type */
+	if (!validate_json_uint32(jobj_key_size)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Illegal field \"key_size\":%s.",
+			json_object_get_string(jobj_key_size));
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_token_validate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			 json_object *hdr_jobj, json_object *jobj_token, const char *key)
+{
+	json_object *jarr, *jobj_keyslots;
+
+	/* keyslots are not yet validated, but we need to know token doesn't reference missing keyslot */
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr_jobj, "keyslots", &jobj_keyslots))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!json_contains(cd, jobj_token, key, "Token", "type", json_type_string))
+		return 1;
+
+	jarr = json_contains(cd, jobj_token, key, "Token", "keyslots", json_type_array);
+	if (!jarr)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!validate_keyslots_array(cd, jarr, jobj_keyslots))
+		return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int hdr_validate_json_size(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj, uint64_t hdr_json_size)
+{
+	json_object *jobj, *jobj1;
+	const char *json;
+	uint64_t json_area_size, json_size;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(hdr_jobj, "config", &jobj);
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj, "json_size", &jobj1);
+
+	json = json_object_to_json_string_ext(hdr_jobj,
+		JSON_C_TO_STRING_PLAIN | JSON_C_TO_STRING_NOSLASHESCAPE);
+	json_area_size = json_object_get_uint64(jobj1);
+	json_size = (uint64_t)strlen(json);
+
+	if (hdr_json_size != json_area_size) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "JSON area size doesn't match value in binary header.");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (json_size > json_area_size) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "JSON doesn't fit in the designated area.");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_check_json_size(struct crypt_device *cd, const struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
+{
+	return hdr_validate_json_size(cd, hdr->jobj, hdr->hdr_size - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN);
+}
+
+static int hdr_validate_keyslots(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
+{
+	json_object *jobj;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr_jobj, "keyslots", &jobj)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Missing keyslots section.");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj, key, val) {
+		if (!numbered(cd, "Keyslot", key))
+			return 1;
+		if (LUKS2_keyslot_validate(cd, hdr_jobj, val, key))
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int hdr_validate_tokens(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
+{
+	json_object *jobj;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr_jobj, "tokens", &jobj)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Missing tokens section.");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj, key, val) {
+		if (!numbered(cd, "Token", key))
+			return 1;
+		if (LUKS2_token_validate(cd, hdr_jobj, val, key))
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int hdr_validate_crypt_segment(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				      json_object *jobj, const char *key, json_object *jobj_digests,
+	uint64_t offset, uint64_t size)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_ivoffset, *jobj_sector_size, *jobj_integrity;
+	uint32_t sector_size;
+	uint64_t ivoffset;
+
+	if (!(jobj_ivoffset = json_contains(cd, jobj, key, "Segment", "iv_tweak", json_type_string)) ||
+	    !json_contains(cd, jobj, key, "Segment", "encryption", json_type_string) ||
+	    !(jobj_sector_size = json_contains(cd, jobj, key, "Segment", "sector_size", json_type_int)))
+		return 1;
+
+	/* integrity */
+	if (json_object_object_get_ex(jobj, "integrity", &jobj_integrity)) {
+		if (!json_contains(cd, jobj, key, "Segment", "integrity", json_type_object) ||
+		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_integrity, key, "Segment integrity", "type", json_type_string) ||
+		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_integrity, key, "Segment integrity", "journal_encryption", json_type_string) ||
+		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_integrity, key, "Segment integrity", "journal_integrity", json_type_string))
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	/* enforce uint32_t type */
+	if (!validate_json_uint32(jobj_sector_size)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Illegal field \"sector_size\":%s.",
+			json_object_get_string(jobj_sector_size));
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	sector_size = json_object_get_uint32(jobj_sector_size);
+	if (!sector_size || MISALIGNED_512(sector_size)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Illegal sector size: %" PRIu32, sector_size);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (!numbered(cd, "iv_tweak", json_object_get_string(jobj_ivoffset)) ||
+	    !json_str_to_uint64(jobj_ivoffset, &ivoffset)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Illegal iv_tweak value.");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (size % sector_size) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Size field has to be aligned to sector size: %" PRIu32, sector_size);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	return !segment_has_digest(key, jobj_digests);
+}
+
+static int hdr_validate_segments(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
+{
+	json_object *jobj, *jobj_digests, *jobj_offset, *jobj_size, *jobj_type, *jobj_flags;
+	int i;
+	uint64_t offset, size;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr_jobj, "segments", &jobj)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Missing segments section.");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (json_object_object_length(jobj) < 1) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Empty segments section.");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/* digests should already be validated */
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr_jobj, "digests", &jobj_digests))
+		return 1;
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj, key, val) {
+		if (!numbered(cd, "Segment", key))
+			return 1;
+
+		/* those fields are mandatory for all segment types */
+		if (!(jobj_type =   json_contains(cd, val, key, "Segment", "type",   json_type_string)) ||
+		    !(jobj_offset = json_contains(cd, val, key, "Segment", "offset", json_type_string)) ||
+		    !(jobj_size =   json_contains(cd, val, key, "Segment", "size",   json_type_string)))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (!numbered(cd, "offset", json_object_get_string(jobj_offset)) ||
+		    !json_str_to_uint64(jobj_offset, &offset))
+			return 1;
+
+		/* size "dynamic" means whole device starting at 'offset' */
+		if (strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj_size), "dynamic")) {
+			if (!numbered(cd, "size", json_object_get_string(jobj_size)) ||
+			    !json_str_to_uint64(jobj_size, &size) || !size)
+				return 1;
+		} else
+			size = 0;
+
+		/* all device-mapper devices are aligned to 512 sector size */
+		if (MISALIGNED_512(offset)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Offset field has to be aligned to sector size: %" PRIu32, SECTOR_SIZE);
+			return 1;
+		}
+		if (MISALIGNED_512(size)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Size field has to be aligned to sector size: %" PRIu32, SECTOR_SIZE);
+			return 1;
+		}
+
+		/* flags array is optional and must contain strings */
+		if (json_object_object_get_ex(val, "flags", NULL)) {
+			if (!(jobj_flags = json_contains(cd, val, key, "Segment", "flags", json_type_array)))
+				return 1;
+			for (i = 0; i < (int) json_object_array_length(jobj_flags); i++)
+				if (!json_object_is_type(json_object_array_get_idx(jobj_flags, i), json_type_string))
+					return 1;
+		}
+
+		/* crypt */
+		if (!strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj_type), "crypt") &&
+		    hdr_validate_crypt_segment(cd, val, key, jobj_digests, offset, size))
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+uint64_t LUKS2_metadata_size(json_object *jobj)
+{
+	json_object *jobj1, *jobj2;
+	uint64_t json_size;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj, "config", &jobj1);
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj1, "json_size", &jobj2);
+	json_str_to_uint64(jobj2, &json_size);
+
+	return json_size + LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN;
+}
+
+static int hdr_validate_areas(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
+{
+	struct interval *intervals;
+	json_object *jobj_keyslots, *jobj_offset, *jobj_length, *jobj_segments, *jobj_area;
+	int length, ret, i = 0;
+	uint64_t metadata_size;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr_jobj, "keyslots", &jobj_keyslots))
+		return 1;
+
+	/* segments are already validated */
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr_jobj, "segments", &jobj_segments))
+		return 1;
+
+	/* config is already validated */
+	metadata_size = LUKS2_metadata_size(hdr_jobj);
+
+	length = json_object_object_length(jobj_keyslots);
+
+	/* Empty section */
+	if (length == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (length < 0) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Invalid keyslot areas specification.");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	intervals = malloc(length * sizeof(*intervals));
+	if (!intervals) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Not enough memory.");
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_keyslots, key, val) {
+
+		if (!(jobj_area = json_contains(cd, val, key, "Keyslot", "area", json_type_object)) ||
+		    !(jobj_offset = json_contains(cd, jobj_area, key, "Keyslot", "offset", json_type_string)) ||
+		    !(jobj_length = json_contains(cd, jobj_area, key, "Keyslot", "size", json_type_string)) ||
+		    !numbered(cd, "offset", json_object_get_string(jobj_offset)) ||
+		    !numbered(cd, "size", json_object_get_string(jobj_length))) {
+			free(intervals);
+			return 1;
+		}
+
+		/* rule out values > UINT64_MAX */
+		if (!json_str_to_uint64(jobj_offset, &intervals[i].offset) ||
+		    !json_str_to_uint64(jobj_length, &intervals[i].length)) {
+			free(intervals);
+			return 1;
+		}
+
+		i++;
+	}
+
+	if (length != i) {
+		free(intervals);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	ret = validate_intervals(cd, length, intervals, metadata_size, LUKS2_hdr_and_areas_size(hdr_jobj)) ? 0 : 1;
+
+	free(intervals);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int hdr_validate_digests(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
+{
+	json_object *jarr_keys, *jarr_segs, *jobj, *jobj_keyslots, *jobj_segments;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr_jobj, "digests", &jobj)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Missing digests section.");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/* keyslots are not yet validated, but we need to know digest doesn't reference missing keyslot */
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr_jobj, "keyslots", &jobj_keyslots))
+		return 1;
+
+	/* segments are not yet validated, but we need to know digest doesn't reference missing segment */
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr_jobj, "segments", &jobj_segments))
+		return 1;
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj, key, val) {
+		if (!numbered(cd, "Digest", key))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (!json_contains(cd, val, key, "Digest", "type", json_type_string) ||
+		    !(jarr_keys = json_contains(cd, val, key, "Digest", "keyslots", json_type_array)) ||
+		    !(jarr_segs = json_contains(cd, val, key, "Digest", "segments", json_type_array)))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (!validate_keyslots_array(cd, jarr_keys, jobj_keyslots))
+			return 1;
+		if (!validate_segments_array(cd, jarr_segs, jobj_segments))
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int hdr_validate_config(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_config, *jobj, *jobj1;
+	int i;
+	uint64_t keyslots_size, metadata_size, segment_offset;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr_jobj, "config", &jobj_config)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Missing config section.");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (!(jobj = json_contains(cd, jobj_config, "section", "Config", "json_size", json_type_string)) ||
+	    !json_str_to_uint64(jobj, &metadata_size))
+		return 1;
+
+	/* single metadata instance is assembled from json area size plus
+	 * binary header size */
+	metadata_size += LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN;
+
+	if (!(jobj = json_contains(cd, jobj_config, "section", "Config", "keyslots_size", json_type_string)) ||
+	    !json_str_to_uint64(jobj, &keyslots_size))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (LUKS2_check_metadata_area_size(metadata_size)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Unsupported LUKS2 header size (%" PRIu64 ").", metadata_size);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (LUKS2_check_keyslots_area_size(keyslots_size)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Unsupported LUKS2 keyslots size (%" PRIu64 ").", keyslots_size);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * validate keyslots_size fits in between (2 * metadata_size) and first
+	 * segment_offset (except detached header)
+	 */
+	json_object_object_get_ex(hdr_jobj, "segments", &jobj);
+	segment_offset = get_first_data_offset(jobj, "crypt");
+	if (segment_offset &&
+	    (segment_offset < keyslots_size ||
+	     (segment_offset - keyslots_size) < (2 * metadata_size))) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "keyslots_size is too large %" PRIu64 " (bytes). Data offset: %" PRIu64
+			", keyslots offset: %" PRIu64, keyslots_size, segment_offset, 2 * metadata_size);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/* Flags array is optional */
+	if (json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_config, "flags", &jobj)) {
+		if (!json_contains(cd, jobj_config, "section", "Config", "flags", json_type_array))
+			return 1;
+
+		/* All array members must be strings */
+		for (i = 0; i < (int) json_object_array_length(jobj); i++)
+			if (!json_object_is_type(json_object_array_get_idx(jobj, i), json_type_string))
+				return 1;
+	}
+
+	/* Requirements object is optional */
+	if (json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_config, "requirements", &jobj)) {
+		if (!json_contains(cd, jobj_config, "section", "Config", "requirements", json_type_object))
+			return 1;
+
+		/* Mandatory array is optional */
+		if (json_object_object_get_ex(jobj, "mandatory", &jobj1)) {
+			if (!json_contains(cd, jobj, "section", "Requirements", "mandatory", json_type_array))
+				return 1;
+
+			/* All array members must be strings */
+			for (i = 0; i < (int) json_object_array_length(jobj1); i++)
+				if (!json_object_is_type(json_object_array_get_idx(jobj1, i), json_type_string))
+					return 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_hdr_validate(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj, uint64_t json_size)
+{
+	struct {
+		int (*validate)(struct crypt_device *, json_object *);
+	} checks[] = {
+		{ hdr_validate_tokens   },
+		{ hdr_validate_digests  },
+		{ hdr_validate_segments },
+		{ hdr_validate_keyslots },
+		{ hdr_validate_config   },
+		{ hdr_validate_areas    },
+		{ NULL }
+	};
+	int i;
+
+	if (!hdr_jobj)
+		return 1;
+
+	for (i = 0; checks[i].validate; i++)
+		if (checks[i].validate && checks[i].validate(cd, hdr_jobj))
+			return 1;
+
+	if (hdr_validate_json_size(cd, hdr_jobj, json_size))
+		return 1;
+
+	/* validate keyslot implementations */
+	if (LUKS2_keyslots_validate(cd, hdr_jobj))
+		return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* FIXME: should we expose do_recovery parameter explicitly? */
+int LUKS2_hdr_read(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int repair)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	r = device_read_lock(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd));
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to acquire read lock on device %s."),
+			device_path(crypt_metadata_device(cd)));
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	r = LUKS2_disk_hdr_read(cd, hdr, crypt_metadata_device(cd), 1, !repair);
+	if (r == -EAGAIN) {
+		/* unlikely: auto-recovery is required and failed due to read lock being held */
+		device_read_unlock(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd));
+
+		r = device_write_lock(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd));
+		if (r) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Failed to acquire write lock on device %s."),
+				device_path(crypt_metadata_device(cd)));
+			return r;
+		}
+
+		r = LUKS2_disk_hdr_read(cd, hdr, crypt_metadata_device(cd), 1, !repair);
+
+		device_write_unlock(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd));
+	} else
+		device_read_unlock(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd));
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_hdr_write(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
+{
+	/* NOTE: is called before LUKS2 validation routines */
+	/* erase unused digests (no assigned keyslot or segment) */
+	LUKS2_digests_erase_unused(cd, hdr);
+
+	if (LUKS2_hdr_validate(cd, hdr->jobj, hdr->hdr_size - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return LUKS2_disk_hdr_write(cd, hdr, crypt_metadata_device(cd));
+}
+
+int LUKS2_hdr_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, const char *uuid)
+{
+	uuid_t partitionUuid;
+
+	if (uuid && uuid_parse(uuid, partitionUuid) == -1) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Wrong LUKS UUID format provided."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (!uuid)
+		uuid_generate(partitionUuid);
+
+	uuid_unparse(partitionUuid, hdr->uuid);
+
+	return LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr);
+}
+
+int LUKS2_hdr_labels(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+		     const char *label, const char *subsystem, int commit)
+{
+	//FIXME: check if the labels are the same and skip this.
+
+	memset(hdr->label, 0, LUKS2_LABEL_L);
+	if (label)
+		strncpy(hdr->label, label, LUKS2_LABEL_L-1);
+
+	memset(hdr->subsystem, 0, LUKS2_LABEL_L);
+	if (subsystem)
+		strncpy(hdr->subsystem, subsystem, LUKS2_LABEL_L-1);
+
+	return commit ? LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr) : 0;
+}
+
+void LUKS2_hdr_free(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
+{
+	if (json_object_put(hdr->jobj))
+		hdr->jobj = NULL;
+	else if (hdr->jobj)
+		log_dbg(cd, "LUKS2 header still in use");
+}
+
+uint64_t LUKS2_keyslots_size(json_object *jobj)
+{
+	json_object *jobj1, *jobj2;
+	uint64_t keyslots_size;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj, "config", &jobj1);
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj1, "keyslots_size", &jobj2);
+	json_str_to_uint64(jobj2, &keyslots_size);
+
+	return keyslots_size;
+}
+
+uint64_t LUKS2_hdr_and_areas_size(json_object *jobj)
+{
+	return 2 * LUKS2_metadata_size(jobj) + LUKS2_keyslots_size(jobj);
+}
+
+int LUKS2_hdr_backup(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+		     const char *backup_file)
+{
+	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(cd);
+	int r = 0, devfd = -1;
+	ssize_t hdr_size;
+	ssize_t buffer_size;
+	char *buffer = NULL;
+
+	hdr_size = LUKS2_hdr_and_areas_size(hdr->jobj);
+	buffer_size = size_round_up(hdr_size, crypt_getpagesize());
+
+	buffer = crypt_safe_alloc(buffer_size);
+	if (!buffer)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Storing backup of header (%zu bytes).", hdr_size);
+	log_dbg(cd, "Output backup file size: %zu bytes.", buffer_size);
+
+	r = device_read_lock(cd, device);
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to acquire read lock on device %s."),
+			device_path(crypt_metadata_device(cd)));
+		crypt_safe_free(buffer);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	devfd = device_open_locked(cd, device, O_RDONLY);
+	if (devfd < 0) {
+		device_read_unlock(cd, device);
+		log_err(cd, _("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."), device_path(device));
+		crypt_safe_free(buffer);
+		return devfd == -1 ? -EINVAL : devfd;
+	}
+
+	if (read_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+			   device_alignment(device), buffer, hdr_size) < hdr_size) {
+		close(devfd);
+		device_read_unlock(cd, device);
+		crypt_safe_free(buffer);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+	close(devfd);
+
+	device_read_unlock(cd, device);
+
+	devfd = open(backup_file, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY, S_IRUSR);
+	if (devfd == -1) {
+		if (errno == EEXIST)
+			log_err(cd, _("Requested header backup file %s already exists."), backup_file);
+		else
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot create header backup file %s."), backup_file);
+		crypt_safe_free(buffer);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (write_buffer(devfd, buffer, buffer_size) < buffer_size) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot write header backup file %s."), backup_file);
+		r = -EIO;
+	} else
+		r = 0;
+
+	close(devfd);
+	crypt_safe_free(buffer);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int reqs_unknown(uint32_t reqs)
+{
+	return reqs & CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+static int reqs_reencrypt(uint32_t reqs)
+{
+	return reqs & CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_OFFLINE_REENCRYPT;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_hdr_restore(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+		     const char *backup_file)
+{
+	struct device *backup_device, *device = crypt_metadata_device(cd);
+	int r, devfd = -1, diff_uuid = 0;
+	ssize_t buffer_size = 0;
+	char *buffer = NULL, msg[1024];
+	struct luks2_hdr hdr_file;
+	struct luks2_hdr tmp_hdr = {};
+	uint32_t reqs = 0;
+
+	r = device_alloc(cd, &backup_device, backup_file);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	/* FIXME: why lock backup device ? */
+	r = device_read_lock(cd, backup_device);
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to acquire read lock on device %s."),
+			device_path(backup_device));
+		device_free(cd, backup_device);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	r = LUKS2_disk_hdr_read(cd, &hdr_file, backup_device, 0, 0);
+	device_read_unlock(cd, backup_device);
+	device_free(cd, backup_device);
+
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Backup file doesn't contain valid LUKS header."));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* do not allow header restore from backup with unmet requirements */
+	if (LUKS2_unmet_requirements(cd, &hdr_file, 0, 1)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Forbidden LUKS2 requirements detected in backup %s."),
+			backup_file);
+		r = -ETXTBSY;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	buffer_size = LUKS2_hdr_and_areas_size(hdr_file.jobj);
+	buffer = crypt_safe_alloc(buffer_size);
+	if (!buffer) {
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	devfd = open(backup_file, O_RDONLY);
+	if (devfd == -1) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot open header backup file %s."), backup_file);
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (read_buffer(devfd, buffer, buffer_size) < buffer_size) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot read header backup file %s."), backup_file);
+		r = -EIO;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	close(devfd);
+	devfd = -1;
+
+	r = LUKS2_hdr_read(cd, &tmp_hdr, 0);
+	if (r == 0) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Device %s already contains LUKS2 header, checking UUID and requirements.", device_path(device));
+		r = LUKS2_config_get_requirements(cd, &tmp_hdr, &reqs);
+		if (r)
+			goto out;
+
+		if (memcmp(tmp_hdr.uuid, hdr_file.uuid, LUKS2_UUID_L))
+			diff_uuid = 1;
+
+		if (!reqs_reencrypt(reqs)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Checking LUKS2 header size and offsets.");
+			if (LUKS2_get_data_offset(&tmp_hdr) != LUKS2_get_data_offset(&hdr_file)) {
+				log_err(cd, _("Data offset differ on device and backup, restore failed."));
+				r = -EINVAL;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			/* FIXME: what could go wrong? Erase if we're fine with consequences */
+			if (buffer_size != (ssize_t) LUKS2_hdr_and_areas_size(tmp_hdr.jobj)) {
+				log_err(cd, _("Binary header with keyslot areas size differ on device and backup, restore failed."));
+				r = -EINVAL;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	r = snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), _("Device %s %s%s%s%s"), device_path(device),
+		     r ? _("does not contain LUKS2 header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device.") :
+			 _("already contains LUKS2 header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."),
+		     diff_uuid ? _("\nWARNING: real device header has different UUID than backup!") : "",
+		     reqs_unknown(reqs) ? _("\nWARNING: unknown LUKS2 requirements detected in real device header!"
+					    "\nReplacing header with backup may corrupt the data on that device!") : "",
+		     reqs_reencrypt(reqs) ? _("\nWARNING: Unfinished offline reencryption detected on the device!"
+					      "\nReplacing header with backup may corrupt data.") : "");
+	if (r < 0 || (size_t) r >= sizeof(msg)) {
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!crypt_confirm(cd, msg)) {
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Storing backup of header (%zu bytes) to device %s.", buffer_size, device_path(device));
+
+	/* TODO: perform header restore on bdev in stand-alone routine? */
+	r = device_write_lock(cd, device);
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to acquire write lock on device %s."),
+			device_path(device));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	devfd = device_open_locked(cd, device, O_RDWR);
+	if (devfd < 0) {
+		if (errno == EACCES)
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot write to device %s, permission denied."),
+				device_path(device));
+		else
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot open device %s."), device_path(device));
+		device_write_unlock(cd, device);
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (write_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+			    device_alignment(device), buffer, buffer_size) < buffer_size)
+		r = -EIO;
+	else
+		r = 0;
+
+	device_write_unlock(cd, device);
+	/* end of TODO */
+
+out:
+	LUKS2_hdr_free(cd, hdr);
+	LUKS2_hdr_free(cd, &hdr_file);
+	LUKS2_hdr_free(cd, &tmp_hdr);
+	crypt_memzero(&hdr_file, sizeof(hdr_file));
+	crypt_memzero(&tmp_hdr, sizeof(tmp_hdr));
+	crypt_safe_free(buffer);
+
+	if (devfd >= 0) {
+		device_sync(cd, device, devfd);
+		close(devfd);
+	}
+
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Persistent config flags
+ */
+static const struct  {
+	uint32_t flag;
+	const char *description;
+} persistent_flags[] = {
+	{ CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS,         "allow-discards" },
+	{ CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT,         "same-cpu-crypt" },
+	{ CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS, "submit-from-crypt-cpus" },
+	{ CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL,             "no-journal" },
+	{ 0, NULL }
+};
+
+int LUKS2_config_get_flags(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint32_t *flags)
+{
+	json_object *jobj1, *jobj_config, *jobj_flags;
+	int i, j, found;
+
+	if (!hdr || !flags)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*flags = 0;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "config", &jobj_config))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_config, "flags", &jobj_flags))
+		return 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < (int) json_object_array_length(jobj_flags); i++) {
+		jobj1 = json_object_array_get_idx(jobj_flags, i);
+		found = 0;
+		for (j = 0; persistent_flags[j].description && !found; j++)
+			if (!strcmp(persistent_flags[j].description,
+				    json_object_get_string(jobj1))) {
+				*flags |= persistent_flags[j].flag;
+				log_dbg(cd, "Using persistent flag %s.",
+					json_object_get_string(jobj1));
+				found = 1;
+			}
+		if (!found)
+			log_verbose(cd, _("Ignored unknown flag %s."),
+				    json_object_get_string(jobj1));
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_config_set_flags(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint32_t flags)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_config, *jobj_flags;
+	int i;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "config", &jobj_config))
+		return 0;
+
+	jobj_flags = json_object_new_array();
+
+	for (i = 0; persistent_flags[i].description; i++) {
+		if (flags & persistent_flags[i].flag) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Setting persistent flag: %s.", persistent_flags[i].description);
+			json_object_array_add(jobj_flags,
+				json_object_new_string(persistent_flags[i].description));
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Replace or add new flags array */
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_config, "flags", jobj_flags);
+
+	return LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr);
+}
+
+/*
+ * json format example (mandatory array must not be ignored,
+ * all other future fields may be added later)
+ *
+ * "requirements": {
+ *       mandatory : [],
+ *       optional0 : [],
+ *       optional1 : "lala"
+ * }
+ */
+
+/* LUKS2 library requirements */
+static const struct  {
+	uint32_t flag;
+	const char *description;
+} requirements_flags[] = {
+	{ CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_OFFLINE_REENCRYPT, "offline-reencrypt" },
+	{ 0, NULL }
+};
+
+static uint32_t get_requirement_by_name(const char *requirement)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; requirements_flags[i].description; i++)
+		if (!strcmp(requirement, requirements_flags[i].description))
+			return requirements_flags[i].flag;
+
+	return CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+/*
+ * returns count of requirements (past cryptsetup 2.0 release)
+ */
+int LUKS2_config_get_requirements(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint32_t *reqs)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_config, *jobj_requirements, *jobj_mandatory, *jobj;
+	int i, len;
+	uint32_t req;
+
+	assert(hdr);
+	if (!hdr || !reqs)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*reqs = 0;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "config", &jobj_config))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_config, "requirements", &jobj_requirements))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_requirements, "mandatory", &jobj_mandatory))
+		return 0;
+
+	len = (int) json_object_array_length(jobj_mandatory);
+	if (len <= 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "LUKS2 requirements detected:");
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		jobj = json_object_array_get_idx(jobj_mandatory, i);
+		req = get_requirement_by_name(json_object_get_string(jobj));
+		log_dbg(cd, "%s - %sknown", json_object_get_string(jobj),
+				        reqs_unknown(req) ? "un" : "");
+		*reqs |= req;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_config_set_requirements(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint32_t reqs)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_config, *jobj_requirements, *jobj_mandatory, *jobj;
+	int i, r = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!hdr)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	jobj_mandatory = json_object_new_array();
+	if (!jobj_mandatory)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	for (i = 0; requirements_flags[i].description; i++) {
+		if (reqs & requirements_flags[i].flag) {
+			jobj = json_object_new_string(requirements_flags[i].description);
+			if (!jobj) {
+				r = -ENOMEM;
+				goto err;
+			}
+			json_object_array_add(jobj_mandatory, jobj);
+			/* erase processed flag from input set */
+			reqs &= ~(requirements_flags[i].flag);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* any remaining bit in requirements is unknown therefore illegal */
+	if (reqs) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Illegal requirement flag(s) requested");
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "config", &jobj_config))
+		goto err;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_config, "requirements", &jobj_requirements)) {
+		jobj_requirements = json_object_new_object();
+		if (!jobj_requirements) {
+			r = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err;
+		}
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_config, "requirements", jobj_requirements);
+	}
+
+	if (json_object_array_length(jobj_mandatory) > 0) {
+		/* replace mandatory field with new values */
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_requirements, "mandatory", jobj_mandatory);
+	} else {
+		/* new mandatory field was empty, delete old one */
+		json_object_object_del(jobj_requirements, "mandatory");
+		json_object_put(jobj_mandatory);
+	}
+
+	/* remove empty requirements object */
+	if (!json_object_object_length(jobj_requirements))
+		json_object_object_del(jobj_config, "requirements");
+
+	return LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr);
+err:
+	json_object_put(jobj_mandatory);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Header dump
+ */
+static void hdr_dump_config(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
+{
+
+	json_object *jobj1, *jobj_config, *jobj_flags, *jobj_requirements, *jobj_mandatory;
+	int i = 0, flags = 0, reqs = 0;
+
+	log_std(cd, "Flags:       \t");
+
+	if (json_object_object_get_ex(hdr_jobj, "config", &jobj_config)) {
+		if (json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_config, "flags", &jobj_flags))
+			flags = (int) json_object_array_length(jobj_flags);
+		if (json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_config, "requirements", &jobj_requirements) &&
+		    json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_requirements, "mandatory", &jobj_mandatory))
+			reqs = (int) json_object_array_length(jobj_mandatory);
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < flags; i++) {
+		jobj1 = json_object_array_get_idx(jobj_flags, i);
+		log_std(cd, "%s ", json_object_get_string(jobj1));
+	}
+
+	log_std(cd, "%s\n%s", flags > 0 ? "" : "(no flags)", reqs > 0 ? "" : "\n");
+
+	if (reqs > 0) {
+		log_std(cd, "Requirements:\t");
+		for (i = 0; i < reqs; i++) {
+			jobj1 = json_object_array_get_idx(jobj_mandatory, i);
+			log_std(cd, "%s ", json_object_get_string(jobj1));
+		}
+		log_std(cd, "\n\n");
+	}
+}
+
+static const char *get_priority_desc(json_object *jobj)
+{
+	crypt_keyslot_priority priority;
+	json_object *jobj_priority;
+	const char *text;
+
+	if (json_object_object_get_ex(jobj, "priority", &jobj_priority))
+		priority = (crypt_keyslot_priority)(int)json_object_get_int(jobj_priority);
+	else
+		priority = CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_NORMAL;
+
+	switch (priority) {
+		case CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_IGNORE: text = "ignored"; break;
+		case CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_PREFER: text = "preferred"; break;
+		case CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_NORMAL: text = "normal"; break;
+		default: text = "invalid";
+	}
+
+	return text;
+}
+
+static void hdr_dump_keyslots(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
+{
+	char slot[16];
+	json_object *keyslots_jobj, *digests_jobj, *jobj2, *jobj3, *val;
+	const char *tmps;
+	int i, j, r;
+
+	log_std(cd, "Keyslots:\n");
+	json_object_object_get_ex(hdr_jobj, "keyslots", &keyslots_jobj);
+
+	for (j = 0; j < LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX; j++) {
+		(void) snprintf(slot, sizeof(slot), "%i", j);
+		json_object_object_get_ex(keyslots_jobj, slot, &val);
+		if (!val)
+			continue;
+
+		json_object_object_get_ex(val, "type", &jobj2);
+		tmps = json_object_get_string(jobj2);
+
+		r = LUKS2_keyslot_for_segment(crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2), j, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+		log_std(cd, "  %s: %s%s\n", slot, tmps, r == -ENOENT ? " (unbound)" : "");
+
+		if (json_object_object_get_ex(val, "key_size", &jobj2))
+			log_std(cd, "\tKey:        %u bits\n", json_object_get_uint32(jobj2) * 8);
+
+		log_std(cd, "\tPriority:   %s\n", get_priority_desc(val));
+
+		LUKS2_keyslot_dump(cd, j);
+
+		json_object_object_get_ex(hdr_jobj, "digests", &digests_jobj);
+		json_object_object_foreach(digests_jobj, key2, val2) {
+			json_object_object_get_ex(val2, "keyslots", &jobj2);
+			for (i = 0; i < (int) json_object_array_length(jobj2); i++) {
+				jobj3 = json_object_array_get_idx(jobj2, i);
+				if (!strcmp(slot, json_object_get_string(jobj3))) {
+					log_std(cd, "\tDigest ID:  %s\n", key2);
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void hdr_dump_tokens(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
+{
+	char token[16];
+	json_object *tokens_jobj, *jobj2, *jobj3, *val;
+	const char *tmps;
+	int i, j;
+
+	log_std(cd, "Tokens:\n");
+	json_object_object_get_ex(hdr_jobj, "tokens", &tokens_jobj);
+
+	for (j = 0; j < LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX; j++) {
+		(void) snprintf(token, sizeof(token), "%i", j);
+		json_object_object_get_ex(tokens_jobj, token, &val);
+		if (!val)
+			continue;
+
+		json_object_object_get_ex(val, "type", &jobj2);
+		tmps = json_object_get_string(jobj2);
+		log_std(cd, "  %s: %s\n", token, tmps);
+
+		LUKS2_token_dump(cd, j);
+
+		json_object_object_get_ex(val, "keyslots", &jobj2);
+		for (i = 0; i < (int) json_object_array_length(jobj2); i++) {
+			jobj3 = json_object_array_get_idx(jobj2, i);
+			log_std(cd, "\tKeyslot:  %s\n", json_object_get_string(jobj3));
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void hdr_dump_segments(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
+{
+	char segment[16];
+	json_object *jobj_segments, *jobj_segment, *jobj1, *jobj2;
+	int i, j, flags;
+	uint64_t value;
+
+	log_std(cd, "Data segments:\n");
+	json_object_object_get_ex(hdr_jobj, "segments", &jobj_segments);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS2_SEGMENT_MAX; i++) {
+		(void) snprintf(segment, sizeof(segment), "%i", i);
+		if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_segments, segment, &jobj_segment))
+			continue;
+
+		json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_segment, "type", &jobj1);
+		log_std(cd, "  %s: %s\n", segment, json_object_get_string(jobj1));
+
+		json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_segment, "offset", &jobj1);
+		json_str_to_uint64(jobj1, &value);
+		log_std(cd, "\toffset: %" PRIu64 " [bytes]\n", value);
+
+		json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_segment, "size", &jobj1);
+		if (!(strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj1), "dynamic")))
+			log_std(cd, "\tlength: (whole device)\n");
+		else {
+			json_str_to_uint64(jobj1, &value);
+			log_std(cd, "\tlength: %" PRIu64 " [bytes]\n", value);
+		}
+
+		if (json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_segment, "encryption", &jobj1))
+			log_std(cd, "\tcipher: %s\n", json_object_get_string(jobj1));
+
+		if (json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_segment, "sector_size", &jobj1))
+			log_std(cd, "\tsector: %" PRIu32 " [bytes]\n", json_object_get_uint32(jobj1));
+
+		if (json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_segment, "integrity", &jobj1) &&
+		    json_object_object_get_ex(jobj1, "type", &jobj2))
+			log_std(cd, "\tintegrity: %s\n", json_object_get_string(jobj2));
+
+		if (json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_segment, "flags", &jobj1) &&
+		    (flags = (int)json_object_array_length(jobj1)) > 0) {
+			jobj2 = json_object_array_get_idx(jobj1, 0);
+			log_std(cd, "\tflags : %s", json_object_get_string(jobj2));
+			for (j = 1; j < flags; j++) {
+				jobj2 = json_object_array_get_idx(jobj1, j);
+				log_std(cd, ", %s", json_object_get_string(jobj2));
+			}
+			log_std(cd, "\n");
+		}
+
+		log_std(cd, "\n");
+	}
+}
+
+static void hdr_dump_digests(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
+{
+	char key[16];
+	json_object *jobj1, *jobj2, *val;
+	const char *tmps;
+	int i;
+
+	log_std(cd, "Digests:\n");
+	json_object_object_get_ex(hdr_jobj, "digests", &jobj1);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS2_DIGEST_MAX; i++) {
+		(void) snprintf(key, sizeof(key), "%i", i);
+		json_object_object_get_ex(jobj1, key, &val);
+		if (!val)
+			continue;
+
+		json_object_object_get_ex(val, "type", &jobj2);
+		tmps = json_object_get_string(jobj2);
+		log_std(cd, "  %s: %s\n", key, tmps);
+
+		LUKS2_digest_dump(cd, i);
+	}
+}
+
+int LUKS2_hdr_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
+{
+	if (!hdr->jobj)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	JSON_DBG(cd, hdr->jobj, NULL);
+
+	log_std(cd, "LUKS header information\n");
+	log_std(cd, "Version:       \t%u\n", hdr->version);
+	log_std(cd, "Epoch:         \t%" PRIu64 "\n", hdr->seqid);
+	log_std(cd, "Metadata area: \t%" PRIu64 " [bytes]\n", LUKS2_metadata_size(hdr->jobj));
+	log_std(cd, "Keyslots area: \t%" PRIu64 " [bytes]\n", LUKS2_keyslots_size(hdr->jobj));
+	log_std(cd, "UUID:          \t%s\n", *hdr->uuid ? hdr->uuid : "(no UUID)");
+	log_std(cd, "Label:         \t%s\n", *hdr->label ? hdr->label : "(no label)");
+	log_std(cd, "Subsystem:     \t%s\n", *hdr->subsystem ? hdr->subsystem : "(no subsystem)");
+
+	hdr_dump_config(cd, hdr->jobj);
+	hdr_dump_segments(cd, hdr->jobj);
+	hdr_dump_keyslots(cd, hdr->jobj);
+	hdr_dump_tokens(cd, hdr->jobj);
+	hdr_dump_digests(cd, hdr->jobj);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+uint64_t LUKS2_get_data_offset(struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
+{
+	json_object *jobj1;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "segments", &jobj1))
+		return 0;
+
+	return get_first_data_offset(jobj1, "crypt") / SECTOR_SIZE;
+}
+
+const char *LUKS2_get_cipher(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int segment)
+{
+	json_object *jobj1, *jobj2, *jobj3;
+	char buf[16];
+
+	if (segment < 0 || snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u", segment) < 1)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "segments", &jobj1))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj1, buf, &jobj2))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (json_object_object_get_ex(jobj2, "encryption", &jobj3))
+		return json_object_get_string(jobj3);
+
+	/* FIXME: default encryption (for other segment types) must be string here. */
+	return "null";
+
+}
+
+const char *LUKS2_get_keyslot_cipher(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot, size_t *key_size)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_area, *jobj1;
+
+	jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot);
+	if (!jobj_keyslot)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area))
+		return NULL;
+
+	/* currently we only support raw length preserving area encryption */
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "type", &jobj1);
+	if (strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj1), "raw"))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "key_size", &jobj1))
+		return NULL;
+	*key_size = json_object_get_int(jobj1);
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "encryption", &jobj1))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return json_object_get_string(jobj1);
+}
+
+const char *LUKS2_get_integrity(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int segment)
+{
+	json_object *jobj1, *jobj2, *jobj3, *jobj4;
+	char buf[16];
+
+	if (segment < 0 || snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u", segment) < 1)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "segments", &jobj1))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj1, buf, &jobj2))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj2, "integrity", &jobj3))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj3, "type", &jobj4))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return json_object_get_string(jobj4);
+}
+
+/* FIXME: this only ensures that once we have journal encryption, it is not ignored. */
+static int LUKS2_integrity_compatible(struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
+{
+	json_object *jobj1, *jobj2, *jobj3, *jobj4;
+	const char *str;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "segments", &jobj1))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj1, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT_STR, &jobj2))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj2, "integrity", &jobj3))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj3, "journal_encryption", &jobj4) ||
+	    !(str = json_object_get_string(jobj4)) ||
+	    strcmp(str, "none"))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj3, "journal_integrity", &jobj4) ||
+	    !(str = json_object_get_string(jobj4)) ||
+	    strcmp(str, "none"))
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int LUKS2_keyslot_get_volume_key_size(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, const char *keyslot)
+{
+	json_object *jobj1, *jobj2, *jobj3;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "keyslots", &jobj1))
+		return -1;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj1, keyslot, &jobj2))
+		return -1;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj2, "key_size", &jobj3))
+		return -1;
+
+	return json_object_get_int(jobj3);
+}
+
+/* Key size used for encryption of keyslot */
+int LUKS2_get_keyslot_stored_key_size(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot)
+{
+	char keyslot_name[16];
+
+	if (snprintf(keyslot_name, sizeof(keyslot_name), "%u", keyslot) < 1)
+		return -1;
+
+	return LUKS2_keyslot_get_volume_key_size(hdr, keyslot_name);
+}
+
+int LUKS2_get_volume_key_size(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int segment)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_digests, *jobj_digest_segments, *jobj_digest_keyslots, *jobj1;
+	char buf[16];
+
+	if (snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u", segment) < 1)
+		return -1;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "digests", &jobj_digests);
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_digests, key, val) {
+		UNUSED(key);
+		json_object_object_get_ex(val, "segments", &jobj_digest_segments);
+		json_object_object_get_ex(val, "keyslots", &jobj_digest_keyslots);
+
+		if (!LUKS2_array_jobj(jobj_digest_segments, buf))
+			continue;
+		if (json_object_array_length(jobj_digest_keyslots) <= 0)
+			continue;
+
+		jobj1 = json_object_array_get_idx(jobj_digest_keyslots, 0);
+
+		return LUKS2_keyslot_get_volume_key_size(hdr, json_object_get_string(jobj1));
+	}
+
+	return -1;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_get_sector_size(struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
+{
+	json_object *jobj1, *jobj_segment;
+
+	jobj_segment = LUKS2_get_segment_jobj(hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+	if (!jobj_segment)
+		return SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_segment, "sector_size", &jobj1);
+	if (!jobj1)
+		return SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+	return json_object_get_int(jobj1);
+}
+
+int LUKS2_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	struct volume_key *vk,
+	uint32_t flags)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2);
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmdi = {}, dmd = {
+		.uuid   = crypt_get_uuid(cd),
+	};
+
+	/* do not allow activation when particular requirements detected */
+	if ((r = LUKS2_unmet_requirements(cd, hdr, 0, 0)))
+		return r;
+
+	r = dm_crypt_target_set(&dmd.segment, 0, dmd.size, crypt_data_device(cd),
+			vk, crypt_get_cipher_spec(cd), crypt_get_iv_offset(cd),
+			crypt_get_data_offset(cd), crypt_get_integrity(cd) ?: "none",
+			crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd), crypt_get_sector_size(cd));
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	/* Add persistent activation flags */
+	if (!(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_PERSISTENT))
+		LUKS2_config_get_flags(cd, hdr, &dmd.flags);
+
+	dmd.flags |= flags;
+
+	if (crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd)) {
+		if (!LUKS2_integrity_compatible(hdr)) {
+			log_err(cd, "Unsupported device integrity configuration.");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		r = INTEGRITY_create_dmd_device(cd, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &dmdi, dmd.flags);
+		if (r)
+			return r;
+
+		dmd.segment.u.crypt.offset = 0;
+		dmd.segment.size = dmdi.segment.size;
+
+		r = create_or_reload_device_with_integrity(cd, name, CRYPT_LUKS2, &dmd, &dmdi);
+	} else
+		r = create_or_reload_device(cd, name, CRYPT_LUKS2, &dmd);
+
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmdi);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_unmet_requirements(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint32_t reqs_mask, int quiet)
+{
+	uint32_t reqs;
+	int r = LUKS2_config_get_requirements(cd, hdr, &reqs);
+
+	if (r) {
+		if (!quiet)
+			log_err(cd, _("Failed to read LUKS2 requirements."));
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	/* do not mask unknown requirements check */
+	if (reqs_unknown(reqs)) {
+		if (!quiet)
+			log_err(cd, _("Unmet LUKS2 requirements detected."));
+		return -ETXTBSY;
+	}
+
+	/* mask out permitted requirements */
+	reqs &= ~reqs_mask;
+
+	if (reqs_reencrypt(reqs) && !quiet)
+		log_err(cd, _("Offline reencryption in progress. Aborting."));
+
+	/* any remaining unmasked requirement fails the check */
+	return reqs ? -EINVAL : 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * NOTE: this routine is called on json object that failed validation.
+ * 	 Proceed with caution :)
+ *
+ * known glitches so far:
+ *
+ * any version < 2.0.3:
+ *  - luks2 keyslot pbkdf params change via crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase()
+ *    could leave previous type parameters behind. Correct this by purging
+ *    all params not needed by current type.
+ */
+void LUKS2_hdr_repair(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_keyslots;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr_jobj, "keyslots", &jobj_keyslots))
+		return;
+	if (!json_object_is_type(jobj_keyslots, json_type_object))
+		return;
+
+	LUKS2_keyslots_repair(cd, jobj_keyslots);
+}
+
+void json_object_object_del_by_uint(json_object *jobj, unsigned key)
+{
+	char key_name[16];
+
+	if (snprintf(key_name, sizeof(key_name), "%u", key) < 1)
+		return;
+	json_object_object_del(jobj, key_name);
+}
+
+int json_object_object_add_by_uint(json_object *jobj, unsigned key, json_object *jobj_val)
+{
+	char key_name[16];
+
+	if (snprintf(key_name, sizeof(key_name), "%u", key) < 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+#if HAVE_DECL_JSON_OBJECT_OBJECT_ADD_EX
+	return json_object_object_add_ex(jobj, key_name, jobj_val, 0) ? -ENOMEM : 0;
+#else
+	json_object_object_add(jobj, key_name, jobj_val);
+	return 0;
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c b/lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b897ba3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c
@@ -0,0 +1,663 @@
+/*
+ * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, keyslot handling
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include "luks2_internal.h"
+
+/* Internal implementations */
+extern const keyslot_handler luks2_keyslot;
+
+static const keyslot_handler *keyslot_handlers[LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX] = {
+	&luks2_keyslot,
+	NULL
+};
+
+static const keyslot_handler
+*LUKS2_keyslot_handler_type(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *type)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX && keyslot_handlers[i]; i++) {
+		if (!strcmp(keyslot_handlers[i]->name, type))
+			return keyslot_handlers[i];
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static const keyslot_handler
+*LUKS2_keyslot_handler(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
+{
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
+	json_object *jobj1, *jobj2;
+
+	if (keyslot < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!(hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2)))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!(jobj1 = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot)))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj1, "type", &jobj2))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return LUKS2_keyslot_handler_type(cd, json_object_get_string(jobj2));
+}
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_find_empty(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, const char *type)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX; i++)
+		if (!LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, i))
+			return i;
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/* Check if a keyslot is asssigned to specific segment */
+int LUKS2_keyslot_for_segment(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot, int segment)
+{
+	int keyslot_digest, segment_digest;
+
+	/* no need to check anything */
+	if (segment == CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT)
+		return 0;
+
+	keyslot_digest = LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(hdr, keyslot);
+	if (keyslot_digest < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	segment_digest = LUKS2_digest_by_segment(hdr, segment);
+	if (segment_digest < 0)
+		return segment_digest;
+
+	return segment_digest == keyslot_digest ? 0 : -ENOENT;
+}
+
+/* Number of keyslots assigned to a segment or all keyslots for CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT */
+int LUKS2_keyslot_active_count(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int segment)
+{
+	int num = 0;
+	json_object *jobj_keyslots;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "keyslots", &jobj_keyslots);
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_keyslots, slot, val) {
+		UNUSED(val);
+		if (!LUKS2_keyslot_for_segment(hdr, atoi(slot), segment))
+			num++;
+	}
+
+	return num;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_cipher_incompatible(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *cipher_spec)
+{
+	char cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+
+	if (!cipher_spec || !strcmp(cipher_spec, "null") || !strcmp(cipher_spec, "cipher_null"))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (crypt_parse_name_and_mode(cipher_spec, cipher, NULL, cipher_mode) < 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	/* Keyslot is already authenticated; we cannot use integrity tags here */
+	if (crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd))
+		return 1;
+
+	/* Wrapped key schemes cannot be used for keyslot encryption */
+	if (crypt_cipher_wrapped_key(cipher, cipher_mode))
+		return 1;
+
+	/* Check if crypto backend can use the cipher */
+	if (crypt_cipher_ivsize(cipher, cipher_mode) < 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_params_default(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+				 struct luks2_keyslot_params *params)
+{
+	const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf_type(cd);
+	const char *cipher_spec;
+	size_t key_size;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!hdr || !pbkdf || !params)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * set keyslot area encryption parameters
+	 */
+	params->area_type = LUKS2_KEYSLOT_AREA_RAW;
+	cipher_spec = crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, &key_size);
+	if (!cipher_spec || !key_size)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	params->area.raw.key_size = key_size;
+	r = snprintf(params->area.raw.encryption, sizeof(params->area.raw.encryption), "%s", cipher_spec);
+	if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(params->area.raw.encryption))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * set keyslot AF parameters
+	 */
+	params->af_type = LUKS2_KEYSLOT_AF_LUKS1;
+	/* currently we use hash for AF from pbkdf settings */
+	r = snprintf(params->af.luks1.hash, sizeof(params->af.luks1.hash), "%s", pbkdf->hash);
+	if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(params->af.luks1.hash))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	params->af.luks1.stripes = 4000;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_pbkdf(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot, struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_kdf, *jobj;
+
+	if (!hdr || !pbkdf)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (LUKS2_keyslot_info(hdr, keyslot) == CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot);
+	if (!jobj_keyslot)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "kdf", &jobj_kdf))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "type", &jobj))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	memset(pbkdf, 0, sizeof(*pbkdf));
+
+	pbkdf->type = json_object_get_string(jobj);
+	if (json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "hash", &jobj))
+		pbkdf->hash = json_object_get_string(jobj);
+	if (json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "iterations", &jobj))
+		pbkdf->iterations = json_object_get_int(jobj);
+	if (json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "time", &jobj))
+		pbkdf->iterations = json_object_get_int(jobj);
+	if (json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "memory", &jobj))
+		pbkdf->max_memory_kb = json_object_get_int(jobj);
+	if (json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "cpus", &jobj))
+		pbkdf->parallel_threads = json_object_get_int(jobj);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int LUKS2_keyslot_unbound(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_digest, *jobj_segments;
+	int digest = LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(hdr, keyslot);
+
+	if (digest < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!(jobj_digest = LUKS2_get_digest_jobj(hdr, digest)))
+		return 0;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "segments", &jobj_segments);
+	if (!jobj_segments || !json_object_is_type(jobj_segments, json_type_array) ||
+	    json_object_array_length(jobj_segments) == 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+crypt_keyslot_info LUKS2_keyslot_info(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot)
+{
+	if(keyslot >= LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX || keyslot < 0)
+		return CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID;
+
+	if (!LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot))
+		return CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE;
+
+	if (LUKS2_keyslot_unbound(hdr, keyslot))
+		return CRYPT_SLOT_UNBOUND;
+
+	if (LUKS2_keyslot_active_count(hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT) == 1 &&
+	    !LUKS2_keyslot_for_segment(hdr, keyslot, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT))
+		return CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST;
+
+	return CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_area(struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	uint64_t *offset,
+	uint64_t *length)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_area, *jobj;
+
+	if(LUKS2_keyslot_info(hdr, keyslot) == CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot);
+	if (!jobj_keyslot)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "offset", &jobj))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	*offset = json_object_get_int64(jobj);
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "size", &jobj))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	*length = json_object_get_int64(jobj);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int LUKS2_open_and_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	int segment,
+	const char *password,
+	size_t password_len,
+	struct volume_key **vk)
+{
+	const keyslot_handler *h;
+	int key_size, r;
+
+	if (!(h = LUKS2_keyslot_handler(cd, keyslot)))
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	r = h->validate(cd, LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot));
+	if (r) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot %d validation failed.", keyslot);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	r = LUKS2_keyslot_for_segment(hdr, keyslot, segment);
+	if (r) {
+		if (r == -ENOENT)
+			log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot %d unusable for segment %d.", keyslot, segment);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	key_size = LUKS2_get_volume_key_size(hdr, segment);
+	if (key_size < 0)
+		key_size = LUKS2_get_keyslot_stored_key_size(hdr, keyslot);
+	if (key_size < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(key_size, NULL);
+	if (!*vk)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	r = h->open(cd, keyslot, password, password_len, (*vk)->key, (*vk)->keylength);
+	if (r < 0)
+		log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot %d (%s) open failed with %d.", keyslot, h->name, r);
+	else
+		r = LUKS2_digest_verify(cd, hdr, *vk, keyslot);
+
+	if (r < 0) {
+		crypt_free_volume_key(*vk);
+		*vk = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+static int LUKS2_keyslot_open_priority(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	crypt_keyslot_priority priority,
+	const char *password,
+	size_t password_len,
+	int segment,
+	struct volume_key **vk)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_keyslots, *jobj;
+	crypt_keyslot_priority slot_priority;
+	int keyslot, r = -ENOENT;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "keyslots", &jobj_keyslots);
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_keyslots, slot, val) {
+		if (!json_object_object_get_ex(val, "priority", &jobj))
+			slot_priority = CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_NORMAL;
+		else
+			slot_priority = json_object_get_int(jobj);
+
+		keyslot = atoi(slot);
+		if (slot_priority != priority) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot %d priority %d != %d (required), skipped.",
+				keyslot, slot_priority, priority);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		r = LUKS2_open_and_verify(cd, hdr, keyslot, segment, password, password_len, vk);
+
+		/* Do not retry for errors that are no -EPERM or -ENOENT,
+		   former meaning password wrong, latter key slot unusable for segment */
+		if ((r != -EPERM) && (r != -ENOENT))
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_open(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	int segment,
+	const char *password,
+	size_t password_len,
+	struct volume_key **vk)
+{
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
+	int r_prio, r = -EINVAL;
+
+	hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2);
+
+	if (keyslot == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT) {
+		r_prio = LUKS2_keyslot_open_priority(cd, hdr, CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_PREFER,
+			password, password_len, segment, vk);
+		if (r_prio >= 0)
+			r = r_prio;
+		else if (r_prio != -EPERM && r_prio != -ENOENT)
+			r = r_prio;
+		else
+			r = LUKS2_keyslot_open_priority(cd, hdr, CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_NORMAL,
+				password, password_len, segment, vk);
+		/* Prefer password wrong to no entry from priority slot */
+		if (r_prio == -EPERM && r == -ENOENT)
+			r = r_prio;
+	} else
+		r = LUKS2_open_and_verify(cd, hdr, keyslot, segment, password, password_len, vk);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_store(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *password,
+	size_t password_len,
+	const struct volume_key *vk,
+	const struct luks2_keyslot_params *params)
+{
+	const keyslot_handler *h;
+	int r;
+
+	if (keyslot == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot)) {
+		/* Try to allocate default and empty keyslot type */
+		h = LUKS2_keyslot_handler_type(cd, "luks2");
+		if (!h)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		r = h->alloc(cd, keyslot, vk->keylength, params);
+		if (r)
+			return r;
+	} else {
+		if (!(h = LUKS2_keyslot_handler(cd, keyslot)))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		r = h->update(cd, keyslot, params);
+		if (r) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Failed to update keyslot %d json.", keyslot);
+			return r;
+		}
+	}
+
+	r = h->validate(cd, LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot));
+	if (r) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot validation failed.");
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	return h->store(cd, keyslot, password, password_len,
+			vk->key, vk->keylength);
+}
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_wipe(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	int wipe_area_only)
+{
+	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(cd);
+	uint64_t area_offset, area_length;
+	int r;
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_keyslots;
+	const keyslot_handler *h;
+
+	h = LUKS2_keyslot_handler(cd, keyslot);
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "keyslots", &jobj_keyslots))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot);
+	if (!jobj_keyslot)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	if (wipe_area_only)
+		log_dbg(cd, "Wiping keyslot %d area only.", keyslot);
+
+	/* Just check that nobody uses the metadata now */
+	r = device_write_lock(cd, device);
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to acquire write lock on device %s."),
+			device_path(device));
+		return r;
+	}
+	device_write_unlock(cd, device);
+
+	/* secure deletion of possible key material in keyslot area */
+	r = crypt_keyslot_area(cd, keyslot, &area_offset, &area_length);
+	if (r && r != -ENOENT)
+		return r;
+
+	/* We can destroy the binary keyslot area now without lock */
+	if (!r) {
+		r = crypt_wipe_device(cd, device, CRYPT_WIPE_SPECIAL, area_offset,
+			      area_length, area_length, NULL, NULL);
+		if (r) {
+			if (r == -EACCES) {
+				log_err(cd, _("Cannot write to device %s, permission denied."),
+					device_path(device));
+				r = -EINVAL;
+			} else
+				log_err(cd, _("Cannot wipe device %s."), device_path(device));
+			return r;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (wipe_area_only)
+		return r;
+
+	/* Slot specific wipe */
+	if (h) {
+		r = h->wipe(cd, keyslot);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+	} else
+		log_dbg(cd, "Wiping keyslot %d without specific-slot handler loaded.", keyslot);
+
+	json_object_object_del_by_uint(jobj_keyslots, keyslot);
+
+	return LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr);
+}
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
+{
+	const keyslot_handler *h;
+
+	if (!(h = LUKS2_keyslot_handler(cd, keyslot)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return h->dump(cd, keyslot);
+}
+
+crypt_keyslot_priority LUKS2_keyslot_priority_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	  struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_priority;
+
+	jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot);
+	if (!jobj_keyslot)
+		return CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_INVALID;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "priority", &jobj_priority))
+		return CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_NORMAL;
+
+	return json_object_get_int(jobj_priority);
+}
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_priority_set(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			       int keyslot, crypt_keyslot_priority priority, int commit)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot;
+
+	jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot);
+	if (!jobj_keyslot)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (priority == CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_NORMAL)
+		json_object_object_del(jobj_keyslot, "priority");
+	else
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "priority", json_object_new_int(priority));
+
+	return commit ? LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr) : 0;
+}
+
+int placeholder_keyslot_alloc(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	uint64_t area_offset,
+	uint64_t area_length,
+	size_t volume_key_len)
+{
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
+	json_object *jobj_keyslots, *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_area;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Allocating placeholder keyslot %d for LUKS1 down conversion.", keyslot);
+
+	if (!(hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (keyslot < 0 || keyslot >= LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "keyslots", &jobj_keyslots))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	jobj_keyslot = json_object_new_object();
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "type", json_object_new_string("placeholder"));
+	/*
+	 * key_size = -1 makes placeholder keyslot impossible to pass validation.
+	 * It's a safeguard against accidentally storing temporary conversion
+	 * LUKS2 header.
+	 */
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "key_size", json_object_new_int(-1));
+
+	/* Area object */
+	jobj_area = json_object_new_object();
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "offset", json_object_new_uint64(area_offset));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "size", json_object_new_uint64(area_length));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "area", jobj_area);
+
+	json_object_object_add_by_uint(jobj_keyslots, keyslot, jobj_keyslot);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static unsigned LUKS2_get_keyslot_digests_count(json_object *hdr_jobj, int keyslot)
+{
+	char num[16];
+	json_object *jobj_digests, *jobj_keyslots;
+	unsigned count = 0;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr_jobj, "digests", &jobj_digests))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%u", keyslot) < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_digests, key, val) {
+		UNUSED(key);
+		json_object_object_get_ex(val, "keyslots", &jobj_keyslots);
+		if (LUKS2_array_jobj(jobj_keyslots, num))
+			count++;
+	}
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+/* run only on header that passed basic format validation */
+int LUKS2_keyslots_validate(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
+{
+	const keyslot_handler *h;
+	int keyslot;
+	json_object *jobj_keyslots, *jobj_type;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr_jobj, "keyslots", &jobj_keyslots))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_keyslots, slot, val) {
+		keyslot = atoi(slot);
+		json_object_object_get_ex(val, "type", &jobj_type);
+		h = LUKS2_keyslot_handler_type(cd, json_object_get_string(jobj_type));
+		if (!h)
+			continue;
+		if (h->validate && h->validate(cd, val)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot type %s validation failed on keyslot %d.", h->name, keyslot);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		if (!strcmp(h->name, "luks2") && LUKS2_get_keyslot_digests_count(hdr_jobj, keyslot) != 1) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot %d is not assigned to exactly 1 digest.", keyslot);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void LUKS2_keyslots_repair(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj_keyslots)
+{
+	const keyslot_handler *h;
+	json_object *jobj_type;
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_keyslots, slot, val) {
+		UNUSED(slot);
+		if (!json_object_is_type(val, json_type_object) ||
+		    !json_object_object_get_ex(val, "type", &jobj_type) ||
+		    !json_object_is_type(jobj_type, json_type_string))
+			continue;
+
+		h = LUKS2_keyslot_handler_type(cd, json_object_get_string(jobj_type));
+		if (h && h->repair)
+			h->repair(cd, val);
+	}
+}
diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c b/lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..26fe9b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,785 @@
+/*
+ * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, LUKS2 type keyslot handler
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include "luks2_internal.h"
+
+/* FIXME: move keyslot encryption to crypto backend */
+#include "../luks1/af.h"
+
+#define LUKS_SALTSIZE 32
+#define LUKS_SLOT_ITERATIONS_MIN 1000
+#define LUKS_STRIPES 4000
+
+static int luks2_encrypt_to_storage(char *src, size_t srcLength,
+	const char *cipher, const char *cipher_mode,
+	struct volume_key *vk, unsigned int sector,
+	struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(cd);
+#ifndef ENABLE_AF_ALG /* Support for old kernel without Crypto API */
+	int r = device_write_lock(cd, device);
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to acquire write lock on device %s."), device_path(device));
+		return r;
+	}
+	r = LUKS_encrypt_to_storage(src, srcLength, cipher, cipher_mode, vk, sector, cd);
+	device_write_unlock(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd));
+	return r;
+#else
+	struct crypt_storage *s;
+	int devfd = -1, r;
+
+	/* Only whole sector writes supported */
+	if (MISALIGNED_512(srcLength))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Encrypt buffer */
+	r = crypt_storage_init(&s, 0, cipher, cipher_mode, vk->key, vk->keylength);
+	if (r) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Userspace crypto wrapper cannot use %s-%s (%d).",
+			cipher, cipher_mode, r);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_storage_encrypt(s, 0, srcLength / SECTOR_SIZE, src);
+	crypt_storage_destroy(s);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	r = device_write_lock(cd, device);
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to acquire write lock on device %s."),
+			device_path(device));
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	devfd = device_open_locked(cd, device, O_RDWR);
+	if (devfd >= 0) {
+		if (write_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+					  device_alignment(device), src,
+					  srcLength, sector * SECTOR_SIZE) < 0)
+			r = -EIO;
+		else
+			r = 0;
+
+		device_sync(cd, device, devfd);
+		close(devfd);
+	} else
+		r = -EIO;
+
+	device_write_unlock(cd, device);
+
+	if (r)
+		log_err(cd, _("IO error while encrypting keyslot."));
+
+	return r;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int luks2_decrypt_from_storage(char *dst, size_t dstLength,
+	const char *cipher, const char *cipher_mode, struct volume_key *vk,
+	unsigned int sector, struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(cd);
+#ifndef ENABLE_AF_ALG /* Support for old kernel without Crypto API */
+	int r = device_read_lock(cd, device);
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to acquire read lock on device %s."), device_path(device));
+		return r;
+	}
+	r = LUKS_decrypt_from_storage(dst, dstLength, cipher, cipher_mode, vk, sector, cd);
+	device_read_unlock(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd));
+	return r;
+#else
+	struct crypt_storage *s;
+	int devfd = -1, r;
+
+	/* Only whole sector writes supported */
+	if (MISALIGNED_512(dstLength))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = crypt_storage_init(&s, 0, cipher, cipher_mode, vk->key, vk->keylength);
+	if (r) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Userspace crypto wrapper cannot use %s-%s (%d).",
+			cipher, cipher_mode, r);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	r = device_read_lock(cd, device);
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to acquire read lock on device %s."),
+			device_path(device));
+		crypt_storage_destroy(s);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	devfd = device_open_locked(cd, device, O_RDONLY);
+	if (devfd >= 0) {
+		if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+					 device_alignment(device), dst,
+					 dstLength, sector * SECTOR_SIZE) < 0)
+			r = -EIO;
+		else
+			r = 0;
+		close(devfd);
+	} else
+		r = -EIO;
+
+	device_read_unlock(cd, device);
+
+	/* Decrypt buffer */
+	if (!r)
+		r = crypt_storage_decrypt(s, 0, dstLength / SECTOR_SIZE, dst);
+	else
+		log_err(cd, _("IO error while decrypting keyslot."));
+
+	crypt_storage_destroy(s);
+	return r;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int luks2_keyslot_get_pbkdf_params(json_object *jobj_keyslot,
+		                struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf, char *salt)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_kdf, *jobj1, *jobj2;
+	size_t salt_len;
+
+	if (!jobj_keyslot || !pbkdf)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	memset(pbkdf, 0, sizeof(*pbkdf));
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "kdf", &jobj_kdf))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "type", &jobj1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	pbkdf->type = json_object_get_string(jobj1);
+	if (!strcmp(pbkdf->type, CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2)) {
+		if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "hash", &jobj2))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		pbkdf->hash = json_object_get_string(jobj2);
+		if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "iterations", &jobj2))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		pbkdf->iterations = json_object_get_int(jobj2);
+		pbkdf->max_memory_kb = 0;
+		pbkdf->parallel_threads = 0;
+	} else {
+		if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "time", &jobj2))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		pbkdf->iterations = json_object_get_int(jobj2);
+		if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "memory", &jobj2))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		pbkdf->max_memory_kb = json_object_get_int(jobj2);
+		if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "cpus", &jobj2))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		pbkdf->parallel_threads = json_object_get_int(jobj2);
+	}
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "salt", &jobj2))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	salt_len = LUKS_SALTSIZE;
+	if (!base64_decode(json_object_get_string(jobj2),
+			   json_object_get_string_len(jobj2),
+			   salt, &salt_len))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (salt_len != LUKS_SALTSIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int luks2_keyslot_set_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot,
+	const char *password, size_t passwordLen,
+	const char *volume_key, size_t volume_key_len)
+{
+	struct volume_key *derived_key;
+	char salt[LUKS_SALTSIZE], cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+	char *AfKey = NULL;
+	const char *af_hash = NULL;
+	size_t AFEKSize, keyslot_key_len;
+	json_object *jobj2, *jobj_kdf, *jobj_af, *jobj_area;
+	uint64_t area_offset;
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_type pbkdf;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "kdf", &jobj_kdf) ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "af", &jobj_af) ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* prevent accidental volume key size change after allocation */
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "key_size", &jobj2))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (json_object_get_int(jobj2) != (int)volume_key_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "offset", &jobj2))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	area_offset = json_object_get_uint64(jobj2);
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "encryption", &jobj2))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	r = crypt_parse_name_and_mode(json_object_get_string(jobj2), cipher, NULL, cipher_mode);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "key_size", &jobj2))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	keyslot_key_len = json_object_get_int(jobj2);
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_af, "hash", &jobj2))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	af_hash = json_object_get_string(jobj2);
+
+	if (luks2_keyslot_get_pbkdf_params(jobj_keyslot, &pbkdf, salt))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Allocate derived key storage.
+	 */
+	derived_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(keyslot_key_len, NULL);
+	if (!derived_key)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	/*
+	 * Calculate keyslot content, split and store it to keyslot area.
+	 */
+	r = crypt_pbkdf(pbkdf.type, pbkdf.hash, password, passwordLen,
+			salt, LUKS_SALTSIZE,
+			derived_key->key, derived_key->keylength,
+			pbkdf.iterations, pbkdf.max_memory_kb,
+			pbkdf.parallel_threads);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		crypt_free_volume_key(derived_key);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	// FIXME: verity key_size to AFEKSize
+	AFEKSize = AF_split_sectors(volume_key_len, LUKS_STRIPES) * SECTOR_SIZE;
+	AfKey = crypt_safe_alloc(AFEKSize);
+	if (!AfKey) {
+		crypt_free_volume_key(derived_key);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	r = AF_split(cd, volume_key, AfKey, volume_key_len, LUKS_STRIPES, af_hash);
+
+	if (r == 0) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Updating keyslot area [0x%04x].", (unsigned)area_offset);
+		/* FIXME: sector_offset should be size_t, fix LUKS_encrypt... accordingly */
+		r = luks2_encrypt_to_storage(AfKey, AFEKSize, cipher, cipher_mode,
+				    derived_key, (unsigned)(area_offset / SECTOR_SIZE), cd);
+	}
+
+	crypt_safe_free(AfKey);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(derived_key);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int luks2_keyslot_get_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot,
+	const char *password, size_t passwordLen,
+	char *volume_key, size_t volume_key_len)
+{
+	struct volume_key *derived_key;
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_type pbkdf;
+	char *AfKey;
+	size_t AFEKSize;
+	const char *af_hash = NULL;
+	char salt[LUKS_SALTSIZE], cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+	json_object *jobj2, *jobj_af, *jobj_area;
+	uint64_t area_offset;
+	size_t keyslot_key_len;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "af", &jobj_af) ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (luks2_keyslot_get_pbkdf_params(jobj_keyslot, &pbkdf, salt))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_af, "hash", &jobj2))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	af_hash = json_object_get_string(jobj2);
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "offset", &jobj2))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	area_offset = json_object_get_uint64(jobj2);
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "encryption", &jobj2))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	r = crypt_parse_name_and_mode(json_object_get_string(jobj2), cipher, NULL, cipher_mode);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "key_size", &jobj2))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	keyslot_key_len = json_object_get_int(jobj2);
+
+	/*
+	 * Allocate derived key storage space.
+	 */
+	derived_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(keyslot_key_len, NULL);
+	if (!derived_key)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	AFEKSize = AF_split_sectors(volume_key_len, LUKS_STRIPES) * SECTOR_SIZE;
+	AfKey = crypt_safe_alloc(AFEKSize);
+	if (!AfKey) {
+		crypt_free_volume_key(derived_key);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Calculate derived key, decrypt keyslot content and merge it.
+	 */
+	r = crypt_pbkdf(pbkdf.type, pbkdf.hash, password, passwordLen,
+			salt, LUKS_SALTSIZE,
+			derived_key->key, derived_key->keylength,
+			pbkdf.iterations, pbkdf.max_memory_kb,
+			pbkdf.parallel_threads);
+
+	if (r == 0) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Reading keyslot area [0x%04x].", (unsigned)area_offset);
+		/* FIXME: sector_offset should be size_t, fix LUKS_decrypt... accordingly */
+		r = luks2_decrypt_from_storage(AfKey, AFEKSize, cipher, cipher_mode,
+				      derived_key, (unsigned)(area_offset / SECTOR_SIZE), cd);
+	}
+
+	if (r == 0)
+		r = AF_merge(cd, AfKey, volume_key, volume_key_len, LUKS_STRIPES, af_hash);
+
+	crypt_free_volume_key(derived_key);
+	crypt_safe_free(AfKey);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * currently we support update of only:
+ *
+ * - af hash function
+ * - kdf params
+ */
+static int luks2_keyslot_update_json(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot,
+	const struct luks2_keyslot_params *params)
+{
+	const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf;
+	json_object *jobj_af, *jobj_area, *jobj_kdf;
+	char salt[LUKS_SALTSIZE], *salt_base64 = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	/* jobj_keyslot is not yet validated */
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "af", &jobj_af) ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* update area encryption parameters */
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "encryption", json_object_new_string(params->area.raw.encryption));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "key_size", json_object_new_int(params->area.raw.key_size));
+
+	pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf_type(cd);
+	if (!pbkdf)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = crypt_benchmark_pbkdf_internal(cd, CONST_CAST(struct crypt_pbkdf_type *)pbkdf, params->area.raw.key_size);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	/* refresh whole 'kdf' object */
+	jobj_kdf = json_object_new_object();
+	if (!jobj_kdf)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_kdf, "type", json_object_new_string(pbkdf->type));
+	if (!strcmp(pbkdf->type, CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2)) {
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_kdf, "hash", json_object_new_string(pbkdf->hash));
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_kdf, "iterations", json_object_new_int(pbkdf->iterations));
+	} else {
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_kdf, "time", json_object_new_int(pbkdf->iterations));
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_kdf, "memory", json_object_new_int(pbkdf->max_memory_kb));
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_kdf, "cpus", json_object_new_int(pbkdf->parallel_threads));
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "kdf", jobj_kdf);
+
+	/*
+	 * Regenerate salt and add it in 'kdf' object
+	 */
+	r = crypt_random_get(cd, salt, LUKS_SALTSIZE, CRYPT_RND_SALT);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+	base64_encode_alloc(salt, LUKS_SALTSIZE, &salt_base64);
+	if (!salt_base64)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_kdf, "salt", json_object_new_string(salt_base64));
+	free(salt_base64);
+
+	/* update 'af' hash */
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_af, "hash", json_object_new_string(params->af.luks1.hash));
+
+	JSON_DBG(cd, jobj_keyslot, "Keyslot JSON:");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int luks2_keyslot_alloc(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	size_t volume_key_len,
+	const struct luks2_keyslot_params *params)
+{
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
+	uint64_t area_offset, area_length;
+	json_object *jobj_keyslots, *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_af, *jobj_area;
+	int r;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Trying to allocate LUKS2 keyslot %d.", keyslot);
+
+	if (!params || params->area_type != LUKS2_KEYSLOT_AREA_RAW ||
+	    params->af_type != LUKS2_KEYSLOT_AF_LUKS1) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Invalid LUKS2 keyslot parameters.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!(hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (keyslot == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
+		keyslot = LUKS2_keyslot_find_empty(hdr, "luks2");
+
+	if (keyslot < 0 || keyslot >= LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Cannot modify already active keyslot %d.", keyslot);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "keyslots", &jobj_keyslots))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = LUKS2_find_area_gap(cd, hdr, volume_key_len, &area_offset, &area_length);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	jobj_keyslot = json_object_new_object();
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "type", json_object_new_string("luks2"));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "key_size", json_object_new_int(volume_key_len));
+
+	/* AF object */
+	jobj_af = json_object_new_object();
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_af, "type", json_object_new_string("luks1"));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_af, "stripes", json_object_new_int(params->af.luks1.stripes));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "af", jobj_af);
+
+	/* Area object */
+	jobj_area = json_object_new_object();
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "type", json_object_new_string("raw"));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "offset", json_object_new_uint64(area_offset));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "size", json_object_new_uint64(area_length));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "area", jobj_area);
+
+	json_object_object_add_by_uint(jobj_keyslots, keyslot, jobj_keyslot);
+
+	r = luks2_keyslot_update_json(cd, jobj_keyslot, params);
+
+	if (!r && LUKS2_check_json_size(cd, hdr)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Not enough space in header json area for new keyslot.");
+		r = -ENOSPC;
+	}
+
+	if (r)
+		json_object_object_del_by_uint(jobj_keyslots, keyslot);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int luks2_keyslot_open(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *password,
+	size_t password_len,
+	char *volume_key,
+	size_t volume_key_len)
+{
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Trying to open LUKS2 keyslot %d.", keyslot);
+
+	if (!(hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot);
+	if (!jobj_keyslot)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return luks2_keyslot_get_key(cd, jobj_keyslot,
+				     password, password_len,
+				     volume_key, volume_key_len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function must not modify json.
+ * It's called after luks2 keyslot validation.
+ */
+static int luks2_keyslot_store(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *password,
+	size_t password_len,
+	const char *volume_key,
+	size_t volume_key_len)
+{
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot;
+	int r;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Calculating attributes for LUKS2 keyslot %d.", keyslot);
+
+	if (!(hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot);
+	if (!jobj_keyslot)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = luks2_keyslot_set_key(cd, jobj_keyslot,
+				  password, password_len,
+				  volume_key, volume_key_len);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return keyslot;
+}
+
+static int luks2_keyslot_wipe(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
+{
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
+
+	if (!(hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Remove any reference of deleted keyslot from digests and tokens */
+	LUKS2_digest_assign(cd, hdr, keyslot, CRYPT_ANY_DIGEST, 0, 0);
+	LUKS2_token_assign(cd, hdr, keyslot, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, 0, 0);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int luks2_keyslot_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj1, *jobj_kdf, *jobj_af, *jobj_area;
+
+	jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2), keyslot);
+	if (!jobj_keyslot)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "kdf", &jobj_kdf) ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "af", &jobj_af) ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "encryption", &jobj1);
+	log_std(cd, "\tCipher:     %s\n", json_object_get_string(jobj1));
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "key_size", &jobj1);
+	log_std(cd, "\tCipher key: %u bits\n", json_object_get_uint32(jobj1) * 8);
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "type", &jobj1);
+	log_std(cd, "\tPBKDF:      %s\n", json_object_get_string(jobj1));
+
+	if (!strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj1), CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2)) {
+		json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "hash", &jobj1);
+		log_std(cd, "\tHash:       %s\n", json_object_get_string(jobj1));
+
+		json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "iterations", &jobj1);
+		log_std(cd, "\tIterations: %" PRIu64 "\n", json_object_get_uint64(jobj1));
+	} else {
+		json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "time", &jobj1);
+		log_std(cd, "\tTime cost:  %" PRIu64 "\n", json_object_get_int64(jobj1));
+
+		json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "memory", &jobj1);
+		log_std(cd, "\tMemory:     %" PRIu64 "\n", json_object_get_int64(jobj1));
+
+		json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "cpus", &jobj1);
+		log_std(cd, "\tThreads:    %" PRIu64 "\n", json_object_get_int64(jobj1));
+	}
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "salt", &jobj1);
+	log_std(cd, "\tSalt:       ");
+	hexprint_base64(cd, jobj1, " ", "            ");
+
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_af, "stripes", &jobj1);
+	log_std(cd, "\tAF stripes: %u\n", json_object_get_int(jobj1));
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_af, "hash", &jobj1);
+	log_std(cd, "\tAF hash:    %s\n", json_object_get_string(jobj1));
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "offset", &jobj1);
+	log_std(cd, "\tArea offset:%" PRIu64 " [bytes]\n", json_object_get_uint64(jobj1));
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "size", &jobj1);
+	log_std(cd, "\tArea length:%" PRIu64 " [bytes]\n", json_object_get_uint64(jobj1));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int luks2_keyslot_validate(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj_keyslot)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_kdf, *jobj_af, *jobj_area, *jobj1;
+	const char *type;
+	int count;
+
+	if (!jobj_keyslot)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "kdf", &jobj_kdf) ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "af", &jobj_af) ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	count = json_object_object_length(jobj_kdf);
+
+	jobj1 = json_contains(cd, jobj_kdf, "", "kdf section", "type", json_type_string);
+	if (!jobj1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	type = json_object_get_string(jobj1);
+
+	if (!strcmp(type, CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2)) {
+		if (count != 4 || /* type, salt, hash, iterations only */
+		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "hash", json_type_string) ||
+		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "iterations", json_type_int) ||
+		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "salt", json_type_string))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else if (!strcmp(type, CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2I) || !strcmp(type, CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2ID)) {
+		if (count != 5 || /* type, salt, time, memory, cpus only */
+		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "time", json_type_int) ||
+		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "memory", json_type_int) ||
+		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "cpus", json_type_int) ||
+		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "salt", json_type_string))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_af, "type", &jobj1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj1), "luks1")) {
+		if (!json_contains(cd, jobj_af, "", "luks1 af", "hash", json_type_string) ||
+		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_af, "", "luks1 af", "stripes", json_type_int))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	// FIXME check numbered
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "type", &jobj1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj1), "raw")) {
+		if (!json_contains(cd, jobj_area, "area", "raw type", "encryption", json_type_string) ||
+		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_area, "area", "raw type", "key_size", json_type_int) ||
+		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_area, "area", "raw type", "offset", json_type_string) ||
+		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_area, "area", "raw type", "size", json_type_string))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int luks2_keyslot_update(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	const struct luks2_keyslot_params *params)
+{
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot;
+	int r;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Updating LUKS2 keyslot %d.", keyslot);
+
+	if (!(hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot);
+	if (!jobj_keyslot)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = luks2_keyslot_update_json(cd, jobj_keyslot, params);
+
+	if (!r && LUKS2_check_json_size(cd, hdr)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Not enough space in header json area for updated keyslot %d.", keyslot);
+		r = -ENOSPC;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void luks2_keyslot_repair(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj_keyslot)
+{
+	const char *type;
+	json_object *jobj_kdf, *jobj_type;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "kdf", &jobj_kdf) ||
+	    !json_object_is_type(jobj_kdf, json_type_object))
+		return;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "type", &jobj_type) ||
+	    !json_object_is_type(jobj_type, json_type_string))
+		return;
+
+	type = json_object_get_string(jobj_type);
+
+	if (!strcmp(type, CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2)) {
+		/* type, salt, hash, iterations only */
+		json_object_object_foreach(jobj_kdf, key, val) {
+			UNUSED(val);
+			if (!strcmp(key, "type") || !strcmp(key, "salt") ||
+			    !strcmp(key, "hash") || !strcmp(key, "iterations"))
+					continue;
+			json_object_object_del(jobj_kdf, key);
+		}
+	} else if (!strcmp(type, CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2I) || !strcmp(type, CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2ID)) {
+		/* type, salt, time, memory, cpus only */
+		json_object_object_foreach(jobj_kdf, key, val) {
+			UNUSED(val);
+			if (!strcmp(key, "type") || !strcmp(key, "salt") ||
+			    !strcmp(key, "time") || !strcmp(key, "memory") ||
+			    !strcmp(key, "cpus"))
+					continue;
+			json_object_object_del(jobj_kdf, key);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+const keyslot_handler luks2_keyslot = {
+	.name  = "luks2",
+	.alloc  = luks2_keyslot_alloc,
+	.update = luks2_keyslot_update,
+	.open  = luks2_keyslot_open,
+	.store = luks2_keyslot_store,
+	.wipe  = luks2_keyslot_wipe,
+	.dump  = luks2_keyslot_dump,
+	.validate = luks2_keyslot_validate,
+	.repair = luks2_keyslot_repair
+};
diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c b/lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7884de0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c
@@ -0,0 +1,863 @@
+/*
+ * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, LUKS1 conversion code
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Ondrej Kozina
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include "luks2_internal.h"
+#include "../luks1/luks.h"
+#include "../luks1/af.h"
+
+static int json_luks1_keyslot(const struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, int keyslot, struct json_object **keyslot_object)
+{
+	char *base64_str, cipher[LUKS_CIPHERNAME_L+LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L];
+	size_t base64_len;
+	struct json_object *keyslot_obj, *field, *jobj_kdf, *jobj_af, *jobj_area;
+	uint64_t offset, area_size, offs_a, offs_b, length;
+
+	keyslot_obj = json_object_new_object();
+	json_object_object_add(keyslot_obj, "type", json_object_new_string("luks2"));
+	json_object_object_add(keyslot_obj, "key_size", json_object_new_int64(hdr_v1->keyBytes));
+
+	/* KDF */
+	jobj_kdf = json_object_new_object();
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_kdf, "type", json_object_new_string(CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_kdf, "hash", json_object_new_string(hdr_v1->hashSpec));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_kdf, "iterations", json_object_new_int64(hdr_v1->keyblock[keyslot].passwordIterations));
+	/* salt field */
+	base64_len = base64_encode_alloc(hdr_v1->keyblock[keyslot].passwordSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE, &base64_str);
+	if (!base64_str) {
+		json_object_put(keyslot_obj);
+		json_object_put(jobj_kdf);
+		if (!base64_len)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	field = json_object_new_string_len(base64_str, base64_len);
+	free(base64_str);
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_kdf, "salt", field);
+	json_object_object_add(keyslot_obj, "kdf", jobj_kdf);
+
+	/* AF */
+	jobj_af = json_object_new_object();
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_af, "type", json_object_new_string("luks1"));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_af, "hash", json_object_new_string(hdr_v1->hashSpec));
+	/* stripes field ignored, fixed to LUKS_STRIPES (4000) */
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_af, "stripes", json_object_new_int(4000));
+	json_object_object_add(keyslot_obj, "af", jobj_af);
+
+	/* Area */
+	jobj_area = json_object_new_object();
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "type", json_object_new_string("raw"));
+
+	/* encryption algorithm field */
+	if (*hdr_v1->cipherMode != '\0') {
+		(void) snprintf(cipher, sizeof(cipher), "%s-%s", hdr_v1->cipherName, hdr_v1->cipherMode);
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "encryption", json_object_new_string(cipher));
+	} else
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "encryption", json_object_new_string(hdr_v1->cipherName));
+
+	/* area */
+	if (LUKS_keyslot_area(hdr_v1, 0, &offs_a, &length) ||
+	    LUKS_keyslot_area(hdr_v1, 1, &offs_b, &length) ||
+	    LUKS_keyslot_area(hdr_v1, keyslot, &offset, &length)) {
+		json_object_put(keyslot_obj);
+		json_object_put(jobj_area);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	area_size = offs_b - offs_a;
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "key_size", json_object_new_int(hdr_v1->keyBytes));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "offset", json_object_new_uint64(offset));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "size", json_object_new_uint64(area_size));
+	json_object_object_add(keyslot_obj, "area", jobj_area);
+
+	*keyslot_object = keyslot_obj;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int json_luks1_keyslots(const struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, struct json_object **keyslots_object)
+{
+	int keyslot, r;
+	struct json_object *keyslot_obj, *field;
+
+	keyslot_obj = json_object_new_object();
+	if (!keyslot_obj)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	for (keyslot = 0; keyslot < LUKS_NUMKEYS; keyslot++) {
+		if (hdr_v1->keyblock[keyslot].active != LUKS_KEY_ENABLED)
+			continue;
+		r = json_luks1_keyslot(hdr_v1, keyslot, &field);
+		if (r) {
+			json_object_put(keyslot_obj);
+			return r;
+		}
+		json_object_object_add_by_uint(keyslot_obj, keyslot, field);
+	}
+
+	*keyslots_object = keyslot_obj;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int json_luks1_segment(const struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, struct json_object **segment_object)
+{
+	const char *c;
+	char cipher[LUKS_CIPHERNAME_L+LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L];
+	struct json_object *segment_obj, *field;
+	uint64_t number;
+
+	segment_obj = json_object_new_object();
+	if (!segment_obj)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* type field */
+	field = json_object_new_string("crypt");
+	if (!field) {
+		json_object_put(segment_obj);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(segment_obj, "type", field);
+
+	/* offset field */
+	number = (uint64_t)hdr_v1->payloadOffset * SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+	field = json_object_new_uint64(number);
+	if (!field) {
+		json_object_put(segment_obj);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(segment_obj, "offset", field);
+
+	/* iv_tweak field */
+	field = json_object_new_string("0");
+	if (!field) {
+		json_object_put(segment_obj);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(segment_obj, "iv_tweak", field);
+
+	/* length field */
+	field = json_object_new_string("dynamic");
+	if (!field) {
+		json_object_put(segment_obj);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(segment_obj, "size", field);
+
+	/* cipher field */
+	if (*hdr_v1->cipherMode != '\0') {
+		(void) snprintf(cipher, sizeof(cipher), "%s-%s", hdr_v1->cipherName, hdr_v1->cipherMode);
+		c = cipher;
+	} else
+		c = hdr_v1->cipherName;
+
+	field = json_object_new_string(c);
+	if (!field) {
+		json_object_put(segment_obj);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(segment_obj, "encryption", field);
+
+	/* block field */
+	field = json_object_new_int(SECTOR_SIZE);
+	if (!field) {
+		json_object_put(segment_obj);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(segment_obj, "sector_size", field);
+
+	*segment_object = segment_obj;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int json_luks1_segments(const struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, struct json_object **segments_object)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct json_object *segments_obj, *field;
+
+	segments_obj = json_object_new_object();
+	if (!segments_obj)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	r = json_luks1_segment(hdr_v1, &field);
+	if (r) {
+		json_object_put(segments_obj);
+		return r;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add_by_uint(segments_obj, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, field);
+
+	*segments_object = segments_obj;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int json_luks1_digest(const struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, struct json_object **digest_object)
+{
+	char keyslot_str[2], *base64_str;
+	int ks;
+	size_t base64_len;
+	struct json_object *digest_obj, *array, *field;
+
+	digest_obj = json_object_new_object();
+	if (!digest_obj)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* type field */
+	field = json_object_new_string("pbkdf2");
+	if (!field) {
+		json_object_put(digest_obj);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(digest_obj, "type", field);
+
+	/* keyslots array */
+	array = json_object_new_array();
+	if (!array) {
+		json_object_put(digest_obj);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(digest_obj, "keyslots", json_object_get(array));
+
+	for (ks = 0; ks < LUKS_NUMKEYS; ks++) {
+		if (hdr_v1->keyblock[ks].active != LUKS_KEY_ENABLED)
+			continue;
+		(void) snprintf(keyslot_str, sizeof(keyslot_str), "%d", ks);
+
+		field = json_object_new_string(keyslot_str);
+		if (!field || json_object_array_add(array, field) < 0) {
+			json_object_put(field);
+			json_object_put(array);
+			json_object_put(digest_obj);
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+	}
+
+	json_object_put(array);
+
+	/* segments array */
+	array = json_object_new_array();
+	if (!array) {
+		json_object_put(digest_obj);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(digest_obj, "segments", json_object_get(array));
+
+	field = json_object_new_string("0");
+	if (!field || json_object_array_add(array, field) < 0) {
+		json_object_put(field);
+		json_object_put(array);
+		json_object_put(digest_obj);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	json_object_put(array);
+
+	/* hash field */
+	field = json_object_new_string(hdr_v1->hashSpec);
+	if (!field) {
+		json_object_put(digest_obj);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(digest_obj, "hash", field);
+
+	/* salt field */
+	base64_len = base64_encode_alloc(hdr_v1->mkDigestSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE, &base64_str);
+	if (!base64_str) {
+		json_object_put(digest_obj);
+		if (!base64_len)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	field = json_object_new_string_len(base64_str, base64_len);
+	free(base64_str);
+	if (!field) {
+		json_object_put(digest_obj);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(digest_obj, "salt", field);
+
+	/* digest field */
+	base64_len = base64_encode_alloc(hdr_v1->mkDigest, LUKS_DIGESTSIZE, &base64_str);
+	if (!base64_str) {
+		json_object_put(digest_obj);
+		if (!base64_len)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	field = json_object_new_string_len(base64_str, base64_len);
+	free(base64_str);
+	if (!field) {
+		json_object_put(digest_obj);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(digest_obj, "digest", field);
+
+	/* iterations field */
+	field = json_object_new_int64(hdr_v1->mkDigestIterations);
+	if (!field) {
+		json_object_put(digest_obj);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(digest_obj, "iterations", field);
+
+	*digest_object = digest_obj;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int json_luks1_digests(const struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, struct json_object **digests_object)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct json_object *digests_obj, *field;
+
+	digests_obj = json_object_new_object();
+	if (!digests_obj)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	r = json_luks1_digest(hdr_v1, &field);
+	if (r) {
+		json_object_put(digests_obj);
+		return r;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(digests_obj, "0", field);
+
+	*digests_object = digests_obj;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int json_luks1_object(struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, struct json_object **luks1_object, uint64_t keyslots_size)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct json_object *luks1_obj, *field;
+	uint64_t json_size;
+
+	luks1_obj = json_object_new_object();
+	if (!luks1_obj)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* keyslots field */
+	r = json_luks1_keyslots(hdr_v1, &field);
+	if (r) {
+		json_object_put(luks1_obj);
+		return r;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(luks1_obj, "keyslots", field);
+
+	/* tokens field */
+	field = json_object_new_object();
+	if (!field) {
+		json_object_put(luks1_obj);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(luks1_obj, "tokens", field);
+
+	/* segments field */
+	r = json_luks1_segments(hdr_v1, &field);
+	if (r) {
+		json_object_put(luks1_obj);
+		return r;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(luks1_obj, "segments", field);
+
+	/* digests field */
+	r = json_luks1_digests(hdr_v1, &field);
+	if (r) {
+		json_object_put(luks1_obj);
+		return r;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(luks1_obj, "digests", field);
+
+	/* config field */
+	/* anything else? */
+	field = json_object_new_object();
+	if (!field) {
+		json_object_put(luks1_obj);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(luks1_obj, "config", field);
+
+	json_size = LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN;
+	json_object_object_add(field, "json_size", json_object_new_uint64(json_size));
+	json_object_object_add(field, "keyslots_size", json_object_new_uint64(keyslots_size));
+
+	*luks1_object = luks1_obj;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void move_keyslot_offset(json_object *jobj, int offset_add)
+{
+	json_object *jobj1, *jobj2, *jobj_area;
+	uint64_t offset = 0;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj, "keyslots", &jobj1);
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj1, key, val) {
+		UNUSED(key);
+		json_object_object_get_ex(val, "area", &jobj_area);
+		json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "offset", &jobj2);
+		offset = json_object_get_uint64(jobj2) + offset_add;
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "offset", json_object_new_uint64(offset));
+	}
+}
+
+/* FIXME: return specific error code for partial write error (aka keyslots are gone) */
+static int move_keyslot_areas(struct crypt_device *cd, off_t offset_from,
+			      off_t offset_to, size_t buf_size)
+{
+	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(cd);
+	void *buf = NULL;
+	int r = -EIO, devfd = -1;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Moving keyslot areas of size %zu from %jd to %jd.",
+		buf_size, (intmax_t)offset_from, (intmax_t)offset_to);
+
+	if (posix_memalign(&buf, crypt_getpagesize(), buf_size))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	devfd = device_open(cd, device, O_RDWR);
+	if (devfd == -1) {
+		free(buf);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	/* This can safely fail (for block devices). It only allocates space if it is possible. */
+	if (posix_fallocate(devfd, offset_to, buf_size))
+		log_dbg(cd, "Preallocation (fallocate) of new keyslot area not available.");
+
+	/* Try to read *new* area to check that area is there (trimmed backup). */
+	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+				 device_alignment(device), buf, buf_size,
+				 offset_to)!= (ssize_t)buf_size)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+				 device_alignment(device), buf, buf_size,
+				 offset_from)!= (ssize_t)buf_size)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (write_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+				  device_alignment(device), buf, buf_size,
+				  offset_to) != (ssize_t)buf_size)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = 0;
+out:
+	device_sync(cd, device, devfd);
+	close(devfd);
+	crypt_memzero(buf, buf_size);
+	free(buf);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int luks_header_in_use(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	r = lookup_dm_dev_by_uuid(cd, crypt_get_uuid(cd), crypt_get_type(cd));
+	if (r < 0)
+		log_err(cd, _("Can not check status of device with uuid: %s."), crypt_get_uuid(cd));
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* Check if there is a luksmeta area (foreign metadata created by the luksmeta package) */
+static int luksmeta_header_present(struct crypt_device *cd, off_t luks1_size)
+{
+	static const uint8_t LM_MAGIC[] = { 'L', 'U', 'K', 'S', 'M', 'E', 'T', 'A' };
+	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(cd);
+	void *buf = NULL;
+	int devfd, r = 0;
+
+	if (posix_memalign(&buf, crypt_getpagesize(), sizeof(LM_MAGIC)))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	devfd = device_open(cd, device, O_RDONLY);
+	if (devfd == -1) {
+		free(buf);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	/* Note: we must not detect failure as problem here, header can be trimmed. */
+	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device), device_alignment(device),
+		buf, sizeof(LM_MAGIC), luks1_size) == (ssize_t)sizeof(LM_MAGIC) &&
+		!memcmp(LM_MAGIC, buf, sizeof(LM_MAGIC))) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Unable to convert header with LUKSMETA additional metadata."));
+			r = -EBUSY;
+	}
+
+	close(devfd);
+	free(buf);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* Convert LUKS1 -> LUKS2 */
+int LUKS2_luks1_to_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks_phdr *hdr1, struct luks2_hdr *hdr2)
+{
+	int r;
+	json_object *jobj = NULL;
+	size_t buf_size, buf_offset, luks1_size, luks1_shift = 2 * LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN - LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS;
+	uint64_t max_size = crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+	/* for detached headers max size == device size */
+	if (!max_size && (r = device_size(crypt_metadata_device(cd), &max_size)))
+		return r;
+
+	luks1_size = LUKS_device_sectors(hdr1) << SECTOR_SHIFT;
+	luks1_size = size_round_up(luks1_size, LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS);
+	if (!luks1_size)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (LUKS_keyslots_offset(hdr1) != (LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS / SECTOR_SIZE)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Unsupported keyslots material offset: %zu.", LUKS_keyslots_offset(hdr1));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (luksmeta_header_present(cd, luks1_size))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Max size: %" PRIu64 ", LUKS1 (full) header size %zu , required shift: %zu",
+		max_size, luks1_size, luks1_shift);
+	if ((max_size - luks1_size) < luks1_shift) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Unable to move keyslot area. Not enough space."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = json_luks1_object(hdr1, &jobj, max_size - 2 * LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	move_keyslot_offset(jobj, luks1_shift);
+
+	// fill hdr2
+	memset(hdr2, 0, sizeof(*hdr2));
+	hdr2->hdr_size = LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN;
+	hdr2->seqid = 1;
+	hdr2->version = 2;
+	strncpy(hdr2->checksum_alg, "sha256", LUKS2_CHECKSUM_ALG_L);
+	crypt_random_get(cd, (char*)hdr2->salt1, sizeof(hdr2->salt1), CRYPT_RND_SALT);
+	crypt_random_get(cd, (char*)hdr2->salt2, sizeof(hdr2->salt2), CRYPT_RND_SALT);
+	strncpy(hdr2->uuid, crypt_get_uuid(cd), LUKS2_UUID_L-1); /* UUID should be max 36 chars */
+	hdr2->jobj = jobj;
+
+	/*
+	 * It duplicates check in LUKS2_hdr_write() but we don't want to move
+	 * keyslot areas in case it would fail later
+	 */
+	if (max_size < LUKS2_hdr_and_areas_size(hdr2->jobj)) {
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = luks_header_in_use(cd))) {
+		if (r > 0)
+			r = -EBUSY;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	// move keyslots 4k -> 32k offset
+	buf_offset = 2 * LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN;
+	buf_size   = luks1_size - LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS;
+	if ((r = move_keyslot_areas(cd, 8 * SECTOR_SIZE, buf_offset, buf_size)) < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Unable to move keyslot area."));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	// Write JSON hdr2
+	r = LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr2);
+out:
+	LUKS2_hdr_free(cd, hdr2);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int keyslot_LUKS1_compatible(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+				    int keyslot, uint32_t key_size, const char *hash)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj, *jobj_kdf, *jobj_af;
+	uint64_t l2_offset, l2_length;
+	size_t ks_key_size;
+	const char *ks_cipher, *data_cipher;
+
+	jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot);
+	if (!jobj_keyslot)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "type", &jobj) ||
+	    strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj), "luks2"))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Using PBKDF2, this implies memory and parallel is not used. */
+	jobj = NULL;
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "kdf", &jobj_kdf) ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "type", &jobj) ||
+	    strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj), CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2) ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "hash", &jobj) ||
+	    strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj), hash))
+		return 0;
+
+	jobj = NULL;
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "af", &jobj_af) ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_af, "stripes", &jobj) ||
+	    json_object_get_int(jobj) != LUKS_STRIPES)
+		return 0;
+
+	jobj = NULL;
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_af, "hash", &jobj) ||
+	    (crypt_hash_size(json_object_get_string(jobj)) < 0) ||
+	    strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj), hash))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* FIXME: should this go to validation code instead (aka invalid luks2 header if assigned to segment 0)? */
+	/* FIXME: check all keyslots are assigned to segment id 0, and segments count == 1 */
+	ks_cipher = LUKS2_get_keyslot_cipher(hdr, keyslot, &ks_key_size);
+	data_cipher = LUKS2_get_cipher(hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+	if (!ks_cipher || !data_cipher || key_size != ks_key_size || strcmp(ks_cipher, data_cipher)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Cipher in keyslot %d is different from volume key encryption.", keyslot);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (LUKS2_keyslot_area(hdr, keyslot, &l2_offset, &l2_length))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (l2_length != (size_round_up(AF_split_sectors(key_size, LUKS_STRIPES) * SECTOR_SIZE, 4096))) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Area length in LUKS2 keyslot (%d) is not compatible with LUKS1", keyslot);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* Convert LUKS2 -> LUKS1 */
+int LUKS2_luks2_to_luks1(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr2, struct luks_phdr *hdr1)
+{
+	size_t buf_size, buf_offset;
+	char cipher[LUKS_CIPHERNAME_L-1], cipher_mode[LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L-1];
+	char digest[LUKS_DIGESTSIZE], digest_salt[LUKS_SALTSIZE];
+	const char *hash;
+	size_t len;
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_digest, *jobj_segment, *jobj_kdf, *jobj_area, *jobj1, *jobj2;
+	uint32_t key_size;
+	int i, r, last_active = 0;
+	uint64_t offset, area_length;
+	char buf[256], luksMagic[] = LUKS_MAGIC;
+
+	jobj_digest  = LUKS2_get_digest_jobj(hdr2, 0);
+	if (!jobj_digest)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	jobj_segment = LUKS2_get_segment_jobj(hdr2, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+	if (!jobj_segment)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(hdr2->jobj, "digests", &jobj1);
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "type", &jobj2) ||
+	    strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj2), "pbkdf2") ||
+	    json_object_object_length(jobj1) != 1) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - key slot digests are not LUKS1 compatible."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "hash", &jobj2))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	hash = json_object_get_string(jobj2);
+
+	r = crypt_parse_name_and_mode(LUKS2_get_cipher(hdr2, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT), cipher, NULL, cipher_mode);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (crypt_cipher_wrapped_key(cipher, cipher_mode)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - device uses wrapped key cipher %s."), cipher);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = LUKS2_tokens_count(hdr2);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+	if (r > 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - LUKS2 header contains %u token(s)."), r);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = LUKS2_get_volume_key_size(hdr2, 0);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	key_size = r;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX; i++) {
+		if (LUKS2_keyslot_info(hdr2, i) == CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE)
+			continue;
+
+		if (LUKS2_keyslot_info(hdr2, i) == CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - keyslot %u is in invalid state."), i);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		if (i >= LUKS_NUMKEYS) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - slot %u (over maximum slots) is still active."), i);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		if (!keyslot_LUKS1_compatible(cd, hdr2, i, key_size, hash)) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - keyslot %u is not LUKS1 compatible."), i);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	memset(hdr1, 0, sizeof(*hdr1));
+
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++) {
+		hdr1->keyblock[i].active = LUKS_KEY_DISABLED;
+		hdr1->keyblock[i].stripes = LUKS_STRIPES;
+
+		jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr2, i);
+
+		if (jobj_keyslot) {
+			if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area))
+				return -EINVAL;
+			if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "offset", &jobj1))
+				return -EINVAL;
+			offset = json_object_get_uint64(jobj1);
+		} else {
+			if (LUKS2_find_area_gap(cd, hdr2, key_size, &offset, &area_length))
+				return -EINVAL;
+			/*
+			 * We have to create placeholder luks2 keyslots in place of all
+			 * inactive keyslots. Otherwise we would allocate all
+			 * inactive luks1 keyslots over same binary keyslot area.
+			 */
+			if (placeholder_keyslot_alloc(cd, i, offset, area_length, key_size))
+				return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		offset /= SECTOR_SIZE;
+		if (offset > UINT32_MAX)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		hdr1->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset = offset;
+		hdr1->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset -=
+				((2 * LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN - LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS) / SECTOR_SIZE);
+
+		if (!jobj_keyslot)
+			continue;
+
+		hdr1->keyblock[i].active = LUKS_KEY_ENABLED;
+		last_active = i;
+
+		if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "kdf", &jobj_kdf))
+			continue;
+
+		if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "iterations", &jobj1))
+			continue;
+		hdr1->keyblock[i].passwordIterations = json_object_get_uint32(jobj1);
+
+		if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "salt", &jobj1))
+			continue;
+		len = sizeof(buf);
+		memset(buf, 0, len);
+		if (!base64_decode(json_object_get_string(jobj1),
+				   json_object_get_string_len(jobj1), buf, &len))
+			continue;
+		if (len > 0 && len != LUKS_SALTSIZE)
+			continue;
+		memcpy(hdr1->keyblock[i].passwordSalt, buf, LUKS_SALTSIZE);
+	}
+
+	if (!jobj_keyslot) {
+		jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr2, last_active);
+		if (!jobj_keyslot)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "encryption", &jobj1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	r = crypt_parse_name_and_mode(json_object_get_string(jobj1), cipher, NULL, cipher_mode);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	strncpy(hdr1->cipherName, cipher, sizeof(hdr1->cipherName) - 1);
+	strncpy(hdr1->cipherMode, cipher_mode, sizeof(hdr1->cipherMode) - 1);
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "kdf", &jobj_kdf))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "hash", &jobj1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	strncpy(hdr1->hashSpec, json_object_get_string(jobj1), sizeof(hdr1->hashSpec) - 1);
+
+	hdr1->keyBytes = key_size;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "iterations", &jobj1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	hdr1->mkDigestIterations = json_object_get_uint32(jobj1);
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "digest", &jobj1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	len = sizeof(digest);
+	if (!base64_decode(json_object_get_string(jobj1),
+			   json_object_get_string_len(jobj1), digest, &len))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	/* We can store full digest here, not only sha1 length */
+	if (len < LUKS_DIGESTSIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	memcpy(hdr1->mkDigest, digest, LUKS_DIGESTSIZE);
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "salt", &jobj1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	len = sizeof(digest_salt);
+	if (!base64_decode(json_object_get_string(jobj1),
+			   json_object_get_string_len(jobj1), digest_salt, &len))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (len != LUKS_SALTSIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	memcpy(hdr1->mkDigestSalt, digest_salt, LUKS_SALTSIZE);
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_segment, "offset", &jobj1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	offset = json_object_get_uint64(jobj1) / SECTOR_SIZE;
+	if (offset > UINT32_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	/* FIXME: LUKS1 requires offset == 0 || offset >= luks1_hdr_size */
+	hdr1->payloadOffset = offset;
+
+	strncpy(hdr1->uuid, hdr2->uuid, UUID_STRING_L); /* max 36 chars */
+	hdr1->uuid[UUID_STRING_L-1] = '\0';
+
+	memcpy(hdr1->magic, luksMagic, LUKS_MAGIC_L);
+
+	hdr1->version = 1;
+
+	r = luks_header_in_use(cd);
+	if (r)
+		return r > 0 ? -EBUSY : r;
+
+	// move keyslots 32k -> 4k offset
+	buf_offset = 2 * LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN;
+	buf_size   = LUKS2_keyslots_size(hdr2->jobj);
+	r = move_keyslot_areas(cd, buf_offset, 8 * SECTOR_SIZE, buf_size);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Unable to move keyslot area."));
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	crypt_wipe_device(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd), CRYPT_WIPE_ZERO, 0,
+			  8 * SECTOR_SIZE, 8 * SECTOR_SIZE, NULL, NULL);
+
+	// Write LUKS1 hdr
+	return LUKS_write_phdr(hdr1, cd);
+}
diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2_token.c b/lib/luks2/luks2_token.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..58ba61d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/luks2/luks2_token.c
@@ -0,0 +1,606 @@
+/*
+ * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, token handling
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "luks2_internal.h"
+
+/* Builtin tokens */
+extern const crypt_token_handler keyring_handler;
+
+static token_handler token_handlers[LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX] = {
+	/* keyring builtin token */
+	{
+	  .get = token_keyring_get,
+	  .set = token_keyring_set,
+	  .h = &keyring_handler
+	},
+};
+
+static int is_builtin_candidate(const char *type)
+{
+	return !strncmp(type, LUKS2_BUILTIN_TOKEN_PREFIX, LUKS2_BUILTIN_TOKEN_PREFIX_LEN);
+}
+
+int crypt_token_register(const crypt_token_handler *handler)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (is_builtin_candidate(handler->name)) {
+		log_dbg(NULL, "'" LUKS2_BUILTIN_TOKEN_PREFIX "' is reserved prefix for builtin tokens.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX && token_handlers[i].h; i++) {
+		if (!strcmp(token_handlers[i].h->name, handler->name)) {
+			log_dbg(NULL, "Keyslot handler %s is already registered.", handler->name);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (i == LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	token_handlers[i].h = handler;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const token_handler
+*LUKS2_token_handler_type_internal(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *type)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX && token_handlers[i].h; i++)
+		if (!strcmp(token_handlers[i].h->name, type))
+			return token_handlers + i;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static const crypt_token_handler
+*LUKS2_token_handler_type(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *type)
+{
+	const token_handler *th = LUKS2_token_handler_type_internal(cd, type);
+
+	return th ? th->h : NULL;
+}
+
+static const token_handler
+*LUKS2_token_handler_internal(struct crypt_device *cd, int token)
+{
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
+	json_object *jobj1, *jobj2;
+
+	if (token < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!(hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2)))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!(jobj1 = LUKS2_get_token_jobj(hdr, token)))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj1, "type", &jobj2))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return LUKS2_token_handler_type_internal(cd, json_object_get_string(jobj2));
+}
+
+static const crypt_token_handler
+*LUKS2_token_handler(struct crypt_device *cd, int token)
+{
+	const token_handler *th = LUKS2_token_handler_internal(cd, token);
+
+	return th ? th->h : NULL;
+}
+
+static int LUKS2_token_find_free(struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX; i++)
+		if (!LUKS2_get_token_jobj(hdr, i))
+			return i;
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_token_create(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int token,
+	const char *json,
+	int commit)
+{
+	const crypt_token_handler *h;
+	const token_handler *th;
+	json_object *jobj_tokens, *jobj_type, *jobj;
+	enum json_tokener_error jerr;
+	char num[16];
+
+	if (token == CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN) {
+		if (!json)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		token = LUKS2_token_find_free(hdr);
+	}
+
+	if (token < 0 || token >= LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "tokens", &jobj_tokens))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%d", token);
+
+	/* Remove token */
+	if (!json)
+		json_object_object_del(jobj_tokens, num);
+	else {
+
+		jobj = json_tokener_parse_verbose(json, &jerr);
+		if (!jobj) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Token JSON parse failed.");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		if (LUKS2_token_validate(cd, hdr->jobj, jobj, num)) {
+			json_object_put(jobj);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		json_object_object_get_ex(jobj, "type", &jobj_type);
+		if (is_builtin_candidate(json_object_get_string(jobj_type))) {
+			th = LUKS2_token_handler_type_internal(cd, json_object_get_string(jobj_type));
+			if (!th || !th->set) {
+				log_dbg(cd, "%s is builtin token candidate with missing handler", json_object_get_string(jobj_type));
+				json_object_put(jobj);
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+			h = th->h;
+		} else
+			h = LUKS2_token_handler_type(cd, json_object_get_string(jobj_type));
+
+		if (h && h->validate && h->validate(cd, json)) {
+			json_object_put(jobj);
+			log_dbg(cd, "Token type %s validation failed.", h->name);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_tokens, num, jobj);
+		if (LUKS2_check_json_size(cd, hdr)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Not enough space in header json area for new token.");
+			json_object_object_del(jobj_tokens, num);
+			return -ENOSPC;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (commit)
+		return LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr) ?: token;
+
+	return token;
+}
+
+crypt_token_info LUKS2_token_status(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int token,
+	const char **type)
+{
+	const char *tmp;
+	const token_handler *th;
+	json_object *jobj_type, *jobj_token;
+
+	if (token < 0 || token >= LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX)
+		return CRYPT_TOKEN_INVALID;
+
+	if (!(jobj_token = LUKS2_get_token_jobj(hdr, token)))
+		return CRYPT_TOKEN_INACTIVE;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_token, "type", &jobj_type);
+	tmp = json_object_get_string(jobj_type);
+
+	if ((th = LUKS2_token_handler_type_internal(cd, tmp))) {
+		if (type)
+			*type = th->h->name;
+		return th->set ? CRYPT_TOKEN_INTERNAL : CRYPT_TOKEN_EXTERNAL;
+	}
+
+	if (type)
+		*type = tmp;
+
+	return is_builtin_candidate(tmp) ? CRYPT_TOKEN_INTERNAL_UNKNOWN : CRYPT_TOKEN_EXTERNAL_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_builtin_token_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int token,
+	const char *type,
+	void *params)
+{
+	const token_handler *th = LUKS2_token_handler_type_internal(cd, type);
+
+	// internal error
+	assert(th && th->get);
+
+	return th->get(LUKS2_get_token_jobj(hdr, token), params) ?: token;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_builtin_token_create(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int token,
+	const char *type,
+	const void *params,
+	int commit)
+{
+	const token_handler *th;
+	int r;
+	json_object *jobj_token, *jobj_tokens;
+
+	th = LUKS2_token_handler_type_internal(cd, type);
+
+	// at this point all builtin handlers must exist and have validate fn defined
+	assert(th && th->set && th->h->validate);
+
+	if (token == CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN) {
+		if ((token = LUKS2_token_find_free(hdr)) < 0)
+			log_err(cd, _("No free token slot."));
+	}
+	if (token < 0 || token >= LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = th->set(&jobj_token, params);
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to create builtin token %s."), type);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	// builtin tokens must produce valid json
+	r = LUKS2_token_validate(cd, hdr->jobj, jobj_token, "new");
+	assert(!r);
+	r = th->h->validate(cd, json_object_to_json_string_ext(jobj_token,
+		JSON_C_TO_STRING_PLAIN | JSON_C_TO_STRING_NOSLASHESCAPE));
+	assert(!r);
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "tokens", &jobj_tokens);
+	json_object_object_add_by_uint(jobj_tokens, token, jobj_token);
+	if (LUKS2_check_json_size(cd, hdr)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Not enough space in header json area for new %s token.", type);
+		json_object_object_del_by_uint(jobj_tokens, token);
+		return -ENOSPC;
+	}
+
+	if (commit)
+		return LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr) ?: token;
+
+	return token;
+}
+
+static int LUKS2_token_open(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int token,
+	char **buffer,
+	size_t *buffer_len,
+	void *usrptr)
+{
+	const char *json;
+	const crypt_token_handler *h;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!(h = LUKS2_token_handler(cd, token)))
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	if (h->validate) {
+		if (LUKS2_token_json_get(cd, hdr, token, &json))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (h->validate(cd, json)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Token %d (%s) validation failed.", token, h->name);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	r = h->open(cd, token, buffer, buffer_len, usrptr);
+	if (r < 0)
+		log_dbg(cd, "Token %d (%s) open failed with %d.", token, h->name, r);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void LUKS2_token_buffer_free(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		int token,
+		void *buffer,
+		size_t buffer_len)
+{
+	const crypt_token_handler *h = LUKS2_token_handler(cd, token);
+
+	if (h->buffer_free)
+		h->buffer_free(buffer, buffer_len);
+	else {
+		crypt_memzero(buffer, buffer_len);
+		free(buffer);
+	}
+}
+
+static int LUKS2_keyslot_open_by_token(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int token,
+	int segment,
+	const char *buffer,
+	size_t buffer_len,
+	struct volume_key **vk)
+{
+	const crypt_token_handler *h;
+	json_object *jobj_token, *jobj_token_keyslots, *jobj;
+	const char *num = NULL;
+	int i, r;
+
+	if (!(h = LUKS2_token_handler(cd, token)))
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	jobj_token = LUKS2_get_token_jobj(hdr, token);
+	if (!jobj_token)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_token, "keyslots", &jobj_token_keyslots);
+	if (!jobj_token_keyslots)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Try to open keyslot referenced in token */
+	r = -EINVAL;
+	for (i = 0; i < (int) json_object_array_length(jobj_token_keyslots) && r < 0; i++) {
+		jobj = json_object_array_get_idx(jobj_token_keyslots, i);
+		num = json_object_get_string(jobj);
+		log_dbg(cd, "Trying to open keyslot %s with token %d (type %s).", num, token, h->name);
+		r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, atoi(num), segment, buffer, buffer_len, vk);
+	}
+
+	if (r >= 0 && num)
+		return atoi(num);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_token_open_and_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+		int token,
+		const char *name,
+		uint32_t flags,
+		void *usrptr)
+{
+	int keyslot, r;
+	char *buffer;
+	size_t buffer_len;
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+	r = LUKS2_token_open(cd, hdr, token, &buffer, &buffer_len, usrptr);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = LUKS2_keyslot_open_by_token(cd, hdr, token,
+					(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY) ?
+					CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT : CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT,
+					buffer, buffer_len, &vk);
+
+	LUKS2_token_buffer_free(cd, token, buffer, buffer_len);
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	keyslot = r;
+
+	if ((name || (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY)) && crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd))
+		r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_keyslot(cd, hdr, vk, keyslot);
+
+	if (r >= 0 && name)
+		r = LUKS2_activate(cd, name, vk, flags);
+
+	if (r < 0 && vk)
+		crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vk->key_description);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+
+	return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_token_open_and_activate_any(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	const char *name,
+	uint32_t flags)
+{
+	char *buffer;
+	json_object *tokens_jobj;
+	size_t buffer_len;
+	int keyslot, token, r = -EINVAL;
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "tokens", &tokens_jobj);
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(tokens_jobj, slot, val) {
+		UNUSED(val);
+		token = atoi(slot);
+
+		r = LUKS2_token_open(cd, hdr, token, &buffer, &buffer_len, NULL);
+		if (r < 0)
+			continue;
+
+		r = LUKS2_keyslot_open_by_token(cd, hdr, token,
+						(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY) ?
+						CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT : CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT,
+						buffer, buffer_len, &vk);
+		LUKS2_token_buffer_free(cd, token, buffer, buffer_len);
+		if (r >= 0)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	keyslot = r;
+
+	if (r >= 0 && (name || (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY)) && crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd))
+		r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_keyslot(cd, hdr, vk, keyslot);
+
+	if (r >= 0 && name)
+		r = LUKS2_activate(cd, name, vk, flags);
+
+	if (r < 0 && vk)
+		crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vk->key_description);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+
+	return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+void LUKS2_token_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, int token)
+{
+	const crypt_token_handler *h;
+	json_object *jobj_token;
+
+	h = LUKS2_token_handler(cd, token);
+	if (h && h->dump) {
+		jobj_token = LUKS2_get_token_jobj(crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2), token);
+		if (jobj_token)
+			h->dump(cd, json_object_to_json_string_ext(jobj_token,
+				JSON_C_TO_STRING_PLAIN | JSON_C_TO_STRING_NOSLASHESCAPE));
+	}
+}
+
+int LUKS2_token_json_get(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			   int token, const char **json)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_token;
+
+	jobj_token = LUKS2_get_token_jobj(hdr, token);
+	if (!jobj_token)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*json = json_object_to_json_string_ext(jobj_token,
+		JSON_C_TO_STRING_PLAIN | JSON_C_TO_STRING_NOSLASHESCAPE);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int assign_one_keyslot(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			      int token, int keyslot, int assign)
+{
+	json_object *jobj1, *jobj_token, *jobj_token_keyslots;
+	char num[16];
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot %i %s token %i.", keyslot, assign ? "assigned to" : "unassigned from", token);
+
+	jobj_token = LUKS2_get_token_jobj(hdr, token);
+	if (!jobj_token)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_token, "keyslots", &jobj_token_keyslots);
+	if (!jobj_token_keyslots)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%d", keyslot);
+	if (assign) {
+		jobj1 = LUKS2_array_jobj(jobj_token_keyslots, num);
+		if (!jobj1)
+			json_object_array_add(jobj_token_keyslots, json_object_new_string(num));
+	} else {
+		jobj1 = LUKS2_array_remove(jobj_token_keyslots, num);
+		if (jobj1)
+			json_object_object_add(jobj_token, "keyslots", jobj1);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int assign_one_token(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			    int keyslot, int token, int assign)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_keyslots;
+	int r = 0;
+
+	if (!LUKS2_get_token_jobj(hdr, token))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (keyslot == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT) {
+		json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "keyslots", &jobj_keyslots);
+
+		json_object_object_foreach(jobj_keyslots, key, val) {
+			UNUSED(val);
+			r = assign_one_keyslot(cd, hdr, token, atoi(key), assign);
+			if (r < 0)
+				break;
+		}
+	} else
+		r = assign_one_keyslot(cd, hdr, token, keyslot, assign);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_token_assign(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			int keyslot, int token, int assign, int commit)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_tokens;
+	int r = 0;
+
+	if (token == CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN) {
+		json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "tokens", &jobj_tokens);
+
+		json_object_object_foreach(jobj_tokens, key, val) {
+			UNUSED(val);
+			r = assign_one_token(cd, hdr, keyslot, atoi(key), assign);
+			if (r < 0)
+				break;
+		}
+	} else
+		r = assign_one_token(cd, hdr, keyslot, token, assign);
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	// FIXME: do not write header in nothing changed
+	if (commit)
+		return LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr) ?: token;
+
+	return token;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_token_is_assigned(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			    int keyslot, int token)
+{
+	int i;
+	json_object *jobj_token, *jobj_token_keyslots, *jobj;
+
+	if (keyslot < 0 || keyslot >= LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX || token < 0 || token >= LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	jobj_token = LUKS2_get_token_jobj(hdr, token);
+	if (!jobj_token)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_token, "keyslots", &jobj_token_keyslots);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < (int) json_object_array_length(jobj_token_keyslots); i++) {
+		jobj = json_object_array_get_idx(jobj_token_keyslots, i);
+		if (keyslot == atoi(json_object_get_string(jobj)))
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+	return -ENOENT;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_tokens_count(struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_tokens = LUKS2_get_tokens_jobj(hdr);
+	if (!jobj_tokens)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return json_object_object_length(jobj_tokens);
+}
diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2_token_keyring.c b/lib/luks2/luks2_token_keyring.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7f28607
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/luks2/luks2_token_keyring.c
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+/*
+ * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, kernel keyring token
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Ondrej Kozina
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "luks2_internal.h"
+
+static int keyring_open(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				int token,
+				char **buffer,
+				size_t *buffer_len,
+				void *usrptr __attribute__((unused)))
+{
+	json_object *jobj_token, *jobj_key;
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!(hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	jobj_token = LUKS2_get_token_jobj(hdr, token);
+	if (!jobj_token)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_token, "key_description", &jobj_key);
+
+	r = keyring_get_passphrase(json_object_get_string(jobj_key), buffer, buffer_len);
+	if (r == -ENOTSUP) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Kernel keyring features disabled.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	} else if (r < 0) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "keyring_get_passphrase failed (error %d)", r);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int keyring_validate(struct crypt_device *cd __attribute__((unused)),
+				    const char *json)
+{
+	enum json_tokener_error jerr;
+	json_object *jobj_token, *jobj_key;
+	int r = 1;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Validating keyring token json");
+
+	jobj_token = json_tokener_parse_verbose(json, &jerr);
+	if (!jobj_token) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Keyring token JSON parse failed.");
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	if (json_object_object_length(jobj_token) != 3) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Keyring token is expected to have exactly 3 fields.");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_token, "key_description", &jobj_key)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "missing key_description field.");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!json_object_is_type(jobj_key, json_type_string)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "key_description is not a string.");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* TODO: perhaps check that key description is in '%s:%s'
+	 * format where both strings are not empty */
+	r = !strlen(json_object_get_string(jobj_key));
+out:
+	json_object_put(jobj_token);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void keyring_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *json)
+{
+	enum json_tokener_error jerr;
+	json_object *jobj_token, *jobj_key;
+
+	jobj_token = json_tokener_parse_verbose(json, &jerr);
+	if (!jobj_token)
+		return;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_token, "key_description", &jobj_key)) {
+		json_object_put(jobj_token);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	log_std(cd, "\tKey description: %s\n", json_object_get_string(jobj_key));
+
+	json_object_put(jobj_token);
+}
+
+int token_keyring_set(json_object **jobj_builtin_token,
+	const void *params)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_token, *jobj;
+	const struct crypt_token_params_luks2_keyring *keyring_params = (const struct crypt_token_params_luks2_keyring *) params;
+
+	jobj_token = json_object_new_object();
+	if (!jobj_token)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	jobj = json_object_new_string(LUKS2_TOKEN_KEYRING);
+	if (!jobj) {
+		json_object_put(jobj_token);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_token, "type", jobj);
+
+	jobj = json_object_new_array();
+	if (!jobj) {
+		json_object_put(jobj_token);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_token, "keyslots", jobj);
+
+	jobj = json_object_new_string(keyring_params->key_description);
+	if (!jobj) {
+		json_object_put(jobj_token);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_token, "key_description", jobj);
+
+	*jobj_builtin_token = jobj_token;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int token_keyring_get(json_object *jobj_token,
+	void *params)
+{
+	json_object *jobj;
+	struct crypt_token_params_luks2_keyring *keyring_params = (struct crypt_token_params_luks2_keyring *) params;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_token, "type", &jobj);
+	assert(!strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj), LUKS2_TOKEN_KEYRING));
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_token, "key_description", &jobj);
+
+	keyring_params->key_description = json_object_get_string(jobj);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+const crypt_token_handler keyring_handler = {
+	.name = LUKS2_TOKEN_KEYRING,
+	.open = keyring_open,
+	.validate = keyring_validate,
+	.dump = keyring_dump
+};
diff --git a/lib/nls.h b/lib/nls.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..39760b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/nls.h
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+#ifndef CRYPTSETUP_NLS_H
+#define CRYPTSETUP_NLS_H
+
+#ifndef LOCALEDIR
+#define LOCALEDIR "/usr/share/locale"
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LOCALE_H
+# include <locale.h>
+#else
+# undef setlocale
+# define setlocale(Category, Locale) /* empty */
+#endif
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_NLS
+# include <libintl.h>
+# define _(Text) gettext (Text)
+# ifdef gettext_noop
+#  define N_(String) gettext_noop (String)
+# else
+#  define N_(String) (String)
+# endif
+#else
+# undef bindtextdomain
+# define bindtextdomain(Domain, Directory) /* empty */
+# undef textdomain
+# define textdomain(Domain) /* empty */
+# define _(Text) (Text)
+# define N_(Text) (Text)
+# define ngettext(Singular, Plural, Count) \
+    ( (Count) == 1 ? (Singular) : (Plural) )
+#endif
+
+#endif /* CRYPTSETUP_NLS_H */
diff --git a/lib/random.c b/lib/random.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a59848
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/random.c
@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+/*
+ * cryptsetup kernel RNG access functions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <sys/select.h>
+
+#include "libcryptsetup.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+#ifndef O_CLOEXEC
+#define O_CLOEXEC 0
+#endif
+
+static int random_initialised = 0;
+
+#define URANDOM_DEVICE	"/dev/urandom"
+static int urandom_fd = -1;
+
+#define RANDOM_DEVICE	"/dev/random"
+static int random_fd = -1;
+
+/* Read random chunk - gathered data usually appears with this granularity */
+#define RANDOM_DEVICE_CHUNK	8
+
+/* Timeout to print warning if no random data (entropy) */
+#define RANDOM_DEVICE_TIMEOUT	5
+
+/* URANDOM_DEVICE access */
+static int _get_urandom(struct crypt_device *ctx __attribute__((unused)),
+			char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+	int r;
+	size_t old_len = len;
+	char *old_buf = buf;
+
+	assert(urandom_fd != -1);
+
+	while(len) {
+		r = read(urandom_fd, buf, len);
+		if (r == -1 && errno != EINTR)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (r > 0) {
+			len -= r;
+			buf += r;
+		}
+	}
+
+	assert(len == 0);
+	assert((size_t)(buf - old_buf) == old_len);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void _get_random_progress(struct crypt_device *ctx, int warn,
+				 size_t expected_len, size_t read_len)
+{
+	if (warn)
+		log_std(ctx,
+			_("System is out of entropy while generating volume key.\n"
+			  "Please move mouse or type some text in another window "
+			  "to gather some random events.\n"));
+
+	log_std(ctx, _("Generating key (%d%% done).\n"),
+		(int)((expected_len - read_len) * 100 / expected_len));
+}
+
+/* RANDOM_DEVICE access */
+static int _get_random(struct crypt_device *ctx, char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+	int r, warn_once = 1;
+	size_t n, old_len = len;
+	char *old_buf = buf;
+	fd_set fds;
+	struct timeval tv;
+
+	assert(random_fd != -1);
+
+	while (len) {
+		FD_ZERO(&fds);
+		FD_SET(random_fd, &fds);
+
+		tv.tv_sec = RANDOM_DEVICE_TIMEOUT;
+		tv.tv_usec = 0;
+
+		r = select(random_fd + 1, &fds, NULL, NULL, &tv);
+		if(r == -1)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if(!r) {
+			_get_random_progress(ctx, warn_once, old_len, len);
+			warn_once = 0;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		do {
+			n = RANDOM_DEVICE_CHUNK;
+			if (len < RANDOM_DEVICE_CHUNK)
+				n = len;
+
+			r = read(random_fd, buf, n);
+
+			if (r == -1 && errno == EINTR) {
+				r = 0;
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			/* bogus read? */
+			if(r > (int)n)
+				return -EINVAL;
+
+			/* random device is opened with O_NONBLOCK, EAGAIN is expected */
+			if (r == -1 && (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EWOULDBLOCK))
+				return -EINVAL;
+
+			if (r > 0) {
+				len -= r;
+				buf += r;
+			}
+		} while (len && r > 0);
+	}
+
+	assert(len == 0);
+	assert((size_t)(buf - old_buf) == old_len);
+
+	if (!warn_once)
+		_get_random_progress(ctx, 0, old_len, len);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+/* Initialisation of both RNG file descriptors is mandatory */
+int crypt_random_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
+{
+	if (random_initialised)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Used for CRYPT_RND_NORMAL */
+	if(urandom_fd == -1)
+		urandom_fd = open(URANDOM_DEVICE, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+	if(urandom_fd == -1)
+		goto fail;
+
+	/* Used for CRYPT_RND_KEY */
+	if(random_fd == -1)
+		random_fd = open(RANDOM_DEVICE, O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK | O_CLOEXEC);
+	if(random_fd == -1)
+		goto fail;
+
+	if (crypt_fips_mode())
+		log_verbose(ctx, _("Running in FIPS mode."));
+
+	random_initialised = 1;
+	return 0;
+fail:
+	crypt_random_exit();
+	log_err(ctx, _("Fatal error during RNG initialisation."));
+	return -ENOSYS;
+}
+
+int crypt_random_get(struct crypt_device *ctx, char *buf, size_t len, int quality)
+{
+	int status, rng_type;
+
+	switch(quality) {
+	case CRYPT_RND_NORMAL:
+		status = _get_urandom(ctx, buf, len);
+		break;
+	case CRYPT_RND_SALT:
+		if (crypt_fips_mode())
+			status = crypt_backend_rng(buf, len, quality, 1);
+		else
+			status = _get_urandom(ctx, buf, len);
+		break;
+	case CRYPT_RND_KEY:
+		if (crypt_fips_mode()) {
+			status = crypt_backend_rng(buf, len, quality, 1);
+			break;
+		}
+		rng_type = ctx ? crypt_get_rng_type(ctx) :
+				 crypt_random_default_key_rng();
+		switch (rng_type) {
+		case CRYPT_RNG_URANDOM:
+			status = _get_urandom(ctx, buf, len);
+			break;
+		case CRYPT_RNG_RANDOM:
+			status = _get_random(ctx, buf, len);
+			break;
+		default:
+			abort();
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		log_err(ctx, _("Unknown RNG quality requested."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (status)
+		log_err(ctx, _("Error reading from RNG."));
+
+	return status;
+}
+
+void crypt_random_exit(void)
+{
+	random_initialised = 0;
+
+	if(random_fd != -1) {
+		(void)close(random_fd);
+		random_fd = -1;
+	}
+
+	if(urandom_fd != -1) {
+		(void)close(urandom_fd);
+		urandom_fd = -1;
+	}
+}
+
+int crypt_random_default_key_rng(void)
+{
+	/* coverity[pointless_string_compare] */
+	if (!strcmp(DEFAULT_RNG, RANDOM_DEVICE))
+		return CRYPT_RNG_RANDOM;
+
+	/* coverity[pointless_string_compare] */
+	if (!strcmp(DEFAULT_RNG, URANDOM_DEVICE))
+		return CRYPT_RNG_URANDOM;
+
+	/* RNG misconfiguration is fatal */
+	abort();
+}
diff --git a/lib/setup.c b/lib/setup.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cb6ce29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/setup.c
@@ -0,0 +1,5464 @@
+/*
+ * libcryptsetup - cryptsetup library
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <sys/utsname.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "libcryptsetup.h"
+#include "luks.h"
+#include "luks2.h"
+#include "loopaes.h"
+#include "verity.h"
+#include "tcrypt.h"
+#include "integrity.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+#define CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED	(1 << 0)
+#define CRYPT_CD_QUIET		(1 << 1)
+
+struct crypt_device {
+	char *type;
+
+	struct device *device;
+	struct device *metadata_device;
+
+	struct volume_key *volume_key;
+	int rng_type;
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_type pbkdf;
+
+	/* global context scope settings */
+	unsigned key_in_keyring:1;
+
+	uint64_t data_offset;
+	uint64_t metadata_size; /* Used in LUKS2 format */
+	uint64_t keyslots_size; /* Used in LUKS2 format */
+
+	// FIXME: private binary headers and access it properly
+	// through sub-library (LUKS1, TCRYPT)
+
+	union {
+	struct { /* used in CRYPT_LUKS1 */
+		struct luks_phdr hdr;
+		char *cipher_spec;
+	} luks1;
+	struct { /* used in CRYPT_LUKS2 */
+		struct luks2_hdr hdr;
+		char cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];	  /* only for compatibility */
+		char cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN]; /* only for compatibility */
+		char *keyslot_cipher;
+		unsigned int keyslot_key_size;
+	} luks2;
+	struct { /* used in CRYPT_PLAIN */
+		struct crypt_params_plain hdr;
+		char *cipher_spec;
+		char *cipher;
+		const char *cipher_mode;
+		unsigned int key_size;
+	} plain;
+	struct { /* used in CRYPT_LOOPAES */
+		struct crypt_params_loopaes hdr;
+		char *cipher_spec;
+		char *cipher;
+		const char *cipher_mode;
+		unsigned int key_size;
+	} loopaes;
+	struct { /* used in CRYPT_VERITY */
+		struct crypt_params_verity hdr;
+		char *root_hash;
+		unsigned int root_hash_size;
+		char *uuid;
+		struct device *fec_device;
+	} verity;
+	struct { /* used in CRYPT_TCRYPT */
+		struct crypt_params_tcrypt params;
+		struct tcrypt_phdr hdr;
+	} tcrypt;
+	struct { /* used in CRYPT_INTEGRITY */
+		struct crypt_params_integrity params;
+		struct volume_key *journal_mac_key;
+		struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key;
+	} integrity;
+	struct { /* used if initialized without header by name */
+		char *active_name;
+		/* buffers, must refresh from kernel on every query */
+		char cipher_spec[MAX_CIPHER_LEN*2+1];
+		char cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+		const char *cipher_mode;
+		unsigned int key_size;
+	} none;
+	} u;
+
+	/* callbacks definitions */
+	void (*log)(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr);
+	void *log_usrptr;
+	int (*confirm)(const char *msg, void *usrptr);
+	void *confirm_usrptr;
+};
+
+/* Just to suppress redundant messages about crypto backend */
+static int _crypto_logged = 0;
+
+/* Log helper */
+static void (*_default_log)(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr) = NULL;
+static int _debug_level = 0;
+
+/* Library can do metadata locking  */
+static int _metadata_locking = 1;
+
+/* Library scope detection for kernel keyring support */
+static int _kernel_keyring_supported;
+
+/* Library allowed to use kernel keyring for loading VK in kernel crypto layer */
+static int _vk_via_keyring = 1;
+
+void crypt_set_debug_level(int level)
+{
+	_debug_level = level;
+}
+
+int crypt_get_debug_level(void)
+{
+	return _debug_level;
+}
+
+void crypt_log(struct crypt_device *cd, int level, const char *msg)
+{
+	if (!msg)
+		return;
+
+	if (level < _debug_level)
+		return;
+
+	if (cd && cd->log)
+		cd->log(level, msg, cd->log_usrptr);
+	else if (_default_log)
+		_default_log(level, msg, NULL);
+	/* Default to stdout/stderr if there is no callback. */
+	else
+		fprintf(level == CRYPT_LOG_ERROR ? stderr : stdout, "%s", msg);
+}
+
+__attribute__((format(printf, 5, 6)))
+void logger(struct crypt_device *cd, int level, const char *file,
+	    int line, const char *format, ...)
+{
+	va_list argp;
+	char target[LOG_MAX_LEN + 2];
+
+	va_start(argp, format);
+
+	if (vsnprintf(&target[0], LOG_MAX_LEN, format, argp) > 0 ) {
+		/* All verbose and error messages in tools end with EOL. */
+		if (level == CRYPT_LOG_VERBOSE || level == CRYPT_LOG_ERROR)
+			strncat(target, "\n", LOG_MAX_LEN);
+
+		crypt_log(cd, level, target);
+	}
+
+	va_end(argp);
+}
+
+static const char *mdata_device_path(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	return device_path(cd->metadata_device ?: cd->device);
+}
+
+static const char *data_device_path(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	return device_path(cd->device);
+}
+
+/* internal only */
+struct device *crypt_metadata_device(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	return cd->metadata_device ?: cd->device;
+}
+
+struct device *crypt_data_device(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	return cd->device;
+}
+
+int init_crypto(struct crypt_device *ctx)
+{
+	struct utsname uts;
+	int r;
+
+	r = crypt_random_init(ctx);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot initialize crypto RNG backend."));
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_backend_init(ctx);
+	if (r < 0)
+		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot initialize crypto backend."));
+
+	if (!r && !_crypto_logged) {
+		log_dbg(ctx, "Crypto backend (%s) initialized in cryptsetup library version %s.",
+			crypt_backend_version(), PACKAGE_VERSION);
+		if (!uname(&uts))
+			log_dbg(ctx, "Detected kernel %s %s %s.",
+				uts.sysname, uts.release, uts.machine);
+		_crypto_logged = 1;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int process_key(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *hash_name,
+		       size_t key_size, const char *pass, size_t passLen,
+		       struct volume_key **vk)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!key_size)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(key_size, NULL);
+	if (!*vk)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (hash_name) {
+		r = crypt_plain_hash(cd, hash_name, (*vk)->key, key_size, pass, passLen);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			if (r == -ENOENT)
+				log_err(cd, _("Hash algorithm %s not supported."),
+					hash_name);
+			else
+				log_err(cd, _("Key processing error (using hash %s)."),
+					hash_name);
+			crypt_free_volume_key(*vk);
+			*vk = NULL;
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	} else if (passLen > key_size) {
+		memcpy((*vk)->key, pass, key_size);
+	} else {
+		memcpy((*vk)->key, pass, passLen);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int isPLAIN(const char *type)
+{
+	return (type && !strcmp(CRYPT_PLAIN, type));
+}
+
+static int isLUKS1(const char *type)
+{
+	return (type && !strcmp(CRYPT_LUKS1, type));
+}
+
+static int isLUKS2(const char *type)
+{
+	return (type && !strcmp(CRYPT_LUKS2, type));
+}
+
+static int isLUKS(const char *type)
+{
+	return (isLUKS2(type) || isLUKS1(type));
+}
+
+static int isLOOPAES(const char *type)
+{
+	return (type && !strcmp(CRYPT_LOOPAES, type));
+}
+
+static int isVERITY(const char *type)
+{
+	return (type && !strcmp(CRYPT_VERITY, type));
+}
+
+static int isTCRYPT(const char *type)
+{
+	return (type && !strcmp(CRYPT_TCRYPT, type));
+}
+
+static int isINTEGRITY(const char *type)
+{
+	return (type && !strcmp(CRYPT_INTEGRITY, type));
+}
+
+static int _onlyLUKS(struct crypt_device *cd, uint32_t cdflags)
+{
+	int r = 0;
+
+	if (cd && !cd->type) {
+		if (!(cdflags & CRYPT_CD_QUIET))
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot determine device type. Incompatible activation of device?"));
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!cd || !isLUKS(cd->type)) {
+		if (!(cdflags & CRYPT_CD_QUIET))
+			log_err(cd, _("This operation is supported only for LUKS device."));
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (r || (cdflags & CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED) || isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		return r;
+
+	return LUKS2_unmet_requirements(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, 0, cdflags & CRYPT_CD_QUIET);
+}
+
+static int onlyLUKS(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	return _onlyLUKS(cd, 0);
+}
+
+static int _onlyLUKS2(struct crypt_device *cd, uint32_t cdflags)
+{
+	int r = 0;
+
+	if (cd && !cd->type) {
+		if (!(cdflags & CRYPT_CD_QUIET))
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot determine device type. Incompatible activation of device?"));
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!cd || !isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+		if (!(cdflags & CRYPT_CD_QUIET))
+			log_err(cd, _("This operation is supported only for LUKS2 device."));
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (r || (cdflags & CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED))
+		return r;
+
+	return LUKS2_unmet_requirements(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, 0, cdflags & CRYPT_CD_QUIET);
+}
+
+static int onlyLUKS2(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	return _onlyLUKS2(cd, 0);
+}
+
+static void crypt_set_null_type(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!cd->type)
+		return;
+
+	free(cd->type);
+	cd->type = NULL;
+	cd->u.none.active_name = NULL;
+	cd->data_offset = 0;
+	cd->metadata_size = 0;
+	cd->keyslots_size = 0;
+}
+
+static void crypt_reset_null_type(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (cd->type)
+		return;
+
+	free(cd->u.none.active_name);
+	cd->u.none.active_name = NULL;
+}
+
+/* keyslot helpers */
+static int keyslot_verify_or_find_empty(struct crypt_device *cd, int *keyslot)
+{
+	crypt_keyslot_info ki;
+
+	if (*keyslot == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT) {
+		if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+			*keyslot = LUKS_keyslot_find_empty(&cd->u.luks1.hdr);
+		else
+			*keyslot = LUKS2_keyslot_find_empty(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, "luks2");
+		if (*keyslot < 0) {
+			log_err(cd, _("All key slots full."));
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		ki = LUKS_keyslot_info(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, *keyslot);
+	else
+		ki = LUKS2_keyslot_info(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, *keyslot);
+	switch (ki) {
+		case CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID:
+			log_err(cd, _("Key slot %d is invalid, please select between 0 and %d."),
+				*keyslot, LUKS_NUMKEYS - 1);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		case CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE:
+			break;
+		default:
+			log_err(cd, _("Key slot %d is full, please select another one."),
+				*keyslot);
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Selected keyslot %d.", *keyslot);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * compares UUIDs returned by device-mapper (striped by cryptsetup) and uuid in header
+ */
+static int crypt_uuid_cmp(const char *dm_uuid, const char *hdr_uuid)
+{
+	int i, j;
+	char *str;
+
+	if (!dm_uuid || !hdr_uuid)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	str = strchr(dm_uuid, '-');
+	if (!str)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	for (i = 0, j = 1; hdr_uuid[i]; i++) {
+		if (hdr_uuid[i] == '-')
+			continue;
+
+		if (!str[j] || str[j] == '-')
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (str[j] != hdr_uuid[i])
+			return -EINVAL;
+		j++;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * compares type of active device to provided string (only if there is no explicit type)
+ */
+static int crypt_uuid_type_cmp(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *type)
+{
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+	size_t len;
+	int r;
+
+	/* Must user header-on-disk if we know type here */
+	if (cd->type || !cd->u.none.active_name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Checking if active device %s without header has UUID type %s.",
+		cd->u.none.active_name, type);
+
+	r = dm_query_device(cd, cd->u.none.active_name, DM_ACTIVE_UUID, &dmd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = -ENODEV;
+	len = strlen(type);
+	if (dmd.uuid && strlen(dmd.uuid) > len &&
+	    !strncmp(dmd.uuid, type, len) && dmd.uuid[len] == '-')
+		r = 0;
+
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)dmd.uuid);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int PLAIN_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		     const char *name,
+		     struct volume_key *vk,
+		     uint64_t size,
+		     uint32_t flags)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {
+		.flags = flags,
+		.size = size,
+	};
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Trying to activate PLAIN device %s using cipher %s.",
+		name, crypt_get_cipher_spec(cd));
+
+	r = dm_crypt_target_set(&dmd.segment, 0, dmd.size, crypt_data_device(cd),
+			vk, crypt_get_cipher_spec(cd), crypt_get_iv_offset(cd),
+			crypt_get_data_offset(cd), crypt_get_integrity(cd),
+			crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd), crypt_get_sector_size(cd));
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = create_or_reload_device(cd, name, CRYPT_PLAIN, &dmd);
+
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_confirm(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *msg)
+{
+	if (!cd || !cd->confirm)
+		return 1;
+	else
+		return cd->confirm(msg, cd->confirm_usrptr);
+}
+
+void crypt_set_log_callback(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	void (*log)(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr),
+	void *usrptr)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		_default_log = log;
+	else {
+		cd->log = log;
+		cd->log_usrptr = usrptr;
+	}
+}
+
+void crypt_set_confirm_callback(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int (*confirm)(const char *msg, void *usrptr),
+	void *usrptr)
+{
+	if (cd) {
+		cd->confirm = confirm;
+		cd->confirm_usrptr = usrptr;
+	}
+}
+
+const char *crypt_get_dir(void)
+{
+	return dm_get_dir();
+}
+
+int crypt_init(struct crypt_device **cd, const char *device)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *h = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!cd)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(NULL, "Allocating context for crypt device %s.", device ?: "(none)");
+
+	if (!(h = malloc(sizeof(struct crypt_device))))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	memset(h, 0, sizeof(*h));
+
+	r = device_alloc(NULL, &h->device, device);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto bad;
+
+	dm_backend_init(NULL);
+
+	h->rng_type = crypt_random_default_key_rng();
+
+	*cd = h;
+	return 0;
+bad:
+	device_free(NULL, h->device);
+	free(h);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int crypt_check_data_device_size(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	int r;
+	uint64_t size, size_min;
+
+	/* Check data device size, require at least header or one sector */
+	size_min = crypt_get_data_offset(cd) << SECTOR_SHIFT ?: SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+	r = device_size(cd->device, &size);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (size < size_min) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Header detected but device %s is too small."),
+			device_path(cd->device));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _crypt_set_data_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *device)
+{
+	struct device *dev = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	r = device_alloc(cd, &dev, device);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (!cd->metadata_device) {
+		cd->metadata_device = cd->device;
+	} else
+		device_free(cd, cd->device);
+
+	cd->device = dev;
+
+	return crypt_check_data_device_size(cd);
+}
+
+int crypt_set_data_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *device)
+{
+	/* metadata device must be set */
+	if (!cd || !cd->device || !device)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Setting ciphertext data device to %s.", device ?: "(none)");
+
+	if (!isLUKS1(cd->type) && !isLUKS2(cd->type) && !isVERITY(cd->type) &&
+	    !isINTEGRITY(cd->type)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("This operation is not supported for this device type."));
+		return  -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return _crypt_set_data_device(cd, device);
+}
+
+int crypt_init_data_device(struct crypt_device **cd, const char *device, const char *data_device)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!cd)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = crypt_init(cd, device);
+	if (r || !data_device)
+		return r;
+
+	log_dbg(NULL, "Setting ciphertext data device to %s.", data_device ?: "(none)");
+	r = _crypt_set_data_device(*cd, data_device);
+	if (r)
+		crypt_free(*cd);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+
+/* internal only */
+struct crypt_pbkdf_type *crypt_get_pbkdf(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	return &cd->pbkdf;
+}
+
+/*
+ * crypt_load() helpers
+ */
+static int _crypt_load_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd, int reload, int repair)
+{
+	int r;
+	char *type = NULL;
+	struct luks2_hdr hdr2 = {};
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "%soading LUKS2 header (repair %sabled).", reload ? "Rel" : "L", repair ? "en" : "dis");
+
+	r = LUKS2_hdr_read(cd, &hdr2, repair);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	if (!reload && !(type = strdup(CRYPT_LUKS2))) {
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (verify_pbkdf_params(cd, &cd->pbkdf)) {
+		r = init_pbkdf_type(cd, NULL, CRYPT_LUKS2);
+		if (r)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (reload)
+		LUKS2_hdr_free(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+	else
+		cd->type = type;
+
+	r = 0;
+	memcpy(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, &hdr2, sizeof(hdr2));
+	cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher = NULL;
+
+out:
+	if (r) {
+		free(type);
+		LUKS2_hdr_free(cd, &hdr2);
+	}
+	/* FIXME: why? */
+	crypt_memzero(&hdr2, sizeof(hdr2));
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void _luks2_reload(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!cd || !isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return;
+
+	(void) _crypt_load_luks2(cd, 1, 0);
+}
+
+static int _crypt_load_luks(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *requested_type,
+			    int require_header, int repair)
+{
+	char *cipher_spec;
+	struct luks_phdr hdr = {};
+	int r, version;
+
+	r = init_crypto(cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	/* This will return 0 if primary LUKS2 header is damaged */
+	version = LUKS2_hdr_version_unlocked(cd, NULL);
+
+	if ((isLUKS1(requested_type) && version == 2) ||
+	    (isLUKS2(requested_type) && version == 1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (requested_type)
+		version = 0;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(requested_type) || version == 1) {
+		if (cd->type && isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialised to type %s", cd->type);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		if (verify_pbkdf_params(cd, &cd->pbkdf)) {
+			r = init_pbkdf_type(cd, NULL, CRYPT_LUKS1);
+			if (r)
+				return r;
+		}
+
+		r = LUKS_read_phdr(&hdr, require_header, repair, cd);
+		if (r)
+			goto out;
+
+		if (!cd->type && !(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_LUKS1))) {
+			r = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		/* Set hash to the same as in the loaded header */
+		if (!cd->pbkdf.hash || strcmp(cd->pbkdf.hash, hdr.hashSpec)) {
+			free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->pbkdf.hash);
+			cd->pbkdf.hash = strdup(hdr.hashSpec);
+			if (!cd->pbkdf.hash) {
+				r = -ENOMEM;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (asprintf(&cipher_spec, "%s-%s", hdr.cipherName, hdr.cipherMode) < 0) {
+			r = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		free(cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec);
+		cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec = cipher_spec;
+
+		memcpy(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, &hdr, sizeof(hdr));
+	} else if (isLUKS2(requested_type) || version == 2 || version == 0) {
+		if (cd->type && isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialised to type %s", cd->type);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Current LUKS2 repair just overrides blkid probes
+		 * and perform auto-recovery if possible. This is safe
+		 * unless future LUKS2 repair code do something more
+		 * sophisticated. In such case we would need to check
+		 * for LUKS2 requirements and decide if it's safe to
+		 * perform repair.
+		 */
+		r =  _crypt_load_luks2(cd, cd->type != NULL, repair);
+	} else {
+		if (version > 2)
+			log_err(cd, _("Unsupported LUKS version %d."), version);
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+out:
+	crypt_memzero(&hdr, sizeof(hdr));
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _crypt_load_tcrypt(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!params)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (cd->metadata_device) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Detached metadata device is not supported for this crypt type."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = init_crypto(cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	memcpy(&cd->u.tcrypt.params, params, sizeof(*params));
+
+	r = TCRYPT_read_phdr(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params);
+
+	cd->u.tcrypt.params.passphrase = NULL;
+	cd->u.tcrypt.params.passphrase_size = 0;
+	cd->u.tcrypt.params.keyfiles = NULL;
+	cd->u.tcrypt.params.keyfiles_count = 0;
+	cd->u.tcrypt.params.veracrypt_pim = 0;
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (!cd->type && !(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_TCRYPT)))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _crypt_load_verity(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_params_verity *params)
+{
+	int r;
+	size_t sb_offset = 0;
+
+	r = init_crypto(cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (params && params->flags & CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (params)
+		sb_offset = params->hash_area_offset;
+
+	r = VERITY_read_sb(cd, sb_offset, &cd->u.verity.uuid, &cd->u.verity.hdr);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	//FIXME: use crypt_free
+	if (!cd->type && !(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_VERITY))) {
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_name);
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.salt);
+		free(cd->u.verity.uuid);
+		crypt_memzero(&cd->u.verity.hdr, sizeof(cd->u.verity.hdr));
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (params)
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.flags = params->flags;
+
+	/* Hash availability checked in sb load */
+	cd->u.verity.root_hash_size = crypt_hash_size(cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_name);
+	if (cd->u.verity.root_hash_size > 4096)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (params && params->data_device &&
+	    (r = crypt_set_data_device(cd, params->data_device)) < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (params && params->fec_device) {
+		r = device_alloc(cd, &cd->u.verity.fec_device, params->fec_device);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_area_offset = params->fec_area_offset;
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_roots = params->fec_roots;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _crypt_load_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				 struct crypt_params_integrity *params)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	r = init_crypto(cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = INTEGRITY_read_sb(cd, &cd->u.integrity.params);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	// FIXME: add checks for fields in integrity sb vs params
+
+	if (params) {
+		cd->u.integrity.params.journal_watermark = params->journal_watermark;
+		cd->u.integrity.params.journal_commit_time = params->journal_commit_time;
+		cd->u.integrity.params.buffer_sectors = params->buffer_sectors;
+		// FIXME: check ENOMEM
+		if (params->integrity)
+			cd->u.integrity.params.integrity = strdup(params->integrity);
+		cd->u.integrity.params.integrity_key_size = params->integrity_key_size;
+		if (params->journal_integrity)
+			cd->u.integrity.params.journal_integrity = strdup(params->journal_integrity);
+		if (params->journal_crypt)
+			cd->u.integrity.params.journal_crypt = strdup(params->journal_crypt);
+
+		if (params->journal_crypt_key) {
+			cd->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key =
+				crypt_alloc_volume_key(params->journal_crypt_key_size,
+						       params->journal_crypt_key);
+			if (!cd->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+		if (params->journal_integrity_key) {
+			cd->u.integrity.journal_mac_key =
+				crypt_alloc_volume_key(params->journal_integrity_key_size,
+						       params->journal_integrity_key);
+			if (!cd->u.integrity.journal_mac_key)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!cd->type && !(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_INTEGRITY))) {
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.integrity.params.integrity);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_load(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	       const char *requested_type,
+	       void *params)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!cd)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Trying to load %s crypt type from device %s.",
+		requested_type ?: "any", mdata_device_path(cd) ?: "(none)");
+
+	if (!crypt_metadata_device(cd))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	crypt_reset_null_type(cd);
+	cd->data_offset = 0;
+	cd->metadata_size = 0;
+	cd->keyslots_size = 0;
+
+	if (!requested_type || isLUKS1(requested_type) || isLUKS2(requested_type)) {
+		if (cd->type && !isLUKS1(cd->type) && !isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialised to type %s", cd->type);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, requested_type, 1, 0);
+	} else if (isVERITY(requested_type)) {
+		if (cd->type && !isVERITY(cd->type)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialised to type %s", cd->type);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		r = _crypt_load_verity(cd, params);
+	} else if (isTCRYPT(requested_type)) {
+		if (cd->type && !isTCRYPT(cd->type)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialised to type %s", cd->type);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		r = _crypt_load_tcrypt(cd, params);
+	} else if (isINTEGRITY(requested_type)) {
+		if (cd->type && !isINTEGRITY(cd->type)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialised to type %s", cd->type);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		r = _crypt_load_integrity(cd, params);
+	} else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * crypt_init() helpers
+ */
+static int _init_by_name_crypt_none(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	int r;
+	char _mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+	struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd.segment;
+
+	if (cd->type || !cd->u.none.active_name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = dm_query_device(cd, cd->u.none.active_name,
+			DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_CIPHER |
+			DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE, &dmd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+	if (!single_segment(&dmd) || tgt->type != DM_CRYPT)
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	if (r >= 0)
+		r = crypt_parse_name_and_mode(tgt->u.crypt.cipher,
+					      cd->u.none.cipher, NULL,
+					      _mode);
+
+	if (!r) {
+		snprintf(cd->u.none.cipher_spec, sizeof(cd->u.none.cipher_spec),
+			 "%s-%s", cd->u.none.cipher, _mode);
+		cd->u.none.cipher_mode = cd->u.none.cipher_spec + strlen(cd->u.none.cipher) + 1;
+		cd->u.none.key_size = tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength;
+	}
+
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static const char *LUKS_UUID(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return NULL;
+	else if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.luks1.hdr.uuid;
+	else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.luks2.hdr.uuid;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static void crypt_free_type(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (isPLAIN(cd->type)) {
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.plain.hdr.hash);
+		free(cd->u.plain.cipher);
+		free(cd->u.plain.cipher_spec);
+	} else if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+		LUKS2_hdr_free(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+		free(cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher);
+	} else if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+		free(cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec);
+	} else if (isLOOPAES(cd->type)) {
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.loopaes.hdr.hash);
+		free(cd->u.loopaes.cipher);
+		free(cd->u.loopaes.cipher_spec);
+	} else if (isVERITY(cd->type)) {
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_name);
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.data_device);
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_device);
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_device);
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.salt);
+		free(cd->u.verity.root_hash);
+		free(cd->u.verity.uuid);
+		device_free(cd, cd->u.verity.fec_device);
+	} else if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type)) {
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.integrity.params.integrity);
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.integrity.params.journal_integrity);
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.integrity.params.journal_crypt);
+		crypt_free_volume_key(cd->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key);
+		crypt_free_volume_key(cd->u.integrity.journal_mac_key);
+	} else if (!cd->type) {
+		free(cd->u.none.active_name);
+		cd->u.none.active_name = NULL;
+	}
+
+	crypt_set_null_type(cd);
+}
+
+static int _init_by_name_crypt(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+	char *cipher_spec = NULL, cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+	const char *namei;
+	int key_nums, r;
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd, dmdi = {};
+	struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd.segment, *tgti = &dmdi.segment;
+
+	r = dm_query_device(cd, name,
+			DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE |
+			DM_ACTIVE_UUID |
+			DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_CIPHER |
+			DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE, &dmd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (!single_segment(&dmd) || tgt->type != DM_CRYPT) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Unsupported device table detected in %s.", name);
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_parse_name_and_mode(tgt->u.crypt.cipher, cipher,
+				      &key_nums, cipher_mode);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Cannot parse cipher and mode from active device.");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (tgt->u.crypt.integrity && (namei = device_dm_name(tgt->data_device))) {
+		r = dm_query_device(cd, namei, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE, &dmdi);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+		if (!single_segment(&dmdi) || tgti->type != DM_INTEGRITY) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Unsupported device table detected in %s.", namei);
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (!cd->metadata_device) {
+			device_free(cd, cd->device);
+			MOVE_REF(cd->device, tgti->data_device);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (asprintf(&cipher_spec, "%s-%s", cipher, cipher_mode) < 0) {
+		cipher_spec = NULL;
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (isPLAIN(cd->type)) {
+		cd->u.plain.hdr.hash = NULL; /* no way to get this */
+		cd->u.plain.hdr.offset = tgt->u.crypt.offset;
+		cd->u.plain.hdr.skip = tgt->u.crypt.iv_offset;
+		cd->u.plain.hdr.sector_size = tgt->u.crypt.sector_size;
+		cd->u.plain.key_size = tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength;
+		cd->u.plain.cipher = strdup(cipher);
+		MOVE_REF(cd->u.plain.cipher_spec, cipher_spec);
+		cd->u.plain.cipher_mode = cd->u.plain.cipher_spec + strlen(cipher) + 1;
+	} else if (isLOOPAES(cd->type)) {
+		cd->u.loopaes.hdr.offset = tgt->u.crypt.offset;
+		cd->u.loopaes.cipher = strdup(cipher);
+		MOVE_REF(cd->u.loopaes.cipher_spec, cipher_spec);
+		cd->u.loopaes.cipher_mode = cd->u.loopaes.cipher_spec + strlen(cipher) + 1;
+		/* version 3 uses last key for IV */
+		if (tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength % key_nums)
+			key_nums++;
+		cd->u.loopaes.key_size = tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength / key_nums;
+	} else if (isLUKS1(cd->type) || isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+		if (crypt_metadata_device(cd)) {
+			r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, cd->type, 0, 0);
+			if (r < 0) {
+				log_dbg(cd, "LUKS device header does not match active device.");
+				crypt_set_null_type(cd);
+				r = 0;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			/* check whether UUIDs match each other */
+			r = crypt_uuid_cmp(dmd.uuid, LUKS_UUID(cd));
+			if (r < 0) {
+				log_dbg(cd, "LUKS device header uuid: %s mismatches DM returned uuid %s",
+					LUKS_UUID(cd), dmd.uuid);
+				crypt_free_type(cd);
+				r = 0;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		} else {
+			log_dbg(cd, "LUKS device header not available.");
+			crypt_set_null_type(cd);
+			r = 0;
+		}
+	} else if (isTCRYPT(cd->type)) {
+		r = TCRYPT_init_by_name(cd, name, dmd.uuid, tgt, &cd->device,
+					&cd->u.tcrypt.params, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr);
+	}
+out:
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmdi);
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)dmd.uuid);
+	free(cipher_spec);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _init_by_name_verity(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+	struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd.segment;
+	int r;
+
+	r = dm_query_device(cd, name,
+				DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE |
+				DM_ACTIVE_VERITY_HASH_DEVICE |
+				DM_ACTIVE_VERITY_PARAMS, &dmd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+	if (!single_segment(&dmd) || tgt->type != DM_VERITY) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Unsupported device table detected in %s.", name);
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (r > 0)
+		r = 0;
+
+	if (isVERITY(cd->type)) {
+		cd->u.verity.uuid = NULL; // FIXME
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.flags = CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER; //FIXME
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.data_size = tgt->u.verity.vp->data_size;
+		cd->u.verity.root_hash_size = tgt->u.verity.root_hash_size;
+		MOVE_REF(cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_name, tgt->u.verity.vp->hash_name);
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.data_device = NULL;
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_device = NULL;
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.data_block_size = tgt->u.verity.vp->data_block_size;
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_block_size = tgt->u.verity.vp->hash_block_size;
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_area_offset = tgt->u.verity.hash_offset;
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_area_offset = tgt->u.verity.fec_offset;
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_type = tgt->u.verity.vp->hash_type;
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.flags = tgt->u.verity.vp->flags;
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.salt_size = tgt->u.verity.vp->salt_size;
+		MOVE_REF(cd->u.verity.hdr.salt, tgt->u.verity.vp->salt);
+		MOVE_REF(cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_device, tgt->u.verity.vp->fec_device);
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_roots = tgt->u.verity.vp->fec_roots;
+		MOVE_REF(cd->u.verity.fec_device, tgt->u.verity.fec_device);
+		MOVE_REF(cd->metadata_device, tgt->u.verity.hash_device);
+	}
+out:
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _init_by_name_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+	struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd.segment;
+	int r;
+
+	r = dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE |
+				      DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY |
+				      DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE |
+				      DM_ACTIVE_INTEGRITY_PARAMS, &dmd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+	if (!single_segment(&dmd) || tgt->type != DM_INTEGRITY) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Unsupported device table detected in %s.", name);
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (r > 0)
+		r = 0;
+
+	if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type)) {
+		cd->u.integrity.params.tag_size = tgt->u.integrity.tag_size;
+		cd->u.integrity.params.sector_size = tgt->u.integrity.sector_size;
+		cd->u.integrity.params.journal_size = tgt->u.integrity.journal_size;
+		cd->u.integrity.params.journal_watermark = tgt->u.integrity.journal_watermark;
+		cd->u.integrity.params.journal_commit_time = tgt->u.integrity.journal_commit_time;
+		cd->u.integrity.params.interleave_sectors = tgt->u.integrity.interleave_sectors;
+		cd->u.integrity.params.buffer_sectors = tgt->u.integrity.buffer_sectors;
+		MOVE_REF(cd->u.integrity.params.integrity, tgt->u.integrity.integrity);
+		MOVE_REF(cd->u.integrity.params.journal_integrity, tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity);
+		MOVE_REF(cd->u.integrity.params.journal_crypt, tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt);
+
+		if (tgt->u.integrity.vk)
+			cd->u.integrity.params.integrity_key_size = tgt->u.integrity.vk->keylength;
+		if (tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key)
+			cd->u.integrity.params.journal_integrity_key_size = tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key->keylength;
+		if (tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key)
+			cd->u.integrity.params.integrity_key_size = tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key->keylength;
+		MOVE_REF(cd->metadata_device, tgt->u.integrity.meta_device);
+	}
+out:
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_init_by_name_and_header(struct crypt_device **cd,
+				  const char *name,
+				  const char *header_device)
+{
+	crypt_status_info ci;
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+	struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd.segment;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!cd || !name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(NULL, "Allocating crypt device context by device %s.", name);
+
+	ci = crypt_status(NULL, name);
+	if (ci == CRYPT_INVALID)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	if (ci < CRYPT_ACTIVE) {
+		log_err(NULL, _("Device %s is not active."), name);
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+
+	r = dm_query_device(NULL, name, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE | DM_ACTIVE_UUID, &dmd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+	if (!single_segment(&dmd)) {
+		log_dbg(NULL, "Unsupported device table detected in %s.", name);
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	*cd = NULL;
+
+	if (header_device) {
+		r = crypt_init(cd, header_device);
+	} else {
+		r = crypt_init(cd, device_path(tgt->data_device));
+
+		/* Underlying device disappeared but mapping still active */
+		if (!tgt->data_device || r == -ENOTBLK)
+			log_verbose(NULL, _("Underlying device for crypt device %s disappeared."),
+				    name);
+
+		/* Underlying device is not readable but crypt mapping exists */
+		if (r == -ENOTBLK)
+			r = crypt_init(cd, NULL);
+	}
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (dmd.uuid) {
+		if (!strncmp(CRYPT_PLAIN, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_PLAIN)-1))
+			(*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_PLAIN);
+		else if (!strncmp(CRYPT_LOOPAES, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_LOOPAES)-1))
+			(*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_LOOPAES);
+		else if (!strncmp(CRYPT_LUKS1, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_LUKS1)-1))
+			(*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_LUKS1);
+		else if (!strncmp(CRYPT_LUKS2, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_LUKS2)-1))
+			(*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_LUKS2);
+		else if (!strncmp(CRYPT_VERITY, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_VERITY)-1))
+			(*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_VERITY);
+		else if (!strncmp(CRYPT_TCRYPT, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_TCRYPT)-1))
+			(*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_TCRYPT);
+		else if (!strncmp(CRYPT_INTEGRITY, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_INTEGRITY)-1))
+			(*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_INTEGRITY);
+		else
+			log_dbg(NULL, "Unknown UUID set, some parameters are not set.");
+	} else
+		log_dbg(NULL, "Active device has no UUID set, some parameters are not set.");
+
+	if (header_device) {
+		r = crypt_set_data_device(*cd, device_path(tgt->data_device));
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Try to initialise basic parameters from active device */
+
+	if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT)
+		r = _init_by_name_crypt(*cd, name);
+	else if (tgt->type == DM_VERITY)
+		r = _init_by_name_verity(*cd, name);
+	else if (tgt->type == DM_INTEGRITY)
+		r = _init_by_name_integrity(*cd, name);
+out:
+	if (r < 0) {
+		crypt_free(*cd);
+		*cd = NULL;
+	} else if (!(*cd)->type) {
+		/* For anonymous device (no header found) remember initialized name */
+		(*cd)->u.none.active_name = strdup(name);
+	}
+
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)dmd.uuid);
+	dm_targets_free(NULL, &dmd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_init_by_name(struct crypt_device **cd, const char *name)
+{
+	return crypt_init_by_name_and_header(cd, name, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * crypt_format() helpers
+ */
+static int _crypt_format_plain(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			       const char *cipher,
+			       const char *cipher_mode,
+			       const char *uuid,
+			       size_t volume_key_size,
+			       struct crypt_params_plain *params)
+{
+	unsigned int sector_size = params ? params->sector_size : SECTOR_SIZE;
+	uint64_t dev_size;
+
+	if (!cipher || !cipher_mode) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Invalid plain crypt parameters."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (volume_key_size > 1024) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Invalid key size."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (uuid) {
+		log_err(cd, _("UUID is not supported for this crypt type."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (cd->metadata_device) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Detached metadata device is not supported for this crypt type."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* For compatibility with old params structure */
+	if (!sector_size)
+		sector_size = SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+	if (sector_size < SECTOR_SIZE || sector_size > MAX_SECTOR_SIZE ||
+	    NOTPOW2(sector_size)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Unsupported encryption sector size."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (sector_size > SECTOR_SIZE && !device_size(cd->device, &dev_size)) {
+		if (params && params->offset)
+			dev_size -= (params->offset * SECTOR_SIZE);
+		if (dev_size % sector_size) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Device size is not aligned to requested sector size."));
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_PLAIN)))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	cd->u.plain.key_size = volume_key_size;
+	cd->volume_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, NULL);
+	if (!cd->volume_key)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (asprintf(&cd->u.plain.cipher_spec, "%s-%s", cipher, cipher_mode) < 0) {
+		cd->u.plain.cipher_spec = NULL;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	cd->u.plain.cipher = strdup(cipher);
+	cd->u.plain.cipher_mode = cd->u.plain.cipher_spec + strlen(cipher) + 1;
+
+	if (params && params->hash)
+		cd->u.plain.hdr.hash = strdup(params->hash);
+
+	cd->u.plain.hdr.offset = params ? params->offset : 0;
+	cd->u.plain.hdr.skip = params ? params->skip : 0;
+	cd->u.plain.hdr.size = params ? params->size : 0;
+	cd->u.plain.hdr.sector_size = sector_size;
+
+	if (!cd->u.plain.cipher)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int _crypt_format_luks1(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			       const char *cipher,
+			       const char *cipher_mode,
+			       const char *uuid,
+			       const char *volume_key,
+			       size_t volume_key_size,
+			       struct crypt_params_luks1 *params)
+{
+	int r;
+	unsigned long required_alignment = DEFAULT_DISK_ALIGNMENT;
+	unsigned long alignment_offset = 0;
+	uint64_t dev_size;
+
+	if (!cipher || !cipher_mode)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!crypt_metadata_device(cd)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Can't format LUKS without device."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (params && cd->data_offset && params->data_alignment &&
+	   (cd->data_offset % params->data_alignment)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Requested data alignment is not compatible with data offset."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_LUKS1)))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (volume_key)
+		cd->volume_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size,
+						      volume_key);
+	else
+		cd->volume_key = crypt_generate_volume_key(cd, volume_key_size);
+
+	if (!cd->volume_key)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (verify_pbkdf_params(cd, &cd->pbkdf)) {
+		r = init_pbkdf_type(cd, NULL, CRYPT_LUKS1);
+		if (r)
+			return r;
+	}
+
+	if (params && params->hash && strcmp(params->hash, cd->pbkdf.hash)) {
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->pbkdf.hash);
+		cd->pbkdf.hash = strdup(params->hash);
+		if (!cd->pbkdf.hash)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (params && params->data_device) {
+		if (!cd->metadata_device)
+			cd->metadata_device = cd->device;
+		else
+			device_free(cd, cd->device);
+		cd->device = NULL;
+		if (device_alloc(cd, &cd->device, params->data_device) < 0)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (params && cd->metadata_device) {
+		/* For detached header the alignment is used directly as data offset */
+		if (!cd->data_offset)
+			cd->data_offset = params->data_alignment;
+		required_alignment = params->data_alignment * SECTOR_SIZE;
+	} else if (params && params->data_alignment) {
+		required_alignment = params->data_alignment * SECTOR_SIZE;
+	} else
+		device_topology_alignment(cd, cd->device,
+				       &required_alignment,
+				       &alignment_offset, DEFAULT_DISK_ALIGNMENT);
+
+	r = LUKS_check_cipher(cd, volume_key_size, cipher, cipher_mode);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = LUKS_generate_phdr(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, cd->volume_key, cipher, cipher_mode,
+			       cd->pbkdf.hash, uuid,
+			       cd->data_offset * SECTOR_SIZE,
+			       alignment_offset, required_alignment, cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = device_check_access(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd), DEV_EXCL);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (!device_size(crypt_data_device(cd), &dev_size) &&
+	    dev_size < (crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE))
+		log_std(cd, _("WARNING: Data offset is outside of currently available data device.\n"));
+
+	if (asprintf(&cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec, "%s-%s", cipher, cipher_mode) < 0) {
+		cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec = NULL;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	r = LUKS_wipe_header_areas(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, cd);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		free(cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec);
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot wipe header on device %s."),
+			mdata_device_path(cd));
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	r = LUKS_write_phdr(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, cd);
+	if (r)
+		free(cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _crypt_format_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			       const char *cipher,
+			       const char *cipher_mode,
+			       const char *uuid,
+			       const char *volume_key,
+			       size_t volume_key_size,
+			       struct crypt_params_luks2 *params)
+{
+	int r, integrity_key_size = 0;
+	unsigned long required_alignment = DEFAULT_DISK_ALIGNMENT;
+	unsigned long alignment_offset = 0;
+	unsigned int sector_size = params ? params->sector_size : SECTOR_SIZE;
+	const char *integrity = params ? params->integrity : NULL;
+	uint64_t dev_size;
+	uint32_t dmc_flags;
+
+	cd->u.luks2.hdr.jobj = NULL;
+	cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher = NULL;
+
+	if (!cipher || !cipher_mode)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!crypt_metadata_device(cd)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Can't format LUKS without device."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (params && cd->data_offset && params->data_alignment &&
+	   (cd->data_offset % params->data_alignment)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Requested data alignment is not compatible with data offset."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (sector_size < SECTOR_SIZE || sector_size > MAX_SECTOR_SIZE ||
+	    NOTPOW2(sector_size)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Unsupported encryption sector size."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (sector_size != SECTOR_SIZE && !dm_flags(cd, DM_CRYPT, &dmc_flags) &&
+	    !(dmc_flags & DM_SECTOR_SIZE_SUPPORTED))
+		log_std(cd, _("WARNING: The device activation will fail, dm-crypt is missing "
+			      "support for requested encryption sector size.\n"));
+
+	if (integrity) {
+		if (params->integrity_params) {
+			/* Standalone dm-integrity must not be used */
+			if (params->integrity_params->integrity ||
+			    params->integrity_params->integrity_key_size)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			/* FIXME: journal encryption and MAC is here not yet supported */
+			if (params->integrity_params->journal_crypt ||
+			params->integrity_params->journal_integrity)
+				return -ENOTSUP;
+		}
+		if (!INTEGRITY_tag_size(cd, integrity, cipher, cipher_mode)) {
+			if (!strcmp(integrity, "none"))
+				integrity = NULL;
+			else
+				return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		integrity_key_size = INTEGRITY_key_size(cd, integrity);
+		if ((integrity_key_size < 0) || (integrity_key_size >= (int)volume_key_size)) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Volume key is too small for encryption with integrity extensions."));
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	r = device_check_access(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd), DEV_EXCL);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (!(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_LUKS2)))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (volume_key)
+		cd->volume_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size,
+						      volume_key);
+	else
+		cd->volume_key = crypt_generate_volume_key(cd, volume_key_size);
+
+	if (!cd->volume_key)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (params && params->pbkdf)
+		r = crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, params->pbkdf);
+	else if (verify_pbkdf_params(cd, &cd->pbkdf))
+		r = init_pbkdf_type(cd, NULL, CRYPT_LUKS2);
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (params && params->data_device) {
+		if (!cd->metadata_device)
+			cd->metadata_device = cd->device;
+		else
+			device_free(cd, cd->device);
+		cd->device = NULL;
+		if (device_alloc(cd, &cd->device, params->data_device) < 0)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (params && cd->metadata_device) {
+		/* For detached header the alignment is used directly as data offset */
+		if (!cd->data_offset)
+			cd->data_offset = params->data_alignment;
+		required_alignment = params->data_alignment * SECTOR_SIZE;
+	} else if (params && params->data_alignment) {
+		required_alignment = params->data_alignment * SECTOR_SIZE;
+	} else
+		device_topology_alignment(cd, cd->device,
+				       &required_alignment,
+				       &alignment_offset, DEFAULT_DISK_ALIGNMENT);
+
+	/* FIXME: allow this later also for normal ciphers (check AF_ALG availability. */
+	if (integrity && !integrity_key_size) {
+		r = crypt_cipher_check(cipher, cipher_mode, integrity, volume_key_size);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Cipher %s-%s (key size %zd bits) is not available."),
+				cipher, cipher_mode, volume_key_size * 8);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if ((!integrity || integrity_key_size) && !crypt_cipher_wrapped_key(cipher, cipher_mode) &&
+	    !INTEGRITY_tag_size(cd, NULL, cipher, cipher_mode)) {
+		r = LUKS_check_cipher(cd, volume_key_size - integrity_key_size,
+				      cipher, cipher_mode);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = LUKS2_generate_hdr(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, cd->volume_key,
+			       cipher, cipher_mode,
+			       integrity, uuid,
+			       sector_size,
+			       cd->data_offset * SECTOR_SIZE,
+			       alignment_offset,
+			       required_alignment,
+			       cd->metadata_size, cd->keyslots_size);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = device_size(crypt_data_device(cd), &dev_size);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (dev_size < (crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE))
+		log_std(cd, _("WARNING: Data offset is outside of currently available data device.\n"));
+
+	if (!integrity && sector_size > SECTOR_SIZE) {
+		dev_size -= (crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE);
+		if (dev_size % sector_size) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Device size is not aligned to requested sector size."));
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (params && (params->label || params->subsystem)) {
+		r = LUKS2_hdr_labels(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr,
+				     params->label, params->subsystem, 0);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = LUKS2_wipe_header_areas(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot wipe header on device %s."),
+			mdata_device_path(cd));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Wipe integrity superblock and create integrity superblock */
+	if (crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd)) {
+		r = crypt_wipe_device(cd, crypt_data_device(cd), CRYPT_WIPE_ZERO,
+				      crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE,
+				      8 * SECTOR_SIZE, 8 * SECTOR_SIZE, NULL, NULL);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			if (r == -EBUSY)
+				log_err(cd, _("Cannot format device %s which is still in use."),
+					data_device_path(cd));
+			else if (r == -EACCES) {
+				log_err(cd, _("Cannot format device %s, permission denied."),
+					data_device_path(cd));
+				r = -EINVAL;
+			} else
+				log_err(cd, _("Cannot wipe header on device %s."),
+					data_device_path(cd));
+
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		r = INTEGRITY_format(cd, params ? params->integrity_params : NULL, NULL, NULL);
+		if (r)
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot format integrity for device %s."),
+				data_device_path(cd));
+	}
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		if (r == -EBUSY)
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot format device %s in use."),
+				mdata_device_path(cd));
+		else if (r == -EACCES) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot format device %s, permission denied."),
+				mdata_device_path(cd));
+			r = -EINVAL;
+		} else
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot format device %s."),
+				mdata_device_path(cd));
+	}
+
+out:
+	if (r)
+		LUKS2_hdr_free(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _crypt_format_loopaes(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				 const char *cipher,
+				 const char *uuid,
+				 size_t volume_key_size,
+				 struct crypt_params_loopaes *params)
+{
+	if (!crypt_metadata_device(cd)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Can't format LOOPAES without device."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (volume_key_size > 1024) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Invalid key size."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (uuid) {
+		log_err(cd, _("UUID is not supported for this crypt type."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (cd->metadata_device) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Detached metadata device is not supported for this crypt type."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_LOOPAES)))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	cd->u.loopaes.key_size = volume_key_size;
+
+	cd->u.loopaes.cipher = strdup(cipher ?: DEFAULT_LOOPAES_CIPHER);
+
+	if (params && params->hash)
+		cd->u.loopaes.hdr.hash = strdup(params->hash);
+
+	cd->u.loopaes.hdr.offset = params ? params->offset : 0;
+	cd->u.loopaes.hdr.skip = params ? params->skip : 0;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int _crypt_format_verity(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				 const char *uuid,
+				 struct crypt_params_verity *params)
+{
+	int r = 0, hash_size;
+	uint64_t data_device_size, hash_blocks_size;
+	struct device *fec_device = NULL;
+	char *fec_device_path = NULL, *hash_name = NULL, *root_hash = NULL, *salt = NULL;
+
+	if (!crypt_metadata_device(cd)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Can't format VERITY without device."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!params)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!params->data_device && !cd->metadata_device)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (params->hash_type > VERITY_MAX_HASH_TYPE) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Unsupported VERITY hash type %d."), params->hash_type);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (VERITY_BLOCK_SIZE_OK(params->data_block_size) ||
+	    VERITY_BLOCK_SIZE_OK(params->hash_block_size)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Unsupported VERITY block size."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (MISALIGNED_512(params->hash_area_offset)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Unsupported VERITY hash offset."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (MISALIGNED_512(params->fec_area_offset)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Unsupported VERITY FEC offset."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_VERITY)))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (params->data_device) {
+		r = crypt_set_data_device(cd, params->data_device);
+		if (r)
+			return r;
+	}
+
+	if (!params->data_size) {
+		r = device_size(cd->device, &data_device_size);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.data_size = data_device_size / params->data_block_size;
+	} else
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.data_size = params->data_size;
+
+	if (device_is_identical(crypt_metadata_device(cd), crypt_data_device(cd)) &&
+	   (cd->u.verity.hdr.data_size * params->data_block_size) > params->hash_area_offset) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Data area overlaps with hash area."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	hash_size = crypt_hash_size(params->hash_name);
+	if (hash_size <= 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Hash algorithm %s not supported."),
+			params->hash_name);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	cd->u.verity.root_hash_size = hash_size;
+
+	if (params->fec_device) {
+		fec_device_path = strdup(params->fec_device);
+		if (!fec_device_path)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		r = device_alloc(cd, &fec_device, params->fec_device);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			r = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+		hash_blocks_size = VERITY_hash_blocks(cd, params) * params->hash_block_size;
+		if (device_is_identical(crypt_metadata_device(cd), fec_device) &&
+		    (params->hash_area_offset + hash_blocks_size) > params->fec_area_offset) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Hash area overlaps with FEC area."));
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+		if (device_is_identical(crypt_data_device(cd), fec_device) &&
+		    (cd->u.verity.hdr.data_size * params->data_block_size) > params->fec_area_offset) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Data area overlaps with FEC area."));
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto err;
+		}
+	}
+
+	root_hash = malloc(cd->u.verity.root_hash_size);
+	hash_name = strdup(params->hash_name);
+	salt = malloc(params->salt_size);
+
+	if (!root_hash || !hash_name || !salt) {
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	cd->u.verity.hdr.flags = params->flags;
+	cd->u.verity.root_hash = root_hash;
+	cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_name = hash_name;
+	cd->u.verity.hdr.data_device = NULL;
+	cd->u.verity.fec_device = fec_device;
+	cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_device = fec_device_path;
+	cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_roots = params->fec_roots;
+	cd->u.verity.hdr.data_block_size = params->data_block_size;
+	cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_block_size = params->hash_block_size;
+	cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_area_offset = params->hash_area_offset;
+	cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_area_offset = params->fec_area_offset;
+	cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_type = params->hash_type;
+	cd->u.verity.hdr.flags = params->flags;
+	cd->u.verity.hdr.salt_size = params->salt_size;
+	cd->u.verity.hdr.salt = salt;
+
+	if (params->salt)
+		memcpy(salt, params->salt, params->salt_size);
+	else
+		r = crypt_random_get(cd, salt, params->salt_size, CRYPT_RND_SALT);
+	if (r)
+		goto err;
+
+	if (params->flags & CRYPT_VERITY_CREATE_HASH) {
+		r = VERITY_create(cd, &cd->u.verity.hdr,
+				  cd->u.verity.root_hash, cd->u.verity.root_hash_size);
+		if (!r && params->fec_device)
+			r = VERITY_FEC_process(cd, &cd->u.verity.hdr, cd->u.verity.fec_device, 0, NULL);
+		if (r)
+			goto err;
+	}
+
+	if (!(params->flags & CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER)) {
+		if (uuid) {
+			if (!(cd->u.verity.uuid = strdup(uuid)))
+				r = -ENOMEM;
+		} else
+			r = VERITY_UUID_generate(cd, &cd->u.verity.uuid);
+
+		if (!r)
+			r = VERITY_write_sb(cd, cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_area_offset,
+					    cd->u.verity.uuid,
+					    &cd->u.verity.hdr);
+	}
+
+err:
+	if (r) {
+		device_free(cd, fec_device);
+		free(root_hash);
+		free(hash_name);
+		free(fec_device_path);
+		free(salt);
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _crypt_format_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				   const char *uuid,
+				   struct crypt_params_integrity *params)
+{
+	int r;
+	char *integrity = NULL, *journal_integrity = NULL, *journal_crypt = NULL;
+	struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key = NULL, *journal_mac_key = NULL;
+
+	if (!params)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (uuid) {
+		log_err(cd, _("UUID is not supported for this crypt type."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = device_check_access(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd), DEV_EXCL);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	/* Wipe first 8 sectors - fs magic numbers etc. */
+	r = crypt_wipe_device(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd), CRYPT_WIPE_ZERO, 0,
+			      8 * SECTOR_SIZE, 8 * SECTOR_SIZE, NULL, NULL);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot wipe header on device %s."),
+			mdata_device_path(cd));
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	if (!(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_INTEGRITY)))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (params->journal_crypt_key) {
+		journal_crypt_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(params->journal_crypt_key_size,
+							   params->journal_crypt_key);
+		if (!journal_crypt_key)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (params->journal_integrity_key) {
+		journal_mac_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(params->journal_integrity_key_size,
+							 params->journal_integrity_key);
+		if (!journal_mac_key) {
+			r = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (params->integrity && !(integrity = strdup(params->integrity))) {
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err;
+	}
+	if (params->journal_integrity && !(journal_integrity = strdup(params->journal_integrity))) {
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err;
+	}
+	if (params->journal_crypt && !(journal_crypt = strdup(params->journal_crypt))) {
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	cd->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key = journal_crypt_key;
+	cd->u.integrity.journal_mac_key = journal_mac_key;
+	cd->u.integrity.params.journal_size = params->journal_size;
+	cd->u.integrity.params.journal_watermark = params->journal_watermark;
+	cd->u.integrity.params.journal_commit_time = params->journal_commit_time;
+	cd->u.integrity.params.interleave_sectors = params->interleave_sectors;
+	cd->u.integrity.params.buffer_sectors = params->buffer_sectors;
+	cd->u.integrity.params.sector_size = params->sector_size;
+	cd->u.integrity.params.tag_size = params->tag_size;
+	cd->u.integrity.params.integrity = integrity;
+	cd->u.integrity.params.journal_integrity = journal_integrity;
+	cd->u.integrity.params.journal_crypt = journal_crypt;
+
+	r = INTEGRITY_format(cd, params, cd->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key, cd->u.integrity.journal_mac_key);
+	if (r)
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot format integrity for device %s."),
+			mdata_device_path(cd));
+err:
+	if (r) {
+		crypt_free_volume_key(journal_crypt_key);
+		crypt_free_volume_key(journal_mac_key);
+		free(integrity);
+		free(journal_integrity);
+		free(journal_crypt);
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_format(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *type,
+	const char *cipher,
+	const char *cipher_mode,
+	const char *uuid,
+	const char *volume_key,
+	size_t volume_key_size,
+	void *params)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!cd || !type)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (cd->type) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Context already formatted as %s.", cd->type);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Formatting device %s as type %s.", mdata_device_path(cd) ?: "(none)", type);
+
+	crypt_reset_null_type(cd);
+
+	r = init_crypto(cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (isPLAIN(type))
+		r = _crypt_format_plain(cd, cipher, cipher_mode,
+					uuid, volume_key_size, params);
+	else if (isLUKS1(type))
+		r = _crypt_format_luks1(cd, cipher, cipher_mode,
+					uuid, volume_key, volume_key_size, params);
+	else if (isLUKS2(type))
+		r = _crypt_format_luks2(cd, cipher, cipher_mode,
+					uuid, volume_key, volume_key_size, params);
+	else if (isLOOPAES(type))
+		r = _crypt_format_loopaes(cd, cipher, uuid, volume_key_size, params);
+	else if (isVERITY(type))
+		r = _crypt_format_verity(cd, uuid, params);
+	else if (isINTEGRITY(type))
+		r = _crypt_format_integrity(cd, uuid, params);
+	else {
+		log_err(cd, _("Unknown crypt device type %s requested."), type);
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (r < 0) {
+		crypt_set_null_type(cd);
+		crypt_free_volume_key(cd->volume_key);
+		cd->volume_key = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_repair(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		 const char *requested_type,
+		 void *params __attribute__((unused)))
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!cd)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Trying to repair %s crypt type from device %s.",
+		requested_type ?: "any", mdata_device_path(cd) ?: "(none)");
+
+	if (!crypt_metadata_device(cd))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (requested_type && !isLUKS(requested_type))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Load with repair */
+	r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, requested_type, 1, 1);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	/* cd->type and header must be set in context */
+	r = crypt_check_data_device_size(cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		crypt_set_null_type(cd);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* compare volume keys */
+static int _compare_volume_keys(struct volume_key *svk, unsigned skeyring_only, struct volume_key *tvk, unsigned tkeyring_only)
+{
+	if (!svk && !tvk)
+		return 0;
+	else if (!svk || !tvk)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (svk->keylength != tvk->keylength)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!skeyring_only && !tkeyring_only)
+		return memcmp(svk->key, tvk->key, svk->keylength);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* compare two strings (allows NULL) */
+static int _strcmp_null(const char *a, const char *b)
+{
+	if (!a && !b)
+		return 0;
+	else if (!a || !b)
+		return 1;
+	return strcmp(a, b);
+}
+
+static int _compare_device_types(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			       const struct crypt_dm_active_device *src,
+			       const struct crypt_dm_active_device *tgt)
+{
+	if (!tgt->uuid) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Missing device uuid in target device.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && !src->uuid) {
+		if (strncmp("INTEGRITY-", tgt->uuid, strlen("INTEGRITY-"))) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Unexpected uuid prefix %s in target integrity device.", tgt->uuid);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	} else if (isLUKS(cd->type)) {
+		if (!src->uuid || strncmp(cd->type, tgt->uuid, strlen(cd->type)) ||
+		    crypt_uuid_cmp(tgt->uuid, src->uuid)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "LUKS UUID mismatch.");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	} else if (isPLAIN(cd->type) || isLOOPAES(cd->type)) {
+		if (strncmp(cd->type, tgt->uuid, strlen(cd->type))) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Unexpected uuid prefix %s in target device.", tgt->uuid);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	} else {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Unsupported device type %s for reload.", cd->type ?: "<empty>");
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int _compare_crypt_devices(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			       const struct dm_target *src,
+			       const struct dm_target *tgt)
+{
+	/* for crypt devices keys are mandatory */
+	if (!src->u.crypt.vk || !tgt->u.crypt.vk)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (_compare_volume_keys(src->u.crypt.vk, 0, tgt->u.crypt.vk, tgt->u.crypt.vk->key_description != NULL)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Keys in context and target device do not match.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* CIPHER checks */
+	if (!src->u.crypt.cipher || !tgt->u.crypt.cipher)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (strcmp(src->u.crypt.cipher, tgt->u.crypt.cipher)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Cipher specs do not match.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (_strcmp_null(src->u.crypt.integrity, tgt->u.crypt.integrity)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Integrity parameters do not match.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (src->u.crypt.offset      != tgt->u.crypt.offset ||
+	    src->u.crypt.sector_size != tgt->u.crypt.sector_size ||
+	    src->u.crypt.iv_offset   != tgt->u.crypt.iv_offset ||
+	    src->u.crypt.tag_size    != tgt->u.crypt.tag_size) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Integer parameters do not match.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!device_is_identical(src->data_device, tgt->data_device)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Data devices do not match.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int _compare_integrity_devices(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			       const struct dm_target *src,
+			       const struct dm_target *tgt)
+{
+	/*
+	 * some parameters may be implicit (and set in dm-integrity ctor)
+	 *
+	 *	journal_size
+	 *	journal_watermark
+	 *	journal_commit_time
+	 *	buffer_sectors
+	 *	interleave_sectors
+	 */
+
+	/* check remaining integer values that makes sense */
+	if (src->u.integrity.tag_size	  != tgt->u.integrity.tag_size ||
+	    src->u.integrity.offset	  != tgt->u.integrity.offset   ||
+	    src->u.integrity.sector_size  != tgt->u.integrity.sector_size) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Integer parameters do not match.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (_strcmp_null(src->u.integrity.integrity,	     tgt->u.integrity.integrity) ||
+	    _strcmp_null(src->u.integrity.journal_integrity, tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity) ||
+	    _strcmp_null(src->u.integrity.journal_crypt,     tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Journal parameters do not match.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* unfortunately dm-integrity doesn't support keyring */
+	if (_compare_volume_keys(src->u.integrity.vk, 0, tgt->u.integrity.vk, 0) ||
+	    _compare_volume_keys(src->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key, 0, tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key, 0) ||
+	    _compare_volume_keys(src->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key, 0, tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key, 0)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Journal keys do not match.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* unsupported underneath dm-crypt with auth. encryption */
+	if (src->u.integrity.meta_device || tgt->u.integrity.meta_device)
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+
+	if (src->size != tgt->size) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Device size parameters do not match.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!device_is_identical(src->data_device, tgt->data_device)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Data devices do not match.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int _compare_dm_devices(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			       const struct crypt_dm_active_device *src,
+			       const struct crypt_dm_active_device *tgt)
+{
+	int r;
+	const struct dm_target *s, *t;
+
+	if (!src || !tgt)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = _compare_device_types(cd, src, tgt);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	s = &src->segment;
+	t = &tgt->segment;
+
+	while (s || t) {
+		if (!s || !t) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "segments count mismatch.");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		if (s->type != t->type) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "segment type mismatch.");
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		switch (s->type) {
+		case DM_CRYPT:
+			r = _compare_crypt_devices(cd, s, t);
+			break;
+		case DM_INTEGRITY:
+			r = _compare_integrity_devices(cd, s, t);
+			break;
+		default:
+			r = -ENOTSUP;
+		}
+
+		if (r)
+			break;
+
+		s = s->next;
+		t = t->next;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _reload_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+			  struct crypt_dm_active_device *sdmd)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device tdmd;
+	struct dm_target *src, *tgt = &tdmd.segment;
+
+	if (!cd || !cd->type || !name || !(sdmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_CIPHER |
+				  DM_ACTIVE_UUID | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE |
+				  DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY, &tdmd);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Device %s is not active."), name);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!single_segment(&tdmd) || tgt->type != DM_CRYPT || tgt->u.crypt.tag_size) {
+		r = -ENOTSUP;
+		log_err(cd, _("Unsupported parameters on device %s."), name);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = _compare_dm_devices(cd, sdmd, &tdmd);
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Mismatching parameters on device %s."), name);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	src = &sdmd->segment;
+
+	/* Changing read only flag for active device makes no sense */
+	if (tdmd.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY)
+		sdmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+	else
+		sdmd->flags &= ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+
+	if (sdmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) {
+		r = crypt_volume_key_set_description(tgt->u.crypt.vk, src->u.crypt.vk->key_description);
+		if (r)
+			goto out;
+	} else {
+		crypt_free_volume_key(tgt->u.crypt.vk);
+		tgt->u.crypt.vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(src->u.crypt.vk->keylength, src->u.crypt.vk->key);
+		if (!tgt->u.crypt.vk) {
+			r = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	r = device_block_adjust(cd, src->data_device, DEV_OK,
+				src->u.crypt.offset, &sdmd->size, NULL);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	tdmd.flags = sdmd->flags;
+	tgt->size = tdmd.size = sdmd->size;
+
+	r = dm_reload_device(cd, name, &tdmd, 1);
+out:
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &tdmd);
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)tdmd.uuid);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _reload_device_with_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	const char *iname,
+	const char *ipath,
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device *sdmd,
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device *sdmdi)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device tdmd, tdmdi = {};
+	struct dm_target *src, *srci, *tgt = &tdmd.segment, *tgti = &tdmdi.segment;
+	struct device *data_device = NULL;
+
+	if (!cd || !cd->type || !name || !iname || !(sdmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_CIPHER |
+				  DM_ACTIVE_UUID | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE |
+				  DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY, &tdmd);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Device %s is not active."), name);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!single_segment(&tdmd) || tgt->type != DM_CRYPT || !tgt->u.crypt.tag_size) {
+		r = -ENOTSUP;
+		log_err(cd, _("Unsupported parameters on device %s."), name);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = dm_query_device(cd, iname, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE | DM_ACTIVE_UUID, &tdmdi);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Device %s is not active."), iname);
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!single_segment(&tdmdi) || tgti->type != DM_INTEGRITY) {
+		r = -ENOTSUP;
+		log_err(cd, _("Unsupported parameters on device %s."), iname);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = _compare_dm_devices(cd, sdmdi, &tdmdi);
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Mismatching parameters on device %s."), iname);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	src = &sdmd->segment;
+	srci = &sdmdi->segment;
+
+	r = device_alloc(cd, &data_device, ipath);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = device_block_adjust(cd, srci->data_device, DEV_OK,
+				srci->u.integrity.offset, &sdmdi->size, NULL);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	src->data_device = data_device;
+
+	r = _compare_dm_devices(cd, sdmd, &tdmd);
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(cd, "Crypt devices mismatch.");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Changing read only flag for active device makes no sense */
+	if (tdmd.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY)
+		sdmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+	else
+		sdmd->flags &= ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+
+	if (tdmdi.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY)
+		sdmdi->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+	else
+		sdmdi->flags &= ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+
+	if (sdmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) {
+		r = crypt_volume_key_set_description(tgt->u.crypt.vk, src->u.crypt.vk->key_description);
+		if (r)
+			goto out;
+	} else {
+		crypt_free_volume_key(tgt->u.crypt.vk);
+		tgt->u.crypt.vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(src->u.crypt.vk->keylength, src->u.crypt.vk->key);
+		if (!tgt->u.crypt.vk) {
+			r = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	r = device_block_adjust(cd, src->data_device, DEV_OK,
+				src->u.crypt.offset, &sdmd->size, NULL);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	tdmd.flags = sdmd->flags;
+	tdmd.size = sdmd->size;
+
+	if ((r = dm_reload_device(cd, iname, sdmdi, 0))) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Failed to reload device %s.", iname);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = dm_reload_device(cd, name, &tdmd, 0))) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Failed to reload device %s.", name);
+		goto err_clear;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = dm_suspend_device(cd, name))) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Failed to suspend device %s.", name);
+		goto err_clear;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = dm_suspend_device(cd, iname))) {
+		log_err(cd, "Failed to suspend device %s.", iname);
+		goto err_clear;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = dm_resume_device(cd, iname, sdmdi->flags))) {
+		log_err(cd, "Failed to resume device %s.", iname);
+		goto err_clear;
+	}
+
+	r = dm_resume_device(cd, name, tdmd.flags);
+	if (!r)
+		goto out;
+
+	/*
+	 * This is worst case scenario. We have active underlying dm-integrity device with
+	 * new table but dm-crypt resume failed for some reason. Tear everything down and
+	 * burn it for good.
+	 */
+
+	log_err(cd, "Fatal error while reloading device %s (on top of device %s).", name, iname);
+
+	if (dm_error_device(cd, name))
+		log_err(cd, "Failed to switch device %s to dm-error.", name);
+	if (dm_error_device(cd, iname))
+		log_err(cd, "Failed to switch device %s to dm-error.", iname);
+	goto out;
+
+err_clear:
+	dm_clear_device(cd, name);
+	dm_clear_device(cd, iname);
+
+	if (dm_status_suspended(cd, name) > 0)
+		dm_resume_device(cd, name, 0);
+	if (dm_status_suspended(cd, iname) > 0)
+		dm_resume_device(cd, iname, 0);
+out:
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &tdmd);
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &tdmdi);
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)tdmdi.uuid);
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)tdmd.uuid);
+	device_free(cd, data_device);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_resize(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint64_t new_size)
+{
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmdq, dmd = {};
+	struct dm_target *tgt = &dmdq.segment;
+	int r;
+
+	/*
+	 * FIXME: Also with LUKS2 we must not allow resize when there's
+	 *	  explicit size stored in metadata (length != "dynamic")
+	 */
+
+	/* Device context type must be initialised */
+	if (!cd || !cd->type || !name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Resizing device %s to %" PRIu64 " sectors.", name, new_size);
+
+	r = dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY, &dmdq);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Device %s is not active."), name);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (!single_segment(&dmdq) || tgt->type != DM_CRYPT) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Unsupported device table detected in %s.", name);
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((dmdq.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) && !crypt_key_in_keyring(cd)) {
+		r = -EPERM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (crypt_key_in_keyring(cd)) {
+		if (!isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		r = LUKS2_key_description_by_segment(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr,
+					tgt->u.crypt.vk, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+		if (r)
+			goto out;
+
+		dmdq.flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY;
+	}
+
+	if (crypt_loop_device(crypt_get_device_name(cd))) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Trying to resize underlying loop device %s.",
+			crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+		/* Here we always use default size not new_size */
+		if (crypt_loop_resize(crypt_get_device_name(cd)))
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot resize loop device."));
+	}
+
+	r = device_block_adjust(cd, crypt_data_device(cd), DEV_OK,
+				crypt_get_data_offset(cd), &new_size, &dmdq.flags);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (MISALIGNED(new_size, tgt->u.crypt.sector_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Device %s size is not aligned to requested sector size (%u bytes)."),
+			crypt_get_device_name(cd), (unsigned)tgt->u.crypt.sector_size);
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	dmd.uuid = crypt_get_uuid(cd);
+	dmd.size = new_size;
+	dmd.flags = dmdq.flags | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH;
+	r = dm_crypt_target_set(&dmd.segment, 0, new_size, crypt_data_device(cd),
+			tgt->u.crypt.vk, crypt_get_cipher_spec(cd),
+			crypt_get_iv_offset(cd), crypt_get_data_offset(cd),
+			crypt_get_integrity(cd), crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd),
+			crypt_get_sector_size(cd));
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (new_size == dmdq.size) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Device has already requested size %" PRIu64
+			" sectors.", dmdq.size);
+		r = 0;
+	} else {
+		if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+			r = -ENOTSUP;
+		else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+			r = LUKS2_unmet_requirements(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, 0, 0);
+		if (!r)
+			r = _reload_device(cd, name, &dmd);
+	}
+out:
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmdq);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_set_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *uuid)
+{
+	const char *active_uuid;
+	int r;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "%s device uuid.", uuid ? "Setting new" : "Refreshing");
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	active_uuid = crypt_get_uuid(cd);
+
+	if (uuid && active_uuid && !strncmp(uuid, active_uuid, UUID_STRING_L)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "UUID is the same as requested (%s) for device %s.",
+			uuid, mdata_device_path(cd));
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (uuid)
+		log_dbg(cd, "Requested new UUID change to %s for %s.", uuid, mdata_device_path(cd));
+	else
+		log_dbg(cd, "Requested new UUID refresh for %s.", mdata_device_path(cd));
+
+	if (!crypt_confirm(cd, _("Do you really want to change UUID of device?")))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		return LUKS_hdr_uuid_set(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, uuid, cd);
+	else
+		return LUKS2_hdr_uuid(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, uuid);
+}
+
+int crypt_set_label(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *label, const char *subsystem)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Setting new labels.");
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS2(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	return LUKS2_hdr_labels(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, label, subsystem, 1);
+}
+
+int crypt_header_backup(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			const char *requested_type,
+			const char *backup_file)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (requested_type && !isLUKS(requested_type))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!backup_file)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Load with repair */
+	r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, requested_type, 1, 0);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Requested header backup of device %s (%s) to "
+		"file %s.", mdata_device_path(cd), requested_type ?: "any type", backup_file);
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type) && (!requested_type || isLUKS1(requested_type)))
+		r = LUKS_hdr_backup(backup_file, cd);
+	else if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && (!requested_type || isLUKS2(requested_type)))
+		r = LUKS2_hdr_backup(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, backup_file);
+	else
+		r = -EINVAL;
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_header_restore(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			 const char *requested_type,
+			 const char *backup_file)
+{
+	struct luks_phdr hdr1;
+	struct luks2_hdr hdr2;
+	int r, version;
+
+	if (requested_type && !isLUKS(requested_type))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!cd || (cd->type && !isLUKS(cd->type)) || !backup_file)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = init_crypto(cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Requested header restore to device %s (%s) from "
+		"file %s.", mdata_device_path(cd), requested_type ?: "any type", backup_file);
+
+	version = LUKS2_hdr_version_unlocked(cd, backup_file);
+	if (!version ||
+	   (requested_type && version == 1 && !isLUKS1(requested_type)) ||
+	   (requested_type && version == 2 && !isLUKS2(requested_type))) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Header backup file does not contain compatible LUKS header."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	memset(&hdr2, 0, sizeof(hdr2));
+
+	if (!cd->type) {
+		if (version == 1)
+			r = LUKS_hdr_restore(backup_file, &hdr1, cd);
+		else
+			r = LUKS2_hdr_restore(cd, &hdr2, backup_file);
+
+		crypt_memzero(&hdr1, sizeof(hdr1));
+		crypt_memzero(&hdr2, sizeof(hdr2));
+	} else if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && (!requested_type || isLUKS2(requested_type))) {
+		r = LUKS2_hdr_restore(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, backup_file);
+		if (r)
+			_luks2_reload(cd);
+	} else if (isLUKS1(cd->type) && (!requested_type || isLUKS1(requested_type)))
+		r = LUKS_hdr_restore(backup_file, &cd->u.luks1.hdr, cd);
+	else
+		r = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!r)
+		r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, version == 1 ? CRYPT_LUKS1 : CRYPT_LUKS2, 1, 1);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+void crypt_free(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Releasing crypt device %s context.", mdata_device_path(cd));
+
+	dm_backend_exit(cd);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(cd->volume_key);
+
+	device_free(cd, cd->device);
+	device_free(cd, cd->metadata_device);
+
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->pbkdf.type);
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->pbkdf.hash);
+
+	crypt_free_type(cd);
+
+	/* Some structures can contain keys (TCRYPT), wipe it */
+	crypt_memzero(cd, sizeof(*cd));
+	free(cd);
+}
+
+static char *crypt_get_device_key_description(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+	char *desc = NULL;
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+	struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd.segment;
+
+	if (dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE, &dmd) < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (single_segment(&dmd) && tgt->type == DM_CRYPT &&
+	    (dmd.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) && tgt->u.crypt.vk->key_description)
+		desc = strdup(tgt->u.crypt.vk->key_description);
+
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+
+	return desc;
+}
+
+int crypt_suspend(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		  const char *name)
+{
+	char *key_desc;
+	crypt_status_info ci;
+	int r;
+
+	/* FIXME: check context uuid matches the dm-crypt device uuid (onlyLUKS branching) */
+
+	if (!cd || !name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Suspending volume %s.", name);
+
+	if (cd->type)
+		r = onlyLUKS(cd);
+	else {
+		r = crypt_uuid_type_cmp(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1);
+		if (r < 0)
+			r = crypt_uuid_type_cmp(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2);
+		if (r < 0)
+			log_err(cd, _("This operation is supported only for LUKS device."));
+	}
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	ci = crypt_status(NULL, name);
+	if (ci < CRYPT_ACTIVE) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Volume %s is not active."), name);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	dm_backend_init(cd);
+
+	r = dm_status_suspended(cd, name);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Volume %s is already suspended."), name);
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	key_desc = crypt_get_device_key_description(cd, name);
+
+	/* we can't simply wipe wrapped keys */
+	if (crypt_cipher_wrapped_key(crypt_get_cipher(cd), crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd)))
+		r = dm_suspend_device(cd, name);
+	else
+		r = dm_suspend_and_wipe_key(cd, name);
+
+	if (r == -ENOTSUP)
+		log_err(cd, _("Suspend is not supported for device %s."), name);
+	else if (r)
+		log_err(cd, _("Error during suspending device %s."), name);
+	else
+		crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, key_desc);
+	free(key_desc);
+out:
+	dm_backend_exit(cd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_resume_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			       const char *name,
+			       int keyslot,
+			       const char *passphrase,
+			       size_t passphrase_size)
+{
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	/* FIXME: check context uuid matches the dm-crypt device uuid */
+
+	if (!passphrase || !name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Resuming volume %s.", name);
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	r = dm_status_suspended(cd, name);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (!r) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Volume %s is not suspended."), name);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size,
+					   &cd->u.luks1.hdr, &vk, cd);
+	else
+		r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, keyslot, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, passphrase, passphrase_size, &vk);
+
+	if  (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	keyslot = r;
+
+	if (crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd)) {
+		if (!isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_keyslot(cd,
+					&cd->u.luks2.hdr, vk, keyslot);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = dm_resume_and_reinstate_key(cd, name, vk);
+
+	if (r == -ENOTSUP)
+		log_err(cd, _("Resume is not supported for device %s."), name);
+	else if (r)
+		log_err(cd, _("Error during resuming device %s."), name);
+out:
+	if (r < 0 && vk)
+		crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vk->key_description);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+
+	return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+int crypt_resume_by_keyfile_device_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+					  const char *name,
+					  int keyslot,
+					  const char *keyfile,
+					  size_t keyfile_size,
+					  uint64_t keyfile_offset)
+{
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+	char *passphrase_read = NULL;
+	size_t passphrase_size_read;
+	int r;
+
+	/* FIXME: check context uuid matches the dm-crypt device uuid */
+
+	if (!name || !keyfile)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Resuming volume %s.", name);
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	r = dm_status_suspended(cd, name);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (!r) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Volume %s is not suspended."), name);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_keyfile_device_read(cd, keyfile,
+				      &passphrase_read, &passphrase_size_read,
+				      keyfile_offset, keyfile_size, 0);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(keyslot, passphrase_read, passphrase_size_read,
+					   &cd->u.luks1.hdr, &vk, cd);
+	else
+		r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, keyslot, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, passphrase_read, passphrase_size_read, &vk);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+	keyslot = r;
+
+	if (crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd)) {
+		if (!isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_keyslot(cd,
+					&cd->u.luks2.hdr, vk, keyslot);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = dm_resume_and_reinstate_key(cd, name, vk);
+	if (r)
+		log_err(cd, _("Error during resuming device %s."), name);
+out:
+	crypt_safe_free(passphrase_read);
+	if (r < 0 && vk)
+		crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vk->key_description);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+	return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+int crypt_resume_by_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			    const char *name,
+			    int keyslot,
+			    const char *keyfile,
+			    size_t keyfile_size)
+{
+	return crypt_resume_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, name, keyslot,
+					      keyfile, keyfile_size, 0);
+}
+
+int crypt_resume_by_keyfile_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				   const char *name,
+				   int keyslot,
+				   const char *keyfile,
+				   size_t keyfile_size,
+				   size_t keyfile_offset)
+{
+	return crypt_resume_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, name, keyslot,
+				      keyfile, keyfile_size, keyfile_offset);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Keyslot manipulation
+ */
+int crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot, // -1 any
+	const char *passphrase,
+	size_t passphrase_size,
+	const char *new_passphrase,
+	size_t new_passphrase_size)
+{
+	int digest, r, active_slots;
+	struct luks2_keyslot_params params;
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Adding new keyslot, existing passphrase %sprovided,"
+		"new passphrase %sprovided.",
+		passphrase ? "" : "not ", new_passphrase  ? "" : "not ");
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	if (!passphrase || !new_passphrase)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = keyslot_verify_or_find_empty(cd, &keyslot);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		active_slots = LUKS_keyslot_active_count(&cd->u.luks1.hdr);
+	else
+		active_slots = LUKS2_keyslot_active_count(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+	if (active_slots == 0) {
+		/* No slots used, try to use pre-generated key in header */
+		if (cd->volume_key) {
+			vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(cd->volume_key->keylength, cd->volume_key->key);
+			r = vk ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
+		} else {
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot add key slot, all slots disabled and no volume key provided."));
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	} else if (active_slots < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	else {
+		/* Passphrase provided, use it to unlock existing keyslot */
+		if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+			r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, passphrase,
+						   passphrase_size, &cd->u.luks1.hdr, &vk, cd);
+		else
+			r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, passphrase,
+						passphrase_size, &vk);
+	}
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		r = LUKS_set_key(keyslot, CONST_CAST(char*)new_passphrase,
+				 new_passphrase_size, &cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk, cd);
+	else {
+		r = LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, vk);
+		digest = r;
+
+		if (r >= 0)
+			r = LUKS2_keyslot_params_default(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, &params);
+
+		if (r >= 0)
+			r = LUKS2_digest_assign(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, digest, 1, 0);
+
+		if (r >= 0)
+			r = LUKS2_keyslot_store(cd,  &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot,
+						CONST_CAST(char*)new_passphrase,
+						new_passphrase_size, vk, &params);
+	}
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = 0;
+out:
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		_luks2_reload(cd);
+		return r;
+	}
+	return keyslot;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot_old,
+	int keyslot_new,
+	const char *passphrase,
+	size_t passphrase_size,
+	const char *new_passphrase,
+	size_t new_passphrase_size)
+{
+	int digest = -1, r;
+	struct luks2_keyslot_params params;
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+	if (!passphrase || !new_passphrase)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Changing passphrase from old keyslot %d to new %d.",
+		keyslot_old, keyslot_new);
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(keyslot_old, passphrase, passphrase_size,
+					   &cd->u.luks1.hdr, &vk, cd);
+	else if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+		r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, keyslot_old, CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT, passphrase, passphrase_size, &vk);
+		/* will fail for keyslots w/o digest. fix if supported in a future */
+		if (r >= 0) {
+			digest = LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, r);
+			if (digest < 0)
+				r = -EINVAL;
+		}
+	} else
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (keyslot_old != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT && keyslot_old != r) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot mismatch.");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	keyslot_old = r;
+
+	if (keyslot_new == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT) {
+		if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+			keyslot_new = LUKS_keyslot_find_empty(&cd->u.luks1.hdr);
+		else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+			keyslot_new = LUKS2_keyslot_find_empty(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, "luks2"); // FIXME
+		if (keyslot_new < 0)
+			keyslot_new = keyslot_old;
+	}
+	log_dbg(cd, "Key change, old slot %d, new slot %d.", keyslot_old, keyslot_new);
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+		if (keyslot_old == keyslot_new) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Key slot %d is going to be overwritten.", keyslot_old);
+			(void)crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, keyslot_old);
+		}
+		r = LUKS_set_key(keyslot_new, new_passphrase, new_passphrase_size,
+				 &cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk, cd);
+	} else if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+		r = LUKS2_keyslot_params_default(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, &params);
+		if (r)
+			goto out;
+
+		if (keyslot_old != keyslot_new) {
+			r = LUKS2_digest_assign(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot_new, digest, 1, 0);
+			if (r < 0)
+				goto out;
+		} else {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Key slot %d is going to be overwritten.", keyslot_old);
+			/* FIXME: improve return code so that we can detect area is damaged */
+			r = LUKS2_keyslot_wipe(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot_old, 1);
+			if (r) {
+				/* (void)crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, keyslot_old); */
+				r = -EINVAL;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+
+		r = LUKS2_keyslot_store(cd,  &cd->u.luks2.hdr,
+					keyslot_new, new_passphrase,
+					new_passphrase_size, vk, &params);
+	} else
+		r = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (r >= 0 && keyslot_old != keyslot_new)
+		r = crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, keyslot_old);
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to swap new key slot."));
+out:
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		_luks2_reload(cd);
+		return r;
+	}
+	return keyslot_new;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_device_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *keyfile,
+	size_t keyfile_size,
+	uint64_t keyfile_offset,
+	const char *new_keyfile,
+	size_t new_keyfile_size,
+	uint64_t new_keyfile_offset)
+{
+	int digest, r, active_slots;
+	size_t passwordLen, new_passwordLen;
+	struct luks2_keyslot_params params;
+	char *password = NULL, *new_password = NULL;
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+	if (!keyfile || !new_keyfile)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Adding new keyslot, existing keyfile %s, new keyfile %s.",
+		keyfile, new_keyfile);
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	r = keyslot_verify_or_find_empty(cd, &keyslot);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		active_slots = LUKS_keyslot_active_count(&cd->u.luks1.hdr);
+	else
+		active_slots = LUKS2_keyslot_active_count(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+	if (active_slots == 0) {
+		/* No slots used, try to use pre-generated key in header */
+		if (cd->volume_key) {
+			vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(cd->volume_key->keylength, cd->volume_key->key);
+			r = vk ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
+		} else {
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot add key slot, all slots disabled and no volume key provided."));
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	} else {
+		r = crypt_keyfile_device_read(cd, keyfile,
+				       &password, &passwordLen,
+				       keyfile_offset, keyfile_size, 0);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+			r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, password, passwordLen,
+						   &cd->u.luks1.hdr, &vk, cd);
+		else
+			r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, password, passwordLen, &vk);
+	}
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = crypt_keyfile_device_read(cd, new_keyfile,
+			       &new_password, &new_passwordLen,
+			       new_keyfile_offset, new_keyfile_size, 0);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		r = LUKS_set_key(keyslot, new_password, new_passwordLen,
+				 &cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk, cd);
+	else {
+		r = LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, vk);
+		digest = r;
+
+		if (r >= 0)
+			r = LUKS2_keyslot_params_default(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, &params);
+
+		if (r >= 0)
+			r = LUKS2_digest_assign(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, digest, 1, 0);
+
+		if (r >= 0)
+			r = LUKS2_keyslot_store(cd,  &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot,
+						new_password, new_passwordLen, vk, &params);
+	}
+out:
+	crypt_safe_free(password);
+	crypt_safe_free(new_password);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		_luks2_reload(cd);
+		return r;
+	}
+	return keyslot;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *keyfile,
+	size_t keyfile_size,
+	const char *new_keyfile,
+	size_t new_keyfile_size)
+{
+	return crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, keyslot,
+				keyfile, keyfile_size, 0,
+				new_keyfile, new_keyfile_size, 0);
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *keyfile,
+	size_t keyfile_size,
+	size_t keyfile_offset,
+	const char *new_keyfile,
+	size_t new_keyfile_size,
+	size_t new_keyfile_offset)
+{
+	return crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, keyslot,
+				keyfile, keyfile_size, keyfile_offset,
+				new_keyfile, new_keyfile_size, new_keyfile_offset);
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *volume_key,
+	size_t volume_key_size,
+	const char *passphrase,
+	size_t passphrase_size)
+{
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!passphrase)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Adding new keyslot %d using volume key.", keyslot);
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return crypt_keyslot_add_by_key(cd, keyslot,
+				volume_key, volume_key_size, passphrase,
+				passphrase_size, 0);
+
+	r = keyslot_verify_or_find_empty(cd, &keyslot);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (volume_key)
+		vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
+	else if (cd->volume_key)
+		vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(cd->volume_key->keylength, cd->volume_key->key);
+
+	if (!vk)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	r = LUKS_verify_volume_key(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk);
+	if (r < 0)
+		log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
+	else
+		r = LUKS_set_key(keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size,
+			&cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk, cd);
+
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+	return (r < 0) ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_destroy(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
+{
+	crypt_keyslot_info ki;
+	int r;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Destroying keyslot %d.", keyslot);
+
+	if ((r = _onlyLUKS(cd, CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED)))
+		return r;
+
+	ki = crypt_keyslot_status(cd, keyslot);
+	if (ki == CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Key slot %d is invalid."), keyslot);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+		if (ki == CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Key slot %d is not used."), keyslot);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		return LUKS_del_key(keyslot, &cd->u.luks1.hdr, cd);
+	}
+
+	return LUKS2_keyslot_wipe(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, 0);
+}
+
+static int _check_header_data_overlap(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+	if (!name || !isLUKS(cd->type))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!device_is_identical(crypt_data_device(cd), crypt_metadata_device(cd)))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* FIXME: check real header size */
+	if (crypt_get_data_offset(cd) == 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Device header overlaps with data area."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int check_devices(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, const char *iname, uint32_t *flags)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!flags || !name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (iname) {
+		r = dm_status_device(cd, iname);
+		if (r >= 0 && !(*flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH))
+			return -EBUSY;
+		if (r < 0 && r != -ENODEV)
+			return r;
+		if (r == -ENODEV)
+			*flags &= ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH;
+	}
+
+	r = dm_status_device(cd, name);
+	if (r >= 0 && !(*flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH))
+		return -EBUSY;
+	if (r < 0 && r != -ENODEV)
+		return r;
+	if (r == -ENODEV)
+		*flags &= ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int _create_device_with_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *type, const char *name, const char *iname,
+	const char *ipath, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd,
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmdi)
+{
+	int r;
+	enum devcheck device_check;
+	struct dm_target *tgt;
+	struct device *device = NULL;
+
+	if (!single_segment(dmd))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	tgt = &dmd->segment;
+	if (tgt->type != DM_CRYPT)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	device_check = dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED ? DEV_OK : DEV_EXCL;
+
+	r = INTEGRITY_activate_dmd_device(cd, iname, dmdi);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	r = device_alloc(cd, &device, ipath);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+	tgt->data_device = device;
+
+	r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->data_device, device_check,
+				tgt->u.crypt.offset, &dmd->size, &dmd->flags);
+
+	if (!r)
+		r = dm_create_device(cd, name, type, dmd);
+out:
+	if (r < 0)
+		dm_remove_device(cd, iname, 0);
+
+	device_free(cd, device);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int create_or_reload_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+		     const char *type, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+{
+	int r;
+	enum devcheck device_check;
+	struct dm_target *tgt;
+
+	if (!type || !name || !single_segment(dmd))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	tgt = &dmd->segment;
+	if (tgt->type != DM_CRYPT)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* drop CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH flag if any device is inactive */
+	r = check_devices(cd, name, NULL, &dmd->flags);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	if (dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH)
+		r = _reload_device(cd, name, dmd);
+	else {
+		device_check = dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED ? DEV_OK : DEV_EXCL;
+
+		r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->data_device, device_check,
+					tgt->u.crypt.offset, &dmd->size, &dmd->flags);
+		if (!r) {
+			tgt->size = dmd->size;
+			r = dm_create_device(cd, name, type, dmd);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int create_or_reload_device_with_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+		     const char *type, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd,
+		     struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmdi)
+{
+	int r;
+	const char *iname = NULL;
+	char *ipath = NULL;
+
+	if (!type || !name || !dmd || !dmdi)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (asprintf(&ipath, "%s/%s_dif", dm_get_dir(), name) < 0)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	iname = ipath + strlen(dm_get_dir()) + 1;
+
+	/* drop CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH flag if any device is inactive */
+	r = check_devices(cd, name, iname, &dmd->flags);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH)
+		r = _reload_device_with_integrity(cd, name, iname, ipath, dmd, dmdi);
+	else
+		r = _create_device_with_integrity(cd, type, name, iname, ipath, dmd, dmdi);
+out:
+	free(ipath);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Activation/deactivation of a device
+ */
+static int _activate_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *passphrase,
+	size_t passphrase_size,
+	uint32_t flags)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+	if ((flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) && !crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if ((flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY) && name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = _check_header_data_overlap(cd, name);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	/* plain, use hashed passphrase */
+	if (isPLAIN(cd->type)) {
+		if (!name)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		r = process_key(cd, cd->u.plain.hdr.hash,
+				cd->u.plain.key_size,
+				passphrase, passphrase_size, &vk);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		r = PLAIN_activate(cd, name, vk, cd->u.plain.hdr.size, flags);
+		keyslot = 0;
+	} else if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+		r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(keyslot, passphrase,
+					   passphrase_size, &cd->u.luks1.hdr, &vk, cd);
+		if (r >= 0) {
+			keyslot = r;
+			if (name)
+				r = LUKS1_activate(cd, name, vk, flags);
+		}
+	} else if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+		r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, keyslot,
+				       (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY) ?
+				       CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT : CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT,
+				       passphrase, passphrase_size, &vk);
+		if (r >= 0) {
+			keyslot = r;
+
+			if ((name || (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY)) &&
+			    crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd)) {
+				r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_keyslot(cd,
+						&cd->u.luks2.hdr, vk, keyslot);
+				if (r < 0)
+					goto out;
+				flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY;
+			}
+
+			if (name)
+				r = LUKS2_activate(cd, name, vk, flags);
+		}
+	} else {
+		log_err(cd, _("Device type is not properly initialised."));
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+out:
+	if (r < 0 && vk)
+		crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vk->key_description);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+
+	return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+static int _activate_loopaes(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	char *buffer,
+	size_t buffer_size,
+	uint32_t flags)
+{
+	int r;
+	unsigned int key_count = 0;
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+	r = LOOPAES_parse_keyfile(cd, &vk, cd->u.loopaes.hdr.hash, &key_count,
+				  buffer, buffer_size);
+
+	if (!r && name)
+		r = LOOPAES_activate(cd, name, cd->u.loopaes.cipher, key_count,
+				     vk, flags);
+
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _activate_check_status(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, unsigned reload)
+{
+	crypt_status_info ci;
+
+	if (!name)
+		return 0;
+
+	ci = crypt_status(cd, name);
+	if (ci == CRYPT_INVALID) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot use device %s, name is invalid or still in use."), name);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	} else if (ci >= CRYPT_ACTIVE && !reload) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Device %s already exists."), name);
+		return -EEXIST;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+// activation/deactivation of device mapping
+int crypt_activate_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *passphrase,
+	size_t passphrase_size,
+	uint32_t flags)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!cd || !passphrase || (!name && (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "%s volume %s [keyslot %d] using passphrase.",
+		name ? "Activating" : "Checking", name ?: "passphrase",
+		keyslot);
+
+	r = _activate_check_status(cd, name, flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return _activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags);
+}
+
+int crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *keyfile,
+	size_t keyfile_size,
+	uint64_t keyfile_offset,
+	uint32_t flags)
+{
+	char *passphrase_read = NULL;
+	size_t passphrase_size_read;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!cd || !keyfile ||
+	    ((flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) && !crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "%s volume %s [keyslot %d] using keyfile %s.",
+		name ? "Activating" : "Checking", name ?: "passphrase", keyslot, keyfile);
+
+	r = _activate_check_status(cd, name, flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = crypt_keyfile_device_read(cd, keyfile,
+				&passphrase_read, &passphrase_size_read,
+				keyfile_offset, keyfile_size, 0);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
+		r = _activate_loopaes(cd, name, passphrase_read, passphrase_size_read, flags);
+	else
+		r = _activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, keyslot, passphrase_read, passphrase_size_read, flags);
+
+out:
+	crypt_safe_free(passphrase_read);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_activate_by_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *keyfile,
+	size_t keyfile_size,
+	uint32_t flags)
+{
+	return crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, name, keyslot, keyfile,
+					keyfile_size, 0, flags);
+}
+
+int crypt_activate_by_keyfile_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *keyfile,
+	size_t keyfile_size,
+	size_t keyfile_offset,
+	uint32_t flags)
+{
+	return crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, name, keyslot, keyfile,
+					keyfile_size, keyfile_offset, flags);
+}
+
+int crypt_activate_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	const char *volume_key,
+	size_t volume_key_size,
+	uint32_t flags)
+{
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!cd ||
+	    ((flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) && !crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "%s volume %s by volume key.", name ? "Activating" : "Checking",
+		name ?: "");
+
+	r = _activate_check_status(cd, name, flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = _check_header_data_overlap(cd, name);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	/* use key directly, no hash */
+	if (isPLAIN(cd->type)) {
+		if (!name)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (!volume_key || !volume_key_size || volume_key_size != cd->u.plain.key_size) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Incorrect volume key specified for plain device."));
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
+		if (!vk)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		r = PLAIN_activate(cd, name, vk, cd->u.plain.hdr.size, flags);
+	} else if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+		/* If key is not provided, try to use internal key */
+		if (!volume_key) {
+			if (!cd->volume_key) {
+				log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+			volume_key_size = cd->volume_key->keylength;
+			volume_key = cd->volume_key->key;
+		}
+
+		vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
+		if (!vk)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		r = LUKS_verify_volume_key(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk);
+
+		if (r == -EPERM)
+			log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
+
+		if (!r && name)
+			r = LUKS1_activate(cd, name, vk, flags);
+	} else if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+		/* If key is not provided, try to use internal key */
+		if (!volume_key) {
+			if (!cd->volume_key) {
+				log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+			volume_key_size = cd->volume_key->keylength;
+			volume_key = cd->volume_key->key;
+		}
+
+		vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
+		if (!vk)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		r = LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, vk);
+		if (r == -EPERM || r == -ENOENT)
+			log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
+		if (r > 0)
+			r = 0;
+
+		if (!r && (name || (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY)) &&
+		    crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd)) {
+			r = LUKS2_key_description_by_segment(cd,
+				&cd->u.luks2.hdr, vk, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+			if (!r)
+				r = crypt_volume_key_load_in_keyring(cd, vk);
+			if (!r)
+				flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY;
+		}
+
+		if (!r && name)
+			r = LUKS2_activate(cd, name, vk, flags);
+	} else if (isVERITY(cd->type)) {
+		/* volume_key == root hash */
+		if (!volume_key || !volume_key_size) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Incorrect root hash specified for verity device."));
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		r = VERITY_activate(cd, name, volume_key, volume_key_size, cd->u.verity.fec_device,
+				    &cd->u.verity.hdr, flags|CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY);
+
+		if (r == -EPERM) {
+			free(cd->u.verity.root_hash);
+			cd->u.verity.root_hash = NULL;
+		} if (!r) {
+			cd->u.verity.root_hash_size = volume_key_size;
+			if (!cd->u.verity.root_hash)
+				cd->u.verity.root_hash = malloc(volume_key_size);
+			if (cd->u.verity.root_hash)
+				memcpy(cd->u.verity.root_hash, volume_key, volume_key_size);
+		}
+	} else if (isTCRYPT(cd->type)) {
+		if (!name)
+			return 0;
+		r = TCRYPT_activate(cd, name, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr,
+				    &cd->u.tcrypt.params, flags);
+	} else if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type)) {
+		if (!name)
+			return 0;
+		if (volume_key) {
+			vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
+			if (!vk)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+		r = INTEGRITY_activate(cd, name, &cd->u.integrity.params, vk,
+				       cd->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key,
+				       cd->u.integrity.journal_mac_key, flags);
+	} else {
+		log_err(cd, _("Device type is not properly initialised."));
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (r < 0 && vk)
+		crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vk->key_description);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_deactivate_by_name(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint32_t flags)
+{
+	char *key_desc;
+	struct crypt_device *fake_cd = NULL;
+	const char *namei = NULL;
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {};
+	int r;
+	struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd.segment;
+	uint32_t get_flags = DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE | DM_ACTIVE_HOLDERS;
+
+	if (!name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Deactivating volume %s.", name);
+
+	if (!cd) {
+		r = crypt_init_by_name(&fake_cd, name);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+		cd = fake_cd;
+	}
+
+	/* skip holders detection and early abort when some flags raised */
+	if (flags & (CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_FORCE | CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED))
+		get_flags &= ~DM_ACTIVE_HOLDERS;
+
+	switch (crypt_status(cd, name)) {
+		case CRYPT_ACTIVE:
+		case CRYPT_BUSY:
+			r = dm_query_device(cd, name, get_flags, &dmd);
+			if (r >= 0) {
+				if (dmd.holders) {
+					log_err(cd, _("Device %s is still in use."), name);
+					r = -EBUSY;
+					break;
+				}
+				if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && single_segment(&dmd) && tgt->type == DM_CRYPT && crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd))
+					namei = device_dm_name(tgt->data_device);
+			}
+
+			key_desc = crypt_get_device_key_description(cd, name);
+
+			if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+				r = TCRYPT_deactivate(cd, name, flags);
+			else
+				r = dm_remove_device(cd, name, flags);
+			if (r < 0 && crypt_status(cd, name) == CRYPT_BUSY) {
+				log_err(cd, _("Device %s is still in use."), name);
+				r = -EBUSY;
+			} else if (namei) {
+				log_dbg(cd, "Deactivating integrity device %s.", namei);
+				r = dm_remove_device(cd, namei, 0);
+			}
+			if (!r)
+				crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, key_desc);
+			free(key_desc);
+			break;
+		case CRYPT_INACTIVE:
+			log_err(cd, _("Device %s is not active."), name);
+			r = -ENODEV;
+			break;
+		default:
+			log_err(cd, _("Invalid device %s."), name);
+			r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+	crypt_free(fake_cd);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_deactivate(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+	return crypt_deactivate_by_name(cd, name, 0);
+}
+
+int crypt_get_active_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+			    struct crypt_active_device *cad)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd, dmdi = {};
+	const char *namei = NULL;
+	struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd.segment;
+
+	if (!cd || !name || !cad)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE, &dmd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (!single_segment(&dmd)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Unexpected multi-segment device detected.");
+		r = -ENOTSUP;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (tgt->type != DM_CRYPT &&
+	    tgt->type != DM_VERITY &&
+	    tgt->type != DM_INTEGRITY) {
+		r = -ENOTSUP;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* For LUKS2 with integrity we need flags from underlying dm-integrity */
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd)) {
+		namei = device_dm_name(tgt->data_device);
+		if (namei && dm_query_device(cd, namei, 0, &dmdi) >= 0)
+			dmd.flags |= dmdi.flags;
+	}
+
+	if (cd && isTCRYPT(cd->type)) {
+		cad->offset	= TCRYPT_get_data_offset(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params);
+		cad->iv_offset	= TCRYPT_get_iv_offset(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params);
+	} else if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT) {
+		cad->offset	= tgt->u.crypt.offset;
+		cad->iv_offset	= tgt->u.crypt.iv_offset;
+	}
+	cad->size	= dmd.size;
+	cad->flags	= dmd.flags;
+
+	r = 0;
+out:
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmdi);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+uint64_t crypt_get_active_integrity_failures(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+	uint64_t failures = 0;
+
+	if (!name)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* FIXME: LUKS2 / dm-crypt does not provide this count. */
+	if (dm_query_device(cd, name, 0, &dmd) < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (single_segment(&dmd) && dmd.segment.type == DM_INTEGRITY)
+		(void)dm_status_integrity_failures(cd, name, &failures);
+
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+
+	return failures;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Volume key handling
+ */
+int crypt_volume_key_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	char *volume_key,
+	size_t *volume_key_size,
+	const char *passphrase,
+	size_t passphrase_size)
+{
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+	int key_len, r = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!cd || !volume_key || !volume_key_size || (!isTCRYPT(cd->type) && !passphrase))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* wrapped keys or unbound keys may be exported */
+	if (crypt_fips_mode() &&
+	    !crypt_cipher_wrapped_key(crypt_get_cipher(cd), crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd))) {
+		if (!isLUKS2(cd->type) || keyslot == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT ||
+		    !LUKS2_keyslot_for_segment(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT)) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Function not available in FIPS mode."));
+			return -EACCES;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && keyslot != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
+		key_len = LUKS2_get_keyslot_stored_key_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot);
+	else
+		key_len = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+
+	if (key_len < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (key_len > (int)*volume_key_size) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Volume key buffer too small."));
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (isPLAIN(cd->type) && cd->u.plain.hdr.hash) {
+		r = process_key(cd, cd->u.plain.hdr.hash, key_len,
+				passphrase, passphrase_size, &vk);
+		if (r < 0)
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot retrieve volume key for plain device."));
+	} else if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+		r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(keyslot, passphrase,
+					passphrase_size, &cd->u.luks1.hdr, &vk, cd);
+	} else if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+		r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, keyslot,
+				keyslot == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT ? CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT : CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT,
+				passphrase, passphrase_size, &vk);
+	} else if (isTCRYPT(cd->type)) {
+		r = TCRYPT_get_volume_key(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params, &vk);
+	} else
+		log_err(cd, _("This operation is not supported for %s crypt device."), cd->type ?: "(none)");
+
+	if (r >= 0) {
+		memcpy(volume_key, vk->key, vk->keylength);
+		*volume_key_size = vk->keylength;
+	}
+
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_volume_key_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *volume_key,
+	size_t volume_key_size)
+{
+	struct volume_key *vk;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = _onlyLUKS(cd, CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED)))
+		return r;
+
+	vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
+	if (!vk)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		r = LUKS_verify_volume_key(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk);
+	else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		r = LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, vk);
+
+	if (r == -EPERM)
+		log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
+
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+
+	return r >= 0 ? 0 : r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * RNG and memory locking
+ */
+void crypt_set_rng_type(struct crypt_device *cd, int rng_type)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return;
+
+	switch (rng_type) {
+	case CRYPT_RNG_URANDOM:
+	case CRYPT_RNG_RANDOM:
+		log_dbg(cd, "RNG set to %d (%s).", rng_type, rng_type ? "random" : "urandom");
+		cd->rng_type = rng_type;
+	}
+}
+
+int crypt_get_rng_type(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return cd->rng_type;
+}
+
+int crypt_memory_lock(struct crypt_device *cd, int lock)
+{
+	return lock ? crypt_memlock_inc(cd) : crypt_memlock_dec(cd);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reporting
+ */
+crypt_status_info crypt_status(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!name)
+		return CRYPT_INVALID;
+
+	if (!cd)
+		dm_backend_init(cd);
+
+	r = dm_status_device(cd, name);
+
+	if (!cd)
+		dm_backend_exit(cd);
+
+	if (r < 0 && r != -ENODEV)
+		return CRYPT_INVALID;
+
+	if (r == 0)
+		return CRYPT_ACTIVE;
+
+	if (r > 0)
+		return CRYPT_BUSY;
+
+	return CRYPT_INACTIVE;
+}
+
+static void hexprint(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *d, int n, const char *sep)
+{
+	int i;
+	for(i = 0; i < n; i++)
+		log_std(cd, "%02hhx%s", (const char)d[i], sep);
+}
+
+static int _luks_dump(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	log_std(cd, "LUKS header information for %s\n\n", mdata_device_path(cd));
+	log_std(cd, "Version:       \t%" PRIu16 "\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.version);
+	log_std(cd, "Cipher name:   \t%s\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.cipherName);
+	log_std(cd, "Cipher mode:   \t%s\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.cipherMode);
+	log_std(cd, "Hash spec:     \t%s\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.hashSpec);
+	log_std(cd, "Payload offset:\t%" PRIu32 "\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.payloadOffset);
+	log_std(cd, "MK bits:       \t%" PRIu32 "\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyBytes * 8);
+	log_std(cd, "MK digest:     \t");
+	hexprint(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigest, LUKS_DIGESTSIZE, " ");
+	log_std(cd, "\n");
+	log_std(cd, "MK salt:       \t");
+	hexprint(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigestSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ");
+	log_std(cd, "\n               \t");
+	hexprint(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigestSalt+LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ");
+	log_std(cd, "\n");
+	log_std(cd, "MK iterations: \t%" PRIu32 "\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigestIterations);
+	log_std(cd, "UUID:          \t%s\n\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.uuid);
+	for(i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++) {
+		if(cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].active == LUKS_KEY_ENABLED) {
+			log_std(cd, "Key Slot %d: ENABLED\n",i);
+			log_std(cd, "\tIterations:         \t%" PRIu32 "\n",
+				cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].passwordIterations);
+			log_std(cd, "\tSalt:               \t");
+			hexprint(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].passwordSalt,
+				 LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ");
+			log_std(cd, "\n\t                      \t");
+			hexprint(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].passwordSalt +
+				 LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ");
+			log_std(cd, "\n");
+
+			log_std(cd, "\tKey material offset:\t%" PRIu32 "\n",
+				cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset);
+			log_std(cd, "\tAF stripes:            \t%" PRIu32 "\n",
+				cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].stripes);
+		}
+		else
+			log_std(cd, "Key Slot %d: DISABLED\n", i);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int _verity_dump(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	log_std(cd, "VERITY header information for %s\n", mdata_device_path(cd));
+	log_std(cd, "UUID:            \t%s\n", cd->u.verity.uuid ?: "");
+	log_std(cd, "Hash type:       \t%u\n", cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_type);
+	log_std(cd, "Data blocks:     \t%" PRIu64 "\n", cd->u.verity.hdr.data_size);
+	log_std(cd, "Data block size: \t%u\n", cd->u.verity.hdr.data_block_size);
+	log_std(cd, "Hash block size: \t%u\n", cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_block_size);
+	log_std(cd, "Hash algorithm:  \t%s\n", cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_name);
+	log_std(cd, "Salt:            \t");
+	if (cd->u.verity.hdr.salt_size)
+		hexprint(cd, cd->u.verity.hdr.salt, cd->u.verity.hdr.salt_size, "");
+	else
+		log_std(cd, "-");
+	log_std(cd, "\n");
+	if (cd->u.verity.root_hash) {
+		log_std(cd, "Root hash:      \t");
+		hexprint(cd, cd->u.verity.root_hash, cd->u.verity.root_hash_size, "");
+		log_std(cd, "\n");
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_dump(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		return _luks_dump(cd);
+	else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return LUKS2_hdr_dump(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+	else if (isVERITY(cd->type))
+		return _verity_dump(cd);
+	else if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+		return TCRYPT_dump(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params);
+	else if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type))
+		return INTEGRITY_dump(cd, crypt_data_device(cd), 0);
+
+	log_err(cd, _("Dump operation is not supported for this device type."));
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/* internal only */
+const char *crypt_get_cipher_spec(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return NULL;
+	else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return LUKS2_get_cipher(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+	else if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec;
+	else if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.plain.cipher_spec;
+	else if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.loopaes.cipher_spec;
+	else if (!cd->type && !_init_by_name_crypt_none(cd))
+		return cd->u.none.cipher_spec;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_get_cipher(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.plain.cipher;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.luks1.hdr.cipherName;
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+		if (crypt_parse_name_and_mode(LUKS2_get_cipher(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT),
+					      cd->u.luks2.cipher, NULL, cd->u.luks2.cipher_mode))
+			return NULL;
+		return cd->u.luks2.cipher;
+	}
+
+	if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.loopaes.cipher;
+
+	if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.tcrypt.params.cipher;
+
+	if (!cd->type && !_init_by_name_crypt_none(cd))
+		return cd->u.none.cipher;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_get_cipher_mode(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.plain.cipher_mode;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.luks1.hdr.cipherMode;
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+		if (crypt_parse_name_and_mode(LUKS2_get_cipher(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT),
+					      cd->u.luks2.cipher, NULL, cd->u.luks2.cipher_mode))
+			return NULL;
+		return cd->u.luks2.cipher_mode;
+	}
+
+	if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.loopaes.cipher_mode;
+
+	if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.tcrypt.params.mode;
+
+	if (!cd->type && !_init_by_name_crypt_none(cd))
+		return cd->u.none.cipher_mode;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/* INTERNAL only */
+const char *crypt_get_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.integrity.params.integrity;
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return LUKS2_get_integrity(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/* INTERNAL only */
+int crypt_get_integrity_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type))
+		return INTEGRITY_key_size(cd, crypt_get_integrity(cd));
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return INTEGRITY_key_size(cd, crypt_get_integrity(cd));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* INTERNAL only */
+int crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.integrity.params.tag_size;
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return INTEGRITY_tag_size(cd, crypt_get_integrity(cd),
+					  crypt_get_cipher(cd),
+					  crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_get_sector_size(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+	if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.plain.hdr.sector_size;
+
+	if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.integrity.params.sector_size;
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return LUKS2_get_sector_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+
+	return SECTOR_SIZE;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_get_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.luks1.hdr.uuid;
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.luks2.hdr.uuid;
+
+	if (isVERITY(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.verity.uuid;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_get_device_name(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	const char *path;
+
+	if (!cd)
+		return NULL;
+
+	path = device_block_path(cd->device);
+	if (!path)
+		path = device_path(cd->device);
+
+	return path;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_get_metadata_device_name(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	const char *path;
+
+	if (!cd || !cd->metadata_device)
+		return NULL;
+
+	path = device_block_path(cd->metadata_device);
+	if (!path)
+		path = device_path(cd->metadata_device);
+
+	return path;
+}
+
+int crypt_get_volume_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!cd)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.plain.key_size;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyBytes;
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+		r = LUKS2_get_volume_key_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+		if (r < 0 && cd->volume_key)
+			r = cd->volume_key->keylength;
+		return r < 0 ? 0 : r;
+	}
+
+	if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.loopaes.key_size;
+
+	if (isVERITY(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.verity.root_hash_size;
+
+	if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.tcrypt.params.key_size;
+
+	if (!cd->type && !_init_by_name_crypt_none(cd))
+		return cd->u.none.key_size;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_get_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
+{
+	if (!cd || !isLUKS(cd->type))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (keyslot < 0 || keyslot >= crypt_keyslot_max(cd->type))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyBytes;
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return LUKS2_get_keyslot_stored_key_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot);
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_set_encryption(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *cipher,
+	size_t key_size)
+{
+	if (!cd || !cipher || ! key_size || !isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (LUKS2_keyslot_cipher_incompatible(cd, cipher))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	free(cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher);
+	cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher = strdup(cipher);
+	if (!cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	cd->u.luks2.keyslot_key_size = key_size;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot, size_t *key_size)
+{
+	const char *cipher;
+
+	if (!cd || !isLUKS(cd->type) || !key_size)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+		if (keyslot != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT &&
+		    LUKS_keyslot_info(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, keyslot) < CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE)
+			return NULL;
+		*key_size = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+		return cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec;
+	}
+
+	if (keyslot != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
+		return LUKS2_get_keyslot_cipher(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, key_size);
+
+	/* Keyslot encryption was set through crypt_keyslot_set_encryption() */
+	if (cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher) {
+		*key_size = cd->u.luks2.keyslot_key_size;
+		return cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher;
+	}
+
+	/* Try to reuse volume encryption parameters */
+	cipher =  LUKS2_get_cipher(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+	if (!LUKS2_keyslot_cipher_incompatible(cd, cipher)) {
+		*key_size = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+		return cipher;
+	}
+
+	/* Fallback to default LUKS2 keyslot encryption */
+	*key_size = DEFAULT_LUKS2_KEYSLOT_KEYBITS / 8;
+	return DEFAULT_LUKS2_KEYSLOT_CIPHER;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_get_pbkdf(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot, struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf)
+{
+	if (!cd || !pbkdf || keyslot == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		return LUKS_keyslot_pbkdf(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, keyslot, pbkdf);
+	else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return LUKS2_keyslot_pbkdf(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, pbkdf);
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int crypt_set_data_offset(struct crypt_device *cd, uint64_t data_offset)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (data_offset % (MAX_SECTOR_SIZE >> SECTOR_SHIFT)) {
+		log_err(cd, "Data offset is not multiple of %u bytes.", MAX_SECTOR_SIZE);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	cd->data_offset = data_offset;
+	log_dbg(cd, "Data offset set to %" PRIu64 " (512-byte) sectors.", data_offset);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_set_metadata_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	uint64_t metadata_size,
+	uint64_t keyslots_size)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (cd->type && !isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (metadata_size && LUKS2_check_metadata_area_size(metadata_size))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (keyslots_size && LUKS2_check_keyslots_area_size(keyslots_size))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	cd->metadata_size = metadata_size;
+	cd->keyslots_size = keyslots_size;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_get_metadata_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	uint64_t *metadata_size,
+	uint64_t *keyslots_size)
+{
+	uint64_t msize, ksize;
+
+	if (!cd)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!cd->type) {
+		msize = cd->metadata_size;
+		ksize = cd->keyslots_size;
+	} else if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+		msize = LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS;
+		ksize = LUKS_device_sectors(&cd->u.luks1.hdr) * SECTOR_SIZE - msize;
+	} else if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+		msize = LUKS2_metadata_size(cd->u.luks2.hdr.jobj);
+		ksize = LUKS2_keyslots_size(cd->u.luks2.hdr.jobj);
+	} else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (metadata_size)
+		*metadata_size = msize;
+	if (keyslots_size)
+		*keyslots_size = ksize;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+uint64_t crypt_get_data_offset(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.plain.hdr.offset;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.luks1.hdr.payloadOffset;
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return LUKS2_get_data_offset(&cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+
+	if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.loopaes.hdr.offset;
+
+	if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+		return TCRYPT_get_data_offset(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params);
+
+	return cd->data_offset;
+}
+
+uint64_t crypt_get_iv_offset(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.plain.hdr.skip;
+
+	if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.loopaes.hdr.skip;
+
+	if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+		return TCRYPT_get_iv_offset(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+crypt_keyslot_info crypt_keyslot_status(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
+{
+	if (_onlyLUKS(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET | CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED) < 0)
+		return CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		return LUKS_keyslot_info(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, keyslot);
+	else if(isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return LUKS2_keyslot_info(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot);
+
+	return CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_max(const char *type)
+{
+	if (type && isLUKS1(type))
+		return LUKS_NUMKEYS;
+
+	if (type && isLUKS2(type))
+		return LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX;
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_area(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	uint64_t *offset,
+	uint64_t *length)
+{
+	if (_onlyLUKS(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET | CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED) || !offset || !length)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return LUKS2_keyslot_area(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, offset, length);
+
+	return LUKS_keyslot_area(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, keyslot, offset, length);
+}
+
+crypt_keyslot_priority crypt_keyslot_get_priority(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
+{
+	if (_onlyLUKS(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET | CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED))
+		return CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_INVALID;
+
+	if (keyslot < 0 || keyslot >= crypt_keyslot_max(cd->type))
+		return CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_INVALID;
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return LUKS2_keyslot_priority_get(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot);
+
+	return CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_NORMAL;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_set_priority(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot, crypt_keyslot_priority priority)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Setting keyslot %d to priority %d.", keyslot, priority);
+
+	if (priority == CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_INVALID)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (keyslot < 0 || keyslot >= crypt_keyslot_max(cd->type))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS2(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	return LUKS2_keyslot_priority_set(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, priority, 1);
+}
+
+const char *crypt_get_type(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	return cd ? cd->type : NULL;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_get_default_type(void)
+{
+	return DEFAULT_LUKS_FORMAT;
+}
+
+int crypt_get_verity_info(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct crypt_params_verity *vp)
+{
+	if (!cd || !isVERITY(cd->type) || !vp)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	vp->data_device = device_path(cd->device);
+	vp->hash_device = mdata_device_path(cd);
+	vp->fec_device  = device_path(cd->u.verity.fec_device);
+	vp->fec_area_offset = cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_area_offset;
+	vp->fec_roots = cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_roots;
+	vp->hash_name = cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_name;
+	vp->salt = cd->u.verity.hdr.salt;
+	vp->salt_size = cd->u.verity.hdr.salt_size;
+	vp->data_block_size = cd->u.verity.hdr.data_block_size;
+	vp->hash_block_size = cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_block_size;
+	vp->data_size = cd->u.verity.hdr.data_size;
+	vp->hash_area_offset = cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_area_offset;
+	vp->hash_type = cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_type;
+	vp->flags = cd->u.verity.hdr.flags & CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_get_integrity_info(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct crypt_params_integrity *ip)
+{
+	if (!cd || !ip)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type)) {
+		ip->journal_size = cd->u.integrity.params.journal_size;
+		ip->journal_watermark = cd->u.integrity.params.journal_watermark;
+		ip->journal_commit_time = cd->u.integrity.params.journal_commit_time;
+		ip->interleave_sectors = cd->u.integrity.params.interleave_sectors;
+		ip->tag_size = cd->u.integrity.params.tag_size;
+		ip->sector_size = cd->u.integrity.params.sector_size;
+		ip->buffer_sectors = cd->u.integrity.params.buffer_sectors;
+
+		ip->integrity = cd->u.integrity.params.integrity;
+		ip->integrity_key_size = crypt_get_integrity_key_size(cd);
+
+		ip->journal_integrity = cd->u.integrity.params.journal_integrity;
+		ip->journal_integrity_key_size = cd->u.integrity.params.journal_integrity_key_size;
+		ip->journal_integrity_key = NULL;
+
+		ip->journal_crypt = cd->u.integrity.params.journal_crypt;
+		ip->journal_crypt_key_size = cd->u.integrity.params.journal_crypt_key_size;
+		ip->journal_crypt_key = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	} else if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+		ip->journal_size = 0; // FIXME
+		ip->journal_watermark = 0; // FIXME
+		ip->journal_commit_time = 0; // FIXME
+		ip->interleave_sectors = 0; // FIXME
+		ip->sector_size = crypt_get_sector_size(cd);
+		ip->buffer_sectors = 0; // FIXME
+
+		ip->integrity = LUKS2_get_integrity(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+		ip->integrity_key_size = crypt_get_integrity_key_size(cd);
+		ip->tag_size = INTEGRITY_tag_size(cd, ip->integrity, crypt_get_cipher(cd), crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd));
+
+		ip->journal_integrity = NULL;
+		ip->journal_integrity_key_size = 0;
+		ip->journal_integrity_key = NULL;
+
+		ip->journal_crypt = NULL;
+		ip->journal_crypt_key_size = 0;
+		ip->journal_crypt_key = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return -ENOTSUP;
+}
+
+int crypt_convert(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		  const char *type,
+		  void *params)
+{
+	struct luks_phdr hdr1;
+	struct luks2_hdr hdr2;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!type)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Converting LUKS device to type %s", type);
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type) && isLUKS2(type))
+		r = LUKS2_luks1_to_luks2(cd, &cd->u.luks1.hdr, &hdr2);
+	else if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && isLUKS1(type))
+		r = LUKS2_luks2_to_luks1(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, &hdr1);
+	else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (r < 0) {
+		/* in-memory header may be invalid after failed conversion */
+		_luks2_reload(cd);
+		if (r == -EBUSY)
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot convert device %s which is still in use."), mdata_device_path(cd));
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	crypt_free_type(cd);
+
+	return crypt_load(cd, type, params);
+}
+
+/* Internal access function to header pointer */
+void *crypt_get_hdr(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *type)
+{
+	/* If requested type differs, ignore it */
+	if (strcmp(cd->type, type))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
+		return &cd->u.plain;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		return &cd->u.luks1.hdr;
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return &cd->u.luks2.hdr;
+
+	if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
+		return &cd->u.loopaes;
+
+	if (isVERITY(cd->type))
+		return &cd->u.verity;
+
+	if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+		return &cd->u.tcrypt;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Token handling
+ */
+int crypt_activate_by_token(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name, int token, void *usrptr, uint32_t flags)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "%s volume %s using token %d.",
+		name ? "Activating" : "Checking", name ?: "passphrase", token);
+
+	if ((r = _onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET | CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED)))
+		return r;
+
+	if ((flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) && !crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if ((flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY) && name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (token == CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN)
+		return LUKS2_token_open_and_activate_any(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, name, flags);
+
+	return LUKS2_token_open_and_activate(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, name, flags, usrptr);
+}
+
+int crypt_token_json_get(struct crypt_device *cd, int token, const char **json)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!json)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Requesting JSON for token %d.", token);
+
+	if ((r = _onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED)))
+		return r;
+
+	return LUKS2_token_json_get(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, json) ?: token;
+}
+
+int crypt_token_json_set(struct crypt_device *cd, int token, const char *json)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Updating JSON for token %d.", token);
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS2(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	return LUKS2_token_create(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, json, 1);
+}
+
+crypt_token_info crypt_token_status(struct crypt_device *cd, int token, const char **type)
+{
+	if (_onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET | CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED))
+		return CRYPT_TOKEN_INVALID;
+
+	return LUKS2_token_status(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, type);
+}
+
+int crypt_token_luks2_keyring_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int token,
+	struct crypt_token_params_luks2_keyring *params)
+{
+	crypt_token_info token_info;
+	const char *type;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!params)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Requesting LUKS2 keyring token %d.", token);
+
+	if ((r = _onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED)))
+		return r;
+
+	token_info = LUKS2_token_status(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, &type);
+	switch (token_info) {
+	case CRYPT_TOKEN_INVALID:
+		log_dbg(cd, "Token %d is invalid.", token);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	case CRYPT_TOKEN_INACTIVE:
+		log_dbg(cd, "Token %d is inactive.", token);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	case CRYPT_TOKEN_INTERNAL:
+		if (!strcmp(type, LUKS2_TOKEN_KEYRING))
+			break;
+		/* Fall through */
+	case CRYPT_TOKEN_INTERNAL_UNKNOWN:
+	case CRYPT_TOKEN_EXTERNAL:
+	case CRYPT_TOKEN_EXTERNAL_UNKNOWN:
+		log_dbg(cd, "Token %d has unexpected type %s.", token, type);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return LUKS2_builtin_token_get(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, LUKS2_TOKEN_KEYRING, params);
+}
+
+int crypt_token_luks2_keyring_set(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int token,
+	const struct crypt_token_params_luks2_keyring *params)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!params)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Creating new LUKS2 keyring token (%d).", token);
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS2(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	return LUKS2_builtin_token_create(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, LUKS2_TOKEN_KEYRING, params, 1);
+}
+
+int crypt_token_assign_keyslot(struct crypt_device *cd, int token, int keyslot)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS2(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	return LUKS2_token_assign(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, token, 1, 1);
+}
+
+int crypt_token_unassign_keyslot(struct crypt_device *cd, int token, int keyslot)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS2(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	return LUKS2_token_assign(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, token, 0, 1);
+}
+
+int crypt_token_is_assigned(struct crypt_device *cd, int token, int keyslot)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = _onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET | CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED)))
+		return r;
+
+	return LUKS2_token_is_assigned(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, token);
+}
+
+/* Internal only */
+int crypt_metadata_locking_enabled(void)
+{
+	return _metadata_locking;
+}
+
+int crypt_metadata_locking(struct crypt_device *cd, int enable)
+{
+	if (enable && !_metadata_locking)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	_metadata_locking = enable ? 1 : 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_persistent_flags_set(struct crypt_device *cd, crypt_flags_type type, uint32_t flags)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS2(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	if (type == CRYPT_FLAGS_ACTIVATION)
+		return LUKS2_config_set_flags(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, flags);
+
+	if (type == CRYPT_FLAGS_REQUIREMENTS)
+		return LUKS2_config_set_requirements(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, flags);
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int crypt_persistent_flags_get(struct crypt_device *cd, crypt_flags_type type, uint32_t *flags)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!flags)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if ((r = _onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED)))
+		return r;
+
+	if (type == CRYPT_FLAGS_ACTIVATION)
+		return LUKS2_config_get_flags(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, flags);
+
+	if (type == CRYPT_FLAGS_REQUIREMENTS)
+		return LUKS2_config_get_requirements(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, flags);
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int update_volume_key_segment_digest(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int digest, int commit)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	/* Remove any assignments in memory */
+	r = LUKS2_digest_segment_assign(cd, hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, CRYPT_ANY_DIGEST, 0, 0);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	/* Assign it to the specific digest */
+	return LUKS2_digest_segment_assign(cd, hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, digest, 1, commit);
+}
+
+static int verify_and_update_segment_digest(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot,
+		const char *volume_key, size_t volume_key_size,
+		const char *password, size_t password_size)
+{
+	int digest, r;
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+	if (keyslot < 0 || (volume_key && !volume_key_size))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (volume_key)
+		vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
+	else {
+		r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, keyslot, CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT, password, password_size, &vk);
+		if (r != keyslot) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!vk)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* check volume_key (param) digest matches keyslot digest */
+	r = LUKS2_digest_verify(cd, hdr, vk, keyslot);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+	digest = r;
+
+	/* nothing to do, volume key in keyslot is already assigned to default segment */
+	r = LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(cd, hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, vk);
+	if (r >= 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = update_volume_key_segment_digest(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, digest, 1);
+	if (r)
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to assign keyslot %u as the new volume key."), keyslot);
+out:
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+	return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+
+int crypt_keyslot_add_by_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *volume_key,
+	size_t volume_key_size,
+	const char *passphrase,
+	size_t passphrase_size,
+	uint32_t flags)
+{
+	int digest, r;
+	struct luks2_keyslot_params params;
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+	if (!passphrase || ((flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT) &&
+			    (flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Adding new keyslot %d with volume key %sassigned to a crypt segment.",
+		keyslot, flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT ? "un" : "");
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS2(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	/* new volume key assignment */
+	if ((flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET) && crypt_keyslot_status(cd, keyslot) > CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE)
+		return verify_and_update_segment_digest(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr,
+			keyslot, volume_key, volume_key_size, passphrase, passphrase_size);
+
+	r = keyslot_verify_or_find_empty(cd, &keyslot);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (volume_key)
+		vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
+	else if (cd->volume_key)
+		vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(cd->volume_key->keylength, cd->volume_key->key);
+	else if (flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT)
+		vk = crypt_generate_volume_key(cd, volume_key_size);
+	else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!vk)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* if key matches volume key digest tear down new vk flag */
+	digest = LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, vk);
+	if (digest >= 0)
+		flags &= ~CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET;
+
+	/* no segment flag or new vk flag requires new key digest */
+	if (flags & (CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT | CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET))
+		digest = LUKS2_digest_create(cd, "pbkdf2", &cd->u.luks2.hdr, vk);
+
+	r = digest;
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = LUKS2_keyslot_params_default(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, &params);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to initialise default LUKS2 keyslot parameters."));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = LUKS2_digest_assign(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, digest, 1, 0);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to assign keyslot %d to digest."), keyslot);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = LUKS2_keyslot_store(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot,
+				passphrase, passphrase_size, vk, &params);
+
+	if (r >= 0 && (flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET))
+		r = update_volume_key_segment_digest(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, digest, 1);
+out:
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		_luks2_reload(cd);
+		return r;
+	}
+	return keyslot;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Keyring handling
+ */
+
+static int kernel_keyring_support(void)
+{
+	static unsigned _checked = 0;
+
+	if (!_checked) {
+		_kernel_keyring_supported = keyring_check();
+		_checked = 1;
+	}
+
+	return _kernel_keyring_supported;
+}
+
+static int dmcrypt_keyring_bug(void)
+{
+	uint64_t kversion;
+
+	if (kernel_version(&kversion))
+		return 1;
+	return kversion < version(4,15,0,0);
+}
+
+int crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	uint32_t dmc_flags;
+
+	/* dm backend must be initialised */
+	if (!cd || !isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!_vk_via_keyring || !kernel_keyring_support())
+		return 0;
+
+	if (dm_flags(cd, DM_CRYPT, &dmc_flags))
+		return dmcrypt_keyring_bug() ? 0 : 1;
+
+	return (dmc_flags & DM_KERNEL_KEYRING_SUPPORTED);
+}
+
+int crypt_volume_key_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd, int enable)
+{
+	_vk_via_keyring = enable ? 1 : 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* internal only */
+int crypt_volume_key_load_in_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd, struct volume_key *vk)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!vk || !cd)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!vk->key_description) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Invalid key description");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Loading key (%zu bytes) in thread keyring.", vk->keylength);
+
+	r = keyring_add_key_in_thread_keyring(vk->key_description, vk->key, vk->keylength);
+	if (r) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "keyring_add_key_in_thread_keyring failed (error %d)", r);
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to load key in kernel keyring."));
+	} else
+		crypt_set_key_in_keyring(cd, 1);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* internal only */
+int crypt_key_in_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	return cd ? cd->key_in_keyring : 0;
+}
+
+/* internal only */
+void crypt_set_key_in_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd, unsigned key_in_keyring)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return;
+
+	cd->key_in_keyring = key_in_keyring;
+}
+
+/* internal only */
+void crypt_drop_keyring_key(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *key_description)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!key_description)
+		return;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Requesting keyring key for revoke and unlink.");
+
+	r = keyring_revoke_and_unlink_key(key_description);
+	if (r)
+		log_dbg(cd, "keyring_revoke_and_unlink failed (error %d)", r);
+	crypt_set_key_in_keyring(cd, 0);
+}
+
+int crypt_activate_by_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			      const char *name,
+			      const char *key_description,
+			      int keyslot,
+			      uint32_t flags)
+{
+	char *passphrase;
+	size_t passphrase_size;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!cd || !key_description)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "%s volume %s [keyslot %d] using passphrase in keyring.",
+		name ? "Activating" : "Checking", name ?: "passphrase", keyslot);
+
+	if (!kernel_keyring_support()) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Kernel keyring is not supported by the kernel."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = _activate_check_status(cd, name, flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = keyring_get_passphrase(key_description, &passphrase, &passphrase_size);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to read passphrase from keyring (error %d)."), r);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = _activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags);
+
+	crypt_memzero(passphrase, passphrase_size);
+	free(passphrase);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void __attribute__((destructor)) libcryptsetup_exit(void)
+{
+	crypt_backend_destroy();
+	crypt_random_exit();
+}
diff --git a/lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c b/lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0f23fca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1126 @@
+/*
+ * TCRYPT (TrueCrypt-compatible) and VeraCrypt volume handling
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "libcryptsetup.h"
+#include "tcrypt.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+/* TCRYPT PBKDF variants */
+static const struct {
+	unsigned int legacy:1;
+	unsigned int veracrypt:1;
+	const char *name;
+	const char *hash;
+	unsigned int iterations;
+	uint32_t veracrypt_pim_const;
+	uint32_t veracrypt_pim_mult;
+} tcrypt_kdf[] = {
+	{ 0, 0, "pbkdf2", "ripemd160",   2000, 0, 0 },
+	{ 0, 0, "pbkdf2", "ripemd160",   1000, 0, 0 },
+	{ 0, 0, "pbkdf2", "sha512",      1000, 0, 0 },
+	{ 0, 0, "pbkdf2", "whirlpool",   1000, 0, 0 },
+	{ 1, 0, "pbkdf2", "sha1",        2000, 0, 0 },
+	{ 0, 1, "pbkdf2", "sha512",    500000, 15000, 1000 },
+	{ 0, 1, "pbkdf2", "whirlpool", 500000, 15000, 1000 },
+	{ 0, 1, "pbkdf2", "sha256",    500000, 15000, 1000 }, // VeraCrypt 1.0f
+	{ 0, 1, "pbkdf2", "sha256",    200000,     0, 2048 }, // boot only
+	{ 0, 1, "pbkdf2", "ripemd160", 655331, 15000, 1000 },
+	{ 0, 1, "pbkdf2", "ripemd160", 327661,     0, 2048 }, // boot only
+	{ 0, 1, "pbkdf2", "stribog512",500000, 15000, 1000 },
+//	{ 0, 1, "pbkdf2", "stribog512",200000,     0, 2048 }, // boot only
+	{ 0, 0,     NULL,        NULL,      0,     0,    0 }
+};
+
+struct tcrypt_alg {
+		const char *name;
+		unsigned int key_size;
+		unsigned int iv_size;
+		unsigned int key_offset;
+		unsigned int iv_offset; /* or tweak key offset */
+		unsigned int key_extra_size;
+};
+
+struct tcrypt_algs {
+	unsigned int legacy:1;
+	unsigned int chain_count;
+	unsigned int chain_key_size;
+	const char *long_name;
+	const char *mode;
+	struct tcrypt_alg cipher[3];
+};
+
+/* TCRYPT cipher variants */
+static struct tcrypt_algs tcrypt_cipher[] = {
+/* XTS mode */
+{0,1,64,"aes","xts-plain64",
+	{{"aes",    64,16,0,32,0}}},
+{0,1,64,"serpent","xts-plain64",
+	{{"serpent",64,16,0,32,0}}},
+{0,1,64,"twofish","xts-plain64",
+	{{"twofish",64,16,0,32,0}}},
+{0,2,128,"twofish-aes","xts-plain64",
+	{{"twofish",64,16, 0,64,0},
+	 {"aes",    64,16,32,96,0}}},
+{0,3,192,"serpent-twofish-aes","xts-plain64",
+	{{"serpent",64,16, 0, 96,0},
+	 {"twofish",64,16,32,128,0},
+	 {"aes",    64,16,64,160,0}}},
+{0,2,128,"aes-serpent","xts-plain64",
+	{{"aes",    64,16, 0,64,0},
+	 {"serpent",64,16,32,96,0}}},
+{0,3,192,"aes-twofish-serpent","xts-plain64",
+	{{"aes",    64,16, 0, 96,0},
+	 {"twofish",64,16,32,128,0},
+	 {"serpent",64,16,64,160,0}}},
+{0,2,128,"serpent-twofish","xts-plain64",
+	{{"serpent",64,16, 0,64,0},
+	 {"twofish",64,16,32,96,0}}},
+{0,1,64,"camellia","xts-plain64",
+	{{"camellia",    64,16,0,32,0}}},
+{0,1,64,"kuznyechik","xts-plain64",
+	{{"kuznyechik",  64,16,0,32,0}}},
+{0,2,128,"kuznyechik-camellia","xts-plain64",
+	{{"kuznyechik",64,16, 0,64,0},
+	 {"camellia",  64,16,32,96,0}}},
+{0,2,128,"twofish-kuznyechik","xts-plain64",
+	{{"twofish",   64,16, 0,64,0},
+	 {"kuznyechik",64,16,32,96,0}}},
+{0,2,128,"serpent-camellia","xts-plain64",
+	{{"serpent",   64,16, 0,64,0},
+	 {"camellia",  64,16,32,96,0}}},
+{0,2,128,"aes-kuznyechik","xts-plain64",
+	{{"aes",       64,16, 0,64,0},
+	 {"kuznyechik",64,16,32,96,0}}},
+{0,3,192,"camellia-serpent-kuznyechik","xts-plain64",
+	{{"camellia",  64,16, 0, 96,0},
+	 {"serpent",   64,16,32,128,0},
+	 {"kuznyechik",64,16,64,160,0}}},
+
+/* LRW mode */
+{0,1,48,"aes","lrw-benbi",
+	{{"aes",    48,16,32,0,0}}},
+{0,1,48,"serpent","lrw-benbi",
+	{{"serpent",48,16,32,0,0}}},
+{0,1,48,"twofish","lrw-benbi",
+	{{"twofish",48,16,32,0,0}}},
+{0,2,96,"twofish-aes","lrw-benbi",
+	{{"twofish",48,16,32,0,0},
+	 {"aes",    48,16,64,0,0}}},
+{0,3,144,"serpent-twofish-aes","lrw-benbi",
+	{{"serpent",48,16,32,0,0},
+	 {"twofish",48,16,64,0,0},
+	 {"aes",    48,16,96,0,0}}},
+{0,2,96,"aes-serpent","lrw-benbi",
+	{{"aes",    48,16,32,0,0},
+	 {"serpent",48,16,64,0,0}}},
+{0,3,144,"aes-twofish-serpent","lrw-benbi",
+	{{"aes",    48,16,32,0,0},
+	 {"twofish",48,16,64,0,0},
+	 {"serpent",48,16,96,0,0}}},
+{0,2,96,"serpent-twofish", "lrw-benbi",
+	{{"serpent",48,16,32,0,0},
+	 {"twofish",48,16,64,0,0}}},
+
+/* Kernel LRW block size is fixed to 16 bytes for GF(2^128)
+ * thus cannot be used with blowfish where block is 8 bytes.
+ * There also no GF(2^64) support.
+{1,1,64,"blowfish_le","lrw-benbi",
+	 {{"blowfish_le",64,8,32,0,0}}},
+{1,2,112,"blowfish_le-aes","lrw-benbi",
+	 {{"blowfish_le",64, 8,32,0,0},
+	  {"aes",        48,16,88,0,0}}},
+{1,3,160,"serpent-blowfish_le-aes","lrw-benbi",
+	  {{"serpent",    48,16, 32,0,0},
+	   {"blowfish_le",64, 8, 64,0,0},
+	   {"aes",        48,16,120,0,0}}},*/
+
+/*
+ * CBC + "outer" CBC (both with whitening)
+ * chain_key_size: alg_keys_bytes + IV_seed_bytes + whitening_bytes
+ */
+{1,1,32+16+16,"aes","cbc-tcw",
+	{{"aes",    32,16,32,0,32}}},
+{1,1,32+16+16,"serpent","cbc-tcw",
+	{{"serpent",32,16,32,0,32}}},
+{1,1,32+16+16,"twofish","cbc-tcw",
+	{{"twofish",32,16,32,0,32}}},
+{1,2,64+16+16,"twofish-aes","cbci-tcrypt",
+	{{"twofish",32,16,32,0,0},
+	 {"aes",    32,16,64,0,32}}},
+{1,3,96+16+16,"serpent-twofish-aes","cbci-tcrypt",
+	{{"serpent",32,16,32,0,0},
+	 {"twofish",32,16,64,0,0},
+	 {"aes",    32,16,96,0,32}}},
+{1,2,64+16+16,"aes-serpent","cbci-tcrypt",
+	{{"aes",    32,16,32,0,0},
+	 {"serpent",32,16,64,0,32}}},
+{1,3,96+16+16,"aes-twofish-serpent", "cbci-tcrypt",
+	{{"aes",    32,16,32,0,0},
+	 {"twofish",32,16,64,0,0},
+	 {"serpent",32,16,96,0,32}}},
+{1,2,64+16+16,"serpent-twofish", "cbci-tcrypt",
+	{{"serpent",32,16,32,0,0},
+	 {"twofish",32,16,64,0,32}}},
+{1,1,16+8+16,"cast5","cbc-tcw",
+	{{"cast5",   16,8,32,0,24}}},
+{1,1,24+8+16,"des3_ede","cbc-tcw",
+	{{"des3_ede",24,8,32,0,24}}},
+{1,1,56+8+16,"blowfish_le","cbc-tcrypt",
+	{{"blowfish_le",56,8,32,0,24}}},
+{1,2,88+16+16,"blowfish_le-aes","cbc-tcrypt",
+	{{"blowfish_le",56, 8,32,0,0},
+	 {"aes",        32,16,88,0,32}}},
+{1,3,120+16+16,"serpent-blowfish_le-aes","cbc-tcrypt",
+	{{"serpent",    32,16, 32,0,0},
+	 {"blowfish_le",56, 8, 64,0,0},
+	 {"aes",        32,16,120,0,32}}},
+{}
+};
+
+static int TCRYPT_hdr_from_disk(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
+				struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params,
+				int kdf_index, int cipher_index)
+{
+	uint32_t crc32;
+	size_t size;
+
+	/* Check CRC32 of header */
+	size = TCRYPT_HDR_LEN - sizeof(hdr->d.keys) - sizeof(hdr->d.header_crc32);
+	crc32 = crypt_crc32(~0, (unsigned char*)&hdr->d, size) ^ ~0;
+	if (be16_to_cpu(hdr->d.version) > 3 &&
+	    crc32 != be32_to_cpu(hdr->d.header_crc32)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "TCRYPT header CRC32 mismatch.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Check CRC32 of keys */
+	crc32 = crypt_crc32(~0, (unsigned char*)hdr->d.keys, sizeof(hdr->d.keys)) ^ ~0;
+	if (crc32 != be32_to_cpu(hdr->d.keys_crc32)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "TCRYPT keys CRC32 mismatch.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Convert header to cpu format */
+	hdr->d.version  =  be16_to_cpu(hdr->d.version);
+	hdr->d.version_tc = be16_to_cpu(hdr->d.version_tc);
+
+	hdr->d.keys_crc32 = be32_to_cpu(hdr->d.keys_crc32);
+
+	hdr->d.hidden_volume_size = be64_to_cpu(hdr->d.hidden_volume_size);
+	hdr->d.volume_size        = be64_to_cpu(hdr->d.volume_size);
+
+	hdr->d.mk_offset = be64_to_cpu(hdr->d.mk_offset);
+	if (!hdr->d.mk_offset)
+		hdr->d.mk_offset = 512;
+
+	hdr->d.mk_size = be64_to_cpu(hdr->d.mk_size);
+
+	hdr->d.flags = be32_to_cpu(hdr->d.flags);
+
+	hdr->d.sector_size = be32_to_cpu(hdr->d.sector_size);
+	if (!hdr->d.sector_size)
+		hdr->d.sector_size = 512;
+
+	hdr->d.header_crc32 = be32_to_cpu(hdr->d.header_crc32);
+
+	/* Set params */
+	params->passphrase = NULL;
+	params->passphrase_size = 0;
+	params->hash_name  = tcrypt_kdf[kdf_index].hash;
+	params->key_size = tcrypt_cipher[cipher_index].chain_key_size;
+	params->cipher = tcrypt_cipher[cipher_index].long_name;
+	params->mode = tcrypt_cipher[cipher_index].mode;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Kernel implements just big-endian version of blowfish, hack it here
+ */
+static void TCRYPT_swab_le(char *buf)
+{
+	uint32_t *l = (uint32_t*)&buf[0];
+	uint32_t *r = (uint32_t*)&buf[4];
+	*l = swab32(*l);
+	*r = swab32(*r);
+}
+
+static int decrypt_blowfish_le_cbc(struct tcrypt_alg *alg,
+				   const char *key, char *buf)
+{
+	int bs = alg->iv_size;
+	char iv[bs], iv_old[bs];
+	struct crypt_cipher *cipher = NULL;
+	int i, j, r;
+
+	assert(bs == 2*sizeof(uint32_t));
+
+	r = crypt_cipher_init(&cipher, "blowfish", "ecb",
+			      &key[alg->key_offset], alg->key_size);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	memcpy(iv, &key[alg->iv_offset], alg->iv_size);
+	for (i = 0; i < TCRYPT_HDR_LEN; i += bs) {
+		memcpy(iv_old, &buf[i], bs);
+		TCRYPT_swab_le(&buf[i]);
+		r = crypt_cipher_decrypt(cipher, &buf[i], &buf[i],
+					  bs, NULL, 0);
+		TCRYPT_swab_le(&buf[i]);
+		if (r < 0)
+			break;
+		for (j = 0; j < bs; j++)
+			buf[i + j] ^= iv[j];
+		memcpy(iv, iv_old, bs);
+	}
+
+	crypt_cipher_destroy(cipher);
+	crypt_memzero(iv, bs);
+	crypt_memzero(iv_old, bs);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void TCRYPT_remove_whitening(char *buf, const char *key)
+{
+	int j;
+
+	for (j = 0; j < TCRYPT_HDR_LEN; j++)
+		buf[j] ^= key[j % 8];
+}
+
+static void TCRYPT_copy_key(struct tcrypt_alg *alg, const char *mode,
+			     char *out_key, const char *key)
+{
+	int ks2;
+	if (!strncmp(mode, "xts", 3)) {
+		ks2 = alg->key_size / 2;
+		memcpy(out_key, &key[alg->key_offset], ks2);
+		memcpy(&out_key[ks2], &key[alg->iv_offset], ks2);
+	} else if (!strncmp(mode, "lrw", 3)) {
+		ks2 = alg->key_size - TCRYPT_LRW_IKEY_LEN;
+		memcpy(out_key, &key[alg->key_offset], ks2);
+		memcpy(&out_key[ks2], key, TCRYPT_LRW_IKEY_LEN);
+	} else if (!strncmp(mode, "cbc", 3)) {
+		memcpy(out_key, &key[alg->key_offset], alg->key_size);
+		/* IV + whitening */
+		memcpy(&out_key[alg->key_size], &key[alg->iv_offset],
+		       alg->key_extra_size);
+	}
+}
+
+static int TCRYPT_decrypt_hdr_one(struct tcrypt_alg *alg, const char *mode,
+				   const char *key,struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr)
+{
+	char backend_key[TCRYPT_HDR_KEY_LEN];
+	char iv[TCRYPT_HDR_IV_LEN] = {};
+	char mode_name[MAX_CIPHER_LEN + 1];
+	struct crypt_cipher *cipher;
+	char *c, *buf = (char*)&hdr->e;
+	int r;
+
+	/* Remove IV if present */
+	mode_name[MAX_CIPHER_LEN] = '\0';
+	strncpy(mode_name, mode, MAX_CIPHER_LEN);
+	c = strchr(mode_name, '-');
+	if (c)
+		*c = '\0';
+
+	if (!strncmp(mode, "lrw", 3))
+		iv[alg->iv_size - 1] = 1;
+	else if (!strncmp(mode, "cbc", 3)) {
+		TCRYPT_remove_whitening(buf, &key[8]);
+		if (!strcmp(alg->name, "blowfish_le"))
+			return decrypt_blowfish_le_cbc(alg, key, buf);
+		memcpy(iv, &key[alg->iv_offset], alg->iv_size);
+	}
+
+	TCRYPT_copy_key(alg, mode, backend_key, key);
+	r = crypt_cipher_init(&cipher, alg->name, mode_name,
+			      backend_key, alg->key_size);
+	if (!r) {
+		r = crypt_cipher_decrypt(cipher, buf, buf, TCRYPT_HDR_LEN,
+					 iv, alg->iv_size);
+		crypt_cipher_destroy(cipher);
+	}
+
+	crypt_memzero(backend_key, sizeof(backend_key));
+	crypt_memzero(iv, TCRYPT_HDR_IV_LEN);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * For chained ciphers and CBC mode we need "outer" decryption.
+ * Backend doesn't provide this, so implement it here directly using ECB.
+ */
+static int TCRYPT_decrypt_cbci(struct tcrypt_algs *ciphers,
+				const char *key, struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr)
+{
+	struct crypt_cipher *cipher[ciphers->chain_count];
+	unsigned int bs = ciphers->cipher[0].iv_size;
+	char *buf = (char*)&hdr->e, iv[bs], iv_old[bs];
+	unsigned int i, j;
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+
+	TCRYPT_remove_whitening(buf, &key[8]);
+
+	memcpy(iv, &key[ciphers->cipher[0].iv_offset], bs);
+
+	/* Initialize all ciphers in chain in ECB mode */
+	for (j = 0; j < ciphers->chain_count; j++)
+		cipher[j] = NULL;
+	for (j = 0; j < ciphers->chain_count; j++) {
+		r = crypt_cipher_init(&cipher[j], ciphers->cipher[j].name, "ecb",
+				      &key[ciphers->cipher[j].key_offset],
+				      ciphers->cipher[j].key_size);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Implements CBC with chained ciphers in loop inside */
+	for (i = 0; i < TCRYPT_HDR_LEN; i += bs) {
+		memcpy(iv_old, &buf[i], bs);
+		for (j = ciphers->chain_count; j > 0; j--) {
+			r = crypt_cipher_decrypt(cipher[j - 1], &buf[i], &buf[i],
+						  bs, NULL, 0);
+			if (r < 0)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		for (j = 0; j < bs; j++)
+			buf[i + j] ^= iv[j];
+		memcpy(iv, iv_old, bs);
+	}
+out:
+	for (j = 0; j < ciphers->chain_count; j++)
+		if (cipher[j])
+			crypt_cipher_destroy(cipher[j]);
+
+	crypt_memzero(iv, bs);
+	crypt_memzero(iv_old, bs);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int TCRYPT_decrypt_hdr(struct crypt_device *cd, struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
+			       const char *key, uint32_t flags)
+{
+	struct tcrypt_phdr hdr2;
+	int i, j, r = -EINVAL;
+
+	for (i = 0; tcrypt_cipher[i].chain_count; i++) {
+		if (!(flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_LEGACY_MODES) && tcrypt_cipher[i].legacy)
+			continue;
+		log_dbg(cd, "TCRYPT:  trying cipher %s-%s",
+			tcrypt_cipher[i].long_name, tcrypt_cipher[i].mode);
+
+		memcpy(&hdr2.e, &hdr->e, TCRYPT_HDR_LEN);
+
+		if (!strncmp(tcrypt_cipher[i].mode, "cbci", 4))
+			r = TCRYPT_decrypt_cbci(&tcrypt_cipher[i], key, &hdr2);
+		else for (j = tcrypt_cipher[i].chain_count - 1; j >= 0 ; j--) {
+			if (!tcrypt_cipher[i].cipher[j].name)
+				continue;
+			r = TCRYPT_decrypt_hdr_one(&tcrypt_cipher[i].cipher[j],
+					    tcrypt_cipher[i].mode, key, &hdr2);
+			if (r < 0)
+				break;
+		}
+
+		if (r < 0) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "TCRYPT:   returned error %d, skipped.", r);
+			if (r == -ENOTSUP)
+				break;
+			r = -ENOENT;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (!strncmp(hdr2.d.magic, TCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC, TCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC_LEN)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "TCRYPT: Signature magic detected.");
+			memcpy(&hdr->e, &hdr2.e, TCRYPT_HDR_LEN);
+			r = i;
+			break;
+		}
+		if ((flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES) &&
+		     !strncmp(hdr2.d.magic, VCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC, TCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC_LEN)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "TCRYPT: Signature magic detected (Veracrypt).");
+			memcpy(&hdr->e, &hdr2.e, TCRYPT_HDR_LEN);
+			r = i;
+			break;
+		}
+		r = -EPERM;
+	}
+
+	crypt_memzero(&hdr2, sizeof(hdr2));
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int TCRYPT_pool_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				unsigned char pool[TCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN],
+				const char *keyfile)
+{
+	unsigned char *data;
+	int i, j, fd, data_size, r = -EIO;
+	uint32_t crc;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "TCRYPT: using keyfile %s.", keyfile);
+
+	data = malloc(TCRYPT_KEYFILE_LEN);
+	if (!data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	memset(data, 0, TCRYPT_KEYFILE_LEN);
+
+	fd = open(keyfile, O_RDONLY);
+	if (fd < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to open key file."));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	data_size = read_buffer(fd, data, TCRYPT_KEYFILE_LEN);
+	close(fd);
+	if (data_size < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Error reading keyfile %s."), keyfile);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0, j = 0, crc = ~0U; i < data_size; i++) {
+		crc = crypt_crc32(crc, &data[i], 1);
+		pool[j++] += (unsigned char)(crc >> 24);
+		pool[j++] += (unsigned char)(crc >> 16);
+		pool[j++] += (unsigned char)(crc >>  8);
+		pool[j++] += (unsigned char)(crc);
+		j %= TCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN;
+	}
+	r = 0;
+out:
+	crypt_memzero(&crc, sizeof(crc));
+	crypt_memzero(data, TCRYPT_KEYFILE_LEN);
+	free(data);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int TCRYPT_init_hdr(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			   struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
+			   struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params)
+{
+	unsigned char pwd[TCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN] = {};
+	size_t passphrase_size;
+	char *key;
+	unsigned int i, skipped = 0, iterations;
+	int r = -EPERM;
+
+	if (posix_memalign((void*)&key, crypt_getpagesize(), TCRYPT_HDR_KEY_LEN))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (params->keyfiles_count)
+		passphrase_size = TCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN;
+	else
+		passphrase_size = params->passphrase_size;
+
+	if (params->passphrase_size > TCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Maximum TCRYPT passphrase length (%d) exceeded."),
+			      TCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Calculate pool content from keyfiles */
+	for (i = 0; i < params->keyfiles_count; i++) {
+		r = TCRYPT_pool_keyfile(cd, pwd, params->keyfiles[i]);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* If provided password, combine it with pool */
+	for (i = 0; i < params->passphrase_size; i++)
+		pwd[i] += params->passphrase[i];
+
+	for (i = 0; tcrypt_kdf[i].name; i++) {
+		if (!(params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_LEGACY_MODES) && tcrypt_kdf[i].legacy)
+			continue;
+		if (!(params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES) && tcrypt_kdf[i].veracrypt)
+			continue;
+		if ((params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES) && params->veracrypt_pim) {
+			/* Do not try TrueCrypt modes if we have PIM value */
+			if (!tcrypt_kdf[i].veracrypt)
+				continue;
+			/* adjust iterations to given PIM cmdline parameter */
+			iterations = tcrypt_kdf[i].veracrypt_pim_const +
+				    (tcrypt_kdf[i].veracrypt_pim_mult * params->veracrypt_pim);
+		} else
+			iterations = tcrypt_kdf[i].iterations;
+
+		/* Derive header key */
+		log_dbg(cd, "TCRYPT: trying KDF: %s-%s-%d%s.",
+			tcrypt_kdf[i].name, tcrypt_kdf[i].hash, tcrypt_kdf[i].iterations,
+			params->veracrypt_pim && tcrypt_kdf[i].veracrypt ? "-PIM" : "");
+		r = crypt_pbkdf(tcrypt_kdf[i].name, tcrypt_kdf[i].hash,
+				(char*)pwd, passphrase_size,
+				hdr->salt, TCRYPT_HDR_SALT_LEN,
+				key, TCRYPT_HDR_KEY_LEN,
+				iterations, 0, 0);
+		if (r < 0 && crypt_hash_size(tcrypt_kdf[i].hash) < 0) {
+			log_verbose(cd, _("PBKDF2 hash algorithm %s not available, skipping."),
+				      tcrypt_kdf[i].hash);
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (r < 0)
+			break;
+
+		/* Decrypt header */
+		r = TCRYPT_decrypt_hdr(cd, hdr, key, params->flags);
+		if (r == -ENOENT) {
+			skipped++;
+			r = -EPERM;
+		}
+		if (r != -EPERM)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if ((r < 0 && r != -EPERM && skipped && skipped == i) || r == -ENOTSUP) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Required kernel crypto interface not available."));
+#ifdef ENABLE_AF_ALG
+		log_err(cd, _("Ensure you have algif_skcipher kernel module loaded."));
+#endif
+	}
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = TCRYPT_hdr_from_disk(cd, hdr, params, i, r);
+	if (!r) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "TCRYPT: Magic: %s, Header version: %d, req. %d, sector %d"
+			", mk_offset %" PRIu64 ", hidden_size %" PRIu64
+			", volume size %" PRIu64, tcrypt_kdf[i].veracrypt ?
+			VCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC : TCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC,
+			(int)hdr->d.version, (int)hdr->d.version_tc, (int)hdr->d.sector_size,
+			hdr->d.mk_offset, hdr->d.hidden_volume_size, hdr->d.volume_size);
+		log_dbg(cd, "TCRYPT: Header cipher %s-%s, key size %zu",
+			params->cipher, params->mode, params->key_size);
+	}
+out:
+	crypt_memzero(pwd, TCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN);
+	if (key)
+		crypt_memzero(key, TCRYPT_HDR_KEY_LEN);
+	free(key);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int TCRYPT_read_phdr(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		     struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
+		     struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params)
+{
+	struct device *base_device, *device = crypt_metadata_device(cd);
+	ssize_t hdr_size = sizeof(struct tcrypt_phdr);
+	char *base_device_path;
+	int devfd = 0, r;
+
+	assert(sizeof(struct tcrypt_phdr) == 512);
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Reading TCRYPT header of size %zu bytes from device %s.",
+		hdr_size, device_path(device));
+
+	if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER &&
+	    crypt_dev_is_partition(device_path(device))) {
+		base_device_path = crypt_get_base_device(device_path(device));
+
+		log_dbg(cd, "Reading TCRYPT system header from device %s.", base_device_path ?: "?");
+		if (!base_device_path)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		r = device_alloc(cd, &base_device, base_device_path);
+		free(base_device_path);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+		devfd = device_open(cd, base_device, O_RDONLY);
+		device_free(cd, base_device);
+	} else
+		devfd = device_open(cd, device, O_RDONLY);
+
+	if (devfd < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot open device %s."), device_path(device));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = -EIO;
+	if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER) {
+		if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+			device_alignment(device), hdr, hdr_size,
+			TCRYPT_HDR_SYSTEM_OFFSET) == hdr_size) {
+			r = TCRYPT_init_hdr(cd, hdr, params);
+		}
+	} else if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_HEADER) {
+		if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_BACKUP_HEADER) {
+			if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+				device_alignment(device), hdr, hdr_size,
+				TCRYPT_HDR_HIDDEN_OFFSET_BCK) == hdr_size)
+				r = TCRYPT_init_hdr(cd, hdr, params);
+		} else {
+			if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+				device_alignment(device), hdr, hdr_size,
+				TCRYPT_HDR_HIDDEN_OFFSET) == hdr_size)
+				r = TCRYPT_init_hdr(cd, hdr, params);
+			if (r && read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+				device_alignment(device), hdr, hdr_size,
+				TCRYPT_HDR_HIDDEN_OFFSET_OLD) == hdr_size)
+				r = TCRYPT_init_hdr(cd, hdr, params);
+		}
+	} else if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_BACKUP_HEADER) {
+		if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+			device_alignment(device), hdr, hdr_size,
+			TCRYPT_HDR_OFFSET_BCK) == hdr_size)
+			r = TCRYPT_init_hdr(cd, hdr, params);
+	} else if (read_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+			device_alignment(device), hdr, hdr_size) == hdr_size)
+		r = TCRYPT_init_hdr(cd, hdr, params);
+
+	close(devfd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		memset(hdr, 0, sizeof (*hdr));
+	return r;
+}
+
+static struct tcrypt_algs *TCRYPT_get_algs(const char *cipher, const char *mode)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!cipher || !mode)
+		return NULL;
+
+	for (i = 0; tcrypt_cipher[i].chain_count; i++)
+		if (!strcmp(tcrypt_cipher[i].long_name, cipher) &&
+		    !strcmp(tcrypt_cipher[i].mode, mode))
+		    return &tcrypt_cipher[i];
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+int TCRYPT_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		     const char *name,
+		     struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
+		     struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params,
+		     uint32_t flags)
+{
+	char dm_name[PATH_MAX], dm_dev_name[PATH_MAX], cipher_spec[MAX_CIPHER_LEN*2+1];
+	char *part_path;
+	unsigned int i;
+	int r;
+	uint32_t req_flags, dmc_flags;
+	struct tcrypt_algs *algs;
+	enum devcheck device_check;
+	uint64_t offset = crypt_get_data_offset(cd);
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+	struct device  *ptr_dev = crypt_data_device(cd), *device = NULL, *part_device = NULL;
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {
+		.flags = flags
+	};
+
+	if (!hdr->d.version) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "TCRYPT: this function is not supported without encrypted header load.");
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+
+	if (hdr->d.sector_size && hdr->d.sector_size != SECTOR_SIZE) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Activation is not supported for %d sector size."),
+			hdr->d.sector_size);
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+
+	if (strstr(params->mode, "-tcrypt")) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Kernel doesn't support activation for this TCRYPT legacy mode."));
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+
+	if (strstr(params->mode, "-tcw"))
+		req_flags = DM_TCW_SUPPORTED;
+	else
+		req_flags = DM_PLAIN64_SUPPORTED;
+
+	algs = TCRYPT_get_algs(params->cipher, params->mode);
+	if (!algs)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (hdr->d.sector_size == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER)
+		dmd.size = 0;
+	else if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_HEADER)
+		dmd.size = hdr->d.hidden_volume_size / hdr->d.sector_size;
+	else
+		dmd.size = hdr->d.volume_size / hdr->d.sector_size;
+
+	if (dmd.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED)
+		device_check = DEV_OK;
+	else
+		device_check = DEV_EXCL;
+
+	if ((params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER) &&
+	     !crypt_dev_is_partition(device_path(crypt_data_device(cd)))) {
+		part_path = crypt_get_partition_device(device_path(crypt_data_device(cd)),
+						       crypt_get_data_offset(cd), dmd.size);
+		if (part_path) {
+			if (!device_alloc(cd, &part_device, part_path)) {
+				log_verbose(cd, _("Activating TCRYPT system encryption for partition %s."),
+					    part_path);
+				ptr_dev = part_device;
+				offset = 0;
+			}
+			free(part_path);
+		} else
+			/*
+			 * System encryption use the whole device mapping, there can
+			 * be active partitions.
+			 */
+			device_check = DEV_OK;
+	}
+
+	r = device_block_adjust(cd, ptr_dev, device_check,
+				offset, &dmd.size, &dmd.flags);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* From here, key size for every cipher must be the same */
+	vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(algs->cipher[0].key_size +
+				    algs->cipher[0].key_extra_size, NULL);
+	if (!vk) {
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	for (i = algs->chain_count; i > 0; i--) {
+		if (i == 1) {
+			dm_name[sizeof(dm_name)-1] = '\0';
+			strncpy(dm_name, name, sizeof(dm_name)-1);
+			dmd.flags = flags;
+		} else {
+			snprintf(dm_name, sizeof(dm_name), "%s_%d", name, i-1);
+			dmd.flags = flags | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE;
+		}
+
+		TCRYPT_copy_key(&algs->cipher[i-1], algs->mode,
+				vk->key, hdr->d.keys);
+
+		if (algs->chain_count != i) {
+			snprintf(dm_dev_name, sizeof(dm_dev_name), "%s/%s_%d",
+				 dm_get_dir(), name, i);
+			r = device_alloc(cd, &device, dm_dev_name);
+			if (r)
+				break;
+			ptr_dev = device;
+			offset = 0;
+		}
+
+		r = snprintf(cipher_spec, sizeof(cipher_spec), "%s-%s", algs->cipher[i-1].name, algs->mode);
+		if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(cipher_spec)) {
+			r = -ENOMEM;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		r = dm_crypt_target_set(&dmd.segment, 0, dmd.size, ptr_dev, vk,
+				cipher_spec, crypt_get_iv_offset(cd), offset,
+				crypt_get_integrity(cd),
+				crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd),
+				crypt_get_sector_size(cd));
+		if (r)
+			break;
+
+		log_dbg(cd, "Trying to activate TCRYPT device %s using cipher %s.",
+			dm_name, dmd.segment.u.crypt.cipher);
+		r = dm_create_device(cd, dm_name, CRYPT_TCRYPT, &dmd);
+
+		dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+		device_free(cd, device);
+		device = NULL;
+
+		if (r)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if (r < 0 &&
+	    (dm_flags(cd, DM_CRYPT, &dmc_flags) || ((dmc_flags & req_flags) != req_flags))) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Kernel doesn't support TCRYPT compatible mapping."));
+		r = -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+
+out:
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+	device_free(cd, device);
+	device_free(cd, part_device);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int TCRYPT_remove_one(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+		      const char *base_uuid, int index, uint32_t flags)
+{
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+	char dm_name[PATH_MAX];
+	int r;
+
+	if (snprintf(dm_name, sizeof(dm_name), "%s_%d", name, index) < 0)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	r = dm_status_device(cd, dm_name);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = dm_query_device(cd, dm_name, DM_ACTIVE_UUID, &dmd);
+	if (!r && !strncmp(dmd.uuid, base_uuid, strlen(base_uuid)))
+		r = dm_remove_device(cd, dm_name, flags);
+
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)dmd.uuid);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int TCRYPT_deactivate(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint32_t flags)
+{
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+	int r;
+
+	r = dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_UUID, &dmd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+	if (!dmd.uuid)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = dm_remove_device(cd, name, flags);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = TCRYPT_remove_one(cd, name, dmd.uuid, 1, flags);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = TCRYPT_remove_one(cd, name, dmd.uuid, 2, flags);
+out:
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)dmd.uuid);
+	return (r == -ENODEV) ? 0 : r;
+}
+
+static int TCRYPT_status_one(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+			      const char *base_uuid, int index,
+			      size_t *key_size, char *cipher,
+			      uint64_t *data_offset, struct device **device)
+{
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+	struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd.segment;
+	char dm_name[PATH_MAX], *c;
+	int r;
+
+	if (snprintf(dm_name, sizeof(dm_name), "%s_%d", name, index) < 0)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	r = dm_status_device(cd, dm_name);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = dm_query_device(cd, dm_name, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE |
+					  DM_ACTIVE_UUID |
+					  DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_CIPHER |
+					  DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE, &dmd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+	if (!single_segment(&dmd) || tgt->type != DM_CRYPT) {
+		r = -ENOTSUP;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = 0;
+
+	if (!strncmp(dmd.uuid, base_uuid, strlen(base_uuid))) {
+		if ((c = strchr(tgt->u.crypt.cipher, '-')))
+			*c = '\0';
+		strcat(cipher, "-");
+		strncat(cipher, tgt->u.crypt.cipher, MAX_CIPHER_LEN);
+		*key_size += tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength;
+		*data_offset = tgt->u.crypt.offset * SECTOR_SIZE;
+		device_free(cd, *device);
+		MOVE_REF(*device, tgt->data_device);
+	} else
+		r = -ENODEV;
+out:
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)dmd.uuid);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int TCRYPT_init_by_name(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+			const char *uuid,
+			const struct dm_target *tgt,
+			struct device **device,
+			struct crypt_params_tcrypt *tcrypt_params,
+			struct tcrypt_phdr *tcrypt_hdr)
+{
+	struct tcrypt_algs *algs;
+	char cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN * 4], mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN+1], *tmp;
+	size_t key_size;
+	int r;
+
+	memset(tcrypt_params, 0, sizeof(*tcrypt_params));
+	memset(tcrypt_hdr, 0, sizeof(*tcrypt_hdr));
+	tcrypt_hdr->d.sector_size = SECTOR_SIZE;
+	tcrypt_hdr->d.mk_offset = tgt->u.crypt.offset * SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+	strncpy(cipher, tgt->u.crypt.cipher, MAX_CIPHER_LEN);
+	tmp = strchr(cipher, '-');
+	if (!tmp)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	*tmp = '\0';
+	mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN] = '\0';
+	strncpy(mode, ++tmp, MAX_CIPHER_LEN);
+
+	key_size = tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength;
+	r = TCRYPT_status_one(cd, name, uuid, 1, &key_size,
+			      cipher, &tcrypt_hdr->d.mk_offset, device);
+	if (!r)
+		r = TCRYPT_status_one(cd, name, uuid, 2, &key_size,
+				      cipher, &tcrypt_hdr->d.mk_offset, device);
+
+	if (r < 0 && r != -ENODEV)
+		return r;
+
+	algs = TCRYPT_get_algs(cipher, mode);
+	if (!algs || key_size != algs->chain_key_size)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	tcrypt_params->key_size = algs->chain_key_size;
+	tcrypt_params->cipher = algs->long_name;
+	tcrypt_params->mode = algs->mode;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+uint64_t TCRYPT_get_data_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				 struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
+				 struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params)
+{
+	uint64_t size;
+
+	/* No real header loaded, initialized by active device */
+	if (!hdr->d.version)
+		goto hdr_offset;
+
+	/* Mapping through whole device, not partition! */
+	if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER) {
+		if (crypt_dev_is_partition(device_path(crypt_metadata_device(cd))))
+			return 0;
+		goto hdr_offset;
+	}
+
+	if (params->mode && !strncmp(params->mode, "xts", 3)) {
+		if (hdr->d.version < 3)
+			return 1;
+
+		if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_HEADER) {
+			if (hdr->d.version > 3)
+				return (hdr->d.mk_offset / hdr->d.sector_size);
+			if (device_size(crypt_metadata_device(cd), &size) < 0)
+				return 0;
+			return (size - hdr->d.hidden_volume_size +
+				(TCRYPT_HDR_HIDDEN_OFFSET_OLD)) / hdr->d.sector_size;
+		}
+		goto hdr_offset;
+	}
+
+	if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_HEADER) {
+		if (device_size(crypt_metadata_device(cd), &size) < 0)
+			return 0;
+		return (size - hdr->d.hidden_volume_size +
+			(TCRYPT_HDR_HIDDEN_OFFSET_OLD)) / hdr->d.sector_size;
+	}
+
+hdr_offset:
+	return hdr->d.mk_offset / hdr->d.sector_size;
+}
+
+uint64_t TCRYPT_get_iv_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			      struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
+			      struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params)
+{
+	uint64_t iv_offset;
+
+	if (params->mode && !strncmp(params->mode, "xts", 3))
+		iv_offset = TCRYPT_get_data_offset(cd, hdr, params);
+	else if (params->mode && !strncmp(params->mode, "lrw", 3))
+		iv_offset = 0;
+	else
+		iv_offset = hdr->d.mk_offset / hdr->d.sector_size;
+
+	if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER)
+		iv_offset += crypt_dev_partition_offset(device_path(crypt_metadata_device(cd)));
+
+	return iv_offset;
+}
+
+int TCRYPT_get_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			  struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
+			  struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params,
+			  struct volume_key **vk)
+{
+	struct tcrypt_algs *algs;
+	unsigned int i, key_index;
+
+	if (!hdr->d.version) {
+		log_err(cd, _("This function is not supported without TCRYPT header load."));
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+
+	algs = TCRYPT_get_algs(params->cipher, params->mode);
+	if (!algs)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(params->key_size, NULL);
+	if (!*vk)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	for (i = 0, key_index = 0; i < algs->chain_count; i++) {
+		TCRYPT_copy_key(&algs->cipher[i], algs->mode,
+				&(*vk)->key[key_index], hdr->d.keys);
+		key_index += algs->cipher[i].key_size;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int TCRYPT_dump(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
+		struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params)
+{
+	log_std(cd, "%s header information for %s\n",
+		hdr->d.magic[0] == 'T' ? "TCRYPT" : "VERACRYPT",
+		device_path(crypt_metadata_device(cd)));
+	if (hdr->d.version) {
+		log_std(cd, "Version:       \t%d\n", hdr->d.version);
+		log_std(cd, "Driver req.:\t%x.%x\n", hdr->d.version_tc >> 8,
+						    hdr->d.version_tc & 0xFF);
+
+		log_std(cd, "Sector size:\t%" PRIu32 "\n", hdr->d.sector_size);
+		log_std(cd, "MK offset:\t%" PRIu64 "\n", hdr->d.mk_offset);
+		log_std(cd, "PBKDF2 hash:\t%s\n", params->hash_name);
+	}
+	log_std(cd, "Cipher chain:\t%s\n", params->cipher);
+	log_std(cd, "Cipher mode:\t%s\n", params->mode);
+	log_std(cd, "MK bits:       \t%zu\n", params->key_size * 8);
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.h b/lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2f8835f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.h
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+/*
+ * TCRYPT (TrueCrypt-compatible)  header defitinion
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPTSETUP_TCRYPT_H
+#define _CRYPTSETUP_TCRYPT_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#define TCRYPT_HDR_SALT_LEN 64
+#define TCRYPT_HDR_IV_LEN   16
+#define TCRYPT_HDR_LEN     448
+#define TCRYPT_HDR_KEY_LEN 192
+#define TCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC "TRUE"
+#define VCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC "VERA"
+#define TCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC_LEN 4
+
+#define TCRYPT_HDR_HIDDEN_OFFSET_OLD -1536
+#define TCRYPT_HDR_HIDDEN_OFFSET 65536
+
+#define TCRYPT_HDR_HIDDEN_OFFSET_BCK -65536
+#define TCRYPT_HDR_OFFSET_BCK -131072
+
+#define TCRYPT_HDR_SYSTEM_OFFSET 31744
+
+#define TCRYPT_LRW_IKEY_LEN 16
+#define TCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN 64
+#define TCRYPT_KEYFILE_LEN  1048576
+
+#define TCRYPT_HDR_FLAG_SYSTEM    (1 << 0)
+#define TCRYPT_HDR_FLAG_NONSYSTEM (1 << 1)
+
+struct tcrypt_phdr {
+	char salt[TCRYPT_HDR_SALT_LEN];
+
+	/* encrypted part, TCRYPT_HDR_LEN bytes */
+	union {
+	struct __attribute__((__packed__)) {
+		char     magic[TCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC_LEN];
+		uint16_t version;
+		uint16_t version_tc;
+		uint32_t keys_crc32;
+		uint64_t _reserved1[2]; /* data/header ctime */
+		uint64_t hidden_volume_size;
+		uint64_t volume_size;
+		uint64_t mk_offset;
+		uint64_t mk_size;
+		uint32_t flags;
+		uint32_t sector_size;
+		uint8_t  _reserved2[120];
+		uint32_t header_crc32;
+		char     keys[256];
+	} d;
+	char e[TCRYPT_HDR_LEN];
+	};
+} __attribute__((__packed__));
+
+struct crypt_device;
+struct crypt_params_tcrypt;
+struct crypt_dm_active_device;
+struct dm_target;
+struct volume_key;
+struct device;
+
+int TCRYPT_read_phdr(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		     struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
+		     struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params);
+
+int TCRYPT_init_by_name(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+			const char *uuid,
+			const struct dm_target *tgt,
+			struct device **device,
+			struct crypt_params_tcrypt *tcrypt_params,
+			struct tcrypt_phdr *tcrypt_hdr);
+
+int TCRYPT_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		     const char *name,
+		     struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
+		     struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params,
+		     uint32_t flags);
+
+int TCRYPT_deactivate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		      const char *name,
+		      uint32_t flags);
+
+uint64_t TCRYPT_get_data_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
+				struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params);
+
+uint64_t TCRYPT_get_iv_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			      struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
+			      struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params);
+
+int TCRYPT_get_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			  struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
+			  struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params,
+			  struct volume_key **vk);
+
+int TCRYPT_dump(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
+		struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/lib/utils.c b/lib/utils.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..63c9189
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/utils.c
@@ -0,0 +1,325 @@
+/*
+ * utils - miscellaneous device utilities for cryptsetup
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/utsname.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+size_t crypt_getpagesize(void)
+{
+	long r = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
+	return r <= 0 ? DEFAULT_MEM_ALIGNMENT : (size_t)r;
+}
+
+unsigned crypt_cpusonline(void)
+{
+	long r = sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN);
+	return r < 0 ? 1 : r;
+}
+
+uint64_t crypt_getphysmemory_kb(void)
+{
+	long pagesize, phys_pages;
+	uint64_t phys_memory_kb;
+
+	pagesize = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
+	phys_pages = sysconf(_SC_PHYS_PAGES);
+
+	if (pagesize < 0 || phys_pages < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	phys_memory_kb = pagesize / 1024;
+	phys_memory_kb *= phys_pages;
+
+	return phys_memory_kb;
+}
+
+/* MEMLOCK */
+#define DEFAULT_PROCESS_PRIORITY -18
+
+static int _priority;
+static int _memlock_count = 0;
+
+// return 1 if memory is locked
+int crypt_memlock_inc(struct crypt_device *ctx)
+{
+	if (!_memlock_count++) {
+		log_dbg(ctx, "Locking memory.");
+		if (mlockall(MCL_CURRENT | MCL_FUTURE) == -1) {
+			log_dbg(ctx, "Cannot lock memory with mlockall.");
+			_memlock_count--;
+			return 0;
+		}
+		errno = 0;
+		if (((_priority = getpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0)) == -1) && errno)
+			log_err(ctx, _("Cannot get process priority."));
+		else
+			if (setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, DEFAULT_PROCESS_PRIORITY))
+				log_dbg(ctx, "setpriority %d failed: %s",
+					DEFAULT_PROCESS_PRIORITY, strerror(errno));
+	}
+	return _memlock_count ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_memlock_dec(struct crypt_device *ctx)
+{
+	if (_memlock_count && (!--_memlock_count)) {
+		log_dbg(ctx, "Unlocking memory.");
+		if (munlockall() == -1)
+			log_err(ctx, _("Cannot unlock memory."));
+		if (setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, _priority))
+			log_dbg(ctx, "setpriority %d failed: %s", _priority, strerror(errno));
+	}
+	return _memlock_count ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+/* Keyfile processing */
+
+/*
+ * A simple call to lseek(3) might not be possible for some inputs (e.g.
+ * reading from a pipe), so this function instead reads of up to BUFSIZ bytes
+ * at a time until the specified number of bytes. It returns -1 on read error
+ * or when it reaches EOF before the requested number of bytes have been
+ * discarded.
+ */
+static int keyfile_seek(int fd, uint64_t bytes)
+{
+	char tmp[BUFSIZ];
+	size_t next_read;
+	ssize_t bytes_r;
+	off64_t r;
+
+	r = lseek64(fd, bytes, SEEK_CUR);
+	if (r > 0)
+		return 0;
+	if (r < 0 && errno != ESPIPE)
+		return -1;
+
+	while (bytes > 0) {
+		/* figure out how much to read */
+		next_read = bytes > sizeof(tmp) ? sizeof(tmp) : (size_t)bytes;
+
+		bytes_r = read(fd, tmp, next_read);
+		if (bytes_r < 0) {
+			if (errno == EINTR)
+				continue;
+
+			crypt_memzero(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+			/* read error */
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		if (bytes_r == 0)
+			/* EOF */
+			break;
+
+		bytes -= bytes_r;
+	}
+
+	crypt_memzero(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+	return bytes == 0 ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyfile_device_read(struct crypt_device *cd,  const char *keyfile,
+			      char **key, size_t *key_size_read,
+			      uint64_t keyfile_offset, size_t key_size,
+			      uint32_t flags)
+{
+	int fd, regular_file, char_to_read = 0, char_read = 0, unlimited_read = 0;
+	int r = -EINVAL, newline;
+	char *pass = NULL;
+	size_t buflen, i;
+	uint64_t file_read_size;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	if (!key || !key_size_read)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*key = NULL;
+	*key_size_read = 0;
+
+	fd = keyfile ? open(keyfile, O_RDONLY) : STDIN_FILENO;
+	if (fd < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to open key file."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (isatty(fd)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot read keyfile from a terminal."));
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	/* If not requested otherwise, we limit input to prevent memory exhaustion */
+	if (key_size == 0) {
+		key_size = DEFAULT_KEYFILE_SIZE_MAXKB * 1024 + 1;
+		unlimited_read = 1;
+		/* use 4k for buffer (page divisor but avoid huge pages) */
+		buflen = 4096 - sizeof(struct safe_allocation);
+	} else
+		buflen = key_size;
+
+	regular_file = 0;
+	if (keyfile) {
+		if (stat(keyfile, &st) < 0) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Failed to stat key file."));
+			goto out_err;
+		}
+		if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
+			regular_file = 1;
+			file_read_size = (uint64_t)st.st_size;
+
+			if (keyfile_offset > file_read_size) {
+				log_err(cd, _("Cannot seek to requested keyfile offset."));
+				goto out_err;
+			}
+			file_read_size -= keyfile_offset;
+
+			/* known keyfile size, alloc it in one step */
+			if (file_read_size >= (uint64_t)key_size)
+				buflen = key_size;
+			else if (file_read_size)
+				buflen = file_read_size;
+		}
+	}
+
+	pass = crypt_safe_alloc(buflen);
+	if (!pass) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Out of memory while reading passphrase."));
+		goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	/* Discard keyfile_offset bytes on input */
+	if (keyfile_offset && keyfile_seek(fd, keyfile_offset) < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot seek to requested keyfile offset."));
+		goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0, newline = 0; i < key_size; i += char_read) {
+		if (i == buflen) {
+			buflen += 4096;
+			pass = crypt_safe_realloc(pass, buflen);
+			if (!pass) {
+				log_err(cd, _("Out of memory while reading passphrase."));
+				r = -ENOMEM;
+				goto out_err;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (flags & CRYPT_KEYFILE_STOP_EOL) {
+			/* If we should stop on newline, we must read the input
+			 * one character at the time. Otherwise we might end up
+			 * having read some bytes after the newline, which we
+			 * promised not to do.
+			 */
+			char_to_read = 1;
+		} else {
+			/* char_to_read = min(key_size - i, buflen - i) */
+			char_to_read = key_size < buflen ?
+				key_size - i : buflen - i;
+		}
+		char_read = read_buffer(fd, &pass[i], char_to_read);
+		if (char_read < 0) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Error reading passphrase."));
+			r = -EPIPE;
+			goto out_err;
+		}
+
+		if (char_read == 0)
+			break;
+		/* Stop on newline only if not requested read from keyfile */
+		if ((flags & CRYPT_KEYFILE_STOP_EOL) && pass[i] == '\n') {
+			newline = 1;
+			pass[i] = '\0';
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Fail if piped input dies reading nothing */
+	if (!i && !regular_file && !newline) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Nothing to read on input."));
+		r = -EPIPE;
+		goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	/* Fail if we exceeded internal default (no specified size) */
+	if (unlimited_read && i == key_size) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Maximum keyfile size exceeded."));
+		goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	if (!unlimited_read && i != key_size) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot read requested amount of data."));
+		goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	*key = pass;
+	*key_size_read = i;
+	r = 0;
+out_err:
+	if (fd != STDIN_FILENO)
+		close(fd);
+
+	if (r)
+		crypt_safe_free(pass);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyfile_read(struct crypt_device *cd,  const char *keyfile,
+		       char **key, size_t *key_size_read,
+		       size_t keyfile_offset, size_t keyfile_size_max,
+		       uint32_t flags)
+{
+	return crypt_keyfile_device_read(cd, keyfile, key, key_size_read,
+					 keyfile_offset, keyfile_size_max, flags);
+}
+
+int kernel_version(uint64_t *kversion)
+{
+	struct utsname uts;
+	uint16_t maj, min, patch, rel;
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (uname(&uts) < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (sscanf(uts.release, "%" SCNu16  ".%" SCNu16 ".%" SCNu16 "-%" SCNu16,
+		   &maj, &min, &patch, &rel) == 4)
+		r = 0;
+	else if (sscanf(uts.release,  "%" SCNu16 ".%" SCNu16 ".%" SCNu16,
+			&maj, &min, &patch) == 3) {
+		rel = 0;
+		r = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (!r)
+		*kversion = version(maj, min, patch, rel);
+
+	return r;
+}
diff --git a/lib/utils_benchmark.c b/lib/utils_benchmark.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2822095
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/utils_benchmark.c
@@ -0,0 +1,360 @@
+/*
+ * libcryptsetup - cryptsetup library, cipher benchmark
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * This is not simulating storage, so using disk block causes extreme overhead.
+ * Let's use some fixed block size where results are more reliable...
+ */
+#define CIPHER_BLOCK_BYTES 65536
+
+/*
+ * If the measured value is lower, encrypted buffer is probably too small
+ * and calculated values are not reliable.
+ */
+#define CIPHER_TIME_MIN_MS 0.001
+
+/*
+ * The whole test depends on Linux kernel usermode crypto API for now.
+ * (The same implementations are used in dm-crypt though.)
+ */
+
+struct cipher_perf {
+	char name[32];
+	char mode[32];
+	char *key;
+	size_t key_length;
+	char *iv;
+	size_t iv_length;
+	size_t buffer_size;
+};
+
+static int time_ms(struct timespec *start, struct timespec *end, double *ms)
+{
+	double start_ms, end_ms;
+
+	start_ms = start->tv_sec * 1000.0 + start->tv_nsec / (1000.0 * 1000);
+	end_ms   = end->tv_sec * 1000.0 + end->tv_nsec / (1000.0 * 1000);
+
+	*ms = end_ms - start_ms;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cipher_perf_one(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			   struct cipher_perf *cp, char *buf,
+			   size_t buf_size, int enc)
+{
+	struct crypt_cipher *cipher = NULL;
+	size_t done = 0, block = CIPHER_BLOCK_BYTES;
+	int r;
+
+	if (buf_size < block)
+		block = buf_size;
+
+	r = crypt_cipher_init(&cipher, cp->name, cp->mode, cp->key, cp->key_length);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Cannot initialise cipher %s, mode %s.", cp->name, cp->mode);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	while (done < buf_size) {
+		if ((done + block) > buf_size)
+			block = buf_size - done;
+
+		if (enc)
+			r = crypt_cipher_encrypt(cipher, &buf[done], &buf[done],
+						 block, cp->iv, cp->iv_length);
+		else
+			r = crypt_cipher_decrypt(cipher, &buf[done], &buf[done],
+						 block, cp->iv, cp->iv_length);
+		if (r < 0)
+			break;
+
+		done += block;
+	}
+
+	crypt_cipher_destroy(cipher);
+
+	return r;
+}
+static int cipher_measure(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			  struct cipher_perf *cp, char *buf,
+			  size_t buf_size, int encrypt, double *ms)
+{
+	struct timespec start, end;
+	int r;
+
+	/*
+	 * Using getrusage would be better here but the precision
+	 * is not adequate, so better stick with CLOCK_MONOTONIC
+	 */
+	if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &start) < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = cipher_perf_one(cd, cp, buf, buf_size, encrypt);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &end) < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = time_ms(&start, &end, ms);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (*ms < CIPHER_TIME_MIN_MS) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Measured cipher runtime (%1.6f) is too low.", *ms);
+		return -ERANGE;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static double speed_mbs(unsigned long bytes, double ms)
+{
+	double speed = bytes, s = ms / 1000.;
+
+	return speed / (1024 * 1024) / s;
+}
+
+static int cipher_perf(struct crypt_device *cd, struct cipher_perf *cp,
+	double *encryption_mbs, double *decryption_mbs)
+{
+	double ms_enc, ms_dec, ms;
+	int r, repeat_enc, repeat_dec;
+	void *buf = NULL;
+
+	if (posix_memalign(&buf, crypt_getpagesize(), cp->buffer_size))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ms_enc = 0.0;
+	repeat_enc = 1;
+	while (ms_enc < 1000.0) {
+		r = cipher_measure(cd, cp, buf, cp->buffer_size, 1, &ms);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			free(buf);
+			return r;
+		}
+		ms_enc += ms;
+		repeat_enc++;
+	}
+
+	ms_dec = 0.0;
+	repeat_dec = 1;
+	while (ms_dec < 1000.0) {
+		r = cipher_measure(cd, cp, buf, cp->buffer_size, 0, &ms);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			free(buf);
+			return r;
+		}
+		ms_dec += ms;
+		repeat_dec++;
+	}
+
+	free(buf);
+
+	*encryption_mbs = speed_mbs(cp->buffer_size * repeat_enc, ms_enc);
+	*decryption_mbs = speed_mbs(cp->buffer_size * repeat_dec, ms_dec);
+
+	return  0;
+}
+
+int crypt_benchmark(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *cipher,
+	const char *cipher_mode,
+	size_t volume_key_size,
+	size_t iv_size,
+	size_t buffer_size,
+	double *encryption_mbs,
+	double *decryption_mbs)
+{
+	struct cipher_perf cp = {
+		.key_length = volume_key_size,
+		.iv_length = iv_size,
+		.buffer_size = buffer_size,
+	};
+	char *c;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!cipher || !cipher_mode || !volume_key_size || !encryption_mbs || !decryption_mbs)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = init_crypto(cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = -ENOMEM;
+	if (iv_size) {
+		cp.iv = malloc(iv_size);
+		if (!cp.iv)
+			goto out;
+		crypt_random_get(cd, cp.iv, iv_size, CRYPT_RND_NORMAL);
+	}
+
+	cp.key = malloc(volume_key_size);
+	if (!cp.key)
+		goto out;
+
+	crypt_random_get(cd, cp.key, volume_key_size, CRYPT_RND_NORMAL);
+	strncpy(cp.name, cipher, sizeof(cp.name)-1);
+	strncpy(cp.mode, cipher_mode, sizeof(cp.mode)-1);
+
+	/* Ignore IV generator */
+	if ((c  = strchr(cp.mode, '-')))
+		*c = '\0';
+
+	r = cipher_perf(cd, &cp, encryption_mbs, decryption_mbs);
+out:
+	free(cp.key);
+	free(cp.iv);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_benchmark_pbkdf(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf,
+	const char *password,
+	size_t password_size,
+	const char *salt,
+	size_t salt_size,
+	size_t volume_key_size,
+	int (*progress)(uint32_t time_ms, void *usrptr),
+	void *usrptr)
+{
+	int r;
+	const char *kdf_opt;
+
+	if (!pbkdf || (!password && password_size))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = init_crypto(cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	kdf_opt = !strcmp(pbkdf->type, CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2) ? pbkdf->hash : "";
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Running %s(%s) benchmark.", pbkdf->type, kdf_opt);
+
+	r = crypt_pbkdf_perf(pbkdf->type, pbkdf->hash, password, password_size,
+			     salt, salt_size, volume_key_size, pbkdf->time_ms,
+			     pbkdf->max_memory_kb, pbkdf->parallel_threads,
+			     &pbkdf->iterations, &pbkdf->max_memory_kb, progress, usrptr);
+
+	if (!r)
+		log_dbg(cd, "Benchmark returns %s(%s) %u iterations, %u memory, %u threads (for %zu-bits key).",
+			pbkdf->type, kdf_opt, pbkdf->iterations, pbkdf->max_memory_kb,
+			pbkdf->parallel_threads, volume_key_size * 8);
+	return r;
+}
+
+struct benchmark_usrptr {
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf;
+};
+
+static int benchmark_callback(uint32_t time_ms, void *usrptr)
+{
+	struct benchmark_usrptr *u = usrptr;
+
+	log_dbg(u->cd, "PBKDF benchmark: memory cost = %u, iterations = %u, "
+		"threads = %u (took %u ms)", u->pbkdf->max_memory_kb,
+		u->pbkdf->iterations, u->pbkdf->parallel_threads, time_ms);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Used in internal places to benchmark crypt_device context PBKDF.
+ * Once requested parameters are benchmarked, iterations attribute is set,
+ * and the benchmarked values can be reused.
+ * Note that memory cost can be changed after benchmark (if used).
+ * NOTE: You need to check that you are benchmarking for the same key size.
+ */
+int crypt_benchmark_pbkdf_internal(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				   struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf,
+				   size_t volume_key_size)
+{
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_limits pbkdf_limits;
+	double PBKDF2_tmp;
+	uint32_t ms_tmp;
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+	struct benchmark_usrptr u = {
+		.cd = cd,
+		.pbkdf = pbkdf
+	};
+
+	r = crypt_pbkdf_get_limits(pbkdf->type, &pbkdf_limits);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	if (pbkdf->flags & CRYPT_PBKDF_NO_BENCHMARK) {
+		if (pbkdf->iterations) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Reusing PBKDF values (no benchmark flag is set).");
+			return 0;
+		}
+		log_err(cd, _("PBKDF benchmark disabled but iterations not set."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* For PBKDF2 run benchmark always. Also note it depends on volume_key_size! */
+	if (!strcmp(pbkdf->type, CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2)) {
+		/*
+		 * For PBKDF2 it is enough to run benchmark for only 1 second
+		 * and interpolate final iterations value from it.
+		 */
+		ms_tmp = pbkdf->time_ms;
+		pbkdf->time_ms = 1000;
+		pbkdf->parallel_threads = 0; /* N/A in PBKDF2 */
+		pbkdf->max_memory_kb = 0; /* N/A in PBKDF2 */
+
+		r = crypt_benchmark_pbkdf(cd, pbkdf, "foo", 3, "bar", 3,
+					volume_key_size, &benchmark_callback, &u);
+		pbkdf->time_ms = ms_tmp;
+		if (r < 0) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Not compatible PBKDF2 options (using hash algorithm %s)."),
+				pbkdf->hash);
+			return r;
+		}
+
+		PBKDF2_tmp = ((double)pbkdf->iterations * pbkdf->time_ms / 1000.);
+		if (PBKDF2_tmp > (double)UINT32_MAX)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		pbkdf->iterations = at_least((uint32_t)PBKDF2_tmp, pbkdf_limits.min_iterations);
+	} else {
+		/* Already benchmarked */
+		if (pbkdf->iterations) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Reusing PBKDF values.");
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		r = crypt_benchmark_pbkdf(cd, pbkdf, "foo", 3,
+			"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef", 32,
+			volume_key_size, &benchmark_callback, &u);
+		if (r < 0)
+			log_err(cd, _("Not compatible PBKDF options."));
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
diff --git a/lib/utils_blkid.c b/lib/utils_blkid.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eaa0f9b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/utils_blkid.c
@@ -0,0 +1,309 @@
+/*
+ * blkid probe utilities
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "utils_blkid.h"
+#include "utils_io.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_BLKID
+#include <blkid/blkid.h>
+/* make bad checksums flag optional */
+#ifndef BLKID_SUBLKS_BADCSUM
+#define BLKID_SUBLKS_BADCSUM 0
+#endif
+struct blkid_handle {
+	int fd;
+	blkid_probe pr;
+};
+#ifndef HAVE_BLKID_WIPE
+static size_t crypt_getpagesize(void)
+{
+	long r = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
+	return r <= 0 ? 4096 : (size_t)r;
+}
+#endif
+#endif
+
+void blk_set_chains_for_wipes(struct blkid_handle *h)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_BLKID
+	blkid_probe_enable_partitions(h->pr, 1);
+	blkid_probe_set_partitions_flags(h->pr, 0
+#ifdef HAVE_BLKID_WIPE
+	| BLKID_PARTS_MAGIC
+#endif
+	);
+
+	blkid_probe_enable_superblocks(h->pr, 1);
+	blkid_probe_set_superblocks_flags(h->pr, BLKID_SUBLKS_LABEL   |
+						 BLKID_SUBLKS_UUID    |
+						 BLKID_SUBLKS_TYPE    |
+						 BLKID_SUBLKS_USAGE   |
+						 BLKID_SUBLKS_VERSION |
+						 BLKID_SUBLKS_MAGIC   |
+						 BLKID_SUBLKS_BADCSUM);
+#endif
+}
+
+void blk_set_chains_for_full_print(struct blkid_handle *h)
+{
+	blk_set_chains_for_wipes(h);
+}
+
+void blk_set_chains_for_fast_detection(struct blkid_handle *h)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_BLKID
+	blkid_probe_enable_partitions(h->pr, 1);
+	blkid_probe_set_partitions_flags(h->pr, 0);
+
+	blkid_probe_enable_superblocks(h->pr, 1);
+	blkid_probe_set_superblocks_flags(h->pr, BLKID_SUBLKS_TYPE);
+#endif
+}
+
+int blk_init_by_path(struct blkid_handle **h, const char *path)
+{
+	int r = -ENOTSUP;
+#ifdef HAVE_BLKID
+	struct blkid_handle *tmp = malloc(sizeof(*tmp));
+	if (!tmp)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	tmp->fd = -1;
+
+	tmp->pr = blkid_new_probe_from_filename(path);
+	if (!tmp->pr) {
+		free(tmp);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	*h = tmp;
+
+	r = 0;
+#endif
+	return r;
+}
+
+int blk_init_by_fd(struct blkid_handle **h, int fd)
+{
+	int r = -ENOTSUP;
+#ifdef HAVE_BLKID
+	struct blkid_handle *tmp = malloc(sizeof(*tmp));
+	if (!tmp)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	tmp->pr = blkid_new_probe();
+	if (!tmp->pr) {
+		free(tmp);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (blkid_probe_set_device(tmp->pr, fd, 0, 0)) {
+		blkid_free_probe(tmp->pr);
+		free(tmp);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	tmp->fd = fd;
+
+	*h = tmp;
+
+	r = 0;
+#endif
+	return r;
+}
+
+int blk_superblocks_filter_luks(struct blkid_handle *h)
+{
+	int r = -ENOTSUP;
+#ifdef HAVE_BLKID
+	char luks[] = "crypto_LUKS";
+	char *luks_filter[] = {
+		luks,
+		NULL
+	};
+	r = blkid_probe_filter_superblocks_type(h->pr, BLKID_FLTR_NOTIN, luks_filter);
+#endif
+	return r;
+}
+
+blk_probe_status blk_probe(struct blkid_handle *h)
+{
+	blk_probe_status pr = PRB_FAIL;
+#ifdef HAVE_BLKID
+	int r = blkid_do_probe(h->pr);
+
+	if (r == 0)
+		pr = PRB_OK;
+	else if (r == 1)
+		pr = PRB_EMPTY;
+#endif
+	return pr;
+}
+
+blk_probe_status blk_safeprobe(struct blkid_handle *h)
+{
+	int r = -1;
+#ifdef HAVE_BLKID
+	r = blkid_do_safeprobe(h->pr);
+#endif
+	switch (r) {
+	case -2:
+		return PRB_AMBIGUOUS;
+	case 1:
+		return PRB_EMPTY;
+	case 0:
+		return PRB_OK;
+	default:
+		return PRB_FAIL;
+	}
+}
+
+int blk_is_partition(struct blkid_handle *h)
+{
+	int r = 0;
+#ifdef HAVE_BLKID
+	r = blkid_probe_has_value(h->pr, "PTTYPE");
+#endif
+	return r;
+}
+
+int blk_is_superblock(struct blkid_handle *h)
+{
+	int r = 0;
+#ifdef HAVE_BLKID
+	r = blkid_probe_has_value(h->pr, "TYPE");
+#endif
+	return r;
+}
+
+const char *blk_get_partition_type(struct blkid_handle *h)
+{
+	const char *value = NULL;
+#ifdef HAVE_BLKID
+	(void) blkid_probe_lookup_value(h->pr, "PTTYPE", &value, NULL);
+#endif
+	return value;
+}
+
+const char *blk_get_superblock_type(struct blkid_handle *h)
+{
+	const char *value = NULL;
+#ifdef HAVE_BLKID
+	(void) blkid_probe_lookup_value(h->pr, "TYPE", &value, NULL);
+#endif
+	return value;
+}
+
+void blk_free(struct blkid_handle *h)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_BLKID
+	if (!h)
+		return;
+
+	if (h->pr)
+		blkid_free_probe(h->pr);
+
+	free(h);
+#endif
+}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_BLKID
+#ifndef HAVE_BLKID_WIPE
+static int blk_step_back(struct blkid_handle *h)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_BLKID_STEP_BACK
+	return blkid_probe_step_back(h->pr);
+#else
+	blkid_reset_probe(h->pr);
+	blkid_probe_set_device(h->pr, h->fd, 0, 0);
+	return 0;
+#endif
+}
+#endif /* not HAVE_BLKID_WIPE */
+#endif /* HAVE_BLKID */
+
+int blk_do_wipe(struct blkid_handle *h)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_BLKID
+#ifdef HAVE_BLKID_WIPE
+	return blkid_do_wipe(h->pr, 0);
+#else
+	const char *offset;
+	off_t offset_val;
+	void *buf;
+	ssize_t ret;
+	size_t alignment, len, bsize = blkid_probe_get_sectorsize(h->pr);
+
+	if (h->fd < 0 || !bsize)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (blk_is_partition(h)) {
+		if (blkid_probe_lookup_value(h->pr, "PTMAGIC_OFFSET", &offset, NULL))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (blkid_probe_lookup_value(h->pr, "PTMAGIC", NULL, &len))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else if (blk_is_superblock(h)) {
+		if (blkid_probe_lookup_value(h->pr, "SBMAGIC_OFFSET", &offset, NULL))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (blkid_probe_lookup_value(h->pr, "SBMAGIC", NULL, &len))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else
+		return 0;
+
+	alignment = crypt_getpagesize();
+
+	if (posix_memalign(&buf, alignment, len))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	memset(buf, 0, len);
+
+	offset_val = strtoll(offset, NULL, 10);
+
+	/* TODO: missing crypt_wipe_fd() */
+	ret = write_lseek_blockwise(h->fd, bsize, alignment, buf, len, offset_val);
+	free(buf);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return -EIO;
+
+	if ((size_t)ret == len) {
+		blk_step_back(h);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return -EIO;
+#endif
+#else /* HAVE_BLKID */
+	return -ENOTSUP;
+#endif
+}
+
+int blk_supported(void)
+{
+	int r = 0;
+#ifdef HAVE_BLKID
+	r = 1;
+#endif
+	return r;
+}
diff --git a/lib/utils_blkid.h b/lib/utils_blkid.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ee001a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/utils_blkid.h
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+/*
+ * blkid probe utilities
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _UTILS_BLKID_H
+#define _UTILS_BLKID_H
+
+struct blkid_handle;
+
+typedef enum { PRB_OK = 0, PRB_EMPTY, PRB_AMBIGUOUS, PRB_FAIL } blk_probe_status;
+
+int blk_init_by_path(struct blkid_handle **h, const char *path);
+
+void blk_free(struct blkid_handle *h);
+
+/*
+ * WARNING: This will reset file description offset as if
+ * 	    lseek(devfd, 0, SEEK_SET) was called!
+ */
+int blk_init_by_fd(struct blkid_handle **h, int fd);
+
+void blk_set_chains_for_wipes(struct blkid_handle *h);
+
+void blk_set_chains_for_full_print(struct blkid_handle *h);
+
+void blk_set_chains_for_fast_detection(struct blkid_handle *h);
+
+int blk_superblocks_filter_luks(struct blkid_handle *h);
+
+blk_probe_status blk_safeprobe(struct blkid_handle *h);
+
+blk_probe_status blk_probe(struct blkid_handle *h);
+
+int blk_is_partition(struct blkid_handle *h);
+
+int blk_is_superblock(struct blkid_handle *h);
+
+const char *blk_get_partition_type(struct blkid_handle *h);
+
+const char *blk_get_superblock_type(struct blkid_handle *h);
+
+int blk_do_wipe(struct blkid_handle *h);
+
+int blk_supported(void);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/lib/utils_crypt.c b/lib/utils_crypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6b189c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/utils_crypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
+/*
+ * utils_crypt - cipher utilities for cryptsetup
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "libcryptsetup.h"
+#include "utils_crypt.h"
+
+int crypt_parse_name_and_mode(const char *s, char *cipher, int *key_nums,
+			      char *cipher_mode)
+{
+	if (!s || !cipher || !cipher_mode)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (sscanf(s, "%" MAX_CIPHER_LEN_STR "[^-]-%" MAX_CIPHER_LEN_STR "s",
+		   cipher, cipher_mode) == 2) {
+		if (!strcmp(cipher_mode, "plain"))
+			strcpy(cipher_mode, "cbc-plain");
+		if (key_nums) {
+			char *tmp = strchr(cipher, ':');
+			*key_nums = tmp ? atoi(++tmp) : 1;
+			if (!*key_nums)
+				return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Short version for "empty" cipher */
+	if (!strcmp(s, "null") || !strcmp(s, "cipher_null")) {
+		strcpy(cipher, "cipher_null");
+		strcpy(cipher_mode, "ecb");
+		if (key_nums)
+			*key_nums = 0;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (sscanf(s, "%" MAX_CIPHER_LEN_STR "[^-]", cipher) == 1) {
+		strcpy(cipher_mode, "cbc-plain");
+		if (key_nums)
+			*key_nums = 1;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int crypt_parse_hash_integrity_mode(const char *s, char *integrity)
+{
+	char mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], hash[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+	int r;
+
+	if (!s || !integrity || strchr(s, '(') || strchr(s, ')'))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = sscanf(s, "%" MAX_CIPHER_LEN_STR "[^-]-%" MAX_CIPHER_LEN_STR "s", mode, hash);
+	if (r == 2)
+		r = snprintf(integrity, MAX_CIPHER_LEN, "%s(%s)", mode, hash);
+	else if (r == 1)
+		r = snprintf(integrity, MAX_CIPHER_LEN, "%s", mode);
+	else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (r < 0 || r == MAX_CIPHER_LEN)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_parse_integrity_mode(const char *s, char *integrity,
+			       int *integrity_key_size)
+{
+	int ks = 0, r = 0;
+
+	if (!s || !integrity)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	// FIXME: do not hardcode it here
+
+	/* AEAD modes */
+	if (!strcmp(s, "aead") ||
+	    !strcmp(s, "poly1305") ||
+	    !strcmp(s, "none")) {
+		strncpy(integrity, s, MAX_CIPHER_LEN);
+		ks = 0;
+	} else if (!strcmp(s, "hmac-sha1")) {
+		strncpy(integrity, "hmac(sha1)", MAX_CIPHER_LEN);
+		ks = 20;
+	} else if (!strcmp(s, "hmac-sha256")) {
+		strncpy(integrity, "hmac(sha256)", MAX_CIPHER_LEN);
+		ks = 32;
+	} else if (!strcmp(s, "hmac-sha512")) {
+		ks = 64;
+		strncpy(integrity, "hmac(sha512)", MAX_CIPHER_LEN);
+	} else if (!strcmp(s, "cmac-aes")) {
+		ks = 16;
+		strncpy(integrity, "cmac(aes)", MAX_CIPHER_LEN);
+	} else
+		r = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (integrity_key_size)
+		*integrity_key_size = ks;
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_parse_pbkdf(const char *s, const char **pbkdf)
+{
+	const char *tmp = NULL;
+
+	if (!s)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcasecmp(s, CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2))
+		tmp = CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2;
+	else if (!strcasecmp(s, CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2I))
+		tmp = CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2I;
+	else if (!strcasecmp(s, CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2ID))
+		tmp = CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2ID;
+
+	if (!tmp)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (pbkdf)
+		*pbkdf = tmp;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Replacement for memset(s, 0, n) on stack that can be optimized out
+ * Also used in safe allocations for explicit memory wipe.
+ */
+void crypt_memzero(void *s, size_t n)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO
+	explicit_bzero(s, n);
+#else
+	volatile uint8_t *p = (volatile uint8_t *)s;
+
+	while(n--)
+		*p++ = 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* safe allocations */
+void *crypt_safe_alloc(size_t size)
+{
+	struct safe_allocation *alloc;
+
+	if (!size || size > (SIZE_MAX - offsetof(struct safe_allocation, data)))
+		return NULL;
+
+	alloc = malloc(size + offsetof(struct safe_allocation, data));
+	if (!alloc)
+		return NULL;
+
+	alloc->size = size;
+	crypt_memzero(&alloc->data, size);
+
+	/* coverity[leaked_storage] */
+	return &alloc->data;
+}
+
+void crypt_safe_free(void *data)
+{
+	struct safe_allocation *alloc;
+
+	if (!data)
+		return;
+
+	alloc = (struct safe_allocation *)
+		((char *)data - offsetof(struct safe_allocation, data));
+
+	crypt_memzero(data, alloc->size);
+
+	alloc->size = 0x55aa55aa;
+	free(alloc);
+}
+
+void *crypt_safe_realloc(void *data, size_t size)
+{
+	struct safe_allocation *alloc;
+	void *new_data;
+
+	new_data = crypt_safe_alloc(size);
+
+	if (new_data && data) {
+
+		alloc = (struct safe_allocation *)
+			((char *)data - offsetof(struct safe_allocation, data));
+
+		if (size > alloc->size)
+			size = alloc->size;
+
+		memcpy(new_data, data, size);
+	}
+
+	crypt_safe_free(data);
+	return new_data;
+}
+
+ssize_t crypt_hex_to_bytes(const char *hex, char **result, int safe_alloc)
+{
+	char buf[3] = "xx\0", *endp, *bytes;
+	size_t i, len;
+
+	len = strlen(hex);
+	if (len % 2)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	len /= 2;
+
+	bytes = safe_alloc ? crypt_safe_alloc(len) : malloc(len);
+	if (!bytes)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		memcpy(buf, &hex[i * 2], 2);
+		bytes[i] = strtoul(buf, &endp, 16);
+		if (endp != &buf[2]) {
+			safe_alloc ? crypt_safe_free(bytes) : free(bytes);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+	*result = bytes;
+	return i;
+}
diff --git a/lib/utils_crypt.h b/lib/utils_crypt.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..239805d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/utils_crypt.h
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/*
+ * utils_crypt - cipher utilities for cryptsetup
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _UTILS_CRYPT_H
+#define _UTILS_CRYPT_H
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#define MAX_CIPHER_LEN		32
+#define MAX_CIPHER_LEN_STR	"31"
+#define MAX_KEYFILES		32
+
+struct crypt_device;
+
+/* Not to be used directly */
+struct safe_allocation {
+	size_t	size;
+	char	data[0];
+};
+
+int crypt_parse_name_and_mode(const char *s, char *cipher,
+			      int *key_nums, char *cipher_mode);
+int crypt_parse_hash_integrity_mode(const char *s, char *integrity);
+int crypt_parse_integrity_mode(const char *s, char *integrity,
+			       int *integrity_key_size);
+int crypt_parse_pbkdf(const char *s, const char **pbkdf);
+
+void *crypt_safe_alloc(size_t size);
+void crypt_safe_free(void *data);
+void *crypt_safe_realloc(void *data, size_t size);
+
+void crypt_memzero(void *s, size_t n);
+
+ssize_t crypt_hex_to_bytes(const char *hex, char **result, int safe_alloc);
+
+#endif /* _UTILS_CRYPT_H */
diff --git a/lib/utils_device.c b/lib/utils_device.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fbb1904
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/utils_device.c
@@ -0,0 +1,892 @@
+/*
+ * device backend utilities
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
+# include <sys/sysmacros.h>     /* for major, minor */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
+# include <sys/statvfs.h>
+#endif
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "utils_device_locking.h"
+
+struct device {
+	char *path;
+
+	char *file_path;
+	int loop_fd;
+
+	struct crypt_lock_handle *lh;
+
+	unsigned int o_direct:1;
+	unsigned int init_done:1; /* path is bdev or loop already initialized */
+
+	/* cached values */
+	size_t alignment;
+	size_t block_size;
+};
+
+static size_t device_fs_block_size_fd(int fd)
+{
+	size_t page_size = crypt_getpagesize();
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
+	struct statvfs buf;
+
+	/*
+	 * NOTE: some filesystems (NFS) returns bogus blocksize (1MB).
+	 * Page-size io should always work and avoids increasing IO beyond aligned LUKS header.
+	 */
+	if (!fstatvfs(fd, &buf) && buf.f_bsize && buf.f_bsize <= page_size)
+		return (size_t)buf.f_bsize;
+#endif
+	return page_size;
+}
+
+static size_t device_block_size_fd(int fd, size_t *min_size)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+	size_t bsize;
+	int arg;
+
+	if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode))
+		bsize = device_fs_block_size_fd(fd);
+	else {
+		if (ioctl(fd, BLKSSZGET, &arg) < 0)
+			bsize = crypt_getpagesize();
+		else
+			bsize = (size_t)arg;
+	}
+
+	if (!min_size)
+		return bsize;
+
+	if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
+		/* file can be empty as well */
+		if (st.st_size > (ssize_t)bsize)
+			*min_size = bsize;
+		else
+			*min_size = st.st_size;
+	} else {
+		/* block device must have at least one block */
+		*min_size = bsize;
+	}
+
+	return bsize;
+}
+
+static size_t device_alignment_fd(int devfd)
+{
+	long alignment = DEFAULT_MEM_ALIGNMENT;
+
+#ifdef _PC_REC_XFER_ALIGN
+	alignment = fpathconf(devfd, _PC_REC_XFER_ALIGN);
+	if (alignment < 0)
+		alignment = DEFAULT_MEM_ALIGNMENT;
+#endif
+	return (size_t)alignment;
+}
+
+static int device_read_test(int devfd)
+{
+	char buffer[512];
+	int r = -EIO;
+	size_t minsize = 0, blocksize, alignment;
+
+	blocksize = device_block_size_fd(devfd, &minsize);
+	alignment = device_alignment_fd(devfd);
+
+	if (!blocksize || !alignment)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (minsize == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (minsize > sizeof(buffer))
+		minsize = sizeof(buffer);
+
+	if (read_blockwise(devfd, blocksize, alignment, buffer, minsize) == (ssize_t)minsize)
+		r = 0;
+
+	crypt_memzero(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The direct-io is always preferred. The header is usually mapped to the same
+ * device and can be accessed when the rest of device is mapped to data device.
+ * Using dirct-io encsures that we do not mess with data in cache.
+ * (But proper alignment should prevent this in the first place.)
+ * The read test is needed to detect broken configurations (seen with remote
+ * block devices) that allow open with direct-io but then fails on read.
+ */
+static int device_ready(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device)
+{
+	int devfd = -1, r = 0;
+	struct stat st;
+	size_t tmp_size;
+
+	if (device->o_direct) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Trying to open and read device %s with direct-io.",
+			device_path(device));
+		device->o_direct = 0;
+		devfd = open(device_path(device), O_RDONLY | O_DIRECT);
+		if (devfd >= 0) {
+			if (device_read_test(devfd) == 0) {
+				device->o_direct = 1;
+			} else {
+				close(devfd);
+				devfd = -1;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (devfd < 0) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Trying to open device %s without direct-io.",
+			device_path(device));
+		devfd = open(device_path(device), O_RDONLY);
+	}
+
+	if (devfd < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Device %s doesn't exist or access denied."),
+			device_path(device));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (fstat(devfd, &st) < 0)
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	else if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode))
+		r = S_ISREG(st.st_mode) ? -ENOTBLK : -EINVAL;
+	if (r == -EINVAL) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Device %s is not compatible."),
+			device_path(device));
+		close(devfd);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	/* Allow only increase (loop device) */
+	tmp_size = device_alignment_fd(devfd);
+	if (tmp_size > device->alignment)
+		device->alignment = tmp_size;
+
+	tmp_size = device_block_size_fd(devfd, NULL);
+	if (tmp_size > device->block_size)
+		device->block_size = tmp_size;
+
+	close(devfd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _open_locked(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device, int flags)
+{
+	int fd;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Opening locked device %s", device_path(device));
+
+	if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY && device_locked_readonly(device->lh)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Can not open locked device %s in write mode. Read lock held.", device_path(device));
+		return -EAGAIN;
+	}
+
+	fd = open(device_path(device), flags);
+	if (fd < 0)
+		return -errno;
+
+	if (device_locked_verify(cd, fd, device->lh)) {
+		/* fd doesn't correspond to a locked resource */
+		close(fd);
+		log_dbg(cd, "Failed to verify lock resource for device %s.", device_path(device));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return fd;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Common wrapper for device sync.
+ * FIXME: file descriptor will be in struct later.
+ */
+void device_sync(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device, int devfd)
+{
+	if (fsync(devfd) == -1)
+		log_dbg(cd, "Cannot sync device %s.", device_path(device));
+}
+
+/*
+ * in non-locked mode returns always fd or -1
+ *
+ * in locked mode:
+ * 	opened fd or one of:
+ * 	-EAGAIN : requested write mode while device being locked in via shared lock
+ * 	-EINVAL : invalid lock fd state
+ * 	-1	: all other errors
+ */
+static int device_open_internal(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device, int flags)
+{
+	int devfd;
+
+	if (device->o_direct)
+		flags |= O_DIRECT;
+
+	if (device_locked(device->lh))
+		devfd = _open_locked(cd, device, flags);
+	else
+		devfd = open(device_path(device), flags);
+
+	if (devfd < 0)
+		log_dbg(cd, "Cannot open device %s%s.",
+			device_path(device),
+			(flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY ? " for write" : "");
+
+	return devfd;
+}
+
+int device_open(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device, int flags)
+{
+	assert(!device_locked(device->lh));
+	return device_open_internal(cd, device, flags);
+}
+
+int device_open_locked(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device, int flags)
+{
+	assert(!crypt_metadata_locking_enabled() || device_locked(device->lh));
+	return device_open_internal(cd, device, flags);
+}
+
+/* Avoid any read from device, expects direct-io to work. */
+int device_alloc_no_check(struct device **device, const char *path)
+{
+	struct device *dev;
+
+	if (!path) {
+		*device = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	dev = malloc(sizeof(struct device));
+	if (!dev)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	memset(dev, 0, sizeof(struct device));
+	dev->path = strdup(path);
+	if (!dev->path) {
+		free(dev);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	dev->loop_fd = -1;
+	dev->o_direct = 1;
+
+	*device = dev;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int device_alloc(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device **device, const char *path)
+{
+	struct device *dev;
+	int r;
+
+	r = device_alloc_no_check(&dev, path);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (dev) {
+		r = device_ready(cd, dev);
+		if (!r) {
+			dev->init_done = 1;
+		} else if (r == -ENOTBLK) {
+			/* alloc loop later */
+		} else if (r < 0) {
+			free(dev->path);
+			free(dev);
+			return -ENOTBLK;
+		}
+	}
+
+	*device = dev;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void device_free(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device)
+{
+	if (!device)
+		return;
+
+	if (device->loop_fd != -1) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Closed loop %s (%s).", device->path, device->file_path);
+		close(device->loop_fd);
+	}
+
+	assert (!device_locked(device->lh));
+
+	free(device->file_path);
+	free(device->path);
+	free(device);
+}
+
+/* Get block device path */
+const char *device_block_path(const struct device *device)
+{
+	if (!device || !device->init_done)
+		return NULL;
+
+	return device->path;
+}
+
+/* Get device-mapper name of device (if possible) */
+const char *device_dm_name(const struct device *device)
+{
+	const char *dmdir = dm_get_dir();
+	size_t dmdir_len = strlen(dmdir);
+
+	if (!device || !device->init_done)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (strncmp(device->path, dmdir, dmdir_len))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return &device->path[dmdir_len+1];
+}
+
+/* Get path to device / file */
+const char *device_path(const struct device *device)
+{
+	if (!device)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (device->file_path)
+		return device->file_path;
+
+	return device->path;
+}
+
+/* block device topology ioctls, introduced in 2.6.32 */
+#ifndef BLKIOMIN
+#define BLKIOMIN    _IO(0x12,120)
+#define BLKIOOPT    _IO(0x12,121)
+#define BLKALIGNOFF _IO(0x12,122)
+#endif
+
+void device_topology_alignment(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			       struct device *device,
+			       unsigned long *required_alignment, /* bytes */
+			       unsigned long *alignment_offset,   /* bytes */
+			       unsigned long default_alignment)
+{
+	int dev_alignment_offset = 0;
+	unsigned int min_io_size = 0, opt_io_size = 0;
+	unsigned long temp_alignment = 0;
+	int fd;
+
+	*required_alignment = default_alignment;
+	*alignment_offset = 0;
+
+	if (!device || !device->path) //FIXME
+		return;
+
+	fd = open(device->path, O_RDONLY);
+	if (fd == -1)
+		return;
+
+	/* minimum io size */
+	if (ioctl(fd, BLKIOMIN, &min_io_size) == -1) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Topology info for %s not supported, using default offset %lu bytes.",
+			device->path, default_alignment);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* optimal io size */
+	if (ioctl(fd, BLKIOOPT, &opt_io_size) == -1)
+		opt_io_size = min_io_size;
+
+	/* alignment offset, bogus -1 means misaligned/unknown */
+	if (ioctl(fd, BLKALIGNOFF, &dev_alignment_offset) == -1 || dev_alignment_offset < 0)
+		dev_alignment_offset = 0;
+	*alignment_offset = (unsigned long)dev_alignment_offset;
+
+	temp_alignment = (unsigned long)min_io_size;
+
+	/* Ignore bogus opt-io that could break alignment */
+	if ((temp_alignment < (unsigned long)opt_io_size) &&
+	    !((unsigned long)opt_io_size % temp_alignment))
+		temp_alignment = (unsigned long)opt_io_size;
+
+	/* If calculated alignment is multiple of default, keep default */
+	if (temp_alignment && (default_alignment % temp_alignment))
+		*required_alignment = temp_alignment;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Topology: IO (%u/%u), offset = %lu; Required alignment is %lu bytes.",
+		min_io_size, opt_io_size, *alignment_offset, *required_alignment);
+out:
+	(void)close(fd);
+}
+
+size_t device_block_size(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device)
+{
+	int fd;
+
+	if (!device)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (device->block_size)
+		return device->block_size;
+
+	fd = open(device->file_path ?: device->path, O_RDONLY);
+	if (fd >= 0) {
+		device->block_size = device_block_size_fd(fd, NULL);
+		close(fd);
+	}
+
+	if (!device->block_size)
+		log_dbg(cd, "Cannot get block size for device %s.", device_path(device));
+
+	return device->block_size;
+}
+
+int device_read_ahead(struct device *device, uint32_t *read_ahead)
+{
+	int fd, r = 0;
+	long read_ahead_long;
+
+	if (!device)
+		return 0;
+
+	if ((fd = open(device->path, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	r = ioctl(fd, BLKRAGET, &read_ahead_long) ? 0 : 1;
+	close(fd);
+
+	if (r)
+		*read_ahead = (uint32_t) read_ahead_long;
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* Get data size in bytes */
+int device_size(struct device *device, uint64_t *size)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+	int devfd, r = -EINVAL;
+
+	devfd = open(device->path, O_RDONLY);
+	if(devfd == -1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (fstat(devfd, &st) < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
+		*size = (uint64_t)st.st_size;
+		r = 0;
+	} else if (ioctl(devfd, BLKGETSIZE64, size) >= 0)
+		r = 0;
+out:
+	close(devfd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* For a file, allocate the required space */
+int device_fallocate(struct device *device, uint64_t size)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+	int devfd, r = -EINVAL;
+
+	devfd = open(device_path(device), O_RDWR);
+	if (devfd == -1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!fstat(devfd, &st) && S_ISREG(st.st_mode) &&
+	    ((uint64_t)st.st_size >= size || !posix_fallocate(devfd, 0, size))) {
+		r = 0;
+		if (device->file_path && crypt_loop_resize(device->path))
+			r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	close(devfd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int device_check_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		      struct device *device,
+		      uint64_t req_offset, int falloc)
+{
+	uint64_t dev_size;
+
+	if (device_size(device, &dev_size)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Cannot get device size for device %s.", device_path(device));
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Device size %" PRIu64 ", offset %" PRIu64 ".", dev_size, req_offset);
+
+	if (req_offset > dev_size) {
+		/* If it is header file, increase its size */
+		if (falloc && !device_fallocate(device, req_offset))
+			return 0;
+
+		log_err(cd, _("Device %s is too small. Need at least %" PRIu64 " bytes."),
+			device_path(device), req_offset);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int device_info(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		       struct device *device,
+		       enum devcheck device_check,
+		       int *readonly, uint64_t *size)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+	int fd = -1, r, flags = 0, real_readonly;
+	uint64_t real_size;
+
+	if (!device)
+		return -ENOTBLK;
+
+	real_readonly = 0;
+	real_size = 0;
+
+	if (stat(device->path, &st) < 0) {
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* never wipe header on mounted device */
+	if (device_check == DEV_EXCL && S_ISBLK(st.st_mode))
+		flags |= O_EXCL;
+
+	/* Try to open read-write to check whether it is a read-only device */
+	/* coverity[toctou] */
+	fd = open(device->path, O_RDWR | flags);
+	if (fd == -1 && errno == EROFS) {
+		real_readonly = 1;
+		fd = open(device->path, O_RDONLY | flags);
+	}
+
+	if (fd == -1 && device_check == DEV_EXCL && errno == EBUSY) {
+		r = -EBUSY;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (fd == -1) {
+		r = errno ? -errno : -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = 0;
+	if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
+		//FIXME: add readonly check
+		real_size = (uint64_t)st.st_size;
+		real_size >>= SECTOR_SHIFT;
+	} else {
+		/* If the device can be opened read-write, i.e. readonly is still 0, then
+		 * check whether BKROGET says that it is read-only. E.g. read-only loop
+		 * devices may be opened read-write but are read-only according to BLKROGET
+		 */
+		if (real_readonly == 0 && (r = ioctl(fd, BLKROGET, &real_readonly)) < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		r = ioctl(fd, BLKGETSIZE64, &real_size);
+		if (r >= 0) {
+			real_size >>= SECTOR_SHIFT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+out:
+	if (fd != -1)
+		close(fd);
+
+	switch (r) {
+	case 0:
+		if (readonly)
+			*readonly = real_readonly;
+		if (size)
+			*size = real_size;
+		break;
+	case -EBUSY:
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot use device %s which is in use "
+			      "(already mapped or mounted)."), device_path(device));
+		break;
+	case -EACCES:
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot use device %s, permission denied."), device_path(device));
+		break;
+	default:
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot get info about device %s."), device_path(device));
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int device_check_access(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			struct device *device,
+			enum devcheck device_check)
+{
+	return device_info(cd, device, device_check, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+static int device_internal_prepare(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device)
+{
+	char *loop_device = NULL, *file_path = NULL;
+	int r, loop_fd, readonly = 0;
+
+	if (device->init_done)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (getuid() || geteuid()) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot use a loopback device, "
+			      "running as non-root user."));
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Allocating a free loop device.");
+
+	/* Keep the loop open, dettached on last close. */
+	loop_fd = crypt_loop_attach(&loop_device, device->path, 0, 1, &readonly);
+	if (loop_fd == -1) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Attaching loopback device failed "
+			"(loop device with autoclear flag is required)."));
+		free(loop_device);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	file_path = device->path;
+	device->path = loop_device;
+
+	r = device_ready(cd, device);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		device->path = file_path;
+		crypt_loop_detach(loop_device);
+		free(loop_device);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	device->loop_fd = loop_fd;
+	device->file_path = file_path;
+	device->init_done = 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int device_block_adjust(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			struct device *device,
+			enum devcheck device_check,
+			uint64_t device_offset,
+			uint64_t *size,
+			uint32_t *flags)
+{
+	int r, real_readonly;
+	uint64_t real_size;
+
+	if (!device)
+		return -ENOTBLK;
+
+	r = device_internal_prepare(cd, device);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	r = device_info(cd, device, device_check, &real_readonly, &real_size);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	if (device_offset >= real_size) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Requested offset is beyond real size of device %s."),
+			device_path(device));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (size && !*size) {
+		*size = real_size;
+		if (!*size) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Device %s has zero size."), device_path(device));
+			return -ENOTBLK;
+		}
+		*size -= device_offset;
+	}
+
+	/* in case of size is set by parameter */
+	if (size && ((real_size - device_offset) < *size)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Device %s: offset = %" PRIu64 " requested size = %" PRIu64
+			", backing device size = %" PRIu64,
+			device->path, device_offset, *size, real_size);
+		log_err(cd, _("Device %s is too small."), device_path(device));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (flags && real_readonly)
+		*flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+
+	if (size)
+		log_dbg(cd, "Calculated device size is %" PRIu64" sectors (%s), offset %" PRIu64 ".",
+		*size, real_readonly ? "RO" : "RW", device_offset);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+size_t size_round_up(size_t size, size_t block)
+{
+	size_t s = (size + (block - 1)) / block;
+	return s * block;
+}
+
+void device_disable_direct_io(struct device *device)
+{
+	device->o_direct = 0;
+}
+
+int device_direct_io(const struct device *device)
+{
+	return device->o_direct;
+}
+
+static dev_t device_devno(const struct device *device)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+
+	if (stat(device->path, &st) || !S_ISBLK(st.st_mode))
+		return 0;
+
+	return st.st_rdev;
+}
+
+int device_is_identical(struct device *device1, struct device *device2)
+{
+	if (!device1 || !device2)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (device1 == device2)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (device1->init_done && device2->init_done)
+		return (device_devno(device1) == device_devno(device2));
+	else if (device1->init_done || device2->init_done)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!strcmp(device_path(device1), device_path(device2)))
+		return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int device_is_rotational(struct device *device)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+
+	if (stat(device_path(device), &st) < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode))
+		return 0;
+
+	return crypt_dev_is_rotational(major(st.st_rdev), minor(st.st_rdev));
+}
+
+size_t device_alignment(struct device *device)
+{
+	int devfd;
+
+	if (!device->alignment) {
+		devfd = open(device_path(device), O_RDONLY);
+		if (devfd != -1) {
+			device->alignment = device_alignment_fd(devfd);
+			close(devfd);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return device->alignment;
+}
+
+int device_read_lock(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device)
+{
+	if (!crypt_metadata_locking_enabled())
+		return 0;
+
+	assert(!device_locked(device->lh));
+
+	device->lh = device_read_lock_handle(cd, device_path(device));
+
+	if (device_locked(device->lh)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Device %s READ lock taken.", device_path(device));
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return -EBUSY;
+}
+
+int device_write_lock(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device)
+{
+	if (!crypt_metadata_locking_enabled())
+		return 0;
+
+	assert(!device_locked(device->lh));
+
+	device->lh = device_write_lock_handle(cd, device_path(device));
+
+	if (device_locked(device->lh)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Device %s WRITE lock taken.", device_path(device));
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return -EBUSY;
+}
+
+void device_read_unlock(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device)
+{
+	if (!crypt_metadata_locking_enabled())
+		return;
+
+	assert(device_locked(device->lh) && device_locked_readonly(device->lh));
+
+	device_unlock_handle(cd, device->lh);
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Device %s READ lock released.", device_path(device));
+
+	device->lh = NULL;
+}
+
+void device_write_unlock(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device)
+{
+	if (!crypt_metadata_locking_enabled())
+		return;
+
+	assert(device_locked(device->lh) && !device_locked_readonly(device->lh));
+
+	device_unlock_handle(cd, device->lh);
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Device %s WRITE lock released.", device_path(device));
+
+	device->lh = NULL;
+}
diff --git a/lib/utils_device_locking.c b/lib/utils_device_locking.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a8becc4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/utils_device_locking.c
@@ -0,0 +1,345 @@
+/*
+ * Metadata on-disk locking for processes serialization
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Ondrej Kozina
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <linux/limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/file.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
+# include <sys/sysmacros.h>     /* for major, minor */
+#endif
+#include <libgen.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "utils_device_locking.h"
+
+#define same_inode(buf1, buf2) \
+	((buf1).st_ino == (buf2).st_ino && \
+	 (buf1).st_dev == (buf2).st_dev)
+
+#ifndef __GNUC__
+# define __typeof__ typeof
+#endif
+
+enum lock_type {
+	DEV_LOCK_READ = 0,
+	DEV_LOCK_WRITE
+};
+
+struct crypt_lock_handle {
+	dev_t devno;
+	int flock_fd;
+	enum lock_type type;
+	__typeof__( ((struct stat*)0)->st_mode) mode;
+};
+
+static int resource_by_devno(char *res, size_t res_size, dev_t devno, unsigned fullpath)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (fullpath)
+		r = snprintf(res, res_size, "%s/L_%d:%d", DEFAULT_LUKS2_LOCK_PATH, major(devno), minor(devno));
+	else
+		r = snprintf(res, res_size, "L_%d:%d", major(devno), minor(devno));
+
+	return (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= res_size) ? -EINVAL : 0;
+}
+
+static int open_lock_dir(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *dir, const char *base)
+{
+	int dirfd, lockdfd;
+
+	dirfd = open(dir, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC);
+	if (dirfd < 0) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Failed to open directory %s: (%d: %s).", dir, errno, strerror(errno));
+		if (errno == ENOTDIR || errno == ENOENT)
+			log_err(cd, _("Locking aborted. The locking path %s/%s is unusable (not a directory or missing)."), dir, base);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	lockdfd = openat(dirfd, base, O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC);
+	if (lockdfd < 0) {
+		if (errno == ENOENT) {
+			log_std(cd, _("WARNING: Locking directory %s/%s is missing!\n"), dir, base);
+
+			/* success or failure w/ errno == EEXIST either way just try to open the 'base' directory again */
+			if (mkdirat(dirfd, base, DEFAULT_LUKS2_LOCK_DIR_PERMS) && errno != EEXIST)
+				log_dbg(cd, "Failed to create directory %s in %s (%d: %s).", base, dir, errno, strerror(errno));
+			else
+				lockdfd = openat(dirfd, base, O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC);
+		} else {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Failed to open directory %s/%s: (%d: %s)", dir, base, errno, strerror(errno));
+			if (errno == ENOTDIR || errno == ELOOP)
+				log_err(cd, _("Locking aborted. The locking path %s/%s is unusable (%s is not a directory)."), dir, base, base);
+		}
+	}
+
+	close(dirfd);
+	return lockdfd >= 0 ? lockdfd : -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int open_resource(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *res)
+{
+	int err, lockdir_fd, r;
+	char dir[] = DEFAULT_LUKS2_LOCK_PATH,
+	     base[] = DEFAULT_LUKS2_LOCK_PATH;
+
+	lockdir_fd = open_lock_dir(cd, dirname(dir), basename(base));
+	if (lockdir_fd < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Opening lock resource file %s/%s", DEFAULT_LUKS2_LOCK_PATH, res);
+	r = openat(lockdir_fd, res, O_CREAT | O_NOFOLLOW | O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC, 0777);
+	err = errno;
+
+	close(lockdir_fd);
+
+	return r < 0 ? -err : r;
+}
+
+static int acquire_lock_handle(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *device_path, struct crypt_lock_handle *h)
+{
+	char res[PATH_MAX];
+	int dev_fd, fd;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	dev_fd = open(device_path, O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK | O_CLOEXEC);
+	if (dev_fd < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (fstat(dev_fd, &st)) {
+		close(dev_fd);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (S_ISBLK(st.st_mode)) {
+		if (resource_by_devno(res, sizeof(res), st.st_rdev, 0)) {
+			close(dev_fd);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		fd = open_resource(cd, res);
+		close(dev_fd);
+		if (fd < 0)
+			return fd;
+
+		h->flock_fd = fd;
+		h->devno = st.st_rdev;
+	} else if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
+		// FIXME: workaround for nfsv4
+		fd = open(device_path, O_RDWR | O_NONBLOCK | O_CLOEXEC);
+		if (fd < 0)
+			h->flock_fd = dev_fd;
+		else {
+			h->flock_fd = fd;
+			close(dev_fd);
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* Wrong device type */
+		close(dev_fd);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	h->mode = st.st_mode;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void release_lock_handle(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_lock_handle *h)
+{
+	char res[PATH_MAX];
+	struct stat buf_a, buf_b;
+
+	if (S_ISBLK(h->mode) && /* was it block device */
+	    !flock(h->flock_fd, LOCK_EX | LOCK_NB) && /* lock to drop the file */
+	    !resource_by_devno(res, sizeof(res), h->devno, 1) && /* acquire lock resource name */
+	    !fstat(h->flock_fd, &buf_a) && /* read inode id referred by fd */
+	    !stat(res, &buf_b) && /* does path file still exist? */
+	    same_inode(buf_a, buf_b)) { /* is it same id as the one referenced by fd? */
+		/* coverity[toctou] */
+		if (unlink(res)) /* yes? unlink the file */
+			log_dbg(cd, "Failed to unlink resource file: %s", res);
+	}
+
+	if (close(h->flock_fd))
+		log_dbg(cd, "Failed to close resource fd (%d).", h->flock_fd);
+}
+
+int device_locked(struct crypt_lock_handle *h)
+{
+	return (h && (h->type == DEV_LOCK_READ || h->type == DEV_LOCK_WRITE));
+}
+
+int device_locked_readonly(struct crypt_lock_handle *h)
+{
+	return (h && h->type == DEV_LOCK_READ);
+}
+
+static int verify_lock_handle(const char *device_path, struct crypt_lock_handle *h)
+{
+	char res[PATH_MAX];
+	struct stat lck_st, res_st;
+
+	/* we locked a regular file, check during device_open() instead. No reason to check now */
+	if (S_ISREG(h->mode))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (resource_by_devno(res, sizeof(res), h->devno, 1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (fstat(h->flock_fd, &lck_st))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return (stat(res, &res_st) || !same_inode(lck_st, res_st)) ? -EAGAIN : 0;
+}
+
+struct crypt_lock_handle *device_read_lock_handle(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *device_path)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct crypt_lock_handle *h = malloc(sizeof(*h));
+
+	if (!h)
+		return NULL;
+
+	do {
+		r = acquire_lock_handle(cd, device_path, h);
+		if (r)
+			break;
+
+		log_dbg(cd, "Acquiring read lock for device %s.", device_path);
+
+		if (flock(h->flock_fd, LOCK_SH)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Shared flock failed with errno %d.", errno);
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			release_lock_handle(cd, h);
+			break;
+		}
+
+		log_dbg(cd, "Verifying read lock handle for device %s.", device_path);
+
+		/*
+		 * check whether another libcryptsetup process removed resource file before this
+		 * one managed to flock() it. See release_lock_handle() for details
+		 */
+		r = verify_lock_handle(device_path, h);
+		if (r) {
+			flock(h->flock_fd, LOCK_UN);
+			release_lock_handle(cd, h);
+			log_dbg(cd, "Read lock handle verification failed.");
+		}
+	} while (r == -EAGAIN);
+
+	if (r) {
+		free(h);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	h->type = DEV_LOCK_READ;
+
+	return h;
+}
+
+struct crypt_lock_handle *device_write_lock_handle(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *device_path)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct crypt_lock_handle *h = malloc(sizeof(*h));
+
+	if (!h)
+		return NULL;
+
+	do {
+		r = acquire_lock_handle(cd, device_path, h);
+		if (r)
+			break;
+
+		log_dbg(cd, "Acquiring write lock for device %s.", device_path);
+
+		if (flock(h->flock_fd, LOCK_EX)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Exclusive flock failed with errno %d.", errno);
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			release_lock_handle(cd, h);
+			break;
+		}
+
+		log_dbg(cd, "Verifying write lock handle for device %s.", device_path);
+
+		/*
+		 * check whether another libcryptsetup process removed resource file before this
+		 * one managed to flock() it. See release_lock_handle() for details
+		 */
+		r = verify_lock_handle(device_path, h);
+		if (r) {
+			flock(h->flock_fd, LOCK_UN);
+			release_lock_handle(cd, h);
+			log_dbg(cd, "Write lock handle verification failed.");
+		}
+	} while (r == -EAGAIN);
+
+	if (r) {
+		free(h);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	h->type = DEV_LOCK_WRITE;
+
+	return h;
+}
+
+void device_unlock_handle(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_lock_handle *h)
+{
+	if (flock(h->flock_fd, LOCK_UN))
+		log_dbg(cd, "flock on fd %d failed.", h->flock_fd);
+
+	release_lock_handle(cd, h);
+
+	free(h);
+}
+
+int device_locked_verify(struct crypt_device *cd, int dev_fd, struct crypt_lock_handle *h)
+{
+	char res[PATH_MAX];
+	struct stat dev_st, lck_st, st;
+
+	if (fstat(dev_fd, &dev_st) || fstat(h->flock_fd, &lck_st))
+		return 1;
+
+	/* if device handle is regular file the handle must match the lock handle */
+	if (S_ISREG(dev_st.st_mode)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Veryfing locked device handle (regular file)");
+		if (!same_inode(dev_st, lck_st))
+			return 1;
+	} else if (S_ISBLK(dev_st.st_mode)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Veryfing locked device handle (bdev)");
+		if (resource_by_devno(res, sizeof(res), dev_st.st_rdev, 1) ||
+		    stat(res, &st) ||
+		    !same_inode(lck_st, st))
+			return 1;
+	} else
+		return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/lib/utils_device_locking.h b/lib/utils_device_locking.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3241d78
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/utils_device_locking.h
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/*
+ * Metadata on-disk locking for processes serialization
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Ondrej Kozina
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPTSETUP_UTILS_LOCKING_H
+#define _CRYPTSETUP_UTILS_LOCKING_H
+
+struct crypt_device;
+struct crypt_lock_handle;
+
+int device_locked_readonly(struct crypt_lock_handle *h);
+int device_locked(struct crypt_lock_handle *h);
+
+struct crypt_lock_handle *device_read_lock_handle(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *device_path);
+struct crypt_lock_handle *device_write_lock_handle(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *device_path);
+void device_unlock_handle(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_lock_handle *h);
+
+int device_locked_verify(struct crypt_device *cd, int fd, struct crypt_lock_handle *h);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/lib/utils_devpath.c b/lib/utils_devpath.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0e92252
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/utils_devpath.c
@@ -0,0 +1,458 @@
+/*
+ * devname - search for device name
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
+# include <sys/sysmacros.h>     /* for major, minor */
+#endif
+#include "internal.h"
+
+static char *__lookup_dev(char *path, dev_t dev, int dir_level, const int max_level)
+{
+	struct dirent *entry;
+	struct stat st;
+	char *ptr;
+	char *result = NULL;
+	DIR *dir;
+	int space;
+
+	/* Ignore strange nested directories */
+	if (dir_level > max_level)
+		return NULL;
+
+	path[PATH_MAX - 1] = '\0';
+	ptr = path + strlen(path);
+	*ptr++ = '/';
+	*ptr = '\0';
+	space = PATH_MAX - (ptr - path);
+
+	dir = opendir(path);
+	if (!dir)
+		return NULL;
+
+	while((entry = readdir(dir))) {
+		if (entry->d_name[0] == '.' ||
+		    !strncmp(entry->d_name, "..", 2))
+			continue;
+
+		if (dir_level == 0 &&
+		    (!strcmp(entry->d_name, "shm") ||
+		     !strcmp(entry->d_name, "fd") ||
+		     !strcmp(entry->d_name, "char") ||
+		     !strcmp(entry->d_name, "pts")))
+			continue;
+
+		strncpy(ptr, entry->d_name, space);
+		if (stat(path, &st) < 0)
+			continue;
+
+		if (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
+			result = __lookup_dev(path, dev, dir_level + 1, max_level);
+			if (result)
+				break;
+		} else if (S_ISBLK(st.st_mode)) {
+			/* workaround: ignore dm-X devices, these are internal kernel names */
+			if (dir_level == 0 && dm_is_dm_kernel_name(entry->d_name))
+				continue;
+			if (st.st_rdev == dev) {
+				result = strdup(path);
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	closedir(dir);
+	return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Non-udev systemd need to scan for device here.
+ */
+static char *lookup_dev_old(int major, int minor)
+{
+	dev_t dev;
+	char *result = NULL, buf[PATH_MAX + 1];
+
+	dev = makedev(major, minor);
+	strncpy(buf, "/dev", PATH_MAX);
+	buf[PATH_MAX] = '\0';
+
+	/* First try low level device */
+	if ((result = __lookup_dev(buf, dev, 0, 0)))
+		return result;
+
+	/* If it is dm, try DM dir  */
+	if (dm_is_dm_device(major, minor)) {
+		strncpy(buf, dm_get_dir(), PATH_MAX);
+		if ((result = __lookup_dev(buf, dev, 0, 0)))
+			return result;
+	}
+
+	strncpy(buf, "/dev", PATH_MAX);
+	return  __lookup_dev(buf, dev, 0, 4);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns string pointing to device in /dev according to "major:minor" dev_id
+ */
+char *crypt_lookup_dev(const char *dev_id)
+{
+	int major, minor;
+	char link[PATH_MAX], path[PATH_MAX], *devname, *devpath = NULL;
+	struct stat st;
+	ssize_t len;
+
+	if (sscanf(dev_id, "%d:%d", &major, &minor) != 2)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/sys/dev/block/%s", dev_id) < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	len = readlink(path, link, sizeof(link) - 1);
+	if (len < 0) {
+		/* Without /sys use old scan */
+		if (stat("/sys/dev/block", &st) < 0)
+			return lookup_dev_old(major, minor);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	link[len] = '\0';
+	devname = strrchr(link, '/');
+	if (!devname)
+		return NULL;
+	devname++;
+
+	if (dm_is_dm_kernel_name(devname))
+		devpath = dm_device_path("/dev/mapper/", major, minor);
+	else if (snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/dev/%s", devname) > 0)
+		devpath = strdup(path);
+
+	/*
+	 * Check that path is correct.
+	 */
+	if (devpath && ((stat(devpath, &st) < 0) ||
+	    !S_ISBLK(st.st_mode) ||
+	    (st.st_rdev != makedev(major, minor)))) {
+		free(devpath);
+		/* Should never happen unless user mangles with dev nodes. */
+		return lookup_dev_old(major, minor);
+	}
+
+	return devpath;
+}
+
+static int _read_uint64(const char *sysfs_path, uint64_t *value)
+{
+	char tmp[64] = {0};
+	int fd, r;
+
+	if ((fd = open(sysfs_path, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
+		return 0;
+	r = read(fd, tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+	close(fd);
+
+	if (r <= 0)
+		return 0;
+
+        if (sscanf(tmp, "%" PRIu64, value) != 1)
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int _sysfs_get_uint64(int major, int minor, uint64_t *value, const char *attr)
+{
+	char path[PATH_MAX];
+
+	if (snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/sys/dev/block/%d:%d/%s",
+		     major, minor, attr) < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	return _read_uint64(path, value);
+}
+
+static int _path_get_uint64(const char *sysfs_path, uint64_t *value, const char *attr)
+{
+	char path[PATH_MAX];
+
+	if (snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s",
+		     sysfs_path, attr) < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	return _read_uint64(path, value);
+}
+
+int crypt_dev_is_rotational(int major, int minor)
+{
+	uint64_t val;
+
+	if (!_sysfs_get_uint64(major, minor, &val, "queue/rotational"))
+		return 1; /* if failed, expect rotational disk */
+
+	return val ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_dev_is_partition(const char *dev_path)
+{
+	uint64_t val;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	if (stat(dev_path, &st) < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!_sysfs_get_uint64(major(st.st_rdev), minor(st.st_rdev),
+			      &val, "partition"))
+		return 0;
+
+	return val ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+uint64_t crypt_dev_partition_offset(const char *dev_path)
+{
+	uint64_t val;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	if (!crypt_dev_is_partition(dev_path))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (stat(dev_path, &st) < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!_sysfs_get_uint64(major(st.st_rdev), minor(st.st_rdev),
+			      &val, "start"))
+		return 0;
+
+	return val;
+}
+
+/* Try to find partition which match offset and size on top level device */
+char *crypt_get_partition_device(const char *dev_path, uint64_t offset, uint64_t size)
+{
+	char link[PATH_MAX], path[PATH_MAX], part_path[PATH_MAX], *devname;
+	char *result = NULL;
+	struct stat st;
+	size_t devname_len;
+	ssize_t len;
+	struct dirent *entry;
+	DIR *dir;
+	uint64_t part_offset, part_size;
+
+	if (stat(dev_path, &st) < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/sys/dev/block/%d:%d",
+		major(st.st_rdev), minor(st.st_rdev)) < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	dir = opendir(path);
+	if (!dir)
+		return NULL;
+
+	len = readlink(path, link, sizeof(link) - 1);
+	if (len < 0) {
+		closedir(dir);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* Get top level disk name for sysfs search */
+	link[len] = '\0';
+	devname = strrchr(link, '/');
+	if (!devname) {
+		closedir(dir);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	devname++;
+
+	/* DM devices do not use kernel partitions. */
+	if (dm_is_dm_kernel_name(devname)) {
+		closedir(dir);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	devname_len = strlen(devname);
+	while((entry = readdir(dir))) {
+		if (strncmp(entry->d_name, devname, devname_len))
+			continue;
+
+		if (snprintf(part_path, sizeof(part_path), "%s/%s",
+		    path, entry->d_name) < 0)
+			continue;
+
+		if (stat(part_path, &st) < 0)
+			continue;
+
+		if (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
+			if (!_path_get_uint64(part_path, &part_offset, "start") ||
+			    !_path_get_uint64(part_path, &part_size, "size"))
+				continue;
+			if (part_offset == offset && part_size == size &&
+			    snprintf(part_path, sizeof(part_path), "/dev/%s",
+				     entry->d_name) > 0) {
+				result = strdup(part_path);
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	closedir(dir);
+
+	return result;
+}
+
+/* Try to find base device from partition */
+char *crypt_get_base_device(const char *dev_path)
+{
+	char link[PATH_MAX], path[PATH_MAX], part_path[PATH_MAX], *devname;
+	struct stat st;
+	ssize_t len;
+
+	if (!crypt_dev_is_partition(dev_path))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (stat(dev_path, &st) < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/sys/dev/block/%d:%d",
+		major(st.st_rdev), minor(st.st_rdev)) < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	len = readlink(path, link, sizeof(link) - 1);
+	if (len < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/* Get top level disk name for sysfs search */
+	link[len] = '\0';
+	devname = strrchr(link, '/');
+	if (!devname)
+		return NULL;
+	*devname = '\0';
+	devname = strrchr(link, '/');
+	if (!devname)
+		return NULL;
+	devname++;
+
+	if (dm_is_dm_kernel_name(devname))
+		return NULL;
+
+	snprintf(part_path, sizeof(part_path), "/dev/%s", devname);
+	return strdup(part_path);
+}
+
+int lookup_by_disk_id(const char *dm_uuid)
+{
+	struct dirent *entry;
+	struct stat st;
+	int r = 0; /* not found */
+	DIR *dir = opendir("/dev/disk/by-id");
+
+	if (!dir)
+		/* map ENOTDIR to ENOENT we'll handle both errors same */
+		return errno == ENOTDIR ? -ENOENT : -errno;
+
+	while ((entry = readdir(dir))) {
+		if (entry->d_name[0] == '.' ||
+		    !strncmp(entry->d_name, "..", 2))
+			continue;
+
+		if (fstatat(dirfd(dir), entry->d_name, &st, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode) && !S_ISLNK(st.st_mode))
+			continue;
+
+		if (!strncmp(entry->d_name, dm_uuid, strlen(dm_uuid))) {
+			r = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	closedir(dir);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int lookup_by_sysfs_uuid_field(const char *dm_uuid, size_t max_len)
+{
+	struct dirent *entry;
+	char subpath[PATH_MAX], uuid[max_len];
+	ssize_t s;
+	struct stat st;
+	int fd, len, r = 0; /* not found */
+	DIR *dir = opendir("/sys/block/");
+
+	if (!dir)
+		/* map ENOTDIR to ENOENT we'll handle both errors same */
+		return errno == ENOTDIR ? -ENOENT : -errno;
+
+	while (r != 1 && (entry = readdir(dir))) {
+		if (entry->d_name[0] == '.' ||
+		    !strncmp(entry->d_name, "..", 2))
+			continue;
+
+		len = snprintf(subpath, PATH_MAX, "%s/%s", entry->d_name, "dm/uuid");
+		if (len < 0 || len >= PATH_MAX) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/* looking for dm-X/dm/uuid file, symlinks are fine */
+		fd = openat(dirfd(dir), subpath, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+		if (fd < 0)
+			continue;
+
+		if (fstat(fd, &st) || !S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
+			close(fd);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/* reads binary data */
+		s = read_buffer(fd, uuid, max_len - 1);
+		if (s > 0) {
+			uuid[s] = '\0';
+			if (!strncmp(uuid, dm_uuid, strlen(dm_uuid)))
+				r = 1;
+		}
+
+		close(fd);
+	}
+
+	closedir(dir);
+
+	return r;
+}
diff --git a/lib/utils_dm.h b/lib/utils_dm.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3d2d07d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/utils_dm.h
@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+/*
+ * libdevmapper - device-mapper backend for cryptsetup
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _UTILS_DM_H
+#define _UTILS_DM_H
+
+/* device-mapper library helpers */
+#include <inttypes.h>
+
+struct crypt_device;
+struct volume_key;
+struct crypt_params_verity;
+struct device;
+struct crypt_params_integrity;
+
+/* Device mapper backend - kernel support flags */
+#define DM_KEY_WIPE_SUPPORTED (1 << 0)	/* key wipe message */
+#define DM_LMK_SUPPORTED      (1 << 1)	/* lmk mode */
+#define DM_SECURE_SUPPORTED   (1 << 2)	/* wipe (secure) buffer flag */
+#define DM_PLAIN64_SUPPORTED  (1 << 3)	/* plain64 IV */
+#define DM_DISCARDS_SUPPORTED (1 << 4)	/* discards/TRIM option is supported */
+#define DM_VERITY_SUPPORTED   (1 << 5)	/* dm-verity target supported */
+#define DM_TCW_SUPPORTED      (1 << 6)	/* tcw (TCRYPT CBC with whitening) */
+#define DM_SAME_CPU_CRYPT_SUPPORTED (1 << 7) /* same_cpu_crypt */
+#define DM_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS_SUPPORTED (1 << 8) /* submit_from_crypt_cpus */
+#define DM_VERITY_ON_CORRUPTION_SUPPORTED (1 << 9) /* ignore/restart_on_corruption, ignore_zero_block */
+#define DM_VERITY_FEC_SUPPORTED (1 << 10) /* Forward Error Correction (FEC) */
+#define DM_KERNEL_KEYRING_SUPPORTED (1 << 11) /* dm-crypt allows loading kernel keyring keys */
+#define DM_INTEGRITY_SUPPORTED (1 << 12) /* dm-integrity target supported */
+#define DM_SECTOR_SIZE_SUPPORTED (1 << 13) /* support for sector size setting in dm-crypt/dm-integrity */
+#define DM_CAPI_STRING_SUPPORTED (1 << 14) /* support for cryptoapi format cipher definition */
+#define DM_DEFERRED_SUPPORTED (1 << 15) /* deferred removal of device */
+#define DM_INTEGRITY_RECALC_SUPPORTED (1 << 16) /* dm-integrity automatic recalculation supported */
+
+typedef enum { DM_CRYPT = 0, DM_VERITY, DM_INTEGRITY, DM_LINEAR, DM_UNKNOWN } dm_target_type;
+enum tdirection { TARGET_SET = 1, TARGET_QUERY };
+
+int dm_flags(struct crypt_device *cd, dm_target_type target, uint32_t *flags);
+
+#define DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE	(1 << 0)
+#define DM_ACTIVE_UUID		(1 << 1)
+#define DM_ACTIVE_HOLDERS	(1 << 2)
+
+#define DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_CIPHER	(1 << 3)
+#define DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE	(1 << 4)
+#define DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY	(1 << 5)
+
+#define DM_ACTIVE_VERITY_ROOT_HASH	(1 << 6)
+#define DM_ACTIVE_VERITY_HASH_DEVICE	(1 << 7)
+#define DM_ACTIVE_VERITY_PARAMS		(1 << 8)
+
+#define DM_ACTIVE_INTEGRITY_PARAMS	(1 << 9)
+
+struct dm_target {
+	dm_target_type type;
+	enum tdirection direction;
+	uint64_t offset;
+	uint64_t size;
+	struct device *data_device;
+	union {
+	struct {
+		const char *cipher;
+		const char *integrity;
+
+		/* Active key for device */
+		struct volume_key *vk;
+
+		/* struct crypt_active_device */
+		uint64_t offset;	/* offset in sectors */
+		uint64_t iv_offset;	/* IV initialisation sector */
+		uint32_t tag_size;	/* additional on-disk tag size */
+		uint32_t sector_size;	/* encryption sector size */
+	} crypt;
+	struct {
+		struct device *hash_device;
+		struct device *fec_device;
+
+		const char *root_hash;
+		uint32_t root_hash_size;
+
+		uint64_t hash_offset;	/* hash offset in blocks (not header) */
+		uint64_t hash_blocks;	/* size of hash device (in hash blocks) */
+		uint64_t fec_offset;	/* FEC offset in blocks (not header) */
+		uint64_t fec_blocks;	/* size of FEC device (in hash blocks) */
+		struct crypt_params_verity *vp;
+	} verity;
+	struct {
+		uint64_t journal_size;
+		uint32_t journal_watermark;
+		uint32_t journal_commit_time;
+		uint32_t interleave_sectors;
+		uint32_t tag_size;
+		uint64_t offset;	/* offset in sectors */
+		uint32_t sector_size;	/* integrity sector size */
+		uint32_t buffer_sectors;
+
+		const char *integrity;
+		/* Active key for device */
+		struct volume_key *vk;
+
+		const char *journal_integrity;
+		struct volume_key *journal_integrity_key;
+
+		const char *journal_crypt;
+		struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key;
+
+		struct device *meta_device;
+	} integrity;
+	struct {
+		uint64_t offset;
+	} linear;
+	} u;
+
+	char *params;
+	struct dm_target *next;
+};
+
+struct crypt_dm_active_device {
+	uint64_t size;		/* active device size */
+	uint32_t flags;		/* activation flags */
+	const char *uuid;
+
+	unsigned holders:1;	/* device holders detected (on query only) */
+
+	struct dm_target segment;
+};
+
+static inline bool single_segment(const struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+{
+	return dmd && !dmd->segment.next;
+}
+
+void dm_backend_init(struct crypt_device *cd);
+void dm_backend_exit(struct crypt_device *cd);
+
+int dm_targets_allocate(struct dm_target *first, unsigned count);
+void dm_targets_free(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd);
+
+int dm_crypt_target_set(struct dm_target *tgt, size_t seg_offset, size_t seg_size,
+	struct device *data_device, struct volume_key *vk, const char *cipher,
+	size_t iv_offset, size_t data_offset, const char *integrity,
+	uint32_t tag_size, uint32_t sector_size);
+int dm_verity_target_set(struct dm_target *tgt, size_t seg_offset, size_t seg_size,
+	struct device *data_device, struct device *hash_device, struct device *fec_device,
+	const char *root_hash, uint32_t root_hash_size, uint64_t hash_offset_block,
+	uint64_t hash_blocks, struct crypt_params_verity *vp);
+int dm_integrity_target_set(struct dm_target *tgt, size_t seg_offset, size_t seg_size,
+	struct device *meta_device,
+	struct device *data_device, uint64_t tag_size, uint64_t offset, uint32_t sector_size,
+	struct volume_key *vk,
+	struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key, struct volume_key *journal_mac_key,
+	const struct crypt_params_integrity *ip);
+int dm_linear_target_set(struct dm_target *tgt, size_t seg_offset, size_t seg_size,
+	struct device *data_device, size_t data_offset);
+
+int dm_remove_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint32_t flags);
+int dm_status_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name);
+int dm_status_suspended(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name);
+int dm_status_verity_ok(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name);
+int dm_status_integrity_failures(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint64_t *count);
+int dm_query_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+		    uint32_t get_flags, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd);
+int dm_create_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+		     const char *type, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd);
+int dm_reload_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+		     struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd, unsigned resume);
+int dm_suspend_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name);
+int dm_suspend_and_wipe_key(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name);
+int dm_resume_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint32_t flags);
+int dm_resume_and_reinstate_key(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+				const struct volume_key *vk);
+int dm_error_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name);
+int dm_clear_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name);
+
+const char *dm_get_dir(void);
+
+int lookup_dm_dev_by_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *uuid, const char *type);
+
+/* These are DM helpers used only by utils_devpath file */
+int dm_is_dm_device(int major, int minor);
+int dm_is_dm_kernel_name(const char *name);
+char *dm_device_path(const char *prefix, int major, int minor);
+
+#endif /* _UTILS_DM_H */
diff --git a/lib/utils_fips.c b/lib/utils_fips.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6f528a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/utils_fips.c
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/*
+ * FIPS mode utilities
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include "utils_fips.h"
+
+#if !ENABLE_FIPS
+int crypt_fips_mode(void) { return 0; }
+#else
+static int kernel_fips_mode(void)
+{
+	int fd;
+	char buf[1] = "";
+
+	if ((fd = open("/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled", O_RDONLY)) >= 0) {
+		while (read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0 && errno == EINTR);
+		close(fd);
+	}
+
+	return (buf[0] == '1') ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_fips_mode(void)
+{
+	return kernel_fips_mode() && !access("/etc/system-fips", F_OK);
+}
+#endif /* ENABLE_FIPS */
diff --git a/lib/utils_fips.h b/lib/utils_fips.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..93a7e83
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/utils_fips.h
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/*
+ * FIPS mode utilities
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _UTILS_FIPS_H
+#define _UTILS_FIPS_H
+
+int crypt_fips_mode(void);
+
+#endif /* _UTILS_FIPS_H */
diff --git a/lib/utils_io.c b/lib/utils_io.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f8da303
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/utils_io.c
@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
+/*
+ * utils - miscellaneous I/O utilities for cryptsetup
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include "utils_io.h"
+
+static ssize_t _read_buffer(int fd, void *buf, size_t length, volatile int *quit)
+{
+	size_t read_size = 0;
+	ssize_t r;
+
+	if (fd < 0 || !buf)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	do {
+		r = read(fd, buf, length - read_size);
+		if (r == -1 && errno != EINTR)
+			return r;
+		if (r > 0) {
+			read_size += (size_t)r;
+			buf = (uint8_t*)buf + r;
+		}
+		if (r == 0 || (quit && *quit))
+			return (ssize_t)read_size;
+	} while (read_size != length);
+
+	return (ssize_t)length;
+}
+
+ssize_t read_buffer(int fd, void *buf, size_t length)
+{
+	return _read_buffer(fd, buf, length, NULL);
+}
+
+ssize_t read_buffer_intr(int fd, void *buf, size_t length, volatile int *quit)
+{
+	return _read_buffer(fd, buf, length, quit);
+}
+
+static ssize_t _write_buffer(int fd, const void *buf, size_t length, volatile int *quit)
+{
+	size_t write_size = 0;
+	ssize_t w;
+
+	if (fd < 0 || !buf || !length)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	do {
+		w = write(fd, buf, length - write_size);
+		if (w < 0 && errno != EINTR)
+			return w;
+		if (w > 0) {
+			write_size += (size_t) w;
+			buf = (const uint8_t*)buf + w;
+		}
+		if (w == 0 || (quit && *quit))
+			return (ssize_t)write_size;
+	} while (write_size != length);
+
+	return (ssize_t)write_size;
+}
+
+ssize_t write_buffer(int fd, const void *buf, size_t length)
+{
+	return _write_buffer(fd, buf, length, NULL);
+}
+
+ssize_t write_buffer_intr(int fd, const void *buf, size_t length, volatile int *quit)
+{
+	return _write_buffer(fd, buf, length, quit);
+}
+
+ssize_t write_blockwise(int fd, size_t bsize, size_t alignment,
+			void *orig_buf, size_t length)
+{
+	void *hangover_buf = NULL, *buf = NULL;
+	size_t hangover, solid;
+	ssize_t r, ret = -1;
+
+	if (fd == -1 || !orig_buf || !bsize || !alignment)
+		return -1;
+
+	hangover = length % bsize;
+	solid = length - hangover;
+
+	if ((size_t)orig_buf & (alignment - 1)) {
+		if (posix_memalign(&buf, alignment, length))
+			return -1;
+		memcpy(buf, orig_buf, length);
+	} else
+		buf = orig_buf;
+
+	if (solid) {
+		r = write_buffer(fd, buf, solid);
+		if (r < 0 || r != (ssize_t)solid)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (hangover) {
+		if (posix_memalign(&hangover_buf, alignment, bsize))
+			goto out;
+		memset(hangover_buf, 0, bsize);
+
+		r = read_buffer(fd, hangover_buf, bsize);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)r, SEEK_CUR) < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		memcpy(hangover_buf, (char*)buf + solid, hangover);
+
+		r = write_buffer(fd, hangover_buf, bsize);
+		if (r < 0 || r < (ssize_t)hangover)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	ret = length;
+out:
+	free(hangover_buf);
+	if (buf != orig_buf)
+		free(buf);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+ssize_t read_blockwise(int fd, size_t bsize, size_t alignment,
+		       void *orig_buf, size_t length)
+{
+	void *hangover_buf = NULL, *buf = NULL;
+	size_t hangover, solid;
+	ssize_t r, ret = -1;
+
+	if (fd == -1 || !orig_buf || !bsize || !alignment)
+		return -1;
+
+	hangover = length % bsize;
+	solid = length - hangover;
+
+	if ((size_t)orig_buf & (alignment - 1)) {
+		if (posix_memalign(&buf, alignment, length))
+			return -1;
+	} else
+		buf = orig_buf;
+
+	r = read_buffer(fd, buf, solid);
+	if (r < 0 || r != (ssize_t)solid)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (hangover) {
+		if (posix_memalign(&hangover_buf, alignment, bsize))
+			goto out;
+		r = read_buffer(fd, hangover_buf, bsize);
+		if (r <  0 || r < (ssize_t)hangover)
+			goto out;
+
+		memcpy((char *)buf + solid, hangover_buf, hangover);
+	}
+	ret = length;
+out:
+	free(hangover_buf);
+	if (buf != orig_buf) {
+		if (ret != -1)
+			memcpy(orig_buf, buf, length);
+		free(buf);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Combines llseek with blockwise write. write_blockwise can already deal with short writes
+ * but we also need a function to deal with short writes at the start. But this information
+ * is implicitly included in the read/write offset, which can not be set to non-aligned
+ * boundaries. Hence, we combine llseek with write.
+ */
+ssize_t write_lseek_blockwise(int fd, size_t bsize, size_t alignment,
+			      void *buf, size_t length, off_t offset)
+{
+	void *frontPadBuf = NULL;
+	size_t frontHang, innerCount = 0;
+	ssize_t r, ret = -1;
+
+	if (fd == -1 || !buf || !bsize || !alignment)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (offset < 0)
+		offset = lseek(fd, offset, SEEK_END);
+
+	if (offset < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	frontHang = offset % bsize;
+
+	if (lseek(fd, offset - frontHang, SEEK_SET) < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (frontHang && length) {
+		if (posix_memalign(&frontPadBuf, alignment, bsize))
+			return -1;
+
+		innerCount = bsize - frontHang;
+		if (innerCount > length)
+			innerCount = length;
+
+		r = read_buffer(fd, frontPadBuf, bsize);
+		if (r < 0 || r < (ssize_t)(frontHang + innerCount))
+			goto out;
+
+		memcpy((char*)frontPadBuf + frontHang, buf, innerCount);
+
+		if (lseek(fd, offset - frontHang, SEEK_SET) < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		r = write_buffer(fd, frontPadBuf, bsize);
+		if (r < 0 || r != (ssize_t)bsize)
+			goto out;
+
+		buf = (char*)buf + innerCount;
+		length -= innerCount;
+	}
+
+	ret = length ? write_blockwise(fd, bsize, alignment, buf, length) : 0;
+	if (ret >= 0)
+		ret += innerCount;
+out:
+	free(frontPadBuf);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+ssize_t read_lseek_blockwise(int fd, size_t bsize, size_t alignment,
+			     void *buf, size_t length, off_t offset)
+{
+	void *frontPadBuf = NULL;
+	size_t frontHang, innerCount = 0;
+	ssize_t r, ret = -1;
+
+	if (fd == -1 || !buf || bsize <= 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (offset < 0)
+		offset = lseek(fd, offset, SEEK_END);
+
+	if (offset < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	frontHang = offset % bsize;
+
+	if (lseek(fd, offset - frontHang, SEEK_SET) < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (frontHang && length) {
+		if (posix_memalign(&frontPadBuf, alignment, bsize))
+			return -1;
+
+		innerCount = bsize - frontHang;
+		if (innerCount > length)
+			innerCount = length;
+
+		r = read_buffer(fd, frontPadBuf, bsize);
+		if (r < 0 || r < (ssize_t)(frontHang + innerCount))
+			goto out;
+
+		memcpy(buf, (char*)frontPadBuf + frontHang, innerCount);
+
+		buf = (char*)buf + innerCount;
+		length -= innerCount;
+	}
+
+	ret = read_blockwise(fd, bsize, alignment, buf, length);
+	if (ret >= 0)
+		ret += innerCount;
+out:
+	free(frontPadBuf);
+	return ret;
+}
diff --git a/lib/utils_io.h b/lib/utils_io.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..509c1a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/utils_io.h
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+/*
+ * utils - miscellaneous I/O utilities for cryptsetup
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPTSETUP_UTILS_IO_H
+#define _CRYPTSETUP_UTILS_IO_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+ssize_t read_buffer(int fd, void *buf, size_t length);
+ssize_t read_buffer_intr(int fd, void *buf, size_t length, volatile int *quit);
+ssize_t write_buffer(int fd, const void *buf, size_t length);
+ssize_t write_buffer_intr(int fd, const void *buf, size_t length, volatile int *quit);
+ssize_t write_blockwise(int fd, size_t bsize, size_t alignment,
+			void *orig_buf, size_t length);
+ssize_t read_blockwise(int fd, size_t bsize, size_t alignment,
+		       void *orig_buf, size_t length);
+ssize_t write_lseek_blockwise(int fd, size_t bsize, size_t alignment,
+			      void *buf, size_t length, off_t offset);
+ssize_t read_lseek_blockwise(int fd, size_t bsize, size_t alignment,
+			     void *buf, size_t length, off_t offset);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/lib/utils_keyring.c b/lib/utils_keyring.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..475cfbc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/utils_keyring.c
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+/*
+ * kernel keyring utilities
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Ondrej Kozina
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+
+#ifndef HAVE_KEY_SERIAL_T
+#define HAVE_KEY_SERIAL_T
+#include <stdint.h>
+typedef int32_t key_serial_t;
+#endif
+
+#include "utils_crypt.h"
+#include "utils_keyring.h"
+
+#ifdef KERNEL_KEYRING
+
+#include <linux/keyctl.h>
+
+/* request_key */
+static key_serial_t request_key(const char *type,
+	const char *description,
+	const char *callout_info,
+	key_serial_t keyring)
+{
+	return syscall(__NR_request_key, type, description, callout_info, keyring);
+}
+
+/* add_key */
+static key_serial_t add_key(const char *type,
+	const char *description,
+	const void *payload,
+	size_t plen,
+	key_serial_t keyring)
+{
+	return syscall(__NR_add_key, type, description, payload, plen, keyring);
+}
+
+/* keyctl_read */
+static long keyctl_read(key_serial_t key, char *buffer, size_t buflen)
+{
+	return syscall(__NR_keyctl, KEYCTL_READ, key, buffer, buflen);
+}
+
+/* keyctl_revoke */
+static long keyctl_revoke(key_serial_t key)
+{
+	return syscall(__NR_keyctl, KEYCTL_REVOKE, key);
+}
+
+/* keyctl_unlink */
+static long keyctl_unlink(key_serial_t key, key_serial_t keyring)
+{
+	return syscall(__NR_keyctl, KEYCTL_UNLINK, key, keyring);
+}
+#endif
+
+int keyring_check(void)
+{
+#ifdef KERNEL_KEYRING
+	/* logon type key descriptions must be in format "prefix:description" */
+	return syscall(__NR_request_key, "logon", "dummy", NULL, 0) == -1l && errno != ENOSYS;
+#else
+	return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+int keyring_add_key_in_thread_keyring(const char *key_desc, const void *key, size_t key_size)
+{
+#ifdef KERNEL_KEYRING
+	key_serial_t kid;
+
+	kid = add_key("logon", key_desc, key, key_size, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING);
+	if (kid < 0)
+		return -errno;
+
+	return 0;
+#else
+	return -ENOTSUP;
+#endif
+}
+
+int keyring_get_passphrase(const char *key_desc,
+		      char **passphrase,
+		      size_t *passphrase_len)
+{
+#ifdef KERNEL_KEYRING
+	int err;
+	key_serial_t kid;
+	long ret;
+	char *buf = NULL;
+	size_t len = 0;
+
+	do
+		kid = request_key("user", key_desc, NULL, 0);
+	while (kid < 0 && errno == EINTR);
+
+	if (kid < 0)
+		return -errno;
+
+	/* just get payload size */
+	ret = keyctl_read(kid, NULL, 0);
+	if (ret > 0) {
+		len = ret;
+		buf = malloc(len);
+		if (!buf)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		/* retrieve actual payload data */
+		ret = keyctl_read(kid, buf, len);
+	}
+
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		err = errno;
+		if (buf)
+			crypt_memzero(buf, len);
+		free(buf);
+		return -err;
+	}
+
+	*passphrase = buf;
+	*passphrase_len = len;
+
+	return 0;
+#else
+	return -ENOTSUP;
+#endif
+}
+
+int keyring_revoke_and_unlink_key(const char *key_desc)
+{
+#ifdef KERNEL_KEYRING
+	key_serial_t kid;
+
+	do
+		kid = request_key("logon", key_desc, NULL, 0);
+	while (kid < 0 && errno == EINTR);
+
+	if (kid < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (keyctl_revoke(kid))
+		return -errno;
+
+	/*
+	 * best effort only. the key could have been linked
+	 * in some other keyring and its payload is now
+	 * revoked anyway.
+	 */
+	keyctl_unlink(kid, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING);
+	keyctl_unlink(kid, KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING);
+	keyctl_unlink(kid, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING);
+
+	return 0;
+#else
+	return -ENOTSUP;
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/lib/utils_keyring.h b/lib/utils_keyring.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1a92b5f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/utils_keyring.h
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/*
+ * kernel keyring syscall wrappers
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Ondrej Kozina
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _UTILS_KEYRING
+#define _UTILS_KEYRING
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+int keyring_check(void);
+
+int keyring_get_passphrase(const char *key_desc,
+		      char **passphrase,
+		      size_t *passphrase_len);
+
+int keyring_add_key_in_thread_keyring(
+	const char *key_desc,
+	const void *key,
+	size_t key_size);
+
+int keyring_revoke_and_unlink_key(const char *key_desc);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/lib/utils_loop.c b/lib/utils_loop.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f6d307
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/utils_loop.c
@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
+/*
+ * loopback block device utilities
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
+# include <sys/sysmacros.h>     /* for major, minor */
+#endif
+#include <linux/loop.h>
+
+#include "utils_loop.h"
+
+#define LOOP_DEV_MAJOR 7
+
+#ifndef LO_FLAGS_AUTOCLEAR
+#define LO_FLAGS_AUTOCLEAR 4
+#endif
+
+#ifndef LOOP_CTL_GET_FREE
+#define LOOP_CTL_GET_FREE 0x4C82
+#endif
+
+#ifndef LOOP_SET_CAPACITY
+#define LOOP_SET_CAPACITY 0x4C07
+#endif
+
+static char *crypt_loop_get_device_old(void)
+{
+	char dev[20];
+	int i, loop_fd;
+	struct loop_info64 lo64 = {0};
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
+		sprintf(dev, "/dev/loop%d", i);
+
+		loop_fd = open(dev, O_RDONLY);
+		if (loop_fd < 0)
+			return NULL;
+
+		if (ioctl(loop_fd, LOOP_GET_STATUS64, &lo64) &&
+		    errno == ENXIO) {
+			close(loop_fd);
+			return strdup(dev);
+		}
+		close(loop_fd);
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static char *crypt_loop_get_device(void)
+{
+	char dev[64];
+	int i, loop_fd;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	loop_fd = open("/dev/loop-control", O_RDONLY);
+	if (loop_fd < 0)
+		return crypt_loop_get_device_old();
+
+	i = ioctl(loop_fd, LOOP_CTL_GET_FREE);
+	if (i < 0) {
+		close(loop_fd);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	close(loop_fd);
+
+	if (sprintf(dev, "/dev/loop%d", i) < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (stat(dev, &st) || !S_ISBLK(st.st_mode))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return strdup(dev);
+}
+
+int crypt_loop_attach(char **loop, const char *file, int offset,
+		      int autoclear, int *readonly)
+{
+	struct loop_info64 lo64 = {0};
+	char *lo_file_name;
+	int loop_fd = -1, file_fd = -1, r = 1;
+
+	*loop = NULL;
+
+	file_fd = open(file, (*readonly ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR) | O_EXCL);
+	if (file_fd < 0 && (errno == EROFS || errno == EACCES) && !*readonly) {
+		*readonly = 1;
+		file_fd = open(file, O_RDONLY | O_EXCL);
+	}
+	if (file_fd < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	while (loop_fd < 0)  {
+		*loop = crypt_loop_get_device();
+		if (!*loop)
+			goto out;
+
+		loop_fd = open(*loop, *readonly ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR);
+		if (loop_fd < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		if (ioctl(loop_fd, LOOP_SET_FD, file_fd) < 0) {
+			if (errno != EBUSY)
+				goto out;
+			free(*loop);
+			*loop = NULL;
+
+			close(loop_fd);
+			loop_fd = -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	lo_file_name = (char*)lo64.lo_file_name;
+	lo_file_name[LO_NAME_SIZE-1] = '\0';
+	strncpy(lo_file_name, file, LO_NAME_SIZE-1);
+	lo64.lo_offset = offset;
+	if (autoclear)
+		lo64.lo_flags |= LO_FLAGS_AUTOCLEAR;
+
+	if (ioctl(loop_fd, LOOP_SET_STATUS64, &lo64) < 0) {
+		(void)ioctl(loop_fd, LOOP_CLR_FD, 0);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Verify that autoclear is really set */
+	if (autoclear) {
+		memset(&lo64, 0, sizeof(lo64));
+		if (ioctl(loop_fd, LOOP_GET_STATUS64, &lo64) < 0 ||
+		   !(lo64.lo_flags & LO_FLAGS_AUTOCLEAR)) {
+		(void)ioctl(loop_fd, LOOP_CLR_FD, 0);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	r = 0;
+out:
+	if (r && loop_fd >= 0)
+		close(loop_fd);
+	if (file_fd >= 0)
+		close(file_fd);
+	if (r && *loop) {
+		free(*loop);
+		*loop = NULL;
+	}
+	return r ? -1 : loop_fd;
+}
+
+int crypt_loop_detach(const char *loop)
+{
+	int loop_fd = -1, r = 1;
+
+	loop_fd = open(loop, O_RDONLY);
+	if (loop_fd < 0)
+                return 1;
+
+	if (!ioctl(loop_fd, LOOP_CLR_FD, 0))
+		r = 0;
+
+	close(loop_fd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_loop_resize(const char *loop)
+{
+	int loop_fd = -1, r = 1;
+
+	loop_fd = open(loop, O_RDONLY);
+	if (loop_fd < 0)
+                return 1;
+
+	if (!ioctl(loop_fd, LOOP_SET_CAPACITY, 0))
+		r = 0;
+
+	close(loop_fd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static char *_ioctl_backing_file(const char *loop)
+{
+	struct loop_info64 lo64 = {0};
+	int loop_fd;
+
+	loop_fd = open(loop, O_RDONLY);
+	if (loop_fd < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (ioctl(loop_fd, LOOP_GET_STATUS64, &lo64) < 0) {
+		close(loop_fd);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	lo64.lo_file_name[LO_NAME_SIZE-2] = '*';
+	lo64.lo_file_name[LO_NAME_SIZE-1] = 0;
+
+	close(loop_fd);
+
+	return strdup((char*)lo64.lo_file_name);
+}
+
+static char *_sysfs_backing_file(const char *loop)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+	char buf[PATH_MAX];
+	size_t len;
+	int fd;
+
+	if (stat(loop, &st) || !S_ISBLK(st.st_mode))
+		return NULL;
+
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "/sys/dev/block/%d:%d/loop/backing_file",
+		 major(st.st_rdev), minor(st.st_rdev));
+
+	fd = open(buf, O_RDONLY);
+	if (fd < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	len = read(fd, buf, PATH_MAX);
+	close(fd);
+	if (len < 2)
+		return NULL;
+
+	buf[len - 1] = '\0';
+	return strdup(buf);
+}
+
+char *crypt_loop_backing_file(const char *loop)
+{
+	char *bf = _sysfs_backing_file(loop);
+	return bf ?: _ioctl_backing_file(loop);
+}
+
+int crypt_loop_device(const char *loop)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+
+	if (!loop)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (stat(loop, &st) || !S_ISBLK(st.st_mode) ||
+	    major(st.st_rdev) != LOOP_DEV_MAJOR)
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
diff --git a/lib/utils_loop.h b/lib/utils_loop.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2ed49cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/utils_loop.h
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/*
+ * loopback block device utilities
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _UTILS_LOOP_H
+#define _UTILS_LOOP_H
+
+/* loopback device helpers */
+
+char *crypt_loop_backing_file(const char *loop);
+int crypt_loop_device(const char *loop);
+int crypt_loop_attach(char **loop, const char *file, int offset,
+		      int autoclear, int *readonly);
+int crypt_loop_detach(const char *loop);
+int crypt_loop_resize(const char *loop);
+
+#endif /* _UTILS_LOOP_H */
diff --git a/lib/utils_pbkdf.c b/lib/utils_pbkdf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..29fd122
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/utils_pbkdf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,329 @@
+/*
+ * utils_pbkdf - PBKDF settings for libcryptsetup
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+const struct crypt_pbkdf_type default_pbkdf2 = {
+	.type = CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2,
+	.hash = DEFAULT_LUKS1_HASH,
+	.time_ms = DEFAULT_LUKS1_ITER_TIME
+};
+
+const struct crypt_pbkdf_type default_argon2i = {
+	.type = CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2I,
+	.hash = DEFAULT_LUKS1_HASH,
+	.time_ms = DEFAULT_LUKS2_ITER_TIME,
+	.max_memory_kb = DEFAULT_LUKS2_MEMORY_KB,
+	.parallel_threads = DEFAULT_LUKS2_PARALLEL_THREADS
+};
+
+const struct crypt_pbkdf_type default_argon2id = {
+	.type = CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2ID,
+	.hash = DEFAULT_LUKS1_HASH,
+	.time_ms = DEFAULT_LUKS2_ITER_TIME,
+	.max_memory_kb = DEFAULT_LUKS2_MEMORY_KB,
+	.parallel_threads = DEFAULT_LUKS2_PARALLEL_THREADS
+};
+
+const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *crypt_get_pbkdf_type_params(const char *pbkdf_type)
+{
+	if (!pbkdf_type)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(pbkdf_type, CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2))
+		return &default_pbkdf2;
+	else if (!strcmp(pbkdf_type, CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2I))
+		return &default_argon2i;
+	else if (!strcmp(pbkdf_type, CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2ID))
+		return &default_argon2id;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static uint32_t adjusted_phys_memory(void)
+{
+	uint64_t memory_kb = crypt_getphysmemory_kb();
+
+	/* Ignore bogus value */
+	if (memory_kb < (128 * 1024) || memory_kb > UINT32_MAX)
+		return DEFAULT_LUKS2_MEMORY_KB;
+
+	/*
+	 * Never use more than half of physical memory.
+	 * OOM killer is too clever...
+	 */
+	memory_kb /= 2;
+
+	return memory_kb;
+}
+
+/*
+ * PBKDF configuration interface
+ */
+int verify_pbkdf_params(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf)
+{
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_limits pbkdf_limits;
+	const char *pbkdf_type;
+	int r;
+
+	r = init_crypto(cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (!pbkdf->type ||
+	    (!pbkdf->hash && !strcmp(pbkdf->type, "pbkdf2")))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!pbkdf->time_ms && !(pbkdf->flags & CRYPT_PBKDF_NO_BENCHMARK)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Requested PBKDF target time cannot be zero."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_parse_pbkdf(pbkdf->type, &pbkdf_type);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Unknown PBKDF type %s."), pbkdf->type);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	if (pbkdf->hash && crypt_hash_size(pbkdf->hash) < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Requested hash %s is not supported."), pbkdf->hash);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_pbkdf_get_limits(pbkdf->type, &pbkdf_limits);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (crypt_get_type(cd) &&
+	    !strcmp(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS1) &&
+	    strcmp(pbkdf_type, CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Requested PBKDF type is not supported for LUKS1."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!strcmp(pbkdf_type, CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2)) {
+		if (pbkdf->max_memory_kb || pbkdf->parallel_threads) {
+			log_err(cd, _("PBKDF max memory or parallel threads must not be set with pbkdf2."));
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		if (pbkdf->flags & CRYPT_PBKDF_NO_BENCHMARK &&
+		    pbkdf->iterations < pbkdf_limits.min_iterations) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Forced iteration count is too low for %s (minimum is %u)."),
+				pbkdf_type, pbkdf_limits.min_iterations);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* TODO: properly define minimal iterations and also minimal memory values */
+	if (pbkdf->flags & CRYPT_PBKDF_NO_BENCHMARK) {
+		if (pbkdf->iterations < pbkdf_limits.min_iterations) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Forced iteration count is too low for %s (minimum is %u)."),
+				pbkdf_type, pbkdf_limits.min_iterations);
+			r = -EINVAL;
+		}
+		if (pbkdf->max_memory_kb < pbkdf_limits.min_memory) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Forced memory cost is too low for %s (minimum is %u kilobytes)."),
+				pbkdf_type, pbkdf_limits.min_memory);
+			r = -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (pbkdf->max_memory_kb > pbkdf_limits.max_memory) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Requested maximum PBKDF memory cost is too high (maximum is %d kilobytes)."),
+			pbkdf_limits.max_memory);
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (!pbkdf->max_memory_kb) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Requested maximum PBKDF memory cannot be zero."));
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (!pbkdf->parallel_threads) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Requested PBKDF parallel threads cannot be zero."));
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int init_pbkdf_type(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		    const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf,
+		    const char *dev_type)
+{
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_type *cd_pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf(cd);
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_limits pbkdf_limits;
+	const char *hash, *type;
+	unsigned cpus;
+	uint32_t old_flags, memory_kb;
+	int r;
+
+	if (crypt_fips_mode()) {
+		if (pbkdf && strcmp(pbkdf->type, CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2)) {
+			log_err(cd, "Only PBKDF2 is supported in FIPS mode.");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		if (!pbkdf)
+			pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf_type_params(CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2);
+	}
+
+	if (!pbkdf && dev_type && !strcmp(dev_type, CRYPT_LUKS2))
+		pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf_type_params(DEFAULT_LUKS2_PBKDF);
+	else if (!pbkdf)
+		pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf_type_params(CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2);
+
+	r = verify_pbkdf_params(cd, pbkdf);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	r = crypt_pbkdf_get_limits(pbkdf->type, &pbkdf_limits);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	type = strdup(pbkdf->type);
+	hash = pbkdf->hash ? strdup(pbkdf->hash) : NULL;
+
+	if (!type || (!hash && pbkdf->hash)) {
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)type);
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)hash);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd_pbkdf->type);
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd_pbkdf->hash);
+	cd_pbkdf->type = type;
+	cd_pbkdf->hash = hash;
+
+	old_flags = cd_pbkdf->flags;
+	cd_pbkdf->flags = pbkdf->flags;
+
+	/* Reset iteration count so benchmark must run again. */
+	if (cd_pbkdf->flags & CRYPT_PBKDF_NO_BENCHMARK)
+		cd_pbkdf->iterations = pbkdf->iterations;
+	else
+		cd_pbkdf->iterations = 0;
+
+	if (old_flags & CRYPT_PBKDF_ITER_TIME_SET)
+		cd_pbkdf->flags |= CRYPT_PBKDF_ITER_TIME_SET;
+	else
+		cd_pbkdf->time_ms = pbkdf->time_ms;
+
+	cd_pbkdf->max_memory_kb = pbkdf->max_memory_kb;
+	cd_pbkdf->parallel_threads = pbkdf->parallel_threads;
+
+	if (cd_pbkdf->parallel_threads > pbkdf_limits.max_parallel) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Maximum PBKDF threads is %d (requested %d).",
+			pbkdf_limits.max_parallel, cd_pbkdf->parallel_threads);
+		cd_pbkdf->parallel_threads = pbkdf_limits.max_parallel;
+	}
+
+	if (cd_pbkdf->parallel_threads) {
+		cpus = crypt_cpusonline();
+		if (cd_pbkdf->parallel_threads > cpus) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Only %u active CPUs detected, "
+				"PBKDF threads decreased from %d to %d.",
+				cpus, cd_pbkdf->parallel_threads, cpus);
+			cd_pbkdf->parallel_threads = cpus;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (cd_pbkdf->max_memory_kb) {
+		memory_kb = adjusted_phys_memory();
+		if (cd_pbkdf->max_memory_kb > memory_kb) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Not enough physical memory detected, "
+				"PBKDF max memory decreased from %dkB to %dkB.",
+				cd_pbkdf->max_memory_kb, memory_kb);
+			cd_pbkdf->max_memory_kb = memory_kb;
+		}
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "PBKDF %s, hash %s, time_ms %u (iterations %u), max_memory_kb %u, parallel_threads %u.",
+		cd_pbkdf->type ?: "(none)", cd_pbkdf->hash ?: "(none)", cd_pbkdf->time_ms,
+		cd_pbkdf->iterations, cd_pbkdf->max_memory_kb, cd_pbkdf->parallel_threads);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Libcryptsetup API */
+
+int crypt_set_pbkdf_type(struct crypt_device *cd, const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!pbkdf)
+		log_dbg(cd, "Resetting pbkdf type to default");
+
+	crypt_get_pbkdf(cd)->flags = 0;
+
+	return init_pbkdf_type(cd, pbkdf, crypt_get_type(cd));
+}
+
+const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *crypt_get_pbkdf_type(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return NULL;
+
+	return crypt_get_pbkdf(cd)->type ? crypt_get_pbkdf(cd) : NULL;
+}
+
+const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *crypt_get_pbkdf_default(const char *type)
+{
+	if (!type)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(type, CRYPT_LUKS1) || crypt_fips_mode())
+		return crypt_get_pbkdf_type_params(CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2);
+	else if (!strcmp(type, CRYPT_LUKS2))
+		return crypt_get_pbkdf_type_params(DEFAULT_LUKS2_PBKDF);
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+void crypt_set_iteration_time(struct crypt_device *cd, uint64_t iteration_time_ms)
+{
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf;
+	uint32_t old_time_ms;
+
+	if (!cd || iteration_time_ms > UINT32_MAX)
+		return;
+
+	pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf(cd);
+	old_time_ms = pbkdf->time_ms;
+	pbkdf->time_ms = (uint32_t)iteration_time_ms;
+
+	if (pbkdf->type && verify_pbkdf_params(cd, pbkdf)) {
+		pbkdf->time_ms = old_time_ms;
+		log_dbg(cd, "Invalid iteration time.");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	pbkdf->flags |= CRYPT_PBKDF_ITER_TIME_SET;
+
+	/* iterations must be benchmarked now */
+	pbkdf->flags &= ~(CRYPT_PBKDF_NO_BENCHMARK);
+	pbkdf->iterations = 0;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Iteration time set to %" PRIu64 " milliseconds.", iteration_time_ms);
+}
diff --git a/lib/utils_wipe.c b/lib/utils_wipe.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..caf7890
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/utils_wipe.c
@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
+/*
+ * utils_wipe - wipe a device
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * Wipe using Peter Gutmann method described in
+ * http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/secure_del.html
+ * Note: used only for rotational device (and even there it is not needed today...)
+ */
+static void wipeSpecial(char *buffer, size_t buffer_size, unsigned int turn)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	unsigned char write_modes[][3] = {
+		{"\x55\x55\x55"}, {"\xaa\xaa\xaa"}, {"\x92\x49\x24"},
+		{"\x49\x24\x92"}, {"\x24\x92\x49"}, {"\x00\x00\x00"},
+		{"\x11\x11\x11"}, {"\x22\x22\x22"}, {"\x33\x33\x33"},
+		{"\x44\x44\x44"}, {"\x55\x55\x55"}, {"\x66\x66\x66"},
+		{"\x77\x77\x77"}, {"\x88\x88\x88"}, {"\x99\x99\x99"},
+		{"\xaa\xaa\xaa"}, {"\xbb\xbb\xbb"}, {"\xcc\xcc\xcc"},
+		{"\xdd\xdd\xdd"}, {"\xee\xee\xee"}, {"\xff\xff\xff"},
+		{"\x92\x49\x24"}, {"\x49\x24\x92"}, {"\x24\x92\x49"},
+		{"\x6d\xb6\xdb"}, {"\xb6\xdb\x6d"}, {"\xdb\x6d\xb6"}
+	};
+
+	for (i = 0; i < buffer_size / 3; ++i) {
+		memcpy(buffer, write_modes[turn], 3);
+		buffer += 3;
+	}
+}
+
+static int crypt_wipe_special(struct crypt_device *cd, int fd, size_t bsize,
+			      size_t alignment, char *buffer,
+			      uint64_t offset, size_t size)
+{
+	int r;
+	unsigned int i;
+	ssize_t written;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 39; ++i) {
+		if (i <  5) {
+			r = crypt_random_get(cd, buffer, size, CRYPT_RND_NORMAL);
+		} else if (i >=  5 && i < 32) {
+			wipeSpecial(buffer, size, i - 5);
+			r = 0;
+		} else if (i >= 32 && i < 38) {
+			r = crypt_random_get(cd, buffer, size, CRYPT_RND_NORMAL);
+		} else if (i >= 38 && i < 39) {
+			memset(buffer, 0xFF, size);
+			r = 0;
+		}
+		if (r < 0)
+			return -EIO;
+
+		written = write_lseek_blockwise(fd, bsize, alignment,
+						buffer, size, offset);
+		if (written < 0 || written != (ssize_t)size)
+			return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	/* Rewrite it finally with random */
+	if (crypt_random_get(cd, buffer, size, CRYPT_RND_NORMAL) < 0)
+		return -EIO;
+
+	written = write_lseek_blockwise(fd, bsize, alignment, buffer, size, offset);
+	if (written < 0 || written != (ssize_t)size)
+		return -EIO;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int wipe_block(struct crypt_device *cd, int devfd, crypt_wipe_pattern pattern,
+		      char *sf, size_t device_block_size, size_t alignment,
+		      size_t wipe_block_size, uint64_t offset, bool *need_block_init)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (pattern == CRYPT_WIPE_SPECIAL)
+		return crypt_wipe_special(cd, devfd, device_block_size, alignment,
+					  sf, offset, wipe_block_size);
+
+	if (*need_block_init) {
+		if (pattern == CRYPT_WIPE_ZERO) {
+			memset(sf, 0, wipe_block_size);
+			*need_block_init = false;
+			r = 0;
+		} else if (pattern == CRYPT_WIPE_RANDOM) {
+			r = crypt_random_get(cd, sf, wipe_block_size,
+					     CRYPT_RND_NORMAL) ? -EIO : 0;
+			*need_block_init = true;
+		} else if (pattern == CRYPT_WIPE_ENCRYPTED_ZERO) {
+			// FIXME
+			r = crypt_random_get(cd, sf, wipe_block_size,
+					     CRYPT_RND_NORMAL) ? -EIO : 0;
+			*need_block_init = true;
+		} else
+			r = -EINVAL;
+
+		if (r)
+			return r;
+	}
+
+	if (write_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size, alignment, sf,
+			    wipe_block_size) == (ssize_t)wipe_block_size)
+		return 0;
+
+	return -EIO;
+}
+
+int crypt_wipe_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct device *device,
+	crypt_wipe_pattern pattern,
+	uint64_t offset,
+	uint64_t length,
+	size_t wipe_block_size,
+	int (*progress)(uint64_t size, uint64_t offset, void *usrptr),
+	void *usrptr)
+{
+	int r, devfd = -1;
+	size_t bsize, alignment;
+	char *sf = NULL;
+	uint64_t dev_size;
+	bool need_block_init = true;
+
+	/* Note: LUKS1 calls it with wipe_block not aligned to multiple of bsize */
+	bsize = device_block_size(cd, device);
+	alignment = device_alignment(device);
+	if (!bsize || !alignment || !wipe_block_size)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* FIXME: if wipe_block_size < bsize, then a wipe is highly ineffective */
+
+	/* Everything must be aligned to SECTOR_SIZE */
+	if (MISALIGNED_512(offset) || MISALIGNED_512(length) || MISALIGNED_512(wipe_block_size))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	devfd = device_open(cd, device, O_RDWR);
+	if (devfd < 0)
+		return errno ? -errno : -EINVAL;
+
+	if (length)
+		dev_size = offset + length;
+	else {
+		r = device_size(device, &dev_size);
+		if (r)
+			goto out;
+
+		if (dev_size <= offset) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	r = posix_memalign((void **)&sf, alignment, wipe_block_size);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (lseek64(devfd, offset, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, "Cannot seek to device offset.");
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (progress && progress(dev_size, offset, usrptr)) {
+		r = -EINVAL; /* No change yet, treat this as a parameter error */
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (pattern == CRYPT_WIPE_SPECIAL && !device_is_rotational(device)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Non-rotational device, using random data wipe mode.");
+		pattern = CRYPT_WIPE_RANDOM;
+	}
+
+	while (offset < dev_size) {
+		if ((offset + wipe_block_size) > dev_size)
+			wipe_block_size = dev_size - offset;
+
+		//log_dbg("Wipe %012" PRIu64 "-%012" PRIu64 " bytes", offset, offset + wipe_block_size);
+
+		r = wipe_block(cd, devfd, pattern, sf, bsize, alignment,
+			       wipe_block_size, offset, &need_block_init);
+		if (r) {
+			log_err(cd, "Device wipe error, offset %" PRIu64 ".", offset);
+			break;
+		}
+
+		offset += wipe_block_size;
+
+		if (progress && progress(dev_size, offset, usrptr)) {
+			r = -EINTR;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	device_sync(cd, device, devfd);
+out:
+	close(devfd);
+	free(sf);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_wipe(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *dev_path,
+	crypt_wipe_pattern pattern,
+	uint64_t offset,
+	uint64_t length,
+	size_t wipe_block_size,
+	uint32_t flags,
+	int (*progress)(uint64_t size, uint64_t offset, void *usrptr),
+	void *usrptr)
+{
+	struct device *device;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!cd)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!dev_path)
+		device = crypt_data_device(cd);
+	else {
+		r = device_alloc_no_check(&device, dev_path);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+
+		if (flags & CRYPT_WIPE_NO_DIRECT_IO)
+			device_disable_direct_io(device);
+	}
+
+	if (!wipe_block_size)
+		wipe_block_size = 1024*1024;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Wipe [%u] device %s, offset %" PRIu64 ", length %" PRIu64 ", block %zu.",
+		(unsigned)pattern, device_path(device), offset, length, wipe_block_size);
+
+	r = crypt_wipe_device(cd, device, pattern, offset, length,
+			      wipe_block_size, progress, usrptr);
+
+	if (dev_path)
+		device_free(cd, device);
+
+	return r;
+}
diff --git a/lib/verity/rs.h b/lib/verity/rs.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cbaa2eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/verity/rs.h
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+/*
+ * Reed-Solomon codecs, based on libfec
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Phil Karn, KA9Q
+ * libcryptsetup modifications
+ *   Copyright (C) 2017-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LIBFEC_RS_H
+#define _LIBFEC_RS_H
+
+/* Special reserved value encoding zero in index form. */
+#define A0 (rs->nn)
+
+#define RS_MIN(a, b) ((a) < (b) ? (a) : (b))
+
+typedef unsigned char data_t;
+
+/* Reed-Solomon codec control block */
+struct rs {
+	int mm;          /* Bits per symbol */
+	int nn;          /* Symbols per block (= (1<<mm)-1) */
+	data_t *alpha_to;/* log lookup table */
+	data_t *index_of;/* Antilog lookup table */
+	data_t *genpoly; /* Generator polynomial */
+	int nroots;      /* Number of generator roots = number of parity symbols */
+	int fcr;         /* First consecutive root, index form */
+	int prim;        /* Primitive element, index form */
+	int iprim;       /* prim-th root of 1, index form */
+	int pad;         /* Padding bytes in shortened block */
+};
+
+static inline int modnn(struct rs *rs, int x)
+{
+	while (x >= rs->nn) {
+		x -= rs->nn;
+		x = (x >> rs->mm) + (x & rs->nn);
+	}
+	return x;
+}
+
+struct rs *init_rs_char(int symsize, int gfpoly, int fcr, int prim, int nroots, int pad);
+void free_rs_char(struct rs *rs);
+
+/* General purpose RS codec, 8-bit symbols */
+void encode_rs_char(struct rs *rs, data_t *data, data_t *parity);
+int decode_rs_char(struct rs *rs, data_t *data);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/lib/verity/rs_decode_char.c b/lib/verity/rs_decode_char.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..316db18
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/verity/rs_decode_char.c
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+/*
+ * Reed-Solomon decoder, based on libfec
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2002, Phil Karn, KA9Q
+ * libcryptsetup modifications
+ *   Copyright (C) 2017-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "rs.h"
+
+int decode_rs_char(struct rs* rs, data_t* data)
+{
+	int deg_lambda, el, deg_omega, syn_error, count;
+	int i, j, r, k;
+	data_t q, tmp, num1, num2, den, discr_r;
+	/* FIXME: remove VLAs here */
+	data_t lambda[rs->nroots + 1], s[rs->nroots]; /* Err+Eras Locator poly and syndrome poly */
+	data_t b[rs->nroots + 1], t[rs->nroots + 1], omega[rs->nroots + 1];
+	data_t root[rs->nroots], reg[rs->nroots + 1], loc[rs->nroots];
+
+	memset(s, 0, rs->nroots * sizeof(data_t));
+	memset(b, 0, (rs->nroots + 1) * sizeof(data_t));
+
+	/* form the syndromes; i.e., evaluate data(x) at roots of g(x) */
+	for (i = 0; i < rs->nroots; i++)
+		s[i] = data[0];
+
+	for (j = 1; j < rs->nn - rs->pad; j++) {
+		for (i = 0; i < rs->nroots; i++) {
+			if (s[i] == 0) {
+				s[i] = data[j];
+			} else {
+				s[i] = data[j] ^ rs->alpha_to[modnn(rs, rs->index_of[s[i]] + (rs->fcr + i) * rs->prim)];
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Convert syndromes to index form, checking for nonzero condition */
+	syn_error = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < rs->nroots; i++) {
+		syn_error |= s[i];
+		s[i] = rs->index_of[s[i]];
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * if syndrome is zero, data[] is a codeword and there are no
+	 * errors to correct. So return data[] unmodified
+	 */
+	if (!syn_error)
+		return 0;
+
+	memset(&lambda[1], 0, rs->nroots * sizeof(lambda[0]));
+	lambda[0] = 1;
+
+	for (i   = 0; i < rs->nroots + 1; i++)
+		b[i] = rs->index_of[lambda[i]];
+
+	/*
+	 * Begin Berlekamp-Massey algorithm to determine error+erasure
+	 * locator polynomial
+	 */
+	r  = 0;
+	el = 0;
+	while (++r <= rs->nroots) { /* r is the step number */
+		/* Compute discrepancy at the r-th step in poly-form */
+		discr_r = 0;
+		for (i = 0; i < r; i++) {
+			if ((lambda[i] != 0) && (s[r - i - 1] != A0)) {
+				discr_r ^= rs->alpha_to[modnn(rs, rs->index_of[lambda[i]] + s[r - i - 1])];
+			}
+		}
+		discr_r = rs->index_of[discr_r]; /* Index form */
+		if (discr_r == A0) {
+			/* 2 lines below: B(x) <-- x*B(x) */
+			memmove(&b[1], b, rs->nroots * sizeof(b[0]));
+			b[0] = A0;
+		} else {
+			/* 7 lines below: T(x) <-- lambda(x) - discr_r*x*b(x) */
+			t[0] = lambda[0];
+			for (i = 0; i < rs->nroots; i++) {
+				if (b[i] != A0)
+					t[i + 1] = lambda[i + 1] ^ rs->alpha_to[modnn(rs, discr_r + b[i])];
+				else
+					t[i + 1] = lambda[i + 1];
+			}
+			if (2 * el <= r - 1) {
+				el = r - el;
+				/*
+				 * 2 lines below: B(x) <-- inv(discr_r) *
+				 * lambda(x)
+				 */
+				for (i   = 0; i <= rs->nroots; i++)
+					b[i] = (lambda[i] == 0) ? A0 : modnn(rs, rs->index_of[lambda[i]] - discr_r + rs->nn);
+			} else {
+				/* 2 lines below: B(x) <-- x*B(x) */
+				memmove(&b[1], b, rs->nroots * sizeof(b[0]));
+				b[0] = A0;
+			}
+			memcpy(lambda, t, (rs->nroots + 1) * sizeof(t[0]));
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Convert lambda to index form and compute deg(lambda(x)) */
+	deg_lambda = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < rs->nroots + 1; i++) {
+		lambda[i] = rs->index_of[lambda[i]];
+		if (lambda[i] != A0)
+			deg_lambda = i;
+	}
+	/* Find roots of the error+erasure locator polynomial by Chien search */
+	memcpy(&reg[1], &lambda[1], rs->nroots * sizeof(reg[0]));
+	count = 0; /* Number of roots of lambda(x) */
+	for (i = 1, k = rs->iprim - 1; i <= rs->nn; i++, k = modnn(rs, k + rs->iprim)) {
+		q = 1; /* lambda[0] is always 0 */
+		for (j = deg_lambda; j > 0; j--) {
+			if (reg[j] != A0) {
+				reg[j] = modnn(rs, reg[j] + j);
+				q ^= rs->alpha_to[reg[j]];
+			}
+		}
+		if (q != 0)
+			continue; /* Not a root */
+
+		/* store root (index-form) and error location number */
+		root[count] = i;
+		loc[count]  = k;
+		/* If we've already found max possible roots, abort the search to save time */
+		if (++count == deg_lambda)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * deg(lambda) unequal to number of roots => uncorrectable
+	 * error detected
+	 */
+	if (deg_lambda != count)
+		return -1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Compute err+eras evaluator poly omega(x) = s(x)*lambda(x) (modulo
+	 * x**rs->nroots). in index form. Also find deg(omega).
+	 */
+	deg_omega = deg_lambda - 1;
+	for (i = 0; i <= deg_omega; i++) {
+		tmp = 0;
+		for (j = i; j >= 0; j--) {
+			if ((s[i - j] != A0) && (lambda[j] != A0))
+				tmp ^= rs->alpha_to[modnn(rs, s[i - j] + lambda[j])];
+		}
+		omega[i] = rs->index_of[tmp];
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Compute error values in poly-form. num1 = omega(inv(X(l))), num2 =
+	 * inv(X(l))**(rs->fcr-1) and den = lambda_pr(inv(X(l))) all in poly-form
+	 */
+	for (j = count - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
+		num1 = 0;
+		for (i = deg_omega; i >= 0; i--) {
+			if (omega[i] != A0)
+				num1 ^= rs->alpha_to[modnn(rs, omega[i] + i * root[j])];
+		}
+		num2 = rs->alpha_to[modnn(rs, root[j] * (rs->fcr - 1) + rs->nn)];
+		den  = 0;
+
+		/* lambda[i+1] for i even is the formal derivative lambda_pr of lambda[i] */
+		for (i = RS_MIN(deg_lambda, rs->nroots - 1) & ~1; i >= 0; i -= 2) {
+			if (lambda[i + 1] != A0)
+				den ^= rs->alpha_to[modnn(rs, lambda[i + 1] + i * root[j])];
+		}
+
+		/* Apply error to data */
+		if (num1 != 0 && loc[j] >= rs->pad) {
+			data[loc[j] - rs->pad] ^= rs->alpha_to[modnn(rs, rs->index_of[num1] +
+						  rs->index_of[num2] + rs->nn - rs->index_of[den])];
+		}
+	}
+
+	return count;
+}
diff --git a/lib/verity/rs_encode_char.c b/lib/verity/rs_encode_char.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc751a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/verity/rs_encode_char.c
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+/*
+ * Reed-Solomon encoder, based on libfec
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2002, Phil Karn, KA9Q
+ * libcryptsetup modifications
+ *   Copyright (C) 2017-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "rs.h"
+
+/* Initialize a Reed-Solomon codec
+ * symsize = symbol size, bits
+ * gfpoly = Field generator polynomial coefficients
+ * fcr = first root of RS code generator polynomial, index form
+ * prim = primitive element to generate polynomial roots
+ * nroots = RS code generator polynomial degree (number of roots)
+ * pad = padding bytes at front of shortened block
+ */
+struct rs *init_rs_char(int symsize, int gfpoly, int fcr, int prim, int nroots, int pad)
+{
+	struct rs *rs;
+	int i, j, sr, root, iprim;
+
+	/* Check parameter ranges */
+	if (symsize < 0 || symsize > 8 * (int)sizeof(data_t))
+		return NULL;
+	if (fcr < 0 || fcr >= (1<<symsize))
+		return NULL;
+	if (prim <= 0 || prim >= (1<<symsize))
+		return NULL;
+	if (nroots < 0 || nroots >= (1<<symsize))
+		return NULL; /* Can't have more roots than symbol values! */
+
+	if (pad < 0 || pad >= ((1<<symsize) - 1 - nroots))
+		return NULL; /* Too much padding */
+
+	rs = calloc(1, sizeof(struct rs));
+	if (rs == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	rs->mm = symsize;
+	rs->nn = (1<<symsize) - 1;
+	rs->pad = pad;
+
+	rs->alpha_to = malloc(sizeof(data_t) * (rs->nn + 1));
+	if (rs->alpha_to == NULL) {
+		free(rs);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	rs->index_of = malloc(sizeof(data_t) * (rs->nn + 1));
+	if (rs->index_of == NULL) {
+		free(rs->alpha_to);
+		free(rs);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	memset(rs->index_of, 0, sizeof(data_t) * (rs->nn + 1));
+
+	/* Generate Galois field lookup tables */
+	rs->index_of[0] = A0; /* log(zero) = -inf */
+	rs->alpha_to[A0] = 0; /* alpha**-inf = 0 */
+	sr = 1;
+	for (i = 0; i < rs->nn; i++) {
+		rs->index_of[sr] = i;
+		rs->alpha_to[i] = sr;
+		sr <<= 1;
+		if(sr & (1<<symsize))
+			sr ^= gfpoly;
+		sr &= rs->nn;
+	}
+	if (sr != 1) {
+		/* field generator polynomial is not primitive! */
+		free(rs->alpha_to);
+		free(rs->index_of);
+		free(rs);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* Form RS code generator polynomial from its roots */
+	rs->genpoly = malloc(sizeof(data_t) * (nroots + 1));
+	if (rs->genpoly == NULL) {
+		free(rs->alpha_to);
+		free(rs->index_of);
+		free(rs);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	rs->fcr = fcr;
+	rs->prim = prim;
+	rs->nroots = nroots;
+
+	/* Find prim-th root of 1, used in decoding */
+	for (iprim = 1; (iprim % prim) != 0; iprim += rs->nn)
+		;
+	rs->iprim = iprim / prim;
+
+	rs->genpoly[0] = 1;
+	for (i = 0, root = fcr * prim; i < nroots; i++, root += prim) {
+		rs->genpoly[i + 1] = 1;
+
+		/* Multiply rs->genpoly[] by  @**(root + x) */
+		for (j = i; j > 0; j--){
+			if (rs->genpoly[j] != 0)
+				rs->genpoly[j] = rs->genpoly[j - 1] ^ rs->alpha_to[modnn(rs, rs->index_of[rs->genpoly[j]] + root)];
+			else
+				rs->genpoly[j] = rs->genpoly[j - 1];
+		}
+		/* rs->genpoly[0] can never be zero */
+		rs->genpoly[0] = rs->alpha_to[modnn(rs, rs->index_of[rs->genpoly[0]] + root)];
+	}
+	/* convert rs->genpoly[] to index form for quicker encoding */
+	for (i = 0; i <= nroots; i++)
+		rs->genpoly[i] = rs->index_of[rs->genpoly[i]];
+
+	return rs;
+}
+
+void free_rs_char(struct rs *rs)
+{
+	if (!rs)
+		return;
+
+	free(rs->alpha_to);
+	free(rs->index_of);
+	free(rs->genpoly);
+	free(rs);
+}
+
+void encode_rs_char(struct rs *rs, data_t *data, data_t *parity)
+{
+	int i, j;
+	data_t feedback;
+
+	memset(parity, 0, rs->nroots * sizeof(data_t));
+
+	for (i = 0; i < rs->nn - rs->nroots - rs->pad; i++) {
+		feedback = rs->index_of[data[i] ^ parity[0]];
+		if (feedback != A0) {
+			/* feedback term is non-zero */
+#ifdef UNNORMALIZED
+			/* This line is unnecessary when GENPOLY[NROOTS] is unity, as it must
+			 * always be for the polynomials constructed by init_rs() */
+			feedback = modnn(rs, rs->nn - rs->genpoly[rs->nroots] + feedback);
+#endif
+			for (j = 1; j < rs->nroots; j++)
+				parity[j] ^= rs->alpha_to[modnn(rs, feedback + rs->genpoly[rs->nroots - j])];
+		}
+
+		/* Shift */
+		memmove(&parity[0], &parity[1], sizeof(data_t) * (rs->nroots - 1));
+
+		if (feedback != A0)
+			parity[rs->nroots - 1] = rs->alpha_to[modnn(rs, feedback + rs->genpoly[0])];
+		else
+			parity[rs->nroots - 1] = 0;
+	}
+}
diff --git a/lib/verity/verity.c b/lib/verity/verity.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..002a087
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/verity/verity.c
@@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
+/*
+ * dm-verity volume handling
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <uuid/uuid.h>
+
+#include "libcryptsetup.h"
+#include "verity.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+#define VERITY_SIGNATURE "verity\0\0"
+
+/* https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMVerity#verity-superblock-format */
+struct verity_sb {
+	uint8_t  signature[8];	/* "verity\0\0" */
+	uint32_t version;	/* superblock version */
+	uint32_t hash_type;	/* 0 - Chrome OS, 1 - normal */
+	uint8_t  uuid[16];	/* UUID of hash device */
+	uint8_t  algorithm[32];/* hash algorithm name */
+	uint32_t data_block_size; /* data block in bytes */
+	uint32_t hash_block_size; /* hash block in bytes */
+	uint64_t data_blocks;	/* number of data blocks */
+	uint16_t salt_size;	/* salt size */
+	uint8_t  _pad1[6];
+	uint8_t  salt[256];	/* salt */
+	uint8_t  _pad2[168];
+} __attribute__((packed));
+
+/* Read verity superblock from disk */
+int VERITY_read_sb(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		   uint64_t sb_offset,
+		   char **uuid_string,
+		   struct crypt_params_verity *params)
+{
+	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(cd);
+	struct verity_sb sb = {};
+	ssize_t hdr_size = sizeof(struct verity_sb);
+	int devfd = 0, sb_version;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Reading VERITY header of size %zu on device %s, offset %" PRIu64 ".",
+		sizeof(struct verity_sb), device_path(device), sb_offset);
+
+	if (params->flags & CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Verity device %s doesn't use on-disk header."),
+			device_path(device));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (MISALIGNED_512(sb_offset)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Unsupported VERITY hash offset."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	devfd = device_open(cd, device, O_RDONLY);
+	if (devfd < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot open device %s."), device_path(device));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+				 device_alignment(device), &sb, hdr_size,
+				 sb_offset) < hdr_size) {
+		close(devfd);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+	close(devfd);
+
+	if (memcmp(sb.signature, VERITY_SIGNATURE, sizeof(sb.signature))) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Device %s is not a valid VERITY device."),
+			device_path(device));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	sb_version = le32_to_cpu(sb.version);
+	if (sb_version != 1) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Unsupported VERITY version %d."), sb_version);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	params->hash_type = le32_to_cpu(sb.hash_type);
+	if (params->hash_type > VERITY_MAX_HASH_TYPE) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Unsupported VERITY hash type %d."), params->hash_type);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	params->data_block_size = le32_to_cpu(sb.data_block_size);
+	params->hash_block_size = le32_to_cpu(sb.hash_block_size);
+	if (VERITY_BLOCK_SIZE_OK(params->data_block_size) ||
+	    VERITY_BLOCK_SIZE_OK(params->hash_block_size)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Unsupported VERITY block size."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	params->data_size = le64_to_cpu(sb.data_blocks);
+
+	params->hash_name = strndup((const char*)sb.algorithm, sizeof(sb.algorithm));
+	if (!params->hash_name)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (crypt_hash_size(params->hash_name) <= 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Hash algorithm %s not supported."),
+			params->hash_name);
+		free(CONST_CAST(char*)params->hash_name);
+		params->hash_name = NULL;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	params->salt_size = le16_to_cpu(sb.salt_size);
+	if (params->salt_size > sizeof(sb.salt)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("VERITY header corrupted."));
+		free(CONST_CAST(char*)params->hash_name);
+		params->hash_name = NULL;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	params->salt = malloc(params->salt_size);
+	if (!params->salt) {
+		free(CONST_CAST(char*)params->hash_name);
+		params->hash_name = NULL;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	memcpy(CONST_CAST(char*)params->salt, sb.salt, params->salt_size);
+
+	if ((*uuid_string = malloc(40)))
+		uuid_unparse(sb.uuid, *uuid_string);
+
+	params->hash_area_offset = sb_offset;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Write verity superblock to disk */
+int VERITY_write_sb(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		   uint64_t sb_offset,
+		   const char *uuid_string,
+		   struct crypt_params_verity *params)
+{
+	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(cd);
+	struct verity_sb sb = {};
+	ssize_t hdr_size = sizeof(struct verity_sb);
+	char *algorithm;
+	uuid_t uuid;
+	int r, devfd = 0;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Updating VERITY header of size %zu on device %s, offset %" PRIu64 ".",
+		sizeof(struct verity_sb), device_path(device), sb_offset);
+
+	if (!uuid_string || uuid_parse(uuid_string, uuid) == -1) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Wrong VERITY UUID format provided on device %s."),
+			device_path(device));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (params->flags & CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Verity device %s doesn't use on-disk header."),
+			device_path(device));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	devfd = device_open(cd, device, O_RDWR);
+	if (devfd < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot open device %s."), device_path(device));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(&sb.signature, VERITY_SIGNATURE, sizeof(sb.signature));
+	sb.version         = cpu_to_le32(1);
+	sb.hash_type       = cpu_to_le32(params->hash_type);
+	sb.data_block_size = cpu_to_le32(params->data_block_size);
+	sb.hash_block_size = cpu_to_le32(params->hash_block_size);
+	sb.salt_size       = cpu_to_le16(params->salt_size);
+	sb.data_blocks     = cpu_to_le64(params->data_size);
+	algorithm = (char *)sb.algorithm;
+	algorithm[sizeof(sb.algorithm)-1] = '\0';
+	strncpy(algorithm, params->hash_name, sizeof(sb.algorithm)-1);
+	memcpy(sb.salt, params->salt, params->salt_size);
+	memcpy(sb.uuid, uuid, sizeof(sb.uuid));
+
+	r = write_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device), device_alignment(device),
+				  (char*)&sb, hdr_size, sb_offset) < hdr_size ? -EIO : 0;
+	if (r)
+		log_err(cd, _("Error during update of verity header on device %s."),
+			device_path(device));
+
+	device_sync(cd, device, devfd);
+	close(devfd);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* Calculate hash offset in hash blocks */
+uint64_t VERITY_hash_offset_block(struct crypt_params_verity *params)
+{
+	uint64_t hash_offset = params->hash_area_offset;
+
+	if (params->flags & CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER)
+		return hash_offset / params->hash_block_size;
+
+	hash_offset += sizeof(struct verity_sb);
+	hash_offset += params->hash_block_size - 1;
+
+	return hash_offset / params->hash_block_size;
+}
+
+int VERITY_UUID_generate(struct crypt_device *cd, char **uuid_string)
+{
+	uuid_t uuid;
+
+	*uuid_string = malloc(40);
+	if (!*uuid_string)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	uuid_generate(uuid);
+	uuid_unparse(uuid, *uuid_string);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Activate verity device in kernel device-mapper */
+int VERITY_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		     const char *name,
+		     const char *root_hash,
+		     size_t root_hash_size,
+		     struct device *fec_device,
+		     struct crypt_params_verity *verity_hdr,
+		     uint32_t activation_flags)
+{
+	uint32_t dmv_flags;
+	unsigned int fec_errors = 0;
+	int r;
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {
+		.size = verity_hdr->data_size * verity_hdr->data_block_size / 512,
+		.flags = activation_flags,
+		.uuid = crypt_get_uuid(cd),
+	};
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Trying to activate VERITY device %s using hash %s.",
+		name ?: "[none]", verity_hdr->hash_name);
+
+	if (verity_hdr->flags & CRYPT_VERITY_CHECK_HASH) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Verification of data in userspace required.");
+		r = VERITY_verify(cd, verity_hdr, root_hash, root_hash_size);
+
+		if (r == -EPERM && fec_device) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Verification failed, trying to repair with FEC device.");
+			r = VERITY_FEC_process(cd, verity_hdr, fec_device, 1, &fec_errors);
+			if (r < 0)
+				log_err(cd, _("Errors cannot be repaired with FEC device."));
+			else if (fec_errors)
+				log_err(cd, _("Found %u repairable errors with FEC device."),
+					fec_errors);
+		}
+
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+
+	if (!name)
+		return 0;
+
+	r = device_block_adjust(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd), DEV_OK,
+				0, NULL, NULL);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	r = device_block_adjust(cd, crypt_data_device(cd), DEV_EXCL,
+				0, &dmd.size, &dmd.flags);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	if (fec_device) {
+		r = device_block_adjust(cd, fec_device, DEV_OK,
+					0, NULL, NULL);
+		if (r)
+			return r;
+	}
+
+	r = dm_verity_target_set(&dmd.segment, 0, dmd.size, crypt_data_device(cd),
+			crypt_metadata_device(cd), fec_device, root_hash,
+			root_hash_size, VERITY_hash_offset_block(verity_hdr),
+			VERITY_hash_blocks(cd, verity_hdr), verity_hdr);
+
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	r = dm_create_device(cd, name, CRYPT_VERITY, &dmd);
+	if (r < 0 && (dm_flags(cd, DM_VERITY, &dmv_flags) || !(dmv_flags & DM_VERITY_SUPPORTED))) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Kernel doesn't support dm-verity mapping."));
+		r = -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = dm_status_verity_ok(cd, name);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!r)
+		log_err(cd, _("Verity device detected corruption after activation."));
+
+	r = 0;
+out:
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+	return r;
+}
diff --git a/lib/verity/verity.h b/lib/verity/verity.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..197eab9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/verity/verity.h
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+/*
+ * dm-verity volume handling
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _VERITY_H
+#define _VERITY_H
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#define VERITY_MAX_HASH_TYPE 1
+#define VERITY_BLOCK_SIZE_OK(x)	((x) % 512 || (x) < 512 || \
+				(x) > (512 * 1024) || (x) & ((x)-1))
+
+struct crypt_device;
+struct crypt_params_verity;
+struct device;
+
+int VERITY_read_sb(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		   uint64_t sb_offset,
+		   char **uuid,
+		   struct crypt_params_verity *params);
+
+int VERITY_write_sb(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		   uint64_t sb_offset,
+		   const char *uuid_string,
+		   struct crypt_params_verity *params);
+
+int VERITY_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		     const char *name,
+		     const char *root_hash,
+		     size_t root_hash_size,
+		     struct device *fec_device,
+		     struct crypt_params_verity *verity_hdr,
+		     uint32_t activation_flags);
+
+int VERITY_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		struct crypt_params_verity *verity_hdr,
+		const char *root_hash,
+		size_t root_hash_size);
+
+int VERITY_create(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		  struct crypt_params_verity *verity_hdr,
+		  char *root_hash,
+		  size_t root_hash_size);
+
+int VERITY_FEC_process(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		      struct crypt_params_verity *params,
+		      struct device *fec_device,
+		      int check_fec,
+		      unsigned int *errors);
+
+uint64_t VERITY_hash_offset_block(struct crypt_params_verity *params);
+
+uint64_t VERITY_hash_blocks(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_params_verity *params);
+
+int VERITY_UUID_generate(struct crypt_device *cd, char **uuid_string);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/lib/verity/verity_fec.c b/lib/verity/verity_fec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..735e923
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/verity/verity_fec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,282 @@
+/*
+ * dm-verity Forward Error Correction (FEC) support
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2015 Google, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2017-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "verity.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "rs.h"
+
+/* ecc parameters */
+#define FEC_RSM 255
+#define FEC_MIN_RSN 231
+#define FEC_MAX_RSN 253
+
+#define FEC_INPUT_DEVICES 2
+
+/* parameters to init_rs_char */
+#define FEC_PARAMS(roots) \
+    8,          /* symbol size in bits */ \
+    0x11d,      /* field generator polynomial coefficients */ \
+    0,          /* first root of the generator */ \
+    1,          /* primitive element to generate polynomial roots */ \
+    (roots),    /* polynomial degree (number of roots) */ \
+    0           /* padding bytes at the front of shortened block */
+
+struct fec_input_device {
+	struct device *device;
+	int fd;
+	uint64_t start;
+	uint64_t count;
+};
+
+struct fec_context {
+	uint32_t rsn;
+	uint32_t roots;
+	uint64_t size;
+	uint64_t blocks;
+	uint64_t rounds;
+	uint32_t block_size;
+	struct fec_input_device *inputs;
+	size_t ninputs;
+};
+
+/* computes ceil(x / y) */
+static inline uint64_t FEC_div_round_up(uint64_t x, uint64_t y)
+{
+	return (x / y) + (x % y > 0 ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+/* returns a physical offset for the given RS offset */
+static inline uint64_t FEC_interleave(struct fec_context *ctx, uint64_t offset)
+{
+	return (offset / ctx->rsn) +
+			(offset % ctx->rsn) * ctx->rounds * ctx->block_size;
+}
+
+/* returns data for a byte at the specified RS offset */
+static int FEC_read_interleaved(struct fec_context *ctx, uint64_t i,
+				void *output, size_t count)
+{
+	size_t n;
+	uint64_t offset = FEC_interleave(ctx, i);
+
+	/* offsets outside input area are assumed to contain zeros */
+	if (offset >= ctx->size) {
+		memset(output, 0, count);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* find the correct input device and read from it */
+	for (n = 0; n < ctx->ninputs; ++n) {
+		if (offset >= ctx->inputs[n].count) {
+			offset -= ctx->inputs[n].count;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/* FIXME: read_lseek_blockwise candidate */
+		if (lseek(ctx->inputs[n].fd, ctx->inputs[n].start + offset, SEEK_SET) < 0)
+			return -1;
+		return (read_buffer(ctx->inputs[n].fd, output, count) == (ssize_t)count) ? 0 : -1;
+	}
+
+	/* should never be reached */
+	return -1;
+}
+
+/* encodes/decode inputs to/from fd */
+static int FEC_process_inputs(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			      struct crypt_params_verity *params,
+			      struct fec_input_device *inputs,
+			      size_t ninputs, int fd,
+			      int decode, unsigned int *errors)
+{
+	int r = 0;
+	unsigned int i;
+	struct fec_context ctx;
+	uint32_t b;
+	uint64_t n;
+	uint8_t rs_block[FEC_RSM];
+	uint8_t *buf = NULL;
+	void *rs;
+
+	/* initialize parameters */
+	ctx.roots = params->fec_roots;
+	ctx.rsn = FEC_RSM - ctx.roots;
+	ctx.block_size = params->data_block_size;
+	ctx.inputs = inputs;
+	ctx.ninputs = ninputs;
+
+	rs = init_rs_char(FEC_PARAMS(ctx.roots));
+	if (!rs) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to allocate RS context."));
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	/* calculate the total area covered by error correction codes */
+	ctx.size = 0;
+	for (n = 0; n < ctx.ninputs; ++n)
+		ctx.size += ctx.inputs[n].count;
+
+	/* each byte in a data block is covered by a different code */
+	ctx.blocks = FEC_div_round_up(ctx.size, ctx.block_size);
+	ctx.rounds = FEC_div_round_up(ctx.blocks, ctx.rsn);
+
+	buf = malloc((size_t)ctx.block_size * ctx.rsn);
+	if (!buf) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to allocate buffer."));
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* encode/decode input */
+	for (n = 0; n < ctx.rounds; ++n) {
+		for (i = 0; i < ctx.rsn; ++i) {
+			if (FEC_read_interleaved(&ctx, n * ctx.rsn * ctx.block_size + i,
+						 &buf[i * ctx.block_size], ctx.block_size)) {
+				log_err(cd, _("Failed to read RS block %" PRIu64 " byte %d."), n, i);
+				r = -EIO;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+
+		for (b = 0; b < ctx.block_size; ++b) {
+			for (i = 0; i < ctx.rsn; ++i)
+				rs_block[i] = buf[i * ctx.block_size + b];
+
+			/* decoding from parity device */
+			if (decode) {
+				if (read_buffer(fd, &rs_block[ctx.rsn], ctx.roots) != ctx.roots) {
+					log_err(cd, _("Failed to read parity for RS block %" PRIu64 "."), n);
+					r = -EIO;
+					goto out;
+				}
+
+				/* coverity[tainted_data] */
+				r = decode_rs_char(rs, rs_block);
+				if (r < 0) {
+					log_err(cd, _("Failed to repair parity for block %" PRIu64 "."), n);
+					goto out;
+				}
+				/* return number of detected errors */
+				if (errors)
+					*errors += r;
+				r = 0;
+			} else {
+				/* encoding and writing parity data to fec device */
+				encode_rs_char(rs, rs_block, &rs_block[ctx.rsn]);
+				if (write_buffer(fd, &rs_block[ctx.rsn], ctx.roots) != ctx.roots) {
+					log_err(cd, _("Failed to write parity for RS block %" PRIu64 "."), n);
+					r = -EIO;
+					goto out;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+out:
+	free_rs_char(rs);
+	free(buf);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int VERITY_FEC_process(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		      struct crypt_params_verity *params,
+		      struct device *fec_device, int check_fec,
+		      unsigned int *errors)
+{
+	int r;
+	int fd = -1;
+	struct fec_input_device inputs[FEC_INPUT_DEVICES] = {
+		{
+			.device = crypt_data_device(cd),
+			.fd = -1,
+			.start = 0,
+			.count =  params->data_size * params->data_block_size
+		},{
+			.device = crypt_metadata_device(cd),
+			.fd = -1,
+			.start = VERITY_hash_offset_block(params) * params->data_block_size
+		}
+	};
+
+	/* validate parameters */
+	if (params->data_block_size != params->hash_block_size) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Block sizes must match for FEC."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (params->fec_roots > FEC_RSM - FEC_MIN_RSN ||
+		params->fec_roots < FEC_RSM - FEC_MAX_RSN) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Invalid number of parity bytes."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = -EIO;
+
+	if (check_fec)
+		fd = open(device_path(fec_device), O_RDONLY);
+	else
+		fd = open(device_path(fec_device), O_RDWR);
+
+	if (fd == -1) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot open device %s."), device_path(fec_device));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (lseek(fd, params->fec_area_offset, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Cannot seek to requested position in FEC device.");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* input devices */
+	inputs[0].fd = open(device_path(inputs[0].device), O_RDONLY);
+	if (inputs[0].fd == -1) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot open device %s."), device_path(inputs[0].device));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	inputs[1].fd = open(device_path(inputs[1].device), O_RDONLY);
+	if (inputs[1].fd == -1) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot open device %s."), device_path(inputs[1].device));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* cover the entire hash device starting from hash_offset */
+	r = device_size(inputs[1].device, &inputs[1].count);
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to determine size for device %s."),
+				device_path(inputs[1].device));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	inputs[1].count -= inputs[1].start;
+
+	r = FEC_process_inputs(cd, params, inputs, FEC_INPUT_DEVICES, fd, check_fec, errors);
+out:
+	if (inputs[0].fd != -1)
+		close(inputs[0].fd);
+	if (inputs[1].fd != -1)
+		close(inputs[1].fd);
+	if (fd != -1)
+		close(fd);
+
+	return r;
+}
diff --git a/lib/verity/verity_hash.c b/lib/verity/verity_hash.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c01f496
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/verity/verity_hash.c
@@ -0,0 +1,458 @@
+/*
+ * dm-verity volume handling
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#include "verity.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+#define VERITY_MAX_LEVELS	63
+
+static unsigned get_bits_up(size_t u)
+{
+	unsigned i = 0;
+	while ((1U << i) < u)
+		i++;
+	return i;
+}
+
+static unsigned get_bits_down(size_t u)
+{
+	unsigned i = 0;
+	while ((u >> i) > 1U)
+		i++;
+	return i;
+}
+
+static int verify_zero(struct crypt_device *cd, FILE *wr, size_t bytes)
+{
+	char block[bytes];
+	size_t i;
+
+	if (fread(block, bytes, 1, wr) != 1) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "EIO while reading spare area.");
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++)
+		if (block[i]) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Spare area is not zeroed at position %" PRIu64 "."),
+				ftello(wr) - bytes);
+			return -EPERM;
+		}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int verify_hash_block(const char *hash_name, int version,
+			      char *hash, size_t hash_size,
+			      const char *data, size_t data_size,
+			      const char *salt, size_t salt_size)
+{
+	struct crypt_hash *ctx = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (crypt_hash_init(&ctx, hash_name))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (version == 1 && (r = crypt_hash_write(ctx, salt, salt_size)))
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((r = crypt_hash_write(ctx, data, data_size)))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (version == 0 && (r = crypt_hash_write(ctx, salt, salt_size)))
+		goto out;
+
+	r = crypt_hash_final(ctx, hash, hash_size);
+out:
+	crypt_hash_destroy(ctx);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int mult_overflow(off_t *u, off_t b, size_t size)
+{
+	*u = (uint64_t)b * size;
+	if ((off_t)(*u / size) != b || (off_t)*u < 0)
+		return 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int hash_levels(size_t hash_block_size, size_t digest_size,
+		       off_t data_file_blocks, off_t *hash_position, int *levels,
+		       off_t *hash_level_block, off_t *hash_level_size)
+{
+	size_t hash_per_block_bits;
+	off_t s;
+	int i;
+
+	if (!digest_size)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	hash_per_block_bits = get_bits_down(hash_block_size / digest_size);
+	if (!hash_per_block_bits)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*levels = 0;
+	while (hash_per_block_bits * *levels < 64 &&
+	       (data_file_blocks - 1) >> (hash_per_block_bits * *levels))
+		(*levels)++;
+
+	if (*levels > VERITY_MAX_LEVELS)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	for (i = *levels - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+		if (hash_level_block)
+			hash_level_block[i] = *hash_position;
+		// verity position of block data_file_blocks at level i
+		s = (data_file_blocks + ((off_t)1 << ((i + 1) * hash_per_block_bits)) - 1) >> ((i + 1) * hash_per_block_bits);
+		if (hash_level_size)
+			hash_level_size[i] = s;
+		if ((*hash_position + s) < *hash_position ||
+		    (*hash_position + s) < 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		*hash_position += s;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int create_or_verify(struct crypt_device *cd, FILE *rd, FILE *wr,
+				   off_t data_block, size_t data_block_size,
+				   off_t hash_block, size_t hash_block_size,
+				   off_t blocks, int version,
+				   const char *hash_name, int verify,
+				   char *calculated_digest, size_t digest_size,
+				   const char *salt, size_t salt_size)
+{
+	char left_block[hash_block_size];
+	char data_buffer[data_block_size];
+	char read_digest[digest_size];
+	size_t hash_per_block = 1 << get_bits_down(hash_block_size / digest_size);
+	size_t digest_size_full = 1 << get_bits_up(digest_size);
+	off_t blocks_to_write = (blocks + hash_per_block - 1) / hash_per_block;
+	off_t seek_rd, seek_wr;
+	size_t left_bytes;
+	unsigned i;
+	int r;
+
+	if (mult_overflow(&seek_rd, data_block, data_block_size) ||
+	    mult_overflow(&seek_wr, hash_block, hash_block_size)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Device offset overflow."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (fseeko(rd, seek_rd, SEEK_SET)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Cannot seek to requested position in data device.");
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	if (wr && fseeko(wr, seek_wr, SEEK_SET)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Cannot seek to requested position in hash device.");
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	memset(left_block, 0, hash_block_size);
+	while (blocks_to_write--) {
+		left_bytes = hash_block_size;
+		for (i = 0; i < hash_per_block; i++) {
+			if (!blocks)
+				break;
+			blocks--;
+			if (fread(data_buffer, data_block_size, 1, rd) != 1) {
+				log_dbg(cd, "Cannot read data device block.");
+				return -EIO;
+			}
+
+			if (verify_hash_block(hash_name, version,
+					calculated_digest, digest_size,
+					data_buffer, data_block_size,
+					salt, salt_size))
+				return -EINVAL;
+
+			if (!wr)
+				break;
+			if (verify) {
+				if (fread(read_digest, digest_size, 1, wr) != 1) {
+					log_dbg(cd, "Cannot read digest form hash device.");
+					return -EIO;
+				}
+				if (memcmp(read_digest, calculated_digest, digest_size)) {
+					log_err(cd, _("Verification failed at position %" PRIu64 "."),
+						ftello(rd) - data_block_size);
+					return -EPERM;
+				}
+			} else {
+				if (fwrite(calculated_digest, digest_size, 1, wr) != 1) {
+					log_dbg(cd, "Cannot write digest to hash device.");
+					return -EIO;
+				}
+			}
+			if (version == 0) {
+				left_bytes -= digest_size;
+			} else {
+				if (digest_size_full - digest_size) {
+					if (verify) {
+						r = verify_zero(cd, wr, digest_size_full - digest_size);
+						if (r)
+							return r;
+					} else if (fwrite(left_block, digest_size_full - digest_size, 1, wr) != 1) {
+						log_dbg(cd, "Cannot write spare area to hash device.");
+						return -EIO;
+					}
+				}
+				left_bytes -= digest_size_full;
+			}
+		}
+		if (wr && left_bytes) {
+			if (verify) {
+				r = verify_zero(cd , wr, left_bytes);
+				if (r)
+					return r;
+			} else if (fwrite(left_block, left_bytes, 1, wr) != 1) {
+				log_dbg(cd, "Cannot write remaining spare area to hash device.");
+				return -EIO;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int VERITY_create_or_verify_hash(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int verify,
+	int version,
+	const char *hash_name,
+	struct device *hash_device,
+	struct device *data_device,
+	size_t hash_block_size,
+	size_t data_block_size,
+	off_t data_blocks,
+	off_t hash_position,
+	char *root_hash,
+	size_t digest_size,
+	const char *salt,
+	size_t salt_size)
+{
+	char calculated_digest[digest_size];
+	FILE *data_file = NULL;
+	FILE *hash_file = NULL, *hash_file_2;
+	off_t hash_level_block[VERITY_MAX_LEVELS];
+	off_t hash_level_size[VERITY_MAX_LEVELS];
+	off_t data_file_blocks;
+	off_t data_device_size = 0, hash_device_size = 0;
+	uint64_t dev_size;
+	int levels, i, r;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Hash %s %s, data device %s, data blocks %" PRIu64
+		", hash_device %s, offset %" PRIu64 ".",
+		verify ? "verification" : "creation", hash_name,
+		device_path(data_device), data_blocks,
+		device_path(hash_device), hash_position);
+
+	if (data_blocks < 0 || hash_position < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Invalid size parameters for verity device."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!data_blocks) {
+		r = device_size(data_device, &dev_size);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+
+		data_file_blocks = dev_size / data_block_size;
+	} else
+		data_file_blocks = data_blocks;
+
+	if (mult_overflow(&data_device_size, data_blocks, data_block_size)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Device offset overflow."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (hash_levels(hash_block_size, digest_size, data_file_blocks, &hash_position,
+		&levels, &hash_level_block[0], &hash_level_size[0])) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Hash area overflow."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Using %d hash levels.", levels);
+
+	if (mult_overflow(&hash_device_size, hash_position, hash_block_size)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Device offset overflow."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Data device size required: %" PRIu64 " bytes.",
+		data_device_size);
+	data_file = fopen(device_path(data_device), "r");
+	if (!data_file) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot open device %s."),
+			device_path(data_device)
+		);
+		r = -EIO;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Hash device size required: %" PRIu64 " bytes.",
+		hash_device_size);
+	hash_file = fopen(device_path(hash_device), verify ? "r" : "r+");
+	if (!hash_file) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot open device %s."),
+			device_path(hash_device));
+		r = -EIO;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	memset(calculated_digest, 0, digest_size);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < levels; i++) {
+		if (!i) {
+			r = create_or_verify(cd, data_file, hash_file,
+						    0, data_block_size,
+						    hash_level_block[i], hash_block_size,
+						    data_file_blocks, version, hash_name, verify,
+						    calculated_digest, digest_size, salt, salt_size);
+			if (r)
+				goto out;
+		} else {
+			hash_file_2 = fopen(device_path(hash_device), "r");
+			if (!hash_file_2) {
+				log_err(cd, _("Cannot open device %s."),
+					device_path(hash_device));
+				r = -EIO;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			r = create_or_verify(cd, hash_file_2, hash_file,
+						    hash_level_block[i - 1], hash_block_size,
+						    hash_level_block[i], hash_block_size,
+						    hash_level_size[i - 1], version, hash_name, verify,
+						    calculated_digest, digest_size, salt, salt_size);
+			fclose(hash_file_2);
+			if (r)
+				goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (levels)
+		r = create_or_verify(cd, hash_file, NULL,
+					    hash_level_block[levels - 1], hash_block_size,
+					    0, hash_block_size,
+					    1, version, hash_name, verify,
+					    calculated_digest, digest_size, salt, salt_size);
+	else
+		r = create_or_verify(cd, data_file, NULL,
+					    0, data_block_size,
+					    0, hash_block_size,
+					    data_file_blocks, version, hash_name, verify,
+					    calculated_digest, digest_size, salt, salt_size);
+out:
+	if (verify) {
+		if (r)
+			log_err(cd, _("Verification of data area failed."));
+		else {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Verification of data area succeeded.");
+			r = memcmp(root_hash, calculated_digest, digest_size) ? -EPERM : 0;
+			if (r)
+				log_err(cd, _("Verification of root hash failed."));
+			else
+				log_dbg(cd, "Verification of root hash succeeded.");
+		}
+	} else {
+		if (r == -EIO)
+			log_err(cd, _("Input/output error while creating hash area."));
+		else if (r)
+			log_err(cd, _("Creation of hash area failed."));
+		else {
+			fsync(fileno(hash_file));
+			memcpy(root_hash, calculated_digest, digest_size);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (data_file)
+		fclose(data_file);
+	if (hash_file)
+		fclose(hash_file);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* Verify verity device using userspace crypto backend */
+int VERITY_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		  struct crypt_params_verity *verity_hdr,
+		  const char *root_hash,
+		  size_t root_hash_size)
+{
+	return VERITY_create_or_verify_hash(cd, 1,
+		verity_hdr->hash_type,
+		verity_hdr->hash_name,
+		crypt_metadata_device(cd),
+		crypt_data_device(cd),
+		verity_hdr->hash_block_size,
+		verity_hdr->data_block_size,
+		verity_hdr->data_size,
+		VERITY_hash_offset_block(verity_hdr),
+		CONST_CAST(char*)root_hash,
+		root_hash_size,
+		verity_hdr->salt,
+		verity_hdr->salt_size);
+}
+
+/* Create verity hash */
+int VERITY_create(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		  struct crypt_params_verity *verity_hdr,
+		  char *root_hash,
+		  size_t root_hash_size)
+{
+	unsigned pgsize = (unsigned)crypt_getpagesize();
+
+	if (verity_hdr->salt_size > 256)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (verity_hdr->data_block_size > pgsize)
+		log_err(cd, _("WARNING: Kernel cannot activate device if data "
+			      "block size exceeds page size (%u)."), pgsize);
+
+	return VERITY_create_or_verify_hash(cd, 0,
+		verity_hdr->hash_type,
+		verity_hdr->hash_name,
+		crypt_metadata_device(cd),
+		crypt_data_device(cd),
+		verity_hdr->hash_block_size,
+		verity_hdr->data_block_size,
+		verity_hdr->data_size,
+		VERITY_hash_offset_block(verity_hdr),
+		root_hash,
+		root_hash_size,
+		verity_hdr->salt,
+		verity_hdr->salt_size);
+}
+
+uint64_t VERITY_hash_blocks(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_params_verity *params)
+{
+	off_t hash_position = 0;
+	int levels = 0;
+
+	if (hash_levels(params->hash_block_size, crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd),
+		params->data_size, &hash_position, &levels, NULL, NULL))
+		return 0;
+
+	return (uint64_t)hash_position;
+}
diff --git a/lib/volumekey.c b/lib/volumekey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bb77103
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/volumekey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+/*
+ * cryptsetup volume key implementation
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+struct volume_key *crypt_alloc_volume_key(size_t keylength, const char *key)
+{
+	struct volume_key *vk;
+
+	if (keylength > (SIZE_MAX - sizeof(*vk)))
+		return NULL;
+
+	vk = malloc(sizeof(*vk) + keylength);
+	if (!vk)
+		return NULL;
+
+	vk->key_description = NULL;
+	vk->keylength = keylength;
+
+	/* keylength 0 is valid => no key */
+	if (vk->keylength) {
+		if (key)
+			memcpy(&vk->key, key, keylength);
+		else
+			crypt_memzero(&vk->key, keylength);
+	}
+
+	return vk;
+}
+
+int crypt_volume_key_set_description(struct volume_key *vk, const char *key_description)
+{
+	if (!vk)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)vk->key_description);
+	vk->key_description = NULL;
+	if (key_description && !(vk->key_description = strdup(key_description)))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void crypt_free_volume_key(struct volume_key *vk)
+{
+	if (vk) {
+		crypt_memzero(vk->key, vk->keylength);
+		vk->keylength = 0;
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)vk->key_description);
+		free(vk);
+	}
+}
+
+struct volume_key *crypt_generate_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd, size_t keylength)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct volume_key *vk;
+
+	vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(keylength, NULL);
+	if (!vk)
+		return NULL;
+
+	r = crypt_random_get(cd, vk->key, keylength, CRYPT_RND_KEY);
+	if(r < 0) {
+		crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return vk;
+}
diff --git a/man/Makemodule.am b/man/Makemodule.am
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3f68441
--- /dev/null
+++ b/man/Makemodule.am
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+EXTRA_DIST += man/cryptsetup.8 man/integritysetup.8 man/veritysetup.8 man/cryptsetup-reencrypt.8
+
+man8_MANS += man/cryptsetup.8
+
+if VERITYSETUP
+man8_MANS += man/veritysetup.8
+endif
+
+if REENCRYPT
+man8_MANS += man/cryptsetup-reencrypt.8
+endif
+
+if INTEGRITYSETUP
+man8_MANS += man/integritysetup.8
+endif
diff --git a/man/cryptsetup-reencrypt.8 b/man/cryptsetup-reencrypt.8
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0ebb38c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/man/cryptsetup-reencrypt.8
@@ -0,0 +1,291 @@
+.TH CRYPTSETUP-REENCRYPT "8" "January 2019" "cryptsetup-reencrypt" "Maintenance Commands"
+.SH NAME
+cryptsetup-reencrypt - tool for offline LUKS device re-encryption
+.SH SYNOPSIS
+.B cryptsetup-reencrypt <options> <device>
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+.PP
+Cryptsetup-reencrypt can be used to change reencryption parameters
+which otherwise require full on-disk data change (re-encryption).
+
+You can regenerate \fBvolume key\fR (the real key used in on-disk encryption
+unclocked by passphrase), \fBcipher\fR, \fBcipher mode\fR.
+
+Cryptsetup-reencrypt reencrypts data on LUKS device in-place. During
+reencryption process the LUKS device is marked unavailable.
+
+\fIWARNING\fR: The cryptsetup-reencrypt program is not resistant to hardware
+or kernel failures during reencryption (you can lose your data in this case).
+
+\fIALWAYS BE SURE YOU HAVE RELIABLE BACKUP BEFORE USING THIS TOOL.\fR
+.br
+The reencryption can be temporarily suspended (by TERM signal or by
+using ctrl+c) but you need to retain temporary files named LUKS-<uuid>.[log|org|new].
+LUKS device is unavailable until reencryption is finished though.
+
+Current working directory must be writable and temporary
+files created during reencryption must be present.
+
+For more info about LUKS see cryptsetup(8).
+.PP
+.SH OPTIONS
+.TP
+To start (or continue) re-encryption for <device> use:
+.PP
+\fIcryptsetup-reencrypt\fR <device>
+
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-batch-mode, \-\-block-size, \-\-cipher | \-\-keep-key,
+\-\-debug, \-\-device-size, \-\-hash, \-\-header, \-\-iter-time | \-\-pbkdf\-force\-iterations,
+\-\-key-file, \-\-key-size, \-\-key-slot, \-\-keyfile-offset, \-\-keyfile-size,
+\-\-master\-key\-file, \-\-tries, \-\-pbkdf, \-\-pbkdf\-memory, \-\-pbkdf\-parallel,
+\-\-progress-frequency, \-\-use-directio, \-\-use-random | \-\-use-urandom, \-\-use-fsync,
+\-\-uuid, \-\-verbose, \-\-write-log]
+
+To encrypt data on (not yet encrypted) device, use \fI\-\-new\fR with combination
+with \fI\-\-reduce-device-size\fR or with \fI\-\-header\fR option for detached header.
+
+To remove encryption from device, use \fI\-\-decrypt\fR.
+
+For detailed description of encryption and key file options see \fIcryptsetup(8)\fR
+man page.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-batch-mode, \-q"
+Suppresses all warnings and reencryption progress output.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-block-size, \-B \fIvalue\fR"
+Use re-encryption block size of <value> in MiB.
+
+Values can be between 1 and 64 MiB.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-cipher, \-c" \fI<cipher-spec>\fR
+Set the cipher specification string.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-debug"
+Run in debug mode with full diagnostic logs. Debug output
+lines are always prefixed by '#'.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-decrypt"
+Remove encryption (decrypt already encrypted device and remove LUKS header).
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR This is destructive operation and cannot be reverted.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-device-size \fIsize[units]\fR"
+Instead of real device size, use specified value.
+
+It means that only specified area (from the start of the device
+to the specified size) will be reencrypted.
+
+If no unit suffix is specified, the size is in bytes.
+
+Unit suffix can be S for 512 byte sectors, K/M/G/T (or KiB,MiB,GiB,TiB)
+for units with 1024 base or KB/MB/GB/TB for 1000 base (SI scale).
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR This is destructive operation.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-hash, \-h \fI<hash-spec>\fR"
+Specifies the hash used in the LUKS1 key setup scheme and volume key digest.
+
+\fBNOTE:\fR if this parameter is not specified, default hash algorithm is always used
+for new LUKS1 device header.
+
+\fBNOTE:\fR with LUKS2 format this option is only relevant when new keyslot pbkdf algorithm
+is set to PBKDF2 (see \fI\-\-pbkdf\fR).
+.TP
+.B "\-\-header\fR \fI<LUKS header file>\fR"
+Use a detached (separated) metadata device or file where the
+LUKS header is stored. This option allows one to store ciphertext
+and LUKS header on different devices.
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR There is no check whether the ciphertext device specified
+actually belongs to the header given.
+If used with \fI\-\-new\fR option, the header file will created (or overwritten).
+Use with care.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-iter-time, \-i \fI<milliseconds>\fR"
+The number of milliseconds to spend with PBKDF2 passphrase processing for the
+new LUKS header.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-keep-key"
+Do not change encryption key, just reencrypt the LUKS header and keyslots.
+
+This option can be combined only with \fI\-\-hash\fR, \fI\-\-iter-time\fR,
+\fI\-\-pbkdf\-force\-iterations\fR, \fI\-\-pbkdf\fR (LUKS2 only),
+\fI\-\-pbkdf\-memory\fR (Argon2i/id and LUKS2 only) and \fI\-\-pbkdf\-parallel\fR
+(Argon2i/id and LUKS2 only) options.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-key-file, \-d \fIname\fR"
+Read the passphrase from file.
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR \-\-key-file option can be used only if there is only one active keyslot,
+or alternatively, also if \-\-key-slot option is specified (then all other keyslots
+will be disabled in new LUKS device).
+
+If this option is not used, cryptsetup-reencrypt will ask for all active keyslot
+passphrases.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-key-size, \-s \fI<bits>\fR"
+Set key size in bits. The argument has to be a multiple of  8.
+
+The possible key-sizes are limited by the cipher and mode used.
+
+If you are increasing key size, there must be enough space in the LUKS header
+for enlarged keyslots (data offset must be large enough) or reencryption
+cannot be performed.
+
+If there is not enough space for keyslots with new key size,
+you can destructively shrink device with \-\-reduce-device-size option.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-key-slot, \-S <0-MAX>"
+Specify which key slot is used. For LUKS1, max keyslot number is 7. For LUKS2, it's 31.
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR All other keyslots will be disabled if this option is used.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-keyfile-offset \fIvalue\fR"
+Skip \fIvalue\fR bytes at the beginning of the key file.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-keyfile-size, \-l"
+Read a maximum of \fIvalue\fR bytes from the key file.
+Default is to read the whole file up to the compiled-in
+maximum.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-master\-key\-file"
+Use new volume (master) key stored in a file.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-new, \-N"
+Create new header (encrypt not yet encrypted device).
+
+This option must be used together with \-\-reduce-device-size.
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR This is destructive operation and cannot be reverted.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-pbkdf"
+Set Password-Based Key Derivation Function (PBKDF) algorithm for LUKS keyslot.
+The PBKDF can be: \fIpbkdf2\fR, \fIargon2i\fR for Argon2i or \fIargon2id\fR for Argon2id.
+
+For LUKS1, only \fIpbkdf2\fR is accepted (no need to use this option).
+.TP
+.B "\-\-pbkdf\-force\-iterations <num>"
+Avoid PBKDF benchmark and set time cost (iterations) directly.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-pbkdf\-memory <number>"
+Set the memory cost for PBKDF (for Argon2i/id the number represents kilobytes).
+Note that it is maximal value, PBKDF benchmark or available physical memory
+can decrease it.
+This option is not available for PBKDF2.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-pbkdf\-parallel <number>"
+Set the parallel cost for PBKDF (number of threads, up to 4).
+Note that it is maximal value, it is decreased automatically if
+CPU online count is lower.
+This option is not available for PBKDF2.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-progress-frequency <seconds>"
+Print separate line every <seconds> with reencryption progress.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-reduce-device-size \fIsize[units]\fR"
+Enlarge data offset to specified value by shrinking device size.
+
+This means that last sectors on the original device will be lost,
+ciphertext data will be effectively shifted by specified
+number of sectors.
+
+It can be useful if you e.g. added some space to underlying
+partition (so last sectors contains no data).
+
+For units suffix see \-\-device-size parameter description.
+
+You cannot shrink device more than by 64 MiB (131072 sectors).
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR This is destructive operation and cannot be reverted.
+Use with extreme care - shrunk filesystems are usually unrecoverable.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-tries, \-T"
+Number of retries for invalid passphrase entry.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-type <type>"
+Use only while encrypting not yet encrypted device (see \-\-new).
+
+Specify LUKS version when performing in-place encryption. If the parameter
+is omitted default value (LUKS1) is used. Type may be one of: \fBluks\fR (default),
+\fBluks1\fR or \fBluks2\fR.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-use-directio"
+Use direct-io (O_DIRECT) for all read/write data operations related
+to block device undergoing reencryption.
+
+Useful if direct-io operations perform better than normal buffered
+operations (e.g. in virtual environments).
+.TP
+.B "\-\-use-fsync"
+Use fsync call after every written block. This applies for reencryption
+log files as well.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-use-random"
+.TP
+.B "\-\-use-urandom"
+Define which kernel random number generator will be used to create the volume key.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-uuid" \fI<uuid>\fR
+Use only while resuming an interrupted decryption process (see \-\-decrypt).
+
+To find out what \fI<uuid>\fR to pass look for temporary files LUKS-<uuid>.[|log|org|new]
+of the interrupted decryption process.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-verbose, \-v"
+Print more information on command execution.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-version"
+Show the program version.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-write-log"
+Update log file after every block write. This can slow down reencryption
+but will minimize data loss in the case of system crash.
+
+.SH RETURN CODES
+Cryptsetup-reencrypt returns 0 on success and a non-zero value on error.
+
+Error codes are: 1 wrong parameters, 2 no permission,
+3 out of memory, 4 wrong device specified, 5 device already exists
+or device is busy.
+.SH EXAMPLES
+.TP
+Reencrypt /dev/sdb1 (change volume key)
+cryptsetup-reencrypt /dev/sdb1
+.TP
+Reencrypt and also change cipher and cipher mode
+cryptsetup-reencrypt /dev/sdb1 \-c aes-xts-plain64
+.TP
+Add LUKS encryption to not yet encrypted device
+
+First, be sure you have space added to disk.
+
+Or alternatively shrink filesystem in advance.
+.br
+Here we need 4096 512-bytes sectors (enough for 2x128 bit key).
+
+fdisk \-u /dev/sdb # move sdb1 partition end + 4096 sectors
+(or use resize2fs or tool for your filesystem and shrink it)
+
+cryptsetup-reencrypt /dev/sdb1 \-\-new \-\-reduce-device-size 4096S
+.TP
+Remove LUKS encryption completely
+
+cryptsetup-reencrypt /dev/sdb1 \-\-decrypt
+
+.SH REPORTING BUGS
+Report bugs, including ones in the documentation, on
+the cryptsetup mailing list at <dm-crypt@saout.de>
+or in the 'Issues' section on LUKS website.
+Please attach the output of the failed command with the
+\-\-debug option added.
+.SH AUTHORS
+Cryptsetup-reencrypt was written by Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>.
+.SH COPYRIGHT
+Copyright \(co 2012-2019 Milan Broz
+.br
+Copyright \(co 2012-2019 Red Hat, Inc.
+
+This is free software; see the source for copying conditions.  There is NO
+warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+.SH SEE ALSO
+The project website at \fBhttps://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup\fR
diff --git a/man/cryptsetup.8 b/man/cryptsetup.8
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3c5b93a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/man/cryptsetup.8
@@ -0,0 +1,1535 @@
+.TH CRYPTSETUP "8" "January 2019" "cryptsetup" "Maintenance Commands"
+.SH NAME
+cryptsetup - manage plain dm-crypt and LUKS encrypted volumes
+.SH SYNOPSIS
+.B cryptsetup <options> <action> <action args>
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+.PP
+cryptsetup is used to conveniently setup dm-crypt managed
+device-mapper mappings. These include plain dm-crypt volumes and
+LUKS volumes. The difference is that LUKS uses a metadata header
+and can hence offer more features than plain dm-crypt. On the other
+hand, the header is visible and vulnerable to damage.
+
+In addition, cryptsetup provides limited support for the use of
+loop-AES volumes and for TrueCrypt compatible volumes.
+
+.SH PLAIN DM-CRYPT OR LUKS?
+.PP
+Unless you understand the cryptographic background well, use LUKS.
+With plain dm-crypt there are a number of possible user errors
+that massively decrease security. While LUKS cannot fix them
+all, it can lessen the impact for many of them.
+.SH WARNINGS
+.PP
+A lot of good information on the risks of using encrypted storage,
+on handling problems and on security aspects can be found in the
+\fICryptsetup FAQ\fR. Read it. Nonetheless, some risks deserve
+to be mentioned here.
+
+\fBBackup:\fR Storage media die. Encryption has no influence on that.
+Backup is mandatory for encrypted data as well, if the data has any
+worth. See the Cryptsetup FAQ for advice on how to do a backup of an
+encrypted volume.
+
+\fBCharacter encoding:\fR If you enter a
+passphrase with special symbols, the passphrase can change
+depending on character encoding. Keyboard settings can also change,
+which can make blind input hard or impossible. For
+example, switching from some ASCII 8-bit variant to UTF-8
+can lead to a different binary encoding and hence different
+passphrase seen by cryptsetup, even if what you see on
+the terminal is exactly the same. It is therefore highly
+recommended to select passphrase characters only from 7-bit
+ASCII, as the encoding for 7-bit ASCII stays the same for
+all ASCII variants and UTF-8.
+
+\fBLUKS header:\fR If the header of a LUKS volume gets damaged,
+all data is permanently lost unless you have a header-backup.
+If a key-slot is damaged, it can only be restored from a header-backup
+or if another active key-slot with known passphrase is undamaged.
+Damaging the LUKS header is something people manage to do with
+surprising frequency. This risk is the result of a trade-off
+between security and safety, as LUKS is designed for fast and
+secure wiping by just overwriting header and key-slot area.
+
+\fBPreviously used partitions:\fR If a partition was previously used,
+it is a very good idea to wipe filesystem signatures, data, etc. before
+creating a LUKS or plain dm-crypt container on it.
+For a quick removal of filesystem signatures, use "wipefs". Take care
+though that this may not remove everything. In particular, MD RAID
+signatures at the end of a device may survive. It also does not
+remove data. For a full wipe, overwrite the whole partition before
+container creation. If you do not know how to do that, the
+cryptsetup FAQ describes several options.
+
+.SH BASIC COMMANDS
+The following are valid actions for all supported device types.
+
+\fIopen\fR <device> <name> \-\-type <device_type>
+.IP
+Opens (creates a mapping with) <name> backed by device <device>.
+
+Device type can be \fIplain\fR, \fIluks\fR (default), \fIluks1\fR, \fIluks2\fR,
+\fIloopaes\fR or \fItcrypt\fR.
+
+For backward compatibility there are \fBopen\fR command aliases:
+
+\fBcreate\fR (argument-order <name> <device>): open \-\-type plain
+.br
+\fBplainOpen\fR: open \-\-type plain
+.br
+\fBluksOpen\fR: open \-\-type luks
+.br
+\fBloopaesOpen\fR: open \-\-type loopaes
+.br
+\fBtcryptOpen\fR: open \-\-type tcrypt
+
+\fB<options>\fR are type specific and are described below
+for individual device types. For \fBcreate\fR, the order of the <name>
+and <device> options is inverted for historical reasons, all other
+aliases use the standard \fB<device> <name>\fR order.
+.PP
+\fIclose\fR <name>
+.IP
+Removes the existing mapping <name> and wipes the key from kernel memory.
+
+For backward compatibility there are \fBclose\fR command aliases:
+\fBremove\fR, \fBplainClose\fR, \fBluksClose\fR, \fBloopaesClose\fR,
+\fBtcryptClose\fR (all behaves exactly the same, device type is
+determined automatically from active device).
+
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-deferred]
+
+.PP
+\fIstatus\fR <name>
+.IP
+Reports the status for the mapping <name>.
+.PP
+\fIresize\fR <name>
+.IP
+Resizes an active mapping <name>.
+
+If \-\-size (in 512-bytes sectors) is not specified, the size is computed
+from the underlying device. For LUKS it is the size of the
+underlying device without the area reserved for LUKS header
+(see data payload offset in \fBluksDump\fR command).
+For plain crypt device, the whole device size is used.
+
+Note that this does not change the raw device geometry, it just
+changes how many sectors of the raw device are represented
+in the mapped device.
+
+If cryptsetup detected volume key for active device loaded in kernel keyring
+service, resize action would first try to retrieve
+the key using a token and only if it failed it'd ask for a passphrase
+to unlock a keyslot (LUKS) or to derive a volume key again (plain mode).
+The kernel keyring is used by default for LUKS2 devices.
+
+With LUKS2 device additional \fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-token\-id, \-\-token\-only,
+\-\-key\-slot, \-\-key\-file, \-\-keyfile\-size, \-\-keyfile\-offset, \-\-timeout,
+\-\-disable\-locks, \-\-disable\-keyring].
+
+.PP
+\fIrefresh\fR <name>
+.IP
+Refreshes parameters of active mapping <name>.
+
+Updates parameters of active device <name> without need to deactivate the device
+(and umount filesystem). Currently it supports parameters refresh on following
+devices: LUKS1, LUKS2 (including authenticated encryption), plain crypt
+and loopaes.
+
+Mandatory parametrs are identical to those of an open action for respective
+device type.
+
+You may change following parameters on all devices \-\-perf\-same_cpu_crypt,
+\-\-perf\-submit_from_crypt_cpus and \-\-allow\-discards.
+
+Refreshing device without any optional parameter will refresh the device
+with default setting (respective to device type).
+
+\fBLUKS2 only:\fR
+
+\-\-integrity\-no\-journal parameter affects only LUKS2 devices with
+underlying dm-integrity device.
+
+Adding option \-\-persistent stores any combination of device parameters
+above in LUKS2 metadata (only after successful refresh operation).
+
+\-\-disable\-keyring parameter refreshes a device with volume key passed
+in dm-crypt driver.
+
+.SH PLAIN MODE
+Plain dm-crypt encrypts the device sector-by-sector with a
+single, non-salted hash of the passphrase. No checks
+are performed, no metadata is used. There is no formatting operation.
+When the raw device is mapped (opened), the usual device operations
+can be used on the mapped device, including filesystem creation.
+Mapped devices usually reside in /dev/mapper/<name>.
+
+The following are valid plain device type actions:
+
+\fIopen\fR \-\-type plain <device> <name>
+.br
+\fIcreate\fR <name> <device> (\fBOBSOLETE syntax\fR)
+.IP
+Opens (creates a mapping with) <name> backed by device <device>.
+
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-hash, \-\-cipher, \-\-verify-passphrase,
+\-\-sector\-size, \-\-key-file, \-\-keyfile-offset, \-\-key-size,
+\-\-offset, \-\-skip, \-\-size, \-\-readonly, \-\-shared, \-\-allow\-discards,
+\-\-refresh]
+
+Example: 'cryptsetup open \-\-type plain /dev/sda10 e1' maps the raw
+encrypted device /dev/sda10 to the mapped (decrypted) device
+/dev/mapper/e1, which can then be mounted, fsck-ed or have a
+filesystem created on it.
+.SH LUKS EXTENSION
+LUKS, the Linux Unified Key Setup, is a standard for disk encryption.
+It adds a standardized header at the start of the device,
+a key-slot area directly behind the header and the bulk
+data area behind that. The whole set is called a 'LUKS container'.
+The device that a LUKS container resides on is called a 'LUKS device'.
+For most purposes, both terms can be used interchangeably. But
+note that when the LUKS header is at a nonzero offset
+in a device, then the device is not a LUKS device anymore, but
+has a LUKS container stored in it at an offset.
+
+LUKS can manage multiple passphrases that can be individually revoked
+or changed and that can be securely scrubbed from persistent
+media due to the use of anti-forensic stripes. Passphrases
+are protected against brute-force and dictionary
+attacks by PBKDF2, which implements hash iteration and salting
+in one function.
+
+LUKS2 is a new version of header format that allows additional
+extensions like different PBKDF algorithm or authenticated encryption.
+You can format device with LUKS2 header if you specify
+\fI\-\-type luks2\fR in \fIluksFormat\fR command.
+For activation, the format is already recognized automatically.
+
+Each passphrase, also called a
+.B key
+in this document, is associated with one of 8 key-slots.
+Key operations that do not specify a slot affect the first slot
+that matches the supplied passphrase or the first empty slot if
+a new passphrase is added.
+
+The \fB<device>\fR parameter can also be specified by a LUKS UUID in the
+format UUID=<uuid>. Translation to real device name uses symlinks
+in /dev/disk/by-uuid directory.
+
+To specify a detached header, the \fB\-\-header\fR parameter can be used
+in all LUKS commands and always takes precedence over the positional
+\fB<device>\fR parameter.
+
+The following are valid LUKS actions:
+
+\fIluksFormat\fR <device> [<key file>]
+.IP
+Initializes a LUKS partition and sets the initial passphrase
+(for key-slot 0),
+either via prompting or via <key file>. Note that
+if the second argument is present, then the passphrase
+is taken from the file given there, without the need
+to use the \-\-key-file option. Also note that for both forms
+of reading the passphrase from a file you can
+give '-' as file name, which results in the passphrase being read
+from stdin and the safety-question being skipped.
+
+You can only call luksFormat on a LUKS device that is not mapped.
+
+To use LUKS2, specify \fI\-\-type luks2\fR.
+
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-hash, \-\-cipher, \-\-verify\-passphrase,
+\-\-key\-size, \-\-key\-slot,
+\-\-key\-file (takes precedence over optional second argument),
+\-\-keyfile\-offset, \-\-keyfile\-size, \-\-use\-random | \-\-use\-urandom,
+\-\-uuid, \-\-master\-key\-file, \-\-iter\-time, \-\-header,
+\-\-pbkdf\-force\-iterations,
+\-\-force\-password, \-\-disable-locks].
+
+For LUKS2, additional \fB<options>\fR can be
+[\-\-integrity, \-\-integrity\-no\-wipe, \-\-sector\-size,
+\-\-label, \-\-subsystem,
+\-\-pbkdf, \-\-pbkdf\-memory, \-\-pbkdf\-parallel,
+\-\-disable\-locks, \-\-disable\-keyring,
+\-\-luks2\-metadata\-size, \-\-luks2\-keyslots\-size,
+\-\-keyslot\-cipher, \-\-keyslot\-key\-size].
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR Doing a luksFormat on an existing LUKS container will
+make all data the old container permanently irretrievable unless
+you have a header backup.
+.PP
+\fIopen\fR \-\-type luks <device> <name>
+.br
+\fIluksOpen\fR <device> <name> (\fBold syntax\fR)
+.IP
+Opens the LUKS device <device> and sets up a mapping <name> after
+successful verification of the supplied passphrase.
+
+First, the passphrase is searched in LUKS tokens. If it's not
+found in any token and also the passphrase is not supplied via \-\-key-file,
+the command prompts for it interactively.
+
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-key\-file, \-\-keyfile\-offset,
+\-\-keyfile\-size, \-\-readonly, \-\-test\-passphrase,
+\-\-allow\-discards, \-\-header, \-\-key-slot, \-\-master\-key\-file, \-\-token\-id,
+\-\-token\-only, \-\-disable\-keyring, \-\-disable\-locks, \-\-type, \-\-refresh].
+.PP
+\fIluksSuspend\fR <name>
+.IP
+Suspends an active device (all IO operations will block
+and accesses to the device will wait indefinitely)
+and wipes the encryption
+key from kernel memory. Needs kernel 2.6.19 or later.
+
+After this operation you have to use \fIluksResume\fR to reinstate
+the encryption key and unblock the device or \fIclose\fR to remove
+the mapped device.
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR never suspend the device on which the cryptsetup binary resides.
+
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-header, \-\-disable\-locks].
+.PP
+\fIluksResume\fR <name>
+.IP
+Resumes a suspended device and reinstates the encryption key.
+Prompts interactively for a passphrase if \-\-key-file is not given.
+
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-key\-file, \-\-keyfile\-size, \-\-header,
+\-\-disable\-keyring, \-\-disable\-locks, \-\-type]
+.PP
+\fIluksAddKey\fR <device> [<key file with new key>]
+.IP
+Adds a new passphrase. An existing passphrase must be supplied
+interactively or via \-\-key-file.
+The new passphrase to be added can be specified interactively
+or read from the file given as positional argument.
+
+\fBNOTE:\fR with \-\-unbound option the action creates new unbound
+LUKS2 keyslot. The keyslot cannot be used for device activation.
+If you don't pass new key via \-\-master\-key\-file option,
+new random key is generated. Existing passphrase for any active keyslot
+is not required.
+
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-key\-file, \-\-keyfile\-offset,
+\-\-keyfile\-size, \-\-new\-keyfile\-offset,
+\-\-new\-keyfile\-size, \-\-key\-slot, \-\-master\-key\-file,
+\-\-iter\-time, \-\-force\-password, \-\-header, \-\-disable\-locks,
+\-\-unbound, \-\-type, \-\-keyslot\-cipher, \-\-keyslot\-key\-size].
+.PP
+\fIluksRemoveKey\fR <device> [<key file with passphrase to be removed>]
+.IP
+Removes the supplied passphrase from the LUKS device. The
+passphrase to be removed can be specified interactively,
+as the positional argument or via \-\-key-file.
+
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-key\-file, \-\-keyfile\-offset,
+\-\-keyfile\-size, \-\-header, \-\-disable\-locks, \-\-type]
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR If you read the passphrase from stdin
+(without further argument or with '-' as an argument
+to \-\-key\-file), batch-mode (\-q) will be implicitly
+switched on and no warning will be given when you remove the
+last remaining passphrase from a LUKS container. Removing
+the last passphrase makes the LUKS container permanently
+inaccessible.
+.PP
+\fIluksChangeKey\fR <device> [<new key file>]
+.IP
+Changes an existing passphrase. The passphrase
+to be changed must be supplied interactively or via \-\-key\-file.
+The new passphrase can be supplied interactively or in
+a file given as positional argument.
+
+If a key-slot is specified (via \-\-key-slot), the passphrase
+for that key-slot must be given and the new passphrase
+will overwrite the specified key-slot. If no key-slot
+is specified and there is still a free key-slot, then
+the new passphrase will be put into a free key-slot before the
+key-slot containing the old passphrase is purged. If there is
+no free key-slot, then the key-slot with the old passphrase is
+overwritten directly.
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR If a key-slot is overwritten, a media failure
+during this operation can cause the overwrite to fail after
+the old passphrase has been wiped and make the LUKS container
+inaccessible.
+
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-key\-file, \-\-keyfile\-offset,
+\-\-keyfile\-size, \-\-new\-keyfile\-offset,
+\-\-new\-keyfile\-size, \-\-key\-slot, \-\-force\-password, \-\-header,
+\-\-disable\-locks, \-\-type, \-\-keyslot\-cipher, \-\-keyslot\-key\-size].
+.PP
+.PP
+\fIluksConvertKey\fR <device>
+.IP
+Converts an existing LUKS2 keyslot to new pbkdf parameters. The
+passphrase for keyslot to be converted must be supplied interactively
+or via \-\-key\-file. If no \-\-pbkdf parameters are specified LUKS2
+default pbkdf values will apply.
+
+If a keyslot is specified (via \-\-key\-slot), the passphrase for that
+keyslot must be given. If no keyslot is specified and there is still
+a free keyslot, then the new parameters will be put into a free
+keyslot before the keyslot containing the old parameters is
+purged. If there is no free keyslot, then the keyslot with the old
+parameters is overwritten directly.
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR If a keyslot is overwritten, a media failure during
+this operation can cause the overwrite to fail after the old
+parameters have been wiped and make the LUKS container inaccessible.
+
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-key\-file, \-\-keyfile\-offset,
+\-\-keyfile\-size, \-\-key\-slot, \-\-header, \-\-disable\-locks,
+\-\-iter-time, \-\-pbkdf, \-\-pbkdf\-force\-iterations,
+\-\-pbkdf\-memory, \-\-pbkdf\-parallel,
+\-\-keyslot\-cipher, \-\-keyslot\-key\-size].
+.PP
+\fIluksKillSlot\fR <device> <key slot number>
+.IP
+Wipe the key-slot number <key slot> from the LUKS device. Except running
+in batch-mode (\-q) a remaining passphrase must be supplied,
+either interactively or via \-\-key-file.
+This command can remove the last remaining key-slot, but requires
+an interactive confirmation when doing so. Removing the last
+passphrase makes a LUKS container permanently inaccessible.
+
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-key\-file, \-\-keyfile\-offset,
+\-\-keyfile\-size, \-\-header, \-\-disable\-locks, \-\-type].
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR If you read the passphrase from stdin
+(without further argument or with '-' as an argument
+to \-\-key-file), batch-mode (\-q) will be implicitly
+switched on and no warning will be given when you remove the
+last remaining passphrase from a LUKS container. Removing
+the last passphrase makes the LUKS container permanently
+inaccessible.
+
+\fBNOTE:\fR If there is no passphrase provided (on stdin or through
+\-\-key-file argument) and batch-mode (\-q) is active, the
+key-slot is removed without any other warning.
+
+.PP
+\fIerase\fR <device>
+.br
+\fIluksErase\fR <device>
+.IP
+Erase all keyslots and make the LUKS container permanently inaccessible.
+You do not need to provide any password for this operation.
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR This operation is irreversible.
+.PP
+\fIluksUUID\fR <device>
+.IP
+Print the UUID of a LUKS device.
+.br
+Set new UUID if \fI\-\-uuid\fR option is specified.
+.PP
+\fIisLuks\fR <device>
+.IP
+Returns true, if <device> is a LUKS device, false otherwise.
+Use option \-v to get human-readable feedback. 'Command successful.'
+means the device is a LUKS device.
+
+By specifying \-\-type you may query for specific LUKS version.
+.PP
+\fIluksDump\fR <device>
+.IP
+Dump the header information of a LUKS device.
+
+If the \-\-dump\-master\-key option is used, the LUKS device master key is
+dumped instead of the keyslot info. Together with \-\-master\-key\-file option,
+master key is dumped to a file instead of standard output. Beware that the
+master key cannot be changed without reencryption and can be used to decrypt
+the data stored in the LUKS container without a passphrase and even without the
+LUKS header. This means that if the master key is compromised, the whole device
+has to be erased to prevent further access. Use this option carefully.
+
+To dump the master key, a passphrase has to be supplied,
+either interactively or via \-\-key\-file.
+
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-dump\-master\-key, \-\-key\-file,
+\-\-keyfile\-offset, \-\-keyfile\-size, \-\-header, \-\-disable\-locks,
+\-\-master\-key\-file, \-\-type].
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR If \-\-dump\-master\-key is used with \-\-key\-file
+and the argument to \-\-key\-file is '-', no validation question
+will be asked and no warning given.
+.PP
+\fIluksHeaderBackup\fR <device> \-\-header\-backup\-file <file>
+.IP
+Stores a binary backup of the LUKS header and keyslot area.
+.br
+Note: Using '-' as filename writes the header backup to a file named '-'.
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR This backup file and a passphrase valid
+at the time of backup allows decryption of the
+LUKS data area, even if the passphrase was later changed or
+removed from the LUKS device. Also note that with a header
+backup you lose the ability to securely wipe the LUKS
+device by just overwriting the header and key-slots. You
+either need to securely erase all header backups in
+addition or overwrite the encrypted data area as well.
+The second option is less secure, as some sectors
+can survive, e.g. due to defect management.
+.PP
+\fIluksHeaderRestore\fR <device> \-\-header\-backup\-file <file>
+.IP
+Restores a binary backup of the LUKS header and keyslot area
+from the specified file.
+.br
+Note: Using '-' as filename reads the header backup from a file named '-'.
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR Header and keyslots will be replaced, only
+the passphrases from the backup will work afterward.
+
+This command requires that the master key size and data offset
+of the LUKS header already on the device and of the header backup
+match. Alternatively, if there is no LUKS header on the device,
+the backup will also be written to it.
+.PP
+\fItoken\fR <add|remove|import|export> <device>
+.IP
+Action \fIadd\fR creates new keyring token to enable auto-activation of the device.
+For the auto-activation, the passphrase must be stored in keyring with the specified
+description. Usually, the passphrase should be stored in \fIuser\fR or
+\fIuser-session\fR keyring.
+The \fItoken\fR command is supported only for LUKS2.
+
+For adding new keyring token, option \-\-key\-description is mandatory.
+Also, new token is assigned to key slot specified with \-\-key\-slot option or to all
+active key slots in the case \-\-key\-slot option is omitted.
+
+To remove existing token, specify the token ID which should be removed with
+\-\-token\-id option.
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR The action \fItoken remove\fR removes any token type, not just \fIkeyring\fR
+type from token slot specified by \-\-token\-id option.
+
+Action \fIimport\fR can store arbitrary valid token json in LUKS2 header. It may be passed via
+standard input or via file passed in \-\-json\-file option. If you specify \-\-key\-slot then
+successfully imported token is also assigned to the key slot.
+
+Action \fIexport\fR writes requested token json to a file passed with \-\-json\-file or
+to standard output.
+
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-header, \-\-token\-id, \-\-key\-slot, \-\-key\-description,
+\-\-disable\-locks, \-\-disable\-keyring, \-\-json\-file].
+.PP
+\fIconvert\fR <device> \-\-type <format>
+.IP
+Converts the device between LUKS1 and LUKS2 format (if possible).
+The conversion will not be performed if there is an additional LUKS2 feature or LUKS1 has
+unsupported header size.
+
+Conversion (both directions) must be performed on inactive device. There must not be active
+dm-crypt mapping established for LUKS header requested for conversion.
+
+\fB\-\-type\fR option is mandatory with following accepted values: \fIluks1\fR or \fIluks2\fR.
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR The \fIconvert\fR action can destroy the LUKS header in the case of a crash
+during conversion or if a media error occurs.
+Always create a header backup before performing this operation!
+
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-header, \-\-type].
+.PP
+\fIconfig\fR <device>
+.IP
+Set permanent configuration options (store to LUKS header).
+The \fIconfig\fR command is supported only for LUKS2.
+
+The permanent options can be \fI\-\-priority\fR to set priority (normal, prefer, ignore)
+for keyslot (specified by \fI\-\-key\-slot\fR) or \fI\-\-label\fR and \fI\-\-subsystem\fR.
+
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-priority, \-\-label, \-\-subsystem, \-\-key\-slot, \-\-header].
+
+.SH loop-AES EXTENSION
+cryptsetup supports mapping loop-AES encrypted partition using
+a compatibility mode.
+.PP
+\fIopen\fR \-\-type loopaes <device> <name> \-\-key\-file <keyfile>
+.br
+\fIloopaesOpen\fR <device> <name> \-\-key\-file <keyfile>  (\fBold syntax\fR)
+.IP
+Opens the loop-AES <device> and sets up a mapping <name>.
+
+If the key file is encrypted with GnuPG, then you have to use
+\-\-key\-file=\- and decrypt it before use, e.g. like this:
+.br
+gpg \-\-decrypt <keyfile> | cryptsetup loopaesOpen \-\-key\-file=\-
+<device> <name>
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR The loop-AES extension cannot use the direct input of key file
+on real terminal because the keys are separated by end-of-line and only part
+of the multi-key file would be read.
+.br
+If you need it in script, just use the pipe redirection:
+.br
+echo $keyfile | cryptsetup loopaesOpen \-\-key\-file=\- <device> <name>
+
+Use \fB\-\-keyfile\-size\fR to specify the proper key length if needed.
+
+Use \fB\-\-offset\fR to specify device offset. Note that the units
+need to be specified in number of 512 byte sectors.
+
+Use \fB\-\-skip\fR to specify the IV offset. If the original device
+used an offset and but did not use it in IV sector calculations,
+you have to explicitly use \fB\-\-skip 0\fR in addition to the offset
+parameter.
+
+Use \fB\-\-hash\fR to override the default hash function for
+passphrase hashing (otherwise it is detected according to key
+size).
+
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-key\-file, \-\-key\-size, \-\-offset, \-\-skip,
+\-\-hash, \-\-readonly, \-\-allow\-discards, \-\-refresh].
+.PP
+See also section 7 of the FAQ and \fBhttp://loop-aes.sourceforge.net\fR
+for more information regarding loop-AES.
+.SH TCRYPT (TrueCrypt-compatible and VeraCrypt) EXTENSION
+cryptsetup supports mapping of TrueCrypt, tcplay or VeraCrypt
+(with \fB\-\-veracrypt\fR option) encrypted partition
+using a native Linux kernel API.
+Header formatting and TCRYPT header change is not supported, cryptsetup
+never changes TCRYPT header on-device.
+
+TCRYPT extension requires kernel userspace
+crypto API to be available (introduced in Linux kernel 2.6.38).
+If you are configuring kernel yourself, enable
+"User-space interface for symmetric key cipher algorithms" in
+"Cryptographic API" section (CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER .config option).
+
+Because TCRYPT header is encrypted, you have to always provide valid
+passphrase and keyfiles.
+
+Cryptsetup should recognize all header variants, except legacy cipher chains
+using LRW encryption mode with 64 bits encryption block (namely Blowfish
+in LRW mode is not recognized, this is limitation of kernel crypto API).
+
+To recognize a VeraCrypt device use the \fB\-\-veracrypt\fR option.
+VeraCrypt is just extension of TrueCrypt header with increased
+iteration count so unlocking can take quite a lot of time (in comparison
+with TCRYPT device).
+
+To open a VeraCrypt device with a custom Personal Iteration Multiplier (PIM)
+value, \fBadditionally to \-\-veracrypt \fR use either the
+\fB\-\-veracrypt\-pim=<PIM>\fR option to directly specify the PIM on the command-
+line or use \fB\-\-veracrypt\-query\-pim\fR to be prompted for the PIM.
+
+The PIM value affects the number of iterations applied during key derivation. Please refer to
+\fBhttps://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Personal%20Iterations%20Multiplier%20%28PIM%29.html\fR
+for more detailed information.
+
+\fBNOTE:\fR Activation with \fBtcryptOpen\fR is supported only for cipher chains
+using LRW or XTS encryption modes.
+
+The \fBtcryptDump\fR command should work for all recognized TCRYPT devices
+and doesn't require superuser privilege.
+
+To map system device (device with boot loader where the whole encrypted
+system resides) use \fB\-\-tcrypt\-system\fR option.
+You can use partition device as the parameter (parameter must be real partition
+device, not an image in a file), then only this partition is mapped.
+
+If you have the whole TCRYPT device as a file image and you want to map multiple
+partition encrypted with system encryption, please create loopback mapping
+with partitions first (\fBlosetup \-P\fR, see \fPlosetup(8)\fR man page for more info),
+and use loop partition as the device parameter.
+
+If you use the whole base device as a parameter, one device for the whole system
+encryption is mapped. This mode is available only for backward compatibility
+with older cryptsetup versions which mapped TCRYPT system encryption
+using the whole device.
+
+To use hidden header (and map hidden device, if available),
+use \fB\-\-tcrypt\-hidden\fR option.
+
+To explicitly use backup (secondary) header, use \fB\-\-tcrypt\-backup\fR
+option.
+
+\fBNOTE:\fR There is no protection for a hidden volume if
+the outer volume is mounted. The reason is that if there
+were any protection, it would require some metadata describing
+what to protect in the outer volume and the hidden volume would
+become detectable.
+
+.PP
+\fIopen\fR \-\-type tcrypt <device> <name>
+.br
+\fItcryptOpen\fR <device> <name>  (\fBold syntax\fR)
+.IP
+Opens the TCRYPT (a TrueCrypt-compatible) <device> and sets up
+a mapping <name>.
+
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-key\-file, \-\-tcrypt\-hidden,
+\-\-tcrypt\-system, \-\-tcrypt\-backup, \-\-readonly, \-\-test\-passphrase,
+\-\-allow-discards, \-\-veracrypt, \-\-veracrypt\-pim, \-\-veracrypt\-query\-pim].
+
+The keyfile parameter allows a combination of file content with the
+passphrase and can be repeated. Note that using keyfiles is compatible
+with TCRYPT and is different from LUKS keyfile logic.
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR Option \fB\-\-allow\-discards\fR cannot be combined with
+option \fB\-\-tcrypt\-hidden\fR. For normal mapping, it can cause
+the \fBdestruction of hidden volume\fR (hidden volume appears as unused space
+for outer volume so this space can be discarded).
+
+.PP
+\fItcryptDump\fR <device>
+.IP
+Dump the header information of a TCRYPT device.
+
+If the \-\-dump\-master\-key option is used, the TCRYPT device master key
+is dumped instead of TCRYPT header info. Beware that the master key
+(or concatenated master keys if cipher chain is used)
+can be used to decrypt the data stored in the TCRYPT container without
+a passphrase.
+This means that if the master key is compromised, the whole device has
+to be erased to prevent further access. Use this option carefully.
+
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-dump\-master\-key, \-\-key\-file,
+\-\-tcrypt\-hidden, \-\-tcrypt\-system, \-\-tcrypt\-backup].
+
+The keyfile parameter allows a combination of file content with the
+passphrase and can be repeated.
+.PP
+See also \fBhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TrueCrypt\fR for more information regarding
+TrueCrypt.
+
+Please note that cryptsetup does not use TrueCrypt code, please report
+all problems related to this compatibility extension to the cryptsetup project.
+.SH MISCELLANEOUS
+.PP
+\fIrepair\fR <device>
+.IP
+Tries to repair the device metadata if possible. Currently supported only
+for LUKS device type.
+
+This command is useful to fix some known benign LUKS metadata
+header corruptions. Only basic corruptions of unused keyslot
+are fixable. This command will only change the LUKS header, not
+any key-slot data. You may enforce LUKS version by adding \-\-type
+option.
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR Always create a binary backup of the original
+header before calling this command.
+.PP
+\fIbenchmark\fR <options>
+.IP
+Benchmarks ciphers and KDF (key derivation function).
+Without parameters, it tries to measure few common configurations.
+
+To benchmark other ciphers or modes, you need to specify \fB\-\-cipher\fR
+and \fB\-\-key\-size\fR options or \fB\-\-hash\fR for KDF test.
+
+\fBNOTE:\fR This benchmark is using memory only and is only informative.
+You cannot directly predict real storage encryption speed from it.
+
+For testing block ciphers, this benchmark requires kernel userspace
+crypto API to be available (introduced in Linux kernel 2.6.38).
+If you are configuring kernel yourself, enable
+"User-space interface for symmetric key cipher algorithms" in
+"Cryptographic API" section (CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER .config option).
+
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-cipher, \-\-key\-size, \-\-hash].
+.SH OPTIONS
+.TP
+.B "\-\-verbose, \-v"
+Print more information on command execution.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-debug or \-\-debug\-json"
+Run in debug mode with full diagnostic logs. Debug output
+lines are always prefixed by '#'.
+If \-\-debug\-json is used, additional LUKS2 JSON data structures are printed.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-type <device-type>
+Specifies required device type, for more info
+read \fIBASIC COMMANDS\fR section.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-hash, \-h \fI<hash\-spec>\fR"
+Specifies the passphrase hash for \fIopen\fR (for plain and
+loopaes device types).
+
+Specifies the hash used in the LUKS key setup scheme and volume key digest
+for \fIluksFormat\fR. The specified hash is used as hash-parameter
+for PBKDF2 and for the AF splitter.
+
+The specified hash name is passed to the compiled-in crypto backend.
+Different backends may support different hashes.
+For \fIluksFormat\fR, the hash
+algorithm must provide at least 160 bits of output, which
+excludes, e.g., MD5. Do not use a non-crypto hash like
+\fB"crc32"\fR as this breaks security.
+
+Values compatible with old version of cryptsetup are
+\fB"ripemd160"\fR for \fIopen \-\-type plain\fR and
+\fB"sha1"\fR for \fIluksFormat\fR.
+
+Use \fIcryptsetup \-\-help\fR to show the defaults.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-cipher, \-c \fI<cipher\-spec>\fR"
+Set the cipher specification string.
+
+\fIcryptsetup \-\-help\fR shows the compiled-in defaults.
+The current default in the distributed sources is
+"aes-cbc-essiv:sha256" for plain dm-crypt and
+"aes-xts-plain64" for LUKS.
+
+If a hash is part of the cipher specification, then it is
+used as part of the IV generation. For example, ESSIV
+needs a hash function, while "plain64" does not and
+hence none is specified.
+
+For XTS mode you can optionally set a key size of
+512 bits with the \-s option. Key size for XTS
+mode is twice that for other modes for the same
+security level.
+
+XTS mode requires kernel 2.6.24 or later and plain64 requires
+kernel 2.6.33 or later. More information can be found in the FAQ.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-verify-passphrase, \-y"
+When interactively asking for a passphrase, ask for it twice
+and complain if both inputs do not match. Advised when creating
+a regular mapping for the first time, or when running
+\fIluksFormat\fR. Ignored on input from file or stdin.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-key-file, \-d \fIname\fR"
+Read the passphrase from file.
+
+If the name given is "-", then the passphrase will be read from stdin.
+In this case, reading will not stop at newline characters.
+
+With LUKS, passphrases supplied via \-\-key\-file are always
+the existing passphrases requested by a command, except in
+the case of \fIluksFormat\fR where \-\-key\-file is equivalent
+to the positional key file argument.
+
+If you want to set a new passphrase via key file, you have to
+use a positional argument to \fIluksAddKey\fR.
+
+See section \fBNOTES ON PASSPHRASE PROCESSING\fR for more information.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-keyfile\-offset \fIvalue\fR"
+Skip \fIvalue\fR bytes at the beginning of the key file.
+Works with all commands that accept key files.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-keyfile\-size, \-l \fIvalue\fR"
+Read a maximum of \fIvalue\fR bytes from the key file.
+The default is to read the whole file up to the compiled-in
+maximum that can be queried with \-\-help. Supplying more
+data than the compiled-in maximum aborts the operation.
+
+This option is useful
+to cut trailing newlines, for example. If \-\-keyfile\-offset
+is also given, the size count starts after the offset.
+Works with all commands that accept key files.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-new\-keyfile\-offset \fIvalue\fR"
+Skip \fIvalue\fR bytes at the start when
+adding a new passphrase from key file with
+\fIluksAddKey\fR.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-new\-keyfile\-size  \fIvalue\fR"
+Read a maximum of \fIvalue\fR bytes when adding
+a new passphrase from key file with \fIluksAddKey\fR.
+The default is to read the whole file up to the compiled-in
+maximum length that can be queried with \-\-help.
+Supplying more than the compiled in maximum aborts the
+operation.
+When \-\-new\-keyfile\-offset is also given, reading starts
+after the offset.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-master\-key\-file"
+Use a master key stored in a file.
+
+For \fIluksFormat\fR this
+allows creating a LUKS header with this specific
+master key. If the master key was taken from an existing
+LUKS header and all other parameters are the same,
+then the new header decrypts the data encrypted with the
+header the master key was taken from.
+
+Action \fIluksDump\fR together with \-\-dump\-master\-key
+option: The volume (master) key is stored in a file instead of
+being printed out to standard output.
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR If you create your own master key, you
+need to make sure to do it right. Otherwise, you can end
+up with a low-entropy or otherwise partially predictable
+master key which will compromise security.
+
+For \fIluksAddKey\fR this allows adding a new passphrase
+without having to know an existing one.
+
+For \fIopen\fR this allows one to open the LUKS device
+without giving a passphrase.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-dump\-master\-key"
+For \fIluksDump\fR this option includes the master key in the displayed
+information. Use with care, as the master key can be used to
+bypass the passphrases, see also option \-\-master\-key\-file.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-json\-file"
+Read token json from a file or write token to it. See \fItoken\fR action for more
+information. \-\-json\-file=- reads json from standard input or writes it to
+standard output respectively.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-use\-random"
+.TP
+.B "\-\-use\-urandom"
+For \fIluksFormat\fR these options define which kernel random number
+generator will be used to create the master key (which is a
+long-term key).
+
+See \fBNOTES ON RANDOM NUMBER GENERATORS\fR for more
+information. Use \fIcryptsetup \-\-help\fR
+to show the compiled-in default random number generator.
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR In a low-entropy situation (e.g. in an
+embedded system), both selections are problematic.
+Using /dev/urandom can lead to weak keys.
+Using /dev/random can block a long time, potentially
+forever, if not enough entropy can be harvested by
+the kernel.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-key\-slot, \-S <0\-7>"
+For LUKS operations that add key material, this options allows you
+to specify which key slot is selected for the new key.
+This option can be used for \fIluksFormat\fR,
+and \fIluksAddKey\fR.
+.br
+In addition, for \fIopen\fR, this option selects a
+specific key-slot to compare the passphrase against.
+If the given passphrase would only match a different key-slot,
+the operation fails.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-key\-size, \-s <bits>"
+Sets key size in bits. The argument has to be a multiple of
+8. The possible key-sizes are limited by the cipher and
+mode used.
+
+See /proc/crypto for more information. Note that key-size
+in /proc/crypto is stated in bytes.
+
+This option can be used for \fIopen \-\-type plain\fR or \fIluksFormat\fR.
+All other LUKS actions will use the key-size specified in the LUKS header.
+Use \fIcryptsetup \-\-help\fR to show the compiled-in defaults.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-size, \-b <number of 512 byte sectors>"
+Set the size of the device in sectors of 512 bytes.
+This option is only relevant for the \fIopen\fR and \fIresize\fR
+actions.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-offset, \-o <number of 512 byte sectors>"
+Start offset in the backend device in 512-byte sectors.
+This option is only relevant for the \fIopen\fR action with plain
+or loopaes device types or for LUKS devices in \fIluksFormat\fR.
+
+For LUKS, the \-\-offset option sets the data offset (payload) of data
+device and must be be aligned to 4096-byte sectors (must be multiple of 8).
+This option cannot be combined with \-\-align\-payload option.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-skip, \-p <number of 512 byte sectors>"
+Start offset used in IV calculation in 512-byte sectors
+(how many sectors of the encrypted data to skip at the beginning).
+This option is only relevant for the \fIopen\fR action with plain
+or loopaes device types.
+
+Hence, if \-\-offset \fIn\fR, and \-\-skip \fIs\fR, sector \fIn\fR
+(the first sector of the encrypted device) will get a sector number
+of \fIs\fR for the IV calculation.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-readonly, \-r"
+set up a read-only mapping.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-shared"
+Creates an additional mapping for one common
+ciphertext device. Arbitrary mappings are supported.
+This option is only relevant for the
+\fIopen \-\-type plain\fR action. Use \-\-offset, \-\-size and \-\-skip to
+specify the mapped area.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-pbkdf <PBKDF spec>"
+Set Password-Based Key Derivation Function (PBKDF) algorithm for LUKS keyslot.
+The PBKDF can be: \fIpbkdf2\fR (for PBKDF2 according to RFC2898),
+\fIargon2i\fR for Argon2i or \fIargon2id\fR for Argon2id
+(see https://www.cryptolux.org/index.php/Argon2 for more info).
+
+For LUKS1, only PBKDF2 is accepted (no need to use this option).
+The default PBKDF2 for LUKS2 is set during compilation time
+and is available in \fIcryptsetup \-\-help\fR output.
+
+A PBKDF is used for increasing dictionary and brute-force attack cost
+for keyslot passwords. The parameters can be time, memory and parallel cost.
+
+For PBKDF2, only time cost (number of iterations) applies.
+For Argon2i/id, there is also memory cost (memory required during
+the process of key derivation) and parallel cost (number of threads
+that run in parallel during the key derivation.
+
+Note that increasing memory cost also increases time, so the final
+parameter values are measured by a benchmark. The benchmark
+tries to find iteration time (\fI\-\-iter\-time\fR) with required
+memory cost \fI\-\-pbkdf\-memory\fR. If it is not possible,
+the memory cost is decreased as well.
+The parallel cost \fI\-\-pbkdf\-parallel\fR is constant, is is checked
+against available CPU cores (if not available, it is decreased) and the maximum
+parallel cost is 4.
+
+You can see all PBKDF parameters for particular LUKS2 keyslot with
+\fIluksDump\fR command.
+
+\fBNOTE:\fR If you do not want to use benchmark and want to specify
+all parameters directly, use \fI\-\-pbkdf\-force\-iterations\fR with
+\fI\-\-pbkdf\-memory\fR and \fI\-\-pbkdf\-parallel\fR.
+This will override the values without benchmarking.
+Note it can cause extremely long unlocking time. Use only is specified
+cases, for example, if you know that the formatted device will
+be used on some small embedded system.
+In this case, the LUKS PBKDF2 digest will be set to the minimum iteration count.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-iter\-time, \-i <number of milliseconds>"
+The number of milliseconds to spend with PBKDF passphrase processing.
+This option is only relevant for LUKS operations that set or change
+passphrases, such as \fIluksFormat\fR or \fIluksAddKey\fR.
+Specifying 0 as parameter selects the compiled-in default.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-pbkdf\-memory <number>"
+Set the memory cost for PBKDF (for Argon2i/id the number represents kilobytes).
+Note that it is maximal value, PBKDF benchmark or available physical memory
+can decrease it.
+This option is not available for PBKDF2.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-pbkdf\-parallel <number>"
+Set the parallel cost for PBKDF (number of threads, up to 4).
+Note that it is maximal value, it is decreased automatically if
+CPU online count is lower.
+This option is not available for PBKDF2.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-pbkdf\-force\-iterations <num>"
+Avoid PBKDF benchmark and set time cost (iterations) directly.
+It can be used for LUKS/LUKS2 device only.
+See \fI\-\-pbkdf\fR option for more info.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-batch\-mode, \-q"
+Suppresses all confirmation questions. Use with care!
+
+If the \-y option is not specified, this option also switches off
+the passphrase verification for \fIluksFormat\fR.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-progress-frequency <seconds>"
+Print separate line every <seconds> with wipe progress.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-timeout, \-t <number of seconds>"
+The number of seconds to wait before timeout on passphrase input
+via terminal. It is relevant every time a passphrase is asked,
+for example for \fIopen\fR, \fIluksFormat\fR or \fIluksAddKey\fR.
+It has no effect if used in conjunction with \-\-key-file.
+.br
+This option is useful when the system
+should not stall if the user does not input a passphrase,
+e.g. during boot. The default is a value of 0 seconds,
+which means to wait forever.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-tries, \-T"
+How often the input of the passphrase shall be retried.
+This option is relevant
+every time a passphrase is asked, for example for
+\fIopen\fR, \fIluksFormat\fR or \fIluksAddKey\fR.
+The default is 3 tries.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-align\-payload <number of 512 byte sectors>"
+Align payload at a boundary of \fIvalue\fR 512-byte sectors.
+This option is relevant for \fIluksFormat\fR.
+
+If not specified, cryptsetup tries to use the topology info
+provided by the kernel for the underlying device to get the optimal alignment.
+If not available (or the calculated value is a multiple of the default)
+data is by default aligned to a 1MiB boundary (i.e. 2048 512-byte sectors).
+
+For a detached LUKS header, this option specifies the offset on the
+data device. See also the \-\-header option.
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR This option is DEPRECATED and has often unexpected impact
+to the data offset and keyslot area size (for LUKS2) due to the complex rounding.
+For fixed data device offset use \fI\-\-offset\fR option instead.
+
+.TP
+.B "\-\-uuid=\fIUUID\fR"
+Use the provided \fIUUID\fR for the \fIluksFormat\fR command
+instead of generating a new one. Changes the existing UUID when
+used with the \fIluksUUID\fR command.
+
+The UUID must be provided in the standard UUID format,
+e.g. 12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789abc.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-allow\-discards\fR"
+Allow the use of discard (TRIM) requests for the device.
+This option is only relevant for \fIopen\fR action.
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR This command can have a negative security impact
+because it can make filesystem-level operations visible on
+the physical device. For example, information leaking
+filesystem type, used space, etc. may be extractable from
+the physical device if the discarded blocks can be located
+later. If in doubt, do not use it.
+
+A kernel version of 3.1 or later is needed. For earlier kernels,
+this option is ignored.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-perf\-same_cpu_crypt\fR"
+Perform encryption using the same cpu that IO was submitted on.
+The default is to use an unbound workqueue so that encryption work
+is automatically balanced between available CPUs.
+This option is only relevant for \fIopen\fR action.
+
+\fBNOTE:\fR This option is available only for low-level dm-crypt
+performance tuning, use only if you need a change to default dm-crypt
+behaviour. Needs kernel 4.0 or later.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-perf\-submit_from_crypt_cpus\fR"
+Disable offloading writes to a separate thread after encryption.
+There are some situations where offloading write bios from the
+encryption threads to a single thread degrades performance
+significantly.  The default is to offload write bios to the same
+thread.
+This option is only relevant for \fIopen\fR action.
+
+\fBNOTE:\fR This option is available only for low-level dm-crypt
+performance tuning, use only if you need a change to default dm-crypt
+behaviour. Needs kernel 4.0 or later.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-test\-passphrase\fR"
+Do not activate the device, just verify passphrase.
+This option is only relevant for \fIopen\fR action (the device
+mapping name is not mandatory if this option is used).
+.TP
+.B "\-\-header\fR <device or file storing the LUKS header>"
+Use a detached (separated) metadata device or file where the
+LUKS header is stored. This option allows one to store ciphertext
+and LUKS header on different devices.
+
+This option is only relevant for LUKS devices and can be
+used with the \fIluksFormat\fR, \fIopen\fR, \fIluksSuspend\fR,
+\fIluksResume\fR, \fIstatus\fR and \fIresize\fR commands.
+
+For \fIluksFormat\fR with a file name as the argument to \-\-header,
+the file will be automatically created if it does not exist.
+See the cryptsetup FAQ for header size calculation.
+
+For other commands that change the LUKS header (e.g. \fIluksAddKey\fR),
+specify the device or file with the LUKS header directly as the
+LUKS device.
+
+If used with \fIluksFormat\fR, the \-\-align\-payload option is taken
+as absolute sector alignment on ciphertext device and can be zero.
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR There is no check whether the ciphertext device specified
+actually belongs to the header given. In fact, you can specify an
+arbitrary device as the ciphertext device for \fIopen\fR
+with the \-\-header option. Use with care.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-header\-backup\-file <file>"
+Specify file with header backup for \fIluksHeaderBackup\fR or
+\fIluksHeaderBackup\fR actions.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-force\-password"
+Do not use password quality checking for new LUKS passwords.
+
+This option applies only to \fIluksFormat\fR, \fIluksAddKey\fR and
+\fIluksChangeKey\fR and is ignored if cryptsetup is built without
+password quality checking support.
+
+For more info about password quality check, see the manual page
+for \fBpwquality.conf(5)\fR and \fBpasswdqc.conf(5)\fR.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-deferred"
+Defers device removal in \fIclose\fR command until the last user closes it.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-disable\-locks"
+Disable lock protection for metadata on disk.
+This option is valid only for LUKS2 and ignored for other formats.
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR Do not use this option unless you run cryptsetup in
+a restricted environment where locking is impossible to perform
+(where /run directory cannot be used).
+.TP
+.B "\-\-disable\-keyring"
+Do not load volume key in kernel keyring but use store key directly
+in the dm-crypt target.
+This option is supported only for the LUKS2 format.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-key\-description <text>"
+Set key description in keyring for use with \fItoken\fR command.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-priority <normal|prefer|ignore>"
+Set a priority for LUKS2 keyslot.
+The \fIprefer\fR priority marked slots are tried before \fInormal\fR priority.
+The \fIignored\fR priority means, that slot is never used, if not explicitly
+requested by \fI\-\-key\-slot\fR option.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-token\-id"
+Specify what token to use in actions \fItoken\fR, \fIopen\fR or \fIresize\fR.
+If omitted, all available tokens will be checked before proceeding further with
+passphrase prompt.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-token\-only"
+Do not proceed further with action (any of \fItoken\fR, \fIopen\fR or
+\fIresize\fR) if token activation failed. Without the option,
+action asks for passphrase to proceed further.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-sector\-size <bytes>"
+Set sector size for use with disk encryption. It must be power of two
+and in range 512 - 4096 bytes. The default is 512 bytes sectors.
+This option is available only in the LUKS2 mode.
+
+Note that if sector size is higher than underlying device hardware sector
+and there is not integrity protection that uses data journal, using
+this option can increase risk on incomplete sector writes during a power fail.
+
+If used together with \fI\-\-integrity\fR option and dm-integrity journal,
+the atomicity of writes is guaranteed in all cases (but it cost write
+performance - data has to be written twice).
+
+Increasing sector size from 512 bytes to 4096 bytes can provide better
+performance on most of the modern storage devices and also with some
+hw encryption accelerators.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-persistent"
+If used with LUKS2 devices and activation commands like \fIopen\fR,
+the specified activation flags are persistently written into metadata
+and used next time automatically even for normal activation.
+(No need to use cryptab or other system configuration files.)
+Only \fI\-\-allow-discards\fR, \fI\-\-perf\-same_cpu_crypt\fR,
+\fI\-\-perf\-submit_from_crypt_cpus\fR and \fI\-\-integrity\-no\-journal\fR
+can be stored persistently.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-refresh"
+Refreshes an active device with new set of parameters. See action \fIrefresh\fR description
+for more details.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-label <LABEL>"
+.B "\-\-subsystem <SUBSYSTEM>"
+Set label and subsystem description for LUKS2 device, can be used
+in \fIconfig\fR and \fIformat\fR actions.
+The label and subsystem are optional fields and can be later used in udev scripts
+for triggering user actions once device marked by these labels is detected.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-integrity <integrity algorithm>"
+Specify integrity algorithm to be used for authenticated disk encryption in LUKS2.
+
+\fBWARNING: This extension is EXPERIMENTAL\fR and requires dm-integrity
+kernel target (available since kernel version 4.12).
+For native AEAD modes, also enable "User-space interface for AEAD cipher algorithms"
+in "Cryptographic API" section (CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD .config option).
+
+For more info, see \fIAUTHENTICATED DISK ENCRYPTION\fR section.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-luks2\-metadata\-size <size>"
+This option can be used to enlarge the LUKS2 metadata (JSON) area.
+The size includes 4096 bytes for binary metadata (usable JSON area is smaller
+of the binary area).
+According to LUKS2 specification, only these values are valid:
+16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, 1024, 2048 and 4096 kB
+The <size> can be specified with unit suffix (for example 128k).
+.TP
+.B "\-\-luks2\-keyslots\-size <size>"
+This option can be used to set specific size of the LUKS2 binary keyslot area
+(key material is encrypted there). The value must be aligned to multiple
+of 4096 bytes with maximum size 128MB.
+The <size> can be specified with unit suffix (for example 128k).
+.TP
+.B "\-\-keyslot\-cipher <cipher\-spec>"
+This option can be used to set specific cipher encryption for the LUKS2 keyslot area.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-keyslot\-key\-size <bits>"
+This option can be used to set specific key size for the LUKS2 keyslot area.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-integrity\-no\-journal"
+Activate device with integrity protection without using data journal (direct
+write of data and integrity tags).
+Note that without journal power fail can cause non-atomic write and data corruption.
+Use only if journalling is performed on a different storage layer.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-integrity\-no\-wipe"
+Skip wiping of device authentication (integrity) tags. If you skip this
+step, sectors will report invalid integrity tag until an application write
+to the sector.
+
+\fBNOTE:\fR Even some writes to the device can fail if the write is not
+aligned to page size and page-cache initiates read of a sector with invalid
+integrity tag.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-unbound"
+
+Creates new LUKS2 unbound keyslot. See \fIluksAddKey\fR action for more
+details.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-tcrypt\-hidden"
+.B "\-\-tcrypt\-system"
+.B "\-\-tcrypt\-backup"
+Specify which TrueCrypt on-disk header will be used to open the device.
+See \fITCRYPT\fR section for more info.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-veracrypt"
+Allow VeraCrypt compatible mode. Only for TCRYPT extension.
+See \fITCRYPT\fR section for more info.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-veracrypt\-pim"
+.B "\-\-veracrypt\-query\-pim"
+Use a custom Personal Iteration Multiplier (PIM) for VeraCrypt device.
+See \fITCRYPT\fR section for more info.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-version"
+Show the program version.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-usage"
+Show short option help.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-help, \-?"
+Show help text and default parameters.
+.SH RETURN CODES
+Cryptsetup returns 0 on success and a non-zero value on error.
+
+Error codes are: 1 wrong parameters, 2 no permission (bad passphrase),
+3 out of memory, 4 wrong device specified, 5 device already exists
+or device is busy.
+.SH NOTES ON PASSPHRASE PROCESSING FOR PLAIN MODE
+Note that no iterated hashing or salting is done in plain mode.
+If hashing is done, it is a single direct hash. This means that
+low-entropy passphrases are easy to attack in plain mode.
+
+\fBFrom a terminal\fR: The passphrase is read until the
+first newline, i.e. '\\n'.
+The input without the newline character is processed with
+the default hash or the hash specified with \-\-hash.
+The hash result will be truncated to the key size
+of the used cipher, or the size specified with \-s.
+
+\fBFrom stdin\fR: Reading will continue until a newline (or until
+the maximum input size is reached), with the trailing newline
+stripped. The maximum input size is defined by the same
+compiled-in default as for the maximum key file size and can
+be overwritten using \-\-keyfile-size option.
+
+The data read will be hashed with the default hash
+or the hash specified with \-\-hash.
+The hash result will be truncated to the key size
+of the used cipher, or the size specified with \-s.
+
+Note that if \-\-key-file=- is used for reading the key
+from stdin, trailing newlines are not stripped from the input.
+
+If "plain" is used as argument to \-\-hash, the input
+data will not be hashed. Instead, it will be zero padded (if
+shorter than the key size) or truncated (if longer than the
+key size) and used directly as the binary key. This is useful for
+directly specifying a binary key.
+No warning will be given if the amount of data read from stdin is
+less than the key size.
+
+\fBFrom a key file\fR: It will be truncated to the
+key size of the used cipher or the size given by \-s
+and directly used as a binary key.
+
+\fBWARNING\fR: The \-\-hash argument is being ignored.
+The \-\-hash option is usable only for stdin input in plain mode.
+
+If the key file is shorter than the key, cryptsetup
+will quit with an error.
+The maximum input size is defined by the same
+compiled-in default as for the maximum key file size and can
+be overwritten using \-\-keyfile-size option.
+
+
+.SH NOTES ON PASSPHRASE PROCESSING FOR LUKS
+LUKS uses PBKDF2 to protect against dictionary attacks
+and to give some protection to low-entropy passphrases
+(see RFC 2898 and the cryptsetup FAQ).
+
+\fBFrom a terminal\fR: The passphrase is read until the
+first newline and then processed by PBKDF2 without
+the newline character.
+
+\fBFrom stdin\fR:
+LUKS will read passphrases from stdin up to the
+first newline character or the compiled-in
+maximum key file length. If \-\-keyfile\-size is
+given, it is ignored.
+
+\fBFrom key file\fR:
+The complete keyfile is read up to the compiled-in
+maximum size. Newline characters do not terminate the
+input. The \-\-keyfile\-size option can be used to limit
+what is read.
+
+\fBPassphrase processing\fR:
+Whenever a passphrase is added to a LUKS header (luksAddKey, luksFormat),
+the user may specify how much the time the passphrase processing
+should consume. The time is used to determine the iteration count
+for PBKDF2 and higher times will offer better protection for
+low-entropy passphrases, but open will take longer to
+complete. For passphrases that have entropy higher than the
+used key length, higher iteration times will not increase security.
+
+The default setting of one or two seconds is sufficient for most
+practical cases. The only exception is a low-entropy
+passphrase used on a device with a slow CPU, as this will
+result in a low iteration count. On a slow device, it may
+be advisable to increase the iteration time using the
+\-\-iter\-time option in order to obtain a higher
+iteration count. This does slow down all later luksOpen
+operations accordingly.
+.SH INCOHERENT BEHAVIOR FOR INVALID PASSPHRASES/KEYS
+LUKS checks for a valid passphrase when an encrypted partition
+is unlocked. The behavior of plain dm-crypt is different.
+It will always decrypt with the passphrase given. If the
+given passphrase is wrong, the device mapped by plain
+dm-crypt will essentially still contain encrypted data and
+will be unreadable.
+.SH NOTES ON SUPPORTED CIPHERS, MODES, HASHES AND KEY SIZES
+The available combinations of ciphers, modes, hashes and key sizes
+depend on kernel support. See /proc/crypto for a list of available
+options. You might need to load additional kernel crypto modules
+in order to get more options.
+
+For the \-\-hash option, if the crypto backend is libgcrypt,
+then all algorithms supported by the gcrypt library are available.
+For other crypto backends, some algorithms may be missing.
+.SH NOTES ON PASSPHRASES
+Mathematics can't be bribed. Make sure you keep your passphrases safe.
+There are a few nice tricks for constructing a fallback, when suddenly
+out of the blue, your brain refuses to cooperate.
+These fallbacks need LUKS, as it's only possible with LUKS
+to have multiple passphrases. Still, if your attacker model does
+not prevent it, storing your passphrase in a sealed envelope somewhere
+may be a good idea as well.
+.SH NOTES ON RANDOM NUMBER GENERATORS
+Random Number Generators (RNG) used in cryptsetup are always the
+kernel RNGs without any modifications or additions to data stream
+produced.
+
+There are two types of randomness cryptsetup/LUKS needs. One type
+(which always uses /dev/urandom) is used for salts, the AF splitter
+and for wiping deleted keyslots.
+
+The second type is used for the volume (master) key. You can switch
+between using /dev/random and /dev/urandom  here, see
+\fP\-\-use\-random\fR and \fP\-\-use\-urandom\fR
+options. Using /dev/random on a system without enough entropy sources
+can cause \fPluksFormat\fR to block until the requested amount of
+random data is gathered. In a low-entropy situation (embedded system),
+this can take a very long time and potentially forever. At the same
+time, using /dev/urandom in a low-entropy situation will
+produce low-quality keys. This is a serious problem, but solving
+it is out of scope for a mere man-page.
+See \fPurandom(4)\fR for more information.
+.SH AUTHENTICATED DISK ENCRYPTION (EXPERIMENTAL)
+Since Linux kernel version 4.12 dm-crypt supports authenticated
+disk encryption.
+
+Normal disk encryption modes are length-preserving (plaintext sector
+is of the same size as a ciphertext sector) and can provide only
+confidentiality protection, but not cryptographically sound
+data integrity protection.
+
+Authenticated modes require additional space per-sector for
+authentication tag and use Authenticated Encryption with Additional
+Data (AEAD) algorithms.
+
+If you configure LUKS2 device with data integrity protection,
+there will be an underlying dm-integrity device, which provides
+additional per-sector metadata space and also provide data
+journal protection to ensure atomicity of data and metadata update.
+Because there must be additional space for metadata and journal,
+the available space for the device will be smaller than for
+length-preserving modes.
+
+The dm-crypt device then resides on top of such a dm-integrity device.
+All activation and deactivation of this device stack is performed
+by cryptsetup, there is no difference in using \fIluksOpen\fR
+for integrity protected devices.
+If you want to format LUKS2 device with data integrity protection,
+use \fI\-\-integrity\fR option.
+
+Some integrity modes requires two independent keys (key for encryption
+and for authentication). Both these keys are stored in one LUKS keyslot.
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR All support for authenticated modes is experimental
+and there are only some modes available for now. Note that there
+are a very few authenticated encryption algorithms that are suitable
+for disk encryption.
+
+.SH NOTES ON LOOPBACK DEVICE USE
+Cryptsetup is usually used directly on a block device (disk
+partition or LVM volume). However, if the device argument is a
+file, cryptsetup tries to allocate a loopback device
+and map it into this file. This mode requires Linux kernel 2.6.25
+or more recent which supports the loop autoclear flag (loop device is
+cleared on the last close automatically). Of course, you can
+always map a file to a loop-device manually. See the
+cryptsetup FAQ for an example.
+
+When device mapping is active, you can see the loop backing file in
+the status command output. Also see losetup(8).
+.SH LUKS2 header locking
+.PP
+The LUKS2 on-disk metadata is updated in several steps and
+to achieve proper atomic update, there is a locking mechanism.
+For an image in file, code uses \fIflock(2)\fR system call.
+For a block device, lock is performed over a special file stored
+in a locking directory (by default \fI/run/lock/cryptsetup\fR).
+The locking directory should be created with the proper security
+context by the distribution during the boot-up phase.
+Only LUKS2 uses locks, other formats do not use this mechanism.
+.SH DEPRECATED ACTIONS
+.PP
+The \fIreload\fR action is no longer supported.
+Please use \fIdmsetup(8)\fR if you need to
+directly manipulate with the device mapping table.
+.PP
+The \fIluksDelKey\fR was replaced with \fIluksKillSlot\fR.
+.PP
+.SH REPORTING BUGS
+Report bugs, including ones in the documentation, on
+the cryptsetup mailing list at <dm-crypt@saout.de>
+or in the 'Issues' section on LUKS website.
+Please attach the output of the failed command with the
+\-\-debug option added.
+.SH AUTHORS
+cryptsetup originally written by Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+.br
+The LUKS extensions and original man page were written by
+Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>.
+.br
+Man page extensions by Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>.
+.br
+Man page rewrite and extension by Arno Wagner <arno@wagner.name>.
+.SH COPYRIGHT
+Copyright \(co 2004 Jana Saout
+.br
+Copyright \(co 2004-2006 Clemens Fruhwirth
+.br
+Copyright \(co 2012-2014 Arno Wagner
+.br
+Copyright \(co 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc.
+.br
+Copyright \(co 2009-2019 Milan Broz
+
+This is free software; see the source for copying conditions.  There is NO
+warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+.SH SEE ALSO
+The LUKS website at \fBhttps://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/\fR
+
+The cryptsetup FAQ, contained in the distribution package and
+online at
+\fBhttps://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/FrequentlyAskedQuestions\fR
+
+The cryptsetup mailing list and list archive, see FAQ entry 1.6.
+
+The LUKS on-disk format specification available at
+\fBhttps://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/Specification\fR
diff --git a/man/integritysetup.8 b/man/integritysetup.8
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5b40b84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/man/integritysetup.8
@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+.TH INTEGRITYSETUP "8" "January 2019" "integritysetup" "Maintenance Commands"
+.SH NAME
+integritysetup - manage dm-integrity (block level integrity) volumes
+.SH SYNOPSIS
+.B integritysetup <options> <action> <action args>
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+.PP
+Integritysetup is used to configure dm-integrity managed device-mapper mappings.
+
+Device-mapper integrity target provides read-write transparent integrity
+checking of block devices. The dm-integrity target emulates additional data
+integrity field per-sector. You can use this additional field directly
+with integritysetup utility, or indirectly (for authenticated encryption)
+through cryptsetup.
+
+Integritysetup supports these operations:
+.PP
+\fIformat\fR <device>
+.IP
+Formats <device> (calculates space and dm-integrity superblock and wipes the device).
+
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-data\-device, \-\-batch\-mode, \-\-no\-wipe, \-\-journal\-size,
+\-\-interleave\-sectors, \-\-tag\-size, \-\-integrity, \-\-integrity\-key\-size,
+\-\-integrity\-key\-file, \-\-sector\-size, \-\-progress-frequency]
+
+.PP
+\fIopen\fR <device> <name>
+.br
+\fIcreate\fR <name> <device> (\fBOBSOLETE syntax\fR)
+.IP
+Open a mapping with <name> backed by device <device>.
+
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-data\-device, \-\-batch\-mode, \-\-journal\-watermark,
+\-\-journal\-commit\-time, \-\-buffer\-sectors, \-\-integrity, \-\-integrity\-key\-size,
+\-\-integrity\-key\-file, \-\-integrity\-no\-journal, \-\-integrity\-recalculate,
+\-\-integrity\-recovery\-mode]
+
+.PP
+\fIclose\fR <name>
+.IP
+Removes existing mapping <name>.
+
+For backward compatibility, there is \fBremove\fR command alias
+for the \fBclose\fR command.
+.PP
+\fIstatus\fR <name>
+.IP
+Reports status for the active integrity mapping <name>.
+.PP
+\fIdump\fR <device>
+.IP
+Reports parameters from on-disk stored superblock.
+
+.SH OPTIONS
+.TP
+.B "\-\-verbose, \-v"
+Print more information on command execution.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-debug"
+Run in debug mode with full diagnostic logs. Debug output
+lines are always prefixed by '#'.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-version"
+Show the program version.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-batch\-mode"
+Do not ask for confirmation.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-progress-frequency <seconds>"
+Print separate line every <seconds> with wipe progress.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-no\-wipe"
+Do not wipe the device after format. A device that is not initially wiped will contain invalid checksums.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-journal\-size, \-j BYTES"
+Size of the journal.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-interleave\-sectors SECTORS"
+The number of interleaved sectors.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-integrity\-recalculate"
+Automatically recalculate integrity tags in kernel on activation.
+The device can be used during automatic integrity recalculation but becomes fully
+integrity protected only after the background operation is finished.
+This option is available since the Linux kernel version 4.19.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-journal\-watermark PERCENT"
+Journal watermark in percents. When the size of the journal exceeds this watermark,
+the journal flush will be started.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-journal\-commit\-time MS"
+Commit time in milliseconds. When this time passes (and no explicit flush operation was issued),
+the journal is written.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-tag\-size, \-t BYTES"
+Size of the integrity tag per-sector (here the integrity function will store authentication tag).
+
+\fBNOTE:\fR The size can be smaller that output size of the hash function, in that case only
+part of the hash will be stored.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-data\-device"
+Specify a separate data device that contains existing data. The <device> then will contain
+calculated integrity tags and journal for this data device.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-sector\-size, \-s BYTES"
+Sector size (power of two: 512, 1024, 2048, 4096).
+.TP
+.B "\-\-buffer\-sectors SECTORS"
+The number of sectors in one buffer.
+
+The tag area is accessed using buffers, the large buffer size means that the I/O size will
+be larger, but there could be less I/Os issued.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-integrity, \-I ALGORITHM"
+Use internal integrity calculation (standalone mode).
+The integrity algorithm can be CRC (crc32c/crc32) or hash function (sha1, sha256).
+
+For HMAC (hmac-sha256) you have also to specify an integrity key and its size.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-integrity\-key\-size BYTES"
+The size of the data integrity key.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-integrity\-key\-file FILE"
+The file with the integrity key.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-integrity\-no\-journal, \-D"
+Disable journal for integrity device.
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR
+In case of a crash, it is possible that the data and integrity tag doesn't match
+if the journal is disabled.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-integrity\-recovery\-mode. \-R"
+Recovery mode (no journal, no tag checking).
+.TP
+
+\fBNOTE:\fR The following options are intended for testing purposes only.
+Using journal encryption does not make sense without encryption the data,
+these options are internally used in authenticated disk encryption with \fBcryptsetup(8)\fR.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-journal\-integrity ALGORITHM"
+Integrity algorithm for journal area.
+See \-\-integrity option for detailed specification.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-journal\-integrity\-key\-size BYTES"
+The size of the journal integrity key.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-journal\-integrity\-key\-file FILE"
+The file with the integrity key.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-journal\-crypt ALGORITHM"
+Encryption algorithm for journal data area.
+You can use a block cipher here such as cbc(aes) or
+a stream cipher, for example, chacha20 or ctr(aes).
+.TP
+.B "\-\-journal\-crypt\-key\-size BYTES"
+The size of the journal encryption key.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-journal\-crypt\-key\-file FILE"
+The file with the journal encryption key.
+.TP
+The dm-integrity target is available since Linux kernel version 4.12.
+.TP
+\fBNOTE:\fR
+Format and activation of an integrity device always require superuser
+privilege because the superblock is calculated and handled in dm-integrity kernel target.
+
+.SH RETURN CODES
+Integritysetup returns 0 on success and a non-zero value on error.
+
+Error codes are:
+    1 wrong parameters
+    2 no permission
+    3 out of memory
+    4 wrong device specified
+    5 device already exists, or device is busy.
+
+.SH EXAMPLES
+Format the device with default standalone mode (CRC32C):
+
+.B "integritysetup format <device>"
+
+Open the device with default parameters:
+
+.B "integritysetup open <device> test"
+
+Format the device in standalone mode for use with HMAC(SHA256):
+
+.B "integritysetup format <device> \-\-tag\-size 32 \-\-integrity hmac\-sha256 \
+\-\-integrity\-key\-file <keyfile> \-\-integrity\-key\-size <key_bytes>"
+
+Open (activate) the device with HMAC(SHA256) and HMAC key in file:
+
+.B "integritysetup open <device> test \-\-integrity hmac\-sha256 \
+\-\-integrity\-key\-file <keyfile> \-\-integrity\-key\-size <key_bytes>"
+
+Dump dm-integrity superblock information:
+
+.B "integritysetup dump <device>"
+
+.SH REPORTING BUGS
+Report bugs, including ones in the documentation, on
+the cryptsetup mailing list at <dm-crypt@saout.de>
+or in the 'Issues' section on LUKS website.
+Please attach the output of the failed command with the
+\-\-debug option added.
+.SH AUTHORS
+The integritysetup tool is written by Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+and is part of the cryptsetup project.
+.SH COPYRIGHT
+Copyright \(co 2016-2019 Red Hat, Inc.
+.br
+Copyright \(co 2016-2019 Milan Broz
+
+This is free software; see the source for copying conditions.  There is NO
+warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+.SH SEE ALSO
+The project website at \fBhttps://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup\fR
+
+The integrity on-disk format specification available at
+\fBhttps://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMIntegrity\fR
diff --git a/man/veritysetup.8 b/man/veritysetup.8
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6878aba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/man/veritysetup.8
@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+.TH VERITYSETUP "8" "January 2019" "veritysetup" "Maintenance Commands"
+.SH NAME
+veritysetup - manage dm-verity (block level verification) volumes
+.SH SYNOPSIS
+.B veritysetup <options> <action> <action args>
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+.PP
+Veritysetup is used to configure dm-verity managed device-mapper mappings.
+
+Device-mapper verity target provides read-only transparent integrity
+checking of block devices using kernel crypto API.
+
+The dm-verity devices are always read-only.
+
+Veritysetup supports these operations:
+.PP
+\fIformat\fR <data_device> <hash_device>
+.IP
+Calculates and permanently stores hash verification data for data_device.
+Hash area can be located on the same device after data if specified
+by \-\-hash\-offset option.
+
+Note you need to provide root hash string for device verification
+or activation. Root hash must be trusted.
+
+The data or hash device argument can be block device or file image.
+If hash device path doesn't exist, it will be created as file.
+
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-hash, \-\-no-superblock, \-\-format,
+\-\-data-block-size, \-\-hash-block-size, \-\-data-blocks, \-\-hash-offset,
+\-\-salt, \-\-uuid]
+.PP
+\fIopen\fR <data_device> <name> <hash_device> <root_hash>
+\fIcreate\fR <name> <data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>
+.IP
+Creates a mapping with <name> backed by device <data_device> and using
+<hash_device> for in-kernel verification.
+
+The <root_hash> is a hexadecimal string.
+
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-hash-offset, \-\-no-superblock,
+\-\-ignore-corruption or \-\-restart-on-corruption, \-\-ignore-zero-blocks,
+\-\-check-at-most-once]
+
+If option \-\-no-superblock is used, you have to use as the same options
+as in initial format operation.
+.PP
+\fIverify\fR <data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>
+.IP
+Verifies data on data_device with use of hash blocks stored on hash_device.
+
+This command performs userspace verification, no kernel device is created.
+
+The <root_hash> is a hexadecimal string.
+
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-hash-offset, \-\-no-superblock]
+
+If option \-\-no-superblock is used, you have to use as the same options
+as in initial format operation.
+.PP
+\fIclose\fR <name>
+.IP
+Removes existing mapping <name>.
+
+For backward compatibility there is \fBremove\fR command alias
+for \fBclose\fR command.
+.PP
+\fIstatus\fR <name>
+.IP
+Reports status for the active verity mapping <name>.
+.PP
+\fIdump\fR <hash_device>
+.IP
+Reports parameters of verity device from on-disk stored superblock.
+
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-no-superblock]
+.SH OPTIONS
+.TP
+.B "\-\-verbose, \-v"
+Print more information on command execution.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-debug"
+Run in debug mode with full diagnostic logs. Debug output
+lines are always prefixed by '#'.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-no-superblock"
+Create or use dm-verity without permanent on-disk superblock.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-format=number"
+Specifies the hash version type.
+Format type 0 is original Chrome OS version. Format type 1 is current version.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-data-block-size=bytes"
+Used block size for the data device.
+(Note kernel supports only page-size as maximum here.)
+.TP
+.B "\-\-hash-block-size=bytes"
+Used block size for the hash device.
+(Note kernel supports only page-size as maximum here.)
+.TP
+.B "\-\-data-blocks=blocks"
+Size of data device used in verification.
+If not specified, the whole device is used.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-hash-offset=bytes"
+Offset of hash area/superblock on hash_device.
+Value must be aligned to disk sector offset.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-salt=hex string"
+Salt used for format or verification.
+Format is a hexadecimal string.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-uuid=UUID"
+Use the provided UUID for format command instead of generating new one.
+
+The UUID must be provided in standard UUID format,
+e.g. 12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789abc.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-ignore-corruption", "\-\-restart-on-corruption"
+Defines what to do if data integrity problem is detected (data corruption).
+
+Without these options kernel fails the IO operation with I/O error.
+With \-\-ignore-corruption option the corruption is only logged.
+With \-\-restart-on-corruption the kernel is restarted immediately.
+(You have to provide way how to avoid restart loops.)
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR Use these options only for very specific cases.
+These options are available since Linux kernel version 4.1.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-ignore-zero-blocks"
+Instruct kernel to not verify blocks that are expected to contain zeroes
+and always directly return zeroes instead.
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR Use this option only in very specific cases.
+This option is available since Linux kernel version 4.5.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-check-at-most-once"
+Instruct kernel to verify blocks only the first time they are read
+from the data device, rather than every time.
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR It provides a reduced level of security because only
+offline tampering of the data device's content will be detected,
+not online tampering.
+This option is available since Linux kernel version 4.17.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-hash=hash"
+Hash algorithm for dm-verity. For default see \-\-help option.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-version"
+Show the program version.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-fec-device=fec_device"
+Use forward error correction (FEC) to recover from corruption if hash verification fails.
+Use encoding data from the specified device.
+
+The fec device argument can be block device or file image.
+For format, if fec device path doesn't exist, it will be created as file.
+
+Note: block sizes for data and hash devices must match. Also, if the verity data_device is encrypted the fec_device should be too.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-fec-offset=bytes"
+This is the offset, in bytes, from the start of the FEC device to the beginning of the encoding data.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-fec-roots=num"
+Number of generator roots. This equals to the number of parity bytes in the encoding data.
+In RS(M, N) encoding, the number of roots is M-N. M is 255 and M-N is between 2 and 24 (including).
+.TP
+.SH RETURN CODES
+Veritysetup returns 0 on success and a non-zero value on error.
+
+Error codes are:
+    1 wrong parameters
+    2 no permission
+    3 out of memory
+    4 wrong device specified
+    5 device already exists or device is busy.
+
+.SH EXAMPLES
+.B "veritysetup \-\-data-blocks=256 format <data_device> <hash_device>"
+
+Calculates and stores verification data on hash_device for the first 256 blocks (of block-size).
+If hash_device does not exist, it is created (as file image).
+
+.B "veritysetup format <data_device> <hash_device>"
+
+Calculates and stores verification data on hash_device for the whole data_device.
+
+.B "veritysetup \-\-data-blocks=256 \-\-hash-offset=1052672 format <device> <device>"
+
+Verification data (hashes) is stored on the same device as data (starting at hash-offset).
+Hash-offset must be greater than number of blocks in data-area.
+
+.B "veritysetup \-\-data-blocks=256 \-\-hash-offset=1052672 create test-device <device> <device> <root_hash>"
+
+Activates the verity device named test-device. Options \-\-data-blocks and \-\-hash-offset are the same
+as in the format command. The <root_hash> was calculated in format command.
+
+.B "veritysetup \-\-data-blocks=256 \-\-hash-offset=1052672 verify <data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+
+Verifies device without activation (in userspace).
+
+.B "veritysetup \-\-fec-device=<fec_device> \-\-fec-roots=10 format <data_device> <hash_device>"
+
+Calculates and stores verification and encoding data for data_device.
+
+.SH REPORTING BUGS
+Report bugs, including ones in the documentation, on
+the cryptsetup mailing list at <dm-crypt@saout.de>
+or in the 'Issues' section on LUKS website.
+Please attach the output of the failed command with the
+\-\-debug option added.
+.SH AUTHORS
+The first implementation of veritysetup was written by Chrome OS authors.
+
+This version is based on verification code written by Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
+and rewritten for libcryptsetup by Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>.
+.SH COPYRIGHT
+Copyright \(co 2012-2019 Red Hat, Inc.
+.br
+Copyright \(co 2012-2019 Milan Broz
+
+This is free software; see the source for copying conditions.  There is NO
+warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+.SH SEE ALSO
+The project website at \fBhttps://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup\fR
+
+The verity on-disk format specification available at
+\fBhttps://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMVerity\fR
diff --git a/misc/11-dm-crypt.rules b/misc/11-dm-crypt.rules
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dfbb3a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/misc/11-dm-crypt.rules
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# Old udev rules historically used in device-mapper.
+# No need to install these until you have some weird configuration.
+# (Code internally set the same flags.)
+
+ACTION!="add|change", GOTO="crypt_end"
+ENV{DM_UDEV_RULES_VSN}!="?*", GOTO="crypt_end"
+
+ENV{DM_UUID}=="CRYPT-TEMP-?*", GOTO="crypt_disable"
+ENV{DM_UUID}!="?*", ENV{DM_NAME}=="temporary-cryptsetup-?*", GOTO="crypt_disable"
+GOTO="crypt_end"
+
+LABEL="crypt_disable"
+ENV{DM_UDEV_DISABLE_SUBSYSTEM_RULES_FLAG}="1"
+ENV{DM_UDEV_DISABLE_DISK_RULES_FLAG}="1"
+ENV{DM_UDEV_DISABLE_OTHER_RULES_FLAG}="1"
+
+LABEL="crypt_end"
diff --git a/misc/dict_search/Makefile b/misc/dict_search/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0226c98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/misc/dict_search/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+TARGET=crypt_dict
+CFLAGS=-O2 -g -Wall -D_GNU_SOURCE
+LDLIBS=-lcryptsetup
+CC=gcc
+
+SOURCES=$(wildcard *.c)
+OBJECTS=$(SOURCES:.c=.o)
+
+all: $(TARGET)
+
+$(TARGET): $(OBJECTS)
+	$(CC) -o $@ $^ $(LDLIBS)
+
+clean:
+	rm -f *.o *~ core $(TARGET)
+
+.PHONY: clean
diff --git a/misc/dict_search/README b/misc/dict_search/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fc6aa44
--- /dev/null
+++ b/misc/dict_search/README
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+Simple example how to use libcryptsetup
+for password search.
+
+Run: crypt_dict luks|tcrypt <device|image> <dictionary> [cpus]
+
+luks|tcrypt specified device type (LUKS or TrueCrypt)
+
+<device|image> is LUKS or TrueCrypt device or image
+
+<dictionary> is list of passphrases to try
+(note trailing EOL is stripped)
+
+cpus - number of processes to start in parallel
+
+Format of dictionary file is simple one password per line,
+if first char on line is # it is skipped as comment.
+
+For LUKS, you have it run as root (device-mapper cannot
+create dmcrypt devices as nrmal user. Code need
+to map keyslots as temporary dmcrypt device.)
+
+For TrueCrypt devices root privilege is not required.
diff --git a/misc/dict_search/crypt_dict.c b/misc/dict_search/crypt_dict.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c80d502
--- /dev/null
+++ b/misc/dict_search/crypt_dict.c
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+/*
+ * Example of LUKS/TrueCrypt password dictionary search
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+ *
+ * Run this (for LUKS as root),
+ * e.g. ./crypt_dict test.img /usr/share/john/password.lst 4
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <libcryptsetup.h>
+
+#define MAX_LEN 512
+
+static enum { LUKS, TCRYPT } device_type;
+
+static void check(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *pwd_file, unsigned my_id, unsigned max_id)
+{
+	FILE *f;
+	int len, r = -1;
+	unsigned long line = 0;
+	char pwd[MAX_LEN];
+
+	if (fork())
+		return;
+
+	/* open password file, now in separate process */
+	f = fopen(pwd_file, "r");
+	if (!f) {
+		printf("Cannot open %s.\n", pwd_file);
+		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+	}
+
+	while (fgets(pwd, MAX_LEN, f)) {
+
+		/* every process tries N-th line, skip others */
+		if (line++ % max_id != my_id)
+			continue;
+
+		len = strlen(pwd);
+
+		/* strip EOL - this is like a input from tty */
+		if (len && pwd[len - 1] == '\n') {
+			pwd[len - 1] = '\0';
+			len--;
+		}
+
+		/* lines starting "#!comment" are comments */
+		if (len >= 9 && !strncmp(pwd, "#!comment", 9)) {
+			/* printf("skipping %s\n", pwd); */
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/* printf("%d: checking %s\n", my_id, pwd); */
+		if (device_type == LUKS)
+			r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, pwd, len, 0);
+		else if (device_type == TCRYPT) {
+			struct crypt_params_tcrypt params = {
+				.flags = CRYPT_TCRYPT_LEGACY_MODES,
+				.passphrase = pwd,
+				.passphrase_size = len,
+			};
+			r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_TCRYPT, &params);
+		}
+		if (r >= 0) {
+			printf("Found passphrase for slot %d: \"%s\"\n", r, pwd);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	fclose(f);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	exit(r >= 0 ? 2 : EXIT_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+	int i, status, procs = 4;
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+
+	if (argc < 4 || argc > 5) {
+		printf("Use: %s luks|tcrypt <device|file> <password file> [#processes] %d\n", argv[0], argc);
+		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+	}
+
+	if (argc == 5 && (sscanf(argv[4], "%i", &procs) != 1 || procs < 1)) {
+		printf("Wrong number of processes.\n");
+		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+	}
+
+	if (!strcmp(argv[1], "luks"))
+		device_type = LUKS;
+	else if (!strcmp(argv[1], "tcrypt"))
+		device_type = TCRYPT;
+	else {
+		printf("Wrong device type %s.\n", argv[1]);
+		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+	}
+
+	/* crypt_set_debug_level(CRYPT_DEBUG_ALL); */
+
+	/*
+	 * Need to create temporary keyslot device-mapper devices and allocate loop if needed,
+	 * so root is required here.
+	 */
+	if (getuid() != 0) {
+		printf("You must be root to run this program.\n");
+                exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+	}
+
+	/* signal all children if anything happens */
+	prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGHUP);
+	setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, -5);
+
+	/* we are not going to modify anything, so common init is ok */
+	if (crypt_init(&cd, argv[2]) ||
+	    (device_type == LUKS && crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL))) {
+		printf("Cannot open %s.\n", argv[2]);
+		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+	}
+
+	/* run scan in separate processes, it is up to scheduler to assign CPUs inteligently */
+	for (i = 0; i < procs; i++)
+		check(cd, argv[3], i, procs);
+
+	/* wait until at least one finishes with error or status 2 (key found) */
+	while (wait(&status) != -1 && WIFEXITED(status)) {
+		if (WEXITSTATUS(status) == EXIT_SUCCESS)
+			continue;
+		/* kill rest of processes */
+		kill(0, SIGHUP);
+		/* not reached */
+		break;
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
diff --git a/misc/dracut_90reencrypt/README b/misc/dracut_90reencrypt/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0672949
--- /dev/null
+++ b/misc/dracut_90reencrypt/README
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+Example of simple dracut module for reencryption of system
+LUKS drive on-the-fly.
+
+Install in /usr/[share|lib]/dracut/modules.d/90reencrypt, then
+build special initramfs "with dracut -a reencrypt -o crypt".
+Reencrypt module doesn't work (has a conflict) with crypt module as
+of now. After successful reencryption reboot using original initramfs.
+
+Dracut then recognize argument rd.luks.reencrypt=name:size,
+e.g. rd.luks.reencrypt=sda2:52G means only 52G of device
+will be reencrypted (default is whole device).
+(Name is kernel name of device.)
+
+If there's more than single active keyslot in the target luks device
+you're required to select one keyslot explicitly for reencryption via
+rd.luks.reencrypt_keyslot=<keyslot_number> option. Bear in mind that
+if you use this option, all other keyslots will get deactivated in the
+process.
+
+Another argument, rd.luks.reencrypt_key=/dev/sda:/path/to/keyfile
+can be used to read password for specific keyslot from device containing
+filesystem with a keyfile (file with a password). If you omit reencrypt_key
+argument, reencryption would work only in case a LUKS container has
+exactly one keyslot activated.
+
+Arguments rd.luks.reencrypt_keyslot and rd.luks.reencrypt_key are not
+mandatory.
+
+Note that reencryption context is stored in ramdisk, any
+fail can mean complete lost of data!
+
+Copyright (C) 2012 Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+
+This copyrighted material is made available to anyone wishing to use,
+modify, copy, or redistribute it subject to the terms and conditions
+of the GNU General Public License v.2.
+
+You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation,
+Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
diff --git a/misc/dracut_90reencrypt/check.old b/misc/dracut_90reencrypt/check.old
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..53010b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/misc/dracut_90reencrypt/check.old
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+which cryptsetup-reencrypt >/dev/null 2>&1 || exit 1
+
+exit 0
diff --git a/misc/dracut_90reencrypt/install.old b/misc/dracut_90reencrypt/install.old
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..6e0523b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/misc/dracut_90reencrypt/install.old
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+inst cryptsetup-reencrypt
+
+inst_hook cmdline 30 "$moddir/parse-reencrypt.sh"
+inst "$moddir"/reencrypt.sh /sbin/reencrypt
diff --git a/misc/dracut_90reencrypt/module-setup.sh b/misc/dracut_90reencrypt/module-setup.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..fcd7c92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/misc/dracut_90reencrypt/module-setup.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+check() {
+    [ -x /sbin/cryptsetup-reencrypt ] || return 1
+    return 255
+}
+
+depends() {
+    echo dm rootfs-block
+}
+
+installkernel() {
+    # requires hostonly='' override so that loop module is pulled in initramfs
+    # even if not loaded in actual kernel. dracut bug?
+    hostonly='' instmods dm_crypt =crypto loop
+}
+
+install() {
+    if dracut_module_included crypt; then
+        derror "'reencrypt' can't be installed together with 'crypt'."
+        derror "Add '-o crypt' option to install reencrypt module."
+        return 1
+    fi
+
+    dracut_install cryptsetup-reencrypt
+
+    # moddir variable is assigned in dracut general shell lib
+    # shellcheck disable=SC2154
+    inst_hook cmdline 30 "$moddir/parse-reencrypt.sh"
+    inst_simple "$moddir"/reencrypt.sh /sbin/reencrypt
+    inst_simple "$moddir"/reencrypt-verbose.sh /sbin/cryptsetup-reencrypt-verbose
+}
diff --git a/misc/dracut_90reencrypt/parse-reencrypt.sh b/misc/dracut_90reencrypt/parse-reencrypt.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..5fec191
--- /dev/null
+++ b/misc/dracut_90reencrypt/parse-reencrypt.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+REENC=$(getargs rd.luks.reencrypt=)
+# shellcheck disable=SC2086
+REENC_DEV=$(echo $REENC | sed 's/:.*//')
+# shellcheck disable=SC2086
+REENC_SIZE=$(echo $REENC | sed -n 's/.*://p')
+
+REENC_KEY=$(getargs rd.luks.reencrypt_key=)
+if [ -z "$REENC_KEY" ] ; then
+    REENC_KEY=none
+fi
+
+REENC_SLOT=$(getargs rd.luks.reencrypt_keyslot=)
+if [ -z "$REENC_SLOT" ] ; then
+    REENC_SLOT=any
+fi
+
+# shellcheck disable=SC2086
+# shellcheck disable=SC1004
+# shellcheck disable=SC2016
+if [ -n "$REENC_DEV" ] ; then
+{
+   printf 'SUBSYSTEM!="block", GOTO="reenc_end"\n'
+   printf 'ACTION!="add|change", GOTO="reenc_end"\n'
+   printf 'KERNEL=="%s", ' $REENC_DEV
+   printf 'ENV{ID_FS_TYPE}=="crypto_LUKS", RUN+="/sbin/initqueue \
+           --unique --onetime --settled --name crypt-reencrypt-%%k \
+           /sbin/reencrypt $env{DEVNAME} %s"\n' "$REENC_KEY $REENC_SLOT $REENC_SIZE"
+
+   printf 'ENV{ID_FS_UUID}=="*%s*", ' $REENC_DEV
+   printf 'ENV{ID_FS_TYPE}=="crypto_LUKS", RUN+="/sbin/initqueue \
+           --unique --onetime --settled --name crypt-reencrypt-%%k \
+           /sbin/reencrypt $env{DEVNAME} %s"\n' "$REENC_KEY $REENC_SLOT $REENC_SIZE"
+   printf 'LABEL="reenc_end"\n'
+} > /etc/udev/rules.d/69-reencryption.rules
+   initqueue --unique --finished --name crypt-reencrypt-finished-${REENC_DEV} [ -e /tmp/reencrypted ]
+fi
diff --git a/misc/dracut_90reencrypt/reencrypt-verbose.sh b/misc/dracut_90reencrypt/reencrypt-verbose.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..109ce6e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/misc/dracut_90reencrypt/reencrypt-verbose.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+# Route stdout to stderr in initrd. Otherwise output is invisible
+# unless we run in debug mode.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2068
+/sbin/cryptsetup-reencrypt $@ 1>&2
diff --git a/misc/dracut_90reencrypt/reencrypt.sh b/misc/dracut_90reencrypt/reencrypt.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..db09e64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/misc/dracut_90reencrypt/reencrypt.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+#
+# $1=$device [$2=keyfile|none [$3=keyslot|any [$4=size]]]
+#
+
+[ -d /sys/module/dm_crypt ] || modprobe dm_crypt
+
+[ -d /sys/module/loop ] || modprobe loop
+
+[ -f /tmp/reencrypted ] && exit 0
+
+. /lib/dracut-lib.sh
+
+# if device name is /dev/dm-X, convert to /dev/mapper/name
+if [ "${1##/dev/dm-}" != "$1" ]; then
+    device="/dev/mapper/$(dmsetup info -c --noheadings -o name "$1")"
+else
+    device="$1"
+fi
+
+PARAMS="$device -T 1 --use-fsync --progress-frequency 5 -B 32"
+if [ "$3" != "any" ]; then
+    PARAMS="$PARAMS -S $3"
+fi
+
+if [ -n "$4" ]; then
+    PARAMS="$PARAMS --device-size $4"
+fi
+
+reenc_readkey() {
+    keypath="${1#*:}"
+    keydev="${1%%:*}"
+
+    mntp="/tmp/reencrypted-mount-tmp"
+    mkdir "$mntp"
+    mount -r "$keydev" "$mntp" && cat "$mntp/$keypath"
+    umount "$mntp"
+    rm -r "$mntp"
+}
+
+# shellcheck disable=SC2086
+# shellcheck disable=SC2164
+reenc_run() {
+    cwd=$(pwd)
+    _prompt="LUKS password for REENCRYPTING $device"
+    cd /tmp
+    udevadm settle
+    if [ "$1" = "none" ] ; then
+	if [ "$2" != "any" ]; then
+		_prompt="$_prompt, using keyslot $2"
+	fi
+        /bin/plymouth ask-for-password \
+        --prompt "$_prompt" \
+        --command="/sbin/cryptsetup-reencrypt-verbose $PARAMS"
+    else
+        info "REENCRYPT using key $1"
+        reenc_readkey "$1" | /sbin/cryptsetup-reencrypt-verbose -d - $PARAMS
+    fi
+    _ret=$?
+    cd $cwd
+}
+
+info "REENCRYPT $device requested"
+# flock against other interactive activities
+# shellcheck disable=SC2086
+{ flock -s 9;
+    reenc_run $2 $3
+} 9>/.console_lock
+
+if [ $_ret -eq 0 ]; then
+    # do not ask again
+    # shellcheck disable=SC2188
+    >> /tmp/reencrypted
+    warn "Reencryption of device $device has finished successfully. Use previous"
+    warn "initramfs image (without reencrypt module) to boot the system. When"
+    warn "you leave the emergency shell, the system will reboot."
+
+    emergency_shell -n "(reboot)"
+    [ -x /usr/bin/systemctl ] && /usr/bin/systemctl reboot
+    [ -x /sbin/shutdown ] && /sbin/shutdown -r now
+fi
+
+# panic the kernel otherwise
+exit 1
diff --git a/misc/keyslot_checker/Makefile b/misc/keyslot_checker/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3b159fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/misc/keyslot_checker/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+TARGETS=chk_luks_keyslots
+CFLAGS=-O0 -g -Wall -D_GNU_SOURCE
+LDLIBS=-lcryptsetup -lm
+CC=gcc
+
+all: $(TARGETS)
+
+chk_luks_keyslots: chk_luks_keyslots.o
+	$(CC) -o $@ $^ $(LDLIBS)
+
+clean:
+	rm -f *.o *~ core $(TARGETS)
+
+.PHONY: clean
diff --git a/misc/keyslot_checker/README b/misc/keyslot_checker/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cd5bf81
--- /dev/null
+++ b/misc/keyslot_checker/README
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+Purpose
+=======
+
+chk_luks_keyslots is a tool that searches the keyslot area of a
+LUKS container for positions where entropy is low and hence
+there is a high probability of damage from overwrites of parts
+of the key-slot with data such as a RAID superblock or a partition
+table.
+
+
+Installation
+============
+
+1. Install the version of cryptsetup the tool came with.
+2. Compile with "make"
+   
+Manual compile can be done with
+   gcc -lm -lcryptsetup chk_luks_keyslots.c -o chk_luks_keyslots
+
+Usage
+=====
+
+Call chk_luks_keyslots without arguments for an option summary.
+
+
+Example of a good keyslot area with keys 0 and 2 in use:
+--------------------------------------------------------
+
+root> ./chk_luks_keyslots /dev/loop0
+
+parameters (commandline and LUKS header):
+  sector size: 512
+  threshold:   0.900000
+
+- processing keyslot 0:  start: 0x001000   end: 0x020400
+- processing keyslot 1:  keyslot not in use
+- processing keyslot 2:  start: 0x041000   end: 0x060400
+- processing keyslot 3:  keyslot not in use
+- processing keyslot 4:  keyslot not in use
+- processing keyslot 5:  keyslot not in use
+- processing keyslot 6:  keyslot not in use
+- processing keyslot 7:  keyslot not in use
+
+
+Same example of a fault in slot 2 at offset 0x50000:
+----------------------------------------------------
+
+root>./chk_luks_keyslots /dev/loop2
+
+parameters (commandline and LUKS header):
+  sector size: 512
+  threshold:   0.900000
+
+- processing keyslot 0:  start: 0x001000   end: 0x020400
+- processing keyslot 1:  keyslot not in use
+- processing keyslot 2:  start: 0x041000   end: 0x060400
+  low entropy at: 0x050000    entropy: 0.549165
+- processing keyslot 3:  keyslot not in use
+- processing keyslot 4:  keyslot not in use
+- processing keyslot 5:  keyslot not in use
+- processing keyslot 6:  keyslot not in use
+- processing keyslot 7:  keyslot not in use
+
+
+Same as last, but verbose:
+--------------------------
+root>./chk_luks_keyslots  -v /dev/loop2
+
+parameters (commandline and LUKS header):
+  sector size: 512
+  threshold:   0.900000
+
+- processing keyslot 0:  start: 0x001000   end: 0x020400
+- processing keyslot 1:  keyslot not in use
+- processing keyslot 2:  start: 0x041000   end: 0x060400
+  low entropy at: 0x050000    entropy: 0.549165
+  Binary dump:
+  0x050000  54 68 69 73 20 69 73 20  61 20 74 65 73 74 2D 73  This is a test-s
+  0x050010  65 63 74 6F 72 20 66 6F  72 20 63 68 6B 5F 6C 75  ector for chk_lu
+  0x050020  6B 73 5F 6B 65 79 73 6C  6F 74 73 20 74 68 65 20  ks_keyslots the
+  0x050030  71 75 69 63 6B 20 62 72  6F 77 6E 20 66 6F 78 20  quick brown fox
+  0x050040  6A 75 6D 70 73 20 6F 76  65 72 20 74 68 65 20 6C  jumps over the l
+  0x050050  61 7A 79 20 64 6F 67 20  74 68 65 20 71 75 69 63  azy dog the quic
+  0x050060  6B 20 62 72 6F 77 6E 20  66 6F 78 20 6A 75 6D 70  k brown fox jump
+  0x050070  73 20 6F 76 65 72 20 74  68 65 20 6C 61 7A 79 20  s over the lazy
+  0x050080  64 6F 67 20 74 68 65 20  71 75 69 63 6B 20 62 72  dog the quick br
+  0x050090  6F 77 6E 20 66 6F 78 20  6A 75 6D 70 73 20 6F 76  own fox jumps ov
+  0x0500a0  65 72 20 74 68 65 20 6C  61 7A 79 20 64 6F 67 20  er the lazy dog
+  0x0500b0  74 68 65 20 71 75 69 63  6B 20 62 72 6F 77 6E 20  the quick brown
+  0x0500c0  66 6F 78 20 6A 75 6D 70  73 20 6F 76 65 72 20 74  fox jumps over t
+  0x0500d0  68 65 20 6C 61 7A 79 20  64 6F 67 20 74 68 65 20  he lazy dog the
+  0x0500e0  71 75 69 63 6B 20 62 72  6F 77 6E 20 66 6F 78 20  quick brown fox
+  0x0500f0  6A 75 6D 70 73 20 6F 76  65 72 20 74 68 65 20 6C  jumps over the l
+  0x050100  61 7A 79 20 64 6F 67 20  74 68 65 20 71 75 69 63  azy dog the quic
+  0x050110  6B 20 62 72 6F 77 6E 20  66 6F 78 20 6A 75 6D 70  k brown fox jump
+  0x050120  73 20 6F 76 65 72 20 74  68 65 20 6C 61 7A 79 20  s over the lazy
+  0x050130  64 6F 67 20 74 68 65 20  71 75 69 63 6B 20 62 72  dog the quick br
+  0x050140  6F 77 6E 20 66 6F 78 20  6A 75 6D 70 73 20 6F 76  own fox jumps ov
+  0x050150  65 72 20 74 68 65 20 6C  61 7A 79 20 64 6F 67 20  er the lazy dog
+  0x050160  74 68 65 20 71 75 69 63  6B 20 62 72 6F 77 6E 20  the quick brown
+  0x050170  66 6F 78 20 6A 75 6D 70  73 20 6F 76 65 72 20 74  fox jumps over t
+  0x050180  68 65 20 6C 61 7A 79 20  64 6F 67 20 74 68 65 20  he lazy dog the
+  0x050190  71 75 69 63 6B 20 62 72  6F 77 6E 20 66 6F 78 20  quick brown fox
+  0x0501a0  6A 75 6D 70 73 20 6F 76  65 72 20 74 68 65 20 6C  jumps over the l
+  0x0501b0  61 7A 79 20 64 6F 67 20  74 68 65 20 71 75 69 63  azy dog the quic
+  0x0501c0  6B 20 62 72 6F 77 6E 20  66 6F 78 20 6A 75 6D 70  k brown fox jump
+  0x0501d0  73 20 6F 76 65 72 20 74  68 65 20 6C 61 7A 79 20  s over the lazy
+  0x0501e0  64 6F 67 20 74 68 65 20  71 75 69 63 6B 20 62 72  dog the quick br
+  0x0501f0  6F 77 6E 20 66 6F 78 20  6A 75 6D 70 73 20 6F 76  own fox jumps ov
+
+- processing keyslot 3:  keyslot not in use
+- processing keyslot 4:  keyslot not in use
+- processing keyslot 5:  keyslot not in use
+- processing keyslot 6:  keyslot not in use
+- processing keyslot 7:  keyslot not in use
+
+----
+Copyright (C) 2012, Arno Wagner <arno@wagner.name>
+This file is free documentation; the author gives
+unlimited permission to copy, distribute and modify it.
diff --git a/misc/keyslot_checker/chk_luks_keyslots.c b/misc/keyslot_checker/chk_luks_keyslots.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d05aad8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/misc/keyslot_checker/chk_luks_keyslots.c
@@ -0,0 +1,371 @@
+/*
+ * LUKS keyslot entropy tester. Works only for header version 1.
+ *
+ * Functionality: Determines sample entropy (symbols: bytes) for
+ * each (by default) 512B sector in each used keyslot. If it
+ * is lower than a threshold, the sector address is printed
+ * as it is suspected of having non-"random" data in it, indicating
+ * damage by overwriting. This can obviously not find overwriting
+ * with random or random-like data (encrypted, compressed).
+ *
+ * Version history:
+ *    v0.1: 09.09.2012 Initial release
+ *    v0.2: 08.10.2012 Converted to use libcryptsetup
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012, Arno Wagner <arno@wagner.name>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <math.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <inttypes.h>
+#include <libcryptsetup.h>
+
+const char *help =
+"Version 0.2 [8.10.2012]\n"
+"\n"
+"    chk_luks_keyslots [options] luks-device \n"
+"\n"
+"This tool checks all keyslots of a LUKS device for \n"
+"low entropy sections. If any are found, they are reported. \n"
+"This allows to find areas damaged by things like filesystem \n"
+"creation or RAID superblocks. \n"
+"\n"
+"Options: \n"
+"  -t <num>  Entropy threshold. Possible values 0.0 ... 1.0 \n"
+"            Default: 0.90, which works well for 512B sectors.\n"
+"            For 512B sectors, you will get frequent misdetections\n"
+"            at thresholds around 0.94\n"
+"            Higher value: more sensitive but more false detections.\n"
+"  -s <num>  Sector size. Must divide keyslot-size.\n"
+"            Default: 512 Bytes.\n"
+"            Values smaller than 128 are generally not very useful.\n"
+"            For values smaller than the default, you need to adjust\n"
+"            the threshold down to reduce misdetection. For values\n"
+"            larger than the default you need to adjust the threshold\n"
+"            up to retain sensitivity.\n"
+"  -v        Print found suspicious sectors verbosely. \n"
+"  -d        Print decimal addresses instead of hex ones.\n"
+"\n";
+
+
+/* Config defaults */
+
+static int sector_size = 512;
+static double threshold = 0.90;
+static int print_decimal = 0;
+static int verbose = 0;
+
+/* tools */
+
+/* Calculates and returns sample entropy on byte level for
+ * The argument.
+ */
+static double ent_samp(unsigned char * buf, int len)
+{
+	int freq[256];   /* stores symbol frequencies */
+	int i;
+	double e, f;
+
+	/* 0. Plausibility checks */
+	if (len <= 0)
+		return 0.0;
+
+	/* 1. count all frequencies */
+	for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
+		freq[i] = 0.0;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i ++)
+		freq[buf[i]]++;
+
+	/* 2. calculate sample entropy */
+	e = 0.0;
+	for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
+		f = freq[i];
+		if (f > 0) {
+			f =  f / (double)len;
+			e += f * log2(f);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (e != 0.0)
+		e = -1.0 * e;
+
+	e = e / 8.0;
+	return e;
+}
+
+static void print_address(FILE *out, uint64_t value)
+{
+	if (print_decimal) {
+		fprintf(out,"%08" PRIu64 " ", value);
+	} else {
+		fprintf(out,"%#08" PRIx64 " ", value);
+	}
+}
+
+/* uses default "hd" style, i.e. 16 bytes followed by ASCII */
+static void hexdump_line(FILE *out, uint64_t address, unsigned char *buf) {
+	int i;
+	static char tbl[16] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
+
+	fprintf(out,"  ");
+	print_address(out, address);
+	fprintf(out," ");
+
+	/* hex */
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+		fprintf(out, "%c%c",
+			tbl[(unsigned char)buf[i]>> 4],
+			tbl[(unsigned char)buf[i] & 0x0f]);
+		fprintf(out," ");
+		if (i == 7)
+			fprintf(out," ");
+	}
+
+	fprintf(out," ");
+
+	/* ascii */
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+		if (isprint(buf[i])) {
+			fprintf(out, "%c", buf[i]);
+		} else {
+			fprintf(out, ".");
+		}
+	}
+	fprintf(out, "\n");
+}
+
+static void hexdump_sector(FILE *out, unsigned char *buf, uint64_t address, int len)
+{
+	int done;
+
+	done = 0;
+	while (len - done >= 16) {
+		hexdump_line(out, address + done, buf + done);
+		done += 16;
+	}
+}
+
+static int check_keyslots(FILE *out, struct crypt_device *cd, int f_luks)
+{
+	int i;
+	double ent;
+	off_t ofs;
+	uint64_t start, length, end;
+	crypt_keyslot_info ki;
+	unsigned char buffer[sector_size];
+
+	for (i = 0; i < crypt_keyslot_max(CRYPT_LUKS1) ; i++) {
+		fprintf(out, "- processing keyslot %d:", i);
+		ki = crypt_keyslot_status(cd, i);
+		if (ki == CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE) {
+			fprintf(out, "  keyslot not in use\n");
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (ki == CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID) {
+			fprintf(out, "\nError: keyslot invalid.\n");
+			return EXIT_FAILURE;
+		}
+
+		if (crypt_keyslot_area(cd, i, &start, &length) < 0) {
+			fprintf(stderr,"\nError: querying keyslot area failed for slot %d\n", i);
+			perror(NULL);
+			return EXIT_FAILURE;
+		}
+		end = start + length;
+
+		fprintf(out, "  start: ");
+		print_address(out, start);
+		fprintf(out, "  end: ");
+		print_address(out, end);
+		fprintf(out, "\n");
+
+		/* check whether sector-size divides size */
+		if (length % sector_size != 0) {
+			fprintf(stderr,"\nError: Argument to -s does not divide keyslot size\n");
+			return EXIT_FAILURE;
+		}
+
+		for (ofs = start; (uint64_t)ofs < end; ofs += sector_size) {
+			if (lseek(f_luks, ofs, SEEK_SET) != ofs) {
+				fprintf(stderr,"\nCannot seek to keyslot area.\n");
+				return EXIT_FAILURE;
+			}
+			if (read(f_luks, buffer, sector_size) != sector_size) {
+				fprintf(stderr,"\nCannot read keyslot area.\n");
+				return EXIT_FAILURE;
+			}
+			ent = ent_samp(buffer, sector_size);
+			if (ent < threshold) {
+				fprintf(out, "  low entropy at: ");
+				print_address(out, ofs);
+				fprintf(out, "   entropy: %f\n", ent);
+				if (verbose) {
+					fprintf(out, "  Binary dump:\n");
+					hexdump_sector(out, buffer, (uint64_t)ofs, sector_size);
+					fprintf(out,"\n");
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	return EXIT_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/* Main */
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	/* for option processing */
+	int c, r;
+	char *device;
+
+	/* for use of libcryptsetup */
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+
+	/* Other vars */
+	int f_luks;   /* device file for the luks device */
+	FILE *out;
+
+	/* temporary helper vars */
+	int res;
+
+	/* getopt values */
+	char *s, *end;
+	double tvalue;
+	int svalue;
+
+	/* global initializations */
+	out = stdout;
+
+	/* get commandline parameters */
+	while ((c = getopt (argc, argv, "t:s:vd")) != -1) {
+		switch (c) {
+		case 't':
+			s = optarg;
+			tvalue = strtod(s, &end);
+			if (s == end) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "\nError: Parsing of argument to -t failed.\n");
+				exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+			}
+
+			if (tvalue < 0.0 || tvalue > 1.0) {
+				fprintf(stderr,"\nError: Argument to -t must be in 0.0 ... 1.0\n");
+				exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+			}
+			threshold = tvalue;
+			break;
+		case 's':
+			s = optarg;
+			svalue = strtol(s, &end, 10);
+			if (s == end) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "\nError: Parsing of argument to -s failed.\n");
+				exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+			}
+
+			if (svalue < 1) {
+				fprintf(stderr,"\nError: Argument to -s must be >= 1 \n");
+				exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+			}
+			sector_size = svalue;
+			break;
+		case 'v':
+			verbose = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'd':
+			print_decimal = 1;
+			break;
+		case '?':
+			if (optopt == 't' || optopt == 's')
+				fprintf (stderr,"\nError: Option -%c requires an argument.\n",
+					 optopt);
+			else if (isprint (optopt)) {
+				fprintf(stderr,"\nError: Unknown option `-%c'.\n", optopt);
+				fprintf(stderr,"\n\n%s", help);
+			} else {
+				fprintf (stderr, "\nError: Unknown option character `\\x%x'.\n",
+					 optopt);
+				fprintf(stderr,"\n\n%s", help);
+			}
+			exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+		default:
+			exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* parse non-option stuff. Should be exactly one, the device. */
+	if (optind+1 != argc) {
+		fprintf(stderr,"\nError: exactly one non-option argument expected!\n");
+		fprintf(stderr,"\n\n%s", help);
+		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+	}
+	device = argv[optind];
+
+	/* test whether we can open and read device */
+	/* This is needed as we are reading the actual data
+	* in the keyslots directly from the LUKS container.
+	*/
+	f_luks = open(device, O_RDONLY);
+	if (f_luks == -1) {
+		fprintf(stderr,"\nError: Opening of device %s failed:\n", device);
+		perror(NULL);
+		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+	}
+
+	/* now get the parameters we need via libcryptsetup */
+	/* Basically we need all active keyslots and their placement on disk */
+
+	/* first init. This does the following:
+	 *   - gets us a crypt_device struct with some values filled in
+	 *     Note: This does some init stuff we do not need, but that
+	 *     should not cause trouble.
+	 */
+
+	res = crypt_init(&cd, device);
+	if (res < 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "crypt_init() failed. Maybe not running as root?\n");
+		close(f_luks);
+		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+	}
+
+	/* now load LUKS header into the crypt_device
+	 * This should also make sure a valid LUKS1 header is on disk
+	 * and hence we should be able to skip magic and version checks.
+	 */
+	res = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL);
+	if (res < 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "crypt_load() failed. LUKS header too broken/absent?\n");
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		close(f_luks);
+		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+	}
+
+	fprintf(out, "\nparameters (commandline and LUKS header):\n");
+	fprintf(out, "  sector size: %d\n", sector_size);
+	fprintf(out, "  threshold:   %0f\n\n", threshold);
+
+	r = check_keyslots(out, cd, f_luks);
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	close(f_luks);
+	return r;
+}
diff --git a/misc/luks-header-from-active b/misc/luks-header-from-active
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..a94ad33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/misc/luks-header-from-active
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+# Try to get LUKS info and master key from active mapping and prepare parameters for cryptsetup.
+#
+# Copyright (C) 2010,2011,2012 Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+#
+# This copyrighted material is made available to anyone wishing to use,
+# modify, copy, or redistribute it subject to the terms and conditions
+# of the GNU General Public License v.2.
+#
+# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation,
+# Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+#
+umask 0077
+
+fail() { echo -e $1 ; exit 1 ; }
+field() { echo $(dmsetup table --target crypt --showkeys $DEVICE | sed 's/.*: //' | cut -d' ' -f$1) ; }
+field_uuid() { echo $(dmsetup info $1 --noheadings -c -o uuid) ; }
+field_device() {
+	TEMP=$(readlink /sys/dev/block/$1 | sed -e 's/.*\///')
+	if [  ${TEMP:0:3} = "dm-" -a -e /sys/block/$TEMP/dm/name ] ; then
+		TEMP=/dev/mapper/$(cat /sys/block/$TEMP/dm/name)
+	else
+		TEMP=/dev/$TEMP
+	fi
+	echo $TEMP
+}
+
+which readlink >/dev/null || fail "You need readlink (part of coreutils package)."
+which xxd >/dev/null || fail "You need xxd (part of vim package) installed to convert key."
+
+[ -z "$2" ] && fail "Recover LUKS header from active mapping, use:\n $0 crypt_mapped_device mk_file_name"
+
+DEVICE=$1
+MK_FILE=$2
+
+[ -z "$(field 4)" ] && fail "Mapping $1 not active or it is not crypt target."
+
+CIPHER=$(field 4)
+OFFSET=$(field 8)
+SYS_DEVICE=$(field 7)
+REAL_DEVICE=$(field_device $SYS_DEVICE)
+KEY=$(field 5)
+KEY_SIZE=$(( ${#KEY} / 2 * 8 ))
+SYS_UUID=$(field_uuid $DEVICE)
+UUID="${SYS_UUID:12:8}-${SYS_UUID:20:4}-${SYS_UUID:24:4}-${SYS_UUID:28:4}-${SYS_UUID:32:12}"
+
+#echo "CIPHER=$CIPHER OFFSET=$OFFSET SYS_DEVICE=$SYS_DEVICE REAL_DEVICE=$REAL_DEVICE KEY_SIZE=$KEY_SIZE KEY=$KEY UUID=$UUID SYS_UUID=$SYS_UUID"
+
+[ -z "$CIPHER" -o -z "$OFFSET" -o "$OFFSET" -le 383 -o \
+-z "$KEY" -o -z "$UUID" -o -z "$REAL_DEVICE" -o "${SYS_UUID:0:12}" != "CRYPT-LUKS1-" ] && \
+fail "Incompatible device, sorry."
+
+echo "Generating master key to file $MK_FILE."
+echo -E -n $KEY| xxd -r -p >$MK_FILE
+
+echo "You can now try to reformat LUKS device using:"
+echo "  cryptsetup luksFormat -c $CIPHER -s $KEY_SIZE --align-payload=$OFFSET --master-key-file=$MK_FILE --uuid=$UUID $REAL_DEVICE"
diff --git a/misc/luks2_keyslot_example/Makefile b/misc/luks2_keyslot_example/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..777eafa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/misc/luks2_keyslot_example/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+TARGET=keyslot_test
+CFLAGS=-O0 -g -Wall -D_GNU_SOURCE -I ../../lib/
+LDLIBS=-ljson-c -luuid -lgcrypt -ldevmapper -lpthread -lssh
+CC=gcc
+
+TARGET2=keyslot_test_remote_pass
+
+SOURCES=keyslot_test.c
+OBJECTS=$(SOURCES:.c=.o)
+SOURCES2=keyslot_test_remote_pass.c
+OBJECTS2=$(SOURCES2:.c=.o)
+
+all: $(TARGET) $(TARGET2) $(TARGET4)
+
+$(TARGET): $(OBJECTS) ../../.libs/libcryptsetup.a
+	$(CC) -o $@ $^ $(LDLIBS)
+
+$(TARGET2): $(OBJECTS2) ../../.libs/libcryptsetup.a
+	$(CC) -o $@ $^ $(LDLIBS)
+
+clean:
+	rm -f *.o *~ core $(TARGET) $(TARGET2)
+
+.PHONY: clean
diff --git a/misc/luks2_keyslot_example/README b/misc/luks2_keyslot_example/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ac4ab6b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/misc/luks2_keyslot_example/README
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+to create LUKSv2 container run:
+
+$(top_level_dir)/src/cryptsetup --type luks2 luksFormat /dev/xxx
diff --git a/misc/luks2_keyslot_example/keyslot_test.c b/misc/luks2_keyslot_example/keyslot_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f651cef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/misc/luks2_keyslot_example/keyslot_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,409 @@
+/*
+ * Example of LUKS2 kesylot handler (EXAMPLE)
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+ *
+ * Use:
+ *  - generate LUKS device
+ *  - store passphrase used in previous step remotely (single line w/o \r\n)
+ *  - add new token using this example
+ *  - activate device by token
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <json-c/json.h>
+#include <libssh/libssh.h>
+#include <libssh/sftp.h>
+#include "libcryptsetup.h"
+
+#define TOKEN_NUM 0
+
+#define PASSWORD_LENGTH 8192
+
+typedef int (*password_cb_func) (char **password);
+
+static json_object *get_token_jobj(struct crypt_device *cd, int token)
+{
+	const char *json_slot;
+
+	/* libcryptsetup API call */
+	if (crypt_token_json_get(cd, token, &json_slot))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return json_tokener_parse(json_slot);
+}
+
+static int download_remote_password(struct crypt_device *cd, ssh_session ssh,
+				    const char *path, char **password,
+				    size_t *password_len)
+{
+	char *pass;
+	size_t pass_len;
+	int r;
+	sftp_attributes sftp_attr = NULL;
+	sftp_session sftp = NULL;
+	sftp_file file = NULL;
+
+
+	sftp = sftp_new(ssh);
+	if (!sftp) {
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, "Cannot create sftp session: ");
+		r = SSH_FX_FAILURE;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = sftp_init(sftp);
+	if (r != SSH_OK) {
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, "Cannot init sftp session: ");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	file = sftp_open(sftp, path, O_RDONLY, 0);
+	if (!file) {
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, "Cannot create sftp session: ");
+		r = SSH_FX_FAILURE;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	sftp_attr = sftp_fstat(file);
+	if (!sftp_attr) {
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, "Cannot stat sftp file: ");
+		r = SSH_FX_FAILURE;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	pass_len = sftp_attr->size > PASSWORD_LENGTH ? PASSWORD_LENGTH : sftp_attr->size;
+	pass = malloc(pass_len);
+	if (!pass) {
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, "Not enough memory.\n");
+		r = SSH_FX_FAILURE;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = sftp_read(file, pass, pass_len);
+	if (r < 0 || (size_t)r != pass_len) {
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, "Cannot read remote key: ");
+		r = SSH_FX_FAILURE;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	*password = pass;
+	*password_len = pass_len;
+
+	r = SSH_OK;
+out:
+	if (r != SSH_OK) {
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, ssh_get_error(ssh));
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, "\n");
+		free(pass);
+	}
+
+	if (sftp_attr)
+		sftp_attributes_free(sftp_attr);
+
+	if (file)
+		sftp_close(file);
+	if (sftp)
+		sftp_free(sftp);
+	return r == SSH_OK ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static ssh_session ssh_session_init(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				    const char *host,
+				    const char *user)
+{
+	int r, port = 22;
+	ssh_session ssh = ssh_new();
+	if (!ssh)
+		return NULL;
+
+	ssh_options_set(ssh, SSH_OPTIONS_HOST, host);
+	ssh_options_set(ssh, SSH_OPTIONS_USER, user);
+	ssh_options_set(ssh, SSH_OPTIONS_PORT, &port);
+
+	crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_NORMAL, "Initiating ssh session.\n");
+
+	r = ssh_connect(ssh);
+	if (r != SSH_OK) {
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, "Connection failed: ");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = ssh_is_server_known(ssh);
+	if (r != SSH_SERVER_KNOWN_OK) {
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, "Server not known: ");
+		r = SSH_AUTH_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = SSH_OK;
+
+	/* initialise list of authentication methods. yes, according to official libssh docs... */
+	ssh_userauth_none(ssh, NULL);
+out:
+	if (r != SSH_OK) {
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, ssh_get_error(ssh));
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, "\n");
+		ssh_disconnect(ssh);
+		ssh_free(ssh);
+		ssh = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return ssh;
+}
+
+static void ssh_session_close(ssh_session ssh)
+{
+	if (ssh) {
+		ssh_disconnect(ssh);
+		ssh_free(ssh);
+	}
+}
+
+static int _public_key_auth(struct crypt_device *cd, ssh_session ssh)
+{
+	int r;
+	ssh_key pkey = NULL;
+
+	crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG, "Trying public key authentication method.\n");
+
+	if (!(ssh_userauth_list(ssh, NULL) & SSH_AUTH_METHOD_PUBLICKEY)) {
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, "Public key auth method not allowed on host.\n");
+		return SSH_AUTH_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	r = ssh_pki_import_privkey_file("/home/user/.ssh/id_rsa", NULL, NULL, NULL, &pkey);
+	if (r != SSH_OK) {
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, "Failed to import private key\n");
+
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	r = ssh_userauth_try_publickey(ssh, NULL, pkey);
+	if (r == SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS) {
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG, "Public key method accepted.\n");
+		r = ssh_userauth_publickey(ssh, NULL, pkey);
+	}
+
+	ssh_key_free(pkey);
+
+	if (r != SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS) {
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, "Public key authentication error: ");
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, ssh_get_error(ssh));
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, "\n");
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _password_auth(struct crypt_device *cd, ssh_session ssh, password_cb_func pcb)
+{
+	int r = SSH_AUTH_ERROR;
+	char *ssh_password = NULL;
+
+	if (!(ssh_userauth_list(ssh, NULL) & SSH_AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD)) {
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, "Password auth method not allowed on host.\n");
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	if (pcb(&ssh_password)) {
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, "Failed to process password.\n");
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	r = ssh_userauth_password(ssh, NULL, ssh_password);
+
+	free(ssh_password);
+
+	if (r != SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS) {
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, "Password authentication error: ");
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, ssh_get_error(ssh));
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, "\n");
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int SSHTEST_token_open(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int token,
+	char **password,
+	size_t *password_len,
+	void *usrptr)
+{
+	int r;
+	json_object *jobj_server, *jobj_user, *jobj_path, *jobj_token;
+	ssh_session ssh;
+	password_cb_func pcb = usrptr; /* custom password callback */
+
+	jobj_token = get_token_jobj(cd, token);
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_token, "ssh_server", &jobj_server);
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_token, "ssh_user",   &jobj_user);
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_token, "ssh_path",   &jobj_path);
+
+	ssh = ssh_session_init(cd, json_object_get_string(jobj_server),
+			       json_object_get_string(jobj_user));
+	if (!ssh)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = _public_key_auth(cd, ssh);
+
+	/* try password method fallback. superficial example use case for an usrptr */
+	if (r != SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS && pcb) {
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG, "Trying password method instead.\n");
+		r = _password_auth(cd, ssh, pcb);
+	}
+
+	if (r == SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS)
+		r = download_remote_password(cd, ssh, json_object_get_string(jobj_path),
+					     password, password_len);
+
+	ssh_session_close(ssh);
+
+	return r ? -EINVAL : r;
+}
+
+const crypt_token_handler SSHTEST_token = {
+	.name  = "sshkeytest",
+	.open  = SSHTEST_token_open,
+};
+
+static int token_add(const char *device, const char *server,
+		   const char *user, const char *path)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	json_object *jobj = NULL, *jobj_keyslots;
+	int r;
+
+	r = crypt_token_register(&SSHTEST_token);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return EXIT_FAILURE;
+
+	r = crypt_init(&cd, device);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return EXIT_FAILURE;
+
+	r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return EXIT_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	jobj = json_object_new_object();
+	json_object_object_add(jobj, "type", json_object_new_string(SSHTEST_token.name)); /* mandatory */
+
+	jobj_keyslots = json_object_new_array();
+	json_object_array_add(jobj_keyslots, json_object_new_string("0")); /* assign to first keyslot only */
+	json_object_object_add(jobj, "keyslots", jobj_keyslots); /* mandatory array field (may be empty and assigned later */
+
+	/* custom metadata */
+	json_object_object_add(jobj, "ssh_server", json_object_new_string(server));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj, "ssh_user", json_object_new_string(user));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj, "ssh_path", json_object_new_string(path));
+
+	/* libcryptsetup API call */
+	r = crypt_token_json_set(cd, TOKEN_NUM, json_object_to_json_string_ext(jobj, JSON_C_TO_STRING_PLAIN));
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	json_object_put(jobj);
+
+	return EXIT_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+
+/* naive implementation of password prompt. Yes it will print out the password on input :) */
+static int ssh_password_callback(char **ssh_password)
+{
+	ssize_t i;
+	char *pass = malloc(512);
+
+	if (!pass)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	fprintf(stdout, "Host asks for password:\n");
+
+	i = read(STDIN_FILENO, pass, 512);
+	if (i > 0) {
+		pass[i-1] = '\0';
+		i = 0;
+	} else if (i == 0) { /* EOF */
+		*pass = '\0';
+		i = -1;
+	}
+
+	if (!i)
+		*ssh_password = pass;
+	else
+		free(pass);
+
+	return i;
+}
+
+static int open_by_token(const char *device, const char *name)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	r = crypt_token_register(&SSHTEST_token);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return EXIT_FAILURE;
+
+	r = crypt_init(&cd, device);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return EXIT_FAILURE;
+
+	r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return EXIT_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_activate_by_token(cd, name, TOKEN_NUM, ssh_password_callback, 0);
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return r < 0 ? EXIT_FAILURE : EXIT_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+static void keyslot_help(void)
+{
+	printf("Use parameters:\n add device server user path\n"
+		" open device name\n");
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+	crypt_set_debug_level(CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG);
+
+	/* Adding slot to device */
+	if (argc == 6 && !strcmp("add", argv[1]))
+		return token_add(argv[2], argv[3], argv[4], argv[5]);
+
+	/* Key check without activation */
+	if (argc == 3 && !strcmp("open", argv[1]))
+		return open_by_token(argv[2], NULL);
+
+	/* Key check with activation (requires root) */
+	if (argc == 4 && !strcmp("open", argv[1]))
+		return open_by_token(argv[2], argv[3]);
+
+	keyslot_help();
+	return 1;
+}
diff --git a/misc/luks2_keyslot_example/keyslot_test_remote_pass.c b/misc/luks2_keyslot_example/keyslot_test_remote_pass.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..267bb47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/misc/luks2_keyslot_example/keyslot_test_remote_pass.c
@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+/*
+ * Example of LUKS2 token storing third party metadata (EXAMPLE)
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+ *
+ * Use:
+ *  - generate LUKS device
+ *  - store passphrase used in previous step remotely (single line w/o \n\r)
+ *  - add new token using this example
+ *  - activate device with passphrase recovered remotely using the example
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <json-c/json.h>
+#include <libssh/libssh.h>
+#include <libssh/sftp.h>
+#include "libcryptsetup.h"
+
+#define TOKEN_NUM 0
+#define TOKEN_TYPE "sshkeytest"
+
+#define PASSWORD_LENGTH 8192
+
+static json_object *get_token_jobj(struct crypt_device *cd, int token)
+{
+	const char *json_slot;
+
+	if (crypt_token_json_get(cd, token, &json_slot))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return json_tokener_parse(json_slot);
+}
+
+static int read_remote_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *host,
+			   const char *user, const char *path,
+			   char *password, size_t password_size)
+{
+	ssh_session ssh = NULL;
+	sftp_session sftp = NULL;
+	sftp_file file = NULL;
+	ssh_key pkey = NULL;
+
+	int r, port = 22;
+
+	ssh = ssh_new();
+	if (!ssh)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ssh_options_set(ssh, SSH_OPTIONS_HOST, host);
+	ssh_options_set(ssh, SSH_OPTIONS_USER, user);
+	ssh_options_set(ssh, SSH_OPTIONS_PORT, &port);
+
+	r = ssh_connect(ssh);
+	if (r != SSH_OK) {
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, "Connection failed: ");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = ssh_is_server_known(ssh);
+	if (r != SSH_SERVER_KNOWN_OK) {
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, "Server not known: ");
+		r = SSH_AUTH_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = ssh_pki_import_privkey_file("/home/user/.ssh/id_rsa", NULL, NULL, NULL, &pkey);
+	if (r != SSH_OK) {
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, "error\n");
+		r = SSH_AUTH_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = ssh_userauth_publickey(ssh, user, pkey);
+	/* or r = ssh_userauth_publickey_auto(ssh, user, NULL); */
+	if (r != SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS) {
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, "Public key authentication error: ");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	sftp = sftp_new(ssh);
+	if (!sftp) {
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, "Cannot create sftp session: ");
+		r = SSH_FX_FAILURE;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = sftp_init(sftp);
+	if (r != SSH_OK) {
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, "Cannot init sftp session: ");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	file = sftp_open(sftp, path, O_RDONLY, 0);
+	if (!file) {
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, "Cannot create sftp session: ");
+		r = SSH_FX_FAILURE;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = sftp_read(file, password, password_size);
+	if (r < 1 || (size_t)r >= password_size) {
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, "Cannot read remote password: ");
+		r = SSH_FX_FAILURE;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = SSH_OK;
+out:
+	if (r != SSH_OK) {
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, ssh_get_error(ssh));
+		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, "\n");
+	}
+
+	if (pkey)
+		ssh_key_free(pkey);
+
+	if (file)
+		sftp_close(file);
+	if (sftp)
+		sftp_free(sftp);
+	ssh_disconnect(ssh);
+	ssh_free(ssh);
+	return r == SSH_OK ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int token_add(const char *device, const char *server,
+		   const char *user, const char *path)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	json_object *jobj = NULL, *jobj_keyslots;
+	int r;
+
+	r = crypt_init(&cd, device);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return EXIT_FAILURE;
+
+	r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return EXIT_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	jobj = json_object_new_object();
+
+	/* 'type' is mandatory field */
+	json_object_object_add(jobj, "type", json_object_new_string(TOKEN_TYPE));
+
+	/* 'keyslots' is mandatory field (may be empty) */
+	jobj_keyslots = json_object_new_array();
+	json_object_array_add(jobj_keyslots, json_object_new_string("0"));
+	json_object_array_add(jobj_keyslots, json_object_new_string("1"));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj, "keyslots", jobj_keyslots);
+
+	/* third party values */
+	json_object_object_add(jobj, "ssh_server", json_object_new_string(server));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj, "ssh_user", json_object_new_string(user));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj, "ssh_path", json_object_new_string(path));
+
+	r = crypt_token_json_set(cd, TOKEN_NUM, json_object_to_json_string_ext(jobj, JSON_C_TO_STRING_PLAIN));
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	json_object_put(jobj);
+
+	return EXIT_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+static int download_remote_password(struct crypt_device *cd, char *password, size_t password_len)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_server, *jobj_user, *jobj_path, *jobj_keyslot;
+
+	/* get token json object representation as string */
+	jobj_keyslot = get_token_jobj(cd, TOKEN_NUM);
+	if (!jobj_keyslot)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+
+	/* extract third party metadata necessary to extract passphrase remotely */
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "ssh_server", &jobj_server);
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "ssh_user",   &jobj_user);
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "ssh_path",   &jobj_path);
+
+	return read_remote_passphrase(cd, json_object_get_string(jobj_server),
+				    json_object_get_string(jobj_user),
+				    json_object_get_string(jobj_path),
+				    password, password_len);
+}
+
+static int open_by_remote_password(const char *device, const char *name)
+{
+	char password[PASSWORD_LENGTH+1];
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	r = crypt_init(&cd, device);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return EXIT_FAILURE;
+
+	r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return EXIT_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	/* custom routines to acquire password */
+	r = download_remote_password(cd, password, sizeof(password));
+	if (r < 0) {
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return EXIT_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	password[PASSWORD_LENGTH] = '\0';
+
+	/* open first genuine LUKS2 keyslot available provided the password matches */
+	/* for the sake of simplicity password is a string */
+	r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, password, strlen(password), 0);
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return r < 0 ? EXIT_FAILURE : EXIT_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+static void keyslot_help(void)
+{
+	printf("Use parameters:\n add device server user path\n"
+		" open device name\n");
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+	crypt_set_debug_level(CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG);
+
+	/* Adding slot to device */
+	if (argc == 6 && !strcmp("add", argv[1]))
+		return token_add(argv[2], argv[3], argv[4], argv[5]);
+
+	/* Password check without activation */
+	if (argc == 3 && !strcmp("open", argv[1]))
+		return open_by_remote_password(argv[2], NULL);
+
+	/* Password check with activation (requires root) */
+	if (argc == 4 && !strcmp("open", argv[1]))
+		return open_by_remote_password(argv[2], argv[3]);
+
+	keyslot_help();
+	return 1;
+}
diff --git a/po/LINGUAS b/po/LINGUAS
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4f1c55a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/po/LINGUAS
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+cs
+da
+de
+es
+fi
+fr
+id
+it
+nl
+pl
+pt_BR
+ru
+sr
+sv
+uk
+vi
+zh_CN
diff --git a/po/Makevars b/po/Makevars
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8940c0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/po/Makevars
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+# Makefile variables for PO directory in any package using GNU gettext.
+
+# Usually the message domain is the same as the package name.
+DOMAIN = $(PACKAGE)
+
+# These two variables depend on the location of this directory.
+subdir = po
+top_builddir = ..
+
+# These options get passed to xgettext.
+XGETTEXT_OPTIONS = --keyword=_ --keyword=N_
+
+# This option gets passed to msgmerge.
+MSGMERGE_OPTIONS = --no-wrap
+
+# This is the copyright holder that gets inserted into the header of the
+# $(DOMAIN).pot file.  Set this to the copyright holder of the surrounding
+# package.  (Note that the msgstr strings, extracted from the package's
+# sources, belong to the copyright holder of the package.)  Translators are
+# expected to transfer the copyright for their translations to this person
+# or entity, or to disclaim their copyright.  The empty string stands for
+# the public domain; in this case the translators are expected to disclaim
+# their copyright.
+COPYRIGHT_HOLDER =
+
+# This is the email address or URL to which the translators shall report
+# bugs in the untranslated strings:
+# - Strings which are not entire sentences, see the maintainer guidelines
+#   in the GNU gettext documentation, section 'Preparing Strings'.
+# - Strings which use unclear terms or require additional context to be
+#   understood.
+# - Strings which make invalid assumptions about notation of date, time or
+#   money.
+# - Pluralisation problems.
+# - Incorrect English spelling.
+# - Incorrect formatting.
+# It can be your email address, or a mailing list address where translators
+# can write to without being subscribed, or the URL of a web page through
+# which the translators can contact you.
+MSGID_BUGS_ADDRESS = dm-crypt@saout.de
+
+# This is the list of locale categories, beyond LC_MESSAGES, for which the
+# message catalogs shall be used.  It is usually empty.
+EXTRA_LOCALE_CATEGORIES =
diff --git a/po/POTFILES.in b/po/POTFILES.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b579603
--- /dev/null
+++ b/po/POTFILES.in
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+lib/libdevmapper.c
+lib/random.c
+lib/setup.c
+lib/utils.c
+lib/volumekey.c
+lib/crypt_plain.c
+lib/utils_crypt.c
+lib/utils_loop.c
+lib/utils_fips.c
+lib/utils_device.c
+lib/utils_devpath.c
+lib/utils_pbkdf.c
+lib/utils_benchmark.c
+lib/utils_device_locking.c
+lib/utils_wipe.c
+lib/utils_keyring.c
+lib/utils_blkid.c
+lib/utils_io.c
+lib/luks1/af.c
+lib/luks1/keyencryption.c
+lib/luks1/keymanage.c
+lib/loopaes/loopaes.c
+lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c
+lib/verity/verity.c
+lib/verity/verity_hash.c
+lib/verity/verity_fec.c
+lib/integrity/integrity.c
+lib/luks2/luks2_digest.c
+lib/luks2/luks2_digest_pbkdf2.c
+lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c
+lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c
+lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c
+lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c
+lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c
+lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c
+lib/luks2/luks2_token.c
+lib/luks2/luks2_token_keyring.c
+src/cryptsetup.c
+src/veritysetup.c
+src/integritysetup.c
+src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c
+src/utils_tools.c
+src/utils_password.c
+src/utils_luks2.c
diff --git a/po/cs.po b/po/cs.po
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d426168
--- /dev/null
+++ b/po/cs.po
@@ -0,0 +1,3295 @@
+# Czech translation for cryptsetup.
+# Copyright (C) 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+# This file is distributed under the same license as the cryptsetup package.
+# Milan Broz <mbroz@redhat.com>, 2010.
+# Petr Pisar <petr.pisar@atlas.cz>, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016.
+# Petr Pisar <petr.pisar@atlas.cz>, 2017, 2018, 2019.
+#
+# See `LUKS On-Disk Format Specification' document to clarify some terms.
+#
+# digest → otisk
+# key slot → pozice klíče
+# keyring → klíčenka
+# plain/LUKS1 crypt → šifra plain/LUKS1 („plain“ nepřekládat)
+# refresh → reaktivace
+# resume → probudit
+# suspend → uspat
+#
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: cryptsetup 2.1.0\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: dm-crypt@saout.de\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-01-26 19:02+0100\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2019-01-29 20:26+01:00\n"
+"Last-Translator: Petr Pisar <petr.pisar@atlas.cz>\n"
+"Language-Team: Czech <translation-team-cs@lists.sourceforge.net>\n"
+"Language: cs\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+"X-Bugs: Report translation errors to the Language-Team address.\n"
+"Plural-Forms: nplurals=3; plural=(n==1) ? 0 : (n>=2 && n<=4) ? 1 : 2;\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:336
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper, running as non-root user."
+msgstr "Nelze inicializovat device-mapper, nespuštěno superuživatelem."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:339
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper. Is dm_mod kernel module loaded?"
+msgstr "Nelze inicializovat device-mapper. Je jaderný modul dm_mod zaveden?"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1010
+msgid "Requested deferred flag is not supported."
+msgstr "Požadovaný příznak pozdrženo není podporován."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1077
+#, c-format
+msgid "DM-UUID for device %s was truncated."
+msgstr "DM-UUID pro zařízení %s bylo zkráceno."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1486
+msgid "Requested dm-crypt performance options are not supported."
+msgstr "Požadované výkonnostní volby dm-cryptu nejsou podporovány."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1493
+msgid "Requested dm-verity data corruption handling options are not supported."
+msgstr "Požadované volby, jak zacházet s poškozením dat dm-verity, nejsou podporovány."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1497
+msgid "Requested dm-verity FEC options are not supported."
+msgstr "Požadované FEC volby dm-cryptu nejsou podporovány."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1501
+msgid "Requested data integrity options are not supported."
+msgstr "Požadované volby integrity dat nejsou podporovány."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1503
+msgid "Requested sector_size option is not supported."
+msgstr "Požadované volby sector_size není podporována."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1508
+msgid "Requested automatic recalculation of integrity tags is not supported."
+msgstr "Požadovaný automatický přepočet značek integrity není podporován."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1534
+msgid "Requested dmcrypt performance options are not supported."
+msgstr "Požadované výkonnostní volby dmcryptu nejsou podporovány."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1537
+msgid "Discard/TRIM is not supported."
+msgstr "Zahazování (TRIM) není podporováno."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:2413
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to query dm-%s segment."
+msgstr "Dotaz na část dm-%s selhal."
+
+#: lib/random.c:80
+msgid ""
+"System is out of entropy while generating volume key.\n"
+"Please move mouse or type some text in another window to gather some random events.\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Během vytváření klíče svazku došla systému entropie.\n"
+"Aby bylo možné nasbírat náhodné události, žádáme uživatele, aby pohyboval\n"
+"myší nebo psal text do jiného okna.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:84
+#, c-format
+msgid "Generating key (%d%% done).\n"
+msgstr "Vytváří se klíč (%d %% hotovo).\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:170
+msgid "Running in FIPS mode."
+msgstr "Režim FIPS zapnut."
+
+#: lib/random.c:176
+msgid "Fatal error during RNG initialisation."
+msgstr "Fatální chyba během přípravy generátoru náhodných čísel."
+
+#: lib/random.c:213
+msgid "Unknown RNG quality requested."
+msgstr "Požadována neznámá kvalita generátoru náhodných čísel."
+
+#: lib/random.c:218
+msgid "Error reading from RNG."
+msgstr "Chyba při čtení z generátoru náhodných čísel."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:214
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto RNG backend."
+msgstr "Implementaci šifrovacího generátoru náhodných čísel nelze inicializovat."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:220
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto backend."
+msgstr "Implementaci šifrování nelze inicializovat."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:251 lib/setup.c:1899 lib/verity/verity.c:123
+#, c-format
+msgid "Hash algorithm %s not supported."
+msgstr "Hašovací algoritmus %s není podporován."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:254 lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:90
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key processing error (using hash %s)."
+msgstr "Chyba zpracování klíče (za použití haše %s)."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:315 lib/setup.c:342
+msgid "Cannot determine device type. Incompatible activation of device?"
+msgstr "Druh zařízení nelze určit. Nekompatibilní aktivace zařízení?"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:321 lib/setup.c:2892
+msgid "This operation is supported only for LUKS device."
+msgstr "Tato operace je podporována jen u zařízení LUKS."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:348
+msgid "This operation is supported only for LUKS2 device."
+msgstr "Tato operace je podporována jen u zařízení LUKS2."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:396
+msgid "All key slots full."
+msgstr "Všechny pozice klíčů jsou obsazeny."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:407
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select between 0 and %d."
+msgstr "Pozice klíče %d není platná, prosím, vyberte číslo mezi 0 a %d."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:413
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is full, please select another one."
+msgstr "Pozice klíče %d je obsazena, prosím, vyberte jinou."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:589
+#, c-format
+msgid "Header detected but device %s is too small."
+msgstr "Nalezena hlavička, ale zařízení %s je příliš malé."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:626
+msgid "This operation is not supported for this device type."
+msgstr "Tato operace není na zařízení tohoto typu podporována."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:791 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:481
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported LUKS version %d."
+msgstr "Nepodporovaná verze LUKS %d."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:808 lib/setup.c:1403 lib/setup.c:1812
+msgid "Detached metadata device is not supported for this crypt type."
+msgstr "Zařízení s oddělenými metadaty není na šifře tohoto typu podporováno."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1288 lib/setup.c:2392 lib/setup.c:2464 lib/setup.c:2476
+#: lib/setup.c:2625 lib/setup.c:4021
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not active."
+msgstr "Zařízení %s není aktivní."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1310
+#, c-format
+msgid "Underlying device for crypt device %s disappeared."
+msgstr "Zařízení nižší úrovně pod šifrovaným zařízením %s zmizelo."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1388
+msgid "Invalid plain crypt parameters."
+msgstr "Neplatné parametry plain šifry."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1393 lib/setup.c:1802 src/integritysetup.c:72
+msgid "Invalid key size."
+msgstr "Neplatná velikost klíče."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1398 lib/setup.c:1807 lib/setup.c:2009
+msgid "UUID is not supported for this crypt type."
+msgstr "UUID není na šifře tohoto typu podporováno."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1413 lib/setup.c:1603 src/cryptsetup.c:1045
+msgid "Unsupported encryption sector size."
+msgstr "Nepodporovaná velikost šifrovaného sektoru."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1421 lib/setup.c:1720
+msgid "Device size is not aligned to requested sector size."
+msgstr "Velikost zařízení není zarovnaná na požadovanou velikost sektoru."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1472 lib/setup.c:1591
+msgid "Can't format LUKS without device."
+msgstr "LUKS nelze bez zařízení naformátovat."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1478 lib/setup.c:1597
+msgid "Requested data alignment is not compatible with data offset."
+msgstr "Požadované zarovnání dat není slučitelné s polohou dat."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1546 lib/setup.c:1715
+msgid "WARNING: Data offset is outside of currently available data device.\n"
+msgstr "POZOR: Poloha dat je mimo nyní dostupné zařízení s daty.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1556 lib/setup.c:1735 lib/setup.c:1754 lib/setup.c:2021
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe header on device %s."
+msgstr "Ze zařízení %s nelze odstranit hlavičku."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1608
+msgid "WARNING: The device activation will fail, dm-crypt is missing support for requested encryption sector size.\n"
+msgstr "POZOR: Aktivace zařízení selže, dm-crypt nepodporuje požadovanou velikost šifrovaného sektoru.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1630
+msgid "Volume key is too small for encryption with integrity extensions."
+msgstr "Klíč svazku je příliš malý na šifrovaní s rozšířeními pro integritu."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1685
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cipher %s-%s (key size %zd bits) is not available."
+msgstr "Šifra %s-%s (velikost klíče %zd bitů) není dostupná."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1747
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s which is still in use."
+msgstr "Zařízení %s, které se stále používá, nelze formátovat."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1750 lib/setup.c:1775
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "Zařízení %s nelze formátovat, povolení zamítnuto."
+
+# FIXME "format integrity" is nonsense
+#: lib/setup.c:1762 lib/setup.c:2073
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format integrity for device %s."
+msgstr "Zařízení %s není možné formátovat integritu."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1772
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s in use."
+msgstr "Zařízení %s, které se používá, nelze formátovat."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1779
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s."
+msgstr "Zařízení %s nelze formátovat."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1797
+msgid "Can't format LOOPAES without device."
+msgstr "LOOPAES nelze bez zařízení naformátovat."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1842
+msgid "Can't format VERITY without device."
+msgstr "VERITY nelze bez zařízení naformátovat."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1853 lib/verity/verity.c:106
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash type %d."
+msgstr "Nepodporovaný druh VERITY haše %d."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1859 lib/verity/verity.c:114
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY block size."
+msgstr "Nepodporovaná velikost bloku VERITY."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1864 lib/verity/verity.c:75
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash offset."
+msgstr "Nepodporovaná poloha haše VERITY."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1869
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY FEC offset."
+msgstr "Nepodporovaná poloha VERITY FEC."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1893
+msgid "Data area overlaps with hash area."
+msgstr "Oblast dat se překrývá s oblastí haše."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1918
+msgid "Hash area overlaps with FEC area."
+msgstr "Oblast FEC se překrývá s oblastí haše."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1925
+msgid "Data area overlaps with FEC area."
+msgstr "Oblast dat se překrývá s oblastí FEC."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2130
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unknown crypt device type %s requested."
+msgstr "Požadován neznámý typ šifrovaného zařízení %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2398 lib/setup.c:2470 lib/setup.c:2483
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported parameters on device %s."
+msgstr "Nepodporované parametry na zařízení %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2404 lib/setup.c:2489
+#, c-format
+msgid "Mismatching parameters on device %s."
+msgstr "Neodpovídající parametry an za zařízení %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2657
+msgid "Cannot resize loop device."
+msgstr "Nelze změnit velikost zařízení zpětné smyčky."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2666
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s size is not aligned to requested sector size (%u bytes)."
+msgstr "Velikost zařízení %s není zarovnaná na požadovanou velikost sektoru (%u bajtů)."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2725
+msgid "Do you really want to change UUID of device?"
+msgstr "Opravdu chcete změnit UUID zařízení?"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2801
+msgid "Header backup file does not contain compatible LUKS header."
+msgstr "Soubor se zálohou hlavičky neobsahuje kompatibilní hlavičku LUKS."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2900
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not active."
+msgstr "Svazek %s není aktivní."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2911
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is already suspended."
+msgstr "Svazek %s je již uspán."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2925
+#, c-format
+msgid "Suspend is not supported for device %s."
+msgstr "Uspání není na zařízení %s podporováno."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2927
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during suspending device %s."
+msgstr "Chyba při uspávání zařízení %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2960 lib/setup.c:3027
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not suspended."
+msgstr "Svazek %s není uspán."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2989
+#, c-format
+msgid "Resume is not supported for device %s."
+msgstr "Probuzení není na zařízení %s podporováno."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2991 lib/setup.c:3059
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during resuming device %s."
+msgstr "Chyba při probouzení zařízení %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3127 lib/setup.c:3315
+msgid "Cannot add key slot, all slots disabled and no volume key provided."
+msgstr "Nelze přidat pozici klíče, všechny pozice jsou zakázány a klíč svazku nebyl poskytnut."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3267
+msgid "Failed to swap new key slot."
+msgstr "Záměna novou pozicí klíče se nezdařila."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3432 lib/setup.c:3865 lib/setup.c:3878 lib/setup.c:3886
+#: lib/setup.c:3899 lib/setup.c:4198 lib/setup.c:5274
+msgid "Volume key does not match the volume."
+msgstr "Heslo svazku neodpovídá svazku."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3453
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid."
+msgstr "Pozice klíče %d je neplatná."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3459
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is not used."
+msgstr "Pozice klíče %d není použita."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3478
+msgid "Device header overlaps with data area."
+msgstr "Hlavička zařízení se překrývá s datovou oblastí."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3684 lib/setup.c:3952
+msgid "Device type is not properly initialised."
+msgstr "Typ zařízení není řádně inicializován."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3726
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s, name is invalid or still in use."
+msgstr "Zařízení %s nelze použít. Název není platný nebo zařízení se stále používá."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3729
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s already exists."
+msgstr "Zařízení %s již existuje."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3852
+msgid "Incorrect volume key specified for plain device."
+msgstr "Byl zadán neplatný klíč svazku."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3918
+msgid "Incorrect root hash specified for verity device."
+msgstr "K zařízení VERITY byl zadán neplatný kořenový haš."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3995 lib/setup.c:4010
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is still in use."
+msgstr "Zařízení %s se stále používá."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4025
+#, c-format
+msgid "Invalid device %s."
+msgstr "Neplatné zařízení %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4134
+msgid "Function not available in FIPS mode."
+msgstr "V režimu FIPS není funkce dostupná."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4148
+msgid "Volume key buffer too small."
+msgstr "Vyhrazená paměť pro klíč svazku je příliš malá."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4156
+msgid "Cannot retrieve volume key for plain device."
+msgstr "Nelze získat klíč svazku pro otevřené zařízení."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4167
+#, c-format
+msgid "This operation is not supported for %s crypt device."
+msgstr "Na šifrovaném zařízení %s není tato operace podporována."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4354
+msgid "Dump operation is not supported for this device type."
+msgstr "Operace výpisu není na zařízení tohoto typu podporována."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4930
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert device %s which is still in use."
+msgstr "Zařízení %s, které se stále používá, nelze konvertovat."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5213
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign keyslot %u as the new volume key."
+msgstr "Přiřazení pozice klíče %u jakožto nového klíče svazku se nezdařilo."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5280
+msgid "Failed to initialise default LUKS2 keyslot parameters."
+msgstr "Inicializace parametrů výchozí pozice klíče LUKS2 selhala."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5286
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign keyslot %d to digest."
+msgstr "Přiřazení pozice klíče %d k otisku se nezdařilo."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5370
+msgid "Failed to load key in kernel keyring."
+msgstr "Klíč se nepodařilo přidat do jaderné klíčenky."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5425
+msgid "Kernel keyring is not supported by the kernel."
+msgstr "Jaderná klíčenka není jádrem podporována."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5435
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read passphrase from keyring (error %d)."
+msgstr "Čtení hesla z klíčenky selhalo (chyba %d)."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:81
+msgid "Cannot get process priority."
+msgstr "Nelze zjistit prioritu procesu."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:95
+msgid "Cannot unlock memory."
+msgstr "Paměť nelze odemknout."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:169 lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:498
+msgid "Failed to open key file."
+msgstr "Soubor s klíčem se nepodařilo otevřít."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:174
+msgid "Cannot read keyfile from a terminal."
+msgstr "Soubor s klíčem nelze z terminálu přečíst."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:191
+msgid "Failed to stat key file."
+msgstr "O souboru s klíčem nebylo možné zjistit údaje."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:199 lib/utils.c:220
+msgid "Cannot seek to requested keyfile offset."
+msgstr "Nelze se přesunout na požadované místo v souboru s klíčem."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:214 lib/utils.c:229 src/utils_password.c:188
+#: src/utils_password.c:201
+msgid "Out of memory while reading passphrase."
+msgstr "Při čtení hesla došla paměť."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:249
+msgid "Error reading passphrase."
+msgstr "Chyba při čtení hesla."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:266
+msgid "Nothing to read on input."
+msgstr "Na vstupu není nic k přečtení."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:273
+msgid "Maximum keyfile size exceeded."
+msgstr "Maximální délka souboru s klíčem překročena."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:278
+msgid "Cannot read requested amount of data."
+msgstr "Požadované množství dat nelze načíst."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:184 lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:92
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s doesn't exist or access denied."
+msgstr "Zařízení %s neexistuje nebo přístup byl zamítnut."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:194
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not compatible."
+msgstr "Zařízení %s není kompatibilní."
+
+# TODO: Pluralize
+#: lib/utils_device.c:560
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small. Need at least %<PRIu64> bytes."
+msgstr "Zařízení %s je příliš malé. Je třeba alespoň %<PRIu64> bajtů."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:641
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s which is in use (already mapped or mounted)."
+msgstr "Zařízení %s nelze použít, protože se již používá (již namapováno nebo připojeno)."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:645
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "Zařízení %s nelze použít, povolení zamítnuto."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:648
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot get info about device %s."
+msgstr "O zařízení %s nelze získat údaje."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:671
+msgid "Cannot use a loopback device, running as non-root user."
+msgstr "Zařízení typu loopback nelze použít, nespuštěno superuživatelem."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:681
+msgid "Attaching loopback device failed (loop device with autoclear flag is required)."
+msgstr "Připojení zařízení zpětné smyčky selhalo (požadováno zařízení s příznakem autoclear)."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:727
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested offset is beyond real size of device %s."
+msgstr "Požadovaná poloha je za hranicí skutečné velikosti zařízení %s."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:735
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s has zero size."
+msgstr "Zařízení %s má nulovou velikost."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:746 lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:252
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small."
+msgstr "Zařízení %s je příliš malé."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:100
+msgid "Requested PBKDF target time cannot be zero."
+msgstr "Požadovaný cílový čas PBKDF nemůže být nula."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:106
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unknown PBKDF type %s."
+msgstr "Neznámý druh PBKDF %s."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:111
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested hash %s is not supported."
+msgstr "Požadovaný haš %s není podporován."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:122
+msgid "Requested PBKDF type is not supported for LUKS1."
+msgstr "Požadovaný druh PBKDF není podporován formátem LUKS1."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:128
+msgid "PBKDF max memory or parallel threads must not be set with pbkdf2."
+msgstr "Při PBKDF2 nesmí být nastavena maximální paměť pro PBKDF nebo počet souběžných vláken."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:133 lib/utils_pbkdf.c:143
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forced iteration count is too low for %s (minimum is %u)."
+msgstr "Vynucený počet opakování je pro %s příliš nízký (minimum je %u)."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:148
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forced memory cost is too low for %s (minimum is %u kilobytes)."
+msgstr "Vynucená cena paměti je pro %s příliš nízká (minimum je %u kilobajtů)."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:155
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested maximum PBKDF memory cost is too high (maximum is %d kilobytes)."
+msgstr "Požadovaná maximální cena PBKDF paměti je příliš vysoká (maximum je %d kilobajtů)."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:160
+msgid "Requested maximum PBKDF memory cannot be zero."
+msgstr "Požadované maximum paměti PBKDF nemůže být nula."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:164
+msgid "Requested PBKDF parallel threads cannot be zero."
+msgstr "Požadovaný počet souběžných vláken PBKDF nemůže být nula."
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:317
+msgid "PBKDF benchmark disabled but iterations not set."
+msgstr "Porovnání výkonu PBKDF je zakázáno, ale počet iterací není nastaven."
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:336
+#, c-format
+msgid "Not compatible PBKDF2 options (using hash algorithm %s)."
+msgstr "Neslučitelné volby PBKDF2 (při použití hašovacího algoritmu %s)."
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:356
+msgid "Not compatible PBKDF options."
+msgstr "Neslučitelné volby PBKDF."
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:80
+#, c-format
+msgid "Locking aborted. The locking path %s/%s is unusable (not a directory or missing)."
+msgstr "Zamykání zrušeno. Zamykací cesta %s/%s je nepoužitelná (není adresářem nebo neexistuje)."
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:87
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Locking directory %s/%s is missing!\n"
+msgstr "POZOR: Adresář se zámkem %s/%s chybí!\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:97
+#, c-format
+msgid "Locking aborted. The locking path %s/%s is unusable (%s is not a directory)."
+msgstr "Zamykání zrušeno. Zamykací cesta %s/%s je nepoužitelná (%s není adresářem)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:40
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Failed to setup dm-crypt key mapping for device %s.\n"
+"Check that kernel supports %s cipher (check syslog for more info)."
+msgstr ""
+"Nepodařilo se nastavit mapování klíče v dm-cryptu pro zařízení %s.\n"
+"Zkontrolujte, že jádro podporuje šifru %s (podrobnosti v syslogu)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:45
+msgid "Key size in XTS mode must be 256 or 512 bits."
+msgstr "V režimu XTS musí být velikost klíče 256 nebo 512 bitů."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:47
+msgid "Cipher specification should be in [cipher]-[mode]-[iv] format."
+msgstr "Zápis šifry by měl být ve tvaru [šifra]-[režim]-[iv]."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:98 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:345
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:642 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1079
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1157 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:448
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write to device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "Na zařízení %s nelze zapsat, povolení zamítnuto."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:120
+msgid "Failed to open temporary keystore device."
+msgstr "Otevření dočasného zařízení s úložištěm klíče selhalo."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:127
+msgid "Failed to access temporary keystore device."
+msgstr "Přístup do dočasného zařízení s úložištěm klíče selhal."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:200 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:91
+msgid "IO error while encrypting keyslot."
+msgstr "Chyba vstupu/výstupu při šifrování pozice klíče."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:243 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:348
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:594 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:645 lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:663
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:81 lib/verity/verity.c:182 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:308
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:319 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:339
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:242 lib/verity/verity_fec.c:254
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:259 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1160
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:208
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open device %s."
+msgstr "Zařízení %s nelze otevřít."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:254 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:152
+msgid "IO error while decrypting keyslot."
+msgstr "Chyba vstupu/výstupu při dešifrování pozice klíče."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:111
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small. (LUKS1 requires at least %<PRIu64> bytes.)"
+msgstr "Zařízení %s je příliš malé. (LUKS1 vyžaduje alespoň %<PRIu64> bajtů.)"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:132 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:140
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:152 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:163
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:175
+#, c-format
+msgid "LUKS keyslot %u is invalid."
+msgstr "Pozice %u klíče LUKS není platná."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:228 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:478
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:991 src/cryptsetup.c:1236
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1355 src/cryptsetup.c:1412 src/cryptsetup.c:1468
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1535 src/cryptsetup.c:1631 src/cryptsetup.c:1695
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1855 src/cryptsetup.c:2044 src/cryptsetup.c:2104
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2170 src/cryptsetup.c:2334 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1397
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."
+msgstr "Zařízení %s není platným zařízením LUKS."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:247 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1010
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested header backup file %s already exists."
+msgstr "Požadovaný soubor se zálohou hlavičky %s již existuje."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:249 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1012
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Soubor se zálohou hlavičky %s nelze vytvořit."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:254 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1017
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Nelze zapsat soubor %s se zálohou hlavičky."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:287 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1066
+msgid "Backup file doesn't contain valid LUKS header."
+msgstr "Záložní soubor neobsahuje platnou hlavičku LUKS."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:300 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:555
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1087
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Nelze otevřít soubor se zálohou hlavičky %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:306 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1093
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Soubor se zálohou hlavičky %s nelze načíst."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:318
+msgid "Data offset or key size differs on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "Počátek dat nebo velikost klíče se liší mezi zařízením a zálohou, obnova se nezdařila."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:326
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s %s%s"
+msgstr "Zařízení %s %s%s"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:327
+msgid "does not contain LUKS header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device."
+msgstr "neobsahuje hlavičku LUKS. Nahrazení hlavičky může zničit data na daném zařízení."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:328
+msgid "already contains LUKS header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."
+msgstr "již obsahuje hlavičku LUKS. Nahrazení hlavičky zničí existující pozice s klíči."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:329 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1129
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: real device header has different UUID than backup!"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"POZOR: hlavička ve skutečném zařízení má jiné UUID než záloha!"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:381
+msgid "Non standard key size, manual repair required."
+msgstr "Nestandardní velikost klíče, je třeba ruční opravy."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:386
+msgid "Non standard keyslots alignment, manual repair required."
+msgstr "Nestandardní zarovnání pozice klíče, je třeba ruční opravy."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:396
+msgid "Repairing keyslots."
+msgstr "Opravují se pozice klíčů."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:415
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: offset repaired (%u -> %u)."
+msgstr "Pozice klíče %i: poloha opravena (%u → %u)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:423
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: stripes repaired (%u -> %u)."
+msgstr "Pozice klíče %i: proklad opraven (%u → %u)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:432
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: bogus partition signature."
+msgstr "Pozice klíče %i: chybná značka oddílu."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:437
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: salt wiped."
+msgstr "Pozice klíče %i: sůl vymazána."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:454
+msgid "Writing LUKS header to disk."
+msgstr "Hlavička LUKS se zapisuje na disk."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:459
+msgid "Repair failed."
+msgstr "Oprava selhala."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:487 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:758
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested LUKS hash %s is not supported."
+msgstr "Požadovaný haš LUKSu %s není podporován."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:515 src/cryptsetup.c:960
+msgid "No known problems detected for LUKS header."
+msgstr "V hlavičce LUKS nenalezen žádný známý problém."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:667
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during update of LUKS header on device %s."
+msgstr "Chyba při aktualizaci hlavičky LUKS na zařízení %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:676
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error re-reading LUKS header after update on device %s."
+msgstr "Chyba při opakovaném čtení hlavičky LUKS po aktualizaci zařízení %s."
+
+# TODO: Pluralize
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:752
+msgid "Data offset for LUKS header must be either 0 or higher than header size."
+msgstr "Poloha dat u hlavičky LUKS musí být buď 0 nebo více než velikost hlavičky."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:763 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:828
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:207 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:909
+msgid "Wrong LUKS UUID format provided."
+msgstr "Poskytnut UUID LUKSu ve špatném tvaru."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:786
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: reading random salt failed."
+msgstr "Hlavičku LUKS nelze vytvořit: čtení náhodné soli selhalo."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:807
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: header digest failed (using hash %s)."
+msgstr "Hlavičku LUKS nelze vytvořit: výpočet otisku hlavičky (haš %s) selhal."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:851
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d active, purge first."
+msgstr "Pozice klíče %d je aktivní, nejprve ji uvolněte."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:857
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d material includes too few stripes. Header manipulation?"
+msgstr "Pozice klíče %d obsahuje příliš málo útržků. Manipulace s hlavičkou?"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1065
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select keyslot between 0 and %d."
+msgstr "Pozice klíče %d není platná, prosím, vyberte pozici mezi 0 a %d."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1083 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:452
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe device %s."
+msgstr "Zařízení %s není možné smazat."
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:146
+msgid "Detected not yet supported GPG encrypted keyfile."
+msgstr "Zjištěn dosud nepodporovaný soubor s klíčem šifrovaný pomocí GPG."
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:147
+msgid "Please use gpg --decrypt <KEYFILE> | cryptsetup --keyfile=- ...\n"
+msgstr "Prosím, použijte gpg --decrypt SOUBOR_S_KLÍČEM | cryptsetup --keyfile=- …\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:168 lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:188
+msgid "Incompatible loop-AES keyfile detected."
+msgstr "Zjištěn nekompatibilní soubor s klíčem loop-AES."
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:245
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support loop-AES compatible mapping."
+msgstr "Jádro nepodporuje mapování kompatibilní s loop-AES."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:505
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error reading keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Chyba při čtení souboru s klíčem %s"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:545
+#, c-format
+msgid "Maximum TCRYPT passphrase length (%d) exceeded."
+msgstr "Překročena maximální délka hesla TCRYPT (%d)."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:586
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2 hash algorithm %s not available, skipping."
+msgstr "Hašovací algoritmus PBKDF2 %s není podporován, přeskakuje se."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:604 src/cryptsetup.c:915
+msgid "Required kernel crypto interface not available."
+msgstr "Požadované kryptografické rozhraní jádra není dostupné."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:606 src/cryptsetup.c:917
+msgid "Ensure you have algif_skcipher kernel module loaded."
+msgstr "Ujistěte se, že jaderný modul algif_skcipher je zaveden."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:746
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activation is not supported for %d sector size."
+msgstr "Aktivace nad sektory o velikosti %d není podporována."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:752
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support activation for this TCRYPT legacy mode."
+msgstr "Jádro nepodporuje aktivaci v tomto zastaralém režimu TCRYPT."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:786
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activating TCRYPT system encryption for partition %s."
+msgstr "Aktivuje se systémové šifrování TCRYPT pro oddíl %s."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:864
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support TCRYPT compatible mapping."
+msgstr "Jádro nepodporuje mapování kompatibilní s TCRYPT."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:1085
+msgid "This function is not supported without TCRYPT header load."
+msgstr "Bez dat s hlavičkou TCRYPT není tato funkce podporována."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:69 lib/verity/verity.c:175
+#, c-format
+msgid "Verity device %s doesn't use on-disk header."
+msgstr "Zařízení VERITY %s nepoužívá hlavičku uvnitř disku."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:94
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not a valid VERITY device."
+msgstr "Zařízení %s není platným zařízením VERITY."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:101
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY version %d."
+msgstr "Nepodporovaná verze VERITY %d."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:132
+msgid "VERITY header corrupted."
+msgstr "Hlavička VERITY je poškozena."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:169
+#, c-format
+msgid "Wrong VERITY UUID format provided on device %s."
+msgstr "Na zařízení %s poskytnuto UUID VERITY ve špatném tvaru."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:202
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during update of verity header on device %s."
+msgstr "Chyba při aktualizaci hlavičky VERITY na zařízení %s."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:266
+msgid "Errors cannot be repaired with FEC device."
+msgstr "Chyby v zařízení FEC nelze opravit."
+
+# TODO: Pluralize
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:268
+#, c-format
+msgid "Found %u repairable errors with FEC device."
+msgstr "Nalezeno %u opravitelných chyb v zařízení FEC."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:306
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support dm-verity mapping."
+msgstr "Jádro nepodporuje mapování dm-verity."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:317
+msgid "Verity device detected corruption after activation."
+msgstr "Po aktivaci zjistilo zařízení VERITY poškození."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:59
+#, c-format
+msgid "Spare area is not zeroed at position %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Řídká oblast na pozici %<PRIu64> není vynulována."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:160 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:287
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:300
+msgid "Device offset overflow."
+msgstr "Pozice na zařízení přetekla."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:200
+#, c-format
+msgid "Verification failed at position %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Ověření na pozici %<PRIu64> selhalo."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:273
+msgid "Invalid size parameters for verity device."
+msgstr "Neplatné parametry velikosti pro zařízení VERITY."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:293
+msgid "Hash area overflow."
+msgstr "Přetečení oblasti haše."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:370
+msgid "Verification of data area failed."
+msgstr "Ověření datové oblasti selhalo."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:375
+msgid "Verification of root hash failed."
+msgstr "Ověření kořenového haše selhalo."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:381
+msgid "Input/output error while creating hash area."
+msgstr "Při vytváření oblasti haší došlo k chybě na vstupu/výstupu."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:383
+msgid "Creation of hash area failed."
+msgstr "Oblast haší se nepodařilo vytvořit."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:430
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Kernel cannot activate device if data block size exceeds page size (%u)."
+msgstr "POZOR: Jádro nemůže aktivovat zařízení, pokud velikost datového bloku přesahuje velikost stránky (%u)."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:132
+msgid "Failed to allocate RS context."
+msgstr "Kontext RS se nepodařilo alokovat."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:147
+msgid "Failed to allocate buffer."
+msgstr "Vyrovnávací paměť se nepodařilo alokovat."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:157
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read RS block %<PRIu64> byte %d."
+msgstr "Čtení bloku RS %<PRIu64> bajtu %d selhalo."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:170
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read parity for RS block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Čtení parity bloku RS %<PRIu64> selhalo."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:178
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to repair parity for block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Oprava parity bloku RS %<PRIu64> selhala."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:189
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to write parity for RS block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Zápis parity bloku RS %<PRIu64> selhal."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:224
+msgid "Block sizes must match for FEC."
+msgstr "Velikosti bloků musí odpovídat FEC."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:230
+msgid "Invalid number of parity bytes."
+msgstr "Chybný počet paritních bajtů."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:266
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to determine size for device %s."
+msgstr "Velikost zařízení %s se nepodařilo určit."
+
+#: lib/integrity/integrity.c:239 lib/integrity/integrity.c:304
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support dm-integrity mapping."
+msgstr "Jádro nepodporuje mapování dm-integrity."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:413
+msgid "Failed to acquire write device lock."
+msgstr "Získání zámku pro zápis do zařízení selhalo."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:654 lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:675
+msgid ""
+"Device contains ambiguous signatures, cannot auto-recover LUKS2.\n"
+"Please run \"cryptsetup repair\" for recovery."
+msgstr ""
+"Zařízení obsahuje nejednoznačný vzorec. LUKS2 nelze automaticky obnovit.\n"
+"Prosím, spusťte obnovu příkazem „cryptsetup repair“."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:99
+msgid "No space for new keyslot."
+msgstr "Pro novou pozicí klíče není místo."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:158
+msgid "Requested data offset is too small."
+msgstr "Požadovaná poloha dat je příliš nízká."
+
+# TODO: Pluralize
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:195
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: keyslots area (%<PRIu64> bytes) is very small, available LUKS2 keyslot count is very limited.\n"
+msgstr "POZOR: oblast s pozicemi klíčů (%<PRIu64> bajtů) je příliš malá, dostupný počet pozic klíčů LUKS2 je značně omezen.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:866 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:982
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1055 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:105
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:128
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to acquire read lock on device %s."
+msgstr "Získání zámku pro čtení ze zařízení %s selhalo."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:878 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1149
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:431 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:40
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:69
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to acquire write lock on device %s."
+msgstr "Získání zámku pro zápis do zařízení %s selhalo."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1072
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forbidden LUKS2 requirements detected in backup %s."
+msgstr "V záloze %s byly zjištěny zakázané požadavky na LUKS2."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1113
+msgid "Data offset differ on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "Počátek dat se liší mezi zařízením a zálohou, obnova se nezdařila."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1119
+msgid "Binary header with keyslot areas size differ on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "Velikost binární hlavičky s oblastí pro pozice klíčů se liší mezi zařízením a zálohou, obnova se nezdařila."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1126
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s %s%s%s%s"
+msgstr "Zařízení %s %s%s%s%s"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1127
+msgid "does not contain LUKS2 header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device."
+msgstr "neobsahuje hlavičku LUKS2. Nahrazení hlavičky může zničit data na daném zařízení."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1128
+msgid "already contains LUKS2 header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."
+msgstr "již obsahuje hlavičku LUKS2. Nahrazení hlavičky zničí existující pozice s klíči."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1130
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: unknown LUKS2 requirements detected in real device header!\n"
+"Replacing header with backup may corrupt the data on that device!"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"POZOR: Ve skutečné hlavičce zařízení byly objeveny neznámé požadavky na LUKS2!\n"
+"Nahrazení hlavičky zálohou může zničit data na zařízení!"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1132
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: Unfinished offline reencryption detected on the device!\n"
+"Replacing header with backup may corrupt data."
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"POZOR: Na zařízení bylo objeveno nedokončené offline přešifrování!\n"
+"Nahrazení hlavičky zálohou může zničit data."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1234
+#, c-format
+msgid "Ignored unknown flag %s."
+msgstr "Neznámý příznak %s ignorován."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1869
+msgid "Failed to read LUKS2 requirements."
+msgstr "Čtení požadavků na LUKS2 selhalo."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1876
+msgid "Unmet LUKS2 requirements detected."
+msgstr "Zjištěny nesplněné požadavky na LUKS2."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1884
+msgid "Offline reencryption in progress. Aborting."
+msgstr "Probíhá offline přešifrování. Operace se ruší."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:474
+#, c-format
+msgid "Can not check status of device with uuid: %s."
+msgstr "Nelze zjistit stav zařízení s UUID: %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:500
+msgid "Unable to convert header with LUKSMETA additional metadata."
+msgstr "Hlavičky s dodatečnými metadaty LUKSMETA nelze převést."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:537
+msgid "Unable to move keyslot area. Not enough space."
+msgstr "Oblast s pozicemi klíčů nelze přesunout. Nedostatek místa."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:577 lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:854
+msgid "Unable to move keyslot area."
+msgstr "Oblast s pozicemi klíčů nelze přesunout."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:672
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - key slot digests are not LUKS1 compatible."
+msgstr "Nelze převést do formátu LUKS1 – otisky v pozicích s klíči nejsou slučitelné s LUKS1."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:684
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - device uses wrapped key cipher %s."
+msgstr "Nelze převést do formátu LUKS1 – zařízení používá šifru se zabaleným klíčem %s."
+
+# TODO: Pluralize
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:692
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - LUKS2 header contains %u token(s)."
+msgstr "Nelze převést do formátu LUKS1 – hlavička LUKS2 obsahuje %u token(ů)."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:706
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - keyslot %u is in invalid state."
+msgstr "Nelze převést do formátu LUKS1 – pozice s klíče %u je v nesprávném stavu."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:711
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - slot %u (over maximum slots) is still active."
+msgstr "Nelze převést do formátu LUKS1 – pozice s klíčem %u (nad maximem pozic) je stále aktivní."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:716
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - keyslot %u is not LUKS1 compatible."
+msgstr "Nelze převést do formátu LUKS1 – pozice s klíče %u není slučitelná s LUKS1."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_token.c:262
+msgid "No free token slot."
+msgstr "Žádná volná pozice s tokenem"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_token.c:269
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to create builtin token %s."
+msgstr "Vestavěný token %s nebylo možné vytvořit"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:141
+msgid "Can't do passphrase verification on non-tty inputs."
+msgstr "Se vstupem mimo terminál nelze ověřit heslo."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:182
+msgid "Keyslot encryption parameters can be set only for LUKS2 device."
+msgstr "Parametry pro šifrování pozice s klíčem lze nastavit jen u zařízení LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:212 src/cryptsetup.c:849 src/cryptsetup.c:1088
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:749 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:814
+msgid "No known cipher specification pattern detected."
+msgstr "Nelze najít žádný známý vzorek se specifikaci šifry."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:220
+msgid "WARNING: The --hash parameter is being ignored in plain mode with keyfile specified.\n"
+msgstr "POZOR: Jedná-li se o režim plain a je-li určen soubor s klíčem, parametr --hash se ignoruje.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:228
+msgid "WARNING: The --keyfile-size option is being ignored, the read size is the same as the encryption key size.\n"
+msgstr "POZOR: Přepínač --keyfile-size se ignoruje, velikost pro čtení je stejná jako velikosti šifrovacího klíče.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:268
+#, c-format
+msgid "Detected device signature(s) on %s. Proceeding further may damage existing data."
+msgstr "Na %s byla nalezen vzorec zařízení. Pokračování může poškodit existující data."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:274 src/cryptsetup.c:969 src/cryptsetup.c:1065
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1138 src/cryptsetup.c:1763 src/integritysetup.c:230
+msgid "Operation aborted.\n"
+msgstr "Operace zrušena.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:342
+msgid "Option --key-file is required."
+msgstr "Je vyžadován přepínač --key-file."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:395
+msgid "Enter VeraCrypt PIM: "
+msgstr "Zadejte PIM VeraCryptu: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:404
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: parse error."
+msgstr "Neplatná hodnota VIM: chyba rozboru"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:407
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: 0."
+msgstr "Neplatná hodnota PIM: 0"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:410
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: outside of range."
+msgstr "Neplatná hodnota PIM: mimo rozsah"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:433
+msgid "No device header detected with this passphrase."
+msgstr "S tímto heslem není rozpoznatelná žádná hlavička zařízení."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:495 src/cryptsetup.c:1790
+msgid ""
+"Header dump with volume key is sensitive information\n"
+"which allows access to encrypted partition without passphrase.\n"
+"This dump should be always stored encrypted on safe place."
+msgstr ""
+"Výpis hlavičky s klíčem svazku je citlivý údaj,\n"
+"který umožňuje přístup k šifrovanému oddílu bez znalosti hesla.\n"
+"Tento výpis by měl být vždy uložen na bezpečném místě a v zašifrované podobě."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:574
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is still active and scheduled for deferred removal.\n"
+msgstr "Zařízení %s je stále aktivní a naplánováno pro opožděné odstranění.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:602
+msgid "Resize of active device requires volume key in keyring but --disable-keyring option is set."
+msgstr "Změna velikosti aktivního zařízení vyžaduje klíč svazku v klíčence. Byl však použit přepínač --disable-keyring."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:727
+msgid "Benchmark interrupted."
+msgstr "Hodnocení výkonu přerušeno."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:748
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2-%-9s     N/A\n"
+msgstr "PBKDF2-%-9s     –\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:750
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2-%-9s %7u iterations per second for %zu-bit key\n"
+msgstr "PBKDF2-%-9s %7u iterací za sekundu pro %zubitový klíč\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:764
+#, c-format
+msgid "%-10s N/A\n"
+msgstr "%-10s –\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:766
+#, c-format
+msgid "%-10s %4u iterations, %5u memory, %1u parallel threads (CPUs) for %zu-bit key (requested %u ms time)\n"
+msgstr "%-10s %4u iterací, %5u paměti, %1u souběžných vláken (procesorů) pro %zubitový klíč (požadován čas %u ms)\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:790
+msgid "Result of benchmark is not reliable."
+msgstr "Výsledek hodnocení výkonu není spolehlivý."
+
+# ???: are aproximated?
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:841
+msgid "# Tests are approximate using memory only (no storage IO).\n"
+msgstr "# Testy jsou počítány jen z práce s pamětí (žádné I/O úložiště).\n"
+
+#. TRANSLATORS: The string is header of a table and must be exactly (right side) aligned.
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:875
+#, c-format
+msgid "#%*s Algorithm |       Key |      Encryption |      Decryption\n"
+msgstr "#%*sAlgoritmus |      Klíč |       Šifrování |     Dešifrování\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:879
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cipher %s is not available."
+msgstr "Šifra %s není dostupná."
+
+#. TRANSLATORS: The string is header of a table and must be exactly (right side) aligned.
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:899
+msgid "#     Algorithm |       Key |      Encryption |      Decryption\n"
+msgstr "#    Algoritmus |      Klíč |       Šifrování |     Dešifrování\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:908
+msgid "N/A"
+msgstr "–"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:968
+msgid "Really try to repair LUKS device header?"
+msgstr "Opravdu se pokusit opravit hlavičku zařízení LUKS?"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:984 src/integritysetup.c:144
+msgid ""
+"Wiping device to initialize integrity checksum.\n"
+"You can interrupt this by pressing CTRL+c (rest of not wiped device will contain invalid checksum).\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Maže se zařízení, aby se inicializovaly kontrolní součty integrity.\n"
+"Lze přerušit pomocí Ctrl+C (zbytek nesmazaného zařízení bude obsahovat\n"
+"neplatné součty).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1006 src/integritysetup.c:166
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot deactivate temporary device %s."
+msgstr "Dočasné zařízení %s nelze deaktivovat."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1050
+msgid "Integrity option can be used only for LUKS2 format."
+msgstr "Volby integrity lze použít jen při formátu LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1055 src/cryptsetup.c:1115
+msgid "Unsupported LUKS2 metadata size options."
+msgstr "Nepodporované volby velikosti metadat LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1072
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create header file %s."
+msgstr "Soubor s hlavičkou %s nelze vytvořit."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1095 src/integritysetup.c:192 src/integritysetup.c:201
+#: src/integritysetup.c:210 src/integritysetup.c:276 src/integritysetup.c:285
+#: src/integritysetup.c:295
+msgid "No known integrity specification pattern detected."
+msgstr "Nelze najít žádný známý vzorek se specifikací integrity."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1108
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use %s as on-disk header."
+msgstr "%s nelze použít pro hlavičku uvnitř disku."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1132 src/integritysetup.c:224
+#, c-format
+msgid "This will overwrite data on %s irrevocably."
+msgstr "Toto nevratně přepíše data na %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1173 src/cryptsetup.c:1484 src/cryptsetup.c:1551
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1646 src/cryptsetup.c:1712
+msgid "Failed to set pbkdf parameters."
+msgstr "Nastavení parametrů PBKDF selhalo."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1242
+msgid "Reduced data offset is allowed only for detached LUKS header."
+msgstr "Zmenšená poloha dat je dovolena jen u oddělené hlavičky LUKS."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1284
+msgid "Device activated but cannot make flags persistent."
+msgstr "Zařízení aktivováno, ale příznaky nelze učinit trvalými."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1365
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %d is selected for deletion."
+msgstr "Ke smazání vybrán klíč na pozici %d."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1368 src/cryptsetup.c:1706
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %d is not active."
+msgstr "Pozice klíče %d není aktivní."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1377 src/cryptsetup.c:1438
+msgid "This is the last keyslot. Device will become unusable after purging this key."
+msgstr ""
+"Toto je poslední pozice klíče. Smazáním tohoto klíče přijdete o možnost\n"
+"zařízení použít."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1378
+msgid "Enter any remaining passphrase: "
+msgstr "Zadejte jakékoliv jiné heslo: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1379 src/cryptsetup.c:1440
+msgid "Operation aborted, the keyslot was NOT wiped.\n"
+msgstr "Operace zrušena, pozice klíče NEBYLA vymazána.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1417
+msgid "Enter passphrase to be deleted: "
+msgstr "Zadejte heslo, které se má smazat: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1435
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d selected for deletion."
+msgstr "Ke smazání vybrán klíč na pozici %d."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1498 src/cryptsetup.c:1565 src/cryptsetup.c:1599
+msgid "Enter new passphrase for key slot: "
+msgstr "Zadejte nové heslo pro pozici klíče: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1582 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1352
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter any existing passphrase: "
+msgstr "Zadejte jakékoliv existující heslo: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1650
+msgid "Enter passphrase to be changed: "
+msgstr "Zadejte heslo, které má být změněno: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1666 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1338
+msgid "Enter new passphrase: "
+msgstr "Zadejte nové heslo: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1716
+msgid "Enter passphrase for keyslot to be converted: "
+msgstr "Zadejte heslo pro pozici klíče, který má být převeden: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1740
+msgid "Only one device argument for isLuks operation is supported."
+msgstr "U operace isLuks je podporován pouze jeden argument se zařízením."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1924 src/cryptsetup.c:1945
+msgid "Option --header-backup-file is required."
+msgstr "Je vyžadován přepínač --header-backup-file."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1975
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s is not cryptsetup managed device."
+msgstr "%s není zařízení spravované nástrojem cryptsetup."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1986
+#, c-format
+msgid "Refresh is not supported for device type %s"
+msgstr "Reaktivace není na zařízení typu %s podporována"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2024
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unrecognized metadata device type %s."
+msgstr "Nerozpoznaná metadata druhu zařízení %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2027
+msgid "Command requires device and mapped name as arguments."
+msgstr "Příkaz vyžaduje jako argumenty zařízení a mapovaný název."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2049
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"This operation will erase all keyslots on device %s.\n"
+"Device will become unusable after this operation."
+msgstr ""
+"Tento úkon smaže všechny pozice s klíči na zařízení %s.\n"
+"Po jeho dokončení zařízení bude nepoužitelné."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2056
+msgid "Operation aborted, keyslots were NOT wiped.\n"
+msgstr "Operace zrušena, pozice s klíči NEBYLY smazány.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2093
+msgid "Invalid LUKS type, only luks1 and luks2 are supported."
+msgstr "Neplatný druh formátu LUKS. Podporován je pouze LUKS1 a LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2111
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device is already %s type."
+msgstr "Zařízení je již druhu %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2116
+#, c-format
+msgid "This operation will convert %s to %s format.\n"
+msgstr "Tato operace převede formát %s na %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2122
+msgid "Operation aborted, device was NOT converted.\n"
+msgstr "Operace zrušena, zařízení NEBYLO převedeno.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2162
+msgid "Option --priority, --label or --subsystem is missing."
+msgstr "Chybí přepínač --priority, --label nebo --subsystem."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2196 src/cryptsetup.c:2229 src/cryptsetup.c:2252
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %d is invalid."
+msgstr "Token %d je neplatný."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2199 src/cryptsetup.c:2255
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %d in use."
+msgstr "Token %d se používá."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2206
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to add luks2-keyring token %d."
+msgstr "Přidání tokenu %d klíčenky LUKS2 selhalo."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2215 src/cryptsetup.c:2277
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign token %d to keyslot %d."
+msgstr "Přiřazení tokenu %d do pozice s klíčem %d selhalo."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2232
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %d is not in use."
+msgstr "Token %d se nepoužívá."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2267
+msgid "Failed to import token from file."
+msgstr "Import tokenu ze souboru selhal."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2292
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to get token %d for export."
+msgstr "Získání tokenu %d za účelem exportu selhalo."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2307
+msgid "--key-description parameter is mandatory for token add action."
+msgstr "Parametr --key-description je při přidávání tokenu povinný."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2313 src/cryptsetup.c:2321
+msgid "Action requires specific token. Use --token-id parameter."
+msgstr "Akce vyžaduje určitý token. Použijte parametr --token-id."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2326
+#, c-format
+msgid "Invalid token operation %s."
+msgstr "Neplatná operace tokenu %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2366
+msgid "<device> [--type <type>] [<name>]"
+msgstr "<zařízení> [--type <druh>] [<název>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2366
+msgid "open device as mapping <name>"
+msgstr "otevře zařízení jako mapování <název>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2367 src/cryptsetup.c:2368 src/cryptsetup.c:2369
+#: src/veritysetup.c:363 src/veritysetup.c:364 src/integritysetup.c:464
+#: src/integritysetup.c:465
+msgid "<name>"
+msgstr "<název>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2367
+msgid "close device (remove mapping)"
+msgstr "zavře zařízení (odstraní mapování)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2368
+msgid "resize active device"
+msgstr "změní velikost aktivního zařízení"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2369
+msgid "show device status"
+msgstr "zobrazí stav zařízení"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2370
+msgid "[--cipher <cipher>]"
+msgstr "[--cipher <šifra>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2370
+msgid "benchmark cipher"
+msgstr "zhodnotí výkon šifry"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2371 src/cryptsetup.c:2372 src/cryptsetup.c:2373
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2374 src/cryptsetup.c:2381 src/cryptsetup.c:2382
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2383 src/cryptsetup.c:2384 src/cryptsetup.c:2385
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2386 src/cryptsetup.c:2387 src/cryptsetup.c:2388
+msgid "<device>"
+msgstr "<zařízení>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2371
+msgid "try to repair on-disk metadata"
+msgstr "pokusí se opravit metadata uložená na disku"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2372
+msgid "erase all keyslots (remove encryption key)"
+msgstr "smaže všechny pozice s klíči (odstraní šifrovací klíč)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2373
+msgid "convert LUKS from/to LUKS2 format"
+msgstr "převede formát LUKS do/z formátu LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2374
+msgid "set permanent configuration options for LUKS2"
+msgstr "nastaví trvalé volby konfigurace pro LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2375 src/cryptsetup.c:2376
+msgid "<device> [<new key file>]"
+msgstr "<zařízení> [<soubor_s_novým_klíčem>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2375
+msgid "formats a LUKS device"
+msgstr "naformátuje zařízení LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2376
+msgid "add key to LUKS device"
+msgstr "do zařízení LUKS přidá klíč"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2377 src/cryptsetup.c:2378 src/cryptsetup.c:2379
+msgid "<device> [<key file>]"
+msgstr "<zařízení> [<soubor_s_klíčem>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2377
+msgid "removes supplied key or key file from LUKS device"
+msgstr "odstraní zadaný klíč nebo soubor s klíčem ze zařízení LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2378
+msgid "changes supplied key or key file of LUKS device"
+msgstr "změní zadaný klíč nebo soubor s klíčem u zařízení LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2379
+msgid "converts a key to new pbkdf parameters"
+msgstr "převede klíč do nových parametrů PBKDF"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2380
+msgid "<device> <key slot>"
+msgstr "<zařízení> <pozice_klíče>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2380
+msgid "wipes key with number <key slot> from LUKS device"
+msgstr "smaže klíč s číslem <pozice_klíče> ze zařízení LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2381
+msgid "print UUID of LUKS device"
+msgstr "zobrazí UUID zařízení LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2382
+msgid "tests <device> for LUKS partition header"
+msgstr "otestuje <zařízení> na hlavičku oddílu LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2383
+msgid "dump LUKS partition information"
+msgstr "vypíše údaje o oddílu LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2384
+msgid "dump TCRYPT device information"
+msgstr "vypíše údaje o oddílu TCRYPT"
+
+# TODO: not consistent with previous line
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2385
+msgid "Suspend LUKS device and wipe key (all IOs are frozen)"
+msgstr "Uspí zařízení LUKS a smaže klíč (všechny operace budou zmrazeny)"
+
+# TODO: not consistent with previous line
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2386
+msgid "Resume suspended LUKS device"
+msgstr "Probudí uspané zařízení LUKS"
+
+# TODO: not consistent with previous line
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2387
+msgid "Backup LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "Zálohuje hlavičku zařízení LUKS a jeho pozice s klíči"
+
+# TODO: not consistent with previous line
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2388
+msgid "Restore LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "Obnoví hlavičku zařízení LUKS a jeho pozice s klíči"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2389
+msgid "<add|remove|import|export> <device>"
+msgstr "<add|remove|import|export> <zařízení>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2389
+msgid "Manipulate LUKS2 tokens"
+msgstr "Zachází s tokeny LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2407 src/veritysetup.c:380 src/integritysetup.c:481
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<action> is one of:\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<akce> je jedna z:\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2413
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"You can also use old <action> syntax aliases:\n"
+"\topen: create (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen\n"
+"\tclose: remove (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tcryptClose\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Rovněž lze použít aliasy se starým zápisem <akce>:\n"
+"\topen: create (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen\n"
+"\tclose: remove (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tcryptClose\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2417
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<device> is the encrypted device\n"
+"<key slot> is the LUKS key slot number to modify\n"
+"<key file> optional key file for the new key for luksAddKey action\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<název> je zařízení, které se má vytvořit v %s\n"
+"<zařízení> je zašifrované zařízení\n"
+"<pozice_klíče> je číslo pozice klíče LUKS, který se má upravit\n"
+"<soubor_s_klíčem> je volitelný soubor s novým klíčem pro akci luksAddKey\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2424
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in metadata format is %s (for luksFormat action).\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Výchozí zakompilovaný formát metadat (pro akci luksFormat) je %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2429
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in key and passphrase parameters:\n"
+"\tMaximum keyfile size: %dkB, Maximum interactive passphrase length %d (characters)\n"
+"Default PBKDF for LUKS1: %s, iteration time: %d (ms)\n"
+"Default PBKDF for LUKS2: %s\n"
+"\tIteration time: %d, Memory required: %dkB, Parallel threads: %d\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Výchozí zakompilované parametry klíče a hesla:\n"
+"\tMaximální velikost souboru s klíčem: %d kB, maximální délka interaktivního hesla %d (znaků)\n"
+"Výchozí PBKDF pro LUKS1: %s, doba opakování: %d (ms)\n"
+"Výchozí PBKDF pro LUKS2: %s\n"
+"\tDoba iterací: %d, nutná paměť: %d kB, souběžná vlákna: %d\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2440
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in device cipher parameters:\n"
+"\tloop-AES: %s, Key %d bits\n"
+"\tplain: %s, Key: %d bits, Password hashing: %s\n"
+"\tLUKS: %s, Key: %d bits, LUKS header hashing: %s, RNG: %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Výchozí zakompilované parametry šifer zařízení:\n"
+"\tloop-AES: %s, Klíč %d bitů\n"
+"\tplain: %s, Klíč: %d bitů, Haš hesla: %s\n"
+"\tLUKS: %s, Klíč: %d bitů, Haš hlavičky LUKS: %s, RNG: %s\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2449
+msgid "\tLUKS: Default keysize with XTS mode (two internal keys) will be doubled.\n"
+msgstr "\tLUKS: V režimu XTS (dva vnitřní klíče) bude výchozí velikost klíče zdvojnásobena.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2460 src/veritysetup.c:537 src/integritysetup.c:621
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s: requires %s as arguments"
+msgstr "%s: vyžaduje %s jako argumenty"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2498 src/veritysetup.c:420 src/integritysetup.c:515
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1611
+msgid "Show this help message"
+msgstr "Zobrazí tuto nápovědu"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2499 src/veritysetup.c:421 src/integritysetup.c:516
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1612
+msgid "Display brief usage"
+msgstr "Zobrazí stručný návod na použití"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2503 src/veritysetup.c:425 src/integritysetup.c:520
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1616
+msgid "Help options:"
+msgstr "Přepínače nápovědy:"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2504 src/veritysetup.c:426 src/integritysetup.c:521
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1617
+msgid "Print package version"
+msgstr "Vypíše verzi balíku"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2505 src/veritysetup.c:427 src/integritysetup.c:522
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1618
+msgid "Shows more detailed error messages"
+msgstr "Zobrazuje podrobnější chybové hlášky"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2506 src/veritysetup.c:428 src/integritysetup.c:523
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1619
+msgid "Show debug messages"
+msgstr "Zobrazuje ladicí hlášky"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2507
+msgid "Show debug messages including JSON metadata"
+msgstr "Zobrazuje ladicí hlášky včetně metadat JSON"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2508 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1621
+msgid "The cipher used to encrypt the disk (see /proc/crypto)"
+msgstr "Šifra použita k zašifrování disku (vizte /proc/crypto)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2509 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1623
+msgid "The hash used to create the encryption key from the passphrase"
+msgstr "Haš použit k vytvoření šifrovacího klíče z hesla"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2510
+msgid "Verifies the passphrase by asking for it twice"
+msgstr "Ověřuje heslo dvojitým dotazem"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2511 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1625
+msgid "Read the key from a file"
+msgstr "Klíč načte ze souboru"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2512
+msgid "Read the volume (master) key from file."
+msgstr "(Hlavní) klíč svazku načte ze souboru."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2513
+msgid "Dump volume (master) key instead of keyslots info"
+msgstr "Vypíše (hlavní) klíč svazku namísto údajů o pozicích klíčů"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2514 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1622
+msgid "The size of the encryption key"
+msgstr "Velikost šifrovacího klíče"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2514 src/cryptsetup.c:2571 src/integritysetup.c:539
+#: src/integritysetup.c:543 src/integritysetup.c:547
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1622
+msgid "BITS"
+msgstr "BITY"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2515 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1638
+msgid "Limits the read from keyfile"
+msgstr "Omezí čtení ze souboru s klíčem"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2515 src/cryptsetup.c:2516 src/cryptsetup.c:2517
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2518 src/cryptsetup.c:2568 src/cryptsetup.c:2569
+#: src/veritysetup.c:431 src/veritysetup.c:432 src/veritysetup.c:433
+#: src/veritysetup.c:436 src/veritysetup.c:437 src/integritysetup.c:530
+#: src/integritysetup.c:534 src/integritysetup.c:535
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1637 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1638
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1639 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1640
+msgid "bytes"
+msgstr "bajty"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2516 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1637
+msgid "Number of bytes to skip in keyfile"
+msgstr "Přeskočí daný počet bajtů na začátku souboru s klíčem"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2517
+msgid "Limits the read from newly added keyfile"
+msgstr "Omezí čtení z nově přidaného souboru s klíčem"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2518
+msgid "Number of bytes to skip in newly added keyfile"
+msgstr "Přeskočí daný počet bajtů na začátku nově přidaného souboru s klíčem"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2519
+msgid "Slot number for new key (default is first free)"
+msgstr "Číslo pozice pro nový klíč (výchozí je první volná)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2520
+msgid "The size of the device"
+msgstr "Velikost zařízení"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2520 src/cryptsetup.c:2521 src/cryptsetup.c:2522
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2528 src/integritysetup.c:531 src/integritysetup.c:536
+msgid "SECTORS"
+msgstr "SEKTORY"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2521
+msgid "The start offset in the backend device"
+msgstr "Poloha začátku dat v podkladovém zařízení"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2522
+msgid "How many sectors of the encrypted data to skip at the beginning"
+msgstr "Kolik sektorů šifrovaných dat se má na začátku přeskočit"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2523
+msgid "Create a readonly mapping"
+msgstr "Vytvoří mapování určené jen pro čtení"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2524 src/integritysetup.c:524
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1628
+msgid "Do not ask for confirmation"
+msgstr "Nevyžaduje potvrzení"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2525
+msgid "Timeout for interactive passphrase prompt (in seconds)"
+msgstr "Časový limit pro interaktivní dotaz na heslo (v sekundách)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2525 src/cryptsetup.c:2526 src/integritysetup.c:525
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1629
+msgid "secs"
+msgstr "sekundy"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2526 src/integritysetup.c:525
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1629
+msgid "Progress line update (in seconds)"
+msgstr "Aktualizace ukazatele postupu (v sekundách)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2527 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1630
+msgid "How often the input of the passphrase can be retried"
+msgstr "Kolikrát se lze zeptat na heslo"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2528
+msgid "Align payload at <n> sector boundaries - for luksFormat"
+msgstr "Zarovnává data na hranici <n> sektorů – pro luksFormat"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2529
+msgid "File with LUKS header and keyslots backup"
+msgstr "Soubor se zálohou hlavičky LUKS a pozic s klíči"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2530 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1631
+msgid "Use /dev/random for generating volume key"
+msgstr "Pro vytvoření klíče svazku použije /dev/random"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2531 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1632
+msgid "Use /dev/urandom for generating volume key"
+msgstr "Pro vytvoření klíče svazku použije /dev/urandom"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2532
+msgid "Share device with another non-overlapping crypt segment"
+msgstr "Zařízení sdílí s jiným nepřekrývajícím se šifrovaným segmentem"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2533 src/veritysetup.c:440
+msgid "UUID for device to use"
+msgstr "Použije zařízení s UUID"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2534
+msgid "Allow discards (aka TRIM) requests for device"
+msgstr "Povolí u daného zařízení požadavky na zahození (TRIM)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2535 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1649
+msgid "Device or file with separated LUKS header"
+msgstr "Zařízení nebo soubor s oddělenou hlavičkou LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2536
+msgid "Do not activate device, just check passphrase"
+msgstr "Zařízení neaktivuje, jen zkontroluje heslo"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2537
+msgid "Use hidden header (hidden TCRYPT device)"
+msgstr "Použije se skrytá hlavička (skryté zařízení TCRYPT)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2538
+msgid "Device is system TCRYPT drive (with bootloader)"
+msgstr "Zařízení je systémová jednotka TCRYPT (se zavaděčem)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2539
+msgid "Use backup (secondary) TCRYPT header"
+msgstr "Použije se záložní (druhá) hlavička TCRYPT"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2540
+msgid "Scan also for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "Hledá také zařízení kompatibilní s VeraCrypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2541
+msgid "Personal Iteration Multiplier for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "Osobní iterační činitel (PIM) pro zařízení kompatibilní s VeraCrypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2542
+msgid "Query Personal Iteration Multiplier for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "Zeptá se na Osobní iterační činitel pro zařízení kompatibilní s VeraCrypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2543
+msgid "Type of device metadata: luks, plain, loopaes, tcrypt"
+msgstr "Druh metadat zařízení: luks, plain, loopaes, tcrypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2544
+msgid "Disable password quality check (if enabled)"
+msgstr "Vypne kontrolku odolnosti hesla (byla-li zapnuta)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2545
+msgid "Use dm-crypt same_cpu_crypt performance compatibility option"
+msgstr "Použije výkonnostně kompatibilní přepínač dmcryptu same_cpu_crypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2546
+msgid "Use dm-crypt submit_from_crypt_cpus performance compatibility option"
+msgstr "Použije výkonnostně kompatibilní přepínač dmcryptu submit_from_crypt_cpus"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2547
+msgid "Device removal is deferred until the last user closes it"
+msgstr "Odstranění zařízení se odloží, dokud jej poslední uživatel neuzavře"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2548
+msgid "PBKDF iteration time for LUKS (in ms)"
+msgstr "Doba opakování PBKDF pro LUKS (v ms)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2548 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1627
+msgid "msecs"
+msgstr "milisekundy"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2549 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1645
+msgid "PBKDF algorithm (for LUKS2): argon2i, argon2id, pbkdf2"
+msgstr "Algoritmus PBKDF (pro LUKS2): argon2i, argon2id, pbkdf2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2550 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1646
+msgid "PBKDF memory cost limit"
+msgstr "omezení paměťové náročnosti PBKDF"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2550 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1646
+msgid "kilobytes"
+msgstr "kilobajty"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2551 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1647
+msgid "PBKDF parallel cost"
+msgstr "náročnost paralelizace PBKDF"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2551 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1647
+msgid "threads"
+msgstr "vlákna"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2552 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1648
+msgid "PBKDF iterations cost (forced, disables benchmark)"
+msgstr "náročnost iterací PBKDF (vynuceno, vypne test složitosti)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2553
+msgid "Keyslot priority: ignore, normal, prefer"
+msgstr "Priorita pozice klíče: ignore [ignorovat], normal [normální], prefer [upřednostnit]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2554
+msgid "Disable locking of on-disk metadata"
+msgstr "Vypne zamykání metadata uložených na disku"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2555
+msgid "Disable loading volume keys via kernel keyring"
+msgstr "Vypne načítání klíčů svazků přes jadernou klíčenku"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2556
+msgid "Data integrity algorithm (LUKS2 only)"
+msgstr "Algoritmus pro integritu dat (pouze LUKS2)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2557 src/integritysetup.c:550
+msgid "Disable journal for integrity device"
+msgstr "Vypne žurnál pro zařízení s integritou"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2558 src/integritysetup.c:526
+msgid "Do not wipe device after format"
+msgstr "Po formátu nevymazat zařízení"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2559
+msgid "Do not ask for passphrase if activation by token fails"
+msgstr "Neptat se na heslo, když aktivace tokenem selže"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2560
+msgid "Token number (default: any)"
+msgstr "Číslo tokenu (výchozí cokoliv)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2561
+msgid "Key description"
+msgstr "Popis klíče"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2562
+msgid "Encryption sector size (default: 512 bytes)"
+msgstr "Velikost sektoru šifrování (výchozí: 512 bajtů)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2563
+msgid "Set activation flags persistent for device"
+msgstr "Nastaví trvalé příznaky pro aktivaci zařízení"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2564
+msgid "Set label for the LUKS2 device"
+msgstr "Nastaví jmenovku zařízení LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2565
+msgid "Set subsystem label for the LUKS2 device"
+msgstr "Nastaví jmenovku podsystému zařízení LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2566
+msgid "Create unbound (no assigned data segment) LUKS2 keyslot"
+msgstr "Vytvoří nepřiřazenou (žádný datový segment nepřiřazen) LUKS2 pozici s klíčem"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2567
+msgid "Read or write the json from or to a file"
+msgstr "Načte nebo zapíše JSON z nebo do souboru"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2568
+msgid "LUKS2 header metadata area size"
+msgstr "Velikost oblasti s metadaty hlavičky LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2569
+msgid "LUKS2 header keyslots area size"
+msgstr "Velikost oblasti s pozicemi klíčů hlavičky LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2570
+msgid "Refresh (reactivate) device with new parameters"
+msgstr "Reaktivuje zařízení s novými parametry"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2571
+msgid "LUKS2 keyslot: The size of the encryption key"
+msgstr "Pozice s klíčem LUKS2: Velikost šifrovacího klíče"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2572
+msgid "LUKS2 keyslot: The cipher used for keyslot encryption"
+msgstr "Pozice s klíčem LUKS2: Šifra použitá pro šifrování pozice s klíčem"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2588 src/veritysetup.c:461 src/integritysetup.c:568
+msgid "[OPTION...] <action> <action-specific>"
+msgstr "[PŘEPÍNAČ…] <akce> <přepínače_akce>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2645 src/veritysetup.c:501 src/integritysetup.c:585
+msgid "Argument <action> missing."
+msgstr "Chybí argument <akce>."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2708 src/veritysetup.c:532 src/integritysetup.c:616
+msgid "Unknown action."
+msgstr "Neznámá akce."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2718
+msgid "Parameter --refresh is only allowed with open or refresh commands.\n"
+msgstr "Přepínač --refresh je dovolen jen při příkazu otevření nebo reaktivace.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2723
+msgid "Options --refresh and --test-passphrase are mutually exclusive.\n"
+msgstr "Přepínače --refresh a --test-passphrase se vzájemně vylučují.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2728
+msgid "Option --deferred is allowed only for close command.\n"
+msgstr "Přepínač --deferred je dovolen jen při příkazu zavření.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2733
+msgid "Option --shared is allowed only for open of plain device.\n"
+msgstr "Přepínač --shared je dovolen jen při úkonu otevírání zařízení plain.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2738
+msgid "Option --allow-discards is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "Přepínač --allow-discards je dovolen jen při úkonu otevírání.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2743
+msgid "Option --persistent is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "Přepínač --persistent je dovolen jen při úkonu otevírání.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2748
+msgid "Option --persistent is not allowed with --test-passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "Přepínač --persistent není dovolen současně s --test-passphrase.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2757
+msgid ""
+"Option --key-size is allowed only for luksFormat, luksAddKey (with --unbound),\n"
+"open and benchmark actions. To limit read from keyfile use --keyfile-size=(bytes)."
+msgstr ""
+"Přepínač --key-size je dovolen jen pro akce luksFormat, luksAddKey\n"
+"(s --unbound), open a benchmark. Čtení ze souboru s klíčem lze omezit\n"
+"pomocí --keyfile-size=(bajty)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2763
+msgid "Option --integrity is allowed only for luksFormat (LUKS2).\n"
+msgstr "Přepínač --integrity je dovolen pouze u luksFormat (LUKS2).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2768
+msgid "Option --integrity-no-wipe can be used only for format action with integrity extension.\n"
+msgstr "Přepínač --integrity-no-wipe smí být použit jen při formátování s rozšířením integrity.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2774
+msgid "Options --label and --subsystem are allowed only for luksFormat and config LUKS2 operations.\n"
+msgstr "Přepínače --label a --subsystem jsou dovoleny jen při úkonech luksFormat a config s LUKS2.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2780
+msgid "Option --test-passphrase is allowed only for open of LUKS and TCRYPT devices.\n"
+msgstr "Přepínač --test-passphrase je dovolen pouze při otevírání zařízení LUKS a TCRYPT.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2785 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1718
+msgid "Key size must be a multiple of 8 bits"
+msgstr "Velikost klíče musí být násobkem 8 bitů."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2791 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1403
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1723
+msgid "Key slot is invalid."
+msgstr "Pozice klíče není platná."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2798
+msgid "Option --key-file takes precedence over specified key file argument."
+msgstr "Přepínač --key-file má přednost před zadaným argumentem souboru s klíčem."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2805 src/veritysetup.c:544 src/integritysetup.c:640
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1697
+msgid "Negative number for option not permitted."
+msgstr "U přepínače není záporné číslo dovoleno."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2809
+msgid "Only one --key-file argument is allowed."
+msgstr "Je dovolen pouze jeden argument přepínače --key-file."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2813 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1689
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1727
+msgid "Only one of --use-[u]random options is allowed."
+msgstr "Je dovolen pouze jeden z přepínačů --use-[u]random."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2817
+msgid "Option --use-[u]random is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgstr "Přepínač --use-[u]random je dovolen pouze u luksFormat."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2821
+msgid "Option --uuid is allowed only for luksFormat and luksUUID."
+msgstr "Přepínač --uuid je dovolen pouze u luksFormat a luksUUID."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2825
+msgid "Option --align-payload is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgstr "Přepínač --align-payload je dovolen pouze u luksFormat."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2829
+msgid "Options --luks2-metadata-size and --opt-luks2-keyslots-size are allowed only for luksFormat with LUKS2."
+msgstr "Přepínače --luks2-metadata-size a --opt-luks2-keyslots-size jsou dovoleny jen při úkonu luksFormat s LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2834
+msgid "Invalid LUKS2 metadata size specification."
+msgstr "Zadána neplatná velikost metadat LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2838
+msgid "Invalid LUKS2 keyslots size specification."
+msgstr "Zadána neplatná velikost pozic s klíči LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2842
+msgid "Option --align-payload and --offset cannot be combined."
+msgstr "Přepínač --align-payload a --offset nelze kombinovat."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2848
+msgid "Option --skip is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices.\n"
+msgstr "Přepínač --skip je podporován jen při otevírání zařízení plain a loopaes.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2855
+msgid "Option --offset is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices and for luksFormat.\n"
+msgstr "Přepínač --offset je podporován jen při otevírání zařízení plain a loopaes při úkonu luksFormat.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2861
+msgid "Option --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system or --tcrypt-backup is supported only for TCRYPT device.\n"
+msgstr "Přepínač --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system nebo --tcrypt-backup je podporován jen u zařízení TCRYPT.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2866
+msgid "Option --tcrypt-hidden cannot be combined with --allow-discards.\n"
+msgstr "Přepínač --tcrypt-hidden nelze použít s přepínačem --allow-discards.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2871
+msgid "Option --veracrypt is supported only for TCRYPT device type.\n"
+msgstr "Přepínač --veracrypt je podporován jen u typu zařízení TCRYPT.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2877
+msgid "Invalid argument for parameter --veracrypt-pim supplied.\n"
+msgstr "Zadán neplatný argument parametru --veracrypt-pim.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2881
+msgid "Option --veracrypt-pim is supported only for VeraCrypt compatible devices.\n"
+msgstr "Přepínač --veracrypt-pim je podporován jen u zařízení kompatibilním s VeraCrypt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2889
+msgid "Option --veracrypt-query-pim is supported only for VeraCrypt compatible devices.\n"
+msgstr "Přepínač --veracrypt-query-pim je podporován jen u zařízení kompatibilním s VeraCrypt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2893
+msgid "The options --veracrypt-pim and --veracrypt-query-pim are mutually exclusive.\n"
+msgstr "Přepínače --veracrypt-pim a --veracrypt-query-pim se vzájemně vylučují.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2900
+msgid "Option --priority can be only ignore/normal/prefer.\n"
+msgstr "Přepínač --priority smí mít pouze argument ignore, normal a prefer.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2905
+msgid "Keyslot specification is required.\n"
+msgstr "Je nutné určit pozici s klíčem.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2910 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1703
+msgid "Password-based key derivation function (PBKDF) can be only pbkdf2 or argon2i/argon2id.\n"
+msgstr "Funkce pro odvození klíče na základě hesla (PBKDF) smí být pouze pbkdf2 nebo argon2i/argon2id.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2915 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1708
+msgid "PBKDF forced iterations cannot be combined with iteration time option.\n"
+msgstr "Vynucené iterace PBKDF nelze kombinovat s volnou doby iterací.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2921
+msgid "Sector size option is not supported for this command.\n"
+msgstr "Tento příkaz nepodporuje volbu velikosti sektoru.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2927
+msgid "Unsupported encryption sector size.\n"
+msgstr "Nepodporovaná velikost šifrovaného sektoru.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2932
+msgid "Key size is required with --unbound option.\n"
+msgstr "Přepínač --unbound vyžaduje velikost klíče.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2937
+msgid "Option --unbound may be used only with luksAddKey action.\n"
+msgstr "Přepínač --unbound lze použít pouze s akcí luksAddKey.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2942
+msgid "Option --refresh may be used only with open action.\n"
+msgstr "Přepínač --refresh lze použít pouze s úkonem otevření.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2953
+msgid "Cannot disable metadata locking.\n"
+msgstr "Zamykání metadata nelze vypnout.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:67
+msgid "Invalid salt string specified."
+msgstr "Zadán neplatný řetězec se solí."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:98
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create hash image %s for writing."
+msgstr "Nelze vytvořit obraz hašů %s určený k zápisu."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:108
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create FEC image %s for writing."
+msgstr "Nelze vytvořit obraz FEC %s určený k zápisu."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:178
+msgid "Invalid root hash string specified."
+msgstr "Zadán neplatný řetězec s kořenovým hašem."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:360
+msgid "<data_device> <hash_device>"
+msgstr "<zařízení_dat> <zařízení_hašů>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:360 src/integritysetup.c:462
+msgid "format device"
+msgstr "naformátuje zařízení"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:361
+msgid "<data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgstr "<zařízení_dat> <zařízení_hašů> <kořenový_haš>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:361
+msgid "verify device"
+msgstr "ověří zařízení"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:362
+msgid "<data_device> <name> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgstr "<zařízení_dat> <název> <zařízení_hašů> <kořenový_haš>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:362 src/integritysetup.c:463
+msgid "open device as <name>"
+msgstr "otevře zařízení jako <název>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:363 src/integritysetup.c:464
+msgid "close device (deactivate and remove mapping)"
+msgstr "zavře zařízení (deaktivuje a odstraní mapování)"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:364 src/integritysetup.c:465
+msgid "show active device status"
+msgstr "zobrazí stav aktivního zařízení"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:365
+msgid "<hash_device>"
+msgstr "<zařízení_hašů>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:365 src/integritysetup.c:466
+msgid "show on-disk information"
+msgstr "zobrazí údaje z disku"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:384
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<data_device> is the data device\n"
+"<hash_device> is the device containing verification data\n"
+"<root_hash> hash of the root node on <hash_device>\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<název> je zařízení, které bude vytvořeno pod %s\n"
+"<zařízení_dat> je datové zařízení\n"
+"<zařízení_hašů> je zařízení obsahující ověřovací data\n"
+"<kořenový_haš> haš kořenového uzlu na <zařízení_hašů>\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:391
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in dm-verity parameters:\n"
+"\tHash: %s, Data block (bytes): %u, Hash block (bytes): %u, Salt size: %u, Hash format: %u\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Výchozí zakompilované parametry dm-verity:\n"
+"\tHaš: %s, Datový blok (bajty): %u, Blok hašů (bajty): %u, Velikost soli: %u, Formát haše: %u\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:429
+msgid "Do not use verity superblock"
+msgstr "Nepoužije superblok verity"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:430
+msgid "Format type (1 - normal, 0 - original Chrome OS)"
+msgstr "Druh formátu (1 – běžný, 0 – původní z OS Chrome)"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:430
+msgid "number"
+msgstr "číslo"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:431
+msgid "Block size on the data device"
+msgstr "Velikost bloku na zařízení dat"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:432
+msgid "Block size on the hash device"
+msgstr "Velikost bloku na zařízení hašů"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:433
+msgid "FEC parity bytes"
+msgstr "Paritní bajty FEC"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:434
+msgid "The number of blocks in the data file"
+msgstr "Počet bloků v datovém souboru"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:434
+msgid "blocks"
+msgstr "bloky"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:435
+msgid "Path to device with error correction data"
+msgstr "Cesta k zařízení s daty pro opravu chyb"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:435 src/integritysetup.c:528
+msgid "path"
+msgstr "cesta"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:436
+msgid "Starting offset on the hash device"
+msgstr "Poloha začátku dat v zařízení hašů"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:437
+msgid "Starting offset on the FEC device"
+msgstr "Poloha začátku dat v zařízení FEC"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:438
+msgid "Hash algorithm"
+msgstr "Hašovací algoritmus"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:438
+msgid "string"
+msgstr "řetězec"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:439
+msgid "Salt"
+msgstr "Sůl"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:439
+msgid "hex string"
+msgstr "šestnáctkový řetězec"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:441
+msgid "Restart kernel if corruption is detected"
+msgstr "Restartuje jádro, pokud je zjištěno poškození"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:442
+msgid "Ignore corruption, log it only"
+msgstr "Ignoruje poškození, pouze jej zaznamená"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:443
+msgid "Do not verify zeroed blocks"
+msgstr "Neověřuje vynulované bloky"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:444
+msgid "Verify data block only the first time it is read"
+msgstr "Ověří datový blok pouze při prvním čtení"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:550
+msgid "Option --ignore-corruption, --restart-on-corruption or --ignore-zero-blocks is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "Přepínače --ignore-corruption, --restart-on-corruption nebo --ignore-zero-blocks jsou dovoleny jen při úkonu otevírání.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:555
+msgid "Option --ignore-corruption and --restart-on-corruption cannot be used together.\n"
+msgstr "Přepínače --ignore-corruption a --restart-on-corruption nelze použít najednou.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:82 src/utils_password.c:298
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Soubor s klíčem %s nelze číst."
+
+# FIXME: Pluralize
+#: src/integritysetup.c:86 src/utils_password.c:302
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read %d bytes from keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Ze souboru s klíčem %2$s nelze přečíst %1$d bajtů."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:248
+#, c-format
+msgid "Formatted with tag size %u, internal integrity %s.\n"
+msgstr "Formátováno s velikostí značky %u, vnitřní integrita %s.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:462 src/integritysetup.c:466
+msgid "<integrity_device>"
+msgstr "<zařízení_s_daty_integrity>"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:463
+msgid "<integrity_device> <name>"
+msgstr "<zařízení_s_daty_integrity> <název>"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:485
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<integrity_device> is the device containing data with integrity tags\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<název> je zařízení, které bude vytvořeno pod %s\n"
+"<zařízení_s_daty_integrity> je zařízení obsahující data se značkami integrity\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:490
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in dm-integrity parameters:\n"
+"\tTag size: %u bytes, Checksum algorithm: %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Výchozí zakompilované parametry dm-integrity:\n"
+"\tVelikost značky: %u bajtů, Algoritmus kontrolního součtu: %s\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:528
+msgid "Path to data device (if separated)"
+msgstr "Cesta k zařízení s daty (je-li odděleno)"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:530
+msgid "Journal size"
+msgstr "Velikost žurnálu"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:531
+msgid "Interleave sectors"
+msgstr "Prokládat sektory"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:532
+msgid "Journal watermark"
+msgstr "Zaplněnost žurnálu"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:532
+msgid "percent"
+msgstr "procenta"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:533
+msgid "Journal commit time"
+msgstr "Perioda vyprazdňování žurnálu"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:533
+msgid "ms"
+msgstr "ms"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:534
+msgid "Tag size (per-sector)"
+msgstr "Velikost značky (na sektor)"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:535
+msgid "Sector size"
+msgstr "Velikost sektoru"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:536
+msgid "Buffers size"
+msgstr "Velikost vyrovnávací paměti"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:538
+msgid "Data integrity algorithm"
+msgstr "Algoritmus pro kontrolu integrity dat"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:539
+msgid "The size of the data integrity key"
+msgstr "Velikost klíče pro integritu dat"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:540
+msgid "Read the integrity key from a file"
+msgstr "Klíč pro integritu načte ze souboru"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:542
+msgid "Journal integrity algorithm"
+msgstr "Algoritmus pro integritu žurnálu"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:543
+msgid "The size of the journal integrity key"
+msgstr "Velikost klíče integrity žurnálu"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:544
+msgid "Read the journal integrity key from a file"
+msgstr "Klíč integrity žurnálu načte ze souboru"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:546
+msgid "Journal encryption algorithm"
+msgstr "Algoritmus šifrování žurnálu"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:547
+msgid "The size of the journal encryption key"
+msgstr "Velikost šifrovacího klíče žurnálu"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:548
+msgid "Read the journal encryption key from a file"
+msgstr "Šifrovací klíč žurnálu načte ze souboru"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:551
+msgid "Recovery mode (no journal, no tag checking)"
+msgstr "Režim obnovy (žádný žurnál, žádná kontrola značek)"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:552
+msgid "Recalculate initial tags automatically."
+msgstr "Automaticky přepočítá počáteční značky."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:631
+msgid "Option --integrity-recalculate can be used only for open action."
+msgstr "Přepínač --integrity-recalculate smí být použit jen při otevírání."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:646
+msgid "Options --journal-size, --interleave-sectors, --sector-size, --tag-size and --no-wipe can be used only for format action.\n"
+msgstr "Přepínače --journal-size, --interleave-sectors, --sector-size, --tag-size a --no-wipe lze použít jen při formátování.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:652
+msgid "Invalid journal size specification."
+msgstr "Zadána neplatná velikost žurnálu."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:657
+msgid "Both key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "Musí být zadány oba přepínače pro soubor s klíčem a velikostí klíče."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:660
+msgid "Integrity algorithm must be specified if integrity key is used."
+msgstr "Je-li použit klíč integrity, musí být zadán algoritmus integrity."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:665
+msgid "Both journal integrity key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "Musí být zadány oba přepínače pro soubor s klíčem žurnálu a velikostí klíče."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:668
+msgid "Journal integrity algorithm must be specified if journal integrity key is used."
+msgstr "Je-li použit klíč integrity žurnálu, musí být zadán algoritmus integrity žurnálu."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:673
+msgid "Both journal encryption key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "Musí být zadány oba přepínače pro soubor s šifrovacím klíčem žurnálu a velikostí klíče."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:676
+msgid "Journal encryption algorithm must be specified if journal encryption key is used."
+msgstr "Je-li použit šifrovací klíč žurnálu, musí být zadán algoritmus šifrování žurnálu."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:175
+msgid "Reencryption already in-progress."
+msgstr "Přešifrování již probíhá."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:181
+msgid "Reencryption of device with integrity profile is not supported."
+msgstr "Přešifrování zařízení s profilem integrity není podporováno."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:204
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot exclusively open %s, device in use."
+msgstr "Zařízení %s nelze výlučně otevřít. Zařízení se používá."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:218 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1148
+msgid "Allocation of aligned memory failed."
+msgstr "Alokace zarovnané paměti se nezdařila."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:225
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read device %s."
+msgstr "Ze zařízení %s nelze číst."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:236
+#, c-format
+msgid "Marking LUKS1 device %s unusable."
+msgstr "LUKS1 zařízení %s se označuje za nepoužitelné."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:240
+#, c-format
+msgid "Setting LUKS2 offline reencrypt flag on device %s."
+msgstr "Na zařízení %s se nastavuje příznak offline přešifrování."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:257
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write device %s."
+msgstr "Zařízení %s není možné zapsat."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:345
+msgid "Cannot write reencryption log file."
+msgstr "Nelze zapsat soubor s protokolem přešifrování."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:401
+msgid "Cannot read reencryption log file."
+msgstr "Soubor s protokolem přešifrování nelze načíst."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:439
+#, c-format
+msgid "Log file %s exists, resuming reencryption.\n"
+msgstr "Soubor s protokolem %s existuje, pokračuje se v přerušeném přešifrování.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:488
+msgid "Activating temporary device using old LUKS header."
+msgstr "Aktivuje se dočasné zařízení za pomoci staré hlavičky LUKS."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:498
+msgid "Activating temporary device using new LUKS header."
+msgstr "Aktivuje se dočasné zařízení za pomoci nové hlavičky LUKS."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:508
+msgid "Activation of temporary devices failed."
+msgstr "Aktivace dočasných zařízení selhala."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:586
+msgid "Failed to set PBKDF parameters."
+msgstr "Nastavení parametrů PBKDF selhalo."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:592
+msgid "Failed to set data offset."
+msgstr "Nastavení polohy dat selhalo."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:600
+#, c-format
+msgid "New LUKS header for device %s created."
+msgstr "Byla vytvořena nová hlavička LUKS zařízení %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:660
+#, c-format
+msgid "This version of cryptsetup-reencrypt can't handle new internal token type %s."
+msgstr "Tato verze cryptsetup-reencrypt neumí zacházet s novým vnitřním druhem tokenů %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:682
+msgid "Failed to read activation flags from backup header."
+msgstr "Přečtení příznaků pro aktivaci ze záložní hlavičky selhalo."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:686
+msgid "Failed to write activation flags to new header."
+msgstr "Zápis příznaků pro aktivaci do nové hlavičky selhal."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:690 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:694
+msgid "Failed to read requirements from backup header."
+msgstr "Čtení požadavků ze záložní hlavičky selhalo."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:731
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s header backup of device %s created."
+msgstr "Záloha hlavičky %s zařízení %s byla vytvořena."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:789
+msgid "Creation of LUKS backup headers failed."
+msgstr "Záložní hlavičky LUKS se nepodařilo vytvořit."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:918
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot restore %s header on device %s."
+msgstr "Hlavičku %s na zařízení %s nelze obnovit."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:920
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s header on device %s restored."
+msgstr "Hlavička %s na zařízení %s byla obnovena."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:958 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1038
+msgid "Cannot seek to device offset."
+msgstr "Nelze se přesunout na požadované místo v zařízení."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1081
+msgid "Cannot seek to device offset.\n"
+msgstr "Nelze se přesunout na požadované místo v zařízení.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1120 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1126
+msgid "Cannot open temporary LUKS device."
+msgstr "Nelze otevřít dočasné zařízení LUKS."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1131 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1136
+msgid "Cannot get device size."
+msgstr "Velikost zařízení nelze zjistit."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1173
+msgid "Interrupted by a signal."
+msgstr "Přerušeno signálem."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1175
+msgid "IO error during reencryption."
+msgstr "Chyba vstupu/výstupu během přešifrování."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1206
+msgid "Provided UUID is invalid."
+msgstr "Poskytnuté UUID není platné."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1309
+msgid "Key file can be used only with --key-slot or with exactly one key slot active."
+msgstr "Soubor s klíčem lze použít jen s přepínačem --key-slot nebo s právě jednou aktivní pozicí klíče."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1350 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1361
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for key slot %u: "
+msgstr "Zadejte heslo pro pozici klíče %u: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1432
+msgid "Cannot open reencryption log file."
+msgstr "Nelze otevřít soubor s protokolem přešifrování."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1438
+msgid "No decryption in progress, provided UUID can be used only to resume suspended decryption process."
+msgstr "Žádné dešifrování není rozpracované. Poskytnuté UUID lze použít jen k obnovení pozastaveného procesu dešifrování."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1513
+#, c-format
+msgid "Changed pbkdf parameters in keyslot %i."
+msgstr "Parametry PBKDF pro pozici klíče %i změněny."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1620
+msgid "Reencryption block size"
+msgstr "Velikost bloku přešifrování"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1620
+msgid "MiB"
+msgstr "MiB"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1624
+msgid "Do not change key, no data area reencryption"
+msgstr "Nezmění klíč, oblast s daty se nepřešifruje"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1626
+msgid "Read new volume (master) key from file"
+msgstr "Nový (hlavní) klíč svazku načte ze souboru"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1627
+msgid "PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS (in ms)"
+msgstr "Doba opakování PBKDF2 pro LUKS (v ms)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1633
+msgid "Use direct-io when accessing devices"
+msgstr "K zařízením se bude přistupovat pomocí přímého I/O"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1634
+msgid "Use fsync after each block"
+msgstr "Po každém bloku se zavolá fsync"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1635
+msgid "Update log file after every block"
+msgstr "Po každém bloku se aktualizuje soubor s protokolem"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1636
+msgid "Use only this slot (others will be disabled)"
+msgstr "Použije se pouze tato pozice (ostatní budou zakázány)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1639
+msgid "Reduce data device size (move data offset). DANGEROUS!"
+msgstr "Zmenší velikost datového zařízení (posune začátek dat). NEBEZPEČNÉ!"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1640
+msgid "Use only specified device size (ignore rest of device). DANGEROUS!"
+msgstr "Použije zadanou velikost zařízení (ignoruje zbytek zařízení). NEBEZPEČNÉ!"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1641
+msgid "Create new header on not encrypted device"
+msgstr "Vytvoří novou hlavičku na nešifrovaném zařízení"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1642
+msgid "Permanently decrypt device (remove encryption)"
+msgstr "Natrvalo dešifruje zařízení (odstraní šifrování)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1643
+msgid "The UUID used to resume decryption"
+msgstr "UUID, které se použije pro obnovení dešifrování"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1644
+msgid "Type of LUKS metadata: luks1, luks2"
+msgstr "Druh metadat LUKS: luks1, luks2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1663
+msgid "[OPTION...] <device>"
+msgstr "[PŘEPÍNAČ…] <zařízení>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1677
+#, c-format
+msgid "Reencryption will change: %s%s%s%s%s%s."
+msgstr "Přešifrování změní: %s%s%s%s%s%s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1678
+msgid "volume key"
+msgstr "klíč svazku"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1680
+msgid "set hash to "
+msgstr "nastaví haš na "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1681
+msgid ", set cipher to "
+msgstr ", nastaví šifru na "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1685
+msgid "Argument required."
+msgstr "Vyžadován argument."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1713
+msgid "Only values between 1 MiB and 64 MiB allowed for reencryption block size."
+msgstr "Velikost bloku při přešifrování může nabývat hodnot pouze mezi 1 a 64 MiB."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1732 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1737
+msgid "Invalid device size specification."
+msgstr "Zadána neplatná velikost zařízení."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1740
+msgid "Maximum device reduce size is 64 MiB."
+msgstr "Maximální velikost zmenšení zařízení je 64 MiB."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1743
+msgid "Reduce size must be multiple of 512 bytes sector."
+msgstr "Velikost zmenšení musí být násobkem 512bajtových sektorů."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1747
+msgid "Option --new must be used together with --reduce-device-size or --header."
+msgstr "Přepínač --new musí být použit spolu s --reduce-device-size nebo --header."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1751
+msgid "Option --keep-key can be used only with --hash, --iter-time or --pbkdf-force-iterations."
+msgstr "Přepínač --keep-key lze použít jen s přepínači --hash, --iter-time nebo --pbkdf-force-iterations."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1755
+msgid "Option --new cannot be used together with --decrypt."
+msgstr "Přepínač --new nelze být použit spolu s --decrypt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1759
+msgid "Option --decrypt is incompatible with specified parameters."
+msgstr "Přepínač --decrypt se neslučuje se zadanými parametry."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1763
+msgid "Option --uuid is allowed only together with --decrypt."
+msgstr "Přepínač --uuid lze použít jen spolu s přepínačem --decrypt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1767
+msgid "Invalid luks type. Use one of these: 'luks', 'luks1' or 'luks2'."
+msgstr "Neplatný druh LUKS. Použijte jeden z: „luks“, „luks1“ nebo „luks2“"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:150
+msgid "Error reading response from terminal."
+msgstr "Chyba při čtení odpovědi z terminálu."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:175
+msgid "Command successful.\n"
+msgstr "Příkaz úspěšně vykonán.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:183
+msgid "wrong or missing parameters"
+msgstr "špatné nebo chybějící parametry"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:185
+msgid "no permission or bad passphrase"
+msgstr "žádné oprávnění nebo chybné heslo"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:187
+msgid "out of memory"
+msgstr "nedostatek paměti"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:189
+msgid "wrong device or file specified"
+msgstr "zadáno špatné zařízení nebo soubor"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:191
+msgid "device already exists or device is busy"
+msgstr "zařízení již existuje nebo zařízení je zaneprázdněno"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:193
+msgid "unknown error"
+msgstr "neznámá chyba"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:195
+#, c-format
+msgid "Command failed with code %i (%s).\n"
+msgstr "Příkaz selhal s kódem %i (%s).\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:272
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %i created."
+msgstr "Pozice klíče %i vytvořena."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:274
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %i unlocked."
+msgstr "Pozice klíče %i odemknuta."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:276
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %i removed."
+msgstr "Pozice klíče %i odemknuta."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:285
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %i created."
+msgstr "Token %i vytvořen."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:287
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %i removed."
+msgstr "Token %i se odstraněn."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:453
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Device %s already contains a '%s' partition signature.\n"
+msgstr "POZOR: Zařízení %s již obsahuje vzorec oddílu „%s“.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:461
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Device %s already contains a '%s' superblock signature.\n"
+msgstr "POZOR: Zařízení %s již obsahuje vzorec superbloku „%s“.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:482 src/utils_tools.c:546
+msgid "Failed to initialize device signature probes."
+msgstr "Sondu vzorců zařízení se nepodařilo inicializovat."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:526
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to stat device %s."
+msgstr "O zařízení %s nebylo možné zjistit údaje."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:539
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is in use. Can not proceed with format operation."
+msgstr "Zařízení %s se používá. K formátování nelze přikročit."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:541
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to open file %s in read/write mode."
+msgstr "Soubor %s nebylo možné otevřít pro čtení i zápis."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:561
+msgid "Failed to wipe device signature."
+msgstr "Odstranění vzorce ze zařízení selhalo."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:568
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to probe device %s for a signature."
+msgstr "Otestování zařízení %s na vzorce selhalo."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:43 src/utils_password.c:75
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot check password quality: %s"
+msgstr "Odolnost hesla nelze prověřit: %s"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:51
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Password quality check failed:\n"
+" %s"
+msgstr ""
+"Kontrola odolnosti hesla selhala:\n"
+" %s"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:83
+#, c-format
+msgid "Password quality check failed: Bad passphrase (%s)"
+msgstr "Kontrola odolnosti hesla selhala: Špatné heslo (%s)"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:193 src/utils_password.c:208
+msgid "Error reading passphrase from terminal."
+msgstr "Chyba při čtení hesla z terminálu."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:206
+msgid "Verify passphrase: "
+msgstr "Ověřte heslo: "
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:213
+msgid "Passphrases do not match."
+msgstr "Hesla se neshodují."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:250
+msgid "Cannot use offset with terminal input."
+msgstr "Ve vstupu z terminálu nelze měnit polohu."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:253
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase: "
+msgstr "Zadejte heslo: "
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:255
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for %s: "
+msgstr "Zadejte heslo pro %s: "
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:285
+msgid "No key available with this passphrase."
+msgstr "S tímto heslem není dostupný žádný klíč."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:320
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open keyfile %s for write."
+msgstr "Soubor s klíčem %s nelze otevřít pro zápis."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:327
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write to keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Do souboru s klíčem %s nelze zapsat."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:47
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to open file %s in read-only mode."
+msgstr "Soubor %s se nepodařilo otevřít pouze pro čtení."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:60
+msgid "Provide valid LUKS2 token JSON:\n"
+msgstr "Poskytněte JSON s platným tokenem LUKS2:\n"
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:67
+msgid "Failed to read JSON file."
+msgstr "Soubor s dokumentem JSON se nepodařilo přečíst."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:72
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Read interrupted."
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Čtení přerušeno."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:113
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to open file %s in write mode."
+msgstr "Otevření souboru %s pro zápis selhalo."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:122
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Write interrupted."
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Zápis přerušen."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:126
+msgid "Failed to write JSON file."
+msgstr "Zapsaní souboru s dokumentem JSON selhalo."
+
+#~ msgid "Device %s is too small. (LUKS2 requires at least %<PRIu64> bytes.)"
+#~ msgstr "Zařízení %s je příliš malé. (LUKS2 vyžaduje alespoň %<PRIu64> bajtů.)"
+
+#~ msgid "Replaced with key slot %d."
+#~ msgstr "Nahrazeno pozicí klíče %d."
+
+#~ msgid "Missing LUKS target type, option --type is required."
+#~ msgstr "Chybí druh cíle LUKS, je potřeba přepínač --type."
+
+#~ msgid "Missing --token option specifying token for removal."
+#~ msgstr "Chybí přepínač --token určující token, který se má odebrat."
+
+#~ msgid "Failed to remove token %d."
+#~ msgstr "Odebrání tokenu %d selhalo."
+
+#~ msgid "Add or remove keyring token"
+#~ msgstr "Přidá nebo odebere token klíčenky"
+
+#~ msgid "Activated keyslot %i."
+#~ msgstr "Pozice klíče %i aktivována."
+
+#~ msgid "memory allocation error in action_luksFormat"
+#~ msgstr "chyba alokace paměti v action_luksFormat"
+
+#~ msgid "Key slot is invalid.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Pozice klíče není platná.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Using default pbkdf parameters for new LUKS2 header.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Pro novou hlavičku LUKS2 se použije výchozí parametry PBKDF.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Too many tree levels for verity volume.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Příliš mnoho úrovní stromu ve svazku VERITY.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Key %d not active. Can't wipe.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Klíč %d není aktivní. Nelze jej odstranit.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "<name> <data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+#~ msgstr "<název> <zařízení_dat> <zařízení_hašů> <kořenový_haš>"
+
+#~ msgid "create active device"
+#~ msgstr "vytvoří aktivní zařízení"
+
+#~ msgid "remove (deactivate) device"
+#~ msgstr "odstraní (deaktivuje) zařízení"
+
+#~ msgid "Progress: %5.1f%%, ETA %02llu:%02llu, %4llu MiB written, speed %5.1f MiB/s%s"
+#~ msgstr "Průběh: %5.1f %%, ETA %02llu:%02llu, zapsáno %'4llu MiB, rychlost %'5.1f MiB/s%s"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot find a free loopback device.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Nelze najít volné zařízení zpětné smyčky.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot open device %s\n"
+#~ msgstr "Zařízení %s nelze otevřít\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot use passed UUID unless decryption in progress.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Dokud probíhá dešifrování, předaný UUID nelze použít.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Marking LUKS device %s usable.\n"
+#~ msgstr "LUKS zařízení %s se označuje za použitelné.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "WARNING: this is experimental code, it can completely break your data.\n"
+#~ msgstr "POZOR: toto je pokusný kód, může zničit vaše data.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "FIPS checksum verification failed.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Ověření kontrolního součtu FIPS selhalo.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "WARNING: device %s is a partition, for TCRYPT system encryption you usually need to use whole block device path.\n"
+#~ msgstr "POZOR: zařízení %s je oddíl. U systémového šifrování TCRYPT je obvykle třeba použít cestu k celému blokovému zařízení.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Kernel doesn't support plain64 IV.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Jádro nepodporuje inicializační vektor plain64.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Enter LUKS passphrase: "
+#~ msgstr "Zadejte heslo LUKS: "
+
+#~ msgid "Enter new LUKS passphrase: "
+#~ msgstr "Zadejte nové heslo LUKS: "
+
+#~ msgid "Enter any LUKS passphrase: "
+#~ msgstr "Zadejte jakékoliv heslo LUKS: "
+
+#~ msgid "Backup file %s doesn't exist.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Záložní soubor %s neexistuje.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "create device"
+#~ msgstr "vytvoří zařízení"
+
+#~ msgid "remove device"
+#~ msgstr "odstraní zařízení"
+
+#~ msgid "remove LUKS mapping"
+#~ msgstr "odstraní mapování LUKS"
+
+#~ msgid "open loop-AES device as mapping <name>"
+#~ msgstr "otevře zařízení loop-AES jako mapování <název>"
+
+#~ msgid "remove loop-AES mapping"
+#~ msgstr "odstraní mapování loop-AES"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot open device %s for %s%s access.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Zařízení %s nelze otevřít pro %s%s přístup.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "exclusive "
+#~ msgstr "výlučný "
+
+#~ msgid "writable"
+#~ msgstr "zápisový"
+
+#~ msgid "read-only"
+#~ msgstr "jen pro čtení"
+
+#~ msgid "WARNING!!! Possibly insecure memory. Are you root?\n"
+#~ msgstr "POZOR!!! Zřejmě nezabezpečená paměť. Jste root?\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Unable to obtain sector size for %s"
+#~ msgstr "Není možné zjistit velikost sektoru u %s"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot use device %s (crypt segments overlaps or in use by another device).\n"
+#~ msgstr "Zařízení %s nelze použít (šifrované segmenty se překrývají nebo jsou používány jiným zařízením).\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Key slot %d verified.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Pozice klíče %d ověřena.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Block mode XTS is available since kernel 2.6.24.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Blokový režim XTS je dostupný až od jádra 2.6.24.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Key size in LRW mode must be 256 or 512 bits.\n"
+#~ msgstr "V režimu LRW musí být velikost klíče 256 nebo 512 bitů.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Block mode LRW is available since kernel 2.6.20.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Blokový režim LRW je dostupný až od jádra 2.6.20.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Negative keyfile size not permitted.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Záporná velikost souboru s klíčen není dovolena.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Warning: exhausting read requested, but key file is not a regular file, function might never return.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Pozor: požadováno úplné čtení, avšak soubor s klíčem není běžný soubor. Funkce se možná nikdy nevrátí.\n"
diff --git a/po/da.po b/po/da.po
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e9af846
--- /dev/null
+++ b/po/da.po
@@ -0,0 +1,3147 @@
+# Danish translation cryptsetup-1.7.2.da.po.
+# Copyright (C) 2019 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+# This file is distributed under the same license as the cryptsetup package.
+# Joe Hansen <joedalton2@yahoo.dk>, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019.
+#
+# Konventioner
+# deferred -> udskudt
+# iteration -> iteration (gennemløb)
+# probe -> undersøge (bedre mulighed?)
+# reencryption -> omkryptering
+# suspended -> suspenderet (skal det være standset i stedet for?)
+# wipe -> rydde
+#
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: cryptsetup-2.1.0\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: dm-crypt@saout.de\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-01-26 19:02+0100\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2019-02-05 22:30+0200\n"
+"Last-Translator: Joe Hansen <joedalton2@yahoo.dk>\n"
+"Language-Team: Danish <dansk@dansk-gruppen.dk>\n"
+"Language: da\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+"X-Bugs: Report translation errors to the Language-Team address.\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:336
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper, running as non-root user."
+msgstr "Kan ikke initialisere enhedsoversætter, kører som ikke-root bruger."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:339
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper. Is dm_mod kernel module loaded?"
+msgstr "Kan ikke initialisere enhedsoversætter. Er dm_mod-kernemodulet indlæst?"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1010
+msgid "Requested deferred flag is not supported."
+msgstr "Det anmodte udskudte flag er ikke understøttet."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1077
+#, c-format
+msgid "DM-UUID for device %s was truncated."
+msgstr "DM-UUID for enheden %s blev afkortet."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1486
+msgid "Requested dm-crypt performance options are not supported."
+msgstr "Forespurgte dm-crypt-ydelsestilvalg er ikke understøttede."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1493
+msgid "Requested dm-verity data corruption handling options are not supported."
+msgstr "Forespurgte dm-verity-håndteringstilvalg for datakorruption er ikke understøttede."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1497
+msgid "Requested dm-verity FEC options are not supported."
+msgstr "Forespurgte dm-verity FEC-tilvalg er ikke understøttede."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1501
+msgid "Requested data integrity options are not supported."
+msgstr "Forespurgte dataintegritetstilvalg er ikke understøttede."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1503
+msgid "Requested sector_size option is not supported."
+msgstr "Forespurgte sector_size-tilvalg er ikke understøttet."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1508
+msgid "Requested automatic recalculation of integrity tags is not supported."
+msgstr "Forespurgte automatiske genberegning af integritetsmærker er ikke understøttet."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1534
+msgid "Requested dmcrypt performance options are not supported."
+msgstr "Forespurgte dmcrypt-ydelsestilvalg er ikke understøttede."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1537
+msgid "Discard/TRIM is not supported."
+msgstr "Discard/TRIM %s er ikke understøttet."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:2413
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to query dm-%s segment."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke forespørge dm-%s-segment."
+
+#: lib/random.c:80
+msgid ""
+"System is out of entropy while generating volume key.\n"
+"Please move mouse or type some text in another window to gather some random events.\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Systemet har ikke nok entropi til oprettelse af diskenhedsnøgle.\n"
+"Flyt venligst musen eller indtast noget tekst i et andet vindue for at samle nogle vilkårlige hændelser.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:84
+#, c-format
+msgid "Generating key (%d%% done).\n"
+msgstr "Opretter nøgle (%d%% færdig).\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:170
+msgid "Running in FIPS mode."
+msgstr "Kører i FIPS-tilstand."
+
+#: lib/random.c:176
+msgid "Fatal error during RNG initialisation."
+msgstr "Fatal fejl under RNG-initialisering."
+
+#: lib/random.c:213
+msgid "Unknown RNG quality requested."
+msgstr "Der blev anmodt om ukendt RNG-kvalitet."
+
+#: lib/random.c:218
+msgid "Error reading from RNG."
+msgstr "Der opstod en fejl under læsning fra RNG."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:214
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto RNG backend."
+msgstr "Kan ikke initialisere crypto RNG-motor."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:220
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto backend."
+msgstr "Kan ikke initialisere crypto-motor."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:251 lib/setup.c:1899 lib/verity/verity.c:123
+#, c-format
+msgid "Hash algorithm %s not supported."
+msgstr "Hashalgoritmen %s er ikke understøttet."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:254 lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:90
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key processing error (using hash %s)."
+msgstr "Nøglebehandlingsfejl (der bruger hash %s)."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:315 lib/setup.c:342
+msgid "Cannot determine device type. Incompatible activation of device?"
+msgstr "Kan ikke bestemme enhedstype. Er aktivering af enhed ikke kompatibel?"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:321 lib/setup.c:2892
+msgid "This operation is supported only for LUKS device."
+msgstr "Denne operation er kun understøttet for LUKS-enhed."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:348
+msgid "This operation is supported only for LUKS2 device."
+msgstr "Denne operation er kun understøttet for LUKS2-enhed."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:396
+msgid "All key slots full."
+msgstr "Alle nøglepladser er udfyldt."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:407
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select between 0 and %d."
+msgstr "Nøglepladsen %d er ugyldig, vælg venligst mellem 0 og %d."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:413
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is full, please select another one."
+msgstr "Nøglepladsen %d er fuld, vælg venligst en anden."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:589
+#, c-format
+msgid "Header detected but device %s is too small."
+msgstr "Teksthoved registreret men enheden %s er for lille."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:626
+msgid "This operation is not supported for this device type."
+msgstr "Denne operation er ikke understøttet for denne enhedstype."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:791 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:481
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported LUKS version %d."
+msgstr "LUKS-version %d er ikke understøttet."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:808 lib/setup.c:1403 lib/setup.c:1812
+msgid "Detached metadata device is not supported for this crypt type."
+msgstr "Frakoblet metadataenhed er ikke understøttet for denne crypttype."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1288 lib/setup.c:2392 lib/setup.c:2464 lib/setup.c:2476
+#: lib/setup.c:2625 lib/setup.c:4021
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not active."
+msgstr "Enheden %s er ikke aktiv."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1310
+#, c-format
+msgid "Underlying device for crypt device %s disappeared."
+msgstr "Underliggende enhed for cryptenheden %s forsvandt."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1388
+msgid "Invalid plain crypt parameters."
+msgstr "Ugyldige rene crypt-parametre."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1393 lib/setup.c:1802 src/integritysetup.c:72
+msgid "Invalid key size."
+msgstr "Ugyldig nøglestørrelse."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1398 lib/setup.c:1807 lib/setup.c:2009
+msgid "UUID is not supported for this crypt type."
+msgstr "UUID er ikke understøttet for denne crypttype."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1413 lib/setup.c:1603 src/cryptsetup.c:1045
+msgid "Unsupported encryption sector size."
+msgstr "Sektorstørrelsen på krypteringen er ikke understøttet."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1421 lib/setup.c:1720
+msgid "Device size is not aligned to requested sector size."
+msgstr "Enhedsstørrelsen er ikke justeret til den anmodte sektorstørrelse."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1472 lib/setup.c:1591
+msgid "Can't format LUKS without device."
+msgstr "Kan ikke formatere LUKS uden enhed."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1478 lib/setup.c:1597
+msgid "Requested data alignment is not compatible with data offset."
+msgstr "Forespurgte datajustering er ikke kompatibel med dataforskydning."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1546 lib/setup.c:1715
+msgid "WARNING: Data offset is outside of currently available data device.\n"
+msgstr "ADVARSEL: Dataforskydning er uden for nuværende tilgængelig dataenhed.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1556 lib/setup.c:1735 lib/setup.c:1754 lib/setup.c:2021
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe header on device %s."
+msgstr "Kan ikke rydde teksthoved på enheden %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1608
+msgid "WARNING: The device activation will fail, dm-crypt is missing support for requested encryption sector size.\n"
+msgstr "ADVARSEL: Enhedsaktiveringen vil fejle, dm-crypt mangler understøttelse for anmodet størrelse på krypteringssektor.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1630
+msgid "Volume key is too small for encryption with integrity extensions."
+msgstr "Diskenhedsnøglen er for lille til kryptering med integritetsudvidelser."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1685
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cipher %s-%s (key size %zd bits) is not available."
+msgstr "Krypteringsalgoritmen %s-%s (nøglestørrelse %zd bit) er ikke tilgængelig."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1747
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s which is still in use."
+msgstr "Kan ikke formatere enheden %s som stadig er i brug."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1750 lib/setup.c:1775
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "Kan ikke formatere enheden %s, tilladelse nægtet."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1762 lib/setup.c:2073
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format integrity for device %s."
+msgstr "Kan ikke formatere integritet for enheden %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1772
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s in use."
+msgstr "Kan ikke formatere enheden %s i brug."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1779
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s."
+msgstr "Kan ikke formatere enheden %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1797
+msgid "Can't format LOOPAES without device."
+msgstr "Kan ikke formatere LOOPAES uden enhed."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1842
+msgid "Can't format VERITY without device."
+msgstr "Kan ikke formatere VERITY uden enhed."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1853 lib/verity/verity.c:106
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash type %d."
+msgstr "VERITY-hashtypen %d er ikke understøttet."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1859 lib/verity/verity.c:114
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY block size."
+msgstr "VERITY-blokstørrelse er ikke understøttet."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1864 lib/verity/verity.c:75
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash offset."
+msgstr "VERITY-hashforskydning er ikke understøttet."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1869
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY FEC offset."
+msgstr "VERITY FEC-forskydning er ikke understøttet."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1893
+msgid "Data area overlaps with hash area."
+msgstr "Dataområde overlapper med hashområde."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1918
+msgid "Hash area overlaps with FEC area."
+msgstr "Dataområde overlapper med FEC-område."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1925
+msgid "Data area overlaps with FEC area."
+msgstr "Dataområde overlapper med FEC-område."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2130
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unknown crypt device type %s requested."
+msgstr "Der blev anmodt om ukendt crypt-enhedstype %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2398 lib/setup.c:2470 lib/setup.c:2483
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported parameters on device %s."
+msgstr "Ikke understøttede parametre på enheden %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2404 lib/setup.c:2489
+#, c-format
+msgid "Mismatching parameters on device %s."
+msgstr "Parametre matcher ikke på enheden %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2657
+msgid "Cannot resize loop device."
+msgstr "Kan ikke ændre størrelse på loop-enhed."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2666
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s size is not aligned to requested sector size (%u bytes)."
+msgstr "Enhedsstørrelsen for %s er ikke justeret til den anmodte sektorstørrelse (%u byte)."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2725
+msgid "Do you really want to change UUID of device?"
+msgstr "Ønsker du at ændre UUID for enhed?"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2801
+msgid "Header backup file does not contain compatible LUKS header."
+msgstr "Sikkerhedskopifilen indeholder ikke gyldige LUKS-teksthoveder."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2900
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not active."
+msgstr "Diskenheden %s er ikke aktiv."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2911
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is already suspended."
+msgstr "Diskenheden %s er allerede suspenderet."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2925
+#, c-format
+msgid "Suspend is not supported for device %s."
+msgstr "Suspension er ikke understøttet for enheden %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2927
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during suspending device %s."
+msgstr "Fejl under suspension af enheden %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2960 lib/setup.c:3027
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not suspended."
+msgstr "Diskenheden %s er ikke suspenderet."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2989
+#, c-format
+msgid "Resume is not supported for device %s."
+msgstr "Genoptag er ikke understøttet for enheden %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2991 lib/setup.c:3059
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during resuming device %s."
+msgstr "Fejl under genoptagelse af enheden %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3127 lib/setup.c:3315
+msgid "Cannot add key slot, all slots disabled and no volume key provided."
+msgstr "Kan ikke tilføje nøgleplads, alle pladser er deaktiveret og ingen diskenhedsnøgle tilbudt."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3267
+msgid "Failed to swap new key slot."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke swappe ny nøgleplads."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3432 lib/setup.c:3865 lib/setup.c:3878 lib/setup.c:3886
+#: lib/setup.c:3899 lib/setup.c:4198 lib/setup.c:5274
+msgid "Volume key does not match the volume."
+msgstr "Diskenhedsnøgle matcher ikke diskenheden."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3453
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid."
+msgstr "Nøglepladsen %d er ugyldig."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3459
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is not used."
+msgstr "Nøglepladsen %d er ikke brugt."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3478
+msgid "Device header overlaps with data area."
+msgstr "Enhedsteksthoved overlapper med dataområde."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3684 lib/setup.c:3952
+msgid "Device type is not properly initialised."
+msgstr "Enhedstypen er ikke ordentlig initialiseret."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3726
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s, name is invalid or still in use."
+msgstr "Kan ikke bruge enheden %s, navnet er ugyldigt eller stadig i brug."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3729
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s already exists."
+msgstr "Enheden %s findes allerede."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3852
+msgid "Incorrect volume key specified for plain device."
+msgstr "Ukorrekt diskenhedsnøgle specificeret for ren enhed."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3918
+msgid "Incorrect root hash specified for verity device."
+msgstr "Ukorrekt roothash specificeret for verity-enhed."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3995 lib/setup.c:4010
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is still in use."
+msgstr "Enheden %s er stadig i brug."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4025
+#, c-format
+msgid "Invalid device %s."
+msgstr "Ugyldig enhed %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4134
+msgid "Function not available in FIPS mode."
+msgstr "Funkton er ikke tilgængelig i FIPS-tilstand."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4148
+msgid "Volume key buffer too small."
+msgstr "Diskenhedsnøglebuffer er for lille."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4156
+msgid "Cannot retrieve volume key for plain device."
+msgstr "Kan ikke indhente diskenhedsnøgle for ren enhed."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4167
+#, c-format
+msgid "This operation is not supported for %s crypt device."
+msgstr "Denne operation er ikke understøttet for %s crypt-enhed."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4354
+msgid "Dump operation is not supported for this device type."
+msgstr "Dump-operation er ikke understøttet for denne enhedstype."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4930
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert device %s which is still in use."
+msgstr "Kan ikke konvertere enheden %s som stadig er i brug."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5213
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign keyslot %u as the new volume key."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke tildele nøglepladsen %u som den nye diskenhedsnøgle."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5280
+msgid "Failed to initialise default LUKS2 keyslot parameters."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke initialisere standardparametre for LUKS2-nøgleplads."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5286
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign keyslot %d to digest."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke tildele nøglepladsen %d til sammendrag."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5370
+msgid "Failed to load key in kernel keyring."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke indlæse nøgle i kernenøglefil."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5425
+msgid "Kernel keyring is not supported by the kernel."
+msgstr "Kernenøglering er ikke understøttet af kernen."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5435
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read passphrase from keyring (error %d)."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke læse adgangsfrase fra nøglering (fejl %d)."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:81
+msgid "Cannot get process priority."
+msgstr "Kan ikke indhente procesprioritet."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:95
+msgid "Cannot unlock memory."
+msgstr "Kan ikke låse hukommelsen op."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:169 lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:498
+msgid "Failed to open key file."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke åbne nøglefil."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:174
+msgid "Cannot read keyfile from a terminal."
+msgstr "Kan ikke læse nøglefilen fra en terminal."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:191
+msgid "Failed to stat key file."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke køre stat på nøglefil."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:199 lib/utils.c:220
+msgid "Cannot seek to requested keyfile offset."
+msgstr "Kan ikke søge til anmodte nøglefilsforskydning."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:214 lib/utils.c:229 src/utils_password.c:188
+#: src/utils_password.c:201
+msgid "Out of memory while reading passphrase."
+msgstr "Ikke nok hukommelse under læsning af adgangsfrase."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:249
+msgid "Error reading passphrase."
+msgstr "Der opstod en fejl under læsning af adgangsfrase."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:266
+msgid "Nothing to read on input."
+msgstr "Intet at læse på inddata."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:273
+msgid "Maximum keyfile size exceeded."
+msgstr "Nøglefilsstørrelsen er over maksimum."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:278
+msgid "Cannot read requested amount of data."
+msgstr "Kan ikke læse den anmodte datamængde."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:184 lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:92
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s doesn't exist or access denied."
+msgstr "Enheden %s findes ikke eller adgang nægtet."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:194
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not compatible."
+msgstr "Enheden %s er ikke kompatibel."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:560
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small. Need at least %<PRIu64> bytes."
+msgstr "Enheden %s er for lille. Kræver mindst %<PRIu64> byte."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:641
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s which is in use (already mapped or mounted)."
+msgstr "Kan ikke bruge enheden %s som er i brug (allerede kortlagt eller monteret)."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:645
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "Kan ikke bruge enheden %s, tilladelse nægtet."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:648
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot get info about device %s."
+msgstr "Kan ikke indhente information om enheden %s."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:671
+msgid "Cannot use a loopback device, running as non-root user."
+msgstr "Kan ikke bruge en loopback-enhed, kører som ikke-root bruger."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:681
+msgid "Attaching loopback device failed (loop device with autoclear flag is required)."
+msgstr "Vedhæftelse af loopback-enhed mislykkedes (loop-enhed med flaget autoclear er krævet)."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:727
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested offset is beyond real size of device %s."
+msgstr "Anmodt forskydning er mere end den reelle størrelse for enheden %s."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:735
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s has zero size."
+msgstr "Enheden %s har nul størrelse."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:746 lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:252
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small."
+msgstr "Enheden %s er for lille."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:100
+msgid "Requested PBKDF target time cannot be zero."
+msgstr "Anmodte PBKDF-måltidspunkt kan ikke være nul."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:106
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unknown PBKDF type %s."
+msgstr "Ukendt PBKDF-type %s."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:111
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested hash %s is not supported."
+msgstr "Den anmodte hash %s er ikke understøttet."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:122
+msgid "Requested PBKDF type is not supported for LUKS1."
+msgstr "Den anmodte PBKDF-type er ikke understøttet for LUKS1."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:128
+msgid "PBKDF max memory or parallel threads must not be set with pbkdf2."
+msgstr "PBKDF maks hukommelse eller parallelle tråde må ikke angives med pbkdf2."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:133 lib/utils_pbkdf.c:143
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forced iteration count is too low for %s (minimum is %u)."
+msgstr "Tvungen iterationantal er for lavt for %s (minimum er %u)."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:148
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forced memory cost is too low for %s (minimum is %u kilobytes)."
+msgstr "Tvungen hukommelsesomkostning er for lav for %s (minimum er %u kilobyte)."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:155
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested maximum PBKDF memory cost is too high (maximum is %d kilobytes)."
+msgstr "Anmodte maksimal PBKDF-hukommelsesomkostning er for høj (maksimum er %d kilobyte)."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:160
+msgid "Requested maximum PBKDF memory cannot be zero."
+msgstr "Anmodte maksimal PBKDF-hukommelse kan ikke være nul."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:164
+msgid "Requested PBKDF parallel threads cannot be zero."
+msgstr "Anmodte PBKDF parallelle tråde kan ikke være nul."
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:317
+msgid "PBKDF benchmark disabled but iterations not set."
+msgstr "PBKDF-sammenligning deaktiveret men iterationer er ikke angivet."
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:336
+#, c-format
+msgid "Not compatible PBKDF2 options (using hash algorithm %s)."
+msgstr "Ikke kompatible PBKDF2-tilvalg (der bruger hash-algoritme %s)."
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:356
+msgid "Not compatible PBKDF options."
+msgstr "Ikke kompatible PBKDF2-tilvalg."
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:80
+#, c-format
+msgid "Locking aborted. The locking path %s/%s is unusable (not a directory or missing)."
+msgstr "Låsning afbrudt. Låsestien %s/%s kan ikke bruges (ikke en mappe eller mangler)."
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:87
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Locking directory %s/%s is missing!\n"
+msgstr "ADVARSEL: Låsemappen %s/%s mangler!\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:97
+#, c-format
+msgid "Locking aborted. The locking path %s/%s is unusable (%s is not a directory)."
+msgstr "Låsning afbrudt. Låsestien %s/%s kan ikke bruges (%s er ikke en mappe)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:40
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Failed to setup dm-crypt key mapping for device %s.\n"
+"Check that kernel supports %s cipher (check syslog for more info)."
+msgstr ""
+"Kunne ikke opsætte dm-crypt nøgleoversættelse for enheden %s.\n"
+"Kontroller at kernen understøtter krypteringsalgoritmen %s (kontroller syslog for yderligere information)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:45
+msgid "Key size in XTS mode must be 256 or 512 bits."
+msgstr "Nøglestørrelse i XTS-tilstand skal være 256- eller 512-bit."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:47
+msgid "Cipher specification should be in [cipher]-[mode]-[iv] format."
+msgstr "Specifikation for krypteringsalgoritme skal være i [cipher]-[mode]-[iv]-format."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:98 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:345
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:642 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1079
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1157 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:448
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write to device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "Kan ikke skrive til enheden %s, tilladelse nægtet."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:120
+msgid "Failed to open temporary keystore device."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke åbne midlertidig nøglelagerenhed."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:127
+msgid "Failed to access temporary keystore device."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke tilgå midlertidig nøglelagerenhed."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:200 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:91
+msgid "IO error while encrypting keyslot."
+msgstr "IO-fejl under kryptering af nøgleplads."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:243 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:348
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:594 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:645 lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:663
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:81 lib/verity/verity.c:182 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:308
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:319 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:339
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:242 lib/verity/verity_fec.c:254
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:259 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1160
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:208
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open device %s."
+msgstr "Kan ikke åbne enheden %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:254 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:152
+msgid "IO error while decrypting keyslot."
+msgstr "IO-fejl under dekryptering af nøgleplads."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:111
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small. (LUKS1 requires at least %<PRIu64> bytes.)"
+msgstr "Enheden %s er for lille. (LUKS1 kræver mindst %<PRIu64> byte.)"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:132 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:140
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:152 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:163
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:175
+#, c-format
+msgid "LUKS keyslot %u is invalid."
+msgstr "LUKS-nøgleplads %u er ugyldig."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:228 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:478
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:991 src/cryptsetup.c:1236
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1355 src/cryptsetup.c:1412 src/cryptsetup.c:1468
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1535 src/cryptsetup.c:1631 src/cryptsetup.c:1695
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1855 src/cryptsetup.c:2044 src/cryptsetup.c:2104
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2170 src/cryptsetup.c:2334 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1397
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."
+msgstr "Enheden %s er ikke en gyldig LUKS-enhed."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:247 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1010
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested header backup file %s already exists."
+msgstr "Den anmodte sikkerhedskopifil %s for teksthoveder findes allerede."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:249 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1012
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Kan ikke oprette sikkerhedskopifilen %s for teksthoveder."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:254 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1017
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Kan ikke skrive sikkerhedskopifilen %sf for teksthoveder."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:287 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1066
+msgid "Backup file doesn't contain valid LUKS header."
+msgstr "Sikkerhedskopifilen indeholder ikke gyldige LUKS-teksthoveder."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:300 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:555
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1087
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Kan ikke åbne sikkerhedskopifilen %s for teksthoveder."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:306 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1093
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Kan ikke læse sikkerhedskopifilen %s for teksthoveder."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:318
+msgid "Data offset or key size differs on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "Dataforskydning eller nøglestørrelse er forskellige på enhed eller sikkerhedskopi, gendannelse mislykkedes."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:326
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s %s%s"
+msgstr "Enheden %s %s%s"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:327
+msgid "does not contain LUKS header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device."
+msgstr "indeholder ikke LUKS-teksthoveder. Erstatning af teksthoved kan ødelægge data på den enhed."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:328
+msgid "already contains LUKS header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."
+msgstr "indeholder allerede LUKS-teksthoveder. Erstatning af teksthoveder vil ødelægge eksisterende nøglepladser."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:329 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1129
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: real device header has different UUID than backup!"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"ADVARSEL: reel enhedsteksthoved har en anden UUID end sikkerhedskopien!"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:381
+msgid "Non standard key size, manual repair required."
+msgstr "Nøglestørrelsen følger ikke standarden, en manuel reparation er krævet."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:386
+msgid "Non standard keyslots alignment, manual repair required."
+msgstr "Nøglepladsopstillingen følger ikke standarden, en manuel reparation er krævet."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:396
+msgid "Repairing keyslots."
+msgstr "Reparerer nøglepladser."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:415
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: offset repaired (%u -> %u)."
+msgstr "Nøgleplads %i: forskydning repareret (%u -> %u)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:423
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: stripes repaired (%u -> %u)."
+msgstr "Nøgleplads %i: striber (»stripes«) repareret (%u -> %u)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:432
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: bogus partition signature."
+msgstr "Nøgleplads %i: falsk partitionssignatur."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:437
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: salt wiped."
+msgstr "Nøgleplads %i: salt ryddet."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:454
+msgid "Writing LUKS header to disk."
+msgstr "Skriver LUKS-teksthovedet til disken."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:459
+msgid "Repair failed."
+msgstr "Reparation mislykkedes."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:487 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:758
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested LUKS hash %s is not supported."
+msgstr "Den anmodte LUKS-hash %s er ikke understøttet."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:515 src/cryptsetup.c:960
+msgid "No known problems detected for LUKS header."
+msgstr "Ingen kendte problemer registreret for LUKS-teksthoved."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:667
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during update of LUKS header on device %s."
+msgstr "Fejl under opdatering af LUKS-teksthoved på enheden %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:676
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error re-reading LUKS header after update on device %s."
+msgstr "Fejl under genlæsning af LUKS-teksthoved efter opdatering på enheden %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:752
+msgid "Data offset for LUKS header must be either 0 or higher than header size."
+msgstr "Dataforskydning for LUKS-teksthoved skal være enten 0 eller højere end teksthovedstørrelse."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:763 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:828
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:207 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:909
+msgid "Wrong LUKS UUID format provided."
+msgstr "Forkert LUKS UUID-format anført."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:786
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: reading random salt failed."
+msgstr "Kan ikke oprette LUKS-teksthoved: læsning af vilkårlig salt mislykkedes."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:807
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: header digest failed (using hash %s)."
+msgstr "Kan ikke oprette LUKS-teksthoved: Teksthovedsammendrag mislykkedes (bruger hash %s)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:851
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d active, purge first."
+msgstr "Nøgleplads %d aktiv, nulstil (purge) den først."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:857
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d material includes too few stripes. Header manipulation?"
+msgstr "Nøgleplads %d-materiale inkluderer for få striber (»stribes«). Teksthovedmanipulering?"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1065
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select keyslot between 0 and %d."
+msgstr "Nøgleplads %d er ugyldig, vælg nøgleplads mellem 0 og %d."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1083 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:452
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe device %s."
+msgstr "Kan ikke rydde enheden %s."
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:146
+msgid "Detected not yet supported GPG encrypted keyfile."
+msgstr "Registreret endnu ikke understøttet GPG-krypteret nøglefil."
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:147
+msgid "Please use gpg --decrypt <KEYFILE> | cryptsetup --keyfile=- ...\n"
+msgstr "Brug venligst gpg --decrypt <NØGLEFIL> | cryptsetup --keyfile=- ...\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:168 lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:188
+msgid "Incompatible loop-AES keyfile detected."
+msgstr "Ikke kompatibel loop-AES-nøglefil registreret."
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:245
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support loop-AES compatible mapping."
+msgstr "Kerne understøtter ikke loop-AES-kompatibel oversættelse."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:505
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error reading keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Fejl under læsning af nøglefilen %s."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:545
+#, c-format
+msgid "Maximum TCRYPT passphrase length (%d) exceeded."
+msgstr "Den maksimale længde for TCRYPT-adgangsfrasen (%d) er overskredet."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:586
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2 hash algorithm %s not available, skipping."
+msgstr "PBKDF2-hashalgoritmen %s er ikke tilgængelig, udelader."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:604 src/cryptsetup.c:915
+msgid "Required kernel crypto interface not available."
+msgstr "Krævet kernegrænseflade for crypto er ikke tilgængelig."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:606 src/cryptsetup.c:917
+msgid "Ensure you have algif_skcipher kernel module loaded."
+msgstr "Sikr dig at du har kernemodulet algif_skcipher indlæst."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:746
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activation is not supported for %d sector size."
+msgstr "Aktivering er endnu ikke understøttet for %d sektorstørrelse."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:752
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support activation for this TCRYPT legacy mode."
+msgstr "Kerne understøtter ikke aktivering for denne TCRYPT legacy-tilstand."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:786
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activating TCRYPT system encryption for partition %s."
+msgstr "Aktivering af TCRYPT-systemkryptering for partition %s."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:864
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support TCRYPT compatible mapping."
+msgstr "Kerne undersøtter ikke TCRYPT-kompatibel oversættelse."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:1085
+msgid "This function is not supported without TCRYPT header load."
+msgstr "Denne funktion er ikke understøttet uden TCRYPT-teksthovedindlæsning."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:69 lib/verity/verity.c:175
+#, c-format
+msgid "Verity device %s doesn't use on-disk header."
+msgstr "Verity-enheden %s bruger ikke on-disk-teksthoved."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:94
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not a valid VERITY device."
+msgstr "Enheden %s er ikke en gyldig VERITY-enhed."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:101
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY version %d."
+msgstr "Ikke understøttet VERITY-version %d."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:132
+msgid "VERITY header corrupted."
+msgstr "VERITY-teksthovedet er ødelagt."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:169
+#, c-format
+msgid "Wrong VERITY UUID format provided on device %s."
+msgstr "Forkert VERITY UUID-format indeholdt på enheden %s."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:202
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during update of verity header on device %s."
+msgstr "Fejl under opdatering af verity-teksthoved på enheden %s."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:266
+msgid "Errors cannot be repaired with FEC device."
+msgstr "Fejl kan ikke repareres med FEC-enhed."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:268
+#, c-format
+msgid "Found %u repairable errors with FEC device."
+msgstr "Fandt %u fejl der kan repareres med FEC-enhed."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:306
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support dm-verity mapping."
+msgstr "Kerne understøtter ikke dm-verity-oversættelse."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:317
+msgid "Verity device detected corruption after activation."
+msgstr "Verity-enheden registrerede korruption efter aktivering."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:59
+#, c-format
+msgid "Spare area is not zeroed at position %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Ledigt område nulstilles ikke (»not zeroed«) på position %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:160 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:287
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:300
+msgid "Device offset overflow."
+msgstr "Forskydningsoverløb for enhed."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:200
+#, c-format
+msgid "Verification failed at position %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Verificering mislykkedes på position %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:273
+msgid "Invalid size parameters for verity device."
+msgstr "Ugyldig størrelse for parametre for verity-enhed."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:293
+msgid "Hash area overflow."
+msgstr "Hashområdeoverløb."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:370
+msgid "Verification of data area failed."
+msgstr "Verifikation af dataområde mislykkedes."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:375
+msgid "Verification of root hash failed."
+msgstr "Verifikation af root-hash mislykkedes."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:381
+msgid "Input/output error while creating hash area."
+msgstr "Inddata/uddata-fejl under oprettelse af hash-område."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:383
+msgid "Creation of hash area failed."
+msgstr "Oprettelse af hash-område mislykkedes."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:430
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Kernel cannot activate device if data block size exceeds page size (%u)."
+msgstr "ADVARSEL: Kerne kan ikke aktivere enhed hvis dataenes blokstørrelse er større end sidestørrelsen (%u)."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:132
+msgid "Failed to allocate RS context."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke allokere RS-kontekst."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:147
+msgid "Failed to allocate buffer."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke allokere buffer."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:157
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read RS block %<PRIu64> byte %d."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke læse RS-blok %<PRIu64> byte %d."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:170
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read parity for RS block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke læse paritet for RS-blok %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:178
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to repair parity for block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke reparere paritet for blok %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:189
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to write parity for RS block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke skrive paritet for RS-blok %<PRIu64>.."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:224
+msgid "Block sizes must match for FEC."
+msgstr "Blokstørrelser skal matche for FEC."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:230
+msgid "Invalid number of parity bytes."
+msgstr "Ugyldigt antal paritetsbyte."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:266
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to determine size for device %s."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke bestemme størrelsen på enheden %s."
+
+#: lib/integrity/integrity.c:239 lib/integrity/integrity.c:304
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support dm-integrity mapping."
+msgstr "Kerne understøtter ikke dm-verity-oversættelse."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:413
+msgid "Failed to acquire write device lock."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke indhente skrivelås for enheden."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:654 lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:675
+msgid ""
+"Device contains ambiguous signatures, cannot auto-recover LUKS2.\n"
+"Please run \"cryptsetup repair\" for recovery."
+msgstr ""
+"Enhed indeholder tvetydige signaturer, kan ikke gendanne LUKS2 automatisk.\n"
+"Kør venligst »cryptsetup repair« for gendannelse."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:99
+msgid "No space for new keyslot."
+msgstr "Ingen plads for ny nøgleplads."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:158
+msgid "Requested data offset is too small."
+msgstr "Forespurgt dataforskydning er for lille."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:195
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: keyslots area (%<PRIu64> bytes) is very small, available LUKS2 keyslot count is very limited.\n"
+msgstr "ADVARSEL: nøglepladsområde (%<PRIu64> byte) er meget lille, tilgængelig LUKS2-nøglepladsantal er meget begrænset.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:866 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:982
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1055 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:105
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:128
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to acquire read lock on device %s."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke indhente læselås på enheden %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:878 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1149
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:431 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:40
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:69
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to acquire write lock on device %s."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke indhente skrivelås på enheden %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1072
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forbidden LUKS2 requirements detected in backup %s."
+msgstr "Forbudt LUKS2-krav registreret i sikkerhedskopien %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1113
+msgid "Data offset differ on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "Dataforskydning er forskellig på enhed eller sikkerhedskopi, gendannelse mislykkedes."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1119
+msgid "Binary header with keyslot areas size differ on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "Binær teksthoved med nøglepladsområdestørrelse er forskellige på enhed eller sikkerhedskopi, gendannelse mislykkedes."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1126
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s %s%s%s%s"
+msgstr "Enheden %s %s%s%s%s"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1127
+msgid "does not contain LUKS2 header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device."
+msgstr "indeholder ikke LUKS2-teksthoveder. Erstatning af teksthoved kan ødelægge data på den enhed."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1128
+msgid "already contains LUKS2 header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."
+msgstr "indeholder allerede LUKS2-teksthoveder. Erstatning af teksthoveder vil ødelægge eksisterende nøglepladser."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1130
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: unknown LUKS2 requirements detected in real device header!\n"
+"Replacing header with backup may corrupt the data on that device!"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"ADVARSEL: Ukendte LUKS2-krav registreret i reel enhedsteksthoved!\n"
+"Erstatning af teksthoved med sikkerhedskopi kan ødelægge data på den enhed!"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1132
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: Unfinished offline reencryption detected on the device!\n"
+"Replacing header with backup may corrupt data."
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"ADVARSEL: Ufærdig frakoblet omkryptering registreret på enheden!\n"
+"Erstatning af teksthoved med sikkerhedskopi kan ødelægge data."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1234
+#, c-format
+msgid "Ignored unknown flag %s."
+msgstr "Ignorerede ukendt flag %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1869
+msgid "Failed to read LUKS2 requirements."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke læse LUKS2-krav."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1876
+msgid "Unmet LUKS2 requirements detected."
+msgstr "Uopfyldte LUKS2-krav registreret."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1884
+msgid "Offline reencryption in progress. Aborting."
+msgstr "Frakoblet omkryptering i gang. Afbryder."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:474
+#, c-format
+msgid "Can not check status of device with uuid: %s."
+msgstr "Kan ikke kontrollere status for enheden med uuid: %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:500
+msgid "Unable to convert header with LUKSMETA additional metadata."
+msgstr "Kan ikke konvertere teksthoved med yderligere metadata for LUKSMETA."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:537
+msgid "Unable to move keyslot area. Not enough space."
+msgstr "Kan ikke flytte nøglepladsområde. Ikke nok plads."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:577 lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:854
+msgid "Unable to move keyslot area."
+msgstr "Kan ikke flytte nøglepladsområde."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:672
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - key slot digests are not LUKS1 compatible."
+msgstr "Kan ikke konverterer til LUKS1-format - nøglepladssammendrag er ikke LUKS1-kompatibel."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:684
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - device uses wrapped key cipher %s."
+msgstr ""
+"Kan ikke konverterer til LUKS1-format - enheden bruger omsluttet\n"
+"nøglekrypteringsalgoritme %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:692
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - LUKS2 header contains %u token(s)."
+msgstr ""
+"Kan ikke konverterer til LUKS1-format - LUKS2-teksthoved indeholder\n"
+"%u symboler (tokens)."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:706
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - keyslot %u is in invalid state."
+msgstr "Kan ikke konvertere til LUKS1-format - nøgleplads %u er i ugyldig tilstand."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:711
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - slot %u (over maximum slots) is still active."
+msgstr ""
+"Kan ikke konverterer til LUKS1-format - plads %u (over maksimalt antal pladser)\n"
+"er stadig aktiv."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:716
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - keyslot %u is not LUKS1 compatible."
+msgstr ""
+"Kan ikke konvertere til LUKS1-format - nøglepladsen %u er ikke\n"
+"LUKS1-kompatibel."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_token.c:262
+msgid "No free token slot."
+msgstr "Ingen frie symbolpladser."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_token.c:269
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to create builtin token %s."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke oprette indbygget symbol %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:141
+msgid "Can't do passphrase verification on non-tty inputs."
+msgstr "Kan ikke udføre verificering af adgangsfrase på ikke-tty-inddata."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:182
+msgid "Keyslot encryption parameters can be set only for LUKS2 device."
+msgstr "Parametre til kryptering af nøgleplads kan kun angives for LUKS2-enhed."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:212 src/cryptsetup.c:849 src/cryptsetup.c:1088
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:749 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:814
+msgid "No known cipher specification pattern detected."
+msgstr "Ikke kendt specifikationsmønster for krypteringsalgoritme registreret."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:220
+msgid "WARNING: The --hash parameter is being ignored in plain mode with keyfile specified.\n"
+msgstr "ADVARSEL: Parameteren --hash bliver ignoreret i ren (plain) tilstand med nøglefil specificeret.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:228
+msgid "WARNING: The --keyfile-size option is being ignored, the read size is the same as the encryption key size.\n"
+msgstr "ADVARSEL: Tilvalget --keyfile-size bliver ignoreret, læsestørrelsen er den samme som størrelsen for krypteringsnøglen.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:268
+#, c-format
+msgid "Detected device signature(s) on %s. Proceeding further may damage existing data."
+msgstr "Registrerede enhedssignaturer på %s. Videre behanding kan beskadige eksisterende data."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:274 src/cryptsetup.c:969 src/cryptsetup.c:1065
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1138 src/cryptsetup.c:1763 src/integritysetup.c:230
+msgid "Operation aborted.\n"
+msgstr "Operation afbrudt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:342
+msgid "Option --key-file is required."
+msgstr "Tilvalget --key-file er krævet."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:395
+msgid "Enter VeraCrypt PIM: "
+msgstr "Indtast VeraCrypt-PIM: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:404
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: parse error."
+msgstr "Ugyldig PIM-værdi: fortolkningsfejl."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:407
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: 0."
+msgstr "Ugyldig PIM-værdi: 0."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:410
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: outside of range."
+msgstr "Ugyldig PIM-værdi: uden for interval."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:433
+msgid "No device header detected with this passphrase."
+msgstr "Intet enhedsteksthoved registreret med denne adgangsfrase."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:495 src/cryptsetup.c:1790
+msgid ""
+"Header dump with volume key is sensitive information\n"
+"which allows access to encrypted partition without passphrase.\n"
+"This dump should be always stored encrypted on safe place."
+msgstr ""
+"Teksthoveddump med diskenhedsnøgle er sensitiv information\n"
+"som giver adgang til krypteret partition uden adgangsfrase.\n"
+"Dette dump bør altid lagres krypteret et sikkert sted."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:574
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is still active and scheduled for deferred removal.\n"
+msgstr "Enheden %s er stadig aktiv og planlagt til udskudt fjernelse.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:602
+msgid "Resize of active device requires volume key in keyring but --disable-keyring option is set."
+msgstr "Ændring af størrelse på aktiv enhed kræver diskenhedsnøgle i nøglering men tilvalget --disable-keyring er ikke angivet."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:727
+msgid "Benchmark interrupted."
+msgstr "Sammenligning afbrudt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:748
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2-%-9s     N/A\n"
+msgstr "PBKDF2-%-9s     -\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:750
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2-%-9s %7u iterations per second for %zu-bit key\n"
+msgstr "PBKDF2-%-9s %7u iterationer per sekund for %zu-bit nøgle\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:764
+#, c-format
+msgid "%-10s N/A\n"
+msgstr "%-10s .\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:766
+#, c-format
+msgid "%-10s %4u iterations, %5u memory, %1u parallel threads (CPUs) for %zu-bit key (requested %u ms time)\n"
+msgstr "%-10s %4u iterationer, %5u hukommelse, %1u parallelle tråde (CPU'er) for %zu-bit nøgle (anmodet %u ms time)\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:790
+msgid "Result of benchmark is not reliable."
+msgstr "Sammenligningens resultat er ikke troværdigt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:841
+msgid "# Tests are approximate using memory only (no storage IO).\n"
+msgstr "# Test bruger kun hukommelse omtrentlig (ingen lager-IO).\n"
+
+#. TRANSLATORS: The string is header of a table and must be exactly (right side) aligned.
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:875
+#, c-format
+msgid "#%*s Algorithm |       Key |      Encryption |      Decryption\n"
+msgstr "#%*s Algoritme |     Nøgle |      Kryptering |    Dekryptering\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:879
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cipher %s is not available."
+msgstr "Krypteringsalgoritmen %s er ikke tilgængelig."
+
+#. TRANSLATORS: The string is header of a table and must be exactly (right side) aligned.
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:899
+msgid "#     Algorithm |       Key |      Encryption |      Decryption\n"
+msgstr "#     Algoritme |       Nøgle |    Kryptering |    Dekryptering\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:908
+msgid "N/A"
+msgstr "-"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:968
+msgid "Really try to repair LUKS device header?"
+msgstr "Skal LUKS-enhedsteksthovedet forsøges repareres?"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:984 src/integritysetup.c:144
+msgid ""
+"Wiping device to initialize integrity checksum.\n"
+"You can interrupt this by pressing CTRL+c (rest of not wiped device will contain invalid checksum).\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Rydder enhed for at initialisere integritetskontrolsum.\n"
+"Du kan afbryde dette ved at trykke på CTRL+c (resten af ikke ryddet enhed vil indeholder ugyldig kontrolsum).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1006 src/integritysetup.c:166
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot deactivate temporary device %s."
+msgstr "Kan ikke deaktivere midlertidig enhed %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1050
+msgid "Integrity option can be used only for LUKS2 format."
+msgstr "Integritetstilvalg kan kun bruges for LUKS2-format."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1055 src/cryptsetup.c:1115
+msgid "Unsupported LUKS2 metadata size options."
+msgstr "Indstillinger for LUKS2-metadatastørrelse er ikke understøttet."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1072
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create header file %s."
+msgstr "Kan ikke oprette teksthovedfilen %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1095 src/integritysetup.c:192 src/integritysetup.c:201
+#: src/integritysetup.c:210 src/integritysetup.c:276 src/integritysetup.c:285
+#: src/integritysetup.c:295
+msgid "No known integrity specification pattern detected."
+msgstr "Ikke kendt specifikationsmønster for krypteringsalgoritme registreret."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1108
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use %s as on-disk header."
+msgstr "Kan ikke bruge %s på on-disk-teksthoved."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1132 src/integritysetup.c:224
+#, c-format
+msgid "This will overwrite data on %s irrevocably."
+msgstr "Dette vil uigenkaldeligt overskrive data på %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1173 src/cryptsetup.c:1484 src/cryptsetup.c:1551
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1646 src/cryptsetup.c:1712
+msgid "Failed to set pbkdf parameters."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke angive pbkdf-parametre."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1242
+msgid "Reduced data offset is allowed only for detached LUKS header."
+msgstr "Reduceret dataforskydning er kun tilladt for frakoblet LUKS-teksthoved."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1284
+msgid "Device activated but cannot make flags persistent."
+msgstr "Enhed aktiveret men kan ikke gøre flag vedvarende."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1365
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %d is selected for deletion."
+msgstr "Nøgleplads %d valgt for sletning."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1368 src/cryptsetup.c:1706
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %d is not active."
+msgstr "Nøglepladsen %d er ikke aktiv."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1377 src/cryptsetup.c:1438
+msgid "This is the last keyslot. Device will become unusable after purging this key."
+msgstr "Dette er den sidste nøgleplads. Enheden vil blive ubrugelig efter fjernelse af denne nøgle."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1378
+msgid "Enter any remaining passphrase: "
+msgstr "Indtast en eventuel tilbageværende adgangsfrase: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1379 src/cryptsetup.c:1440
+msgid "Operation aborted, the keyslot was NOT wiped.\n"
+msgstr "Operation afbrudt, nøglepladsen var IKKE ryddet.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1417
+msgid "Enter passphrase to be deleted: "
+msgstr "Indtast adgangsfrase som skal slettes: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1435
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d selected for deletion."
+msgstr "Nøgleplads %d valgt for sletning."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1498 src/cryptsetup.c:1565 src/cryptsetup.c:1599
+msgid "Enter new passphrase for key slot: "
+msgstr "Indtast ny adgangsfrase for nøgleplads: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1582 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1352
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter any existing passphrase: "
+msgstr "Indtast en eventuel eksisterende adgangsfrase: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1650
+msgid "Enter passphrase to be changed: "
+msgstr "Indtast adgangsfrase som skal ændres: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1666 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1338
+msgid "Enter new passphrase: "
+msgstr "Indtast ny adgangsfrase: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1716
+msgid "Enter passphrase for keyslot to be converted: "
+msgstr "Indtast adgangsfrase for nøgleplads til konvertering: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1740
+msgid "Only one device argument for isLuks operation is supported."
+msgstr "Kun et enhedsargument for isLuks-operation er understøttet."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1924 src/cryptsetup.c:1945
+msgid "Option --header-backup-file is required."
+msgstr "Tilvalget --header-backup-file er krævet."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1975
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s is not cryptsetup managed device."
+msgstr "%s er ikke en cryptsetup-håndteret enhed."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1986
+#, c-format
+msgid "Refresh is not supported for device type %s"
+msgstr "Opdater er ikke understøttet for enhedstypen %s"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2024
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unrecognized metadata device type %s."
+msgstr "Metadataenhedstypen %s blev ikke genkendt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2027
+msgid "Command requires device and mapped name as arguments."
+msgstr "Kommandoen kræver enhedsnavn og oversat navn som argumenter."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2049
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"This operation will erase all keyslots on device %s.\n"
+"Device will become unusable after this operation."
+msgstr ""
+"Denne operation vil slette alle nøglepladser på enheden %s.\n"
+"Enheden vil blive ubrugelig efter denne operation."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2056
+msgid "Operation aborted, keyslots were NOT wiped.\n"
+msgstr "Operation afbrudt, nøglepladser blev IKKE fjernet (wiped).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2093
+msgid "Invalid LUKS type, only luks1 and luks2 are supported."
+msgstr "Ugyldig LUKS-type, kun luks1 og luks2 er understøttet."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2111
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device is already %s type."
+msgstr "Enheden er allerede %s-type."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2116
+#, c-format
+msgid "This operation will convert %s to %s format.\n"
+msgstr "Denne operation vil konvertere %s til %s-format.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2122
+msgid "Operation aborted, device was NOT converted.\n"
+msgstr "Operation afbrudt, enheden blev IKKE konverteret.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2162
+msgid "Option --priority, --label or --subsystem is missing."
+msgstr "Tilvalget --priority, --label eller --subsystem mangler."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2196 src/cryptsetup.c:2229 src/cryptsetup.c:2252
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %d is invalid."
+msgstr "Symbolet %d er ugyldigt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2199 src/cryptsetup.c:2255
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %d in use."
+msgstr "Symbolet %d er i brug."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2206
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to add luks2-keyring token %d."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke tilføje luks2-keyringsymbolet %d."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2215 src/cryptsetup.c:2277
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign token %d to keyslot %d."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke tildele symbolet %d til nøglepladsen %d."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2232
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %d is not in use."
+msgstr "Symbolet %d er ikke i brug."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2267
+msgid "Failed to import token from file."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke importere symbol fra fil."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2292
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to get token %d for export."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke indhente symbolet %d for eksport."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2307
+msgid "--key-description parameter is mandatory for token add action."
+msgstr "parameteren --key-description er obligatorisk for symbol tilføj-handling."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2313 src/cryptsetup.c:2321
+msgid "Action requires specific token. Use --token-id parameter."
+msgstr "Handling kræver specifik symbol. Brug parameteren --token-id."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2326
+#, c-format
+msgid "Invalid token operation %s."
+msgstr "Ugyldig symboloperation %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2366
+msgid "<device> [--type <type>] [<name>]"
+msgstr "<enhed> [--type <type>] [<navn>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2366
+msgid "open device as mapping <name>"
+msgstr "åbn enhed som oversættelse <navn>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2367 src/cryptsetup.c:2368 src/cryptsetup.c:2369
+#: src/veritysetup.c:363 src/veritysetup.c:364 src/integritysetup.c:464
+#: src/integritysetup.c:465
+msgid "<name>"
+msgstr "<navn>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2367
+msgid "close device (remove mapping)"
+msgstr "luk enhed (fjern oversættelse)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2368
+msgid "resize active device"
+msgstr "ændr størrelse på aktiv enhed"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2369
+msgid "show device status"
+msgstr "vis enhedsstatus"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2370
+msgid "[--cipher <cipher>]"
+msgstr "[--cipher <krypteringsalgoritme>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2370
+msgid "benchmark cipher"
+msgstr "krypteringsalgoritme for sammenligning"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2371 src/cryptsetup.c:2372 src/cryptsetup.c:2373
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2374 src/cryptsetup.c:2381 src/cryptsetup.c:2382
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2383 src/cryptsetup.c:2384 src/cryptsetup.c:2385
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2386 src/cryptsetup.c:2387 src/cryptsetup.c:2388
+msgid "<device>"
+msgstr "<enhed>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2371
+msgid "try to repair on-disk metadata"
+msgstr "prøv at reparere on-disk-metadata"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2372
+msgid "erase all keyslots (remove encryption key)"
+msgstr "slet alle nøglepladser (fjern krypteringsnøgle)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2373
+msgid "convert LUKS from/to LUKS2 format"
+msgstr "konverter LUKS fra/til LUKS2-format"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2374
+msgid "set permanent configuration options for LUKS2"
+msgstr "angiv permanente konfigurationstilvalg for LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2375 src/cryptsetup.c:2376
+msgid "<device> [<new key file>]"
+msgstr "<enhed> [<ny nøglefil>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2375
+msgid "formats a LUKS device"
+msgstr "formaterer en LUKS-enhed"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2376
+msgid "add key to LUKS device"
+msgstr "tilføj nøgle til LUKS-enhed"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2377 src/cryptsetup.c:2378 src/cryptsetup.c:2379
+msgid "<device> [<key file>]"
+msgstr "<enhed> [<nøglefil>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2377
+msgid "removes supplied key or key file from LUKS device"
+msgstr "fjerner leveret nøgle eller nøglefil fra LUKS-enhed"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2378
+msgid "changes supplied key or key file of LUKS device"
+msgstr "ændrer leveret nøgle eller nøglefil for LUKS-enhed"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2379
+msgid "converts a key to new pbkdf parameters"
+msgstr "konverterer en nøgle til nye pbkdf-parametre"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2380
+msgid "<device> <key slot>"
+msgstr "<enhed> <nøgleplads>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2380
+msgid "wipes key with number <key slot> from LUKS device"
+msgstr "rydder nøgle med nummer <nøgleplads> fra LUKS-enhed"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2381
+msgid "print UUID of LUKS device"
+msgstr "vis UUID for lUKS-enhed"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2382
+msgid "tests <device> for LUKS partition header"
+msgstr "tester <enhed> for LUKS-partitionsteksthoved"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2383
+msgid "dump LUKS partition information"
+msgstr "dump LUKS-partitionsinformation"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2384
+msgid "dump TCRYPT device information"
+msgstr "dump TCRYPT-enhedsinformation"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2385
+msgid "Suspend LUKS device and wipe key (all IOs are frozen)"
+msgstr "Suspender LUKS-enhed og ryd nøgle (alle IO'er fryses fast)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2386
+msgid "Resume suspended LUKS device"
+msgstr "Genoptag suspenderet LUKS-enhed"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2387
+msgid "Backup LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "Lav sikkerhedskopi af LUKS-enhedsteksthoved og nøglepladser"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2388
+msgid "Restore LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "Gendan LUKS-teksthoved og nøglepladser"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2389
+msgid "<add|remove|import|export> <device>"
+msgstr "<add|remove|import|export> <enhed>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2389
+msgid "Manipulate LUKS2 tokens"
+msgstr "Manipuler LUKS2-symboler"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2407 src/veritysetup.c:380 src/integritysetup.c:481
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<action> is one of:\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<handling> er en af:\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2413
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"You can also use old <action> syntax aliases:\n"
+"\topen: create (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen\n"
+"\tclose: remove (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tcryptClose\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Du kan også bruge gamle <handling> syntaksaliasser:\n"
+"\topen: create (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen\n"
+"\tclose: remove (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tcryptClose\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2417
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<device> is the encrypted device\n"
+"<key slot> is the LUKS key slot number to modify\n"
+"<key file> optional key file for the new key for luksAddKey action\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<navn> er enheden at oprette under %s\n"
+"<enhed> er den krypterede enhed\n"
+"<nøgleplads> er LUKS-nøglens pladsnummer, der skal ændres\n"
+"<nøglefil> valgfri nøglefil for den nye nøgle for luksAddKey-handling\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2424
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in metadata format is %s (for luksFormat action).\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Standardindkompileret metadataformat er %s (for luksFormat-handling).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2429
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in key and passphrase parameters:\n"
+"\tMaximum keyfile size: %dkB, Maximum interactive passphrase length %d (characters)\n"
+"Default PBKDF for LUKS1: %s, iteration time: %d (ms)\n"
+"Default PBKDF for LUKS2: %s\n"
+"\tIteration time: %d, Memory required: %dkB, Parallel threads: %d\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Standardindkompileret nøgle og adgangsfraseparametre.\n"
+"\tMaksimal nøglefilsstørrelse: %dkB, Maksimal interaktiv adgangsfraselængde %d (tegn)\n"
+"Standard-PBKDF for LUKS1: %s, iterationtid: %d (ms)\n"
+"Standard-PBKDF for LUKS2: %s\n"
+"\tTterationtid: %d, hukommelse krævet: %dkB, parallelle tråde: %d\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2440
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in device cipher parameters:\n"
+"\tloop-AES: %s, Key %d bits\n"
+"\tplain: %s, Key: %d bits, Password hashing: %s\n"
+"\tLUKS: %s, Key: %d bits, LUKS header hashing: %s, RNG: %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Standardindkompileret enhedskrypteringsalgoritmeparametre:\n"
+"\tloop-AES: %s, Nøgle %d bit\n"
+"\tplain: %s, Nøgle: %d bit, Adgangskodehashing: %s\n"
+"\tLUKS: %s, Nøgle: %d bit, LUKS-teksthovedhashing: %s, RNG: %s\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2449
+msgid "\tLUKS: Default keysize with XTS mode (two internal keys) will be doubled.\n"
+msgstr "\tLUKS: Standardstørrelse på nøgle med XTS-tilstand (to interne nøgler) vil blive fordoblet.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2460 src/veritysetup.c:537 src/integritysetup.c:621
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s: requires %s as arguments"
+msgstr "%s: kræver %s som argumenter"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2498 src/veritysetup.c:420 src/integritysetup.c:515
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1611
+msgid "Show this help message"
+msgstr "Vis denne hjælpetekst"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2499 src/veritysetup.c:421 src/integritysetup.c:516
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1612
+msgid "Display brief usage"
+msgstr "Vis en kort brugsmanual"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2503 src/veritysetup.c:425 src/integritysetup.c:520
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1616
+msgid "Help options:"
+msgstr "Hjælpetilvalg:"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2504 src/veritysetup.c:426 src/integritysetup.c:521
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1617
+msgid "Print package version"
+msgstr "Vis pakkeversion"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2505 src/veritysetup.c:427 src/integritysetup.c:522
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1618
+msgid "Shows more detailed error messages"
+msgstr "Viser mere detaljerede fejlbeskeder"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2506 src/veritysetup.c:428 src/integritysetup.c:523
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1619
+msgid "Show debug messages"
+msgstr "Vis fejlsøgningsbeskeder"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2507
+msgid "Show debug messages including JSON metadata"
+msgstr "Vis fejlsøgningsbeskeder inklusive JSON-metadata"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2508 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1621
+msgid "The cipher used to encrypt the disk (see /proc/crypto)"
+msgstr "Krypteringsalgoritmen brugt til at kryptere disken (se /proc/crypto)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2509 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1623
+msgid "The hash used to create the encryption key from the passphrase"
+msgstr "Hashen brugt til at oprette krypteringsnøglen fra adgangsfrasen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2510
+msgid "Verifies the passphrase by asking for it twice"
+msgstr "Verificerer adgangsfrasen ved at anmode om den to gange"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2511 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1625
+msgid "Read the key from a file"
+msgstr "Læs nøglen fra en fil"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2512
+msgid "Read the volume (master) key from file."
+msgstr "Læs diskenhedens (master) nøgle fra fil."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2513
+msgid "Dump volume (master) key instead of keyslots info"
+msgstr "Dump diskenheds (master) nøgle i stedet for information om nøgleplads"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2514 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1622
+msgid "The size of the encryption key"
+msgstr "Størrelsen for den krypterede nøgle"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2514 src/cryptsetup.c:2571 src/integritysetup.c:539
+#: src/integritysetup.c:543 src/integritysetup.c:547
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1622
+msgid "BITS"
+msgstr "BIT"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2515 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1638
+msgid "Limits the read from keyfile"
+msgstr "Begræns læsningen fra nøglefil"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2515 src/cryptsetup.c:2516 src/cryptsetup.c:2517
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2518 src/cryptsetup.c:2568 src/cryptsetup.c:2569
+#: src/veritysetup.c:431 src/veritysetup.c:432 src/veritysetup.c:433
+#: src/veritysetup.c:436 src/veritysetup.c:437 src/integritysetup.c:530
+#: src/integritysetup.c:534 src/integritysetup.c:535
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1637 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1638
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1639 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1640
+msgid "bytes"
+msgstr "byte"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2516 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1637
+msgid "Number of bytes to skip in keyfile"
+msgstr "Antallet af byte at udelade i nøglefil"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2517
+msgid "Limits the read from newly added keyfile"
+msgstr "Begræns læsningnen fra nyligt tilføjet nøglefil"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2518
+msgid "Number of bytes to skip in newly added keyfile"
+msgstr "Antallet af byte at udelade i senest tilføjet nøglefil"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2519
+msgid "Slot number for new key (default is first free)"
+msgstr "Pladsnummer for ny nøgle (standard er den første ledige)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2520
+msgid "The size of the device"
+msgstr "Størrelse på enheden"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2520 src/cryptsetup.c:2521 src/cryptsetup.c:2522
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2528 src/integritysetup.c:531 src/integritysetup.c:536
+msgid "SECTORS"
+msgstr "SEKTORER"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2521
+msgid "The start offset in the backend device"
+msgstr "Startforskydningen i motorenheden"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2522
+msgid "How many sectors of the encrypted data to skip at the beginning"
+msgstr "Antal sektorer med krypterede data som skal udelades i begyndelsen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2523
+msgid "Create a readonly mapping"
+msgstr "Opret en skrivebeskyttet oversættelse"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2524 src/integritysetup.c:524
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1628
+msgid "Do not ask for confirmation"
+msgstr "Anmod ikke om bekræftelse"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2525
+msgid "Timeout for interactive passphrase prompt (in seconds)"
+msgstr "Tidsudløb for interaktiv adgangsfraseprompt (i sekunder)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2525 src/cryptsetup.c:2526 src/integritysetup.c:525
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1629
+msgid "secs"
+msgstr "sek"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2526 src/integritysetup.c:525
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1629
+msgid "Progress line update (in seconds)"
+msgstr "Statuslinjeopdatering (i sekunder)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2527 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1630
+msgid "How often the input of the passphrase can be retried"
+msgstr "Hvor ofte inddata for adgangsfrasen kan indhentes"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2528
+msgid "Align payload at <n> sector boundaries - for luksFormat"
+msgstr "Juster belastning ved <n> sektorgrænser - for luksFormat"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2529
+msgid "File with LUKS header and keyslots backup"
+msgstr "Fil med LUKS-teksthoved og sikkerhedskopi af nøglepladser"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2530 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1631
+msgid "Use /dev/random for generating volume key"
+msgstr "Brug /dev/random til oprettelse af diskenhedsnøgle"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2531 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1632
+msgid "Use /dev/urandom for generating volume key"
+msgstr "Brug /dev/urandom til oprettelse af diskenhedsnøgle"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2532
+msgid "Share device with another non-overlapping crypt segment"
+msgstr "Del enhed med et andet ikkeoverlappende kryptsegment"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2533 src/veritysetup.c:440
+msgid "UUID for device to use"
+msgstr "UUID som enheden skal bruge"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2534
+msgid "Allow discards (aka TRIM) requests for device"
+msgstr "Tillader fjernelsesforespørgsler (a.k.a. TRIM) for enhed"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2535 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1649
+msgid "Device or file with separated LUKS header"
+msgstr "Enhed eller fil med adskilt LUKS-teksthoved"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2536
+msgid "Do not activate device, just check passphrase"
+msgstr "Aktiver ikke enhed, kontroller bare adgangsfrase"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2537
+msgid "Use hidden header (hidden TCRYPT device)"
+msgstr "Brug skjult teksthoved (skjult TCRYPT-enhed)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2538
+msgid "Device is system TCRYPT drive (with bootloader)"
+msgstr "Enhed er system-TCRYPT-drev (med opstartsindlæser)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2539
+msgid "Use backup (secondary) TCRYPT header"
+msgstr "Brug sikkerhedskopi (sekundær) TCRYPT-teksthoved"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2540
+msgid "Scan also for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "Skan også for VeraCrypt-kompatibel enhed"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2541
+msgid "Personal Iteration Multiplier for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "Personlig iterationmultiplikator for VeraCrypt-kompatibel enhed"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2542
+msgid "Query Personal Iteration Multiplier for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "Forespørg personlig iterationmultiplikator for VeraCrypt-kompatibel enhed"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2543
+msgid "Type of device metadata: luks, plain, loopaes, tcrypt"
+msgstr "Type for enhedsmetadata: luks, plain, loopaes, tcrypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2544
+msgid "Disable password quality check (if enabled)"
+msgstr "Deaktiver kontrol af adgangskodens kvalitet (hvis aktiveret)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2545
+msgid "Use dm-crypt same_cpu_crypt performance compatibility option"
+msgstr "Brug tilvalgene dm-crypt og same_cpu_crypt for ydelseskompatibilitet"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2546
+msgid "Use dm-crypt submit_from_crypt_cpus performance compatibility option"
+msgstr "Brug tilvalgene dm-crypt og submit_from_crypt_cpus for ydelseskompatibilitet"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2547
+msgid "Device removal is deferred until the last user closes it"
+msgstr "Enhedsfjernelse er udskudt indtil den sidste bruger lukker enheden"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2548
+msgid "PBKDF iteration time for LUKS (in ms)"
+msgstr "PBKDF-iterationstid for LUKS (i ms)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2548 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1627
+msgid "msecs"
+msgstr "ms"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2549 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1645
+msgid "PBKDF algorithm (for LUKS2): argon2i, argon2id, pbkdf2"
+msgstr "PBKDF-algoritme (for LUKS2): argon2i, argon2id, pbkdf2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2550 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1646
+msgid "PBKDF memory cost limit"
+msgstr "PBKDF-hukommelsesomkostningsbegrænsning"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2550 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1646
+msgid "kilobytes"
+msgstr "kilobyte"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2551 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1647
+msgid "PBKDF parallel cost"
+msgstr "PBKDF-parallel omkostning"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2551 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1647
+msgid "threads"
+msgstr "tråde"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2552 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1648
+msgid "PBKDF iterations cost (forced, disables benchmark)"
+msgstr "PBKDF-iterationsomkostning (tvunget, deaktiverer sammenligning)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2553
+msgid "Keyslot priority: ignore, normal, prefer"
+msgstr "Nøglepladsprioritet: ignore, normal, prefer"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2554
+msgid "Disable locking of on-disk metadata"
+msgstr "Deaktiver låsning af on-disk-metadata"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2555
+msgid "Disable loading volume keys via kernel keyring"
+msgstr "Deaktiver indlæsning af diskenhedsnøgler via kernenøglering"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2556
+msgid "Data integrity algorithm (LUKS2 only)"
+msgstr "Dataintegritetsalgoritme (kun LUKS2)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2557 src/integritysetup.c:550
+msgid "Disable journal for integrity device"
+msgstr "Deaktiver journal for integritetsenhed"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2558 src/integritysetup.c:526
+msgid "Do not wipe device after format"
+msgstr "Ryd ikke enhed efter formatering"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2559
+msgid "Do not ask for passphrase if activation by token fails"
+msgstr "Spørg ikke om adgangsfrase hvis aktivering via symbol mislykkes"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2560
+msgid "Token number (default: any)"
+msgstr "Symbolnummer (standard: alle)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2561
+msgid "Key description"
+msgstr "Nøglebeskrivelse"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2562
+msgid "Encryption sector size (default: 512 bytes)"
+msgstr "Sektorstørrelse for kryptering (standard: 512 byte)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2563
+msgid "Set activation flags persistent for device"
+msgstr "Angiv aktiveringsflag vedvarende for enhed"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2564
+msgid "Set label for the LUKS2 device"
+msgstr "Angiv etiket for LUKS2-enhed"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2565
+msgid "Set subsystem label for the LUKS2 device"
+msgstr "Angiv undersystemetiket for LUKS2-enhed"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2566
+msgid "Create unbound (no assigned data segment) LUKS2 keyslot"
+msgstr "Opret ubunden (intet tildelt datasegment) LUKS2-nøgleplads"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2567
+msgid "Read or write the json from or to a file"
+msgstr "Læs eller skriv json fra eller til en fil"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2568
+msgid "LUKS2 header metadata area size"
+msgstr "Størrelse på metadataområdet for LUKS2-teksthovedet"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2569
+msgid "LUKS2 header keyslots area size"
+msgstr "Størrelse på nøglepladsområdet for LUKS2-teksthovedet"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2570
+msgid "Refresh (reactivate) device with new parameters"
+msgstr "Opdater (genaktiver) enhed med nye parametre"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2571
+msgid "LUKS2 keyslot: The size of the encryption key"
+msgstr "LUKS2-nøgleplads: Størrelsen for den krypterede nøgle"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2572
+msgid "LUKS2 keyslot: The cipher used for keyslot encryption"
+msgstr "LUKS2-nøgleplads: krypteringsalgoritmen brugt for nøglepladskryptering"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2588 src/veritysetup.c:461 src/integritysetup.c:568
+msgid "[OPTION...] <action> <action-specific>"
+msgstr "[TILVALG...] <handling> <handling-specifik>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2645 src/veritysetup.c:501 src/integritysetup.c:585
+msgid "Argument <action> missing."
+msgstr "Argument <handling> mangler."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2708 src/veritysetup.c:532 src/integritysetup.c:616
+msgid "Unknown action."
+msgstr "Ukendt handling."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2718
+msgid "Parameter --refresh is only allowed with open or refresh commands.\n"
+msgstr "Parameter --refresh er kun tilladt for kommandoerne open (åbn) eller refresh (opdater).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2723
+msgid "Options --refresh and --test-passphrase are mutually exclusive.\n"
+msgstr "Tilvalgene --refresh og --test-passphrase udelukker hinanden.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2728
+msgid "Option --deferred is allowed only for close command.\n"
+msgstr "Tilvalget --deferred er kun tilladt for kommandoen close (luk).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2733
+msgid "Option --shared is allowed only for open of plain device.\n"
+msgstr "Tilvalget --shared er kun tilladt for åbning af en ren enhed.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2738
+msgid "Option --allow-discards is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "Tilvalget --allow-discards er kun tilladt for åbne operationer.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2743
+msgid "Option --persistent is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "Tilvalget --persistent er kun tilladt for åben operation.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2748
+msgid "Option --persistent is not allowed with --test-passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "Tilvalget --persistent er ikke tilladt med --test-passphrase.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2757
+msgid ""
+"Option --key-size is allowed only for luksFormat, luksAddKey (with --unbound),\n"
+"open and benchmark actions. To limit read from keyfile use --keyfile-size=(bytes)."
+msgstr ""
+"Tilvalget --key-size er kun tilladt for luksFormat, luksAddKey (med --unbound),\n"
+"åbn- og sammenligningshandlinger. For at begrænse læsning fra nøglefilen bruges\n"
+"--keyfile-size=(bytes)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2763
+msgid "Option --integrity is allowed only for luksFormat (LUKS2).\n"
+msgstr "Tilvalget --integrity er kun tilladt for luksFormat (LUKS2).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2768
+msgid "Option --integrity-no-wipe can be used only for format action with integrity extension.\n"
+msgstr "Tilvalget --integrity-no-wipe kan kun bruges for formathandling med integritetudvidelse.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2774
+msgid "Options --label and --subsystem are allowed only for luksFormat and config LUKS2 operations.\n"
+msgstr "Tilvalget --label og --subsystem er kun tilladt for luksFormat og config LUKS2-operationer.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2780
+msgid "Option --test-passphrase is allowed only for open of LUKS and TCRYPT devices.\n"
+msgstr "Tilvalget --test-passphrase er kun tilladt for åbning af LUKS- og TCRYPT-enheder.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2785 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1718
+msgid "Key size must be a multiple of 8 bits"
+msgstr "Nøglestørrelse skal gå op i 8 bit"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2791 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1403
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1723
+msgid "Key slot is invalid."
+msgstr "Nøgleplads er ugyldig."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2798
+msgid "Option --key-file takes precedence over specified key file argument."
+msgstr "Tilvalget --key-file har forrang over specificeret nøglefilsargument."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2805 src/veritysetup.c:544 src/integritysetup.c:640
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1697
+msgid "Negative number for option not permitted."
+msgstr "Negativ nummer for tilvalg er ikke tilladt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2809
+msgid "Only one --key-file argument is allowed."
+msgstr "Kun en parameter for --key-file er tilladt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2813 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1689
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1727
+msgid "Only one of --use-[u]random options is allowed."
+msgstr "Kun et af tilvalgene --use-[u]random er tilladt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2817
+msgid "Option --use-[u]random is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgstr "Tilvalget --use-[u]random er kun tilladt for luksFormat."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2821
+msgid "Option --uuid is allowed only for luksFormat and luksUUID."
+msgstr "Tilvalget --uid er kun tilladt for luksFormat og luksUUID."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2825
+msgid "Option --align-payload is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgstr "Tilvalget --align-payload er kun tilladt for luksFormat."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2829
+msgid "Options --luks2-metadata-size and --opt-luks2-keyslots-size are allowed only for luksFormat with LUKS2."
+msgstr "Tilvalgene --luks2-metadata-size og --opt-luks2-keyslots-size er kun tilladt for luksFormat med LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2834
+msgid "Invalid LUKS2 metadata size specification."
+msgstr "Ugyldig specifikation for størrelsen på LUKS2-metadata."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2838
+msgid "Invalid LUKS2 keyslots size specification."
+msgstr "Ugyldig specifikation for størrelsen på LUKS2-nøgleplads."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2842
+msgid "Option --align-payload and --offset cannot be combined."
+msgstr "Tilvalget --align-payload og --offset kan ikke kombineres."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2848
+msgid "Option --skip is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices.\n"
+msgstr "Tilvalget --skip er kun understøttet for åbning af plain- og loopaes-enheder.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2855
+msgid "Option --offset is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices and for luksFormat.\n"
+msgstr "Tilvalget --offset er kun understøttet for åbning af plain- og loopaes-enheder samt for LuksFormat.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2861
+msgid "Option --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system or --tcrypt-backup is supported only for TCRYPT device.\n"
+msgstr "Tilvalgene --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system eller --tcrypt-backup er kun understøttet for TCRYPT-enhed.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2866
+msgid "Option --tcrypt-hidden cannot be combined with --allow-discards.\n"
+msgstr "Tilvaget --tcrypt-hidden kan ikke kombineres med --allow-discards.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2871
+msgid "Option --veracrypt is supported only for TCRYPT device type.\n"
+msgstr "Tilvalget --veracrypt er kun understøttet for TCRYPT-enhedstype.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2877
+msgid "Invalid argument for parameter --veracrypt-pim supplied.\n"
+msgstr "Ugyldigt argument for parameter --veracrypt-pim angivet.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2881
+msgid "Option --veracrypt-pim is supported only for VeraCrypt compatible devices.\n"
+msgstr "Tilvalget --veracrypt-pim er kun understøttet for VeraCrypt-kompatible enheder.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2889
+msgid "Option --veracrypt-query-pim is supported only for VeraCrypt compatible devices.\n"
+msgstr "Tilvalget --veracrypt-query-pim er kun understøttet for VeraCrypt-kompatible enheder.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2893
+msgid "The options --veracrypt-pim and --veracrypt-query-pim are mutually exclusive.\n"
+msgstr "Tilvalgene --veracrypt-pim og --veracrypt-query-pm udelukker hinanden.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2900
+msgid "Option --priority can be only ignore/normal/prefer.\n"
+msgstr "Tilvalget --priority kan kun være ignore/normal/prefer.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2905
+msgid "Keyslot specification is required.\n"
+msgstr "Nøglepladsspecifikation er krævet.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2910 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1703
+msgid "Password-based key derivation function (PBKDF) can be only pbkdf2 or argon2i/argon2id.\n"
+msgstr "Adgangskodebaseret nøgleudledningsfunktion (PBKDF) kan kun være pbkdf2 eller argon2i/argon2id.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2915 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1708
+msgid "PBKDF forced iterations cannot be combined with iteration time option.\n"
+msgstr "PBKDF-tvungne iterationer kan ikke kombineres med tilvalg for iterationstid.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2921
+msgid "Sector size option is not supported for this command.\n"
+msgstr "Tilvalg for sektorstørrelse er ikke understøttet for denne kommando..\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2927
+msgid "Unsupported encryption sector size.\n"
+msgstr "Krypteringsektorstørrelsen er ikke understøttet.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2932
+msgid "Key size is required with --unbound option.\n"
+msgstr "Nøglestørrelse er krævet med tilvalget --unbound.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2937
+msgid "Option --unbound may be used only with luksAddKey action.\n"
+msgstr "Tilvalget --unbound kan kun bruges med luksAddKey-handlingen.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2942
+msgid "Option --refresh may be used only with open action.\n"
+msgstr "Tilvalget --refresh kan kun bruges med open-handlingen.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2953
+msgid "Cannot disable metadata locking.\n"
+msgstr "Kan ikke deaktivere metadatalåsning.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:67
+msgid "Invalid salt string specified."
+msgstr "Ugyldig salt-streng angivet."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:98
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create hash image %s for writing."
+msgstr "Kan ikke oprette hashaftryk %s for skriving."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:108
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create FEC image %s for writing."
+msgstr "Kan ikke oprette FEC-aftryk %s for skriving."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:178
+msgid "Invalid root hash string specified."
+msgstr "Ugyldig root-hash-streng angivet."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:360
+msgid "<data_device> <hash_device>"
+msgstr "<data_enhed> <hash_device>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:360 src/integritysetup.c:462
+msgid "format device"
+msgstr "formater enhed"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:361
+msgid "<data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgstr "<data_enhed> <hash_enhed> <root_hash>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:361
+msgid "verify device"
+msgstr "verificer enhed"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:362
+msgid "<data_device> <name> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgstr "<data_enhed> <navn> <hash_enhed> <root_hash>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:362 src/integritysetup.c:463
+msgid "open device as <name>"
+msgstr "åbn enhed som <navn>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:363 src/integritysetup.c:464
+msgid "close device (deactivate and remove mapping)"
+msgstr "luk enhed (deaktiver og fjern oversættelse)"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:364 src/integritysetup.c:465
+msgid "show active device status"
+msgstr "vis aktiv enhedsstatus"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:365
+msgid "<hash_device>"
+msgstr "<hash_enhed>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:365 src/integritysetup.c:466
+msgid "show on-disk information"
+msgstr "vis on-disk-information"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:384
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<data_device> is the data device\n"
+"<hash_device> is the device containing verification data\n"
+"<root_hash> hash of the root node on <hash_device>\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<navn> er enheden der skal opretttes under %s\n"
+"<data_enhed> er dataenheden\n"
+"<hash_enhed> er enheden indeholdende verifikationsdata\n"
+"<root_hash> hash for root-knuden på <hash_enhed>\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:391
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in dm-verity parameters:\n"
+"\tHash: %s, Data block (bytes): %u, Hash block (bytes): %u, Salt size: %u, Hash format: %u\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Standardindkompilerede dm-verity-parametre:\n"
+"\tHash: %s, Databok (byte): %u, Hashblok (byte): %u, Salt-str.: %u, Hashformat: %u\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:429
+msgid "Do not use verity superblock"
+msgstr "Brug ikke verity-superblok"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:430
+msgid "Format type (1 - normal, 0 - original Chrome OS)"
+msgstr "Formatype (1 - normal, 0 - original Chrome OS)"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:430
+msgid "number"
+msgstr "nummer"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:431
+msgid "Block size on the data device"
+msgstr "Blokstørrelse på dataenheden"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:432
+msgid "Block size on the hash device"
+msgstr "Blokstørrelse på hashenheden"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:433
+msgid "FEC parity bytes"
+msgstr "FEC-paritetbyte"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:434
+msgid "The number of blocks in the data file"
+msgstr "Antallet af blokke i datafilen"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:434
+msgid "blocks"
+msgstr "blokke"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:435
+msgid "Path to device with error correction data"
+msgstr "Sti til enhed med fejlkorrektionsdata"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:435 src/integritysetup.c:528
+msgid "path"
+msgstr "sti"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:436
+msgid "Starting offset on the hash device"
+msgstr "Starter forskydning på hashenheden"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:437
+msgid "Starting offset on the FEC device"
+msgstr "Starter forskydning på FEC-enheden"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:438
+msgid "Hash algorithm"
+msgstr "Hashalgoritme"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:438
+msgid "string"
+msgstr "streng"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:439
+msgid "Salt"
+msgstr "Salt"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:439
+msgid "hex string"
+msgstr "hex-streng"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:441
+msgid "Restart kernel if corruption is detected"
+msgstr "Genstart kerne hvis korruption er registreret"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:442
+msgid "Ignore corruption, log it only"
+msgstr "Ignorer korruption, log den kun"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:443
+msgid "Do not verify zeroed blocks"
+msgstr "Bekræft ikke nulstillede blokke"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:444
+msgid "Verify data block only the first time it is read"
+msgstr "Verificer kun datablok første gang den læses"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:550
+msgid "Option --ignore-corruption, --restart-on-corruption or --ignore-zero-blocks is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "Tilvalgene --ignore-corruption, --restart-on-corruption eller --ignore-zero-blocks er kun tilladt for åben operation.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:555
+msgid "Option --ignore-corruption and --restart-on-corruption cannot be used together.\n"
+msgstr "Tilvalgene --ignore-corruption og --restart-on-corruption kan ikke bruges sammen.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:82 src/utils_password.c:298
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Kan ikke læse nøglefilen %s."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:86 src/utils_password.c:302
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read %d bytes from keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Kan ikke læse %d byte fra nøglefilen %s."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:248
+#, c-format
+msgid "Formatted with tag size %u, internal integrity %s.\n"
+msgstr "Formateret med mærkestørrelse %u, intern integritet %s.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:462 src/integritysetup.c:466
+msgid "<integrity_device>"
+msgstr "<integritet_enhed>"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:463
+msgid "<integrity_device> <name>"
+msgstr "<integritet_enhed> <navn>"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:485
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<integrity_device> is the device containing data with integrity tags\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<navn> er enheden der skal opretttes under %s\n"
+"<integritet_enhed> er enheden indeholdende data med integritetsmærker\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:490
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in dm-integrity parameters:\n"
+"\tTag size: %u bytes, Checksum algorithm: %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Standardindkompilerede dm-verity-parametre:\n"
+"\tMærkestørrelse: %u byte, kontrolsumalgoritme: %s\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:528
+msgid "Path to data device (if separated)"
+msgstr "Sti til datatjeneste (hvis adskilt)"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:530
+msgid "Journal size"
+msgstr "Journalstørrelse"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:531
+msgid "Interleave sectors"
+msgstr "Interleave-sektorer"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:532
+msgid "Journal watermark"
+msgstr "Journalvandmærke"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:532
+msgid "percent"
+msgstr "procent"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:533
+msgid "Journal commit time"
+msgstr "Journal commit-tid"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:533
+msgid "ms"
+msgstr "ms"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:534
+msgid "Tag size (per-sector)"
+msgstr "Mærkestørrelse (per-sektor)"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:535
+msgid "Sector size"
+msgstr "Sektorstørrelse"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:536
+msgid "Buffers size"
+msgstr "Bufferstørrelse"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:538
+msgid "Data integrity algorithm"
+msgstr "Dataintegritetsalgoritme"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:539
+msgid "The size of the data integrity key"
+msgstr "Størrelsen for dataintegritetsnøglen"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:540
+msgid "Read the integrity key from a file"
+msgstr "Læs integritetsnøglen fra en fil"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:542
+msgid "Journal integrity algorithm"
+msgstr "Journalintegritetsalgoritme"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:543
+msgid "The size of the journal integrity key"
+msgstr "Størrelsen for journalintegritetsnøglen"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:544
+msgid "Read the journal integrity key from a file"
+msgstr "Læs journalintegritetsnøglen fra en fil"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:546
+msgid "Journal encryption algorithm"
+msgstr "Journalkrypteringsalgoritme"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:547
+msgid "The size of the journal encryption key"
+msgstr "Størrelsen for journalkrypteringsnøglen"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:548
+msgid "Read the journal encryption key from a file"
+msgstr "Læs journalkrypteringsnøglen fra en fil"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:551
+msgid "Recovery mode (no journal, no tag checking)"
+msgstr "Gendannelsestilstand (ingen journal, ingen mærkekontrol)"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:552
+msgid "Recalculate initial tags automatically."
+msgstr "Genberegn oprindelige mærker automatisk."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:631
+msgid "Option --integrity-recalculate can be used only for open action."
+msgstr "Tilvalget --integrity-recalculate kan kun bruges for open-handling."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:646
+msgid "Options --journal-size, --interleave-sectors, --sector-size, --tag-size and --no-wipe can be used only for format action.\n"
+msgstr "Tilvalgene --journal-size, --interleave-sectors, --sector-size, --tag-size og --no-wipe kan kun bruges for formathandlingen.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:652
+msgid "Invalid journal size specification."
+msgstr "Ugyldig specifikation for journalstørrelse."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:657
+msgid "Both key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "Både nøglefil og tilvalg for nøglestørrelse skal være angivet."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:660
+msgid "Integrity algorithm must be specified if integrity key is used."
+msgstr "Integritetsalgoritme skal være angivet hvis der bruges integritetsnøgle."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:665
+msgid "Both journal integrity key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "Både journalintegritetsnøglefil og tilvalg for nøglestørrelse skal være angivet."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:668
+msgid "Journal integrity algorithm must be specified if journal integrity key is used."
+msgstr "Journalintegritetsalgoritme skal være angivet hvis journalintegritetsnøgle anvendes."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:673
+msgid "Both journal encryption key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "Både journalkrypteringsnøglefil og tilvalg for nøglestørrelse skal være angivet."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:676
+msgid "Journal encryption algorithm must be specified if journal encryption key is used."
+msgstr "Journalkrypteringsalgoritme skal være angivet hvis journalkrypteringsnøgle bruges."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:175
+msgid "Reencryption already in-progress."
+msgstr "Omkryptering er allerede i gang."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:181
+msgid "Reencryption of device with integrity profile is not supported."
+msgstr "Omkryptering af enhed med integritetsprofil er ikke understøttet."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:204
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot exclusively open %s, device in use."
+msgstr "Kan ikke eksklusivt åbne %s, enheden er i brug."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:218 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1148
+msgid "Allocation of aligned memory failed."
+msgstr "Allokering af tilpasset hukommelse mislykkedes."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:225
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read device %s."
+msgstr "Kan ikke læse enheden %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:236
+#, c-format
+msgid "Marking LUKS1 device %s unusable."
+msgstr "Markerer LUKS-enheden %s som ubrugelig."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:240
+#, c-format
+msgid "Setting LUKS2 offline reencrypt flag on device %s."
+msgstr "Angivelse af LUKS2 som frakoblet omkrypterer flag på enheden %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:257
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write device %s."
+msgstr "Kan ikke skrive enhed %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:345
+msgid "Cannot write reencryption log file."
+msgstr "Kan ikke skrive omkrypteringslogfilen."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:401
+msgid "Cannot read reencryption log file."
+msgstr "Kan ikke læse omkrypteringslogfilen."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:439
+#, c-format
+msgid "Log file %s exists, resuming reencryption.\n"
+msgstr "Logfilen %s findes, genoptager omkryptering.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:488
+msgid "Activating temporary device using old LUKS header."
+msgstr "Aktiverer midlertidig enhed via brug af gammelt LUKS-teksthoved."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:498
+msgid "Activating temporary device using new LUKS header."
+msgstr "Aktiverer midlertidig enhed via brug af nyt LUKS-teksthoved."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:508
+msgid "Activation of temporary devices failed."
+msgstr "Aktivering af midlertidige enheder mislykkedes."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:586
+msgid "Failed to set PBKDF parameters."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke angive PBKDF-parametre."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:592
+msgid "Failed to set data offset."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke angive dataforskydning."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:600
+#, c-format
+msgid "New LUKS header for device %s created."
+msgstr "Nyt LUKS-teksthoved for enheden %s oprettet."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:660
+#, c-format
+msgid "This version of cryptsetup-reencrypt can't handle new internal token type %s."
+msgstr "Denne version af cryptsetup-reencrypt kan ikke håndtere ny intern symboltype %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:682
+msgid "Failed to read activation flags from backup header."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke læse aktiveringsflag fra sikkerhedskopiteksthoved."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:686
+msgid "Failed to write activation flags to new header."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke skrive aktiveringsflag til nyt teksthoved."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:690 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:694
+msgid "Failed to read requirements from backup header."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke læse krav fra sikkerhedskopiteksthoved."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:731
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s header backup of device %s created."
+msgstr "%s-sikkerhedskopi af teksthoved for enheden %s er oprettet."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:789
+msgid "Creation of LUKS backup headers failed."
+msgstr "Oprettelse af LUKS-sikkerhedskopiteksthoveder mislykkedes."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:918
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot restore %s header on device %s."
+msgstr "Kan ikke gendanne %s-teksthoved på enheden %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:920
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s header on device %s restored."
+msgstr "%s-teksthoved på enheden %s er gendannet."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:958 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1038
+msgid "Cannot seek to device offset."
+msgstr "Kan ikke søge til enhedsforskydning."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1081
+msgid "Cannot seek to device offset.\n"
+msgstr "Kan ikke søge til enhedsforskydning.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1120 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1126
+msgid "Cannot open temporary LUKS device."
+msgstr "Kan ikke åbne midlertidig LUKS-enhed."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1131 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1136
+msgid "Cannot get device size."
+msgstr "Kan ikke indhente enhedsstørrelse."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1173
+msgid "Interrupted by a signal."
+msgstr "Afbrudt af et signal."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1175
+msgid "IO error during reencryption."
+msgstr "IO-fejl under omkryptering."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1206
+msgid "Provided UUID is invalid."
+msgstr "Angivet UUID er ugyldig."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1309
+msgid "Key file can be used only with --key-slot or with exactly one key slot active."
+msgstr "Nøglefil kan kun bruges med --key-slot eller med præcis en aktiv nøgleplads."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1350 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1361
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for key slot %u: "
+msgstr "Indtast adgangsfrase for nøgleplads %u: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1432
+msgid "Cannot open reencryption log file."
+msgstr "Kan ikke åbne omkrypteringslogfilen."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1438
+msgid "No decryption in progress, provided UUID can be used only to resume suspended decryption process."
+msgstr "Ingen dekryptering i gang, angivet UUID kan kun bruges til at genoptage suspenderet dekrypteringsproces."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1513
+#, c-format
+msgid "Changed pbkdf parameters in keyslot %i."
+msgstr "Ændret pbkdf-parameter i nøgleplads %i."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1620
+msgid "Reencryption block size"
+msgstr "Blokstørrelse for omkryptering"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1620
+msgid "MiB"
+msgstr "MiB"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1624
+msgid "Do not change key, no data area reencryption"
+msgstr "Ændr ikke nøgle, ingen dataområdeomkryptering"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1626
+msgid "Read new volume (master) key from file"
+msgstr "Læs ny diskenhednøgle (master) fra fil"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1627
+msgid "PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS (in ms)"
+msgstr "PBKDF2-iterationstid for LUKS (i ms)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1633
+msgid "Use direct-io when accessing devices"
+msgstr "Brug direct-io når enheder tilgås"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1634
+msgid "Use fsync after each block"
+msgstr "Brug fsync efter hver blok"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1635
+msgid "Update log file after every block"
+msgstr "Opdater logfil efter hver blok"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1636
+msgid "Use only this slot (others will be disabled)"
+msgstr "Brug kun denne plads (andre vil blive deaktiveret)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1639
+msgid "Reduce data device size (move data offset). DANGEROUS!"
+msgstr "Reducer dataenhedstørrelse (flyt dataforskydning). FARLIGT!"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1640
+msgid "Use only specified device size (ignore rest of device). DANGEROUS!"
+msgstr "Brug kun specificeret enhedstørrelse (ignorer resten af enheden). FARLIGT!"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1641
+msgid "Create new header on not encrypted device"
+msgstr "Opret nyt teksthoved på ikke krypteret enhed"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1642
+msgid "Permanently decrypt device (remove encryption)"
+msgstr "Dekrypter enhed permanent (fjern kryptering)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1643
+msgid "The UUID used to resume decryption"
+msgstr "UUID'en brugt til at genoptage dekryptering"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1644
+msgid "Type of LUKS metadata: luks1, luks2"
+msgstr "Type for LUKS-metadata: luks1, luks2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1663
+msgid "[OPTION...] <device>"
+msgstr "[TILVALG...] <enhed>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1677
+#, c-format
+msgid "Reencryption will change: %s%s%s%s%s%s."
+msgstr "Omkryptering vil ændre: %s%s%s%s%s%s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1678
+msgid "volume key"
+msgstr "diskenhedsnøgle"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1680
+msgid "set hash to "
+msgstr "sæt hash til "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1681
+msgid ", set cipher to "
+msgstr ", set krypteringsalgoritme til "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1685
+msgid "Argument required."
+msgstr "Argument krævet."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1713
+msgid "Only values between 1 MiB and 64 MiB allowed for reencryption block size."
+msgstr "Kun værdier mellem 1 MiB og 64 MiB tilladt for omkrypteringsblokstørrelsen."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1732 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1737
+msgid "Invalid device size specification."
+msgstr "Ugyldig specifikation for enhedsstørrelse."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1740
+msgid "Maximum device reduce size is 64 MiB."
+msgstr "Maksimal reduceringsstørrelse for enhed er 64 MiB."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1743
+msgid "Reduce size must be multiple of 512 bytes sector."
+msgstr "Reducer størrelse skal være multiplum af 512 byte sektor."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1747
+msgid "Option --new must be used together with --reduce-device-size or --header."
+msgstr "Tilvalget --new skal bruges sammen med --reduce-device-size eller --header."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1751
+msgid "Option --keep-key can be used only with --hash, --iter-time or --pbkdf-force-iterations."
+msgstr "Tilvalget --keep-key kan kun bruges med --hash, --iter-time eller --pbkdf-force-iterations."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1755
+msgid "Option --new cannot be used together with --decrypt."
+msgstr "Tilvalget --new kan ikke bruges sammen med --decrypt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1759
+msgid "Option --decrypt is incompatible with specified parameters."
+msgstr "Tilvalget --decrypt er ikke kompatibelt med specificerede parametre."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1763
+msgid "Option --uuid is allowed only together with --decrypt."
+msgstr "Tilvalget --uuid er kun tilladt sammen med --decrypt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1767
+msgid "Invalid luks type. Use one of these: 'luks', 'luks1' or 'luks2'."
+msgstr "Ugyldig luks-type. Brug en af disse: »luks«, »luks2« eller »luks2«."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:150
+msgid "Error reading response from terminal."
+msgstr "Fejl ved læsning af svar fra terminal."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:175
+msgid "Command successful.\n"
+msgstr "Kommando succesfuld.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:183
+msgid "wrong or missing parameters"
+msgstr "forkert eller manglende parametre"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:185
+msgid "no permission or bad passphrase"
+msgstr "ingen tilladelse eller ugyldg adgangsfrase"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:187
+msgid "out of memory"
+msgstr "ikke nok hukommelse"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:189
+msgid "wrong device or file specified"
+msgstr "forkert enhed eller fil angivet"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:191
+msgid "device already exists or device is busy"
+msgstr "enheden findes allerede eller enheden er optaget"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:193
+msgid "unknown error"
+msgstr "ukendt fejl"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:195
+#, c-format
+msgid "Command failed with code %i (%s).\n"
+msgstr "Kommando mislykkedes med kode %i (%s).\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:272
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %i created."
+msgstr "Nøglepladsen %i oprettet."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:274
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %i unlocked."
+msgstr "Nøgleplads %i låst op."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:276
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %i removed."
+msgstr "Nøgleplads %i fjernet."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:285
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %i created."
+msgstr "Symbol %i oprettet."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:287
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %i removed."
+msgstr "Symbol %i fjernet."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:453
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Device %s already contains a '%s' partition signature.\n"
+msgstr "ADVARSEL: Enheden %s indeholder allerede en »%s«-partitionsignatur.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:461
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Device %s already contains a '%s' superblock signature.\n"
+msgstr "ADVARSEL: Enheden %s indeholder allerede en »%s«-superbloksignatur.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:482 src/utils_tools.c:546
+msgid "Failed to initialize device signature probes."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke initialisere enhedssignaturundersøgelser."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:526
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to stat device %s."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke køre stat på enheden %s."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:539
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is in use. Can not proceed with format operation."
+msgstr "Enheden %s er i brug. Kan ikke fortsætte med formatoperation."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:541
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to open file %s in read/write mode."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke åbne filen %s i læs/skriv-tilstand."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:561
+msgid "Failed to wipe device signature."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke rydde enhedssignatur."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:568
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to probe device %s for a signature."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke undersøge enheden %s for en signatur."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:43 src/utils_password.c:75
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot check password quality: %s"
+msgstr "Kan ikke kontrollere adganskodekvalitet: %s"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:51
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Password quality check failed:\n"
+" %s"
+msgstr ""
+"Kontrol af adgangskodens kvalitet mislykkedes:\n"
+" %s"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:83
+#, c-format
+msgid "Password quality check failed: Bad passphrase (%s)"
+msgstr "Kontrol af adgangskodens kvalitet mislykkedes: Ugyldig adgangsfrase (%s)"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:193 src/utils_password.c:208
+msgid "Error reading passphrase from terminal."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke læse adgangsfrase fra terminal."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:206
+msgid "Verify passphrase: "
+msgstr "Verificer adgangsfrase: "
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:213
+msgid "Passphrases do not match."
+msgstr "Adgangsfraser matcher ikke."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:250
+msgid "Cannot use offset with terminal input."
+msgstr "Kan ikke bruge forskydning med terminalinddata."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:253
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase: "
+msgstr "Indtast adgangsfrase: "
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:255
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for %s: "
+msgstr "Indtast adgangsfrase for %s: "
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:285
+msgid "No key available with this passphrase."
+msgstr "Ingen nøgle tilgængelig med denne adgangsfrase."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:320
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open keyfile %s for write."
+msgstr "Kan ikke bne nøglefilen %s for skrivning."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:327
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write to keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Kan ikke skrive til nøglefilen %s."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:47
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to open file %s in read-only mode."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke åbne filen %s i skrivebeskyttet tilstand."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:60
+msgid "Provide valid LUKS2 token JSON:\n"
+msgstr "Tilbyd gyldig LUKS2-symbol JSON:\n"
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:67
+msgid "Failed to read JSON file."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke læse JSON-fil."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:72
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Read interrupted."
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Læsning afbrudt."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:113
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to open file %s in write mode."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke åbne filen %s i skrive-tilstand."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:122
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Write interrupted."
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Skrivning afbrudt."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:126
+msgid "Failed to write JSON file."
+msgstr "Kunne ikke skrive JSON-fil."
+
+#~ msgid "Device %s is too small. (LUKS2 requires at least %<PRIu64> bytes.)"
+#~ msgstr "Enheden %s er for lille. (LUKS2 kræver mindst %<PRIu64> byte.)"
diff --git a/po/de.po b/po/de.po
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8cfe190
--- /dev/null
+++ b/po/de.po
@@ -0,0 +1,3172 @@
+# German translation for the cryptsetup package.
+# Copyright (C) 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+# This file is distributed under the same license as the cryptsetup package.
+# Roland Illig <roland.illig@gmx.de>, 2010-2019.
+#
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: cryptsetup 2.1.0\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: dm-crypt@saout.de\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-01-26 19:02+0100\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2019-01-27 11:19+0100\n"
+"Last-Translator: Roland Illig <roland.illig@gmx.de>\n"
+"Language-Team: German <translation-team-de@lists.sourceforge.net>\n"
+"Language: de\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+"X-Bugs: Report translation errors to the Language-Team address.\n"
+"X-Generator: Poedit 2.2.1\n"
+"Plural-Forms: nplurals=2; plural=(n != 1);\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:336
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper, running as non-root user."
+msgstr "Das Kernelmodul »device-mapper« kann nicht initialisiert werden, da das Programm nicht mit Root-Rechten läuft."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:339
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper. Is dm_mod kernel module loaded?"
+msgstr "Das Kernelmodul »device-mapper« kann nicht initialisiert werden. Ist das Kernelmodul »dm_mod« geladen?"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1010
+msgid "Requested deferred flag is not supported."
+msgstr "Verlangter »deferred«-Schalter wird nicht unterstützt."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1077
+#, c-format
+msgid "DM-UUID for device %s was truncated."
+msgstr "DM-UUID für Gerät »%s« wurde verkürzt."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1486
+msgid "Requested dm-crypt performance options are not supported."
+msgstr "Die verlangten dm-crypt-Performance-Optionen werden nicht unterstützt."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1493
+msgid "Requested dm-verity data corruption handling options are not supported."
+msgstr "Die verlangten dm-verity-Datenbeschädigungs-Optionen werden nicht unterstützt."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1497
+msgid "Requested dm-verity FEC options are not supported."
+msgstr "Die verlangten dm-verity-FEC-Optionen werden nicht unterstützt."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1501
+msgid "Requested data integrity options are not supported."
+msgstr "Die verlangten Datenintegritäts-Optionen werden nicht unterstützt."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1503
+msgid "Requested sector_size option is not supported."
+msgstr "Die verlangte sector_size-Option wird nicht unterstützt."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1508
+msgid "Requested automatic recalculation of integrity tags is not supported."
+msgstr "Die verlangte automatische Berechnung der Integritätsangaben wird nicht unterstützt."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1534
+msgid "Requested dmcrypt performance options are not supported."
+msgstr "Die verlangten dmcrypt-Performance-Optionen werden nicht unterstützt."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1537
+msgid "Discard/TRIM is not supported."
+msgstr "»Discard/TRIM« wird nicht unterstützt."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:2413
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to query dm-%s segment."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Abfragen des »dm-%s«-Segments."
+
+#: lib/random.c:80
+msgid ""
+"System is out of entropy while generating volume key.\n"
+"Please move mouse or type some text in another window to gather some random events.\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Das System hat keine Entropie mehr, um den Laufwerksschlüssel zu generieren.\n"
+"Bitte bewegen Sie die Maus oder tippen Sie etwas Text in ein anderes Fenster, um einige zufällige Ereignisse zu sammeln.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:84
+#, c-format
+msgid "Generating key (%d%% done).\n"
+msgstr "Schlüssel wird generiert (%d %% erledigt).\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:170
+msgid "Running in FIPS mode."
+msgstr "Laufe im FIPS-Modus."
+
+#: lib/random.c:176
+msgid "Fatal error during RNG initialisation."
+msgstr "Fataler Fehler während der Initialisierung des Zufallszahlengenerators."
+
+#: lib/random.c:213
+msgid "Unknown RNG quality requested."
+msgstr "Unbekannte Qualität des Zufallszahlengenerators verlangt."
+
+#: lib/random.c:218
+msgid "Error reading from RNG."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Einlesen vom Zufallszahlengenerator."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:214
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto RNG backend."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Initialisieren des Krypto-Zufallszahlengenerator-Backends."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:220
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto backend."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Initialisieren des Krypto-Backends."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:251 lib/setup.c:1899 lib/verity/verity.c:123
+#, c-format
+msgid "Hash algorithm %s not supported."
+msgstr "Hash-Algorithmus »%s« wird nicht unterstützt."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:254 lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:90
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key processing error (using hash %s)."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Verarbeiten des Schlüssels (mit Hash-Algorithmus »%s«)."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:315 lib/setup.c:342
+msgid "Cannot determine device type. Incompatible activation of device?"
+msgstr "Geräte-Art kann nicht bestimmt werden. Inkompatible Aktivierung des Geräts?"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:321 lib/setup.c:2892
+msgid "This operation is supported only for LUKS device."
+msgstr "Diese Operation wird nur für LUKS-Geräte unterstützt."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:348
+msgid "This operation is supported only for LUKS2 device."
+msgstr "Diese Operation wird nur für LUKS2-Geräte unterstützt."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:396
+msgid "All key slots full."
+msgstr "Alle Schlüsselfächer sind voll."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:407
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select between 0 and %d."
+msgstr "Schlüsselfach %d ist ungültig, bitte wählen Sie eins zwischen 0 und %d."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:413
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is full, please select another one."
+msgstr "Schlüsselfach %d ist voll, bitte wählen Sie ein anderes."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:589
+#, c-format
+msgid "Header detected but device %s is too small."
+msgstr "Header gefunden, aber Gerät »%s« ist zu klein."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:626
+msgid "This operation is not supported for this device type."
+msgstr "Diese Operation wird für diese Geräteart nicht unterstützt."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:791 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:481
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported LUKS version %d."
+msgstr "Nicht unterstützte LUKS-Version %d."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:808 lib/setup.c:1403 lib/setup.c:1812
+msgid "Detached metadata device is not supported for this crypt type."
+msgstr "Gerät für separierte Metadaten wird für diese Verschlüsselungsart nicht unterstützt."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1288 lib/setup.c:2392 lib/setup.c:2464 lib/setup.c:2476
+#: lib/setup.c:2625 lib/setup.c:4021
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not active."
+msgstr "Gerät »%s« ist nicht aktiv."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1310
+#, c-format
+msgid "Underlying device for crypt device %s disappeared."
+msgstr "Zugrundeliegendes Gerät für das Kryptogerät »%s« ist verschwunden."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1388
+msgid "Invalid plain crypt parameters."
+msgstr "Ungültige Parameter für Plain-Verschlüsselung."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1393 lib/setup.c:1802 src/integritysetup.c:72
+msgid "Invalid key size."
+msgstr "Ungültige Schlüsselgröße."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1398 lib/setup.c:1807 lib/setup.c:2009
+msgid "UUID is not supported for this crypt type."
+msgstr "UUID wird für diese Verschlüsselungsart nicht unterstützt."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1413 lib/setup.c:1603 src/cryptsetup.c:1045
+msgid "Unsupported encryption sector size."
+msgstr "Nicht unterstützte Sektorengröße für Verschlüsselung."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1421 lib/setup.c:1720
+msgid "Device size is not aligned to requested sector size."
+msgstr "Gerätegröße ist nicht an verlangter Sektorgröße ausgerichtet."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1472 lib/setup.c:1591
+msgid "Can't format LUKS without device."
+msgstr "Ohne Gerät kann LUKS nicht formatiert werden."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1478 lib/setup.c:1597
+msgid "Requested data alignment is not compatible with data offset."
+msgstr "Die angeforderte Datenausrichtung ist nicht mit dem Datenoffset kompatibel."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1546 lib/setup.c:1715
+msgid "WARNING: Data offset is outside of currently available data device.\n"
+msgstr "WARNING: Der Datenoffset ist außerhalb des derzeit verfügbaren Datengeräts.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1556 lib/setup.c:1735 lib/setup.c:1754 lib/setup.c:2021
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe header on device %s."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Auslöschen des Headers auf Gerät »%s«."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1608
+msgid "WARNING: The device activation will fail, dm-crypt is missing support for requested encryption sector size.\n"
+msgstr "WARNUNG: Die Geräteaktivierung wird fehlschlagen, dm-crypt fehlt die Unterstützung für die angeforderte Verschlüsselungsgröße.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1630
+msgid "Volume key is too small for encryption with integrity extensions."
+msgstr "Laufwerksschlüssel ist zu klein für die Verschlüsselung mit Integritätserweiterungen."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1685
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cipher %s-%s (key size %zd bits) is not available."
+msgstr "Verschlüsselung »%s-%s« (Schlüsselgröße %zd Bits) ist nicht verfügbar."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1747
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s which is still in use."
+msgstr "Gerät »%s« kann nicht formatiert werden, da es gerade benutzt wird."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1750 lib/setup.c:1775
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "Gerät »%s« kann nicht formatiert werden, Zugriff verweigert."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1762 lib/setup.c:2073
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format integrity for device %s."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Formatieren der Integrität auf Gerät »%s«."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1772
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s in use."
+msgstr "Gerät »%s« kann nicht formatiert werden, da es gerade benutzt wird."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1779
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s."
+msgstr "Gerät »%s« kann nicht formatiert werden."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1797
+msgid "Can't format LOOPAES without device."
+msgstr "Ohne Gerät kann LOOPAES nicht formatiert werden."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1842
+msgid "Can't format VERITY without device."
+msgstr "Ohne Gerät kann VERITY nicht formatiert werden."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1853 lib/verity/verity.c:106
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash type %d."
+msgstr "Nicht unterstützte VERITY-Hash-Art %d."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1859 lib/verity/verity.c:114
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY block size."
+msgstr "Nicht unterstützte VERITY-Blockgröße."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1864 lib/verity/verity.c:75
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash offset."
+msgstr "Nicht unterstützter VERITY-Hash-Offset."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1869
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY FEC offset."
+msgstr "Nicht unterstützter VERITY-FEC-Offset."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1893
+msgid "Data area overlaps with hash area."
+msgstr "Datenbereich und Hashbereich überlappen sich."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1918
+msgid "Hash area overlaps with FEC area."
+msgstr "Hashbereich und FEC-Bereich überlappen sich."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1925
+msgid "Data area overlaps with FEC area."
+msgstr "Datenbereich und FEC-Bereich überlappen sich."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2130
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unknown crypt device type %s requested."
+msgstr "Unbekannte Art des Verschlüsselungsgeräts »%s« verlangt."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2398 lib/setup.c:2470 lib/setup.c:2483
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported parameters on device %s."
+msgstr "Nicht unterstützte Parameter für Gerät %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2404 lib/setup.c:2489
+#, c-format
+msgid "Mismatching parameters on device %s."
+msgstr "Parameter für Gerät %s sind durcheinander."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2657
+msgid "Cannot resize loop device."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Ändern der Größe des Loopback-Geräts."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2666
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s size is not aligned to requested sector size (%u bytes)."
+msgstr "Gerät »%s« ist nicht an verlangter Sektorgröße (%u Bytes) ausgerichtet."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2725
+msgid "Do you really want to change UUID of device?"
+msgstr "Wollen Sie wirklich die UUID des Geräts ändern?"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2801
+msgid "Header backup file does not contain compatible LUKS header."
+msgstr "Header-Backupdatei enthält keinen kompatiblen LUKS-Header."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2900
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not active."
+msgstr "Laufwerk »%s« ist nicht aktiv."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2911
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is already suspended."
+msgstr "Laufwerk »%s« ist bereits im Ruhezustand."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2925
+#, c-format
+msgid "Suspend is not supported for device %s."
+msgstr "Das Gerät »%s« unterstützt keinen Ruhezustand."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2927
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during suspending device %s."
+msgstr "Das Gerät »%s« kann nicht in den Ruhezustand versetzt werden."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2960 lib/setup.c:3027
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not suspended."
+msgstr "Laufwerk »%s« ist nicht im Ruhezustand."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2989
+#, c-format
+msgid "Resume is not supported for device %s."
+msgstr "Das Gerät »%s« kann nicht aus dem Ruhezustand aufgeweckt werden."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2991 lib/setup.c:3059
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during resuming device %s."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Aufwecken von Gerät »%s« aus dem Ruhezustand."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3127 lib/setup.c:3315
+msgid "Cannot add key slot, all slots disabled and no volume key provided."
+msgstr "Schlüsselfach kann nicht hinzugefügt werden, da alle Fächer deaktiviert sind und kein Laufwerksschlüssel angegeben wurde."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3267
+msgid "Failed to swap new key slot."
+msgstr "Neues Schlüsselfach konnte nicht ausgewechselt werden."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3432 lib/setup.c:3865 lib/setup.c:3878 lib/setup.c:3886
+#: lib/setup.c:3899 lib/setup.c:4198 lib/setup.c:5274
+msgid "Volume key does not match the volume."
+msgstr "Der Laufwerksschlüssel passt nicht zum Laufwerk."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3453
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid."
+msgstr "Schlüsselfach %d ist ungültig."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3459
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is not used."
+msgstr "Schlüsselfach %d ist unbenutzt."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3478
+msgid "Device header overlaps with data area."
+msgstr "Geräteheader und Datenbereich überlappen sich."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3684 lib/setup.c:3952
+msgid "Device type is not properly initialised."
+msgstr "Geräteart ist nicht richtig initialisiert."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3726
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s, name is invalid or still in use."
+msgstr "Gerät »%s« kann nicht verwendet werden, da es gerade benutzt wird oder der Name ungültig ist."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3729
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s already exists."
+msgstr "Das Gerät »%s« existiert bereits."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3852
+msgid "Incorrect volume key specified for plain device."
+msgstr "Falscher Laufwerksschlüssel für Plain-Gerät angegeben."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3918
+msgid "Incorrect root hash specified for verity device."
+msgstr "Falscher Root-Hash-Schlüssel für VERITY-Gerät angegeben."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3995 lib/setup.c:4010
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is still in use."
+msgstr "Gerät »%s« wird gerade benutzt."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4025
+#, c-format
+msgid "Invalid device %s."
+msgstr "Ungültiges Gerät »%s«."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4134
+msgid "Function not available in FIPS mode."
+msgstr "Diese Funktion ist im FIPS-Modus nicht verfügbar."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4148
+msgid "Volume key buffer too small."
+msgstr "Laufwerks-Schlüsselpuffer zu klein."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4156
+msgid "Cannot retrieve volume key for plain device."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Ermitteln des Laufwerksschlüssels für Plain-Gerät."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4167
+#, c-format
+msgid "This operation is not supported for %s crypt device."
+msgstr "Diese Operation wird für Kryptogerät »%s« nicht unterstützt."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4354
+msgid "Dump operation is not supported for this device type."
+msgstr "Die Dump-Operation wird für diese Geräteart nicht unterstützt."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4930
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert device %s which is still in use."
+msgstr "Gerät »%s« kann nicht konvertiert werden, da es gerade benutzt wird."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5213
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign keyslot %u as the new volume key."
+msgstr "Schlüsselfach %u konnte nicht dem Laufwerksschlüssel zugeordnet werden."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5280
+msgid "Failed to initialise default LUKS2 keyslot parameters."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Initialisieren der LUKS2-Schlüsselfach-Parameter."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5286
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign keyslot %d to digest."
+msgstr "Schlüsselfach %d konnte nicht dem Digest zugeordnet werden."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5370
+msgid "Failed to load key in kernel keyring."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Laden des Schlüssels im Kernel-Schlüsselbund."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5425
+msgid "Kernel keyring is not supported by the kernel."
+msgstr "Der Kernel-Schlüsselbund wird vom Kernel nicht unterstützt."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5435
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read passphrase from keyring (error %d)."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Lesen der Passphrase vom Schlüsselbund (Fehler %d)."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:81
+msgid "Cannot get process priority."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Ermitteln der Prozesspriorität."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:95
+msgid "Cannot unlock memory."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Entsperren des Speichers."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:169 lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:498
+msgid "Failed to open key file."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Öffnen der Schlüsseldatei."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:174
+msgid "Cannot read keyfile from a terminal."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Einlesen der Schlüsseldatei »%s« vom Terminal."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:191
+msgid "Failed to stat key file."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Öffnen der Schlüsseldatei."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:199 lib/utils.c:220
+msgid "Cannot seek to requested keyfile offset."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Zugriff auf die Schlüsseldatei."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:214 lib/utils.c:229 src/utils_password.c:188
+#: src/utils_password.c:201
+msgid "Out of memory while reading passphrase."
+msgstr "Zu wenig Speicher zum Einlesen der Passphrase."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:249
+msgid "Error reading passphrase."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Einlesen der Passphrase."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:266
+msgid "Nothing to read on input."
+msgstr "Nichts zu lesen in der Eingabe."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:273
+msgid "Maximum keyfile size exceeded."
+msgstr "Größenbegrenzung für die Schlüsseldatei überschritten."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:278
+msgid "Cannot read requested amount of data."
+msgstr "Die gewünschte Menge an Daten kann nicht eingelesen werden."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:184 lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:92
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s doesn't exist or access denied."
+msgstr "Gerät »%s« existiert nicht oder Zugriff verweigert."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:194
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not compatible."
+msgstr "Gerät »%s« ist nicht kompatibel."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:560
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small. Need at least %<PRIu64> bytes."
+msgstr "Gerät »%s« ist zu klein. Mindestens %<PRIu64> Bytes erforderlich."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:641
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s which is in use (already mapped or mounted)."
+msgstr "Gerät »%s« kann nicht benutzt werden, da es bereits anderweitig benutzt wird."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:645
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "Gerät »%s« kann nicht verwendet werden, Zugriff verweigert."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:648
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot get info about device %s."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Abrufen der Infos über Gerät »%s«."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:671
+msgid "Cannot use a loopback device, running as non-root user."
+msgstr "Das Loopback-Gerät kann nicht benutzt werden, da das Programm nicht mit Root-Rechten läuft."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:681
+msgid "Attaching loopback device failed (loop device with autoclear flag is required)."
+msgstr "Anklemmen des Loopback-Geräts fehlgeschlagen (das Loopback-Gerät benötigt den »autoclear«-Schalter)."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:727
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested offset is beyond real size of device %s."
+msgstr "Der angeforderte Offset ist jenseits der wirklichen Größe des Geräts »%s«."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:735
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s has zero size."
+msgstr "Gerät »%s« hat die Größe 0."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:746 lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:252
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small."
+msgstr "Gerät »%s« ist zu klein."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:100
+msgid "Requested PBKDF target time cannot be zero."
+msgstr "Verlangte Vorgabezeit für PBKDF darf nicht 0 sein."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:106
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unknown PBKDF type %s."
+msgstr "Unbekannte PBKDF, Typ »%s«."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:111
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested hash %s is not supported."
+msgstr "Verlangter Hash »%s« wird nicht unterstützt."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:122
+msgid "Requested PBKDF type is not supported for LUKS1."
+msgstr "Verlangter PBKDF-Typ wird von LUKS1 nicht unterstützt."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:128
+msgid "PBKDF max memory or parallel threads must not be set with pbkdf2."
+msgstr "Für pbkdf2 dürfen weder das Speichermaximum noch die Anzahl der Threads angegeben werden."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:133 lib/utils_pbkdf.c:143
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forced iteration count is too low for %s (minimum is %u)."
+msgstr "Anzahl der verlangten Durchläufe ist zu gering für %s (Minimum ist %u)."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:148
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forced memory cost is too low for %s (minimum is %u kilobytes)."
+msgstr "Verlangte Speicherkosten sind zu gering für %s (Minimum sind %u Kilobyte)."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:155
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested maximum PBKDF memory cost is too high (maximum is %d kilobytes)."
+msgstr "Das verlangte Speicherkosten-Maximum ist zu hoch (maximal %d Kilobyte)."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:160
+msgid "Requested maximum PBKDF memory cannot be zero."
+msgstr "Der verlangte PBKDF-Speicherbedarf darf nicht 0 sein."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:164
+msgid "Requested PBKDF parallel threads cannot be zero."
+msgstr "Die Anzahl der verlangten parallelen Threads für PBKDF darf nicht 0 sein."
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:317
+msgid "PBKDF benchmark disabled but iterations not set."
+msgstr "PBKDF-Benchmark deaktiviert, aber Anzahl der Iterationen nicht angegeben."
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:336
+#, c-format
+msgid "Not compatible PBKDF2 options (using hash algorithm %s)."
+msgstr "Inkompatible PBKDF2-Optionen (mit Hash-Algorithmus »%s«)."
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:356
+msgid "Not compatible PBKDF options."
+msgstr "Inkompatible PBKDF2-Optionen."
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:80
+#, c-format
+msgid "Locking aborted. The locking path %s/%s is unusable (not a directory or missing)."
+msgstr "Sperren abgebrochen. Der Sperrpfad %s/%s ist unbenutzbar (kein Verzeichnis oder existiert nicht)."
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:87
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Locking directory %s/%s is missing!\n"
+msgstr "WARNUNG: Zugriffssperren-Verzeichnis %s/%s ist nicht vorhanden!\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:97
+#, c-format
+msgid "Locking aborted. The locking path %s/%s is unusable (%s is not a directory)."
+msgstr "Sperren abgebrochen. Der Sperrpfad %s/%s ist unbenutzbar (%s ist kein Verzeichnis)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:40
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Failed to setup dm-crypt key mapping for device %s.\n"
+"Check that kernel supports %s cipher (check syslog for more info)."
+msgstr ""
+"Einrichten der dm-crypt-Schlüsselzuordnung für Gerät »%s« fehlgeschlagen.\n"
+"Stellen Sie sicher, dass der Kernel die Verschlüsselung »%s« unterstützt.\n"
+"(Sehen Sie im System-Log nach, ob sich dort Hinweise finden.)"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:45
+msgid "Key size in XTS mode must be 256 or 512 bits."
+msgstr "Schlüsselgröße im XTS-Modus muss entweder 256 oder 512 Bits sein."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:47
+msgid "Cipher specification should be in [cipher]-[mode]-[iv] format."
+msgstr "Verschlüsselungsverfahren sollte im Format [Verfahren]-[Modus]-[IV] sein."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:98 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:345
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:642 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1079
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1157 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:448
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write to device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Schreiben auf Gerät »%s«, Zugriff verweigert."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:120
+msgid "Failed to open temporary keystore device."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Öffnen des temporären Schlüsselspeichergeräts."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:127
+msgid "Failed to access temporary keystore device."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Zugriff auf das temporäre Schlüsselspeichergerät."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:200 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:91
+msgid "IO error while encrypting keyslot."
+msgstr "E/A-Fehler beim Verschlüsseln des Schlüsselfachs."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:243 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:348
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:594 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:645 lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:663
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:81 lib/verity/verity.c:182 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:308
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:319 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:339
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:242 lib/verity/verity_fec.c:254
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:259 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1160
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:208
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open device %s."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Öffnen des Geräts »%s«."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:254 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:152
+msgid "IO error while decrypting keyslot."
+msgstr "E/A-Fehler beim Entschlüsseln des Schlüsselfachs."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:111
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small. (LUKS1 requires at least %<PRIu64> bytes.)"
+msgstr "Gerät »%s« ist zu klein. (LUKS1 benötigt mindestens %<PRIu64> Bytes.)"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:132 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:140
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:152 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:163
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:175
+#, c-format
+msgid "LUKS keyslot %u is invalid."
+msgstr "LUKS-Schlüsselfach %u ist ungültig."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:228 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:478
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:991 src/cryptsetup.c:1236
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1355 src/cryptsetup.c:1412 src/cryptsetup.c:1468
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1535 src/cryptsetup.c:1631 src/cryptsetup.c:1695
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1855 src/cryptsetup.c:2044 src/cryptsetup.c:2104
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2170 src/cryptsetup.c:2334 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1397
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."
+msgstr "Gerät »%s« ist kein gültiges LUKS-Gerät."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:247 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1010
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested header backup file %s already exists."
+msgstr "Angeforderte Header-Backupdatei »%s« existiert bereits."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:249 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1012
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Anlegen der Header-Backupdatei »%s«."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:254 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1017
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Speichern der Header-Backupdatei »%s«."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:287 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1066
+msgid "Backup file doesn't contain valid LUKS header."
+msgstr "Backupdatei enthält keinen gültigen LUKS-Header."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:300 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:555
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1087
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Öffnen der Header-Backupdatei »%s«."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:306 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1093
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Einlesen der Header-Backupdatei »%s«."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:318
+msgid "Data offset or key size differs on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "Unterschiedlicher Offset oder Schlüsselgröße zwischen Gerät und Backup. Wiederherstellung fehlgeschlagen."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:326
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s %s%s"
+msgstr "Gerät »%s« %s%s"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:327
+msgid "does not contain LUKS header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device."
+msgstr "enthält keinen LUKS-Header. Das Ersetzen des Headers kann Daten auf dem Gerät zerstören."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:328
+msgid "already contains LUKS header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."
+msgstr "enthält bereits einen LUKS-Header. Das Ersetzen des Headers wird bestehende Schlüsselfächer zerstören."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:329 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1129
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: real device header has different UUID than backup!"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"WARNUNG: Der Header des echten Geräts hat eine andere UUID als das Backup!"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:381
+msgid "Non standard key size, manual repair required."
+msgstr "Ungewöhnliche Schlüsselgröße, manuelles Reparieren erforderlich."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:386
+msgid "Non standard keyslots alignment, manual repair required."
+msgstr "Ungewöhnliche Ausrichtung der Schlüsselfächer, manuelles Reparieren erforderlich."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:396
+msgid "Repairing keyslots."
+msgstr "Schlüsselfächer werden repariert."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:415
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: offset repaired (%u -> %u)."
+msgstr "Schlüsselfach %i: Offset repariert (%u -> %u)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:423
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: stripes repaired (%u -> %u)."
+msgstr "Schlüsselfach %i: Streifen repariert (%u -> %u)."
+
+# XXX
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:432
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: bogus partition signature."
+msgstr "Schlüsselfach %i: schwindlerische Partitions-Signatur."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:437
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: salt wiped."
+msgstr "Schlüsselfach %i: Salt gelöscht."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:454
+msgid "Writing LUKS header to disk."
+msgstr "LUKS-Header wird auf den Datenträger geschrieben."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:459
+msgid "Repair failed."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Reparieren."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:487 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:758
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested LUKS hash %s is not supported."
+msgstr "Verlangter LUKS-Hash »%s« wird nicht unterstützt."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:515 src/cryptsetup.c:960
+msgid "No known problems detected for LUKS header."
+msgstr "Keine bekannten Probleme im LUKS-Header erkannt."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:667
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during update of LUKS header on device %s."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Aktualisieren des LUKS-Headers auf Gerät »%s«."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:676
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error re-reading LUKS header after update on device %s."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Neueinlesen des LUKS-Headers nach dem Aktualisieren auf Gerät »%s«."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:752
+msgid "Data offset for LUKS header must be either 0 or higher than header size."
+msgstr "Daten-Offset für LUKS-Header muss entweder 0 sein oder mehr als die Headergröße."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:763 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:828
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:207 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:909
+msgid "Wrong LUKS UUID format provided."
+msgstr "Falsches LUKS-UUID-Format angegeben."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:786
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: reading random salt failed."
+msgstr "LUKS-Header kann nicht angelegt werden: Fehler beim Einlesen des zufälligen Salts."
+
+# XXX
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:807
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: header digest failed (using hash %s)."
+msgstr "LUKS-Header kann nicht angelegt werden: Fehler beim Hashen des Headers (mit Hash-Algorithmus »%s«)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:851
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d active, purge first."
+msgstr "Schlüsselfach %d aktiv, löschen Sie es erst."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:857
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d material includes too few stripes. Header manipulation?"
+msgstr "Material für Schlüsselfach %d enthält zu wenige Streifen. Manipulation des Headers?"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1065
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select keyslot between 0 and %d."
+msgstr "Schlüsselfach %d ist ungültig, bitte wählen Sie ein Schlüsselfach zwischen 0 und %d."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1083 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:452
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe device %s."
+msgstr "Gerät »%s« kann nicht ausgelöscht werden."
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:146
+msgid "Detected not yet supported GPG encrypted keyfile."
+msgstr "Noch nicht unterstützte verschlüsselte GPG-Schlüsseldatei erkannt."
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:147
+msgid "Please use gpg --decrypt <KEYFILE> | cryptsetup --keyfile=- ...\n"
+msgstr "Bitte benutzen Sie »gpg --decrypt <SCHLÜSSELDATEI> | cryptsetup --keyfile=- …«\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:168 lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:188
+msgid "Incompatible loop-AES keyfile detected."
+msgstr "Inkompatible Loop-AES-Schlüsseldatei erkannt."
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:245
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support loop-AES compatible mapping."
+msgstr "Kernel unterstützt Loop-AES-kompatibles Mapping nicht."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:505
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error reading keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Einlesen der Schlüsseldatei »%s«."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:545
+#, c-format
+msgid "Maximum TCRYPT passphrase length (%d) exceeded."
+msgstr "Maximale Länge der TCRYPT-Passphrase (%d) überschritten."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:586
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2 hash algorithm %s not available, skipping."
+msgstr "Der Hash-Algorithmus »%s« für PBKDF2 wird nicht unterstützt, überspringe diesen Teil."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:604 src/cryptsetup.c:915
+msgid "Required kernel crypto interface not available."
+msgstr "Die benötigte Crypto-Kernel-Schnittstelle ist nicht verfügbar."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:606 src/cryptsetup.c:917
+msgid "Ensure you have algif_skcipher kernel module loaded."
+msgstr "Stellen Sie sicher, dass das Kernelmodul »algif_skcipher« geladen ist."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:746
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activation is not supported for %d sector size."
+msgstr "Aktivierung wird für die Sektorengröße %d nicht unterstützt."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:752
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support activation for this TCRYPT legacy mode."
+msgstr "Der Kernel unterstützt die Aktivierung für diesen TCRYPT-Legacymodus nicht."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:786
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activating TCRYPT system encryption for partition %s."
+msgstr "TCRYPT-Systemverschlüsselung für Partition »%s« wird aktiviert."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:864
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support TCRYPT compatible mapping."
+msgstr "Kernel unterstützt TCRYPT-kompatibles Mapping nicht."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:1085
+msgid "This function is not supported without TCRYPT header load."
+msgstr "Diese Funktionalität braucht einen geladenen TCRYPT-Header."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:69 lib/verity/verity.c:175
+#, c-format
+msgid "Verity device %s doesn't use on-disk header."
+msgstr "Verity-Gerät »%s« benutzt keinen Header auf dem Datenträger."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:94
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not a valid VERITY device."
+msgstr "Gerät »%s« ist kein gültiges VERITY-Gerät."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:101
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY version %d."
+msgstr "Nicht unterstützte VERITY-Version %d."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:132
+msgid "VERITY header corrupted."
+msgstr "VERITY-Header verfälscht."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:169
+#, c-format
+msgid "Wrong VERITY UUID format provided on device %s."
+msgstr "Falsches VERITY-UUID-Format über Gerät »%s« angegeben."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:202
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during update of verity header on device %s."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Aktualisieren des VERITY-Headers auf Gerät »%s«."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:266
+msgid "Errors cannot be repaired with FEC device."
+msgstr "Fehler können mit einem FEC-Gerät nicht repariert werden."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:268
+#, c-format
+msgid "Found %u repairable errors with FEC device."
+msgstr "%u reparierbare Fehler mit FEC-Gerät gefunden."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:306
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support dm-verity mapping."
+msgstr "Kernel unterstützt dm-verity-Zuordnung nicht."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:317
+msgid "Verity device detected corruption after activation."
+msgstr "Verity-Gerät hat eine Verfälschung nach der Aktivierung festgestellt."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:59
+#, c-format
+msgid "Spare area is not zeroed at position %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Zusätzlicher Platz an Position %<PRIu64> ist nicht ausgenullt."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:160 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:287
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:300
+msgid "Device offset overflow."
+msgstr "Überlauf beim Geräte-Offset."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:200
+#, c-format
+msgid "Verification failed at position %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Verifizieren an Position %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:273
+msgid "Invalid size parameters for verity device."
+msgstr "Ungültige Größenparameter für Verity-Gerät."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:293
+msgid "Hash area overflow."
+msgstr "Überlauf des Hashbereichs."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:370
+msgid "Verification of data area failed."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Verifizieren des Datenbereichs."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:375
+msgid "Verification of root hash failed."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Verifizieren des Root-Hashes."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:381
+msgid "Input/output error while creating hash area."
+msgstr "E/A-Fehler beim Anlegen des Hash-Bereiches."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:383
+msgid "Creation of hash area failed."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Anlegen des Hash-Bereiches."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:430
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Kernel cannot activate device if data block size exceeds page size (%u)."
+msgstr "WARNUNG: Kernel kann das Gerät nicht aktivieren, wenn die Datenblockgröße die Seitengröße (%u) übersteigt."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:132
+msgid "Failed to allocate RS context."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Reservieren des RS-Kontexts."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:147
+msgid "Failed to allocate buffer."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Reservieren des Puffers."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:157
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read RS block %<PRIu64> byte %d."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Lesen des RS-Blocks %<PRIu64>, Byte %d."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:170
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read parity for RS block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Lesen der Parität für RS-Block %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:178
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to repair parity for block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Reparieren der Parität für RS-Block %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:189
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to write parity for RS block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Schreiben der Parität für RS-Block %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:224
+msgid "Block sizes must match for FEC."
+msgstr "Blockgrößen müssen für FEC zusammen passen."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:230
+msgid "Invalid number of parity bytes."
+msgstr "Ungültige Anzahl von Paritätsbytes."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:266
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to determine size for device %s."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Ermitteln der Größe von Gerät »%s«."
+
+#: lib/integrity/integrity.c:239 lib/integrity/integrity.c:304
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support dm-integrity mapping."
+msgstr "Kernel unterstützt dm-integrity-Zuordnung nicht."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:413
+msgid "Failed to acquire write device lock."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Zugriff auf die Schreibsperre für das Gerät."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:654 lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:675
+msgid ""
+"Device contains ambiguous signatures, cannot auto-recover LUKS2.\n"
+"Please run \"cryptsetup repair\" for recovery."
+msgstr ""
+"Gerät enthält mehrdeutige Signaturen, LUKS2 kann nicht automatisch wiederhergestellt werden.\n"
+"Bitte führen Sie \"cryptsetup repair\" zur Wiederherstellung aus."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:99
+msgid "No space for new keyslot."
+msgstr "Nicht genug Speicherplatz für neues Schlüsselfach."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:158
+msgid "Requested data offset is too small."
+msgstr "Verlangter Daten-Offset ist zu klein."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:195
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: keyslots area (%<PRIu64> bytes) is very small, available LUKS2 keyslot count is very limited.\n"
+msgstr "WARNING: Der Schlüsselfach-Bereich (%<PRIu64> Bytes) ist sehr klein, die LUKS2-Schlüsselfachanzahl ist sehr begrenzt.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:866 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:982
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1055 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:105
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:128
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to acquire read lock on device %s."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Zugriff auf die Lesesperre für das Gerät »%s«."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:878 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1149
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:431 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:40
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:69
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to acquire write lock on device %s."
+msgstr "Fehler beim exklusiven Schreibzugriff auf Gerät »%s«."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1072
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forbidden LUKS2 requirements detected in backup %s."
+msgstr "Verbotene LUKS2-Anforderungen in Backup »%s« entdeckt."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1113
+msgid "Data offset differ on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "Unterschiedliche Datenoffsets auf Gerät und Backup. Wiederherstellung fehlgeschlagen."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1119
+msgid "Binary header with keyslot areas size differ on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "Unterschiedliche Größe der Binärheader mit Schlüsselfach-Bereichen zwischen Gerät und Backup. Wiederherstellung fehlgeschlagen."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1126
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s %s%s%s%s"
+msgstr "Gerät »%s« %s%s%s%s"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1127
+msgid "does not contain LUKS2 header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device."
+msgstr "enthält keinen LUKS2-Header. Das Ersetzen des Headers kann Daten auf dem Gerät zerstören."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1128
+msgid "already contains LUKS2 header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."
+msgstr "enthält bereits einen LUKS2-Header. Das Ersetzen des Headers wird bestehende Schlüsselfächer zerstören."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1130
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: unknown LUKS2 requirements detected in real device header!\n"
+"Replacing header with backup may corrupt the data on that device!"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"WARNUNG: Unbekannte LUKS2-Anforderungen im echten Geräteheader entdeckt!\n"
+"Das Ersetzen des Headers mit dem Backup kann zu Datenverlust auf dem Gerät führen!"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1132
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: Unfinished offline reencryption detected on the device!\n"
+"Replacing header with backup may corrupt data."
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"WARNUNG: Unvollendete Offline-Wiederverschlüsselung auf dem Gerät entdeckt!\n"
+"Das Ersetzen des Headers mit dem Backup kann zu Datenverlust auf dem Gerät führen."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1234
+#, c-format
+msgid "Ignored unknown flag %s."
+msgstr "Unbekannter Schalter »%s« wird ignoriert."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1869
+msgid "Failed to read LUKS2 requirements."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Lesen der LUKS2-Anforderungen."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1876
+msgid "Unmet LUKS2 requirements detected."
+msgstr "Unerfüllte LUKS2-Anforderungen entdeckt."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1884
+msgid "Offline reencryption in progress. Aborting."
+msgstr "Offline-Wiederverschlüsselung läuft gerade. Wird abgebrochen."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:474
+#, c-format
+msgid "Can not check status of device with uuid: %s."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Prüfen des Zustands von Gerät mit der UUID %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:500
+msgid "Unable to convert header with LUKSMETA additional metadata."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Konvertieren des Headers mit zusätzlichen LUKSMETA-Metadaten."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:537
+msgid "Unable to move keyslot area. Not enough space."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Verschieben des Schlüsselfach-Bereichs. Nicht genug Speicherplatz."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:577 lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:854
+msgid "Unable to move keyslot area."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Verschieben des Schlüsselfach-Bereichs."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:672
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - key slot digests are not LUKS1 compatible."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Konvertieren in LUKS1-Format: Schlüsselfach-Digeste sind nicht zu LUKS1 kompatibel."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:684
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - device uses wrapped key cipher %s."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Konvertieren in LUKS1-Format: Gerät verwendet eingepacktes Verschlüsselungsverfahren %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:692
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - LUKS2 header contains %u token(s)."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Konvertieren in LUKS1-Format: LUKS2-Header enthält %u Token."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:706
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - keyslot %u is in invalid state."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Konvertieren in LUKS1-Format: Schlüsselfach %u ist in ungültigem Zustand."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:711
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - slot %u (over maximum slots) is still active."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Konvertieren in LUKS1-Format: Schlüsselfach %u (über Maximalfach) ist noch aktiv."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:716
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - keyslot %u is not LUKS1 compatible."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Konvertieren in LUKS1-Format: Schlüsselfach %u ist nicht zu LUKS1 kompatibel."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_token.c:262
+msgid "No free token slot."
+msgstr "Kein freies Fach für Token."
+
+# upstream: period missing
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_token.c:269
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to create builtin token %s."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Erzeugen des eingebauten Tokens »%s«."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:141
+msgid "Can't do passphrase verification on non-tty inputs."
+msgstr "Passphrase-Verifikation ist nur auf Terminal-Eingaben möglich."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:182
+msgid "Keyslot encryption parameters can be set only for LUKS2 device."
+msgstr "Verschlüsselungsparameter für Schlüsselfach wird nur für LUKS2-Geräte unterstützt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:212 src/cryptsetup.c:849 src/cryptsetup.c:1088
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:749 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:814
+msgid "No known cipher specification pattern detected."
+msgstr "Kein bekanntes Verschlüsselungsmuster entdeckt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:220
+msgid "WARNING: The --hash parameter is being ignored in plain mode with keyfile specified.\n"
+msgstr "WARNUNG: Der Parameter --hash wird im Plain-Modus ignoriert, wenn eine Schlüsseldatei angegeben ist.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:228
+msgid "WARNING: The --keyfile-size option is being ignored, the read size is the same as the encryption key size.\n"
+msgstr "WARNUNG: Die Option --keyfile-size wird ignoriert, da die Lesegröße die gleiche ist wie die Verschlüsselungsschlüsselgröße ist.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:268
+#, c-format
+msgid "Detected device signature(s) on %s. Proceeding further may damage existing data."
+msgstr "Gerätesignaturen auf »%s« erkannt. Wenn Sie fortfahren, könnte das bestehende Daten beschädigen."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:274 src/cryptsetup.c:969 src/cryptsetup.c:1065
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1138 src/cryptsetup.c:1763 src/integritysetup.c:230
+msgid "Operation aborted.\n"
+msgstr "Vorgang abgebrochen.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:342
+msgid "Option --key-file is required."
+msgstr "Die Option »--key-file« muss angegeben werden."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:395
+msgid "Enter VeraCrypt PIM: "
+msgstr "VeraCrypt-PIM eingeben: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:404
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: parse error."
+msgstr "Ungültiger PIM-Wert: Formatfehler."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:407
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: 0."
+msgstr "Ungültiger PIM-Wert: 0."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:410
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: outside of range."
+msgstr "Ungültiger PIM-Wert: außerhalb des gültigen Bereichs."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:433
+msgid "No device header detected with this passphrase."
+msgstr "Kein Geräte-Header mit dieser Passphrase gefunden."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:495 src/cryptsetup.c:1790
+msgid ""
+"Header dump with volume key is sensitive information\n"
+"which allows access to encrypted partition without passphrase.\n"
+"This dump should be always stored encrypted on safe place."
+msgstr ""
+"Der Headerdump zusammen mit dem Laufwerksschlüssel sind\n"
+"sensible Daten, mit deren Hilfe man ohne Passphrase auf die\n"
+"verschlüsselte Partition zugreifen kann. Dieser Dump sollte\n"
+"daher ausschließlich an einem sicheren Ort und verschlüsselt\n"
+"aufbewahrt werden."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:574
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is still active and scheduled for deferred removal.\n"
+msgstr "Gerät »%s« ist noch aktiv und zum verzögerten Entfernen eingeplant.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:602
+msgid "Resize of active device requires volume key in keyring but --disable-keyring option is set."
+msgstr "Um die Größe von aktiven Geräten zu öndern, muss der Laufwerksschlüssel im Schlüsselbund sein, aber die Option --disable-keyring wurde angegeben."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:727
+msgid "Benchmark interrupted."
+msgstr "Benchmark unterbrochen."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:748
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2-%-9s     N/A\n"
+msgstr "PBKDF2-%-9s     (nicht zutreffend)\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:750
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2-%-9s %7u iterations per second for %zu-bit key\n"
+msgstr "PBKDF2-%-9s %7u Iterationen pro Sekunde für %zu-Bit-Schlüssel\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:764
+#, c-format
+msgid "%-10s N/A\n"
+msgstr "%-10s (nicht zutreffend)\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:766
+#, c-format
+msgid "%-10s %4u iterations, %5u memory, %1u parallel threads (CPUs) for %zu-bit key (requested %u ms time)\n"
+msgstr "%-10s %4u Iterationen, %5u Speicher, %1u parallele Threads (CPUs) für %zu-Bit-Schlüssel (Zieldauer %u Millisekunden)\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:790
+msgid "Result of benchmark is not reliable."
+msgstr "Das Ergebnis des Benchmarks ist nicht zuverlässig."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:841
+msgid "# Tests are approximate using memory only (no storage IO).\n"
+msgstr "# Die Tests sind nur annähernd genau, da sie nicht auf den Datenträger zugreifen.\n"
+
+# upstream: the following line should also be translated. This is because the long word "Schlüssel" for "Key" will break the layout, as well as "Verschlüsselung" for "Encryption".
+# To help the translators, you should provide an example for what goes into the %x placeholders, since I had to make an educated guess that the second %s would be exactly 4 characters long. This is an unnecessary burden for the translators.
+#. TRANSLATORS: The string is header of a table and must be exactly (right side) aligned.
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:875
+#, c-format
+msgid "#%*s Algorithm |       Key |      Encryption |      Decryption\n"
+msgstr "#%*s   Algorithmus | Schlüssel | Verschlüsselung | Entschlüsselung\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:879
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cipher %s is not available."
+msgstr "Verschlüsselung »%s« ist nicht verfügbar."
+
+# upstream: the following line should also be translated. This is because the long word "Schlüssel" for "Key" will break the layout, as well as "Verschlüsselung" for "Encryption".
+# To help the translators, you should provide an example for what goes into the %x placeholders, since I had to make an educated guess that the second %s would be exactly 4 characters long. This is an unnecessary burden for the translators.
+#. TRANSLATORS: The string is header of a table and must be exactly (right side) aligned.
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:899
+msgid "#     Algorithm |       Key |      Encryption |      Decryption\n"
+msgstr "#   Algorithmus | Schlüssel | Verschlüsselung | Entschlüsselung\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:908
+msgid "N/A"
+msgstr "N/A"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:968
+msgid "Really try to repair LUKS device header?"
+msgstr "Wirklich versuchen, den LUKS-Geräteheader wiederherzustellen?"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:984 src/integritysetup.c:144
+msgid ""
+"Wiping device to initialize integrity checksum.\n"
+"You can interrupt this by pressing CTRL+c (rest of not wiped device will contain invalid checksum).\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Gerät wird gesäubert, um die Prüfsumme für die Integrität zu initialisieren.\n"
+"Sie können diesen Vorgang mit Strg+C unterbrechen (der nicht gesäuberte Bereich des Geräts wird dann ungültige Prüfsummen haben).\n"
+
+# upstream: it is boring that I have to translate the newline at the end of each of these messages. Translating strings without newlines is much easier and faster. Since it is redundant anyway (all calls to log_err have a trailing newline), this newline should be written implicitly.
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1006 src/integritysetup.c:166
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot deactivate temporary device %s."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Deaktivieren des temporären Geräts »%s«."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1050
+msgid "Integrity option can be used only for LUKS2 format."
+msgstr "Die Integritätsoption kann nur für das LUKS2-Format verwendet werden."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1055 src/cryptsetup.c:1115
+msgid "Unsupported LUKS2 metadata size options."
+msgstr "Nicht unterstützte Optionen für Größe der LUKS-Metadaten."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1072
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create header file %s."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Anlegen der Headerdatei »%s«."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1095 src/integritysetup.c:192 src/integritysetup.c:201
+#: src/integritysetup.c:210 src/integritysetup.c:276 src/integritysetup.c:285
+#: src/integritysetup.c:295
+msgid "No known integrity specification pattern detected."
+msgstr "Kein bekanntes Integritätsspezifikationsmuster entdeckt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1108
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use %s as on-disk header."
+msgstr "Das Gerät »%s« kann nicht als Datenträger-Header benutzt werden."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1132 src/integritysetup.c:224
+#, c-format
+msgid "This will overwrite data on %s irrevocably."
+msgstr "Hiermit werden die Daten auf »%s« unwiderruflich überschrieben."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1173 src/cryptsetup.c:1484 src/cryptsetup.c:1551
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1646 src/cryptsetup.c:1712
+msgid "Failed to set pbkdf parameters."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Festlegen der PBKDF-Parameter."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1242
+msgid "Reduced data offset is allowed only for detached LUKS header."
+msgstr "Verringerter Datenoffset ist nur für separaten LUKS-Header erlaubt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1284
+msgid "Device activated but cannot make flags persistent."
+msgstr "Gerät aktiviert, aber die Schalter können nicht dauerhaft gespeichert werden."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1365
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %d is selected for deletion."
+msgstr "Schlüsselfach %d zum Löschen ausgewählt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1368 src/cryptsetup.c:1706
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %d is not active."
+msgstr "Schlüsselfach %d ist nicht aktiv."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1377 src/cryptsetup.c:1438
+msgid "This is the last keyslot. Device will become unusable after purging this key."
+msgstr "Dies ist das letzte Schlüsselfach. Wenn Sie diesen Schlüssel löschen, wird das Gerät unbrauchbar."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1378
+msgid "Enter any remaining passphrase: "
+msgstr "Geben Sie irgendeine verbleibende Passphrase ein: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1379 src/cryptsetup.c:1440
+msgid "Operation aborted, the keyslot was NOT wiped.\n"
+msgstr "Vorgang abgebrochen, das Schlüsselfach wurde NICHT gesäubert.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1417
+msgid "Enter passphrase to be deleted: "
+msgstr "Geben Sie die zu löschende Passphrase ein: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1435
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d selected for deletion."
+msgstr "Schlüsselfach %d zum Löschen ausgewählt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1498 src/cryptsetup.c:1565 src/cryptsetup.c:1599
+msgid "Enter new passphrase for key slot: "
+msgstr "Geben Sie die neue Passphrase für das Schlüsselfach ein: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1582 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1352
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter any existing passphrase: "
+msgstr "Geben Sie irgendeine bestehende Passphrase ein: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1650
+msgid "Enter passphrase to be changed: "
+msgstr "Geben Sie die zu ändernde Passphrase ein: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1666 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1338
+msgid "Enter new passphrase: "
+msgstr "Geben Sie die neue Passphrase ein: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1716
+msgid "Enter passphrase for keyslot to be converted: "
+msgstr "Geben Sie die Passphrase für das umzuwandelnde Schlüsselfach ein: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1740
+msgid "Only one device argument for isLuks operation is supported."
+msgstr "Die Operation »isLuks« unterstützt nur genau ein Geräte-Argument."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1924 src/cryptsetup.c:1945
+msgid "Option --header-backup-file is required."
+msgstr "Option »--header-backup-file« muss angegeben werden."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1975
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s is not cryptsetup managed device."
+msgstr "%s ist kein von cryptsetup verwaltetes Gerät."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1986
+#, c-format
+msgid "Refresh is not supported for device type %s"
+msgstr "Die Geräteart »%s« kann nicht aus dem Ruhezustand aufgeweckt werden."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2024
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unrecognized metadata device type %s."
+msgstr "Unbekannte Art »%s« des Metadaten-Geräts."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2027
+msgid "Command requires device and mapped name as arguments."
+msgstr "Dieser Befehl benötigt den Gerätenamen und den zugeordneten Namen als Argumente."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2049
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"This operation will erase all keyslots on device %s.\n"
+"Device will become unusable after this operation."
+msgstr ""
+"Diese Operation wird alle Schlüsselfächer auf Gerät »%s« löschen.\n"
+"Dadurch wird das Gerät unbrauchbar."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2056
+msgid "Operation aborted, keyslots were NOT wiped.\n"
+msgstr "Vorgang abgebrochen, die Schlüsselfächer wurden NICHT gesäubert.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2093
+msgid "Invalid LUKS type, only luks1 and luks2 are supported."
+msgstr "Invalid LUKS type, only luks1 and luks2 are supported."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2111
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device is already %s type."
+msgstr "Das Gerät hat bereits den Typ »%s«."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2116
+#, c-format
+msgid "This operation will convert %s to %s format.\n"
+msgstr "Diese Operation wird für »%s« ins Format »%s« umwandeln.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2122
+msgid "Operation aborted, device was NOT converted.\n"
+msgstr "Vorgang abgebrochen, das Gerät wurde NICHT konvertiert.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2162
+msgid "Option --priority, --label or --subsystem is missing."
+msgstr "Die Option --priority, --label oder --subsystem fehlt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2196 src/cryptsetup.c:2229 src/cryptsetup.c:2252
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %d is invalid."
+msgstr "Token %d ist ungültig."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2199 src/cryptsetup.c:2255
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %d in use."
+msgstr "Token %d ist in Benutzung."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2206
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to add luks2-keyring token %d."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Hinzufügen des LUKS2-Schlüsselring-Tokens %d."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2215 src/cryptsetup.c:2277
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign token %d to keyslot %d."
+msgstr "Token %d kann nicht dem Schlüsselfach %d zugeordnet werden."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2232
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %d is not in use."
+msgstr "Token %d wird gerade nicht verwendet."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2267
+msgid "Failed to import token from file."
+msgstr "Token konnte nicht aus der Datei importiert werden."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2292
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to get token %d for export."
+msgstr "Auf Token %d kann nicht für den Export zugegriffen werden."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2307
+msgid "--key-description parameter is mandatory for token add action."
+msgstr "Der Parameter --key-description ist Pflicht für die Aktion »token add«."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2313 src/cryptsetup.c:2321
+msgid "Action requires specific token. Use --token-id parameter."
+msgstr "Die Aktion erfordert ein bestimmtes Token. Verwenden Sie den Parameter --token-id."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2326
+#, c-format
+msgid "Invalid token operation %s."
+msgstr "Ungültige Token-Operation »%s«."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2366
+msgid "<device> [--type <type>] [<name>]"
+msgstr "<Gerät> [--type <Art>] [<Name>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2366
+msgid "open device as mapping <name>"
+msgstr "Gerät als Zuordnung <Name> öffnen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2367 src/cryptsetup.c:2368 src/cryptsetup.c:2369
+#: src/veritysetup.c:363 src/veritysetup.c:364 src/integritysetup.c:464
+#: src/integritysetup.c:465
+msgid "<name>"
+msgstr "<Name>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2367
+msgid "close device (remove mapping)"
+msgstr "Gerät schließen (Zuordnung entfernen)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2368
+msgid "resize active device"
+msgstr "Größe des aktiven Geräts ändern"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2369
+msgid "show device status"
+msgstr "Gerätestatus anzeigen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2370
+msgid "[--cipher <cipher>]"
+msgstr "[--cipher <Algorithmus>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2370
+msgid "benchmark cipher"
+msgstr "Verschlüsselungsalgorithmus benchmarken"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2371 src/cryptsetup.c:2372 src/cryptsetup.c:2373
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2374 src/cryptsetup.c:2381 src/cryptsetup.c:2382
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2383 src/cryptsetup.c:2384 src/cryptsetup.c:2385
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2386 src/cryptsetup.c:2387 src/cryptsetup.c:2388
+msgid "<device>"
+msgstr "<Gerät>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2371
+msgid "try to repair on-disk metadata"
+msgstr "Versuchen, die Metadaten auf dem Datenträger zu reparieren"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2372
+msgid "erase all keyslots (remove encryption key)"
+msgstr "Alle Schlüsselfächer löschen (Verschlüsselungsschlüssel entfernen)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2373
+msgid "convert LUKS from/to LUKS2 format"
+msgstr "Zwischen den Formaten LUKS und LUKS2 umwandeln"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2374
+msgid "set permanent configuration options for LUKS2"
+msgstr "Permanente Konfigurationsoptionen für LUKS2 festlegen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2375 src/cryptsetup.c:2376
+msgid "<device> [<new key file>]"
+msgstr "<Gerät> [<neue Schlüsseldatei>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2375
+msgid "formats a LUKS device"
+msgstr "Ein LUKS-Gerät formatieren"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2376
+msgid "add key to LUKS device"
+msgstr "Schlüssel zu LUKS-Gerät hinzufügen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2377 src/cryptsetup.c:2378 src/cryptsetup.c:2379
+msgid "<device> [<key file>]"
+msgstr "<Gerät> [<Schlüsseldatei>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2377
+msgid "removes supplied key or key file from LUKS device"
+msgstr "Entfernt bereitgestellten Schlüssel oder Schlüsseldatei vom LUKS-Gerät"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2378
+msgid "changes supplied key or key file of LUKS device"
+msgstr "Ändert den angegebenen Schlüssel oder die Schlüsseldatei des LUKS-Geräts"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2379
+msgid "converts a key to new pbkdf parameters"
+msgstr "Wandelt einen Schlüssel in neue PBKDF-Parameter um"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2380
+msgid "<device> <key slot>"
+msgstr "<Gerät> <Schlüsselfach>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2380
+msgid "wipes key with number <key slot> from LUKS device"
+msgstr "Löscht Schlüssel mit Nummer <Schlüsselfach> vom LUKS-Gerät"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2381
+msgid "print UUID of LUKS device"
+msgstr "UUID des LUKS-Geräts ausgeben"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2382
+msgid "tests <device> for LUKS partition header"
+msgstr "Testet <Gerät> auf Header einer LUKS-Partition"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2383
+msgid "dump LUKS partition information"
+msgstr "LUKS-Partitionsinformationen ausgeben"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2384
+msgid "dump TCRYPT device information"
+msgstr "TCRYPT-Geräteinformationen ausgeben"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2385
+msgid "Suspend LUKS device and wipe key (all IOs are frozen)"
+msgstr "LUKS-Gerät in Ruhezustand versetzen und alle Schlüssel auslöschen (alle IOs werden eingefroren)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2386
+msgid "Resume suspended LUKS device"
+msgstr "LUKS-Gerät aus dem Ruhezustand aufwecken"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2387
+msgid "Backup LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "Header und Schlüsselfächer eines LUKS-Geräts sichern"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2388
+msgid "Restore LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "Header und Schlüsselfächer eines LUKS-Geräts wiederherstellen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2389
+msgid "<add|remove|import|export> <device>"
+msgstr "<add|remove|import|export> <Gerät>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2389
+msgid "Manipulate LUKS2 tokens"
+msgstr "LUKS2-Token manipulieren"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2407 src/veritysetup.c:380 src/integritysetup.c:481
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<action> is one of:\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<Aktion> ist eine von:\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2413
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"You can also use old <action> syntax aliases:\n"
+"\topen: create (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen\n"
+"\tclose: remove (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tcryptClose\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Sie können auch die alten <Aktion>-Aliase benutzen:\n"
+"\topen: create (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen\n"
+"\tclose: remove (plainClose), luksClose, lookaesClose, tcryptClose\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2417
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<device> is the encrypted device\n"
+"<key slot> is the LUKS key slot number to modify\n"
+"<key file> optional key file for the new key for luksAddKey action\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<Name> ist das Gerät, das unter »%s« erzeugt wird\n"
+"<Gerät> ist das verschlüsselte Gerät\n"
+"<Schlüsselfach> ist die Nummer des zu verändernden LUKS-Schlüsselfachs\n"
+"<Schlüsseldatei> optionale Schlüsseldatei für den neuen Schlüssel der »luksAddKey«-Aktion\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2424
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in metadata format is %s (for luksFormat action).\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Vorgegebenes festeingebautes Metadatenformat ist %s (für luksFormat-Aktion).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2429
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in key and passphrase parameters:\n"
+"\tMaximum keyfile size: %dkB, Maximum interactive passphrase length %d (characters)\n"
+"Default PBKDF for LUKS1: %s, iteration time: %d (ms)\n"
+"Default PBKDF for LUKS2: %s\n"
+"\tIteration time: %d, Memory required: %dkB, Parallel threads: %d\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Werkseinstellungen für Schlüssel und Passphrasen:\n"
+"\tMaximale Größe der Schlüsseldatei: %d kB, Maximale Länge der interaktiven Passphrase: %d Zeichen\n"
+"Vorgabe-PBKDF für LUKS1: %s, Durchlaufzeit: %d Millisekunden\n"
+"Vorgabe-PBKDF für LUKS2: %s\n"
+"\tIterationszeit: %d, benötigter Speicher: %d kB, parallele Threads: %d\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2440
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in device cipher parameters:\n"
+"\tloop-AES: %s, Key %d bits\n"
+"\tplain: %s, Key: %d bits, Password hashing: %s\n"
+"\tLUKS: %s, Key: %d bits, LUKS header hashing: %s, RNG: %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Standard-Verschlüsselungsparameter:\n"
+"\tLoop-AES: %s, Schlüssel %d Bits\n"
+"\tplain: %s, Schlüssel: %d Bits, Passphrase-Hashen: %s\n"
+"\tLUKS: %s, Schlüssel: %d Bits, LUKS-Header-Hashen: %s, Zufallszahlengenerator: %s\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2449
+msgid "\tLUKS: Default keysize with XTS mode (two internal keys) will be doubled.\n"
+msgstr "\tLUKS: Standard-Schlüsselgröße mit XTS-Modus (zwei interne Schlüssel) wird verdoppelt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2460 src/veritysetup.c:537 src/integritysetup.c:621
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s: requires %s as arguments"
+msgstr "%s: Benötigt %s als Argumente"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2498 src/veritysetup.c:420 src/integritysetup.c:515
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1611
+msgid "Show this help message"
+msgstr "Diese Hilfe anzeigen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2499 src/veritysetup.c:421 src/integritysetup.c:516
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1612
+msgid "Display brief usage"
+msgstr "Kurze Aufrufsyntax anzeigen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2503 src/veritysetup.c:425 src/integritysetup.c:520
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1616
+msgid "Help options:"
+msgstr "Hilfe-Optionen:"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2504 src/veritysetup.c:426 src/integritysetup.c:521
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1617
+msgid "Print package version"
+msgstr "Paketversion ausgeben"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2505 src/veritysetup.c:427 src/integritysetup.c:522
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1618
+msgid "Shows more detailed error messages"
+msgstr "Zeigt detailliertere Fehlermeldungen an"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2506 src/veritysetup.c:428 src/integritysetup.c:523
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1619
+msgid "Show debug messages"
+msgstr "Zeigt Debugging-Meldungen an"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2507
+msgid "Show debug messages including JSON metadata"
+msgstr "Debugging-Meldungen anzeigen, inclusive JSON-Metadaten"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2508 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1621
+msgid "The cipher used to encrypt the disk (see /proc/crypto)"
+msgstr "Der Algorithmus zum Verschlüsseln des Datenträgers (siehe /proc/crypto)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2509 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1623
+msgid "The hash used to create the encryption key from the passphrase"
+msgstr "Das Hashverfahren, um den Verschlüsselungsschlüssel aus der Passphrase zu erzeugen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2510
+msgid "Verifies the passphrase by asking for it twice"
+msgstr "Verifiziert die Passphrase durch doppeltes Nachfragen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2511 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1625
+msgid "Read the key from a file"
+msgstr "Schlüssel aus einer Datei lesen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2512
+msgid "Read the volume (master) key from file."
+msgstr "Laufwerks-(Master-)Schlüssel aus Datei lesen."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2513
+msgid "Dump volume (master) key instead of keyslots info"
+msgstr "Laufwerks-(Master-)schlüssel anstelle der Schlüsselfach-Informationen wegschreiben"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2514 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1622
+msgid "The size of the encryption key"
+msgstr "Die Größe des Verschlüsselungsschlüssels"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2514 src/cryptsetup.c:2571 src/integritysetup.c:539
+#: src/integritysetup.c:543 src/integritysetup.c:547
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1622
+msgid "BITS"
+msgstr "BITS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2515 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1638
+msgid "Limits the read from keyfile"
+msgstr "Begrenzt das Lesen aus der Schlüsseldatei"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2515 src/cryptsetup.c:2516 src/cryptsetup.c:2517
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2518 src/cryptsetup.c:2568 src/cryptsetup.c:2569
+#: src/veritysetup.c:431 src/veritysetup.c:432 src/veritysetup.c:433
+#: src/veritysetup.c:436 src/veritysetup.c:437 src/integritysetup.c:530
+#: src/integritysetup.c:534 src/integritysetup.c:535
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1637 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1638
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1639 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1640
+msgid "bytes"
+msgstr "Bytes"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2516 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1637
+msgid "Number of bytes to skip in keyfile"
+msgstr "Anzahl der Bytes, die in der Schlüsseldatei übersprungen werden"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2517
+msgid "Limits the read from newly added keyfile"
+msgstr "Begrenzt das Lesen aus der neu erzeugten Schlüsseldatei"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2518
+msgid "Number of bytes to skip in newly added keyfile"
+msgstr "Anzahl der Bytes, die in der neu erzeugten Schlüsseldatei übersprungen werden"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2519
+msgid "Slot number for new key (default is first free)"
+msgstr "Fachnummer für den neuen Schlüssel (im Zweifel das nächste freie)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2520
+msgid "The size of the device"
+msgstr "Die Größe des Geräts"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2520 src/cryptsetup.c:2521 src/cryptsetup.c:2522
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2528 src/integritysetup.c:531 src/integritysetup.c:536
+msgid "SECTORS"
+msgstr "SEKTOREN"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2521
+msgid "The start offset in the backend device"
+msgstr "Der Startoffset im Backend-Gerät"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2522
+msgid "How many sectors of the encrypted data to skip at the beginning"
+msgstr "Wieviele Sektoren der verschlüsselten Daten am Anfang übersprungen werden sollen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2523
+msgid "Create a readonly mapping"
+msgstr "Eine schreibgeschützte Zuordnung erzeugen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2524 src/integritysetup.c:524
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1628
+msgid "Do not ask for confirmation"
+msgstr "Nicht nach Bestätigung fragen"
+
+# XXX
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2525
+msgid "Timeout for interactive passphrase prompt (in seconds)"
+msgstr "Frist für interaktive Eingabe der Passphrase (in Sekunden)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2525 src/cryptsetup.c:2526 src/integritysetup.c:525
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1629
+msgid "secs"
+msgstr "sek"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2526 src/integritysetup.c:525
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1629
+msgid "Progress line update (in seconds)"
+msgstr "Aktualisierungsintervall für Fortschrittszeile (in Sekunden)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2527 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1630
+msgid "How often the input of the passphrase can be retried"
+msgstr "Wie oft die Eingabe der Passphrase wiederholt werden kann"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2528
+msgid "Align payload at <n> sector boundaries - for luksFormat"
+msgstr "Nutzdaten an Grenzen von <n> Sektoren ausrichten - für luksFormat"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2529
+msgid "File with LUKS header and keyslots backup"
+msgstr "Datei mit dem Backup der LUKS-Header und den Schlüsselfächern"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2530 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1631
+msgid "Use /dev/random for generating volume key"
+msgstr "/dev/random zum Generieren des Laufwerksschlüssels benutzen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2531 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1632
+msgid "Use /dev/urandom for generating volume key"
+msgstr "/dev/urandom zum Generieren des Laufwerksschlüssels benutzen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2532
+msgid "Share device with another non-overlapping crypt segment"
+msgstr "Gerät mit einem anderen nicht-überlappenden Kryptosegment teilen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2533 src/veritysetup.c:440
+msgid "UUID for device to use"
+msgstr "UUID für das zu verwendende Gerät"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2534
+msgid "Allow discards (aka TRIM) requests for device"
+msgstr "Auswurf-Anfragen (»TRIM«-Befehl) für das Gerät zulassen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2535 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1649
+msgid "Device or file with separated LUKS header"
+msgstr "Gerät oder Datei mit separatem LUKS-Header"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2536
+msgid "Do not activate device, just check passphrase"
+msgstr "Gerät nicht aktivieren, nur Passphrase überprüfen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2537
+msgid "Use hidden header (hidden TCRYPT device)"
+msgstr "Versteckten Header benutzen (verstecktes TCRYPT-Gerät)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2538
+msgid "Device is system TCRYPT drive (with bootloader)"
+msgstr "Das Gerät ist das System-TCRYPT-Laufwerk (mit Bootlader)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2539
+msgid "Use backup (secondary) TCRYPT header"
+msgstr "Backup-(Zweit-)-TCRYPT-Header benutzen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2540
+msgid "Scan also for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "Auch nach VeryCrypt-kompatiblen Geräten suchen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2541
+msgid "Personal Iteration Multiplier for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "Persönlicher Interations-Multiplizierer (PIM) für VeryCrypt-kompatibles Gerät"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2542
+msgid "Query Personal Iteration Multiplier for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "Bei VeraCrypt-kompatiblem Gerät nach persönlichem Iterations-Multiplizierer (PIM) fragen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2543
+msgid "Type of device metadata: luks, plain, loopaes, tcrypt"
+msgstr "Art der Geräte-Metadaten: luks, plain, loopaes, tcrypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2544
+msgid "Disable password quality check (if enabled)"
+msgstr "Passwort-Qualitätsprüfung deaktivieren (wenn sie aktiviert ist)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2545
+msgid "Use dm-crypt same_cpu_crypt performance compatibility option"
+msgstr "Kompatibilitäts-Performance-Option »same_cpu_crypt« für dm-crypt benutzen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2546
+msgid "Use dm-crypt submit_from_crypt_cpus performance compatibility option"
+msgstr "Kompatibilitäts-Performance-Option »submit_from_crypt_cpus« für dm-crypt benutzen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2547
+msgid "Device removal is deferred until the last user closes it"
+msgstr "Das Entfernen des Geräts wird aufgeschoben, bis der letzte Benutzer es schließt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2548
+msgid "PBKDF iteration time for LUKS (in ms)"
+msgstr "PBKDF-Iterationszeit for LUKS (in ms)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2548 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1627
+msgid "msecs"
+msgstr "msek"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2549 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1645
+msgid "PBKDF algorithm (for LUKS2): argon2i, argon2id, pbkdf2"
+msgstr "PBKDF-Algorithmus (für LUKS2): argon2i, argon2id, pbkdf2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2550 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1646
+msgid "PBKDF memory cost limit"
+msgstr "PBKDF-Speicherkostengrenze"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2550 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1646
+msgid "kilobytes"
+msgstr "Kilobytes"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2551 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1647
+msgid "PBKDF parallel cost"
+msgstr "PBKDF-Parallelitätskosten"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2551 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1647
+msgid "threads"
+msgstr "Threads"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2552 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1648
+msgid "PBKDF iterations cost (forced, disables benchmark)"
+msgstr "PBKDF-Iterationskosten (erzwungen, deaktiviert Benchmark)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2553
+msgid "Keyslot priority: ignore, normal, prefer"
+msgstr "Schlüsselfach-Priorität: ignore (ignorieren), normal, prefer (bevorzugen)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2554
+msgid "Disable locking of on-disk metadata"
+msgstr "Dateisperrung von Metadaten auf der Platte deaktivieren"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2555
+msgid "Disable loading volume keys via kernel keyring"
+msgstr "Deaktivieren, dass Laufwerksschlüssel über den Kernel-Schlüsselbund geladen werden"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2556
+msgid "Data integrity algorithm (LUKS2 only)"
+msgstr "Datenintegritätsalgorithmus (nur LUKS2)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2557 src/integritysetup.c:550
+msgid "Disable journal for integrity device"
+msgstr "Aufzeichnung für Integritätsgerät deaktivieren"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2558 src/integritysetup.c:526
+msgid "Do not wipe device after format"
+msgstr "Gerät nach dem Formatieren nicht säubern"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2559
+msgid "Do not ask for passphrase if activation by token fails"
+msgstr "Nicht nach einer Passphrase fragen, wenn die Aktivierung durch Token fehlschlägt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2560
+msgid "Token number (default: any)"
+msgstr "Token-Nummer (Vorgabe: eine beliebige)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2561
+msgid "Key description"
+msgstr "Schlüsselbeschreibung"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2562
+msgid "Encryption sector size (default: 512 bytes)"
+msgstr "Verschlüsselungs-Sektorgröße (Vorgabe: 512 Bytes)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2563
+msgid "Set activation flags persistent for device"
+msgstr "Aktivierungsschalter für Gerät permanent festlegen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2564
+msgid "Set label for the LUKS2 device"
+msgstr "Beschriftung für das LUKS2-Gerät festlegen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2565
+msgid "Set subsystem label for the LUKS2 device"
+msgstr "Teilsystem-Beschriftung für das LUKS2-Gerät festlegen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2566
+msgid "Create unbound (no assigned data segment) LUKS2 keyslot"
+msgstr "Unbeschränktes LUKS2-Schlüsselfach (ohne zugeordnetem Datensegment) anlegen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2567
+msgid "Read or write the json from or to a file"
+msgstr "JSON aus einer Datei lesen oder in eine Datei schreiben"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2568
+msgid "LUKS2 header metadata area size"
+msgstr "Größe des Bereichs für LUKS2-Header-Metadaten"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2569
+msgid "LUKS2 header keyslots area size"
+msgstr "Größe des Bereichs für Schlüsselfächer im LUKS2-Header"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2570
+msgid "Refresh (reactivate) device with new parameters"
+msgstr "Gerät mit neuen Parametern auffrischen (reaktivieren)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2571
+msgid "LUKS2 keyslot: The size of the encryption key"
+msgstr "LUKS2-Schlüsselfach: Die Größe des Verschlüsselungsschlüssels"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2572
+msgid "LUKS2 keyslot: The cipher used for keyslot encryption"
+msgstr "LUKS2-Keyslot: Der Algorithmus, der für die Keyslot-Verschlüsselung verwendet wird"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2588 src/veritysetup.c:461 src/integritysetup.c:568
+msgid "[OPTION...] <action> <action-specific>"
+msgstr "[OPTION...] <Aktion> <aktionsabhängig>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2645 src/veritysetup.c:501 src/integritysetup.c:585
+msgid "Argument <action> missing."
+msgstr "Argument <Aktion> fehlt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2708 src/veritysetup.c:532 src/integritysetup.c:616
+msgid "Unknown action."
+msgstr "Unbekannte Aktion."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2718
+msgid "Parameter --refresh is only allowed with open or refresh commands.\n"
+msgstr "Die Option --refresh ist nur beim »open«- oder »refresh«-Befehl erlaubt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2723
+msgid "Options --refresh and --test-passphrase are mutually exclusive.\n"
+msgstr "Die Optionen --refresh und --test-passphrase schließen sich gegenseitig aus.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2728
+msgid "Option --deferred is allowed only for close command.\n"
+msgstr "Die Option --deferred ist nur beim »close«-Befehl erlaubt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2733
+msgid "Option --shared is allowed only for open of plain device.\n"
+msgstr "Die Option --shared ist nur beim beim »open«-Befehl eines Plain-Gerätes erlaubt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2738
+msgid "Option --allow-discards is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "Die Option --allow-discards ist nur beim »open«-Befehl erlaubt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2743
+msgid "Option --persistent is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "Die Option --persistent ist nur beim »open«-Befehl erlaubt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2748
+msgid "Option --persistent is not allowed with --test-passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "Die Option --persistent ist nicht mit --test-passphrase kombinierbar.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2757
+msgid ""
+"Option --key-size is allowed only for luksFormat, luksAddKey (with --unbound),\n"
+"open and benchmark actions. To limit read from keyfile use --keyfile-size=(bytes)."
+msgstr ""
+"Die Option --key-size ist nur für »luksFormat«, »luksAddKey« (mit »--unbound«),\n"
+"»open« und »benchmark« erlaubt. Benutzen Sie stattdessen »--keyfile-size=(Bytes)«,\n"
+"um das Lesen aus der Schlüsseldatei zu begrenzen."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2763
+msgid "Option --integrity is allowed only for luksFormat (LUKS2).\n"
+msgstr "Die Option --align-payload ist nur für luksFormat erlaubt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2768
+msgid "Option --integrity-no-wipe can be used only for format action with integrity extension.\n"
+msgstr "Die Option --integrity-no-wipe ist nur für die »format«-Aktion mit Integritätserweiterung erlaubt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2774
+msgid "Options --label and --subsystem are allowed only for luksFormat and config LUKS2 operations.\n"
+msgstr "Die Option --uuid ist nur für luksFormat und luksUUID erlaubt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2780
+msgid "Option --test-passphrase is allowed only for open of LUKS and TCRYPT devices.\n"
+msgstr "Die Option --test-passphrase ist nur beim Öffnen von LUKS- und TCRYPT-Geräten erlaubt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2785 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1718
+msgid "Key size must be a multiple of 8 bits"
+msgstr "Schlüsselgröße muss ein Vielfaches von 8 Bit sein"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2791 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1403
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1723
+msgid "Key slot is invalid."
+msgstr "Schlüsselfach ist ungültig."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2798
+msgid "Option --key-file takes precedence over specified key file argument."
+msgstr "Die Option --key-file wirkt stärker als das angegebene Schlüsseldatei-Argument."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2805 src/veritysetup.c:544 src/integritysetup.c:640
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1697
+msgid "Negative number for option not permitted."
+msgstr "Negative Zahl für die Option nicht erlaubt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2809
+msgid "Only one --key-file argument is allowed."
+msgstr "Die Option --key-file ist nur einmal erlaubt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2813 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1689
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1727
+msgid "Only one of --use-[u]random options is allowed."
+msgstr "Nur eine der Optionen --use-[u]random ist erlaubt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2817
+msgid "Option --use-[u]random is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgstr "Die Option --use-[u]random ist nur für luksFormat erlaubt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2821
+msgid "Option --uuid is allowed only for luksFormat and luksUUID."
+msgstr "Die Option --uuid ist nur für luksFormat und luksUUID erlaubt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2825
+msgid "Option --align-payload is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgstr "Die Option --align-payload ist nur für luksFormat erlaubt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2829
+msgid "Options --luks2-metadata-size and --opt-luks2-keyslots-size are allowed only for luksFormat with LUKS2."
+msgstr "Die Optionen --luks2-metadata-size und --opt-luks2-keyslots-size sind nur für luksFormat mit LUKS2 erlaubt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2834
+msgid "Invalid LUKS2 metadata size specification."
+msgstr "Ungültige Angabe für die Größe der LUKS2-Metadaten."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2838
+msgid "Invalid LUKS2 keyslots size specification."
+msgstr "Ungültige Angabe für die Größe der LUKS2-Schlüsselfächer."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2842
+msgid "Option --align-payload and --offset cannot be combined."
+msgstr "Die Optionen --align-payload und --offset können nicht kombiniert werden."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2848
+msgid "Option --skip is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices.\n"
+msgstr "Die Option --skip ist nur beim Öffnen von plain- und loopaes-Geräten erlaubt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2855
+msgid "Option --offset is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices and for luksFormat.\n"
+msgstr "Die Option --offset ist nur beim Öffnen von plain- und loopaes-Geräten erlaubt, sowie für luksFormat.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2861
+msgid "Option --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system or --tcrypt-backup is supported only for TCRYPT device.\n"
+msgstr "Die Optionen --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system und --tcrypt-backup sind nur zusammen mit einem TCRYPT-Gerät erlaubt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2866
+msgid "Option --tcrypt-hidden cannot be combined with --allow-discards.\n"
+msgstr "Die Option --tcrypt-hidden kann nicht mit --allow-discards kombiniert werden.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2871
+msgid "Option --veracrypt is supported only for TCRYPT device type.\n"
+msgstr "Die Option --veracrypt wird nur für TCRYPT-kompatible Geräte unterstützt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2877
+msgid "Invalid argument for parameter --veracrypt-pim supplied.\n"
+msgstr "Ungültiges Argument für Parameter --veracrypt-pim angegeben.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2881
+msgid "Option --veracrypt-pim is supported only for VeraCrypt compatible devices.\n"
+msgstr "Die Option --veracrypt-pim wird nur für VeraCrypt-kompatible Geräte unterstützt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2889
+msgid "Option --veracrypt-query-pim is supported only for VeraCrypt compatible devices.\n"
+msgstr "Die Option --veracrypt-query-pim wird nur für VeraCrypt-kompatible Geräte unterstützt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2893
+msgid "The options --veracrypt-pim and --veracrypt-query-pim are mutually exclusive.\n"
+msgstr "Die Optionen --veracrypt-pim und --veracrypt-query-pim schließen sich gegenseitig aus.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2900
+msgid "Option --priority can be only ignore/normal/prefer.\n"
+msgstr "Die Option --priority kann nur »ignore/normal/prefer« sein.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2905
+msgid "Keyslot specification is required.\n"
+msgstr "Das Schlüsselfach muss angegeben werden.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2910 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1703
+msgid "Password-based key derivation function (PBKDF) can be only pbkdf2 or argon2i/argon2id.\n"
+msgstr "Passwortbasierte Schlüsselableitungsfunktion (PBKDF) kann nur »pbkdf2« oder »argon2i/argon2id« sein.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2915 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1708
+msgid "PBKDF forced iterations cannot be combined with iteration time option.\n"
+msgstr "Bei PBKDF darf nur entweder die Anzahl der Durchläufe oder die Zeitbegrenzung angegeben werden.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2921
+msgid "Sector size option is not supported for this command.\n"
+msgstr "Die Option Sektorgröße wird für diesen Befehl nicht unterstützt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2927
+msgid "Unsupported encryption sector size.\n"
+msgstr "Nicht unterstützte Sektorengröße für Verschlüsselung.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2932
+msgid "Key size is required with --unbound option.\n"
+msgstr "Die Option »--unbound« erfordert die Schlüsselgröße.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2937
+msgid "Option --unbound may be used only with luksAddKey action.\n"
+msgstr "Die Option »--unbound« kann nur zusammen mit der Aktion »luksAddKey« benutzt werden.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2942
+msgid "Option --refresh may be used only with open action.\n"
+msgstr "Die Option --refresh kann nur zusammen mit der Aktion »open« benutzt werden.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2953
+msgid "Cannot disable metadata locking.\n"
+msgstr "Fehler beim Deaktivieren der Metadaten-Dateisperre.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:67
+msgid "Invalid salt string specified."
+msgstr "Ungültiger Salt-String angegeben."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:98
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create hash image %s for writing."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Schreiben des Hash-Abbilds »%s«."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:108
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create FEC image %s for writing."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Schreiben des FEC-Abbilds »%s«."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:178
+msgid "Invalid root hash string specified."
+msgstr "Ungültiger Root-Hash-String angegeben."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:360
+msgid "<data_device> <hash_device>"
+msgstr "<Datengerät> <Hash-Gerät>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:360 src/integritysetup.c:462
+msgid "format device"
+msgstr "Gerät formatieren"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:361
+msgid "<data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgstr "<Datengerät> <Hash-Gerät> <Root-Hash>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:361
+msgid "verify device"
+msgstr "Gerät verifizieren"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:362
+msgid "<data_device> <name> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgstr "<Datengerät> <Name> <Hash-Gerät> <Root-Hash>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:362 src/integritysetup.c:463
+msgid "open device as <name>"
+msgstr "Gerät als <Name> öffnen"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:363 src/integritysetup.c:464
+msgid "close device (deactivate and remove mapping)"
+msgstr "Gerät schließen (deaktivieren und Zuordnung entfernen)"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:364 src/integritysetup.c:465
+msgid "show active device status"
+msgstr "Status der aktiven Geräte anzeigen"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:365
+msgid "<hash_device>"
+msgstr "<Hash-Gerät>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:365 src/integritysetup.c:466
+msgid "show on-disk information"
+msgstr "Auf dem Datenträger gespeicherte Informationen anzeigen"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:384
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<data_device> is the data device\n"
+"<hash_device> is the device containing verification data\n"
+"<root_hash> hash of the root node on <hash_device>\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<Name> ist das Gerät, das unter »%s« angelegt werden soll\n"
+"<Datengerät> ist das Datengerät\n"
+"<Hash-Gerät> ist das Gerät, das die Verifikationsdaten enthält\n"
+"<Root-Hash> ist der Hash des Rootknotens auf <Hash-Gerät>\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:391
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in dm-verity parameters:\n"
+"\tHash: %s, Data block (bytes): %u, Hash block (bytes): %u, Salt size: %u, Hash format: %u\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Einkompilierte Vorgabewerte für dm-verity:\n"
+"\tHash: %s, Datenblock (Bytes): %u, Hashblock (Bytes): %u, Salt-Größe: %u, Hashformat: %u\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:429
+msgid "Do not use verity superblock"
+msgstr "Verity-Superblock nicht benutzen"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:430
+msgid "Format type (1 - normal, 0 - original Chrome OS)"
+msgstr "Format-Art (1 - normal, 0 - originales Chrome-OS)"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:430
+msgid "number"
+msgstr "Zahl"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:431
+msgid "Block size on the data device"
+msgstr "Blockgröße auf dem Datengerät"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:432
+msgid "Block size on the hash device"
+msgstr "Blockgröße auf dem Hash-Gerät"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:433
+msgid "FEC parity bytes"
+msgstr "FEC-Paritätsbytes"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:434
+msgid "The number of blocks in the data file"
+msgstr "Die Anzahl der Blöcke in der Datendatei"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:434
+msgid "blocks"
+msgstr "Blöcke"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:435
+msgid "Path to device with error correction data"
+msgstr "Pfad zum Gerät mit Fehlerkorrekturdaten"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:435 src/integritysetup.c:528
+msgid "path"
+msgstr "Pfad"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:436
+msgid "Starting offset on the hash device"
+msgstr "Start-Offset auf dem Hash-Gerät"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:437
+msgid "Starting offset on the FEC device"
+msgstr "Start-Offset auf dem FEC-Gerät"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:438
+msgid "Hash algorithm"
+msgstr "Hash-Algorithmus"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:438
+msgid "string"
+msgstr "Zeichenkette"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:439
+msgid "Salt"
+msgstr "Salt"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:439
+msgid "hex string"
+msgstr "Hex-Zeichenkette"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:441
+msgid "Restart kernel if corruption is detected"
+msgstr "Kernel neustarten wenn Beschädigung festgestellt wird"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:442
+msgid "Ignore corruption, log it only"
+msgstr "Beschädigung ignorieren, nur mitloggen"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:443
+msgid "Do not verify zeroed blocks"
+msgstr "Ausgenullte Blöcke nicht überprüfen"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:444
+msgid "Verify data block only the first time it is read"
+msgstr "Datenblock nur beim erstmaligen Lesen verifizieren"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:550
+msgid "Option --ignore-corruption, --restart-on-corruption or --ignore-zero-blocks is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "Die Optionen --ignore-corruption, --restart-on-corruption und --ignore-zero-blocks sind nur für die »open«-Aktion erlaubt.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:555
+msgid "Option --ignore-corruption and --restart-on-corruption cannot be used together.\n"
+msgstr "Die Optionen --ignore-corruption und --restart-on-corruption können nicht zusammen benutzt werden.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:82 src/utils_password.c:298
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Einlesen der Schlüsseldatei »%s«."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:86 src/utils_password.c:302
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read %d bytes from keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Einlesen von %d Bytes aus der Schlüsseldatei »%s«."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:248
+#, c-format
+msgid "Formatted with tag size %u, internal integrity %s.\n"
+msgstr "Formatiert mit Etikettgröße %u und interner Integrität %s.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:462 src/integritysetup.c:466
+msgid "<integrity_device>"
+msgstr "<Integritätsgerät>"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:463
+msgid "<integrity_device> <name>"
+msgstr "<Integritätsgerät> <Name>"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:485
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<integrity_device> is the device containing data with integrity tags\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<Name> ist das Gerät, das unter »%s« angelegt werden soll\n"
+"<Integritätsgerät> ist das Gerät, das die Daten mit Integritätsangaben enthält\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:490
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in dm-integrity parameters:\n"
+"\tTag size: %u bytes, Checksum algorithm: %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Einkompilierte Vorgabewerte für dm-integrity:\n"
+"\tEtikettgröße: %u Bytes, Prüfalgorithmus: %s\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:528
+msgid "Path to data device (if separated)"
+msgstr "Pfad zum Datengerät (wenn getrennt)"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:530
+msgid "Journal size"
+msgstr "Journalgröße"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:531
+msgid "Interleave sectors"
+msgstr "Sektoren verschränken"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:532
+msgid "Journal watermark"
+msgstr "Jornal-Wasserzeichen"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:532
+msgid "percent"
+msgstr "Prozent"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:533
+msgid "Journal commit time"
+msgstr "Journal-Commitzeit"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:533
+msgid "ms"
+msgstr "ms"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:534
+msgid "Tag size (per-sector)"
+msgstr "Etikettgröße pro Sektor"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:535
+msgid "Sector size"
+msgstr "Sektorengröße"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:536
+msgid "Buffers size"
+msgstr "Puffergröße"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:538
+msgid "Data integrity algorithm"
+msgstr "Datenintegritäts-Algorithmus"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:539
+msgid "The size of the data integrity key"
+msgstr "Die Größe des Datenintegritätsschlüssels"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:540
+msgid "Read the integrity key from a file"
+msgstr "Integritätsschlüssel aus einer Datei lesen"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:542
+msgid "Journal integrity algorithm"
+msgstr "Integritätsalgorithmus für Journal"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:543
+msgid "The size of the journal integrity key"
+msgstr "Die Größe des Integritätsschlüssels für das Journal"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:544
+msgid "Read the journal integrity key from a file"
+msgstr "Integritätsschlüssel für das Journal aus einer Datei lesen"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:546
+msgid "Journal encryption algorithm"
+msgstr "Algorithmus für Journalverschlüsselung"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:547
+msgid "The size of the journal encryption key"
+msgstr "Die Größe des Journal-Verschlüsselungsschlüssels"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:548
+msgid "Read the journal encryption key from a file"
+msgstr "Journal-Verschlüsselungsschlüssel aus einer Datei lesen"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:551
+msgid "Recovery mode (no journal, no tag checking)"
+msgstr "Wiederherstellungsmodus (kein Journal, keine Etikettprüfung)"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:552
+msgid "Recalculate initial tags automatically."
+msgstr "Initiale Integritätsangaben automatisch neu berechnen."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:631
+msgid "Option --integrity-recalculate can be used only for open action."
+msgstr "Die Option --integrity-recalculate kann nur zusammen mit der Aktion »open« benutzt werden."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:646
+msgid "Options --journal-size, --interleave-sectors, --sector-size, --tag-size and --no-wipe can be used only for format action.\n"
+msgstr "Die Optionen --journal-size, --interleave-sectors, --sector-size, --tag-size und --no-wipe können nur bei der Aktion »format« verwendet werden.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:652
+msgid "Invalid journal size specification."
+msgstr "Ungültige Angabe der Journalgröße."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:657
+msgid "Both key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "Sowohl die Schlüsseldatei als auch die Schlüsselgröße müssen angegeben werden."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:660
+msgid "Integrity algorithm must be specified if integrity key is used."
+msgstr "Wenn ein Integritätsschlüssel verwendet wird, muss auch der Integritätsalgorithmus angegeben werden."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:665
+msgid "Both journal integrity key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "Sowohl die Schlüsseldatei als auch die Schlüsselgröße müssen für die Journalintegrität angegeben werden."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:668
+msgid "Journal integrity algorithm must be specified if journal integrity key is used."
+msgstr "Wenn ein Integritätsschlüssel für das Journal verwendet wird, muss auch der Integritätsalgorithmus angegeben werden."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:673
+msgid "Both journal encryption key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "Sowohl der Verschlüsselungsschlüssel als auch die Schlüsselgröße müssen für die Journalverschlüsselung angegeben werden."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:676
+msgid "Journal encryption algorithm must be specified if journal encryption key is used."
+msgstr "Wenn ein Verschlüsselungsschlüssel für das Journal verwendet wird, muss auch der Verschlüsselungsalgorithmus angegeben werden."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:175
+msgid "Reencryption already in-progress."
+msgstr "Wiederverschlüsselung läuft bereits."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:181
+msgid "Reencryption of device with integrity profile is not supported."
+msgstr "Wiederverschlüsselung von Geräten mit Integritätsprofil wird nicht unterstützt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:204
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot exclusively open %s, device in use."
+msgstr "Gerät »%s« kann nicht exklusiv geöffnet werden, da es bereits benutzt wird."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:218 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1148
+msgid "Allocation of aligned memory failed."
+msgstr "Belegen des ausgerichteten Speichers fehlgeschlagen."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:225
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read device %s."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Lesen von Gerät »%s«."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:236
+#, c-format
+msgid "Marking LUKS1 device %s unusable."
+msgstr "LUKS1-Gerät »%s« wird als unbenutzbar markiert."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:240
+#, c-format
+msgid "Setting LUKS2 offline reencrypt flag on device %s."
+msgstr "LUKS2-Offline-Wiederverschlüsselungs-Kennzeichen wird auf Gerät »%s« festgelegt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:257
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write device %s."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Schreiben auf Gerät »%s«."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:345
+msgid "Cannot write reencryption log file."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Speichern der Wiederverschlüsselungs-Logdatei."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:401
+msgid "Cannot read reencryption log file."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Einlesen der Wiederverschlüsselungs-Logdatei."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:439
+#, c-format
+msgid "Log file %s exists, resuming reencryption.\n"
+msgstr "Logdatei »%s« existiert, Wiederverschlüsselung wird fortgesetzt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:488
+msgid "Activating temporary device using old LUKS header."
+msgstr "Temporäres Gerät mit dem alten LUKS-Header wird aktiviert."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:498
+msgid "Activating temporary device using new LUKS header."
+msgstr "Temporäres Gerät mit dem neuen LUKS-Header wird aktiviert."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:508
+msgid "Activation of temporary devices failed."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Aktivieren der temporären Geräte."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:586
+msgid "Failed to set PBKDF parameters."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Festlegen der PBKDF-Parameter."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:592
+msgid "Failed to set data offset."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Festlegen des Daten-Offsets."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:600
+#, c-format
+msgid "New LUKS header for device %s created."
+msgstr "Neuer LUKS-Header für Gerät »%s« angelegt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:660
+#, c-format
+msgid "This version of cryptsetup-reencrypt can't handle new internal token type %s."
+msgstr "Diese Version von cryptsetup-reencrypt kann internen Tokentyp %s nicht verarbeiten."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:682
+msgid "Failed to read activation flags from backup header."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Lesen der Aktivierungsschalter aus dem Backup-Header."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:686
+msgid "Failed to write activation flags to new header."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Schreiben der Aktivierungsschalter in den neuen Header."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:690 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:694
+msgid "Failed to read requirements from backup header."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Lesen der Anforderungen aus dem Backup-Header."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:731
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s header backup of device %s created."
+msgstr "%s-Backup-Header von Gerät »%s« angelegt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:789
+msgid "Creation of LUKS backup headers failed."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Anlegen des LUKS-Backup-Headers."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:918
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot restore %s header on device %s."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Wiederherstellen des %s-Headers auf Gerät »%s«."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:920
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s header on device %s restored."
+msgstr "%s-Header auf Gerät »%s« wiederhergestellt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:958 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1038
+msgid "Cannot seek to device offset."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Springen zum Gerät-Offset."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1081
+msgid "Cannot seek to device offset.\n"
+msgstr "Fehler beim Springen zum Gerät-Offset.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1120 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1126
+msgid "Cannot open temporary LUKS device."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Öffnen des temporären LUKS-Geräts."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1131 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1136
+msgid "Cannot get device size."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Ermitteln der Gerätegröße."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1173
+msgid "Interrupted by a signal."
+msgstr "Durch ein Signal unterbrochen."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1175
+msgid "IO error during reencryption."
+msgstr "E/A-Fehler während der Wiederverschlüsselung."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1206
+msgid "Provided UUID is invalid."
+msgstr "Die angegebene UUID ist ungültig."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1309
+msgid "Key file can be used only with --key-slot or with exactly one key slot active."
+msgstr "Schlüsseldatei kann nur mit --key-slot oder mit genau einem aktiven Schlüsselfach benutzt werden."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1350 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1361
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for key slot %u: "
+msgstr "Geben Sie die Passphrase für Schlüsselfach %u ein: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1432
+msgid "Cannot open reencryption log file."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Öffnen der Wiederverschlüsselungs-Logdatei."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1438
+msgid "No decryption in progress, provided UUID can be used only to resume suspended decryption process."
+msgstr "Derzeit ist keine Entschlüsselung im Gange, die angegebene UUID kann nur benutzt werden, um einen unterbrochenen Entschlüsselungsvorgang fortzusetzen."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1513
+#, c-format
+msgid "Changed pbkdf parameters in keyslot %i."
+msgstr "PBKDF-Parameter in Schlüsselfach %i wurden geändert."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1620
+msgid "Reencryption block size"
+msgstr "Wiederverschlüsselungs-Blockgröße"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1620
+msgid "MiB"
+msgstr "MiB"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1624
+msgid "Do not change key, no data area reencryption"
+msgstr "Schlüssel nicht ändern, Datenbereich nicht neu verschlüsseln"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1626
+msgid "Read new volume (master) key from file"
+msgstr "Laufwerks-(Master-)Schlüssel aus Datei lesen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1627
+msgid "PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS (in ms)"
+msgstr "PBKDF2 Iterationszeit for LUKS (in ms)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1633
+msgid "Use direct-io when accessing devices"
+msgstr "Beim Zugriff auf die Geräte direct-io benutzen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1634
+msgid "Use fsync after each block"
+msgstr "Nach jedem Block fsync aufrufen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1635
+msgid "Update log file after every block"
+msgstr "Logdatei nach jedem Block aktualisieren"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1636
+msgid "Use only this slot (others will be disabled)"
+msgstr "Nur dieses Schlüsselfach benutzen (alle anderen werden deaktiviert)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1639
+msgid "Reduce data device size (move data offset). DANGEROUS!"
+msgstr "Größe des Datengeräts reduzieren (Datenoffset verschieben). GEFÄHRLICH!"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1640
+msgid "Use only specified device size (ignore rest of device). DANGEROUS!"
+msgstr "Nur die angegebene Gerätegröße benutzen (Rest des Gerätes ignorieren). GEFÄHRLICH!"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1641
+msgid "Create new header on not encrypted device"
+msgstr "Neuen Header auf unverschlüsseltem Gerät anlegen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1642
+msgid "Permanently decrypt device (remove encryption)"
+msgstr "Gerät dauerhaft entschlüsseln (Verschlüsselung entfernen)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1643
+msgid "The UUID used to resume decryption"
+msgstr "Die UUID, um das Entschlüsseln fortzusetzen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1644
+msgid "Type of LUKS metadata: luks1, luks2"
+msgstr "Art der LUKS-Metadaten: luks1, luks2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1663
+msgid "[OPTION...] <device>"
+msgstr "[OPTION...] <Gerät>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1677
+#, c-format
+msgid "Reencryption will change: %s%s%s%s%s%s."
+msgstr "Wiederverschlüsselung ändert: %s%s%s%s%s%s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1678
+msgid "volume key"
+msgstr "Laufwerksschlüssel"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1680
+msgid "set hash to "
+msgstr ", Hash auf "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1681
+msgid ", set cipher to "
+msgstr ", Verschlüsselung auf "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1685
+msgid "Argument required."
+msgstr "Argument muss angegeben werden."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1713
+msgid "Only values between 1 MiB and 64 MiB allowed for reencryption block size."
+msgstr "Für die Wiederverschlüsselungs-Blockgröße sind nur Werte zwischen 1 MiB und 64 MiB erlaubt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1732 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1737
+msgid "Invalid device size specification."
+msgstr "Ungültige Angabe der Gerätegröße."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1740
+msgid "Maximum device reduce size is 64 MiB."
+msgstr "Die maximale Verkleinerungsgröße ist 64 MiB."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1743
+msgid "Reduce size must be multiple of 512 bytes sector."
+msgstr "Die verkleinerte Größe muss ein Vielfaches von 512-Byte-Sektoren sein."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1747
+msgid "Option --new must be used together with --reduce-device-size or --header."
+msgstr "Die Option »--new« muss zusammen mit »--reduce-device-size« oder »--header« benutzt werden."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1751
+msgid "Option --keep-key can be used only with --hash, --iter-time or --pbkdf-force-iterations."
+msgstr "Die Option »--keep-new« kann nur zusammen mit »--hash«, »--iter-time« oder »--pbkdf-force-iterations« benutzt werden."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1755
+msgid "Option --new cannot be used together with --decrypt."
+msgstr "Die Option »--new« kann nicht zusammen mit »--decrypt« benutzt werden."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1759
+msgid "Option --decrypt is incompatible with specified parameters."
+msgstr "Die Option --decrypt verträgt sich nicht mit den angegebenen Parametern."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1763
+msgid "Option --uuid is allowed only together with --decrypt."
+msgstr "Die Option »--uuid« kann nur zusammen mit »--decrypt« benutzt werden."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1767
+msgid "Invalid luks type. Use one of these: 'luks', 'luks1' or 'luks2'."
+msgstr "Ungültiger LUKS-Typ. Verwenden Sie einen von diesen: luks, luks1, luks2."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:150
+msgid "Error reading response from terminal."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Lesen der Antwort vom Terminal."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:175
+msgid "Command successful.\n"
+msgstr "Befehl erfolgreich.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:183
+msgid "wrong or missing parameters"
+msgstr "Falsche oder fehlende Parameter"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:185
+msgid "no permission or bad passphrase"
+msgstr "Kein Zugriff, oder falsche Passphrase"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:187
+msgid "out of memory"
+msgstr "Nicht genug Speicher"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:189
+msgid "wrong device or file specified"
+msgstr "Falsches Gerät oder falsche Datei angegeben"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:191
+msgid "device already exists or device is busy"
+msgstr "Das Gerät existiert bereits oder wird bereits benutzt"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:193
+msgid "unknown error"
+msgstr "Unbekannter Fehler"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:195
+#, c-format
+msgid "Command failed with code %i (%s).\n"
+msgstr "Fehler %i beim Ausführen eines Befehls »%s«.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:272
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %i created."
+msgstr "Schlüsselfach %i erstellt."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:274
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %i unlocked."
+msgstr "Schlüsselfach %i entsperrt."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:276
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %i removed."
+msgstr "Schlüsselfach %i entfernt."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:285
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %i created."
+msgstr "Token %i erstellt."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:287
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %i removed."
+msgstr "Token %i entfernt."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:453
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Device %s already contains a '%s' partition signature.\n"
+msgstr "WARNUNG: Gerät %s enthält bereits eine '%s'-Partitionssignatur.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:461
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Device %s already contains a '%s' superblock signature.\n"
+msgstr "WARNUNG: Gerät %s enthält bereits eine '%s'-Superblock-Signatur.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:482 src/utils_tools.c:546
+msgid "Failed to initialize device signature probes."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Initialisieren der Gerätesignatursonden."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:526
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to stat device %s."
+msgstr "Gerät %s konnte nicht gefunden werden."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:539
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is in use. Can not proceed with format operation."
+msgstr "Gerät %s wird gerade benutzt. Das Formatieren ist gerade nicht möglich."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:541
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to open file %s in read/write mode."
+msgstr "Datei %s konnte nicht im Lese-/Schreibmodus geöffnet werden."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:561
+msgid "Failed to wipe device signature."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Löschen der Gerätesignatur."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:568
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to probe device %s for a signature."
+msgstr "Gerät %s konnte nicht auf eine Signatur geprüft werden."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:43 src/utils_password.c:75
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot check password quality: %s"
+msgstr "Fehler beim Prüfen der Passwortqualität: %s"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:51
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Password quality check failed:\n"
+" %s"
+msgstr ""
+"Passwort-Qualitätsüberprüfung fehlgeschlagen:\n"
+" %s"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:83
+#, c-format
+msgid "Password quality check failed: Bad passphrase (%s)"
+msgstr "Passwort-Qualitätsüberprüfung fehlgeschlagen: Falsche Passphrase (%s)"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:193 src/utils_password.c:208
+msgid "Error reading passphrase from terminal."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Lesen der Passphrase vom Terminal."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:206
+msgid "Verify passphrase: "
+msgstr "Passphrase bestätigen: "
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:213
+msgid "Passphrases do not match."
+msgstr "Passphrasen stimmen nicht überein."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:250
+msgid "Cannot use offset with terminal input."
+msgstr "Offset kann nicht zusammen mit Terminaleingabe benutzt werden."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:253
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase: "
+msgstr "Passphrase eingeben: "
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:255
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for %s: "
+msgstr "Geben Sie die Passphrase für »%s« ein: "
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:285
+msgid "No key available with this passphrase."
+msgstr "Kein Schlüssel mit dieser Passphrase verfügbar."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:320
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open keyfile %s for write."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Schreiben der Schlüsseldatei »%s«."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:327
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write to keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Fehler beim Schreiben der Schlüsseldatei »%s«."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:47
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to open file %s in read-only mode."
+msgstr "Datei %s konnte nicht im Nur-Lese-Modus geöffnet werden."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:60
+msgid "Provide valid LUKS2 token JSON:\n"
+msgstr "Geben Sie gültiges LUKS2-Token-JSON an:\n"
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:67
+msgid "Failed to read JSON file."
+msgstr "JSON-Datei konnte nicht gelesen werden."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:72
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Read interrupted."
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Lesen unterbrochen."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:113
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to open file %s in write mode."
+msgstr "Datei %s konnte nicht im Schreibmodus geöffnet werden."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:122
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Write interrupted."
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Schreiben unterbrochen."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:126
+msgid "Failed to write JSON file."
+msgstr "JSON-Datei konnte nicht geschrieben werden."
+
+#~ msgid "Device %s is too small. (LUKS2 requires at least %<PRIu64> bytes.)"
+#~ msgstr "Gerät »%s« ist zu klein. (LUKS2 benötigt mindestens %<PRIu64> Bytes.)"
+
+#~ msgid "Replaced with key slot %d."
+#~ msgstr "Ersetzt durch Schlüsselfach %d."
+
+#~ msgid "Missing LUKS target type, option --type is required."
+#~ msgstr "Fehlender LUKS-Zieltyp, die Option --type ist Pflicht."
+
+#~ msgid "Missing --token option specifying token for removal."
+#~ msgstr "Um ein Token zu löschen, muss die Option --token angegeben werden."
+
+#~ msgid "Failed to remove token %d."
+#~ msgstr "Fehler beim Entfernen des Tokens %d."
+
+#~ msgid "Add or remove keyring token"
+#~ msgstr "Schlüsselring-Token hinzufügen oder entfernen"
+
+#~ msgid "Activated keyslot %i."
+#~ msgstr "Schlüsselfach %i aktiviert."
+
+#~ msgid "memory allocation error in action_luksFormat"
+#~ msgstr "Speicherproblem in action_luksFormat"
+
+#~ msgid "Key slot is invalid.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Schlüsselfach ist ungültig.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Using default pbkdf parameters for new LUKS2 header.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Für den neuen LUKS2-Header werden die vorgegebenen PBKDF-Parameter verwendet.\n"
diff --git a/po/es.po b/po/es.po
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5a4a6a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/po/es.po
@@ -0,0 +1,3120 @@
+# Spanish translations for cryptsetup package
+# Traducciones al español para el paquete cryptsetup.
+# Copyright (C) 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+# This file is put in the public domain.
+# Antonio Ceballos <aceballos@gmail.com>, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018
+#
+# ######################################################################
+# Traducciones dudosas:
+# ######################################################################
+#
+# initialize = inicializar
+# kernel = núcleo
+#  imperativo - usted
+# % done = % hecho
+# fatal error = error fatal
+#  RNG = generador de números aleatorios
+# not supported = no disponible
+# key slot = ranura de claves
+# passphrase = frase contraseña
+# offset = desplazamiento
+# offset = posición
+# suspended = suspendido
+# plain device = dispositivo no cifrado (dispositivo en claro)
+# crypt device = dispositivo cifrado
+# error reading = error al leer
+# keyfile = fichero de claves (¿fichero de la clave?)
+#  checksum = suma de comprobación
+# loopback device = dispositivo de bucle invertido (Santiago: dispositivo de bucle)
+# backup file = fichero de copia de seguridad
+# please - omitido, porque ya es suficiente cortesía tratar de usted al usuario
+#  wipe = limpiar, borrar
+# interface = (la) interfaz
+# cipher = algoritmo de cifrado
+# default = predefinido
+# default compiled-in = predefinido de fábrica
+# debug = depuración
+# bootloader = cargador de arranque
+# verify = verificar
+# verification = verificación
+# log file = fichero de registro
+# temporary = temporal
+# reencryption = recifrado
+# invalid = no válido, -a
+# lock = bloqueo
+#
+# #######################################################################
+# Términos no traducidos
+# #######################################################################
+#
+# device mapper
+# backend
+# hash
+# buffer
+# offset
+# bit(s)
+# byte(s)
+# loopaes
+# luks
+# tcrypt
+# salt
+# verity
+#
+# #######################################################################
+# Otras dudas
+# #######################################################################
+#
+# invalid = inválido, -a -> barbarismo -> mejor: no válido
+# on-disk
+#
+# #######################################################################
+#
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: cryptsetup 2.0.6\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: dm-crypt@saout.de\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2018-11-25 16:04+0100\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2018-11-27 01:31+0100\n"
+"Last-Translator: Antonio Ceballos <aceballos@gmail.com>\n"
+"Language-Team: Spanish <es@tp.org.es>\n"
+"Language: es\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+"X-Bugs: Report translation errors to the Language-Team address.\n"
+"Plural-Forms: nplurals=2; plural=(n != 1);\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:331
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper, running as non-root user."
+msgstr "No se puede inicializar el «device mapper», ejecutando como usuario no administrador."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:334
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper. Is dm_mod kernel module loaded?"
+msgstr "No se puede inicializar el «device-mapper». ¿Está cargado el módulo del núcleo dm_mod?"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:935
+msgid "Requested deferred flag is not supported."
+msgstr "El indicador diferido solicitado no está disponible."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1000
+#, c-format
+msgid "DM-UUID for device %s was truncated."
+msgstr "El DM-UUID del dispositivo %s ha sido truncado."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1220
+msgid "Requested dm-crypt performance options are not supported."
+msgstr "Las opciones de rendimiento de dm-crypt solicitadas no están disponibles."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1227
+msgid "Requested dm-verity data corruption handling options are not supported."
+msgstr "Las opciones de manejo de corrupción de datos de dm-verity solicitadas no están disponibles."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1231
+msgid "Requested dm-verity FEC options are not supported."
+msgstr "Las opciones FEC de dm-verify solicitadas no están disponibles."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1235
+msgid "Requested data integrity options are not supported."
+msgstr "Las opciones de integridad de datos solicitadas no están disponibles."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1237
+msgid "Requested sector_size option is not supported."
+msgstr "La opción sector_size solicitada no está disponible."
+
+#: lib/random.c:80
+msgid ""
+"System is out of entropy while generating volume key.\n"
+"Please move mouse or type some text in another window to gather some random events.\n"
+msgstr ""
+"El sistema se ha quedado sin entropía mientras estaba generando la clave del volumen.\n"
+"Por favor, mueva el ratón o pulse alguna tecla en otra ventana para provocar algún evento aleatorio.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:84
+#, c-format
+msgid "Generating key (%d%% done).\n"
+msgstr "Generando la clave (%d%% hecho).\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:170
+msgid "Running in FIPS mode."
+msgstr "Modo FIPS en funcionamiento."
+
+#: lib/random.c:176
+msgid "Fatal error during RNG initialisation."
+msgstr "Error fatal durante la inicialización del generador de números aleatorios."
+
+#: lib/random.c:213
+msgid "Unknown RNG quality requested."
+msgstr "La calidad solicitada para el generador de números aleatorios es desconocida."
+
+#: lib/random.c:218
+msgid "Error reading from RNG."
+msgstr "Error leyendo del generador de números aleatorios."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:208
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto RNG backend."
+msgstr "No se puede inicializar el «backend» del generador de números aleatorios de cifrado."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:214
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto backend."
+msgstr "No se puede inicializar el «backend» de cifrado."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:245 lib/setup.c:1802 lib/verity/verity.c:123
+#, c-format
+msgid "Hash algorithm %s not supported."
+msgstr "Algoritmo «hash» %s no disponible."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:248 lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:90
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key processing error (using hash %s)."
+msgstr "Error de procesamiento de la clave (usando «hash» %s)."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:309 lib/setup.c:336
+msgid "Cannot determine device type. Incompatible activation of device?"
+msgstr "No se puede determinar el tipo de dispositivo. ¿Es incompatible la activación del dispositivo?"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:315 lib/setup.c:2364
+msgid "This operation is supported only for LUKS device."
+msgstr "Esta operación solamente está disponible para dispositivos LUKS."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:342
+msgid "This operation is supported only for LUKS2 device."
+msgstr "Esta operación solamente está disponible para dispositivos LUKS2."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:387
+msgid "All key slots full."
+msgstr "Todas las ranuras de claves están llenas."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:398
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select between 0 and %d."
+msgstr "La ranura de claves %d no es válida; seleccione un número entre 0 y %d."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:404
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is full, please select another one."
+msgstr "La ranura de claves %d está llena; seleccione otra."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:602
+#, c-format
+msgid "Header detected but device %s is too small."
+msgstr "Cabecera detectada pero el dispositivo %s es demasiado pequeño."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:621
+msgid "This operation is not supported for this device type."
+msgstr "Esta operación no está disponible para este tipo de dispositivo."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:787 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:499
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported LUKS version %d."
+msgstr "Versión LUKS no disponible %d."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1256 lib/setup.c:2101 lib/setup.c:3357
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not active."
+msgstr "El dispositivo %s no está activo."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1273
+#, c-format
+msgid "Underlying device for crypt device %s disappeared."
+msgstr "El dispositivo subyacente asociado al dispositivo cifrado %s ha desaparecido."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1354
+msgid "Invalid plain crypt parameters."
+msgstr "Parámetros de cifrado para modo claro no válidos."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1359 lib/setup.c:1716 src/integritysetup.c:68
+msgid "Invalid key size."
+msgstr "Tamaño de clave no válido."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1364 lib/setup.c:1721 lib/setup.c:1912
+msgid "UUID is not supported for this crypt type."
+msgstr "El UUID no está disponible para este tipo de cifrado."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1374 lib/setup.c:1526 src/cryptsetup.c:984
+msgid "Unsupported encryption sector size."
+msgstr "Tamaño de sector de cifrado no admitido."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1382 lib/setup.c:1629
+msgid "Device size is not aligned to requested sector size."
+msgstr "El tamaño del dispositivo no está alineado con el tamaño del sector solicitado."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1429 lib/setup.c:1520
+msgid "Can't format LUKS without device."
+msgstr "Imposible dar formato LUKS sin dispositivo."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1489 lib/setup.c:1644 lib/setup.c:1663 lib/setup.c:1924
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe header on device %s."
+msgstr "No se puede limpiar la cabecera del dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1549
+msgid "Volume key is too small for encryption with integrity extensions."
+msgstr "La clave del volumen es demasiado pequeña para cifrado con extensiones de integridad."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1603
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cipher %s-%s (key size %zd bits) is not available."
+msgstr "El algoritmo de cifrado %s-%s (tamaño de clave %zd bits) no está disponible."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1656
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s which is still in use."
+msgstr "No se puede dar formato al dispositivo %s que todavía está en uso."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1659 lib/setup.c:1684
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "No se puede dar formato al dispositivo %s; permiso denegado."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1671 lib/setup.c:1976
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format integrity for device %s."
+msgstr "No se puede dar formato a la integridad del dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1681
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s in use."
+msgstr "No se puede dar formato al dispositivo %s en uso."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1688
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s."
+msgstr "No se puede dar formato al dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1711
+msgid "Can't format LOOPAES without device."
+msgstr "Imposible dar formato LOOPAES sin dispositivo."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1751
+msgid "Can't format VERITY without device."
+msgstr "Imposible dar formato VERITY sin dispositivo."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1759 lib/verity/verity.c:106
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash type %d."
+msgstr "Tipo de «hash» VERITY %d no disponible."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1765 lib/verity/verity.c:114
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY block size."
+msgstr "Tamaño de bloque VERITY no disponible."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1770 lib/verity/verity.c:75
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash offset."
+msgstr "Desplazamiento «hash» VERITY no disponible."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1775
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY FEC offset."
+msgstr "Desplazamiento FEC VERITY no disponible."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1796
+msgid "Data area overlaps with hash area."
+msgstr "La zona de datos se solapa con la zona «hash»."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1821
+msgid "Hash area overlaps with FEC area."
+msgstr "La zona «hash» se solapa con la zona FEC."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1828
+msgid "Data area overlaps with FEC area."
+msgstr "La zona de datos se solapa con la zona FEC."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2033
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unknown crypt device type %s requested."
+msgstr "El tipo de dispositivo cifrado % solicitado es desconocido."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2133
+msgid "Cannot resize loop device."
+msgstr "No se ha podido cambiar el tamaño del dispositivo de bucle."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2142
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s size is not aligned to requested sector size (%u bytes)."
+msgstr "El tamaño del dispositivo %s no está alineado con el tamaño del sector solicitado (%u bytes)."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2196
+msgid "Do you really want to change UUID of device?"
+msgstr "¿Está seguro de que quiere cambiar el UUID del dispositivo?"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2272
+msgid "Header backup file does not contain compatible LUKS header."
+msgstr "El fichero de copia de seguridad de la cabecera no contiene una cabecera LUKS compatible."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2372
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not active."
+msgstr "El volumen %s no está activo."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2383
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is already suspended."
+msgstr "El volumen %s ya está suspendido."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2397
+#, c-format
+msgid "Suspend is not supported for device %s."
+msgstr "La suspensión no está disponible para el dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2399
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during suspending device %s."
+msgstr "Error durante la suspensión del dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2432 lib/setup.c:2499
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not suspended."
+msgstr "EL volumen %s no está suspendido."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2461
+#, c-format
+msgid "Resume is not supported for device %s."
+msgstr "La reanudación no está disponible para el dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2463 lib/setup.c:2531
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during resuming device %s."
+msgstr "Error durante la reanudación del dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2599 lib/setup.c:2786
+msgid "Cannot add key slot, all slots disabled and no volume key provided."
+msgstr "No se puede añadir ranura de claves; todas las ranuras están desactivadas y no se ha proporcionado una clave para el volumen."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2738
+msgid "Failed to swap new key slot."
+msgstr "No se ha logrado intercambiar la nueva ranura de claves."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2903 lib/setup.c:3202 lib/setup.c:3215 lib/setup.c:3223
+#: lib/setup.c:3236 lib/setup.c:3520 lib/setup.c:4437
+msgid "Volume key does not match the volume."
+msgstr "La clave de volumen no corresponde a este volumen."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2924
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid."
+msgstr "La ranura de claves %d no es válida."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2930
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is not used."
+msgstr "La ranura de claves %d no se está utilizando."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2949
+msgid "Device header overlaps with data area."
+msgstr "La cabecera del dispositivo se solapa con la zona de datos."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3021 lib/setup.c:3289
+msgid "Device type is not properly initialised."
+msgstr "Este tipo de dispositivo no se ha inicializado adecuadamente."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3063
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s, name is invalid or still in use."
+msgstr "No se puede utilizar el dispositivo %s; el nombre no es válido o todavía está en uso."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3066
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s already exists."
+msgstr "El dispositivo %s ya existe."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3189
+msgid "Incorrect volume key specified for plain device."
+msgstr "Clave de volumen incorrecta para dispositivo no cifrado."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3255
+msgid "Incorrect root hash specified for verity device."
+msgstr "«Hash» raíz incorrecta para dispositivo «verity»."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3331 lib/setup.c:3346
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is still in use."
+msgstr "El dispositivo %s todavía se está utilizando."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3361
+#, c-format
+msgid "Invalid device %s."
+msgstr "Dispositivo inválido %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3456
+msgid "Function not available in FIPS mode."
+msgstr "Función no disponible en modo FIPS."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3470
+msgid "Volume key buffer too small."
+msgstr "El «buffer» de la clave del volumen es demasiado pequeño."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3478
+msgid "Cannot retrieve volume key for plain device."
+msgstr "No se puede recuperar la clave para el dispositivo no cifrado."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3489
+#, c-format
+msgid "This operation is not supported for %s crypt device."
+msgstr "Esta operación no está disponible para el dispositivo cifrado %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3676
+msgid "Dump operation is not supported for this device type."
+msgstr "Operación de volcado no deisponible para este tipo de dispositivo."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4085
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert device %s which is still in use."
+msgstr "No se puede convertir el dispositivo %s que todavía está en uso."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4368
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign keyslot %u as the new volume key."
+msgstr "No se ha logrado asignar la ranura de claves %u como nueva clave del volumen."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4431
+msgid "Failed to initialise default LUKS2 keyslot parameters."
+msgstr "No se han podido inicializar los parámetros predefinidos de la ranura de claves LUKS2."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4443
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign keyslot %d to digest."
+msgstr "No se ha logrado asignar la ranura de claves %d al resumen."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4527
+msgid "Failed to load key in kernel keyring."
+msgstr "No se ha podido cargar la clave en el llavero del núcleo."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4582
+msgid "Kernel keyring is not supported by the kernel."
+msgstr "El llavero de núcleo no está admitido en el núcleo."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4592
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read passphrase from keyring (error %d)."
+msgstr "No se ha podido leer la frase contraseña desde el llavero (error %d)"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:81
+msgid "Cannot get process priority."
+msgstr "No se puede obtener la prioridad del proceso."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:95
+msgid "Cannot unlock memory."
+msgstr "No se puede desbloquear la memoria."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:169 lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:497
+msgid "Failed to open key file."
+msgstr "No se ha podido abrir el fichero de claves."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:174
+msgid "Cannot read keyfile from a terminal."
+msgstr "No se puede leer el fichero de claves desde un terminal."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:191
+msgid "Failed to stat key file."
+msgstr "No se ha podido efectuar «stat» sobre el fichero de claves."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:199 lib/utils.c:220
+msgid "Cannot seek to requested keyfile offset."
+msgstr "No es posible situarse en la posición solicitada del fichero de claves."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:214 lib/utils.c:229 src/utils_password.c:188
+#: src/utils_password.c:201
+msgid "Out of memory while reading passphrase."
+msgstr "Memoria agotada mientras se estaba leyendo la frase contraseña."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:249
+msgid "Error reading passphrase."
+msgstr "Error al leer la frase contraseña."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:266
+msgid "Nothing to read on input."
+msgstr "No hay nada para leer en la entrada."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:273
+msgid "Maximum keyfile size exceeded."
+msgstr "Se ha excedido el tamaño máximo de fichero de claves."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:278
+msgid "Cannot read requested amount of data."
+msgstr "No se puede leer la cantidad de datos solicitada."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:184 lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:102
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s doesn't exist or access denied."
+msgstr "El dispositivo %s no existe o el acceso al mismo ha sido denegado."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:194
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not compatible."
+msgstr "El dispositivo %s no es compatible."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:614
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s which is in use (already mapped or mounted)."
+msgstr "No se puede usar el dispositivo %s porque ya está en uso (asignado o montado)."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:618
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "No se puede utilizar el dispositivo %s; permiso denegado."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:621
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot get info about device %s."
+msgstr "No se puede obtener información del dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:644
+msgid "Cannot use a loopback device, running as non-root user."
+msgstr "No se puede utilizar un dispositivo de bucle invertido como usuario no administrador."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:654
+msgid "Attaching loopback device failed (loop device with autoclear flag is required)."
+msgstr "No se ha logrado asociar el dispositivo de bucle invertido (hace falta un dispositivo de bucle con marcador de auto-limpieza)."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:700
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested offset is beyond real size of device %s."
+msgstr "El «offset» solicitado está más allá del tamaño real del dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:708
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s has zero size."
+msgstr "El dispositivo %s tiene tamaño cero."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:719 lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:254
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small."
+msgstr "El dispositivo %s es demasiado pequeño."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:77
+msgid "Requested PBKDF target time cannot be zero."
+msgstr "El tiempo objetivo máximo de PBKDF no puede ser cero."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:83
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unknown PBKDF type %s."
+msgstr "Tipo de PBKDF %s desconocido."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:88
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested hash %s is not supported."
+msgstr "La «hash» solicitada %s no está disponible."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:99
+msgid "Requested PBKDF type is not supported for LUKS1."
+msgstr "El tipo de PBKDF solicitado no está disponible para LUKS1."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:105
+msgid "PBKDF max memory or parallel threads must not be set with pbkdf2."
+msgstr "No se pueden establecer la memoria máxima de PBKDF ni los hilos paralelos con pbkdf2."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:110 lib/utils_pbkdf.c:120
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forced iteration count is too low for %s (minimum is %u)."
+msgstr "El número de iteraciones forzadas es demasiado pequeño para %s (el mínimo es %u)."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:125
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forced memory cost is too low for %s (minimum is %u kilobytes)."
+msgstr "El coste de la memoria forzada es demasiado bajo para %s (el mínimo es %u kilobytes)."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:132
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested maximum PBKDF memory cost is too high (maximum is %d kilobytes)."
+msgstr "El coste de la memoria máxima solicitada de PBKDF es demasiado alto (el máximo es %d kilobytes)."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:137
+msgid "Requested maximum PBKDF memory cannot be zero."
+msgstr "La memoria máxima solicitada de PBKDF no puede ser cero."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:141
+msgid "Requested PBKDF parallel threads cannot be zero."
+msgstr "Los hilos paralelos solicitados de PBKDF no pueden ser cero."
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:306
+msgid "PBKDF benchmark disabled but iterations not set."
+msgstr "Banco de pruebas PBKDF desactivado pero las iteraciones no están establecidas."
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:325
+#, c-format
+msgid "Not compatible PBKDF2 options (using hash algorithm %s)."
+msgstr "Opciones PBKDF2 no compatibles (usando el algoritmo «hash» %s)."
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:345
+msgid "Not compatible PBKDF options."
+msgstr "Opciones PBKDF no compatibles."
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:80
+#, c-format
+msgid "Locking aborted. The locking path %s/%s is unusable (not a directory or missing)."
+msgstr "Bloqueo abortado. La ruta del bloqueo %s/%s no puede utilizarse (o no es un directorio o no existe)."
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:87
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Locking directory %s/%s is missing!\n"
+msgstr "ATENCIÓN: ¡Falta el directorio de bloqueo %s/%s!\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:97
+#, c-format
+msgid "Locking aborted. The locking path %s/%s is unusable (%s is not a directory)."
+msgstr "Bloqueo abortado. La ruta del bloqueo %s/%s no puede utilizarse (%s no es un directorio)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:40
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Failed to setup dm-crypt key mapping for device %s.\n"
+"Check that kernel supports %s cipher (check syslog for more info)."
+msgstr ""
+"No se ha podido establecer asignación de clave dm-crypt al dispositivo %s.\n"
+"Compruebe que el núcleo admite el algoritmo de cifrado %s (consulte syslog para más información)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:45
+msgid "Key size in XTS mode must be 256 or 512 bits."
+msgstr "El tamaño de clave en modo XTS debe ser 256 o 512 bits."
+
+# TODO
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:47
+msgid "Cipher specification should be in [cipher]-[mode]-[iv] format."
+msgstr "La especificación de cifrado debería estar en formato [cipher]-[mode]-[iv]."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:108 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:362
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:660 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1095
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1172 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:451
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write to device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "No se puede escribir en el dispositivo %s; permiso denegado."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:123
+msgid "Failed to open temporary keystore device."
+msgstr "No se ha podido abrir el dispositivo de almacenamiento de claves temporal."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:130
+msgid "Failed to access temporary keystore device."
+msgstr "No se ha podido acceder al dispositivo de almacenamiento de claves temporal."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:202 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:91
+msgid "IO error while encrypting keyslot."
+msgstr "Error de entrada/salida mientras se cifraba una ranura de claves."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:245 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:365
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:612 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:663 lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:662
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:81 lib/verity/verity.c:182 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:308
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:319 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:339
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:242 lib/verity/verity_fec.c:254
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:259 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1175
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:207
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open device %s."
+msgstr "No se puede abrir el dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:256 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:152
+msgid "IO error while decrypting keyslot."
+msgstr "Error de entrada/salida mientras se descifraba una ranura de claves."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:128
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small. (LUKS1 requires at least %<PRIu64> bytes.)"
+msgstr "El dispositivo %s es demasiado pequeño. (LUKS1 necesita %<PRIu64> btyes como mínimo.)"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:149 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:157
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:169 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:180
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:192
+#, c-format
+msgid "LUKS keyslot %u is invalid."
+msgstr "La ranura de claves LUKS %u no es válida."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:245 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:496
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1006 src/cryptsetup.c:1137
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1259 src/cryptsetup.c:1316 src/cryptsetup.c:1372
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1435 src/cryptsetup.c:1527 src/cryptsetup.c:1587
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1743 src/cryptsetup.c:1892 src/cryptsetup.c:1952
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2018 src/cryptsetup.c:2182 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1403
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."
+msgstr "El dispositivo %s no es un dispositivo LUKS válido."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:264 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1025
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested header backup file %s already exists."
+msgstr "El fichero de copia de seguridad de cabecera solicitado %s ya existe."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:266 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1027
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create header backup file %s."
+msgstr "No se puede crear el fichero de copia de seguridad %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:271 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1032
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write header backup file %s."
+msgstr "No se puede escribir en el fichero de copia de seguridad %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:304 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1081
+msgid "Backup file doesn't contain valid LUKS header."
+msgstr "El fichero de copia de seguridad no contiene una cabecera LUKS válida."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:317 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:573
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1102
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open header backup file %s."
+msgstr "No se puede abrir el fichero de copia de seguridad de cabecerda %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:323 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1108
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read header backup file %s."
+msgstr "No se puede leer el fichero de copia de seguridad de cabecerda %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:335
+msgid "Data offset or key size differs on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "La posición de los datos o el tamaño de la clave no coinciden en el dispositivo y en la copia de seguridad."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:343
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s %s%s"
+msgstr "Dispositivo %s %s%s"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:344
+msgid "does not contain LUKS header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device."
+msgstr "no contiene cabecera LUKS. Reemplazar la cabecera puede destruir los datos en ese dispositivo."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:345
+msgid "already contains LUKS header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."
+msgstr "ya contiene cabecera LUKS. Reemplazar la cabecera destruirá las ranuras de claves existentes."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:346 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1144
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: real device header has different UUID than backup!"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"ATENCIÓN: ¡la cabecera del dispositivo real tiene un UUID distinto que el de la copia de seguridad!"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:398
+msgid "Non standard key size, manual repair required."
+msgstr "El tamaño de la clave no es estándar; se requiere una reparación manual."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:403
+msgid "Non standard keyslots alignment, manual repair required."
+msgstr "El alineamiento de las ranuras de claves no es estándar; se requiere una reparación manual."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:413
+msgid "Repairing keyslots."
+msgstr "Reparando ranuras de claves."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:433
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: offset repaired (%u -> %u)."
+msgstr "Ranura de claves %i: posición reparada (%u -> %u)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:441
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: stripes repaired (%u -> %u)."
+msgstr "Ranura de claves %i: bandas reparadas (%u -> %u)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:450
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: bogus partition signature."
+msgstr "Ranura de claves %i: la firma de la partición es falsa."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:455
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: salt wiped."
+msgstr "Ranura de claves %i: «salt wiped»."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:472
+msgid "Writing LUKS header to disk."
+msgstr "Escribiendo cabecera LUKS en el disco."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:477
+msgid "Repair failed."
+msgstr "La reparación ha fallado."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:505 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:753
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested LUKS hash %s is not supported."
+msgstr "La «hash» LUKS solicitada %s no está disponible."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:533 src/cryptsetup.c:899
+msgid "No known problems detected for LUKS header."
+msgstr "No se ha detectado ningún problema en la cabecera LUKS."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:685
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during update of LUKS header on device %s."
+msgstr "Error al actualizar la cabecera LUKS en el dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:694
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error re-reading LUKS header after update on device %s."
+msgstr "Error al leer la cabecera LUKS después de actualizarla en el dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:746
+#, c-format
+msgid "Data offset for detached LUKS header must be either 0 or higher than header size (%d sectors)."
+msgstr "La posición de los datos de una cabecera LUKS separada debe ser 0 o superior al tamaño de la cabecera (%d sectores)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:758 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:844
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:161 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:917
+msgid "Wrong LUKS UUID format provided."
+msgstr "El formato de UUID LUKS proporcionado es incorrecto."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:783
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: reading random salt failed."
+msgstr "No se puede crear la cabecera LUKS: fallo en la lectura «random salt»."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:804
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: header digest failed (using hash %s)."
+msgstr "No se puede crear la cabecera LUKS: fallo en la cabecera (usando «hash» %s)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:867
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d active, purge first."
+msgstr "La ranura de claves %d está activa; primero hay que purgar."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:873
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d material includes too few stripes. Header manipulation?"
+msgstr "El material de la ranura de claves %d no tiene suficientes bandas. Quizá se haya manipulado la cabecera."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1081
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select keyslot between 0 and %d."
+msgstr "La ranura %d no es válida; seleccione una ranura de claves entre 0 y %d."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1099 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:455
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe device %s."
+msgstr "No se puede limpiar el dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:146
+msgid "Detected not yet supported GPG encrypted keyfile.\n"
+msgstr "Se ha detectado un fichero de claves cifrado con GPG que el programa no puede procesar en la actualidad.\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:147
+msgid "Please use gpg --decrypt <KEYFILE> | cryptsetup --keyfile=- ...\n"
+msgstr "Utilice 'gpg --decrypt <FICHERO-DE-CLAVES> | cryptsetup --keyfile=- ...'\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:168 lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:188
+msgid "Incompatible loop-AES keyfile detected."
+msgstr "Se ha detectado un fichero de claves incompatible con «loop-AES»."
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:246
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support loop-AES compatible mapping."
+msgstr "El núcleo no admite asignación compatible con «loop-AES»."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:504
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error reading keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Error leyendo el fichero de claves %s."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:544
+#, c-format
+msgid "Maximum TCRYPT passphrase length (%d) exceeded."
+msgstr "Se ha excedido la longitud máxima (%d) de la frase contraseña TCRYPT."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:585
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2 hash algorithm %s not available, skipping."
+msgstr "El algoritmo «hash» %s no está disponible, por lo que se ha ignorado."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:603 src/cryptsetup.c:850
+msgid "Required kernel crypto interface not available."
+msgstr "La interfaz de cifrado del núcleo requerida no está disponible."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:605 src/cryptsetup.c:852
+msgid "Ensure you have algif_skcipher kernel module loaded."
+msgstr "Asegúrese de que el módulo del núcleo algof_skcipher está cargado."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:751
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activation is not supported for %d sector size."
+msgstr "No es posible la activación para el tamaño de sector %d."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:757
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support activation for this TCRYPT legacy mode."
+msgstr "El núcleo no dispone de activación para este modo antiguo TCRYPT."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:791
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activating TCRYPT system encryption for partition %s."
+msgstr "Activando el sistema de cifrado TCRYPT para la partición %s."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:859
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support TCRYPT compatible mapping."
+msgstr "El núcleo no admite asignación compatible con TCRYPT."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:1074
+msgid "This function is not supported without TCRYPT header load."
+msgstr "Esta función no está disponible sin carga de cabecera TCRYPT."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:69 lib/verity/verity.c:175
+#, c-format
+msgid "Verity device %s doesn't use on-disk header."
+msgstr "El dispositivo «verity» %s no utiliza cabecera en disco."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:94
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not a valid VERITY device."
+msgstr "El dispositivo %s no es un dispositivo VERITY válido."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:101
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY version %d."
+msgstr "Versión VERITY %d no disponible."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:132
+msgid "VERITY header corrupted."
+msgstr "Cabecera VERITY corrupta."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:169
+#, c-format
+msgid "Wrong VERITY UUID format provided on device %s."
+msgstr "El formato UUID VERITY proporcionado en el dispositivo %s es incorrecto."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:202
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during update of verity header on device %s."
+msgstr "Error al actualizar la cabecera «verity» en el dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:261
+msgid "Errors cannot be repaired with FEC device."
+msgstr "Los errores no pueden repararse con dispositivo FEC."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:263
+#, c-format
+msgid "Found %u repairable errors with FEC device."
+msgstr "Se han encontrado %u errores reparables con dispositivo FEC."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:307
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support dm-verity mapping."
+msgstr "El núcleo no dispone de asignación «dm-verity»."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:318
+msgid "Verity device detected corruption after activation."
+msgstr "El dispositivo «verity» ha detectado algo corrupto después de la activación."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:59
+#, c-format
+msgid "Spare area is not zeroed at position %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "El área de reserva no tiene ceros en la posición %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:160 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:287
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:300
+msgid "Device offset overflow."
+msgstr "Desbordamiento de la posición del dispositivo."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:200
+#, c-format
+msgid "Verification failed at position %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "La verificación ha fallado en la posición %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:273
+msgid "Invalid size parameters for verity device."
+msgstr "Parámetros de tamaño inválido para un dispositivo «verity»."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:293
+msgid "Hash area overflow."
+msgstr "Desbordamiento del área «hash»."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:370
+msgid "Verification of data area failed."
+msgstr "Fallo en la verificación del área de datos."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:375
+msgid "Verification of root hash failed."
+msgstr "Fallo en la verificación de la «hash» raíz."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:381
+msgid "Input/output error while creating hash area."
+msgstr "Error de entrada/salida al crear el área «hash»."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:383
+msgid "Creation of hash area failed."
+msgstr "La creación del área «hash» ha fallado."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:430
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Kernel cannot activate device if data block size exceeds page size (%u)."
+msgstr "ATENCIÓN: el núcleo no puede activar un dispositivo si el tamaño del bloque de datos excede el tamaño de página (%u)."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:132
+msgid "Failed to allocate RS context."
+msgstr "No se ha podido asignar contexto RS."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:147
+msgid "Failed to allocate buffer."
+msgstr "No se ha podido asignar «buffer»."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:157
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read RS block %<PRIu64> byte %d."
+msgstr "No se ha podido leer el bloque RS %<PRIu64> byte %d."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:170
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read parity for RS block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "No se ha podido leer la paridad para el bloque RS %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:178
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to repair parity for block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "No se ha podido reparar la paridad para el bloque %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:189
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to write parity for RS block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "No se ha podido escribir la paridad para el bloque RS %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:224
+msgid "Block sizes must match for FEC."
+msgstr "Los tamaños de bloque deben coincidir para FEC."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:230
+msgid "Invalid number of parity bytes."
+msgstr "Número no válido de bytes de paridad."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:266
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to determine size for device %s."
+msgstr "No se ha podido determinar el tamaño para el dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/integrity/integrity.c:233 lib/integrity/integrity.c:284
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support dm-integrity mapping."
+msgstr "El núcleo no dispone de asociación «dm-integrity»."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:374
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small. (LUKS2 requires at least %<PRIu64> bytes.)"
+msgstr "El dispositivo %s es demasiado pequeño. (LUKS3 necesita %<PRIu64> btyes como mínimo.)"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:433
+msgid "Failed to acquire write device lock."
+msgstr "No se ha podido adquirir el bloqueo de escritura para el dispositivo."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:673 lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:694
+msgid ""
+"Device contains ambiguous signatures, cannot auto-recover LUKS2.\n"
+"Please run \"cryptsetup repair\" for recovery."
+msgstr ""
+"El dispositivo contiene firmas ambiguas; no se puede autorecuperar LUKS2.\n"
+"Por favor, ejecute \"cryptsetup repair\" para recuperación."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:99
+msgid "No space for new keyslot."
+msgstr "No hay espacio para la nueva ranura de claves."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:874 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:997
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1070 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:105
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:128
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to acquire read lock on device %s."
+msgstr "No se ha podido adquirir el bloqueo de lectura para el dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:886 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1164
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:434 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:40
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:69
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to acquire write lock on device %s."
+msgstr "No se ha podido adquirir el bloqueo de escritura del dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1087
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forbidden LUKS2 requirements detected in backup %s."
+msgstr "Se han detectado requisitos prohibidos para LUKS2 en la copia de seguridad %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1128
+msgid "Data offset differ on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "La posición de los datos no coinciden en el dispositivo y en la copia de seguridad; ha fallado la restauración."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1134
+msgid "Binary header with keyslot areas size differ on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "La cabecera binaria con el tamaño de las áreas de ranuras de claves no coinciden en el dispositivo y en la copia de seguridad; la restauración ha fallado."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1141
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s %s%s%s%s"
+msgstr "Dispositivo %s %s%s%s%s"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1142
+msgid "does not contain LUKS2 header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device."
+msgstr "no contiene cabecera LUKS2. Reemplazar la cabecera puede destruir los datos en ese dispositivo."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1143
+msgid "already contains LUKS2 header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."
+msgstr "ya contiene cabecera LUKS2. Reemplazar la cabecera destruirá las ranuras de claves existentes."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1145
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: unknown LUKS2 requirements detected in real device header!\n"
+"Replacing header with backup may corrupt the data on that device!"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"AVISO: ¡Se han detectado requisitos LUKS2 desconocidos en cabecera de\n"
+"dispositivo real! Reemplazar la cabecera con la copia de seguridad puede\n"
+"corromper los datos en ese dispositivo!"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1147
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: Unfinished offline reencryption detected on the device!\n"
+"Replacing header with backup may corrupt data."
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"AVISO: ¡Se ha detectado recifrado «offline» no terminado en el dispositivo!\n"
+"¡Reemplazar la cabecera con la copia de seguridad puede corromper los datos!"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1248
+#, c-format
+msgid "Ignored unknown flag %s."
+msgstr "Se hará caso omiso del indicador desconocido %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1965
+msgid "Failed to read LUKS2 requirements."
+msgstr "Fallo al leer los requisitos LUKS2."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1972
+msgid "Unmet LUKS2 requirements detected."
+msgstr "Se han detectado requisitos LUKS2 no satisfechos."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1980
+msgid "Offline reencryption in progress. Aborting."
+msgstr "Recifrado «offline» en progreso. Se aborta."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:478
+#, c-format
+msgid "Can not check status of device with uuid: %s."
+msgstr "No se puede comprobar el estado del dispositivo con uuid: %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:504
+msgid "Unable to convert header with LUKSMETA additional metadata."
+msgstr "Imposible convertir cabecera con metadatos adicionales LUKSMETA."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:541
+msgid "Unable to move keyslot area. Not enough space."
+msgstr "Imposible mover el área de la ranura de claves. No hay suficiente espacio."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:581 lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:848
+msgid "Unable to move keyslot area."
+msgstr "Imposible mover el área de la ranura de claves."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:669
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - key slot digests are not LUKS1 compatible."
+msgstr "No se puede convertir a formato LUKS1 - los resúmenes de rarunas de claves no son compatibles con LUKS1."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:678
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - device uses wrapped key cipher %s."
+msgstr "No se puede convertir a formato LUKS1 - el dispositivo utiliza el cifrado de clave encapsulado %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:686
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - LUKS2 header contains %u token(s)."
+msgstr "No se puede convertir a formato LUKS1 - la cabecera LUKS2 contiene %u «token(s)»."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:700
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - keyslot %u is in invalid state."
+msgstr "No se puede convertir a formato LUKS1 - la ranura de claves %u está en un estado no válido."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:705
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - slot %u (over maximum slots) is still active."
+msgstr "No se puede convertir a formato LUKS1 - la ranura %u (sobre las ranuras máximas) todavía está activa."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:710
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - keyslot %u is not LUKS1 compatible."
+msgstr "No se puede convertir a formato LUKS1 - la ranura de claves %u no es compatible con LUKS1."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_token.c:266
+msgid "No free token slot."
+msgstr "No hay ninguna ranura de «token» libre."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_token.c:274
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to create builtin token %s."
+msgstr "No se ha podido crear el «token» interno %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:133
+msgid "Can't do passphrase verification on non-tty inputs."
+msgstr "No se puede hacer verificación de frase contraseña en entradas no tty."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:186 src/cryptsetup.c:784 src/cryptsetup.c:1022
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:746 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:820
+msgid "No known cipher specification pattern detected."
+msgstr "No se ha detectado ningún patrón conocido de especificación de cifrado."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:194
+msgid "WARNING: The --hash parameter is being ignored in plain mode with keyfile specified.\n"
+msgstr "ATENCIÓN: No se va a hacer caso del parámetro --hash en modo no cifrado con el fichero de claves especificado.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:202
+msgid "WARNING: The --keyfile-size option is being ignored, the read size is the same as the encryption key size.\n"
+msgstr "ATENCIÓN: No se va a hacer caso de la opción --keyfile-size; el tamaño de lectura es igual al tamaño de la clave de cifrado.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:217
+#, c-format
+msgid "Detected device signature(s) on %s. Proceeding further may damage existing data."
+msgstr "Se ha(n) detectado firma(s) de dispositivo en %s. Si se prosigue, pueden dañarse los datos existentes."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:223 src/cryptsetup.c:908 src/cryptsetup.c:999
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1058 src/cryptsetup.c:1651 src/integritysetup.c:226
+msgid "Operation aborted.\n"
+msgstr "Operación abortada.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:285
+msgid "Option --key-file is required."
+msgstr "Es necesaria la opción --key-file."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:330
+msgid "Enter VeraCrypt PIM: "
+msgstr "Introduzca PIM de VeraCrypt: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:339
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: parse error."
+msgstr "Valor de PIM no válido: error de análisis."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:342
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: 0."
+msgstr "Valor de PIM no válido: 0."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:345
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: outside of range."
+msgstr "Valor de PIM no válido: fuera de rango."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:368
+msgid "No device header detected with this passphrase."
+msgstr "No se ha detectado ninguna cabecera de dispositivo con esa frase contraseña."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:430 src/cryptsetup.c:1678
+msgid ""
+"Header dump with volume key is sensitive information\n"
+"which allows access to encrypted partition without passphrase.\n"
+"This dump should be always stored encrypted on safe place."
+msgstr ""
+"El volcado de la cabecera con la clave del volumen es información\n"
+"sensible que permite el acceso a una partición cifrada sin frase contraseña.\n"
+"Este volcado debería almacenarse siempre cifrado en un lugar seguro."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:509
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is still active and scheduled for deferred removal.\n"
+msgstr "El dispositivo %s todavía está activo y programado para borrado diferido.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:537
+msgid "Resize of active device requires volume key in keyring but --disable-keyring option is set."
+msgstr "El cambio de tamaño del dispositivo activo requiere clave de volumen en el llavero pero la opción --disable-keyring está puesta."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:662
+msgid "Benchmark interrupted."
+msgstr "Comparativa interrumpida."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:683
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2-%-9s     N/A\n"
+msgstr "PBKDF2-%-9s     N/A\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:685
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2-%-9s %7u iterations per second for %zu-bit key\n"
+msgstr "PBKDF2-%-9s %7u iteraciones por segundo para clave de %zu bits\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:699
+#, c-format
+msgid "%-10s N/A\n"
+msgstr "%-10s N/A\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:701
+#, c-format
+msgid "%-10s %4u iterations, %5u memory, %1u parallel threads (CPUs) for %zu-bit key (requested %u ms time)\n"
+msgstr "%-10s %4u iteraciones, %5u memora, %1u hilos paralelos (CPUs) para clave de %zu bits (tiempo solicitado %u ms)\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:725
+msgid "Result of benchmark is not reliable."
+msgstr "El resultado de la comparativa no es fiable."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:776
+msgid "# Tests are approximate using memory only (no storage IO).\n"
+msgstr "# Las pruebas son solo aproximadas usando memoria (no hay entrada/salida de almacenadmiento).\n"
+
+#. TRANSLATORS: The string is header of a table and must be exactly (right side) aligned.
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:810
+#, c-format
+msgid "#%*s Algorithm |       Key |      Encryption |      Decryption\n"
+msgstr "#%*s Algoritmo |     Clave |         Cifrado |      Descifrado\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:814
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cipher %s is not available."
+msgstr "El algoritmo de cifrado %s no está disponible."
+
+#. TRANSLATORS: The string is header of a table and must be exactly (right side) aligned.
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:834
+msgid "#     Algorithm |       Key |      Encryption |      Decryption\n"
+msgstr "#     Algoritmo |     Clave |         Cifrado |      Descifrado\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:843
+msgid "N/A"
+msgstr "/N/A"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:907
+msgid "Really try to repair LUKS device header?"
+msgstr "¿Está seguro de que quiere intentar reparar la cabecera del dispositivo LUKS?"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:923 src/integritysetup.c:140
+msgid ""
+"Wiping device to initialize integrity checksum.\n"
+"You can interrupt this by pressing CTRL+c (rest of not wiped device will contain invalid checksum).\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Limpieza de dispositivo para inicializar la suma de comprobación de integridad.\n"
+"Puede interrumpirse pulsando CTRL+c (el resto de dispositivo no limpiado contendrá sumas de comprobación no válidas.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:945 src/integritysetup.c:162
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot deactivate temporary device %s."
+msgstr "No se puede desactivar el dispositivo temporal %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:989
+msgid "Integrity option can be used only for LUKS2 format."
+msgstr "La opción de integridad solo puede utilizarse para formato LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1006
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create header file %s."
+msgstr "No se puede crear el fichero de cabecera %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1029 src/integritysetup.c:188 src/integritysetup.c:197
+#: src/integritysetup.c:206 src/integritysetup.c:272 src/integritysetup.c:281
+#: src/integritysetup.c:291
+msgid "No known integrity specification pattern detected."
+msgstr "No se ha detectado ningún patrón conocido de especificación de integridad."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1042
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use %s as on-disk header."
+msgstr "No se puede utilizar %s como cabecera en disco."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1052 src/integritysetup.c:220
+#, c-format
+msgid "This will overwrite data on %s irrevocably."
+msgstr "Esto sobreescribirá los datos en %s de forma irrevocable."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1085 src/cryptsetup.c:1384 src/cryptsetup.c:1447
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1538 src/cryptsetup.c:1600
+msgid "Failed to set pbkdf parameters."
+msgstr "No se han podido establecer los parámetros pbkdf."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1147
+msgid "Reduced data offset is allowed only for detached LUKS header."
+msgstr "La posición de datos reducida está permitida solamente para cabecera LUKS separada."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1188
+msgid "Device activated but cannot make flags persistent."
+msgstr "Dispositivo activado pero los indicadores no pueden hacerse persistentes."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1269
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %d is selected for deletion."
+msgstr "La ranura de claves %d se va a borrar."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1272 src/cryptsetup.c:1594
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %d is not active."
+msgstr "La ranura de claves %d no está activa."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1281 src/cryptsetup.c:1342
+msgid "This is the last keyslot. Device will become unusable after purging this key."
+msgstr "Esta es la última ranura de claves. El dispositivo quedará inutilizado después de purgar esta clave."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1282
+msgid "Enter any remaining passphrase: "
+msgstr "Introduzca cualquier frase contraseña que quede: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1283 src/cryptsetup.c:1344
+msgid "Operation aborted, the keyslot was NOT wiped.\n"
+msgstr "Operación abortada; la ranura de claves NO estaba limpia.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1321
+msgid "Enter passphrase to be deleted: "
+msgstr "Introduzca la frase contraseña que hay que borrar: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1339
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d selected for deletion."
+msgstr "La ranura de claves %d se va a borrar."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1398 src/cryptsetup.c:1461 src/cryptsetup.c:1495
+msgid "Enter new passphrase for key slot: "
+msgstr "Introduzca una nueva frase contraseña para la ranura de claves: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1478 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1358
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter any existing passphrase: "
+msgstr "Introduzca cualquier frase contraseña que exista: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1542
+msgid "Enter passphrase to be changed: "
+msgstr "Introduzca la frase contraseña que hay que cambiar: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1558 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1343
+msgid "Enter new passphrase: "
+msgstr "Introduzca una nueva frase contraseña: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1604
+msgid "Enter passphrase for keyslot to be converted: "
+msgstr "Introduzca la frase contraseña para la ranura de claves que se va a convertir: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1628
+msgid "Only one device argument for isLuks operation is supported."
+msgstr "La operación isLuks solo admite un argumento de dispositivo."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1812 src/cryptsetup.c:1833
+msgid "Option --header-backup-file is required."
+msgstr "Es necesaria la opción --header-backup-file."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1872
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unrecognized metadata device type %s."
+msgstr "Tipo de dispositivo de metadatos %s no reconocido."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1875
+msgid "Command requires device and mapped name as arguments."
+msgstr "Esta orden necesita como argumentos el dispositivo y el nombre asociado."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1897
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"This operation will erase all keyslots on device %s.\n"
+"Device will become unusable after this operation."
+msgstr ""
+"Esta operación borrará todas las ranuras de claves en el dispositivo %s.\n"
+"El dispositivo quedará inutilizable después de esta operación."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1904
+msgid "Operation aborted, keyslots were NOT wiped.\n"
+msgstr "Operación abortada; las ranuras de claves NO estaban limpias.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1941
+msgid "Invalid LUKS type, only luks1 and luks2 are supported."
+msgstr "Tipo LUKS no válido; solo se admiten luks1 y luks2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1959
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device is already %s type."
+msgstr "El dispositivo ya es de tipo %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1964
+#, c-format
+msgid "This operation will convert %s to %s format.\n"
+msgstr "Esta operación convertirá el formato %s a %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1970
+msgid "Operation aborted, device was NOT converted.\n"
+msgstr "Operación abortada; el dispositivo NO estaba convertido.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2010
+msgid "Option --priority, --label or --subsystem is missing."
+msgstr "Falta la opción --priority, --label o --subsystem."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2044 src/cryptsetup.c:2077 src/cryptsetup.c:2100
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %d is invalid."
+msgstr "El «token» %d no es válido."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2047 src/cryptsetup.c:2103
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %d in use."
+msgstr "El «token» %d está en uso."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2054
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to add luks2-keyring token %d."
+msgstr "No se ha podido añadir el «token» %d al llavero luks."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2063 src/cryptsetup.c:2125
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign token %d to keyslot %d."
+msgstr "No se ha logrado asignar el «token» %d a la ranura de claves %d."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2080
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %d is not in use."
+msgstr "El «token» %d no está en uso."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2115
+msgid "Failed to import token from file."
+msgstr "No se ha podido importar el «token» del fichero."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2140
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to get token %d for export."
+msgstr "No se ha logrado obtener el «token» %d para exportar."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2155
+msgid "--key-description parameter is mandatory for token add action."
+msgstr "El parámetro --key-description es obligatorio para la acción de añadir «token»."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2161 src/cryptsetup.c:2169
+msgid "Action requires specific token. Use --token-id parameter."
+msgstr "La acción requiere un «token» específico. Utilice el parámetro --token-id."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2174
+#, c-format
+msgid "Invalid token operation %s."
+msgstr "Operación de «token» no válida %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2214
+msgid "<device> [--type <type>] [<name>]"
+msgstr "<dispositivo> [--type <tipo> [<nombre>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2214
+msgid "open device as mapping <name>"
+msgstr "abrir el dispositivo como asociado a <nombre>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2215 src/cryptsetup.c:2216 src/cryptsetup.c:2217
+#: src/veritysetup.c:366 src/veritysetup.c:367 src/integritysetup.c:447
+#: src/integritysetup.c:448
+msgid "<name>"
+msgstr "<nombre>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2215
+msgid "close device (remove mapping)"
+msgstr "cerrar dispositivo (eliminar asociación)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2216
+msgid "resize active device"
+msgstr "cambiar el tamaño del dispositivo activo"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2217
+msgid "show device status"
+msgstr "mostrar el estado del dispositivo"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2218
+msgid "[--cipher <cipher>]"
+msgstr "[--cypher <algoritmo_de_cifrador>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2218
+msgid "benchmark cipher"
+msgstr "algoritmo de cifrado para pruebas"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2219 src/cryptsetup.c:2220 src/cryptsetup.c:2221
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2222 src/cryptsetup.c:2229 src/cryptsetup.c:2230
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2231 src/cryptsetup.c:2232 src/cryptsetup.c:2233
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2234 src/cryptsetup.c:2235 src/cryptsetup.c:2236
+msgid "<device>"
+msgstr "<dispositivo>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2219
+msgid "try to repair on-disk metadata"
+msgstr "intentar reparar metadatos en disco"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2220
+msgid "erase all keyslots (remove encryption key)"
+msgstr "borrar todas las ranuras de claves (eliminar clave de cifrado)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2221
+msgid "convert LUKS from/to LUKS2 format"
+msgstr "convertir formato LUKS de/en LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2222
+msgid "set permanent configuration options for LUKS2"
+msgstr "establecer opciones de configuración permanentes para LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2223 src/cryptsetup.c:2224
+msgid "<device> [<new key file>]"
+msgstr "<dispositivo> [<nuevo fichero de claves>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2223
+msgid "formats a LUKS device"
+msgstr "da formato a un dispositivo LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2224
+msgid "add key to LUKS device"
+msgstr "añadir clave a un dispositivo LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2225 src/cryptsetup.c:2226 src/cryptsetup.c:2227
+msgid "<device> [<key file>]"
+msgstr "<dispositivo> [<fichero de claves>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2225
+msgid "removes supplied key or key file from LUKS device"
+msgstr "elimina la clave suministrada o el fichero de claves del dispositivo LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2226
+msgid "changes supplied key or key file of LUKS device"
+msgstr "cambia la clave suministrada o el fichero de claves del dispositivo LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2227
+msgid "converts a key to new pbkdf parameters"
+msgstr "convierte una clave a los nuevos parámetros pbkdf"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2228
+msgid "<device> <key slot>"
+msgstr "<dispositivo> <ranura de claves>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2228
+msgid "wipes key with number <key slot> from LUKS device"
+msgstr "borra la clave con el número <ranura de clave> del dispositivo LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2229
+msgid "print UUID of LUKS device"
+msgstr "imprimir el UUID del dispositivo LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2230
+msgid "tests <device> for LUKS partition header"
+msgstr "comprueba si <dispositivo> tiene cabecera de partición LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2231
+msgid "dump LUKS partition information"
+msgstr "volcar información sobre la partición LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2232
+msgid "dump TCRYPT device information"
+msgstr "volcar información sobre el dispositivo TCRYPT"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2233
+msgid "Suspend LUKS device and wipe key (all IOs are frozen)"
+msgstr "Suspender el dispositivo LUKS y limpiar la clave (todas las entradas/salidas congeladas)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2234
+msgid "Resume suspended LUKS device"
+msgstr "Reanudar el dispositivo LUKS suspendido."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2235
+msgid "Backup LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "Hacer copia de seguridad de la cabecera y de las ranuras de claves del dispositivo LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2236
+msgid "Restore LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "Restaurar la cabecera y las ranuras de claves del dispositivo LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2237
+msgid "<add|remove|import|export> <device>"
+msgstr "<añade|elimina|importa|exporta> <dispositivo>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2237
+msgid "Manipulate LUKS2 tokens"
+msgstr "Manipular «tokens» LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2255 src/veritysetup.c:383 src/integritysetup.c:464
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<action> is one of:\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<acción> es una de:\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2261
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"You can also use old <action> syntax aliases:\n"
+"\topen: create (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen\n"
+"\tclose: remove (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tcryptClose\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"También se pueden utilizar los alias del tipo <acción> de la antigua sintaxis:\n"
+"\topen: create (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen\n"
+"\tclose: remove (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tcryptClose\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2265
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<device> is the encrypted device\n"
+"<key slot> is the LUKS key slot number to modify\n"
+"<key file> optional key file for the new key for luksAddKey action\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<nombre> es el dispositivo que se va a crear en %s\n"
+"<dispositivo> es el dispositivo cifrado\n"
+"<ranura de claves> es el número de la ranura de claves que se va a modificar\n"
+"<fichero de claves> fichero de claves opcional para la nueva clave para la acción 'luksAddKey'\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2272
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in metadata format is %s (for luksFormat action).\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"El formato de metadatos predefinido de fábrica es %s (para la acción luksFormat).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2277
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in key and passphrase parameters:\n"
+"\tMaximum keyfile size: %dkB, Maximum interactive passphrase length %d (characters)\n"
+"Default PBKDF for LUKS1: %s, iteration time: %d (ms)\n"
+"Default PBKDF for LUKS2: %s\n"
+"\tIteration time: %d, Memory required: %dkB, Parallel threads: %d\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Parámetros predefinidos de fábrica de clave y de frase contraseña:\n"
+"\tTamaño máximo del fichero de claves: %dk8, Longitud máxima de frase contraseña interactiva: %d (caracteres)\n"
+"PBKDF predefinido para LUKS1: %s, tiempo de iteración: %d (ms)\n"
+"PBKDF predefinido para LUKS2: %s\n"
+"\tTiempo de iteración: %d, Memoria requerida: %dkB, hilos en paralelo: %d\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2288
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in device cipher parameters:\n"
+"\tloop-AES: %s, Key %d bits\n"
+"\tplain: %s, Key: %d bits, Password hashing: %s\n"
+"\tLUKS1: %s, Key: %d bits, LUKS header hashing: %s, RNG: %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Parámetros predefinidos de fábrica del algoritmo de cifrado de dispositivos:\n"
+"\tbucle-AES: %s, Clave %d bits\n"
+"\tsin cifrado: %s, Clave: %d bits, Contraseña «hashing»: %s\n"
+"\tLUKS1: %s, Clave: %d bits, «hashing» de la cabecera LUKS: %s, Generador de números aleatorios: %s\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2305 src/veritysetup.c:540 src/integritysetup.c:601
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s: requires %s as arguments"
+msgstr "%s: necesita %s como argumentos"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2338 src/veritysetup.c:423 src/integritysetup.c:498
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1617
+msgid "Show this help message"
+msgstr "Mostrar este mensaje de ayuda"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2339 src/veritysetup.c:424 src/integritysetup.c:499
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1618
+msgid "Display brief usage"
+msgstr "Mostrar brevemente cómo se usa"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2343 src/veritysetup.c:428 src/integritysetup.c:503
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1622
+msgid "Help options:"
+msgstr "Opciones de ayuda:"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2344 src/veritysetup.c:429 src/integritysetup.c:504
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1623
+msgid "Print package version"
+msgstr "Imprimir versión del paquete"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2345 src/veritysetup.c:430 src/integritysetup.c:505
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1624
+msgid "Shows more detailed error messages"
+msgstr "Muestra mensajes de error más detallados"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2346 src/veritysetup.c:431 src/integritysetup.c:506
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1625
+msgid "Show debug messages"
+msgstr "Mostrar mensajes de depuración"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2347 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1627
+msgid "The cipher used to encrypt the disk (see /proc/crypto)"
+msgstr "Algoritmo de cifrado utilizado para cifrar el disco (ver /proc/crypto)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2348 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1629
+msgid "The hash used to create the encryption key from the passphrase"
+msgstr "Algoritmo «hash» utilizado para crear la clave de cifrado a partir de la frase contraseña"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2349
+msgid "Verifies the passphrase by asking for it twice"
+msgstr "Verifica la frase contraseña preguntándola dos veces"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2350 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1631
+msgid "Read the key from a file"
+msgstr "Leer la clave de un fichero."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2351
+msgid "Read the volume (master) key from file."
+msgstr "Leer la clave (maestra) del volumen desde fichero."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2352
+msgid "Dump volume (master) key instead of keyslots info"
+msgstr "Volcar la clave (maestra) del volumen en lugar de la información de las ranuras de claves."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2353 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1628
+msgid "The size of the encryption key"
+msgstr "Tamaño de la clave de cifrado"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2353 src/integritysetup.c:520 src/integritysetup.c:524
+#: src/integritysetup.c:528 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1628
+msgid "BITS"
+msgstr "BITS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2354 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1644
+msgid "Limits the read from keyfile"
+msgstr "Limita la lectura desde fichero de claves"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2354 src/cryptsetup.c:2355 src/cryptsetup.c:2356
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2357 src/veritysetup.c:434 src/veritysetup.c:435
+#: src/veritysetup.c:436 src/veritysetup.c:439 src/veritysetup.c:440
+#: src/integritysetup.c:511 src/integritysetup.c:515 src/integritysetup.c:516
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1643 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1644
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1645 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1646
+msgid "bytes"
+msgstr "bytes"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2355 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1643
+msgid "Number of bytes to skip in keyfile"
+msgstr "Número de bytes que hay que saltar en el fichero de claves"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2356
+msgid "Limits the read from newly added keyfile"
+msgstr "Limita la lectura desde un fichero de claves recién añadido"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2357
+msgid "Number of bytes to skip in newly added keyfile"
+msgstr "Número de bytes que hay que saltar en el fichero de claves recién añadido"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2358
+msgid "Slot number for new key (default is first free)"
+msgstr "Número de ranura para la nueva clave (el primero libre es lo predefinido)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2359
+msgid "The size of the device"
+msgstr "Tamaño del dispositivo"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2359 src/cryptsetup.c:2360 src/cryptsetup.c:2361
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2367 src/integritysetup.c:512 src/integritysetup.c:517
+msgid "SECTORS"
+msgstr "SECTORES"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2360
+msgid "The start offset in the backend device"
+msgstr "iPosición de comienzo en el dispositivo «backend»"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2361
+msgid "How many sectors of the encrypted data to skip at the beginning"
+msgstr "Cuántos sectores de los datos cifrados hay que saltar al principio"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2362
+msgid "Create a readonly mapping"
+msgstr "Crear una asignación alatoria"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2363 src/integritysetup.c:507
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1634
+msgid "Do not ask for confirmation"
+msgstr "No pedir confirmación"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2364
+msgid "Timeout for interactive passphrase prompt (in seconds)"
+msgstr "Tiempo de espera máximo para petición interactiva de frase contraseña (en segundos)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2364 src/cryptsetup.c:2365 src/integritysetup.c:508
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1635
+msgid "secs"
+msgstr "s"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2365 src/integritysetup.c:508
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1635
+msgid "Progress line update (in seconds)"
+msgstr "Actualización de la línea de progreso (en segundos)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2366 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1636
+msgid "How often the input of the passphrase can be retried"
+msgstr "Con qué frecuencia se puede volver a intentar introducir la frase contraseña"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2367
+msgid "Align payload at <n> sector boundaries - for luksFormat"
+msgstr "Alinear los datos a <n> bordes de sector - para luksFormat"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2368
+msgid "File with LUKS header and keyslots backup"
+msgstr "Fichero con copia de seguridad de cabecera LUKS y de ranuras de clave."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2369 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1637
+msgid "Use /dev/random for generating volume key"
+msgstr "Usar /dev/random para generar la clave del volumen."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2370 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1638
+msgid "Use /dev/urandom for generating volume key"
+msgstr "Usar /dev/urandom para generar la clave del volumen."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2371
+msgid "Share device with another non-overlapping crypt segment"
+msgstr "Compartir dispositivo con otro segmento cifrado no solapado."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2372 src/veritysetup.c:443
+msgid "UUID for device to use"
+msgstr "UUID del dispositivo que se va a usar"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2373
+msgid "Allow discards (aka TRIM) requests for device"
+msgstr "Permitir solicitudes de descarte (también llamadas TRIM) para el dispositivo"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2374 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1655
+msgid "Device or file with separated LUKS header"
+msgstr "Dispositivo o fichero con cabecera LUKS separada"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2375
+msgid "Do not activate device, just check passphrase"
+msgstr "No activar dispositivo; comprobar frase contraseña solamente"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2376
+msgid "Use hidden header (hidden TCRYPT device)"
+msgstr "Utilizar cabecera oculta (dispositivo TCRYPT oculto)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2377
+msgid "Device is system TCRYPT drive (with bootloader)"
+msgstr "El dispositivo es una unidad con sistema TCRYPT (con cargador de arranque)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2378
+msgid "Use backup (secondary) TCRYPT header"
+msgstr "Utilizar la cabecera TCRYPT de respaldo (secundaria)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2379
+msgid "Scan also for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "Explorar también si es un dispositivo compatible con VeraCrypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2380
+msgid "Personal Iteration Multiplier for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "Multiplicador de iteración personal para dispositivo compatible con VeraCrypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2381
+msgid "Query Personal Iteration Multiplier for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "Consulta el multiplicador de iteración personal para dispositivo compatible con VeraCrypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2382
+msgid "Type of device metadata: luks, plain, loopaes, tcrypt"
+msgstr "Tipo de metadatos del dispositivo: «luks», no cifrado, «loopaes», «tcrypt»"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2383
+msgid "Disable password quality check (if enabled)"
+msgstr "Desactivar la comprobación de la calidad de la contraseña (si estaba activada)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2384
+msgid "Use dm-crypt same_cpu_crypt performance compatibility option"
+msgstr "Utilizar la opción de compatibilidad de rendimiento same_cpu_crypt de dm-crypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2385
+msgid "Use dm-crypt submit_from_crypt_cpus performance compatibility option"
+msgstr "Utilizar la opción de compatibilidad de rendimiento submit_from_crypt_cpus de dm-crypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2386
+msgid "Device removal is deferred until the last user closes it"
+msgstr "La eliminación del dispositivo está diferida hasta que el último usuario lo cierre"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2387
+msgid "PBKDF iteration time for LUKS (in ms)"
+msgstr "Tiempo de iteración PBKDF para LUKS (en ms)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2387 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1633
+msgid "msecs"
+msgstr "ms"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2388 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1651
+msgid "PBKDF algorithm (for LUKS2): argon2i, argon2id, pbkdf2"
+msgstr "Algoritmo PBKDF (para LUKS2): argon2i, argon2id, pbkdf2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2389 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1652
+msgid "PBKDF memory cost limit"
+msgstr "Límite del coste de memoria PBKDF"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2389 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1652
+msgid "kilobytes"
+msgstr "kilobytes"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2390 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1653
+msgid "PBKDF parallel cost"
+msgstr "Coste del paralelismo PBKDF"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2390 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1653
+msgid "threads"
+msgstr "hilos"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2391 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1654
+msgid "PBKDF iterations cost (forced, disables benchmark)"
+msgstr "Coste de las iteraciones PBKDF (forzado, desactiva el banco de pruebas)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2392
+msgid "Keyslot priority: ignore, normal, prefer"
+msgstr "Prioridad de la ranura de claves: ignorada, normal, preferente"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2393
+msgid "Disable locking of on-disk metadata"
+msgstr "Desactiva el bloqueo de metadatos en disco"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2394
+msgid "Disable loading volume keys via kernel keyring"
+msgstr "Desactiva la carga de las claves del volumen mediante el llavero del núcleo"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2395
+msgid "Data integrity algorithm (LUKS2 only)"
+msgstr "Algoritmo de integridad de datos (solo LUKS2)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2396 src/integritysetup.c:531
+msgid "Disable journal for integrity device"
+msgstr "Desactiva el diario para dispositivo de integridad"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2397 src/integritysetup.c:509
+msgid "Do not wipe device after format"
+msgstr "No limpiar dispositivo después de dar formato"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2398
+msgid "Do not ask for passphrase if activation by token fails"
+msgstr "No pedir frase de paso si falla la activación por «token»"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2399
+msgid "Token number (default: any)"
+msgstr "Número de «token» (predefinido: cualquiera)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2400
+msgid "Key description"
+msgstr "Descripción de la clave"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2401
+msgid "Encryption sector size (default: 512 bytes)"
+msgstr "Tamaño de sector de cifrado (predeterminado: 512 bytes)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2402
+msgid "Set activation flags persistent for device"
+msgstr "Establecer indicadores de activación persistentes para el dispositivo"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2403
+msgid "Set label for the LUKS2 device"
+msgstr "Poner etiqueta al dispositivo LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2404
+msgid "Set subsystem label for the LUKS2 device"
+msgstr "Poner etiqueta de subsistema al dispositivo LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2405
+msgid "Create unbound (no assigned data segment) LUKS2 keyslot"
+msgstr "Crear ranura de claves LUKS2 ilimitada (sin segmento de datos asignado)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2406
+msgid "Read or write the json from or to a file"
+msgstr "Leer o escribir el json de o en un fichero"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2422 src/veritysetup.c:464 src/integritysetup.c:548
+msgid "[OPTION...] <action> <action-specific>"
+msgstr "[OPCIÓN...] <acción> <acción-específica>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2479 src/veritysetup.c:504 src/integritysetup.c:565
+msgid "Argument <action> missing."
+msgstr "El argumento <acción> no se ha proporcionado."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2535 src/veritysetup.c:535 src/integritysetup.c:596
+msgid "Unknown action."
+msgstr "Acción desconocida."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2545
+msgid "Option --deferred is allowed only for close command.\n"
+msgstr "La opción --deferred solo se permite con la orden de cerrar.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2550
+msgid "Option --shared is allowed only for open of plain device.\n"
+msgstr "La opción --shared solo se permite para abrir dispositivos no cifrados.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2555
+msgid "Option --allow-discards is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "La opción --allow-discards solo se permite para la operación de abrir.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2560
+msgid "Option --persistent is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "La opción --persistent solo se permite para la operación de abrir.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2565
+msgid "Option --persistent is not allowed with --test-passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "La opción --persistent no se permite con --test-passphrase.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2574
+msgid ""
+"Option --key-size is allowed only for luksFormat, luksAddKey (with --unbound),\n"
+"open and benchmark actions. To limit read from keyfile use --keyfile-size=(bytes)."
+msgstr ""
+"La opción --key-size solo se permite con las acciones luksFormat, luksAddKey\n"
+"(con --unbound), open y benchmark. Para limitar la lectura del fichero de\n"
+"claves, utilizar --keyfile-size=(bytes)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2580
+msgid "Option --integrity is allowed only for luksFormat (LUKS2).\n"
+msgstr "La opción --integrity solo se permite con luksFormat (LUKS2).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2585
+msgid "Option --integrity-no-wipe can be used only for format action with integrity extension.\n"
+msgstr "La opción --integrity-no-wipe solo puede usarse para la acción de formato con extensión de integridad.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2591
+msgid "Options --label and --subsystem are allowed only for luksFormat and config LUKS2 operations.\n"
+msgstr "Las opciones --label y --subsystem solo se permiten con las operaciones luksFormat y config LUKS2.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2597
+msgid "Option --test-passphrase is allowed only for open of LUKS and TCRYPT devices.\n"
+msgstr "La opción --test-passphrase solo se permite para abrir dispositivos LUKS y TCRYPT.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2602 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1724
+msgid "Key size must be a multiple of 8 bits"
+msgstr "El tamaño de clave debe ser un múltiplo de 8 bits"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2608 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1409
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1729
+msgid "Key slot is invalid."
+msgstr "La ranura de claves no es válida."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2615
+msgid "Option --key-file takes precedence over specified key file argument."
+msgstr "La opción --key-file tiene precedencia sobre el argumento de fichero de claves especificado."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2622 src/veritysetup.c:547 src/integritysetup.c:615
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1703
+msgid "Negative number for option not permitted."
+msgstr "No se permiten números negativos para esta opción."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2626
+msgid "Only one --key-file argument is allowed."
+msgstr "Solo se permite un argumento --key-file."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2630 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1695
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1733
+msgid "Only one of --use-[u]random options is allowed."
+msgstr "Solo se permite una de las opciones --use-[u]random."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2634
+msgid "Option --use-[u]random is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgstr "La opción --use-[u]random solo se permite con luksFormat."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2638
+msgid "Option --uuid is allowed only for luksFormat and luksUUID."
+msgstr "La opción --uuid solo se permite con luksFormat luksUUID."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2642
+msgid "Option --align-payload is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgstr "La opción --align-payload solo se permite con luksFormat."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2648
+msgid "Option --skip is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices.\n"
+msgstr "La opción --skip solo está disponible para abrir dispositivos no cifrados y «loopaes».\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2654
+msgid "Option --offset is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices.\n"
+msgstr "La opción --offset solo está disponible para abrir dispositivos no cifrados y «loopaes».\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2660
+msgid "Option --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system or --tcrypt-backup is supported only for TCRYPT device.\n"
+msgstr "La opción --tcrypt-hidden o --tcrypt-system o --tcrypt-backup solo está disponible para dispositivos TCRYPT.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2665
+msgid "Option --tcrypt-hidden cannot be combined with --allow-discards.\n"
+msgstr "La opción --tcrypt-hidden no puede combinarse con --allow-discards.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2670
+msgid "Option --veracrypt is supported only for TCRYPT device type.\n"
+msgstr "La opción --veracrypt solo está disponible para dispositivos TCRYPT.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2676
+msgid "Invalid argument for parameter --veracrypt-pim supplied.\n"
+msgstr "Argumento no válido para el parámetro --veracrypt-pim supplied.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2680
+msgid "Option --veracrypt-pim is supported only for VeraCrypt compatible devices.\n"
+msgstr "La opción --veracrypt-pim solo está disponible para dispositivos compatibles con VeraCrypt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2688
+msgid "Option --veracrypt-query-pim is supported only for VeraCrypt compatible devices.\n"
+msgstr "La opción --veracrypt-query-pim  solo está disponible para dispositivos compatibles con VeraCrypt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2692
+msgid "The options --veracrypt-pim and --veracrypt-query-pim are mutually exclusive.\n"
+msgstr "Las opciones --veracrypt-pim y --veracrypt-query-pim son mutuamente excluyentes.\n"
+
+# TODO
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2699
+msgid "Option --priority can be only ignore/normal/prefer.\n"
+msgstr "La opción --priority solo puede ser ignore/normal/prefer.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2704
+msgid "Keyslot specification is required.\n"
+msgstr "Se requiere especificación de ranura de claves.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2709 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1709
+msgid "Password-based key derivation function (PBKDF) can be only pbkdf2 or argon2i/argon2id.\n"
+msgstr "La función de derivación de clave basada en contraseña (PBKDF) solo puede ser pbkdf2 o argon2i/argon2id.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2714 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1714
+msgid "PBKDF forced iterations cannot be combined with iteration time option.\n"
+msgstr "Las iteraciones forzadas de PBKDF no pueden combinarse con la opción de tiempo de iteración.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2720
+msgid "Sector size option is not supported for this command.\n"
+msgstr "La opción de tamaño de sector no está disponible para esta orden.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2726
+msgid "Unsupported encryption sector size.\n"
+msgstr "Tamaño de sector de cifrado no admitido.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2731
+msgid "Key size is required with --unbound option.\n"
+msgstr "El tamaño de la clave es requerido con la opción --unbound.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2736
+msgid "Option --unbound may be used only with luksAddKey action.\n"
+msgstr "La opción --unbound solo puede utilizarse con la acción luksAddKey.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2746
+msgid "Cannot disable metadata locking.\n"
+msgstr "No se puede desactivar el bloqueo de metadatos.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:67
+msgid "Invalid salt string specified."
+msgstr "La cadena «salt» especificada no es válida."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:98
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create hash image %s for writing."
+msgstr "No se puede crear la imagen «hash» %s para escribir."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:108
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create FEC image %s for writing."
+msgstr "No se puede crear la imagen FEC %s para escribir."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:181
+msgid "Invalid root hash string specified."
+msgstr "La cadena «hash» raíz especificada no es válida."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:363
+msgid "<data_device> <hash_device>"
+msgstr "<dispositivo_de_datos> <dispositivo_«hash»>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:363 src/integritysetup.c:445
+msgid "format device"
+msgstr "dar formato al dispositivo"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:364
+msgid "<data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgstr "<dispositivo_de_datos> <dispositivo_«hash»> <«hash»_raíz>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:364
+msgid "verify device"
+msgstr "verificar dispositivo"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:365
+msgid "<data_device> <name> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgstr "<dispositivo_de_datos> <nombre> <dispositivo_«hash»> <«hash»_raíz>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:365 src/integritysetup.c:446
+msgid "open device as <name>"
+msgstr "abrir el dispositivo como <nombre>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:366 src/integritysetup.c:447
+msgid "close device (deactivate and remove mapping)"
+msgstr "cerrar dispositivo (desactivar y eliminar la asociación)"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:367 src/integritysetup.c:448
+msgid "show active device status"
+msgstr "mostrar el estado del dispositivo activo"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:368
+msgid "<hash_device>"
+msgstr "<dispositivo_«hash»>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:368 src/integritysetup.c:449
+msgid "show on-disk information"
+msgstr "mostrar información sobre el disco"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:387
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<data_device> is the data device\n"
+"<hash_device> is the device containing verification data\n"
+"<root_hash> hash of the root node on <hash_device>\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<nombre> es el dispositivo que se va a crear bajo %s\n"
+"<dispositivo_de_datos> es el dispositivo de datos\n"
+"<dispositivo_«hash»> es el dispositivo que contiene los datos de verificación\n"
+"<«hash»_raíz> «hash» del nodo raíz en «dispositivo—«hash»>\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:394
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in dm-verity parameters:\n"
+"\tHash: %s, Data block (bytes): %u, Hash block (bytes): %u, Salt size: %u, Hash format: %u\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Parámetros dm-verity predefinidos de fábrica:\n"
+"\tAlgoritmo «hash»: %s, Bloque de datos (bytes): %u, Bloque «hash» (bytes): %u, Tamaño de «salt»: %u, Formato «hash»: %u\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:432
+msgid "Do not use verity superblock"
+msgstr "No utilizar superbloque «verity»"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:433
+msgid "Format type (1 - normal, 0 - original Chrome OS)"
+msgstr "Tipo de formato (1 - normal, 0 - Chrome OS original)"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:433
+msgid "number"
+msgstr "número"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:434
+msgid "Block size on the data device"
+msgstr "Tamaño de bloque en el dispositivo de datos"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:435
+msgid "Block size on the hash device"
+msgstr "Tamaño de bloque en el dispositivo «hash»"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:436
+msgid "FEC parity bytes"
+msgstr "Bytes de paridad FEC"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:437
+msgid "The number of blocks in the data file"
+msgstr "Número de bloques en el fichero de datos"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:437
+msgid "blocks"
+msgstr "bloques"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:438
+msgid "Path to device with error correction data"
+msgstr "Ruta a dispositivo con datos de corrección de errores"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:438
+msgid "path"
+msgstr "ruta"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:439
+msgid "Starting offset on the hash device"
+msgstr "Posición inicial en el dispositivo «hash»"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:440
+msgid "Starting offset on the FEC device"
+msgstr "Posición inicial en el dispositivo FEC"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:441
+msgid "Hash algorithm"
+msgstr "Algoritmo «hash»"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:441
+msgid "string"
+msgstr "cadena"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:442
+msgid "Salt"
+msgstr "«Salt»"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:442
+msgid "hex string"
+msgstr "cadena hexadecimal"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:444
+msgid "Restart kernel if corruption is detected"
+msgstr "Reiniciar el núcleo si se detecta corrupción"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:445
+msgid "Ignore corruption, log it only"
+msgstr "Ignorar corrupción, tomar nota únicamente"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:446
+msgid "Do not verify zeroed blocks"
+msgstr "No verificar bloques con zeros"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:447
+msgid "Verify data block only the first time it is read"
+msgstr "Verificar el bloque de datos solo en la primera lectura"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:553
+msgid "Option --ignore-corruption, --restart-on-corruption or --ignore-zero-blocks is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "Las opciones --ignore-corruption, --restart-on-corruption y --ignore-zero-blocks solo están permitidas para la operación de abrir.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:558
+msgid "Option --ignore-corruption and --restart-on-corruption cannot be used together.\n"
+msgstr "Las opciones --ignore-corruption y --restart-on-corruption no pueden utilizarse juntas.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:78 src/utils_password.c:298
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read keyfile %s."
+msgstr "No se puede leer el fichero de claves %s."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:82 src/utils_password.c:302
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read %d bytes from keyfile %s."
+msgstr "No se pueden leer %d «bytes» en el fichero de claves %s."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:244
+#, c-format
+msgid "Formatted with tag size %u, internal integrity %s.\n"
+msgstr "Formato dado con tamaño de etiqueta %u, integridad interna %s.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:445 src/integritysetup.c:449
+msgid "<integrity_device>"
+msgstr "<dispositivo_de_integridad>"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:446
+msgid "<integrity_device> <name>"
+msgstr "<dispositivo_de_integridad> <nombre>"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:468
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<integrity_device> is the device containing data with integrity tags\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<nombre> es el dispositivo que se va a crear bajo %s\n"
+"<dispositivo_de_integridad> es el dispositivo que contiene datos con etiquetas de integridad\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:473
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in dm-integrity parameters:\n"
+"\tTag size: %u bytes, Checksum algorithm: %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Parámetros dm-integrity predefinidos de fábrica:\n"
+"\tTamaño de etiqueta: %u bytes, Algoritmo para la suma de comprobación: %s\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:511
+msgid "Journal size"
+msgstr "Tamaño del diario"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:512
+msgid "Interleave sectors"
+msgstr "Sectores de entrelazado"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:513
+msgid "Journal watermark"
+msgstr "Marca de agua del diario"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:513
+msgid "percent"
+msgstr "por ciento"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:514
+msgid "Journal commit time"
+msgstr "Tiempo de escritura en el diario"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:514
+msgid "ms"
+msgstr "ms"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:515
+msgid "Tag size (per-sector)"
+msgstr "Tamaño de etiqueta (por sector)"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:516
+msgid "Sector size"
+msgstr "Tamaño de sector"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:517
+msgid "Buffers size"
+msgstr "Tamaño de los «buffers»"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:519
+msgid "Data integrity algorithm"
+msgstr "Algoritmo para la integridad de datos"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:520
+msgid "The size of the data integrity key"
+msgstr "Tamaño de la clave de integridad de datos"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:521
+msgid "Read the integrity key from a file"
+msgstr "Leer la clave de integridad de un fichero"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:523
+msgid "Journal integrity algorithm"
+msgstr "Algoritmo de integridad del diario"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:524
+msgid "The size of the journal integrity key"
+msgstr "Tamaño de la clave de integridad del diario"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:525
+msgid "Read the journal integrity key from a file"
+msgstr "Leer la clave de integridad del diario de un fichero"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:527
+msgid "Journal encryption algorithm"
+msgstr "Algoritmo de cifrado del diario"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:528
+msgid "The size of the journal encryption key"
+msgstr "Tamaño de la clave de cifrado del diario"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:529
+msgid "Read the journal encryption key from a file"
+msgstr "Leer la clave de cifrado del diario de un fichero"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:532
+msgid "Recovery mode (no journal, no tag checking)"
+msgstr "Modo de recuperación (sin diario, sin comprobación de etiqueta)"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:621
+msgid "Options --journal-size, --interleave-sectors, --sector-size, --tag-size and --no-wipe can be used only for format action.\n"
+msgstr "Las opciones --journal-size, --interleave-sectors, --sector-size, --tag-size y --no-wipe solo pueden utilizarse para la acción de dar formato.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:627
+msgid "Invalid journal size specification."
+msgstr "La especificación del tamaño del diario no es válida."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:632
+msgid "Both key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "Deben especificarse las opciones tanto de fichero de claves como tamaño de clave."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:635
+msgid "Integrity algorithm must be specified if integrity key is used."
+msgstr "El algoritmo para la integridad debe especificarse si se va a utilizar clave de integridad."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:640
+msgid "Both journal integrity key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "Deben especificarse la opción del fichero de clave de integridad del diario y la del tamaño de la clave."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:643
+msgid "Journal integrity algorithm must be specified if journal integrity key is used."
+msgstr "Debe especificarse el algoritmo de integridad del diario si va a utilizarse la clave de integridad del diario."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:648
+msgid "Both journal encryption key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "Deben especificarse la opción del fichero de la clave de cifrado del diario y la del tamaño de la clave."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:651
+msgid "Journal encryption algorithm must be specified if journal encryption key is used."
+msgstr "Debe especificarse el algoritmo de cifrado del diario si va a utilizarse la clave de cifrado del diario."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:174
+msgid "Reencryption already in-progress."
+msgstr "Recifrado ya en progreso."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:180
+msgid "Reencryption of device with integrity profile is not supported."
+msgstr "El recifrado de dispositivo con perfil de integridad no está admitido."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:203
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot exclusively open %s, device in use."
+msgstr "No se puede abrir %s en exclusividad; el dispositivo está en uso."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:217 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1153
+msgid "Allocation of aligned memory failed."
+msgstr "La reserva de memoria alineada ha fallado."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:224
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read device %s."
+msgstr "No se puede leer el dispositivo %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:235
+#, c-format
+msgid "Marking LUKS1 device %s unusable."
+msgstr "Marcando el dispositivo LUKS1 %s como inutilizable."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:239
+#, c-format
+msgid "Setting LUKS2 offline reencrypt flag on device %s."
+msgstr "Estableciendo el indicador de recifrado fuera de línea LUKS2 en el dispositivo %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:256
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write device %s."
+msgstr "No se puede escribir en el dispositivo %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:340
+msgid "Cannot write reencryption log file."
+msgstr "No se puede escribir en el fichero de registro de recifrado."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:396
+msgid "Cannot read reencryption log file."
+msgstr "No se puede leer el fichero de registro de recifrado."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:434
+#, c-format
+msgid "Log file %s exists, resuming reencryption.\n"
+msgstr "El fichero de registro %s ya existe; reanudando el recifrado.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:484
+msgid "Activating temporary device using old LUKS header."
+msgstr "Activando dispositivo temporal utilizando cabecera LUKS antigua."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:495
+msgid "Activating temporary device using new LUKS header."
+msgstr "Activando dispositivo temporal utilizando cabecera LUKS nueva."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:505
+msgid "Activation of temporary devices failed."
+msgstr "Fallo en la activación de los dispositivos temporales."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:587
+msgid "Failed to set PBKDF parameters."
+msgstr "No se han podido establecer los parámetros PBKDF."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:595
+#, c-format
+msgid "New LUKS header for device %s created."
+msgstr "Se ha creado una nueva cabecera LUKS para el dispositivo %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:655
+#, c-format
+msgid "This version of cryptsetup-reencrypt can't handle new internal token type %s."
+msgstr "Esta versión de cryptsetup-reencrypt no sabe manejar el nuevo tipo de «token» interno %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:677
+msgid "Failed to read activation flags from backup header."
+msgstr "Fallo al leer los indicadores de activación en la cabecera de respaldo."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:681
+msgid "Failed to write activation flags to new header."
+msgstr "Fallo al escribir los indicadores de activación en la nueva cabecera."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:685 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:689
+msgid "Failed to read requirements from backup header."
+msgstr "Fallo al leer los requisitos en la cabecera de respaldo."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:726
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s header backup of device %s created."
+msgstr "Se ha creado una copia de seguridad de la cabecera %s del dispositivo %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:786
+msgid "Creation of LUKS backup headers failed."
+msgstr "Fallo al crear la copia de seguridad de las cabeceras LUKS."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:923
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot restore %s header on device %s."
+msgstr "No se puede restaurar la cabecera %s en el dispositivo %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:925
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s header on device %s restored."
+msgstr "Se ha restaurado la cabecera %s en el dispositivo %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:963 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1043
+msgid "Cannot seek to device offset."
+msgstr "No es posible situarse en la posición del dispositivo."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1086
+msgid "Cannot seek to device offset.\n"
+msgstr "No es posible situarse en la posición del dispositivo.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1125 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1131
+msgid "Cannot open temporary LUKS device."
+msgstr "No se puede abrir el dispositivo LUKS temporal."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1136 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1141
+msgid "Cannot get device size."
+msgstr "No se puede obtener el tamaño del dispositivo."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1178
+msgid "Interrupted by a signal."
+msgstr "Interrumpido por una señal."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1180
+msgid "IO error during reencryption."
+msgstr "Error de entrada/salida durante el recifrado."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1211
+msgid "Provided UUID is invalid."
+msgstr "El UUID proporcionado no es válido."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1314
+msgid "Key file can be used only with --key-slot or with exactly one key slot active."
+msgstr "El fichero de claves solo puede usarse con --key-slot o con una sola ranura de claves activa exactamente."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1356 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1367
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for key slot %u: "
+msgstr "Introduzca la frase contraseña para la ranura de claves %u: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1438
+msgid "Cannot open reencryption log file."
+msgstr "No se puede abrir el fichero de registro de recifrado."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1444
+msgid "No decryption in progress, provided UUID can be used only to resume suspended decryption process."
+msgstr "No hay ningún proceso de descifrado en marcha; el UUID proporcionado solo puede utilizarse para reanudar un proceso de descifrado suspendido."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1519
+#, c-format
+msgid "Changed pbkdf parameters in keyslot %i."
+msgstr "Se han cambiado los parámetros pbkdf en la ranura de claves %i."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1626
+msgid "Reencryption block size"
+msgstr "Tamaño de bloque de recifrado"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1626
+msgid "MiB"
+msgstr "MiB"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1630
+msgid "Do not change key, no data area reencryption"
+msgstr "No cambie la clave; no hay recifrado en la zona de datos"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1632
+msgid "Read new volume (master) key from file"
+msgstr "Leer la clave (maestra) del volumen desde fichero"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1633
+msgid "PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS (in ms)"
+msgstr "Tiempo de iteración PBKDF2 para LUKS (en ms)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1639
+msgid "Use direct-io when accessing devices"
+msgstr "Utilizar entrada/salida directa para acceder a los dispositivos"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1640
+msgid "Use fsync after each block"
+msgstr "Utilizar fsync después de cada bloque"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1641
+msgid "Update log file after every block"
+msgstr "Actualizar el fichero de registro después de cada bloque"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1642
+msgid "Use only this slot (others will be disabled)"
+msgstr "Utilizar solamente esta ranura (se desactivarán las demás)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1645
+msgid "Reduce data device size (move data offset). DANGEROUS!"
+msgstr "Reducir el tamaño del dispositivo de datos (mover la posición de los datos). ¡PELIGROSO!"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1646
+msgid "Use only specified device size (ignore rest of device). DANGEROUS!"
+msgstr "Utilizar solamente el tamaño especificado de dispositivo (ignorar el resto del dispositivo). ¡PELIGROSO!"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1647
+msgid "Create new header on not encrypted device"
+msgstr "Crear nueva cabecera en dispositivo no cifrado"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1648
+msgid "Permanently decrypt device (remove encryption)"
+msgstr "Descrifrar el dispositivo de forma permanente (eliminar cifrado)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1649
+msgid "The UUID used to resume decryption"
+msgstr "El UUID utilizado para reanudar el descifrado"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1650
+msgid "Type of LUKS metadata: luks1, luks2"
+msgstr "Tipo de metadato LUKS: luks1, luks2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1669
+msgid "[OPTION...] <device>"
+msgstr "[OPCIÓN...] <dispositivo>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1683
+#, c-format
+msgid "Reencryption will change: %s%s%s%s%s%s."
+msgstr "El recifrado va a cambiar: %s%s%s%s%s%s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1684
+msgid "volume key"
+msgstr "clave del volumen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1686
+msgid "set hash to "
+msgstr "nuevo algoritmo «hash» "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1687
+msgid ", set cipher to "
+msgstr ", nuevo algoritmo de cifrado: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1691
+msgid "Argument required."
+msgstr "Hace falta argumento."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1719
+msgid "Only values between 1 MiB and 64 MiB allowed for reencryption block size."
+msgstr "Solo se permiten valores entre 1 MiB y 64 MiB para el tamaño de bloque de recifrado."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1738 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1743
+msgid "Invalid device size specification."
+msgstr "La especificación del tamaño del dispositivo no es válida."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1746
+msgid "Maximum device reduce size is 64 MiB."
+msgstr "El tamaño máximo de reducción del dispositivo es de 64 MiB."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1749
+msgid "Reduce size must be multiple of 512 bytes sector."
+msgstr "El tamaño de reducción debe ser múltiplo de sectores de 512 bytes."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1753
+msgid "Option --new must be used together with --reduce-device-size or --header."
+msgstr "La opción --new debe utilizarse conjuntamente con --reduce-device-size o --header."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1757
+msgid "Option --keep-key can be used only with --hash, --iter-time or --pbkdf-force-iterations."
+msgstr "La opción --keep-key solamente puede utilizarse con --hash, --iter-time o --pbkdf-force-iterations."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1761
+msgid "Option --new cannot be used together with --decrypt."
+msgstr "La opción --new no puede utilizarse conjuntamente con --decrypt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1765
+msgid "Option --decrypt is incompatible with specified parameters."
+msgstr "La opción --decrypt es incompatible con los parámetros especificados."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1769
+msgid "Option --uuid is allowed only together with --decrypt."
+msgstr "La opción --uuid solo está permitida conjuntamente con --decrypt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1773
+msgid "Invalid luks type. Use one of these: 'luks', 'luks1' or 'luks2'."
+msgstr "Tipo de luks no válido. Utilice uno de estos: 'luks', 'luks1' o 'luks2'."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:159
+msgid "Error reading response from terminal."
+msgstr "Error de lectura de la respuesta recibida desde el terminal."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:184
+msgid "Command successful.\n"
+msgstr "Orden ejecutada correctamente.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:192
+msgid "wrong or missing parameters"
+msgstr "parámetros incorrectos u omisos"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:194
+msgid "no permission or bad passphrase"
+msgstr "sin permiso o frase de paso mala"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:196
+msgid "out of memory"
+msgstr "sin memoria"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:198
+msgid "wrong device or file specified"
+msgstr "se ha especificado un dispositivo o fichero incorrecto"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:200
+msgid "device already exists or device is busy"
+msgstr "el dispositivo ya existe o está ocupado"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:202
+msgid "unknown error"
+msgstr "error desconocido"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:204
+#, c-format
+msgid "Command failed with code %i (%s).\n"
+msgstr "La orden ha fallado con código %i (%s).\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:281
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %i created."
+msgstr "Ranura de claves %i creada."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:283
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %i unlocked."
+msgstr "Ranura de claves %i desbloqueada."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:285
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %i removed."
+msgstr "Ranura de claves %i eliminada."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:294
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %i created."
+msgstr "«Token» %i creado."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:296
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %i removed."
+msgstr "«Token» %i eliminado."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:462
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Device %s already contains a '%s' partition signature.\n"
+msgstr "AVISO: El dispositivo %s ya contiene una firma de partición '%s'.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:470
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Device %s already contains a '%s' superblock signature.\n"
+msgstr "AVISO: El dispositivo %s ya contiene uan firma de superbloque '%s'.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:491 src/utils_tools.c:555
+msgid "Failed to initialize device signature probes."
+msgstr "No se han podido inicializar los sondeos de firma del dispositivo."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:535
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to stat device %s."
+msgstr "No se ha podido efectuar «stat» sobre el dispositivo %s."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:548
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is in use. Can not proceed with format operation."
+msgstr "El dispositivo %s está en uso. No se puede proceder con la operación de dar formato."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:550
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to open file %s in read/write mode."
+msgstr "No se ha podido abrir el fichero %s para lectura y escritura."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:570
+msgid "Failed to wipe device signature."
+msgstr "No se ha podido limpiar la firma del dispositivo."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:577
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to probe device %s for a signature."
+msgstr "No se ha podido sondear el dispositivo %s para una firma."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:43 src/utils_password.c:75
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot check password quality: %s"
+msgstr "No se puede comprobar la calidad de la contraseña: %s"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:51
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Password quality check failed:\n"
+" %s"
+msgstr ""
+"Fallo en la comprobación de la calidad de la contraseña:\n"
+" %s"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:83
+#, c-format
+msgid "Password quality check failed: Bad passphrase (%s)"
+msgstr "Fallo en la comprobación de la calidad de la contraseña: frase contraseña incorrecta (%s)"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:193 src/utils_password.c:208
+msgid "Error reading passphrase from terminal."
+msgstr "Error al leer la frase contraseña desde el terminal."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:206
+msgid "Verify passphrase: "
+msgstr "Verifique la frase contraseña: "
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:213
+msgid "Passphrases do not match."
+msgstr "La frase contraseña no coincide."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:250
+msgid "Cannot use offset with terminal input."
+msgstr "No se puede usar «offset» con entrada desde terminal."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:253
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase: "
+msgstr "Introduzca la frase contraseña: "
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:255
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for %s: "
+msgstr "Introduzca la frase contraseña de %s: "
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:285
+msgid "No key available with this passphrase."
+msgstr "No hay ninguna clave disponible con esa frase contraseña."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:320
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open keyfile %s for write."
+msgstr "No se puede abrir el fichero de claves %s para escritura."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:327
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write to keyfile %s."
+msgstr "No se puede escribir en el fichero de claves %s."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:47
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to open file %s in read-only mode."
+msgstr "No se ha podido abrir el fichero %s para solo lectura."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:60
+msgid "Provide valid LUKS2 token JSON:\n"
+msgstr "Proporciona «token» LUKS2 válido en JSON:\n"
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:67
+msgid "Failed to read JSON file."
+msgstr "No se ha podido leer el fichero JSON."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:72
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Read interrupted."
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Lectura interrumpida."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:113
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to open file %s in write mode."
+msgstr "No se ha podido abrir el fichero %s para escritura."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:122
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Write interrupted."
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Escritura interrumpida."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:126
+msgid "Failed to write JSON file."
+msgstr "No se ha podido escribir el fichero JSON."
+
+#~ msgid "Replaced with key slot %d."
+#~ msgstr "Reemplazado con ranura de claves %d."
+
+#~ msgid "Missing LUKS target type, option --type is required."
+#~ msgstr "Falta el tipo de objetivo LUKS, se requiere la opción --type."
+
+#~ msgid "Missing --token option specifying token for removal."
+#~ msgstr "Falta la opción --token que especifica el «token» que se va a borrar."
+
+#~ msgid "Failed to remove token %d."
+#~ msgstr "No se ha podido eliminar el «token» %d."
+
+#~ msgid "Add or remove keyring token"
+#~ msgstr "Añadir o eliminar «token» de llavero"
+
+#~ msgid "Activated keyslot %i."
+#~ msgstr "Se ha activado la ranura de claves %i."
+
+#~ msgid "memory allocation error in action_luksFormat"
+#~ msgstr "error de reserva de memoria en action_luksFormat"
+
+#~ msgid "Key slot is invalid.\n"
+#~ msgstr "La ranura de claves no es válida.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Using default pbkdf parameters for new LUKS2 header.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Se está utilizando los parámetros pbkdf predeterminados para la nueva cabecera LUKS2.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Too many tree levels for verity volume.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Demasiados niveles de arborescencia en el volumen «verity».\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Key %d not active. Can't wipe.\n"
+#~ msgstr "La clave %d no está activa. No se puede limpiar.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "<name> <data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+#~ msgstr "<nombre> <dispositivo_de_datos> <dispositivo_«hash»> <«hash»_raíz>"
+
+#~ msgid "create active device"
+#~ msgstr "crear dispositivo activo"
+
+#~ msgid "remove (deactivate) device"
+#~ msgstr "eliminar (desactivar) dispositivo"
+
+#~ msgid "Progress: %5.1f%%, ETA %02llu:%02llu, %4llu MiB written, speed %5.1f MiB/s%s"
+#~ msgstr "Progreso: %5.1f%%, ETA %02llu:%02llu, %4llu MiB escritos, velocidad %5.1f MiB/s%s"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot find a free loopback device.\n"
+#~ msgstr "No se ha encontrado ningún dispositivo de bucle invertido libre.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot open device %s\n"
+#~ msgstr "No se puede abrir el dispositivo %s\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot use passed UUID unless decryption in progress.\n"
+#~ msgstr "No se puede utilizar el UUID pasado a menos que haya descifrado en curso.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Marking LUKS device %s usable.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Marcando el dispositivo LUKS %s como utilizable.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "WARNING: this is experimental code, it can completely break your data.\n"
+#~ msgstr "ATENCIÓN: este código es experimental; puede ser que sus datos queden deteriorados por completo.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "FIPS checksum verification failed.\n"
+#~ msgstr "La verificación de suma («checksum») FIPS ha fallado.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "WARNING: device %s is a partition, for TCRYPT system encryption you usually need to use whole block device path.\n"
+#~ msgstr "ATENCIÓN: el dispositivo %s es una partición; para el sistema de cifrado TCRYPT normalmente se necesita usar la ruta de un dispositivo de bloque entero.\n"
diff --git a/po/fi.po b/po/fi.po
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7cfbba4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/po/fi.po
@@ -0,0 +1,1933 @@
+# Finnish messages for cryptsetup.
+# Copyright © 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+# This file is put in the public domain.
+# This file is distributed under the same license as the cryptsetup package.
+# Jorma Karvonen <karvonen.jorma@gmail.com>, 2011-2015.
+#
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: cryptsetup 1.7.0\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: dm-crypt@saout.de\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2015-10-29 13:27+0100\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2015-11-08 12:48+0200\n"
+"Last-Translator: Jorma Karvonen <karvonen.jorma@gmail.com>\n"
+"Language-Team: Finnish <translation-team-fi@lists.sourceforge.net>\n"
+"Language: fi\n"
+"X-Bugs: Report translation errors to the Language-Team address.\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+"Plural-Forms: nplurals=2; plural=(n != 1);\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:253
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper, running as non-root user.\n"
+msgstr "Laitekuvaimen alustus epäonnistui, suoritetaan ei-root-käyttäjänä.\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:256
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper. Is dm_mod kernel module loaded?\n"
+msgstr "Laitekuvaimen alustus epäonnistui. Onko dm_mod-käyttöjärjestelmäydinmoduuli ladattu?\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:551
+#, c-format
+msgid "DM-UUID for device %s was truncated.\n"
+msgstr "DM-UUID laitteelle %s typistettiin.\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:699
+msgid "Requested dmcrypt performance options are not supported.\n"
+msgstr "Pyydetyt dmcrypt-suorituskykyvalitsimet eivät ole tuettuja.\n"
+
+#  Entropy viittaa tässä ilmeisesti tiivistettävän tekstin satunnaisuuteen. Mitä satunnaisempi se on, sitä vähemmän sitä voi tiivistää.
+#: lib/random.c:76
+msgid ""
+"System is out of entropy while generating volume key.\n"
+"Please move mouse or type some text in another window to gather some random events.\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Järjestelmässä ei ole satunnaisuutta taltioavainta tuotettaessa.\n"
+"Siirrä hiirtä tai kirjoita jotain tekstiä toiseen ikkunaan joidenkin satunnaistapahtumien keräämiseksi.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:80
+#, c-format
+msgid "Generating key (%d%% done).\n"
+msgstr "Avainta tuotetaan (%d%% valmis).\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:166
+msgid "Running in FIPS mode.\n"
+msgstr "Suoritetaan FIPS-tilassa.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:172
+msgid "Fatal error during RNG initialisation.\n"
+msgstr "Kohtalokas virhe RNG-alustuksen aikana.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:209
+msgid "Unknown RNG quality requested.\n"
+msgstr "Tuntematonta RNG-laatua pyydetty.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:214
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error %d reading from RNG: %s\n"
+msgstr "Virhe %d luettaessa kohteesta RNG: %s\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:200
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto RNG backend.\n"
+msgstr "RNG-salaustaustaohjelman alustus epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:206
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto backend.\n"
+msgstr "Salaustaustaohjelman alustus epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:237 lib/setup.c:1193 lib/verity/verity.c:123
+#, c-format
+msgid "Hash algorithm %s not supported.\n"
+msgstr "Tiivistealgoritmia %s ei tueta.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:240 lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:90
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key processing error (using hash %s).\n"
+msgstr "Avainkäsittelyvirhe (käytetään tiivistealgoritmia %s).\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:285
+msgid "Cannot determine device type. Incompatible activation of device?\n"
+msgstr "Laitetyypin määritteleminen epäonnistui. Laitteen yhteensopimaton aktivointi?\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:289 lib/setup.c:1546
+msgid "This operation is supported only for LUKS device.\n"
+msgstr "Tätä toimintoa tuetaan vain LUKS-laitteelle.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:321
+msgid "All key slots full.\n"
+msgstr "Kaikki avainvälit ovat täynnä.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:328
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select between 0 and %d.\n"
+msgstr "Avainväli %d on virheellinen, valitse väliltä 0 ... %d.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:334
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is full, please select another one.\n"
+msgstr "Avainväli %d on täynnä, valitse joku toinen.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:473
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for %s: "
+msgstr "Kirjoita salasanalause kohteelle %s: "
+
+#: lib/setup.c:654
+#, c-format
+msgid "Header detected but device %s is too small.\n"
+msgstr "Otsake havaittu, mutta laite %s on liian pieni.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:670 lib/setup.c:1429
+msgid "This operation is not supported for this device type.\n"
+msgstr "Tätä toimintoa ei tueta tälle laitetyypille.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:909 lib/setup.c:1382 lib/setup.c:2273
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not active.\n"
+msgstr "Laite %s ei ole aktiivinen.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:926
+#, c-format
+msgid "Underlying device for crypt device %s disappeared.\n"
+msgstr "Salauslaitteen %s perustana oleva laite hävisi.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:995
+msgid "Invalid plain crypt parameters.\n"
+msgstr "Virheelliset tavalliset salausparametrit.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1000 lib/setup.c:1120
+msgid "Invalid key size.\n"
+msgstr "Virheellinen avainkoko.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1005 lib/setup.c:1125
+msgid "UUID is not supported for this crypt type.\n"
+msgstr "UUID ei ole tuettu tälle laitetyypille.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1047
+msgid "Can't format LUKS without device.\n"
+msgstr "Kohteen LUKS pohjustus ilman laitetta epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1090
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s which is still in use.\n"
+msgstr "Laitteen %s pohjustus epäonnistui, koska se on yhä käytössä.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1093
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s, permission denied.\n"
+msgstr "Laitteen %s pohjustus epäonnistui, koska pääsy laitteeseen on kielletty.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1097
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe header on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Otsakkeen pyyhkiminen pois laitteesta %s epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1115
+msgid "Can't format LOOPAES without device.\n"
+msgstr "Kohteen LOOPAES pohjustus ilman laitetta epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1153
+msgid "Can't format VERITY without device.\n"
+msgstr "Kohteen VERITY pohjustus ilman laitetta epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1161 lib/verity/verity.c:106
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash type %d.\n"
+msgstr "Tukematon VERITY-tiivistetyyppi %d.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1167 lib/verity/verity.c:114
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY block size.\n"
+msgstr "Tukematon VERITY-lohkokoko.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1172 lib/verity/verity.c:76
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash offset.\n"
+msgstr "Tukematon VERITY-tiivistesiirros.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1286
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unknown crypt device type %s requested.\n"
+msgstr "Tuntematon salauslaitetyyppi %s pyydetty.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1396
+msgid "Cannot resize loop device.\n"
+msgstr "Silmukkalaitteen koon muuttaminen epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1444
+msgid "Do you really want to change UUID of device?"
+msgstr "Haluatko todella vaihtaa laitteen UUID-tunnistetta?"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1554
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not active.\n"
+msgstr "Taltio %s ei ole käytössä.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1565
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is already suspended.\n"
+msgstr "Taltio %s on jo keskeytetty.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1572
+#, c-format
+msgid "Suspend is not supported for device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Keskeyttämistä ei tueta laitetyypille %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1574
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during suspending device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Virhe keskeytettäessä laitetta %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1600 lib/setup.c:1647
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not suspended.\n"
+msgstr "Taltiota %s ei ole keskeytetty.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1614
+#, c-format
+msgid "Resume is not supported for device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Jatkamista ei tueta laiteelle %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1616 lib/setup.c:1668
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during resuming device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Virhe jatkettaessa laitteella %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1654 lib/setup.c:2089 lib/setup.c:2103 src/cryptsetup.c:183
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:244 src/cryptsetup.c:732 src/cryptsetup.c:1162
+msgid "Enter passphrase: "
+msgstr "Kirjoita salasanalause: "
+
+#  Volume key tarkoittaa yleensä äänenvoimakkuussäädintä, ei välttämättä tässä.
+#: lib/setup.c:1716 lib/setup.c:1852
+msgid "Cannot add key slot, all slots disabled and no volume key provided.\n"
+msgstr "Avainvälin lisäys epäonnistui, kaikki välit on otettu pois käytöstä ja yhtään taltioavainta ei ole tarjottu.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1725 lib/setup.c:1858 lib/setup.c:1862
+msgid "Enter any passphrase: "
+msgstr "Kirjoita mikä tahansa salasanalause: "
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1742 lib/setup.c:1875 lib/setup.c:1879 lib/setup.c:1941
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:992 src/cryptsetup.c:1023
+msgid "Enter new passphrase for key slot: "
+msgstr "Kirjoita uusi salasanalause avainvälille: "
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1807
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d changed.\n"
+msgstr "Avaivälin %d vaihtui.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1810
+#, c-format
+msgid "Replaced with key slot %d.\n"
+msgstr "Korvattiin avainvälillä %d.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1815
+msgid "Failed to swap new key slot.\n"
+msgstr "Uuden avainvälin vaihtaminen epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1932 lib/setup.c:2193 lib/setup.c:2206 lib/setup.c:2348
+msgid "Volume key does not match the volume.\n"
+msgstr "Taltioavain ei täsmää taltion kanssa.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1970
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid.\n"
+msgstr "Avainväli %d on virheellinen.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1975
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is not used.\n"
+msgstr "Avainväli %d ei ole käytössä.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2005 lib/setup.c:2077 lib/setup.c:2169
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s already exists.\n"
+msgstr "Laite %s on jo olemassa.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2180
+msgid "Incorrect volume key specified for plain device.\n"
+msgstr "Virheellinen taltioavain määritelty tavalliselle laitteelle.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2213
+msgid "Incorrect root hash specified for verity device.\n"
+msgstr "Virheellinen root-tiiviste määritelty verity-laitteelle.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2236
+msgid "Device type is not properly initialised.\n"
+msgstr "Laitetyyppi ei ole alustettu oikein.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2268
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is still in use.\n"
+msgstr "Laite %s on yhä käytössä.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2277
+#, c-format
+msgid "Invalid device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Virheellinen laite %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2298
+msgid "Function not available in FIPS mode.\n"
+msgstr "Funktio ei ole käytettävissä FIPS-tilassa.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2304
+msgid "Volume key buffer too small.\n"
+msgstr "Taltioavainpuskuri on liian pieni.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2312
+msgid "Cannot retrieve volume key for plain device.\n"
+msgstr "Taltioavaimen nouto tavalliselle laitteelle epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2319
+#, c-format
+msgid "This operation is not supported for %s crypt device.\n"
+msgstr "Tätä toimintoa ei tueta %s-salauslaitteelle.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2515
+msgid "Dump operation is not supported for this device type.\n"
+msgstr "Dump-toimintoa ei tueta tälle laitetyypille.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:244
+msgid "Cannot get process priority.\n"
+msgstr "Prosessiprioriteetin hakeminen epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:258
+msgid "Cannot unlock memory.\n"
+msgstr "Muistin lukituksen avaus epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:241 lib/utils_crypt.c:254 lib/utils_crypt.c:401
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:416
+msgid "Out of memory while reading passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "Muisti loppui luettaessa salasanalausetta.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:246 lib/utils_crypt.c:261
+msgid "Error reading passphrase from terminal.\n"
+msgstr "Virhe luettaessa salasanalausetta pääteikkunasta.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:259
+msgid "Verify passphrase: "
+msgstr "Todenna salasanalause: "
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:266
+msgid "Passphrases do not match.\n"
+msgstr "Salasanalauseet eivät täsmää.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:350
+msgid "Cannot use offset with terminal input.\n"
+msgstr "Siirrososoitteen käyttö pääteikkunasyötteellä epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:369 lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:467
+msgid "Failed to open key file.\n"
+msgstr "Avaintiedoston avaus epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:378
+msgid "Failed to stat key file.\n"
+msgstr "Avaintiedoston kutsuminen stat-funktiolla epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:386 lib/utils_crypt.c:407
+msgid "Cannot seek to requested keyfile offset.\n"
+msgstr "Pyydetyn avaintiedostosiirrososoitteen etsintä epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:424
+msgid "Error reading passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "Virhe luettaessa salasanalausetta.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:447
+msgid "Maximum keyfile size exceeded.\n"
+msgstr "Avaintiedoston enimmäiskoko ylitettiin.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:452
+msgid "Cannot read requested amount of data.\n"
+msgstr "Pyydetyn tietomäärän lukeminen epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:136 lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:90
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s doesn't exist or access denied.\n"
+msgstr "Laite %s ei ole olemassa tai pääsy siihen on kielletty.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:430
+msgid "Cannot use a loopback device, running as non-root user.\n"
+msgstr "Silmukkalaitteen käyttö epäonnistui, suoritetaan ei-root-käyttäjänä.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:433
+msgid "Cannot find a free loopback device.\n"
+msgstr "Vapaan silmukkalaiteen löytäminen epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:440
+msgid "Attaching loopback device failed (loop device with autoclear flag is required).\n"
+msgstr "Silmukkalaitteeseen liittyminen epäonnistui (vaaditaan silmukkalaite autoclear-lipulla).\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:484
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s which is in use (already mapped or mounted).\n"
+msgstr "Laitteen %s käyttö epäonnistui, koska se on jo käytössä (jo kuvattu tai liitetty).\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:488
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot get info about device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Tietojen hakeminen laitteesta %s epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:494
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested offset is beyond real size of device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Pyydetty siirrososoite on laitteen %s todellisen koon ulkopuolella.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:502
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s has zero size.\n"
+msgstr "Laitteen %s koko on nolla.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:513
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small.\n"
+msgstr "Laite %s on liian pieni.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:37
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Failed to setup dm-crypt key mapping for device %s.\n"
+"Check that kernel supports %s cipher (check syslog for more info).\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Dm-crypt -avainkuvausasetus laitteelle %s epäonnistui.\n"
+"Tarkista, että käyttöjärjestelmäydin tukee %s-salakirjoitusmenetelmää (lisätietoja tarkistamalla syslog).\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:42
+msgid "Key size in XTS mode must be 256 or 512 bits.\n"
+msgstr "Avainkoon on oltava XTS-tilassa 256 tai 512 bittiä.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:96 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:296
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:572 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1022
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write to device %s, permission denied.\n"
+msgstr "Laitteeseen %s kirjoittaminen epäonnistui, pääsy kielletty.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:111
+msgid "Failed to open temporary keystore device.\n"
+msgstr "Tilapäisen avainsäiliön avaaminen epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:118
+msgid "Failed to access temporary keystore device.\n"
+msgstr "Pääsy tilapäiseen avainsäiliölaitteeseen epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:191
+msgid "IO error while encrypting keyslot.\n"
+msgstr "Siirräntävirhe salattaessa avainväliä.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:256
+msgid "IO error while decrypting keyslot.\n"
+msgstr "Siirräntävirhe purettaessa avainvälin salausta.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:90
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small. (LUKS requires at least %<PRIu64> bytes.)\n"
+msgstr "Laite %s on liian pieni. (LUKS vaatii vähintään %<PRIu64> tavua.)\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:180 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:418
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1131
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not a valid LUKS device.\n"
+msgstr "Laite %s ei ole kelvollinen LUKS-laite.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:198
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested header backup file %s already exists.\n"
+msgstr "Pyydetty otsakevarmuuskopiotiedosto %s on jo olemassa.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:200
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create header backup file %s.\n"
+msgstr "Otsakevarmuuskopiotiedoston %s luominen epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:205
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write header backup file %s.\n"
+msgstr "Otsakevarmuuskopiotiedoston %s kirjoittaminen epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:239
+msgid "Backup file doesn't contain valid LUKS header.\n"
+msgstr "Varmuuskopiotiedosto ei sisällä kelvollista LUKS-otsaketta.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:252 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:496
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open header backup file %s.\n"
+msgstr "Otsakevarmuuskopiotiedoston %s avaus epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:258
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read header backup file %s.\n"
+msgstr "Otsakevarmuuskopiotiedoston %s lukeminen epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:269
+msgid "Data offset or key size differs on device and backup, restore failed.\n"
+msgstr "Tietosiirrososoite tai avainkoko eroaa laitteessa ja varmuuskopiossa, palautus epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:277
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s %s%s"
+msgstr "Laite %s %s%s"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:278
+msgid "does not contain LUKS header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device."
+msgstr "ei sisällä LUKS-otsaketta. Otsakkeen korvaaminen voi tuhota tietoja tuossa laitteessa."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:279
+msgid "already contains LUKS header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."
+msgstr "sisältää jo LUKS-otsakkeen. Otsakkeen korvaaminen tuhoaa olemassaolevat avainvälit."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:280
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: real device header has different UUID than backup!"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"VAROITUS: oikealla laiteotsakkeella on eri UUID-tunniste kuin varmuuskopiolla!"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:299 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:535
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:575 lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:624 lib/verity/verity.c:82
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:179 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:292
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:303 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:323
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Laitteen %s avaus epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:329
+msgid "Non standard key size, manual repair required.\n"
+msgstr "Ei-vakio avainkoko, manuaalinen korjaus pyydetty.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:334
+msgid "Non standard keyslots alignment, manual repair required.\n"
+msgstr "Ei-vakiot avainvälitasaukset, manuaalinen korjaus pyydetty.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:340
+msgid "Repairing keyslots.\n"
+msgstr "Korjataan avainvälit.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:351
+msgid "Repair failed."
+msgstr "Korjaus epäonnistui."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:363
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: offset repaired (%u -> %u).\n"
+msgstr "Avainväli %i: siirrososoite korjattu (%u -> %u).\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:371
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: stripes repaired (%u -> %u).\n"
+msgstr "Avainväli %i: raidat korjattu (%u -> %u).\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:380
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: bogus partition signature.\n"
+msgstr "Avainväli %i: valeosiotunniste.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:385
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: salt wiped.\n"
+msgstr "Avainväli %i: satunnaisarvosiemen tuhottu.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:396
+msgid "Writing LUKS header to disk.\n"
+msgstr "Kirjoitetaan LUKS-otsake levylle.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:421
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported LUKS version %d.\n"
+msgstr "Tukematon LUKS-versio %d.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:427 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:661
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested LUKS hash %s is not supported.\n"
+msgstr "Pyydetty LUKS-tiiviste %s ei ole tuettu.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:442
+#, c-format
+msgid "LUKS keyslot %u is invalid.\n"
+msgstr "LUKS-avainväli %u on virheellinen.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:456 src/cryptsetup.c:664
+msgid "No known problems detected for LUKS header.\n"
+msgstr "Tuntemattomat pulmat havaittu LUKS-otsakkeelle.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:596
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during update of LUKS header on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Virhe LUKS-otsakkeen päivityksen aikana laitteessa %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:603
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error re-reading LUKS header after update on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Virhe luettaessa uudelleen LUKS-otsaketta päivityksen jälkeen laitteessa %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:654
+#, c-format
+msgid "Data offset for detached LUKS header must be either 0 or higher than header size (%d sectors).\n"
+msgstr "Tietosiirrososoitteen irrotetulle LUKS-otsakkeelle on oltava joko 0 tai suurempi kuin otsakekoko (%d sektoria).\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:666 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:757
+msgid "Wrong LUKS UUID format provided.\n"
+msgstr "Väärä LUKS UUID-muoto tarjottu.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:695
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: reading random salt failed.\n"
+msgstr "LUKS-otsakkeen luominen epäonnistui: satunnaisarvosiemenen lukeminen epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:702 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:798
+#, c-format
+msgid "Not compatible PBKDF2 options (using hash algorithm %s).\n"
+msgstr "Ei ole yhteensopiva PBKDF2-valitsimien kanssa (käytetään tiivitstealgoritmia %s).\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:717
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: header digest failed (using hash %s).\n"
+msgstr "LUKS-otsakkeen luominen epäonnistui: otsaketiiviste epäonnistui (käytettäen tiivistettä %s).\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:782
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d active, purge first.\n"
+msgstr "Avainväli %d aktiivinen, puhdista ensimmäinen.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:788
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d material includes too few stripes. Header manipulation?\n"
+msgstr "Avainvälin %d materiaali sisältää liian vähän raitoja. Otsaketta on käsitelty?\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:955
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d unlocked.\n"
+msgstr "Avaivälin %d lukitus avattu.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:990 src/cryptsetup.c:858
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1020 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1057
+msgid "No key available with this passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "Tälle salasanalauseelle ei ole saatavissa avainta.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1008
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select keyslot between 0 and %d.\n"
+msgstr "Avainväli %d on virheellinen, valitse avainväli välillä 0 ... %d.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1026
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Laitteen %s pyyhkiminen tyhjäksi epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:146
+msgid "Detected not yet supported GPG encrypted keyfile.\n"
+msgstr "Havaittu vielä tukematon GPG-salausavaintiedosto.\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:147
+msgid "Please use gpg --decrypt <KEYFILE> | cryptsetup --keyfile=- ...\n"
+msgstr "Käytä gpg --decrypt <AVAINTIEDOSTO> | cryptsetup --keyfile=- ...\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:168 lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:188
+msgid "Incompatible loop-AES keyfile detected.\n"
+msgstr "Yhteensopimaton loop-AES -avaintiedosto havaittu.\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:244
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support loop-AES compatible mapping.\n"
+msgstr "Käyttöjärjestelmäydin ei tule loop-AES -yhteensopivaa kuvausta.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:475
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error reading keyfile %s.\n"
+msgstr "Virhe luettaessa avaintiedostoa %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:513
+#, c-format
+msgid "Maximum TCRYPT passphrase length (%d) exceeded.\n"
+msgstr "TCRYPT-salasanalauseen enimmäispituus (%d) ylitettiin.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:543
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2 hash algorithm %s not available, skipping.\n"
+msgstr "PBKDF2-tiivistealgoritmi %s ei ole käytettävissä, ohitetaan.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:561 src/cryptsetup.c:617
+msgid "Required kernel crypto interface not available.\n"
+msgstr "Pyydetty ydinsalauskäyttöliittymä ei ole käytettävissä.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:563 src/cryptsetup.c:619
+msgid "Ensure you have algif_skcipher kernel module loaded.\n"
+msgstr "Varmista, että algif_skcipher-käyttöjärjestelmäydinmoduuli on ladattu.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:707
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activation is not supported for %d sector size.\n"
+msgstr "Aktivointia ei tueta sektorikoolle %d.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:713
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support activation for this TCRYPT legacy mode.\n"
+msgstr "Käyttöjärjestelmäydin ei tue aktivointia tälle TCRYPT-perinnetilassa.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:744
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activating TCRYPT system encryption for partition %s.\n"
+msgstr "Aktivoidaan TCRYPT-järjestelmäsalaus osiolle %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:810
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support TCRYPT compatible mapping.\n"
+msgstr "Käyttöjärjestelmäydin ei tue TCRYPT -yhteensopivaa kuvausta.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:1024
+msgid "This function is not supported without TCRYPT header load."
+msgstr "Tätä toimintoa ei tueta ilman TCRYPT-otsakelatausta."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:70 lib/verity/verity.c:172
+#, c-format
+msgid "Verity device %s doesn't use on-disk header.\n"
+msgstr "Verity-laite %s ei käytä paikallista levyotsaketta.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:94
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not a valid VERITY device.\n"
+msgstr "Laite %s ei ole kelvollinen VERITY-laite.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:101
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY version %d.\n"
+msgstr "Tukematon VERITY-versio %d.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:131
+msgid "VERITY header corrupted.\n"
+msgstr "VERITY-otsake rikkinäinen.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:166
+#, c-format
+msgid "Wrong VERITY UUID format provided on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Väärä VERITY UUID-muoto tarjottu laitteessa %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:196
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during update of verity header on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Virhe verity-otsakkeen päivityksen aikana laitteessa %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:276
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support dm-verity mapping.\n"
+msgstr "Käyttöjärjestelmäydin ei tule dm-verity -yhteensopivaa kuvausta.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:287
+msgid "Verity device detected corruption after activation.\n"
+msgstr "Verity-laite havaitsi rikkoutumisen aktivoinnin jälkeen.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:59
+#, c-format
+msgid "Spare area is not zeroed at position %<PRIu64>.\n"
+msgstr "Vapaa-aluetta ei ole nollattu sijainnissa %<PRIu64>.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:121 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:249
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:277 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:284
+msgid "Device offset overflow.\n"
+msgstr "Laitesiirrososoitteen ylivuoto.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:161
+#, c-format
+msgid "Verification failed at position %<PRIu64>.\n"
+msgstr "Todennus epäonnistui sijainnissa %<PRIu64>.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:235
+msgid "Invalid size parameters for verity device.\n"
+msgstr "Virheelliset kokoparametrit verity-laitteelle.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:266
+msgid "Too many tree levels for verity volume.\n"
+msgstr "Verity-taltiolla liian monta puutasoa.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:354
+msgid "Verification of data area failed.\n"
+msgstr "Data-alueen todentaminen epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:359
+msgid "Verification of root hash failed.\n"
+msgstr "Root-tiivisteen todentaminen epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:365
+msgid "Input/output error while creating hash area.\n"
+msgstr "Syöte/tulostevirhe luotaessa tiivistealuetta.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:367
+msgid "Creation of hash area failed.\n"
+msgstr "Tiivistealueen luominen epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:414
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Kernel cannot activate device if data block size exceeds page size (%u).\n"
+msgstr "VAROITUS: Käyttöjärjestelmäydin ei voi aktivoida laitetta, jos lohkokoko ylittää sivukoon (%u).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:91
+msgid "Can't do passphrase verification on non-tty inputs.\n"
+msgstr "Salasanalauseiden todennus epäonnistui ei-tty-syötteissä.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:132 src/cryptsetup.c:560 src/cryptsetup.c:707
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:523 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:577
+msgid "No known cipher specification pattern detected.\n"
+msgstr "Havaittu tuntematon salakirjoitusmenetelmämäärittelymalli.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:140
+msgid "WARNING: The --hash parameter is being ignored in plain mode with keyfile specified.\n"
+msgstr "VAROITUS: Parametri --hash ohitetaan tavallisessa tilassa kun avaintiedosto on määritelty.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:148
+msgid "WARNING: The --keyfile-size option is being ignored, the read size is the same as the encryption key size.\n"
+msgstr "VAROITUS: Valitsin --keyfile-size ohitetaan , lukukoko on sama kuin salausavaimen koko.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:214
+msgid "Option --key-file is required.\n"
+msgstr "Vaaditaan valitsin --key-file.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:263
+msgid "No device header detected with this passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "Tälle salasanalauseelle ei ole saatavissa laiteotsaketta.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:323 src/cryptsetup.c:1151
+msgid ""
+"Header dump with volume key is sensitive information\n"
+"which allows access to encrypted partition without passphrase.\n"
+"This dump should be always stored encrypted on safe place."
+msgstr ""
+"Otsakevedos taltioavaimella on arkaluonteista tietoa,\n"
+"joka sallii pääsyn salatulle osiolle ilman salasanaa.\n"
+"Tämä vedos pitäisi aina tallentaa salattuna turvallisessa paikasssa."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:513
+msgid "Result of benchmark is not reliable.\n"
+msgstr "Suorituskykytestin tulos ei ole luotettava.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:554
+msgid "# Tests are approximate using memory only (no storage IO).\n"
+msgstr "# Testit käyttävät vain muistia ylimalkaan (ei tallennussiirtos).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:579 src/cryptsetup.c:601
+msgid "#  Algorithm | Key |  Encryption |  Decryption\n"
+msgstr "#  Algoritmi | Avain |  Salaus |  Salauksen purku\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:583
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cipher %s is not available.\n"
+msgstr "Salaus %s ei ole käytettävissä.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:610
+msgid "N/A"
+msgstr "Ei käytössä"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:635
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read keyfile %s.\n"
+msgstr "Avaintiedoston %s lukeminen epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:639
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read %d bytes from keyfile %s.\n"
+msgstr "Ei voida lukea %d tavua avaintiedostosta %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:668
+msgid "Really try to repair LUKS device header?"
+msgstr "Yritetäänkö todella korjata LUKS-laiteotsake?"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:693
+#, c-format
+msgid "This will overwrite data on %s irrevocably."
+msgstr "Tämä korvaa tiedot kohteella %s peruuttamattomasti."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:695
+msgid "memory allocation error in action_luksFormat"
+msgstr "muistivarausvirhe kohteessa action_luksFormat"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:717
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use %s as on-disk header.\n"
+msgstr "Kohteen %s käyttö paikallisena levyotsakkeena epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:784
+msgid "Reduced data offset is allowed only for detached LUKS header.\n"
+msgstr "Pienennetty tietosiirrososoite sallitaan vain irrotetulle LUKS-otsakkeelle.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:881 src/cryptsetup.c:937
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d selected for deletion.\n"
+msgstr "Avainväli %d valittu poistoa varten.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:884
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key %d not active. Can't wipe.\n"
+msgstr "Avain %d ei ole käytössä. Ei voida pyyhkiä pois.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:892 src/cryptsetup.c:940
+msgid "This is the last keyslot. Device will become unusable after purging this key."
+msgstr "Tämä on viimeinen avainväli. Laite tulee käyttökelvottomaksi tämän avaimen poistamisen jälkeen."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:893
+msgid "Enter any remaining passphrase: "
+msgstr "Kirjoita mikä tahansa jäljellä oleva salasanalause: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:921
+msgid "Enter passphrase to be deleted: "
+msgstr "Kirjoita poistettava salasanalause: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1008 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1095
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter any existing passphrase: "
+msgstr "Kirjoita mikä tahansa olemassa oleva salasanalause: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1063
+msgid "Enter passphrase to be changed: "
+msgstr "Kirjoita vaihdettava salasanalause: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1077 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1080
+msgid "Enter new passphrase: "
+msgstr "Kirjoita uusi salasanalause: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1101
+msgid "Only one device argument for isLuks operation is supported.\n"
+msgstr "Tuetaan vain yhtä laiteargumenttia isLuks-toiminnolle.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1257 src/cryptsetup.c:1278
+msgid "Option --header-backup-file is required.\n"
+msgstr "Vaaditaan valitsin --header-backup-file.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1315
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unrecognized metadata device type %s.\n"
+msgstr "Tunnistamaton metatietolaitetyyppi %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1318
+msgid "Command requires device and mapped name as arguments.\n"
+msgstr "Komento vaatii laitteen ja kuvausnimen argumenttina.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1337
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"This operation will erase all keyslots on device %s.\n"
+"Device will become unusable after this operation."
+msgstr ""
+"Tämä toiminto poistaa kaikki avainvälit laitteesta %s.\n"
+"Laite tulee käyttökelvottomaksi tämän toiminnon jälkeen."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1371
+msgid "<device> [--type <type>] [<name>]"
+msgstr "<laite> [--type <tyyppi>] [<nimi>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1371
+msgid "open device as mapping <name>"
+msgstr "avaa laite kuvauksena <nimi>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1372 src/cryptsetup.c:1373 src/cryptsetup.c:1374
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1375 src/veritysetup.c:311 src/veritysetup.c:312
+msgid "<name>"
+msgstr "<nimi>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1372
+msgid "close device (remove mapping)"
+msgstr "sulje laite (poista kuvaus)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1373
+msgid "resize active device"
+msgstr "muuta käytössä olevan laitteen kokoa"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1374
+msgid "show device status"
+msgstr "näytä laitetila"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1375
+msgid "benchmark cipher"
+msgstr "koestussalaus"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1376 src/cryptsetup.c:1377 src/cryptsetup.c:1383
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1384 src/cryptsetup.c:1385 src/cryptsetup.c:1386
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1387 src/cryptsetup.c:1388 src/cryptsetup.c:1389
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1390
+msgid "<device>"
+msgstr "<laite>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1376
+msgid "try to repair on-disk metadata"
+msgstr "yritä korjata levyn sisäiset metatiedot"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1377
+msgid "erase all keyslots (remove encryption key)"
+msgstr "poista kaikki avainvälit (poista salausavain)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1378 src/cryptsetup.c:1379
+msgid "<device> [<new key file>]"
+msgstr "<laite> [<uusi avaintiedosto>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1378
+msgid "formats a LUKS device"
+msgstr "pohjustaa LUKS-laitteen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1379
+msgid "add key to LUKS device"
+msgstr "lisää avain LUKS-laitteeseen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1380 src/cryptsetup.c:1381
+msgid "<device> [<key file>]"
+msgstr "<laite> [<avaintiedosto>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1380
+msgid "removes supplied key or key file from LUKS device"
+msgstr "poistaa tarjotun avaimen tai avaintiedoston LUKS-laitteesta"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1381
+msgid "changes supplied key or key file of LUKS device"
+msgstr "vaihtaa LUKS-laitteen tarjotun avaimen tai avaintiedoston"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1382
+msgid "<device> <key slot>"
+msgstr "<laite> <avainväli>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1382
+msgid "wipes key with number <key slot> from LUKS device"
+msgstr "pyyhkäisee pois avaimen numerolla <avainväli> LUKS-laitteesta"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1383
+msgid "print UUID of LUKS device"
+msgstr "tulostaa LUKS-laitteen UUID-tunnuksen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1384
+msgid "tests <device> for LUKS partition header"
+msgstr "testaa <laite> LUKS-osio-otsakkeesta"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1385
+msgid "dump LUKS partition information"
+msgstr "vedosta LUKS-osiotiedot"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1386
+msgid "dump TCRYPT device information"
+msgstr "vedosta TCRYPT-laitetiedot"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1387
+msgid "Suspend LUKS device and wipe key (all IOs are frozen)."
+msgstr "Keskeytä LUKS-laite ja pyyhi pois avain (kaikki siirräntäliitännät jäädytetään)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1388
+msgid "Resume suspended LUKS device."
+msgstr "Aloita uudelleen pysäytetty LUKS-laite."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1389
+msgid "Backup LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "Varmuuskopioi LUKS-laiteotsake ja avainvälit"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1390
+msgid "Restore LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "Palauta LUKS-laiteotsake ja avainvälit"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1407 src/veritysetup.c:328
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<action> is one of:\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<toiminto> on yksi seuraavista:\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1413
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"You can also use old <action> syntax aliases:\n"
+"\topen: create (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen\n"
+"\tclose: remove (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tcryptClose\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Voit myös käyttää vanhaa <toiminto>-syntaksialiasta:\n"
+"\topen: luo (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen\n"
+"\tclose: poista (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tcryptClose\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1417
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<device> is the encrypted device\n"
+"<key slot> is the LUKS key slot number to modify\n"
+"<key file> optional key file for the new key for luksAddKey action\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<nimi> on laite, joka luodaan kohteen %s alaisena\n"
+"<laite> on salaussuojattu laite\n"
+"<avainväli> on LUKS-avainväli muokattavaksi\n"
+"<avaintiedosto> valinnainen avaintiedosto uudelle avaimelle luksAddKey-toimintoa varten\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1424
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in key and passphrase parameters:\n"
+"\tMaximum keyfile size: %dkB, Maximum interactive passphrase length %d (characters)\n"
+"Default PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS: %d (ms)\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Käännetyn avaintiedoston ja salasanan oletusparametrit:\n"
+"\tAvaintiedoston enimmäiskoko: %d kilobittiä, vuorovaikutteisen\n"
+"\tsalasanalauseen enimmäispituus %d (merkkiä)\n"
+"PBKDF2-iteroinnin enimmäisaika LUKS-avainvälille: %d (millisekuntia)\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1431
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in device cipher parameters:\n"
+"\tloop-AES: %s, Key %d bits\n"
+"\tplain: %s, Key: %d bits, Password hashing: %s\n"
+"\tLUKS1: %s, Key: %d bits, LUKS header hashing: %s, RNG: %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Käännetyn laitesalakirjoitusmenetelmän oletusparametrit:\n"
+"\tloop-AES: %s, Avain %d bittiä\n"
+"\tplain-tyyppi: %s, Avain: %d bittiä, Salasanatiivistys: %s\n"
+"\tLUKS1: %s, Avain: %d bittiä, LUKS-otsaketiivistys: %s, RNG: %s\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1448 src/veritysetup.c:460
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s: requires %s as arguments"
+msgstr "%s: vaatii %s argumentteina"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1481 src/veritysetup.c:368 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1274
+msgid "Show this help message"
+msgstr "Näytä tämä opastesanoma"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1482 src/veritysetup.c:369 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1275
+msgid "Display brief usage"
+msgstr "Näytä lyhyt käyttöopaste"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1486 src/veritysetup.c:373 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1279
+msgid "Help options:"
+msgstr "Opastevalitsimet:"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1487 src/veritysetup.c:374 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1280
+msgid "Print package version"
+msgstr "Tulosta pakkausversio"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1488 src/veritysetup.c:375 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1281
+msgid "Shows more detailed error messages"
+msgstr "Näyttää yksityiskohtaisemmat virheilmoitukset"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1489 src/veritysetup.c:376 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1282
+msgid "Show debug messages"
+msgstr "Näytä vianjäljityssanomat"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1490 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1284
+msgid "The cipher used to encrypt the disk (see /proc/crypto)"
+msgstr "Salakirjoitusmenetelmä, jota käytetään salaamaan levy (katso /proc/crypto)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1491 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1286
+msgid "The hash used to create the encryption key from the passphrase"
+msgstr "Tiivisteavain, jota käytetään salausavaimen luomiseen salasanalauseesta"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1492
+msgid "Verifies the passphrase by asking for it twice"
+msgstr "Todentaa salasanalauseen kysymällä kahdesti"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1493 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1288
+msgid "Read the key from a file."
+msgstr "Lue avain tiedostosta."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1494
+msgid "Read the volume (master) key from file."
+msgstr "Lue taltion (pää)avain tiedostosta."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1495
+msgid "Dump volume (master) key instead of keyslots info."
+msgstr "Vedosta taltion (pää)avain eikä avainvälien tiedot."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1496 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1285
+msgid "The size of the encryption key"
+msgstr "Salausavaimen koko"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1496 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1285
+msgid "BITS"
+msgstr "BITTIÄ"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1497 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1299
+msgid "Limits the read from keyfile"
+msgstr "Avaintiedostosta luettavat rajat"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1497 src/cryptsetup.c:1498 src/cryptsetup.c:1499
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1500 src/veritysetup.c:379 src/veritysetup.c:380
+#: src/veritysetup.c:382 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1298
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1299 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1300
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1301
+msgid "bytes"
+msgstr "tavua"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1498 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1298
+msgid "Number of bytes to skip in keyfile"
+msgstr "Avaintiedostossa ohitettavien tavujen määrä"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1499
+msgid "Limits the read from newly added keyfile"
+msgstr "Äskettäin lisätystä avaintiedostosta luetut rajat"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1500
+msgid "Number of bytes to skip in newly added keyfile"
+msgstr "Ohitettu tavumäärä äskettäin lisätyssä avaintiedostossa"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1501
+msgid "Slot number for new key (default is first free)"
+msgstr "Välinumero uudelle avaimelle (oletus on ensimmäinen vapaa)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1502
+msgid "The size of the device"
+msgstr "Laitteen koko"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1502 src/cryptsetup.c:1503 src/cryptsetup.c:1504
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1510
+msgid "SECTORS"
+msgstr "SEKTORIA"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1503
+msgid "The start offset in the backend device"
+msgstr "Alkusiirrososoite taustalaitteessa"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1504
+msgid "How many sectors of the encrypted data to skip at the beginning"
+msgstr "Kuinka monta salaustietojen sektoria ohitetaan alussa"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1505
+msgid "Create a readonly mapping"
+msgstr "Luo kirjoitussuojattu kuvaus"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1506 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1289
+msgid "PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS (in ms)"
+msgstr "PBKDF2-iterointiaika kohteelle LUKS (millisekunneissa)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1506 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1289
+msgid "msecs"
+msgstr "ms"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1507 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1290
+msgid "Do not ask for confirmation"
+msgstr "Älä pyydä vahvistusta"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1508
+msgid "Timeout for interactive passphrase prompt (in seconds)"
+msgstr "Aikakatkaisu vuorovaikutteiselle salasanalausekyselylle (sekunteina)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1508
+msgid "secs"
+msgstr "s"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1509 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1291
+msgid "How often the input of the passphrase can be retried"
+msgstr "Kuinka usein salasanasyötettä voidaan yrittää uudelleen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1510
+msgid "Align payload at <n> sector boundaries - for luksFormat"
+msgstr "Tasaa tietosisältö osoitteessa <n> sektorirajoihin - kohdetta luksFormat varten"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1511
+msgid "File with LUKS header and keyslots backup."
+msgstr "Tiedosto LUKS-otsakkeella ja avainvälien varmuuskopiolla."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1512 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1292
+msgid "Use /dev/random for generating volume key."
+msgstr "Käytä /dev/random taltioavaimen synnyttämiseen."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1513 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1293
+msgid "Use /dev/urandom for generating volume key."
+msgstr "Käytä /dev/urandom taltioavaimen synnyttämiseen."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1514
+msgid "Share device with another non-overlapping crypt segment."
+msgstr "Jaa laite toisen ei-päällekkäisen salaussegmentin kanssa."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1515 src/veritysetup.c:385
+msgid "UUID for device to use."
+msgstr "UUID laitteelle käytettäväksi."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1516
+msgid "Allow discards (aka TRIM) requests for device."
+msgstr "Salli hylkäys(lempinimeltään TRIM)-pyynnöt laitteelle."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1517
+msgid "Device or file with separated LUKS header."
+msgstr "Laite tai tiedosto erillisellä LUKS-otsakkeella."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1518
+msgid "Do not activate device, just check passphrase."
+msgstr "Älä aktivoi laitetta, tarkista vain salasanalauseke."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1519
+msgid "Use hidden header (hidden TCRYPT device)."
+msgstr "Käytä piilotettua otsaketta (piilotettu TCRYPT-laite)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1520
+msgid "Device is system TCRYPT drive (with bootloader)."
+msgstr "Laite on järjestelmä-TCRYPT-levyasema (alkulatausohjelmalla)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1521
+msgid "Use backup (secondary) TCRYPT header."
+msgstr "Käytä (toissijaista) TCRYPT-varmuuskopio-otsaketta."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1522
+msgid "Scan also for VeraCrypt compatible device."
+msgstr "Tutkinta myös VeraCrypt-yhteensopivalle laitteelle."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1523
+msgid "Type of device metadata: luks, plain, loopaes, tcrypt."
+msgstr "Laitemetatietojen tyyppi: luks, plain, loopaes, tcrypt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1524
+msgid "Disable password quality check (if enabled)."
+msgstr "Ota pois käytöstä salasanan laatutarkistus (jos käytössä)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1525
+msgid "Use dm-crypt same_cpu_crypt performance compatibility option."
+msgstr "Käytä dm-crypt same_cpu_crypt-suorituskyky-yhteensopivuusvalitsinta."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1526
+msgid "Use dm-crypt submit_from_crypt_cpus performance compatibility option."
+msgstr "Käytä dm-crypt submit_from_crypt_cpus-suorituskyky-yhteensopivuusvalitsinta."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1542 src/veritysetup.c:402
+msgid "[OPTION...] <action> <action-specific>"
+msgstr "[VALITSIN...] <toiminto> <toimintokohtainen>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1589 src/veritysetup.c:439
+msgid "Argument <action> missing."
+msgstr "Argumentti <toiminto> puuttuu."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1642 src/veritysetup.c:445
+msgid "Unknown action."
+msgstr "Tuntematon toiminto."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1652
+msgid "Option --shared is allowed only for open of plain device.\n"
+msgstr "Valitsin --shared sallitaan vain pelkän laitteen avaukseen.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1657
+msgid "Option --allow-discards is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "Valitsin --allow-discards sallitaan vain open-toiminnolle.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1665
+msgid ""
+"Option --key-size is allowed only for luksFormat, open and benchmark.\n"
+"To limit read from keyfile use --keyfile-size=(bytes)."
+msgstr ""
+"Valitsin --key-size sallitaan vain muodoille luksFormat, open ja benchmark.\n"
+"Käytä avaintiedostosta lukemisen rajoittamiseksi valitsinta --keyfile-size=(tavua)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1672
+msgid "Option --test-passphrase is allowed only for open of LUKS and TCRYPT devices.\n"
+msgstr "Valitsin --test-passphrase sallitaan vain LUKS- ja TCRYPT-laitteiden avaamiseen.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1677 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1360
+msgid "Key size must be a multiple of 8 bits"
+msgstr "Avainkoon on oltava 8-bitin monikerta"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1684 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1365
+msgid "Key slot is invalid."
+msgstr "Avainväli on virheellinen."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1691
+msgid "Option --key-file takes precedence over specified key file argument.\n"
+msgstr "Valitsin --key-file on ensisijainen määritellylle avaintiedostoargumentille.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1699 src/veritysetup.c:467 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1349
+msgid "Negative number for option not permitted."
+msgstr "Valitsimelle ei sallita negatiivista numeroa."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1703 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1343
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1369
+msgid "Only one of --use-[u]random options is allowed."
+msgstr "Vain yksi --use-[u]random -valitsin on sallittu."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1707
+msgid "Option --use-[u]random is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgstr "Valitsin --use-[u]random sallitaan vain luksFormat-muodolle."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1711
+msgid "Option --uuid is allowed only for luksFormat and luksUUID."
+msgstr "Valitsin --uuid sallitaan vain luksFormat-muodolle ja luksUUID-muodolle."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1715
+msgid "Option --align-payload is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgstr "Valitsin --align-payload sallitaan vain luksFormat-muodolle."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1721
+msgid "Option --skip is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices.\n"
+msgstr "Valitsinta --skip tuetaan vain plain- ja loopaes-laitteiden avaamiseen.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1727
+msgid "Option --offset is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices.\n"
+msgstr "Valitsinta --offset tuetaan vain plain- ja loopaes-laitteiden avaamiseen.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1733
+msgid "Option --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system or --tcrypt-backup is supported only for TCRYPT device.\n"
+msgstr "Valitsinta --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system tai --tcrypt-backup tuetaan vain TCRYPT-laiteeelle.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1738
+msgid "Option --tcrypt-hidden cannot be combined with --allow-discards.\n"
+msgstr "Valitsinta --tcrypt-hidden ei voida yhdistää valitsimeen --allow-discards.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1743
+msgid "Option --veracrypt is supported only for TCRYPT device type.\n"
+msgstr "Valitsinta --veracrypt tuetaan vain TCRYPT-laiteeelle.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:58
+msgid "Invalid salt string specified.\n"
+msgstr "Määritelty virheellinen satunnaisarvosiemenmerkkijono.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:88
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create hash image %s for writing.\n"
+msgstr "Tiivistevedoksen %s luominen kirjoittamista varten epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:148
+msgid "Invalid root hash string specified.\n"
+msgstr "Virheellinen root-tiivistemerkkijono määritelty.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:308
+msgid "<data_device> <hash_device>"
+msgstr "<data_laite> <tiiviste_laite>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:308
+msgid "format device"
+msgstr "pohjusta laite"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:309
+msgid "<data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgstr "<data_laite> <tiiviste_laite> <root_tiiviste>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:309
+msgid "verify device"
+msgstr "todenna laite"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:310
+msgid "<name> <data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgstr "<nimi> <data_laite> <tiiviste_laite> <root_tiiviste>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:310
+msgid "create active device"
+msgstr "luo aktiivilaite"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:311
+msgid "remove (deactivate) device"
+msgstr "poista (deaktivoi) laite"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:312
+msgid "show active device status"
+msgstr "näytä aktiivilaitteen tila"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:313
+msgid "<hash_device>"
+msgstr "<tiiviste_laite>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:313
+msgid "show on-disk information"
+msgstr "näytä paikallisen levyn tiedot"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:332
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<data_device> is the data device\n"
+"<hash_device> is the device containing verification data\n"
+"<root_hash> hash of the root node on <hash_device>\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<nimi> on kohteen alle %s luotava laite\n"
+"<data_laite> on datalaite\n"
+"<tiiviste_laite> on todennusdataa sisältävä laite\n"
+"<root_tiiviste> root-solmun tiiviste kohteella <tiiviste_laite>\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:339
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in dm-verity parameters:\n"
+"\tHash: %s, Data block (bytes): %u, Hash block (bytes): %u, Salt size: %u, Hash format: %u\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Käännetyt dm-verity oletusparametrit:\n"
+"\tTiiviste: %s, Data-lohko (tavua): %u, Tiivistelohko (tavua): %u, Satunnaislukuarvosiemenen koko: %u, Tiivistemuoto: %u\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:377
+msgid "Do not use verity superblock"
+msgstr "Älä käytä verity-superlohkoa"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:378
+msgid "Format type (1 - normal, 0 - original Chrome OS)"
+msgstr "Muototyyppi (1 - normaali, 0 - alkuperäinen Chrome OS)"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:378
+msgid "number"
+msgstr "numero"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:379
+msgid "Block size on the data device"
+msgstr "Data-laitteen lohkokoko"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:380
+msgid "Block size on the hash device"
+msgstr "Tiivistelaitteen lohkokoko"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:381
+msgid "The number of blocks in the data file"
+msgstr "Data-tiedoston lohkojen määrä"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:381
+msgid "blocks"
+msgstr "lohkoa"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:382
+msgid "Starting offset on the hash device"
+msgstr "Tiivistelaitteen alkusiirrososoite"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:383
+msgid "Hash algorithm"
+msgstr "Tiivistealgoritmi"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:383
+msgid "string"
+msgstr "merkkijono"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:384
+msgid "Salt"
+msgstr "Satunnaisarvosiemenluku"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:384
+msgid "hex string"
+msgstr "heksadesimaalimerkkijono"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:147
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot exclusively open %s, device in use.\n"
+msgstr "Kohteen %s avaaminen eksklusiivisesti epäonnistui, laite on käytössä.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:151
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open device %s\n"
+msgstr "Laitteen %s avaus epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:161 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:914
+msgid "Allocation of aligned memory failed.\n"
+msgstr "Tasatun muistin varaaminen epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:168
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Laitteen %s lukeminen epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:179
+#, c-format
+msgid "Marking LUKS device %s unusable.\n"
+msgstr "Merkitään LUKS-laite %s käyttökelvottomaksi.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:184
+#, c-format
+msgid "Marking LUKS device %s usable.\n"
+msgstr "Merkitään LUKS-laite %s käyttökelpoiseksi.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:200
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Laitteelle %s kirjoittaminen epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:281
+msgid "Cannot write reencryption log file.\n"
+msgstr "Uudelleensalauslokitiedoston kirjoittaminen epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:337
+msgid "Cannot read reencryption log file.\n"
+msgstr "Uudelleensalauslokitiedoston lukeminen epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:374
+#, c-format
+msgid "Log file %s exists, resuming reencryption.\n"
+msgstr "Lokitiedosto %s on olemassa, aloitetaan salaus uudelleen.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:424
+msgid "Activating temporary device using old LUKS header.\n"
+msgstr "Aktivoidaan tilapäinen laite käyttäen vanhaa LUKS-otsaketta.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:435
+msgid "Activating temporary device using new LUKS header.\n"
+msgstr "Aktivoidaan tilapäinen laite käyttäen uutta LUKS-otsaketta.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:445
+msgid "Activation of temporary devices failed.\n"
+msgstr "Tilapäisten laitteiden aktivoiminen epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:471
+#, c-format
+msgid "New LUKS header for device %s created.\n"
+msgstr "Luotiin uusi LUKS-otsake laitteelle %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:479
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activated keyslot %i.\n"
+msgstr "Aktivoitiin avainväli %i.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:505
+#, c-format
+msgid "LUKS header backup of device %s created.\n"
+msgstr "Laitteen %s LUKS-otsakkeen varmuuskopio luotu.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:553
+msgid "Creation of LUKS backup headers failed.\n"
+msgstr "LUKS-varmuuskopio-otsakkeiden luominen epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:655
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot restore LUKS header on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "LUKS-otsakkeen palautus laitteeseen %s epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:657
+#, c-format
+msgid "LUKS header on device %s restored.\n"
+msgstr "LUKS-otsake palautettu laitteessa %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:690
+#, c-format
+msgid "Progress: %5.1f%%, ETA %02llu:%02llu, %4llu MiB written, speed %5.1f MiB/s%s"
+msgstr "Eteneminen: %5.1f%%, ETA %02llu:%02llu, %4llu Mebitavua kirjoitettu, nopeus %5.1f Mebitavua/s%s"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:729 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:805
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:847
+msgid "Cannot seek to device offset.\n"
+msgstr "Laitteen siirrososoitteen etsintä epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:886 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:892
+msgid "Cannot open temporary LUKS device.\n"
+msgstr "Tilapäisen LUKS-laitteen avaaminen epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:897 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:902
+msgid "Cannot get device size.\n"
+msgstr "Laitekoon hakeminen epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:940
+msgid "Interrupted by a signal.\n"
+msgstr "Signaalin keskeyttämä.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:942
+msgid "IO error during reencryption.\n"
+msgstr "Siirräntävirhe uudelleensalauksen aikana.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1049
+msgid "Key file can be used only with --key-slot or with exactly one key slot active.\n"
+msgstr "Avaintiedostoa voidaan käyttää vain valitsimen --key-slot kanssa tai täsmälleen yhden avainvälin ollessa aktiivisena.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1093 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1108
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for key slot %u: "
+msgstr "Kirjoita salasanalause avainvälille %u: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1157
+msgid "Cannot open reencryption log file.\n"
+msgstr "Uudelleensalauslokitiedoston avaus epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1283
+msgid "Reencryption block size"
+msgstr "Uudelleensalauslohkon koko"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1283
+msgid "MiB"
+msgstr "Mebitavua"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1287
+msgid "Do not change key, no data area reencryption."
+msgstr "Älä vaihda avainta, yhtään data-aluetta ei ole salattu uudelleen."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1294
+msgid "Use direct-io when accessing devices."
+msgstr "Käytä direct-io -siirräntää laitteisiin yhdistettäessä."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1295
+msgid "Use fsync after each block."
+msgstr "Käytä fsync-komentoa jokaisen lohkon jälkeen."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1296
+msgid "Update log file after every block."
+msgstr "Päivitä lokitiedosto jokaisen lohkon jälkeen."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1297
+msgid "Use only this slot (others will be disabled)."
+msgstr "Käytä vain tätä väliä (muut ovat pois käytöstä)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1300
+msgid "Reduce data device size (move data offset). DANGEROUS!"
+msgstr "Pienennä datalaitekokoa (siirrä datasiirrososoitetta). VAARALLINEN!"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1301
+msgid "Use only specified device size (ignore rest of device). DANGEROUS!"
+msgstr "Käytä vain määriteltyä laitekokoa (ohita laitteen loppu). VAARALLINEN!"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1302
+msgid "Create new header on not encrypted device."
+msgstr "Luo uusi otsake ei-salattuun laitteeseen."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1303
+msgid "Permanently decrypt device (remove encryption)."
+msgstr "Poista laitteen salaus pysyvästi (poista salaus)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1319
+msgid "[OPTION...] <device>"
+msgstr "[VALITSIN...] <laite>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1333
+#, c-format
+msgid "Reencryption will change: volume key%s%s%s%s.\n"
+msgstr "Uudelleensalauas muuttuu: taltio key%s%s%s%s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1334
+msgid ", set hash to "
+msgstr ", aseta tiivisteeksi "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1335
+msgid ", set cipher to "
+msgstr ", aseta salaukseksi "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1339
+msgid "Argument required."
+msgstr "Argumentti vaadittu."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1355
+msgid "Only values between 1 MiB and 64 MiB allowed for reencryption block size."
+msgstr "Vain arvot välillä 1 mebitavua ja 64 mebitavua ovat sallittuja uudelleensalauslohkokokoja."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1374 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1379
+msgid "Invalid device size specification."
+msgstr "Virheellinen laitekokomäärittely."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1382
+msgid "Maximum device reduce size is 64 MiB."
+msgstr "Maksimi laitepienennyskoko on 64 mebitavua."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1385
+msgid "Reduce size must be multiple of 512 bytes sector."
+msgstr "Pienennyskoon on oltava 512-tavuisen sektorin monikerta."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1389
+msgid "Option --new must be used together with --reduce-device-size."
+msgstr "Valitsinta --new on käytettävä yhdessä valitsimen --reduce-device-size kanssa."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1393
+msgid "Option --keep-key can be used only with --hash or --iter-time."
+msgstr "Valitsinta --keep-key voidaan käyttää vain valitsimen --hash tai --iter-time kanssa."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1397
+msgid "Option --new cannot be used together with --decrypt."
+msgstr "Valitsinta --new ei voi käytttää yhdessä valitsimen --decrypt kanssa."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1401
+msgid "Option --decrypt is incompatible with specified parameters."
+msgstr "Valitsin --decrypt on yhteensopimaton määriteltyjen parametrien kanssa."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:151
+msgid "Error reading response from terminal.\n"
+msgstr "Virhe luettaessa vastausta pääteikkunasta.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:173
+msgid "Command successful.\n"
+msgstr "Komento onnistui.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:191
+#, c-format
+msgid "Command failed with code %i"
+msgstr "Komento epäonnistui koodilla %i"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:42 src/utils_password.c:74
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot check password quality: %s\n"
+msgstr "Salasanan laatutarkistus epäonnistui: %s\n"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:50
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Password quality check failed:\n"
+" %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Salasanan laatutarkistus epäonnistui:\n"
+" %s\n"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:82
+#, c-format
+msgid "Password quality check failed: Bad passphrase (%s)\n"
+msgstr "Salasanan laatutarkistus epäonnistui: Virheellinen salasana (%s)\n"
+
+#~ msgid "WARNING: this is experimental code, it can completely break your data.\n"
+#~ msgstr "VAROITUS: tämä on kokeellista koodia, se voi rikkoa tietosi kokonaan.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "FIPS checksum verification failed.\n"
+#~ msgstr "FIPS-tarkistussummavarmennus epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "WARNING: device %s is a partition, for TCRYPT system encryption you usually need to use whole block device path.\n"
+#~ msgstr "VAROITUS: laite %s on osio, TCRYPT-järjestelmäsalaukselle tarvitaan normaalisti koko lohkolaitepolun käyttö.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Kernel doesn't support plain64 IV.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Käyttöjärjestelmäydin ei tule plain64 IV.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Enter LUKS passphrase: "
+#~ msgstr "Kirjoita LUKS-salasanalause: "
+
+#~ msgid "Enter new LUKS passphrase: "
+#~ msgstr "Kirjoita uusi LUKS-salasanalause: "
+
+#~ msgid "Enter any LUKS passphrase: "
+#~ msgstr "Kirjoita mikä tahansa LUKS-salasanalause: "
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot check passsword quality: %s\n"
+#~ msgstr "Salasanan laatutarkistus epäonnistui: %s\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Failed to obtain device mapper directory."
+#~ msgstr "Laitekuvaajahakemiston hankkiminen epäonnistui."
+
+#~ msgid "Backup file %s doesn't exist.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Varmuuskopiotiedostoa %s ei ole olemassa.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot open file %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Tiedoston %s avaus epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "<name> <device>"
+#~ msgstr "<nimi> <laite>"
+
+#~ msgid "create device"
+#~ msgstr "luo laite"
+
+#~ msgid "remove device"
+#~ msgstr "poista laite"
+
+#~ msgid "remove LUKS mapping"
+#~ msgstr "poista LUKS-kuvaus"
+
+#~ msgid "open loop-AES device as mapping <name>"
+#~ msgstr "avaa loop-AES -laitteen kuvauksena <nimi>"
+
+#~ msgid "remove loop-AES mapping"
+#~ msgstr "poista loop-AES -kuvaus"
+
+#~ msgid "Option --allow-discards is allowed only for luksOpen, loopaesOpen and create operation.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Valitsin --allow-discards sallitaan vain luksOpen-, loopaesOpen- ja create-toiminnoille .\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot open device %s for %s%s access.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Ei voida avata laitetta %s kohteeseen %s%s pääsyä varten.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "exclusive "
+#~ msgstr "yksinomainen "
+
+#~ msgid "writable"
+#~ msgstr "kirjoitettava"
+
+#~ msgid "read-only"
+#~ msgstr "kirjoitussuojattu"
+
+#~ msgid "WARNING!!! Possibly insecure memory. Are you root?\n"
+#~ msgstr "VAROITUS!!! Mahdollisesti turvaton muisti. Oletko pääkäyttäjä?\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Unable to obtain sector size for %s"
+#~ msgstr "Ei kyetä samaan sektorikokoa kohteelle %s"
+
+#~ msgid "Failed to write to key storage.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Avainsäiliöön kirjoittaminen epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Failed to read from key storage.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Avainsäiliöstä lukeminen epäonnistui.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot use device %s (crypt segments overlaps or in use by another device).\n"
+#~ msgstr "Ei voida käyttää laitetta %s (salatut segmentit ovat päällekkäin tai toisen laitteen käyttämiä).\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Key slot %d verified.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Avainväli %d on todennettu.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Invalid key size %d.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Virheellinen avainkoko %d.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Block mode XTS is available since kernel 2.6.24.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Lohkotila XTS on käytetettävissä käyttöjärjestelmäytimestä 2.6.24 alkaen.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Key size in LRW mode must be 256 or 512 bits.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Avainkoon on oltava LRW-tilassa 256 tai 512 bittiä.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Block mode LRW is available since kernel 2.6.20.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Lohkotila LRW on käytettävissä käyttöjärjestelmäytimestä 2.6.20 alkaen.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Negative keyfile size not permitted.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Negatiivinen avaintiedostokoko ei ole sallittu.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Warning: exhausting read requested, but key file is not a regular file, function might never return.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Varoitus: uuvuttava luku pyydetty, mutta avaintiedosto ei ole tavallinen tiedosto, funktio ei ehkä koskaan palaa.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot find compatible device-mapper kernel modules.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Ei voida löytää yhteensopivia laitekuvaimen käyttöjärjestelmäydinmoduuleja.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot open device: %s\n"
+#~ msgstr "Ei voida avata laitetta: %s\n"
+
+#~ msgid "BLKROGET failed on device %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "BLKROGET epäonnistui laitteessa %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "BLKGETSIZE failed on device %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "BLKGETSIZE epäonnistui laitteessa %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "identical to luksKillSlot - DEPRECATED - see man page"
+#~ msgstr "identtinen kohteelle luksKillSlot - VANHENTUNUT - katso man-sivua"
+
+#~ msgid "modify active device - DEPRECATED - see man page"
+#~ msgstr "muokkaa aktiivista laitetta - VANHENTUNUT - katso man-sivua"
+
+#~ msgid ""
+#~ "The reload action is deprecated. Please use \"dmsetup reload\" in case you really need this functionality.\n"
+#~ "WARNING: do not use reload to touch LUKS devices. If that is the case, hit Ctrl-C now.\n"
+#~ msgstr ""
+#~ "Uudelleenlataustoiminto on vanhentunut. Käytä ”dmsetup reload” siinä tapauksessa, että todella tarvitset tätä toiminnallisuutta.\n"
+#~ "VAROITUS: älä käytä uudelleenlatausta koskettamaan LUKS-laitteita. Jos näin on laita, paina nyt näppäimiä Ctrl-C.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Obsolete option --non-exclusive is ignored.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Vanhentunut valitsin --non-exclusive ohitetaan.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Read the key from a file (can be /dev/random)"
+#~ msgstr "Lue avain tiedostosta (voi olla /dev/random)"
+
+#~ msgid "(Obsoleted, see man page.)"
+#~ msgstr "(Vanhentunut, katso man-sivu.)"
+
+#~ msgid "%s is not LUKS device.\n"
+#~ msgstr "%s ei ole LUKS-laite.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "%s is not LUKS device."
+#~ msgstr "%s ei ole LUKS-laite."
+
+#~ msgid "Unknown crypto device type %s requesed.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Tuntematon salauslaitetyyppi %s pyydetty.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Limits to read from keyfile"
+#~ msgstr "Avaintiedostosta luettavat rajat"
diff --git a/po/fr.po b/po/fr.po
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7091c3e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/po/fr.po
@@ -0,0 +1,3300 @@
+# Messages français pour cryptsetup.
+# Copyright (C) 2019 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+# This file is put in the public domain.
+#
+# Solveig <perso@solveig.org>, 2009.
+# Nicolas Provost <nprovost@quadriv.com>, 2011.
+# Frédéric Marchal <fmarchal@perso.be>, 2019.
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: cryptsetup 2.1.0\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: dm-crypt@saout.de\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-01-26 19:02+0100\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2019-01-29 08:29+0100\n"
+"Last-Translator: Frédéric Marchal <fmarchal@perso.be>\n"
+"Language-Team: French <traduc@traduc.org>\n"
+"Language: fr\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+"X-Bugs: Report translation errors to the Language-Team address.\n"
+"Plural-Forms: nplurals=2; plural=(n >= 2);\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:336
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper, running as non-root user."
+msgstr "Impossible d'initialiser le gestionnaire « device-mapper ». Exécution comme un utilisateur non-root."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:339
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper. Is dm_mod kernel module loaded?"
+msgstr "Impossible d'initialiser le gestionnaire « device-mapper ». Le module noyau dm_mod est-il chargé ?"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1010
+msgid "Requested deferred flag is not supported."
+msgstr "Le fanion différé demandé n'est pas supporté."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1077
+#, c-format
+msgid "DM-UUID for device %s was truncated."
+msgstr "Le DM-UUID du périphérique %s a été tronqué."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1486
+msgid "Requested dm-crypt performance options are not supported."
+msgstr "Les options de performance dm-crypt demandées ne sont pas supportées."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1493
+msgid "Requested dm-verity data corruption handling options are not supported."
+msgstr "Les options demandées de gestion de corruption des données dm-verity ne sont pas supportées."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1497
+msgid "Requested dm-verity FEC options are not supported."
+msgstr "Les options dm-verity FEC demandées ne sont pas supportées."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1501
+msgid "Requested data integrity options are not supported."
+msgstr "Les options d'intégrité de données demandées ne sont pas supportées."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1503
+msgid "Requested sector_size option is not supported."
+msgstr "L'option sector_size demandée n'est pas supportée."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1508
+msgid "Requested automatic recalculation of integrity tags is not supported."
+msgstr "Le recalcule automatique des balises de sécurité demandés n'est pas supporté."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1534
+msgid "Requested dmcrypt performance options are not supported."
+msgstr "Les options de performance dmcrypt demandées ne sont pas supportées."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1537
+msgid "Discard/TRIM is not supported."
+msgstr "Discard/TRIM n'est pas supporté."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:2413
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to query dm-%s segment."
+msgstr "Échec lors de l'interrogation du segment dm-%s."
+
+#: lib/random.c:80
+msgid ""
+"System is out of entropy while generating volume key.\n"
+"Please move mouse or type some text in another window to gather some random events.\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Le système a manqué d'entropie lors de la génération de la clef de volume.\n"
+"Veuillez remuer la souris ou taper du texte dans une autre fenêtre pour générer des événements aléatoires.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:84
+#, c-format
+msgid "Generating key (%d%% done).\n"
+msgstr "Génération de la clef (%d%% effectués).\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:170
+msgid "Running in FIPS mode."
+msgstr "Fonctionne en mode FIPS."
+
+#: lib/random.c:176
+msgid "Fatal error during RNG initialisation."
+msgstr "Erreur fatale d'initialisation RNG."
+
+#: lib/random.c:213
+msgid "Unknown RNG quality requested."
+msgstr "La qualité du générateur aléatoire RNG demandé est inconnue."
+
+#: lib/random.c:218
+msgid "Error reading from RNG."
+msgstr "Erreur en lecture du générateur aléatoire RNG "
+
+#: lib/setup.c:214
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto RNG backend."
+msgstr "Impossible d'initialiser le moteur aléatoire RNG pour le chiffrement."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:220
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto backend."
+msgstr "Impossible d'initialiser le moteur de chiffrement."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:251 lib/setup.c:1899 lib/verity/verity.c:123
+#, c-format
+msgid "Hash algorithm %s not supported."
+msgstr "L'algorithme de hachage %s n'est pas supporté."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:254 lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:90
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key processing error (using hash %s)."
+msgstr "Erreur de traitement de clé (valeur hachage %s)."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:315 lib/setup.c:342
+msgid "Cannot determine device type. Incompatible activation of device?"
+msgstr "Impossible de déterminer le type de périphérique. Activation du périphérique incompatible ?"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:321 lib/setup.c:2892
+msgid "This operation is supported only for LUKS device."
+msgstr "Cette opération n'est possible que pour les périphériques LUKS."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:348
+msgid "This operation is supported only for LUKS2 device."
+msgstr "Cette opération n'est possible que pour les périphériques LUKS2."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:396
+msgid "All key slots full."
+msgstr "Tous les emplacements de clés sont utilisés."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:407
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select between 0 and %d."
+msgstr "L'emplacement de clé %d n'est pas valide, merci d'en choisir un entre 0 et %d."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:413
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is full, please select another one."
+msgstr "L'emplacement de clé %d est utilisé, merci d'en sélectionner un autre."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:589
+#, c-format
+msgid "Header detected but device %s is too small."
+msgstr "En-tête détecté mais le périphérique %s est trop petit."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:626
+msgid "This operation is not supported for this device type."
+msgstr "Cette opération n'est pas supportée pour ce type de périphérique."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:791 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:481
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported LUKS version %d."
+msgstr "La version %d de LUKS n'est pas supportée."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:808 lib/setup.c:1403 lib/setup.c:1812
+msgid "Detached metadata device is not supported for this crypt type."
+msgstr "Un périphérique avec des métadonnées détachées n'est pas supporté avec ce type de chiffrement."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1288 lib/setup.c:2392 lib/setup.c:2464 lib/setup.c:2476
+#: lib/setup.c:2625 lib/setup.c:4021
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not active."
+msgstr "Le périphérique %s n'est pas activé."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1310
+#, c-format
+msgid "Underlying device for crypt device %s disappeared."
+msgstr "Le périphérique sous-jacent pour le périphérique chiffré %s a disparu."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1388
+msgid "Invalid plain crypt parameters."
+msgstr "Paramètres de chiffrement non valides."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1393 lib/setup.c:1802 src/integritysetup.c:72
+msgid "Invalid key size."
+msgstr "La taille de la clé n'est pas valide."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1398 lib/setup.c:1807 lib/setup.c:2009
+msgid "UUID is not supported for this crypt type."
+msgstr "le UUID n'est pas supporté avec ce type de chiffrement."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1413 lib/setup.c:1603 src/cryptsetup.c:1045
+msgid "Unsupported encryption sector size."
+msgstr "Taille de secteur de chiffrement non supportée."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1421 lib/setup.c:1720
+msgid "Device size is not aligned to requested sector size."
+msgstr "La taille du périphérique n'est pas alignée avec la taille de secteur demandée."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1472 lib/setup.c:1591
+msgid "Can't format LUKS without device."
+msgstr "Impossible de formater en LUKS sans périphérique."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1478 lib/setup.c:1597
+msgid "Requested data alignment is not compatible with data offset."
+msgstr "L'alignement de données demandé n'est pas compatible avec le décalage des données."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1546 lib/setup.c:1715
+msgid "WARNING: Data offset is outside of currently available data device.\n"
+msgstr "AVERTISSEMENT: L'offset des données est en dehors du périphérique de données actuellement disponible.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1556 lib/setup.c:1735 lib/setup.c:1754 lib/setup.c:2021
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe header on device %s."
+msgstr "Impossible d'effacer l'en-tête du périphérique %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1608
+msgid "WARNING: The device activation will fail, dm-crypt is missing support for requested encryption sector size.\n"
+msgstr "AVERTISSEMENT: L'activation du périphérique va échouer, dm-crypt ne supporte pas la taille de secteur de chiffrement demandée.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1630
+msgid "Volume key is too small for encryption with integrity extensions."
+msgstr "La clé de volume est trop petite pour chiffrer avec les extensions d'intégrité."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1685
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cipher %s-%s (key size %zd bits) is not available."
+msgstr "Le chiffrement %s-%s (clé de %zd bits) n'est pas disponible."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1747
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s which is still in use."
+msgstr "Impossible de formater le périphérique %s qui est déjà en cours d'utilisation."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1750 lib/setup.c:1775
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "Impossible de formater le périphérique %s. Permission refusée."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1762 lib/setup.c:2073
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format integrity for device %s."
+msgstr "Impossible de formater l'intégrité du périphérique %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1772
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s in use."
+msgstr "Impossible de formater le périphérique %s qui est en cours d'utilisation."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1779
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s."
+msgstr "Impossible de formater le périphérique %s"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1797
+msgid "Can't format LOOPAES without device."
+msgstr "Impossible de formater LOOPAES sans périphérique."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1842
+msgid "Can't format VERITY without device."
+msgstr "Impossible de formater VERITY sans périphérique."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1853 lib/verity/verity.c:106
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash type %d."
+msgstr "Type de hachage VERITY %d non supporté."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1859 lib/verity/verity.c:114
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY block size."
+msgstr "Taille de bloc VERITY non supportée."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1864 lib/verity/verity.c:75
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash offset."
+msgstr "Décalage de hachage VERITY non supporté."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1869
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY FEC offset."
+msgstr "Décalage VERITY FEC non supporté."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1893
+msgid "Data area overlaps with hash area."
+msgstr "La zone de données recouvre la zone de hachage."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1918
+msgid "Hash area overlaps with FEC area."
+msgstr "La zone de hachage recouvre la zone FEC."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1925
+msgid "Data area overlaps with FEC area."
+msgstr "La zone de données recouvre la zone FEC."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2130
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unknown crypt device type %s requested."
+msgstr "Type de chiffrement de périphérique demandé (%s) inconnu."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2398 lib/setup.c:2470 lib/setup.c:2483
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported parameters on device %s."
+msgstr "Paramètres non supportés sur le périphérique %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2404 lib/setup.c:2489
+#, c-format
+msgid "Mismatching parameters on device %s."
+msgstr "Paramètres non concordants sur le périphérique %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2657
+msgid "Cannot resize loop device."
+msgstr "Impossible de redimensionner le périphérique loopback."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2666
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s size is not aligned to requested sector size (%u bytes)."
+msgstr "La taille du périphérique %s n'est pas alignée avec la taille de secteur demandée (%u octets)"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2725
+msgid "Do you really want to change UUID of device?"
+msgstr "Voulez vous réellement changer l'UUID du périphérique ?"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2801
+msgid "Header backup file does not contain compatible LUKS header."
+msgstr "Le fichier de sauvegarde de l'en-tête ne contient pas d'en-tête compatible LUKS."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2900
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not active."
+msgstr "Le volume %s n'est pas actif."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2911
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is already suspended."
+msgstr "Le volume %s est déjà suspendu."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2925
+#, c-format
+msgid "Suspend is not supported for device %s."
+msgstr "Le périphérique %s ne supporte pas la suspension."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2927
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during suspending device %s."
+msgstr "Erreur lors de la suspension du périphérique %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2960 lib/setup.c:3027
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not suspended."
+msgstr "Le volume %s n'est pas suspendu."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2989
+#, c-format
+msgid "Resume is not supported for device %s."
+msgstr "Le périphérique %s ne supporte pas la remise en service."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2991 lib/setup.c:3059
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during resuming device %s."
+msgstr "Erreur lors de la remise en service du périphérique %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3127 lib/setup.c:3315
+msgid "Cannot add key slot, all slots disabled and no volume key provided."
+msgstr "Impossible d'ajouter un emplacement de clé, tous les emplacements sont désactivés et aucune clé n'a été fournie pour ce volume."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3267
+msgid "Failed to swap new key slot."
+msgstr "Nouvel emplacement de clé impossible à échanger."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3432 lib/setup.c:3865 lib/setup.c:3878 lib/setup.c:3886
+#: lib/setup.c:3899 lib/setup.c:4198 lib/setup.c:5274
+msgid "Volume key does not match the volume."
+msgstr "Ceci n'est pas la clé du volume."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3453
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid."
+msgstr "L'emplacement de clé %d n'est pas valide."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3459
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is not used."
+msgstr "L'emplacement de clé %d n'est pas utilisé."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3478
+msgid "Device header overlaps with data area."
+msgstr "L'en-tête du périphérique recouvre la zone de données."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3684 lib/setup.c:3952
+msgid "Device type is not properly initialised."
+msgstr "Type de périphérique improprement initialisé."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3726
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s, name is invalid or still in use."
+msgstr "Impossible d'utiliser le périphérique %s, le nom est invalide ou est toujours utilisé."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3729
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s already exists."
+msgstr "Le périphérique %s existe déjà."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3852
+msgid "Incorrect volume key specified for plain device."
+msgstr "Clé de volume incorrecte pour le périphérique en clair."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3918
+msgid "Incorrect root hash specified for verity device."
+msgstr "Hachage racine incorrect spécifié pour le périphérique verity."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3995 lib/setup.c:4010
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is still in use."
+msgstr "Le périphérique %s est toujours occupé."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4025
+#, c-format
+msgid "Invalid device %s."
+msgstr "Le périphérique %s n'est pas valide."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4134
+msgid "Function not available in FIPS mode."
+msgstr "Fonction pas disponible en mode FIPS."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4148
+msgid "Volume key buffer too small."
+msgstr "Le tampon de la clé du volume est trop petit."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4156
+msgid "Cannot retrieve volume key for plain device."
+msgstr "Impossible de récupérer la clé du volume pour ce périphérique de type « plain »."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4167
+#, c-format
+msgid "This operation is not supported for %s crypt device."
+msgstr "Cette opération n'est pas possible pour le périphérique chiffré %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4354
+msgid "Dump operation is not supported for this device type."
+msgstr "L'opération de vidage n'est pas supportée pour ce type de périphérique."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4930
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert device %s which is still in use."
+msgstr "Impossible de convertir le périphérique %s qui est toujours en cours d'utilisation."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5213
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign keyslot %u as the new volume key."
+msgstr "Échec de l'affectation de l'emplacement de clé %u pour la nouvelle clé de volume."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5280
+msgid "Failed to initialise default LUKS2 keyslot parameters."
+msgstr "Échec de l'initialisation des paramètres par défaut des emplacement de clé LUKS2."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5286
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign keyslot %d to digest."
+msgstr "Échec de l'affectation de l'emplacement de clé %d aux résumé."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5370
+msgid "Failed to load key in kernel keyring."
+msgstr "Impossible de charger la clé dans le porte-clé du noyau."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5425
+msgid "Kernel keyring is not supported by the kernel."
+msgstr "Le porte-clé du noyau n'est pas supporté par ce noyau."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5435
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read passphrase from keyring (error %d)."
+msgstr "Échec lors de la lecture du mot de passe depuis le porte-clé (erreur %d)."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:81
+msgid "Cannot get process priority."
+msgstr "Impossible d'obtenir la priorité du processus."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:95
+msgid "Cannot unlock memory."
+msgstr "Impossible de déverrouiller la mémoire."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:169 lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:498
+msgid "Failed to open key file."
+msgstr "Impossible d'ouvrir le fichier de clef."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:174
+msgid "Cannot read keyfile from a terminal."
+msgstr "Impossible de lire le fichier de clé depuis un terminal."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:191
+msgid "Failed to stat key file."
+msgstr "Impossible d'exécuter « stat » sur le fichier de clef."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:199 lib/utils.c:220
+msgid "Cannot seek to requested keyfile offset."
+msgstr "Impossible de sauter au décalage demandé dans le fichier de clé."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:214 lib/utils.c:229 src/utils_password.c:188
+#: src/utils_password.c:201
+msgid "Out of memory while reading passphrase."
+msgstr "Plus assez de mémoire lors de la lecture de la phrase secrète."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:249
+msgid "Error reading passphrase."
+msgstr "Erreur de lecture de la phrase secrète."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:266
+msgid "Nothing to read on input."
+msgstr "Rien à lire en entrée."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:273
+msgid "Maximum keyfile size exceeded."
+msgstr "Taille max. de fichier de clé dépassée."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:278
+msgid "Cannot read requested amount of data."
+msgstr "Impossible de lire la quantité de données demandée."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:184 lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:92
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s doesn't exist or access denied."
+msgstr "Le périphérique %s n'existe pas ou l'accès y est interdit."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:194
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not compatible."
+msgstr "Le périphérique %s n'est pas compatible."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:560
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small. Need at least %<PRIu64> bytes."
+msgstr "Le périphérique %s est trop petit. Il a besoin d'au moins %<PRIu64> octets."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:641
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s which is in use (already mapped or mounted)."
+msgstr "Impossible d'utiliser le périphérique %s actuellement utilisé (déjà mappé ou monté)."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:645
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "Impossible d'utiliser le périphérique %s, permission refusée."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:648
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot get info about device %s."
+msgstr "Impossible d'obtenir des informations au sujet du périphérique %s."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:671
+msgid "Cannot use a loopback device, running as non-root user."
+msgstr "Impossible d'utiliser un périphérique loopback. Fonctionne comme un utilisateur non-root."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:681
+msgid "Attaching loopback device failed (loop device with autoclear flag is required)."
+msgstr "Impossible d'associer le périphérique loopback (le drapeau « autoclear » est requis)."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:727
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested offset is beyond real size of device %s."
+msgstr "Le décalage demandé est au delà de la taille réelle du périphérique %s."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:735
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s has zero size."
+msgstr "Le périphérique %s a une taille nulle."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:746 lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:252
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small."
+msgstr "Le périphérique %s est trop petit."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:100
+msgid "Requested PBKDF target time cannot be zero."
+msgstr "Le temps cible PBKDF demandé ne peut pas être zéro."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:106
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unknown PBKDF type %s."
+msgstr "Type PBKDF %s inconnu."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:111
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested hash %s is not supported."
+msgstr "L'algorithme de hachage %s demandé n'est pas supporté."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:122
+msgid "Requested PBKDF type is not supported for LUKS1."
+msgstr "Le type PBKDF demandé n'est pas supporté par LUKS1."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:128
+msgid "PBKDF max memory or parallel threads must not be set with pbkdf2."
+msgstr "La mémoire maximum ou les threads parallèles de PBKDF ne peuvent pas être définis avec pbkdf2."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:133 lib/utils_pbkdf.c:143
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forced iteration count is too low for %s (minimum is %u)."
+msgstr "Le nombre d'itérations forcées est trop petit pour %s (le minimum est %u)."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:148
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forced memory cost is too low for %s (minimum is %u kilobytes)."
+msgstr "Le coût de la mémoire forcé est trop petit pour %s (le minimum est %u kilooctets)."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:155
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested maximum PBKDF memory cost is too high (maximum is %d kilobytes)."
+msgstr "Le coût de la mémoire PBKDF maximum demandée est trop grand (maximum est %d kilooctets)."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:160
+msgid "Requested maximum PBKDF memory cannot be zero."
+msgstr "La mémoire PBKDF maximum demandée ne peut pas être zéro."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:164
+msgid "Requested PBKDF parallel threads cannot be zero."
+msgstr "Le nombre de threads parallèles PBKDF demandé ne peut pas être zéro."
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:317
+msgid "PBKDF benchmark disabled but iterations not set."
+msgstr "L'étalon PBKDF est désactivé mais les itérations ne sont pas définies."
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:336
+#, c-format
+msgid "Not compatible PBKDF2 options (using hash algorithm %s)."
+msgstr "Options PBKDF2 incompatibles (en utilisant l'algorithme de hachage %s)."
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:356
+msgid "Not compatible PBKDF options."
+msgstr "Options PBKDF incompatibles."
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:80
+#, c-format
+msgid "Locking aborted. The locking path %s/%s is unusable (not a directory or missing)."
+msgstr "Verrouillage interrompu. Le chemin de verrouillage %s/%s est inutilisable (pas un répertoire ou est manquant)."
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:87
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Locking directory %s/%s is missing!\n"
+msgstr "ATTENTION: Le répertoire verrou %s/%s est manquant !\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:97
+#, c-format
+msgid "Locking aborted. The locking path %s/%s is unusable (%s is not a directory)."
+msgstr "Verrouillage interrompu. Le chemin de verrouillage %s/%s est inutilisable (%s n'est pas un répertoire)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:40
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Failed to setup dm-crypt key mapping for device %s.\n"
+"Check that kernel supports %s cipher (check syslog for more info)."
+msgstr ""
+"Impossible de configurer la correspondance des clés dm-crypt du périphérique %s.\n"
+"Vérifiez que le noyau supporte le chiffrement %s (pour plus d'informations, voir les journaux syslog)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:45
+msgid "Key size in XTS mode must be 256 or 512 bits."
+msgstr "La taille de la clé en mode XTS doit être un multiple de 256 ou 512 bits."
+
+# Frédéric: Je laisse iv (initialisation vector) sous cette forme car elle est plus habituelle que vi
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:47
+msgid "Cipher specification should be in [cipher]-[mode]-[iv] format."
+msgstr "La spécification du chiffrement devrait être au format [chiffrement]-[mode]-[iv]."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:98 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:345
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:642 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1079
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1157 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:448
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write to device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "Impossible d'écrire sur le périphérique %s. Permission refusée."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:120
+msgid "Failed to open temporary keystore device."
+msgstr "Échec lors de l'ouverture du périphérique de stockage temporaire de clés."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:127
+msgid "Failed to access temporary keystore device."
+msgstr "Impossible d'accéder au périphérique de stockage temporaire de clés."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:200 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:91
+msgid "IO error while encrypting keyslot."
+msgstr "Erreur E/S pendant le chiffrement de l'emplacement de clé."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:243 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:348
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:594 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:645 lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:663
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:81 lib/verity/verity.c:182 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:308
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:319 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:339
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:242 lib/verity/verity_fec.c:254
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:259 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1160
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:208
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open device %s."
+msgstr "Impossible d'ouvrir le périphérique %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:254 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:152
+msgid "IO error while decrypting keyslot."
+msgstr "Erreur E/S pendant le déchiffrement de l'emplacement de clé."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:111
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small. (LUKS1 requires at least %<PRIu64> bytes.)"
+msgstr "Le périphérique %s est trop petit (LUKS1 a besoin d'au moins %<PRIu64> octets)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:132 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:140
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:152 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:163
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:175
+#, c-format
+msgid "LUKS keyslot %u is invalid."
+msgstr "L'emplacement de clé LUKS %u n'est pas valide."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:228 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:478
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:991 src/cryptsetup.c:1236
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1355 src/cryptsetup.c:1412 src/cryptsetup.c:1468
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1535 src/cryptsetup.c:1631 src/cryptsetup.c:1695
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1855 src/cryptsetup.c:2044 src/cryptsetup.c:2104
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2170 src/cryptsetup.c:2334 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1397
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."
+msgstr "%s n'est pas un périphérique LUKS valide."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:247 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1010
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested header backup file %s already exists."
+msgstr "Le fichier de sauvegarde d'en-tête demandé %s existe déjà."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:249 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1012
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Impossible de créer le fichier de sauvegarde d'en-tête %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:254 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1017
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Impossible d'écrire le fichier de sauvegarde d'en-tête %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:287 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1066
+msgid "Backup file doesn't contain valid LUKS header."
+msgstr "Le fichier de sauvegarde ne contient pas d'en-tête LUKS valide."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:300 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:555
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1087
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Impossible d'ouvrir le fichier de sauvegarde d'en-tête %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:306 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1093
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Impossible de lire le fichier de sauvegarde d'en-tête %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:318
+msgid "Data offset or key size differs on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "Le décalage des données (« offset ») ou la taille de la clé ne sont pas identiques dans le périphérique et la sauvegarde. La restauration a échouée."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:326
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s %s%s"
+msgstr "Périphérique %s %s%s"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:327
+msgid "does not contain LUKS header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device."
+msgstr "ne contient pas d'en-tête LUKS. Remplacer l'en-tête peut détruire les données de ce périphérique."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:328
+msgid "already contains LUKS header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."
+msgstr "contient déjà un en-tête LUKS. Remplacer l'en-tête détruira les emplacements de clés actuels."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:329 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1129
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: real device header has different UUID than backup!"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"ATTENTION : l'en-tête du périphérique a un UUID différent de celui de la sauvegarde !"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:381
+msgid "Non standard key size, manual repair required."
+msgstr "Taille de clé non standard. Réparation manuelle requise."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:386
+msgid "Non standard keyslots alignment, manual repair required."
+msgstr "Alignement non standard des emplacements de clé. Réparation manuelle requise."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:396
+msgid "Repairing keyslots."
+msgstr "Réparation des emplacements de clé."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:415
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: offset repaired (%u -> %u)."
+msgstr "Emplacement de clé %i : décalage réparé (%u -> %u)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:423
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: stripes repaired (%u -> %u)."
+msgstr "Emplacement de clé %i : bandes réparées (%u -> %u)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:432
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: bogus partition signature."
+msgstr "Emplacement de clé %i : signature de partition contrefaite."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:437
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: salt wiped."
+msgstr "Emplacement de clé %i : aléa effacé."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:454
+msgid "Writing LUKS header to disk."
+msgstr "Écriture de l'en-tête LUKS sur le disque."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:459
+msgid "Repair failed."
+msgstr "Échec de la réparation."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:487 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:758
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested LUKS hash %s is not supported."
+msgstr "L'algorithme de hachage LUKS demandé (%s) n'est pas supporté."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:515 src/cryptsetup.c:960
+msgid "No known problems detected for LUKS header."
+msgstr "Aucun problème connu détecté pour l'en-tête LUKS."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:667
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during update of LUKS header on device %s."
+msgstr "Erreur lors de la mise à jour de l'en-tête LUKS sur le périphérique %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:676
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error re-reading LUKS header after update on device %s."
+msgstr "Erreur lors de la relecture de l'en-tête LUKS après la mise à jour sur le périphérique %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:752
+msgid "Data offset for LUKS header must be either 0 or higher than header size."
+msgstr "L'offset des données d'un en-tête LUKS doit être soit 0 ou soit plus grand que la taille de l'en-tête."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:763 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:828
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:207 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:909
+msgid "Wrong LUKS UUID format provided."
+msgstr "Mauvais format fourni pour le UUID LUKS."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:786
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: reading random salt failed."
+msgstr "Impossible de créer un en-tête LUKS : échec lors de la lecture de l'aléa."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:807
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: header digest failed (using hash %s)."
+msgstr "Impossible de créer un en-tête LUKS : le résumé (« digest ») de l'en-tête a échoué (en utilisant l'algorithme de hachage %s)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:851
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d active, purge first."
+msgstr "L'emplacement de clé %d est activé, effacez le d'abord."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:857
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d material includes too few stripes. Header manipulation?"
+msgstr "Le matériel de l'emplacement de clé %d a trop peu de bandes. L'en-tête a-t-il été modifié ?"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1065
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select keyslot between 0 and %d."
+msgstr "L'emplacement de clé %d n'est pas valide, merci de sélectionner un emplacement entre 0 et %d."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1083 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:452
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe device %s."
+msgstr "Impossible d'effacer de façon sécurisée le périphérique %s."
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:146
+msgid "Detected not yet supported GPG encrypted keyfile."
+msgstr "Fichier de clé GPG chiffré détecté mais pas encore supporté."
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:147
+msgid "Please use gpg --decrypt <KEYFILE> | cryptsetup --keyfile=- ...\n"
+msgstr "SVP utilisez gpg --decrypt <FICHIER DE CLE> | cryptsetup --keyfile=-...\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:168 lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:188
+msgid "Incompatible loop-AES keyfile detected."
+msgstr "Fichier de clé incompatible pour boucle « loop-AES »."
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:245
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support loop-AES compatible mapping."
+msgstr "Le noyau ne supporte pas les associations de type boucle « loop-AES »."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:505
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error reading keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Erreur lors de la lecture du fichier de clé %s."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:545
+#, c-format
+msgid "Maximum TCRYPT passphrase length (%d) exceeded."
+msgstr "Longueur maximum de la phrase secrète TCRYPT (%d) dépassée."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:586
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2 hash algorithm %s not available, skipping."
+msgstr "L'algorithme de hachage PBKDF2 %s n'est pas supporté, ignoré."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:604 src/cryptsetup.c:915
+msgid "Required kernel crypto interface not available."
+msgstr "L'interface du noyau requise pour le chiffrement n'est pas disponible."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:606 src/cryptsetup.c:917
+msgid "Ensure you have algif_skcipher kernel module loaded."
+msgstr "Vérifiez que le module du noyau algif_skcipher est chargé."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:746
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activation is not supported for %d sector size."
+msgstr "L'activation n'est pas supportée pour des secteurs de taille %d."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:752
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support activation for this TCRYPT legacy mode."
+msgstr "Le noyau ne supporte pas l'activation pour ce mode TCRYPT historique."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:786
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activating TCRYPT system encryption for partition %s."
+msgstr "Activation du chiffrement du système TCRYPT sur la partition %s."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:864
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support TCRYPT compatible mapping."
+msgstr "Le noyau ne supporte pas les associations de type TCRYPT."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:1085
+msgid "This function is not supported without TCRYPT header load."
+msgstr "Cette fonction n'est pas supportée sans le chargement de l'en-tête TCRYPT."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:69 lib/verity/verity.c:175
+#, c-format
+msgid "Verity device %s doesn't use on-disk header."
+msgstr "Le périphérique verity %s n'utilise pas l'en-tête sur le disque."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:94
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not a valid VERITY device."
+msgstr "Le périphérique %s n'est pas un périphérique VERITY valable."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:101
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY version %d."
+msgstr "La version VERITY %d n'est pas supportée."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:132
+msgid "VERITY header corrupted."
+msgstr "En-tête VERITY corrompu."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:169
+#, c-format
+msgid "Wrong VERITY UUID format provided on device %s."
+msgstr "Mauvais format d'UUID VERITY fourni sur le périphérique %s."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:202
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during update of verity header on device %s."
+msgstr "Erreur lors de la mise à jour de l'en-tête verity sur le périphérique %s."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:266
+msgid "Errors cannot be repaired with FEC device."
+msgstr "Les erreurs ne savent pas être réparées avec un périphérique FEC."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:268
+#, c-format
+msgid "Found %u repairable errors with FEC device."
+msgstr "%u erreurs réparables ont été trouvées avec le périphérique FEC."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:306
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support dm-verity mapping."
+msgstr "Le noyau ne supporte pas les associations de type dm-verity."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:317
+msgid "Verity device detected corruption after activation."
+msgstr "Le périphérique verity a détecté une corruption après l'activation."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:59
+#, c-format
+msgid "Spare area is not zeroed at position %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "La zone de réserve n'a pas été mise à zéro à la positon %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:160 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:287
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:300
+msgid "Device offset overflow."
+msgstr "Débordement du décalage du périphérique."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:200
+#, c-format
+msgid "Verification failed at position %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "La vérification a échoué à la position %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:273
+msgid "Invalid size parameters for verity device."
+msgstr "Mauvais paramètres de taille pour le périphérique verity."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:293
+msgid "Hash area overflow."
+msgstr "Débordement de la zone de hachage."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:370
+msgid "Verification of data area failed."
+msgstr "La vérification de la zone de données a échoué."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:375
+msgid "Verification of root hash failed."
+msgstr "La vérification du hachage de la racine a échoué."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:381
+msgid "Input/output error while creating hash area."
+msgstr "Erreur d'entrée/sortie lors de la création de la zone de hachage."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:383
+msgid "Creation of hash area failed."
+msgstr "La création de la zone de hachage a échoué."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:430
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Kernel cannot activate device if data block size exceeds page size (%u)."
+msgstr "ATTENTION : Le kernel ne peut pas activer le périphérique si la taille des blocs de données dépasse la taille d'une page (%u)."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:132
+msgid "Failed to allocate RS context."
+msgstr "Échec de l'allocation du contexte RS."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:147
+msgid "Failed to allocate buffer."
+msgstr "Échec de l'allocation du tampon."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:157
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read RS block %<PRIu64> byte %d."
+msgstr "Échec de lecture du bloc RS %<PRIu64> octet %d."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:170
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read parity for RS block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Échec de la lecture de la parité du bloc RS %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:178
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to repair parity for block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Échec de la réparation de la parité du bloc %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:189
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to write parity for RS block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Échec de l'écriture de la parité du bloc RS %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:224
+msgid "Block sizes must match for FEC."
+msgstr "Les tailles des blocs doivent concorder pour FEC."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:230
+msgid "Invalid number of parity bytes."
+msgstr "Nombre d'octets de parité invalide."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:266
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to determine size for device %s."
+msgstr "Impossible de déterminer la taille du périphérique %s."
+
+#: lib/integrity/integrity.c:239 lib/integrity/integrity.c:304
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support dm-integrity mapping."
+msgstr "Le noyau ne supporte pas les associations de type dm-integrity."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:413
+msgid "Failed to acquire write device lock."
+msgstr "Impossible d'acquérir le verrou d'écriture sur le périphérique."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:654 lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:675
+msgid ""
+"Device contains ambiguous signatures, cannot auto-recover LUKS2.\n"
+"Please run \"cryptsetup repair\" for recovery."
+msgstr ""
+"Le périphérique contient une signature ambigüe, impossible de récupérer automatiquement LUKS2.\n"
+"Veuillez exécuter « cryptsetup repair » pour la récupération."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:99
+msgid "No space for new keyslot."
+msgstr "Plus d'espace pour le nouvel emplacement de clé."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:158
+msgid "Requested data offset is too small."
+msgstr "Le décalage de données demandé est trop petit."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:195
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: keyslots area (%<PRIu64> bytes) is very small, available LUKS2 keyslot count is very limited.\n"
+msgstr "ATTENTION: la zone des emplacements de clés (%<PRIu64> octets) est très petite, le nombre d'emplacements de clés LUKS2 est très limité.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:866 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:982
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1055 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:105
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:128
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to acquire read lock on device %s."
+msgstr "Impossible d'acquérir le verrou de lecture sur le périphérique %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:878 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1149
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:431 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:40
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:69
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to acquire write lock on device %s."
+msgstr "Impossible d'acquérir un verrou en écriture sur le périphérique %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1072
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forbidden LUKS2 requirements detected in backup %s."
+msgstr "Des exigences LUKS2 interdites ont été détectées dans la sauvegarde %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1113
+msgid "Data offset differ on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "Les décalages des données ne sont pas identiques sur le périphérique et la sauvegarde, la restauration a échoué."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1119
+msgid "Binary header with keyslot areas size differ on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "Les en-têtes binaires avec des tailles de zones d'emplacements de clés sont différents sur le périphérique et la sauvegarde, la restauration a échouée."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1126
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s %s%s%s%s"
+msgstr "Périphérique %s %s%s%s%s"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1127
+msgid "does not contain LUKS2 header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device."
+msgstr "ne contient pas d'en-tête LUKS2. Remplacer l'en-tête peut détruire les données de ce périphérique."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1128
+msgid "already contains LUKS2 header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."
+msgstr "contient déjà un en-tête LUKS2. Remplacer l'en-tête détruira les emplacements de clés actuels."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1130
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: unknown LUKS2 requirements detected in real device header!\n"
+"Replacing header with backup may corrupt the data on that device!"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"ATTENTION: des exigences LUKS2 inconnues ont été détectées sur l'en-tête du périphérique réel !\n"
+"Remplacer l'en-tête par la sauvegarde peut corrompre les données sur ce périphérique !"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1132
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: Unfinished offline reencryption detected on the device!\n"
+"Replacing header with backup may corrupt data."
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"ATTENTION: Un rechiffrement hors-ligne non terminé a été détecté sur le périphérique !\n"
+"Remplacer l'en-tête par la sauvegarde peut corrompre les données."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1234
+#, c-format
+msgid "Ignored unknown flag %s."
+msgstr "Fanion inconnu %s ignoré."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1869
+msgid "Failed to read LUKS2 requirements."
+msgstr "Échec lors de la lecture des exigences LUKS2."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1876
+msgid "Unmet LUKS2 requirements detected."
+msgstr "Des exigences LUKS2 non rencontrées ont été détectées."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1884
+msgid "Offline reencryption in progress. Aborting."
+msgstr "Un rechiffrement hors-ligne est en cours. Interruption."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:474
+#, c-format
+msgid "Can not check status of device with uuid: %s."
+msgstr "Ne peut vérifier le statut du périphérique avec le uuid : %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:500
+msgid "Unable to convert header with LUKSMETA additional metadata."
+msgstr "Impossible de convertir un en-tête avec des métadonnées LUKSMETA supplémentaires."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:537
+msgid "Unable to move keyslot area. Not enough space."
+msgstr "Impossible de déplacer la zone des emplacements de clés. Pas assez d'espace."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:577 lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:854
+msgid "Unable to move keyslot area."
+msgstr "Impossible de déplacer la zone des emplacements de clés."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:672
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - key slot digests are not LUKS1 compatible."
+msgstr "Impossible de convertir au format LUKS1 – les résumés des emplacements de clés ne sont pas compatibles avec LUKS1."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:684
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - device uses wrapped key cipher %s."
+msgstr "Impossible de convertir au format LUKS1 – le périphérique utilise des clés de chiffrement %s emballées."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:692
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - LUKS2 header contains %u token(s)."
+msgstr "Impossible de convertir au format LUKS1 – l'en-tête LUKS2 contient %u jeton(s)."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:706
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - keyslot %u is in invalid state."
+msgstr "Impossible de convertir au format LUKS1 – l'emplacement de clé %u est dans un état invalide."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:711
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - slot %u (over maximum slots) is still active."
+msgstr "Impossible de convertir au format LUKS1 – l'emplacement %u (sur les emplacements maximum) est toujours actif."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:716
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - keyslot %u is not LUKS1 compatible."
+msgstr "Impossible de convertir au format LUKS1 – l'emplacement de clé %u n'est pas compatible avec LUKS1."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_token.c:262
+msgid "No free token slot."
+msgstr "Aucun emplacement de jeton libre"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_token.c:269
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to create builtin token %s."
+msgstr "Échec lors de la création du jeton intégré %s"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:141
+msgid "Can't do passphrase verification on non-tty inputs."
+msgstr "Impossible de vérifier une phrase secrète non saisie sur une console."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:182
+msgid "Keyslot encryption parameters can be set only for LUKS2 device."
+msgstr "Les paramètres de chiffrement des emplacement de clés peuvent uniquement être définis pour un périphérique LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:212 src/cryptsetup.c:849 src/cryptsetup.c:1088
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:749 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:814
+msgid "No known cipher specification pattern detected."
+msgstr "Aucun motif connu d'algorithme de chiffrement n'a été détecté."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:220
+msgid "WARNING: The --hash parameter is being ignored in plain mode with keyfile specified.\n"
+msgstr "ATTENTION: Le paramètre --hash est ignoré en mode non chiffré quand le fichier de clé est spécifié.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:228
+msgid "WARNING: The --keyfile-size option is being ignored, the read size is the same as the encryption key size.\n"
+msgstr "ATTENTION: L'option --keyfile-size est ignorée. La taille de lecture est la même que la taille de la clé de chiffrement.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:268
+#, c-format
+msgid "Detected device signature(s) on %s. Proceeding further may damage existing data."
+msgstr "Signature(s) de périphérique détectée(s) sur %s. Continuer risque d'endommager les données existantes."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:274 src/cryptsetup.c:969 src/cryptsetup.c:1065
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1138 src/cryptsetup.c:1763 src/integritysetup.c:230
+msgid "Operation aborted.\n"
+msgstr "Opération interrompue.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:342
+msgid "Option --key-file is required."
+msgstr "L'option --key-file est requise."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:395
+msgid "Enter VeraCrypt PIM: "
+msgstr "Entrez le PIN VeraCrypt : "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:404
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: parse error."
+msgstr "Valeur PIN invalide : erreur d'analyse"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:407
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: 0."
+msgstr "Valeur PIN invalide: 0"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:410
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: outside of range."
+msgstr "Valeur PIN invalide: hors des limites."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:433
+msgid "No device header detected with this passphrase."
+msgstr "Aucun en-tête détecté avec cette phrase secrète sur le périphérique."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:495 src/cryptsetup.c:1790
+msgid ""
+"Header dump with volume key is sensitive information\n"
+"which allows access to encrypted partition without passphrase.\n"
+"This dump should be always stored encrypted on safe place."
+msgstr ""
+"Le contenu de l'en-tête avec la clé de volume est une information\n"
+"sensible qui permet d'accéder à la partition chiffrée sans mot de passe.\n"
+"Ce contenu devrait toujours être stocké, chiffré, en lieu sûr."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:574
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is still active and scheduled for deferred removal.\n"
+msgstr "Le périphérique %s est toujours actif et prévu pour une suppression différée.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:602
+msgid "Resize of active device requires volume key in keyring but --disable-keyring option is set."
+msgstr "Le redimensionnement d'un périphérique actif requiert que la clé du volume soit dans le porte-clé mais l'option --disable-keyring est définie."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:727
+msgid "Benchmark interrupted."
+msgstr "Test de performance interrompu."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:748
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2-%-9s     N/A\n"
+msgstr "PBKDF2-%-9s     N/A\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:750
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2-%-9s %7u iterations per second for %zu-bit key\n"
+msgstr "PBKDF2-%-9s %7u itérations par seconde pour une clé de %zu bits\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:764
+#, c-format
+msgid "%-10s N/A\n"
+msgstr "%-10s N/A\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:766
+#, c-format
+msgid "%-10s %4u iterations, %5u memory, %1u parallel threads (CPUs) for %zu-bit key (requested %u ms time)\n"
+msgstr "%-10s %4u itérations, %5u mémoire, %1u threads parallèles (CPUs) pour une clé de %zu bits (temps de %u ms demandé)\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:790
+msgid "Result of benchmark is not reliable."
+msgstr "Le résultat de l'évaluation de performance n'est pas fiable."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:841
+msgid "# Tests are approximate using memory only (no storage IO).\n"
+msgstr "# Tests approximatifs en utilisant uniquement la mémoire (pas de stockage E/S).\n"
+
+#. TRANSLATORS: The string is header of a table and must be exactly (right side) aligned.
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:875
+#, c-format
+msgid "#%*s Algorithm |       Key |      Encryption |      Decryption\n"
+msgstr "#%*s Algorithme |       Clé |     Chiffrement |    Déchiffrement\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:879
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cipher %s is not available."
+msgstr "Le chiffrement %s n'est pas disponible."
+
+#. TRANSLATORS: The string is header of a table and must be exactly (right side) aligned.
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:899
+msgid "#     Algorithm |       Key |      Encryption |      Decryption\n"
+msgstr "#    Algorithme |       Clé |     Chiffrement |    Déchiffrement\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:908
+msgid "N/A"
+msgstr "N/D"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:968
+msgid "Really try to repair LUKS device header?"
+msgstr "Réellement essayer de réparer l'en-tête du périphérique LUKS ?"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:984 src/integritysetup.c:144
+msgid ""
+"Wiping device to initialize integrity checksum.\n"
+"You can interrupt this by pressing CTRL+c (rest of not wiped device will contain invalid checksum).\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Effacement du périphérique pour initialiser les sommes de contrôle d'intégrité.\n"
+"Vous pouvez interrompre ceci en appuyant sur CTRL+c (le reste du périphérique effacé contiendra toujours des sommes de contrôle invalides).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1006 src/integritysetup.c:166
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot deactivate temporary device %s."
+msgstr "Impossible de désactiver le périphérique temporaire %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1050
+msgid "Integrity option can be used only for LUKS2 format."
+msgstr "L'option d'intégrité peut uniquement être utilisée avec le format LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1055 src/cryptsetup.c:1115
+msgid "Unsupported LUKS2 metadata size options."
+msgstr "Options de taille des métadonnées LUKS2 non supportées."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1072
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create header file %s."
+msgstr "Impossible de créer le fichier d'en-tête %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1095 src/integritysetup.c:192 src/integritysetup.c:201
+#: src/integritysetup.c:210 src/integritysetup.c:276 src/integritysetup.c:285
+#: src/integritysetup.c:295
+msgid "No known integrity specification pattern detected."
+msgstr "Aucun motif connu de spécification d'intégrité n'a été détecté."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1108
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use %s as on-disk header."
+msgstr "Ne peut utiliser %s comme en-tête sur disque."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1132 src/integritysetup.c:224
+#, c-format
+msgid "This will overwrite data on %s irrevocably."
+msgstr "Cette action écrasera définitivement les données sur %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1173 src/cryptsetup.c:1484 src/cryptsetup.c:1551
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1646 src/cryptsetup.c:1712
+msgid "Failed to set pbkdf parameters."
+msgstr "Impossible de définir les paramètres pbkdf."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1242
+msgid "Reduced data offset is allowed only for detached LUKS header."
+msgstr "Décalage réduit de données est uniquement permis dans un en-tête LUKS détaché."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1284
+msgid "Device activated but cannot make flags persistent."
+msgstr "Le périphérique a été activé mais les fanions ne peuvent pas être rendus permanents."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1365
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %d is selected for deletion."
+msgstr "Emplacement de clé %d sélectionné pour suppression."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1368 src/cryptsetup.c:1706
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %d is not active."
+msgstr "L'emplacement de clé %d n'est pas actif."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1377 src/cryptsetup.c:1438
+msgid "This is the last keyslot. Device will become unusable after purging this key."
+msgstr "Ceci est le dernier emplacement de clé. Le périphérique sera inutilisable après la suppression de cette clé."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1378
+msgid "Enter any remaining passphrase: "
+msgstr "Entrez toute phrase secrète restante : "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1379 src/cryptsetup.c:1440
+msgid "Operation aborted, the keyslot was NOT wiped.\n"
+msgstr "Opération interrompue, l'emplacement de clé n'a PAS été effacé.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1417
+msgid "Enter passphrase to be deleted: "
+msgstr "Entrez la phrase secrète à effacer : "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1435
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d selected for deletion."
+msgstr "Emplacement de clé %d sélectionné pour suppression."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1498 src/cryptsetup.c:1565 src/cryptsetup.c:1599
+msgid "Enter new passphrase for key slot: "
+msgstr "Entrez une nouvelle phrase secrète pour l'emplacement de clé : "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1582 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1352
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter any existing passphrase: "
+msgstr "Entrez une phrase secrète existante : "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1650
+msgid "Enter passphrase to be changed: "
+msgstr "Entrez la phrase secrète à changer : "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1666 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1338
+msgid "Enter new passphrase: "
+msgstr "Entrez la nouvelle phrase secrète : "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1716
+msgid "Enter passphrase for keyslot to be converted: "
+msgstr "Entrez la phrase secrète pour l'emplacement de clé à convertir: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1740
+msgid "Only one device argument for isLuks operation is supported."
+msgstr "L'opération isLuks supporte seulement un périphérique en argument."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1924 src/cryptsetup.c:1945
+msgid "Option --header-backup-file is required."
+msgstr "L'option --header-backup-file est requise."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1975
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s is not cryptsetup managed device."
+msgstr "%s n'est pas un périphérique géré par cryptsetup."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1986
+#, c-format
+msgid "Refresh is not supported for device type %s"
+msgstr "Le rafraîchissement n'est pas supporté pour un périphérique de type %s"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2024
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unrecognized metadata device type %s."
+msgstr "Type de métadonnée du périphérique %s non reconnu."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2027
+msgid "Command requires device and mapped name as arguments."
+msgstr "La commande exige un périphérique et un nom de correspondance comme arguments."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2049
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"This operation will erase all keyslots on device %s.\n"
+"Device will become unusable after this operation."
+msgstr ""
+"Cette opération va supprimer tous les emplacements de clés du périphérique %s.\n"
+"Le périphérique sera inutilisable après cette opération."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2056
+msgid "Operation aborted, keyslots were NOT wiped.\n"
+msgstr "Opération interrompue, les emplacements de clés n'ont PAS été effacés.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2093
+msgid "Invalid LUKS type, only luks1 and luks2 are supported."
+msgstr "Type LUKS invalide, seuls luks1 et luks2 sont supportés."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2111
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device is already %s type."
+msgstr "Le périphérique est déjà du type %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2116
+#, c-format
+msgid "This operation will convert %s to %s format.\n"
+msgstr "Cette opération va convertir %s au format %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2122
+msgid "Operation aborted, device was NOT converted.\n"
+msgstr "Opération interrompue, le périphérique n'a PAS été converti.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2162
+msgid "Option --priority, --label or --subsystem is missing."
+msgstr "L'option --priority, --label ou --subsystem est manquante."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2196 src/cryptsetup.c:2229 src/cryptsetup.c:2252
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %d is invalid."
+msgstr "Le jeton %d est invalide."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2199 src/cryptsetup.c:2255
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %d in use."
+msgstr "Le jeton %d est utilisé."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2206
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to add luks2-keyring token %d."
+msgstr "Échec lors de l'ajout du jeton %d au porte-clé luks2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2215 src/cryptsetup.c:2277
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign token %d to keyslot %d."
+msgstr "Échec lors de l'affectation du jeton %d à l'emplacement de clé %d."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2232
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %d is not in use."
+msgstr "Le jeton %d n'est pas utilisé."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2267
+msgid "Failed to import token from file."
+msgstr "Impossible d'importer le jeton depuis le fichier."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2292
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to get token %d for export."
+msgstr "Impossible d'obtenir le jeton %d pour l'export."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2307
+msgid "--key-description parameter is mandatory for token add action."
+msgstr "Le paramètre --key-description est requis pour l'action d'ajout d'un jeton."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2313 src/cryptsetup.c:2321
+msgid "Action requires specific token. Use --token-id parameter."
+msgstr "L'action requiert un jeton spécifique. Utilisez le paramètre --token-id."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2326
+#, c-format
+msgid "Invalid token operation %s."
+msgstr "L'opération de jeton %s est invalide."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2366
+msgid "<device> [--type <type>] [<name>]"
+msgstr "<périphérique> [--type <type>] [<nom>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2366
+msgid "open device as mapping <name>"
+msgstr "ouvrir un périphérique avec <nom> comme « mapping »"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2367 src/cryptsetup.c:2368 src/cryptsetup.c:2369
+#: src/veritysetup.c:363 src/veritysetup.c:364 src/integritysetup.c:464
+#: src/integritysetup.c:465
+msgid "<name>"
+msgstr "<nom>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2367
+msgid "close device (remove mapping)"
+msgstr "fermeture du périphérique (supprime le « mapping »)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2368
+msgid "resize active device"
+msgstr "redimensionner le périphérique actif"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2369
+msgid "show device status"
+msgstr "afficher le statut du périphérique"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2370
+msgid "[--cipher <cipher>]"
+msgstr "[--cipher <chiffrement>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2370
+msgid "benchmark cipher"
+msgstr "chiffrement pour test de performance"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2371 src/cryptsetup.c:2372 src/cryptsetup.c:2373
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2374 src/cryptsetup.c:2381 src/cryptsetup.c:2382
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2383 src/cryptsetup.c:2384 src/cryptsetup.c:2385
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2386 src/cryptsetup.c:2387 src/cryptsetup.c:2388
+msgid "<device>"
+msgstr "<périphérique>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2371
+msgid "try to repair on-disk metadata"
+msgstr "essayer de réparer les métadonnées sur le disque"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2372
+msgid "erase all keyslots (remove encryption key)"
+msgstr "supprime tous les emplacements de clés (supprime la clé de chiffrement)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2373
+msgid "convert LUKS from/to LUKS2 format"
+msgstr "convertir LUKS depuis/vers le format LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2374
+msgid "set permanent configuration options for LUKS2"
+msgstr "définir les options de configuration permanentes pour LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2375 src/cryptsetup.c:2376
+msgid "<device> [<new key file>]"
+msgstr "<périphérique> [<fichier de la nouvelle clé>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2375
+msgid "formats a LUKS device"
+msgstr "formate un périphérique LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2376
+msgid "add key to LUKS device"
+msgstr "ajouter une clé au périphérique LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2377 src/cryptsetup.c:2378 src/cryptsetup.c:2379
+msgid "<device> [<key file>]"
+msgstr "<périphérique> [<fichier de clé>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2377
+msgid "removes supplied key or key file from LUKS device"
+msgstr "retire du périphérique LUKS la clé ou le fichier de clé fourni"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2378
+msgid "changes supplied key or key file of LUKS device"
+msgstr "modifie la clé ou le fichier de clé fourni pour le périphérique LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2379
+msgid "converts a key to new pbkdf parameters"
+msgstr "converti une clé vers les nouveaux paramètres pbkdf"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2380
+msgid "<device> <key slot>"
+msgstr "<périphérique> <emplacement de clé>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2380
+msgid "wipes key with number <key slot> from LUKS device"
+msgstr "efface de façon sécurisée la clé avec le numéro <emplacement de clé> du périphérique LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2381
+msgid "print UUID of LUKS device"
+msgstr "afficher l'UUID du périphérique LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2382
+msgid "tests <device> for LUKS partition header"
+msgstr "teste si <périphérique> a un en-tête de partition LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2383
+msgid "dump LUKS partition information"
+msgstr "affiche les informations LUKS de la partition"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2384
+msgid "dump TCRYPT device information"
+msgstr "affiche les informations du périphérique TCRYPT"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2385
+msgid "Suspend LUKS device and wipe key (all IOs are frozen)"
+msgstr "Suspendre le périphérique LUKS et effacer de façon sécurisée la clé (toutes les entrées/sorties sont suspendues)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2386
+msgid "Resume suspended LUKS device"
+msgstr "Remettre en service le périphérique LUKS suspendu"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2387
+msgid "Backup LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "Sauvegarder l'en-tête et les emplacements de clés du périphérique LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2388
+msgid "Restore LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "Restaurer l'en-tête et les emplacements de clés du périphérique LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2389
+msgid "<add|remove|import|export> <device>"
+msgstr "<add|remove|import|export> <périphérique>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2389
+msgid "Manipulate LUKS2 tokens"
+msgstr "Manipuler les jetons LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2407 src/veritysetup.c:380 src/integritysetup.c:481
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<action> is one of:\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<action> est l'une de :\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2413
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"You can also use old <action> syntax aliases:\n"
+"\topen: create (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen\n"
+"\tclose: remove (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tcryptClose\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Vous pouvez aussi utiliser les alias de l'ancienne syntaxe <action> :\n"
+"\touvrir : create (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen\n"
+"\tfermer : remove (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tcryptClose\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2417
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<device> is the encrypted device\n"
+"<key slot> is the LUKS key slot number to modify\n"
+"<key file> optional key file for the new key for luksAddKey action\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<nom> est le périphérique à créer dans %s\n"
+"<périphérique> est le périphérique chiffré\n"
+"<emplacement> est le numéro de l'emplacement de clé LUKS à modifier\n"
+"<fichier de clé> est un fichier optionnel contenant la nouvelle clé pour l'action luksAddKey\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2424
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in metadata format is %s (for luksFormat action).\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Le format de métadonnées compilé par défaut est %s (pour l'action luksFormat).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2429
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in key and passphrase parameters:\n"
+"\tMaximum keyfile size: %dkB, Maximum interactive passphrase length %d (characters)\n"
+"Default PBKDF for LUKS1: %s, iteration time: %d (ms)\n"
+"Default PBKDF for LUKS2: %s\n"
+"\tIteration time: %d, Memory required: %dkB, Parallel threads: %d\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Clé compilée par défaut et paramètres de phrase secrète :\n"
+"\tTaille max. fichier de clé : %d ko, longueur max. interactive de phrase secrète %d (caractères)\n"
+"PBKDF par défaut pour LUKS1 : %s, temps d'itération : %d (ms)\n"
+"PBKDF par défaut pour LUKS2 : %s\n"
+"\tTemps d'itération: %d, Mémoire requise: %d ko, Threads parallèles: %d\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2440
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in device cipher parameters:\n"
+"\tloop-AES: %s, Key %d bits\n"
+"\tplain: %s, Key: %d bits, Password hashing: %s\n"
+"\tLUKS: %s, Key: %d bits, LUKS header hashing: %s, RNG: %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Paramètres de chiffrement compilés par défaut :\n"
+"\tloop-AES: %s, Clé %d bits\n"
+"\tplain: %s, Clé: %d bits, Hachage mot de passe: %s\n"
+"\tLUKS: %s, Clé: %d bits, Hachage en-tête LUKS: %s, RNG: %s\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2449
+msgid "\tLUKS: Default keysize with XTS mode (two internal keys) will be doubled.\n"
+msgstr "\tLUKS: La taille de clé par défaut en mode XTS (deux clés internes) sera doublée.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2460 src/veritysetup.c:537 src/integritysetup.c:621
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s: requires %s as arguments"
+msgstr "%s : exige %s comme arguments."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2498 src/veritysetup.c:420 src/integritysetup.c:515
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1611
+msgid "Show this help message"
+msgstr "Afficher ce message d'aide"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2499 src/veritysetup.c:421 src/integritysetup.c:516
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1612
+msgid "Display brief usage"
+msgstr "Afficher, en résumé, la syntaxe d'invocation"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2503 src/veritysetup.c:425 src/integritysetup.c:520
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1616
+msgid "Help options:"
+msgstr "Options d'aide :"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2504 src/veritysetup.c:426 src/integritysetup.c:521
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1617
+msgid "Print package version"
+msgstr "Afficher la version du paquet"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2505 src/veritysetup.c:427 src/integritysetup.c:522
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1618
+msgid "Shows more detailed error messages"
+msgstr "Afficher des messages d'erreur plus détaillés"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2506 src/veritysetup.c:428 src/integritysetup.c:523
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1619
+msgid "Show debug messages"
+msgstr "Afficher les messages de débogage"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2507
+msgid "Show debug messages including JSON metadata"
+msgstr "Montrer les messages de débogage incluant les métadonnées JSON"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2508 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1621
+msgid "The cipher used to encrypt the disk (see /proc/crypto)"
+msgstr "L'algorithme de chiffrement utilisé pour chiffrer le disque (voir /proc/crypto)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2509 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1623
+msgid "The hash used to create the encryption key from the passphrase"
+msgstr "L'algorithme de hachage utilisé pour créer la clé de chiffrement à partir de la phrase secrète"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2510
+msgid "Verifies the passphrase by asking for it twice"
+msgstr "Vérifier la phrase secrète en la demandant deux fois"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2511 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1625
+msgid "Read the key from a file"
+msgstr "Lire la clef depuis un fichier"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2512
+msgid "Read the volume (master) key from file."
+msgstr "Lire la clé (maîtresse) du volume depuis un fichier."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2513
+msgid "Dump volume (master) key instead of keyslots info"
+msgstr "Lister les informations de la clé (maîtresse) de volume au lieu des autres emplacements de clefs"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2514 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1622
+msgid "The size of the encryption key"
+msgstr "La taille de la clé de chiffrement"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2514 src/cryptsetup.c:2571 src/integritysetup.c:539
+#: src/integritysetup.c:543 src/integritysetup.c:547
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1622
+msgid "BITS"
+msgstr "BITS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2515 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1638
+msgid "Limits the read from keyfile"
+msgstr "Limite la lecture d'un fichier de clé"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2515 src/cryptsetup.c:2516 src/cryptsetup.c:2517
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2518 src/cryptsetup.c:2568 src/cryptsetup.c:2569
+#: src/veritysetup.c:431 src/veritysetup.c:432 src/veritysetup.c:433
+#: src/veritysetup.c:436 src/veritysetup.c:437 src/integritysetup.c:530
+#: src/integritysetup.c:534 src/integritysetup.c:535
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1637 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1638
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1639 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1640
+msgid "bytes"
+msgstr "octets"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2516 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1637
+msgid "Number of bytes to skip in keyfile"
+msgstr "Nombre d'octets à ignorer dans le fichier de clé"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2517
+msgid "Limits the read from newly added keyfile"
+msgstr "Limite la lecture d'un nouveau fichier de clé ajouté"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2518
+msgid "Number of bytes to skip in newly added keyfile"
+msgstr "Nombre d'octets à ignorer dans le fichier de clé nouvellement ajouté"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2519
+msgid "Slot number for new key (default is first free)"
+msgstr "Numéro de l'emplacement pour la nouvelle clé (par défaut, le premier disponible)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2520
+msgid "The size of the device"
+msgstr "La taille du périphérique"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2520 src/cryptsetup.c:2521 src/cryptsetup.c:2522
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2528 src/integritysetup.c:531 src/integritysetup.c:536
+msgid "SECTORS"
+msgstr "SECTEURS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2521
+msgid "The start offset in the backend device"
+msgstr "Le décalage de départ dans le périphérique sous-jacent"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2522
+msgid "How many sectors of the encrypted data to skip at the beginning"
+msgstr "Combien de secteurs de données chiffrées à ignorer au début"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2523
+msgid "Create a readonly mapping"
+msgstr "Crée une association en lecture seule"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2524 src/integritysetup.c:524
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1628
+msgid "Do not ask for confirmation"
+msgstr "Ne pas demander confirmation"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2525
+msgid "Timeout for interactive passphrase prompt (in seconds)"
+msgstr "Délai d'expiration de la demande interactive de phrase secrète (en secondes)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2525 src/cryptsetup.c:2526 src/integritysetup.c:525
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1629
+msgid "secs"
+msgstr "s"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2526 src/integritysetup.c:525
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1629
+msgid "Progress line update (in seconds)"
+msgstr "Mise à jour de la ligne de progression (en secondes)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2527 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1630
+msgid "How often the input of the passphrase can be retried"
+msgstr "Nombre de tentatives possibles pour entrer la phrase secrète"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2528
+msgid "Align payload at <n> sector boundaries - for luksFormat"
+msgstr "Utiliser une limite de <n> secteurs pour aligner les données – pour luksFormat"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2529
+msgid "File with LUKS header and keyslots backup"
+msgstr "Fichier contenant une sauvegarde de l'en-tête LUKS et des emplacements de clés"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2530 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1631
+msgid "Use /dev/random for generating volume key"
+msgstr "Utiliser /dev/random pour générer la clé de volume"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2531 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1632
+msgid "Use /dev/urandom for generating volume key"
+msgstr "Utiliser /dev/urandom pour générer la clé de volume"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2532
+msgid "Share device with another non-overlapping crypt segment"
+msgstr "Partager le périphérique avec un autre segment chiffré sans recouvrement"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2533 src/veritysetup.c:440
+msgid "UUID for device to use"
+msgstr "UUID du périphérique à utiliser"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2534
+msgid "Allow discards (aka TRIM) requests for device"
+msgstr "Autoriser les demandes d'abandon (TRIM) pour le périphérique"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2535 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1649
+msgid "Device or file with separated LUKS header"
+msgstr "Périphérique ou fichier avec un en-tête LUKS séparé"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2536
+msgid "Do not activate device, just check passphrase"
+msgstr "Ne pas activer le périphérique. Vérifie simplement le phrase secrète"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2537
+msgid "Use hidden header (hidden TCRYPT device)"
+msgstr "Utilise l'en-tête caché (périphérique TCRYPT caché)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2538
+msgid "Device is system TCRYPT drive (with bootloader)"
+msgstr "Le périphérique est un lecteur TCRYPT système (avec secteur d'amorçage)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2539
+msgid "Use backup (secondary) TCRYPT header"
+msgstr "Utiliser l'en-tête TCRYPT de secours (secondaire)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2540
+msgid "Scan also for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "Recherche aussi des périphériques compatibles avec VeraCrypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2541
+msgid "Personal Iteration Multiplier for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "Multiplicateur d'Itération Personnel pour le périphérique compatible avec VeraCrypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2542
+msgid "Query Personal Iteration Multiplier for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "Interroger le Multiplicateur d'Itération Personnel pour le périphérique compatible avec VeraCrypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2543
+msgid "Type of device metadata: luks, plain, loopaes, tcrypt"
+msgstr "Type de métadonnées du périphérique : luks, plain, loopaes, tcrypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2544
+msgid "Disable password quality check (if enabled)"
+msgstr "Désactive la vérification de la qualité du mot de passe (si activé)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2545
+msgid "Use dm-crypt same_cpu_crypt performance compatibility option"
+msgstr "Utilise l'option de compatibilité de performance dm-crypt same_cpu_crypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2546
+msgid "Use dm-crypt submit_from_crypt_cpus performance compatibility option"
+msgstr "Utilise l'option de compatibilité de performance dm-crypt submit_from_crypt_cpus"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2547
+msgid "Device removal is deferred until the last user closes it"
+msgstr "La suppression du périphérique est différée jusqu'à ce que le dernier utilisateur le ferme"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2548
+msgid "PBKDF iteration time for LUKS (in ms)"
+msgstr "Temps d'itération de PBKDF pour LUKS (en ms)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2548 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1627
+msgid "msecs"
+msgstr "ms"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2549 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1645
+msgid "PBKDF algorithm (for LUKS2): argon2i, argon2id, pbkdf2"
+msgstr "Algorithme PBKDF (pour LUKS2): argon2i, argon2id, pbkdf2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2550 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1646
+msgid "PBKDF memory cost limit"
+msgstr "Limite de coût mémoire PBKDF"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2550 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1646
+msgid "kilobytes"
+msgstr "kilooctets"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2551 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1647
+msgid "PBKDF parallel cost"
+msgstr "Coût parallèle PBKDF"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2551 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1647
+msgid "threads"
+msgstr "threads"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2552 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1648
+msgid "PBKDF iterations cost (forced, disables benchmark)"
+msgstr "Coût d'itération PBKDF (forcé, désactive l'étalon)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2553
+msgid "Keyslot priority: ignore, normal, prefer"
+msgstr "Priorité de l'emplacement de clé: ignore, normal, prefer"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2554
+msgid "Disable locking of on-disk metadata"
+msgstr "Désactiver le verrouillage des métadonnées sur le disque"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2555
+msgid "Disable loading volume keys via kernel keyring"
+msgstr "Désactiver le chargement des clés de volume via le porte-clé du noyau"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2556
+msgid "Data integrity algorithm (LUKS2 only)"
+msgstr "Algorithme d'intégrité des données (uniquement LUKS2)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2557 src/integritysetup.c:550
+msgid "Disable journal for integrity device"
+msgstr "Désactiver le journal pour le périphérique d'intégrité"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2558 src/integritysetup.c:526
+msgid "Do not wipe device after format"
+msgstr "Ne pas effacer le périphérique après le formatage"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2559
+msgid "Do not ask for passphrase if activation by token fails"
+msgstr "Ne pas demander le mot de passe si l'activation par jeton échoue"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2560
+msgid "Token number (default: any)"
+msgstr "Numéro de jeton (défaut: n'importe lequel)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2561
+msgid "Key description"
+msgstr "Description de clé"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2562
+msgid "Encryption sector size (default: 512 bytes)"
+msgstr "Taille du secteur de chiffrement (défaut: 512 octets)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2563
+msgid "Set activation flags persistent for device"
+msgstr "Définir les fanions d'activation comme permanents pour le périphérique"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2564
+msgid "Set label for the LUKS2 device"
+msgstr "Définir l'étiquette pour le périphérique LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2565
+msgid "Set subsystem label for the LUKS2 device"
+msgstr "Définir l'étiquette de sous-système pour le périphérique LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2566
+msgid "Create unbound (no assigned data segment) LUKS2 keyslot"
+msgstr "Créer un emplacement de clé LUKS2 non lié (aucun segment de donnée assigné)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2567
+msgid "Read or write the json from or to a file"
+msgstr "Lire ou écrire le json depuis ou vers un fichier"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2568
+msgid "LUKS2 header metadata area size"
+msgstr "Taille de la zone de métadonnées de l'en-tête LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2569
+msgid "LUKS2 header keyslots area size"
+msgstr "Taille de la zone des emplacements de clés de l'en-tête LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2570
+msgid "Refresh (reactivate) device with new parameters"
+msgstr "Rafraîchir (réactiver) le périphérique avec de nouveaux paramètres"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2571
+msgid "LUKS2 keyslot: The size of the encryption key"
+msgstr "Emplacement de clé LUKS2: La taille de la clé de chiffrement"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2572
+msgid "LUKS2 keyslot: The cipher used for keyslot encryption"
+msgstr "Emplacement de clé LUKS2: Le chiffrement utilisé pour le chiffrement de l'emplacement de clé"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2588 src/veritysetup.c:461 src/integritysetup.c:568
+msgid "[OPTION...] <action> <action-specific>"
+msgstr "[OPTION...] <action> <paramètres de l'action>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2645 src/veritysetup.c:501 src/integritysetup.c:585
+msgid "Argument <action> missing."
+msgstr "Il manque l'argument <action>."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2708 src/veritysetup.c:532 src/integritysetup.c:616
+msgid "Unknown action."
+msgstr "Action inconnue."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2718
+msgid "Parameter --refresh is only allowed with open or refresh commands.\n"
+msgstr "L'option --refresh est permise uniquement avec les commandes open ou refresh.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2723
+msgid "Options --refresh and --test-passphrase are mutually exclusive.\n"
+msgstr "Les options --refresh et --test-passphrase sont mutuellement exclusives.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2728
+msgid "Option --deferred is allowed only for close command.\n"
+msgstr "L'option --deferred est permise uniquement avec la commande close.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2733
+msgid "Option --shared is allowed only for open of plain device.\n"
+msgstr "L'option --shared est permise uniquement pour ouvrir un périphérique ordinaire.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2738
+msgid "Option --allow-discards is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "L'option --allow-discards est permise uniquement pour une opération d'ouverture.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2743
+msgid "Option --persistent is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "L'option --persistent est permise uniquement pour une opération d'ouverture.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2748
+msgid "Option --persistent is not allowed with --test-passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "L'option --persistent n'est pas permise avec --test-passphrase.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2757
+msgid ""
+"Option --key-size is allowed only for luksFormat, luksAddKey (with --unbound),\n"
+"open and benchmark actions. To limit read from keyfile use --keyfile-size=(bytes)."
+msgstr ""
+"L'option --key-size est permise seulement avec les actions luksFormat, luksAddKey (avec --unbound),\n"
+"open et benchmark. Pour limiter la lecture depuis un fichier de clé, utilisez --keyfile-size=(octets)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2763
+msgid "Option --integrity is allowed only for luksFormat (LUKS2).\n"
+msgstr "L'option --integrity est autorisée uniquement avec luksFormat (LUKS2).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2768
+msgid "Option --integrity-no-wipe can be used only for format action with integrity extension.\n"
+msgstr "L'option --integrity-no-wipe peut uniquement être utilisée pour une action de formatage avec l'extension d'intégrité.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2774
+msgid "Options --label and --subsystem are allowed only for luksFormat and config LUKS2 operations.\n"
+msgstr "Les options --label et --subsystem sont permises uniquement pour les opérations luksFormat et config LUKS2.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2780
+msgid "Option --test-passphrase is allowed only for open of LUKS and TCRYPT devices.\n"
+msgstr "L'option --test-passphrase est autorisée uniquement pour ouvrir des périphériques LUKS et TCRYPT.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2785 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1718
+msgid "Key size must be a multiple of 8 bits"
+msgstr "La taille de la clé doit être un multiple de 8 bits"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2791 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1403
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1723
+msgid "Key slot is invalid."
+msgstr "Emplacement de clé non valide."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2798
+msgid "Option --key-file takes precedence over specified key file argument."
+msgstr "L'option --key-file est prioritaire par rapport à un fichier de clé spécifié en argument."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2805 src/veritysetup.c:544 src/integritysetup.c:640
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1697
+msgid "Negative number for option not permitted."
+msgstr "Nombre négatif non autorisé pour l'option."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2809
+msgid "Only one --key-file argument is allowed."
+msgstr "Un seul argument --key-file est autorisé."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2813 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1689
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1727
+msgid "Only one of --use-[u]random options is allowed."
+msgstr "Seule une des deux possibilités --use-[u]random est autorisée."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2817
+msgid "Option --use-[u]random is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgstr "L'option --use-[u]random est autorisée seulement avec luksFormat."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2821
+msgid "Option --uuid is allowed only for luksFormat and luksUUID."
+msgstr "L'option --uuid est autorisée seulement avec luksFormat et luksUUID."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2825
+msgid "Option --align-payload is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgstr "L'option --align-payload est autorisée uniquement avec luksFormat."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2829
+msgid "Options --luks2-metadata-size and --opt-luks2-keyslots-size are allowed only for luksFormat with LUKS2."
+msgstr "Les options --luks2-metadata-size et --opt-luks2-keyslots-size sont permises uniquement pour luksFormat avec LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2834
+msgid "Invalid LUKS2 metadata size specification."
+msgstr "Spécification de taille de métadonnées LUKS2 invalide."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2838
+msgid "Invalid LUKS2 keyslots size specification."
+msgstr "Spécification de taille d'emplacements de clés LUKS2 invalide."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2842
+msgid "Option --align-payload and --offset cannot be combined."
+msgstr "Les options --align-payload et --offset ne peuvent pas être combinées."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2848
+msgid "Option --skip is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices.\n"
+msgstr "L'option --skip est supportée uniquement pour ouvrir des périphériques ordinaires et loopaes.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2855
+msgid "Option --offset is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices and for luksFormat.\n"
+msgstr "L'option --offset est supportée uniquement pour ouvrir des périphériques ordinaires et loopaes et pour luksFormat.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2861
+msgid "Option --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system or --tcrypt-backup is supported only for TCRYPT device.\n"
+msgstr "Les options --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system ou --tcrypt-backup sont supportées seulement pour un périphérique TCRYPT.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2866
+msgid "Option --tcrypt-hidden cannot be combined with --allow-discards.\n"
+msgstr "L'option --tcrypt-hidden ne peut pas être combinée avec --allow-discards.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2871
+msgid "Option --veracrypt is supported only for TCRYPT device type.\n"
+msgstr "L'option --veracrypt est uniquement supportée pour un périphérique de type TCRYPT.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2877
+msgid "Invalid argument for parameter --veracrypt-pim supplied.\n"
+msgstr "Argument invalide fourni pour le paramètre --veracrypt-pim.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2881
+msgid "Option --veracrypt-pim is supported only for VeraCrypt compatible devices.\n"
+msgstr "L'option --veracrypt-pim est uniquement supportée pour un périphérique compatible avec VeraCrypt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2889
+msgid "Option --veracrypt-query-pim is supported only for VeraCrypt compatible devices.\n"
+msgstr "L'option --veracrypt-query-pim est uniquement supportée pour un périphérique compatible avec VeraCrypt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2893
+msgid "The options --veracrypt-pim and --veracrypt-query-pim are mutually exclusive.\n"
+msgstr "Les options --veracrypt-pim et --veracrypt-query-pim sont mutuellement exclusives.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2900
+msgid "Option --priority can be only ignore/normal/prefer.\n"
+msgstr "L'option --priority peut uniquement être ignore/normal/prefer.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2905
+msgid "Keyslot specification is required.\n"
+msgstr "Une spécification d'emplacement de clé est requise.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2910 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1703
+msgid "Password-based key derivation function (PBKDF) can be only pbkdf2 or argon2i/argon2id.\n"
+msgstr "La fonction de dérivation d'une clé basée sur un mot de passe (PBKDF = Password-Based Key Derivation Function) peut uniquement être pbkdf2 ou argon2i/argon2id.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2915 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1708
+msgid "PBKDF forced iterations cannot be combined with iteration time option.\n"
+msgstr "Les itérations forcées de PBKDF ne peuvent pas être combinées avec l'option de temps d'itération.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2921
+msgid "Sector size option is not supported for this command.\n"
+msgstr "L'option de taille de secteur n'est pas supportée pour cette commande.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2927
+msgid "Unsupported encryption sector size.\n"
+msgstr "Taille de secteur de chiffrement non supportée.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2932
+msgid "Key size is required with --unbound option.\n"
+msgstr "La taille de clé est requise avec l'option --unbound.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2937
+msgid "Option --unbound may be used only with luksAddKey action.\n"
+msgstr "L'option --unbound peut uniquement être utilisée avec l'action luksAddKey.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2942
+msgid "Option --refresh may be used only with open action.\n"
+msgstr "L'option --refresh peut uniquement être utilisée avec l'action open.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2953
+msgid "Cannot disable metadata locking.\n"
+msgstr "Impossible de désactiver le verrouillage des métadonnées.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:67
+msgid "Invalid salt string specified."
+msgstr "Chaîne d'aléa spécifiée invalide."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:98
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create hash image %s for writing."
+msgstr "Impossible de créer l'image de hachage %s en écriture."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:108
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create FEC image %s for writing."
+msgstr "Impossible de créer l'image FEC %s en écriture."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:178
+msgid "Invalid root hash string specified."
+msgstr "Chaîne de hachage racine invalide."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:360
+msgid "<data_device> <hash_device>"
+msgstr "<périph_données> <périph_hachage>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:360 src/integritysetup.c:462
+msgid "format device"
+msgstr "formater le périphérique"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:361
+msgid "<data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgstr "<périph_données> <périph_hachage> <hachage_racine>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:361
+msgid "verify device"
+msgstr "vérifier le périphérique"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:362
+msgid "<data_device> <name> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgstr "<périph_données> <nom> <périph_hachage> <hachage_racine>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:362 src/integritysetup.c:463
+msgid "open device as <name>"
+msgstr "ouvrir le périphérique comme <nom>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:363 src/integritysetup.c:464
+msgid "close device (deactivate and remove mapping)"
+msgstr "fermeture du périphérique (désactive et supprime le « mapping »)"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:364 src/integritysetup.c:465
+msgid "show active device status"
+msgstr "afficher le statut du périphérique actif"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:365
+msgid "<hash_device>"
+msgstr "<périph_hachage>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:365 src/integritysetup.c:466
+msgid "show on-disk information"
+msgstr "afficher les informations sur le disque"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:384
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<data_device> is the data device\n"
+"<hash_device> is the device containing verification data\n"
+"<root_hash> hash of the root node on <hash_device>\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<nom> est le périphérique à créer sous %s\n"
+"<périph_données> est le périphérique de données\n"
+"<périph_hachage> est le périphérique contenant les données de vérification\n"
+"<hachage_racine> hachage du nœud racine sur <périph_hachage>\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:391
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in dm-verity parameters:\n"
+"\tHash: %s, Data block (bytes): %u, Hash block (bytes): %u, Salt size: %u, Hash format: %u\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Paramètres compilés par défaut dans dm-verity :\n"
+"\tHachage: %s, Bloc données (octets): %u, Bloc hachage (octets): %u, Taille aléa: %u, Format hachage: %u\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:429
+msgid "Do not use verity superblock"
+msgstr "Ne pas utiliser le superbloc de verity"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:430
+msgid "Format type (1 - normal, 0 - original Chrome OS)"
+msgstr "Type de format (1: normal ; 0: Chrome OS)"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:430
+msgid "number"
+msgstr "nombre"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:431
+msgid "Block size on the data device"
+msgstr "Taille de bloc sur le périphérique de données"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:432
+msgid "Block size on the hash device"
+msgstr "Taille de bloc sur le périphérique de hachage"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:433
+msgid "FEC parity bytes"
+msgstr "Octets de parité FEC"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:434
+msgid "The number of blocks in the data file"
+msgstr "Le nombre de blocs dans le fichier de données"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:434
+msgid "blocks"
+msgstr "blocs"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:435
+msgid "Path to device with error correction data"
+msgstr "Chemin vers le périphérique avec les données de correction d'erreurs"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:435 src/integritysetup.c:528
+msgid "path"
+msgstr "chemin"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:436
+msgid "Starting offset on the hash device"
+msgstr "Décalage de départ sur le périphérique de hachage"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:437
+msgid "Starting offset on the FEC device"
+msgstr "Décalage de départ sur le périphérique FEC"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:438
+msgid "Hash algorithm"
+msgstr "Algorithme de hachage"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:438
+msgid "string"
+msgstr "chaîne"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:439
+msgid "Salt"
+msgstr "Aléa"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:439
+msgid "hex string"
+msgstr "chaîne hexa"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:441
+msgid "Restart kernel if corruption is detected"
+msgstr "Redémarrer le noyau si une corruption est détectée"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:442
+msgid "Ignore corruption, log it only"
+msgstr "Ignore la corruption, elle est seulement enregistrée dans le journal"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:443
+msgid "Do not verify zeroed blocks"
+msgstr "Ne pas vérifier les blocs mis à zéro"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:444
+msgid "Verify data block only the first time it is read"
+msgstr "Vérifier le bloc de données uniquement à la première lecture"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:550
+msgid "Option --ignore-corruption, --restart-on-corruption or --ignore-zero-blocks is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "L'option --ignore-corruption, --restart-on-corruption ou --ignore-zero-blocks est seulement permise pour une opération d'ouverture.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:555
+msgid "Option --ignore-corruption and --restart-on-corruption cannot be used together.\n"
+msgstr "Les options --ignore-corruption et --restart-on-corruption ne peuvent être utilisées ensembles.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:82 src/utils_password.c:298
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Impossible de lire le fichier de clé %s."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:86 src/utils_password.c:302
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read %d bytes from keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Échec à la lecture de %d octets du fichier de clé %s."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:248
+#, c-format
+msgid "Formatted with tag size %u, internal integrity %s.\n"
+msgstr "Formaté avec une taille de balise de %u, intégrité interne %s.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:462 src/integritysetup.c:466
+msgid "<integrity_device>"
+msgstr "<périph_intégrité>"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:463
+msgid "<integrity_device> <name>"
+msgstr "<périph_intégrigé> <nom>"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:485
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<integrity_device> is the device containing data with integrity tags\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<nom> est le périphérique à créer sous %s\n"
+"<périph_intégrité> est le périphérique contenant les données avec les balises d'intégrité\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:490
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in dm-integrity parameters:\n"
+"\tTag size: %u bytes, Checksum algorithm: %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Paramètres compilés par défaut dans dm-integrity :\n"
+"\tTaille d'étiquette : %u octets, Algorithme de somme de contrôle : %s\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:528
+msgid "Path to data device (if separated)"
+msgstr "Chemin vers le périphérique de données (si séparé)"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:530
+msgid "Journal size"
+msgstr "Taille du journal"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:531
+msgid "Interleave sectors"
+msgstr "Secteurs d'entrelacement"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:532
+msgid "Journal watermark"
+msgstr "Filigrane du journal"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:532
+msgid "percent"
+msgstr "pourcent"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:533
+msgid "Journal commit time"
+msgstr "Temps pour écrire le journal"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:533
+msgid "ms"
+msgstr "ms"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:534
+msgid "Tag size (per-sector)"
+msgstr "Taille de balise (par secteur)"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:535
+msgid "Sector size"
+msgstr "Taille de secteur"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:536
+msgid "Buffers size"
+msgstr "Taille des tampons"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:538
+msgid "Data integrity algorithm"
+msgstr "Algorithme d'intégrité des données"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:539
+msgid "The size of the data integrity key"
+msgstr "La taille de la clé d'intégrité des données"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:540
+msgid "Read the integrity key from a file"
+msgstr "Lire la clef d'intégrité depuis un fichier"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:542
+msgid "Journal integrity algorithm"
+msgstr "Algorithme d'intégrité du journal"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:543
+msgid "The size of the journal integrity key"
+msgstr "La taille de la clé du journal d'intégrité"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:544
+msgid "Read the journal integrity key from a file"
+msgstr "Lire la clé du journal d'intégrité depuis un fichier"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:546
+msgid "Journal encryption algorithm"
+msgstr "Algorithme de chiffrement du journal"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:547
+msgid "The size of the journal encryption key"
+msgstr "La taille de la clé de chiffrement du journal"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:548
+msgid "Read the journal encryption key from a file"
+msgstr "Lire la clé de chiffrement du journal depuis un fichier"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:551
+msgid "Recovery mode (no journal, no tag checking)"
+msgstr "Mode récupération (pas de journal, pas de vérification des balises)"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:552
+msgid "Recalculate initial tags automatically."
+msgstr "Recalculer les balises initiales automatiquement."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:631
+msgid "Option --integrity-recalculate can be used only for open action."
+msgstr "L'option --integrity-recalculate peut uniquement être utilisée avec l'action open."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:646
+msgid "Options --journal-size, --interleave-sectors, --sector-size, --tag-size and --no-wipe can be used only for format action.\n"
+msgstr "Les options --journal-size, --interleave-sectors, --sector-size, --tag-size et --no-wipe peuvent uniquement être utilisée avec l'action de format.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:652
+msgid "Invalid journal size specification."
+msgstr "La spécification de la taille du journal est invalide."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:657
+msgid "Both key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "Les options du fichier de clé et de la taille de la clé doivent être spécifiées toutes les deux."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:660
+msgid "Integrity algorithm must be specified if integrity key is used."
+msgstr "L'algorithme d'intégrité doit être spécifié si la clé d'intégrité est utilisée."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:665
+msgid "Both journal integrity key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "Les options du fichier de clé de l'intégrité du journal et de la taille de la clé doivent être spécifiées toutes les deux."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:668
+msgid "Journal integrity algorithm must be specified if journal integrity key is used."
+msgstr "L'algorithme d'intégrité du journal doit être spécifié si la clé d'intégrité du journal est utilisée."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:673
+msgid "Both journal encryption key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "Les options du fichier de clé de chiffrement du journal et de la taille de la clé doivent être spécifiées toutes les deux."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:676
+msgid "Journal encryption algorithm must be specified if journal encryption key is used."
+msgstr "L'algorithme de chiffrement du journal doit être spécifié si la clé de chiffrement du journal est utilisée."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:175
+msgid "Reencryption already in-progress."
+msgstr "Re-chiffrement déjà en cours."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:181
+msgid "Reencryption of device with integrity profile is not supported."
+msgstr "Le re-chiffrement d'un périphérique avec un profil d'intégrité n'est pas supporté."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:204
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot exclusively open %s, device in use."
+msgstr "Impossible d'ouvrir exclusivement %s : périphérique utilisé."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:218 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1148
+msgid "Allocation of aligned memory failed."
+msgstr "La réservation de la mémoire alignée a échoué."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:225
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read device %s."
+msgstr "Impossible de lire le périphérique %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:236
+#, c-format
+msgid "Marking LUKS1 device %s unusable."
+msgstr "Marque le périphérique LUKS1 %s comme inutilisable."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:240
+#, c-format
+msgid "Setting LUKS2 offline reencrypt flag on device %s."
+msgstr "Activation du fanion de re-chiffrement hors-ligne de LUKS2 sur le périphérique %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:257
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write device %s."
+msgstr "Impossible d'écrire le périphérique %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:345
+msgid "Cannot write reencryption log file."
+msgstr "Impossible d'écrire le journal de re-chiffrement."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:401
+msgid "Cannot read reencryption log file."
+msgstr "Impossible de lire le journal de re-chiffrement."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:439
+#, c-format
+msgid "Log file %s exists, resuming reencryption.\n"
+msgstr "Fichier journal %s existe. Reprise du re-chiffrement.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:488
+msgid "Activating temporary device using old LUKS header."
+msgstr "Activation du périphérique temporaire en utilisant l'ancien en-tête LUKS."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:498
+msgid "Activating temporary device using new LUKS header."
+msgstr "Activation du périphérique temporaire un utilisant le nouvel en-tête LUKS."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:508
+msgid "Activation of temporary devices failed."
+msgstr "Échec de l'activation des périphériques temporaires."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:586
+msgid "Failed to set PBKDF parameters."
+msgstr "Impossible de définir les paramètres PBKDF."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:592
+msgid "Failed to set data offset."
+msgstr "Impossible de définir les offsets des données."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:600
+#, c-format
+msgid "New LUKS header for device %s created."
+msgstr "Nouvel en-tête LUKS créé pour le périphérique %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:660
+#, c-format
+msgid "This version of cryptsetup-reencrypt can't handle new internal token type %s."
+msgstr "Cette version de cryptsetup-reencrypt ne gère pas le nouveau type de jeton interne %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:682
+msgid "Failed to read activation flags from backup header."
+msgstr "Échec lors de la lecture des fanions d'activation depuis l'en-tête de sauvegarde."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:686
+msgid "Failed to write activation flags to new header."
+msgstr "Échec lors de l'écriture des fanions d'activation dans le nouvel en-tête."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:690 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:694
+msgid "Failed to read requirements from backup header."
+msgstr "Échec lors de la lecture des exigences de l'en-tête de sauvegarde."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:731
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s header backup of device %s created."
+msgstr "Sauvegarde de l'en-tête %s du périphérique %s créée."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:789
+msgid "Creation of LUKS backup headers failed."
+msgstr "La création de la sauvegarde des en-têtes LUKS a échoué."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:918
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot restore %s header on device %s."
+msgstr "Impossible de rétablir l'en-tête %s sur le périphérique %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:920
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s header on device %s restored."
+msgstr "En-tête %s rétabli sur le périphérique %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:958 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1038
+msgid "Cannot seek to device offset."
+msgstr "Impossible de se déplacer au décalage du périphérique."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1081
+msgid "Cannot seek to device offset.\n"
+msgstr "Impossible de se déplacer au décalage du périphérique.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1120 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1126
+msgid "Cannot open temporary LUKS device."
+msgstr "Impossible d'ouvrir le périphérique LUKS temporaire."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1131 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1136
+msgid "Cannot get device size."
+msgstr "Impossible d'obtenir la taille du périphérique."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1173
+msgid "Interrupted by a signal."
+msgstr "Interrompu par un signal."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1175
+msgid "IO error during reencryption."
+msgstr "Erreur E/S pendant le re-chiffrement."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1206
+msgid "Provided UUID is invalid."
+msgstr "Le UUID fourni est invalide."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1309
+msgid "Key file can be used only with --key-slot or with exactly one key slot active."
+msgstr "Le fichier de clé peut uniquement être utilisé avec --key-slot ou avec exactement un seul emplacement de clé actif."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1350 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1361
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for key slot %u: "
+msgstr "Entrez la phrase secrète pour l'emplacement de clé %u : "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1432
+msgid "Cannot open reencryption log file."
+msgstr "Impossible d'ouvrir le journal de re-chiffrement."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1438
+msgid "No decryption in progress, provided UUID can be used only to resume suspended decryption process."
+msgstr "Pas de déchiffrement en cours. Le UUID fourni ne peut être utilisé que pour reprendre un déchiffrement suspendu."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1513
+#, c-format
+msgid "Changed pbkdf parameters in keyslot %i."
+msgstr "Les paramètres pbkdf ont été changés dans l'emplacement de clé %i."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1620
+msgid "Reencryption block size"
+msgstr "Taille de bloc de re-chiffrement"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1620
+msgid "MiB"
+msgstr "MiB"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1624
+msgid "Do not change key, no data area reencryption"
+msgstr "Ne pas changer la clé, pas de re-chiffrement de la zone de donnée"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1626
+msgid "Read new volume (master) key from file"
+msgstr "Lire la nouvelle clé (maîtresse) du volume depuis un fichier"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1627
+msgid "PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS (in ms)"
+msgstr "Temps d'itération de PBKDF2 pour LUKS (en ms)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1633
+msgid "Use direct-io when accessing devices"
+msgstr "Utiliser direct-io pour accéder aux périphériques"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1634
+msgid "Use fsync after each block"
+msgstr "Utiliser fsync après chaque bloc"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1635
+msgid "Update log file after every block"
+msgstr "Mettre le journal à jour après chaque bloc"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1636
+msgid "Use only this slot (others will be disabled)"
+msgstr "Utiliser uniquement cet emplacement (les autres seront désactivés)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1639
+msgid "Reduce data device size (move data offset). DANGEROUS!"
+msgstr "Réduire la taille des données du périphérique (déplace le décalage des données). DANGEREUX !"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1640
+msgid "Use only specified device size (ignore rest of device). DANGEROUS!"
+msgstr "Utiliser uniquement la taille demandée du périphérique (ignore le reste du périphérique). DANGEREUX !"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1641
+msgid "Create new header on not encrypted device"
+msgstr "Créer un nouvel en-tête sur le périphérique non chiffré"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1642
+msgid "Permanently decrypt device (remove encryption)"
+msgstr "Déchiffrer le périphérique de manière permanente (supprime le chiffrement)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1643
+msgid "The UUID used to resume decryption"
+msgstr "Le UUID utilisé pour poursuivre le déchiffrement"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1644
+msgid "Type of LUKS metadata: luks1, luks2"
+msgstr "Type de métadonnées LUKS: luks1, luks2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1663
+msgid "[OPTION...] <device>"
+msgstr "[OPTION...] <périph>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1677
+#, c-format
+msgid "Reencryption will change: %s%s%s%s%s%s."
+msgstr "Le re-chiffrement va changer : %s%s%s%s%s%s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1678
+msgid "volume key"
+msgstr "clé de volume"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1680
+msgid "set hash to "
+msgstr "change hachage en "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1681
+msgid ", set cipher to "
+msgstr ", change chiffrement en "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1685
+msgid "Argument required."
+msgstr "Argument requis."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1713
+msgid "Only values between 1 MiB and 64 MiB allowed for reencryption block size."
+msgstr "Seules les valeurs entre 1 MiB et 64 MiB sont permises pour la taille des blocs de re-chiffrement."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1732 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1737
+msgid "Invalid device size specification."
+msgstr "La taille de périphérique spécifiée est invalide."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1740
+msgid "Maximum device reduce size is 64 MiB."
+msgstr "La taille maximum réduite pour le périphérique est 64 MiB."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1743
+msgid "Reduce size must be multiple of 512 bytes sector."
+msgstr "La taille réduite doit être un multiple d'un secteur de 512 octets."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1747
+msgid "Option --new must be used together with --reduce-device-size or --header."
+msgstr "L'option --new doit être utilisée avec --reduce-device-size ou --header."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1751
+msgid "Option --keep-key can be used only with --hash, --iter-time or --pbkdf-force-iterations."
+msgstr "L'option --keep-key ne peut être utilisée que avec --hash, --iter-time ou --pbkdf-force-iterations²."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1755
+msgid "Option --new cannot be used together with --decrypt."
+msgstr "L'option --new ne peut pas être utilisée avec --decrypt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1759
+msgid "Option --decrypt is incompatible with specified parameters."
+msgstr "L'option --decrypt est incompatible avec les paramètres spécifiés."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1763
+msgid "Option --uuid is allowed only together with --decrypt."
+msgstr "L'option --uuid ne peut être utilisée qu'avec --decrypt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1767
+msgid "Invalid luks type. Use one of these: 'luks', 'luks1' or 'luks2'."
+msgstr "Type luks invalide. Utilisez « luks », « luks1 » ou « luks2 »."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:150
+msgid "Error reading response from terminal."
+msgstr "Erreur de lecture de la réponse depuis le terminal."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:175
+msgid "Command successful.\n"
+msgstr "Opération réussie.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:183
+msgid "wrong or missing parameters"
+msgstr "paramètres erronés ou manquants"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:185
+msgid "no permission or bad passphrase"
+msgstr "Aucune permission ou mauvais mot de passe"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:187
+msgid "out of memory"
+msgstr "mémoire épuisée"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:189
+msgid "wrong device or file specified"
+msgstr "mauvais périphérique ou fichier spécifié"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:191
+msgid "device already exists or device is busy"
+msgstr "le périphérique existe déjà ou est utilisé"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:193
+msgid "unknown error"
+msgstr "erreur inconnue"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:195
+#, c-format
+msgid "Command failed with code %i (%s).\n"
+msgstr "La commande a échoué avec le code %i (%s).\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:272
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %i created."
+msgstr "Emplacement de clef %i créé."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:274
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %i unlocked."
+msgstr "Emplacement de clé %i déverrouillé."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:276
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %i removed."
+msgstr "Emplacement de clé %i supprimé."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:285
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %i created."
+msgstr "Jeton %i créé."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:287
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %i removed."
+msgstr "Jeton %i supprimé."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:453
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Device %s already contains a '%s' partition signature.\n"
+msgstr "ATTENTION: Le périphérique %s contient déjà une signature pour une partition « %s ».\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:461
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Device %s already contains a '%s' superblock signature.\n"
+msgstr "ATTENTION: Le périphérique %s contient déjà une signature pour un superblock « %s ».\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:482 src/utils_tools.c:546
+msgid "Failed to initialize device signature probes."
+msgstr "Impossible d'initialiser les sondes de la signature du périphérique."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:526
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to stat device %s."
+msgstr "Impossible d'exécuter « stat » sur le périphérique %s."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:539
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is in use. Can not proceed with format operation."
+msgstr "Le périphérique %s est utilisé. Impossible de continuer avec l'opération de formatage."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:541
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to open file %s in read/write mode."
+msgstr "Impossible d'ouvrir le fichier %s en mode lecture/écriture."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:561
+msgid "Failed to wipe device signature."
+msgstr "Impossible d'effacer la signature du périphérique."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:568
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to probe device %s for a signature."
+msgstr "Impossible de sonder le périphérique %s pour une signature."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:43 src/utils_password.c:75
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot check password quality: %s"
+msgstr "Ne peut vérifier la qualité du mot de passe : %s"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:51
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Password quality check failed:\n"
+" %s"
+msgstr ""
+"Échec de la vérification de la qualité du mot de passe :\n"
+" %s"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:83
+#, c-format
+msgid "Password quality check failed: Bad passphrase (%s)"
+msgstr "Échec de la vérification de la qualité du mot de passe : Mauvais mot de passe (%s)"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:193 src/utils_password.c:208
+msgid "Error reading passphrase from terminal."
+msgstr "Erreur de lecture de la phrase secrète depuis la console."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:206
+msgid "Verify passphrase: "
+msgstr "Vérifiez la phrase secrète : "
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:213
+msgid "Passphrases do not match."
+msgstr "Les phrases secrètes ne sont pas identiques."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:250
+msgid "Cannot use offset with terminal input."
+msgstr "Le décalage n'est pas possible si l'entrée provient de la console."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:253
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase: "
+msgstr "Saisissez la phrase secrète : "
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:255
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for %s: "
+msgstr "Saisissez la phrase secrète pour %s : "
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:285
+msgid "No key available with this passphrase."
+msgstr "Aucune clé disponible avec cette phrase secrète."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:320
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open keyfile %s for write."
+msgstr "Impossible d'ouvrir le fichier de clé %s en écriture."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:327
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write to keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Impossible d'écrire dans le fichier de clé %s."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:47
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to open file %s in read-only mode."
+msgstr "Impossible d'ouvrir le fichier %s en lecture seule."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:60
+msgid "Provide valid LUKS2 token JSON:\n"
+msgstr "Fournissez le jeton LUKS valide au format JSON:\n"
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:67
+msgid "Failed to read JSON file."
+msgstr "Impossible de lire le fichier JSON."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:72
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Read interrupted."
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Lecture interrompue."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:113
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to open file %s in write mode."
+msgstr "Impossible d'ouvrir le fichier %s en écriture seule."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:122
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Write interrupted."
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Écriture interrompue."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:126
+msgid "Failed to write JSON file."
+msgstr "Erreur lors de l'écriture du fichier JSON."
+
+#~ msgid "Device %s is too small. (LUKS2 requires at least %<PRIu64> bytes.)"
+#~ msgstr "Le périphérique %s est trop petit (LUKS2 a besoin d'au moins %<PRIu64> octets)."
+
+#~ msgid "Replaced with key slot %d."
+#~ msgstr "Remplacé par l'emplacement de clé %d."
+
+#~ msgid "Missing LUKS target type, option --type is required."
+#~ msgstr "Type de cible LUKS manquant, l'option --type est requise."
+
+#~ msgid "Missing --token option specifying token for removal."
+#~ msgstr "Il manque l'option --token pour spécifier le jeton à retirer."
+
+#~ msgid "Failed to remove token %d."
+#~ msgstr "Échec lors du retrait du jeton %d."
+
+#~ msgid "Add or remove keyring token"
+#~ msgstr "Ajoute ou retire le jeton du porte-clé"
+
+#~ msgid "Activated keyslot %i."
+#~ msgstr "Emplacement de clé activé %i."
+
+#~ msgid "memory allocation error in action_luksFormat"
+#~ msgstr "erreur d'allocation de mémoire dans action_luksFormat"
+
+#~ msgid "Key slot is invalid.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Emplacement de clé non valide.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Using default pbkdf parameters for new LUKS2 header.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Utilisation des paramètres pbkdf par défaut pour le nouvel en-tête LUKS2.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Too many tree levels for verity volume.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Trop de niveaux dans l'arborescence du volume verity.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Key %d not active. Can't wipe.\n"
+#~ msgstr "La clé %d n'est pas active. Impossible de l'effacer.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "<name> <data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+#~ msgstr "<nom> <périph_données> <périph_hachage> <hachage_racine>"
+
+#~ msgid "create active device"
+#~ msgstr "créer le périphérique actif"
+
+#~ msgid "remove (deactivate) device"
+#~ msgstr "supprime (désactive) le périphérique"
+
+#~ msgid "Progress: %5.1f%%, ETA %02llu:%02llu, %4llu MiB written, speed %5.1f MiB/s%s"
+#~ msgstr "Progression: %5.1f%%, ETA %02llu:%02llu, %4llu MiB écrits, vitesse %5.1f MIB/s%s"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot find a free loopback device.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Impossible de trouver un périphérique loopback libre.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot open device %s\n"
+#~ msgstr "Impossible d'ouvrir le périphérique %s\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot use passed UUID unless decryption in progress.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Le UUID passé ne peut pas être utilisé à moins qu'un déchiffrement ne soit en cours.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Marking LUKS device %s usable.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Marque le périphérique LUKS %s comme utilisable.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "WARNING: this is experimental code, it can completely break your data.\n"
+#~ msgstr "ATTENTION : ce code est expérimental. Il peut complètement détruire vos données.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "FIPS checksum verification failed.\n"
+#~ msgstr "La vérification de la somme de contrôle FIPS a échoué.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "WARNING: device %s is a partition, for TCRYPT system encryption you usually need to use whole block device path.\n"
+#~ msgstr "ATTENTION : le périphérique %s est une partition. Pour le chiffrement de système TCRYPT, vous avez généralement besoin du chemin d'un périphérique bloc entier.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Kernel doesn't support plain64 IV.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Le noyau ne supporte pas plain64 IV.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Enter LUKS passphrase: "
+#~ msgstr "Saisissez la phrase secrète LUKS : "
+
+#~ msgid "Enter new LUKS passphrase: "
+#~ msgstr "Entrez la nouvelle phrase secrète LUKS : "
+
+#~ msgid "Enter any LUKS passphrase: "
+#~ msgstr "Entrez n'importe quelle phrase secrète LUKS : "
+
+#~ msgid "Backup file %s doesn't exist.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Le fichier de sauvegarde %s n'existe pas.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "create device"
+#~ msgstr "créer un périphérique"
+
+#~ msgid "remove device"
+#~ msgstr "retirer le périphérique"
+
+#~ msgid "remove LUKS mapping"
+#~ msgstr "retire une association LUKS"
+
+#~ msgid "open loop-AES device as mapping <name>"
+#~ msgstr "ouvre un périphérique loop-AES avec pour nom associé <nom>"
+
+#~ msgid "remove loop-AES mapping"
+#~ msgstr "enlève une association loop-AES"
+
+#~ msgid "Key slot %d verified.\n"
+#~ msgstr "L'emplacement de clé %d a été vérifié.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot open device %s for %s%s access.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Impossible d'ouvrir le périphérique %s pour un accès %s%s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "exclusive "
+#~ msgstr "exclusif "
+
+#~ msgid "writable"
+#~ msgstr "en écriture"
+
+#~ msgid "read-only"
+#~ msgstr "en lecture seule"
+
+#~ msgid "WARNING!!! Possibly insecure memory. Are you root?\n"
+#~ msgstr "ATTENTION !!! La mémoire n'est peut-être pas sécurisée. Êtes-vous super-utilisateur ?\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Negative keyfile size not permitted.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Taille négative de fichier de clé non autorisée.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Unable to obtain sector size for %s"
+#~ msgstr "Impossible d'obtenir la taille de secteur de %s"
+
+#~ msgid "Block mode XTS is available since kernel 2.6.24.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Le mode \"bloc\" XTS est disponible depuis le noyau 2.6.24.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Key size in LRW mode must be 256 or 512 bits.\n"
+#~ msgstr "La taille de la clé en mode LRW doit être un multiple de 256 ou 512 bits.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Block mode LRW is available since kernel 2.6.20.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Le mode \"bloc\" LRW est disponible depuis le noyau 2.6.20.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Warning: exhausting read requested, but key file is not a regular file, function might never return.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Attention : requête de lecture, mais le fichier de clef n'est pas régulier, la procédure peut rester bloquée.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot find compatible device-mapper kernel modules.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Impossible de trouver des modules noyau compatibles avec device-mapper.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot open device: %s\n"
+#~ msgstr "Impossible d'ouvrir le périphérique : %s\n"
+
+#~ msgid "BLKROGET failed on device %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "BLKROGET a échoué sur le périphérique %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "BLKGETSIZE failed on device %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "BLKGETSIZE a échoué sur le périphérique %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "identical to luksKillSlot - DEPRECATED - see man page"
+#~ msgstr "identique à luksKillSlot - OBSOLÈTE - voir la page de man"
+
+#~ msgid "modify active device - DEPRECATED - see man page"
+#~ msgstr "modifier le périphérique actif - OBSOLÈTE - voir la page de man"
+
+#~ msgid ""
+#~ "The reload action is deprecated. Please use \"dmsetup reload\" in case you really need this functionality.\n"
+#~ "WARNING: do not use reload to touch LUKS devices. If that is the case, hit Ctrl-C now.\n"
+#~ msgstr ""
+#~ "L'action « reload » est obsolète. Merci d'utiliser « dmsetup reload » si vous avez vraiment besoin de cette fonctionnalité.\n"
+#~ "ATTENTION : n'utilisez pas « reload » sur des périphériques LUKS. Si c'est le cas, tapez Ctrl-C.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Obsolete option --non-exclusive is ignored.\n"
+#~ msgstr "L'option obsolète --non-exclusive est ignorée.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Read the key from a file (can be /dev/random)"
+#~ msgstr "Lit la clé depuis un fichier (qui peut être /dev/random)"
+
+#~ msgid "(Obsoleted, see man page.)"
+#~ msgstr "(Obsolète, voir la page de man)."
diff --git a/po/id.po b/po/id.po
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bd56880
--- /dev/null
+++ b/po/id.po
@@ -0,0 +1,815 @@
+# Pesan bahasa Indonesia untuk cryptsetup.
+# Copyright (C) 2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+# This file is put in the public domain.
+# Arif E. Nugroho <arif_endro@yahoo.com>, 2009, 2010.
+#
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: cryptsetup 1.1.0-rc4\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: dm-crypt@saout.de\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2009-12-30 20:09+0100\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2010-01-27 07:30+0700\n"
+"Last-Translator: Arif E. Nugroho <arif_endro@yahoo.com>\n"
+"Language-Team: Indonesian <translation-team-id@lists.sourceforge.net>\n"
+"X-Bugs: Report translation errors to the Language-Team address.\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:48
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper. Is dm_mod kernel module loaded?\n"
+msgstr "Tidak dapat menginisialisasi pemeta-perangkat. Apakah kernel modul dm_mod telah dimuat?\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:304
+#, c-format
+msgid "DM-UUID for device %s was truncated.\n"
+msgstr "DM-UUID untuk perangkat %s telah terpotong.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:103
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot not read %d bytes from key file %s.\n"
+msgstr "Tidak dapat membaca %d bytes dari berkas kunci %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:115
+msgid "Key processing error.\n"
+msgstr "Terjadi kesalahan dalam pengolahan kunci.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:169
+msgid "All key slots full.\n"
+msgstr "Semua slot kunci telah penuh.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:176 lib/setup.c:304 lib/setup.c:778
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select between 0 and %d.\n"
+msgstr "Slot kunci %d tidak valid, mohon pilih diantara 0 dan %d.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:182
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is full, please select another one.\n"
+msgstr "Slot kunci %d penuh, mohon pilih yang lain.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:201
+msgid "Enter any remaining LUKS passphrase: "
+msgstr "Masukan kata sandi LUKS yang tersisa: "
+
+#: lib/setup.c:222
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d verified.\n"
+msgstr "Slot kunci %d telah terverifikasi.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:257
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot get info about device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Tidak dapat mendapatkan informasi mengenai perangkat %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:264
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s has zero size.\n"
+msgstr "Perangkat %s memiliki ukuran nol.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:268
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small.\n"
+msgstr "Perangkat %s terlalu kecil.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:293
+msgid "Enter LUKS passphrase to be deleted: "
+msgstr "Masukan kata sandi LUKS yang akan dihapus: "
+
+#: lib/setup.c:299
+#, c-format
+msgid "key slot %d selected for deletion.\n"
+msgstr "slot kunci %d terpilih untuk penghapusan.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:310
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key %d not active. Can't wipe.\n"
+msgstr "Kunci %d tidak aktif. Tidak dapat menghapus.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:316
+msgid "This is the last keyslot. Device will become unusable after purging this key."
+msgstr "Ini adalah slot kunci terakhir. Perangkat mungkin akan menjadi tidak stabil setelah menghapus kunci ini."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:364 lib/setup.c:1651 lib/setup.c:1704 lib/setup.c:1761
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s already exists.\n"
+msgstr "Perangkat %s telah ada.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:369
+#, c-format
+msgid "Invalid key size %d.\n"
+msgstr "Besar kunci %d tidak valid.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:471 lib/setup.c:1656
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for %s: "
+msgstr "Masukan kata sandi untuk %s: "
+
+#: lib/setup.c:600 lib/setup.c:628 lib/setup.c:1365 lib/setup.c:1712
+msgid "Enter passphrase: "
+msgstr "Masukan kata sandi: "
+
+#: lib/setup.c:661 lib/setup.c:1040 lib/setup.c:1803
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not active.\n"
+msgstr "Perangkat %s tidak aktif.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:770
+msgid "No known cipher specification pattern detected.\n"
+msgstr "Tidak ada pola spesifikasi cipher yang dikenal terdeteksi.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:784
+msgid "Enter LUKS passphrase: "
+msgstr "Masukan kata sandi LUKS: "
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1060
+msgid "Invalid plain crypt parameters.\n"
+msgstr "Parameter crypt tidak valid.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1065
+msgid "Invalid key size.\n"
+msgstr "Ukuran kunci tidak valid.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1097
+msgid "Can't format LUKS without device.\n"
+msgstr "Tidak dapat memformat LUKS tanpat perangkat.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1112
+#, c-format
+msgid "Can't wipe header on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Tidak dapat menghapus kepala di perangkat %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1154
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unknown crypt device type %s requested.\n"
+msgstr "Tipe perangkat sandi %s yang diminta tidak diketahui.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1187
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto backend.\n"
+msgstr "Tidak dapat menginisialisasi backend crypto.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1261
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not active.\n"
+msgstr "Volume %s tidak aktif.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1274
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is already suspended.\n"
+msgstr "Volume %s telah disuspend.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1300 lib/setup.c:1347 lib/setup.c:1406 lib/setup.c:1484
+#: lib/setup.c:1556 lib/setup.c:1601 lib/setup.c:1695 lib/setup.c:1752
+#: lib/setup.c:1873 lib/setup.c:1956 lib/setup.c:2056
+msgid "This operation is supported only for LUKS device.\n"
+msgstr "Operasi ini hanya didukunga untuk perangkat LUKS.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1311 lib/setup.c:1358
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not suspended.\n"
+msgstr "Volume %s tidak disuspend.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1420 lib/setup.c:1498
+msgid "Cannot add key slot, all slots disabled and no volume key provided.\n"
+msgstr "Tidak dapat menambahkan slot kunci, seluruh slot tidak aktif dan tidak ada volume kunci yang disediakan.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1429 lib/setup.c:1504 lib/setup.c:1507
+msgid "Enter any passphrase: "
+msgstr "Masukan kata sandi: "
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1448 lib/setup.c:1522 lib/setup.c:1526 lib/setup.c:1579
+msgid "Enter new passphrase for key slot: "
+msgstr "Masukan kasa sandi baru untuk slot kunci: "
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1570 lib/setup.c:1772 lib/setup.c:1884
+msgid "Volume key does not match the volume.\n"
+msgstr "Kunci volume tidak cocok dengan volume.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1607
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid.\n"
+msgstr "Slot kunci %d tidak valid.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1612
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is not used.\n"
+msgstr "Slot kunci %d tidak digunakan.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1799
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is busy.\n"
+msgstr "Perangkat %s sibuk.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1807
+#, c-format
+msgid "Invalid device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Perangkat %s tidak valid.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1831
+msgid "Volume key buffer too small.\n"
+msgstr "Penyangga kunci volume terlalu kecil.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1839
+msgid "Cannot retrieve volume key for plain device.\n"
+msgstr "Tidak dapat mendapatkan kunci volume untuk perangkat.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1861
+#, c-format
+msgid "This operation is not supported for %s crypt device.\n"
+msgstr "Operasi ini tidak didukung untuk perangkat crypt %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:416
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to open key file %s.\n"
+msgstr "Gagal membuka berkas kunci %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:436
+msgid "Error reading passphrase from terminal.\n"
+msgstr "Kesalahan dalam pembacaan kata sandi dari terminal.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:441
+msgid "Verify passphrase: "
+msgstr "Memverifikasi kata sandi: "
+
+#: lib/utils.c:443
+msgid "Passphrases do not match.\n"
+msgstr "Kata sandi tidak cocok.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:458
+msgid "Can't do passphrase verification on non-tty inputs.\n"
+msgstr "Tidak dapat melakukan verifikasi kata sandi di masukan bukan tty.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:471
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to stat key file %s.\n"
+msgstr "Gagal memperoleh data statistik berkas kunci %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:475
+#, c-format
+msgid "Warning: exhausting read requested, but key file %s is not a regular file, function might never return.\n"
+msgstr "Peringatan: pembacaan yang melelahkan diminta, tetapi berkas kunci %s bukan sebuah berkas biasa, fungsi mungkin tidak pernah kembali.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:487
+msgid "Out of memory while reading passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "Kehabisan memori ketika membaca kata sandi.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:494
+msgid "Error reading passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "Kesalahan dalam pembacaan kata sandi.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:531
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s doesn't exist or access denied.\n"
+msgstr "Perangkat %s tidak ada atau akses ditolak.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:538
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open device %s for %s%s access.\n"
+msgstr "Tidak dapat membuka perangkat %s untuk akses %s%s.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:539
+msgid "exclusive "
+msgstr "ekslusif "
+
+#: lib/utils.c:540
+msgid "writable"
+msgstr "dapat-ditulis"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:540
+msgid "read-only"
+msgstr "baca-saja"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:547
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Tidak dapat membaca perangkat %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:577
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open device: %s\n"
+msgstr "Tidak dapat membuka perangkat: %s\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:587
+#, c-format
+msgid "BLKROGET failed on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "BLKROGET gagal di perangkat %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:612
+#, c-format
+msgid "BLKGETSIZE failed on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "BLKGETSIZE gagal di perangkat %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:660
+msgid "WARNING!!! Possibly insecure memory. Are you root?\n"
+msgstr "PERINGATAN!!! Kemungkinan menggunakan memori tidak aman. Apakah anda root?\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:666
+msgid "Cannot get process priority.\n"
+msgstr "Tidak dapat mendapatkan prioritas proses.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:669 lib/utils.c:682
+#, c-format
+msgid "setpriority %u failed: %s"
+msgstr "setpriority %u gagal: %s"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:680
+msgid "Cannot unlock memory."
+msgstr "Tidak dapat membuka kunci memori."
+
+#: luks/keyencryption.c:68
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unable to obtain sector size for %s"
+msgstr "Tidak dapat mendapatkan ukuran sektor untuk %s"
+
+#: luks/keyencryption.c:137
+msgid "Failed to obtain device mapper directory."
+msgstr "Gagal untuk memperoleh direktori pemeta-perangkat."
+
+#: luks/keyencryption.c:153
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Failed to setup dm-crypt key mapping for device %s.\n"
+"Check that kernel supports %s cipher (check syslog for more info).\n"
+"%s"
+msgstr ""
+"Gagal untuk mengkonfigurasi pemetaan kunci dm-crypt untuk perangkat %s.\n"
+"Periksa apakah kernel mendukung cipher %s (periksa syslog untuk informasi lebih lanjut).\n"
+"%s"
+
+#: luks/keyencryption.c:163
+msgid "Failed to open temporary keystore device.\n"
+msgstr "Gagal untuk membuka perangkat penyimpan kunci sementara.\n"
+
+#: luks/keyencryption.c:170
+msgid "Failed to access temporary keystore device.\n"
+msgstr "Gagal untuk mengakses perangkat penyimpan kunci sementara.\n"
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:91
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested file %s already exist.\n"
+msgstr "Berkas %s yang diminta telah ada.\n"
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:111
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not LUKS device.\n"
+msgstr "Perangkat %s bukan perangkat LUKS.\n"
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:131
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write header backup file %s.\n"
+msgstr "Tidak dapat menulis berkas cadangan header %s.\n"
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:158
+#, c-format
+msgid "Backup file %s doesn't exist.\n"
+msgstr "Berkas cadangan %s tidak ada.\n"
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:166
+msgid "Backup file do not contain valid LUKS header.\n"
+msgstr "Berkas cadangan tidak berisi header LUKS yang valid.\n"
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:179
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open header backup file %s.\n"
+msgstr "Tidak dapat membuka berkas cadangan header %s.\n"
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:185
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read header backup file %s.\n"
+msgstr "Tidak dapat membaca berkas cadangan header %s.\n"
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:196
+msgid "Data offset or key size differs on device and backup, restore failed.\n"
+msgstr "Data offset atau ukuran kunci berbeda di perangkat dan cadangan, pengembalian gagal.\n"
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:204
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s %s%s"
+msgstr "Perangkat %s %s%s"
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:205
+msgid "does not contain LUKS header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device."
+msgstr "tidak berisi header LUKS. Mengganti header dapat menghancurkan data di perangkat itu."
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:206
+msgid "already contains LUKS header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."
+msgstr "telah berisi header LUKS. Mengganti header dapat mengganti slot kunci yang telah ada."
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:207
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: real device header has different UUID than backup!"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"PERINGATAN: header perangkat ril memiliki UUID berbeda dengan cadangan!"
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:222 luks/keymanage.c:319 luks/keymanage.c:354
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Tidak dapat membuka perangkat %s.\n"
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:254
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s is not LUKS device.\n"
+msgstr "%s bukan perangkat LUKS.\n"
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:256
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s is not LUKS device."
+msgstr "%s bukan perangkat LUKS."
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:259
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported LUKS version %d.\n"
+msgstr "versi LUKS %d tidak didukung.\n"
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:262
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested LUKS hash %s is not supported.\n"
+msgstr "Hash %s LUKS yang diminta tidak didukung.\n"
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:293
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open file %s.\n"
+msgstr "Tidak dapat membuka berkas %s.\n"
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:331
+#, c-format
+msgid "LUKS header detected but device %s is too small.\n"
+msgstr "Header LUKS terdeteksi tetapi perangkat %s terlalu kecil.\n"
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:375
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during update of LUKS header on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Error selama memperbarui header LUKS di perangkat %s.\n"
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:382
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error re-reading LUKS header after update on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Error membaca-kembali header LUKS setelah memperbarui di perangkat %s.\n"
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:394
+#, c-format
+msgid "Not compatible PBKDF2 options (using hash algorithm %s)."
+msgstr "Pilihan PBKDF2 tidak kompatibel (menggunakan algoritma hash %s)."
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:439
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: reading random salt failed.\n"
+msgstr "Tidak dapat membuat header LUKS: pembacaan garam acak gagal.\n"
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:456
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: header digest failed (using hash %s).\n"
+msgstr "Tidak dapat membuat header LUKS: digest header gagal (menggunakan hash %s).\n"
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:473
+msgid "Wrong UUID format provided, generating new one.\n"
+msgstr "Format UUID yang disediakan berbeda, membuat yang baru.\n"
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:500
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d active, purge first.\n"
+msgstr "Slot kunci %d aktif, hapus terlebih dahulu.\n"
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:505
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d material includes too few stripes. Header manipulation?\n"
+msgstr "Slot kunci %d material terdapat terlalu sedikit stripes. Manipulasi header?\n"
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:564
+msgid "Failed to write to key storage.\n"
+msgstr "Gagal untuk menulis di penyimpanan kunci.\n"
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:641
+msgid "Failed to read from key storage.\n"
+msgstr "Gagal untuk membaca dari penyimpanan kunci.\n"
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:650
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d unlocked.\n"
+msgstr "Slot kunci %d tidak terkunci.\n"
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:683
+msgid "No key available with this passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "Tidak ada kunci tersedia dengan kata sandi ini.\n"
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:760
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select keyslot between 0 and %d.\n"
+msgstr "Slot kunci %d tidak valid, mohon pilih slot kunci diantara 0 dan %d.\n"
+
+#: luks/keymanage.c:772
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Tidak dapat menghapus perangkat %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:71 src/cryptsetup.c:89
+msgid "<name> <device>"
+msgstr "<nama> <perangkat>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:71
+msgid "create device"
+msgstr "buat perangkat"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:72 src/cryptsetup.c:73 src/cryptsetup.c:74
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:82
+msgid "<name>"
+msgstr "<nama>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:72
+msgid "remove device"
+msgstr "hapus perangkat"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:73
+msgid "resize active device"
+msgstr "ubah ukuran perangkat aktif"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:74
+msgid "show device status"
+msgstr "tampilkan status perangkat"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:75 src/cryptsetup.c:77
+msgid "<device> [<new key file>]"
+msgstr "<perangkat> [<berkas kunci baru>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:75
+msgid "formats a LUKS device"
+msgstr "format sebuah perangkat LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:76
+msgid "<device> <name> "
+msgstr "<perangkat> <nama>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:76
+msgid "open LUKS device as mapping <name>"
+msgstr "buka perangkat LUKS sebagai pemetaan <nama>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:77
+msgid "add key to LUKS device"
+msgstr "tambahkan kunci ke perangkat LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:78
+msgid "<device> [<key file>]"
+msgstr "<perangkat> [<berkas kunci>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:78
+msgid "removes supplied key or key file from LUKS device"
+msgstr "hapus kunci yang diberikan atau berkas kunci dari perangkat LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:79 src/cryptsetup.c:88
+msgid "<device> <key slot>"
+msgstr "<perangkat> <slot kunci>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:79
+msgid "wipes key with number <key slot> from LUKS device"
+msgstr "hapus kunci dengan nomor <slot kunci> dari perangkat LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:80 src/cryptsetup.c:81 src/cryptsetup.c:83
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:84 src/cryptsetup.c:85 src/cryptsetup.c:86
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:87
+msgid "<device>"
+msgstr "<perangkat>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:80
+msgid "print UUID of LUKS device"
+msgstr "tampilkan UUID dari perangkat LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:81
+msgid "tests <device> for LUKS partition header"
+msgstr "periksa <perangkat> untuk header partisi LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:82
+msgid "remove LUKS mapping"
+msgstr "hapus pemetaan LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:83
+msgid "dump LUKS partition information"
+msgstr "dump informasi  partisi LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:84
+msgid "Suspend LUKS device and wipe key (all IOs are frozen)."
+msgstr "Hentikan perangkat LUKS dan hapus kunci (semua IO dihentikan)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:85
+msgid "Resume suspended LUKS device."
+msgstr "Lanjutkan perangkat LUKS yang dihentikan."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:86
+msgid "Backup LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "Buat cadangan header perangkat LUKS dan slot kunci"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:87
+msgid "Restore LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "Kembalikan header perangkat LUKS dan slot kunci"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:88
+msgid "identical to luksKillSlot - DEPRECATED - see man page"
+msgstr "identik ke luksKillSlot - DITINGGALKAN - lihat halaman petunjuk penggunaan"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:89
+msgid "modify active device - DEPRECATED - see man page"
+msgstr "modifikasi perangkat aktif - DITINGGALKAN - lihat halaman petunjuk penggunaan"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:180
+msgid "Command successful.\n"
+msgstr "Perintah berhasil.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:194
+#, c-format
+msgid "Command failed with code %i"
+msgstr "Perintah gagal dengan kode %i"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:222
+msgid ""
+"The reload action is deprecated. Please use \"dmsetup reload\" in case you really need this functionality.\n"
+"WARNING: do not use reload to touch LUKS devices. If that is the case, hit Ctrl-C now.\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Aksi muat kembali telah ditinggalkan. Mohon gunakan \"dmsetup reload\" dalam kasus anda benar benar membutuhkan fungsi ini.\n"
+"PERINGATAN: jangan gunakan muat-kembali untuk menyentuk perangkat LUKS. Jika itu masalahnya, tekan Ctrl-C sekarang.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:390
+#, c-format
+msgid "This will overwrite data on %s irrevocably."
+msgstr "Ini akan memaksa menulis data di %s secara permanen."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:391
+msgid "memory allocation error in action_luksFormat"
+msgstr "alokasi memori error dalam action_luksFormat"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:421
+msgid "Obsolete option --non-exclusive is ignored.\n"
+msgstr "Pilihan sudah ditinggalkan --no-exclusive diabaikan.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:581 src/cryptsetup.c:603
+msgid "Option --header-backup-file is required.\n"
+msgstr "Pilihan --header-backup-file dibutuhkan.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:637
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<action> is one of:\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<aksi> adalah salah satu dari:\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:643
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<device> is the encrypted device\n"
+"<key slot> is the LUKS key slot number to modify\n"
+"<key file> optional key file for the new key for luksAddKey action\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<nama> adalah perangkat untuk dibuat dibawah %s\n"
+"<perangkat> adalah perangkat terenkripsi\n"
+"<slot kunci> adalah nomor slot kunci LUKS untuk dimodifikasi\n"
+"<berkas kunci> adalah berkas kunci opsional untuk kunci baru untuk aksi luksAddKey\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:650
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in device cipher parameters:\n"
+"\tplain: %s, Key: %d bits, Password hashing: %s\n"
+"\tLUKS1: %s, Key: %d bits, LUKS header hashing: %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Parameter baku yang terkompilasi dalam perangkat penyandi:\n"
+"\tterbuka: %s, Kunci: %d bits, Hash kata sandi : %s\n"
+"\tLUKS1  : %s, Kunci: %d bits, Hash kepala LUKS: %s\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:697
+msgid "Show this help message"
+msgstr "Tampilkan pesan bantuan ini"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:698
+msgid "Display brief usage"
+msgstr "Tampilkan penggunaan singkat"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:702
+msgid "Help options:"
+msgstr "Pilihan bantuan:"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:703
+msgid "Shows more detailed error messages"
+msgstr "Tampilkan pesan kesalahan secara lebih detail"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:704
+msgid "Show debug messages"
+msgstr "Tampilkan pesan penelusuran"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:705
+msgid "The cipher used to encrypt the disk (see /proc/crypto)"
+msgstr "Cipher yang digunakan untuk mengenkripsi ke disk (lihat /proc/crypto)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:706
+msgid "The hash used to create the encryption key from the passphrase"
+msgstr "Hash yang digunakan untuk membuat kunci enkripsi dari kata sandi"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:707
+msgid "Verifies the passphrase by asking for it twice"
+msgstr "Verifikasi kata sandi dengan menanyakan itu dua kali"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:708
+msgid "Read the key from a file (can be /dev/random)"
+msgstr "Baca kunci dari sebuah berkas (dapat berupa /dev/random)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:709
+msgid "Read the volume (master) key from file."
+msgstr "Baca volume (master) kunci dari berkas."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:710
+msgid "The size of the encryption key"
+msgstr "Besar dari kunci enkripsi"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:710
+msgid "BITS"
+msgstr "BITS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:711
+msgid "Slot number for new key (default is first free)"
+msgstr "Nomor slot untuk kunci baru (baku adalah yang kosong pertama)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:712
+msgid "The size of the device"
+msgstr "Besar dari perangkat"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:712 src/cryptsetup.c:713 src/cryptsetup.c:714
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:722
+msgid "SECTORS"
+msgstr "SEKTOR"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:713
+msgid "The start offset in the backend device"
+msgstr "Awal ofset dalam perangkat backend"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:714
+msgid "How many sectors of the encrypted data to skip at the beginning"
+msgstr "Berapa banyak sektor dari data terenkripsi yang dilewatkan di awal"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:715
+msgid "Create a readonly mapping"
+msgstr "Buat pemetaan baca-saja"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:716
+msgid "PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS (in ms)"
+msgstr "waktu iterasi PBKDF2 untuk LUKS (dalam mdet)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:717
+msgid "msecs"
+msgstr "mdetik"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:718
+msgid "Do not ask for confirmation"
+msgstr "Jangan tanya untuk konfirmasi"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:719
+msgid "Print package version"
+msgstr "Tampilkan versi paket"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:720
+msgid "Timeout for interactive passphrase prompt (in seconds)"
+msgstr "Waktu habis untuk pertanyaan interaktif kata sandi (dalam detik)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:720
+msgid "secs"
+msgstr "detik"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:721
+msgid "How often the input of the passphrase can be retried"
+msgstr "Seberapa sering masukan dari kata sandi dapat dicoba"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:722
+msgid "Align payload at <n> sector boundaries - for luksFormat"
+msgstr "Sesuaikan muatan di batas sektor <n> - untuk luksFormat"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:723
+msgid "(Obsoleted, see man page.)"
+msgstr "(Ditinggalkan, lihat halaman petunjuk penggunaan.)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:724
+msgid "File with LUKS header and keyslots backup."
+msgstr "Berkas dengan header LUKS dan cadangan slot kunci."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:742
+msgid "[OPTION...] <action> <action-specific>]"
+msgstr "[PILIHAN...] <aksi> <aksi-spesifik>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:778
+msgid "Key size must be a multiple of 8 bits"
+msgstr "Kunci harus kelipatan dari 8 bit"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:782
+msgid "Argument <action> missing."
+msgstr "Argumen <aksi> hilang."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:788
+msgid "Unknown action."
+msgstr "Aksi tidak diketahui."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:803
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s: requires %s as arguments"
+msgstr "%s: membutuhkan %s sebagai argumen"
diff --git a/po/it.po b/po/it.po
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7274009
--- /dev/null
+++ b/po/it.po
@@ -0,0 +1,3193 @@
+# Italian translation for cryptsetup.
+# Copyright (C) 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2018 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+# This file is put in the public domain.
+# Sergio Zanchetta <primes2h@ubuntu.com>, 2010, 2011, 2012.
+# Milo Casagrande <milo@milo.name>, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2018, 2019.
+#
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: cryptsetup-2.1.0\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: dm-crypt@saout.de\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-01-26 19:02+0100\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2019-01-28 09:18+0100\n"
+"Last-Translator: Milo Casagrande <milo@milo.name>\n"
+"Language-Team: Italian <tp@lists.linux.it>\n"
+"Language: it\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+"X-Bugs: Report translation errors to the Language-Team address.\n"
+"Plural-Forms: nplurals=2; plural=(n!=1);\n"
+"X-Generator: Poedit 2.2.1\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:336
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper, running as non-root user."
+msgstr "Impossibile inizializzare device-mapper: in esecuzione come utente non-root."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:339
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper. Is dm_mod kernel module loaded?"
+msgstr "Impossibile inizializzare device-mapper. Forse il modulo kernel dm_mod non è caricato."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1010
+msgid "Requested deferred flag is not supported."
+msgstr "Il flag posticipato richiesto non è supportato."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1077
+#, c-format
+msgid "DM-UUID for device %s was truncated."
+msgstr "Il DM-UUID per il dispositivo %s è stato troncato."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1486
+msgid "Requested dm-crypt performance options are not supported."
+msgstr "Le opzioni di prestazioni richieste per dm-crypt non sono supportate."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1493
+msgid "Requested dm-verity data corruption handling options are not supported."
+msgstr "Le opzioni di gestione dei dati rovinati richieste per dm-verity non sono supportate."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1497
+msgid "Requested dm-verity FEC options are not supported."
+msgstr "Le opzioni FEC dm-verity richieste non sono supportate."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1501
+msgid "Requested data integrity options are not supported."
+msgstr "Le opzioni di integrità dei dati richieste non sono supportate."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1503
+msgid "Requested sector_size option is not supported."
+msgstr "L'opzione sector_size richiesta non è supportata."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1508
+msgid "Requested automatic recalculation of integrity tags is not supported."
+msgstr "Il ricalcolo automatico dei tag d'integrità non è supportato."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1534
+msgid "Requested dmcrypt performance options are not supported."
+msgstr "Le opzioni di prestazioni richieste per dmcrypt non sono supportate."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1537
+msgid "Discard/TRIM is not supported."
+msgstr "Discard/TRIM non è supportato."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:2413
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to query dm-%s segment."
+msgstr "Interrogazione del segmento dm-%s non riuscita."
+
+#: lib/random.c:80
+msgid ""
+"System is out of entropy while generating volume key.\n"
+"Please move mouse or type some text in another window to gather some random events.\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Il sistema non ha un'entropia sufficiente mentre viene generata la chiave di volume.\n"
+"Muovere il mouse o digitare del testo in un'altra finestra per accumulare più eventi casuali.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:84
+#, c-format
+msgid "Generating key (%d%% done).\n"
+msgstr "Generazione chiave (%d%% completato).\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:170
+msgid "Running in FIPS mode."
+msgstr "Esecuzione in modalità FIPS."
+
+#: lib/random.c:176
+msgid "Fatal error during RNG initialisation."
+msgstr "Errore fatale durante l'inizializzazione dell'RNG."
+
+#: lib/random.c:213
+msgid "Unknown RNG quality requested."
+msgstr "Qualità richiesta per l'RNG sconosciuta."
+
+#: lib/random.c:218
+msgid "Error reading from RNG."
+msgstr "Errore nel leggere dall'RNG."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:214
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto RNG backend."
+msgstr "Impossibile inizializzare il backend crypto RNG."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:220
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto backend."
+msgstr "Impossibile inizializzare il backend crypto."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:251 lib/setup.c:1899 lib/verity/verity.c:123
+#, c-format
+msgid "Hash algorithm %s not supported."
+msgstr "Algoritmo di hash %s non supportato."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:254 lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:90
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key processing error (using hash %s)."
+msgstr "Errore nell'elaborazione della chiave (usando l'hash %s)."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:315 lib/setup.c:342
+msgid "Cannot determine device type. Incompatible activation of device?"
+msgstr "Impossibile determinare il tipo di dispositivo. Attivazione incompatibile del dispositivo?"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:321 lib/setup.c:2892
+msgid "This operation is supported only for LUKS device."
+msgstr "Questa operazione è supportata solo per il dispositivo LUKS."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:348
+msgid "This operation is supported only for LUKS2 device."
+msgstr "Questa operazione è supportata solo per il dispositivo LUKS2."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:396
+msgid "All key slots full."
+msgstr "Tutti gli slot di chiave sono pieni."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:407
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select between 0 and %d."
+msgstr "Lo slot di chiave %d non è valido, selezionarne uno tra 0 e %d."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:413
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is full, please select another one."
+msgstr "Lo slot di chiave %d è pieno, selezionarne un altro."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:589
+#, c-format
+msgid "Header detected but device %s is too small."
+msgstr "Rilevato un header, ma il dispositivo %s è troppo piccolo."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:626
+msgid "This operation is not supported for this device type."
+msgstr "Questa operazione non è supportata per questo tipo di dispositivo."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:791 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:481
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported LUKS version %d."
+msgstr "Versione %d di LUKS non supportata."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:808 lib/setup.c:1403 lib/setup.c:1812
+msgid "Detached metadata device is not supported for this crypt type."
+msgstr "Il dispositivo di metadati scollegato non è supportato per questo tipo di cifratura."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1288 lib/setup.c:2392 lib/setup.c:2464 lib/setup.c:2476
+#: lib/setup.c:2625 lib/setup.c:4021
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not active."
+msgstr "Il dispositivo %s non è attivo."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1310
+#, c-format
+msgid "Underlying device for crypt device %s disappeared."
+msgstr "Device sottostante a quello cifrato %s scomparso."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1388
+msgid "Invalid plain crypt parameters."
+msgstr "Parametri di cifratura in chiaro non validi."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1393 lib/setup.c:1802 src/integritysetup.c:72
+msgid "Invalid key size."
+msgstr "Dimensione della chiave non valida."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1398 lib/setup.c:1807 lib/setup.c:2009
+msgid "UUID is not supported for this crypt type."
+msgstr "UUID non è supportato per questo tipo di cifratura."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1413 lib/setup.c:1603 src/cryptsetup.c:1045
+msgid "Unsupported encryption sector size."
+msgstr "Dimensione settore di cifratura non supportato."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1421 lib/setup.c:1720
+msgid "Device size is not aligned to requested sector size."
+msgstr "La dimensione del dispositivo non è allineata con la dimensione del settore richiesta."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1472 lib/setup.c:1591
+msgid "Can't format LUKS without device."
+msgstr "Impossibile formattare LUKS senza dispositivo."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1478 lib/setup.c:1597
+msgid "Requested data alignment is not compatible with data offset."
+msgstr "L'allineamento dei dati richiesti non è compatibile con l'offset dei dati."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1546 lib/setup.c:1715
+msgid "WARNING: Data offset is outside of currently available data device.\n"
+msgstr "Attenzione: l'offset dei dati è al di fuori del dispositivo dati attualmente disponibile.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1556 lib/setup.c:1735 lib/setup.c:1754 lib/setup.c:2021
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe header on device %s."
+msgstr "Impossibile ripulire l'header sul dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1608
+msgid "WARNING: The device activation will fail, dm-crypt is missing support for requested encryption sector size.\n"
+msgstr "Attenzione: l'attivazione del dispositivo non riuscirà, dm-crypt manca il supporto per la dimensione del settore di crittografia richiesta.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1630
+msgid "Volume key is too small for encryption with integrity extensions."
+msgstr "La chiave di volume è troppo piccola per la cifratura con estensioni di integrità."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1685
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cipher %s-%s (key size %zd bits) is not available."
+msgstr "Il cifrario %s-%s (dimensione chiave di %zd byte) non è disponibile."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1747
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s which is still in use."
+msgstr "Impossibile formattare il dispositivo %s che risulta ancora in uso."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1750 lib/setup.c:1775
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "Impossibile formattare il dispositivo %s, permessi non concessi."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1762 lib/setup.c:2073
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format integrity for device %s."
+msgstr "Impossibile formattare l'integrità per il dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1772
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s in use."
+msgstr "Impossibile formattare il dispositivo %s che risulta ancora in uso."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1779
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s."
+msgstr "Impossibile formattare il dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1797
+msgid "Can't format LOOPAES without device."
+msgstr "Impossibile formattare LOOPAES senza dispositivo."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1842
+msgid "Can't format VERITY without device."
+msgstr "Impossibile formattare VERITY senza dispositivo."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1853 lib/verity/verity.c:106
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash type %d."
+msgstr "Tipo di hash %d VERITY non supportato."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1859 lib/verity/verity.c:114
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY block size."
+msgstr "Dimensione blocco VERITY non supportata."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1864 lib/verity/verity.c:75
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash offset."
+msgstr "Offset hash VERITY non supportato."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1869
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY FEC offset."
+msgstr "Offset FEC VERITY non supportato."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1893
+msgid "Data area overlaps with hash area."
+msgstr "L'area dati si sovrappone a quella di hash."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1918
+msgid "Hash area overlaps with FEC area."
+msgstr "L'area di hash si sovrappone a quella FEC."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1925
+msgid "Data area overlaps with FEC area."
+msgstr "L'area dati si sovrappone a quella FEC."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2130
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unknown crypt device type %s requested."
+msgstr "Richiesto dispositivo cifrato di tipo %s sconosciuto."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2398 lib/setup.c:2470 lib/setup.c:2483
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported parameters on device %s."
+msgstr "Parametri non supportati sul dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2404 lib/setup.c:2489
+#, c-format
+msgid "Mismatching parameters on device %s."
+msgstr "Parametri non corrispondenti sul dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2657
+msgid "Cannot resize loop device."
+msgstr "Impossibile ridimensionare un dispositivo di loopback."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2666
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s size is not aligned to requested sector size (%u bytes)."
+msgstr "La dimensione del dispositivo %s non è allineata con la dimensione del settore richiesta (%u byte)."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2725
+msgid "Do you really want to change UUID of device?"
+msgstr "Cambiare veramente l'UUID del dispositivo?"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2801
+msgid "Header backup file does not contain compatible LUKS header."
+msgstr "Il file di backup dell'header non contiene un header LUKS compatibile."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2900
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not active."
+msgstr "Il volume %s non è attivo."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2911
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is already suspended."
+msgstr "Il volume %s è già sospeso."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2925
+#, c-format
+msgid "Suspend is not supported for device %s."
+msgstr "La sospensione non è supportata per il dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2927
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during suspending device %s."
+msgstr "Errore durante la sospensione del dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2960 lib/setup.c:3027
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not suspended."
+msgstr "Il volume %s non è sospeso."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2989
+#, c-format
+msgid "Resume is not supported for device %s."
+msgstr "Il ripristino non è supportato per il dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2991 lib/setup.c:3059
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during resuming device %s."
+msgstr "Errore durante il ripristino del dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3127 lib/setup.c:3315
+msgid "Cannot add key slot, all slots disabled and no volume key provided."
+msgstr "Impossibile aggiungere uno slot di chiave, tutti gli slot sono disabilitati e nessuna chiave di volume è stata fornita."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3267
+msgid "Failed to swap new key slot."
+msgstr "Sostituzione del nuovo slot di chiave non riuscita."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3432 lib/setup.c:3865 lib/setup.c:3878 lib/setup.c:3886
+#: lib/setup.c:3899 lib/setup.c:4198 lib/setup.c:5274
+msgid "Volume key does not match the volume."
+msgstr "La chiave di volume non corrisponde al volume."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3453
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid."
+msgstr "Lo slot di chiave %d non è valido."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3459
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is not used."
+msgstr "Lo slot di chiave %d non è utilizzato."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3478
+msgid "Device header overlaps with data area."
+msgstr "L'header del dispositivo si sovrappone all'area dati."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3684 lib/setup.c:3952
+msgid "Device type is not properly initialised."
+msgstr "Il tipo di dispositivo non è inizializzato correttamente."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3726
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s, name is invalid or still in use."
+msgstr "Impossibile formattare il dispositivo %s che risulta ancora in uso."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3729
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s already exists."
+msgstr "Esiste già un dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3852
+msgid "Incorrect volume key specified for plain device."
+msgstr "Specificata una chiave di volume non corretta per il dispositivo in chiaro."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3918
+msgid "Incorrect root hash specified for verity device."
+msgstr "Specificato un hash root non corretto per il dispositivo verity."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3995 lib/setup.c:4010
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is still in use."
+msgstr "Il dispositivo %s è ancora in uso."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4025
+#, c-format
+msgid "Invalid device %s."
+msgstr "Device %s non valido."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4134
+msgid "Function not available in FIPS mode."
+msgstr "Funzione non disponibile in modalità FIPS."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4148
+msgid "Volume key buffer too small."
+msgstr "Buffer di chiave del volume troppo piccolo."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4156
+msgid "Cannot retrieve volume key for plain device."
+msgstr "Impossibile recuperare la chiave di volume per il dispositivo in chiaro."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4167
+#, c-format
+msgid "This operation is not supported for %s crypt device."
+msgstr "Questa operazione non è supportata per il dispositivo cifrato %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4354
+msgid "Dump operation is not supported for this device type."
+msgstr "L'operazione di dump non è supportata per questo tipo di dispositivo."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4930
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert device %s which is still in use."
+msgstr "Impossibile convertire il dispositivo %s che risulta ancora in uso."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5213
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign keyslot %u as the new volume key."
+msgstr "Assegnamento slot di chiave %u come nuova chiave del volume non riuscito."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5280
+msgid "Failed to initialise default LUKS2 keyslot parameters."
+msgstr "Inizializzazione parametri predefiniti per lo slot di chiave LUKS2 non riuscita."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5286
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign keyslot %d to digest."
+msgstr "Assegnazione slot di chiave %d al digest non riuscita."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5370
+msgid "Failed to load key in kernel keyring."
+msgstr "Caricamento chiave nel portachiavi del kernel non riuscito."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5425
+msgid "Kernel keyring is not supported by the kernel."
+msgstr "Il portachiavi del kernel non è supportato dal kernel."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5435
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read passphrase from keyring (error %d)."
+msgstr "Lettura della passphrase dal portachiavi non riuscita (errore %d)."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:81
+msgid "Cannot get process priority."
+msgstr "Impossibile ottenere la priorità del processo."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:95
+msgid "Cannot unlock memory."
+msgstr "Impossibile sbloccare la memoria."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:169 lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:498
+msgid "Failed to open key file."
+msgstr "Apertura del file chiave non riuscita."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:174
+msgid "Cannot read keyfile from a terminal."
+msgstr "Impossibile leggere il file chiave dal terminale."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:191
+msgid "Failed to stat key file."
+msgstr "Stat del file chiave non riuscito."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:199 lib/utils.c:220
+msgid "Cannot seek to requested keyfile offset."
+msgstr "Impossibile posizionarsi all'offset del file di chiave richiesto."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:214 lib/utils.c:229 src/utils_password.c:188
+#: src/utils_password.c:201
+msgid "Out of memory while reading passphrase."
+msgstr "Memoria esaurita durante la lettura della passphrase."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:249
+msgid "Error reading passphrase."
+msgstr "Errore nel leggere la passphrase."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:266
+msgid "Nothing to read on input."
+msgstr "Nessun dato da leggere sull'input."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:273
+msgid "Maximum keyfile size exceeded."
+msgstr "Dimensione massima del file chiave superata."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:278
+msgid "Cannot read requested amount of data."
+msgstr "Impossibile leggere la quantità richiesta di dati."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:184 lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:92
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s doesn't exist or access denied."
+msgstr "Il dispositivo %s non esiste oppure è negato l'accesso."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:194
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not compatible."
+msgstr "Il dispositivo %s non è compatibile."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:560
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small. Need at least %<PRIu64> bytes."
+msgstr "Il dispositivo %s è troppo piccolo, sono necessari almeno %<PRIu64> byte."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:641
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s which is in use (already mapped or mounted)."
+msgstr "Impossibile utilizzare il dispositivo %s il quale è in uso (già mappato o montato)."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:645
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "Impossibile usare il dispositivo %s, permessi negati."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:648
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot get info about device %s."
+msgstr "Impossibile ottenere informazioni sul dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:671
+msgid "Cannot use a loopback device, running as non-root user."
+msgstr "Impossibile usare un dispositivo di loopback, in esecuzione come utente non root."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:681
+msgid "Attaching loopback device failed (loop device with autoclear flag is required)."
+msgstr "Collegamento del dispositivo di loopback non riuscito (è richiesto un dispositivo di loop con flag autoclear)."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:727
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested offset is beyond real size of device %s."
+msgstr "L'offset richiesto è oltre la dimensione reale del dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:735
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s has zero size."
+msgstr "Il dispositivo %s ha dimensione zero."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:746 lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:252
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small."
+msgstr "Il dispositivo %s è troppo piccolo."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:100
+msgid "Requested PBKDF target time cannot be zero."
+msgstr "Il tempo PBKDF richiesto non può essere zero."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:106
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unknown PBKDF type %s."
+msgstr "Tipo PBKDF %s non riconosciuto."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:111
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested hash %s is not supported."
+msgstr "L'hash %s richiesto non è supportato."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:122
+msgid "Requested PBKDF type is not supported for LUKS1."
+msgstr "Il tipo PBKDF richiesto non è supportato per LUKS1."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:128
+msgid "PBKDF max memory or parallel threads must not be set with pbkdf2."
+msgstr "Memoria massima o thread paralleli PBKDF non devono essere impostati con pbkdf2."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:133 lib/utils_pbkdf.c:143
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forced iteration count is too low for %s (minimum is %u)."
+msgstr "Il conteggio delle iterazioni forzate è troppo basso per %s (minimo è %u)."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:148
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forced memory cost is too low for %s (minimum is %u kilobytes)."
+msgstr "Il costo della memoria forzata è troppo basso per %s (minimo è %u kilobyte)."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:155
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested maximum PBKDF memory cost is too high (maximum is %d kilobytes)."
+msgstr "Il costo massimo richiesto per la memoria PBKDF è troppo elevato (massimo è %d kilobyte)."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:160
+msgid "Requested maximum PBKDF memory cannot be zero."
+msgstr "La memoria PBKDF massima richiesta non può essere zero."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:164
+msgid "Requested PBKDF parallel threads cannot be zero."
+msgstr "I thread paralleli PBKDF richiesti non possono essere zero."
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:317
+msgid "PBKDF benchmark disabled but iterations not set."
+msgstr "Benchmark PBKDF disabilitato, ma iterazioni non impostate."
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:336
+#, c-format
+msgid "Not compatible PBKDF2 options (using hash algorithm %s)."
+msgstr "Opzioni PBKDF2 non compatibili (usando l'algoritmo di hash %s)."
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:356
+msgid "Not compatible PBKDF options."
+msgstr "Opzioni PBKDF non compatibili."
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:80
+#, c-format
+msgid "Locking aborted. The locking path %s/%s is unusable (not a directory or missing)."
+msgstr "Blocco interrotto. Il percorso di blocco %s/%s è inutilizzabile (non una directory o mancante)."
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:87
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Locking directory %s/%s is missing!\n"
+msgstr "Attenzione: la directory di blocco %s/%s non esiste.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:97
+#, c-format
+msgid "Locking aborted. The locking path %s/%s is unusable (%s is not a directory)."
+msgstr "Blocco interrotto. Il percorso di blocco %s/%s è inutilizzabile (%s non è una directory)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:40
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Failed to setup dm-crypt key mapping for device %s.\n"
+"Check that kernel supports %s cipher (check syslog for more info)."
+msgstr ""
+"Impostazione mappatura di chiave dm-crypt non riuscita per il dispositivo %s.\n"
+"Controllare che il kernel supporti il cifrario %s (controllare syslog per maggiori informazioni)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:45
+msgid "Key size in XTS mode must be 256 or 512 bits."
+msgstr "La dimensione della chiave in modalità XTS deve essere 256 o 512 bit."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:47
+msgid "Cipher specification should be in [cipher]-[mode]-[iv] format."
+msgstr "La specifica del cifrario dovrebbe essere nel formato [cifrario]-[modalità]-[iv]."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:98 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:345
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:642 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1079
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1157 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:448
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write to device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "Impossibile scrivere sul dispositivo %s, permessi negati."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:120
+msgid "Failed to open temporary keystore device."
+msgstr "Apertura del dispositivo temporaneo di deposito chiavi non riuscita."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:127
+msgid "Failed to access temporary keystore device."
+msgstr "Accesso al dispositivo temporaneo di deposito chiavi non riuscito."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:200 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:91
+msgid "IO error while encrypting keyslot."
+msgstr "Errore di IO durante la cifratura dello slot di chiave."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:243 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:348
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:594 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:645 lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:663
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:81 lib/verity/verity.c:182 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:308
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:319 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:339
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:242 lib/verity/verity_fec.c:254
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:259 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1160
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:208
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open device %s."
+msgstr "Impossibile aprire il dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:254 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:152
+msgid "IO error while decrypting keyslot."
+msgstr "Errore di IO durante la decifratura dello slot di chiave."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:111
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small. (LUKS1 requires at least %<PRIu64> bytes.)"
+msgstr "Il dispositivo %s è troppo piccolo (LUKS1 richiede almeno %<PRIu64> byte)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:132 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:140
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:152 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:163
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:175
+#, c-format
+msgid "LUKS keyslot %u is invalid."
+msgstr "Lo slot di chiave LUKS %u non è valido."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:228 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:478
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:991 src/cryptsetup.c:1236
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1355 src/cryptsetup.c:1412 src/cryptsetup.c:1468
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1535 src/cryptsetup.c:1631 src/cryptsetup.c:1695
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1855 src/cryptsetup.c:2044 src/cryptsetup.c:2104
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2170 src/cryptsetup.c:2334 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1397
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."
+msgstr "Il dispositivo %s non è un dispositivo LUKS valido."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:247 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1010
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested header backup file %s already exists."
+msgstr "Il file di backup dell'header %s richiesto esiste già."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:249 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1012
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Impossibile creare il file di backup dell'header %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:254 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1017
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Impossibile scrivere il file di backup dell'header %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:287 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1066
+msgid "Backup file doesn't contain valid LUKS header."
+msgstr "Il file di backup non contiene un header LUKS valido."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:300 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:555
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1087
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Impossibile aprire il file di backup dell'header %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:306 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1093
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Impossibile leggere il file di backup dell'header %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:318
+msgid "Data offset or key size differs on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "L'offset di dati oppure la dimensione della chiave sono diversi tra il dispositivo e il backup, ripristino non riuscito."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:326
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s %s%s"
+msgstr "Il dispositivo %s %s%s"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:327
+msgid "does not contain LUKS header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device."
+msgstr "non contiene un header LUKS. La sostituzione dell'header può distruggere i dati in quel dispositivo."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:328
+msgid "already contains LUKS header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."
+msgstr "contiene già un header LUKS. La sostituzione dell'header distruggerà gli slot di chiave esistenti."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:329 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1129
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: real device header has different UUID than backup!"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Attenzione: l'header reale del dispositivo ha un UUID diverso da quello di backup."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:381
+msgid "Non standard key size, manual repair required."
+msgstr "Dimensione non standard della chiave, è richiesta una riparazione manuale."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:386
+msgid "Non standard keyslots alignment, manual repair required."
+msgstr "Allineamento slot di chiave non standard, richiesta riparazione manuale."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:396
+msgid "Repairing keyslots."
+msgstr "Riparazione degli slot di chiave."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:415
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: offset repaired (%u -> %u)."
+msgstr "Slot di chiave %i: offset riparato (%u -> %u)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:423
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: stripes repaired (%u -> %u)."
+msgstr "Slot di chiave %i: strisce riparate (%u -> %u)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:432
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: bogus partition signature."
+msgstr "Slot di chiave %i: firma della partizione non corretta."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:437
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: salt wiped."
+msgstr "Slot di chiave %i: salt ripulito."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:454
+msgid "Writing LUKS header to disk."
+msgstr "Scrittura dell'header LUKS sul disco."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:459
+msgid "Repair failed."
+msgstr "Riparazione non riuscita."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:487 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:758
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested LUKS hash %s is not supported."
+msgstr "L'hash %s di LUKS richiesto non è supportato."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:515 src/cryptsetup.c:960
+msgid "No known problems detected for LUKS header."
+msgstr "Nessun problema conosciuto rilevato per l'header LUKS."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:667
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during update of LUKS header on device %s."
+msgstr "Errore durante l'aggiornamento dell'header LUKS sul dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:676
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error re-reading LUKS header after update on device %s."
+msgstr "Errore nel rileggere l'header LUKS dopo l'aggiornamento sul dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:752
+msgid "Data offset for LUKS header must be either 0 or higher than header size."
+msgstr "L'offset dei dati per l'header LUKS deve essere 0 o maggiore della dimensione dell'header."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:763 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:828
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:207 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:909
+msgid "Wrong LUKS UUID format provided."
+msgstr "Fornito un formato UUID per LUKS errato."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:786
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: reading random salt failed."
+msgstr "Impossibile creare l'header LUKS: lettura salt casuale non riuscita."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:807
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: header digest failed (using hash %s)."
+msgstr "Impossibile creare l'header LUKS: digest dell'header non riuscito (usando l'hash %s)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:851
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d active, purge first."
+msgstr "Slot di chiave %d attivo, eliminarlo prima."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:857
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d material includes too few stripes. Header manipulation?"
+msgstr "Il materiale dello slot di chiave %d contiene troppe poche strisce. Manipolazione dell'header?"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1065
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select keyslot between 0 and %d."
+msgstr "Lo slot di chiave %d non è valido, selezionarne uno tra 0 e %d."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1083 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:452
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe device %s."
+msgstr "Impossibile ripulire il dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:146
+msgid "Detected not yet supported GPG encrypted keyfile."
+msgstr "Rilevato un file chiave cifrato con GPG non ancora supportato."
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:147
+msgid "Please use gpg --decrypt <KEYFILE> | cryptsetup --keyfile=- ...\n"
+msgstr "Usare gpg --decrypt <FILECHIAVE> | cryptsetup --keyfile=- ...\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:168 lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:188
+msgid "Incompatible loop-AES keyfile detected."
+msgstr "Rilevato file chiave loop-AES non compatibile."
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:245
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support loop-AES compatible mapping."
+msgstr "Il kernel non supporta la mappatura compatibile loop-AES."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:505
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error reading keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Errore nel leggere il file chiave %s."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:545
+#, c-format
+msgid "Maximum TCRYPT passphrase length (%d) exceeded."
+msgstr "Lunghezza massima (%d) della passphrase TCRYPT superata."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:586
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2 hash algorithm %s not available, skipping."
+msgstr "L'algoritmo di hash PBKDF2 %s non è disponibile, viene saltato."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:604 src/cryptsetup.c:915
+msgid "Required kernel crypto interface not available."
+msgstr "L'interfaccia kernel richiesta del cifrario non è disponibile."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:606 src/cryptsetup.c:917
+msgid "Ensure you have algif_skcipher kernel module loaded."
+msgstr "Assicurarsi di avere il modulo del kernel algif_skcipher caricato."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:746
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activation is not supported for %d sector size."
+msgstr "Attivazione non supportata per la dimensione del settore di %d."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:752
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support activation for this TCRYPT legacy mode."
+msgstr "Il kernel non supporta l'attivazione per questa modalità legacy TCRYPT."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:786
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activating TCRYPT system encryption for partition %s."
+msgstr "Attivazione sistema di cifratura TCRYPT per la partizione %s."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:864
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support TCRYPT compatible mapping."
+msgstr "Il kernel non supporta la mappatura compatibile TCYPRT."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:1085
+msgid "This function is not supported without TCRYPT header load."
+msgstr "Questa funzione non è supportata senza l'header TCRYPT caricato."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:69 lib/verity/verity.c:175
+#, c-format
+msgid "Verity device %s doesn't use on-disk header."
+msgstr "Il dispositivo verity %s non usa header su disco."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:94
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not a valid VERITY device."
+msgstr "Il dispositivo %s non è un dispositivo VERITY valido."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:101
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY version %d."
+msgstr "Versione %d di VERITY non supportata."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:132
+msgid "VERITY header corrupted."
+msgstr "Header VERITY danneggiato."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:169
+#, c-format
+msgid "Wrong VERITY UUID format provided on device %s."
+msgstr "Fornito un formato UUID per VERITY errato sul dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:202
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during update of verity header on device %s."
+msgstr "Errore durante l'aggiornamento dell'header verity sul dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:266
+msgid "Errors cannot be repaired with FEC device."
+msgstr "Impossibile risolvere gli errori con dispositivo FEC."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:268
+#, c-format
+msgid "Found %u repairable errors with FEC device."
+msgstr "Trovati %u errori risolubili con dispositivo FEC."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:306
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support dm-verity mapping."
+msgstr "Il kernel non supporta la mappatura dm-verity."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:317
+msgid "Verity device detected corruption after activation."
+msgstr "Il dispositivo verity ha rilevato un'anomalia dopo l'attivazione."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:59
+#, c-format
+msgid "Spare area is not zeroed at position %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "L'area spare non risulta essere a zero alla posizione %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:160 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:287
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:300
+msgid "Device offset overflow."
+msgstr "Overflow offset del dispositivo."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:200
+#, c-format
+msgid "Verification failed at position %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Verifica alla posizione %<PRIu64> non riuscita."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:273
+msgid "Invalid size parameters for verity device."
+msgstr "Parametri della dimensione non validi per il dispositivo verity."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:293
+msgid "Hash area overflow."
+msgstr "Overflow dell'area di hash."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:370
+msgid "Verification of data area failed."
+msgstr "Verifica dell'area dati non riuscita."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:375
+msgid "Verification of root hash failed."
+msgstr "Verifica dall'hash root non riuscita."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:381
+msgid "Input/output error while creating hash area."
+msgstr "Errore di input/output nel creare l'area hash."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:383
+msgid "Creation of hash area failed."
+msgstr "Creazione dell'area hash non riuscita."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:430
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Kernel cannot activate device if data block size exceeds page size (%u)."
+msgstr "Attenzione: il kernel non può attivare il dispositivo se la dimensione del blocco dati supera la dimensione di pagina (%u)."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:132
+msgid "Failed to allocate RS context."
+msgstr "Allocazione contesto RS non riuscita."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:147
+msgid "Failed to allocate buffer."
+msgstr "Allocazione buffer non riuscita."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:157
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read RS block %<PRIu64> byte %d."
+msgstr "Lettura del blocco RS %<PRIu64> byte %d non riuscita."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:170
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read parity for RS block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Lettura bit di parità per il blocco RS %<PRIu64> non riuscita."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:178
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to repair parity for block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Ripristino della parità per il blocco %<PRIu64> non riuscito."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:189
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to write parity for RS block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Scrittura della parità per il blocco RS %<PRIu64> non riuscita."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:224
+msgid "Block sizes must match for FEC."
+msgstr "Le dimensioni del blocco devono corrispondere per FEC."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:230
+msgid "Invalid number of parity bytes."
+msgstr "Numero di byte di parità non valido."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:266
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to determine size for device %s."
+msgstr "Impossibile determinare la dimensione per il dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/integrity/integrity.c:239 lib/integrity/integrity.c:304
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support dm-integrity mapping."
+msgstr "Il kernel non supporta la mappatura dm-integrity."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:413
+msgid "Failed to acquire write device lock."
+msgstr "Impossibile acquisire blocco del dispositivo di scrittura."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:654 lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:675
+msgid ""
+"Device contains ambiguous signatures, cannot auto-recover LUKS2.\n"
+"Please run \"cryptsetup repair\" for recovery."
+msgstr ""
+"Il dispositivo contiene firme ambigue, impossibile recuperare automaticamente LUKS2.\n"
+"Eseguire \"cryptsetup repair\" per il recupero."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:99
+msgid "No space for new keyslot."
+msgstr "Spazio insufficiente per il nuovo slot di chiave."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:158
+msgid "Requested data offset is too small."
+msgstr "L'offset dati richiesto è troppo piccolo."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:195
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: keyslots area (%<PRIu64> bytes) is very small, available LUKS2 keyslot count is very limited.\n"
+msgstr "Attenzione: l'area degli slot di chiave è molto piccola (%<PRIu64> byte), il conteggio degli slot di chiave LUKS2 disponibili è limitato.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:866 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:982
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1055 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:105
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:128
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to acquire read lock on device %s."
+msgstr "Impossibile acquisire il blocco di lettura sul dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:878 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1149
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:431 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:40
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:69
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to acquire write lock on device %s."
+msgstr "Impossibile acquisire il blocco di scrittura sul dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1072
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forbidden LUKS2 requirements detected in backup %s."
+msgstr "Rilevati requisiti LUKS2 proibiti nel backup %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1113
+msgid "Data offset differ on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "L'offset di dati è diverso tra il dispositivo e il backup, ripristino non riuscito."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1119
+msgid "Binary header with keyslot areas size differ on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "L'header binario con dimensione aree dello slot di chiave è diverso tra il dispositivo e il backup, ripristino non riuscito."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1126
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s %s%s%s%s"
+msgstr "Il dispositivo %s %s%s%s%s"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1127
+msgid "does not contain LUKS2 header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device."
+msgstr "non contiene un header LUKS2. La sostituzione dell'header può distruggere i dati su quel dispositivo."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1128
+msgid "already contains LUKS2 header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."
+msgstr "contiene già un header LUKS2. La sostituzione dell'header distruggerà gli slot di chiave esistenti."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1130
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: unknown LUKS2 requirements detected in real device header!\n"
+"Replacing header with backup may corrupt the data on that device!"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Attenzione: requisiti LUKS2 sconosciuti rilevati nell'header del dispositivo reale.\n"
+"La sostituzione dell'header con il backup può danneggiare i dati su quel dispositivo."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1132
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: Unfinished offline reencryption detected on the device!\n"
+"Replacing header with backup may corrupt data."
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Attenzione: rilevata re-cifratura non completata sul dispositivo.\n"
+"La sostituzione dell'header con il backup potrebbe danneggiare i dati."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1234
+#, c-format
+msgid "Ignored unknown flag %s."
+msgstr "Flag %s sconosciuto ignorato."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1869
+msgid "Failed to read LUKS2 requirements."
+msgstr "Letture dei requisiti LUKS2 non riuscita."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1876
+msgid "Unmet LUKS2 requirements detected."
+msgstr "Rilevati requisiti LUKS2 non soddisfatti."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1884
+msgid "Offline reencryption in progress. Aborting."
+msgstr "Re-cifratura offline in corso. Terminato."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:474
+#, c-format
+msgid "Can not check status of device with uuid: %s."
+msgstr "Impossibile controllare lo stato del dispositivo con UUID: %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:500
+msgid "Unable to convert header with LUKSMETA additional metadata."
+msgstr "Impossibile convertire l'header con metadati LUKSMETA aggiuntivi."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:537
+msgid "Unable to move keyslot area. Not enough space."
+msgstr "Impossibile spostare l'area dello slot di chiave: spazio insufficiente."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:577 lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:854
+msgid "Unable to move keyslot area."
+msgstr "Impossibile spostare l'area dello slot di chiave."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:672
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - key slot digests are not LUKS1 compatible."
+msgstr "Impossibile convertire al formato LUKS1: i digest dello slot di chiave non sono compatibili con LUKS1."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:684
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - device uses wrapped key cipher %s."
+msgstr "Impossibile convertire al formato LUKS1: il dispositivo utilizza una chiave di cifrario %s con wrapper."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:692
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - LUKS2 header contains %u token(s)."
+msgstr "Impossibile convertire al formato LUKS1: l'header LUKS2 contiene %u token."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:706
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - keyslot %u is in invalid state."
+msgstr "Impossibile convertire al formato LUKS1: lo slot di chiave %u è in uno stato non valido."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:711
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - slot %u (over maximum slots) is still active."
+msgstr "Impossibile convertire al formato LUKS1: lo slot %u (oltre gli slot massimi) è ancora attivo."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:716
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - keyslot %u is not LUKS1 compatible."
+msgstr "Impossibile convertire al formato LUKS1: lo slot di chiave %u non è compatibile con LUKS1."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_token.c:262
+msgid "No free token slot."
+msgstr "Nessun slot token libero."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_token.c:269
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to create builtin token %s."
+msgstr "Impossibile creare token integrato %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:141
+msgid "Can't do passphrase verification on non-tty inputs."
+msgstr "Impossibile verificare la passphrase su input non tty."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:182
+msgid "Keyslot encryption parameters can be set only for LUKS2 device."
+msgstr "I parametri di cifratura dello slot di chiave possono essere impostati solo per dispositivi LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:212 src/cryptsetup.c:849 src/cryptsetup.c:1088
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:749 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:814
+msgid "No known cipher specification pattern detected."
+msgstr "Non è stato rilevato alcun modello noto di specifica di cifrario."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:220
+msgid "WARNING: The --hash parameter is being ignored in plain mode with keyfile specified.\n"
+msgstr "Attenzione: il parametro --hash viene ignorato in modalità normale con file di chiave specificato.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:228
+msgid "WARNING: The --keyfile-size option is being ignored, the read size is the same as the encryption key size.\n"
+msgstr "Attenzione: l'opzione --keyfile-size viene ignorata, la dimensione di lettura è la stessa della dimensione della chiave di cifratura.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:268
+#, c-format
+msgid "Detected device signature(s) on %s. Proceeding further may damage existing data."
+msgstr "Rilevata firma dispositivo su %s. Attenzione: continuare potrebbe danneggiare i dati esistenti."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:274 src/cryptsetup.c:969 src/cryptsetup.c:1065
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1138 src/cryptsetup.c:1763 src/integritysetup.c:230
+msgid "Operation aborted.\n"
+msgstr "Operazione interrotta.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:342
+msgid "Option --key-file is required."
+msgstr "È richiesta l'opzione --key-file."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:395
+msgid "Enter VeraCrypt PIM: "
+msgstr "Inserire PIM VeraCrypt: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:404
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: parse error."
+msgstr "Valore PIM non valido: errore di lettura."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:407
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: 0."
+msgstr "Valore PIM non valido: 0."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:410
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: outside of range."
+msgstr "Valore PIM non valido: fuori dall'intervallo."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:433
+msgid "No device header detected with this passphrase."
+msgstr "Nessun header di dispositivo rilevato con questa passphrase."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:495 src/cryptsetup.c:1790
+msgid ""
+"Header dump with volume key is sensitive information\n"
+"which allows access to encrypted partition without passphrase.\n"
+"This dump should be always stored encrypted on safe place."
+msgstr ""
+"Il dump dell'header con la chiave di volume contiene informazioni\n"
+"confidenziali che permettono di accedere alla partizione cifrata senza passphrase.\n"
+"Questo dump dovrebbe sempre essere salvato in modo cifrato in un luogo sicuro."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:574
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is still active and scheduled for deferred removal.\n"
+msgstr "Il dispositivo %s è ancora attivo ed è pianificato per essere rimosso.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:602
+msgid "Resize of active device requires volume key in keyring but --disable-keyring option is set."
+msgstr "Il ridimensionamento di un dispositivo attivo richiede la chiave del volume nel portachiavi, ma l'opzione --disable-keyring è impostata."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:727
+msgid "Benchmark interrupted."
+msgstr "Benchmark interrotto."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:748
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2-%-9s     N/A\n"
+msgstr "PBKDF2-%-9s     N/D\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:750
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2-%-9s %7u iterations per second for %zu-bit key\n"
+msgstr "PBKDF2-%-9s %7u iterazioni per secondo per chiave di %zu-bit\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:764
+#, c-format
+msgid "%-10s N/A\n"
+msgstr "%-10s N/D\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:766
+#, c-format
+msgid "%-10s %4u iterations, %5u memory, %1u parallel threads (CPUs) for %zu-bit key (requested %u ms time)\n"
+msgstr "%-10s %4u iterazioni, %5u memoria, %1u thread paralleli (CPU) per chiave di %zu-bit (tempo richiesto %u ms)\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:790
+msgid "Result of benchmark is not reliable."
+msgstr "Il risultato del benchmark non è attendibile."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:841
+msgid "# Tests are approximate using memory only (no storage IO).\n"
+msgstr "# I test sono approssimati usando solo la memoria (nessun IO dall'archivio).\n"
+
+#. TRANSLATORS: The string is header of a table and must be exactly (right side) aligned.
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:875
+#, c-format
+msgid "#%*s Algorithm |       Key |      Encryption |      Decryption\n"
+msgstr ""
+"#%*s Algoritmo |    Chiave |       Cifratura |   Decrifrazione\n"
+"\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:879
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cipher %s is not available."
+msgstr "Il cifrario %s non è disponibile."
+
+#. TRANSLATORS: The string is header of a table and must be exactly (right side) aligned.
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:899
+msgid "#     Algorithm |       Key |      Encryption |      Decryption\n"
+msgstr ""
+"#     Algoritmo |    Chiave |       Cifratura |   Decrifrazione\n"
+"\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:908
+msgid "N/A"
+msgstr "N/D"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:968
+msgid "Really try to repair LUKS device header?"
+msgstr "Provare a riparare l'header del dispositivo LUKS?"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:984 src/integritysetup.c:144
+msgid ""
+"Wiping device to initialize integrity checksum.\n"
+"You can interrupt this by pressing CTRL+c (rest of not wiped device will contain invalid checksum).\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Pulizia del dispositivo per inizializzare il controllo dell'integrità.\n"
+"È possibile interrompere questa operazione premendo Ctrl+C: la parte del dispositivo non pulita\n"
+"conterrà dati di controllo non validi.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1006 src/integritysetup.c:166
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot deactivate temporary device %s."
+msgstr "Impossibile disattivare il dispositivo %s temporaneo."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1050
+msgid "Integrity option can be used only for LUKS2 format."
+msgstr "L'opzione di integrità può essere usata solo col formato LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1055 src/cryptsetup.c:1115
+msgid "Unsupported LUKS2 metadata size options."
+msgstr "Opzioni dimensione metadati LUKS2 non supportate."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1072
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create header file %s."
+msgstr "Impossibile creare il file header %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1095 src/integritysetup.c:192 src/integritysetup.c:201
+#: src/integritysetup.c:210 src/integritysetup.c:276 src/integritysetup.c:285
+#: src/integritysetup.c:295
+msgid "No known integrity specification pattern detected."
+msgstr "Non è stato rilevato alcun modello noto di specifica di integrità."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1108
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use %s as on-disk header."
+msgstr "Impossibile usare %s come header on-disk."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1132 src/integritysetup.c:224
+#, c-format
+msgid "This will overwrite data on %s irrevocably."
+msgstr "Ciò sovrascriverà i dati in %s in modo irreversibile."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1173 src/cryptsetup.c:1484 src/cryptsetup.c:1551
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1646 src/cryptsetup.c:1712
+msgid "Failed to set pbkdf parameters."
+msgstr "Impostazione dei parametri pbkdf non riuscita."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1242
+msgid "Reduced data offset is allowed only for detached LUKS header."
+msgstr "L'offset di dati ridotti è ammesso solo per l'header LUKS scollegato."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1284
+msgid "Device activated but cannot make flags persistent."
+msgstr "Dispositivo attivato, ma non è possibile rendere i flag permanenti."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1365
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %d is selected for deletion."
+msgstr "Slot di chiave %d selezionato per l'eliminazione."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1368 src/cryptsetup.c:1706
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %d is not active."
+msgstr "Lo slot di chiave %d non è attivo."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1377 src/cryptsetup.c:1438
+msgid "This is the last keyslot. Device will become unusable after purging this key."
+msgstr "Questo è l'ultimo slot di chiave. Il dispositivo sarà inutilizzabile dopo aver eliminato questa chiave."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1378
+msgid "Enter any remaining passphrase: "
+msgstr "Inserire una delle passphrase rimanenti: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1379 src/cryptsetup.c:1440
+msgid "Operation aborted, the keyslot was NOT wiped.\n"
+msgstr "Operazione terminata, lo slot di chiave NON è stato pulito.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1417
+msgid "Enter passphrase to be deleted: "
+msgstr "Inserire la passphrase da eliminare: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1435
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d selected for deletion."
+msgstr "Slot di chiave %d selezionato per l'eliminazione."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1498 src/cryptsetup.c:1565 src/cryptsetup.c:1599
+msgid "Enter new passphrase for key slot: "
+msgstr "Inserire la nuova passphrase per lo slot di chiave: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1582 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1352
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter any existing passphrase: "
+msgstr "Inserire una delle passphrase esistenti: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1650
+msgid "Enter passphrase to be changed: "
+msgstr "Inserire la passphrase da cambiare: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1666 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1338
+msgid "Enter new passphrase: "
+msgstr "Inserire la nuova passphrase: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1716
+msgid "Enter passphrase for keyslot to be converted: "
+msgstr "Inserire la passphrase per lo slot da convertire: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1740
+msgid "Only one device argument for isLuks operation is supported."
+msgstr "È supportato un solo argomento dispositivo per ogni operazione isLuks."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1924 src/cryptsetup.c:1945
+msgid "Option --header-backup-file is required."
+msgstr "È richiesta l'opzione --header-backup-file."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1975
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s is not cryptsetup managed device."
+msgstr "%s non è un dispositivo gestito via cryptsetup."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1986
+#, c-format
+msgid "Refresh is not supported for device type %s"
+msgstr "L'aggiornamento non è supportato per dispositivi di tipo %s"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2024
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unrecognized metadata device type %s."
+msgstr "Tipo di dispositivo metadati %s non riconosciuto."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2027
+msgid "Command requires device and mapped name as arguments."
+msgstr "Il comando richiede un dispositivo e un nome di mappatura come argomenti."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2049
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"This operation will erase all keyslots on device %s.\n"
+"Device will become unusable after this operation."
+msgstr ""
+"Questa operazione eliminerà tutti gli slot di chiave sul dispositivo %s.\n"
+"Il dispositivo sarà inutilizzabile dopo questa operazione."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2056
+msgid "Operation aborted, keyslots were NOT wiped.\n"
+msgstr "Operazione terminata, gli slot di chiave NON sono stati puliti.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2093
+msgid "Invalid LUKS type, only luks1 and luks2 are supported."
+msgstr "Tipo LUKS non valido, solo «luks1» o «luks2» sono supportati."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2111
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device is already %s type."
+msgstr "Il dispositivo è già di tipo %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2116
+#, c-format
+msgid "This operation will convert %s to %s format.\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Questa operazione converte %s nel formato %s.\n"
+"\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2122
+msgid "Operation aborted, device was NOT converted.\n"
+msgstr "Operazione terminata, il dispositivo NON è stato convertito.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2162
+msgid "Option --priority, --label or --subsystem is missing."
+msgstr "Manca l'opzione --priority, --label o --subsystem."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2196 src/cryptsetup.c:2229 src/cryptsetup.c:2252
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %d is invalid."
+msgstr "Il token %d non è valido."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2199 src/cryptsetup.c:2255
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %d in use."
+msgstr "Il token %d è in uso."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2206
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to add luks2-keyring token %d."
+msgstr "Aggiunta del token luks2-keyring %d non riuscita."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2215 src/cryptsetup.c:2277
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign token %d to keyslot %d."
+msgstr "Assegnazione del token %d allo slot di chiave %d non riuscita."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2232
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %d is not in use."
+msgstr "Il token %d non è in uso."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2267
+msgid "Failed to import token from file."
+msgstr "Importazione del token da file non riuscita."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2292
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to get token %d for export."
+msgstr "Recupero del token %d per l'esportazione non riuscito."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2307
+msgid "--key-description parameter is mandatory for token add action."
+msgstr "Il parametro --key-description è obbligatorio per l'azione di aggiunta token."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2313 src/cryptsetup.c:2321
+msgid "Action requires specific token. Use --token-id parameter."
+msgstr "L'azione richiede un token specifico. Utilizzare il parametro --token-id."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2326
+#, c-format
+msgid "Invalid token operation %s."
+msgstr "Operazione token %s non valida."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2366
+msgid "<device> [--type <type>] [<name>]"
+msgstr "<dispositivo> [--type <tipo>] [<nome>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2366
+msgid "open device as mapping <name>"
+msgstr "Apre il dispositivo come mappatura in <nome>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2367 src/cryptsetup.c:2368 src/cryptsetup.c:2369
+#: src/veritysetup.c:363 src/veritysetup.c:364 src/integritysetup.c:464
+#: src/integritysetup.c:465
+msgid "<name>"
+msgstr "<nome>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2367
+msgid "close device (remove mapping)"
+msgstr "Chiude il dispositivo (rimuove la mappatura)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2368
+msgid "resize active device"
+msgstr "Ridimensiona il dispositivo attivo"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2369
+msgid "show device status"
+msgstr "Mostra lo stato del dispositivo"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2370
+msgid "[--cipher <cipher>]"
+msgstr "[--cipher <cifrario>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2370
+msgid "benchmark cipher"
+msgstr "Esegue benchmark del cifrario"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2371 src/cryptsetup.c:2372 src/cryptsetup.c:2373
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2374 src/cryptsetup.c:2381 src/cryptsetup.c:2382
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2383 src/cryptsetup.c:2384 src/cryptsetup.c:2385
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2386 src/cryptsetup.c:2387 src/cryptsetup.c:2388
+msgid "<device>"
+msgstr "<dispositivo>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2371
+msgid "try to repair on-disk metadata"
+msgstr "Prova a riparare i metadati on-disk"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2372
+msgid "erase all keyslots (remove encryption key)"
+msgstr "Elimina tutti gli slot di chiavi (rimuove chiave di cifratura)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2373
+msgid "convert LUKS from/to LUKS2 format"
+msgstr "Converte LUKS dal/al formato LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2374
+msgid "set permanent configuration options for LUKS2"
+msgstr "Imposta opzioni di configurazione permanenti per LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2375 src/cryptsetup.c:2376
+msgid "<device> [<new key file>]"
+msgstr "<dispositivo> [<nuovo file chiave>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2375
+msgid "formats a LUKS device"
+msgstr "Formatta un dispositivo LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2376
+msgid "add key to LUKS device"
+msgstr "Aggiunge chiave al dispositivo LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2377 src/cryptsetup.c:2378 src/cryptsetup.c:2379
+msgid "<device> [<key file>]"
+msgstr "<dispositivo> [<file chiave>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2377
+msgid "removes supplied key or key file from LUKS device"
+msgstr "Rimuove la chiave fornita o il file chiave dal dispositivo LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2378
+msgid "changes supplied key or key file of LUKS device"
+msgstr "Cambia la chiave fornita o il file chiave del dispositivo LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2379
+msgid "converts a key to new pbkdf parameters"
+msgstr "Converte una chiave nei nuovi parametri pbkdf"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2380
+msgid "<device> <key slot>"
+msgstr "<dispositivo> <slot di chiave>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2380
+msgid "wipes key with number <key slot> from LUKS device"
+msgstr "Ripulisce la chiave con numero <slot di chiave> dal dispositivo LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2381
+msgid "print UUID of LUKS device"
+msgstr "Stampa l'UUID del dispositivo LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2382
+msgid "tests <device> for LUKS partition header"
+msgstr "Verifica l'header della partizione LUKS di <dispositivo>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2383
+msgid "dump LUKS partition information"
+msgstr "Esegue il dump delle informazioni della partizione LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2384
+msgid "dump TCRYPT device information"
+msgstr "Esegue il dump delle informazioni TCRYPT del dispositivo"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2385
+msgid "Suspend LUKS device and wipe key (all IOs are frozen)"
+msgstr "Sospende il dispositivo LUKS e ripulisce la chiave (operazioni I/O bloccate)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2386
+msgid "Resume suspended LUKS device"
+msgstr "Ripristina il dispositivo LUKS sospeso"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2387
+msgid "Backup LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "Fa il backup dell'header del dispositivo e degli slot di chiave"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2388
+msgid "Restore LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "Ripristina l'header del dispositivo LUKS e gli slot di chiave"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2389
+msgid "<add|remove|import|export> <device>"
+msgstr "<add|remove|import|export> <dispositivo>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2389
+msgid "Manipulate LUKS2 tokens"
+msgstr "Gestisce token LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2407 src/veritysetup.c:380 src/integritysetup.c:481
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<action> is one of:\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<azione> è una tra:\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2413
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"You can also use old <action> syntax aliases:\n"
+"\topen: create (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen\n"
+"\tclose: remove (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tcryptClose\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"È possibile usare anche la vecchia sintassi <azione>:\n"
+"\topen: create (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen\n"
+"\tclose: remove (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tcryptClose\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2417
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<device> is the encrypted device\n"
+"<key slot> is the LUKS key slot number to modify\n"
+"<key file> optional key file for the new key for luksAddKey action\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<nome> è il dispositivo da creare in %s\n"
+"<dispositivo> è il dispositivo cifrato\n"
+"<slot di chiave> è il numero dello slot di chiave LUKS da modificare\n"
+"<file chiave> è il file chiave opzionale per la nuova chiave per l'azione luksAddKey\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2424
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in metadata format is %s (for luksFormat action).\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Formato predefinito metadati compilati: %s (per azione luksFormat).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2429
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in key and passphrase parameters:\n"
+"\tMaximum keyfile size: %dkB, Maximum interactive passphrase length %d (characters)\n"
+"Default PBKDF for LUKS1: %s, iteration time: %d (ms)\n"
+"Default PBKDF for LUKS2: %s\n"
+"\tIteration time: %d, Memory required: %dkB, Parallel threads: %d\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Parametri predefiniti compilati di chiave e passphrase:\n"
+"\tdimensione massima file chiave: %dkB, lunghezza massima della passphrase interattiva %d (caratteri)\n"
+"PBKDF predefinito per LUKS1: %s, tempo iterazione: %d (ms)\n"
+"PBKDF predefinito per LUKS2: %s\n"
+"\tTempo iterazione: %d, memoria richiesta: %dkB, thread paralleli: %d\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2440
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in device cipher parameters:\n"
+"\tloop-AES: %s, Key %d bits\n"
+"\tplain: %s, Key: %d bits, Password hashing: %s\n"
+"\tLUKS: %s, Key: %d bits, LUKS header hashing: %s, RNG: %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Parametri predefiniti compilati del cifrario del dispositivo:\n"
+"\tloop-AES: %s, chiave: %d bit\n"
+"\tin chiaro: %s, chiave: %d bit, hash della password: %s\n"
+"\tLUKS: %s, chiave: %d bit, hash dell'header LUKS: %s, RNG: %s\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2449
+msgid "\tLUKS: Default keysize with XTS mode (two internal keys) will be doubled.\n"
+msgstr "\tLUKS: la dimensione predefinita della chiave in modalità XTS (due chiavi interne) viene raddoppiata.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2460 src/veritysetup.c:537 src/integritysetup.c:621
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s: requires %s as arguments"
+msgstr "%s: richiede %s come argomenti"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2498 src/veritysetup.c:420 src/integritysetup.c:515
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1611
+msgid "Show this help message"
+msgstr "Mostra questo messaggio d'aiuto"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2499 src/veritysetup.c:421 src/integritysetup.c:516
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1612
+msgid "Display brief usage"
+msgstr "Mostra il modo d'uso sintetico"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2503 src/veritysetup.c:425 src/integritysetup.c:520
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1616
+msgid "Help options:"
+msgstr "Opzioni di aiuto:"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2504 src/veritysetup.c:426 src/integritysetup.c:521
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1617
+msgid "Print package version"
+msgstr "Stampa la versione del pacchetto"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2505 src/veritysetup.c:427 src/integritysetup.c:522
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1618
+msgid "Shows more detailed error messages"
+msgstr "Mostra i messaggi di errore con maggior dettaglio"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2506 src/veritysetup.c:428 src/integritysetup.c:523
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1619
+msgid "Show debug messages"
+msgstr "Mostra i messaggi di debug"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2507
+msgid "Show debug messages including JSON metadata"
+msgstr "Mostra i messaggi di debug compresi i metadati JSON"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2508 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1621
+msgid "The cipher used to encrypt the disk (see /proc/crypto)"
+msgstr "Il cifrario usato per cifrare il disco (vedere /proc/crypto)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2509 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1623
+msgid "The hash used to create the encryption key from the passphrase"
+msgstr "L'hash usato per creare la chiave di cifratura dalla passphrase"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2510
+msgid "Verifies the passphrase by asking for it twice"
+msgstr "Verifica la passphrase chiedendola due volte"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2511 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1625
+msgid "Read the key from a file"
+msgstr "Legge la chiave da un file"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2512
+msgid "Read the volume (master) key from file."
+msgstr "Legge la chiave (master) del volume dal file."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2513
+msgid "Dump volume (master) key instead of keyslots info"
+msgstr "Esegue il dump della chiave (master) del volume invece delle informazioni sugli slot di chiave"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2514 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1622
+msgid "The size of the encryption key"
+msgstr "La dimensione della chiave di cifratura"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2514 src/cryptsetup.c:2571 src/integritysetup.c:539
+#: src/integritysetup.c:543 src/integritysetup.c:547
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1622
+msgid "BITS"
+msgstr "BIT"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2515 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1638
+msgid "Limits the read from keyfile"
+msgstr "Limita la lettura dal file di chiave"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2515 src/cryptsetup.c:2516 src/cryptsetup.c:2517
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2518 src/cryptsetup.c:2568 src/cryptsetup.c:2569
+#: src/veritysetup.c:431 src/veritysetup.c:432 src/veritysetup.c:433
+#: src/veritysetup.c:436 src/veritysetup.c:437 src/integritysetup.c:530
+#: src/integritysetup.c:534 src/integritysetup.c:535
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1637 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1638
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1639 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1640
+msgid "bytes"
+msgstr "byte"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2516 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1637
+msgid "Number of bytes to skip in keyfile"
+msgstr "Numero di byte da saltare nel file di chiave"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2517
+msgid "Limits the read from newly added keyfile"
+msgstr "Limita la lettura dal file di chiave appena aggiunto"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2518
+msgid "Number of bytes to skip in newly added keyfile"
+msgstr "Numero di byte da saltare nel file di chiave appena aggiunto"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2519
+msgid "Slot number for new key (default is first free)"
+msgstr "Numero dello slot per la nuova chiave (il primo libero è quello predefinito)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2520
+msgid "The size of the device"
+msgstr "La dimensione del dispositivo"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2520 src/cryptsetup.c:2521 src/cryptsetup.c:2522
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2528 src/integritysetup.c:531 src/integritysetup.c:536
+msgid "SECTORS"
+msgstr "SETTORI"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2521
+msgid "The start offset in the backend device"
+msgstr "L'offset iniziale del dispositivo di backend"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2522
+msgid "How many sectors of the encrypted data to skip at the beginning"
+msgstr "Quanti settori dei dati cifrati saltare dall'inizio"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2523
+msgid "Create a readonly mapping"
+msgstr "Crea una mappatura in sola lettura"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2524 src/integritysetup.c:524
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1628
+msgid "Do not ask for confirmation"
+msgstr "Non chiede conferma"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2525
+msgid "Timeout for interactive passphrase prompt (in seconds)"
+msgstr "Timeout per il prompt interattivo della passphrase (in secondi)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2525 src/cryptsetup.c:2526 src/integritysetup.c:525
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1629
+msgid "secs"
+msgstr "sec"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2526 src/integritysetup.c:525
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1629
+msgid "Progress line update (in seconds)"
+msgstr "Aggiornamento linea di avanzamento (in secondi)"
+
+# (NDT) Descrizione dell'opzione
+# --tries, indica il numero di tentativi per richiesta
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2527 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1630
+msgid "How often the input of the passphrase can be retried"
+msgstr "Quante volte può essere ritentato l'inserimento della passphrase"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2528
+msgid "Align payload at <n> sector boundaries - for luksFormat"
+msgstr "Allinea il payload agli estremi del settore <n> - per luksFormat"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2529
+msgid "File with LUKS header and keyslots backup"
+msgstr "File con header LUKS e backup degli slot di chiave"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2530 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1631
+msgid "Use /dev/random for generating volume key"
+msgstr "Usa /dev/random per generare la chiave di volume"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2531 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1632
+msgid "Use /dev/urandom for generating volume key"
+msgstr "Usa /dev/urandom per generare la chiave di volume"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2532
+msgid "Share device with another non-overlapping crypt segment"
+msgstr "Condivide il dispositivo con un altro segmento cifrato non sovrapposto"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2533 src/veritysetup.c:440
+msgid "UUID for device to use"
+msgstr "UUID per il dispositivo da usare"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2534
+msgid "Allow discards (aka TRIM) requests for device"
+msgstr "Ammette le richieste di scarto (funzione TRIM) per il dispositivo"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2535 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1649
+msgid "Device or file with separated LUKS header"
+msgstr "Device o file con header LUKS separato"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2536
+msgid "Do not activate device, just check passphrase"
+msgstr "Non attiva il dispositivo, verifica solamente la passphrase"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2537
+msgid "Use hidden header (hidden TCRYPT device)"
+msgstr "Usa header nascosto (dispositivo TCRYPT nascosto)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2538
+msgid "Device is system TCRYPT drive (with bootloader)"
+msgstr "Il dispositivo è l'unità TCRYPT di sistema (con bootloader)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2539
+msgid "Use backup (secondary) TCRYPT header"
+msgstr "Usa header TCRYPT di backup (secondario)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2540
+msgid "Scan also for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "Ricerca anche dispositivo compatibile VeraCrypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2541
+msgid "Personal Iteration Multiplier for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "PIM (Personal Iteration Multiplier) per dispositivo VeraCrypt compatibile"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2542
+msgid "Query Personal Iteration Multiplier for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "Interroga PIM (Personal Iteration Multiplier) per dispositivo VeraCrypt compatibile"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2543
+msgid "Type of device metadata: luks, plain, loopaes, tcrypt"
+msgstr "Tipo di metadati del dispositivo: luks, plain, loopaes, tcrypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2544
+msgid "Disable password quality check (if enabled)"
+msgstr "Disabilita la verifica della qualità della password (se abilitata)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2545
+msgid "Use dm-crypt same_cpu_crypt performance compatibility option"
+msgstr "Usa l'opzione compatibile per prestazioni same_cpu_crypt di dm-crypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2546
+msgid "Use dm-crypt submit_from_crypt_cpus performance compatibility option"
+msgstr "Usa l'opzione compatibile per prestazioni submit_from_crypt_cpus di dm-crypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2547
+msgid "Device removal is deferred until the last user closes it"
+msgstr "La rimozione del dispositivo è posticipata fino a quando l'ultimo utente lo chiude"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2548
+msgid "PBKDF iteration time for LUKS (in ms)"
+msgstr "Tempo di iterazione di PBKDF per LUKS (in ms)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2548 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1627
+msgid "msecs"
+msgstr "msec"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2549 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1645
+msgid "PBKDF algorithm (for LUKS2): argon2i, argon2id, pbkdf2"
+msgstr "Algoritmo PBKDF (per LUKS2): argon2i, argon2id, pbkdf2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2550 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1646
+msgid "PBKDF memory cost limit"
+msgstr "Limite costo memoria PBKDF"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2550 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1646
+msgid "kilobytes"
+msgstr "kilobyte"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2551 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1647
+msgid "PBKDF parallel cost"
+msgstr "Costo PBKDF parallelo"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2551 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1647
+msgid "threads"
+msgstr "thread"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2552 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1648
+msgid "PBKDF iterations cost (forced, disables benchmark)"
+msgstr "Costo iterazioni PBKDF (forzato, disabilita benchmark)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2553
+msgid "Keyslot priority: ignore, normal, prefer"
+msgstr "Priorità slot di chiave: ignore, normal, prefer"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2554
+msgid "Disable locking of on-disk metadata"
+msgstr "Disabilita il blocco dei metadati su disco"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2555
+msgid "Disable loading volume keys via kernel keyring"
+msgstr "Disabilita il caricamento delle chiavi di volume tramite il portachiavi del kernel"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2556
+msgid "Data integrity algorithm (LUKS2 only)"
+msgstr "Algoritmo integrità dei dati (solo LUKS2)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2557 src/integritysetup.c:550
+msgid "Disable journal for integrity device"
+msgstr "Disabilita il journal per il dispositivo di integrità"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2558 src/integritysetup.c:526
+msgid "Do not wipe device after format"
+msgstr "Non pulisce il dispositivo dopo la formattazione"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2559
+msgid "Do not ask for passphrase if activation by token fails"
+msgstr "Non chiede la passphrase se l'attivazione con token non riesce"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2560
+msgid "Token number (default: any)"
+msgstr "Numero token (predefinito: any)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2561
+msgid "Key description"
+msgstr "Descrizione chiave"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2562
+msgid "Encryption sector size (default: 512 bytes)"
+msgstr "Dimensione settore di cifratura (predefinito: 512 byte)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2563
+msgid "Set activation flags persistent for device"
+msgstr "Imposta flag attivazione persistente per il dispositivo"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2564
+msgid "Set label for the LUKS2 device"
+msgstr "Imposta l'etichetta per il dispositivo LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2565
+msgid "Set subsystem label for the LUKS2 device"
+msgstr "Imposta l'etichetta del sottosistema per il dispositivo LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2566
+msgid "Create unbound (no assigned data segment) LUKS2 keyslot"
+msgstr "Crea slot di chiave LUKS2 non vincolato (segmento dati non assegnato)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2567
+msgid "Read or write the json from or to a file"
+msgstr "Legge/Scrive JSON da/su file"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2568
+msgid "LUKS2 header metadata area size"
+msgstr "Dimensione area metadati header LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2569
+msgid "LUKS2 header keyslots area size"
+msgstr "Dimensione area slot di chiave header LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2570
+msgid "Refresh (reactivate) device with new parameters"
+msgstr "Aggiorna (riattiva) il dispositivo con nuovi parametri"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2571
+msgid "LUKS2 keyslot: The size of the encryption key"
+msgstr "Slot di chiave LUKS2: la dimensione della chiave di cifratura"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2572
+msgid "LUKS2 keyslot: The cipher used for keyslot encryption"
+msgstr "Slot di chiave LUKS2: il cifrario usato per la cifratura dello slot di chiave"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2588 src/veritysetup.c:461 src/integritysetup.c:568
+msgid "[OPTION...] <action> <action-specific>"
+msgstr "[OPZIONE...] <azione> <azione-specifica>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2645 src/veritysetup.c:501 src/integritysetup.c:585
+msgid "Argument <action> missing."
+msgstr "Argomento <azione> mancante."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2708 src/veritysetup.c:532 src/integritysetup.c:616
+msgid "Unknown action."
+msgstr "Azione sconosciuta."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2718
+msgid "Parameter --refresh is only allowed with open or refresh commands.\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Il parametro --refresh è consentito solo col comando open o refresh.\n"
+"\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2723
+msgid "Options --refresh and --test-passphrase are mutually exclusive.\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Solo un'opzione tra --refresh e --test-passphrase può essere usata.\n"
+"\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2728
+msgid "Option --deferred is allowed only for close command.\n"
+msgstr ""
+"L'opzione --deferred è consentita solo per il comando close.\n"
+"\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2733
+msgid "Option --shared is allowed only for open of plain device.\n"
+msgstr "L'opzione --shared è consentita solo per l'azione open di dispositivo in chiaro.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2738
+msgid "Option --allow-discards is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "L'opzione --allow-discards è consentita solo per l'azione open.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2743
+msgid "Option --persistent is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "L'opzione --persistent è consentita solo per l'azione open.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2748
+msgid "Option --persistent is not allowed with --test-passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "L'opzione --persistent non è consentita con --test-passphrase.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2757
+msgid ""
+"Option --key-size is allowed only for luksFormat, luksAddKey (with --unbound),\n"
+"open and benchmark actions. To limit read from keyfile use --keyfile-size=(bytes)."
+msgstr ""
+"L'opzione --key-size è consentita solo per le azioni luksFormat, luksAddKey (con --unbound),\n"
+"open e benchmark. Per limitare la lettura dal file chiave usare --keyfile-size=(byte)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2763
+msgid "Option --integrity is allowed only for luksFormat (LUKS2).\n"
+msgstr "L'opzione --integrity è consentita solo per luksFormat (LUKS2).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2768
+msgid "Option --integrity-no-wipe can be used only for format action with integrity extension.\n"
+msgstr ""
+"L'opzione --integrity-no-wipe può essere usata solo con l'azione format con estensione di integrità.\n"
+"\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2774
+msgid "Options --label and --subsystem are allowed only for luksFormat and config LUKS2 operations.\n"
+msgstr "Le opzioni --label e --subsystem sono consentite solo per operazioni LUKS2 luksFormat e config.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2780
+msgid "Option --test-passphrase is allowed only for open of LUKS and TCRYPT devices.\n"
+msgstr "L'opzione --test-passphrase è consentita solo per l'operazione open di dispositivo LUKS e TCRYPT.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2785 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1718
+msgid "Key size must be a multiple of 8 bits"
+msgstr "La dimensione della chiave deve essere un multiplo di 8 bit"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2791 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1403
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1723
+msgid "Key slot is invalid."
+msgstr "Lo slot di chiave non è valido."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2798
+msgid "Option --key-file takes precedence over specified key file argument."
+msgstr "L'opzione --key-file ha la precedenza sull'argomento specificato per il file chiave."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2805 src/veritysetup.c:544 src/integritysetup.c:640
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1697
+msgid "Negative number for option not permitted."
+msgstr "Non è ammesso un numero negativo per l'opzione."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2809
+msgid "Only one --key-file argument is allowed."
+msgstr "È consentito solo un argomento --key-file."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2813 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1689
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1727
+msgid "Only one of --use-[u]random options is allowed."
+msgstr "È consentita solo una tra le opzioni --use-[u]random."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2817
+msgid "Option --use-[u]random is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgstr "L'opzione --use-[u]random è consentita solo per luksFormat."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2821
+msgid "Option --uuid is allowed only for luksFormat and luksUUID."
+msgstr "L'opzione --uuid è consentita solo per luksFormat e luksUUID."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2825
+msgid "Option --align-payload is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgstr "L'opzione --align-payload è consentita solo per luksFormat."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2829
+msgid "Options --luks2-metadata-size and --opt-luks2-keyslots-size are allowed only for luksFormat with LUKS2."
+msgstr "Le opzioni --luks2-metadata-size e --opt-luks2-keyslots-size sono consentite solo luksFormat con LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2834
+msgid "Invalid LUKS2 metadata size specification."
+msgstr "Specifica di dimensione dei metadati LUKS2 non valida."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2838
+msgid "Invalid LUKS2 keyslots size specification."
+msgstr "Specifica di dimensione dello slot di chiave LUKS2 non valida."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2842
+msgid "Option --align-payload and --offset cannot be combined."
+msgstr "Le opzioni --align-payload --offset cannot non possono essere utilizzate assieme."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2848
+msgid "Option --skip is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices.\n"
+msgstr "L'opzione --skip è supportata solo per l'azione open di dispositivi in chiaro e loopaes.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2855
+msgid "Option --offset is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices and for luksFormat.\n"
+msgstr "L'opzione --offset è supportata solo per l'azione open di dispositivi in chiaro e loopaes e per luksFormat.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2861
+msgid "Option --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system or --tcrypt-backup is supported only for TCRYPT device.\n"
+msgstr "L'opzione --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system o --tcrypt-backup è supportata solo per dispositivo TCRYPT.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2866
+msgid "Option --tcrypt-hidden cannot be combined with --allow-discards.\n"
+msgstr "L'opzione --tcrypt-hidden non può essere utilizzata con --allow-discards.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2871
+msgid "Option --veracrypt is supported only for TCRYPT device type.\n"
+msgstr "L'opzione --veracrypt è supportata solo per dispositivo TCRYPT.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2877
+msgid "Invalid argument for parameter --veracrypt-pim supplied.\n"
+msgstr "Argomento fornito per il parametro --veracrypt-pim non valido.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2881
+msgid "Option --veracrypt-pim is supported only for VeraCrypt compatible devices.\n"
+msgstr ""
+"L'opzione --veracrypt-pim è supportata solo per dispositivi compatibili VeraCrypt.\n"
+"\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2889
+msgid "Option --veracrypt-query-pim is supported only for VeraCrypt compatible devices.\n"
+msgstr "L'opzione --veracrypt-query-pim è supportata solo per dispositivi compatibili VeraCrypt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2893
+msgid "The options --veracrypt-pim and --veracrypt-query-pim are mutually exclusive.\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Solo un'opzione tra --veracrypt-pim e --veracrypt-query-pim può essere usata.\n"
+"\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2900
+msgid "Option --priority can be only ignore/normal/prefer.\n"
+msgstr "L'opzione --priority può essere solamente ignore/normal/prefer.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2905
+msgid "Keyslot specification is required.\n"
+msgstr "È richiesta la specifica dello slot di chiave.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2910 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1703
+msgid "Password-based key derivation function (PBKDF) can be only pbkdf2 or argon2i/argon2id.\n"
+msgstr "La funzione di derivazione della chiave basata su password (PBKDF) può essere solamente pbkdf2 oppure argon2i/argon2id.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2915 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1708
+msgid "PBKDF forced iterations cannot be combined with iteration time option.\n"
+msgstr "Le iterazioni forzate PBKDF non possono essere usate assieme all'opzione del tempo delle iterazioni.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2921
+msgid "Sector size option is not supported for this command.\n"
+msgstr "L'opzione della dimensione del settore non è supportata con questo comando.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2927
+msgid "Unsupported encryption sector size.\n"
+msgstr "Dimensione settore di cifratura non supportata.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2932
+msgid "Key size is required with --unbound option.\n"
+msgstr "La dimensione della chiave è richiesta con l'opzione --unbound.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2937
+msgid "Option --unbound may be used only with luksAddKey action.\n"
+msgstr "L'opzione --unbound può essere usata solamente con l'azione luksAddKey.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2942
+msgid "Option --refresh may be used only with open action.\n"
+msgstr "L'opzione --refresh può essere usata solamente con l'azione open.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2953
+msgid "Cannot disable metadata locking.\n"
+msgstr "Impossibile disabilitare il blocco dei metadati.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:67
+msgid "Invalid salt string specified."
+msgstr "Stringa salt specificata non valida."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:98
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create hash image %s for writing."
+msgstr "Impossibile creare l'immagine hash %s per la scrittura."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:108
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create FEC image %s for writing."
+msgstr "Impossibile creare l'immagine FEC %s per la scrittura."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:178
+msgid "Invalid root hash string specified."
+msgstr "Stringa hash root specificata non valida."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:360
+msgid "<data_device> <hash_device>"
+msgstr "<dispositivo_dati> <dispositivo_hash>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:360 src/integritysetup.c:462
+msgid "format device"
+msgstr "Formatta il dispositivo"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:361
+msgid "<data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgstr "<dispositivo_dati> <dispositivo_hash> <hash_root>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:361
+msgid "verify device"
+msgstr "Verifica il dispositivo"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:362
+msgid "<data_device> <name> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgstr "<dispositivo_dati> <nome> <dispositivo_hash> <hash_root>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:362 src/integritysetup.c:463
+msgid "open device as <name>"
+msgstr "Apre il dispositivo come <nome>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:363 src/integritysetup.c:464
+msgid "close device (deactivate and remove mapping)"
+msgstr "Chiude il dispositivo (disattiva e rimuove la mappatura)"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:364 src/integritysetup.c:465
+msgid "show active device status"
+msgstr "Mostra lo stato del dispositivo attivo"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:365
+msgid "<hash_device>"
+msgstr "<dispositivo_hash>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:365 src/integritysetup.c:466
+msgid "show on-disk information"
+msgstr "Mostra informazioni on-disk"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:384
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<data_device> is the data device\n"
+"<hash_device> is the device containing verification data\n"
+"<root_hash> hash of the root node on <hash_device>\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<nome> è il dispositivo da creare in %s\n"
+"<dispositivo_dati> è il dispositivo dei dati\n"
+"<dispositivo_hash> è il dispositivo che contiene i dati di verifica\n"
+"<hash_root> è l'hash del nodo radice nel <dispositivo_hash>\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:391
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in dm-verity parameters:\n"
+"\tHash: %s, Data block (bytes): %u, Hash block (bytes): %u, Salt size: %u, Hash format: %u\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Parametri predefiniti compilati in dm-verity:\n"
+"\tHash: %s, Blocco dati (byte): %u, Blocco hash (byte): %u, Dimensione salt: %u, Formato hash: %u\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:429
+msgid "Do not use verity superblock"
+msgstr "Non usa il super-blocco verity"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:430
+msgid "Format type (1 - normal, 0 - original Chrome OS)"
+msgstr "Tipo di formato (1 - normale, 0 - ChromeOS originale)"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:430
+msgid "number"
+msgstr "numero"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:431
+msgid "Block size on the data device"
+msgstr "La dimensione del blocco sul dispositivo dati"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:432
+msgid "Block size on the hash device"
+msgstr "La dimensione del blocco sul dispositivo hash"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:433
+msgid "FEC parity bytes"
+msgstr "Byte di parità FEC"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:434
+msgid "The number of blocks in the data file"
+msgstr "Il numero di blocchi nel file dati"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:434
+msgid "blocks"
+msgstr "blocchi"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:435
+msgid "Path to device with error correction data"
+msgstr "Percorso al dispositivo con i dati di correzione degli errori"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:435 src/integritysetup.c:528
+msgid "path"
+msgstr "percorso"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:436
+msgid "Starting offset on the hash device"
+msgstr "L'offset iniziale del dispositivo di hash"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:437
+msgid "Starting offset on the FEC device"
+msgstr "L'offset iniziale del dispositivo FEC"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:438
+msgid "Hash algorithm"
+msgstr "Algoritmo di hash"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:438
+msgid "string"
+msgstr "stringa"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:439
+msgid "Salt"
+msgstr "Salt"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:439
+msgid "hex string"
+msgstr "stringa esadecimale"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:441
+msgid "Restart kernel if corruption is detected"
+msgstr "Riavvia il kernel se sono rilevati dati rovinati"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:442
+msgid "Ignore corruption, log it only"
+msgstr "Ignora i dati rovinati, li registra solamente"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:443
+msgid "Do not verify zeroed blocks"
+msgstr "Non verifica i blocchi azzerati"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:444
+msgid "Verify data block only the first time it is read"
+msgstr "Verifica i blocchi dati solo alla prima lettura"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:550
+msgid "Option --ignore-corruption, --restart-on-corruption or --ignore-zero-blocks is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "L'opzione --ignore-corruption, --restart-on-corruption o --ignore-zero-blocks è consentita solo per l'operazione di apertura.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:555
+msgid "Option --ignore-corruption and --restart-on-corruption cannot be used together.\n"
+msgstr "Le opzioni --ignore-corruption e --restart-on-corruption non possono essere utilizzate assieme.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:82 src/utils_password.c:298
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Impossibile leggere il file chiave %s."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:86 src/utils_password.c:302
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read %d bytes from keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Impossibile leggere %d byte dal file chiave %s."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:248
+#, c-format
+msgid "Formatted with tag size %u, internal integrity %s.\n"
+msgstr "Formattato con dimensione tag di %u, integrità interna %s.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:462 src/integritysetup.c:466
+msgid "<integrity_device>"
+msgstr "<dispositivo_integrità>"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:463
+msgid "<integrity_device> <name>"
+msgstr "<dispositivo_integrità> <nome>"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:485
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<integrity_device> is the device containing data with integrity tags\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<nome> è il dispositivo da creare in %s\n"
+"<dispositivo_integrità> è il dispositivo che contiene dai con i tag di integrità\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:490
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in dm-integrity parameters:\n"
+"\tTag size: %u bytes, Checksum algorithm: %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Parametri predefiniti compilati in dm-integrity:\n"
+"\tDimensione tag: %u byte - Algoritmo di controllo: %s\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:528
+msgid "Path to data device (if separated)"
+msgstr "Percorso al dispositivo dati (se scollegato)"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:530
+msgid "Journal size"
+msgstr "Dimensione journal"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:531
+msgid "Interleave sectors"
+msgstr "Settori di interfogliazione"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:532
+msgid "Journal watermark"
+msgstr "Watermark del journal"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:532
+msgid "percent"
+msgstr "percento"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:533
+msgid "Journal commit time"
+msgstr "Tempo scrittura del journal"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:533
+msgid "ms"
+msgstr "ms"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:534
+msgid "Tag size (per-sector)"
+msgstr "Dimensione tag (per settore)"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:535
+msgid "Sector size"
+msgstr "Dimensione settore"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:536
+msgid "Buffers size"
+msgstr "Dimensione buffer"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:538
+msgid "Data integrity algorithm"
+msgstr "Algoritmo integrità dati"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:539
+msgid "The size of the data integrity key"
+msgstr "La dimensione della chiave di integrità dei dati"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:540
+msgid "Read the integrity key from a file"
+msgstr "Legge la chiave di integrità da un file"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:542
+msgid "Journal integrity algorithm"
+msgstr "Algoritmo integrità journal"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:543
+msgid "The size of the journal integrity key"
+msgstr "La dimensione della chiave di integrità del journal"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:544
+msgid "Read the journal integrity key from a file"
+msgstr "Legge la chiave di integrità del journal da un file"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:546
+msgid "Journal encryption algorithm"
+msgstr "Algoritmo cifratura journal"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:547
+msgid "The size of the journal encryption key"
+msgstr "La dimensione della chiave di cifratura del journal"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:548
+msgid "Read the journal encryption key from a file"
+msgstr "Legge la chiave di cifratura del journal da un file"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:551
+msgid "Recovery mode (no journal, no tag checking)"
+msgstr "Modalità ripristino (jorunal e verifica tag disattivai)"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:552
+msgid "Recalculate initial tags automatically."
+msgstr "Ricalcola i tag iniziali automaticamente"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:631
+msgid "Option --integrity-recalculate can be used only for open action."
+msgstr "L'opzione --integrity-recalculate può essere usata solo con l'azione open."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:646
+msgid "Options --journal-size, --interleave-sectors, --sector-size, --tag-size and --no-wipe can be used only for format action.\n"
+msgstr "Le opzioni --journal-size, --interleave-sectors, --sector-size, --tag-size e --no-wipe possono essere usate solamente per azioni di formattazione.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:652
+msgid "Invalid journal size specification."
+msgstr "Specifica di dimensione del journal non valida."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:657
+msgid "Both key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "Devono essere specificate entrambe le opzioni file della chiave e dimensione delle chiave."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:660
+msgid "Integrity algorithm must be specified if integrity key is used."
+msgstr "L'algoritmo di integrità deve essere specificato se viene usata la chiave di integrità."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:665
+msgid "Both journal integrity key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "Devono essere specificate entrambe le opzioni file della chiave e dimensione della chiave di integrità del journal."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:668
+msgid "Journal integrity algorithm must be specified if journal integrity key is used."
+msgstr "L'algoritmo di integrità del journal deve essere specificato se viene usata la chiave di integrità del journal."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:673
+msgid "Both journal encryption key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "Devono essere specificate entrambe le opzioni file della chiave e dimensione della chiave di cifratura del journal."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:676
+msgid "Journal encryption algorithm must be specified if journal encryption key is used."
+msgstr "L'algoritmo di cifratura del journal deve essere specificato se viene usata la chiave di cifratura del journal."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:175
+msgid "Reencryption already in-progress."
+msgstr "Re-cifratura in corso."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:181
+msgid "Reencryption of device with integrity profile is not supported."
+msgstr "La re-cifratura del dispositivo con un profilo di integrità non è supportata."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:204
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot exclusively open %s, device in use."
+msgstr "Impossibile aprire esclusivamente il dispositivo %s, già in uso."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:218 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1148
+msgid "Allocation of aligned memory failed."
+msgstr "Allocazione di memoria allineata non riuscita."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:225
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read device %s."
+msgstr "Impossibile leggere il dispositivo %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:236
+#, c-format
+msgid "Marking LUKS1 device %s unusable."
+msgstr "Impostazione dispositivo LUKS %s come inutilizzabile."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:240
+#, c-format
+msgid "Setting LUKS2 offline reencrypt flag on device %s."
+msgstr "Impostazione flag re-cifratura offline LUKS2 sul dispositivo %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:257
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write device %s."
+msgstr "Impossibile scrivere il dispositivo %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:345
+msgid "Cannot write reencryption log file."
+msgstr "Impossibile scrivere il file di registro di re-cifratura."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:401
+msgid "Cannot read reencryption log file."
+msgstr "Impossibile leggere il file di registro di re-cifratura."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:439
+#, c-format
+msgid "Log file %s exists, resuming reencryption.\n"
+msgstr "Il file di registro %s esiste, viene ripristinata la re-cifratura.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:488
+msgid "Activating temporary device using old LUKS header."
+msgstr "Attivazione dispositivo temporaneo usando il vecchio header LUKS."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:498
+msgid "Activating temporary device using new LUKS header."
+msgstr "Attivazione dispositivo temporaneo usando il nuovo header LUKS."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:508
+msgid "Activation of temporary devices failed."
+msgstr "Attivazione del dispositivo temporaneo non riuscita."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:586
+msgid "Failed to set PBKDF parameters."
+msgstr "Impostazione parametri PBKDF non riuscita."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:592
+msgid "Failed to set data offset."
+msgstr "Impostazione offset dei dati non riuscita."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:600
+#, c-format
+msgid "New LUKS header for device %s created."
+msgstr "Creato nuovo header LUKS per il dispositivo %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:660
+#, c-format
+msgid "This version of cryptsetup-reencrypt can't handle new internal token type %s."
+msgstr "Questa versione di cryptsetup-reencrypt non può gestire token interni di tipo %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:682
+msgid "Failed to read activation flags from backup header."
+msgstr "Lettura dei flag di attivazione dall'header di backup non riuscita."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:686
+msgid "Failed to write activation flags to new header."
+msgstr "Scrittura dei flag di attivazione sul nuovo header non riuscita."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:690 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:694
+msgid "Failed to read requirements from backup header."
+msgstr "Lettura dei requisiti dall'header di backup non riuscita."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:731
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s header backup of device %s created."
+msgstr "Header %s di backup del dispositivo %s creato."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:789
+msgid "Creation of LUKS backup headers failed."
+msgstr "Creazione degli header di backup LUKS non riuscita."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:918
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot restore %s header on device %s."
+msgstr "Impossibile ripristinare l'header %s sul dispositivo %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:920
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s header on device %s restored."
+msgstr "Ripristinato l'header %s sul dispositivo %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:958 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1038
+msgid "Cannot seek to device offset."
+msgstr "Impossibile posizionarsi all'offset del dispositivo."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1081
+msgid "Cannot seek to device offset.\n"
+msgstr "Impossibile posizionarsi all'offset del dispositivo.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1120 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1126
+msgid "Cannot open temporary LUKS device."
+msgstr "Impossibile aprire il dispositivo temporaneo LUKS."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1131 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1136
+msgid "Cannot get device size."
+msgstr "Impossibile ottenere la dimensione del dispositivo."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1173
+msgid "Interrupted by a signal."
+msgstr "Interrotto da un segnale."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1175
+msgid "IO error during reencryption."
+msgstr "Errore di IO durante la re-cifratura."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1206
+msgid "Provided UUID is invalid."
+msgstr "Lo UUID fornito non è valido."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1309
+msgid "Key file can be used only with --key-slot or with exactly one key slot active."
+msgstr "Il file chiave può essere usato solamente con --key-slot o con esattamente uno slot di chiave attivo."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1350 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1361
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for key slot %u: "
+msgstr "Inserire la passphrase per lo slot di chiave %u: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1432
+msgid "Cannot open reencryption log file."
+msgstr "Impossibile aprire il file di registro di re-cifratura."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1438
+msgid "No decryption in progress, provided UUID can be used only to resume suspended decryption process."
+msgstr "Nessuna decifrazione in corso: lo UUID fornito può essere usato solamente per riprendere un processo di decifrazione."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1513
+#, c-format
+msgid "Changed pbkdf parameters in keyslot %i."
+msgstr "Parametri pbkdf modificati nello slot di chiave %i."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1620
+msgid "Reencryption block size"
+msgstr "Dimensione blocco re-cifratura"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1620
+msgid "MiB"
+msgstr "MiB"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1624
+msgid "Do not change key, no data area reencryption"
+msgstr "Non cambia chiave, nessuna re-cifratura dei dati"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1626
+msgid "Read new volume (master) key from file"
+msgstr "Legge la chiave (master) del volume da file"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1627
+msgid "PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS (in ms)"
+msgstr "Tempo di iterazione di PBKDF2 per LUKS (in ms)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1633
+msgid "Use direct-io when accessing devices"
+msgstr "Usa IO diretto negli accessi ai dispositivi"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1634
+msgid "Use fsync after each block"
+msgstr "Usa fsync dopo ogni blocco"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1635
+msgid "Update log file after every block"
+msgstr "Aggiorna il registro a ogni blocco"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1636
+msgid "Use only this slot (others will be disabled)"
+msgstr "Usa solo questo slot (gli altri vengono disabilitati)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1639
+msgid "Reduce data device size (move data offset). DANGEROUS!"
+msgstr "Riduce la dimensione dei dati del dispositivo (muove l'offset dei dati) PERICOLOSO"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1640
+msgid "Use only specified device size (ignore rest of device). DANGEROUS!"
+msgstr "Usa solo la dimensione specificata del dispositivo (ignora il resto del dispositivo) PERICOLOSO"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1641
+msgid "Create new header on not encrypted device"
+msgstr "Crea un nuovo header su un dispositivo non cifrato"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1642
+msgid "Permanently decrypt device (remove encryption)"
+msgstr "Decifra definitivamente il dispositivo (rimuove la cifratura)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1643
+msgid "The UUID used to resume decryption"
+msgstr "Lo UUID utilizzato per riprendere la decifrazione"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1644
+msgid "Type of LUKS metadata: luks1, luks2"
+msgstr "Metadati di tipo LUKS: luks1, luks2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1663
+msgid "[OPTION...] <device>"
+msgstr "[OPZIONI...] <dispositivo>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1677
+#, c-format
+msgid "Reencryption will change: %s%s%s%s%s%s."
+msgstr "La re-cifratura modificherà: %s%s%s%s%s%s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1678
+msgid "volume key"
+msgstr "chiave volume"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1680
+msgid "set hash to "
+msgstr "imposta l'hash a "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1681
+msgid ", set cipher to "
+msgstr ", imposta il cifrario a "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1685
+msgid "Argument required."
+msgstr "Argomento richiesto."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1713
+msgid "Only values between 1 MiB and 64 MiB allowed for reencryption block size."
+msgstr "Solo valori tra 1 MiB e 64 MiB sono consentiti per la dimensione del blocco di re-cifratura."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1732 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1737
+msgid "Invalid device size specification."
+msgstr "Specifica di dimensione del dispositivo non valida."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1740
+msgid "Maximum device reduce size is 64 MiB."
+msgstr "La dimensione massima di riduzione del dispositivo è 64 MiB."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1743
+msgid "Reduce size must be multiple of 512 bytes sector."
+msgstr "La dimensione di riduzione deve essere un multiplo di 512 byte."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1747
+msgid "Option --new must be used together with --reduce-device-size or --header."
+msgstr "L'opzione --new deve essere usata con --reduce-device-size o --header."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1751
+msgid "Option --keep-key can be used only with --hash, --iter-time or --pbkdf-force-iterations."
+msgstr "L'opzione --keep-key può essere usata solo con --hash, --iter-time --pbkdf-force-iterations."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1755
+msgid "Option --new cannot be used together with --decrypt."
+msgstr "L'opzione --new non può essere usata con --decrypt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1759
+msgid "Option --decrypt is incompatible with specified parameters."
+msgstr "L'opzione --decrypt non è compatibile con i parametri specificati."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1763
+msgid "Option --uuid is allowed only together with --decrypt."
+msgstr "L'opzione --uuid può essere usata solo con --decrypt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1767
+msgid "Invalid luks type. Use one of these: 'luks', 'luks1' or 'luks2'."
+msgstr "Tipo luks non valido. Usare uno tra: \"luks\", \"luks1\" o \"luks2\"."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:150
+msgid "Error reading response from terminal."
+msgstr "Errore nel leggere la risposta dal terminale."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:175
+msgid "Command successful.\n"
+msgstr "Comando eseguito con successo.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:183
+msgid "wrong or missing parameters"
+msgstr "parametri errati o mancanti"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:185
+msgid "no permission or bad passphrase"
+msgstr "permessi mancanti o passphrase errata"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:187
+msgid "out of memory"
+msgstr "memoria esaurita"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:189
+msgid "wrong device or file specified"
+msgstr "dispositivo o file specificato errato"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:191
+msgid "device already exists or device is busy"
+msgstr "il dispositivo esiste già o è occupato"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:193
+msgid "unknown error"
+msgstr "errore sconosciuto"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:195
+#, c-format
+msgid "Command failed with code %i (%s).\n"
+msgstr "Comando non riuscito con codice %i (%s).\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:272
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %i created."
+msgstr "Slot di chiave %i creato."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:274
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %i unlocked."
+msgstr "Slot di chiave %i sbloccato."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:276
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %i removed."
+msgstr "Slot di chiave %i rimosso."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:285
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %i created."
+msgstr "Token %i creato."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:287
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %i removed."
+msgstr "Token %i rimosso."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:453
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Device %s already contains a '%s' partition signature.\n"
+msgstr "Attenzione: il dispositivo %s contiene già una firma di partizione «%s».\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:461
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Device %s already contains a '%s' superblock signature.\n"
+msgstr "Attenzione: il dispositivo %s contiene già una firma di super-blocco «%s».\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:482 src/utils_tools.c:546
+msgid "Failed to initialize device signature probes."
+msgstr "Inizializzazione sonde per la firma del dispositivo non riuscita."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:526
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to stat device %s."
+msgstr "Stat del dispositivo %s non riuscita."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:539
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is in use. Can not proceed with format operation."
+msgstr "Il dispositivo %s è in uso. Impossibile procedere con l'operazione di formattazione."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:541
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to open file %s in read/write mode."
+msgstr "Apertura del file %s in lettura/scrittura non riuscita."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:561
+msgid "Failed to wipe device signature."
+msgstr "Pulizia della firma del dispositivo non riuscita."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:568
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to probe device %s for a signature."
+msgstr "Esame del dispositivo %s per una firma non riuscito."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:43 src/utils_password.c:75
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot check password quality: %s"
+msgstr "Impossibile controllare la qualità della password: %s"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:51
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Password quality check failed:\n"
+" %s"
+msgstr ""
+"Controllo qualità della password non riuscito:\n"
+" %s"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:83
+#, c-format
+msgid "Password quality check failed: Bad passphrase (%s)"
+msgstr "Controllo qualità della password non riuscito: passphrase non valida (%s)"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:193 src/utils_password.c:208
+msgid "Error reading passphrase from terminal."
+msgstr "Errore nel leggere la passphrase dal terminale."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:206
+msgid "Verify passphrase: "
+msgstr "Verifica passphrase: "
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:213
+msgid "Passphrases do not match."
+msgstr "Le passphrase non corrispondono."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:250
+msgid "Cannot use offset with terminal input."
+msgstr "Impossibile usare l'offset con l'input da terminale."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:253
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase: "
+msgstr "Inserire la passphrase: "
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:255
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for %s: "
+msgstr "Inserire la passphrase per %s: "
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:285
+msgid "No key available with this passphrase."
+msgstr "Nessuna chiave disponibile con questa passphrase."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:320
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open keyfile %s for write."
+msgstr "Impossibile aprire il file chiave %s per la scrittura."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:327
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write to keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Impossibile scrivere sul file chiave %s."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:47
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to open file %s in read-only mode."
+msgstr "Apertura del file %s in sola lettura non riuscita."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:60
+msgid "Provide valid LUKS2 token JSON:\n"
+msgstr "Fornire token JSON LUKS2 valido:\n"
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:67
+msgid "Failed to read JSON file."
+msgstr "Lettura file JSON non riuscita."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:72
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Read interrupted."
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Lettura interrotta."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:113
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to open file %s in write mode."
+msgstr "Apertura del file %s in lettura non riuscita."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:122
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Write interrupted."
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Scrittura interrotta."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:126
+msgid "Failed to write JSON file."
+msgstr "Scrittura file JSON non riuscita."
+
+#~ msgid "Device %s is too small. (LUKS2 requires at least %<PRIu64> bytes.)"
+#~ msgstr "Il dispositivo %s è troppo piccolo (LUKS2 richiede almeno %<PRIu64> byte)."
+
+#~ msgid "Replaced with key slot %d.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Sostituito con lo slot di chiave %d.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Too many tree levels for verity volume.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Troppi livelli d'albero per il volume verity.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "memory allocation error in action_luksFormat"
+#~ msgstr "errore di allocazione di memoria in action_luksFormat"
+
+#~ msgid "Key %d not active. Can't wipe.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Chiave %d non attiva. Impossibile ripulirla.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "<name> <data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+#~ msgstr "<nome> <dispositivo_dati> <dispositivo_hash> <hash_root>"
+
+#~ msgid "create active device"
+#~ msgstr "Crea dispositivo attivo"
+
+#~ msgid "remove (deactivate) device"
+#~ msgstr "Rimuove (disattiva) dispositivo"
+
+#~ msgid "Activated keyslot %i.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Slot di chiave %i attivato.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Progress: %5.1f%%, ETA %02llu:%02llu, %4llu MiB written, speed %5.1f MiB/s%s"
+#~ msgstr "Avanzamento: %5.1f%%, ETA %02llu:%02llu, %4llu MiB scritti, velocità %5.1f MiB/s%s"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot find a free loopback device.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Impossibile trovare un dispositivo di loopback libero.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot open device %s\n"
+#~ msgstr "Impossibile aprire il dispositivo %s\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot use passed UUID unless decryption in progress.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Impossibile utilizzare lo UUID fornito se non è in corso una decifratura.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Marking LUKS device %s usable.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Impostazione device LUKS %s come utilizzabile.\n"
diff --git a/po/nl.po b/po/nl.po
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..854d0d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/po/nl.po
@@ -0,0 +1,1972 @@
+# Dutch translation of cryptsetup.
+# This file is distributed under the same license as the cryptsetup package.
+# Copyright (C) 2016 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+# Koen <koen@drunkfelines.com>, 2017.
+#
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: cryptsetup-1.7.4\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: dm-crypt@saout.de\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2017-03-02 09:40+0100\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2017-03-03 23:04+0100\n"
+"Last-Translator: Koen <koen@drunkfelines.com>\n"
+"Language-Team: Dutch <vertaling@vrijschrift.org>\n"
+"Language: nl\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+"X-Bugs: Report translation errors to the Language-Team address.\n"
+"Plural-Forms: nplurals=2; plural=n != 1;\n"
+"X-Generator: Poedit 1.6.10\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:262
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper, running as non-root user.\n"
+msgstr "Kan apparaatstoewijzer niet initialiseren, uitvoering als non-root gebruiker.\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:265
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper. Is dm_mod kernel module loaded?\n"
+msgstr "Kan apparaatstoewijzer niet initialiseren. Is kernelmodule dm_mod geladen?\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:581
+#, c-format
+msgid "DM-UUID for device %s was truncated.\n"
+msgstr "DM-UUID voor apparaat %s werd afgekapt.\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:729
+msgid "Requested dm-crypt performance options are not supported.\n"
+msgstr "Aangevraagde prestatie-opties voor dm-crypt worden niet ondersteund.\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:735
+msgid "Requested dm-verity data corruption handling options are not supported.\n"
+msgstr "Aangevraagde opties voor behandeling van datacorruptie van dm-verity worden niet ondersteund.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:80
+msgid ""
+"System is out of entropy while generating volume key.\n"
+"Please move mouse or type some text in another window to gather some random events.\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Systeem heeft niet genoeg willekeurige gegevens om de sleutel tot het opslagmedium verder te genereren.\n"
+"Beweeg de muis of typ wat tekst in een nieuw venster om enkele willekeurige evenementen te verzamelen.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:84
+#, c-format
+msgid "Generating key (%d%% done).\n"
+msgstr "Sleutel wordt gegenereerd (%d%% afgewerkt).\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:170
+msgid "Running in FIPS mode.\n"
+msgstr "Uitvoering in FIPS-modus.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:176
+msgid "Fatal error during RNG initialisation.\n"
+msgstr "Fatale fout bij initialisatie van RNG.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:213
+msgid "Unknown RNG quality requested.\n"
+msgstr "Onbekende RNG-kwaliteit aangevraagd.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:218
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error %d reading from RNG: %s\n"
+msgstr "Fout %d bij lezen uit RNG: %s\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:200
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto RNG backend.\n"
+msgstr "Kan RNG versleutelings-backend niet initialiseren.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:206
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto backend.\n"
+msgstr "Kan versleutelings-backend niet initialiseren.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:237 lib/setup.c:1199 lib/verity/verity.c:123
+#, c-format
+msgid "Hash algorithm %s not supported.\n"
+msgstr "Aangevraagd hash-algoritme %s wordt niet ondersteund.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:240 lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:90
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key processing error (using hash %s).\n"
+msgstr "Sleutelbehandelingsfout (met hash %s in gebruik).\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:285
+msgid "Cannot determine device type. Incompatible activation of device?\n"
+msgstr "Apparaatstype kan niet bepaald worden. Incompatibele apparaatsactivering?\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:289 lib/setup.c:1552
+msgid "This operation is supported only for LUKS device.\n"
+msgstr "Deze operatie wordt enkel ondersteund voor LUKS-apparaten.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:321
+msgid "All key slots full.\n"
+msgstr "Alle sleutelplaatsen zijn vol.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:328
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select between 0 and %d.\n"
+msgstr "Sleutelplaats %d is ongeldig, selecteer een plaats tussen 0 en %d.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:334
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is full, please select another one.\n"
+msgstr "Sleutelplaats %d is vol, selecteer een andere.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:473
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for %s: "
+msgstr "Voer wachtwoord in voor %s: "
+
+#: lib/setup.c:654
+#, c-format
+msgid "Header detected but device %s is too small.\n"
+msgstr "Koptekst gevonden maar apparaat %s is te klein.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:670 lib/setup.c:1435
+msgid "This operation is not supported for this device type.\n"
+msgstr "Deze operatie wordt niet ondersteund voor dit apparaatstype.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:909 lib/setup.c:1388 lib/setup.c:2279
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not active.\n"
+msgstr "Apparaat %s is niet actief.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:926
+#, c-format
+msgid "Underlying device for crypt device %s disappeared.\n"
+msgstr "Onderliggend apparaat van versleutelingsapparaat %s is verdwenen.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:995
+msgid "Invalid plain crypt parameters.\n"
+msgstr "Ongeldige normale versleutelingsparameters.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1000 lib/setup.c:1120
+msgid "Invalid key size.\n"
+msgstr "Ongeldige sleutelgrootte.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1005 lib/setup.c:1125
+msgid "UUID is not supported for this crypt type.\n"
+msgstr "UUID wordt niet ondersteund voor dit encryptietype.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1047
+msgid "Can't format LUKS without device.\n"
+msgstr "Kan LUKS niet formatteren zonder apparaat.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1090
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s which is still in use.\n"
+msgstr "Kan apparaat %s niet formatteren; het is nog steeds actief.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1093
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s, permission denied.\n"
+msgstr "Kan apparaat %s niet formatteren: toestemming geweigerd.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1097
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe header on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Kan koptekst op apparaat %s niet wissen.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1115
+msgid "Can't format LOOPAES without device.\n"
+msgstr "Kan LOOPAES niet formatteren zonder apparaat.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1153
+msgid "Can't format VERITY without device.\n"
+msgstr "Kan VERITY niet formatteren zonder apparaat.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1161 lib/verity/verity.c:106
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash type %d.\n"
+msgstr "Niet-ondersteund VERITY-hashtype %d.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1167 lib/verity/verity.c:114
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY block size.\n"
+msgstr "Niet-ondersteunde VERITY-blokgrootte.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1172 lib/verity/verity.c:76
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash offset.\n"
+msgstr "Niet-ondersteunde VERITY-hashgegevenspositie.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1193
+msgid "Data area overlaps with hash area.\n"
+msgstr "Overlapping tussen datagedeelte en hashgedeelte.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1292
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unknown crypt device type %s requested.\n"
+msgstr "Onbekend versleutelingsapparaattype %s aangevraagd.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1402
+msgid "Cannot resize loop device.\n"
+msgstr "Kan grootte van loopback-apparaat niet aanpassen.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1450
+msgid "Do you really want to change UUID of device?"
+msgstr "Bent u zeker dat u het UUID van het apparaat wilt wijzigen?"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1560
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not active.\n"
+msgstr "Opslagmedium %s is niet actief.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1571
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is already suspended.\n"
+msgstr "Opslagmedium %s is reeds geschorst.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1578
+#, c-format
+msgid "Suspend is not supported for device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Opschorten wordt niet ondersteund voor apparaat %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1580
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during suspending device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Fout bij het opschorten van apparaat %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1606 lib/setup.c:1653
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not suspended.\n"
+msgstr "Opslagmedium %s is niet geschorst.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1620
+#, c-format
+msgid "Resume is not supported for device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Hervatting wordt niet ondersteund voor apparaat %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1622 lib/setup.c:1674
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during resuming device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Fout bij het hervatten van apparaat %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1660 lib/setup.c:2095 lib/setup.c:2109 src/cryptsetup.c:184
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:248 src/cryptsetup.c:736 src/cryptsetup.c:1171
+msgid "Enter passphrase: "
+msgstr "Voer wachtwoord in: "
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1722 lib/setup.c:1858
+msgid "Cannot add key slot, all slots disabled and no volume key provided.\n"
+msgstr "Kan geen sleutelplaats toevoegen, alle plaatsen zijn uitgeschakeld en er is geen sleutel tot het opslagmedium voorzien.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1731 lib/setup.c:1864 lib/setup.c:1868
+msgid "Enter any passphrase: "
+msgstr "Voer enig wachtwoord in: "
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1748 lib/setup.c:1881 lib/setup.c:1885 lib/setup.c:1947
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1001 src/cryptsetup.c:1032
+msgid "Enter new passphrase for key slot: "
+msgstr "Voer een nieuw wachtwoord in voor de sleutelplaats: "
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1813
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d changed.\n"
+msgstr "Sleutelplaats %d werd gewijzigd.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1816
+#, c-format
+msgid "Replaced with key slot %d.\n"
+msgstr "Vervangen door sleutelplaats %d.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1821
+msgid "Failed to swap new key slot.\n"
+msgstr "Kan nieuwe sleutelplaats niet verwisselen.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1938 lib/setup.c:2199 lib/setup.c:2212 lib/setup.c:2354
+msgid "Volume key does not match the volume.\n"
+msgstr "Sleutel tot opslagmedium komt niet overeen met het opslagmedium.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1976
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid.\n"
+msgstr "Sleutelplaats %d is ongeldig.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1981
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is not used.\n"
+msgstr "Sleutelplaats %d is niet in gebruik.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2011 lib/setup.c:2083 lib/setup.c:2175
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s already exists.\n"
+msgstr "Apparaat %s bestaat reeds.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2186
+msgid "Incorrect volume key specified for plain device.\n"
+msgstr "Incorrecte sleutel tot het opslagmedium voor normaal apparaat verschaft.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2219
+msgid "Incorrect root hash specified for verity device.\n"
+msgstr "Incorrecte root-hash voor het VERITY-apparaat opgegeven.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2242
+msgid "Device type is not properly initialised.\n"
+msgstr "Apparaatstype is niet behoorlijk geïnitialiseerd.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2274
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is still in use.\n"
+msgstr "Apparaat %s is nog in gebruik.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2283
+#, c-format
+msgid "Invalid device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Ongeldig apparaat %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2304
+msgid "Function not available in FIPS mode.\n"
+msgstr "Functie niet beschikbaar in FIPS-modus.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2310
+msgid "Volume key buffer too small.\n"
+msgstr "Sleutelbuffer van het opslagmedium is te klein.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2318
+msgid "Cannot retrieve volume key for plain device.\n"
+msgstr "Kan sleutel tot het opslagmedium voor normaal apparaat niet ophalen.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2325
+#, c-format
+msgid "This operation is not supported for %s crypt device.\n"
+msgstr "Deze operatie wordt niet ondersteund voor versleutelapparaat %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2521
+msgid "Dump operation is not supported for this device type.\n"
+msgstr "Dump-operatie wordt niet ondersteund voor dit apparaatstype.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:244
+msgid "Cannot get process priority.\n"
+msgstr "Kan geen procesprioriteit verkrijgen.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:258
+msgid "Cannot unlock memory.\n"
+msgstr "Kan geheugen niet ontgrendelen.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:242 lib/utils_crypt.c:255 lib/utils_crypt.c:402
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:417
+msgid "Out of memory while reading passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "Geen geheugen meer beschikbaar bij lezen van wachtwoord.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:247 lib/utils_crypt.c:262
+msgid "Error reading passphrase from terminal.\n"
+msgstr "Fout bij het lezen van het wachtwoord uit de terminal.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:260
+msgid "Verify passphrase: "
+msgstr "Voer wachtwoord nogmaals in: "
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:267
+msgid "Passphrases do not match.\n"
+msgstr "Wachtwoorden komen niet overeen.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:351
+msgid "Cannot use offset with terminal input.\n"
+msgstr "Kan de gegevenspositie niet via terminalinvoer gebruiken.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:370 lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:468
+msgid "Failed to open key file.\n"
+msgstr "Openen van sleutelbestand is mislukt.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:379
+msgid "Failed to stat key file.\n"
+msgstr "Kan status van sleutelbestand niet opvragen.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:387 lib/utils_crypt.c:408
+msgid "Cannot seek to requested keyfile offset.\n"
+msgstr "Kan niet zoeken tot aan het aangevraagde sleutelbestand.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:425
+msgid "Error reading passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "Fout bij lezen van wachtwoord.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:448
+msgid "Maximum keyfile size exceeded.\n"
+msgstr "Maximum sleutelbestandsgrootte overschreden.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:453
+msgid "Cannot read requested amount of data.\n"
+msgstr "Kan aangevraagde hoeveelheid data niet lezen.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:138 lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:90
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s doesn't exist or access denied.\n"
+msgstr "Apparaat %s bestaat niet of toegang is geweigerd.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:429
+msgid "Cannot use a loopback device, running as non-root user.\n"
+msgstr "Kan geen loopback-apparaat gebruiken, uitvoering als non-root gebruiker.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:439
+msgid "Attaching loopback device failed (loop device with autoclear flag is required).\n"
+msgstr "Vastmaken loopback-apparaat gefaald (loop-apparaat met autoclear-vlag is vereist).\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:483
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s which is in use (already mapped or mounted).\n"
+msgstr "Kan apparaat %s niet gebruiken; het is nog actief (reeds toegewezen of aangekoppeld).\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:487
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot get info about device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Kan geen informatie verkrijgen over apparaat %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:493
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested offset is beyond real size of device %s.\n"
+msgstr "De aangevraagde gegevenspositie valt buiten de werkelijke grootte van apparaat %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:501
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s has zero size.\n"
+msgstr "Apparaat %s heeft grootte nul.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:512
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small.\n"
+msgstr "Apparaat %s is te klein.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:37
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Failed to setup dm-crypt key mapping for device %s.\n"
+"Check that kernel supports %s cipher (check syslog for more info).\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Kan dm-crypt sleuteltoewijzing niet instellen voor apparaat %s.\n"
+"Kijk na of de kernel versleutelalgoritme %s ondersteunt (bekijk syslog voor meer informatie).\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:42
+msgid "Key size in XTS mode must be 256 or 512 bits.\n"
+msgstr "In XTS-modus moet de sleutelgrootte 256 of 512 bits zijn.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:96 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:296
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:583 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1033
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write to device %s, permission denied.\n"
+msgstr "Kan apparaat %s niet beschrijven: toestemming geweigerd.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:111
+msgid "Failed to open temporary keystore device.\n"
+msgstr "Openen van het tijdelijke sleutelopslagapparaat is mislukt.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:118
+msgid "Failed to access temporary keystore device.\n"
+msgstr "Kan geen toegang verkrijgen tot tijdelijk sleutelopslagapparaat.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:191
+msgid "IO error while encrypting keyslot.\n"
+msgstr "Invoer/uitvoerfout tijdens het versleutelen van de sleutelplaats.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:256
+msgid "IO error while decrypting keyslot.\n"
+msgstr "Invoer/uitvoerfout tijdens het ontsleutelen van de sleutelplaats.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:90
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small. (LUKS requires at least %<PRIu64> bytes.)\n"
+msgstr "Apparaat %s is te klein. (LUKS vereist minstens %<PRIu64> bytes.)\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:180 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:419
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1152
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not a valid LUKS device.\n"
+msgstr "Apparaat %s is geen geldig LUKS-apparaat.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:198
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested header backup file %s already exists.\n"
+msgstr "Aangevraagd reservekopiebestand %s van koptekst bestaat reeds.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:200
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create header backup file %s.\n"
+msgstr "Kan reservekopiebestand %s van koptekst niet aanmaken.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:205
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write header backup file %s.\n"
+msgstr "Kan reservekopiebestand %s van koptekst niet schrijven.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:238
+msgid "Backup file doesn't contain valid LUKS header.\n"
+msgstr "Reservekopiebestand bevat geen geldige LUKS-koptekst.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:251 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:497
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open header backup file %s.\n"
+msgstr "Kan reservekopiebestand %s van koptekst niet openen.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:257
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read header backup file %s.\n"
+msgstr "Kan reservekopiebestand %s van koptekst niet lezen.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:269
+msgid "Data offset or key size differs on device and backup, restore failed.\n"
+msgstr "Verschillende gegevenspositie of sleutelgrootte in apparaat en reservekopie; herstelling is mislukt.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:277
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s %s%s"
+msgstr "Apparaat %s %s%s"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:278
+msgid "does not contain LUKS header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device."
+msgstr "bevat geen LUKS-koptekst. Het vervangen van de koptekst kan gegevens op het apparaat vernietigen."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:279
+msgid "already contains LUKS header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."
+msgstr "bevat reeds een LUKS-koptekst. Het vervangen van de koptekst zal bestaande sleutelplaatsen vernietigen."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:280
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: real device header has different UUID than backup!"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"WAARSCHUWING: originele apparaatkoptekst heeft een ander UUID dan de reservekopie!"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:299 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:536
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:586 lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:625 lib/verity/verity.c:82
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:180 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:292
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:303 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:323
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:154
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Kan apparaat %s niet openen.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:330
+msgid "Non standard key size, manual repair required.\n"
+msgstr "Niet-standaard sleutelgrootte, handmatige herstelling is vereist.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:335
+msgid "Non standard keyslots alignment, manual repair required.\n"
+msgstr "Niet-standaard sleutelplaatsuitlijning, handmatige herstelling is vereist.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:341
+msgid "Repairing keyslots.\n"
+msgstr "Sleutelplaatsen worden hersteld.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:352
+msgid "Repair failed."
+msgstr "Herstelling is mislukt."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:364
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: offset repaired (%u -> %u).\n"
+msgstr "Sleutelplaats %i: gegevenspositie hersteld (%u -> %u).\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:372
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: stripes repaired (%u -> %u).\n"
+msgstr "Sleutelplaats %i: fragmenten hersteld (%u -> %u).\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:381
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: bogus partition signature.\n"
+msgstr "Sleutelplaats %i: valse partitiehandtekening.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:386
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: salt wiped.\n"
+msgstr "Sleutelplaats %i: salt uitgewist.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:397
+msgid "Writing LUKS header to disk.\n"
+msgstr "LUKS-koptekst wordt naar schijf geschreven.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:422
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported LUKS version %d.\n"
+msgstr "Niet-ondersteunde LUKS-versie %d.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:428 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:672
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested LUKS hash %s is not supported.\n"
+msgstr "Aangevraagde LUKS-hash %s wordt niet ondersteund.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:443
+#, c-format
+msgid "LUKS keyslot %u is invalid.\n"
+msgstr "LUKS-sleutelplaats %u is ongeldig.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:457 src/cryptsetup.c:668
+msgid "No known problems detected for LUKS header.\n"
+msgstr "Geen gekende problemen gevonden bij LUKS-koptekst.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:607
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during update of LUKS header on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Fout bij het bijwerken van LUKS-koptekst op apparaat %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:614
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error re-reading LUKS header after update on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Fout bij het herlezen van LUKS-koptekst na bijwerken van apparaat %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:665
+#, c-format
+msgid "Data offset for detached LUKS header must be either 0 or higher than header size (%d sectors).\n"
+msgstr "De datagegevenspositie voor een aparte LUKS-koptekst moet of 0 zijn, of hoger liggen dan de koptekstgrootte (%d sectoren).\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:677 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:768
+msgid "Wrong LUKS UUID format provided.\n"
+msgstr "Verkeerd LUKS UUID-formaat verschaft.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:706
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: reading random salt failed.\n"
+msgstr "Kan LUKS-koptekst niet aanmaken: lezen van random salt is mislukt.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:713 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:809
+#, c-format
+msgid "Not compatible PBKDF2 options (using hash algorithm %s).\n"
+msgstr "Niet-compatibele PBKDF2-opties (met hash-algoritme %s in gebruik).\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:728
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: header digest failed (using hash %s).\n"
+msgstr "Kan LUKS-koptekst niet aanmaken: koptekst-extract is mislukt (met %s-hash).\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:793
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d active, purge first.\n"
+msgstr "Sleutelplaats %d is actief; ruim eerst op.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:799
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d material includes too few stripes. Header manipulation?\n"
+msgstr "Inhoud van sleutelplaats %d bevat te weinig fragmenten. Koptekstmanipulatie?\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:966
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d unlocked.\n"
+msgstr "Sleutelplaats %d is ontgrendeld.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1001 src/cryptsetup.c:867
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1041 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1078
+msgid "No key available with this passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "Geen sleutel beschikbaar met dit wachtwoord.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1019
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select keyslot between 0 and %d.\n"
+msgstr "Sleutelplaats %d is ongeldig, selecteer een sleutelplaats tussen 0 en %d.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1037
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Kan apparaat %s niet wissen.\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:146
+msgid "Detected not yet supported GPG encrypted keyfile.\n"
+msgstr "Nog niet ondersteund GPG-versleuteld sleutelbestand gevonden.\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:147
+msgid "Please use gpg --decrypt <KEYFILE> | cryptsetup --keyfile=- ...\n"
+msgstr "Gebruik gpg --decrypt <KEYFILE> | cryptsetup --keyfile=- ...\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:168 lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:188
+msgid "Incompatible loop-AES keyfile detected.\n"
+msgstr "Onverenigbaar loop-AES-sleutelbestand gevonden.\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:244
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support loop-AES compatible mapping.\n"
+msgstr "Toewijzingen compatibel met loop-AES worden niet ondersteund door de kernel.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:476
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error reading keyfile %s.\n"
+msgstr "Fout bij het lezen van sleutelbestand %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:514
+#, c-format
+msgid "Maximum TCRYPT passphrase length (%d) exceeded.\n"
+msgstr "Maximum TCRYPT-wachtwoorlengte (%d) overschreden.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:544
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2 hash algorithm %s not available, skipping.\n"
+msgstr "PBKDF2 hash-algoritme %s is niet beschikbaar, wordt overgeslaan.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:562 src/cryptsetup.c:621
+msgid "Required kernel crypto interface not available.\n"
+msgstr "Benodigde kernel cryptografie-interface is niet beschikbaar.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:564 src/cryptsetup.c:623
+msgid "Ensure you have algif_skcipher kernel module loaded.\n"
+msgstr "Kijk na of kernelmodule algif_skcipher geladen is.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:708
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activation is not supported for %d sector size.\n"
+msgstr "Activatie wordt niet ondersteund voor %d sectorgrootte.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:714
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support activation for this TCRYPT legacy mode.\n"
+msgstr "Activatie voor deze TCRYPT-legacymodus wordt niet ondersteund door de kernel.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:748
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activating TCRYPT system encryption for partition %s.\n"
+msgstr "TCRYPT-systeemversleuteling voor partitie %s wordt geactiveerd.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:815
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support TCRYPT compatible mapping.\n"
+msgstr "Toewijzingen compatibel met TCRYPT worden niet ondersteund door de kernel.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:1030
+msgid "This function is not supported without TCRYPT header load."
+msgstr "Deze functie wordt niet ondersteund zonder TCRYPT-koptekst."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:70 lib/verity/verity.c:173
+#, c-format
+msgid "Verity device %s doesn't use on-disk header.\n"
+msgstr "VERITY-apparaat %s gebruikt geen on-disk koptekst.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:94
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not a valid VERITY device.\n"
+msgstr "Apparaat %s is geen geldig VERITY-apparaat.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:101
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY version %d.\n"
+msgstr "Niet-ondersteunde VERITY-versie %d.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:131
+msgid "VERITY header corrupted.\n"
+msgstr "VERITY-koptekst beschadigd.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:167
+#, c-format
+msgid "Wrong VERITY UUID format provided on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Verkeerd VERITY UUID-formaat verschaft op apparaat %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:199
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during update of verity header on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Fout bij het bijwerken van VERITY-koptekst op apparaat %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:279
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support dm-verity mapping.\n"
+msgstr "dm-verity toewijzingen niet ondersteund door kernel.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:290
+msgid "Verity device detected corruption after activation.\n"
+msgstr "VERITY-apparaat ontdekte beschadiging na activatie.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:59
+#, c-format
+msgid "Spare area is not zeroed at position %<PRIu64>.\n"
+msgstr "Reservegebied is niet ingesteld op positie %<PRIu64>.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:121 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:249
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:277 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:284
+msgid "Device offset overflow.\n"
+msgstr "Overloop van apparaatsgegevenspositie.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:161
+#, c-format
+msgid "Verification failed at position %<PRIu64>.\n"
+msgstr "Controle gefaald op positie %<PRIu64>.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:235
+msgid "Invalid size parameters for verity device.\n"
+msgstr "Ongeldige grootteparameters voor VERITY-apparaat.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:266
+msgid "Too many tree levels for verity volume.\n"
+msgstr "Te veel niveau's in de boomstructuur voor een VERITY-volume.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:354
+msgid "Verification of data area failed.\n"
+msgstr "Controle van gegevensgebied gefaald.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:359
+msgid "Verification of root hash failed.\n"
+msgstr "Controle van root-hash gefaald.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:365
+msgid "Input/output error while creating hash area.\n"
+msgstr "Invoer/uitvoerfout bij het aanmaken van hash-gebied.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:367
+msgid "Creation of hash area failed.\n"
+msgstr "Creatie hash-gebied gefaald.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:414
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Kernel cannot activate device if data block size exceeds page size (%u).\n"
+msgstr "WAARSCHUWING: Kernel kan apparaat niet activeren als de gegevensblokgrootte groter is dan de paginagrootte (%u).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:92
+msgid "Can't do passphrase verification on non-tty inputs.\n"
+msgstr "Kan geen wachtwoordverificatie uitvoeren op invoer van buiten de terminal.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:133 src/cryptsetup.c:564 src/cryptsetup.c:711
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:524 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:578
+msgid "No known cipher specification pattern detected.\n"
+msgstr "Geen bekend specificatiepatroon voor het sleutelalgoritme gevonden.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:141
+msgid "WARNING: The --hash parameter is being ignored in plain mode with keyfile specified.\n"
+msgstr "WAARSCHUWING: In normale modus met opgegeven sleutelbestand wordt de --hash-parameter genegeerd.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:149
+msgid "WARNING: The --keyfile-size option is being ignored, the read size is the same as the encryption key size.\n"
+msgstr "WAARSCHUWING: De optie --keyfile-size wordt genegeerd, de leesgrootte is gelijk aan de encryptiesleutelgrootte.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:215
+msgid "Option --key-file is required.\n"
+msgstr "Optie --key-file is vereist.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:267
+msgid "No device header detected with this passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "Geen apparaatkoptekst beschikbaar met dit wachtwoord.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:327 src/cryptsetup.c:1160
+msgid ""
+"Header dump with volume key is sensitive information\n"
+"which allows access to encrypted partition without passphrase.\n"
+"This dump should be always stored encrypted on safe place."
+msgstr ""
+"Dump van koptekst met sleutel tot het opslagmedium bevat gevoelige informatie\n"
+"die zonder wachtwoord toegang verschaft tot versleutelde partities.\n"
+"De dump zou steeds versleuteld en op een veilige plaats bewaard moeten worden."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:517
+msgid "Result of benchmark is not reliable.\n"
+msgstr "Benchmarkresultaat is niet betrouwbaar.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:558
+msgid "# Tests are approximate using memory only (no storage IO).\n"
+msgstr "# Tests zijn bij benadering met enkel geheugen in gebruik (geen opslag-IO).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:583 src/cryptsetup.c:605
+msgid "#  Algorithm | Key |  Encryption |  Decryption\n"
+msgstr "#  Algoritme | Sleutel |  Versleuteling |  Ontsleuteling\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:587
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cipher %s is not available.\n"
+msgstr "Versleutelalgoritme %s is niet beschikbaar.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:614
+msgid "N/A"
+msgstr "N/A"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:639
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read keyfile %s.\n"
+msgstr "Kan sleutelbestand %s niet lezen.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:643
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read %d bytes from keyfile %s.\n"
+msgstr "Kan %d bytes uit sleutelbestand %s niet lezen.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:672
+msgid "Really try to repair LUKS device header?"
+msgstr "Bent u zeker de LUKS-apparaatkoptekst te willen herstellen?"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:697
+#, c-format
+msgid "This will overwrite data on %s irrevocably."
+msgstr "Dit zal data op %s onherroepelijk overschrijven."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:699
+msgid "memory allocation error in action_luksFormat"
+msgstr "geheugentoewijzingsfout in action_luksFormat"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:721
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use %s as on-disk header.\n"
+msgstr "Kan %s niet als on-diskkoptekst gebruiken.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:788
+msgid "Reduced data offset is allowed only for detached LUKS header.\n"
+msgstr "Een verlaagde datagegevenspositie wordt enkel toegestaan voor een vrijstaande LUKS-koptekst.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:890 src/cryptsetup.c:946
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d selected for deletion.\n"
+msgstr "Sleutelplaats %d geselecteerd voor verwijdering.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:893
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key %d not active. Can't wipe.\n"
+msgstr "Sleutel %d is niet actief. Kan niet wissen.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:901 src/cryptsetup.c:949
+msgid "This is the last keyslot. Device will become unusable after purging this key."
+msgstr "Dit is de laatste sleutelplaats. Apparaat zal onbruikbaar worden na het verwijderen van deze sleutel."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:902
+msgid "Enter any remaining passphrase: "
+msgstr "Voer enig overblijvend wachtwoord in: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:930
+msgid "Enter passphrase to be deleted: "
+msgstr "Voer het te verwijderen wachtwoord in: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1017 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1116
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter any existing passphrase: "
+msgstr "Voer een bestaand wachtwoord in: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1072
+msgid "Enter passphrase to be changed: "
+msgstr "Voer het te wijzigen wachtwoord in: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1086 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1101
+msgid "Enter new passphrase: "
+msgstr "Voer nieuw wachtwoord in: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1110
+msgid "Only one device argument for isLuks operation is supported.\n"
+msgstr "Voor de isLuks-operatie wordt slechts één apparaatsargument ondersteund.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1266 src/cryptsetup.c:1287
+msgid "Option --header-backup-file is required.\n"
+msgstr "Optie --header-backup-file is vereist.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1324
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unrecognized metadata device type %s.\n"
+msgstr "Niet-herkende metadata bij apparaatstype %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1327
+msgid "Command requires device and mapped name as arguments.\n"
+msgstr "Opdracht vereist apparaat en toewijzingsnaam als argumenten.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1346
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"This operation will erase all keyslots on device %s.\n"
+"Device will become unusable after this operation."
+msgstr ""
+"Deze operatie zal alle sleutelplaatsen op apparaat %s wissen.\n"
+"Na deze operatie wordt het apparaat onbruikbaar."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1380
+msgid "<device> [--type <type>] [<name>]"
+msgstr "<apparaat> [--type <type>] [<naam>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1380
+msgid "open device as mapping <name>"
+msgstr "apparaat als toewijzing <naam> openen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1381 src/cryptsetup.c:1382 src/cryptsetup.c:1383
+#: src/veritysetup.c:329 src/veritysetup.c:330
+msgid "<name>"
+msgstr "<naam>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1381
+msgid "close device (remove mapping)"
+msgstr "apparaat sluiten (toewijzingen verwijderen)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1382
+msgid "resize active device"
+msgstr "actief apparaat vergroten of verkleinen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1383
+msgid "show device status"
+msgstr "apparaatstatus tonen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1384
+msgid "[--cipher <cipher>]"
+msgstr "[--cipher <versleutelalgoritme>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1384
+msgid "benchmark cipher"
+msgstr "versleutelalgoritme benchmarken"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1385 src/cryptsetup.c:1386 src/cryptsetup.c:1392
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1393 src/cryptsetup.c:1394 src/cryptsetup.c:1395
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1396 src/cryptsetup.c:1397 src/cryptsetup.c:1398
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1399
+msgid "<device>"
+msgstr "<apparaat>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1385
+msgid "try to repair on-disk metadata"
+msgstr "on-disk metadata proberen te herstellen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1386
+msgid "erase all keyslots (remove encryption key)"
+msgstr "alle sleutelplaatsen wissen (encryptiesleutel verwijderen)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1387 src/cryptsetup.c:1388
+msgid "<device> [<new key file>]"
+msgstr "<apparaat> [<nieuw sleutelbestand>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1387
+msgid "formats a LUKS device"
+msgstr "een LUKS-apparaat formatteren"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1388
+msgid "add key to LUKS device"
+msgstr "sleutel aan LUKS-apparaat toevoegen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1389 src/cryptsetup.c:1390
+msgid "<device> [<key file>]"
+msgstr "<apparaat> [<sleutelbestand>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1389
+msgid "removes supplied key or key file from LUKS device"
+msgstr "verschafte sleutel of sleutelbestand van LUKS-apparaat verwijderen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1390
+msgid "changes supplied key or key file of LUKS device"
+msgstr "wijzigt verschafte sleutel of sleutelbestand van LUKS-apparaat"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1391
+msgid "<device> <key slot>"
+msgstr "<apparaat> <sleutelplaats>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1391
+msgid "wipes key with number <key slot> from LUKS device"
+msgstr "sleutel met nummer <sleutelplaats> van LUKS-apparaat verwijderen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1392
+msgid "print UUID of LUKS device"
+msgstr "UUID van LUKS-apparaat tonen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1393
+msgid "tests <device> for LUKS partition header"
+msgstr "<apparaat> op een LUKS-partitiekoptekst testen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1394
+msgid "dump LUKS partition information"
+msgstr "LUKS-partitie-informatie dumpen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1395
+msgid "dump TCRYPT device information"
+msgstr "TCRYPT-apparaatsinformatie dumpen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1396
+msgid "Suspend LUKS device and wipe key (all IOs are frozen)."
+msgstr "LUKS-apparaat schorsen en sleutel wissen (alle in-/uitvoer wordt bevroren)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1397
+msgid "Resume suspended LUKS device."
+msgstr "Geschorst LUKS-apparaat hervatten."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1398
+msgid "Backup LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "Reservekopie van LUKS-apparaatkoptekst en -sleutelplaatsen maken"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1399
+msgid "Restore LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "LUKS-apparaatkoptekst en -sleutelplaatsen herstellen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1416 src/veritysetup.c:346
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<action> is one of:\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<actie> is één van:\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1422
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"You can also use old <action> syntax aliases:\n"
+"\topen: create (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen\n"
+"\tclose: remove (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tcryptClose\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"U kan ook oude <actie>-syntax aliasen gebruiken:\n"
+"\topen: (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen aanmaken\n"
+"\tclose: (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tryptClose verwijderen\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1426
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<device> is the encrypted device\n"
+"<key slot> is the LUKS key slot number to modify\n"
+"<key file> optional key file for the new key for luksAddKey action\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<naam> is het onder %s aan te maken apparaat\n"
+"<apparaat> is het versleutelde apparaat\n"
+"<sleutelplaats> is het nummer van de te wijzigen LUKS-sleutelplaats\n"
+"<sleutelbestand> optioneel sleutelbestand voor de nieuwe sleutel voor de luksAddKey-actie\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1433
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in key and passphrase parameters:\n"
+"\tMaximum keyfile size: %dkB, Maximum interactive passphrase length %d (characters)\n"
+"Default PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS: %d (ms)\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Standaard meegecompileerde sleutel- en wachtwoordparameters:\n"
+"\tMaximum sleutelplaatsgrootte: %dkB, maximum lengte interactief wachtwoord %d (karakters)\n"
+"Standaard PBKDF2-herhalingstijd voor LUKS: %d (ms)\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1440
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in device cipher parameters:\n"
+"\tloop-AES: %s, Key %d bits\n"
+"\tplain: %s, Key: %d bits, Password hashing: %s\n"
+"\tLUKS1: %s, Key: %d bits, LUKS header hashing: %s, RNG: %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Standaard meegecompileerde parameters van het apparaatsversleutelingsalgoritme:\n"
+"\tloop-AES: %s, Sleutel: %d bits\n"
+"\tplain: %s, Sleutel: %d bits, Wachtwoordhashing: %s\n"
+"\tLUKS1: %s, Sleutel: %d bits, LUKS-kopteksthashing: %s, RNG: %s\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1457 src/veritysetup.c:481
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s: requires %s as arguments"
+msgstr "%s: vereist %s als argumenten"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1490 src/veritysetup.c:386 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1302
+msgid "Show this help message"
+msgstr "Deze hulptekst tonen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1491 src/veritysetup.c:387 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1303
+msgid "Display brief usage"
+msgstr "Korte gebruikssamenvatting tonen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1495 src/veritysetup.c:391 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1307
+msgid "Help options:"
+msgstr "Hulpopties:"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1496 src/veritysetup.c:392 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1308
+msgid "Print package version"
+msgstr "Pakketversie tonen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1497 src/veritysetup.c:393 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1309
+msgid "Shows more detailed error messages"
+msgstr "Gedetailleerdere foutboodschappen tonen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1498 src/veritysetup.c:394 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1310
+msgid "Show debug messages"
+msgstr "Debug-boodschappen tonen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1499 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1312
+msgid "The cipher used to encrypt the disk (see /proc/crypto)"
+msgstr "Het gebruikte versleutelalgoritme om de schijf te versleutelen (zie /proc/crypto)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1500 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1314
+msgid "The hash used to create the encryption key from the passphrase"
+msgstr "De gebruikte hash om de encryptiesleutel uit het wachtwoord aan te maken"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1501
+msgid "Verifies the passphrase by asking for it twice"
+msgstr "Het wachtwoord controleren door het twee keer te vragen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1502 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1316
+msgid "Read the key from a file."
+msgstr "De sleutel uit een bestand lezen."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1503
+msgid "Read the volume (master) key from file."
+msgstr "De (hoofd)sleutel tot het opslagmedium uit een bestand lezen."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1504
+msgid "Dump volume (master) key instead of keyslots info."
+msgstr "Dump (hoofd)sleutel tot het opslagmedium in plaats van de sleutelplaatsinformatie."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1505 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1313
+msgid "The size of the encryption key"
+msgstr "De grootte van de encryptiesleutel"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1505 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1313
+msgid "BITS"
+msgstr "BITS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1506 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1327
+msgid "Limits the read from keyfile"
+msgstr "Beperkt de lezing uit sleutelbestand"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1506 src/cryptsetup.c:1507 src/cryptsetup.c:1508
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1509 src/veritysetup.c:397 src/veritysetup.c:398
+#: src/veritysetup.c:400 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1326
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1327 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1328
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1329
+msgid "bytes"
+msgstr "bytes"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1507 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1326
+msgid "Number of bytes to skip in keyfile"
+msgstr "Aantal bytes over te slaan in sleutelbestand"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1508
+msgid "Limits the read from newly added keyfile"
+msgstr "Beperkt de lezing uit een nieuw toegevoegd sleutelbestand"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1509
+msgid "Number of bytes to skip in newly added keyfile"
+msgstr "Aantal bytes over te slaan in nieuwste toegevoegde sleutelbestand"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1510
+msgid "Slot number for new key (default is first free)"
+msgstr "Plaatsnummer voor nieuwe sleutel (standaard is de eerste open plaats)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1511
+msgid "The size of the device"
+msgstr "De grootte van het apparaat"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1511 src/cryptsetup.c:1512 src/cryptsetup.c:1513
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1519
+msgid "SECTORS"
+msgstr "SECTOREN"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1512
+msgid "The start offset in the backend device"
+msgstr "De startplaats in het backend-apparaat"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1513
+msgid "How many sectors of the encrypted data to skip at the beginning"
+msgstr "Hoeveel sectoren van de versleutelde gegevens aan het begin over te slaan"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1514
+msgid "Create a readonly mapping"
+msgstr "Een alleen-lezen toewijzing aanmaken"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1515 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1317
+msgid "PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS (in ms)"
+msgstr "PBKDF2 herhalingstijd voor LUKS (in ms)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1515 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1317
+msgid "msecs"
+msgstr "milliseconden"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1516 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1318
+msgid "Do not ask for confirmation"
+msgstr "Niet om bevestiging vragen"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1517
+msgid "Timeout for interactive passphrase prompt (in seconds)"
+msgstr "Timeout voor interactieve wachtwoordprompt (in seconden)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1517
+msgid "secs"
+msgstr "seconden"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1518 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1319
+msgid "How often the input of the passphrase can be retried"
+msgstr "Hoe vaak de invoering van het wachtwoord opnieuw geprobeerd kan worden"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1519
+msgid "Align payload at <n> sector boundaries - for luksFormat"
+msgstr "Payload uitlijnen op meervouden van <n> sectoren – voor luksFormat"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1520
+msgid "File with LUKS header and keyslots backup."
+msgstr "Bestand met reservekopie van LUKS-koptekst en -sleutelplaatsen."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1521 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1320
+msgid "Use /dev/random for generating volume key."
+msgstr "Gebruik /dev/random om de sleutel tot het opslagmedium te genereren."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1522 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1321
+msgid "Use /dev/urandom for generating volume key."
+msgstr "Gebruik /dev/urandom om de sleutel tot het opslagmedium te genereren."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1523
+msgid "Share device with another non-overlapping crypt segment."
+msgstr "Apparaat met een ander, niet-overlappend cryptsegment delen."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1524 src/veritysetup.c:403
+msgid "UUID for device to use."
+msgstr "UUID van het te gebruiken apparaat."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1525
+msgid "Allow discards (aka TRIM) requests for device."
+msgstr "Discardaanvragen (alias TRIM) op dit apparaat toelaten."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1526
+msgid "Device or file with separated LUKS header."
+msgstr "Apparaat of bestand met verschillende LUKS-koptekst."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1527
+msgid "Do not activate device, just check passphrase."
+msgstr "Apparaat niet activeren, enkel wachtwoord controleren."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1528
+msgid "Use hidden header (hidden TCRYPT device)."
+msgstr "Verborgen koptekst gebruiken (verborgen TCRYPT-apparaat)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1529
+msgid "Device is system TCRYPT drive (with bootloader)."
+msgstr "Apparaat is TCRYPT-systeemschijf (met bootloader)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1530
+msgid "Use backup (secondary) TCRYPT header."
+msgstr "Reserve (secundaire) TCRYPT-koptekst gebruiken."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1531
+msgid "Scan also for VeraCrypt compatible device."
+msgstr "Eveneens naar VeraCrypt-compatibel apparaat scannen."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1532
+msgid "Type of device metadata: luks, plain, loopaes, tcrypt."
+msgstr "Soorten apparaat-metadata: luks, plain, loopaes, tcrypt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1533
+msgid "Disable password quality check (if enabled)."
+msgstr "Wachtwoordkwaliteitscontrole uitschakelen (indien ingeschakeld)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1534
+msgid "Use dm-crypt same_cpu_crypt performance compatibility option."
+msgstr "dm-crypt same_cpu_crypt prestatie-compatibiliteitsoptie gebruiken."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1535
+msgid "Use dm-crypt submit_from_crypt_cpus performance compatibility option."
+msgstr "dm-crypt submit_from_crypt_cpus prestatie-compatibiliteitsoptie gebruiken."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1551 src/veritysetup.c:423
+msgid "[OPTION...] <action> <action-specific>"
+msgstr "[OPTIE…] <actie> <actie-specifiek>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1602 src/veritysetup.c:460
+msgid "Argument <action> missing."
+msgstr "Argument <actie> ontbreekt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1655 src/veritysetup.c:466
+msgid "Unknown action."
+msgstr "Onbekende actie."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1665
+msgid "Option --shared is allowed only for open of plain device.\n"
+msgstr "Optie --shared wordt enkel toegestaan voor open-opdracht op plain-apparaat.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1670
+msgid "Option --allow-discards is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "Optie --allow-discards wordt enkel toegestaan voor de open-operatie.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1678
+msgid ""
+"Option --key-size is allowed only for luksFormat, open and benchmark.\n"
+"To limit read from keyfile use --keyfile-size=(bytes)."
+msgstr ""
+"Optie --key-size is enkel toegestaan bij luksFormat, open en benchmark.\n"
+"Om de lezing uit een sleutelbestand te beperken, gebruik --keyfile-size=(bytes)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1685
+msgid "Option --test-passphrase is allowed only for open of LUKS and TCRYPT devices.\n"
+msgstr "Optie --test-passphrase is enkel toegestaan bij open van LUKS- en TCRYPT-apparaten.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1690 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1389
+msgid "Key size must be a multiple of 8 bits"
+msgstr "Sleutelgrootte moet een meervoud zijn van 8 bits"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1697 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1394
+msgid "Key slot is invalid."
+msgstr "Sleutelplaats is ongeldig."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1704
+msgid "Option --key-file takes precedence over specified key file argument.\n"
+msgstr "Optie --key-file krijgt voorrang over het gespecificeerde sleutelbestandsargument.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1712 src/veritysetup.c:488 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1378
+msgid "Negative number for option not permitted."
+msgstr "Een negatief getal wordt niet toegestaan voor deze optie."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1716
+msgid "Only one --key-file argument is allowed."
+msgstr "Slechts een enkel gebruik van het --key-file argument is toegestaan."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1720 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1372
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1398
+msgid "Only one of --use-[u]random options is allowed."
+msgstr "Slechts een enkel gebruik van de opties --use-[u]random is toegestaan."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1724
+msgid "Option --use-[u]random is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgstr "OPtie --use-[u]random is enkel toegestaan bij luksFormat."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1728
+msgid "Option --uuid is allowed only for luksFormat and luksUUID."
+msgstr "Optie --uuid is enkel toegestaan bij luksFormat en luksUUID."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1732
+msgid "Option --align-payload is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgstr "Optie --align-payload is enkel toegestaan voor luksFormat."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1738
+msgid "Option --skip is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices.\n"
+msgstr "Optie --skip wordt enkel ondersteund voor open-opdracht op plain- en loopaes-apparaten.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1744
+msgid "Option --offset is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices.\n"
+msgstr "Optie --offset wordt enkel ondersteund voor open-opdracht op plain- en loopaes-apparaten.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1750
+msgid "Option --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system or --tcrypt-backup is supported only for TCRYPT device.\n"
+msgstr "Optie --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system of --tcrypt-backup wordt enkel ondersteund voor TCRYPT-apparaten.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1755
+msgid "Option --tcrypt-hidden cannot be combined with --allow-discards.\n"
+msgstr "Optie --tcrypt-hidden kan niet met --allow-discards gecombineerd worden.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1760
+msgid "Option --veracrypt is supported only for TCRYPT device type.\n"
+msgstr "Optie --veracrypt wordt enkel ondersteund voor TCRYPT-apparaatstype.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:61
+msgid "Invalid salt string specified.\n"
+msgstr "Ongeldige salt-tekenreeks opgegeven.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:91
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create hash image %s for writing.\n"
+msgstr "Kan hashafbeeling %s niet aanmaken voor beschrijving.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:158
+msgid "Invalid root hash string specified.\n"
+msgstr "Ongeldige root-hash tekenreeks opgegeven.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:326
+msgid "<data_device> <hash_device>"
+msgstr "<gegevensapparaat> <hash-apparaat>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:326
+msgid "format device"
+msgstr "apparaat formateren"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:327
+msgid "<data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgstr "<gegevensapparaat> <hash-apparaat> <root-hash>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:327
+msgid "verify device"
+msgstr "apparaat controleren"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:328
+msgid "<name> <data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgstr "<naam> <gegevensapparaat> <hash-apparaat> <root-hash>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:328
+msgid "create active device"
+msgstr "actief apparaat aanmaken"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:329
+msgid "remove (deactivate) device"
+msgstr "apparaat verwijderen (deactiveren)"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:330
+msgid "show active device status"
+msgstr "status van actief apparaat tonen"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:331
+msgid "<hash_device>"
+msgstr "<hash-apparaat>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:331
+msgid "show on-disk information"
+msgstr "on-disk informatie tonen"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:350
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<data_device> is the data device\n"
+"<hash_device> is the device containing verification data\n"
+"<root_hash> hash of the root node on <hash_device>\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<naam> is de naam van het onder %s te creëren apparaat\n"
+"<gegevensapparaat> is het de naam van het gegevensapparaat\n"
+"<hash-apparaat> is de naam van het apparaat dat de verificatiegegevens bevat\n"
+"<root-hash> is de hash van de rootnode op <hash-apparaat>\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:357
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in dm-verity parameters:\n"
+"\tHash: %s, Data block (bytes): %u, Hash block (bytes): %u, Salt size: %u, Hash format: %u\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Standaard meegecompileerde dm-verity parameters:\n"
+"\tHash: %s, Datablok (bytes): %u, Hashblock (bytes): %u, Saltgrootte: %u, Hashformaat: %u\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:395
+msgid "Do not use verity superblock"
+msgstr "VERITY-superblok niet gebruiken"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:396
+msgid "Format type (1 - normal, 0 - original Chrome OS)"
+msgstr "Formaatstype (1 - normaal, 0 - origineel Chrome OS)"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:396
+msgid "number"
+msgstr "nummer"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:397
+msgid "Block size on the data device"
+msgstr "Blokgrootte op het gegevensapparaat"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:398
+msgid "Block size on the hash device"
+msgstr "Blokgrootte op het hash-apparaat"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:399
+msgid "The number of blocks in the data file"
+msgstr "Aantal blokken in het gegevensbestand"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:399
+msgid "blocks"
+msgstr "blokken"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:400
+msgid "Starting offset on the hash device"
+msgstr "De startplaats op het hash-apparaat"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:401
+msgid "Hash algorithm"
+msgstr "Hash-algoritme"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:401
+msgid "string"
+msgstr "tekenreeks"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:402
+msgid "Salt"
+msgstr "Salt"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:402
+msgid "hex string"
+msgstr "hex-tekenreeks"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:404
+msgid "Restart kernel if corruption is detected"
+msgstr "Kernel herstarten bij ontdekking van corruptie"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:405
+msgid "Ignore corruption, log it only"
+msgstr "Datacorruptie negeren, enkel loggen"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:406
+msgid "Do not verify zeroed blocks"
+msgstr "Op nul ingestelde blokken niet controleren"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:494
+msgid "Option --ignore-corruption, --restart-on-corruption or --ignore-zero-blocks is allowed only for create operation.\n"
+msgstr "Opties --ignore-corruption, --restart-on-corruption of --ignore-zero-blocks kunnen enkel bij een create-operatie gebruikt worden.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:499
+msgid "Option --ignore-corruption and --restart-on-corruption cannot be used together.\n"
+msgstr "Opties --ignore-corruption en --restart-on-corruption kunnen niet samen gebruikt worden.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:150
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot exclusively open %s, device in use.\n"
+msgstr "Kan %s niet exclusief openen, apparaat wordt gebruikt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:164 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:920
+msgid "Allocation of aligned memory failed.\n"
+msgstr "Reservering van uitgelijnd geheugen gefaald.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:171
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Kan apparaat niet lezen: %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:182
+#, c-format
+msgid "Marking LUKS device %s unusable.\n"
+msgstr "LUKS-apparaat %s wordt als onbruikbaar gemarkeerd.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:198
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Kan apparaat %s niet beschrijven.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:281
+msgid "Cannot write reencryption log file.\n"
+msgstr "Kan herencryptie-logbestand niet schrijven.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:337
+msgid "Cannot read reencryption log file.\n"
+msgstr "Kan herencryptie-logbestand niet lezen.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:375
+#, c-format
+msgid "Log file %s exists, resuming reencryption.\n"
+msgstr "Logbestand %s bestaat reeds, herencryptie wordt herstart.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:425
+msgid "Activating temporary device using old LUKS header.\n"
+msgstr "Activatie van tijdelijke apparaat met oude LUKS-koptekst.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:436
+msgid "Activating temporary device using new LUKS header.\n"
+msgstr "Activatie van tijdelijke apparaat met nieuwe LUKS-koptekst.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:446
+msgid "Activation of temporary devices failed.\n"
+msgstr "Activatie van tijdelijke apparaten gefaald.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:472
+#, c-format
+msgid "New LUKS header for device %s created.\n"
+msgstr "Nieuwe LUKS-koptekst voor apparaat %s aangemaakt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:480
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activated keyslot %i.\n"
+msgstr "Sleutelplaats %d geactiveerd.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:506
+#, c-format
+msgid "LUKS header backup of device %s created.\n"
+msgstr "Reservekopie van LUKS-koptekst op apparaat %s aangemaakt .\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:554
+msgid "Creation of LUKS backup headers failed.\n"
+msgstr "Creatie van LUKS-reservekopteksten gefaald.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:656
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot restore LUKS header on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Kan koptekst op apparaat %s niet herstellen.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:658
+#, c-format
+msgid "LUKS header on device %s restored.\n"
+msgstr "LUKS-koptekst op apparaat %s hersteld.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:693
+#, c-format
+msgid "Progress: %5.1f%%, ETA %02llu:%02llu, %4llu MiB written, speed %5.1f MiB/s%s"
+msgstr "Vooruitgang: %5.1f%%, geschatte voltooiïngstijd %02llu:%02llu, %4llu MB geschreven, snelheid %5.1f MiB/s%s"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:732 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:811
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:853
+msgid "Cannot seek to device offset.\n"
+msgstr "Onmogelijk te zoeken tot startplaats van apparaat.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:892 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:898
+msgid "Cannot open temporary LUKS device.\n"
+msgstr "Kan tijdelijk LUKS-apparaat niet openen.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:903 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:908
+msgid "Cannot get device size.\n"
+msgstr "Kan apparaatgrootte niet lezen.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:946
+msgid "Interrupted by a signal.\n"
+msgstr "Onderbroken door een signaal.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:948
+msgid "IO error during reencryption.\n"
+msgstr "Invoer/uitvoerfout tijdens herencryptie.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:978
+msgid "Provided UUID is invalid.\n"
+msgstr "Opgegeven UUID is ongeldig.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1070
+msgid "Key file can be used only with --key-slot or with exactly one key slot active.\n"
+msgstr "Sleutelbestand kan enkel gebruikt worden met optie --key-slot of met enkel één actieve sleutelplaats.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1114 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1129
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for key slot %u: "
+msgstr "Voer wachtwoord voor sleutelplaats %u in: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1178
+msgid "Cannot open reencryption log file.\n"
+msgstr "Kan herencryptie-logbestand niet openen.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1184
+msgid "No decryption in progress, provided UUID can be used only to resume suspended decryption process.\n"
+msgstr "Er is geen ontsleutelingsproces aan de gang. Het opgegeven UUID kan enkel gebruikt worden om een geschorst ontsleutelingsproces opnieuw te starten.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1311
+msgid "Reencryption block size"
+msgstr "Blokgrootte herencryptie"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1311
+msgid "MiB"
+msgstr "MB"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1315
+msgid "Do not change key, no data area reencryption."
+msgstr "Sleutel niet wijzigen; gegevensgebied wordt niet opnieuw versleuteld."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1322
+msgid "Use direct-io when accessing devices."
+msgstr "direct-io gebruiken bij het lezen van apparaten."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1323
+msgid "Use fsync after each block."
+msgstr "fsync na elk blok gebruiken."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1324
+msgid "Update log file after every block."
+msgstr "Na elk blok het logbestand bijwerken."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1325
+msgid "Use only this slot (others will be disabled)."
+msgstr "Enkel deze plaats gebruiken (anderen worden uitgeschakeld)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1328
+msgid "Reduce data device size (move data offset). DANGEROUS!"
+msgstr "Grootte van gegevensapparaat wijzigen (gegevenspositie wijzigen). GEVAARLIJK!"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1329
+msgid "Use only specified device size (ignore rest of device). DANGEROUS!"
+msgstr "Enkel ingegeven apparaatsgrootte gebruiken (rest van apparaat wordt genegeerd). GEVAARLIJK!"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1330
+msgid "Create new header on not encrypted device."
+msgstr "Nieuwe koptekst op niet-versleuteld apparaat invoeren."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1331
+msgid "Permanently decrypt device (remove encryption)."
+msgstr "Apparaat permanent ontsleutelen (encryptie verwijderen)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1332
+msgid "The uuid used to resume decryption."
+msgstr "Het UUID om de ontsleuteling te hervatten."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1348
+msgid "[OPTION...] <device>"
+msgstr "[OPTIE...] <apparaat>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1362
+#, c-format
+msgid "Reencryption will change: volume key%s%s%s%s.\n"
+msgstr "Herencryptie zal sleutel tot het opslagmedium %s%s%s%s wijzigen.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1363
+msgid ", set hash to "
+msgstr ", stel hash in op "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1364
+msgid ", set cipher to "
+msgstr ", stel sleutelalgoritme in op "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1368
+msgid "Argument required."
+msgstr "Argument is vereist."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1384
+msgid "Only values between 1 MiB and 64 MiB allowed for reencryption block size."
+msgstr "Enkel waarden tussen 1 MB en 64 MB zijn toegestaan als herencryptieblokgrootte."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1403 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1408
+msgid "Invalid device size specification."
+msgstr "Ongeldig apparaatsgrootte ingegeven."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1411
+msgid "Maximum device reduce size is 64 MiB."
+msgstr "Maximum apparaatsverkleiningsgrootte is 64 MB."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1414
+msgid "Reduce size must be multiple of 512 bytes sector."
+msgstr "Verkleiningsgrootte moet een meervoud zijn van de 512 bytes-grote sector."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1418
+msgid "Option --new must be used together with --reduce-device-size."
+msgstr "Optie --new moet samen met --reduce-device-size gebruikt worden."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1422
+msgid "Option --keep-key can be used only with --hash or --iter-time."
+msgstr "Optie -- keep-key kan enkel samen met --hash of --iter-time gebruikt worden."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1426
+msgid "Option --new cannot be used together with --decrypt."
+msgstr "Optie --new kan niet samen met --decrypt gebruikt worden."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1430
+msgid "Option --decrypt is incompatible with specified parameters."
+msgstr "Optie --decrypt is niet verenigbaar met de verschafte parameters."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1434
+msgid "Option --uuid is allowed only together with --decrypt."
+msgstr "Optie --uuid kan enkel samen met --decrypt gebruikt worden."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:151
+msgid "Error reading response from terminal.\n"
+msgstr "Fout bij het lezen van antwoord uit de terminal.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:173
+msgid "Command successful.\n"
+msgstr "Opdracht succesvol.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:191
+#, c-format
+msgid "Command failed with code %i"
+msgstr "Opdracht is mislukt met code %i"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:42 src/utils_password.c:74
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot check password quality: %s\n"
+msgstr "Kan wachtwoordkwaliteit niet nakijken: %s\n"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:50
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Password quality check failed:\n"
+" %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Wachtwoordkwaliteitscontrole gefaald:\n"
+"%s\n"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:82
+#, c-format
+msgid "Password quality check failed: Bad passphrase (%s)\n"
+msgstr "Wachtwoordkwaliteitscontrole gefaald: Wachtwoord is van slechte kwaliteit (%s)\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot find a free loopback device.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Kan geen vrij loopback-apparaat vinden.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot open device %s\n"
+#~ msgstr "Kan apparaat %s niet openen.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot use passed UUID unless decryption in progress.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Kan doorgegeven UUID niet gebruiken tenzij ontsleuteling al bezig is.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Marking LUKS device %s usable.\n"
+#~ msgstr "LUKS-apparaat %s wordt als bruikbaar gemarkeerd.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "WARNING: this is experimental code, it can completely break your data.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Waarschuwing: deze code is nog experimenteel, het kan al uw data volledig vernielen.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "FIPS checksum verification failed.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Verificatie van FIPS-controlesom gefaald.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "WARNING: device %s is a partition, for TCRYPT system encryption you usually need to use whole block device path.\n"
+#~ msgstr "WAARSCHUWING: apparaat %s is een partitie; bij TCRYPT-systeemversleuteling moet u doorgaans het volledige pad naar het blok-apparaat gebruiken.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Kernel doesn't support plain64 IV.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Kernel ondersteunt plain64 IV niet.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Enter LUKS passphrase: "
+#~ msgstr "Voer LUKS-wachtwoord in: "
+
+#~ msgid "Enter new LUKS passphrase: "
+#~ msgstr "Voer nieuw LUKS-wachtwoord in: "
+
+#~ msgid "Enter any LUKS passphrase: "
+#~ msgstr "Voer een LUKS-wachtwoord in: "
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot open device %s for %s%s access.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Kan apparaat %s niet openen voor %s%s-toegang.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "exclusive "
+#~ msgstr "exclusieve "
+
+#~ msgid "writable"
+#~ msgstr "schrijf"
+
+#~ msgid "read-only"
+#~ msgstr "alleen-lezen"
+
+#~ msgid "WARNING!!! Possibly insecure memory. Are you root?\n"
+#~ msgstr "WAARSCHUWING!!! Mogelijk onveilig geheugen. Bent u root?\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Unable to obtain sector size for %s"
+#~ msgstr "Kan sectorgrootte van %s niet verkrijgen"
+
+#~ msgid "Failed to obtain device mapper directory."
+#~ msgstr "Kan geen map voor de apparaatstoewijzer verkrijgen."
+
+#~ msgid "Backup file %s doesn't exist.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Reservekopiebestand %s bestaat niet.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot open file %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Kan bestand %s niet openen.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Failed to write to key storage.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Schrijven naar sleutelopslag is mislukt.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Failed to read from key storage.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Lezen uit sleutelopslag is mislukt.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "<name> <device>"
+#~ msgstr "<naam> <apparaat>"
+
+#~ msgid "create device"
+#~ msgstr "apparaat aanmaken"
+
+#~ msgid "remove device"
+#~ msgstr "apparaat verwijderen"
+
+#~ msgid "remove LUKS mapping"
+#~ msgstr "LUKS-toewijzing verwijderen"
+
+#~ msgid "open loop-AES device as mapping <name>"
+#~ msgstr "loop-AES-apparaat als toewijzing <naam> openen"
+
+#~ msgid "remove loop-AES mapping"
+#~ msgstr "loop-AES-toewijzing verwijderen"
+
+#~ msgid "Option --allow-discards is allowed only for luksOpen, loopaesOpen and create operation.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Optie --allow-discards wordt enkel ondersteund voor de luksOpen-, loopaesOpen- en create-opdrachten.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot use device %s (crypt segments overlaps or in use by another device).\n"
+#~ msgstr "Kan apparaat %s niet gebruiken (cryptsegmenten overlappen of worden door een ander apparaat gebruikt).\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Key slot %d verified.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Sleutelplaats %d is geverifieerd.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Invalid key size %d.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Ongeldige sleutelgrootte %d.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Block mode XTS is available since kernel 2.6.24.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Blokmodus XTS is beschikbaar vanaf kernelversie 2.6.24.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Key size in LRW mode must be 256 or 512 bits.\n"
+#~ msgstr "In LRW-modus moet de sleutelgrootte 256 of 512 bits zijn.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Block mode LRW is available since kernel 2.6.20.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Blokmodus LRW is beschikbaar vanaf kernelversie 2.6.20.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Negative keyfile size not permitted.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Een negatieve sleutelbestandsgrootte is niet toegestaan.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Warning: exhausting read requested, but key file is not a regular file, function might never return.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Waarschuwing: volledige lezing aangevraagd, maar sleutelbestand is geen regulier bestand, functie zal misschien nooit terugkeren.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot find compatible device-mapper kernel modules.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Kan geen compatibele kernelmodules voor apparaatstoewijzer vinden.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot open device: %s\n"
+#~ msgstr "Kan apparaat niet openen: %s\n"
+
+#~ msgid "BLKROGET failed on device %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "BLKROGET() is mislukt op apparaat %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "BLKGETSIZE failed on device %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "BLKGETSIZE() is mislukt op apparaat %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "identical to luksKillSlot - DEPRECATED - see man page"
+#~ msgstr "identiek aan luksKillSlot - VEROUDERD - zie man-pagina"
+
+#~ msgid "modify active device - DEPRECATED - see man page"
+#~ msgstr "actief apparaat wijzigen - VEROUDERD - zie man-pagina"
+
+#~ msgid ""
+#~ "The reload action is deprecated. Please use \"dmsetup reload\" in case you really need this functionality.\n"
+#~ "WARNING: do not use reload to touch LUKS devices. If that is the case, hit Ctrl-C now.\n"
+#~ msgstr ""
+#~ "De herlaadactie is verouderd. Gebruik “dmsetup reload” indien u deze functionaliteit echt nodig hebt.\n"
+#~ "WAARSCHUWING: gebruik de herlaadactie niet om LUKS-apparaten te “touchen”. Indien u dat wilt doen, typ nu Ctrl-C.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Obsolete option --non-exclusive is ignored.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Verouderde optie --non-exclusive wordt genegeerd.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Read the key from a file (can be /dev/random)"
+#~ msgstr "De sleutel uit een bestand lezen (mag /dev/random zijn)"
+
+#~ msgid "(Obsoleted, see man page.)"
+#~ msgstr "(Verouderd, zie man-pagina.)"
+
+#~ msgid "%s is not LUKS device.\n"
+#~ msgstr "%s is geen LUKS-apparaat.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "%s is not LUKS device."
+#~ msgstr "%s is geen LUKS-apparaat."
diff --git a/po/pl.po b/po/pl.po
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7d47c75
--- /dev/null
+++ b/po/pl.po
@@ -0,0 +1,3130 @@
+# Polish translation for cryptsetup.
+# Copyright (C) 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+# This file is put in the public domain.
+# Jakub Bogusz <qboosh@pld-linux.org>, 2010-2019.
+#
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: cryptsetup 2.1.0\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: dm-crypt@saout.de\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-01-26 19:02+0100\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2019-01-27 10:15+0100\n"
+"Last-Translator: Jakub Bogusz <qboosh@pld-linux.org>\n"
+"Language-Team: Polish <translation-team-pl@lists.sourceforge.net>\n"
+"Language: pl\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+"X-Bugs: Report translation errors to the Language-Team address.\n"
+"Plural-Forms: nplurals=3; plural=n==1 ? 0 : n%10>=2 && n%10<=4 && (n%100<10 || n%100>=20) ? 1 : 2;\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:336
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper, running as non-root user."
+msgstr "Nie można zainicjować device-mappera w czasie działania jako nie-root."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:339
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper. Is dm_mod kernel module loaded?"
+msgstr "Nie można zainicjować device-mappera. Czy moduł jądra dm_mod jest wczytany?"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1010
+msgid "Requested deferred flag is not supported."
+msgstr "Żądana flaga odroczona nie jest obsługiwana."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1077
+#, c-format
+msgid "DM-UUID for device %s was truncated."
+msgstr "DM-UUID dla urządzenia %s został skrócony."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1486
+msgid "Requested dm-crypt performance options are not supported."
+msgstr "Żądane opcje dm-crypta dotyczące wydajności nie są obsługiwane."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1493
+msgid "Requested dm-verity data corruption handling options are not supported."
+msgstr "Żądane opcje dm-verity dotyczące obsługi uszkodzenia danych nie są obsługiwane."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1497
+msgid "Requested dm-verity FEC options are not supported."
+msgstr "Żądane opcje FEC dm-verity nie są obsługiwane."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1501
+msgid "Requested data integrity options are not supported."
+msgstr "Żądane opcje integralności danych nie są obsługiwane."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1503
+msgid "Requested sector_size option is not supported."
+msgstr "Żądana opcja sector_size nie jest obsługiwana."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1508
+msgid "Requested automatic recalculation of integrity tags is not supported."
+msgstr "Żądane automatyczne przeliczenie znaczników integralności nie jest obsługiwane."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1534
+msgid "Requested dmcrypt performance options are not supported."
+msgstr "Żądane opcje wydajności dmcrypta nie są obsługiwane."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1537
+msgid "Discard/TRIM is not supported."
+msgstr "Porzucenie/TRIM nie jest obsługiwane."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:2413
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to query dm-%s segment."
+msgstr "Nie udało się odpytać segmentu dm-%s."
+
+#: lib/random.c:80
+msgid ""
+"System is out of entropy while generating volume key.\n"
+"Please move mouse or type some text in another window to gather some random events.\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Entropia w systemie wyczerpała się w trakcie generowania klucza wolumenu.\n"
+"Proszę poruszać myszą albo wpisać trochę tekstu w innym oknie w celu zebrania zdarzeń losowych.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:84
+#, c-format
+msgid "Generating key (%d%% done).\n"
+msgstr "Generowanie klucza (gotowe %d%%).\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:170
+msgid "Running in FIPS mode."
+msgstr "Działanie w trybie FIPS."
+
+#: lib/random.c:176
+msgid "Fatal error during RNG initialisation."
+msgstr "Błąd krytyczny w trakcie inicjalizacji RNG."
+
+#: lib/random.c:213
+msgid "Unknown RNG quality requested."
+msgstr "Nieznane żądanie jakości RNG."
+
+#: lib/random.c:218
+msgid "Error reading from RNG."
+msgstr "Błąd odczytu z RNG."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:214
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto RNG backend."
+msgstr "Nie można zainicjować backendu kryptograficznego RNG."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:220
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto backend."
+msgstr "Nie można zainicjować backendu kryptograficznego."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:251 lib/setup.c:1899 lib/verity/verity.c:123
+#, c-format
+msgid "Hash algorithm %s not supported."
+msgstr "Algorytm skrótu %s nie jest obsługiwany."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:254 lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:90
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key processing error (using hash %s)."
+msgstr "Błąd przetwarzania klucza (użyto algorytmu skrótu %s)."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:315 lib/setup.c:342
+msgid "Cannot determine device type. Incompatible activation of device?"
+msgstr "Nie można określić rodzaju urządzenia. Niezgodny sposób aktywacji urządzenia?"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:321 lib/setup.c:2892
+msgid "This operation is supported only for LUKS device."
+msgstr "Ta operacja jest obsługiwana tylko dla urządzeń LUKS."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:348
+msgid "This operation is supported only for LUKS2 device."
+msgstr "Ta operacja jest obsługiwana tylko dla urządzeń LUKS2."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:396
+msgid "All key slots full."
+msgstr "Wszyskie miejsca na klucze są pełne."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:407
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select between 0 and %d."
+msgstr "Numer klucza %d jest błędny, proszę wybrać wartość między 0 a %d."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:413
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is full, please select another one."
+msgstr "Miejsce na klucz %d jest pełne, proszę wybrać inne."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:589
+#, c-format
+msgid "Header detected but device %s is too small."
+msgstr "Wykryto nagłówek, ale urządzenie %s jest zbyt małe."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:626
+msgid "This operation is not supported for this device type."
+msgstr "Ta operacja nie jest obsługiwana dla tego rodzaju urządzenia."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:791 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:481
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported LUKS version %d."
+msgstr "Nieobsługiwana wersja LUKS %d."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:808 lib/setup.c:1403 lib/setup.c:1812
+msgid "Detached metadata device is not supported for this crypt type."
+msgstr "Osobne urządzenie metadanych nie jest obsługiwane dla tego rodzaju szyfrowania."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1288 lib/setup.c:2392 lib/setup.c:2464 lib/setup.c:2476
+#: lib/setup.c:2625 lib/setup.c:4021
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not active."
+msgstr "Urządzenie %s nie jest aktywne."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1310
+#, c-format
+msgid "Underlying device for crypt device %s disappeared."
+msgstr "Urządzenie stojące za urządzeniem szyfrowanym %s zniknęło."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1388
+msgid "Invalid plain crypt parameters."
+msgstr "Błędne parametry szyfru plain."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1393 lib/setup.c:1802 src/integritysetup.c:72
+msgid "Invalid key size."
+msgstr "Błędny rozmiar klucza."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1398 lib/setup.c:1807 lib/setup.c:2009
+msgid "UUID is not supported for this crypt type."
+msgstr "UUID nie jest obsługiwany dla tego rodzaju szyfrowania."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1413 lib/setup.c:1603 src/cryptsetup.c:1045
+msgid "Unsupported encryption sector size."
+msgstr "Nieobsługiwany rozmiar sektora szyfrowania."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1421 lib/setup.c:1720
+msgid "Device size is not aligned to requested sector size."
+msgstr "Rozmiar urządzenia nie jest wyrównany do żądanego rozmiaru sektura."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1472 lib/setup.c:1591
+msgid "Can't format LUKS without device."
+msgstr "Nie można sformatować LUKS-a bez urządzenia."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1478 lib/setup.c:1597
+msgid "Requested data alignment is not compatible with data offset."
+msgstr "Żądane wyrównanie metadanych nie jest zgodne z offsetem danych."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1546 lib/setup.c:1715
+msgid "WARNING: Data offset is outside of currently available data device.\n"
+msgstr "UWAGA: offset danych leży poza obecnie dostępnym urządzeniem danych.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1556 lib/setup.c:1735 lib/setup.c:1754 lib/setup.c:2021
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe header on device %s."
+msgstr "Nie można wymazać nagłówka na urządzeniu %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1608
+msgid "WARNING: The device activation will fail, dm-crypt is missing support for requested encryption sector size.\n"
+msgstr "UWAGA: aktywacja urządzenia się nie powiedzie, dm-crypt nie ma obsługi żądanego rozmiaru sektora szyfrowania.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1630
+msgid "Volume key is too small for encryption with integrity extensions."
+msgstr "Klucz wolumenu jest zbyt mały do szyfrowania z rozszerzeniami integralności."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1685
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cipher %s-%s (key size %zd bits) is not available."
+msgstr "Szyfr %s-%s (rozmiar klucza w bitach: %zd) nie jest dostępny."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1747
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s which is still in use."
+msgstr "Nie można sformatować urządzenia %s, które jest nadal w użyciu."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1750 lib/setup.c:1775
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "Nie można sformatować urządzenia %s, brak uprawnień."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1762 lib/setup.c:2073
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format integrity for device %s."
+msgstr "Nie można sformatować integralności dla urządzenia %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1772
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s in use."
+msgstr "Nie można sformatować urządzenia %s, które jest w użyciu."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1779
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s."
+msgstr "Nie można sformatować urządzenia %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1797
+msgid "Can't format LOOPAES without device."
+msgstr "Nie można sformatować urządzenia LUKSAES bez urządzenia."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1842
+msgid "Can't format VERITY without device."
+msgstr "Nie można sformatować VERITY bez urządzenia."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1853 lib/verity/verity.c:106
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash type %d."
+msgstr "Nieobsługiwany typ hasza VERITY %d."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1859 lib/verity/verity.c:114
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY block size."
+msgstr "Nieobsługiwany rozmiar bloku VERITY."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1864 lib/verity/verity.c:75
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash offset."
+msgstr "Nieobsługiwany offset hasza VERITY."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1869
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY FEC offset."
+msgstr "Nieobsługiwany offset FEC VERITY."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1893
+msgid "Data area overlaps with hash area."
+msgstr "Obszar danych zachodzi na obszar skrótów."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1918
+msgid "Hash area overlaps with FEC area."
+msgstr "Obszar skrótu zachodzi na obszar FEC."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1925
+msgid "Data area overlaps with FEC area."
+msgstr "Obszar danych zachodzi na obszar FEC."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2130
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unknown crypt device type %s requested."
+msgstr "Nieznany typ żądanego urządzenia szyfrującego %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2398 lib/setup.c:2470 lib/setup.c:2483
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported parameters on device %s."
+msgstr "Nieobsługiwane parametry urządzenia %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2404 lib/setup.c:2489
+#, c-format
+msgid "Mismatching parameters on device %s."
+msgstr "Niezgodne parametry dla urządzenia %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2657
+msgid "Cannot resize loop device."
+msgstr "Nie można zmienić rozmiaru urządzenia loopback."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2666
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s size is not aligned to requested sector size (%u bytes)."
+msgstr "Rozmiar urządzenia %s nie jest wyrównany do żądanego rozmiaru sektura (bajtów: %u)."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2725
+msgid "Do you really want to change UUID of device?"
+msgstr "Czy na pewno zmienić UUID urządzenia?"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2801
+msgid "Header backup file does not contain compatible LUKS header."
+msgstr "Plik nagłówka kopii zapasowej nie zawiera zgodnego nagłówka LUKS."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2900
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not active."
+msgstr "Wolumen %s nie jest aktywny."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2911
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is already suspended."
+msgstr "Wolumen %s już został wstrzymany."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2925
+#, c-format
+msgid "Suspend is not supported for device %s."
+msgstr "Wstrzymywanie nie jest obsługiwane dla urządzenia %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2927
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during suspending device %s."
+msgstr "Błąd podczas wstrzymywania urządzenia %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2960 lib/setup.c:3027
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not suspended."
+msgstr "Wolumen %s nie jest wstrzymany."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2989
+#, c-format
+msgid "Resume is not supported for device %s."
+msgstr "Wznawianie nie jest obsługiwane dla urządzenia %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2991 lib/setup.c:3059
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during resuming device %s."
+msgstr "Błąd podczas wznawiania urządzenia %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3127 lib/setup.c:3315
+msgid "Cannot add key slot, all slots disabled and no volume key provided."
+msgstr "Nie można dodać klucza, wszystkie miejsca na klucze wyłączone i nie podano klucza wolumenu."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3267
+msgid "Failed to swap new key slot."
+msgstr "Nie udało się podstawić nowego klucza."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3432 lib/setup.c:3865 lib/setup.c:3878 lib/setup.c:3886
+#: lib/setup.c:3899 lib/setup.c:4198 lib/setup.c:5274
+msgid "Volume key does not match the volume."
+msgstr "Klucz wolumenu nie pasuje do wolumenu."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3453
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid."
+msgstr "Numer klucza %d jest nieprawidłowy."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3459
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is not used."
+msgstr "Klucz %d nie jest używany."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3478
+msgid "Device header overlaps with data area."
+msgstr "Nagłówek urządzenia zachodzi na obszar danych."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3684 lib/setup.c:3952
+msgid "Device type is not properly initialised."
+msgstr "Typ urządzenia nie został właściwie zainicjalizowany."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3726
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s, name is invalid or still in use."
+msgstr "Nie można użyć urządzenia %s, nazwa jest nieprawidłowa lub nadal w użyciu."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3729
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s already exists."
+msgstr "Urządzenie %s już istnieje."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3852
+msgid "Incorrect volume key specified for plain device."
+msgstr "Podano niewłaściwy klucz wolumenu dla zwykłego urządzenia."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3918
+msgid "Incorrect root hash specified for verity device."
+msgstr "Podano niewłaściwy hasz główny dla urządzenia VERITY."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3995 lib/setup.c:4010
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is still in use."
+msgstr "Urządzenie %s jest nadal w użyciu."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4025
+#, c-format
+msgid "Invalid device %s."
+msgstr "Błędne urządzenie %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4134
+msgid "Function not available in FIPS mode."
+msgstr "Funkcja nie jest dostępna w trybie FIPS."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4148
+msgid "Volume key buffer too small."
+msgstr "Bufor klucza wolumenu zbyt mały."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4156
+msgid "Cannot retrieve volume key for plain device."
+msgstr "Nie można odtworzyć klucza wolumenu dla zwykłego urządzenia."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4167
+#, c-format
+msgid "This operation is not supported for %s crypt device."
+msgstr "Ta operacja nie jest obsługiwana dla urządzenia szyfrującego %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4354
+msgid "Dump operation is not supported for this device type."
+msgstr "Operacja zrzutu nie jest obsługiwana dla tego rodzaju urządzenia."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4930
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert device %s which is still in use."
+msgstr "Nie można przekonwertować urządzenia %s, które jest nadal w użyciu."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5213
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign keyslot %u as the new volume key."
+msgstr "Nie udało się przypisać klucza %u jako nowego klucza wolumenu."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5280
+msgid "Failed to initialise default LUKS2 keyslot parameters."
+msgstr "Nie udało się zainicjować domyślnych parametrów klucza LUKS2."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5286
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign keyslot %d to digest."
+msgstr "Nie udało się przypisać klucza %d do skrótu."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5370
+msgid "Failed to load key in kernel keyring."
+msgstr "Nie udało się załadować klucza do pęku kluczy w jądrze."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5425
+msgid "Kernel keyring is not supported by the kernel."
+msgstr "Pęk kluczy w jądrze nie jest obsługiwany przez jądro."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5435
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read passphrase from keyring (error %d)."
+msgstr "Nie udało się odczytać hasła z pęku kluczy (błąd %d)."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:81
+msgid "Cannot get process priority."
+msgstr "Nie można odczytać priorytetu procesu."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:95
+msgid "Cannot unlock memory."
+msgstr "Nie można odblokować pamięci."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:169 lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:498
+msgid "Failed to open key file."
+msgstr "Nie udało się otworzyć pliku klucza."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:174
+msgid "Cannot read keyfile from a terminal."
+msgstr "Nie można odczytać pliku klucza z terminala."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:191
+msgid "Failed to stat key file."
+msgstr "Nie udało się wykonać stat na pliku klucza."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:199 lib/utils.c:220
+msgid "Cannot seek to requested keyfile offset."
+msgstr "Nie można przemieścić się do żądanego położenia pliku klucza."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:214 lib/utils.c:229 src/utils_password.c:188
+#: src/utils_password.c:201
+msgid "Out of memory while reading passphrase."
+msgstr "Brak pamięci podczas odczytu hasła."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:249
+msgid "Error reading passphrase."
+msgstr "Błąd podczas odczytu hasła."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:266
+msgid "Nothing to read on input."
+msgstr "Na wejściu nie ma nic do odczytu."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:273
+msgid "Maximum keyfile size exceeded."
+msgstr "Przekroczono maksymalny rozmiar pliku klucza."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:278
+msgid "Cannot read requested amount of data."
+msgstr "Nie można odczytać żądanej ilości danych."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:184 lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:92
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s doesn't exist or access denied."
+msgstr "Urządzenie %s nie istnieje lub dostęp jest zabroniony."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:194
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not compatible."
+msgstr "Urządzenie %s nie jest zgodne."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:560
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small. Need at least %<PRIu64> bytes."
+msgstr "Urządzenie %s jest zbyt małe. Wymagane przynajmniej %<PRIu64> bajtów."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:641
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s which is in use (already mapped or mounted)."
+msgstr "Nie można użyć urządzenia %s, które jest w użyciu (już podmapowane lub zamontowane)."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:645
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "Nie można użyć urządzenia %s, brak uprawnień."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:648
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot get info about device %s."
+msgstr "Nie można uzyskać informacji o urządzeniu %s."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:671
+msgid "Cannot use a loopback device, running as non-root user."
+msgstr "Nie można użyć urządzenia loopback w czasie działania jako nie-root."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:681
+msgid "Attaching loopback device failed (loop device with autoclear flag is required)."
+msgstr "Nie udało się podłączyć urządzenia loopback (wymagane urządzenie loop z flagą autoclear)."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:727
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested offset is beyond real size of device %s."
+msgstr "Żądany offset jest poza rzeczywistym rozmiarem urządzenia %s."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:735
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s has zero size."
+msgstr "Urządzenie %s ma zerowy rozmiar."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:746 lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:252
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small."
+msgstr "Urządzenie %s jest zbyt małe."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:100
+msgid "Requested PBKDF target time cannot be zero."
+msgstr "Żądany czas docelowy PBKDF nie może być zerowy."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:106
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unknown PBKDF type %s."
+msgstr "Nieznany typ PBKDF %s."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:111
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested hash %s is not supported."
+msgstr "Żądany skrót %s nie jest obsługiwany."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:122
+msgid "Requested PBKDF type is not supported for LUKS1."
+msgstr "Żądany typ PBKDF nie jest obsługiwany dla LUKS1."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:128
+msgid "PBKDF max memory or parallel threads must not be set with pbkdf2."
+msgstr "Wartości maksymalnej pamięci lub liczby wątków PBKDF nie mogą być ustawione dla PBKDF2."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:133 lib/utils_pbkdf.c:143
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forced iteration count is too low for %s (minimum is %u)."
+msgstr "Wymuszona liczba iteracji jest zbyt mała dla %s (minimum to %u)."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:148
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forced memory cost is too low for %s (minimum is %u kilobytes)."
+msgstr "Wymuszony koszt pamięciowy jest zbyt mały dla %s (minimum to %u kB)."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:155
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested maximum PBKDF memory cost is too high (maximum is %d kilobytes)."
+msgstr "Żądany maksymalny koszt pamięciowy PBKDF jest zbyt duży (maksimum to %d kB)."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:160
+msgid "Requested maximum PBKDF memory cannot be zero."
+msgstr "Żądana maksymalna pamięć PBKDF nie może być zerowa."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:164
+msgid "Requested PBKDF parallel threads cannot be zero."
+msgstr "Żądana liczba wątków PBKDF nie może być zerowa."
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:317
+msgid "PBKDF benchmark disabled but iterations not set."
+msgstr "Test wydajności PBKDF jest wyłączony, ale nie ustawiono liczby iteracji."
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:336
+#, c-format
+msgid "Not compatible PBKDF2 options (using hash algorithm %s)."
+msgstr "Niekompatybilne opcje PBKDF2 (przy użyciu algorytmu skrótu %s)."
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:356
+msgid "Not compatible PBKDF options."
+msgstr "Niekompatybilne opcje PBKDF."
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:80
+#, c-format
+msgid "Locking aborted. The locking path %s/%s is unusable (not a directory or missing)."
+msgstr "Blokowanie nie powiodło się. Ścieżka blokady %s/%s jest nieużywalna (brak lub nie jest katalogiem)."
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:87
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Locking directory %s/%s is missing!\n"
+msgstr "UWAGA: brak katalogu blokad %s/%s!\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:97
+#, c-format
+msgid "Locking aborted. The locking path %s/%s is unusable (%s is not a directory)."
+msgstr "Blokowanie przerwane. Ścieżka blokady %s/%s jest nieużywalna (%s nie jest katalogiem)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:40
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Failed to setup dm-crypt key mapping for device %s.\n"
+"Check that kernel supports %s cipher (check syslog for more info)."
+msgstr ""
+"Nie udało się ustawić odwzorowania klucza dm-crypt dla urządzenia %s.\n"
+"Proszę sprawdzić, czy jądro obsługuje szyfr %s (więcej informacji w syslogu)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:45
+msgid "Key size in XTS mode must be 256 or 512 bits."
+msgstr "Rozmiar klucza w trybie XTS musi wynosić 256 lub 512 bitów."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:47
+msgid "Cipher specification should be in [cipher]-[mode]-[iv] format."
+msgstr "Określenie szyfru powinno być w formacie [szyfr]-[tryb]-[iv]."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:98 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:345
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:642 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1079
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1157 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:448
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write to device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "Nie można zapisać na urządzenie %s, brak uprawnień."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:120
+msgid "Failed to open temporary keystore device."
+msgstr "Nie udało się otworzyć urządzenia do tymczasowego przechowywania kluczy."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:127
+msgid "Failed to access temporary keystore device."
+msgstr "Nie udało się uzyskać dostępu do urządzenia do tymczasowego przechowywania kluczy."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:200 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:91
+msgid "IO error while encrypting keyslot."
+msgstr "Błąd we/wy podczas szyfrowania klucza."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:243 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:348
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:594 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:645 lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:663
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:81 lib/verity/verity.c:182 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:308
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:319 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:339
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:242 lib/verity/verity_fec.c:254
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:259 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1160
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:208
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open device %s."
+msgstr "Nie można otworzyć urządzenia %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:254 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:152
+msgid "IO error while decrypting keyslot."
+msgstr "Błąd we/wy podczas odszyfrowywania klucza."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:111
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small. (LUKS1 requires at least %<PRIu64> bytes.)"
+msgstr "Urządzenie %s jest zbyt małe (LUKS1 wymaga przynajmniej %<PRIu64> bajtów)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:132 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:140
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:152 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:163
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:175
+#, c-format
+msgid "LUKS keyslot %u is invalid."
+msgstr "Numer klucza LUKS %u jest nieprawidłowy."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:228 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:478
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:991 src/cryptsetup.c:1236
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1355 src/cryptsetup.c:1412 src/cryptsetup.c:1468
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1535 src/cryptsetup.c:1631 src/cryptsetup.c:1695
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1855 src/cryptsetup.c:2044 src/cryptsetup.c:2104
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2170 src/cryptsetup.c:2334 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1397
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."
+msgstr "Urządzenie %s nie jest prawidłowym urządzeniem LUKS."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:247 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1010
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested header backup file %s already exists."
+msgstr "Żądany plik kopii zapasowej nagłówka %s już istnieje."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:249 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1012
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Nie można utworzyć pliku kopii zapasowej nagłówka %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:254 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1017
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Nie można zapisać pliku kopii zapasowej nagłówka %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:287 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1066
+msgid "Backup file doesn't contain valid LUKS header."
+msgstr "Plik kopii zapasowej nie zawiera prawidłowego nagłówka LUKS."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:300 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:555
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1087
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Nie można otworzyć pliku kopii zapasowej nagłówka %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:306 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1093
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Nie można odczytać pliku kopii zapasowej nagłówka %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:318
+msgid "Data offset or key size differs on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "Offset danych lub rozmiar klucza różnią się między urządzeniem a kopią zapasową; przywrócenie nie powiodło się."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:326
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s %s%s"
+msgstr "Urządzenie %s %s%s"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:327
+msgid "does not contain LUKS header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device."
+msgstr "nie zawiera nagłówka LUKS. Nadpisanie nagłówka może zniszczyć dane na tym urządzeniu."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:328
+msgid "already contains LUKS header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."
+msgstr "już zawiera nagłówek LUKS. Nadpisanie nagłówka zniszczy istniejące klucze."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:329 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1129
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: real device header has different UUID than backup!"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"UWAGA: nagłówek prawdziwego urządzenia ma inny UUID niż kopia zapasowa!"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:381
+msgid "Non standard key size, manual repair required."
+msgstr "Niestandardowy rozmiar klucza, wymagana ręczna naprawa."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:386
+msgid "Non standard keyslots alignment, manual repair required."
+msgstr "Niestandardowe wyrównanie kluczy, wymagana ręczna naprawa."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:396
+msgid "Repairing keyslots."
+msgstr "Naprawianie kluczy."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:415
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: offset repaired (%u -> %u)."
+msgstr "Klucz %i: naprawiono offset (%u -> %u)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:423
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: stripes repaired (%u -> %u)."
+msgstr "Klucz %i: naprawiono pasy (%u -> %u)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:432
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: bogus partition signature."
+msgstr "Klucz %i: błędna sygnatura partycji."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:437
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: salt wiped."
+msgstr "Klucz %i: zarodek wymazany."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:454
+msgid "Writing LUKS header to disk."
+msgstr "Zapis nagłówka LUKS na dysk."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:459
+msgid "Repair failed."
+msgstr "Naprawa nie powiodła się."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:487 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:758
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested LUKS hash %s is not supported."
+msgstr "Żądany skrót LUKS %s nie jest obsługiwany."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:515 src/cryptsetup.c:960
+msgid "No known problems detected for LUKS header."
+msgstr "W nagłówku LUKS nie wykryto żadnych znanych problemów."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:667
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during update of LUKS header on device %s."
+msgstr "Błąd podczas uaktualniania nagłówka LUKS na urządzeniu %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:676
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error re-reading LUKS header after update on device %s."
+msgstr "Błęd podczas ponownego odczytu nagłówka LUKS po uaktualnieniu na urządzeniu %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:752
+msgid "Data offset for LUKS header must be either 0 or higher than header size."
+msgstr "Offset danych dla nagłówka LUKS musi wynosić 0 lub więcej niż rozmiar nagłówka."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:763 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:828
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:207 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:909
+msgid "Wrong LUKS UUID format provided."
+msgstr "Podano zły format LUKS UUID."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:786
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: reading random salt failed."
+msgstr "Nie można utworzyć nagłówka LUKS: odczyt losowego zarodka nie powiódł się."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:807
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: header digest failed (using hash %s)."
+msgstr "Nie można utworzyć nagłówka LUKS: uzyskanie skrótu nagłówka nie powiodło się (przy użyciu algorytmu %s)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:851
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d active, purge first."
+msgstr "Klucz numer %d jest aktywny, należy go najpierw wyczyścić."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:857
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d material includes too few stripes. Header manipulation?"
+msgstr "Klucz %d zawiera zbyt mało pasów. Zmieniony nagłówek?"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1065
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select keyslot between 0 and %d."
+msgstr "Numer klucza %d jest błędny, proszę wybrać numer od 0 do %d."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1083 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:452
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe device %s."
+msgstr "Nie można wymazać urządzenia %s."
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:146
+msgid "Detected not yet supported GPG encrypted keyfile."
+msgstr "Wykryto jeszcze nie obsługiwany plik klucza szyfrowany GPG."
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:147
+msgid "Please use gpg --decrypt <KEYFILE> | cryptsetup --keyfile=- ...\n"
+msgstr "Proszę użyć gpg --decrypt <PLIK-KLUCZA> | cryptsetup --keyfile=- ...\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:168 lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:188
+msgid "Incompatible loop-AES keyfile detected."
+msgstr "Wykryto niekompatybilny plik klucza loop-AES."
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:245
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support loop-AES compatible mapping."
+msgstr "Jądro nie obsługuje odwzorowań zgodnych z loop-AES."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:505
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error reading keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Błąd odczytu pliku klucza %s."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:545
+#, c-format
+msgid "Maximum TCRYPT passphrase length (%d) exceeded."
+msgstr "Przekroczono maksymalną długość hasła TCRYPT (%d)."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:586
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2 hash algorithm %s not available, skipping."
+msgstr "Algorytm skrótu PBKDF2 %s nie jest dostępny, pominięto."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:604 src/cryptsetup.c:915
+msgid "Required kernel crypto interface not available."
+msgstr "Wymagany interfejs kryptograficzny jądra nie jest dostępny."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:606 src/cryptsetup.c:917
+msgid "Ensure you have algif_skcipher kernel module loaded."
+msgstr "Proszę upewnić się, że moduł jądra algif_skcipher został załadowany."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:746
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activation is not supported for %d sector size."
+msgstr "Aktywacja nie jest obsługiwana dla rozmiaru sektora %d."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:752
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support activation for this TCRYPT legacy mode."
+msgstr "Jądro nie obsługuje aktywacji dla tego starego trybu TCRYPT."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:786
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activating TCRYPT system encryption for partition %s."
+msgstr "Włączanie szyfrowania systemu TCRYPT dla partycji %s."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:864
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support TCRYPT compatible mapping."
+msgstr "Jądro nie obsługuje odwzorowań zgodnych z TCRYPT."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:1085
+msgid "This function is not supported without TCRYPT header load."
+msgstr "Ta funkcja nie jest obsługiwana bez załadowanego nagłówka TCRYPT."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:69 lib/verity/verity.c:175
+#, c-format
+msgid "Verity device %s doesn't use on-disk header."
+msgstr "Urządzenie Verity %s nie używa nagłówka na dysku."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:94
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not a valid VERITY device."
+msgstr "Urządzenie %s nie jest prawidłowym urządzeniem VERITY."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:101
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY version %d."
+msgstr "Nieobsługiwana wersja VERITY %d."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:132
+msgid "VERITY header corrupted."
+msgstr "Uszkodzony nagłówek VERITY."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:169
+#, c-format
+msgid "Wrong VERITY UUID format provided on device %s."
+msgstr "Podano zły format UUID-a VERITY na urządzeniu %s."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:202
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during update of verity header on device %s."
+msgstr "Błąd podczas uaktualniania nagłówka VERITY na urządzeniu %s."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:266
+msgid "Errors cannot be repaired with FEC device."
+msgstr "Błędów nie można naprawić z urządzeniem FEC."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:268
+#, c-format
+msgid "Found %u repairable errors with FEC device."
+msgstr "Znaleziono %u błędów możliwych do naprawienia z urządzeniem FEC."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:306
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support dm-verity mapping."
+msgstr "Jądro nie obsługuje odwzorowań dm-verity."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:317
+msgid "Verity device detected corruption after activation."
+msgstr "Urządzenie VERITY wykryło uszkodzenie po uaktywnieniu."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:59
+#, c-format
+msgid "Spare area is not zeroed at position %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Nie wyzerowane miejsce zapasowe na pozycji %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:160 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:287
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:300
+msgid "Device offset overflow."
+msgstr "Przepełnienie offsetu urządzenia."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:200
+#, c-format
+msgid "Verification failed at position %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Weryfikacja nie powiodła się na pozycji %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:273
+msgid "Invalid size parameters for verity device."
+msgstr "Błędne parametry rozmiaru dla urządzenia VERITY."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:293
+msgid "Hash area overflow."
+msgstr "Przepełnienie obszaru skrótu."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:370
+msgid "Verification of data area failed."
+msgstr "Weryfikacja obszaru danych nie powiodła się."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:375
+msgid "Verification of root hash failed."
+msgstr "Weryfikacja głównego hasza nie powiodła się."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:381
+msgid "Input/output error while creating hash area."
+msgstr "Błąd wejścia/wyjścia podczas tworzenia obszaru haszy."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:383
+msgid "Creation of hash area failed."
+msgstr "Tworzenie obszaru haszy nie powiodło się."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:430
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Kernel cannot activate device if data block size exceeds page size (%u)."
+msgstr "UWAGA: Jądro nie może uaktywnić urządzenia, jeśli rozmiar bloku danych przekracza rozmiar strony (%u)."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:132
+msgid "Failed to allocate RS context."
+msgstr "Nie udało się przydzielić kontekstu RS."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:147
+msgid "Failed to allocate buffer."
+msgstr "Nie udało się przydzielić bufora."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:157
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read RS block %<PRIu64> byte %d."
+msgstr "Nie udało się odczytać bloku RS %<PRIu64> bajt %d."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:170
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read parity for RS block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Nie udało się odczytać parzystości dla bloku RS %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:178
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to repair parity for block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Nie udało się naprawić parzystości dla bloku %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:189
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to write parity for RS block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Nie udało się zapisać parzystości dla bloku RS %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:224
+msgid "Block sizes must match for FEC."
+msgstr "Dla FEC rozmiary bloków muszą się zgadzać."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:230
+msgid "Invalid number of parity bytes."
+msgstr "Błędna liczba bajtów parzystości."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:266
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to determine size for device %s."
+msgstr "Nie udało się określić rozmiaru urządzenia %s."
+
+#: lib/integrity/integrity.c:239 lib/integrity/integrity.c:304
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support dm-integrity mapping."
+msgstr "Jądro nie obsługuje odwzorowań dm-integrity."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:413
+msgid "Failed to acquire write device lock."
+msgstr "Nie udało się uzyskać blokady do zapisu na urządzeniu."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:654 lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:675
+msgid ""
+"Device contains ambiguous signatures, cannot auto-recover LUKS2.\n"
+"Please run \"cryptsetup repair\" for recovery."
+msgstr ""
+"Urządzenie zawiera niejednoznaczne sygnatury, nie można automatycznie odtworzyć LUKS2.\n"
+"W celu odtworzenia należy uruchomić \"cryptsetup repair\"."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:99
+msgid "No space for new keyslot."
+msgstr "Brak miejsca na nowy klucz."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:158
+msgid "Requested data offset is too small."
+msgstr "Żądany offset danych jest zbyt mały."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:195
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: keyslots area (%<PRIu64> bytes) is very small, available LUKS2 keyslot count is very limited.\n"
+msgstr "UWAGA: obszar kluczy (%<PRIu64> bajtów) bardzo mały, dostępna liczba kluczy LUKS2 jest bardzo ograniczona.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:866 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:982
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1055 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:105
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:128
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to acquire read lock on device %s."
+msgstr "Nie udało się uzyskać blokady do odczytu na urządzeniu %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:878 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1149
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:431 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:40
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:69
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to acquire write lock on device %s."
+msgstr "Nie udało się uzyskać blokady dla zapisu na urządzeniu %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1072
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forbidden LUKS2 requirements detected in backup %s."
+msgstr "Wykryto zabronione wymagania LUKS2 w kopii zapasowej %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1113
+msgid "Data offset differ on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "Offset danych różni się między urządzeniem a kopią zapasową; przywrócenie nie powiodło się."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1119
+msgid "Binary header with keyslot areas size differ on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "Nagłówek binarny z rozmiarem obszarów kluczy różni się między urządzeniem a kopią zapasową; przywrócenie nie powiodło się."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1126
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s %s%s%s%s"
+msgstr "Urządzenie %s %s%s%s%s"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1127
+msgid "does not contain LUKS2 header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device."
+msgstr "nie zawiera nagłówka LUKS2. Nadpisanie nagłówka może zniszczyć dane na tym urządzeniu."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1128
+msgid "already contains LUKS2 header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."
+msgstr "już zawiera nagłówek LUKS2. Nadpisanie nagłówka zniszczy istniejące klucze."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1130
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: unknown LUKS2 requirements detected in real device header!\n"
+"Replacing header with backup may corrupt the data on that device!"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"UWAGA: wykryto nieznane wymagania LUKS2 w nagłówku prawdziwego urządzenia!\n"
+"Nadpisanie nagłówka kopią zapasową może uszkodzić dane na tym urządzeniu!"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1132
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: Unfinished offline reencryption detected on the device!\n"
+"Replacing header with backup may corrupt data."
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"UWAGA: wykryto nie zakończone ponowne szyfrowanie offline na urządzeniu!\n"
+"Nadpisanie nagłówka kopią zapasową może uszkodzić dane."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1234
+#, c-format
+msgid "Ignored unknown flag %s."
+msgstr "Zignorowano nieznaną flagę %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1869
+msgid "Failed to read LUKS2 requirements."
+msgstr "Nie udało się odczytać wymagań LUKS2."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1876
+msgid "Unmet LUKS2 requirements detected."
+msgstr "Wykryto nie spełnione wymagania LUKS2."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1884
+msgid "Offline reencryption in progress. Aborting."
+msgstr "Ponowne szyfrowanie offline w trakcie. Przerwano."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:474
+#, c-format
+msgid "Can not check status of device with uuid: %s."
+msgstr "Nie można sprawdzić stanu urządzenia mającego UUID: %s"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:500
+msgid "Unable to convert header with LUKSMETA additional metadata."
+msgstr "Nie można przekonwertować nagłówka z dodatkowymi metadanymi LUKSMETA."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:537
+msgid "Unable to move keyslot area. Not enough space."
+msgstr "Nie można przenieść obszaru kluczy. Brak miejsca."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:577 lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:854
+msgid "Unable to move keyslot area."
+msgstr "Nie można przenieść obszaru kluczy."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:672
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - key slot digests are not LUKS1 compatible."
+msgstr "Nie można przekonwertować formatu LUKS1 - skróty kluczy nie są zgodne z LUKS1."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:684
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - device uses wrapped key cipher %s."
+msgstr "Nie można przekonwertować formatu LUKS1 - urządzenie używa szyfru %s z obudowanym kluczem."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:692
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - LUKS2 header contains %u token(s)."
+msgstr "Nie można przekonwertować do formatu LUKS1 - nagłówek LUKS2 zawiera %u token(ów)."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:706
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - keyslot %u is in invalid state."
+msgstr "Nie można przekonwertować do formatu LUKS1 - klucz %u jest w błędnym stanie."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:711
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - slot %u (over maximum slots) is still active."
+msgstr "Nie można przekonwertować do formatu LUKS1 - klucz %u (powyzej maksimum) jest nadal aktywny."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:716
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - keyslot %u is not LUKS1 compatible."
+msgstr "Nie można przekonwertować do formatu LUKS1 - klucz %u nie jest zgodny z LUKS1."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_token.c:262
+msgid "No free token slot."
+msgstr "Brak wolnego miejsca na token."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_token.c:269
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to create builtin token %s."
+msgstr "Nie udało się utworzyć wbudowanego tokenu %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:141
+msgid "Can't do passphrase verification on non-tty inputs."
+msgstr "Nie można wykonać weryfikacji hasła, jeśli wejściem nie jest terminal."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:182
+msgid "Keyslot encryption parameters can be set only for LUKS2 device."
+msgstr "Parametry szyfrowania kluczy mogą być ustawione tylko dla urządzeń LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:212 src/cryptsetup.c:849 src/cryptsetup.c:1088
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:749 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:814
+msgid "No known cipher specification pattern detected."
+msgstr "Nie wykryto znanego wzorca określającego szyfr."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:220
+msgid "WARNING: The --hash parameter is being ignored in plain mode with keyfile specified.\n"
+msgstr "UWAGA: Parametr --hash jest ignorowany w trybie zwykłym z podanym plikiem klucza.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:228
+msgid "WARNING: The --keyfile-size option is being ignored, the read size is the same as the encryption key size.\n"
+msgstr "UWAGA: Opcja --keyfile-size jest ignorowana, rozmiar odczytu jest taki sam, jak rozmiar klucza szyfrującego.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:268
+#, c-format
+msgid "Detected device signature(s) on %s. Proceeding further may damage existing data."
+msgstr "Wykryto sygnatury urządzeń na %s. Dalsze operacje mogą uszkodzić istniejące dane."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:274 src/cryptsetup.c:969 src/cryptsetup.c:1065
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1138 src/cryptsetup.c:1763 src/integritysetup.c:230
+msgid "Operation aborted.\n"
+msgstr "Operacja przerwana.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:342
+msgid "Option --key-file is required."
+msgstr "Wymagana jest opcja --key-file."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:395
+msgid "Enter VeraCrypt PIM: "
+msgstr "Proszę wprowadzić PIM VeraCrypt: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:404
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: parse error."
+msgstr "Błędna wartość PIM: błąd składni."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:407
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: 0."
+msgstr "Błędna wartość PIM: 0."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:410
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: outside of range."
+msgstr "Błędna wartość PIM: poza zakresem."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:433
+msgid "No device header detected with this passphrase."
+msgstr "Nie wykryto nagłówka urządzenia z tym hasłem."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:495 src/cryptsetup.c:1790
+msgid ""
+"Header dump with volume key is sensitive information\n"
+"which allows access to encrypted partition without passphrase.\n"
+"This dump should be always stored encrypted on safe place."
+msgstr ""
+"Zrzut nagłówka z kluczem wolumenu jest informacją wrażliwą,\n"
+"pozwalającą na dostęp do zaszyfrowanej partycji bez hasła.\n"
+"Zrzut ten powinien być zawsze zapisywany w postaci zaszyfrowanej\n"
+"w bezpiecznym miejscu."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:574
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is still active and scheduled for deferred removal.\n"
+msgstr "Urządzenie %s jest nadal aktywne i zaplanowane do odroczonego usunięcia.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:602
+msgid "Resize of active device requires volume key in keyring but --disable-keyring option is set."
+msgstr "Zmiana rozmiaru aktywnego urządzenia wymaga klucza wolumenu w pęku, ale ustawiono opcję --disable-keyring."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:727
+msgid "Benchmark interrupted."
+msgstr "Test szybkości przerwany."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:748
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2-%-9s     N/A\n"
+msgstr "PBKDF2-%-9s     N/D\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:750
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2-%-9s %7u iterations per second for %zu-bit key\n"
+msgstr "PBKDF2-%-9s %7u iteracji/sekundę dla klucza %zu-bitowego\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:764
+#, c-format
+msgid "%-10s N/A\n"
+msgstr "%-10s N/D\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:766
+#, c-format
+msgid "%-10s %4u iterations, %5u memory, %1u parallel threads (CPUs) for %zu-bit key (requested %u ms time)\n"
+msgstr "%-10s %4u iteracji, pamięć: %5u, równoległe wątki (CPU): %1u dla klucza %zu-bitowego (żądany czas %u ms)\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:790
+msgid "Result of benchmark is not reliable."
+msgstr "Wynik testu wydajności nie jest wiarygodny."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:841
+msgid "# Tests are approximate using memory only (no storage IO).\n"
+msgstr "# Testy są przybliżone tylko z użyciem pamięci (bez we/wy na dysk).\n"
+
+#. TRANSLATORS: The string is header of a table and must be exactly (right side) aligned.
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:875
+#, c-format
+msgid "#%*s Algorithm |       Key |      Encryption |      Decryption\n"
+msgstr "#%*s  Algorytm |     Klucz |     Szyfrowanie | Odszyfrowywanie\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:879
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cipher %s is not available."
+msgstr "Szyfr %s nie jest dostępny."
+
+#. TRANSLATORS: The string is header of a table and must be exactly (right side) aligned.
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:899
+msgid "#     Algorithm |       Key |      Encryption |      Decryption\n"
+msgstr "#      Algorytm |     Klucz |     Szyfrowanie | Odszyfrowywanie\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:908
+msgid "N/A"
+msgstr "N/D"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:968
+msgid "Really try to repair LUKS device header?"
+msgstr "Naprawdę próbować naprawić nagłówek urządzenia LUKS?"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:984 src/integritysetup.c:144
+msgid ""
+"Wiping device to initialize integrity checksum.\n"
+"You can interrupt this by pressing CTRL+c (rest of not wiped device will contain invalid checksum).\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Czyszczenie urządzenia w celu zainicjowania sumy kontrolnej integralności.\n"
+"Można przerwać ten proces wciskając Ctrl+C (reszta nie wymazanego urządzenia będzie zawierać błędną sumę kontrolną).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1006 src/integritysetup.c:166
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot deactivate temporary device %s."
+msgstr "Nie można dezaktywować urządzenia tymczasowego %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1050
+msgid "Integrity option can be used only for LUKS2 format."
+msgstr "Opcja integralności może być używana tylko dla formatu LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1055 src/cryptsetup.c:1115
+msgid "Unsupported LUKS2 metadata size options."
+msgstr "Nieobsługiwane opcje rozmiaru metadanych LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1072
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create header file %s."
+msgstr "Nie można utworzyć pliku nagłówka %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1095 src/integritysetup.c:192 src/integritysetup.c:201
+#: src/integritysetup.c:210 src/integritysetup.c:276 src/integritysetup.c:285
+#: src/integritysetup.c:295
+msgid "No known integrity specification pattern detected."
+msgstr "Nie wykryto znanego wzorca określającego integralność."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1108
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use %s as on-disk header."
+msgstr "Nie można użyć %s jako nagłówka na dysku."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1132 src/integritysetup.c:224
+#, c-format
+msgid "This will overwrite data on %s irrevocably."
+msgstr "To nieodwołalnie nadpisze dane na %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1173 src/cryptsetup.c:1484 src/cryptsetup.c:1551
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1646 src/cryptsetup.c:1712
+msgid "Failed to set pbkdf parameters."
+msgstr "Nie udało się ustawić parametrów PBKDF."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1242
+msgid "Reduced data offset is allowed only for detached LUKS header."
+msgstr "Offset zmniejszonych danych jest dozwolony tylko dla osobnego nagłówka LUKS."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1284
+msgid "Device activated but cannot make flags persistent."
+msgstr "Urządzenie aktywowane, ale nie można uczynić flag trwałymi."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1365
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %d is selected for deletion."
+msgstr "Klucz %d jest wybrany do usunięcia."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1368 src/cryptsetup.c:1706
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %d is not active."
+msgstr "Klucz %d nie jest aktywny."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1377 src/cryptsetup.c:1438
+msgid "This is the last keyslot. Device will become unusable after purging this key."
+msgstr "To jest ostatni klucz. Urządzenie stanie się bezużyteczne po usunięciu tego klucza."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1378
+msgid "Enter any remaining passphrase: "
+msgstr "Dowolne pozostałe hasło: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1379 src/cryptsetup.c:1440
+msgid "Operation aborted, the keyslot was NOT wiped.\n"
+msgstr "Operacja przerwana, klucz NIE został wymazany.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1417
+msgid "Enter passphrase to be deleted: "
+msgstr "Hasło do usunięcia: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1435
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d selected for deletion."
+msgstr "klucz %d wybrany do usunięcia."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1498 src/cryptsetup.c:1565 src/cryptsetup.c:1599
+msgid "Enter new passphrase for key slot: "
+msgstr "Nowe hasło dla klucza: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1582 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1352
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter any existing passphrase: "
+msgstr "Dowolne istniejące hasło: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1650
+msgid "Enter passphrase to be changed: "
+msgstr "Hasło, które ma być zmienione: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1666 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1338
+msgid "Enter new passphrase: "
+msgstr "Nowe hasło: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1716
+msgid "Enter passphrase for keyslot to be converted: "
+msgstr "Hasło dla klucza do konwersji: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1740
+msgid "Only one device argument for isLuks operation is supported."
+msgstr "Dla operacji isLuks obsługiwany jest tylko jeden argument będący urządzeniem."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1924 src/cryptsetup.c:1945
+msgid "Option --header-backup-file is required."
+msgstr "Wymagana jest opcja --header-backup-file."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1975
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s is not cryptsetup managed device."
+msgstr "%s nie jest urządzeniem zarządzanym przez cryptsetup."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1986
+#, c-format
+msgid "Refresh is not supported for device type %s"
+msgstr "Odświeżanie nie jest obsługiwane dla typu urządzenia %s"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2024
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unrecognized metadata device type %s."
+msgstr "Nie rozpoznany typ urządzenia metadanych %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2027
+msgid "Command requires device and mapped name as arguments."
+msgstr "Polecenie wymaga urządzenia i nazwy odwzorowywanej jako argumentów."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2049
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"This operation will erase all keyslots on device %s.\n"
+"Device will become unusable after this operation."
+msgstr ""
+"Ta operacja usunię wszystkie klucze na urządzeniu %s.\n"
+"Urządzenie po tej operacji stanie się bezużyteczne."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2056
+msgid "Operation aborted, keyslots were NOT wiped.\n"
+msgstr "Operacja przerwana, klucze NIE zostały wymazane.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2093
+msgid "Invalid LUKS type, only luks1 and luks2 are supported."
+msgstr "Błędny typ LUKS, obsługiwane są tylko luks1 i luks2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2111
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device is already %s type."
+msgstr "Urządzenie już ma typ %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2116
+#, c-format
+msgid "This operation will convert %s to %s format.\n"
+msgstr "Ta operacja przekonwertuje %s do formatu %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2122
+msgid "Operation aborted, device was NOT converted.\n"
+msgstr "Operacja przerwana, urządzenie NIE zostało skonwertowane.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2162
+msgid "Option --priority, --label or --subsystem is missing."
+msgstr "Brak opcji --priority, --label lub --subsystem."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2196 src/cryptsetup.c:2229 src/cryptsetup.c:2252
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %d is invalid."
+msgstr "Token %d jest błędny."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2199 src/cryptsetup.c:2255
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %d in use."
+msgstr "Token %d jest w użyciu."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2206
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to add luks2-keyring token %d."
+msgstr "Nie udało się dodać tokenu %d do pęku kluczy luks2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2215 src/cryptsetup.c:2277
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign token %d to keyslot %d."
+msgstr "Nie udało się przypisać tokenu %d do klucza %d."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2232
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %d is not in use."
+msgstr "Token %d nie jest w użyciu."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2267
+msgid "Failed to import token from file."
+msgstr "Nie udało się zaimportować tokenu z pliku."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2292
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to get token %d for export."
+msgstr "Nie udało się pobrać tokenu %d do eksportu."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2307
+msgid "--key-description parameter is mandatory for token add action."
+msgstr "Parametr --key-description jest wymagany do akcji dodania tokenu."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2313 src/cryptsetup.c:2321
+msgid "Action requires specific token. Use --token-id parameter."
+msgstr "Akcja wymaga określonego tokenu. Należy użyć parametru --token-id."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2326
+#, c-format
+msgid "Invalid token operation %s."
+msgstr "Błędna operacja na tokenie %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2366
+msgid "<device> [--type <type>] [<name>]"
+msgstr "<uządzenie> [--type <typ>] [<nazwa>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2366
+msgid "open device as mapping <name>"
+msgstr "otwarcie urządzenia jako odwzorowania <nazwa>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2367 src/cryptsetup.c:2368 src/cryptsetup.c:2369
+#: src/veritysetup.c:363 src/veritysetup.c:364 src/integritysetup.c:464
+#: src/integritysetup.c:465
+msgid "<name>"
+msgstr "<nazwa>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2367
+msgid "close device (remove mapping)"
+msgstr "zamknięcie urządzenia (usunięcie odwzorowania)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2368
+msgid "resize active device"
+msgstr "zmiana rozmiaru aktywnego urządzenia"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2369
+msgid "show device status"
+msgstr "pokazanie stanu urządzenia"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2370
+msgid "[--cipher <cipher>]"
+msgstr "[--cipher <szyfr>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2370
+msgid "benchmark cipher"
+msgstr "test szybkości szyfru"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2371 src/cryptsetup.c:2372 src/cryptsetup.c:2373
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2374 src/cryptsetup.c:2381 src/cryptsetup.c:2382
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2383 src/cryptsetup.c:2384 src/cryptsetup.c:2385
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2386 src/cryptsetup.c:2387 src/cryptsetup.c:2388
+msgid "<device>"
+msgstr "<urządzenie>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2371
+msgid "try to repair on-disk metadata"
+msgstr "próba naprawy metadanych na dysku"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2372
+msgid "erase all keyslots (remove encryption key)"
+msgstr "usunięcie wszystkich kluczy (usunięcie klucza szyfrującego)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2373
+msgid "convert LUKS from/to LUKS2 format"
+msgstr "przekonwertowanie formatu LUKS z/do LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2374
+msgid "set permanent configuration options for LUKS2"
+msgstr "ustawienie opcji trwałej konfiguracji dla LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2375 src/cryptsetup.c:2376
+msgid "<device> [<new key file>]"
+msgstr "<urządzenie> [<nowy plik klucza>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2375
+msgid "formats a LUKS device"
+msgstr "sformatowanie urządzenia LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2376
+msgid "add key to LUKS device"
+msgstr "dodanie klucza do urządzenia LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2377 src/cryptsetup.c:2378 src/cryptsetup.c:2379
+msgid "<device> [<key file>]"
+msgstr "<urządzenie> [<plik klucza>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2377
+msgid "removes supplied key or key file from LUKS device"
+msgstr "usunięcie podanego klucza lub pliku klucza z urządzenia LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2378
+msgid "changes supplied key or key file of LUKS device"
+msgstr "zmiana podanego klucza lub pliku klucza urządzenia LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2379
+msgid "converts a key to new pbkdf parameters"
+msgstr "konwersja klucza na nowe parametry pbkdf"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2380
+msgid "<device> <key slot>"
+msgstr "<urządzenie> <numer klucza>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2380
+msgid "wipes key with number <key slot> from LUKS device"
+msgstr "wymazanie klucza o numerze <numer klucza> z urządzenia LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2381
+msgid "print UUID of LUKS device"
+msgstr "wypisanie UUID-a urządzenia LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2382
+msgid "tests <device> for LUKS partition header"
+msgstr "sprawdzenie <urządzenia> pod kątem nagłówka partycji LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2383
+msgid "dump LUKS partition information"
+msgstr "zrzut informacji o partycji LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2384
+msgid "dump TCRYPT device information"
+msgstr "zrzut informacji o urządzeniu TCRYPT"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2385
+msgid "Suspend LUKS device and wipe key (all IOs are frozen)"
+msgstr "Wstrzymanie urządzenia LUKS i wymazanie klucza (zamraża wszystkie operacje we/wy)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2386
+msgid "Resume suspended LUKS device"
+msgstr "Wznowienie zatrzymanego urządzenia LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2387
+msgid "Backup LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "Kopia zapasowa nagłówka i kluczy urządzenia LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2388
+msgid "Restore LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "Odtworzenie nagłówka i kluczy urządzenia LUKS z kopii zapasowej"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2389
+msgid "<add|remove|import|export> <device>"
+msgstr "<add|remove|import|export> <urządzenie>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2389
+msgid "Manipulate LUKS2 tokens"
+msgstr "Operacja na tokenach LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2407 src/veritysetup.c:380 src/integritysetup.c:481
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<action> is one of:\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<akcja> to jedno z:\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2413
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"You can also use old <action> syntax aliases:\n"
+"\topen: create (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen\n"
+"\tclose: remove (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tcryptClose\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Można także używać starych aliasów składni <akcja>:\n"
+"\topen: create (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen\n"
+"\tclose: remove (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tcryptClose\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2417
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<device> is the encrypted device\n"
+"<key slot> is the LUKS key slot number to modify\n"
+"<key file> optional key file for the new key for luksAddKey action\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<nazwa> to urządzenie do utworzenia wewnątrz %s\n"
+"<urządzenie> to zaszyfrowane urządzenie\n"
+"<numer klucza> to numer klucza LUKS do zmiany\n"
+"<plik klucza> to opcjonalny plik nowego klucza dla akcji luksAddKey\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2424
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in metadata format is %s (for luksFormat action).\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Domyślny wkompilowany format metadanych to %s (dla akcji luksFormat).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2429
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in key and passphrase parameters:\n"
+"\tMaximum keyfile size: %dkB, Maximum interactive passphrase length %d (characters)\n"
+"Default PBKDF for LUKS1: %s, iteration time: %d (ms)\n"
+"Default PBKDF for LUKS2: %s\n"
+"\tIteration time: %d, Memory required: %dkB, Parallel threads: %d\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Domyślne wkompilowane parametry kluczy i haseł:\n"
+"\tMaksymalny rozmiar pliku klucza: %dkB, maksymalna długość hasła interaktywnego %d (znaków)\n"
+"Domyślny PBKDF dla LUKS1: %s, czas iteracji %d (ms)\n"
+"Domyślny PBKDF dla LUKS2: %s\n"
+"\tCzas iteracji: %d, wymagana pamięć: %dkB, liczba wątków: %d\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2440
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in device cipher parameters:\n"
+"\tloop-AES: %s, Key %d bits\n"
+"\tplain: %s, Key: %d bits, Password hashing: %s\n"
+"\tLUKS: %s, Key: %d bits, LUKS header hashing: %s, RNG: %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Domyślne wkompilowane parametry szyfrowania urządzeń:\n"
+"\tloop-AES: %s, bitów klucza: %d\n"
+"\tplain: %s, bitów klucza: %d, skrót hasła: %s\n"
+"\tLUKS: %s, bitów klucza: %d, skrót nagłówka LUKS: %s, RNG: %s\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2449
+msgid "\tLUKS: Default keysize with XTS mode (two internal keys) will be doubled.\n"
+msgstr "\tLUKS: Domyślny rozmiar klucza z trybem XTS (dwa klucze wewnętrzne) będzie podwojony.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2460 src/veritysetup.c:537 src/integritysetup.c:621
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s: requires %s as arguments"
+msgstr "%s: wymaga %s jako argumentów"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2498 src/veritysetup.c:420 src/integritysetup.c:515
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1611
+msgid "Show this help message"
+msgstr "Wyświetlenie tego opisu"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2499 src/veritysetup.c:421 src/integritysetup.c:516
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1612
+msgid "Display brief usage"
+msgstr "Wyświetlenie krótkiej informacji o składni"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2503 src/veritysetup.c:425 src/integritysetup.c:520
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1616
+msgid "Help options:"
+msgstr "Opcje pomocnicze:"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2504 src/veritysetup.c:426 src/integritysetup.c:521
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1617
+msgid "Print package version"
+msgstr "Wypisanie wersji pakietu"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2505 src/veritysetup.c:427 src/integritysetup.c:522
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1618
+msgid "Shows more detailed error messages"
+msgstr "Wyświetlanie bardziej szczegółowych komunikatów błędów"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2506 src/veritysetup.c:428 src/integritysetup.c:523
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1619
+msgid "Show debug messages"
+msgstr "Wyświetlanie informacji diagnostycznych"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2507
+msgid "Show debug messages including JSON metadata"
+msgstr "Wyświetlanie informacji diagnostycznych wraz z metadanymi JSON"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2508 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1621
+msgid "The cipher used to encrypt the disk (see /proc/crypto)"
+msgstr "Szyfr używany do zaszyfrowania dysku (p. /proc/crypto)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2509 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1623
+msgid "The hash used to create the encryption key from the passphrase"
+msgstr "Skrót używany do utworzenia klucza szyfrującego z hasła"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2510
+msgid "Verifies the passphrase by asking for it twice"
+msgstr "Sprawdzenie poprawności hasła poprzez dwukrotne pytanie"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2511 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1625
+msgid "Read the key from a file"
+msgstr "Odczyt klucza z pliku"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2512
+msgid "Read the volume (master) key from file."
+msgstr "Odczyt klucza wolumenu (klucza głównego) z pliku."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2513
+msgid "Dump volume (master) key instead of keyslots info"
+msgstr "Zrzut (głównego) klucza wolumenu zamiast informacji o kluczach"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2514 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1622
+msgid "The size of the encryption key"
+msgstr "Rozmiar klucza szyfrującego"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2514 src/cryptsetup.c:2571 src/integritysetup.c:539
+#: src/integritysetup.c:543 src/integritysetup.c:547
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1622
+msgid "BITS"
+msgstr "BITÓW"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2515 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1638
+msgid "Limits the read from keyfile"
+msgstr "Ograniczenie odczytu z pliku klucza"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2515 src/cryptsetup.c:2516 src/cryptsetup.c:2517
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2518 src/cryptsetup.c:2568 src/cryptsetup.c:2569
+#: src/veritysetup.c:431 src/veritysetup.c:432 src/veritysetup.c:433
+#: src/veritysetup.c:436 src/veritysetup.c:437 src/integritysetup.c:530
+#: src/integritysetup.c:534 src/integritysetup.c:535
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1637 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1638
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1639 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1640
+msgid "bytes"
+msgstr "bajty"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2516 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1637
+msgid "Number of bytes to skip in keyfile"
+msgstr "Liczba bajtów do pominięcia w pliku klucza"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2517
+msgid "Limits the read from newly added keyfile"
+msgstr "Ograniczenie odczytu z nowo dodanego pliku klucza"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2518
+msgid "Number of bytes to skip in newly added keyfile"
+msgstr "Liczba bajtów do pominięcia w nowo dodanym kluczu"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2519
+msgid "Slot number for new key (default is first free)"
+msgstr "Numer dla nowego klucza (domyślny: pierwszy wolny)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2520
+msgid "The size of the device"
+msgstr "Rozmiar urządzenia"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2520 src/cryptsetup.c:2521 src/cryptsetup.c:2522
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2528 src/integritysetup.c:531 src/integritysetup.c:536
+msgid "SECTORS"
+msgstr "SEKTORÓW"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2521
+msgid "The start offset in the backend device"
+msgstr "Offset początku na urządzeniu przechowującym"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2522
+msgid "How many sectors of the encrypted data to skip at the beginning"
+msgstr "Liczba sektorów zaszyfrowanych danych do pominięcia"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2523
+msgid "Create a readonly mapping"
+msgstr "Utworzenie odwzorowania tylko do odczytu"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2524 src/integritysetup.c:524
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1628
+msgid "Do not ask for confirmation"
+msgstr "Bez pytań o potwierdzenie"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2525
+msgid "Timeout for interactive passphrase prompt (in seconds)"
+msgstr "Limit czasu przy interaktywnym pytaniu o hasło (w sekundach)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2525 src/cryptsetup.c:2526 src/integritysetup.c:525
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1629
+msgid "secs"
+msgstr "s"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2526 src/integritysetup.c:525
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1629
+msgid "Progress line update (in seconds)"
+msgstr "Uaktualnianie wiersza postępu (w sekundach)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2527 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1630
+msgid "How often the input of the passphrase can be retried"
+msgstr "Jak często można powtarzać próby wprowadzenia hasła"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2528
+msgid "Align payload at <n> sector boundaries - for luksFormat"
+msgstr "Wyrównanie danych do granicy <n> sektorów - dla luksFormat"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2529
+msgid "File with LUKS header and keyslots backup"
+msgstr "Plik z kopią zapasową nagłówka LUKS i kluczy"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2530 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1631
+msgid "Use /dev/random for generating volume key"
+msgstr "Użycie /dev/random do wygenerowania klucza wolumenu"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2531 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1632
+msgid "Use /dev/urandom for generating volume key"
+msgstr "Użycie /dev/urandom do wygenerowania klucza wolumenu"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2532
+msgid "Share device with another non-overlapping crypt segment"
+msgstr "Współdzielenie urządzenia z innym, nie zachodzącym segmentem szyfrowanym"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2533 src/veritysetup.c:440
+msgid "UUID for device to use"
+msgstr "UUID dla urządzenia, które ma być użyte"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2534
+msgid "Allow discards (aka TRIM) requests for device"
+msgstr "Zezwolenie na żądania porzucenia (TRIM) dla urządzenia"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2535 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1649
+msgid "Device or file with separated LUKS header"
+msgstr "Urządzenie lub plik z osobnym nagłówkiem LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2536
+msgid "Do not activate device, just check passphrase"
+msgstr "Sprawdzenie hasła bez uaktywniania urządzenia"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2537
+msgid "Use hidden header (hidden TCRYPT device)"
+msgstr "Użycie nagłówka ukrytego (ukrytego urządzenia TCRYPT)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2538
+msgid "Device is system TCRYPT drive (with bootloader)"
+msgstr "Urządzenie jest napędem systemowym TCRYPT (z bootloaderem)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2539
+msgid "Use backup (secondary) TCRYPT header"
+msgstr "Użycie zapasowego (drugiego) nagłówka TCRYPT"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2540
+msgid "Scan also for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "Wyszukiwanie także urządzeń zgodnych z VeraCryptem"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2541
+msgid "Personal Iteration Multiplier for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "PIM (osobisty mnożnik iteracji) dla urządzenia zgodnego z VeraCryptem"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2542
+msgid "Query Personal Iteration Multiplier for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "Odpytanie PIM (osobistego mnożnika iteracji) pod kątem urządzenia zgodnego z VeraCryptem"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2543
+msgid "Type of device metadata: luks, plain, loopaes, tcrypt"
+msgstr "Typ metadanych urządzenia: luks, plain, loopaes, tcrypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2544
+msgid "Disable password quality check (if enabled)"
+msgstr "Wyłączenie sprawdzania jakości hasła (jeśli włączone)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2545
+msgid "Use dm-crypt same_cpu_crypt performance compatibility option"
+msgstr "Użycie opcji zgodności wydajności dm-crypta same_cpu_crypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2546
+msgid "Use dm-crypt submit_from_crypt_cpus performance compatibility option"
+msgstr "Użycie opcji zgodności wydajności dm-crypta submit_from_crypt_cpus"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2547
+msgid "Device removal is deferred until the last user closes it"
+msgstr "Usunięcie urządzenia jest odroczone do czasu zamknięcia przez ostatniego użytkownika"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2548
+msgid "PBKDF iteration time for LUKS (in ms)"
+msgstr "Czas iteracji PBKDF dla LUKS (w milisekundach)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2548 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1627
+msgid "msecs"
+msgstr "ms"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2549 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1645
+msgid "PBKDF algorithm (for LUKS2): argon2i, argon2id, pbkdf2"
+msgstr "Algorytm PBKDF (dla LUKS2): argon2i, argon2id, pbkdf2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2550 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1646
+msgid "PBKDF memory cost limit"
+msgstr "Limit kosztu pamięciowego PBKDF"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2550 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1646
+msgid "kilobytes"
+msgstr "kilobajty"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2551 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1647
+msgid "PBKDF parallel cost"
+msgstr "Koszt zrównoleglenia PBKDF"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2551 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1647
+msgid "threads"
+msgstr "wątki"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2552 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1648
+msgid "PBKDF iterations cost (forced, disables benchmark)"
+msgstr "Koszt iteracji PBKDF (wymuszony, wyłącza test wydajności)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2553
+msgid "Keyslot priority: ignore, normal, prefer"
+msgstr "Priorytet klucza: ignore, normal, prefer"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2554
+msgid "Disable locking of on-disk metadata"
+msgstr "Wyłączenie blokowania metadanych na dysku"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2555
+msgid "Disable loading volume keys via kernel keyring"
+msgstr "Wyłączenie ładowania kluczy wolumenu przez pęk kluczy w jądrze"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2556
+msgid "Data integrity algorithm (LUKS2 only)"
+msgstr "Algorytm integralności danych (tylko LUKS2)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2557 src/integritysetup.c:550
+msgid "Disable journal for integrity device"
+msgstr "Wyłączenie kroniki dla urządzenia integralności"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2558 src/integritysetup.c:526
+msgid "Do not wipe device after format"
+msgstr "Bez wymazania urządzenia po formatowaniu"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2559
+msgid "Do not ask for passphrase if activation by token fails"
+msgstr "Bez pytania o hasło, jeśli aktywacja przy użyciu tokenu się nie powiedzie"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2560
+msgid "Token number (default: any)"
+msgstr "Numer tokenu (domyślnie: dowolny)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2561
+msgid "Key description"
+msgstr "Opis klucza"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2562
+msgid "Encryption sector size (default: 512 bytes)"
+msgstr "Rozmiar sektora szyfrowania (domyślnie: 512 bajtów)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2563
+msgid "Set activation flags persistent for device"
+msgstr "Trwałe ustawienie flag aktywowania dla urządzenia"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2564
+msgid "Set label for the LUKS2 device"
+msgstr "Ustawienie etykiety dla urządzenia LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2565
+msgid "Set subsystem label for the LUKS2 device"
+msgstr "Ustawienie etykiety podsystemu dla urządzenia LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2566
+msgid "Create unbound (no assigned data segment) LUKS2 keyslot"
+msgstr "Utworzenie nie powiązanego (z segmentem danych) klucza LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2567
+msgid "Read or write the json from or to a file"
+msgstr "Odczyt lub zapis danych JSON z/do pliku"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2568
+msgid "LUKS2 header metadata area size"
+msgstr "Rozmiar obszaru metadanych nagłówka LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2569
+msgid "LUKS2 header keyslots area size"
+msgstr "Rozmiar obszaru kluczy nagłówka LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2570
+msgid "Refresh (reactivate) device with new parameters"
+msgstr "Odświeżenie (ponowna aktywacja) urządzenia z nowymi parametrami"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2571
+msgid "LUKS2 keyslot: The size of the encryption key"
+msgstr "Klucz LUKS2: rozmiar klucza szyfrującego"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2572
+msgid "LUKS2 keyslot: The cipher used for keyslot encryption"
+msgstr "Klucz LUKS2: szyfr używany do szyfrowania kluczy"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2588 src/veritysetup.c:461 src/integritysetup.c:568
+msgid "[OPTION...] <action> <action-specific>"
+msgstr "[OPCJA...] <akcja> <parametry-akcji>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2645 src/veritysetup.c:501 src/integritysetup.c:585
+msgid "Argument <action> missing."
+msgstr "Brak argumentu <akcja>."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2708 src/veritysetup.c:532 src/integritysetup.c:616
+msgid "Unknown action."
+msgstr "Nieznana akcja."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2718
+msgid "Parameter --refresh is only allowed with open or refresh commands.\n"
+msgstr "Parametr --refresh jest dozwolony tylko dla operacji otwarcia i odświeżenia.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2723
+msgid "Options --refresh and --test-passphrase are mutually exclusive.\n"
+msgstr "Opcje --refresh i --test-passphrase wykluczają się wzajemnie.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2728
+msgid "Option --deferred is allowed only for close command.\n"
+msgstr "Opcja --deferred jest dozwolona tylko dla operacji zamknięcia.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2733
+msgid "Option --shared is allowed only for open of plain device.\n"
+msgstr "Opcja --shared jest dozwolona tylko dla operacji otwarcia zwykłego urządzenia.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2738
+msgid "Option --allow-discards is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "Opcja --allow-discards jest dozwolona tylko dla operacji otwarcia.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2743
+msgid "Option --persistent is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "Opcja --persistent jest dozwolona tylko dla operacji otwarcia.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2748
+msgid "Option --persistent is not allowed with --test-passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "Opcja --persistent nie jest dozwolona z --test-passphrase.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2757
+msgid ""
+"Option --key-size is allowed only for luksFormat, luksAddKey (with --unbound),\n"
+"open and benchmark actions. To limit read from keyfile use --keyfile-size=(bytes)."
+msgstr ""
+"Opcja --key-size jest dozwolona tylko dla operacji luksFormat, luksAddKey\n"
+"(z --unbound), open i benchmark. Aby ograniczyć odczyt z pliku klucza, należy\n"
+"użyć --keyfile-size=(bajty)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2763
+msgid "Option --integrity is allowed only for luksFormat (LUKS2).\n"
+msgstr "Opcja --integrity jest dozwolona tylko dla operacji luksFormat (LUKS2).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2768
+msgid "Option --integrity-no-wipe can be used only for format action with integrity extension.\n"
+msgstr "Opcja --integrity-no-wipe może być użyta tylko do akcji formatowania z rozszerzeniem integralności.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2774
+msgid "Options --label and --subsystem are allowed only for luksFormat and config LUKS2 operations.\n"
+msgstr "Opcje --label i --subsystem są dozwolone tylko dla operacji LUKS2 luksFormat i config.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2780
+msgid "Option --test-passphrase is allowed only for open of LUKS and TCRYPT devices.\n"
+msgstr "Opcja --test-passphrase jest dozwolona tylko przy otwieraniu urządzeń LUKS i TRCYPT.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2785 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1718
+msgid "Key size must be a multiple of 8 bits"
+msgstr "Rozmiar klucza musi być wielokrotnością 8 bitów"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2791 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1403
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1723
+msgid "Key slot is invalid."
+msgstr "Numer klucza jest nieprawidłowy."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2798
+msgid "Option --key-file takes precedence over specified key file argument."
+msgstr "Opcja --key-file ma priorytet nad podanym argumentem pliku klucza."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2805 src/veritysetup.c:544 src/integritysetup.c:640
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1697
+msgid "Negative number for option not permitted."
+msgstr "Liczba ujemna nie jest dozwolona dla tej opcji."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2809
+msgid "Only one --key-file argument is allowed."
+msgstr "Dozwolony jest tylko jeden argument --key-file."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2813 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1689
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1727
+msgid "Only one of --use-[u]random options is allowed."
+msgstr "Dozwolona jest tylko jedna z opcji --use-[u]random."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2817
+msgid "Option --use-[u]random is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgstr "Opcja --use-[u]random jest dozwolona tylko dla operacji luksFormat."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2821
+msgid "Option --uuid is allowed only for luksFormat and luksUUID."
+msgstr "Opcja --uuid jest dozwolona tylko dla operacji luksFormat i luksUUID."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2825
+msgid "Option --align-payload is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgstr "Opcja --align-payload jest dozwolona tylko dla operacji luksFormat."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2829
+msgid "Options --luks2-metadata-size and --opt-luks2-keyslots-size are allowed only for luksFormat with LUKS2."
+msgstr "Opcje --luks2-metadata-size i --opt-luks2-keyslots-size są dozwolone tylko dla operacji luksFormat z LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2834
+msgid "Invalid LUKS2 metadata size specification."
+msgstr "Błędne określenie rozmiaru metadanych LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2838
+msgid "Invalid LUKS2 keyslots size specification."
+msgstr "Błędne określenie rozmiaru kluczy LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2842
+msgid "Option --align-payload and --offset cannot be combined."
+msgstr "Opcji --align-payload i --offset nie można łączyć."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2848
+msgid "Option --skip is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices.\n"
+msgstr "Opcja --skip jest obsługiwana tylko przy otwieraniu urządzeń plain i loopaes.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2855
+msgid "Option --offset is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices and for luksFormat.\n"
+msgstr "Opcja --offset jest obsługiwana tylko przy otwieraniu urządzeń plain i loopaes oraz dla operacji luksFormat.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2861
+msgid "Option --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system or --tcrypt-backup is supported only for TCRYPT device.\n"
+msgstr "Opcje --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system i --tcrypt-backup są obsługiwane tylko dla urządzeń TCRYPT.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2866
+msgid "Option --tcrypt-hidden cannot be combined with --allow-discards.\n"
+msgstr "Opcji --tcrypt-hidden nie można łączyć z --allow-discards.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2871
+msgid "Option --veracrypt is supported only for TCRYPT device type.\n"
+msgstr "Opcja --veracrypt jest obsługiwana tylko dla typu urządzeń TCRYPT.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2877
+msgid "Invalid argument for parameter --veracrypt-pim supplied.\n"
+msgstr "Podano błędny argument dla parametru --veracrypt-pim.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2881
+msgid "Option --veracrypt-pim is supported only for VeraCrypt compatible devices.\n"
+msgstr "Opcja --veracrypt-pim jest obsługiwana tylko dla urządzeń zgodnych z VeraCryptem.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2889
+msgid "Option --veracrypt-query-pim is supported only for VeraCrypt compatible devices.\n"
+msgstr "Opcja --veracrypt-query-pim jest obsługiwana tylko dla urządzeń zgodnych z VeraCryptem.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2893
+msgid "The options --veracrypt-pim and --veracrypt-query-pim are mutually exclusive.\n"
+msgstr "Opcje --veracrypt-pim i --veracrypt-query-pim wykluczają się wzajemnie.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2900
+msgid "Option --priority can be only ignore/normal/prefer.\n"
+msgstr "Opcja --priority może mieć wartości tylko ignore/normal/prefer.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2905
+msgid "Keyslot specification is required.\n"
+msgstr "Wymagane jest określenie klucza.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2910 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1703
+msgid "Password-based key derivation function (PBKDF) can be only pbkdf2 or argon2i/argon2id.\n"
+msgstr "Funkcja pochodna klucza oparta na haśle (PBKDF) może być tylko pbkdf2 lub argon2i/argon2id.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2915 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1708
+msgid "PBKDF forced iterations cannot be combined with iteration time option.\n"
+msgstr "Wymuszonych iteracji PBKDF nie można łączyć z opcją czasu iteracji.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2921
+msgid "Sector size option is not supported for this command.\n"
+msgstr "Opcja rozmiaru sektora nie jest obsługiwana dla tego polecenia.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2927
+msgid "Unsupported encryption sector size.\n"
+msgstr "Nieobsługiwany rozmiar sektora szyfrowania.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2932
+msgid "Key size is required with --unbound option.\n"
+msgstr "Przy opcji --unbound wymagany jest rozmiar klucza.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2937
+msgid "Option --unbound may be used only with luksAddKey action.\n"
+msgstr "Opcja --unbound może być użyta tylko z akcją luksAddKey.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2942
+msgid "Option --refresh may be used only with open action.\n"
+msgstr "Opcja --refresh może być użyta tylko dla akcji otwierania.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2953
+msgid "Cannot disable metadata locking.\n"
+msgstr "Nie można wyłączyć blokowania metadanych.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:67
+msgid "Invalid salt string specified."
+msgstr "Podano błędny łańcuch zarodka."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:98
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create hash image %s for writing."
+msgstr "Nie można utworzyć obrazu hasza %s do zapisu."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:108
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create FEC image %s for writing."
+msgstr "Nie można utworzyć obrazu FEC %s do zapisu."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:178
+msgid "Invalid root hash string specified."
+msgstr "Podano błędny łańcuch głównego hasza."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:360
+msgid "<data_device> <hash_device>"
+msgstr "<urządzenie_danych> <urządzenie_haszy>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:360 src/integritysetup.c:462
+msgid "format device"
+msgstr "sformatowanie urządzenia"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:361
+msgid "<data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgstr "<urządzenie_danych> <urządzenie_haszy> <główny_hasz>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:361
+msgid "verify device"
+msgstr "weryfikacja urządzenia"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:362
+msgid "<data_device> <name> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgstr "<urządzenie_danych> <nazwa> <urządzenie_haszy> <główny_hasz>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:362 src/integritysetup.c:463
+msgid "open device as <name>"
+msgstr "otwarcie urządzenia jako <nazwa>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:363 src/integritysetup.c:464
+msgid "close device (deactivate and remove mapping)"
+msgstr "zamknięcie urządzenia (dezaktywacja i usunięcie odwzorowania)"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:364 src/integritysetup.c:465
+msgid "show active device status"
+msgstr "pokazanie stanu aktywnego urządzenia"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:365
+msgid "<hash_device>"
+msgstr "<urządzenie_haszy>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:365 src/integritysetup.c:466
+msgid "show on-disk information"
+msgstr "wyświetlenie informacji z dysku"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:384
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<data_device> is the data device\n"
+"<hash_device> is the device containing verification data\n"
+"<root_hash> hash of the root node on <hash_device>\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<nazwa> to urządzenie do utworzenia pod %s\n"
+"<urządzenie_danych> to urządzenie z danymi\n"
+"<urządzenie_haszy> to urządzenie zawierające dane weryfikacyjne\n"
+"<główny_hasz> to hasz głównego węzła na <urządzeniu_haszy>\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:391
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in dm-verity parameters:\n"
+"\tHash: %s, Data block (bytes): %u, Hash block (bytes): %u, Salt size: %u, Hash format: %u\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Domyślnie wkompilowane parametry dm-verity:\n"
+"\tHasz: %s, blok danych (bajtów): %u, blok haszy (bajtów): %u, rozmiar zarodka: %u, format haszy: %u\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:429
+msgid "Do not use verity superblock"
+msgstr "Nieużywanie superbloku VERITY"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:430
+msgid "Format type (1 - normal, 0 - original Chrome OS)"
+msgstr "Typ formatu (1 - normalny, 0 - oryginalny Chrome OS)"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:430
+msgid "number"
+msgstr "liczba"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:431
+msgid "Block size on the data device"
+msgstr "Rozmiar bloku na urządzeniu z danymi"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:432
+msgid "Block size on the hash device"
+msgstr "Rozmiar bloku na urządzeniu z haszami"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:433
+msgid "FEC parity bytes"
+msgstr "bajty parzystości FEC"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:434
+msgid "The number of blocks in the data file"
+msgstr "Liczba bloków w pliku danych"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:434
+msgid "blocks"
+msgstr "bloki"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:435
+msgid "Path to device with error correction data"
+msgstr "Ścieżka do urządzenia z danymi korekcji błędów"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:435 src/integritysetup.c:528
+msgid "path"
+msgstr "ścieżka"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:436
+msgid "Starting offset on the hash device"
+msgstr "Offset początku na urządzeniu z haszami"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:437
+msgid "Starting offset on the FEC device"
+msgstr "Offset początku na urządzeniu FEC"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:438
+msgid "Hash algorithm"
+msgstr "Algorytm skrótu"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:438
+msgid "string"
+msgstr "łańcuch"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:439
+msgid "Salt"
+msgstr "Zarodek"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:439
+msgid "hex string"
+msgstr "Łańcuch szesnastkowy"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:441
+msgid "Restart kernel if corruption is detected"
+msgstr "Restart jądra po wykryciu uszkodzenia"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:442
+msgid "Ignore corruption, log it only"
+msgstr "Zignotowanie uszkodzenia, jedynie logowanie"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:443
+msgid "Do not verify zeroed blocks"
+msgstr "Bez weryfikacji wyzerowanych bloków"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:444
+msgid "Verify data block only the first time it is read"
+msgstr "Sprawdzenie bloku danych tylko przy pierwszym odczycie"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:550
+msgid "Option --ignore-corruption, --restart-on-corruption or --ignore-zero-blocks is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "Opcje --ignore-corruption, --restart-on-corruption oraz --ignore-zero-blocks są dozwolone tylko przy operacji otwierania.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:555
+msgid "Option --ignore-corruption and --restart-on-corruption cannot be used together.\n"
+msgstr "Opcji --ignore-corruption oraz --restart-on-corruption nie można użyć naraz.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:82 src/utils_password.c:298
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Nie można odczytać pliku klucza %s."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:86 src/utils_password.c:302
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read %d bytes from keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Nie można odczytać %d bajtów z pliku klucza %s."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:248
+#, c-format
+msgid "Formatted with tag size %u, internal integrity %s.\n"
+msgstr "Sformatowano z rozmiarem znacznika %u, wewnętrzna integralność %s.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:462 src/integritysetup.c:466
+msgid "<integrity_device>"
+msgstr "<urządzenie_integralności>"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:463
+msgid "<integrity_device> <name>"
+msgstr "<urządzenie_integralności> <nazwa>"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:485
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<integrity_device> is the device containing data with integrity tags\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<nazwa> to urządzenie do utworzenia pod %s\n"
+"<urządzenie_integralności> to urządzenie zawierające dane ze znacznikami integralności\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:490
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in dm-integrity parameters:\n"
+"\tTag size: %u bytes, Checksum algorithm: %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Domyślnie wkompilowane parametry dm-integrity:\n"
+"\tRozmiar znacznika (bajtów): %u, algorytm sumy kontrolnej: %s\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:528
+msgid "Path to data device (if separated)"
+msgstr "Ścieżka do urządzenia danych (jeśli osobne)"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:530
+msgid "Journal size"
+msgstr "Rozmiar kroniki"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:531
+msgid "Interleave sectors"
+msgstr "Sektory przeplotu"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:532
+msgid "Journal watermark"
+msgstr "Znak wodny kroniki"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:532
+msgid "percent"
+msgstr "procent"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:533
+msgid "Journal commit time"
+msgstr "Czas zatwierdzania kroniki"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:533
+msgid "ms"
+msgstr "ms"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:534
+msgid "Tag size (per-sector)"
+msgstr "Rozmiar znacznika (na sektor)"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:535
+msgid "Sector size"
+msgstr "Rozmiar sektora"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:536
+msgid "Buffers size"
+msgstr "Rozmiar buforów"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:538
+msgid "Data integrity algorithm"
+msgstr "Algorytm integralności danych"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:539
+msgid "The size of the data integrity key"
+msgstr "Rozmiar klucza integralności danych"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:540
+msgid "Read the integrity key from a file"
+msgstr "Odczyt klucza integralności z pliku"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:542
+msgid "Journal integrity algorithm"
+msgstr "Algorytm integralności kroniki"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:543
+msgid "The size of the journal integrity key"
+msgstr "Rozmiar klucza integralności kroniki"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:544
+msgid "Read the journal integrity key from a file"
+msgstr "Odczyt klucza integralności z pliku"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:546
+msgid "Journal encryption algorithm"
+msgstr "Algorytm szyfrowania kroniki"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:547
+msgid "The size of the journal encryption key"
+msgstr "Rozmiar klucza szyfrowania kroniki"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:548
+msgid "Read the journal encryption key from a file"
+msgstr "Odczyt klucza szyfrującego kroniki z pliku"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:551
+msgid "Recovery mode (no journal, no tag checking)"
+msgstr "Tryb odtwarzania (bez kroniki, bez sprawdzania znaczników)"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:552
+msgid "Recalculate initial tags automatically."
+msgstr "Automatyczne przeliczenie znaczników początkowych."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:631
+msgid "Option --integrity-recalculate can be used only for open action."
+msgstr "Opcja --integrity-recalculate może być użyta tylko dla akcji otwierania."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:646
+msgid "Options --journal-size, --interleave-sectors, --sector-size, --tag-size and --no-wipe can be used only for format action.\n"
+msgstr "Opcje --journal-size, --interleave-sectors, --sector-size, --tag-size oraz --no-wipe mogą być użyte tylko dla akcji formatowania.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:652
+msgid "Invalid journal size specification."
+msgstr "Błędne określenie rozmiaru kroniki."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:657
+msgid "Both key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "Muszą być podane obie opcje: pliku klucza i rozmiaru klucza."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:660
+msgid "Integrity algorithm must be specified if integrity key is used."
+msgstr "Algorytm integralności musi być podany, jeśli używany jest klucz integralności."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:665
+msgid "Both journal integrity key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "Muszą być podane obie opcje: pliku klucza integralności i rozmiaru klucza."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:668
+msgid "Journal integrity algorithm must be specified if journal integrity key is used."
+msgstr "Algorytm integralności kroniki musi być podany, jeśli używany jest klucz integralności kroniki."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:673
+msgid "Both journal encryption key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "Muszą być podane obie opcje: pliku szyfrowania kroniki i rozmiaru klucza."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:676
+msgid "Journal encryption algorithm must be specified if journal encryption key is used."
+msgstr "Algorytm szyfrowania kroniki musi być podany, jeśli używany jest klucz szyfrowania kroniki."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:175
+msgid "Reencryption already in-progress."
+msgstr "Ponowne szyfrowanie już trwa."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:181
+msgid "Reencryption of device with integrity profile is not supported."
+msgstr "Ponowne szyfrowanie urządzenia z profilem integralności nie jest obsługiwane."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:204
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot exclusively open %s, device in use."
+msgstr "Nie można otworzyć %s w trybie wyłącznym, urządzenie jest w użyciu."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:218 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1148
+msgid "Allocation of aligned memory failed."
+msgstr "Przydzielenie wyrównanego obszaru pamięci nie powiodło się."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:225
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read device %s."
+msgstr "Nie można odczytać urządzenia %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:236
+#, c-format
+msgid "Marking LUKS1 device %s unusable."
+msgstr "Oznaczanie urządzenia LUKS1 %s jako bezużytecznego."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:240
+#, c-format
+msgid "Setting LUKS2 offline reencrypt flag on device %s."
+msgstr "Ustawianie flagi ponownego szyfrowania offline LUKS2 na urządzeniu %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:257
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write device %s."
+msgstr "Nie można zapisać na urządzenie %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:345
+msgid "Cannot write reencryption log file."
+msgstr "Nie można zapisać pliku logu ponownego szyfrowania."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:401
+msgid "Cannot read reencryption log file."
+msgstr "Nie można odczytać pliku logu ponownego szyfrowania."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:439
+#, c-format
+msgid "Log file %s exists, resuming reencryption.\n"
+msgstr "Plik logu %s istnieje, wznowienie ponownego szyfrowania.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:488
+msgid "Activating temporary device using old LUKS header."
+msgstr "Aktywacja urządzenia tymczasowego przy użyciu starego nagłówka LUKS."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:498
+msgid "Activating temporary device using new LUKS header."
+msgstr "Aktywacja urządzenia tymczasowego przy użyciu nowego nagłówka LUKS."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:508
+msgid "Activation of temporary devices failed."
+msgstr "Aktywacja urządzeń tymczasowych nie powiodła się."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:586
+msgid "Failed to set PBKDF parameters."
+msgstr "Nie udało się ustawić parametrów PBKDF."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:592
+msgid "Failed to set data offset."
+msgstr "Nie udało się ustawić offsetu danych."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:600
+#, c-format
+msgid "New LUKS header for device %s created."
+msgstr "Utworzono nowy nagłówek LUKS dla urządzenia %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:660
+#, c-format
+msgid "This version of cryptsetup-reencrypt can't handle new internal token type %s."
+msgstr "Ta wersja cryptsetup-reencrypt nie obsługuje nowego typu tokenu wewnętrznego %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:682
+msgid "Failed to read activation flags from backup header."
+msgstr "Nie udało się odczytać flag aktywacji z nagłówka zapasowego."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:686
+msgid "Failed to write activation flags to new header."
+msgstr "Nie udało się zapisać flag aktywacji w nowym nagłówku."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:690 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:694
+msgid "Failed to read requirements from backup header."
+msgstr "Nie udało się odczytać wymagań z nagłówka zapasowego."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:731
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s header backup of device %s created."
+msgstr "Utworzono kopię zapasową nagłówka %s urządzenia %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:789
+msgid "Creation of LUKS backup headers failed."
+msgstr "Tworzenie kopii zapasowych nagłówków LUKS nie powiodło się."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:918
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot restore %s header on device %s."
+msgstr "Nie można odtworzyć nagłówka %s na urządzeniu %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:920
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s header on device %s restored."
+msgstr "Odtworzono nagłówek %s na urządzeniu %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:958 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1038
+msgid "Cannot seek to device offset."
+msgstr "Nie można przemieścić się we właściwe położenie urządzenia."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1081
+msgid "Cannot seek to device offset.\n"
+msgstr "Nie można przemieścić się we właściwe położenie urządzenia.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1120 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1126
+msgid "Cannot open temporary LUKS device."
+msgstr "Nie można otworzyć tymczasowego urządzenia LUKS."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1131 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1136
+msgid "Cannot get device size."
+msgstr "Nie można pobrać rozmiaru urządzenia."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1173
+msgid "Interrupted by a signal."
+msgstr "Przerwano sygnałem."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1175
+msgid "IO error during reencryption."
+msgstr "Błąd we/wy podczas ponownego szyfrowania."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1206
+msgid "Provided UUID is invalid."
+msgstr "Dostarczony UUID jest nieprawidłowy."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1309
+msgid "Key file can be used only with --key-slot or with exactly one key slot active."
+msgstr "Rozmiaru klucza można użyć tylko z --key-slot albo przy dokładnie jednym aktywnym kluczu."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1350 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1361
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for key slot %u: "
+msgstr "Hasło dla klucza %u: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1432
+msgid "Cannot open reencryption log file."
+msgstr "Nie można otworzyć pliku logu ponownego szyfrowania."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1438
+msgid "No decryption in progress, provided UUID can be used only to resume suspended decryption process."
+msgstr "Nie w trakcie odszyfrowywania; dostarczony UUID może być użyty tylko do wznowienia wstrzymanego procesu odszyfrowywania."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1513
+#, c-format
+msgid "Changed pbkdf parameters in keyslot %i."
+msgstr "Zmieniono parametry PBKDF dla klucza %i."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1620
+msgid "Reencryption block size"
+msgstr "Rozmiar bloku ponownego szyfrowania"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1620
+msgid "MiB"
+msgstr "MiB"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1624
+msgid "Do not change key, no data area reencryption"
+msgstr "Bez zmiany klucza i ponownego szyfrowania obszaru danych"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1626
+msgid "Read new volume (master) key from file"
+msgstr "Odczyt nowego klucza wolumenu (klucza głównego) z pliku"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1627
+msgid "PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS (in ms)"
+msgstr "Czas iteracji PBKDF2 dla LUKS (w milisekundach)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1633
+msgid "Use direct-io when accessing devices"
+msgstr "Użycie bezpośredniego we/wy przy dostępie do urządzeń"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1634
+msgid "Use fsync after each block"
+msgstr "Użycie fsync po każdym bloku"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1635
+msgid "Update log file after every block"
+msgstr "Uaktualnianie pliku logu po każdym bloku"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1636
+msgid "Use only this slot (others will be disabled)"
+msgstr "Użycie tylko tego slotu (wyłączenie pozostałych)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1639
+msgid "Reduce data device size (move data offset). DANGEROUS!"
+msgstr "Ograniczenie rozmiaru urządzenia danych (przesunięcie położenia danych). NIEBEZPIECZNE!"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1640
+msgid "Use only specified device size (ignore rest of device). DANGEROUS!"
+msgstr "Użycie tylko określonego rozmiaru urządzenia (zignorowanie pozostałej części). NIEBEZPIECZNE!"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1641
+msgid "Create new header on not encrypted device"
+msgstr "Utworzenie nowego nagłówka na nieszyfrowanym urządzeniu"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1642
+msgid "Permanently decrypt device (remove encryption)"
+msgstr "Trwałe odszyfrowanie urządzenia (usunięcie szyfrowania)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1643
+msgid "The UUID used to resume decryption"
+msgstr "UUID używany do wznowienia odszyfrowywania"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1644
+msgid "Type of LUKS metadata: luks1, luks2"
+msgstr "Typ metadanych LUKS: luks1, luks2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1663
+msgid "[OPTION...] <device>"
+msgstr "[OPCJA...] <urządzenie>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1677
+#, c-format
+msgid "Reencryption will change: %s%s%s%s%s%s."
+msgstr "Ponowne szyfrowanie zmieni: %s%s%s%s%s%s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1678
+msgid "volume key"
+msgstr "klucz wolumenu"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1680
+msgid "set hash to "
+msgstr "hasz na "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1681
+msgid ", set cipher to "
+msgstr ", szyfr na"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1685
+msgid "Argument required."
+msgstr "Wymagany argument."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1713
+msgid "Only values between 1 MiB and 64 MiB allowed for reencryption block size."
+msgstr "Jako rozmiar bloku ponownego szyfrowania dozwolone są jedynie wartości od 1 MiB do 64 MiB."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1732 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1737
+msgid "Invalid device size specification."
+msgstr "Błędne określenie rozmiaru urządzenia."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1740
+msgid "Maximum device reduce size is 64 MiB."
+msgstr "Maksymalna wartość ograniczenia rozmiaru urządzenia to 64MiB."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1743
+msgid "Reduce size must be multiple of 512 bytes sector."
+msgstr "Rozmiar ograniczenia musi być wielokrotnością 512-bajtowego sektora."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1747
+msgid "Option --new must be used together with --reduce-device-size or --header."
+msgstr "Opcja --new musi być użyta wraz z --reduce_device_size lub --header."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1751
+msgid "Option --keep-key can be used only with --hash, --iter-time or --pbkdf-force-iterations."
+msgstr "Opcja --keep-key może być użyta tylko z --hash, --iter-time lub --pbkdf-force-iterations.."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1755
+msgid "Option --new cannot be used together with --decrypt."
+msgstr "Opcja --new nie może być użyta wraz z --decrypt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1759
+msgid "Option --decrypt is incompatible with specified parameters."
+msgstr "Opcja --decrypt jest niezgodna z podanymi parametrami."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1763
+msgid "Option --uuid is allowed only together with --decrypt."
+msgstr "Opcja --uuid jest dozwolona tylko wraz z --decrypt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1767
+msgid "Invalid luks type. Use one of these: 'luks', 'luks1' or 'luks2'."
+msgstr "Błędny typ LUKS - musi być jednym z 'luks', 'luks1' lub 'luks2'."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:150
+msgid "Error reading response from terminal."
+msgstr "Błąd podczas odczytu odpowiedzi z terminala."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:175
+msgid "Command successful.\n"
+msgstr "Polecenie się powiodło.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:183
+msgid "wrong or missing parameters"
+msgstr "niewłaściwe lub brakujące parametry"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:185
+msgid "no permission or bad passphrase"
+msgstr "brak uprawnień lub błędne hasło"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:187
+msgid "out of memory"
+msgstr "brak pamięci"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:189
+msgid "wrong device or file specified"
+msgstr "podano niewłaściwe urządzenie lub plik"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:191
+msgid "device already exists or device is busy"
+msgstr "urządzenie już istnieje lub jest zajęte"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:193
+msgid "unknown error"
+msgstr "nieznany błąd"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:195
+#, c-format
+msgid "Command failed with code %i (%s).\n"
+msgstr "Polecenie nie powiodło się z kodem %i (%s).\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:272
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %i created."
+msgstr "Klucz numer %i utworzony."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:274
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %i unlocked."
+msgstr "Klucz numer %i odblokowany."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:276
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %i removed."
+msgstr "Klucz numer %i usunięty."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:285
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %i created."
+msgstr "Token %i utworzony."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:287
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %i removed."
+msgstr "Token %i usunięty."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:453
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Device %s already contains a '%s' partition signature.\n"
+msgstr "UWAGA: urządzenie %s już zawiera sygnaturę partycji '%s'.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:461
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Device %s already contains a '%s' superblock signature.\n"
+msgstr "UWAGA: urządzenie %s już zawiera sygnaturę superbloku '%s'.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:482 src/utils_tools.c:546
+msgid "Failed to initialize device signature probes."
+msgstr "Nie udało się zainicjować sond sygnatur urządzeń."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:526
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to stat device %s."
+msgstr "Nie udało się wykonać stat na urządzeniu %s."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:539
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is in use. Can not proceed with format operation."
+msgstr "Urządzenie %s jest w użyciu. Nie można kontynuować operacji formatowania."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:541
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to open file %s in read/write mode."
+msgstr "Nie udało się otworzyć pliku %s do odczytu i zapisu."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:561
+msgid "Failed to wipe device signature."
+msgstr "Nie udało się wymazać sygnatury urządzenia."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:568
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to probe device %s for a signature."
+msgstr "Nie udało się sprawdzić sygnatury urządzenia %s."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:43 src/utils_password.c:75
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot check password quality: %s"
+msgstr "Nie można sprawdzić jakości hasła: %s"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:51
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Password quality check failed:\n"
+" %s"
+msgstr ""
+"Sprawdzenie jakości hasła nie powiodło się:\n"
+" %s"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:83
+#, c-format
+msgid "Password quality check failed: Bad passphrase (%s)"
+msgstr "Sprawdzenie jakości hasła nie powiodło się: błędne hasło (%s)"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:193 src/utils_password.c:208
+msgid "Error reading passphrase from terminal."
+msgstr "Błąd podczas odczytu hasła z terminala."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:206
+msgid "Verify passphrase: "
+msgstr "Weryfikacja hasła: "
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:213
+msgid "Passphrases do not match."
+msgstr "Hasła nie zgadzają się."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:250
+msgid "Cannot use offset with terminal input."
+msgstr "Nie można użyć offsetu, jeśli wejściem jest terminal."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:253
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase: "
+msgstr "Hasło: "
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:255
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for %s: "
+msgstr "Hasło dla %s: "
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:285
+msgid "No key available with this passphrase."
+msgstr "Dla tego hasła nie ma dostępnego klucza."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:320
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open keyfile %s for write."
+msgstr "Nie można otworzyć pliku klucza %s do zapisu."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:327
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write to keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Nie można zapisać pliku klucza %s."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:47
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to open file %s in read-only mode."
+msgstr "Nie udało się otworzyć pliku %s tylko do odczytu."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:60
+msgid "Provide valid LUKS2 token JSON:\n"
+msgstr "Poprawny token JSON dla LUKS2:\n"
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:67
+msgid "Failed to read JSON file."
+msgstr "Nie udało się odczytać pliku JSON."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:72
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Read interrupted."
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Odczyt przerwany."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:113
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to open file %s in write mode."
+msgstr "Nie udało się otworzyć pliku %s do zapisu."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:122
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Write interrupted."
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Zapis przerwany."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:126
+msgid "Failed to write JSON file."
+msgstr "Nie udało się zapisać pliku JSON."
diff --git a/po/pt_BR.po b/po/pt_BR.po
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e0a4122
--- /dev/null
+++ b/po/pt_BR.po
@@ -0,0 +1,3217 @@
+# Brazilian Portuguese translation for cryptsetup
+# Copyright (C) 2019 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+# This file is put in the public domain.
+# Rafael Fontenelle <rafaelff@gnome.org>, 2016-2019.
+# ,
+# ##### Terminologia usada #####
+# ,
+# device mapper = mapeador de dispositivo
+# digest = resumo
+# key slots = slots de chave
+# plain = claro (pois "mensagem plana" é tradução incorreta)
+# passphrase = senha
+# salt = sal    # https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sal_(criptografia)
+# ,
+# ##############################
+# ,
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: cryptsetup 2.1.0\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: dm-crypt@saout.de\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-01-26 19:02+0100\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2019-01-28 07:58-0200\n"
+"Last-Translator: Rafael Fontenelle <rafaelff@gnome.org>\n"
+"Language-Team: Brazilian Portuguese <ldpbr-translation@lists.sourceforge.net>\n"
+"Language: pt_BR\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+"Plural-Forms: nplurals=2; plural=(n > 1);\n"
+"X-Generator: Virtaal 1.0.0-beta1\n"
+"X-Bugs: Report translation errors to the Language-Team address.\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:336
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper, running as non-root user."
+msgstr "Não foi possível inicializar o mapeador de dispositivo, executando como usuário não-root."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:339
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper. Is dm_mod kernel module loaded?"
+msgstr "Não foi possível inicializar o mapeador de dispositivo. O módulo de kernel dm_mod está carregado?"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1010
+msgid "Requested deferred flag is not supported."
+msgstr "Não há suporte ao sinalizador atrasado requisitado."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1077
+#, c-format
+msgid "DM-UUID for device %s was truncated."
+msgstr "DM-UUID para o dispositivo \"%s\" estava truncada."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1486
+msgid "Requested dm-crypt performance options are not supported."
+msgstr "Não há suporte às opções de desempenho de dm-crypt requisitadas."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1493
+msgid "Requested dm-verity data corruption handling options are not supported."
+msgstr "Não há suporte à tratamento de corrompimento de dados de dm-verify requisitada."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1497
+msgid "Requested dm-verity FEC options are not supported."
+msgstr "Não há suporte às opções FEC dm-verity requisitadas."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1501
+msgid "Requested data integrity options are not supported."
+msgstr "Não há suporte às opções de integridade de dados requisitadas."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1503
+msgid "Requested sector_size option is not supported."
+msgstr "Não há suporte à opção sector_size requisitada."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1508
+msgid "Requested automatic recalculation of integrity tags is not supported."
+msgstr "Não há suporte à recalculação automática de tags de integridade requisitada."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1534
+msgid "Requested dmcrypt performance options are not supported."
+msgstr "Não há suporte às opções de desempenho de dmcrypt requisitadas."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1537
+msgid "Discard/TRIM is not supported."
+msgstr "Não há suporte a descarte/TRIM."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:2413
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to query dm-%s segment."
+msgstr "Falha ao consultar o segmento dm-%s."
+
+#: lib/random.c:80
+msgid ""
+"System is out of entropy while generating volume key.\n"
+"Please move mouse or type some text in another window to gather some random events.\n"
+msgstr ""
+"O sistema sem entropia suficiente enquanto gera chave de volume.\n"
+"Por favor mova o mouse ou digite algum texto em outra janela para obter alguns eventos aleatórios.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:84
+#, c-format
+msgid "Generating key (%d%% done).\n"
+msgstr "Gerando chave (%d%% concluído).\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:170
+msgid "Running in FIPS mode."
+msgstr "Executando no modo FIPS."
+
+#: lib/random.c:176
+msgid "Fatal error during RNG initialisation."
+msgstr "Erro fatal durante inicialização de RNG."
+
+#: lib/random.c:213
+msgid "Unknown RNG quality requested."
+msgstr "Qualidade RNG requisitada desconhecida."
+
+#: lib/random.c:218
+msgid "Error reading from RNG."
+msgstr "Erro na leitura de RNG."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:214
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto RNG backend."
+msgstr "Não foi possível inicializar o backend RNG de criptografia."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:220
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto backend."
+msgstr "Não foi possível inicializar o backend de criptografia."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:251 lib/setup.c:1899 lib/verity/verity.c:123
+#, c-format
+msgid "Hash algorithm %s not supported."
+msgstr "Não há suporte ao algoritmo hash %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:254 lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:90
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key processing error (using hash %s)."
+msgstr "Erro de processamento de chave (usando hash %s)."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:315 lib/setup.c:342
+msgid "Cannot determine device type. Incompatible activation of device?"
+msgstr "Não foi possível determinar o tipo do dispositivo. Ativação de dispositivo incompatível?"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:321 lib/setup.c:2892
+msgid "This operation is supported only for LUKS device."
+msgstr "Há suporte a esta operação apenas para dispositivo LUKS."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:348
+msgid "This operation is supported only for LUKS2 device."
+msgstr "Há suporte a esta operação apenas para dispositivo LUKS2."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:396
+msgid "All key slots full."
+msgstr "Todos os slots de chave estão cheios."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:407
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select between 0 and %d."
+msgstr "Slot de chave %d é inválido, por favor selecione entre 0 e %d."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:413
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is full, please select another one."
+msgstr "Slot de chave %d está cheio, por favor selecione outro."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:589
+#, c-format
+msgid "Header detected but device %s is too small."
+msgstr "Cabeçalho detectado, mas o dispositivo %s é muito pequeno."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:626
+msgid "This operation is not supported for this device type."
+msgstr "Não há suporte a esta operação para este tipo de dispositivo."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:791 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:481
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported LUKS version %d."
+msgstr "Não há suporte ao LUKS versão %d."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:808 lib/setup.c:1403 lib/setup.c:1812
+msgid "Detached metadata device is not supported for this crypt type."
+msgstr "Não há suporte ao dispositivo de metadados desanexado para este tipo de criptografia."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1288 lib/setup.c:2392 lib/setup.c:2464 lib/setup.c:2476
+#: lib/setup.c:2625 lib/setup.c:4021
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not active."
+msgstr "O dispositivo \"%s\" não está ativado."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1310
+#, c-format
+msgid "Underlying device for crypt device %s disappeared."
+msgstr "O dispositivo subjacente para o dispositivo de criptografia %s desapareceu."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1388
+msgid "Invalid plain crypt parameters."
+msgstr "Parâmetros de criptografia clara inválidos."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1393 lib/setup.c:1802 src/integritysetup.c:72
+msgid "Invalid key size."
+msgstr "Tamanho de chave inválida."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1398 lib/setup.c:1807 lib/setup.c:2009
+msgid "UUID is not supported for this crypt type."
+msgstr "Não há suporte ao UUID para este tipo de criptografia."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1413 lib/setup.c:1603 src/cryptsetup.c:1045
+msgid "Unsupported encryption sector size."
+msgstr "Não há suporte ao tamanho de setor de criptografia."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1421 lib/setup.c:1720
+msgid "Device size is not aligned to requested sector size."
+msgstr "Tamanho do dispositivo não está alinhado com o tamanho de setor requisitado."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1472 lib/setup.c:1591
+msgid "Can't format LUKS without device."
+msgstr "Não é possível formatar LUKS sem dispositivo."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1478 lib/setup.c:1597
+msgid "Requested data alignment is not compatible with data offset."
+msgstr "Alinhamento de dados requisitado não é compatível com a posição dos dados."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1546 lib/setup.c:1715
+msgid "WARNING: Data offset is outside of currently available data device.\n"
+msgstr "AVISO: A posição dos dados está fora do dispositivo de dados atualmente disponível.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1556 lib/setup.c:1735 lib/setup.c:1754 lib/setup.c:2021
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe header on device %s."
+msgstr "Não foi possível apagar o cabeçalho no dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1608
+msgid "WARNING: The device activation will fail, dm-crypt is missing support for requested encryption sector size.\n"
+msgstr "AVISO: A ativação do dispositivo vai falhar, dm-crypt carece de suporte para o tamanho de setor de criptografia requisitado.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1630
+msgid "Volume key is too small for encryption with integrity extensions."
+msgstr "A chave de volume é pequena demais para criptografia com extensões de integridade."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1685
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cipher %s-%s (key size %zd bits) is not available."
+msgstr "A cifra %s-%s (tamanho de chave %zd bits) não está disponível."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1747
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s which is still in use."
+msgstr "Não foi possível formatar o dispositivo %s, o qual ainda está em uso."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1750 lib/setup.c:1775
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "Não é possível formatar o dispositivo %s, permissão negada."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1762 lib/setup.c:2073
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format integrity for device %s."
+msgstr "Não foi possível formatar integridade para o dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1772
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s in use."
+msgstr "Não é possível formatar dispositivo %s em uso."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1779
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s."
+msgstr "Não foi possível formatar o dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1797
+msgid "Can't format LOOPAES without device."
+msgstr "Não foi possível formatar LOOPAES sem dispositivo."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1842
+msgid "Can't format VERITY without device."
+msgstr "Não foi possível formatar VERITY sem dispositivo."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1853 lib/verity/verity.c:106
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash type %d."
+msgstr "Não há suporte ao tipo de hash VERITY %d."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1859 lib/verity/verity.c:114
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY block size."
+msgstr "Não há suporte ao tamanho de bloco VERITY."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1864 lib/verity/verity.c:75
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash offset."
+msgstr "Não há suporte à posição de hash VERITY."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1869
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY FEC offset."
+msgstr "Não há suporte à posição de FEC VERITY."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1893
+msgid "Data area overlaps with hash area."
+msgstr "A área de dados se sobrepõe à área hash."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1918
+msgid "Hash area overlaps with FEC area."
+msgstr "Área de hash sobreposta com área de FEC."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1925
+msgid "Data area overlaps with FEC area."
+msgstr "Área de dados sobreposta com área de FEC."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2130
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unknown crypt device type %s requested."
+msgstr "Tipo de dispositivo de criptografia requisitado %s desconhecido."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2398 lib/setup.c:2470 lib/setup.c:2483
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported parameters on device %s."
+msgstr "Não há suporte aos parâmetros no dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2404 lib/setup.c:2489
+#, c-format
+msgid "Mismatching parameters on device %s."
+msgstr "Parâmetros incompatíveis no dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2657
+msgid "Cannot resize loop device."
+msgstr "Não foi possível redimensionar o dispositivo de loop."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2666
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s size is not aligned to requested sector size (%u bytes)."
+msgstr "Tamanho do dispositivo %s não está alinhado com o tamanho de setor requisitado (%u bytes)."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2725
+msgid "Do you really want to change UUID of device?"
+msgstr "Você realmente deseja alterar o UUID do dispositivo?"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2801
+msgid "Header backup file does not contain compatible LUKS header."
+msgstr "Arquivo de cópia de segurança de cabeçalho não contém um cabeçalho LUKS compatível."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2900
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not active."
+msgstr "O volume %s não está ativado."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2911
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is already suspended."
+msgstr "O volume %s já está suspenso."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2925
+#, c-format
+msgid "Suspend is not supported for device %s."
+msgstr "A suspensão não oferece suporte ao dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2927
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during suspending device %s."
+msgstr "Ocorreu um erro ao suspender o dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2960 lib/setup.c:3027
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not suspended."
+msgstr "O volume %s não estava suspenso."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2989
+#, c-format
+msgid "Resume is not supported for device %s."
+msgstr "O resumo não oferece suporte a este dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2991 lib/setup.c:3059
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during resuming device %s."
+msgstr "Ocorreu um erro ao resumir o dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3127 lib/setup.c:3315
+msgid "Cannot add key slot, all slots disabled and no volume key provided."
+msgstr "Não foi possível adicionar slot de chave, todos slots desabilitados ou nenhuma chave de volume fornecida."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3267
+msgid "Failed to swap new key slot."
+msgstr "Falha ao trocar novo slot de chave."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3432 lib/setup.c:3865 lib/setup.c:3878 lib/setup.c:3886
+#: lib/setup.c:3899 lib/setup.c:4198 lib/setup.c:5274
+msgid "Volume key does not match the volume."
+msgstr "A chave de volume não corresponde ao volume."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3453
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid."
+msgstr "O slot de chave %d é inválido."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3459
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is not used."
+msgstr "O slot de chave %d não está sendo usado."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3478
+msgid "Device header overlaps with data area."
+msgstr "O cabeçalho do dispositivo se sobrepõe à área de dados."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3684 lib/setup.c:3952
+msgid "Device type is not properly initialised."
+msgstr "O tipo de dispositivo não foi inicializado corretamente."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3726
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s, name is invalid or still in use."
+msgstr "Não foi possível usar o dispositivo %s, o nome é inválido ou ainda está em uso."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3729
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s already exists."
+msgstr "O dispositivo %s já existe."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3852
+msgid "Incorrect volume key specified for plain device."
+msgstr "Chave de volume incorreta especificada para dispositivo claro."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3918
+msgid "Incorrect root hash specified for verity device."
+msgstr "Hash raiz incorreta especificada para o dispositivo verity."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3995 lib/setup.c:4010
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is still in use."
+msgstr "O dispositivo %s ainda está em uso."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4025
+#, c-format
+msgid "Invalid device %s."
+msgstr "Dispositivo inválido %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4134
+msgid "Function not available in FIPS mode."
+msgstr "Função não disponível no modo FIPS."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4148
+msgid "Volume key buffer too small."
+msgstr "Buffer de chave de volume muito pequena."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4156
+msgid "Cannot retrieve volume key for plain device."
+msgstr "Não foi possível obter chave de volume para dispositivo claro."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4167
+#, c-format
+msgid "This operation is not supported for %s crypt device."
+msgstr "Não há suporte a esta operação para o dispositivo de criptografia %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4354
+msgid "Dump operation is not supported for this device type."
+msgstr "Não há suporte à operação de despejo para este tipo de dispositivo."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4930
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert device %s which is still in use."
+msgstr "Não foi possível converter o dispositivo %s, o qual ainda está em uso."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5213
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign keyslot %u as the new volume key."
+msgstr "Falha ao atribuir o slot de chave %u como a nova chave de volume."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5280
+msgid "Failed to initialise default LUKS2 keyslot parameters."
+msgstr "Falha ao inicializar os parâmetros padrão de slot de chave LUKS2."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5286
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign keyslot %d to digest."
+msgstr "Falha ao atribuir o slot de chave %d ao resumo."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5370
+msgid "Failed to load key in kernel keyring."
+msgstr "Falha ao carregar chave no chaveiro de kernel."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5425
+msgid "Kernel keyring is not supported by the kernel."
+msgstr "Não há suporte a chaveiro de kernel neste kernel."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5435
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read passphrase from keyring (error %d)."
+msgstr "Falha ao ler senha do chaveiro (erro %d)."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:81
+msgid "Cannot get process priority."
+msgstr "Não foi possível obter prioridade de processo."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:95
+msgid "Cannot unlock memory."
+msgstr "Não foi possível desbloquear memória."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:169 lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:498
+msgid "Failed to open key file."
+msgstr "Falha ao abrir arquivo de chave."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:174
+msgid "Cannot read keyfile from a terminal."
+msgstr "Não foi possível ler o arquivo de chave de um terminal."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:191
+msgid "Failed to stat key file."
+msgstr "Falha ao obter estado do arquivo."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:199 lib/utils.c:220
+msgid "Cannot seek to requested keyfile offset."
+msgstr "Não foi possível buscar a posição do arquivo de chave requisitado."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:214 lib/utils.c:229 src/utils_password.c:188
+#: src/utils_password.c:201
+msgid "Out of memory while reading passphrase."
+msgstr "Memória insuficiente para leitura da senha."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:249
+msgid "Error reading passphrase."
+msgstr "Erro ao ler a senha."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:266
+msgid "Nothing to read on input."
+msgstr "Nada para ler na entrada."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:273
+msgid "Maximum keyfile size exceeded."
+msgstr "Tamanho máximo de arquivo de chave excedido."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:278
+msgid "Cannot read requested amount of data."
+msgstr "Não foi possível ler a quantidade requisitada de dados."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:184 lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:92
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s doesn't exist or access denied."
+msgstr "O dispositivo %s não existe ou acesso negado."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:194
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not compatible."
+msgstr "O dispositivo %s não é compatível."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:560
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small. Need at least %<PRIu64> bytes."
+msgstr "Dispositivo %s é muito pequeno. Necessita de pelo menos %<PRIu64> bytes."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:641
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s which is in use (already mapped or mounted)."
+msgstr "Não foi possível usar o dispositivo %s, o qual está em uso (já mapeado ou montado)."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:645
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "Não foi possível usar o dispositivo %s, permissão negada."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:648
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot get info about device %s."
+msgstr "Não foi possível obter informação sobre o dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:671
+msgid "Cannot use a loopback device, running as non-root user."
+msgstr "Não foi possível usar um dispositivo de loopback, executando como usuário não-root."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:681
+msgid "Attaching loopback device failed (loop device with autoclear flag is required)."
+msgstr "Anexação de dispositivo loopback falhou (dispositivo de loop com sinalizador autoclear é necessário)."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:727
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested offset is beyond real size of device %s."
+msgstr "A posição requisitada está além do tamanho real do dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:735
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s has zero size."
+msgstr "O dispositivo %s possui tamanho zero."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:746 lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:252
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small."
+msgstr "O dispositivo %s é muito pequeno."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:100
+msgid "Requested PBKDF target time cannot be zero."
+msgstr "Tempo alvo PBKDF requisitado não pode ser zero."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:106
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unknown PBKDF type %s."
+msgstr "Tipo %s de PBKDF desconhecido."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:111
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested hash %s is not supported."
+msgstr "Não há suporte ao hash requisitado %s."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:122
+msgid "Requested PBKDF type is not supported for LUKS1."
+msgstr "Não há suporte ao tipo de PBKDF requisitado para LUKS1."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:128
+msgid "PBKDF max memory or parallel threads must not be set with pbkdf2."
+msgstr "Fluxos paralelos ou memória máxima de PBKDF não pode estar definida com pbkdf2."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:133 lib/utils_pbkdf.c:143
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forced iteration count is too low for %s (minimum is %u)."
+msgstr "Contagem de iterações forçadas é pequena demais para %s (mínimo é %u)."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:148
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forced memory cost is too low for %s (minimum is %u kilobytes)."
+msgstr "Custo de memória forçada é pequeno demais para %s (mínimo é %u kilobytes)."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:155
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested maximum PBKDF memory cost is too high (maximum is %d kilobytes)."
+msgstr "Custo de memória PBKDF máximo requisitado é alto demais (o máximo é %d kilobytes)."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:160
+msgid "Requested maximum PBKDF memory cannot be zero."
+msgstr "Memória PBKDF máxima requisitada não pode ser zero."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:164
+msgid "Requested PBKDF parallel threads cannot be zero."
+msgstr "Fluxos paralelos PBKDF requisitados não podem ser zero."
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:317
+msgid "PBKDF benchmark disabled but iterations not set."
+msgstr "Teste de PBKDF desabilitado, mas iterações não definidas."
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:336
+#, c-format
+msgid "Not compatible PBKDF2 options (using hash algorithm %s)."
+msgstr "Opções PBKDF2 não compatíveis (sando algoritmo hash %s)."
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:356
+msgid "Not compatible PBKDF options."
+msgstr "Opções PBKDF2 não compatíveis."
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:80
+#, c-format
+msgid "Locking aborted. The locking path %s/%s is unusable (not a directory or missing)."
+msgstr "Trava abortada. O caminho de trava %s/%s não é usável (faltando ou não é um diretório)."
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:87
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Locking directory %s/%s is missing!\n"
+msgstr "AVISO: Diretório de trava %s/%s está faltando!\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:97
+#, c-format
+msgid "Locking aborted. The locking path %s/%s is unusable (%s is not a directory)."
+msgstr "Trava abortada. O caminho de trava %s/%s não é usável (%s não é um diretório)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:40
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Failed to setup dm-crypt key mapping for device %s.\n"
+"Check that kernel supports %s cipher (check syslog for more info)."
+msgstr ""
+"Falha ao configurar mapeamento de chave dm-crypt para o dispositivo %s.\n"
+"Certifique-se de que o kernel oferece suporte cifra de %s (verifique o syslog para mais informação)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:45
+msgid "Key size in XTS mode must be 256 or 512 bits."
+msgstr "Tamanho de chave no modo XTS deve ser 256 ou 512 bits."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:47
+msgid "Cipher specification should be in [cipher]-[mode]-[iv] format."
+msgstr "A especificação de cifra deve estar no formato [cifra]-[modo]-[iv]."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:98 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:345
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:642 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1079
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1157 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:448
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write to device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "Não foi possível escrever para o dispositivo %s, permissão negada."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:120
+msgid "Failed to open temporary keystore device."
+msgstr "Falha ao abrir o dispositivo temporário de armazenamento de chave."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:127
+msgid "Failed to access temporary keystore device."
+msgstr "Falha ao acessar o dispositivo temporário de armazenamento de chave."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:200 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:91
+msgid "IO error while encrypting keyslot."
+msgstr "Erro de E/S ao criptografar slot de chave."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:243 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:348
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:594 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:645 lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:663
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:81 lib/verity/verity.c:182 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:308
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:319 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:339
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:242 lib/verity/verity_fec.c:254
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:259 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1160
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:208
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open device %s."
+msgstr "Não foi possível abrir o dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:254 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:152
+msgid "IO error while decrypting keyslot."
+msgstr "Erro de E/S ao descriptografar slot de chave."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:111
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small. (LUKS1 requires at least %<PRIu64> bytes.)"
+msgstr "Dispositivo %s é muito pequeno. (LUKS1 precisa de pelo menos %<PRIu64> bytes.)"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:132 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:140
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:152 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:163
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:175
+#, c-format
+msgid "LUKS keyslot %u is invalid."
+msgstr "O slot de chave LUKS %u é inválido."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:228 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:478
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:991 src/cryptsetup.c:1236
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1355 src/cryptsetup.c:1412 src/cryptsetup.c:1468
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1535 src/cryptsetup.c:1631 src/cryptsetup.c:1695
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1855 src/cryptsetup.c:2044 src/cryptsetup.c:2104
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2170 src/cryptsetup.c:2334 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1397
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."
+msgstr "O dispositivo %s não é um dispositivo LUKS válido."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:247 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1010
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested header backup file %s already exists."
+msgstr "O arquivo de cópia de segurança de cabeçalho requisitado %s já existe."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:249 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1012
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Não foi possível criar o arquivo de cópia de segurança de cabeçalho %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:254 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1017
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Não foi possível escrever o arquivo de cópia de segurança de cabeçalho %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:287 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1066
+msgid "Backup file doesn't contain valid LUKS header."
+msgstr "Arquivo de cópia de segurança não contém cabeçalho LUKS válido."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:300 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:555
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1087
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Não foi possível abrir o arquivo de cópia de segurança de cabeçalho %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:306 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1093
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Não foi possível ler o arquivo de cópia de segurança de cabeçalho %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:318
+msgid "Data offset or key size differs on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "Posição de dados ou tamanho de chave divergem entre dispositivo e cópia de segurança, restauração falhou."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:326
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s %s%s"
+msgstr "Dispositivo %s %s%s"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:327
+msgid "does not contain LUKS header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device."
+msgstr "não contém cabeçalho LUKS. A substituição do cabeçalho pode destruir dados naquele dispositivo."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:328
+msgid "already contains LUKS header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."
+msgstr "já contém cabeçalho LUKS. A substituição do cabeçalho vai destruir slots de chave existentes."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:329 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1129
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: real device header has different UUID than backup!"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"AVISO: o cabeçalho do dispositivo real possui um UUID diferente da cópia de segurança!"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:381
+msgid "Non standard key size, manual repair required."
+msgstr "Tamanho de chave fora do padrão, correção manual necessária."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:386
+msgid "Non standard keyslots alignment, manual repair required."
+msgstr "Alinhamento de slots de chave fora do padrão, correção manual necessária."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:396
+msgid "Repairing keyslots."
+msgstr "Corrigindo slots de chave."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:415
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: offset repaired (%u -> %u)."
+msgstr "Slot de chave %i: posição corrigida (%u -> %u)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:423
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: stripes repaired (%u -> %u)."
+msgstr "Slot de chave %i: barras corrigidas (%u -> %u)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:432
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: bogus partition signature."
+msgstr "Slot de chave %i: assinatura de partição é falsa."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:437
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: salt wiped."
+msgstr "Slot de chave %i: sal apagado."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:454
+msgid "Writing LUKS header to disk."
+msgstr "Escrevendo cabeçalho LUKS para disco."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:459
+msgid "Repair failed."
+msgstr "Correção falhou."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:487 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:758
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested LUKS hash %s is not supported."
+msgstr "Não há suporte ao hash LUKS requisitado %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:515 src/cryptsetup.c:960
+msgid "No known problems detected for LUKS header."
+msgstr "Nenhum problema conhecido foi detectado no cabeçalho LUKS."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:667
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during update of LUKS header on device %s."
+msgstr "Erro durante atualização de cabeçalho LUKS no dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:676
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error re-reading LUKS header after update on device %s."
+msgstr "Erro ao reler cabeçalho LUKS após atualização no dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:752
+msgid "Data offset for LUKS header must be either 0 or higher than header size."
+msgstr "A posição de dados para cabeçalho LUKS deve ser 0 ou maior do que o tamanho do cabeçalho."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:763 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:828
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:207 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:909
+msgid "Wrong LUKS UUID format provided."
+msgstr "Formato de UUID LUKS incorreto foi fornecido."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:786
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: reading random salt failed."
+msgstr "Não foi possível criar cabeçalho LUKS: leitura de sal aleatório falhou."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:807
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: header digest failed (using hash %s)."
+msgstr "Não foi possível criar cabeçalho LUKS: resumo de cabeçalho falhou (usando hash %s)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:851
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d active, purge first."
+msgstr "Slot de chave %d ativado, apagar primeiro."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:857
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d material includes too few stripes. Header manipulation?"
+msgstr "O material do slot de chave %d inclui muito poucas barras. Manipulação do cabeçalho?"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1065
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select keyslot between 0 and %d."
+msgstr "Slot de chave %d é inválido, por favor selecione um slot de chave entre 0 e %d."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1083 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:452
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe device %s."
+msgstr "Não foi possível apagar o dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:146
+msgid "Detected not yet supported GPG encrypted keyfile."
+msgstr "Detectado arquivo de chave criptografado com GPG ainda sem suporte."
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:147
+msgid "Please use gpg --decrypt <KEYFILE> | cryptsetup --keyfile=- ...\n"
+msgstr "Por favor use gpg --decrypt <ARQUIVO-CHAVE> | cryptsetup --keyfile=- ...\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:168 lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:188
+msgid "Incompatible loop-AES keyfile detected."
+msgstr "Arquivo de chave loop-AES incompatível detectado."
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:245
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support loop-AES compatible mapping."
+msgstr "O kernel não oferece suporte a mapeamento compatível com loop-AES."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:505
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error reading keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Erro ao ler arquivo de chave %s."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:545
+#, c-format
+msgid "Maximum TCRYPT passphrase length (%d) exceeded."
+msgstr "Tamanho máximo de senha TCRYPT (%d) excedido."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:586
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2 hash algorithm %s not available, skipping."
+msgstr "Algoritmo hash PBKDF2 %s não disponível, ignorando."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:604 src/cryptsetup.c:915
+msgid "Required kernel crypto interface not available."
+msgstr "Interface necessário de criptografia do kernel não disponível."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:606 src/cryptsetup.c:917
+msgid "Ensure you have algif_skcipher kernel module loaded."
+msgstr "Certifique-se de que você tenha o módulo de kernel algif_skcipher carregado."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:746
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activation is not supported for %d sector size."
+msgstr "Não há suporte a ativação para o tamanho de setor %d."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:752
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support activation for this TCRYPT legacy mode."
+msgstr "O kernel não oferece suporte a ativação para este modo legado TCRYPT."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:786
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activating TCRYPT system encryption for partition %s."
+msgstr "Ativando criptografia de sistema TCRYPT para partição %s."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:864
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support TCRYPT compatible mapping."
+msgstr "O kernel não oferece suporte a mapeamento compatível com TCRYPT."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:1085
+msgid "This function is not supported without TCRYPT header load."
+msgstr "Não há suporte a esta função sem carga de cabeçalho TCRYPT."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:69 lib/verity/verity.c:175
+#, c-format
+msgid "Verity device %s doesn't use on-disk header."
+msgstr "Dispositivo verity %s não usa cabeçalho em disco."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:94
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not a valid VERITY device."
+msgstr "O dispositivo %s não é um dispositivo VERITY válido."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:101
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY version %d."
+msgstr "Não há suporte ao VERITY versão %d."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:132
+msgid "VERITY header corrupted."
+msgstr "Cabeçalho VERITY corrompido."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:169
+#, c-format
+msgid "Wrong VERITY UUID format provided on device %s."
+msgstr "Formato de UUID VERITY inválido fornecido no dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:202
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during update of verity header on device %s."
+msgstr "Erro durante a atualização do cabeçalho verity no dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:266
+msgid "Errors cannot be repaired with FEC device."
+msgstr "Os erros não puderam ser consertados com dispositivo FEC."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:268
+#, c-format
+msgid "Found %u repairable errors with FEC device."
+msgstr "Localizados %u erros corrigíveis com dispositivo FEC."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:306
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support dm-verity mapping."
+msgstr "O kernel não oferece suporte a mapeamento dm-verity."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:317
+msgid "Verity device detected corruption after activation."
+msgstr "O dispositivo verity detectou corrompimento após ativação."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:59
+#, c-format
+msgid "Spare area is not zeroed at position %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Área disponível não está zerada na posição %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:160 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:287
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:300
+msgid "Device offset overflow."
+msgstr "Excesso na posição do dispositivo."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:200
+#, c-format
+msgid "Verification failed at position %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Verificação falhou na posição %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:273
+msgid "Invalid size parameters for verity device."
+msgstr "Parâmetros de tamanho inválido para dispositivo verity."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:293
+msgid "Hash area overflow."
+msgstr "Estouro de área de hash."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:370
+msgid "Verification of data area failed."
+msgstr "Verificação da área de dados falhou."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:375
+msgid "Verification of root hash failed."
+msgstr "Verificação do hash raiz falhou."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:381
+msgid "Input/output error while creating hash area."
+msgstr "Erro de entrada/saída enquanto criava área de hash."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:383
+msgid "Creation of hash area failed."
+msgstr "Criação da área de hash falhou."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:430
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Kernel cannot activate device if data block size exceeds page size (%u)."
+msgstr "AVISO: O kernel não pode ativar um dispositivo se o tamanho do bloco de dados exceder o tamanho da página (%u)."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:132
+msgid "Failed to allocate RS context."
+msgstr "Falha ao alocar contexto de RS."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:147
+msgid "Failed to allocate buffer."
+msgstr "Falha ao alocar buffer."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:157
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read RS block %<PRIu64> byte %d."
+msgstr "Falha ao ler byte %2$d de bloco RS %1$<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:170
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read parity for RS block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Falha ao ler paridade para o bloco RS %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:178
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to repair parity for block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Falha ao corrigir paridade para o bloco %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:189
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to write parity for RS block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Falha ao escrever paridade para o bloco RS %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:224
+msgid "Block sizes must match for FEC."
+msgstr "Tamanhos de bolcos devem corresponder para FEC."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:230
+msgid "Invalid number of parity bytes."
+msgstr "Número inválido de paridade de bytes."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:266
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to determine size for device %s."
+msgstr "Falha ao determinar o tamanho para dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/integrity/integrity.c:239 lib/integrity/integrity.c:304
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support dm-integrity mapping."
+msgstr "O kernel não oferece suporte a mapeamento dm-integrity."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:413
+msgid "Failed to acquire write device lock."
+msgstr "Falha ao obter trava de dispositivo de escrita."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:654 lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:675
+msgid ""
+"Device contains ambiguous signatures, cannot auto-recover LUKS2.\n"
+"Please run \"cryptsetup repair\" for recovery."
+msgstr ""
+"O dispositivo contém assinaturas ambíguas, falha ao autorrecuperar LUKS2.\n"
+"Por favor, execute \"cryptsetup repair\" para recuperação."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:99
+msgid "No space for new keyslot."
+msgstr "Sem espaço para um novo slot de chave."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:158
+msgid "Requested data offset is too small."
+msgstr "A posição dos dados requisitados é muito pequena."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:195
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: keyslots area (%<PRIu64> bytes) is very small, available LUKS2 keyslot count is very limited.\n"
+msgstr "AVISO: área de slot de chaves  (%<PRIu64> bytes) é muito pequena, a contagem de slot de chaves LUKS2 disponível é muito limitada.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:866 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:982
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1055 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:105
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:128
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to acquire read lock on device %s."
+msgstr "Falha ao obter trava de leitura no dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:878 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1149
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:431 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:40
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:69
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to acquire write lock on device %s."
+msgstr "Falha ao obter trava de escrita no dispositivo %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1072
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forbidden LUKS2 requirements detected in backup %s."
+msgstr "Requisitos LUKS2 proibidos detectados na cópia de segurança %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1113
+msgid "Data offset differ on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "Posição de dados diverge entre dispositivo e cópia de segurança, restauração falhou."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1119
+msgid "Binary header with keyslot areas size differ on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "Cabeçalho binário com áreas de slot de chave diverge entre dispositivo e cópia de segurança, restauração falhou."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1126
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s %s%s%s%s"
+msgstr "Dispositivo %s %s%s%s%s"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1127
+msgid "does not contain LUKS2 header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device."
+msgstr "não contém cabeçalho LUKS2. A substituição do cabeçalho pode destruir dados naquele dispositivo."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1128
+msgid "already contains LUKS2 header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."
+msgstr "já contém cabeçalho LUKS2. A substituição do cabeçalho vai destruir slots de chave existentes."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1130
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: unknown LUKS2 requirements detected in real device header!\n"
+"Replacing header with backup may corrupt the data on that device!"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"AVISO: requisitos LUKS2 desconhecidos detectados em cabeçalho de\n"
+"dispositivo real! Substituir cabeçalho com cópia de segurança pode\n"
+"corromper os dados naquele dispositivo!"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1132
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: Unfinished offline reencryption detected on the device!\n"
+"Replacing header with backup may corrupt data."
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"AVISO: recriptografia offline não finalizada detectada no dispositivo!\n"
+"Substituir cabeçalho com cópia de segurança pode corromper os dados."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1234
+#, c-format
+msgid "Ignored unknown flag %s."
+msgstr "Sinalizador desconhecido %s ignorado."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1869
+msgid "Failed to read LUKS2 requirements."
+msgstr "Falha ao ler requisitos LUKS2."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1876
+msgid "Unmet LUKS2 requirements detected."
+msgstr "Requisitos LUKS2 não atendidos detectados."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1884
+msgid "Offline reencryption in progress. Aborting."
+msgstr "Recriptografia offline em progresso. Abortando."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:474
+#, c-format
+msgid "Can not check status of device with uuid: %s."
+msgstr "Não foi possível verificar status do dispositivo com uuid: %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:500
+msgid "Unable to convert header with LUKSMETA additional metadata."
+msgstr "Não foi possível converter cabeçalho com metadados adicionais LUKSMETA."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:537
+msgid "Unable to move keyslot area. Not enough space."
+msgstr "Não foi possível mover área de slot de chave. Espaço insuficiente."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:577 lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:854
+msgid "Unable to move keyslot area."
+msgstr "Não foi possível mover área de slot de chave."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:672
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - key slot digests are not LUKS1 compatible."
+msgstr "Não foi possível converter ao formato LUKS1 - resumos de slot de chave não são compatíveis com LUKS1."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:684
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - device uses wrapped key cipher %s."
+msgstr "Não foi possível converter para o formato LUKS1 - o dispositivo usa cifra de chave envolta %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:692
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - LUKS2 header contains %u token(s)."
+msgstr "Não foi possível converter para o formato LUKS1 - o cabeçalho LUKS2 contém %u token(s)."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:706
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - keyslot %u is in invalid state."
+msgstr "Não foi possível converter para o formato LUKS1 - o slot de chave %u está em um estado inválido."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:711
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - slot %u (over maximum slots) is still active."
+msgstr "Não foi possível converter para o formato LUKS1 - o slot %u (acima do máximo de slots) ainda está ativo."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:716
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - keyslot %u is not LUKS1 compatible."
+msgstr "Não foi possível converter ao formato LUKS1 - o slot de chave %u não é compatível com LUKS1."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_token.c:262
+msgid "No free token slot."
+msgstr "Nenhum slot de token livre."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_token.c:269
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to create builtin token %s."
+msgstr "Falha ao criar um token incorporado %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:141
+msgid "Can't do passphrase verification on non-tty inputs."
+msgstr "Não é possível fazer verificação de senha em entradas diferente de tty."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:182
+msgid "Keyslot encryption parameters can be set only for LUKS2 device."
+msgstr "Parâmetros de criptografia de slot de chaves só pode ser definido para dispositivo LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:212 src/cryptsetup.c:849 src/cryptsetup.c:1088
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:749 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:814
+msgid "No known cipher specification pattern detected."
+msgstr "Nenhum padrão de especificação de cifra conhecida foi detectada."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:220
+msgid "WARNING: The --hash parameter is being ignored in plain mode with keyfile specified.\n"
+msgstr "AVISO: O parâmetro de --hash está sendo ignorado claro com o arquivo de chave especificado.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:228
+msgid "WARNING: The --keyfile-size option is being ignored, the read size is the same as the encryption key size.\n"
+msgstr "AVISO: A opção --keyfile-size está sendo ignorada, o tamanho lido é o mesmo que o tamanho da chave de criptografia.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:268
+#, c-format
+msgid "Detected device signature(s) on %s. Proceeding further may damage existing data."
+msgstr "Detectada assinatura(s) de dispositivo em %s. Prosseguir pode danificar dados existentes."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:274 src/cryptsetup.c:969 src/cryptsetup.c:1065
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1138 src/cryptsetup.c:1763 src/integritysetup.c:230
+msgid "Operation aborted.\n"
+msgstr "Operação abortada.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:342
+msgid "Option --key-file is required."
+msgstr "A opção --key-file é necessária."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:395
+msgid "Enter VeraCrypt PIM: "
+msgstr "Insira o PIM VeraCrypt: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:404
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: parse error."
+msgstr "Valor de PIM inválido: erro de análise."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:407
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: 0."
+msgstr "Valor de PIM inválido: 0."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:410
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: outside of range."
+msgstr "Valor de PIM inválido: fora do intervalo."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:433
+msgid "No device header detected with this passphrase."
+msgstr "Nenhum cabeçalho de dispositivo detectado com esta senha."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:495 src/cryptsetup.c:1790
+msgid ""
+"Header dump with volume key is sensitive information\n"
+"which allows access to encrypted partition without passphrase.\n"
+"This dump should be always stored encrypted on safe place."
+msgstr ""
+"O despejo de cabeçalho com chave de volume é uma informação sensível\n"
+"que permite acesso a uma partição criptografada sem senha.\n"
+"Este despejo deve sempre ser armazenado criptografado em um local seguro."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:574
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is still active and scheduled for deferred removal.\n"
+msgstr "O dispositivo %s ainda está ativo e agendado para a remoção atrasada.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:602
+msgid "Resize of active device requires volume key in keyring but --disable-keyring option is set."
+msgstr "Redimensionamento de dispositivo ativo requer chave de volume no chaveiro, mas a opção --disable-keyring está definida."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:727
+msgid "Benchmark interrupted."
+msgstr "Teste interrompido."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:748
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2-%-9s     N/A\n"
+msgstr "PBKDF2-%-9s     N/A\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:750
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2-%-9s %7u iterations per second for %zu-bit key\n"
+msgstr "PBKDF2-%-9s %7u iterações por segundo para chave de %zu bits\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:764
+#, c-format
+msgid "%-10s N/A\n"
+msgstr "%-10s N/D\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:766
+#, c-format
+msgid "%-10s %4u iterations, %5u memory, %1u parallel threads (CPUs) for %zu-bit key (requested %u ms time)\n"
+msgstr "%-10s %4u iterações, %5u memória, %1u threads paralelas (CPUs) para chave de %zu bits (requisitado tempo de %u ms)\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:790
+msgid "Result of benchmark is not reliable."
+msgstr "O resultado do teste não é confiável."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:841
+msgid "# Tests are approximate using memory only (no storage IO).\n"
+msgstr "# Testes são aproximados usando apenas memória (sem E/S de armazenamento).\n"
+
+#. TRANSLATORS: The string is header of a table and must be exactly (right side) aligned.
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:875
+#, c-format
+msgid "#%*s Algorithm |       Key |      Encryption |      Decryption\n"
+msgstr "#%*s Algoritmo |     Chave |    Criptografia | Descriptografia\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:879
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cipher %s is not available."
+msgstr "A cifra %s não está disponível."
+
+#. TRANSLATORS: The string is header of a table and must be exactly (right side) aligned.
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:899
+msgid "#     Algorithm |       Key |      Encryption |      Decryption\n"
+msgstr "#     Algoritmo |     Chave |    Criptografia | Descriptografia\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:908
+msgid "N/A"
+msgstr "N/D"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:968
+msgid "Really try to repair LUKS device header?"
+msgstr "Realmente tentar corrigir o cabeçalho do dispositivo LUKS?"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:984 src/integritysetup.c:144
+msgid ""
+"Wiping device to initialize integrity checksum.\n"
+"You can interrupt this by pressing CTRL+c (rest of not wiped device will contain invalid checksum).\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Apando dispositivo para inicializar a verificação de soma de integridade.\n"
+"Você pode interromper isso pressionando CTRL+C (o resto dos dispositivo não apagado conterão verificação de soma inválida).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1006 src/integritysetup.c:166
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot deactivate temporary device %s."
+msgstr "Não foi possível desativar o dispositivo temporário %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1050
+msgid "Integrity option can be used only for LUKS2 format."
+msgstr "A opção de integridade pode ser usada apenas para o formato LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1055 src/cryptsetup.c:1115
+msgid "Unsupported LUKS2 metadata size options."
+msgstr "Não há suporte às opções de tamanho de metadados LUKS."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1072
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create header file %s."
+msgstr "Não foi possível criar o arquivo de cabeçalho %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1095 src/integritysetup.c:192 src/integritysetup.c:201
+#: src/integritysetup.c:210 src/integritysetup.c:276 src/integritysetup.c:285
+#: src/integritysetup.c:295
+msgid "No known integrity specification pattern detected."
+msgstr "Nenhum padrão de especificação de integridade conhecida foi detectado."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1108
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use %s as on-disk header."
+msgstr "Não foi possível usar %s como um cabeçalho em disco."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1132 src/integritysetup.c:224
+#, c-format
+msgid "This will overwrite data on %s irrevocably."
+msgstr "Isto vai sobrescrever dados em %s permanentemente."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1173 src/cryptsetup.c:1484 src/cryptsetup.c:1551
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1646 src/cryptsetup.c:1712
+msgid "Failed to set pbkdf parameters."
+msgstr "Falha ao definir os parâmetros de pbkdf."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1242
+msgid "Reduced data offset is allowed only for detached LUKS header."
+msgstr "Posição de dados reduzida é permitido apenas cabeçalho LUKS desanexado."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1284
+msgid "Device activated but cannot make flags persistent."
+msgstr "Dispositivo ativado, mas não foi possível tornar os sinalizadores persistentes."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1365
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %d is selected for deletion."
+msgstr "Slot de chave %d selecionado para exclusão."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1368 src/cryptsetup.c:1706
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %d is not active."
+msgstr "O slot de chave %d não está ativo."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1377 src/cryptsetup.c:1438
+msgid "This is the last keyslot. Device will become unusable after purging this key."
+msgstr "Este é o último slot de chave. O dispositivo se tornará não usável após apagar esta chave."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1378
+msgid "Enter any remaining passphrase: "
+msgstr "Digite qualquer senha remanescente: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1379 src/cryptsetup.c:1440
+msgid "Operation aborted, the keyslot was NOT wiped.\n"
+msgstr "Operação abortada, o slot de chave NÃO foi apagado.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1417
+msgid "Enter passphrase to be deleted: "
+msgstr "Digite a senha para ser excluída: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1435
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d selected for deletion."
+msgstr "Slot de chave %d selecionado para exclusão."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1498 src/cryptsetup.c:1565 src/cryptsetup.c:1599
+msgid "Enter new passphrase for key slot: "
+msgstr "Digite uma senha para o slot de chave: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1582 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1352
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter any existing passphrase: "
+msgstr "Digite qualquer senha existente: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1650
+msgid "Enter passphrase to be changed: "
+msgstr "Digite a senha para ser alterada: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1666 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1338
+msgid "Enter new passphrase: "
+msgstr "Digite uma nova senha: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1716
+msgid "Enter passphrase for keyslot to be converted: "
+msgstr "Digite uma senha para slot de chave a ser convertido: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1740
+msgid "Only one device argument for isLuks operation is supported."
+msgstr "Há suporte apenas a um argumento de dispositivo para a operação isLuks."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1924 src/cryptsetup.c:1945
+msgid "Option --header-backup-file is required."
+msgstr "A opção --header-backup-file é necessária."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1975
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s is not cryptsetup managed device."
+msgstr "%s não é um dispositivo cryptsetup gerenciado."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1986
+#, c-format
+msgid "Refresh is not supported for device type %s"
+msgstr "A renovação não oferece suporte a este tipo de dispositivo %s"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2024
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unrecognized metadata device type %s."
+msgstr "Tipo de dispositivo de metadados %s não reconhecido."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2027
+msgid "Command requires device and mapped name as arguments."
+msgstr "O comando requer um dispositivo e nome mapeado como argumentos."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2049
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"This operation will erase all keyslots on device %s.\n"
+"Device will become unusable after this operation."
+msgstr ""
+"Esta operação vai apagar todos os slots de chave no dispositivo %s.\n"
+"O dispositivo se tornará não usável após esta operação."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2056
+msgid "Operation aborted, keyslots were NOT wiped.\n"
+msgstr "Operação abortada, os slots de chave NÃO foram apagados.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2093
+msgid "Invalid LUKS type, only luks1 and luks2 are supported."
+msgstr "Tipo de LUKS inválido, há suporte apenas a luks1 e luks2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2111
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device is already %s type."
+msgstr "O dispositivo já é do tipo %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2116
+#, c-format
+msgid "This operation will convert %s to %s format.\n"
+msgstr "Essa operação vai converter %s para o formato %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2122
+msgid "Operation aborted, device was NOT converted.\n"
+msgstr "Operação abortada, o dispositivo NÃO foi convertido.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2162
+msgid "Option --priority, --label or --subsystem is missing."
+msgstr "Está faltando a opção --priority, --label ou --subsystem."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2196 src/cryptsetup.c:2229 src/cryptsetup.c:2252
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %d is invalid."
+msgstr "O token %d é inválido."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2199 src/cryptsetup.c:2255
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %d in use."
+msgstr "O token %d em uso."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2206
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to add luks2-keyring token %d."
+msgstr "Falha ao adicionar o token de chaveiro luks2 %d."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2215 src/cryptsetup.c:2277
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign token %d to keyslot %d."
+msgstr "Falha ao atribuir o token %d ao slot de chave %d."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2232
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %d is not in use."
+msgstr "O token %d não está em uso."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2267
+msgid "Failed to import token from file."
+msgstr "Falha ao abrir arquivo de chave."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2292
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to get token %d for export."
+msgstr "Falha ao obter o token %d para exportação."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2307
+msgid "--key-description parameter is mandatory for token add action."
+msgstr "O parâmetro --key-description é obrigatório para ação de adicionar token."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2313 src/cryptsetup.c:2321
+msgid "Action requires specific token. Use --token-id parameter."
+msgstr "A ação requer um token específico. Use o parâmetro --token-id."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2326
+#, c-format
+msgid "Invalid token operation %s."
+msgstr "Operação de token inválida %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2366
+msgid "<device> [--type <type>] [<name>]"
+msgstr "<dispositivo> [--type <tipo>] [<nome>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2366
+msgid "open device as mapping <name>"
+msgstr "abre dispositivo como mapeamento <nome>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2367 src/cryptsetup.c:2368 src/cryptsetup.c:2369
+#: src/veritysetup.c:363 src/veritysetup.c:364 src/integritysetup.c:464
+#: src/integritysetup.c:465
+msgid "<name>"
+msgstr "<nome>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2367
+msgid "close device (remove mapping)"
+msgstr "fecha dispositivo (remove mapeamento)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2368
+msgid "resize active device"
+msgstr "redimensiona dispositivo ativado"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2369
+msgid "show device status"
+msgstr "mostra o estado do dispositivo"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2370
+msgid "[--cipher <cipher>]"
+msgstr "[--cipher <cifra>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2370
+msgid "benchmark cipher"
+msgstr "testa a cifra"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2371 src/cryptsetup.c:2372 src/cryptsetup.c:2373
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2374 src/cryptsetup.c:2381 src/cryptsetup.c:2382
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2383 src/cryptsetup.c:2384 src/cryptsetup.c:2385
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2386 src/cryptsetup.c:2387 src/cryptsetup.c:2388
+msgid "<device>"
+msgstr "<dispositivo>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2371
+msgid "try to repair on-disk metadata"
+msgstr "tente corrigir os metadados em disco"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2372
+msgid "erase all keyslots (remove encryption key)"
+msgstr "apaga todos os slots de chave (remove a chave de criptografia)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2373
+msgid "convert LUKS from/to LUKS2 format"
+msgstr "converte formato LUKS de/para LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2374
+msgid "set permanent configuration options for LUKS2"
+msgstr "define opções de configuração permanentes para LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2375 src/cryptsetup.c:2376
+msgid "<device> [<new key file>]"
+msgstr "<dispositivo> [<novo arquivo de chave>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2375
+msgid "formats a LUKS device"
+msgstr "formata um dispositivo LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2376
+msgid "add key to LUKS device"
+msgstr "adiciona uma chave ao dispositivo LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2377 src/cryptsetup.c:2378 src/cryptsetup.c:2379
+msgid "<device> [<key file>]"
+msgstr "<dispositivo> [<arquivo de chave >]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2377
+msgid "removes supplied key or key file from LUKS device"
+msgstr "remove a chave ou arquivo chave fornecidos do dispositivo LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2378
+msgid "changes supplied key or key file of LUKS device"
+msgstr "altera a chave ou arquivo chave fornecidos do dispositivo LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2379
+msgid "converts a key to new pbkdf parameters"
+msgstr "converte uma chave aos novos parâmetros de pbkdf"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2380
+msgid "<device> <key slot>"
+msgstr "<dispositivo> <slot de chave>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2380
+msgid "wipes key with number <key slot> from LUKS device"
+msgstr "apaga chave com número <slot de chave> do dispositivo LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2381
+msgid "print UUID of LUKS device"
+msgstr "emite UUID do dispositivo LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2382
+msgid "tests <device> for LUKS partition header"
+msgstr "testa <dispositivo> por cabeçalho de partição LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2383
+msgid "dump LUKS partition information"
+msgstr "despeja informação da partição LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2384
+msgid "dump TCRYPT device information"
+msgstr "despeja informação do dispositivo TCRYPT"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2385
+msgid "Suspend LUKS device and wipe key (all IOs are frozen)"
+msgstr "Suspende dispositivo LUKS e apaga chave (todas E/S ficam congeladas)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2386
+msgid "Resume suspended LUKS device"
+msgstr "Resume dispositivo LUKS suspenso"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2387
+msgid "Backup LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "Faz uma cópia de segurança de slots de chave e cabeçalho de dispositivo LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2388
+msgid "Restore LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "Restaura slots de chave e cabeçalho de dispositivo LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2389
+msgid "<add|remove|import|export> <device>"
+msgstr "<add|remove|import|export> <dispositivo>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2389
+msgid "Manipulate LUKS2 tokens"
+msgstr "Manipula tokens LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2407 src/veritysetup.c:380 src/integritysetup.c:481
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<action> is one of:\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<ação> é um entre:\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2413
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"You can also use old <action> syntax aliases:\n"
+"\topen: create (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen\n"
+"\tclose: remove (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tcryptClose\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Você também pode usar apelidos de sintaxe <ação> antigos:\n"
+"\topen: create (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen\n"
+"\tclose: remove (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tcryptClose\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2417
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<device> is the encrypted device\n"
+"<key slot> is the LUKS key slot number to modify\n"
+"<key file> optional key file for the new key for luksAddKey action\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<nome> é o dispositivo a ser criado sob %s\n"
+"<dispositivo> é o dispositivo criptografado\n"
+"<slot de chave> é o número do slot de chave LUKS a ser modificado\n"
+"<arquivo de chave> arquivo de chave opcional para a nova chave para a ação luksAddKey\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2424
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in metadata format is %s (for luksFormat action).\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"O formato padrão de metadados compilados é %s (para a ação luksFormat).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2429
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in key and passphrase parameters:\n"
+"\tMaximum keyfile size: %dkB, Maximum interactive passphrase length %d (characters)\n"
+"Default PBKDF for LUKS1: %s, iteration time: %d (ms)\n"
+"Default PBKDF for LUKS2: %s\n"
+"\tIteration time: %d, Memory required: %dkB, Parallel threads: %d\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Parâmetros padrões de senha e chave compilados internamente:\n"
+"\tTamanho do arquivo chave máximo: %dkB, Tamanho máximo de senha interativa %d (caracteres)\n"
+"PBKDF padrão para LUKS1: %s, tempo de iteração: %d (ms)\n"
+"PBKDF padrão para LUKS2: %s\n"
+"\tTempo de iteração: %d: memória exigida: %dkB, Threads paralelas: %d\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2440
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in device cipher parameters:\n"
+"\tloop-AES: %s, Key %d bits\n"
+"\tplain: %s, Key: %d bits, Password hashing: %s\n"
+"\tLUKS: %s, Key: %d bits, LUKS header hashing: %s, RNG: %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Parâmetros de cifra de dispositivo pré-compilados por padrão:\n"
+"\tloop-AES: %s, Chave %d bits\n"
+"\tplain: %s, Chave: %d bits, Hash de senha: %s\n"
+"\tLUKS: %s, Chave: %d bits, Hash de cabeçalho LUKS: %s, RNG: %s\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2449
+msgid "\tLUKS: Default keysize with XTS mode (two internal keys) will be doubled.\n"
+msgstr "\tLUKS: keysize padrão com modo XTS (duas chaves internas) será duplicado.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2460 src/veritysetup.c:537 src/integritysetup.c:621
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s: requires %s as arguments"
+msgstr "%s: necessita %s como argumentos"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2498 src/veritysetup.c:420 src/integritysetup.c:515
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1611
+msgid "Show this help message"
+msgstr "Mostra essa mensagem de ajuda"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2499 src/veritysetup.c:421 src/integritysetup.c:516
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1612
+msgid "Display brief usage"
+msgstr "Exibe instrução de uso"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2503 src/veritysetup.c:425 src/integritysetup.c:520
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1616
+msgid "Help options:"
+msgstr "Opções de ajuda:"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2504 src/veritysetup.c:426 src/integritysetup.c:521
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1617
+msgid "Print package version"
+msgstr "Emite a versão do pacote"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2505 src/veritysetup.c:427 src/integritysetup.c:522
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1618
+msgid "Shows more detailed error messages"
+msgstr "Mostra mensagens de erro mais detalhadas"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2506 src/veritysetup.c:428 src/integritysetup.c:523
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1619
+msgid "Show debug messages"
+msgstr "Mostra mensagens de depuração"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2507
+msgid "Show debug messages including JSON metadata"
+msgstr "Mostra mensagens de depuração incluindo metadados JSON"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2508 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1621
+msgid "The cipher used to encrypt the disk (see /proc/crypto)"
+msgstr "A cifra usada para criptografar o disco (veja /proc/crypto)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2509 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1623
+msgid "The hash used to create the encryption key from the passphrase"
+msgstr "A hash usada para criar a chave de criptografia a partir da senha"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2510
+msgid "Verifies the passphrase by asking for it twice"
+msgstr "Verifica a senha perguntando-a duas vezes"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2511 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1625
+msgid "Read the key from a file"
+msgstr "Lê a chave de um arquivo"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2512
+msgid "Read the volume (master) key from file."
+msgstr "Lê a chave do volume (mestre) a partir do arquivo."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2513
+msgid "Dump volume (master) key instead of keyslots info"
+msgstr "Despeja a chave de volume (mestre) ao invés da informação de slots de chave"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2514 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1622
+msgid "The size of the encryption key"
+msgstr "O tamanho da chave de criptografia"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2514 src/cryptsetup.c:2571 src/integritysetup.c:539
+#: src/integritysetup.c:543 src/integritysetup.c:547
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1622
+msgid "BITS"
+msgstr "BITS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2515 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1638
+msgid "Limits the read from keyfile"
+msgstr "Limita a leitura do arquivo de chave"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2515 src/cryptsetup.c:2516 src/cryptsetup.c:2517
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2518 src/cryptsetup.c:2568 src/cryptsetup.c:2569
+#: src/veritysetup.c:431 src/veritysetup.c:432 src/veritysetup.c:433
+#: src/veritysetup.c:436 src/veritysetup.c:437 src/integritysetup.c:530
+#: src/integritysetup.c:534 src/integritysetup.c:535
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1637 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1638
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1639 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1640
+msgid "bytes"
+msgstr "bytes"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2516 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1637
+msgid "Number of bytes to skip in keyfile"
+msgstr "Número de bytes a ignorar no arquivo de chave"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2517
+msgid "Limits the read from newly added keyfile"
+msgstr "Limita a leitura do arquivo de chave recém-adicionado"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2518
+msgid "Number of bytes to skip in newly added keyfile"
+msgstr "Número de bytes a ignorar em arquivo de chave recém-adicionado"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2519
+msgid "Slot number for new key (default is first free)"
+msgstr "Número de slot para a nova chave (padrão é a primeira livre)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2520
+msgid "The size of the device"
+msgstr "O tamanho do dispositivo"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2520 src/cryptsetup.c:2521 src/cryptsetup.c:2522
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2528 src/integritysetup.c:531 src/integritysetup.c:536
+msgid "SECTORS"
+msgstr "SETORES"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2521
+msgid "The start offset in the backend device"
+msgstr "A posição inicial do dispositivo de backend"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2522
+msgid "How many sectors of the encrypted data to skip at the beginning"
+msgstr "Quantos setores dos dados criptografados ignorar no começo"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2523
+msgid "Create a readonly mapping"
+msgstr "Cria um mapeamento somente leitura"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2524 src/integritysetup.c:524
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1628
+msgid "Do not ask for confirmation"
+msgstr "Não solicitar confirmação"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2525
+msgid "Timeout for interactive passphrase prompt (in seconds)"
+msgstr "Tempo limite para a solicitação interativa de senha (em segundos)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2525 src/cryptsetup.c:2526 src/integritysetup.c:525
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1629
+msgid "secs"
+msgstr "s"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2526 src/integritysetup.c:525
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1629
+msgid "Progress line update (in seconds)"
+msgstr "Atualização de linha de progresso (em segundos)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2527 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1630
+msgid "How often the input of the passphrase can be retried"
+msgstr "Com qual frequência a entrada da senha pode ser tentada novamente"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2528
+msgid "Align payload at <n> sector boundaries - for luksFormat"
+msgstr "Alinha a carga em <n> limites de setores - para luksFormat"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2529
+msgid "File with LUKS header and keyslots backup"
+msgstr "Arquivo cópia de segurança de slots de chave e cabeçalho LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2530 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1631
+msgid "Use /dev/random for generating volume key"
+msgstr "Usa /dev/random para gerar chave de volume"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2531 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1632
+msgid "Use /dev/urandom for generating volume key"
+msgstr "Usa /dev/urandom para gerar chave de volume"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2532
+msgid "Share device with another non-overlapping crypt segment"
+msgstr "Compartilha o dispositivo com um outro segmento de criptografia sem sobreposição"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2533 src/veritysetup.c:440
+msgid "UUID for device to use"
+msgstr "UUID para dispositivo a ser usado"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2534
+msgid "Allow discards (aka TRIM) requests for device"
+msgstr "Permite requisições de descartes (i.e. TRIM) para dispositivo"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2535 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1649
+msgid "Device or file with separated LUKS header"
+msgstr "Dispositivo ou arquivo com cabeçalho LUKS separado"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2536
+msgid "Do not activate device, just check passphrase"
+msgstr "Não ativa o dispositivo, apenas verifica a senha"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2537
+msgid "Use hidden header (hidden TCRYPT device)"
+msgstr "Usa cabeçalho oculto (dispositivo TCRYPT oculto)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2538
+msgid "Device is system TCRYPT drive (with bootloader)"
+msgstr "O dispositivo é uma unidade TCRYPT de sistema (com carregador de inicialização)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2539
+msgid "Use backup (secondary) TCRYPT header"
+msgstr "Usa o cabeçalho TRCYPT secundário (cópia de segurança)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2540
+msgid "Scan also for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "Verifica também por dispositivo compatível com VeraCrypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2541
+msgid "Personal Iteration Multiplier for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "Multiplicador de Iteração Pessoal (PIM) por dispositivo compatível com VeraCrypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2542
+msgid "Query Personal Iteration Multiplier for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "Consulta Multiplicador de Iteração Pessoal (PIM) por dispositivo compatível com VeraCrypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2543
+msgid "Type of device metadata: luks, plain, loopaes, tcrypt"
+msgstr "Tipo de metadados de dispositivo: luks, plain, loopaes, tcrypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2544
+msgid "Disable password quality check (if enabled)"
+msgstr "Desabilita a verificação de qualidade da senha (se habilitada)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2545
+msgid "Use dm-crypt same_cpu_crypt performance compatibility option"
+msgstr "Usa a opção de compatibilidade de desempenho same_cpu_crypt do dm-crypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2546
+msgid "Use dm-crypt submit_from_crypt_cpus performance compatibility option"
+msgstr "Usa a opção de compatibilidade de desempenho submit_from_crypt_cpus do dm-crypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2547
+msgid "Device removal is deferred until the last user closes it"
+msgstr "A remoção de dispositivo está adiada até o último usuário fechá-lo"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2548
+msgid "PBKDF iteration time for LUKS (in ms)"
+msgstr "Tempo de iteração PBKDF para LUKS (em ms)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2548 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1627
+msgid "msecs"
+msgstr "ms"
+
+# argon2i, argon2id, pbkdf2 são opções, não traduzir.
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2549 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1645
+msgid "PBKDF algorithm (for LUKS2): argon2i, argon2id, pbkdf2"
+msgstr "Algoritmo PBKDF (para LUKS2): argon2i, argon2id, pbkdf2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2550 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1646
+msgid "PBKDF memory cost limit"
+msgstr "limite de custo de memória de PBKDF"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2550 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1646
+msgid "kilobytes"
+msgstr "kilobytes"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2551 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1647
+msgid "PBKDF parallel cost"
+msgstr "Custo paralelo de PBKDF"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2551 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1647
+msgid "threads"
+msgstr "threads"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2552 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1648
+msgid "PBKDF iterations cost (forced, disables benchmark)"
+msgstr "Custo de iterações de PBKDF (forçado, desabilita teste)"
+
+# ignore, normal e prefer são opções, não traduzir.
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2553
+msgid "Keyslot priority: ignore, normal, prefer"
+msgstr "Prioridade de slot de chave: ignore, normal, prefer"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2554
+msgid "Disable locking of on-disk metadata"
+msgstr "Desabilita travamento de metadados em disco"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2555
+msgid "Disable loading volume keys via kernel keyring"
+msgstr "Desabilita carregamento de chaves de volume via chaveiro do kernel"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2556
+msgid "Data integrity algorithm (LUKS2 only)"
+msgstr "Algoritmo de integridade de dados (LUKS2 apenas)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2557 src/integritysetup.c:550
+msgid "Disable journal for integrity device"
+msgstr "Desabilita jornal para dispositivo de integridade"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2558 src/integritysetup.c:526
+msgid "Do not wipe device after format"
+msgstr "Não apaga o dispositivo após formatar"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2559
+msgid "Do not ask for passphrase if activation by token fails"
+msgstr "Não pede por senha se ativação por token falhar"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2560
+msgid "Token number (default: any)"
+msgstr "Número de token (padrão: qualquer)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2561
+msgid "Key description"
+msgstr "Descrição da chave"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2562
+msgid "Encryption sector size (default: 512 bytes)"
+msgstr "Tamanho do setor de criptografia (padrão: 512 bytes)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2563
+msgid "Set activation flags persistent for device"
+msgstr "Define sinalizadores de ativação persistentes para o dispositivo"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2564
+msgid "Set label for the LUKS2 device"
+msgstr "Define o rótulo para o dispositivo LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2565
+msgid "Set subsystem label for the LUKS2 device"
+msgstr "Define o rótulo de subsistema para o dispositivo LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2566
+msgid "Create unbound (no assigned data segment) LUKS2 keyslot"
+msgstr "Cria slot de chave LUKS2 não associado (nenhum segmento de dados atribuído)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2567
+msgid "Read or write the json from or to a file"
+msgstr "Lê ou escreve o json de ou para um arquivo"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2568
+msgid "LUKS2 header metadata area size"
+msgstr "Tamanho de área de metadados de cabeçalho LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2569
+msgid "LUKS2 header keyslots area size"
+msgstr "Tamanho de área de slots de chave de cabeçalho LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2570
+msgid "Refresh (reactivate) device with new parameters"
+msgstr "Renova (reativa) dispositivo com novos parâmetros"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2571
+msgid "LUKS2 keyslot: The size of the encryption key"
+msgstr "Slot de chave LUKS2: O tamanho da chave de criptografia"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2572
+msgid "LUKS2 keyslot: The cipher used for keyslot encryption"
+msgstr "Slot de chave LUKS2: A cifra usada para criptografia de slot de chave"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2588 src/veritysetup.c:461 src/integritysetup.c:568
+msgid "[OPTION...] <action> <action-specific>"
+msgstr "[OPÇÃO...] <ação> <ação-específica>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2645 src/veritysetup.c:501 src/integritysetup.c:585
+msgid "Argument <action> missing."
+msgstr "Faltando o argumento de <ação>."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2708 src/veritysetup.c:532 src/integritysetup.c:616
+msgid "Unknown action."
+msgstr "Ação desconhecida."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2718
+msgid "Parameter --refresh is only allowed with open or refresh commands.\n"
+msgstr "O parâmetro --refresh é apenas permitida com comandos de abrir ou renovar.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2723
+msgid "Options --refresh and --test-passphrase are mutually exclusive.\n"
+msgstr "As opções --refresh e --test-passphrase são mutuamente exclusivas.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2728
+msgid "Option --deferred is allowed only for close command.\n"
+msgstr "A opção --deferred é apenas permitida para o comando de fechamento.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2733
+msgid "Option --shared is allowed only for open of plain device.\n"
+msgstr "A opção --shared é permitida apenas para abertura de dispositivo claro.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2738
+msgid "Option --allow-discards is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "A opção --allow-discards é permitida apenas para a operação de abertura.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2743
+msgid "Option --persistent is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "A opção --persistent é permitida apenas para a operação de abertura.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2748
+msgid "Option --persistent is not allowed with --test-passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "A opção --persistent não é permitida com --test-passphrase.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2757
+msgid ""
+"Option --key-size is allowed only for luksFormat, luksAddKey (with --unbound),\n"
+"open and benchmark actions. To limit read from keyfile use --keyfile-size=(bytes)."
+msgstr ""
+"A opção --key-size só é permitida para luksFormat, luksAddKey (com --unbound),\n"
+"ações de abertura e teste. Para limitar a leitura do arquivo de chave,\n"
+"use --keyfile-size=(bytes)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2763
+msgid "Option --integrity is allowed only for luksFormat (LUKS2).\n"
+msgstr "A opção --integrity é permitida apenas para luksFormat (LUKS2).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2768
+msgid "Option --integrity-no-wipe can be used only for format action with integrity extension.\n"
+msgstr "A opção --integrity-no-wipe só pode ser usada para ação de formato com extensão de integridade.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2774
+msgid "Options --label and --subsystem are allowed only for luksFormat and config LUKS2 operations.\n"
+msgstr "As opções --label e --subsystem são permitidas apenas para luksFormat e operações de configuração de LUKS2.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2780
+msgid "Option --test-passphrase is allowed only for open of LUKS and TCRYPT devices.\n"
+msgstr "A opção --test-passphrase é permitida apenas para abertura de dispositivos LUKS e TCRYPT.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2785 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1718
+msgid "Key size must be a multiple of 8 bits"
+msgstr "Tamanho de chave deve ser um múltiplo de 8 bits"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2791 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1403
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1723
+msgid "Key slot is invalid."
+msgstr "O slot de chave é inválido."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2798
+msgid "Option --key-file takes precedence over specified key file argument."
+msgstr "A opção --key-file tem precedência sobre um argumento de arquivo de chave especificado."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2805 src/veritysetup.c:544 src/integritysetup.c:640
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1697
+msgid "Negative number for option not permitted."
+msgstr "Número negativo para opção não permitido."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2809
+msgid "Only one --key-file argument is allowed."
+msgstr "Apenas um argumento de --key-file é permitido."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2813 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1689
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1727
+msgid "Only one of --use-[u]random options is allowed."
+msgstr "Apenas uma das opções --use-[u]random são permitidas."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2817
+msgid "Option --use-[u]random is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgstr "A opção --use-[u]random é permitida apenas para luksFormat."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2821
+msgid "Option --uuid is allowed only for luksFormat and luksUUID."
+msgstr "A opção --uuid é permitida apenas para luksFormat e luksUUID."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2825
+msgid "Option --align-payload is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgstr "A opção --align-payload é permitida apenas para luksFormat."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2829
+msgid "Options --luks2-metadata-size and --opt-luks2-keyslots-size are allowed only for luksFormat with LUKS2."
+msgstr "As opçãos --luks2-metadata-size e --opt-luks2-keyslots-size são permitidas apenas para luksFormat com LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2834
+msgid "Invalid LUKS2 metadata size specification."
+msgstr "Especificação inválida de tamanho de metadados LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2838
+msgid "Invalid LUKS2 keyslots size specification."
+msgstr "Especificação inválida de tamanho de slots de chave LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2842
+msgid "Option --align-payload and --offset cannot be combined."
+msgstr "As opções --align-payload e --offset não podem ser combinadas."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2848
+msgid "Option --skip is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices.\n"
+msgstr "Há suporte a --skip apenas para abertura de dispositivos claro e loopaes.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2855
+msgid "Option --offset is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices and for luksFormat.\n"
+msgstr "Há suporte a --offset apenas para abertura de dispositivos claro e loopaes. e para luksFormat.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2861
+msgid "Option --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system or --tcrypt-backup is supported only for TCRYPT device.\n"
+msgstr "Há suporte à opção --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system ou --tcrypt-backup apenas para dispositivo TCRYPT.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2866
+msgid "Option --tcrypt-hidden cannot be combined with --allow-discards.\n"
+msgstr "A opção --tcrypt-hidden não pode ser combinada com --allow-discards.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2871
+msgid "Option --veracrypt is supported only for TCRYPT device type.\n"
+msgstr "Há suporte à opção --veracrypt apenas para o tipo de dispositivo TCRYPT.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2877
+msgid "Invalid argument for parameter --veracrypt-pim supplied.\n"
+msgstr "Argumento inválido para o parâmetro --veracrypt-pim fornecido.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2881
+msgid "Option --veracrypt-pim is supported only for VeraCrypt compatible devices.\n"
+msgstr "Há suporte à opção --veracrypt-pim apenas para dispositivos compatíveis com VeraCrypt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2889
+msgid "Option --veracrypt-query-pim is supported only for VeraCrypt compatible devices.\n"
+msgstr "Há suporte à opção --veracrypt-query-pim apenas para dispositivos compatíveis com VeraCrypt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2893
+msgid "The options --veracrypt-pim and --veracrypt-query-pim are mutually exclusive.\n"
+msgstr "As opções --veracrypt-pim e --veracrypt-query-pim são mutuamente exclusivas.\n"
+
+# ignore, normal, prefer são opções, não traduzir.
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2900
+msgid "Option --priority can be only ignore/normal/prefer.\n"
+msgstr "A opção --priority só pode ser ignore/normal/prefer.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2905
+msgid "Keyslot specification is required.\n"
+msgstr "A especificação de slot de chave é exigido.\n"
+
+# argon2i, argon2id, pbkdf2 são opções, não traduzir.
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2910 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1703
+msgid "Password-based key derivation function (PBKDF) can be only pbkdf2 or argon2i/argon2id.\n"
+msgstr "A função de derivação de chave baseada em senha (PBKDF) só pode ser pbkdf2 ou argon2i/argon2id.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2915 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1708
+msgid "PBKDF forced iterations cannot be combined with iteration time option.\n"
+msgstr "Iterações forçadas de PBKDF não podem ser compiladas com opção de tempo de iteração.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2921
+msgid "Sector size option is not supported for this command.\n"
+msgstr "Não há suporte a opção de tamanho de setor para este comando.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2927
+msgid "Unsupported encryption sector size.\n"
+msgstr "Não há suporte ao tamanho de setor de criptografia.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2932
+msgid "Key size is required with --unbound option.\n"
+msgstr "Tamanho de chave é necessário com a opção --unbound.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2937
+msgid "Option --unbound may be used only with luksAddKey action.\n"
+msgstr "A opção --unbound só pode ser usada com a ação luksAddKey.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2942
+msgid "Option --refresh may be used only with open action.\n"
+msgstr "A opção --refresh só pode ser usada com a ação de abrir.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2953
+msgid "Cannot disable metadata locking.\n"
+msgstr "Não foi possível desabilitar trava de metadados.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:67
+msgid "Invalid salt string specified."
+msgstr "Uma string salgada inválida foi especificada."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:98
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create hash image %s for writing."
+msgstr "Não foi possível criar imagem hash %s para escrita."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:108
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create FEC image %s for writing."
+msgstr "Não foi possível criar imagem FEC %s para escrita."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:178
+msgid "Invalid root hash string specified."
+msgstr "Uma string hash raiz inválida foi especificada."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:360
+msgid "<data_device> <hash_device>"
+msgstr "<dispositivo-dados> <dispositivo-hash>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:360 src/integritysetup.c:462
+msgid "format device"
+msgstr "formata o dispositivo"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:361
+msgid "<data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgstr "<dispositivo-dados> <dispositivo-hash> <hash-raiz>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:361
+msgid "verify device"
+msgstr "verifica o dispositivo"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:362
+msgid "<data_device> <name> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgstr "<dispositivo-dados> <nome> <dispositivo-hash> <hash-raiz>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:362 src/integritysetup.c:463
+msgid "open device as <name>"
+msgstr "abre dispositivo como <nome>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:363 src/integritysetup.c:464
+msgid "close device (deactivate and remove mapping)"
+msgstr "fecha dispositivo (desativa e remove mapeamento)"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:364 src/integritysetup.c:465
+msgid "show active device status"
+msgstr "mostra o estado do dispositivo ativado"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:365
+msgid "<hash_device>"
+msgstr "<dispositivo-hash>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:365 src/integritysetup.c:466
+msgid "show on-disk information"
+msgstr "mostra informação em disco"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:384
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<data_device> is the data device\n"
+"<hash_device> is the device containing verification data\n"
+"<root_hash> hash of the root node on <hash_device>\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<nome> é o dispositivo a ser criado sob %s\n"
+"<dispositivo-dados> é o dispositivo de dados\n"
+"<dispositivo-hash> é o dispositivo contendo dados de verificação\n"
+"<hash-raiz> hash do nó raiz no <dispositivo-hash>\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:391
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in dm-verity parameters:\n"
+"\tHash: %s, Data block (bytes): %u, Hash block (bytes): %u, Salt size: %u, Hash format: %u\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Parâmetros dm-verity pré-compilados por padrão:\n"
+"\tHash: %s, Bloco de dados (bytes): %u, Bloco de hash (bytes): %u, Tamanho salgado: %u, Formato hash: %u\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:429
+msgid "Do not use verity superblock"
+msgstr "Não usa superbloco verity"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:430
+msgid "Format type (1 - normal, 0 - original Chrome OS)"
+msgstr "Tipo de formato (1 - normal, 0 - Chrome OS original)"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:430
+msgid "number"
+msgstr "número"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:431
+msgid "Block size on the data device"
+msgstr "Tamanho de bloco no dispositivo de dados"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:432
+msgid "Block size on the hash device"
+msgstr "Tamanho de bloco no dispositivo de hash"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:433
+msgid "FEC parity bytes"
+msgstr "Bytes de paridade FEC"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:434
+msgid "The number of blocks in the data file"
+msgstr "O número de blocos no arquivo de dados"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:434
+msgid "blocks"
+msgstr "blocos"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:435
+msgid "Path to device with error correction data"
+msgstr "Caminho para dispositivo com dados de correção de erro"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:435 src/integritysetup.c:528
+msgid "path"
+msgstr "caminho"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:436
+msgid "Starting offset on the hash device"
+msgstr "Posição inicial no dispositivo de hash"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:437
+msgid "Starting offset on the FEC device"
+msgstr "Posição inicial no dispositivo FEC"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:438
+msgid "Hash algorithm"
+msgstr "Algoritmo hash"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:438
+msgid "string"
+msgstr "string"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:439
+msgid "Salt"
+msgstr "Sal"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:439
+msgid "hex string"
+msgstr "string hexa"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:441
+msgid "Restart kernel if corruption is detected"
+msgstr "Reinicia o kernel, se um corrompimento for detectado"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:442
+msgid "Ignore corruption, log it only"
+msgstr "Ignora corrompimento, apenas registra no log"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:443
+msgid "Do not verify zeroed blocks"
+msgstr "Não verifica por blocos zerados"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:444
+msgid "Verify data block only the first time it is read"
+msgstr "Verifica bloco de dados apenas na primeira vez que é lido"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:550
+msgid "Option --ignore-corruption, --restart-on-corruption or --ignore-zero-blocks is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "O uso da opção --ignore-corruption, --restart-on-corruption ou --ignore-zero-blocks é permitido apenas para operação de abertura.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:555
+msgid "Option --ignore-corruption and --restart-on-corruption cannot be used together.\n"
+msgstr "As opções --ignore-corruption e --restart-on-corruption não podem ser usadas em conjunto.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:82 src/utils_password.c:298
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Não foi possível ler o arquivo de chave %s."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:86 src/utils_password.c:302
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read %d bytes from keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Não foi possível ler %d bytes do arquivo de chave %s."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:248
+#, c-format
+msgid "Formatted with tag size %u, internal integrity %s.\n"
+msgstr "Formatado com tamanho de tag %u, integridade interna %s.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:462 src/integritysetup.c:466
+msgid "<integrity_device>"
+msgstr "<dispositivo_integridade>"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:463
+msgid "<integrity_device> <name>"
+msgstr "<dispositivo_integridade> <nome>"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:485
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<integrity_device> is the device containing data with integrity tags\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<nome> é o dispositivo a ser criado sob %s\n"
+"<dispositivo_integridade> é o dispositivo com dados com tags de integridade\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:490
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in dm-integrity parameters:\n"
+"\tTag size: %u bytes, Checksum algorithm: %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Parâmetros dm-integrity compilados por padrão:\n"
+"\tTamanho Tag: %u bytes, Algoritmo de soma de verificação: %s\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:528
+msgid "Path to data device (if separated)"
+msgstr "Caminho para dispositivo de dados (se separado)"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:530
+msgid "Journal size"
+msgstr "Tamanho do journal"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:531
+msgid "Interleave sectors"
+msgstr "Intercalar setores"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:532
+msgid "Journal watermark"
+msgstr "Marca d'água do jornal"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:532
+msgid "percent"
+msgstr "porcentagem"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:533
+msgid "Journal commit time"
+msgstr "Tempo de commit do journal"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:533
+msgid "ms"
+msgstr "ms"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:534
+msgid "Tag size (per-sector)"
+msgstr "Tamanho de tag (por setor)"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:535
+msgid "Sector size"
+msgstr "Tamanho do setor"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:536
+msgid "Buffers size"
+msgstr "Tamanho de buffers"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:538
+msgid "Data integrity algorithm"
+msgstr "Algoritmo de integridade de dados"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:539
+msgid "The size of the data integrity key"
+msgstr "O tamanho da chave de integridade de dados"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:540
+msgid "Read the integrity key from a file"
+msgstr "Lê a chave de integridade de um arquivo"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:542
+msgid "Journal integrity algorithm"
+msgstr "Algoritmo de integridade de journal"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:543
+msgid "The size of the journal integrity key"
+msgstr "O tamanho da chave de integridade de journal"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:544
+msgid "Read the journal integrity key from a file"
+msgstr "Lê a chave de integridade de journal de um arquivo"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:546
+msgid "Journal encryption algorithm"
+msgstr "Algoritmo de criptografia de journal"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:547
+msgid "The size of the journal encryption key"
+msgstr "O tamanho da chave de criptografia de journal"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:548
+msgid "Read the journal encryption key from a file"
+msgstr "Lê a chave de criptografia de journal de um arquivo"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:551
+msgid "Recovery mode (no journal, no tag checking)"
+msgstr "Modo de recuperação (sem journal, sem verificação de tag)"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:552
+msgid "Recalculate initial tags automatically."
+msgstr "Recalcula tags iniciais automaticamente."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:631
+msgid "Option --integrity-recalculate can be used only for open action."
+msgstr "A opção --integrity-recalculate só pode ser usada para ação de abrir."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:646
+msgid "Options --journal-size, --interleave-sectors, --sector-size, --tag-size and --no-wipe can be used only for format action.\n"
+msgstr "As opções --journal-size, --interleave-sectors, --sector-size, --tag-size e --no-wipe só podem ser usadas para ação de formatação.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:652
+msgid "Invalid journal size specification."
+msgstr "Especificação inválida de tamanho de journal."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:657
+msgid "Both key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "As opções de arquivo de chave e tamanho de chave devem ser especificadas."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:660
+msgid "Integrity algorithm must be specified if integrity key is used."
+msgstr "Um algoritmo de integridade deve ser especificado se uma chave de integridade é usada."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:665
+msgid "Both journal integrity key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "As opções de arquivo de chave de integridade de journal e tamanho de chave devem ser especificadas."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:668
+msgid "Journal integrity algorithm must be specified if journal integrity key is used."
+msgstr "Um algoritmo de integridade de journal deve ser especificado se uma chave de integridade de journal é usada."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:673
+msgid "Both journal encryption key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "As opções de arquivo de chave de criptografia de journal e tamanho de chave devem ser especificadas."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:676
+msgid "Journal encryption algorithm must be specified if journal encryption key is used."
+msgstr "Um algoritmo de criptografia de journal deve ser especificado se uma chave de criptografia de journal é usada."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:175
+msgid "Reencryption already in-progress."
+msgstr "Recriptografia já está em progresso."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:181
+msgid "Reencryption of device with integrity profile is not supported."
+msgstr "Não há suporte a recriptografia de dispositivo com perfil de integridade."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:204
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot exclusively open %s, device in use."
+msgstr "Não foi possível abrir exclusivamente %s, dispositivo em uso."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:218 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1148
+msgid "Allocation of aligned memory failed."
+msgstr "A alocação de memória alinhada falhou."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:225
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read device %s."
+msgstr "Não foi possível ler o dispositivo %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:236
+#, c-format
+msgid "Marking LUKS1 device %s unusable."
+msgstr "Marcando o dispositivo LUKS1 %s como não usável."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:240
+#, c-format
+msgid "Setting LUKS2 offline reencrypt flag on device %s."
+msgstr "Definindo o sinalizador de recriptografia offline do LUKS2 no dispositivo %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:257
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write device %s."
+msgstr "Não foi possível escrever o dispositivo %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:345
+msgid "Cannot write reencryption log file."
+msgstr "Não foi possível escrever o arquivo log de recriptografia."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:401
+msgid "Cannot read reencryption log file."
+msgstr "Não foi possível abrir o arquivo log de recriptografia."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:439
+#, c-format
+msgid "Log file %s exists, resuming reencryption.\n"
+msgstr "Arquivo log %s existe, resumindo recriptografia.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:488
+msgid "Activating temporary device using old LUKS header."
+msgstr "Ativando dispositivo temporário usando antigo cabeçalho LUKS."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:498
+msgid "Activating temporary device using new LUKS header."
+msgstr "Ativando dispositivo temporário usando novo cabeçalho LUKS."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:508
+msgid "Activation of temporary devices failed."
+msgstr "A ativação de dispositivos temporários falhou."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:586
+msgid "Failed to set PBKDF parameters."
+msgstr "Falha ao definir os parâmetros de sessão PBKDF."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:592
+msgid "Failed to set data offset."
+msgstr "Falha ao definir a posição de dados."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:600
+#, c-format
+msgid "New LUKS header for device %s created."
+msgstr "Novo cabeçalho LUKS para dispositivo %s criado."
+
+# "cryptsetup-reencrypt" é o nome do programa, não traduzir.
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:660
+#, c-format
+msgid "This version of cryptsetup-reencrypt can't handle new internal token type %s."
+msgstr "Essa versão de cryptsetup-reencrypt não sabe lidar com o novo tipo de token interno %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:682
+msgid "Failed to read activation flags from backup header."
+msgstr "Falha ao ler sinalizadores de ativação do cabeçalho de cópia de segurança."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:686
+msgid "Failed to write activation flags to new header."
+msgstr "Falha ao escrever sinalizadores de ativação para novo cabeçalho."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:690 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:694
+msgid "Failed to read requirements from backup header."
+msgstr "Falha ao ler requisitos do cabeçalho de cópia de segurança."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:731
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s header backup of device %s created."
+msgstr "Cópia de segurança de cabeçalho %s para dispositivo %s criado."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:789
+msgid "Creation of LUKS backup headers failed."
+msgstr "A criação de cópia de segurança de cabeçalhos LUKS falhou."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:918
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot restore %s header on device %s."
+msgstr "Não foi possível restaurar o cabeçalho %s no dispositivo %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:920
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s header on device %s restored."
+msgstr "Cabeçalho %s no dispositivo %s restaurado."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:958 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1038
+msgid "Cannot seek to device offset."
+msgstr "Não foi possível ir à posição do dispositivo."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1081
+msgid "Cannot seek to device offset.\n"
+msgstr "Não foi possível ir à posição do dispositivo.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1120 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1126
+msgid "Cannot open temporary LUKS device."
+msgstr "Não foi possível abrir o dispositivo LUKS temporário."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1131 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1136
+msgid "Cannot get device size."
+msgstr "Não foi possível obter o tamanho do dispositivo."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1173
+msgid "Interrupted by a signal."
+msgstr "Interrompido por um sinal."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1175
+msgid "IO error during reencryption."
+msgstr "Erro de E/S durante a recriptografia."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1206
+msgid "Provided UUID is invalid."
+msgstr "O UUID fornecido é inválido."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1309
+msgid "Key file can be used only with --key-slot or with exactly one key slot active."
+msgstr "O arquivo de chave pode ser usado apenas com --key-slot ou com exatamente um slot de chave ativado."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1350 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1361
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for key slot %u: "
+msgstr "Digite uma senha para o slot de chave %u: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1432
+msgid "Cannot open reencryption log file."
+msgstr "Não foi possível abrir o arquivo log de recriptografia."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1438
+msgid "No decryption in progress, provided UUID can be used only to resume suspended decryption process."
+msgstr "Nenhuma descriptografia em progresso, UUID fornecido pode ser usado apenas para resumir um processo de descriptografia suspendido."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1513
+#, c-format
+msgid "Changed pbkdf parameters in keyslot %i."
+msgstr "Alterados os parâmetros de pbkdf no slot de chave %i."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1620
+msgid "Reencryption block size"
+msgstr "Tamanho do bloco de recriptografia"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1620
+msgid "MiB"
+msgstr "MB"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1624
+msgid "Do not change key, no data area reencryption"
+msgstr "Não altera chave, nenhuma área de dados de recriptografia"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1626
+msgid "Read new volume (master) key from file"
+msgstr "Lê nova chave do volume (mestre) a partir do arquivo"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1627
+msgid "PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS (in ms)"
+msgstr "Tempo de iteração PBKDF2 para LUKS (em ms)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1633
+msgid "Use direct-io when accessing devices"
+msgstr "Usa direct-io ao acessar dispositivos"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1634
+msgid "Use fsync after each block"
+msgstr "Usa fsync após cada bloco"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1635
+msgid "Update log file after every block"
+msgstr "Atualiza o arquivo log após todo bloco"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1636
+msgid "Use only this slot (others will be disabled)"
+msgstr "Usa apenas este slot (outros serão desabilitados)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1639
+msgid "Reduce data device size (move data offset). DANGEROUS!"
+msgstr "Reduz tamanho do dispositivo de dados (move opção dos dados). PERIGOSO!"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1640
+msgid "Use only specified device size (ignore rest of device). DANGEROUS!"
+msgstr "Usa apenas o tamanho de dispositivo especificado (ignora o resto do dispositivo). PERIGOSO!"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1641
+msgid "Create new header on not encrypted device"
+msgstr "Cria um novo cabeçalho em dispositivo não criptografado"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1642
+msgid "Permanently decrypt device (remove encryption)"
+msgstr "Descriptografa permanentemente o dispositivo (remove criptografia)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1643
+msgid "The UUID used to resume decryption"
+msgstr "A UUID usada para resumir a descriptografia"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1644
+msgid "Type of LUKS metadata: luks1, luks2"
+msgstr "Tipo de metadados LUKS: luks1, luks2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1663
+msgid "[OPTION...] <device>"
+msgstr "[OPÇÃO...] <dispositivo>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1677
+#, c-format
+msgid "Reencryption will change: %s%s%s%s%s%s."
+msgstr "Recriptografia vai alterar: %s%s%s%s%s%s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1678
+msgid "volume key"
+msgstr "chave de volume"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1680
+msgid "set hash to "
+msgstr "definir hash para "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1681
+msgid ", set cipher to "
+msgstr ", definir cifra para "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1685
+msgid "Argument required."
+msgstr "Argumento necessário."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1713
+msgid "Only values between 1 MiB and 64 MiB allowed for reencryption block size."
+msgstr "Apenas valores entre 1 MB e 64 MB são permitidos para tamanho de bloco de recriptografia."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1732 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1737
+msgid "Invalid device size specification."
+msgstr "Especificação inválida de tamanho de dispositivo."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1740
+msgid "Maximum device reduce size is 64 MiB."
+msgstr "Tamanho máximo de redução do dispositivo é 64 MB."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1743
+msgid "Reduce size must be multiple of 512 bytes sector."
+msgstr "Tamanho da redução deve ser múltiplo de 512 bytes (setores)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1747
+msgid "Option --new must be used together with --reduce-device-size or --header."
+msgstr "A opção --new deve ser usada junto de --reduce-device-size ou --header."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1751
+msgid "Option --keep-key can be used only with --hash, --iter-time or --pbkdf-force-iterations."
+msgstr "A opção --keep-key pode ser usada apenas com --hash, --iter-time ou --pbkdf-force-iterations."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1755
+msgid "Option --new cannot be used together with --decrypt."
+msgstr "A opção --new não pode ser usada junto de --decrypt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1759
+msgid "Option --decrypt is incompatible with specified parameters."
+msgstr "A opção --decrypt é incompatível com os parâmetros especificados."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1763
+msgid "Option --uuid is allowed only together with --decrypt."
+msgstr "A opção --uuid é permitida apenas junto de --decrypt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1767
+msgid "Invalid luks type. Use one of these: 'luks', 'luks1' or 'luks2'."
+msgstr "Tipo de luks inválido. Use um desses: \"luks\", \"luks1\" ou \"luks2\"."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:150
+msgid "Error reading response from terminal."
+msgstr "Erro ao ler resposta do terminal."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:175
+msgid "Command successful.\n"
+msgstr "Comando executado com sucesso.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:183
+msgid "wrong or missing parameters"
+msgstr "parâmetros errados ou faltando"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:185
+msgid "no permission or bad passphrase"
+msgstr "sem permissão ou senha incorreta"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:187
+msgid "out of memory"
+msgstr "memória insuficiente"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:189
+msgid "wrong device or file specified"
+msgstr "dispositivo ou arquivo errado especificado"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:191
+msgid "device already exists or device is busy"
+msgstr "o dispositivo já existe ou está ocupado"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:193
+msgid "unknown error"
+msgstr "erro desconhecido"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:195
+#, c-format
+msgid "Command failed with code %i (%s).\n"
+msgstr "O comando falhou com código %i (%s).\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:272
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %i created."
+msgstr "Slot de chave %i criado."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:274
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %i unlocked."
+msgstr "Slot de chave %i desbloqueado."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:276
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %i removed."
+msgstr "Slot de chave %i removido."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:285
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %i created."
+msgstr "Token %i criado."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:287
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %i removed."
+msgstr "Token %i removido."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:453
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Device %s already contains a '%s' partition signature.\n"
+msgstr "AVISO: O dispositivo %s já contém uma assinatura de partição \"%s\".\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:461
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Device %s already contains a '%s' superblock signature.\n"
+msgstr "AVISO: O dispositivo %s já contém uma assinatura de superbloco \"%s\".\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:482 src/utils_tools.c:546
+msgid "Failed to initialize device signature probes."
+msgstr "Falha ao inicializar as sondas de assinatura de dispositivo."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:526
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to stat device %s."
+msgstr "Falha ao obter estado do dispositivo %s."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:539
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is in use. Can not proceed with format operation."
+msgstr "O dispositivo %s está em uso. Não é possível proceder com a operação de formatação."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:541
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to open file %s in read/write mode."
+msgstr "Falha ao abrir o arquivo %s no modo leitura/escrita."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:561
+msgid "Failed to wipe device signature."
+msgstr "Falha ao apagar assinatura do dispositivo."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:568
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to probe device %s for a signature."
+msgstr "Falha ao sondar o dispositivo %s por uma assinatura."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:43 src/utils_password.c:75
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot check password quality: %s"
+msgstr "Não foi possível verificar qualidade da senha: %s"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:51
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Password quality check failed:\n"
+" %s"
+msgstr ""
+"Verificação de qualidade da senha falhou:\n"
+" %s"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:83
+#, c-format
+msgid "Password quality check failed: Bad passphrase (%s)"
+msgstr "Verificação de qualidade da senha falhou: Senha incorreta (%s)"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:193 src/utils_password.c:208
+msgid "Error reading passphrase from terminal."
+msgstr "Erro ao ler senha do terminal."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:206
+msgid "Verify passphrase: "
+msgstr "Verificar senha: "
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:213
+msgid "Passphrases do not match."
+msgstr "As senhas não conferem."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:250
+msgid "Cannot use offset with terminal input."
+msgstr "Não foi possível usar posição com a entrada do terminal."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:253
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase: "
+msgstr "Digite a senha: "
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:255
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for %s: "
+msgstr "Digite a senha para %s: "
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:285
+msgid "No key available with this passphrase."
+msgstr "Nenhuma chave disponível com esta senha."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:320
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open keyfile %s for write."
+msgstr "Não foi possível abrir o arquivo de chave %s para escrita."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:327
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write to keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Não foi possível escrever no arquivo de chave %s."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:47
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to open file %s in read-only mode."
+msgstr "Falha ao abrir o arquivo %s no modo somente leitura."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:60
+msgid "Provide valid LUKS2 token JSON:\n"
+msgstr "Forneça um JSON de token LUKS2 válido:\n"
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:67
+msgid "Failed to read JSON file."
+msgstr "Falha ao ler o arquivo JSON."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:72
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Read interrupted."
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Leitura interrompida."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:113
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to open file %s in write mode."
+msgstr "Falha ao abrir o arquivo %s no modo escrita."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:122
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Write interrupted."
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Escrita interrompida."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:126
+msgid "Failed to write JSON file."
+msgstr "Falha ao escrever arquivo JSON."
+
+#~ msgid "Device %s is too small. (LUKS2 requires at least %<PRIu64> bytes.)"
+#~ msgstr "Dispositivo %s é muito pequeno. (LUKS2 precisa de pelo menos %<PRIu64> bytes.)"
+
+#, fuzzy
+#~| msgid "Replaced with key slot %d.\n"
+#~ msgid "Replaced with key slot %d."
+#~ msgstr "Substituído com o slot de chave %d.\n"
+
+#, fuzzy
+#~| msgid "Missing LUKS target type, option --type is required.\n"
+#~ msgid "Missing LUKS target type, option --type is required."
+#~ msgstr "Faltando o tipo de alvo LUKS, a opção --type é necessária.\n"
+
+#, fuzzy
+#~| msgid "Missing --token option specifying token for removal.\n"
+#~ msgid "Missing --token option specifying token for removal."
+#~ msgstr "Faltando a opção --token especificando token para remoção.\n"
+
+#, fuzzy
+#~| msgid "Failed to remove token %d.\n"
+#~ msgid "Failed to remove token %d."
+#~ msgstr "Falha ao remover o token %d.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Add or remove keyring token"
+#~ msgstr "Adiciona ou remove o token de chaveiro"
+
+#, fuzzy
+#~| msgid "Activated keyslot %i.\n"
+#~ msgid "Activated keyslot %i."
+#~ msgstr "Slot de chave %i ativado.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "memory allocation error in action_luksFormat"
+#~ msgstr "erro de alocação de memória em action_luksFormat"
+
+#, fuzzy
+#~| msgid "Key slot is invalid."
+#~ msgid "Key slot is invalid.\n"
+#~ msgstr "O slot de chave é inválido."
+
+#~ msgid "Too many tree levels for verity volume.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Número excessivo de níveis de árvore para volume verity.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Key %d not active. Can't wipe.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Chave %d não ativada. Não é possível apagar.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "<name> <data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+#~ msgstr "<nome> <dispositivo-dados> <dispositivo-hash> <hash-raiz>"
+
+#~ msgid "create active device"
+#~ msgstr "cria um dispositivo ativado"
+
+#~ msgid "remove (deactivate) device"
+#~ msgstr "remove (desativa) o dispositivo"
+
+#~ msgid "Progress: %5.1f%%, ETA %02llu:%02llu, %4llu MiB written, speed %5.1f MiB/s%s"
+#~ msgstr "Progresso: %5.1f%%, ETA %02llu:%02llu, %4llu MB escrito, vel. %5.1f MB/s%s"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot find a free loopback device.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Não foi possível localizar um dispositivo de loop livre.\n"
+
+# Ponto final acrescentado, pois as mensagens em volta possível, sugerindo ser necessário aqui também.
+#~ msgid "Cannot open device %s\n"
+#~ msgstr "Não foi possível abrir o dispositivo %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot use passed UUID unless decryption in progress.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Não é possível usar o UUID passado a menos que descriptografia estiver em progresso.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Marking LUKS device %s usable.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Marcando o dispositivo LUKS %s como usável.\n"
diff --git a/po/ru.po b/po/ru.po
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..afb5e17
--- /dev/null
+++ b/po/ru.po
@@ -0,0 +1,3487 @@
+# Russian translation for cryptsetup
+# Copyright (C) 2018 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+# This file is distributed under the same license as the cryptsetup package.
+#
+# Rosetta Contributors and Canonical Ltd <EMAIL@ADDRESS>, 2007.
+# Eugene Roskin <Unknown>, 2016.
+# Yuri Kozlov <yuray@komyakino.ru>, 2018, 2019.
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: cryptsetup 2.1.0\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: dm-crypt@saout.de\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-01-26 19:02+0100\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2019-01-29 18:57+0300\n"
+"Last-Translator: Yuri Kozlov <yuray@komyakino.ru>\n"
+"Language-Team: Russian <gnu@d07.ru>\n"
+"Language: ru\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+"X-Bugs: Report translation errors to the Language-Team address.\n"
+"X-Launchpad-Export-Date: 2018-12-03 15:52+0000\n"
+"X-Generator: Lokalize 2.0\n"
+"Plural-Forms: nplurals=3; plural=(n%10==1 && n%100!=11 ? 0 : n%10>=2 && n%10<=4 && (n%100<10 || n%100>=20) ? 1 : 2);\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:336
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper, running as non-root user."
+msgstr "Не удалось инициализировать device-mapper, выполняется без прав суперпользователя."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:339
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper. Is dm_mod kernel module loaded?"
+msgstr "Не удалось инициализировать device-mapper. Загружен ли модуль ядра dm_mod?"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1010
+msgid "Requested deferred flag is not supported."
+msgstr "Запрошенный флаг отсрочки не поддерживается."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1077
+#, c-format
+msgid "DM-UUID for device %s was truncated."
+msgstr "У устройства %s был обрезан DM-UUID."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1486
+msgid "Requested dm-crypt performance options are not supported."
+msgstr "Запрошенные параметры производительности dm-crypt не поддерживаются."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1493
+msgid "Requested dm-verity data corruption handling options are not supported."
+msgstr "Запрошенные параметры обработки повреждённых данных dm-verify не поддерживаются."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1497
+msgid "Requested dm-verity FEC options are not supported."
+msgstr "Запрошенные параметры FEC dm-verify не поддерживаются."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1501
+msgid "Requested data integrity options are not supported."
+msgstr "Запрошенные параметры целостности данных не поддерживаются."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1503
+msgid "Requested sector_size option is not supported."
+msgstr "Запрошенный параметр sector_size не поддерживается."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1508
+msgid "Requested automatic recalculation of integrity tags is not supported."
+msgstr "Запрошенный автоматический пересчёт тегов целостности не поддерживается."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1534
+msgid "Requested dmcrypt performance options are not supported."
+msgstr "Запрошенные параметры производительности dmcrypt не поддерживаются."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1537
+msgid "Discard/TRIM is not supported."
+msgstr "Discard/TRIM не поддерживается."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:2413
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to query dm-%s segment."
+msgstr "Ошибка при запросе сегмента dm-%s."
+
+#: lib/random.c:80
+msgid ""
+"System is out of entropy while generating volume key.\n"
+"Please move mouse or type some text in another window to gather some random events.\n"
+msgstr ""
+"При генерации ключа тома в системе закончились данные энтропии.\n"
+"Подвигайте мышь или наберите любой текст в другом окне, чтобы возникли случайные события.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:84
+#, c-format
+msgid "Generating key (%d%% done).\n"
+msgstr "Генерация ключа (выполнена на %d%%).\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:170
+msgid "Running in FIPS mode."
+msgstr "Выполнение в режиме FIPS."
+
+#: lib/random.c:176
+msgid "Fatal error during RNG initialisation."
+msgstr "При инициализации RNG возникла критическая ошибка."
+
+#: lib/random.c:213
+msgid "Unknown RNG quality requested."
+msgstr "Запрошено неизвестное качество RNG."
+
+#: lib/random.c:218
+msgid "Error reading from RNG."
+msgstr "Ошибка чтения из RNG."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:214
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto RNG backend."
+msgstr "Невозможно инициализировать внутренний интерфейс crypto RNG."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:220
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto backend."
+msgstr "Невозможно инициализировать внутренний интерфейс crypto."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:251 lib/setup.c:1899 lib/verity/verity.c:123
+#, c-format
+msgid "Hash algorithm %s not supported."
+msgstr "Алгоритм хэширования %s не поддерживается."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:254 lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:90
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key processing error (using hash %s)."
+msgstr "Ошибка обработки ключа (используется хэш %s)."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:315 lib/setup.c:342
+msgid "Cannot determine device type. Incompatible activation of device?"
+msgstr "Невозможно определить тип устройства. Несовместимая активация устройства?"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:321 lib/setup.c:2892
+msgid "This operation is supported only for LUKS device."
+msgstr "Эта операция поддерживается только для устройства LUKS."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:348
+msgid "This operation is supported only for LUKS2 device."
+msgstr "Эта операция поддерживается только для устройства LUKS2."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:396
+msgid "All key slots full."
+msgstr "Заполнены все слоты ключей."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:407
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select between 0 and %d."
+msgstr "Некорректный слот ключа %d, укажите значение между 0 и %d."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:413
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is full, please select another one."
+msgstr "Слот ключа %d заполнен, выберите другой."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:589
+#, c-format
+msgid "Header detected but device %s is too small."
+msgstr "Обнаружен заголовок, но устройство %s слишком маленькое."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:626
+msgid "This operation is not supported for this device type."
+msgstr "Эта операция не поддерживается для этого типа устройств."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:791 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:481
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported LUKS version %d."
+msgstr "Неподдерживаемая версия LUKS %d."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:808 lib/setup.c:1403 lib/setup.c:1812
+msgid "Detached metadata device is not supported for this crypt type."
+msgstr "Отсоединение устройства метаданных не поддерживается для этого типа crypt."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1288 lib/setup.c:2392 lib/setup.c:2464 lib/setup.c:2476
+#: lib/setup.c:2625 lib/setup.c:4021
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not active."
+msgstr "Устройство %s не активно."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1310
+#, c-format
+msgid "Underlying device for crypt device %s disappeared."
+msgstr "Исчезло нижележащее устройство у устройства crypt %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1388
+msgid "Invalid plain crypt parameters."
+msgstr "Неверные параметры plain crypt."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1393 lib/setup.c:1802 src/integritysetup.c:72
+msgid "Invalid key size."
+msgstr "Неверный размер ключа."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1398 lib/setup.c:1807 lib/setup.c:2009
+msgid "UUID is not supported for this crypt type."
+msgstr "Для данного типа crypt UUID не поддерживается."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1413 lib/setup.c:1603 src/cryptsetup.c:1045
+msgid "Unsupported encryption sector size."
+msgstr "Неподдерживаемый размер сектора шифрования."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1421 lib/setup.c:1720
+msgid "Device size is not aligned to requested sector size."
+msgstr "Размер устройства не выровнен к запрошенному размеру сектора."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1472 lib/setup.c:1591
+msgid "Can't format LUKS without device."
+msgstr "Невозможно отформатировать LUKS без устройства."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1478 lib/setup.c:1597
+msgid "Requested data alignment is not compatible with data offset."
+msgstr "Запрошенный тип выравнивания данных не совместим со смещением данных."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1546 lib/setup.c:1715
+msgid "WARNING: Data offset is outside of currently available data device.\n"
+msgstr "ПРЕДУПРЕЖДЕНИЕ: смещение данных находится за пределами доступного в данный момент устройства данных.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1556 lib/setup.c:1735 lib/setup.c:1754 lib/setup.c:2021
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe header on device %s."
+msgstr "невозможно затереть заголовок на устройстве %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1608
+msgid "WARNING: The device activation will fail, dm-crypt is missing support for requested encryption sector size.\n"
+msgstr "ПРЕДУПРЕЖДЕНИЕ: Активация устройства завершится ошибкой, так как отсутствует поддержка dm-crypt для запрошенного размера сектора шифрования.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1630
+msgid "Volume key is too small for encryption with integrity extensions."
+msgstr "Ключ тома слишком мал для шифрования с целостными расширениями."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1685
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cipher %s-%s (key size %zd bits) is not available."
+msgstr "Шифр %s-%s (размер ключа %zd бит) недоступен."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1747
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s which is still in use."
+msgstr "Невозможно отформатировать устройство %s, которое всё ещё используется."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1750 lib/setup.c:1775
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "Невозможно отформатировать устройство %s, недостаточно прав."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1762 lib/setup.c:2073
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format integrity for device %s."
+msgstr "Невозможно отформатировать целостность для устройства %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1772
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s in use."
+msgstr "Невозможно отформатировать устройство %s, которое используется."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1779
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s."
+msgstr "Невозможно отформатировать устройство %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1797
+msgid "Can't format LOOPAES without device."
+msgstr "Невозможно отформатировать LOOPAES без устройства."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1842
+msgid "Can't format VERITY without device."
+msgstr "Невозможно отформатировать VERITY без устройства."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1853 lib/verity/verity.c:106
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash type %d."
+msgstr "Неподдерживаемый тип хэша %d для VERITY."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1859 lib/verity/verity.c:114
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY block size."
+msgstr "Неподдерживаемый размер блока для VERITY."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1864 lib/verity/verity.c:75
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash offset."
+msgstr "Неподдерживаемое смещение хэша для VERITY."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1869
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY FEC offset."
+msgstr "Неподдерживаемое смещение FEC для VERITY."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1893
+msgid "Data area overlaps with hash area."
+msgstr "Область данных перекрывает области хэша."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1918
+msgid "Hash area overlaps with FEC area."
+msgstr "Область хэша перекрывает область FEC."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1925
+msgid "Data area overlaps with FEC area."
+msgstr "Область данных перекрывает область FEC."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2130
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unknown crypt device type %s requested."
+msgstr "Запрошен неизвестный тип устройства crypt %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2398 lib/setup.c:2470 lib/setup.c:2483
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported parameters on device %s."
+msgstr "Неподдерживаемые параметры для устройства %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2404 lib/setup.c:2489
+#, c-format
+msgid "Mismatching parameters on device %s."
+msgstr "Несовпадение параметров для устройства %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2657
+msgid "Cannot resize loop device."
+msgstr "Невозможно изменить размер закольцованного (loop) устройства."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2666
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s size is not aligned to requested sector size (%u bytes)."
+msgstr "Размер устройства %s не выровнен к запрошенному размеру сектора (%u байт)."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2725
+msgid "Do you really want to change UUID of device?"
+msgstr "Вы действительно хотите изменить UUID устройства?"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2801
+msgid "Header backup file does not contain compatible LUKS header."
+msgstr "Файл резервного заголовка не содержит заголовка совместимого с LUKS."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2900
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not active."
+msgstr "Том %s не активен."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2911
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is already suspended."
+msgstr "Том %s уже приостановлен."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2925
+#, c-format
+msgid "Suspend is not supported for device %s."
+msgstr "Приостановка не поддерживается устройством %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2927
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during suspending device %s."
+msgstr "Ошибка во время приостановки устройства %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2960 lib/setup.c:3027
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not suspended."
+msgstr "Том %s не приостановлен."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2989
+#, c-format
+msgid "Resume is not supported for device %s."
+msgstr "Возобновление не поддерживается устройством %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2991 lib/setup.c:3059
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during resuming device %s."
+msgstr "Ошибка во время возобновления устройства %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3127 lib/setup.c:3315
+msgid "Cannot add key slot, all slots disabled and no volume key provided."
+msgstr "Невозможно добавить слот ключа, все слоты отключены и не предоставлен ключ тома."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3267
+msgid "Failed to swap new key slot."
+msgstr "Ошибка при переключении на новый слот ключа."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3432 lib/setup.c:3865 lib/setup.c:3878 lib/setup.c:3886
+#: lib/setup.c:3899 lib/setup.c:4198 lib/setup.c:5274
+msgid "Volume key does not match the volume."
+msgstr "Ключ тома не подходит к тому."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3453
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid."
+msgstr "Некорректный слот ключа %d."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3459
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is not used."
+msgstr "Слот ключа %d не используется."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3478
+msgid "Device header overlaps with data area."
+msgstr "Заголовок устройства перекрывает область данных."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3684 lib/setup.c:3952
+msgid "Device type is not properly initialised."
+msgstr "Тип устройства инициализирован неправильно."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3726
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s, name is invalid or still in use."
+msgstr "Невозможно использовать устройство %s, некорректное имя или оно всё ещё используется."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3729
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s already exists."
+msgstr "Устройство %s уже существует."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3852
+msgid "Incorrect volume key specified for plain device."
+msgstr "Для устройства plain указан некорректный ключ тома."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3918
+msgid "Incorrect root hash specified for verity device."
+msgstr "Некорректный корневой хэш для указанного устройства verity."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3995 lib/setup.c:4010
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is still in use."
+msgstr "Устройство %s всё ещё используется."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4025
+#, c-format
+msgid "Invalid device %s."
+msgstr "Неверное устройство %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4134
+msgid "Function not available in FIPS mode."
+msgstr "Функция не доступна в режиме FIPS."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4148
+msgid "Volume key buffer too small."
+msgstr "Буфер ключа тома слишком мал."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4156
+msgid "Cannot retrieve volume key for plain device."
+msgstr "Невозможно получить ключ тома для устройства plain."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4167
+#, c-format
+msgid "This operation is not supported for %s crypt device."
+msgstr "Эта операция не поддерживается для устройства crypt %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4354
+msgid "Dump operation is not supported for this device type."
+msgstr "Операция дампа не поддерживается для устройства этого типа."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4930
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert device %s which is still in use."
+msgstr "Невозможно преобразовать устройство %s, которое всё ещё используется."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5213
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign keyslot %u as the new volume key."
+msgstr "Ошибка при назначении слота ключа %u в качестве нового ключа тома."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5280
+msgid "Failed to initialise default LUKS2 keyslot parameters."
+msgstr "Ошибка при инициализации параметров слота ключа по умолчанию LUKS2."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5286
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign keyslot %d to digest."
+msgstr "Ошибка при назначении слота ключа %d дайджесту."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5370
+msgid "Failed to load key in kernel keyring."
+msgstr "Ошибка при загрузке ключа в связку ключей ядра."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5425
+msgid "Kernel keyring is not supported by the kernel."
+msgstr "Связка ключей ядра не поддерживается ядром."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5435
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read passphrase from keyring (error %d)."
+msgstr "Не удалось прочитать парольную фразу из связки ключей (ошибка %d)."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:81
+msgid "Cannot get process priority."
+msgstr "Невозможно получить приоритет процесса."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:95
+msgid "Cannot unlock memory."
+msgstr "Невозможно разблокировать память."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:169 lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:498
+msgid "Failed to open key file."
+msgstr "Не удалось открыть файл ключа."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:174
+msgid "Cannot read keyfile from a terminal."
+msgstr "Невозможно прочитать файл ключа с терминала."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:191
+msgid "Failed to stat key file."
+msgstr "Не удалось выполнить stat для файла ключа."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:199 lib/utils.c:220
+msgid "Cannot seek to requested keyfile offset."
+msgstr "Невозможно переместиться по запрошенному смещению в файле ключа."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:214 lib/utils.c:229 src/utils_password.c:188
+#: src/utils_password.c:201
+msgid "Out of memory while reading passphrase."
+msgstr "Не хватило памяти при чтении парольной фразы."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:249
+msgid "Error reading passphrase."
+msgstr "Ошибка чтения парольной фразы."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:266
+msgid "Nothing to read on input."
+msgstr "Нет ничего для чтения со стандартного ввода."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:273
+msgid "Maximum keyfile size exceeded."
+msgstr "Превышен максимальный размер файла ключа."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:278
+msgid "Cannot read requested amount of data."
+msgstr "невозможно прочитать запрошенное количество данных."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:184 lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:92
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s doesn't exist or access denied."
+msgstr "Устройство %s не существует или отказано в доступе."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:194
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not compatible."
+msgstr "Устройство %s несовместимо."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:560
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small. Need at least %<PRIu64> bytes."
+msgstr "Устройство %s слишком маленькое. Требуется не менее %<PRIu64> байт."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:641
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s which is in use (already mapped or mounted)."
+msgstr "Невозможно использовать устройство %s, которое используется (отображено или примонтировано)."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:645
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "Невозможно использовать устройство %s, недостаточно прав."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:648
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot get info about device %s."
+msgstr "Невозможно получить информацию об устройстве %s."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:671
+msgid "Cannot use a loopback device, running as non-root user."
+msgstr "Невозможно использовать закольцованное устройство, выполняется без прав суперпользователя."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:681
+msgid "Attaching loopback device failed (loop device with autoclear flag is required)."
+msgstr "Ошибка при присоединении закольцованного устройства (требуется закольцованное устройство с флагом autoclear)."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:727
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested offset is beyond real size of device %s."
+msgstr "Запрошенный размер вне реального размера устройства %s."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:735
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s has zero size."
+msgstr "Устройство %s имеет нулевой размер."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:746 lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:252
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small."
+msgstr "Устройство %s слишком маленькое."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:100
+msgid "Requested PBKDF target time cannot be zero."
+msgstr "Запрошенное время цели PBKDF не может быть нулевым."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:106
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unknown PBKDF type %s."
+msgstr "Неизвестный тип PBKDF %s."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:111
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested hash %s is not supported."
+msgstr "Запрошенный хэш %s не поддерживается."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:122
+msgid "Requested PBKDF type is not supported for LUKS1."
+msgstr "Запрошенный тип PBKDF %s не поддерживается в LUKS1."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:128
+msgid "PBKDF max memory or parallel threads must not be set with pbkdf2."
+msgstr "Максимальный размер памяти PBKDF и количество параллельных нитей нельзя задавать вместе с pbkdf2."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:133 lib/utils_pbkdf.c:143
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forced iteration count is too low for %s (minimum is %u)."
+msgstr "Навязанный счётчик итераций слишком мал для %s (минимальное значение равно %u)."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:148
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forced memory cost is too low for %s (minimum is %u kilobytes)."
+msgstr "Навязанная стоимость памяти слишком мала для %s (минимальное значение равно %u килобайт)."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:155
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested maximum PBKDF memory cost is too high (maximum is %d kilobytes)."
+msgstr "Запрошенная максимальная стоимость памяти PBKDF слишком высока (максимальное значение равно %d килобайт)."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:160
+msgid "Requested maximum PBKDF memory cannot be zero."
+msgstr "Запрошенная максимальная стоимость памяти PBKDF не может быть равна нулю."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:164
+msgid "Requested PBKDF parallel threads cannot be zero."
+msgstr "Запрошенное количество параллельных нитей PBKDF не может быть нулевым."
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:317
+msgid "PBKDF benchmark disabled but iterations not set."
+msgstr "Оценка производительности PBKDF выключена, но не задано количество итераций."
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:336
+#, c-format
+msgid "Not compatible PBKDF2 options (using hash algorithm %s)."
+msgstr "Несовместимые параметры PBKDF2 (используется алгоритм хэширования %s)."
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:356
+msgid "Not compatible PBKDF options."
+msgstr "Несовместимые параметры PBKDF."
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:80
+#, c-format
+msgid "Locking aborted. The locking path %s/%s is unusable (not a directory or missing)."
+msgstr "Блокировка прервана. Путь блокировки %s/%s использовать невозможно (не является каталогом или отсутствует)."
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:87
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Locking directory %s/%s is missing!\n"
+msgstr "ПРЕДУПРЕЖДЕНИЕ: Каталог блокировки %s/%s отсутствует!\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:97
+#, c-format
+msgid "Locking aborted. The locking path %s/%s is unusable (%s is not a directory)."
+msgstr "Блокировка прервана. Путь блокировки %s/%s использовать невозможно (%s не является каталогом)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:40
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Failed to setup dm-crypt key mapping for device %s.\n"
+"Check that kernel supports %s cipher (check syslog for more info)."
+msgstr ""
+"Ошибка при настройке отображения ключей dm-crypt для устройства %s.\n"
+"Убедитесь, что ядро поддерживает шифр %s (подробности смотрите в syslog)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:45
+msgid "Key size in XTS mode must be 256 or 512 bits."
+msgstr "Размер ключа в режиме XTS должен быть 256 или 512 бит."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:47
+msgid "Cipher specification should be in [cipher]-[mode]-[iv] format."
+msgstr "Шифр должен указываться в формате [шифр]-[режим]-[iv]."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:98 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:345
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:642 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1079
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1157 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:448
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write to device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "Невозможно записать на устройство %s, недостаточно прав."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:120
+msgid "Failed to open temporary keystore device."
+msgstr "Не удалось открыть временное устройство keystore."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:127
+msgid "Failed to access temporary keystore device."
+msgstr "Не удалось получить доступ к временному устройству keystore."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:200 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:91
+msgid "IO error while encrypting keyslot."
+msgstr "Ошибка ввода-вывода при шифровании слота ключа."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:243 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:348
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:594 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:645 lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:663
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:81 lib/verity/verity.c:182 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:308
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:319 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:339
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:242 lib/verity/verity_fec.c:254
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:259 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1160
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:208
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open device %s."
+msgstr "Невозможно открыть устройство %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:254 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:152
+msgid "IO error while decrypting keyslot."
+msgstr "Ошибка ввода-вывода при расшифровке слота ключа."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:111
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small. (LUKS1 requires at least %<PRIu64> bytes.)"
+msgstr "Устройство %s слишком маленькое (для LUKS1 требуется не менее %<PRIu64> байт)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:132 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:140
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:152 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:163
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:175
+#, c-format
+msgid "LUKS keyslot %u is invalid."
+msgstr "Некорректный слот ключа LUKS %u."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:228 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:478
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:991 src/cryptsetup.c:1236
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1355 src/cryptsetup.c:1412 src/cryptsetup.c:1468
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1535 src/cryptsetup.c:1631 src/cryptsetup.c:1695
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1855 src/cryptsetup.c:2044 src/cryptsetup.c:2104
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2170 src/cryptsetup.c:2334 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1397
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."
+msgstr "Устройство %s не является корректным устройством LUKS."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:247 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1010
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested header backup file %s already exists."
+msgstr "Запрошенный файл резервного заголовка %s уже существует."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:249 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1012
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Невозможно создать файл резервного заголовка %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:254 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1017
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Невозможно записать файл резервного заголовка %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:287 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1066
+msgid "Backup file doesn't contain valid LUKS header."
+msgstr "Резервный файл не содержит корректный заголовок LUKS."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:300 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:555
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1087
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Невозможно открыть файл резервного заголовка %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:306 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1093
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Невозможно прочитать файл резервного заголовка %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:318
+msgid "Data offset or key size differs on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "Смещение данных или размер ключа различаются на устройстве и в резервной копии, восстановление невозможно."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:326
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s %s%s"
+msgstr "Устройство %s %s%s"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:327
+msgid "does not contain LUKS header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device."
+msgstr "не содержит заголовка LUKS. Замена заголовка может уничтожить данные на этом устройстве."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:328
+msgid "already contains LUKS header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."
+msgstr "уже содержит заголовок LUKS. Замена заголовка уничтожит существующие слоты ключей."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:329 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1129
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: real device header has different UUID than backup!"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"ПРЕДУПРЕЖДЕНИЕ: заголовок устройства и резервная копия содержат разные UUID!"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:381
+msgid "Non standard key size, manual repair required."
+msgstr "Нестандартный размер ключа, требуется исправление вручную."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:386
+msgid "Non standard keyslots alignment, manual repair required."
+msgstr "Нестандартное выравнивание слотов ключей, требуется исправление вручную."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:396
+msgid "Repairing keyslots."
+msgstr "Исправление слотов ключей."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:415
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: offset repaired (%u -> %u)."
+msgstr "Слот ключа %i: исправлено смещение (%u -> %u)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:423
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: stripes repaired (%u -> %u)."
+msgstr "Слот ключа %i: исправлены полосы (%u -> %u)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:432
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: bogus partition signature."
+msgstr "Слот ключа %i: фиктивная подпись раздела."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:437
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: salt wiped."
+msgstr "Слот ключа %i: соль затёрта."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:454
+msgid "Writing LUKS header to disk."
+msgstr "Запись заголовка LUKS на диск."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:459
+msgid "Repair failed."
+msgstr "Ошибка при исправлении."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:487 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:758
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested LUKS hash %s is not supported."
+msgstr "Запрошенный хэш LUKS %s не поддерживается."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:515 src/cryptsetup.c:960
+msgid "No known problems detected for LUKS header."
+msgstr "Известных неполадок в заголовке LUKS не обнаружено."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:667
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during update of LUKS header on device %s."
+msgstr "Ошибка при обновлении заголовка LUKS на устройстве %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:676
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error re-reading LUKS header after update on device %s."
+msgstr "Ошибка при повторном считывании заголовка LUKS после обновления на устройстве %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:752
+msgid "Data offset for LUKS header must be either 0 or higher than header size."
+msgstr "Смещение данных заголовка LUKS должно быть равно 0 или быть больше размера заголовка."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:763 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:828
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:207 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:909
+msgid "Wrong LUKS UUID format provided."
+msgstr "Указан неправильный формат LUKS UUID."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:786
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: reading random salt failed."
+msgstr "Невозможно создать заголовок LUKS: ошибка при чтении случайной соли."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:807
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: header digest failed (using hash %s)."
+msgstr "Невозможно создать заголовок LUKS: ошибка подсчёта дайджеста заголовка (используйте хэш %s)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:851
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d active, purge first."
+msgstr "Активен слот ключа %d, сначала нужна вычистка."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:857
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d material includes too few stripes. Header manipulation?"
+msgstr "Данный слота ключа %d содержат несколько полос. Подделка заголовка?"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1065
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select keyslot between 0 and %d."
+msgstr "Некорректный слот ключа %d, значение слота ключа должно быть между 0 и %d."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1083 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:452
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe device %s."
+msgstr "Невозможно затереть устройство %s."
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:146
+msgid "Detected not yet supported GPG encrypted keyfile."
+msgstr "Обнаружен пока не поддерживаемый зашифрованный файл ключа GPG."
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:147
+msgid "Please use gpg --decrypt <KEYFILE> | cryptsetup --keyfile=- ...\n"
+msgstr "Используйте gpg --decrypt <ФАЙЛ_КЛЮЧА> | cryptsetup --keyfile=- …\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:168 lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:188
+msgid "Incompatible loop-AES keyfile detected."
+msgstr "Обнаружен несовместимый файл ключа loop-AES."
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:245
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support loop-AES compatible mapping."
+msgstr "Ядро не поддерживает совместимое отображение loop-AES."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:505
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error reading keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Ошибка при чтении файла ключа %s."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:545
+#, c-format
+msgid "Maximum TCRYPT passphrase length (%d) exceeded."
+msgstr "Превышена максимальная длина парольной фразы TCRYPT (%d)."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:586
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2 hash algorithm %s not available, skipping."
+msgstr "Алгоритм хэширования PBKDF2 %s недоступен, пропускается."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:604 src/cryptsetup.c:915
+msgid "Required kernel crypto interface not available."
+msgstr "Требуемый интерфейс ядра crypto недоступен."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:606 src/cryptsetup.c:917
+msgid "Ensure you have algif_skcipher kernel module loaded."
+msgstr "Убедитесь, что загружен ядерный модуль algif_skcipher."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:746
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activation is not supported for %d sector size."
+msgstr "Активация не поддерживается при размере сектора %d."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:752
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support activation for this TCRYPT legacy mode."
+msgstr "Ядро не поддерживает активацию для данного устаревшего режима TCRYPT."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:786
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activating TCRYPT system encryption for partition %s."
+msgstr "Активируется система шифрования TCRYPT для раздела %s."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:864
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support TCRYPT compatible mapping."
+msgstr "Ядро не поддерживает совместимое отображение TCRYPT."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:1085
+msgid "This function is not supported without TCRYPT header load."
+msgstr "эта функция не поддерживается без загрузки заголовка TCRYPT."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:69 lib/verity/verity.c:175
+#, c-format
+msgid "Verity device %s doesn't use on-disk header."
+msgstr "Устройство verity %s не содержит заголовка на диске."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:94
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not a valid VERITY device."
+msgstr "Устройство %s не является корректным устройством VERITY."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:101
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY version %d."
+msgstr "Неподдерживаемая версия VERITY %d."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:132
+msgid "VERITY header corrupted."
+msgstr "Повреждён заголовок VERITY."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:169
+#, c-format
+msgid "Wrong VERITY UUID format provided on device %s."
+msgstr "Указан неправильный формат VERITY UUID на устройстве %s."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:202
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during update of verity header on device %s."
+msgstr "Ошибка при обновлении заголовка verity на устройстве %s."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:266
+msgid "Errors cannot be repaired with FEC device."
+msgstr "Невозможно исправить ошибки с устройством FEC."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:268
+#, c-format
+msgid "Found %u repairable errors with FEC device."
+msgstr "Найдено %u исправимых ошибок с устройством FEC."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:306
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support dm-verity mapping."
+msgstr "Ядро не поддерживает отображение dm-verity."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:317
+msgid "Verity device detected corruption after activation."
+msgstr "После активации обнаружено повреждение устройства verity."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:59
+#, c-format
+msgid "Spare area is not zeroed at position %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Резервная область не заполнена нулями по адресу %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:160 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:287
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:300
+msgid "Device offset overflow."
+msgstr "Переполнение смещения устройства."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:200
+#, c-format
+msgid "Verification failed at position %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Ошибка при проверке по адресу %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:273
+msgid "Invalid size parameters for verity device."
+msgstr "Неправильный размер параметров для устройства verity."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:293
+msgid "Hash area overflow."
+msgstr "Переполнение области хэша."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:370
+msgid "Verification of data area failed."
+msgstr "Ошибка при сверке области данных."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:375
+msgid "Verification of root hash failed."
+msgstr "Ошибка при сверке корневого хэша."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:381
+msgid "Input/output error while creating hash area."
+msgstr "Ошибка ввода-вывода при создании области хэша."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:383
+msgid "Creation of hash area failed."
+msgstr "Ошибка при создании области хэша."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:430
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Kernel cannot activate device if data block size exceeds page size (%u)."
+msgstr "ПРЕДУПРЕЖДЕНИЕ: ядро не сможет активировать устройство, если размер блока данных превышает размер страницы (%u)."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:132
+msgid "Failed to allocate RS context."
+msgstr "Ошибка при выделении контекста RS."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:147
+msgid "Failed to allocate buffer."
+msgstr "Ошибка при выделении буфера."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:157
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read RS block %<PRIu64> byte %d."
+msgstr "Не удалось прочитать блок RS %<PRIu64>, байт %d."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:170
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read parity for RS block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Не удалось прочитать чётность для блока RS %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:178
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to repair parity for block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Не удалось исправить чётность для блока %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:189
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to write parity for RS block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Не удалось записать чётность для блока RS %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:224
+msgid "Block sizes must match for FEC."
+msgstr "Для FEC размеры блока должны совпадать."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:230
+msgid "Invalid number of parity bytes."
+msgstr "Неверное количество байт чётности."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:266
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to determine size for device %s."
+msgstr "Не удалось определить размер устройства %s."
+
+#: lib/integrity/integrity.c:239 lib/integrity/integrity.c:304
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support dm-integrity mapping."
+msgstr "Ядро не поддерживает отображение dm-integrity."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:413
+msgid "Failed to acquire write device lock."
+msgstr "Не удалось захватить блокировку устройства на запись."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:654 lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:675
+msgid ""
+"Device contains ambiguous signatures, cannot auto-recover LUKS2.\n"
+"Please run \"cryptsetup repair\" for recovery."
+msgstr ""
+"Устройство содержит двусмысленные подписи, невозможно провести автоматическое\n"
+"восстановление LUKS2. Для восстановления запустите «cryptsetup repair»."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:99
+msgid "No space for new keyslot."
+msgstr "Нет места для нового слота ключа."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:158
+msgid "Requested data offset is too small."
+msgstr "Запрошенное смещение данных слишком мало."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:195
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: keyslots area (%<PRIu64> bytes) is very small, available LUKS2 keyslot count is very limited.\n"
+msgstr "ПРЕДУПРЕЖДЕНИЕ: очень маленькая область слотов ключа (%<PRIu64> байт), количество доступных слотов ключа LUKS2 очень ограничено.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:866 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:982
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1055 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:105
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:128
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to acquire read lock on device %s."
+msgstr "Не удалось захватить блокировку устройства %s на чтение."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:878 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1149
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:431 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:40
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:69
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to acquire write lock on device %s."
+msgstr "Не удалось захватить блокировку на запись на устройстве %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1072
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forbidden LUKS2 requirements detected in backup %s."
+msgstr "В резервной копии %s обнаружены запрещённые требования LUKS2."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1113
+msgid "Data offset differ on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "Смещение данных различается на устройстве и в резервной копии, восстановление невозможно."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1119
+msgid "Binary header with keyslot areas size differ on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "Двоичный заголовок с областями слота ключа различается на устройстве и в резервной копии, восстановление невозможно."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1126
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s %s%s%s%s"
+msgstr "Устройство %s %s%s%s%s"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1127
+msgid "does not contain LUKS2 header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device."
+msgstr "не содержит заголовка LUKS2. Замена заголовка может уничтожить данные на этом устройстве."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1128
+msgid "already contains LUKS2 header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."
+msgstr "уже содержит заголовок LUKS2. Замена заголовка уничтожит существующие слоты ключей."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1130
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: unknown LUKS2 requirements detected in real device header!\n"
+"Replacing header with backup may corrupt the data on that device!"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"ПРЕДУПРЕЖДЕНИЕ: обнаружены неизвестные требования LUKS2 в заголовке\n"
+"действующего устройства! Замена заголовка из резервной копии может повредить\n"
+"данные на этом устройстве!"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1132
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: Unfinished offline reencryption detected on the device!\n"
+"Replacing header with backup may corrupt data."
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"ПРЕДУПРЕЖДЕНИЕ: на устройстве обнаружено незаконченное внесистемное (offline)\n"
+"перешифрование! Замена заголовка из резервной копии может повредить данные."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1234
+#, c-format
+msgid "Ignored unknown flag %s."
+msgstr "Неизвестный флаг %s игнорируется."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1869
+msgid "Failed to read LUKS2 requirements."
+msgstr "Ошибка при чтении требований LUKS2."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1876
+msgid "Unmet LUKS2 requirements detected."
+msgstr "Обнаружены неудовлетворяемые требования LUKS2."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1884
+msgid "Offline reencryption in progress. Aborting."
+msgstr "Ведётся внесистемное (offline) перешифрование. Прерываемся."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:474
+#, c-format
+msgid "Can not check status of device with uuid: %s."
+msgstr "Невозможно определить состояние устройства с uuid: %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:500
+msgid "Unable to convert header with LUKSMETA additional metadata."
+msgstr "Невозможно преобразовать заголовок с дополнительными метаданными LUKSMETA."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:537
+msgid "Unable to move keyslot area. Not enough space."
+msgstr "Невозможно переместить область слота ключа. Недостаточно места."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:577 lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:854
+msgid "Unable to move keyslot area."
+msgstr "Невозможно переместить область слота ключа."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:672
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - key slot digests are not LUKS1 compatible."
+msgstr "Невозможно преобразовать в формат LUKS1 — дайджесты слота ключа несовместимы с LUKS1."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:684
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - device uses wrapped key cipher %s."
+msgstr "Невозможно преобразовать в формат LUKS1 — устройство использует шифр %s с обёрточным ключом."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:692
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - LUKS2 header contains %u token(s)."
+msgstr "Невозможно преобразовать в формат LUKS1 — заголовок LUKS2 содержит %u токенов."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:706
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - keyslot %u is in invalid state."
+msgstr "Невозможно преобразовать в формат LUKS1 — слот ключа %u находится в некорректном состоянии."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:711
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - slot %u (over maximum slots) is still active."
+msgstr "Невозможно преобразовать в формат LUKS1 — слот %u (больше максимального количества слотов) всё ещё активен."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:716
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - keyslot %u is not LUKS1 compatible."
+msgstr "Невозможно преобразовать в формат LUKS1 — слот ключа %u несовместим с LUKS1."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_token.c:262
+msgid "No free token slot."
+msgstr "Нет свободного слота под токен."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_token.c:269
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to create builtin token %s."
+msgstr "Ошибка при создании встроенного токена %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:141
+msgid "Can't do passphrase verification on non-tty inputs."
+msgstr "Невозможно проверить парольную фразу не с входных tty."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:182
+msgid "Keyslot encryption parameters can be set only for LUKS2 device."
+msgstr "Параметры шифрования слота ключа могут задаваться только для устройства LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:212 src/cryptsetup.c:849 src/cryptsetup.c:1088
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:749 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:814
+msgid "No known cipher specification pattern detected."
+msgstr "Обнаружено указание неизвестного шаблона шифра."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:220
+msgid "WARNING: The --hash parameter is being ignored in plain mode with keyfile specified.\n"
+msgstr "ПРЕДУПРЕЖДЕНИЕ: параметр --hash игнорируется в режиме plain с указанным файлом ключа.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:228
+msgid "WARNING: The --keyfile-size option is being ignored, the read size is the same as the encryption key size.\n"
+msgstr "ПРЕДУПРЕЖДЕНИЕ: параметр --keyfile-size игнорируется, размер для чтения приравнивается размеру ключа шифрования.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:268
+#, c-format
+msgid "Detected device signature(s) on %s. Proceeding further may damage existing data."
+msgstr "Обнаружены подпись(и) устройства на %s. Продолжение работы может повредить существующие данные."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:274 src/cryptsetup.c:969 src/cryptsetup.c:1065
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1138 src/cryptsetup.c:1763 src/integritysetup.c:230
+msgid "Operation aborted.\n"
+msgstr "Операция прервана.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:342
+msgid "Option --key-file is required."
+msgstr "Параметр --key-file является обязательным."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:395
+msgid "Enter VeraCrypt PIM: "
+msgstr "Введите VeraCrypt PIM: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:404
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: parse error."
+msgstr "Недопустимое значение PIM: ошибка при разборе."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:407
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: 0."
+msgstr "Недопустимое значение PIM: 0."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:410
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: outside of range."
+msgstr "Недопустимое значение PIM: вышло за границы диапазона."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:433
+msgid "No device header detected with this passphrase."
+msgstr "С этой парольной фразой заголовка устройства не обнаружено."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:495 src/cryptsetup.c:1790
+msgid ""
+"Header dump with volume key is sensitive information\n"
+"which allows access to encrypted partition without passphrase.\n"
+"This dump should be always stored encrypted on safe place."
+msgstr ""
+"Дамп заголовка с ключом тома является секретной информацией,\n"
+"обеспечивающей доступ к зашифрованному разделу без парольной фразы.\n"
+"Этот дамп следует всегда хранить зашифрованным в надёжном месте."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:574
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is still active and scheduled for deferred removal.\n"
+msgstr "Устройство %s всё ещё активно и запланировано к отложенному удалению.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:602
+msgid "Resize of active device requires volume key in keyring but --disable-keyring option is set."
+msgstr "Для изменения размера активного устройства требуется ключ тома в связке ключей, но указан параметр --disable-keyring."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:727
+msgid "Benchmark interrupted."
+msgstr "Оценка производительности прервана."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:748
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2-%-9s     N/A\n"
+msgstr "PBKDF2-%-9s     Н/Д\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:750
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2-%-9s %7u iterations per second for %zu-bit key\n"
+msgstr "PBKDF2-%-9s %7u итераций в секунду для %zu-битного ключа\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:764
+#, c-format
+msgid "%-10s N/A\n"
+msgstr "%-10s Н/Д\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:766
+#, c-format
+msgid "%-10s %4u iterations, %5u memory, %1u parallel threads (CPUs) for %zu-bit key (requested %u ms time)\n"
+msgstr "%-10s %4u итераций, %5u памяти, %1u параллельных нитей (ЦП) для %zu-битного ключа (запрашивался %u мс)\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:790
+msgid "Result of benchmark is not reliable."
+msgstr "Результат оценки производительности ненадёжен."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:841
+msgid "# Tests are approximate using memory only (no storage IO).\n"
+msgstr "# Тесты, использующие практически только память (без ввода-вывода на хранилище).\n"
+
+#. TRANSLATORS: The string is header of a table and must be exactly (right side) aligned.
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:875
+#, c-format
+msgid "#%*s Algorithm |       Key |      Encryption |      Decryption\n"
+msgstr "#%*s  Алгоритм |      Ключ |      Шифрование |     Расшифровка\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:879
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cipher %s is not available."
+msgstr "Шифр %s недоступен."
+
+#. TRANSLATORS: The string is header of a table and must be exactly (right side) aligned.
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:899
+msgid "#     Algorithm |       Key |      Encryption |      Decryption\n"
+msgstr ""
+"#     Algorithm |       Key |      Encryption |      Decryption\n"
+"#      Алгоритм |      Ключ |      Шифрование |     Расшифровка\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:908
+msgid "N/A"
+msgstr "Н/Д"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:968
+msgid "Really try to repair LUKS device header?"
+msgstr "Действительно попробовать восстановить заголовок устройства LUKS?"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:984 src/integritysetup.c:144
+msgid ""
+"Wiping device to initialize integrity checksum.\n"
+"You can interrupt this by pressing CTRL+c (rest of not wiped device will contain invalid checksum).\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Затирается устройство для инициализации целостности контрольной суммы.\n"
+"Вы можете прервать процесс нажав CTRL+c (остаток незатёртого устройства будет содержать некорректную контрольную сумму).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1006 src/integritysetup.c:166
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot deactivate temporary device %s."
+msgstr "Невозможно деактивировать временное устройство %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1050
+msgid "Integrity option can be used only for LUKS2 format."
+msgstr "Параметр целостности можно использовать только в формате LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1055 src/cryptsetup.c:1115
+msgid "Unsupported LUKS2 metadata size options."
+msgstr "Неподдерживаемый размер параметров метаданных LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1072
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create header file %s."
+msgstr "Невозможно создать файл заголовка %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1095 src/integritysetup.c:192 src/integritysetup.c:201
+#: src/integritysetup.c:210 src/integritysetup.c:276 src/integritysetup.c:285
+#: src/integritysetup.c:295
+msgid "No known integrity specification pattern detected."
+msgstr "Обнаружено указание неизвестного шаблона целостности."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1108
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use %s as on-disk header."
+msgstr "Невозможно использовать %s в качестве заголовка для диска."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1132 src/integritysetup.c:224
+#, c-format
+msgid "This will overwrite data on %s irrevocably."
+msgstr "Данные на %s будут перезаписаны без возможности восстановления."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1173 src/cryptsetup.c:1484 src/cryptsetup.c:1551
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1646 src/cryptsetup.c:1712
+msgid "Failed to set pbkdf parameters."
+msgstr "Ошибка при задании параметров pbkdf."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1242
+msgid "Reduced data offset is allowed only for detached LUKS header."
+msgstr "Сокращение смещения данных допускается только для отсоединённого заголовка LUKS."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1284
+msgid "Device activated but cannot make flags persistent."
+msgstr "Устройство активировано, но нельзя сделать флаги постоянными."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1365
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %d is selected for deletion."
+msgstr "Для удаления выбран слот ключа %d."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1368 src/cryptsetup.c:1706
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %d is not active."
+msgstr "Слот ключа %d не активен."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1377 src/cryptsetup.c:1438
+msgid "This is the last keyslot. Device will become unusable after purging this key."
+msgstr "Это последний слот ключа. Устройство станет неработоспособным после вычистки этого ключа."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1378
+msgid "Enter any remaining passphrase: "
+msgstr "Введите любую оставшуюся парольную фразу: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1379 src/cryptsetup.c:1440
+msgid "Operation aborted, the keyslot was NOT wiped.\n"
+msgstr "Операция прервана, слот ключа НЕ затёрт.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1417
+msgid "Enter passphrase to be deleted: "
+msgstr "Введите удаляемую парольную фразу: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1435
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d selected for deletion."
+msgstr "Для удаления выбрал слот ключа %d."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1498 src/cryptsetup.c:1565 src/cryptsetup.c:1599
+msgid "Enter new passphrase for key slot: "
+msgstr "Введите новую парольную фразу для слота ключа: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1582 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1352
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter any existing passphrase: "
+msgstr "Введите любую существующую парольную фразу: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1650
+msgid "Enter passphrase to be changed: "
+msgstr "Введите изменяемую парольную фразу: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1666 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1338
+msgid "Enter new passphrase: "
+msgstr "Введите новую парольную фразу: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1716
+msgid "Enter passphrase for keyslot to be converted: "
+msgstr "Введите парольную фразу для преобразуемого слота ключа: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1740
+msgid "Only one device argument for isLuks operation is supported."
+msgstr "Только одно устройство можно указать для операции isLuks."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1924 src/cryptsetup.c:1945
+msgid "Option --header-backup-file is required."
+msgstr "Параметр --header-backup-file является обязательным."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1975
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s is not cryptsetup managed device."
+msgstr "%s не является управляемым устройством cryptsetup."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1986
+#, c-format
+msgid "Refresh is not supported for device type %s"
+msgstr "Обновление не поддерживается для устройств типа %s"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2024
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unrecognized metadata device type %s."
+msgstr "Нераспознанный тип метаданных устройства %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2027
+msgid "Command requires device and mapped name as arguments."
+msgstr "Для команды требуется задать устройство и имя отображения."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2049
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"This operation will erase all keyslots on device %s.\n"
+"Device will become unusable after this operation."
+msgstr ""
+"Эта операция сотрёт все слоты ключей на устройстве %s.\n"
+"Устройство станет неработоспособным после этой операции."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2056
+msgid "Operation aborted, keyslots were NOT wiped.\n"
+msgstr "Операция прервана, слоты ключа НЕ затёрты.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2093
+msgid "Invalid LUKS type, only luks1 and luks2 are supported."
+msgstr "Некорректный тип LUKS, поддерживаются только luks1 и luks2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2111
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device is already %s type."
+msgstr "Устройство уже имеет тип %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2116
+#, c-format
+msgid "This operation will convert %s to %s format.\n"
+msgstr "Данная операция преобразует формат %s в %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2122
+msgid "Operation aborted, device was NOT converted.\n"
+msgstr "Операция прервана, устройство НЕ преобразовано.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2162
+msgid "Option --priority, --label or --subsystem is missing."
+msgstr "Отсутствует параметр --priority, --label или --subsystem."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2196 src/cryptsetup.c:2229 src/cryptsetup.c:2252
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %d is invalid."
+msgstr "Некорректный токен %d."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2199 src/cryptsetup.c:2255
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %d in use."
+msgstr "Используется токен %d."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2206
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to add luks2-keyring token %d."
+msgstr "Ошибка при добавлении токена luks2-keyring %d."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2215 src/cryptsetup.c:2277
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign token %d to keyslot %d."
+msgstr "Ошибка при назначении токена %d слоту ключа %d."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2232
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %d is not in use."
+msgstr "Токен %d не используется."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2267
+msgid "Failed to import token from file."
+msgstr "Ошибка при импорте токена из файла."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2292
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to get token %d for export."
+msgstr "Ошибка при получении токена %d для экспорта."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2307
+msgid "--key-description parameter is mandatory for token add action."
+msgstr "Для добавления токена требуется параметр --key-description."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2313 src/cryptsetup.c:2321
+msgid "Action requires specific token. Use --token-id parameter."
+msgstr "Для действия требуется указать токен. Используйте параметр --token-id."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2326
+#, c-format
+msgid "Invalid token operation %s."
+msgstr "Некорректная операция с токеном %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2366
+msgid "<device> [--type <type>] [<name>]"
+msgstr "<устройство> [--type <тип>] [<имя>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2366
+msgid "open device as mapping <name>"
+msgstr "открыть устройство как отображение с <именем>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2367 src/cryptsetup.c:2368 src/cryptsetup.c:2369
+#: src/veritysetup.c:363 src/veritysetup.c:364 src/integritysetup.c:464
+#: src/integritysetup.c:465
+msgid "<name>"
+msgstr "<имя>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2367
+msgid "close device (remove mapping)"
+msgstr "закрыть устройство (удалить отображение)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2368
+msgid "resize active device"
+msgstr "изменить размер активного устройства"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2369
+msgid "show device status"
+msgstr "показать состояние устройства"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2370
+msgid "[--cipher <cipher>]"
+msgstr "[--cipher <шифр>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2370
+msgid "benchmark cipher"
+msgstr "оценка производительности шифра"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2371 src/cryptsetup.c:2372 src/cryptsetup.c:2373
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2374 src/cryptsetup.c:2381 src/cryptsetup.c:2382
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2383 src/cryptsetup.c:2384 src/cryptsetup.c:2385
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2386 src/cryptsetup.c:2387 src/cryptsetup.c:2388
+msgid "<device>"
+msgstr "<устройство>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2371
+msgid "try to repair on-disk metadata"
+msgstr "попытаться исправить метаданные на диске"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2372
+msgid "erase all keyslots (remove encryption key)"
+msgstr "стереть все слоты ключей (удалить ключ шифрования)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2373
+msgid "convert LUKS from/to LUKS2 format"
+msgstr "преобразовать LUKS из/в формат LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2374
+msgid "set permanent configuration options for LUKS2"
+msgstr "задать постоянные параметры настройки LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2375 src/cryptsetup.c:2376
+msgid "<device> [<new key file>]"
+msgstr "<устройство> [<новый файл ключа>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2375
+msgid "formats a LUKS device"
+msgstr "форматировать устройство LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2376
+msgid "add key to LUKS device"
+msgstr "добавить ключ к устройству LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2377 src/cryptsetup.c:2378 src/cryptsetup.c:2379
+msgid "<device> [<key file>]"
+msgstr "<устройство> [<файл ключа>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2377
+msgid "removes supplied key or key file from LUKS device"
+msgstr "удалить заданный ключ или файл ключа с устройства LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2378
+msgid "changes supplied key or key file of LUKS device"
+msgstr "изменить заданный ключ или файл ключа устройства LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2379
+msgid "converts a key to new pbkdf parameters"
+msgstr "преобразовать ключ в новые параметры pbkdf"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2380
+msgid "<device> <key slot>"
+msgstr "<устройство> <слот ключа>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2380
+msgid "wipes key with number <key slot> from LUKS device"
+msgstr "затереть ключ с номером <слот ключа> с устройства LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2381
+msgid "print UUID of LUKS device"
+msgstr "напечатать UUID устройства LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2382
+msgid "tests <device> for LUKS partition header"
+msgstr "проверить <устройство> на наличие заголовка раздела LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2383
+msgid "dump LUKS partition information"
+msgstr "выгрузить в дамп информацию о разделе LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2384
+msgid "dump TCRYPT device information"
+msgstr "выгрузить в дамп информацию об устройстве TCRYPT"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2385
+msgid "Suspend LUKS device and wipe key (all IOs are frozen)"
+msgstr "Приостановить устройство LUKS и затереть ключ (заморозка операций ввода-вывода)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2386
+msgid "Resume suspended LUKS device"
+msgstr "Возобновить работу приостановленного устройства LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2387
+msgid "Backup LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "Сделать резервную копию заголовка и слотов ключей устройства LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2388
+msgid "Restore LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "Восстановить заголовок и слоты ключей устройства LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2389
+msgid "<add|remove|import|export> <device>"
+msgstr "<add|remove|import|export> <устройство>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2389
+msgid "Manipulate LUKS2 tokens"
+msgstr "Управление токенами LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2407 src/veritysetup.c:380 src/integritysetup.c:481
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<action> is one of:\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<действие> может быть:\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2413
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"You can also use old <action> syntax aliases:\n"
+"\topen: create (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen\n"
+"\tclose: remove (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tcryptClose\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Также можно использовать псевдонимы старого синтаксиса <действия>:\n"
+"\topen: create (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen\n"
+"\tclose: remove (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tcryptClose\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2417
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<device> is the encrypted device\n"
+"<key slot> is the LUKS key slot number to modify\n"
+"<key file> optional key file for the new key for luksAddKey action\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<имя> - имя устройства для создания под %s\n"
+"<устройство> - зашифрованное устройство\n"
+"<слот ключа> - номер слота ключа LUKS для изменения\n"
+"<файл ключа> - необязательный файл ключа для нового ключа для действия luksAddKey\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2424
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in metadata format is %s (for luksFormat action).\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Встроенным форматом по умолчанию для метаданных является %s (для действия luksFormat).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2429
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in key and passphrase parameters:\n"
+"\tMaximum keyfile size: %dkB, Maximum interactive passphrase length %d (characters)\n"
+"Default PBKDF for LUKS1: %s, iteration time: %d (ms)\n"
+"Default PBKDF for LUKS2: %s\n"
+"\tIteration time: %d, Memory required: %dkB, Parallel threads: %d\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Встроенные параметры ключа и парольной фразы по умолчанию:\n"
+"\tМаксимальный размер файла ключа: %dКБ, Максимальная длина парольной фразы при вводе вручную: %d (символов)\n"
+"PBKDF по умолчанию для LUKS1: %s, Время итерации: %d (мс)\n"
+"PBKDF по умолчанию для LUKS2: %s\n"
+"\tВремя итерации: %d, Требуемая память: %dКБ, Кол-во параллельных нитей: %d\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2440
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in device cipher parameters:\n"
+"\tloop-AES: %s, Key %d bits\n"
+"\tplain: %s, Key: %d bits, Password hashing: %s\n"
+"\tLUKS: %s, Key: %d bits, LUKS header hashing: %s, RNG: %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Встроенные параметры шифра по умолчанию:\n"
+"\tloop-AES: %s, Ключ: %d бит\n"
+"\tplain: %s, Ключ: %d бит, хэширование пароля: %s\n"
+"\tLUKS: %s, Ключ: %d бит, хэширование заголовка LUKS: %s, RNG: %s\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2449
+msgid "\tLUKS: Default keysize with XTS mode (two internal keys) will be doubled.\n"
+msgstr "\tLUKS: Размер ключа по умолчанию в режиме XTS (два внутренних ключа) будет удвоен.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2460 src/veritysetup.c:537 src/integritysetup.c:621
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s: requires %s as arguments"
+msgstr "%s: требуется %s в качестве аргументов"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2498 src/veritysetup.c:420 src/integritysetup.c:515
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1611
+msgid "Show this help message"
+msgstr "Показать это сообщение"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2499 src/veritysetup.c:421 src/integritysetup.c:516
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1612
+msgid "Display brief usage"
+msgstr "Показать краткие инструкции"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2503 src/veritysetup.c:425 src/integritysetup.c:520
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1616
+msgid "Help options:"
+msgstr "Параметры справки:"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2504 src/veritysetup.c:426 src/integritysetup.c:521
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1617
+msgid "Print package version"
+msgstr "Показать версию пакета"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2505 src/veritysetup.c:427 src/integritysetup.c:522
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1618
+msgid "Shows more detailed error messages"
+msgstr "Показывать подробные сообщения об ошибках"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2506 src/veritysetup.c:428 src/integritysetup.c:523
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1619
+msgid "Show debug messages"
+msgstr "Показывать отладочные сообщения"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2507
+msgid "Show debug messages including JSON metadata"
+msgstr "Показывать отладочные сообщения включая метаданные JSON"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2508 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1621
+msgid "The cipher used to encrypt the disk (see /proc/crypto)"
+msgstr "Шифр, используемый для шифрования диска (смотрите /proc/crypto)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2509 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1623
+msgid "The hash used to create the encryption key from the passphrase"
+msgstr "Хэш, используемый для создания ключа шифрования из парольной фразы"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2510
+msgid "Verifies the passphrase by asking for it twice"
+msgstr "Проверить правильность парольной фразы, запрашивая её дважды"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2511 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1625
+msgid "Read the key from a file"
+msgstr "Прочитать ключ из файла"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2512
+msgid "Read the volume (master) key from file."
+msgstr "Прочитать (главный) ключ тома из файла."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2513
+msgid "Dump volume (master) key instead of keyslots info"
+msgstr "Создать дамп (главного) ключа, а не информации слотов ключей"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2514 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1622
+msgid "The size of the encryption key"
+msgstr "Размер ключа шифрования"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2514 src/cryptsetup.c:2571 src/integritysetup.c:539
+#: src/integritysetup.c:543 src/integritysetup.c:547
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1622
+msgid "BITS"
+msgstr "БИТ"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2515 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1638
+msgid "Limits the read from keyfile"
+msgstr "Ограничить чтение из файла ключа"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2515 src/cryptsetup.c:2516 src/cryptsetup.c:2517
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2518 src/cryptsetup.c:2568 src/cryptsetup.c:2569
+#: src/veritysetup.c:431 src/veritysetup.c:432 src/veritysetup.c:433
+#: src/veritysetup.c:436 src/veritysetup.c:437 src/integritysetup.c:530
+#: src/integritysetup.c:534 src/integritysetup.c:535
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1637 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1638
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1639 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1640
+msgid "bytes"
+msgstr "байт"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2516 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1637
+msgid "Number of bytes to skip in keyfile"
+msgstr "Количество пропускаемых байтов в файле ключа"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2517
+msgid "Limits the read from newly added keyfile"
+msgstr "Ограничить чтение из только что добавленного файла ключа"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2518
+msgid "Number of bytes to skip in newly added keyfile"
+msgstr "Количество пропускаемых байтов в только что добавленном файле ключа"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2519
+msgid "Slot number for new key (default is first free)"
+msgstr "Номер слота для нового ключа (по умолчанию первый свободный)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2520
+msgid "The size of the device"
+msgstr "Размер устройства"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2520 src/cryptsetup.c:2521 src/cryptsetup.c:2522
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2528 src/integritysetup.c:531 src/integritysetup.c:536
+msgid "SECTORS"
+msgstr "СЕКТОРОВ"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2521
+msgid "The start offset in the backend device"
+msgstr "Начальное смещение в нижележащем (backend) устройстве"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2522
+msgid "How many sectors of the encrypted data to skip at the beginning"
+msgstr "Сколько секторов зашифрованных данных пропускать от начала"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2523
+msgid "Create a readonly mapping"
+msgstr "Создать отображение в режиме только для чтения"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2524 src/integritysetup.c:524
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1628
+msgid "Do not ask for confirmation"
+msgstr "Не запрашивать подтверждение"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2525
+msgid "Timeout for interactive passphrase prompt (in seconds)"
+msgstr "Время ожидания при ручном вводе парольной фразы (в секундах)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2525 src/cryptsetup.c:2526 src/integritysetup.c:525
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1629
+msgid "secs"
+msgstr "сек"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2526 src/integritysetup.c:525
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1629
+msgid "Progress line update (in seconds)"
+msgstr "Обновление строки хода выполнения (в секундах)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2527 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1630
+msgid "How often the input of the passphrase can be retried"
+msgstr "Как часто можно повторять попытку ввода парольной фразы"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2528
+msgid "Align payload at <n> sector boundaries - for luksFormat"
+msgstr "Выравнивать полезные данные по границам <n> секторов — для luksFormat"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2529
+msgid "File with LUKS header and keyslots backup"
+msgstr "Файл резервной копии заголовка и слотов ключей LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2530 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1631
+msgid "Use /dev/random for generating volume key"
+msgstr "Использовать /dev/random для генерации ключа тома"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2531 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1632
+msgid "Use /dev/urandom for generating volume key"
+msgstr "Использовать /dev/urandom для генерации ключа тома"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2532
+msgid "Share device with another non-overlapping crypt segment"
+msgstr "Совместно использовать устройство с другим неперекрывающимся шифрованным сегментом"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2533 src/veritysetup.c:440
+msgid "UUID for device to use"
+msgstr "Используемый для устройства UUID"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2534
+msgid "Allow discards (aka TRIM) requests for device"
+msgstr "Разрешить отбрасывать запросы (так называемые TRIM) к устройству"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2535 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1649
+msgid "Device or file with separated LUKS header"
+msgstr "Устройство или файл с отдельным заголовком LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2536
+msgid "Do not activate device, just check passphrase"
+msgstr "Не активировать устройство, только проверить парольную фразу"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2537
+msgid "Use hidden header (hidden TCRYPT device)"
+msgstr "Использовать скрытый заголовок (спрятанное устройство TCRYPT)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2538
+msgid "Device is system TCRYPT drive (with bootloader)"
+msgstr "Устройство является системным диском TCRYPT (с загрузчиком)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2539
+msgid "Use backup (secondary) TCRYPT header"
+msgstr "Использовать резервный (вторичный) заголовок TCRYPT"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2540
+msgid "Scan also for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "Также искать устройство совместимое с VeraCrypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2541
+msgid "Personal Iteration Multiplier for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "Персональный умножитель итерации для устройства, совместимого с VeraCrypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2542
+msgid "Query Personal Iteration Multiplier for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "Запрос персонального умножителя итерации для устройства, совместимого с VeraCrypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2543
+msgid "Type of device metadata: luks, plain, loopaes, tcrypt"
+msgstr "Тип метаданных устройства: luks, plain, loopaes, tcrypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2544
+msgid "Disable password quality check (if enabled)"
+msgstr "Выключить проверку качество пароля (если включена)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2545
+msgid "Use dm-crypt same_cpu_crypt performance compatibility option"
+msgstr "Использовать параметр производительности same_cpu_crypt для dm-crypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2546
+msgid "Use dm-crypt submit_from_crypt_cpus performance compatibility option"
+msgstr "Использовать параметр производительности submit_from_crypt_cpus для dm-crypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2547
+msgid "Device removal is deferred until the last user closes it"
+msgstr "Удаление устройства отложено, пока его не закроет последний пользователь"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2548
+msgid "PBKDF iteration time for LUKS (in ms)"
+msgstr "Время итерации PBKDF для LUKS (в мс)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2548 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1627
+msgid "msecs"
+msgstr "мс"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2549 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1645
+msgid "PBKDF algorithm (for LUKS2): argon2i, argon2id, pbkdf2"
+msgstr "Алгоритм PBKDF (для LUKS2): argon2i, argon2id, pbkdf2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2550 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1646
+msgid "PBKDF memory cost limit"
+msgstr "Ограничение стоимости памяти PBKDF"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2550 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1646
+msgid "kilobytes"
+msgstr "килобайт"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2551 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1647
+msgid "PBKDF parallel cost"
+msgstr "Стоимость параллельности PBKDF"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2551 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1647
+msgid "threads"
+msgstr "нити"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2552 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1648
+msgid "PBKDF iterations cost (forced, disables benchmark)"
+msgstr "Стоимость итераций PBKDF (принудительная, оценка производительности отключена)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2553
+msgid "Keyslot priority: ignore, normal, prefer"
+msgstr "Приоритет слота ключа: ignore, normal, prefer"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2554
+msgid "Disable locking of on-disk metadata"
+msgstr "Выключить блокировку метаданных на диске"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2555
+msgid "Disable loading volume keys via kernel keyring"
+msgstr "Выключить загрузку ключей томов через связку ключей ядра"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2556
+msgid "Data integrity algorithm (LUKS2 only)"
+msgstr "Алгоритм целостности данных (только для LUKS2)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2557 src/integritysetup.c:550
+msgid "Disable journal for integrity device"
+msgstr "Выключить журналирование для устройства целостности"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2558 src/integritysetup.c:526
+msgid "Do not wipe device after format"
+msgstr "Не затирать устройство после форматирования"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2559
+msgid "Do not ask for passphrase if activation by token fails"
+msgstr "Не запрашивать парольную фразу, если активация токеном завершилась ошибкой"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2560
+msgid "Token number (default: any)"
+msgstr "Номер токена (по умолчанию: любой)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2561
+msgid "Key description"
+msgstr "Описание ключа"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2562
+msgid "Encryption sector size (default: 512 bytes)"
+msgstr "Размер сектора шифрования (по умолчанию: 512 байт)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2563
+msgid "Set activation flags persistent for device"
+msgstr "Задать набор постоянных флагов активации устройства"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2564
+msgid "Set label for the LUKS2 device"
+msgstr "Задать метку устройства LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2565
+msgid "Set subsystem label for the LUKS2 device"
+msgstr "Задать метку подсистемы устройства LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2566
+msgid "Create unbound (no assigned data segment) LUKS2 keyslot"
+msgstr "Создать непривязанный (без назначенного сегмента данных) слот ключа LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2567
+msgid "Read or write the json from or to a file"
+msgstr "Прочитать или записать json в файл"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2568
+msgid "LUKS2 header metadata area size"
+msgstr "Размер области метаданных заголовка LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2569
+msgid "LUKS2 header keyslots area size"
+msgstr "Размер области слотов ключей заголовка LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2570
+msgid "Refresh (reactivate) device with new parameters"
+msgstr "Обновить (реактивировать) устройство с новыми параметрами"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2571
+msgid "LUKS2 keyslot: The size of the encryption key"
+msgstr "Слот ключа LUKS2: Размер ключа шифрования"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2572
+msgid "LUKS2 keyslot: The cipher used for keyslot encryption"
+msgstr "Слот ключа LUKS2: Шифр, используемый для шифрования слота ключа"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2588 src/veritysetup.c:461 src/integritysetup.c:568
+msgid "[OPTION...] <action> <action-specific>"
+msgstr "[ПАРАМЕТР…] <действие> <данные для действия>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2645 src/veritysetup.c:501 src/integritysetup.c:585
+msgid "Argument <action> missing."
+msgstr "Не задан параметр <действие>."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2708 src/veritysetup.c:532 src/integritysetup.c:616
+msgid "Unknown action."
+msgstr "Неизвестное действие."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2718
+msgid "Parameter --refresh is only allowed with open or refresh commands.\n"
+msgstr "Параметр --refresh допускается только с командами open и refresh.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2723
+msgid "Options --refresh and --test-passphrase are mutually exclusive.\n"
+msgstr "Параметры --refresh и --test-passphrase взаимно исключают друг друга.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2728
+msgid "Option --deferred is allowed only for close command.\n"
+msgstr "Параметр --deferred допускается только для команды close.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2733
+msgid "Option --shared is allowed only for open of plain device.\n"
+msgstr "Параметр --shared допускается только для открытия устройства plain.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2738
+msgid "Option --allow-discards is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "Параметр --allow-discards допускается только для операции открытия.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2743
+msgid "Option --persistent is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "Параметр --persistent допускается только для операции открытия.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2748
+msgid "Option --persistent is not allowed with --test-passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "Параметр --persistent не допускается одновременно указывать с --test-passphrase.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2757
+msgid ""
+"Option --key-size is allowed only for luksFormat, luksAddKey (with --unbound),\n"
+"open and benchmark actions. To limit read from keyfile use --keyfile-size=(bytes)."
+msgstr ""
+"Параметр --key-size допускается только для  luksFormat, luksAddKey (с --unbound),\n"
+"действий open и benchmark. Для ограничения чтения из файла ключа используйте --keyfile-size=(байт)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2763
+msgid "Option --integrity is allowed only for luksFormat (LUKS2).\n"
+msgstr "Параметр --integrity допускается только для luksFormat (LUKS2).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2768
+msgid "Option --integrity-no-wipe can be used only for format action with integrity extension.\n"
+msgstr "Параметр --integrity-no-wipe можно использовать только для действия format с расширением целостности.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2774
+msgid "Options --label and --subsystem are allowed only for luksFormat and config LUKS2 operations.\n"
+msgstr "Параметры --label и --subsystem допускаются только для операций LUKS2 luksFormat и config.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2780
+msgid "Option --test-passphrase is allowed only for open of LUKS and TCRYPT devices.\n"
+msgstr "Параметр --test-passphrase допускается только для открытия устройств LUKS и TCRYPT.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2785 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1718
+msgid "Key size must be a multiple of 8 bits"
+msgstr "Размер ключа должен быть кратен 8-ми битам"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2791 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1403
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1723
+msgid "Key slot is invalid."
+msgstr "Некорректный слот ключа."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2798
+msgid "Option --key-file takes precedence over specified key file argument."
+msgstr "Параметр --key-file имеет приоритет над указанным значением файла ключа."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2805 src/veritysetup.c:544 src/integritysetup.c:640
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1697
+msgid "Negative number for option not permitted."
+msgstr "В параметре нельзя использовать отрицательные числа."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2809
+msgid "Only one --key-file argument is allowed."
+msgstr "Разрешено указывать только один параметр --key-file."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2813 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1689
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1727
+msgid "Only one of --use-[u]random options is allowed."
+msgstr "Разрешено использовать только один параметр --use-[u]random."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2817
+msgid "Option --use-[u]random is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgstr "Параметр --use-[u]random допускается только для luksFormat."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2821
+msgid "Option --uuid is allowed only for luksFormat and luksUUID."
+msgstr "Параметр --uuid допускается только для luksFormat и luksUUID."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2825
+msgid "Option --align-payload is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgstr "Параметр --align-payload допускается только для luksFormat."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2829
+msgid "Options --luks2-metadata-size and --opt-luks2-keyslots-size are allowed only for luksFormat with LUKS2."
+msgstr "Параметры --luks2-metadata-size и --opt-luks2-keyslots-size допускаются только для операции luksFormat с LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2834
+msgid "Invalid LUKS2 metadata size specification."
+msgstr "Неправильно указан размер метаданных LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2838
+msgid "Invalid LUKS2 keyslots size specification."
+msgstr "Неправильно указан размер слота ключа LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2842
+msgid "Option --align-payload and --offset cannot be combined."
+msgstr "Параметры --align-payload и --offset не допускается указывать вместе."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2848
+msgid "Option --skip is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices.\n"
+msgstr "Параметр --skip поддерживается только для открытия устройств plain и loopaes.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2855
+msgid "Option --offset is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices and for luksFormat.\n"
+msgstr "Параметр --offset поддерживается только для открытия устройств plain и loopaes и для luksFormat.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2861
+msgid "Option --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system or --tcrypt-backup is supported only for TCRYPT device.\n"
+msgstr "Параметр --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system или --tcrypt-backup поддерживается только для устройства TCRYPT.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2866
+msgid "Option --tcrypt-hidden cannot be combined with --allow-discards.\n"
+msgstr "Параметр --tcrypt-hidden нельзя указывать вместе с --allow-discards.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2871
+msgid "Option --veracrypt is supported only for TCRYPT device type.\n"
+msgstr "Параметр --veracrypt поддерживается только для устройств TCRYPT.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2877
+msgid "Invalid argument for parameter --veracrypt-pim supplied.\n"
+msgstr "Указано некорректное значение параметра --veracrypt-pim.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2881
+msgid "Option --veracrypt-pim is supported only for VeraCrypt compatible devices.\n"
+msgstr "Параметр --veracrypt-pim поддерживается только для устройств, совместимых с VeraCrypt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2889
+msgid "Option --veracrypt-query-pim is supported only for VeraCrypt compatible devices.\n"
+msgstr "Параметр --veracrypt-query-pim поддерживается только для устройств, совместимых с VeraCrypt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2893
+msgid "The options --veracrypt-pim and --veracrypt-query-pim are mutually exclusive.\n"
+msgstr "Параметры --veracrypt-pim и --veracrypt-query-pim взаимно исключают друг друга.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2900
+msgid "Option --priority can be only ignore/normal/prefer.\n"
+msgstr "Значением параметра --priority может быть только ignore/normal/prefer.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2905
+msgid "Keyslot specification is required.\n"
+msgstr "Требуется указать слот ключа.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2910 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1703
+msgid "Password-based key derivation function (PBKDF) can be only pbkdf2 or argon2i/argon2id.\n"
+msgstr "Функцией отклонения на основе пароля для ключа (PBKDF) может быть только pbkdf2 или argon2i/argon2id.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2915 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1708
+msgid "PBKDF forced iterations cannot be combined with iteration time option.\n"
+msgstr "PBKDF принудительной итерации нельзя объединять вместе с параметром времени итерации.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2921
+msgid "Sector size option is not supported for this command.\n"
+msgstr "Параметр размера сектора не поддерживается этой командой.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2927
+msgid "Unsupported encryption sector size.\n"
+msgstr "Неподдерживаемый размер сектора шифрования.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2932
+msgid "Key size is required with --unbound option.\n"
+msgstr "С параметром --unbound требуется задать размер ключа.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2937
+msgid "Option --unbound may be used only with luksAddKey action.\n"
+msgstr "Параметр --unbound можно использовать только при действии luksAddKey.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2942
+msgid "Option --refresh may be used only with open action.\n"
+msgstr "Параметр --refresh можно использовать только при действии open.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2953
+msgid "Cannot disable metadata locking.\n"
+msgstr "Невозможно выключить блокировку метаданных.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:67
+msgid "Invalid salt string specified."
+msgstr "Указана недопустимая строка соли."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:98
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create hash image %s for writing."
+msgstr "Невозможно создать образ хэша %s для записи."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:108
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create FEC image %s for writing."
+msgstr "Невозможно создать образ FEC %s для записи."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:178
+msgid "Invalid root hash string specified."
+msgstr "Указана недопустимая строка корневого хэша."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:360
+msgid "<data_device> <hash_device>"
+msgstr "<устройство_данных> <устройство_хэша>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:360 src/integritysetup.c:462
+msgid "format device"
+msgstr "отформатировать устройство"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:361
+msgid "<data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgstr "<устройство_данных> <устройство_хэша> <корневой_хэш>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:361
+msgid "verify device"
+msgstr "проверить устройство"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:362
+msgid "<data_device> <name> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgstr "<устройство_данных> <имя> <устройство_хэша> <корневой_хэш>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:362 src/integritysetup.c:463
+msgid "open device as <name>"
+msgstr "открыть устройство как <имя>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:363 src/integritysetup.c:464
+msgid "close device (deactivate and remove mapping)"
+msgstr "закрыть устройство (деактивировать и удалить отображение)"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:364 src/integritysetup.c:465
+msgid "show active device status"
+msgstr "показать состояние активного устройства"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:365
+msgid "<hash_device>"
+msgstr "<устройство_хэша>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:365 src/integritysetup.c:466
+msgid "show on-disk information"
+msgstr "показать информацию на диске"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:384
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<data_device> is the data device\n"
+"<hash_device> is the device containing verification data\n"
+"<root_hash> hash of the root node on <hash_device>\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<имя> — устройство, создаваемое на %s\n"
+"<устройство_данных> — устройство данных\n"
+"<устройство_хэша> — устройство, содержащее проверочные данные\n"
+"<корневой_хэш> — хэш корневого узла на <устройстве_хэша>\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:391
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in dm-verity parameters:\n"
+"\tHash: %s, Data block (bytes): %u, Hash block (bytes): %u, Salt size: %u, Hash format: %u\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Встроенные параметры dm-verity по умолчанию:\n"
+"\tХэш: %s, Блок данных (байт): %u, Блок хэша (байт): %u, Размер соли: %u, Формат хэша: %u\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:429
+msgid "Do not use verity superblock"
+msgstr "Не использовать проверочный суперблок"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:430
+msgid "Format type (1 - normal, 0 - original Chrome OS)"
+msgstr "Тип форматирования (1 - обычное, 0 - как в Chrome OS)"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:430
+msgid "number"
+msgstr "число"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:431
+msgid "Block size on the data device"
+msgstr "Размер блока устройства данных"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:432
+msgid "Block size on the hash device"
+msgstr "Размер блока устройства хэша"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:433
+msgid "FEC parity bytes"
+msgstr "байты чётности FEC"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:434
+msgid "The number of blocks in the data file"
+msgstr "Количество блоков в файле данных"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:434
+msgid "blocks"
+msgstr "блоков"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:435
+msgid "Path to device with error correction data"
+msgstr "Путь к устройству с данными корреции ошибок"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:435 src/integritysetup.c:528
+msgid "path"
+msgstr "путь"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:436
+msgid "Starting offset on the hash device"
+msgstr "Начальное смещение на устройстве хэша"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:437
+msgid "Starting offset on the FEC device"
+msgstr "Начальное смещение на устройстве FEC"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:438
+msgid "Hash algorithm"
+msgstr "Алгоритм хэширования"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:438
+msgid "string"
+msgstr "строка"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:439
+msgid "Salt"
+msgstr "Соль"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:439
+msgid "hex string"
+msgstr "шестн. строка"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:441
+msgid "Restart kernel if corruption is detected"
+msgstr "Перезапустить ядро, если обнаружится ошибка"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:442
+msgid "Ignore corruption, log it only"
+msgstr "Игнорировать повреждение, только запротоколировать"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:443
+msgid "Do not verify zeroed blocks"
+msgstr "Не проверять обнулённые блоки"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:444
+msgid "Verify data block only the first time it is read"
+msgstr "Проверять блок данных только при первом чтении"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:550
+msgid "Option --ignore-corruption, --restart-on-corruption or --ignore-zero-blocks is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "Параметр --ignore-corruption, --restart-on-corruption или --ignore-zero-blocks допускается только для операции открытия.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:555
+msgid "Option --ignore-corruption and --restart-on-corruption cannot be used together.\n"
+msgstr "Параметры --ignore-corruption и --restart-on-corruption нельзя использовать вместе.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:82 src/utils_password.c:298
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Невозможно прочитать файл ключа %s."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:86 src/utils_password.c:302
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read %d bytes from keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Невозможно прочитать %d байт из файл ключа %s."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:248
+#, c-format
+msgid "Formatted with tag size %u, internal integrity %s.\n"
+msgstr "Отформатирован с размером тега %u, внутренняя целостность %s.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:462 src/integritysetup.c:466
+msgid "<integrity_device>"
+msgstr "<устройство_целостности>"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:463
+msgid "<integrity_device> <name>"
+msgstr "<устройство_целостности> <имя>"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:485
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<integrity_device> is the device containing data with integrity tags\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<имя> — устройство, создаваемое на %s\n"
+"<устройство_целостности> — устройство, содержащее данные с тегами целостности\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:490
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in dm-integrity parameters:\n"
+"\tTag size: %u bytes, Checksum algorithm: %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Встроенные параметры dm-integrity:\n"
+"\tРазмер тега: %u байт, Алгоритм контрольной суммы: %s\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:528
+msgid "Path to data device (if separated)"
+msgstr "Путь к устройству данных (при разделении устройств)"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:530
+msgid "Journal size"
+msgstr "Размер журнала"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:531
+msgid "Interleave sectors"
+msgstr "Чередующиеся секторы"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:532
+msgid "Journal watermark"
+msgstr "Отметка журнала"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:532
+msgid "percent"
+msgstr "процент"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:533
+msgid "Journal commit time"
+msgstr "Время фиксации журнала"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:533
+msgid "ms"
+msgstr "мс"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:534
+msgid "Tag size (per-sector)"
+msgstr "Размер тега (на сектор)"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:535
+msgid "Sector size"
+msgstr "Размер сектора"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:536
+msgid "Buffers size"
+msgstr "Размер буфера"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:538
+msgid "Data integrity algorithm"
+msgstr "Алгоритм целостности данных"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:539
+msgid "The size of the data integrity key"
+msgstr "Размер ключа целостности данных"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:540
+msgid "Read the integrity key from a file"
+msgstr "Прочитать ключ целостности из файла"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:542
+msgid "Journal integrity algorithm"
+msgstr "Алгоритм целостности журнала"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:543
+msgid "The size of the journal integrity key"
+msgstr "Размер ключа целостности журнала"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:544
+msgid "Read the journal integrity key from a file"
+msgstr "Прочитать ключ целостности журнала из файла"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:546
+msgid "Journal encryption algorithm"
+msgstr "Алгоритм шифрования журнала"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:547
+msgid "The size of the journal encryption key"
+msgstr "Размер ключа шифрования журнала"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:548
+msgid "Read the journal encryption key from a file"
+msgstr "Прочитать ключ шифрования журнала из файла"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:551
+msgid "Recovery mode (no journal, no tag checking)"
+msgstr "Режим восстановления (без проверки журнала и тегов)"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:552
+msgid "Recalculate initial tags automatically."
+msgstr "Автоматически вычислять начальные теги повторно."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:631
+msgid "Option --integrity-recalculate can be used only for open action."
+msgstr "Параметр --integrity-recalculate можно использовать только для действия open."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:646
+msgid "Options --journal-size, --interleave-sectors, --sector-size, --tag-size and --no-wipe can be used only for format action.\n"
+msgstr "Параметры --journal-size, --interleave-sectors, --sector-size, --tag-size и --no-wipe можно использовать только для действия format.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:652
+msgid "Invalid journal size specification."
+msgstr "Неправильное задание размера журнала."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:657
+msgid "Both key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "Должны быть указаны параметры файла ключа и размер ключа одновременно."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:660
+msgid "Integrity algorithm must be specified if integrity key is used."
+msgstr "Если используется ключ целостности, то должен быть указан алгоритм целостности."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:665
+msgid "Both journal integrity key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "Должны быть указаны параметры файла ключа целостности и размер ключа одновременно."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:668
+msgid "Journal integrity algorithm must be specified if journal integrity key is used."
+msgstr "Если используется ключ целостности журнала, то должен быть указан алгоритм целостности журнала."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:673
+msgid "Both journal encryption key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "Должны быть указаны параметры файла ключа шифрования и размер ключа одновременно."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:676
+msgid "Journal encryption algorithm must be specified if journal encryption key is used."
+msgstr "Если используется ключ шифрования журнала, то должен быть указан алгоритм шифрования журнала."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:175
+msgid "Reencryption already in-progress."
+msgstr "Уже выполняется перешифрование."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:181
+msgid "Reencryption of device with integrity profile is not supported."
+msgstr "Перешифрование устройства с профилем целостности не поддерживается."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:204
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot exclusively open %s, device in use."
+msgstr "Невозможно монопольно открыть устройство %s, оно уже используется."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:218 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1148
+msgid "Allocation of aligned memory failed."
+msgstr "Не удалось выделить выровненную память."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:225
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read device %s."
+msgstr "Невозможно прочитать с устройства %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:236
+#, c-format
+msgid "Marking LUKS1 device %s unusable."
+msgstr "Отметка устройства LUKS1 %s бесполезна."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:240
+#, c-format
+msgid "Setting LUKS2 offline reencrypt flag on device %s."
+msgstr "Установка внесистемного (offline) флага перешифрования LUKS2 на устройстве %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:257
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write device %s."
+msgstr "Невозможно записать на устройство %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:345
+msgid "Cannot write reencryption log file."
+msgstr "Невозможно записать в файл протокола перешифрования."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:401
+msgid "Cannot read reencryption log file."
+msgstr "Невозможно прочитать файл протокола перешифрования."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:439
+#, c-format
+msgid "Log file %s exists, resuming reencryption.\n"
+msgstr "Файл протокола %s существует, подразумевается перешифрование.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:488
+msgid "Activating temporary device using old LUKS header."
+msgstr "Активируется временное устройство, задействуется старый заголовок LUKS."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:498
+msgid "Activating temporary device using new LUKS header."
+msgstr "Активируется временное устройство, задействуется новый заголовок LUKS."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:508
+msgid "Activation of temporary devices failed."
+msgstr "Ошибка при активации временного устройства."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:586
+msgid "Failed to set PBKDF parameters."
+msgstr "Ошибка при задании параметров PBKDF."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:592
+msgid "Failed to set data offset."
+msgstr "Не удалось задать смещение данных."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:600
+#, c-format
+msgid "New LUKS header for device %s created."
+msgstr "Создан новый заголовок LUKS для устройства %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:660
+#, c-format
+msgid "This version of cryptsetup-reencrypt can't handle new internal token type %s."
+msgstr "Эта версия cryptsetup-reencrypt не работает с новым типом внутреннего токена %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:682
+msgid "Failed to read activation flags from backup header."
+msgstr "Ошибка чтения флагов активации из резервной копии заголовка."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:686
+msgid "Failed to write activation flags to new header."
+msgstr "Ошибка записи флагов активации в новый заголовок."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:690 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:694
+msgid "Failed to read requirements from backup header."
+msgstr "Ошибка чтения требований из резервной копии заголовка."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:731
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s header backup of device %s created."
+msgstr "Создана резервная копия заголовка %s для устройства %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:789
+msgid "Creation of LUKS backup headers failed."
+msgstr "Ошибка при создании резервных копий заголовка LUKS."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:918
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot restore %s header on device %s."
+msgstr "Невозможно восстановить заголовок %s устройства %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:920
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s header on device %s restored."
+msgstr "Заголовок %s устройства %s восстановлен."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:958 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1038
+msgid "Cannot seek to device offset."
+msgstr "Невозможно перемещаться по устройству."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1081
+msgid "Cannot seek to device offset.\n"
+msgstr "Невозможно перемещаться по устройству.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1120 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1126
+msgid "Cannot open temporary LUKS device."
+msgstr "Невозможно открыть временное устройство LUKS."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1131 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1136
+msgid "Cannot get device size."
+msgstr "Невозможно получить размер устройства."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1173
+msgid "Interrupted by a signal."
+msgstr "Прервано сигналом."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1175
+msgid "IO error during reencryption."
+msgstr "Ошибка ввода-вывода при перешифровании."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1206
+msgid "Provided UUID is invalid."
+msgstr "Указан некорректный UUID."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1309
+msgid "Key file can be used only with --key-slot or with exactly one key slot active."
+msgstr "Файл ключа можно использовать только с --key-slot или только при одном активном слоте."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1350 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1361
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for key slot %u: "
+msgstr "Введите парольную фразу для слота ключа %u: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1432
+msgid "Cannot open reencryption log file."
+msgstr "Невозможно открыть файл протокола перешифрования."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1438
+msgid "No decryption in progress, provided UUID can be used only to resume suspended decryption process."
+msgstr "Расшифровка не выполняется, указанный UUID можно использовать только для возобновления приостановленного процесса расшифровки."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1513
+#, c-format
+msgid "Changed pbkdf parameters in keyslot %i."
+msgstr "Изменённые параметры pbkdf в слоте ключа %i."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1620
+msgid "Reencryption block size"
+msgstr "Размер блока перешифрования"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1620
+msgid "MiB"
+msgstr "МиБ"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1624
+msgid "Do not change key, no data area reencryption"
+msgstr "Не изменять ключ, нет области перешифрования данных"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1626
+msgid "Read new volume (master) key from file"
+msgstr "Прочитать новый (главный) ключ тома из файла"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1627
+msgid "PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS (in ms)"
+msgstr "Время итерации PBKDF2 для LUKS (мс)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1633
+msgid "Use direct-io when accessing devices"
+msgstr "Использовать direct-io для доступа к устройствам"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1634
+msgid "Use fsync after each block"
+msgstr "Вызывать fsync после каждого блока"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1635
+msgid "Update log file after every block"
+msgstr "Обновлять файл протокола после каждого блока"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1636
+msgid "Use only this slot (others will be disabled)"
+msgstr "Использовать только этот слот (остальные будут выключены)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1639
+msgid "Reduce data device size (move data offset). DANGEROUS!"
+msgstr "Сократить размер данных устройства (переместить смещение данных). ОПАСНО!"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1640
+msgid "Use only specified device size (ignore rest of device). DANGEROUS!"
+msgstr "Использовать только заданный размер устройства (игнорировать остаток устройства). ОПАСНО!"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1641
+msgid "Create new header on not encrypted device"
+msgstr "Создать новый заголовок на не шифрованном устройстве"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1642
+msgid "Permanently decrypt device (remove encryption)"
+msgstr "Окончательно расшифровать устройство (удалить шифрование)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1643
+msgid "The UUID used to resume decryption"
+msgstr "Используемый для возобновления шифрования UUID"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1644
+msgid "Type of LUKS metadata: luks1, luks2"
+msgstr "Тип метаданных LUKS: luks1, luks2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1663
+msgid "[OPTION...] <device>"
+msgstr "[ПАРАМЕТР…] <устройство>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1677
+#, c-format
+msgid "Reencryption will change: %s%s%s%s%s%s."
+msgstr "Перешифрование изменит: %s%s%s%s%s%s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1678
+msgid "volume key"
+msgstr "ключ тома"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1680
+msgid "set hash to "
+msgstr "установить хэш равным"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1681
+msgid ", set cipher to "
+msgstr ", установить шифр равным"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1685
+msgid "Argument required."
+msgstr "Требуется аргумент."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1713
+msgid "Only values between 1 MiB and 64 MiB allowed for reencryption block size."
+msgstr "Значение размера блока перешифрования должно быть в диапазоне от 1 МиБ до 64 МиБ."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1732 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1737
+msgid "Invalid device size specification."
+msgstr "Неправильно указан размер устройства."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1740
+msgid "Maximum device reduce size is 64 MiB."
+msgstr "Максимальный размер сокращения устройства равен 64 МиБ."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1743
+msgid "Reduce size must be multiple of 512 bytes sector."
+msgstr "Размер сокращения должен быть кратен 512 байтовому сектору."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1747
+msgid "Option --new must be used together with --reduce-device-size or --header."
+msgstr "Параметр --new должен использоваться вместе с --reduce-device-size или --header."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1751
+msgid "Option --keep-key can be used only with --hash, --iter-time or --pbkdf-force-iterations."
+msgstr "Параметр --keep-key можно использовать только с --hash, --iter-time или --pbkdf-force-iterations."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1755
+msgid "Option --new cannot be used together with --decrypt."
+msgstr "Параметр --new нельзя использовать вместе с --decrypt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1759
+msgid "Option --decrypt is incompatible with specified parameters."
+msgstr "Параметр --decrypt несовместим с указанными параметрами."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1763
+msgid "Option --uuid is allowed only together with --decrypt."
+msgstr "Параметр --uuid можно использовать только вместе с --decrypt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1767
+msgid "Invalid luks type. Use one of these: 'luks', 'luks1' or 'luks2'."
+msgstr "Некорректный тип luks. Возможные значения: «luks», «luks1» или «luks2»."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:150
+msgid "Error reading response from terminal."
+msgstr "Ошибка чтения ответа с терминала."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:175
+msgid "Command successful.\n"
+msgstr "Команда выполнена успешно.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:183
+msgid "wrong or missing parameters"
+msgstr "некорректные или отсутствующие параметры"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:185
+msgid "no permission or bad passphrase"
+msgstr "нет прав или некорректная парольная фраза"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:187
+msgid "out of memory"
+msgstr "недостаточно памяти"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:189
+msgid "wrong device or file specified"
+msgstr "указано некорректное устройство или файл"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:191
+msgid "device already exists or device is busy"
+msgstr "устройство уже существует или занято"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:193
+msgid "unknown error"
+msgstr "неизвестная ошибка"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:195
+#, c-format
+msgid "Command failed with code %i (%s).\n"
+msgstr "Сбой команды, код %i (%s).\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:272
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %i created."
+msgstr "Создан слот ключа %i."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:274
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %i unlocked."
+msgstr "Слот ключа %i разблокирован."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:276
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %i removed."
+msgstr "Слот ключа %i удалён."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:285
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %i created."
+msgstr "Создан токен %i."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:287
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %i removed."
+msgstr "Токен %i удалён."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:453
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Device %s already contains a '%s' partition signature.\n"
+msgstr "ПРЕДУПРЕЖДЕНИЕ: Устройство %s уже содержит подпись раздела «%s».\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:461
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Device %s already contains a '%s' superblock signature.\n"
+msgstr "ПРЕДУПРЕЖДЕНИЕ: Устройство %s уже содержит подпись суперблока «%s».\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:482 src/utils_tools.c:546
+msgid "Failed to initialize device signature probes."
+msgstr "Ошибка при инициализации определения подписей устройства."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:526
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to stat device %s."
+msgstr "Ошибка выполнения stat для устройства %s."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:539
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is in use. Can not proceed with format operation."
+msgstr "Устройство %s уже используется. Нельзя продолжать выполнение операции форматирования."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:541
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to open file %s in read/write mode."
+msgstr "Ошибка при открытии файла %s в режиме чтения-записи."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:561
+msgid "Failed to wipe device signature."
+msgstr "Ошибка при затирании подписи устройства."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:568
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to probe device %s for a signature."
+msgstr "Ошибка при определении подписи устройства %s."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:43 src/utils_password.c:75
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot check password quality: %s"
+msgstr "Невозможно проверить стойкость пароля: %s"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:51
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Password quality check failed:\n"
+" %s"
+msgstr ""
+"Ошибка при проверке стойкости пароля:\n"
+" %s"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:83
+#, c-format
+msgid "Password quality check failed: Bad passphrase (%s)"
+msgstr "Ошибка при проверке стойкости пароля: некорректная парольная фраза (%s)"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:193 src/utils_password.c:208
+msgid "Error reading passphrase from terminal."
+msgstr "Ошибка чтения парольной фразы с терминала."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:206
+msgid "Verify passphrase: "
+msgstr "Парольная фраза повторно: "
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:213
+msgid "Passphrases do not match."
+msgstr "Парольные фразы не совпадают."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:250
+msgid "Cannot use offset with terminal input."
+msgstr "Невозможно использовать смещение при вводе с терминала."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:253
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase: "
+msgstr "Введите парольную фразу: "
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:255
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for %s: "
+msgstr "Введите парольную фразу для %s: "
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:285
+msgid "No key available with this passphrase."
+msgstr "Ключ недоступен с этой парольной фразой."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:320
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open keyfile %s for write."
+msgstr "Невозможно открыть файл ключа %s для записи."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:327
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write to keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Невозможно записать в файл ключа %s."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:47
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to open file %s in read-only mode."
+msgstr "Ошибка при открытии файла %s в режиме только для чтения."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:60
+msgid "Provide valid LUKS2 token JSON:\n"
+msgstr "Укажите корректный токен LUKS2 в формате JSON:\n"
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:67
+msgid "Failed to read JSON file."
+msgstr "Ошибка чтения файла JSON."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:72
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Read interrupted."
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Чтение прервано."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:113
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to open file %s in write mode."
+msgstr "Ошибка при открытии файла %s в режиме записи."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:122
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Write interrupted."
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Запись прервана."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:126
+msgid "Failed to write JSON file."
+msgstr "Ошибка записи в файл JSON."
+
+#~ msgid "Device %s is too small. (LUKS2 requires at least %<PRIu64> bytes.)"
+#~ msgstr "Устройство %s слишком маленькое (для LUKS2 требуется не менее %<PRIu64> байт)."
+
+#~ msgid "memory allocation error in action_luksFormat"
+#~ msgstr "Ошибка 'memory allocation error' при выполнении action_luksFormat"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot get info about device %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Невозможно получить информацию об устройстве %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Device %s has zero size.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Устройство %s имеет нулевой размер.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Device %s is too small.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Устройство %s слишком маленькое.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Device %s already exists.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Устройство %s уже существует.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Volume %s is not active.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Раздел %s не активен.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Invalid key size.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Неверный размер ключа.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Key slot %d is not used.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Ключевой слот %d не используется.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Key slot %d is invalid.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Неправильный ключевой слот %d.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Invalid device %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Неверное устройство %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Volume key buffer too small.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Буфер ключей раздела слишком мал.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot read device %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Невозможно прочитать устройство %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "This operation is not supported for %s crypt device.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Данная операция не поддерживается для устройства шифрования %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Device %s doesn't exist or access denied.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Устройство %s не существует или доступ к нему запрещён.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Failed to open temporary keystore device.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Не удалось открыть устройство временного хранения ключей.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Failed to access temporary keystore device.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Не удалось получить доступ к устройству временного хранения ключей.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot get process priority.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Невозможно получить приоритет процесса.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Data offset or key size differs on device and backup, restore failed.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Смещение данных или размер ключа не совпадают на устройстве и в резервной копии, восстановление не удалось.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot open device %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Невозможно открыть устройство %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select keyslot between 0 and %d.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Неверный ключевой слот %d, пожалуйста, выберите ключевой слот между 0 и %d.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "No key available with this passphrase.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Нет доступных ключей для данного пароля.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Key slot %d unlocked.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Ключевой слот %d разблокирован.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Key slot %d is full, please select another one.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Ключевой слот %d полон, пожалуйста, выберите другой.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "All key slots full.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Все ключевые слоты полны.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select between 0 and %d.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Неправильный ключевой слот %d, пожалуйста, выберите между 0 и %d.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "This operation is supported only for LUKS device.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Данная операция поддерживается только для устройств LUKS.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot write header backup file %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Невозможно записать файл резервной копии заголовка %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot read header backup file %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Невозможно прочитать файл резервной копии заголовка %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot open header backup file %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Невозможно открыть файл резервной копии заголовка %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Unsupported LUKS version %d.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Неподдерживаемая версия LUKS %d.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Error during update of LUKS header on device %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Ошибка обновления заголовка LUKS на устройстве %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Error re-reading LUKS header after update on device %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Ошибка перечитывания заголовка LUKS после обновления на устройстве %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot wipe device %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Невозможно очистить устройство %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Option --header-backup-file is required.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Необходима опция --header-backup-file.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "File with LUKS header and keyslots backup."
+#~ msgstr "Файл с резервной копией заголовка и ключевых слотов LUKS."
+
+#~ msgid "DM-UUID for device %s was truncated.\n"
+#~ msgstr "DM-UUID для устройства %s был усечён.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Key slot %d active, purge first.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Ключевой слот %d активен, сначала очистите.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Volume key does not match the volume.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Ключ раздела не совпадает с разделом.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot initialize crypto backend.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Невозможно инициализировать внутренний интерфейс crypto.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper. Is dm_mod kernel module loaded?\n"
+#~ msgstr "Невозможно инициализировать device-mapper. Загружен ли модуль ядра dm_mod?\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Volume %s is not suspended.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Том %s не в режим приостановки.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Volume %s is already suspended.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Том %s уже в режим приостановки.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Error reading passphrase from terminal.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Ошибка чтения кодовой фразы из терминала.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Passphrases do not match.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Кодовые фразы не совпадают.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Key size in XTS mode must be 256 or 512 bits.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Размер ключа в режиме XTS должен быть 256 или 512-разрядный.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Error reading passphrase.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Ошибка чтения кодовой фразы.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Out of memory while reading passphrase.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Недостаточно памяти для считывания кодовой фразы.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Not compatible PBKDF2 options (using hash algorithm %s).\n"
+#~ msgstr "Несовместимые параметры PBKDF2 (использование хеш-алгоритма %s).\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot format device %s which is still in use.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Нельзя отформатировать устройство %s, которое ещё используется.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "This operation is not supported for this device type.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Это действие не поддерживается для данного типа устройств.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Fatal error during RNG initialisation.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Критическая ошибка во время инициализации RNG.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Option --key-file is required.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Требуется параметр --key-file.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Hash algorithm %s not supported.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Алгоритм хэширования %s не поддерживается.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Key processing error (using hash %s).\n"
+#~ msgstr "Ошибка обработки ключа (используется хэш %s).\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Failed to open key file.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Не удалось открыть ключевой файл.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot read requested amount of data.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Не удалось считать запрошенное количество данных.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Writing LUKS header to disk.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Запись заголовка LUKS на диск.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Key slot %d selected for deletion.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Слот ключа %d выбран для удаления.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Key slot %d changed.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Слот ключа %d изменён.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Read the key from a file."
+#~ msgstr "Читать ключ из файла."
+
+#~ msgid "Use /dev/random for generating volume key."
+#~ msgstr "Использовать /dev/random для генерации ключа тома."
+
+#~ msgid "Use /dev/urandom for generating volume key."
+#~ msgstr "Использовать /dev/urandom для генерации ключа тома."
+
+#~ msgid "Device type is not properly initialised.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Тип устройства некорректно инициализирован.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Error during resuming device %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Ошибка при возобновлении работы устройства %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Device %s is still in use.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Устройство %s всё ещё используется.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot unlock memory.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Не удалось разблокировать память.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Maximum keyfile size exceeded.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Максимальный размер ключевого файла превышен.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Running in FIPS mode.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Выполняется в режиме FIPS.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Error reading keyfile %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Ошибка при чтении файла ключа %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Maximum TCRYPT passphrase length (%d) exceeded.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Максимальная длина кодовой фразы TCRYPT (%d) превышена.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Unsupported VERITY version %d.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Неподдерживаемая версия VERITY %d.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "VERITY header corrupted.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Заголовок VERITY повреждён.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot format device %s, permission denied.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Невозможно отформатировать устройство %s, отказано в доступе.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Resume is not supported for device %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Возобновление не поддерживается для устройства %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Unsupported VERITY block size.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Неподдерживаемый размер блока VERITY.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Function not available in FIPS mode.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Функция недоступна в режиме FIPS.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Requested offset is beyond real size of device %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Запрошенное смещение за пределами реального размера устройства %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot write to device %s, permission denied.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Запись на устройство %s невозможна, отказано в доступе.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot seek to requested keyfile offset.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Не удалось перейти к запрошенному смещению в ключевом файле.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Non standard key size, manual repair required.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Нестандартный размер ключа, требуется исправление вручную.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Required kernel crypto interface not available.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Запрошенный криптоинтерфейс ядра недоступен.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Ensure you have algif_skcipher kernel module loaded.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Убедитесь, что загружен модуль ядра algif_skcipher.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Activation is not supported for %d sector size.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Активация не поддерживается для размера сектора %d.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "WARNING: Kernel cannot activate device if data block size exceeds page size (%u).\n"
+#~ msgstr "ПРЕДУПРЕЖДЕНИЕ: Ядро не может активировать устройство, если размер блока данных превышает размер страницы (%u).\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot read keyfile %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Не удалось прочитать ключевой файл %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot read %d bytes from keyfile %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Не удалось прочитать %d байт из ключевого файла %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "UUID for device to use."
+#~ msgstr "UUID используемого устройства."
+
+#~ msgid "Do not activate device, just check passphrase."
+#~ msgstr "Не активировать устройство, просто проверить парольную фразу."
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot wipe header on device %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Не удалось стереть заголовок на устройстве %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Dump operation is not supported for this device type.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Создание дампа не поддерживается для этого типа устройств.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot create header backup file %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Не удалось создать файл резервной копии заголовка %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Requested header backup file %s already exists.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Запрошенный файл резервной копии заголовка %s уже существует.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Disable password quality check (if enabled)."
+#~ msgstr "Отключить проверку качества пароля (если включена)."
+
+#~ msgid ""
+#~ "Option --key-size is allowed only for luksFormat, open and benchmark.\n"
+#~ "To limit read from keyfile use --keyfile-size=(bytes)."
+#~ msgstr ""
+#~ "Опция --key-size разрешена только для luksFormat, open и benchmark.\n"
+#~ "Чтобы ограничить чтение из ключевого файла, используйте --keyfile-size=(количество байтов)."
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot write device %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Не удалось выполнить запись на устройство %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "New LUKS header for device %s created.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Создан новый заголовок LUKS для устройства %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Activated keyslot %i.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Активирован слот ключей %i.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot get device size.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Не удалось получить размер устройства.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Option --new must be used together with --reduce-device-size."
+#~ msgstr "Опция --new должна использоваться совместно с --reduce-device-size."
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot check password quality: %s\n"
+#~ msgstr "Не удалось проверить качество пароля: %s\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Interrupted by a signal.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Прервано по сигналу.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot determine device type. Incompatible activation of device?\n"
+#~ msgstr "Невозможно определить тип устройства. Несовместимая активация устройства?\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Requested dm-crypt performance options are not supported.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Запрошенные параметры производительности dm-crypt не поддерживаются.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Requested dm-verity data corruption handling options are not supported.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Запрошенные параметры обработки повреждённых данных dm-verity не поддерживаются.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot initialize crypto RNG backend.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Невозможно инициализировать выходной буфер crypto RNG.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper, running as non-root user.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Невозможно инициализировать device-mapper, выполнение не от имени администратора.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Can't format LUKS without device.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Невозможно отформатировать LUKS без устройства.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash offset.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Неподдерживаемое смещение хэша VERITY.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Suspend is not supported for device %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Приостановка не поддерживается для устройства %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Error during suspending device %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Ошибка во время приостановки устройства %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Can't format LOOPAES without device.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Невозможно отформатировать LOOPAES без устройства.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash type %d.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Неподдерживаемый тип хэша VERITY %d.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Can't format VERITY without device.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Невозможно отформатировать VERITY без устройства.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "UUID is not supported for this crypt type.\n"
+#~ msgstr "UUID не поддерживается для этого типа шифрования.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot use device %s which is in use (already mapped or mounted).\n"
+#~ msgstr "Невозможно использовать устройство %s, которое уже используется (уже внесено в схему или подключено).\n"
diff --git a/po/sr.po b/po/sr.po
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..637b6d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/po/sr.po
@@ -0,0 +1,1837 @@
+# Serbian translation for cryptsetup.
+# Copyright (C) 2014 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+# This file is distributed under the same license as the cryptsetup package.
+# Мирослав Николић <miroslavnikolic@rocketmail.com>, 2014—2017.
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: cryptsetup-1.7.4\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: dm-crypt@saout.de\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2017-03-02 09:40+0100\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2017-04-06 04:22+0200\n"
+"Last-Translator: Мирослав Николић <miroslavnikolic@rocketmail.com>\n"
+"Language-Team: Serbian <(nothing)>\n"
+"Language: sr\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+"Plural-Forms: nplurals=3; plural=(n%10==1 && n%100!=11 ? 0 : n%10>=2 && n%10<=4 && (n%100<10 || n%100>=20) ? 1 : 2);\n"
+"X-Bugs: Report translation errors to the Language-Team address.\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:262
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper, running as non-root user.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да покренем мапера уређаја, радим као обичан корисник.\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:265
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper. Is dm_mod kernel module loaded?\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да покренем мапера уређаја. Да ли је модул језгра „dm_mod“ учитан?\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:581
+#, c-format
+msgid "DM-UUID for device %s was truncated.\n"
+msgstr "ДМ-УЈИБ за уређај „%s“ је скраћен.\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:729
+msgid "Requested dm-crypt performance options are not supported.\n"
+msgstr "Затражене опције перформанси дм-крипта нису подржане.\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:735
+msgid "Requested dm-verity data corruption handling options are not supported.\n"
+msgstr "Затражене опције рада оштећених података дм-веритија нису подржане.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:80
+msgid ""
+"System is out of entropy while generating volume key.\n"
+"Please move mouse or type some text in another window to gather some random events.\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Систем је ван ентропије приликом стварања кључа волумена.\n"
+"Померите миша или откуцајте неки текст у другом прозору да прикупите неке насумичне догађаје.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:84
+#, c-format
+msgid "Generating key (%d%% done).\n"
+msgstr "Стварам кључ (%d %% је урађено).\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:170
+msgid "Running in FIPS mode.\n"
+msgstr "Ради у ФИПС режиму.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:176
+msgid "Fatal error during RNG initialisation.\n"
+msgstr "Кобна грешка за време покретања РНГ-а.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:213
+msgid "Unknown RNG quality requested.\n"
+msgstr "Затражен је непознат квалитет РНГ-а.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:218
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error %d reading from RNG: %s\n"
+msgstr "Грешка %d читања из РНГ-а: %s\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:200
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto RNG backend.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да покренем РНГ позадинца криптографије.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:206
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto backend.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да покренем позадинца криптографије.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:237 lib/setup.c:1199 lib/verity/verity.c:123
+#, c-format
+msgid "Hash algorithm %s not supported.\n"
+msgstr "Хеш алгоритам „%s“ није подржан.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:240 lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:90
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key processing error (using hash %s).\n"
+msgstr "Грешка обраде кључа (користим хеш %s).\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:285
+msgid "Cannot determine device type. Incompatible activation of device?\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да одредим врсту уређаја. Несагласно покретање уређаја?\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:289 lib/setup.c:1552
+msgid "This operation is supported only for LUKS device.\n"
+msgstr "Ова радња је подржана само за ЛУКС уређај.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:321
+msgid "All key slots full.\n"
+msgstr "Сви исеци кључева су пуни.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:328
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select between 0 and %d.\n"
+msgstr "Исек кључа %d није исправан, изаберите између 0 и %d.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:334
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is full, please select another one.\n"
+msgstr "Исек кључа %d је пун, изаберите неки други.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:473
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for %s: "
+msgstr "Унесите пропусну реч за „%s“: "
+
+#: lib/setup.c:654
+#, c-format
+msgid "Header detected but device %s is too small.\n"
+msgstr "Заглавље је откривено али уређај „%s“ је премали.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:670 lib/setup.c:1435
+msgid "This operation is not supported for this device type.\n"
+msgstr "Ова радња није подржана за ову врсту уређаја.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:909 lib/setup.c:1388 lib/setup.c:2279
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not active.\n"
+msgstr "Уређај „%s“ није радан.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:926
+#, c-format
+msgid "Underlying device for crypt device %s disappeared.\n"
+msgstr "Основни уређај за криптографски уређај „%s“ је нестао.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:995
+msgid "Invalid plain crypt parameters.\n"
+msgstr "Неисправни параметри обичне криптографије.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1000 lib/setup.c:1120
+msgid "Invalid key size.\n"
+msgstr "Неисправна величина кључа.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1005 lib/setup.c:1125
+msgid "UUID is not supported for this crypt type.\n"
+msgstr "УЈИБ није подржан за ову врсту криптографије.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1047
+msgid "Can't format LUKS without device.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да обликујем „LUKS“ без уређаја.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1090
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s which is still in use.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да обликујем уређај „%s“ који је још увек у употреби.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1093
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s, permission denied.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да обликујем уређај „%s“, овлашћење је одбијено.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1097
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe header on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да очистим заглавље на уређају „%s“.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1115
+msgid "Can't format LOOPAES without device.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да обликујем „LOOPAES“ без уређаја.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1153
+msgid "Can't format VERITY without device.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да обликујем ТАЧНОСТ без уређаја.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1161 lib/verity/verity.c:106
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash type %d.\n"
+msgstr "Неподржана врста хеша ТАЧНОСТИ %d.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1167 lib/verity/verity.c:114
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY block size.\n"
+msgstr "Неподржана величина блока ТАЧНОСТИ.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1172 lib/verity/verity.c:76
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash offset.\n"
+msgstr "Неподржан померај хеша ТАЧНОСТИ.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1193
+msgid "Data area overlaps with hash area.\n"
+msgstr "Област података се преклапа са облашћу хеша.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1292
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unknown crypt device type %s requested.\n"
+msgstr "Затражена је непозната врста „%s“ криптографског уређаја.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1402
+msgid "Cannot resize loop device.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да променим величину уређаја петље.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1450
+msgid "Do you really want to change UUID of device?"
+msgstr "Да ли стварно желите да измените УЈИБ уређаја?"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1560
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not active.\n"
+msgstr "Волумен „%s“ није радан.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1571
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is already suspended.\n"
+msgstr "Волумен „%s“ је већ обустављен.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1578
+#, c-format
+msgid "Suspend is not supported for device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Обустављање није подржано за уређај „%s“.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1580
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during suspending device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Грешка за време обустављања уређаја „%s“.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1606 lib/setup.c:1653
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not suspended.\n"
+msgstr "Волумен „%s“ није обустављен.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1620
+#, c-format
+msgid "Resume is not supported for device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Настављање није подржано за уређај „%s“.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1622 lib/setup.c:1674
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during resuming device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Грешка за време настављања уређаја „%s“.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1660 lib/setup.c:2095 lib/setup.c:2109 src/cryptsetup.c:184
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:248 src/cryptsetup.c:736 src/cryptsetup.c:1171
+msgid "Enter passphrase: "
+msgstr "Унесите пропусну реч: "
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1722 lib/setup.c:1858
+msgid "Cannot add key slot, all slots disabled and no volume key provided.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да додам исек кључа, сви исеци су искључени а није обезбеђен ниједан кључ волумена.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1731 lib/setup.c:1864 lib/setup.c:1868
+msgid "Enter any passphrase: "
+msgstr "Унесите неку пропусну реч: "
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1748 lib/setup.c:1881 lib/setup.c:1885 lib/setup.c:1947
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1001 src/cryptsetup.c:1032
+msgid "Enter new passphrase for key slot: "
+msgstr "Унесите нову пропусну реч за исек кључа: "
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1813
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d changed.\n"
+msgstr "Исек кључа „%d“ је измењен.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1816
+#, c-format
+msgid "Replaced with key slot %d.\n"
+msgstr "Замењен је исеком кључа „%d“.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1821
+msgid "Failed to swap new key slot.\n"
+msgstr "Нисам успео да разменим нови исек кључа.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1938 lib/setup.c:2199 lib/setup.c:2212 lib/setup.c:2354
+msgid "Volume key does not match the volume.\n"
+msgstr "Кључ волумена не одговара волумену.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1976
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid.\n"
+msgstr "Исек кључа „%d“ није исправан.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1981
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is not used.\n"
+msgstr "Исек кључа „%d“ није у употреби.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2011 lib/setup.c:2083 lib/setup.c:2175
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s already exists.\n"
+msgstr "Уређај „%s“ већ постоји.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2186
+msgid "Incorrect volume key specified for plain device.\n"
+msgstr "Наведен је неисправан кључ волумена за обичан уређај.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2219
+msgid "Incorrect root hash specified for verity device.\n"
+msgstr "Наведен је неисправан хеш корена за уређај тачности.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2242
+msgid "Device type is not properly initialised.\n"
+msgstr "Врста уређаја није исправно покренута.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2274
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is still in use.\n"
+msgstr "Уређај „%s“ је још увеку употреби.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2283
+#, c-format
+msgid "Invalid device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Неисправан уређај „%s“.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2304
+msgid "Function not available in FIPS mode.\n"
+msgstr "Функција није доступна у ФИПС режиму.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2310
+msgid "Volume key buffer too small.\n"
+msgstr "Међумеморија кључа волумена је премала.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2318
+msgid "Cannot retrieve volume key for plain device.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да довучем кључ волумена за обичан уређај.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2325
+#, c-format
+msgid "This operation is not supported for %s crypt device.\n"
+msgstr "Ова радња није подржана за криптографски уређај „%s“.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2521
+msgid "Dump operation is not supported for this device type.\n"
+msgstr "Радња исписа није подржана за ову врсту уређаја.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:244
+msgid "Cannot get process priority.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да добавим хитност процеса.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:258
+msgid "Cannot unlock memory.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да откључам меморију.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:242 lib/utils_crypt.c:255 lib/utils_crypt.c:402
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:417
+msgid "Out of memory while reading passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "Нестало је меморије приликом читања пропусне речи.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:247 lib/utils_crypt.c:262
+msgid "Error reading passphrase from terminal.\n"
+msgstr "Грешка читања пропусне речи из терминала.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:260
+msgid "Verify passphrase: "
+msgstr "Провери пропусну реч: "
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:267
+msgid "Passphrases do not match.\n"
+msgstr "Пропусне речи се не подударају.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:351
+msgid "Cannot use offset with terminal input.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да користим померај са улазом терминала.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:370 lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:468
+msgid "Failed to open key file.\n"
+msgstr "Нисам успео да отворим датотеку кључа.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:379
+msgid "Failed to stat key file.\n"
+msgstr "Нисам успео да добавим податке датотеке кључа.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:387 lib/utils_crypt.c:408
+msgid "Cannot seek to requested keyfile offset.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да премотам на затражени померај датотеке кључа.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:425
+msgid "Error reading passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "Грешка читања пропусне речи.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:448
+msgid "Maximum keyfile size exceeded.\n"
+msgstr "Премашена је највећа величина датотеке кључа.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:453
+msgid "Cannot read requested amount of data.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да прочитам затражену количину података.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:138 lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:90
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s doesn't exist or access denied.\n"
+msgstr "Уређај „%s“ не постоји или је приступ одбијен.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:429
+msgid "Cannot use a loopback device, running as non-root user.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да користим уређај повратне петље, радим као обичан корисник.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:439
+msgid "Attaching loopback device failed (loop device with autoclear flag is required).\n"
+msgstr "Прикачињање уређаја повратне петље није успело (потребан је уређај петље са опцијом самочишћења).\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:483
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s which is in use (already mapped or mounted).\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да користим уређај „%s“ који је у употреби (већ мапиран или прикачен).\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:487
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot get info about device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да добавим податке о уређају „%s“.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:493
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested offset is beyond real size of device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Захтевани померај је изван стварне величине уређаја „%s“.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:501
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s has zero size.\n"
+msgstr "Уређај „%s“ има нулту величину.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:512
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small.\n"
+msgstr "Уређај „%s“ је премали.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:37
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Failed to setup dm-crypt key mapping for device %s.\n"
+"Check that kernel supports %s cipher (check syslog for more info).\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Нисам успео да подесим мапирање кључа „dm-crypt“ за уређај %s.\n"
+"Проверите да ли језгро подржава „%s“ шифрера (проверите дневник система за више података).\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:42
+msgid "Key size in XTS mode must be 256 or 512 bits.\n"
+msgstr "Величина кључа у „XTS“ режиму мора да буде 256 или 512 бита.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:96 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:296
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:583 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1033
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write to device %s, permission denied.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да пишем на уређај „%s“, овлашћење је одбијено.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:111
+msgid "Failed to open temporary keystore device.\n"
+msgstr "Нисам успео да отворим привремени уређај смештаја кључа.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:118
+msgid "Failed to access temporary keystore device.\n"
+msgstr "Нисам успео да приступм привременом уређају смештаја кључа.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:191
+msgid "IO error while encrypting keyslot.\n"
+msgstr "Грешка УИ приликом шифровања исека кључа.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:256
+msgid "IO error while decrypting keyslot.\n"
+msgstr "Грешка УИ приликом дешифровања исека кључа.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:90
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small. (LUKS requires at least %<PRIu64> bytes.)\n"
+msgstr "Уређај „%s“ је премали. (ЛУКС захтева барем %<PRIu64> бајта.)\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:180 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:419
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1152
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not a valid LUKS device.\n"
+msgstr "Уређај „%s“ није исправан ЛУКС уређај.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:198
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested header backup file %s already exists.\n"
+msgstr "Затражена датотека резерве заглавља „%s“ већ постоји.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:200
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create header backup file %s.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да направим резервну датотеку заглавља „%s“.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:205
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write header backup file %s.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да запишем резервну датотеку заглавља „%s“.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:238
+msgid "Backup file doesn't contain valid LUKS header.\n"
+msgstr "Датотека резерве не садржи исправно ЛУКС заглавље.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:251 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:497
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open header backup file %s.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да отворим резервну датотеку заглавља „%s“.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:257
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read header backup file %s.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да прочитам резервну датотеку заглавља „%s“.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:269
+msgid "Data offset or key size differs on device and backup, restore failed.\n"
+msgstr "Померај датума или величина кључа се разликују на уређају и резерви, враћање није успело.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:277
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s %s%s"
+msgstr "Уређај %s %s%s"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:278
+msgid "does not contain LUKS header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device."
+msgstr "не садржи ЛУКС заглавље. Замена заглавља може да уништи податке на том уређају."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:279
+msgid "already contains LUKS header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."
+msgstr "већ садржи „LUKS“ заглавље. Замена заглавља ће уништити постојеће исеке кључева."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:280
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: real device header has different UUID than backup!"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"УПОЗОРЕЊЕ: право заглавље уређаја има другачији УЈИБ од резерве!"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:299 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:536
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:586 lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:625 lib/verity/verity.c:82
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:180 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:292
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:303 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:323
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:154
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да отворим уређај „%s“.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:330
+msgid "Non standard key size, manual repair required.\n"
+msgstr "Неуобичајена величина кључа, потребна је ручна поправка.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:335
+msgid "Non standard keyslots alignment, manual repair required.\n"
+msgstr "Неуобичајено поравнање исека кључева, потребна је ручна поправка.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:341
+msgid "Repairing keyslots.\n"
+msgstr "Поправљам исеке кључева.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:352
+msgid "Repair failed."
+msgstr "Поправканије успела."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:364
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: offset repaired (%u -> %u).\n"
+msgstr "Исек кључа %i: померај је оправљен (%u —> %u).\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:372
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: stripes repaired (%u -> %u).\n"
+msgstr "Исек кључа %i: траке су оправљене (%u —> %u).\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:381
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: bogus partition signature.\n"
+msgstr "Исек кључа %i: лажан потпис партиције.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:386
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: salt wiped.\n"
+msgstr "Исек кључа %i: присолак је обрисан.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:397
+msgid "Writing LUKS header to disk.\n"
+msgstr "Записујем ЛУКС заглавље на диск.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:422
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported LUKS version %d.\n"
+msgstr "Неподржано ЛУКС издање %d.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:428 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:672
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested LUKS hash %s is not supported.\n"
+msgstr "Затражени ЛУКС хеш „%s“ није подржан.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:443
+#, c-format
+msgid "LUKS keyslot %u is invalid.\n"
+msgstr "ЛУКС исек кључа „%u“ није исправан.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:457 src/cryptsetup.c:668
+msgid "No known problems detected for LUKS header.\n"
+msgstr "Нису откривени познати проблеми за ЛУКС заглавље.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:607
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during update of LUKS header on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Грешка приликом освежавања ЛУКС заглавља на уређају „%s“.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:614
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error re-reading LUKS header after update on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Грешка поновног читања ЛУКС заглавља након освежења на уређају „%s“.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:665
+#, c-format
+msgid "Data offset for detached LUKS header must be either 0 or higher than header size (%d sectors).\n"
+msgstr "Померај података за откачено ЛУКС заглавље мора бити или 0 или већи од величине заглавља (%d сектора).\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:677 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:768
+msgid "Wrong LUKS UUID format provided.\n"
+msgstr "Достављен је погрешан запис ЛУКС УЈИБ-а.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:706
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: reading random salt failed.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да направим ЛУКС заглавље: није успело читање насумичног присолка.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:713 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:809
+#, c-format
+msgid "Not compatible PBKDF2 options (using hash algorithm %s).\n"
+msgstr "Нису сагласне ПБКДФ2 опције (користим хеш алгоритам %s).\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:728
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: header digest failed (using hash %s).\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да направим ЛУКС заглавље: није успео преглед заглавља (користим хеш „%s“).\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:793
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d active, purge first.\n"
+msgstr "Исек кључа „%d“ је радан, прво прочистите.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:799
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d material includes too few stripes. Header manipulation?\n"
+msgstr "Материјал исека кључа „%d“ обухвата премало трака. Да управљам заглављем?\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:966
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d unlocked.\n"
+msgstr "Исек кључа „%d“ је откључан.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1001 src/cryptsetup.c:867
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1041 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1078
+msgid "No key available with this passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "Нема доступног кључа са овом пропусном речју.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1019
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select keyslot between 0 and %d.\n"
+msgstr "Исек кључа %d није исправан, изаберите га између 0 и %d.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1037
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да очистим уређај „%s“.\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:146
+msgid "Detected not yet supported GPG encrypted keyfile.\n"
+msgstr "Откривена је још увек неподржана ГПГ-ом шифрована датотека кључа.\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:147
+msgid "Please use gpg --decrypt <KEYFILE> | cryptsetup --keyfile=- ...\n"
+msgstr "Користите gpg --decrypt <ДАТОТЕКА_КЉУЧА> | cryptsetup --keyfile=- ...\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:168 lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:188
+msgid "Incompatible loop-AES keyfile detected.\n"
+msgstr "Откривена је несагласна датотека кључа АЕС петље.\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:244
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support loop-AES compatible mapping.\n"
+msgstr "Језгро не подржава мапирање сагласно са АЕС петљом.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:476
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error reading keyfile %s.\n"
+msgstr "Грешка читања датотеке кључа „%s“.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:514
+#, c-format
+msgid "Maximum TCRYPT passphrase length (%d) exceeded.\n"
+msgstr "Премашена је највећа дужина „TCRYPT“ пропусне речи (%d).\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:544
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2 hash algorithm %s not available, skipping.\n"
+msgstr "ПБКДФ2 алгоритам хеша „%s“ није доступан, прескачем.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:562 src/cryptsetup.c:621
+msgid "Required kernel crypto interface not available.\n"
+msgstr "Није доступно затражено сучеље криптографије језгра.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:564 src/cryptsetup.c:623
+msgid "Ensure you have algif_skcipher kernel module loaded.\n"
+msgstr "Уверите се да је учитан модул језгра „algif_skcipher“.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:708
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activation is not supported for %d sector size.\n"
+msgstr "Покретање није подржано за величину %d сектора.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:714
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support activation for this TCRYPT legacy mode.\n"
+msgstr "Језгро не подржава покретање за овај стари ТКРИПТ режим.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:748
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activating TCRYPT system encryption for partition %s.\n"
+msgstr "Покрећем „TCRYPT“ систем шифровања за партицију „%s“.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:815
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support TCRYPT compatible mapping.\n"
+msgstr "Језгро не подржава мапирање сагласно са „TCRYPT“-ом.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:1030
+msgid "This function is not supported without TCRYPT header load."
+msgstr "Ова функција није подржана без учитавања ТКРИПТ заглавља."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:70 lib/verity/verity.c:173
+#, c-format
+msgid "Verity device %s doesn't use on-disk header.\n"
+msgstr "Уређај тачности %s не користи заглавље на-диску.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:94
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not a valid VERITY device.\n"
+msgstr "Уређај „%s“ није исправан уређај ТАЧНОСТИ.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:101
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY version %d.\n"
+msgstr "Неподржано издање ТАЧНОСТИ %d.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:131
+msgid "VERITY header corrupted.\n"
+msgstr "Заглавље ТАЧНОСТИ је оштећено.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:167
+#, c-format
+msgid "Wrong VERITY UUID format provided on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Достављен је погрешан УЈИБ запис ТАЧНОСТИ на уређају „%s“.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:199
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during update of verity header on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Грешка приликом освежавања заглавља тачности на уређају „%s“.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:279
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support dm-verity mapping.\n"
+msgstr "Језгро не подржава мапирање дм-тачности.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:290
+msgid "Verity device detected corruption after activation.\n"
+msgstr "Уређај тачности је открио оштећење након покретања.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:59
+#, c-format
+msgid "Spare area is not zeroed at position %<PRIu64>.\n"
+msgstr "Сувишна област није нулирана на положају %<PRIu64>.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:121 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:249
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:277 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:284
+msgid "Device offset overflow.\n"
+msgstr "Прекорачење помераја уређаја.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:161
+#, c-format
+msgid "Verification failed at position %<PRIu64>.\n"
+msgstr "Провера није успела на положају %<PRIu64>.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:235
+msgid "Invalid size parameters for verity device.\n"
+msgstr "Неисправни параметри величине за уређај тачности.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:266
+msgid "Too many tree levels for verity volume.\n"
+msgstr "Превише нивоа стабла за волумен тачности.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:354
+msgid "Verification of data area failed.\n"
+msgstr "Провера области података није успела.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:359
+msgid "Verification of root hash failed.\n"
+msgstr "Провера хеша корена није успела.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:365
+msgid "Input/output error while creating hash area.\n"
+msgstr "Улазно/излазна грешка приликом стварања области хеша.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:367
+msgid "Creation of hash area failed.\n"
+msgstr "Стварање области хеша није успело.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:414
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Kernel cannot activate device if data block size exceeds page size (%u).\n"
+msgstr "УПОЗОРЕЊЕ: Језгро не може да покрене уређајако величина блока података премашује величину странице (%u).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:92
+msgid "Can't do passphrase verification on non-tty inputs.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да одрадим проверу пропусне речи на не-конзолним улазима.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:133 src/cryptsetup.c:564 src/cryptsetup.c:711
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:524 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:578
+msgid "No known cipher specification pattern detected.\n"
+msgstr "Није откривен познат образац одреднице шифрера.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:141
+msgid "WARNING: The --hash parameter is being ignored in plain mode with keyfile specified.\n"
+msgstr "УПОЗОРЕЊЕ: Параметар „--hash“ је занемарен у обичном режиму са наведеном кључном датотеком.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:149
+msgid "WARNING: The --keyfile-size option is being ignored, the read size is the same as the encryption key size.\n"
+msgstr "УПОЗОРЕЊЕ: Опција „--keyfile-size“ је занемарена, величина читања је иста као величина кључа шифровања.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:215
+msgid "Option --key-file is required.\n"
+msgstr "Захтевана је опција „--key-file“.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:267
+msgid "No device header detected with this passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "Није откривено заглавље уређаја са овом пропусном речи.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:327 src/cryptsetup.c:1160
+msgid ""
+"Header dump with volume key is sensitive information\n"
+"which allows access to encrypted partition without passphrase.\n"
+"This dump should be always stored encrypted on safe place."
+msgstr ""
+"Избачај заглавља са кључем волумена је осетљив податак\n"
+"који омогућава приступ шифрованој партицији без лозинке.\n"
+"Овај избачај треба увек бити смештен шифрован на безбедном месту."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:517
+msgid "Result of benchmark is not reliable.\n"
+msgstr "Резултат тестирања није поуздан.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:558
+msgid "# Tests are approximate using memory only (no storage IO).\n"
+msgstr "# Пробе су приближне користећи само меморију (без УИ смештаја).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:583 src/cryptsetup.c:605
+msgid "#  Algorithm | Key |  Encryption |  Decryption\n"
+msgstr "#  Алгоритам | Кључ |  Шифровање |  Дешифровање\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:587
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cipher %s is not available.\n"
+msgstr "Шифрер „%s“ није доступан.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:614
+msgid "N/A"
+msgstr "Недоступно"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:639
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read keyfile %s.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да прочитам датотеку кључа „%s“.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:643
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read %d bytes from keyfile %s.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да прочитам %d бајта из датотеке кључа „%s“.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:672
+msgid "Really try to repair LUKS device header?"
+msgstr "Стварно да покушам да поправим заглавље ЛУКС уређаја?"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:697
+#, c-format
+msgid "This will overwrite data on %s irrevocably."
+msgstr "Ово ће неповратно да препише податке на „%s“."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:699
+msgid "memory allocation error in action_luksFormat"
+msgstr "грешка доделе меморије у „action_luksFormat“"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:721
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use %s as on-disk header.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да користим „%s“ као заглавље на-диску.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:788
+msgid "Reduced data offset is allowed only for detached LUKS header.\n"
+msgstr "Смањени померај података је допуштен само за откачена ЛУКС заглавља.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:890 src/cryptsetup.c:946
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d selected for deletion.\n"
+msgstr "Исек кључа „%d“ је изабран за брисање.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:893
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key %d not active. Can't wipe.\n"
+msgstr "Кључ „%d“ није радан. Не могу да очистим.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:901 src/cryptsetup.c:949
+msgid "This is the last keyslot. Device will become unusable after purging this key."
+msgstr "Ово је последњи исек кључа. Уређај ће постати неупотребљив након чишћења овог кључа."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:902
+msgid "Enter any remaining passphrase: "
+msgstr "Унесите неку преосталу пропусну реч: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:930
+msgid "Enter passphrase to be deleted: "
+msgstr "Унесите пропусну реч за брисање: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1017 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1116
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter any existing passphrase: "
+msgstr "Унесите неку постојећу пропусну реч: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1072
+msgid "Enter passphrase to be changed: "
+msgstr "Унесите пропусну реч за мењање: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1086 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1101
+msgid "Enter new passphrase: "
+msgstr "Унесите нову пропусну реч: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1110
+msgid "Only one device argument for isLuks operation is supported.\n"
+msgstr "Подржан је само један аргумент уређаја за радњу „isLuks“.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1266 src/cryptsetup.c:1287
+msgid "Option --header-backup-file is required.\n"
+msgstr "Захтевана је опција „--header-backup-file“.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1324
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unrecognized metadata device type %s.\n"
+msgstr "Непозната врста уређаја метаподатака „%s“.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1327
+msgid "Command requires device and mapped name as arguments.\n"
+msgstr "Наредба захтева уређај и мапирани назив као аргумент.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1346
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"This operation will erase all keyslots on device %s.\n"
+"Device will become unusable after this operation."
+msgstr ""
+"Ова радња ће обрисати све исеке кључева на уређају „%s“.\n"
+"Уређај ће постати неупотребљив након ове радње."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1380
+msgid "<device> [--type <type>] [<name>]"
+msgstr "<уређај> [--type <врста>] [<назив>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1380
+msgid "open device as mapping <name>"
+msgstr "отвара уређај као <назив> мапирања"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1381 src/cryptsetup.c:1382 src/cryptsetup.c:1383
+#: src/veritysetup.c:329 src/veritysetup.c:330
+msgid "<name>"
+msgstr "<назив>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1381
+msgid "close device (remove mapping)"
+msgstr "затвара уређај (уклања мапирање)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1382
+msgid "resize active device"
+msgstr "мења величину радног уређаја"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1383
+msgid "show device status"
+msgstr "показује стање уређаја"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1384
+msgid "[--cipher <cipher>]"
+msgstr "[--cipher <шифрер>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1384
+msgid "benchmark cipher"
+msgstr "шифрер оцењивања"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1385 src/cryptsetup.c:1386 src/cryptsetup.c:1392
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1393 src/cryptsetup.c:1394 src/cryptsetup.c:1395
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1396 src/cryptsetup.c:1397 src/cryptsetup.c:1398
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1399
+msgid "<device>"
+msgstr "<уређај>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1385
+msgid "try to repair on-disk metadata"
+msgstr "покушава да поправи метаподатке на-диску"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1386
+msgid "erase all keyslots (remove encryption key)"
+msgstr "брише све исеке кључева (уклања кључ шифровања)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1387 src/cryptsetup.c:1388
+msgid "<device> [<new key file>]"
+msgstr "<уређај> [<нова датотека кључа>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1387
+msgid "formats a LUKS device"
+msgstr "форматира ЛУКС уређај"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1388
+msgid "add key to LUKS device"
+msgstr "додаје кључ у ЛУКС уређај"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1389 src/cryptsetup.c:1390
+msgid "<device> [<key file>]"
+msgstr "<уређај> [<датотека кључа>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1389
+msgid "removes supplied key or key file from LUKS device"
+msgstr "уклања достављени кључ или датотеку кључа из ЛУКС уређаја"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1390
+msgid "changes supplied key or key file of LUKS device"
+msgstr "мења достављени кључ или датотеку кључа ЛУКС уређаја"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1391
+msgid "<device> <key slot>"
+msgstr "<уређај> <исек кључа>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1391
+msgid "wipes key with number <key slot> from LUKS device"
+msgstr "брише кључ са бројем <исека кључа> са ЛУКС уређаја"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1392
+msgid "print UUID of LUKS device"
+msgstr "исписује УЈИБ ЛУКС уређаја"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1393
+msgid "tests <device> for LUKS partition header"
+msgstr "испробава <уређај> за заглављем ЛУКС партиције"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1394
+msgid "dump LUKS partition information"
+msgstr "исписује податке ЛУКС партиције"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1395
+msgid "dump TCRYPT device information"
+msgstr "исписује податке ТКРИПТ уређаја"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1396
+msgid "Suspend LUKS device and wipe key (all IOs are frozen)."
+msgstr "Обуставља ЛУКС уређај и брише кључ (сви УИ су замрзнути)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1397
+msgid "Resume suspended LUKS device."
+msgstr "Наставља са обустављеним ЛУКС уређајем."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1398
+msgid "Backup LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "Прави резерву заглавља „LUKS“ уређаја и исека кључева"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1399
+msgid "Restore LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "Враћа заглавље „LUKS“ уређаја и исеке кључева"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1416 src/veritysetup.c:346
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<action> is one of:\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<радња> је једна од следећих:\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1422
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"You can also use old <action> syntax aliases:\n"
+"\topen: create (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen\n"
+"\tclose: remove (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tcryptClose\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Можете такође да користите старе надимке синтаксе <радње>:\n"
+"\topen: create (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen\n"
+"\tclose: remove (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tcryptClose\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1426
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<device> is the encrypted device\n"
+"<key slot> is the LUKS key slot number to modify\n"
+"<key file> optional key file for the new key for luksAddKey action\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<назив> је уређај за стварање под „%s“\n"
+"<уређај> је шифровани уређај\n"
+"<исек кључа> је број „LUKS“ исека кључа за мењање\n"
+"<датотека кључа> изборна датотека кључа за нови кључ за радњу „luksAddKey“\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1433
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in key and passphrase parameters:\n"
+"\tMaximum keyfile size: %dkB, Maximum interactive passphrase length %d (characters)\n"
+"Default PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS: %d (ms)\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Основни:\n"
+"\tНајвећа величина датотеке кључа: %d kB, Највећа дужина међудејствене лозинке %d (знакова)\n"
+"Основно време ПБКДФ2 понављања за ЛУКС: %d (ms)\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1440
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in device cipher parameters:\n"
+"\tloop-AES: %s, Key %d bits\n"
+"\tplain: %s, Key: %d bits, Password hashing: %s\n"
+"\tLUKS1: %s, Key: %d bits, LUKS header hashing: %s, RNG: %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Основни преведени параметри шифрера уређаја:\n"
+"\tпетља-АЕС: %s, Кључ %d бита\n"
+"\tобично: %s, Кључ: %d бита, Хеширање лозинке: %s\n"
+"\tЛУКС1: %s, Кључ: %d бита, Хеширање ЛУКС заглавља: %s, РНГ: %s\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1457 src/veritysetup.c:481
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s: requires %s as arguments"
+msgstr "%s: захтева „%s“ као аргумент"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1490 src/veritysetup.c:386 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1302
+msgid "Show this help message"
+msgstr "Приказује ову поруку помоћи"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1491 src/veritysetup.c:387 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1303
+msgid "Display brief usage"
+msgstr "Прикажите кратку поруку о коришћењу"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1495 src/veritysetup.c:391 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1307
+msgid "Help options:"
+msgstr "Опције помоћи:"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1496 src/veritysetup.c:392 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1308
+msgid "Print package version"
+msgstr "Исписује издање пакета"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1497 src/veritysetup.c:393 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1309
+msgid "Shows more detailed error messages"
+msgstr "Приказује опширније поруке о грешкама"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1498 src/veritysetup.c:394 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1310
+msgid "Show debug messages"
+msgstr "Приказује поруке прочишћавања"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1499 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1312
+msgid "The cipher used to encrypt the disk (see /proc/crypto)"
+msgstr "Шифрер коришћен за шифровање диска (видите „/proc/crypto“)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1500 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1314
+msgid "The hash used to create the encryption key from the passphrase"
+msgstr "Хеш коришћен за стварање кључа шифровања из лозинке"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1501
+msgid "Verifies the passphrase by asking for it twice"
+msgstr "Проверава лозинку тражећи је два пута"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1502 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1316
+msgid "Read the key from a file."
+msgstr "Чита кључ из датотеке."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1503
+msgid "Read the volume (master) key from file."
+msgstr "Чита (главни) кључ вочумена из датотеке."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1504
+msgid "Dump volume (master) key instead of keyslots info."
+msgstr "Даје (главни) кључ волумена уместо података исека кључева."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1505 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1313
+msgid "The size of the encryption key"
+msgstr "Величина кључа шифровања"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1505 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1313
+msgid "BITS"
+msgstr "БИТА"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1506 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1327
+msgid "Limits the read from keyfile"
+msgstr "Ограничава читање из датотеке кључа"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1506 src/cryptsetup.c:1507 src/cryptsetup.c:1508
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1509 src/veritysetup.c:397 src/veritysetup.c:398
+#: src/veritysetup.c:400 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1326
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1327 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1328
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1329
+msgid "bytes"
+msgstr "бајта"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1507 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1326
+msgid "Number of bytes to skip in keyfile"
+msgstr "Број бајтова за прескакање у датотеци кључа"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1508
+msgid "Limits the read from newly added keyfile"
+msgstr "Ограничава читање из новододате датотеке кључа"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1509
+msgid "Number of bytes to skip in newly added keyfile"
+msgstr "Број бајтова за прескакање у новододатој датотеци кључа"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1510
+msgid "Slot number for new key (default is first free)"
+msgstr "Број исека за нови кључ (основно је први слободан)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1511
+msgid "The size of the device"
+msgstr "Величина уређаја"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1511 src/cryptsetup.c:1512 src/cryptsetup.c:1513
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1519
+msgid "SECTORS"
+msgstr "ОДЕЉЦИ"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1512
+msgid "The start offset in the backend device"
+msgstr "Почетни померај у позадинском уређају"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1513
+msgid "How many sectors of the encrypted data to skip at the beginning"
+msgstr "Број одељака шифрованих података за прескакање на почетку"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1514
+msgid "Create a readonly mapping"
+msgstr "Прави мапирање само за читање"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1515 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1317
+msgid "PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS (in ms)"
+msgstr "Време ПБКДФ2 понављања за ЛУКС (у милисекундама)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1515 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1317
+msgid "msecs"
+msgstr "милисекунде"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1516 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1318
+msgid "Do not ask for confirmation"
+msgstr "Не тражи потврђивање"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1517
+msgid "Timeout for interactive passphrase prompt (in seconds)"
+msgstr "Време за упит међудејствене лозинке (у секундама)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1517
+msgid "secs"
+msgstr "секунде"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1518 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1319
+msgid "How often the input of the passphrase can be retried"
+msgstr "Колико често унос лозинке може бити покушан"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1519
+msgid "Align payload at <n> sector boundaries - for luksFormat"
+msgstr "Поравнава утовар на границе <n> одељка — за „luksFormat“"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1520
+msgid "File with LUKS header and keyslots backup."
+msgstr "Датотека са резервом „LUKS“ заглавља и исецима кључева."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1521 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1320
+msgid "Use /dev/random for generating volume key."
+msgstr "Користи „/dev/random“ за стварање кључа волумена."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1522 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1321
+msgid "Use /dev/urandom for generating volume key."
+msgstr "Користи „/dev/urandom“ за стварање кључа волумена."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1523
+msgid "Share device with another non-overlapping crypt segment."
+msgstr "Дели уређај са другим не-преклапајућим подеоком шифрера."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1524 src/veritysetup.c:403
+msgid "UUID for device to use."
+msgstr "УЈИБ уређаја за коришћење."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1525
+msgid "Allow discards (aka TRIM) requests for device."
+msgstr "Допушта одбацивања (тј. СКРАЋЕЊЕ) захтева за уређај."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1526
+msgid "Device or file with separated LUKS header."
+msgstr "Уређај или датотека са одвојеним ЛУКС заглављем."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1527
+msgid "Do not activate device, just check passphrase."
+msgstr "Не покреће уређај, само проверава лозинку."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1528
+msgid "Use hidden header (hidden TCRYPT device)."
+msgstr "Користи скривено заглавље (скривени ТКРИПТ уређај)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1529
+msgid "Device is system TCRYPT drive (with bootloader)."
+msgstr "Уређај је ТКРИПТ диск система (са подизачем система)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1530
+msgid "Use backup (secondary) TCRYPT header."
+msgstr "Користи резервно (другоразредно) ТКРИПТ заглавље."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1531
+msgid "Scan also for VeraCrypt compatible device."
+msgstr "Такође обавља преглед за уређајима сагласним са Веракриптом."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1532
+msgid "Type of device metadata: luks, plain, loopaes, tcrypt."
+msgstr "Врста метаподатака уређаја: luks, plain, loopaes, tcrypt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1533
+msgid "Disable password quality check (if enabled)."
+msgstr "Искључује проверу квалитета лозинке (ако је укључена)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1534
+msgid "Use dm-crypt same_cpu_crypt performance compatibility option."
+msgstr "Користи опцију сагласности перформансе „same_cpu_crypt“ дм-крипта."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1535
+msgid "Use dm-crypt submit_from_crypt_cpus performance compatibility option."
+msgstr "Користи опцију сагласности перформансе „submit_from_crypt_cpus“ дм-крипта."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1551 src/veritysetup.c:423
+msgid "[OPTION...] <action> <action-specific>"
+msgstr "[ОПЦИЈА...] <радња> <посебност-радње>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1602 src/veritysetup.c:460
+msgid "Argument <action> missing."
+msgstr "Недостаје аргумент <радња>."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1655 src/veritysetup.c:466
+msgid "Unknown action."
+msgstr "Непозната радња."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1665
+msgid "Option --shared is allowed only for open of plain device.\n"
+msgstr "Опција „--shared“ је допуштена само за отварање обичног уређаја.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1670
+msgid "Option --allow-discards is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "Опција „--allow-discards“ је допуштена само за радњу отварања.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1678
+msgid ""
+"Option --key-size is allowed only for luksFormat, open and benchmark.\n"
+"To limit read from keyfile use --keyfile-size=(bytes)."
+msgstr ""
+"Опција „--key-size“ је допуштена само за „luksFormat“, отварање и оцењивање.\n"
+"Да ограничите читање из датотеке кључа користите „--keyfile-size=(бајтова)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1685
+msgid "Option --test-passphrase is allowed only for open of LUKS and TCRYPT devices.\n"
+msgstr "Опција „--test-passphrase“ је допуштена само за отварање ЛУКС и ТКРИПТ уређаје.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1690 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1389
+msgid "Key size must be a multiple of 8 bits"
+msgstr "Величина кључа мора бити умножак од 8 бита"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1697 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1394
+msgid "Key slot is invalid."
+msgstr "Исек кључа није исправан."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1704
+msgid "Option --key-file takes precedence over specified key file argument.\n"
+msgstr "Опција „--key-file“ има првенство над наведеним аргументом датотеке кључа.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1712 src/veritysetup.c:488 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1378
+msgid "Negative number for option not permitted."
+msgstr "Негативан број за опцију није допуштен."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1716
+msgid "Only one --key-file argument is allowed."
+msgstr "Дозвољен је само један аргумент „--key-file“."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1720 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1372
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1398
+msgid "Only one of --use-[u]random options is allowed."
+msgstr "Дозвољена је само једна опција „--use-[u]random“."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1724
+msgid "Option --use-[u]random is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgstr "Опција „--use-[u]random“ је допуштена само за „luksFormat“."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1728
+msgid "Option --uuid is allowed only for luksFormat and luksUUID."
+msgstr "Опција „--uuid“ је допуштена само за „luksFormat“ и „luksUUID“."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1732
+msgid "Option --align-payload is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgstr "Опција „--align-payload“ је допуштена само за „luksFormat“."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1738
+msgid "Option --skip is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices.\n"
+msgstr "Опција „--skip“ је подржана само за отварање обичних и упетљаних уређаја.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1744
+msgid "Option --offset is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices.\n"
+msgstr "Опција „--offset“ је подржана само за отварање обичних и упетљаних уређаја.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1750
+msgid "Option --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system or --tcrypt-backup is supported only for TCRYPT device.\n"
+msgstr "Опција „--tcrypt-hidden“, „--tcrypt-system“ или „--tcrypt-backup“ је подржана само за ТКРИПТ уређај.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1755
+msgid "Option --tcrypt-hidden cannot be combined with --allow-discards.\n"
+msgstr "Опција „--tcrypt-hidden“ не може бити обједињена са „--allow-discards“.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1760
+msgid "Option --veracrypt is supported only for TCRYPT device type.\n"
+msgstr "Опција „--veracrypt“ је подржана само за ТКРИПТ уређај.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:61
+msgid "Invalid salt string specified.\n"
+msgstr "Наведена је неисправна ниска присолка.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:91
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create hash image %s for writing.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да направим хеш слику „%s“ ради уписа.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:158
+msgid "Invalid root hash string specified.\n"
+msgstr "Наведена је неисправна ниска хеша корена.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:326
+msgid "<data_device> <hash_device>"
+msgstr "<уређај_података> <уређај_хеша>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:326
+msgid "format device"
+msgstr "форматира уређај"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:327
+msgid "<data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgstr "<уређај_података> <уређај_хеша> <хеш_корена>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:327
+msgid "verify device"
+msgstr "проверава уређај"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:328
+msgid "<name> <data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgstr "<назив> <уређај_података> <уређај_хеша> <хеш_корена>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:328
+msgid "create active device"
+msgstr "прави радни уређај"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:329
+msgid "remove (deactivate) device"
+msgstr "уклања (искључује) уређај"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:330
+msgid "show active device status"
+msgstr "показује стање радног уређаја"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:331
+msgid "<hash_device>"
+msgstr "<уређај_хеша>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:331
+msgid "show on-disk information"
+msgstr "приказује податке на-диску"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:350
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<data_device> is the data device\n"
+"<hash_device> is the device containing verification data\n"
+"<root_hash> hash of the root node on <hash_device>\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<назив> јесте уређај за стварање под „%s“\n"
+"<уређај_података> јесте уређај података\n"
+"<уређај_хеша> јесте уређај који садржи податке проверавања\n"
+"<хеш_корена> хеш кореног чвора на <уређају_хеша>\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:357
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in dm-verity parameters:\n"
+"\tHash: %s, Data block (bytes): %u, Hash block (bytes): %u, Salt size: %u, Hash format: %u\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Основни преведени параметри дм-тачности:\n"
+"\tХеш: %s, Блок података (бајта): %u, Блок хеша (бајта): %u, Величина присолка: %u, Запис хеша: %u\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:395
+msgid "Do not use verity superblock"
+msgstr "Не користи суперблок тачности"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:396
+msgid "Format type (1 - normal, 0 - original Chrome OS)"
+msgstr "Врста записа (1 — обично, 0 — изворни Хром ОС)"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:396
+msgid "number"
+msgstr "број"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:397
+msgid "Block size on the data device"
+msgstr "Величина блока на уређају података"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:398
+msgid "Block size on the hash device"
+msgstr "Величина блока на уређају хеша"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:399
+msgid "The number of blocks in the data file"
+msgstr "Број блокова у датотеци података"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:399
+msgid "blocks"
+msgstr "блокови"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:400
+msgid "Starting offset on the hash device"
+msgstr "Почетни померај на уређају хеша"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:401
+msgid "Hash algorithm"
+msgstr "Алгоритам хеша"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:401
+msgid "string"
+msgstr "ниска"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:402
+msgid "Salt"
+msgstr "Присолак"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:402
+msgid "hex string"
+msgstr "ниска хеша"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:404
+msgid "Restart kernel if corruption is detected"
+msgstr "Поново покреће језгро ако је откривено оштећење"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:405
+msgid "Ignore corruption, log it only"
+msgstr "Занемарује оштећење, само га бележи у дневник"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:406
+msgid "Do not verify zeroed blocks"
+msgstr "Не проверава нулиране блокове"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:494
+msgid "Option --ignore-corruption, --restart-on-corruption or --ignore-zero-blocks is allowed only for create operation.\n"
+msgstr "Опција „--ignore-corruption“, „--restart-on-corruption“ или „--ignore-zero-blocks“ су дозвољене само за радње стварања.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:499
+msgid "Option --ignore-corruption and --restart-on-corruption cannot be used together.\n"
+msgstr "Опције „--ignore-corruption“ и „--restart-on-corruption“ се не могу користити заједно.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:150
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot exclusively open %s, device in use.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу изричито да отворим „%s“, уређај је у употреби.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:164 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:920
+msgid "Allocation of aligned memory failed.\n"
+msgstr "Додела поређане меморије није успела.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:171
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да читам уређај „%s“.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:182
+#, c-format
+msgid "Marking LUKS device %s unusable.\n"
+msgstr "Означавам ЛУКС уређај „%s“ неупотребљивим.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:198
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да пишем на уређају „%s“.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:281
+msgid "Cannot write reencryption log file.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да запишем датотеку дневника поновног шифровања.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:337
+msgid "Cannot read reencryption log file.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да прочитам датотеку дневника поновног шифровања.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:375
+#, c-format
+msgid "Log file %s exists, resuming reencryption.\n"
+msgstr "Датотека дневника „%s“ постоји, настављам поновно шифровање.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:425
+msgid "Activating temporary device using old LUKS header.\n"
+msgstr "Покрећем привремени уређај користећи старо ЛУКС заглавље.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:436
+msgid "Activating temporary device using new LUKS header.\n"
+msgstr "Покрећем привремени уређај користећи ново ЛУКС заглавље.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:446
+msgid "Activation of temporary devices failed.\n"
+msgstr "Покретање привременог уређаја није успело.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:472
+#, c-format
+msgid "New LUKS header for device %s created.\n"
+msgstr "Направљено је ново ЛУКС заглавље за уређај „%s“.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:480
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activated keyslot %i.\n"
+msgstr "Покренути исек кључа %i.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:506
+#, c-format
+msgid "LUKS header backup of device %s created.\n"
+msgstr "Направљена је резерва ЛУКС заглавља за уређај „%s“.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:554
+msgid "Creation of LUKS backup headers failed.\n"
+msgstr "Није успело прављење резерве ЛУКС заглавља.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:656
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot restore LUKS header on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да повратим ЛУКС заглавље на уређају „%s“.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:658
+#, c-format
+msgid "LUKS header on device %s restored.\n"
+msgstr "Повраћено је ЛУКС заглавље на уређају „%s“.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:693
+#, c-format
+msgid "Progress: %5.1f%%, ETA %02llu:%02llu, %4llu MiB written, speed %5.1f MiB/s%s"
+msgstr "Напредовање: %5.1f%%, ЕТА %02llu:%02llu, %4llu MiB је записано, брзина %5.1f MiB/s%s"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:732 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:811
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:853
+msgid "Cannot seek to device offset.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да премотам на померај уређаја.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:892 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:898
+msgid "Cannot open temporary LUKS device.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да отворим привремени ЛУКС уређај.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:903 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:908
+msgid "Cannot get device size.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да добавим величину уређаја.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:946
+msgid "Interrupted by a signal.\n"
+msgstr "Прекинуто сигналом.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:948
+msgid "IO error during reencryption.\n"
+msgstr "УИ грешка за време поновног шифровања.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:978
+msgid "Provided UUID is invalid.\n"
+msgstr "Достављени УУИД није исправан.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1070
+msgid "Key file can be used only with --key-slot or with exactly one key slot active.\n"
+msgstr "Датотека кључа може бити коришћена само са „--key-slot“ или са тачно једним радним исеком кључа.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1114 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1129
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for key slot %u: "
+msgstr "Унесите пропусну реч за исек кључа %u: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1178
+msgid "Cannot open reencryption log file.\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да отворим датотеку дневника поновног шифровања.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1184
+msgid "No decryption in progress, provided UUID can be used only to resume suspended decryption process.\n"
+msgstr "Нема описа у напретку, достављени УУИД се може користити само за настављање заустављеног процеса дешифровања.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1311
+msgid "Reencryption block size"
+msgstr "Величина блока поновног шифровања"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1311
+msgid "MiB"
+msgstr "MiB"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1315
+msgid "Do not change key, no data area reencryption."
+msgstr "Не мења кључ, нема поновног шифровања области података."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1322
+msgid "Use direct-io when accessing devices."
+msgstr "Користи непосредни-уи приликом приступа уређајима."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1323
+msgid "Use fsync after each block."
+msgstr "Користи ф-усаглашавање након сваког блока."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1324
+msgid "Update log file after every block."
+msgstr "Освежава датотеку дневника након сваког блока."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1325
+msgid "Use only this slot (others will be disabled)."
+msgstr "Користи само овај исек (остали ће бити искључени)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1328
+msgid "Reduce data device size (move data offset). DANGEROUS!"
+msgstr "Смањује величину уређаја података (премешта померај података). ОВО ЈЕ ОПАСНО!"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1329
+msgid "Use only specified device size (ignore rest of device). DANGEROUS!"
+msgstr "Користи само наведену величину уређаја (занемарује остатак уређаја). ОВО ЈЕ ОПСАНО!"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1330
+msgid "Create new header on not encrypted device."
+msgstr "Прави ново заглавље на нешифрованом уређају."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1331
+msgid "Permanently decrypt device (remove encryption)."
+msgstr "Трајно дешифрује уређај (уклања шифровање)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1332
+msgid "The uuid used to resume decryption."
+msgstr "ууид коришћен за настављање дешифровања."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1348
+msgid "[OPTION...] <device>"
+msgstr "[ОПЦИЈА...] <уређај>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1362
+#, c-format
+msgid "Reencryption will change: volume key%s%s%s%s.\n"
+msgstr "Поновно шифровање ће изменити: кључ волумена%s%s%s%s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1363
+msgid ", set hash to "
+msgstr ", поставља хеш на "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1364
+msgid ", set cipher to "
+msgstr ", поставља шифрера на "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1368
+msgid "Argument required."
+msgstr "Потребан је аргумент."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1384
+msgid "Only values between 1 MiB and 64 MiB allowed for reencryption block size."
+msgstr "Само вредности између 1 MiB и 64 MiB су допуштене завеличину блока поновног шифровања."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1403 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1408
+msgid "Invalid device size specification."
+msgstr "Неисправна одредба величине уређаја."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1411
+msgid "Maximum device reduce size is 64 MiB."
+msgstr "Највећа величина смањења уређаја је 64 MiB."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1414
+msgid "Reduce size must be multiple of 512 bytes sector."
+msgstr "Величина смањивања мора бити умножак одељка од 512 бајта."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1418
+msgid "Option --new must be used together with --reduce-device-size."
+msgstr "Опција „--new“ мора да се користи са „--reduce-device-size“."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1422
+msgid "Option --keep-key can be used only with --hash or --iter-time."
+msgstr "Опција „--keep-key“ може да се користи само са „--hash“ или „--iter-time“."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1426
+msgid "Option --new cannot be used together with --decrypt."
+msgstr "Опција „--new“ не може да се користи са „--decrypt“."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1430
+msgid "Option --decrypt is incompatible with specified parameters."
+msgstr "Опција „--decrypt“ није сагласна са наведеним параметрима."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1434
+msgid "Option --uuid is allowed only together with --decrypt."
+msgstr "Опција „--uuid“ је дозвољена само заједно са „--decrypt“."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:151
+msgid "Error reading response from terminal.\n"
+msgstr "Грешка читања одговора из терминала.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:173
+msgid "Command successful.\n"
+msgstr "Наредба је успела.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:191
+#, c-format
+msgid "Command failed with code %i"
+msgstr "Наредба није успела са кодом %i"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:42 src/utils_password.c:74
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot check password quality: %s\n"
+msgstr "Не могу да проверим квалитет лозинке: %s\n"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:50
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Password quality check failed:\n"
+" %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Провера квалитета лозинке није успела:\n"
+" %s\n"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:82
+#, c-format
+msgid "Password quality check failed: Bad passphrase (%s)\n"
+msgstr "Провера квалитета лозинке није успела: Лоша шифра (%s)\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot find a free loopback device.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Не могу да пронађем слободан уређај повратне петље.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot open device %s\n"
+#~ msgstr "Не могу да отворим уређај „%s“\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot use passed UUID unless decryption in progress.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Не могу да користим прослеђени УУИД док је дешифровање у току.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Marking LUKS device %s usable.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Означавам ЛУКС уређај „%s“ употребљивим.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "WARNING: this is experimental code, it can completely break your data.\n"
+#~ msgstr "УПОЗОРЕЊЕ: ово је пробни код, може потпуно да оштети ваше податке.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "FIPS checksum verification failed.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Није успела провера ФИПС провере суме.\n"
diff --git a/po/sv.po b/po/sv.po
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e8853da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/po/sv.po
@@ -0,0 +1,2739 @@
+# Swedish translation for cryptsetup.
+# Copyright © 2009 - 2017 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+# This file is distributed under the same license as the cryptsetup package.
+# Daniel Nylander <po@danielnylander.se>, 2009.
+# Josef Andersson <l10nl18nsweja@gmail.com>, 2016, 2017.
+#
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: cryptsetup 2.0.0\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: dm-crypt@saout.de\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2017-12-10 20:27+0100\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2017-12-16 15:54+0100\n"
+"Last-Translator: Josef Andersson <josef.andersson@fripost.org>\n"
+"Language-Team: Swedish <tp-sv@listor.tp-sv.se>\n"
+"Language: sv\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+"X-Bugs: Report translation errors to the Language-Team address.\n"
+"X-Generator: Poedit 2.0.4\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:328
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper, running as non-root user.\n"
+msgstr "Det går initiera device-mapper, kör som icke-root-användare.\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:331
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper. Is dm_mod kernel module loaded?\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte initiera device-mapper. Är kärnmodulen dm_mod inläst?\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:932
+msgid "Requested deferred flag is not supported.\n"
+msgstr "Begärd förskjuten flagga stöds inte.\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:997
+#, c-format
+msgid "DM-UUID for device %s was truncated.\n"
+msgstr "DM-UUID för enheten %s förkortades.\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1209
+msgid "Requested dm-crypt performance options are not supported.\n"
+msgstr "Begärda dm-crypt-prestandaalternativ stöds inte.\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1215
+msgid "Requested dm-verity data corruption handling options are not supported.\n"
+msgstr "Begärda dm-verity-hanteringsalternativ för skadad data stöds inte.\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1219
+msgid "Requested dm-verity FEC options are not supported.\n"
+msgstr "Begärda dm-verity FEC-alternativ stöds inte.\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1223
+msgid "Requested data integrity options are not supported.\n"
+msgstr "Begärda dataintegritetsalternativ stöds inte.\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1225
+msgid "Requested sector_size option is not supported.\n"
+msgstr "Begärda sektor_storleksalternativ stöds inte.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:80
+msgid ""
+"System is out of entropy while generating volume key.\n"
+"Please move mouse or type some text in another window to gather some random events.\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Systemet fick slut på entropi under generering av volymnyckeln.\n"
+"Flytta musen eller skriv in text i ett annat fönster för att samla några slumpmässiga händelser.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:84
+#, c-format
+msgid "Generating key (%d%% done).\n"
+msgstr "Genererar nyckel (%d%% done).\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:170
+msgid "Running in FIPS mode.\n"
+msgstr "Kör i FIPS-läge.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:176
+msgid "Fatal error during RNG initialisation.\n"
+msgstr "Ödesdigert fel under RNG-initiering.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:213
+msgid "Unknown RNG quality requested.\n"
+msgstr "Okänd RNG-kvalitet begärd.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:218
+msgid "Error reading from RNG.\n"
+msgstr "Fel vid läsning från RNG.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:200
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto RNG backend.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte initiera RNG-krypteringsbakände.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:206
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto backend.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte initiera krypteringsbakände.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:237 lib/setup.c:1744 lib/verity/verity.c:123
+#, c-format
+msgid "Hash algorithm %s not supported.\n"
+msgstr "Hashalgoritmen %s stöds inte.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:240 lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:90
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key processing error (using hash %s).\n"
+msgstr "Fel vid nyckelbehandling (använder hash %s).\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:301 lib/setup.c:328
+msgid "Cannot determine device type. Incompatible activation of device?\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte avgöra enhetstyp. Inkompatibel aktivering av enhet?\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:307 lib/setup.c:2378
+msgid "This operation is supported only for LUKS device.\n"
+msgstr "Denna åtgärd stöds endast för LUKS-enheter.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:334
+msgid "This operation is supported only for LUKS2 device.\n"
+msgstr "Denna åtgärd stöds endast för LUKS2-enheter.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:379
+msgid "All key slots full.\n"
+msgstr "Alla nyckelplatser är upptagna.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:390
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select between 0 and %d.\n"
+msgstr "Nyckelplats %d är ogiltig. Välj mellan 0 och %d.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:396
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is full, please select another one.\n"
+msgstr "Nyckelplats %d är full. Välj en annan.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:594
+#, c-format
+msgid "Header detected but device %s is too small.\n"
+msgstr "Huvud identifierat men enheten %s är för liten.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:613
+msgid "This operation is not supported for this device type.\n"
+msgstr "Denna åtgärd stöds inte för denna enhetstyp.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1233 lib/setup.c:2097 lib/setup.c:3349
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not active.\n"
+msgstr "Enheten %s är inte aktiv.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1250
+#, c-format
+msgid "Underlying device for crypt device %s disappeared.\n"
+msgstr "Underliggande enhet för krypteringsenheten %s försvann.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1330
+msgid "Invalid plain crypt parameters.\n"
+msgstr "Ogiltiga parametrar för vanlig kryptering.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1335 lib/setup.c:1658 src/integritysetup.c:68
+msgid "Invalid key size.\n"
+msgstr "Ogiltig nyckelstorlek.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1340 lib/setup.c:1663 lib/setup.c:1854
+msgid "UUID is not supported for this crypt type.\n"
+msgstr "UUID stöds inte för denna krypteringstyp.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1350 lib/setup.c:1490 src/cryptsetup.c:960
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2393
+msgid "Unsupported encryption sector size.\n"
+msgstr "Stöder inte sektorstorlek för kryptering.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1396 lib/setup.c:1484
+msgid "Can't format LUKS without device.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte formatera LUKS utan enhet.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1454 lib/setup.c:1595 lib/setup.c:1866
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe header on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte rensa huvudet på enheten %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1516 lib/utils_device.c:591
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s which is in use (already mapped or mounted).\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte använda enheten %s som redan används (redan mappad eller monterad).\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1588
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s which is still in use.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte formatera enheten %s som fortfarande används.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1591 lib/setup.c:1626
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s, permission denied.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte formatera enheten %s, behörighet nekad.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1603 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:838
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1123 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:394
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:40 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:69
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to acquire write lock on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Misslyckades med att få skrivlås på enheten %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1611 lib/setup.c:1918
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format integrity for device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Det går inte att formatera integritet för enheten %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1623
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s in use.\n"
+msgstr "Det går inte att formatera enheten %s som fortfarande används.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1630
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s\n"
+msgstr "Det går inte att formatera enheten %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1653
+msgid "Can't format LOOPAES without device.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte formatera LOOPAES utan enhet.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1693
+msgid "Can't format VERITY without device.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte formatera VERITY utan enhet.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1701 lib/verity/verity.c:106
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash type %d.\n"
+msgstr "VERITY-hashtyp %d stöds inte.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1707 lib/verity/verity.c:114
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY block size.\n"
+msgstr "VERITY-blockstorlek som inte stöds.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1712 lib/verity/verity.c:75
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash offset.\n"
+msgstr "VERITY-hashoffset som inte stöds.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1717
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY FEC offset.\n"
+msgstr "VERITY-FEC-offset som inte stöds.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1738
+msgid "Data area overlaps with hash area.\n"
+msgstr "Dataområde spiller över på hashområdet.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1763
+msgid "Hash area overlaps with FEC area.\n"
+msgstr "Hashområde spiller över på FEC-mrådet.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1770
+msgid "Data area overlaps with FEC area.\n"
+msgstr "Dataområde spiller över på FEC-mrådet.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1975
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unknown crypt device type %s requested.\n"
+msgstr "Okänd typ av krypteringsenhet %s begärd.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2125
+msgid "Cannot resize loop device.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte ändra storlek på loop-enhet.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2134
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s size is not aligned to requested sector size (%u bytes).\n"
+msgstr "Storlek på enhet %s är inte justerad till begärd sektorstorlek (%u byte).\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2188
+msgid "Do you really want to change UUID of device?"
+msgstr "Vill du verkligen ändra UUID för en enhet?"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2264
+msgid "Header backup file does not contain compatible LUKS header.\n"
+msgstr "Säkerhetskopian för huvud innehåller inte något giltigt LUKS-huvud.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2386
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not active.\n"
+msgstr "Volymen %s är inte aktiv.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2397
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is already suspended.\n"
+msgstr "Volymen %s är redan i vänteläge.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2406
+#, c-format
+msgid "Suspend is not supported for device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Vänteläge stöds inte för enhet %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2408
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during suspending device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Fel då enheten %s försattes i vänteläge.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2441 lib/setup.c:2504
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not suspended.\n"
+msgstr "Volymen %s är inte i vänteläge.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2466
+#, c-format
+msgid "Resume is not supported for device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Att fortsätta stöds inte för enhet %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2468 lib/setup.c:2532
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during resuming device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Fel vid fortsättning av enheten %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2589 lib/setup.c:2772
+msgid "Cannot add key slot, all slots disabled and no volume key provided.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte lägga till nyckelplats. Alla platser är inaktiverade och ingen volymnyckel har angivits.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2716
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d changed.\n"
+msgstr "Nyckelplats %d är ändrad.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2719
+#, c-format
+msgid "Replaced with key slot %d.\n"
+msgstr "Ersätt med nyckelplats %d.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2724
+msgid "Failed to swap new key slot.\n"
+msgstr "Misslyckades med att byta ny nyckelplats.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2871 lib/setup.c:3199 lib/setup.c:3212 lib/setup.c:3220
+#: lib/setup.c:3233 lib/setup.c:3472 lib/setup.c:4345
+msgid "Volume key does not match the volume.\n"
+msgstr "Volymnyckeln stämmer inte överens med volymen.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2892
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid.\n"
+msgstr "Nyckelplats %d är ogiltig.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2898
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is not used.\n"
+msgstr "Nyckelplats %d används inte.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2924
+msgid "Failed to load key in kernel keyring.\n"
+msgstr "Misslyckades med att öppna nyckelringen för kärnan.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2984 lib/setup.c:3138 lib/setup.c:3281
+msgid "Device type is not properly initialised.\n"
+msgstr "Enhetstypen är inte korrekt initierad.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3004
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s, name is invalid or still in use.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte använda enheten %s som fortfarande används eller har ett ogiltigt namn.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3007
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s already exists.\n"
+msgstr "Enheten %s finns redan.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3186
+msgid "Incorrect volume key specified for plain device.\n"
+msgstr "Felaktig volymnyckel för vanlig enhet.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3247
+msgid "Incorrect root hash specified for verity device.\n"
+msgstr "Felaktig rothash angiven för verity-enhet.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3323 lib/setup.c:3338
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is still in use.\n"
+msgstr "Enheten %s används fortfarande.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3353
+#, c-format
+msgid "Invalid device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Ogiltig enhet %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3414
+msgid "Function not available in FIPS mode.\n"
+msgstr "Funktion inte tillgänglig i FIPS-läge.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3423
+msgid "Volume key buffer too small.\n"
+msgstr "Buffert för volymnyckel är för liten.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3431
+msgid "Cannot retrieve volume key for plain device.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte hämta volymnyckel för vanlig enhet.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3441
+#, c-format
+msgid "This operation is not supported for %s crypt device.\n"
+msgstr "Denna åtgärd stöds inte för krypteringsenheter av typen %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3628
+msgid "Dump operation is not supported for this device type.\n"
+msgstr "Utskriftsåtgärden stöds inte för denna enhetstyp.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4013
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert device %s which is still in use.\n"
+msgstr "Det går inte konvertera enheten %s som fortfarande används.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4247
+msgid "Kernel keyring is not supported by the kernel.\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Kärnans nyckelring stöds inte av kärnan.\n"
+"\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4256
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read passphrase from keyring key %s"
+msgstr "Misslyckades med att läsa lösenfras från nyckelringsnyckel %s"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4351
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign keyslot %d to digests.\n"
+msgstr "Misslyckades med att tilldela nyckelplats %d till kontrollsummor.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:332
+msgid "Cannot get process priority.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte få processprioritet.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:346
+msgid "Cannot unlock memory.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte låsa upp minne.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:417 lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:473
+msgid "Failed to open key file.\n"
+msgstr "Misslyckades med att öppna nyckelfilen.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:422
+msgid "Cannot read keyfile from a terminal.\n"
+msgstr "Det går inte läsa nyckelfilen från en terminal.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:439
+msgid "Failed to stat key file.\n"
+msgstr "Misslyckades med att ta status på nyckelfilen.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:447 lib/utils.c:468
+msgid "Cannot seek to requested keyfile offset.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte söka efter begärd nyckelfilsoffset.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:462 lib/utils.c:477 src/utils_password.c:207
+#: src/utils_password.c:220
+msgid "Out of memory while reading passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "Slut på minne vid läsning av lösenfras.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:497
+msgid "Error reading passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "Fel vid läsning av lösenfras.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:521
+msgid "Maximum keyfile size exceeded.\n"
+msgstr "Högsta nyckelfilsstorlek överskriden.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:526
+msgid "Cannot read requested amount of data.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte läsa begärd mängd data.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:178 lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:98
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s doesn't exist or access denied.\n"
+msgstr "Enheten %s finns inte eller åtkomst nekas.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:595
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s, permission denied.\n"
+msgstr "Det går inte att använda enhet %s, behörighet nekad.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:598
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot get info about device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte hämta information om enheten %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:620
+msgid "Cannot use a loopback device, running as non-root user.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte använda en loopback-enhet, kör som icke-root-användare.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:630
+msgid "Attaching loopback device failed (loop device with autoclear flag is required).\n"
+msgstr "Misslyckades med fästa loopback-enhet (kräver loop-enhet med flaggan autoclear).\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:676
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested offset is beyond real size of device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Begärd offset är bortom faktiska enhetsstorleken för %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:684
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s has zero size.\n"
+msgstr "Enheten %s har noll storlek.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:695
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small.\n"
+msgstr "Enheten %s är för liten.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:76
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unknown PBKDF type %s.\n"
+msgstr "Okänd PBKDF-typ %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:83
+msgid "Requested PBKDF type is not supported for LUKS1.\n"
+msgstr "Begärd PBKDF-typ stöds inte för LUKS1.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:89
+msgid "PBKDF max memory or parallel threads must not be set with pbkdf2.\n"
+msgstr "Högsta minne för PBKDF eller parallella trådar får inte sättas med pbkdf2.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:96
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested maximum PBKDF memory cost is too high (maximum is %d kilobytes).\n"
+msgstr "Kostnaden för det begärda högsta minnet för PBKDF är för högt (maximum är %d kilobyte).\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:101
+msgid "Requested maximum PBKDF memory can not be zero.\n"
+msgstr "Högst begärt minne för PBKDF kan inte vara noll.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:105
+msgid "Requested PBKDF parallel threads can not be zero.\n"
+msgstr "Begärda parallella trådar för PBKDF kan inte vara noll.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:109
+msgid "Requested PBKDF target time can not be zero.\n"
+msgstr "Begärd måltid för PBKDF kan inte vara noll.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:303
+msgid "PBKDF benchmark disabled but iterations not set.\n"
+msgstr "Prestandamätning för PBKDF är inaktiverad men iterationer är inte satt.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:321
+#, c-format
+msgid "Not compatible PBKDF2 options (using hash algorithm %s).\n"
+msgstr "Ej kompatibla PBKDF2-flaggor (använder hash-algoritmen %s).\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:335
+msgid "Not compatible PBKDF options.\n"
+msgstr "Ej kompatibla PBKDF2-flaggor.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:85
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Locking directory %s/%s is missing!\n"
+msgstr "VARNING:Låskatalog %s/%s saknas!\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:38
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Failed to setup dm-crypt key mapping for device %s.\n"
+"Check that kernel supports %s cipher (check syslog for more info).\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Misslyckades med att konfigurera nyckelmappning för dm-crypt för\n"
+"enheten %s. Kontrollera att kärnan har stöd för chiffret %s (kontrollera syslog för mer information).\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:43
+msgid "Key size in XTS mode must be 256 or 512 bits.\n"
+msgstr "Nyckelstorlek i XTS-läge måste vara en multipel av 256 eller 512 bitar.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:104 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:362
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:654 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1096
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1131 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:411
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write to device %s, permission denied.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte skriva till enhet %s, behörighet nekad.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:119
+msgid "Failed to open temporary keystore device.\n"
+msgstr "Misslyckades med att öppna temporär nyckellagringsenhet.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:126
+msgid "Failed to access temporary keystore device.\n"
+msgstr "Misslyckades med att komma åt temporär nyckellagringsenhet.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:196 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:89
+msgid "IO error while encrypting keyslot.\n"
+msgstr "In-/utfel vid kryptering av nyckelplats.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:258 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:150
+msgid "IO error while decrypting keyslot.\n"
+msgstr "In-/utfel vid dekryptering av nyckelplats.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:128
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small. (LUKS1 requires at least %<PRIu64> bytes.)\n"
+msgstr "Enhet %s är för liten. (LUKS1 kräver minst %<PRIu64> byte.)\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:149 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:157
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:169 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:180
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:192
+#, c-format
+msgid "LUKS keyslot %u is invalid.\n"
+msgstr "LUKS-nyckelplats %u är ogiltig.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:245 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:490
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:965 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1197
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not a valid LUKS device.\n"
+msgstr "Enheten %s är inte en giltig LUKS-enhet.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:264 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:984
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested header backup file %s already exists.\n"
+msgstr "Begärd säkerhetskopia %s av huvud finns redan.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:266 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:986
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create header backup file %s.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte skapa säkerhetskopia för huvud %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:271 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:991
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write header backup file %s.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte skriva säkerhetskopia för huvud %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:304 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1040
+msgid "Backup file doesn't contain valid LUKS header.\n"
+msgstr "Säkerhetskopian innehåller inte något giltigt LUKS-huvud.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:317 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:567
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1061
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open header backup file %s.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte öppna säkerhetskopia för huvud %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:323 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1067
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read header backup file %s.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte läsa säkerhetskopia för huvud %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:335
+msgid "Data offset or key size differs on device and backup, restore failed.\n"
+msgstr "Dataoffset eller nyckelstorlek skiljer sig åt på enhet och säkerhetskopia. Återställningen misslyckades.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:343
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s %s%s"
+msgstr "Enhet %s %s%s"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:344
+msgid "does not contain LUKS header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device."
+msgstr "innehåller inget LUKS-huvud. Ersättning av huvud kan förstöra data på enheten."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:345
+msgid "already contains LUKS header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."
+msgstr "innehåller redan LUKS-huvud. Ersättningen av huvud kommer att förstöra befintliga nyckelplatser."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:346 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1103
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: real device header has different UUID than backup!"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"VARNING: verkligt enhetshuvud har annat UUID än säkerhetskopian!"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:365 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:606
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:657 lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:635 lib/verity/verity.c:81
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:182 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:308
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:319 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:339
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:217 lib/verity/verity_fec.c:229
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:234 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1134
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:191
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte öppna enheten %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:396
+msgid "Non standard key size, manual repair required.\n"
+msgstr "Ej standardstorlek på nyckel, manuell reparation krävs.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:401
+msgid "Non standard keyslots alignment, manual repair required.\n"
+msgstr "Ej standardjustering på nyckelplatser, manuell reparation krävs.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:407
+msgid "Repairing keyslots.\n"
+msgstr "Reparerar nyckelplatser.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:427
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: offset repaired (%u -> %u).\n"
+msgstr "Nyckelplats %i: reparerad offset (%u -> %u).\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:435
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: stripes repaired (%u -> %u).\n"
+msgstr "Nyckelplats %i: reparerade remsor (%u -> %u).\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:444
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: bogus partition signature.\n"
+msgstr "Nyckelplats %i: fejkpartitionssignatur.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:449
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: salt wiped.\n"
+msgstr "Nyckelplats %i: salt borttaget.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:466
+msgid "Writing LUKS header to disk.\n"
+msgstr "Skriver LUKS-huvud till disk.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:471
+msgid "Repair failed.\n"
+msgstr "Reparation misslyckades.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:493
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported LUKS version %d.\n"
+msgstr "LUKS-versionen %d stöds inte.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:499 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:746
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested LUKS hash %s is not supported.\n"
+msgstr "Begärd LUKS-hash %s stöds inte.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:527 src/cryptsetup.c:882
+msgid "No known problems detected for LUKS header.\n"
+msgstr "Inga kända problem identifierade för LUKS-huvud.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:679
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during update of LUKS header on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Fel vid uppdatering av LUKS-huvud på enheten %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:686
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error re-reading LUKS header after update on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Fel vid omläsning av LUKS-huvud efter uppdatering på enheten %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:739
+#, c-format
+msgid "Data offset for detached LUKS header must be either 0 or higher than header size (%d sectors).\n"
+msgstr "Data-offset för fristående LUKS-huvud måste vara antingen 0 eller större än huvudstorleken (%d sektorer).\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:751 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:841
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:145 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:875
+msgid "Wrong LUKS UUID format provided.\n"
+msgstr "Felaktigt LUKS-UUID-format angavs.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:780
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: reading random salt failed.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte skapa LUKS-huvud: läsning av slumpmässigt salt misslyckades.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:801
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: header digest failed (using hash %s).\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte skapa LUKS-huvud: kontrollsumma för huvud misslyckades (använder hashen %s).\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:864
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d active, purge first.\n"
+msgstr "Nyckelplats %d är aktiv, rensa först.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:870
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d material includes too few stripes. Header manipulation?\n"
+msgstr "Nyckelplats %d material inkluderar för få remsor. Har huvudet manipulerats?\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1029
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d unlocked.\n"
+msgstr "Nyckelplats %d är upplåst.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1064 src/cryptsetup.c:1200
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1081 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1118
+msgid "No key available with this passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "Ingen nyckel finns tillgänglig med denna lösenfras.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1082
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select keyslot between 0 and %d.\n"
+msgstr "Nyckelplats %d är ogiltig. Välj en nyckelplats mellan 0 och %d.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1100 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:415
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte rensa enheten %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:146
+msgid "Detected not yet supported GPG encrypted keyfile.\n"
+msgstr "Identifierade en GPG-krypterad nyckelfil som ännu inte stöds.\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:147
+msgid "Please use gpg --decrypt <KEYFILE> | cryptsetup --keyfile=- ...\n"
+msgstr "Använd gpg --decrypt <KEYFILE> | cryptsetup --keyfile=- …\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:168 lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:188
+msgid "Incompatible loop-AES keyfile detected.\n"
+msgstr "Identifierade inkompatibel loop-AES-nyckelfil.\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:246
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support loop-AES compatible mapping.\n"
+msgstr "Kärnan stöder inte loop-AES-kompatibel mappning.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:480
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error reading keyfile %s.\n"
+msgstr "Fel vid läsning av nyckelfil %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:520
+#, c-format
+msgid "Maximum TCRYPT passphrase length (%d) exceeded.\n"
+msgstr "Högsta TCRYPT-lösenfraslängd (%d) överskriden.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:558
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2 hash algorithm %s not available, skipping.\n"
+msgstr "PBKDF2-hashalgoritm %s ej tillgänglig, hoppar över.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:576 src/cryptsetup.c:807
+msgid "Required kernel crypto interface not available.\n"
+msgstr "Begärt kryptogränssnitt för kärnan inte tillgängligt.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:578 src/cryptsetup.c:809
+msgid "Ensure you have algif_skcipher kernel module loaded.\n"
+msgstr "Försäkra dig om att kärnmodulen algif_skcipher är inläst.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:724
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activation is not supported for %d sector size.\n"
+msgstr "Aktivering stöds inte för sektorstorlek %d.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:730
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support activation for this TCRYPT legacy mode.\n"
+msgstr "Kärnan stöder inte aktivering för detta föråldrade TCRYPT-läge.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:764
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activating TCRYPT system encryption for partition %s.\n"
+msgstr "Aktiverar TCRYPT-systemkryptering för partition %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:832
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support TCRYPT compatible mapping.\n"
+msgstr "Kärnan stöder inte TCRYPT-kompatibel mappning.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:1047
+msgid "This function is not supported without TCRYPT header load."
+msgstr "Denna funktion stöds inte utan inläsning av TCRYPT-huvud."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:69 lib/verity/verity.c:175
+#, c-format
+msgid "Verity device %s doesn't use on-disk header.\n"
+msgstr "Verity-enhet %s använder inte huvud på disk.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:94
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not a valid VERITY device.\n"
+msgstr "Enheten %s är inte en giltig VERITY-enhet.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:101
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY version %d.\n"
+msgstr "VERITY-versionen %d stöds inte.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:132
+msgid "VERITY header corrupted.\n"
+msgstr "VERITY-huvud är skadat.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:169
+#, c-format
+msgid "Wrong VERITY UUID format provided on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Felaktigt VERITY-UUID-format angivet på enhet %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:202
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during update of verity header on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Fel vid uppdatering av verity-huvud på enheten %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:294
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support dm-verity mapping.\n"
+msgstr "Kärnan stöder inte dm-verity-mappning.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:305
+msgid "Verity device detected corruption after activation.\n"
+msgstr "Verity-enhet identifierades som skadad efter aktivering.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:59
+#, c-format
+msgid "Spare area is not zeroed at position %<PRIu64>.\n"
+msgstr "Ledigt utrymme är inte nollställt vid position %<PRIu64>.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:160 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:287
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:300
+msgid "Device offset overflow.\n"
+msgstr "Enhets-offset spillde över.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:200
+#, c-format
+msgid "Verification failed at position %<PRIu64>.\n"
+msgstr "Verifiering misslyckades vid %<PRIu64>.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:273
+msgid "Invalid size parameters for verity device.\n"
+msgstr "Ogiltig storlek på parametrar för verity-enhet.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:293
+msgid "Hash area overflow.\n"
+msgstr "Hash-området spillde över.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:370
+msgid "Verification of data area failed.\n"
+msgstr "Misslyckades med verifiering av dataområde.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:375
+msgid "Verification of root hash failed.\n"
+msgstr "Misslyckades med verifiering av rot-hash.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:381
+msgid "Input/output error while creating hash area.\n"
+msgstr "In-/utdatafel vid skapandet av hashområde.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:383
+msgid "Creation of hash area failed.\n"
+msgstr "Misslyckades med skapandet av hashområde.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:430
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Kernel cannot activate device if data block size exceeds page size (%u).\n"
+msgstr "VARNING: Kärnan kan inte aktivera enhet om datablockstorleken överskrider sidstorlek (%u).\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:131
+msgid "Failed to allocate RS context.\n"
+msgstr "Misslyckades med att öppna RS-kontext.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:146
+msgid "Failed to allocate buffer.\n"
+msgstr "Misslyckades med att allokera buffer.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:156
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read RS block %<PRIu64> byte %d.\n"
+msgstr "Misslyckades med att läsa RS block %<PRIu64> byte %d.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:168
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to write parity for RS block %<PRIu64>.\n"
+msgstr "Misslyckades med att skriva paritet för RS block %<PRIu64>.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:202
+msgid "Block sizes must match for FEC.\n"
+msgstr "Blockstorlekar måste matcha för FEC.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:208
+msgid "Invalid number of parity bytes.\n"
+msgstr "Ogiltigt antal paritet-byte.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:241
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to determine size for device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Misslyckades med att bestämma storlek för enhet %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/integrity/integrity.c:220 lib/integrity/integrity.c:271
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support dm-integrity mapping.\n"
+msgstr "Kärnan stöder inte dm-integrity-mappning.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:364
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small. (LUKS2 requires at least %<PRIu64> bytes.)\n"
+msgstr "Enhet %s är för liten. (LUKS2 kräver minst  %<PRIu64> bytes.)\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:427
+msgid "Failed to acquire write device lock.\n"
+msgstr "Misslyckades med att erhålla skrivlås för enhet.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:99
+msgid "No space for new keyslot.\n"
+msgstr "Inget utrymme för ny nyckelplats.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:826 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:956
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1029 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:103
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:126
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to acquire read lock on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Misslyckades med att erhålla läslås på enheten %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1046
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forbidden LUKS2 requirements detected in backup %s.\n"
+msgstr "Förbjudna LUKS2-krav identifierade i säkerhetskopian %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1087
+msgid "Data offset differ on device and backup, restore failed.\n"
+msgstr "Dataoffset skiljer sig på enhet och säkerhetskopia. Återställningen misslyckades.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1093
+msgid "Binary header with keyslot areas size differ on device and backup, restore failed.\n"
+msgstr "Binärhuvud med nyckelstorlek skiljer sig på enhet och säkerhetskopia. Återställningen misslyckades.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1100
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s %s%s%s%s"
+msgstr "Enhet %s %s%s%s%s"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1101
+msgid "does not contain LUKS2 header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device."
+msgstr "innehåller inget LUKS2-huvud. Ersättning av huvud kan förstöra data på enheten."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1102
+msgid "already contains LUKS2 header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."
+msgstr "innehåller redan LUKS2-huvud. Ersättningen av huvud kommer att förstöra befintliga nyckelplatser."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1104
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: unknown LUKS2 requirements detected in real device header!\n"
+"Replacing header with backup may corrupt the data on that device!"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"VARNING:okända LUKS2-krav identifierade i huvudet för riktig enhet!\n"
+"Att ersätta huvudet med en säkerhetskopia kan göra data korrupt på enheten!"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1106
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: Unfinished offline reencryption detected on the device!\n"
+"Replacing header with backup may corrupt data."
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"VARNING:Oavslutad frånkopplade kryptering identifierad på enheten!\n"
+"Att ersätta huvudet med en säkerhetskopia kan orsaka korrupt data."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1205
+#, c-format
+msgid "Ignored unknown flag %s."
+msgstr "Ignorerade okänd flagga %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1830
+msgid "Failed to read LUKS2 requierements.\n"
+msgstr "Misslyckades med att läsa LUKS2-krav.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1837
+msgid "Unmet LUKS2 requirements detected.\n"
+msgstr "Ej uppfyllt LUKS2-krav identifierat.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1845
+msgid "Offline reencryption in progress. Aborting.\n"
+msgstr "Frånkopplad kryptering pågår. Avbryter.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:473
+#, c-format
+msgid "Can not check status of device with uuid: %s.\n"
+msgstr "Det går inte kontrollera status för enheten med uuid: %s\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:502
+msgid "Unable to move keyslot materials. Not enough space\n"
+msgstr "Kunde inte flytta nyckelplatsmaterial. Inte nog med utrymme\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:627
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - key slot digests are not LUKS1 compatible.\n"
+msgstr "Det går inte att konvertera till LUKS1-format - kontrollsummor för nyckelplatser är inte LUKS1-kompatibla.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:640
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - keyslot %u is in invalid state.\n"
+msgstr "Det går inte att konvertera till LUKS1-format - nyckelplats %u är i ogiltigt tillstånd.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:645
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - slot %u (over maximum slots) is still active .\n"
+msgstr "Det går inte att konvertera till LUKS1-format - plats %u (av maximalt antal platser) är fortfarande aktiv.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:650
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - keyslot %u is not LUKS1 compatible.\n"
+msgstr "Det går inte att konvertera till LUKS1-format - nyckelplats %u är inte LUKS1-kompatibel.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_token.c:260
+msgid "No free token slot\n"
+msgstr "Ingen fri plats för token\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_token.c:268
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to create builtin token %s\n"
+msgstr "Misslyckades med att skapa inbyggd token %s\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:131
+msgid "Can't do passphrase verification on non-tty inputs.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte verifiera lösenfras på icke-tty-ingångar.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:180 src/cryptsetup.c:749 src/cryptsetup.c:998
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:584 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:652
+msgid "No known cipher specification pattern detected.\n"
+msgstr "Inget känt chifferspecifikationsmönster kunde identifieras.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:188
+msgid "WARNING: The --hash parameter is being ignored in plain mode with keyfile specified.\n"
+msgstr "VARNING: parametern --hash ignoreras i enkelt läge med specificerad nyckelfil.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:196
+msgid "WARNING: The --keyfile-size option is being ignored, the read size is the same as the encryption key size.\n"
+msgstr "VARNING: flaggan --keyfile-size ignoreras, lässtorleken är densamma som storleken för krypteringsnyckeln.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:258
+msgid "Option --key-file is required.\n"
+msgstr "Flaggan --key-file krävs.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:303
+msgid "Enter VeraCrypt PIM: "
+msgstr "Ange VeraCrypt PIM: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:312
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: parse error\n"
+msgstr "Ogiltigt PIM-värde:tolkningsfel\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:315
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: 0\n"
+msgstr "Ogiltigt PIM-värde: 0\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:318
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: outside of range\n"
+msgstr "Ogiltigt PIM-värde:utanför intervallet\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:341
+msgid "No device header detected with this passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "Inget enhetshuvud finns tillgängligt med denna lösenfras.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:403 src/cryptsetup.c:1488
+msgid ""
+"Header dump with volume key is sensitive information\n"
+"which allows access to encrypted partition without passphrase.\n"
+"This dump should be always stored encrypted on safe place."
+msgstr ""
+"Utskrift av huvudet med volymnyckel är känslig information\n"
+"som tillåter åtkomst till krypterad partition utan lösenfras.\n"
+"Denna utskrift bör alltid lagras krypterad på ett säkert ställe."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:481
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is still active and scheduled for deferred removal.\n"
+msgstr "Enheten %s är fortfarande aktiv och schemalagd för uppskjuten borttagning.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:504
+msgid "Resize of active device requires volume key in keyring but --disable-keyring option is set.\n"
+msgstr "Att ändra storlek på aktiv enhet kräver volymnyckel i nyckelringen, men -flaggan -disable-keyring är angiven.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:690
+msgid "Result of benchmark is not reliable.\n"
+msgstr "Resultat från prestandamätningen är inte pålitligt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:741
+msgid "# Tests are approximate using memory only (no storage IO).\n"
+msgstr "# Tester är ungefärliga och använder endast minne (ingen lagrings-IO).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:768 src/cryptsetup.c:791
+msgid "#     Algorithm | Key |  Encryption |  Decryption\n"
+msgstr "#     Algoritm | Nyckel |  Kryptering |  Dekryptering\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:772
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cipher %s is not available.\n"
+msgstr "Chiffret %s är inte tillgängligt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:800
+msgid "N/A"
+msgstr "N/A"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:825 src/integritysetup.c:78
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read keyfile %s.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte läsa nyckelfilen %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:829 src/integritysetup.c:82
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read %d bytes from keyfile %s.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte läsa %d byte från nyckelfilen %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:886
+msgid "Really try to repair LUKS device header?"
+msgstr "Vill du verkligen försöka att reparera LUKS-enhetshuvud?"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:902 src/integritysetup.c:140
+msgid ""
+"Wiping device to initialize integrity checksum.\n"
+"You can interrupt this by pressing CTRL+c (rest of not wiped device will contain invalid checksum).\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Rensar enheten för att initialisera kontrollsumma för integritet.\n"
+"Du kan avbryta detta genom att trycka ned CTRL+c (resten av den ej rensade enheten kommer att innehålla en ogiltigt kontrollsumma).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:924 src/integritysetup.c:162
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot deactivate temporary device %s.\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Det går inte att inaktivera temporär enhet %s.\n"
+"\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:973
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create header file %s.\n"
+msgstr "Det går inte att skapa huvudfil %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:984
+#, c-format
+msgid "This will overwrite data on %s irrevocably."
+msgstr "Detta kommer att skriva över data på %s och går inte att ångra."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:986
+msgid "memory allocation error in action_luksFormat"
+msgstr "minnesallokeringsfel i action_luksFormat"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1003
+msgid "Integrity option can be used only for LUKS2 format.\n"
+msgstr "Flaggan för integritet kan endast användas för formatet LUKS2.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1008 src/integritysetup.c:187 src/integritysetup.c:196
+#: src/integritysetup.c:205 src/integritysetup.c:252 src/integritysetup.c:261
+#: src/integritysetup.c:271
+msgid "No known integrity specification pattern detected.\n"
+msgstr "Inga kända integritetspecifikationsmönster identifierat.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1021
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use %s as on-disk header.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte använda %s som diskhuvud.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1049 src/cryptsetup.c:1312 src/cryptsetup.c:1396
+msgid "Failed to set pbkdf parameters.\n"
+msgstr "Misslyckades med att sätta pbkdf-parametrar.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1104
+msgid "Reduced data offset is allowed only for detached LUKS header.\n"
+msgstr "Förminskad dataoffset endast tillåtet för fristående LUKS-huvuden.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1142
+msgid "Device activated but cannot make flags persistent.\n"
+msgstr "Enheten aktiverad men kan inte spara undan flaggorna.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1221 src/cryptsetup.c:1274
+msgid "This is the last keyslot. Device will become unusable after purging this key."
+msgstr "Detta är sista nyckelplatsen. Enheten kommer att bli oanvändbar efter att denna nyckel tagits bort."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1222
+msgid "Enter any remaining passphrase: "
+msgstr "Ange eventuell återstående lösenfras: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1255
+msgid "Enter passphrase to be deleted: "
+msgstr "Ange lösenfras att ta bort: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1271
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d selected for deletion.\n"
+msgstr "Nyckelplats %d markerad för borttagning.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1326 src/cryptsetup.c:1357
+msgid "Enter new passphrase for key slot: "
+msgstr "Ange ny lösenfras för nyckelplats: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1342 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1156
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter any existing passphrase: "
+msgstr "Ange valfri existerande lösenfras: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1400
+msgid "Enter passphrase to be changed: "
+msgstr "Ange lösenfras att ändra: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1414 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1141
+msgid "Enter new passphrase: "
+msgstr "Ange ny lösenfras: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1438
+msgid "Only one device argument for isLuks operation is supported.\n"
+msgstr "Endast ett enhetsargument för operationen isLuks stöds.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1605 src/cryptsetup.c:1626
+msgid "Option --header-backup-file is required.\n"
+msgstr "Flaggan --header-backup-file krävs.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1665
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unrecognized metadata device type %s.\n"
+msgstr "Okänd metadata för enhetstyp %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1668
+msgid "Command requires device and mapped name as arguments.\n"
+msgstr "Kommandot kräver enhet och mappat namn som argument.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1687
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"This operation will erase all keyslots on device %s.\n"
+"Device will become unusable after this operation."
+msgstr ""
+"Denna åtgärd kommer att ta bort alla nyckelplatser på enhet %s.\n"
+"Enheten kommer att bli oanvändbar efter denna åtgärd."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1730
+msgid "Missing LUKS target type, option --type is required.\n"
+msgstr "Saknar måltyp för LUKS, flaggan -type krävs.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1746
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device is already %s type.\n"
+msgstr "Enheten är redan av %s-typ.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1751
+#, c-format
+msgid "This operation will convert %s to %s format.\n"
+msgstr "Denna åtgärd kommer att konvertera %s till %s-format.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1797
+msgid "Option --priority, --label or --subsystem is missing.\n"
+msgstr "Saknar flaggan --priority, --label eller --subsystem.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1828
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %d is invalid.\n"
+msgstr "Token %d är ogiltig.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1831
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %d in use.\n"
+msgstr "Token %d används.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1844
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign token %d to keyslot %d.\n"
+msgstr "Misslyckades med att tilldela token %d till nyckelplats %d.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1858
+msgid "--key-description parameter is mandatory for token add action.\n"
+msgstr "parametern --key-description krävs för åtgärden lägg till token.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1864
+msgid "Missing --token option specifying token for removal.\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Saknad flagga --token för att ange token att ta bort.\n"
+" \n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1869
+#, c-format
+msgid "Invalid token operation %s.\n"
+msgstr "Ogiltig tokenåtgärd %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1884
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to add keyring token %d.\n"
+msgstr "Misslyckades med att lägga till nyckelringsstoken %d.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1886
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to remove token %d.\n"
+msgstr "Misslyckades med att ta bort token %d.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1902
+msgid "<device> [--type <type>] [<name>]"
+msgstr "<enhet> [--type <typ>] [<namn>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1902
+msgid "open device as mapping <name>"
+msgstr "öppna enhet som mappning <namn>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1903 src/cryptsetup.c:1904 src/cryptsetup.c:1905
+#: src/veritysetup.c:361 src/veritysetup.c:362 src/integritysetup.c:425
+#: src/integritysetup.c:426
+msgid "<name>"
+msgstr "<namn>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1903
+msgid "close device (remove mapping)"
+msgstr "stäng enhet (ta bort mappning)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1904
+msgid "resize active device"
+msgstr "ändra storlek på aktiv enhet"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1905
+msgid "show device status"
+msgstr "visa enhetsstatus"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1906
+msgid "[--cipher <cipher>]"
+msgstr "[--cipher <chiffer>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1906
+msgid "benchmark cipher"
+msgstr "prestandamät chiffer"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1907 src/cryptsetup.c:1908 src/cryptsetup.c:1909
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1910 src/cryptsetup.c:1916 src/cryptsetup.c:1917
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1918 src/cryptsetup.c:1919 src/cryptsetup.c:1920
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1921 src/cryptsetup.c:1922 src/cryptsetup.c:1923
+msgid "<device>"
+msgstr "<enhet>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1907
+msgid "try to repair on-disk metadata"
+msgstr "försök att reparera metadata på disken"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1908
+msgid "erase all keyslots (remove encryption key)"
+msgstr "ta bort alla nyckelplatser (ta bort krypteringsnyckeln)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1909
+msgid "convert LUKS from/to LUKS2 format"
+msgstr "konvertera LUKS från/till LUKS2-format"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1910
+msgid "set permanent configuration options for LUKS2"
+msgstr "ange permanenta konfigurationsflaggor för LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1911 src/cryptsetup.c:1912
+msgid "<device> [<new key file>]"
+msgstr "<enhet> [<ny nyckelfil>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1911
+msgid "formats a LUKS device"
+msgstr "formaterar en LUKS-enhet"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1912
+msgid "add key to LUKS device"
+msgstr "lägg till nyckel till LUKS-enhet"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1913 src/cryptsetup.c:1914
+msgid "<device> [<key file>]"
+msgstr "<enhet> [<nyckelfil>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1913
+msgid "removes supplied key or key file from LUKS device"
+msgstr "tar bort angiven nyckel eller nyckelfil från LUKS-enhet"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1914
+msgid "changes supplied key or key file of LUKS device"
+msgstr "ändrar angiven nyckel eller nyckelfil för LUKS-enhet"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1915
+msgid "<device> <key slot>"
+msgstr "<enhet> <nyckelplats>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1915
+msgid "wipes key with number <key slot> from LUKS device"
+msgstr "rensar nyckeln med nummer <nyckelplats> från LUKS-enhet"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1916
+msgid "print UUID of LUKS device"
+msgstr "skriv ut UUID för LUKS-enhet"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1917
+msgid "tests <device> for LUKS partition header"
+msgstr "testar <enhet> för LUKS-partitionshuvud"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1918
+msgid "dump LUKS partition information"
+msgstr "skriver ut information om LUKS-partition"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1919
+msgid "dump TCRYPT device information"
+msgstr "skriver ut information om TCRYPT-partition"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1920
+msgid "Suspend LUKS device and wipe key (all IOs are frozen)."
+msgstr "Försätt LUKS-enhet i vänteläge och rensa nyckel (alla in-/ut-åtgärder är frusna)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1921
+msgid "Resume suspended LUKS device."
+msgstr "Återuppta LUKS-enhet i vänteläge."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1922
+msgid "Backup LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "Säkerhetskopiera huvud och nyckelplatser från LUKS-enhet"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1923
+msgid "Restore LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "Återställ huvud och nyckelplatser för LUKS-enhet"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1924
+msgid "<add|remove> <device>"
+msgstr "<läggtill|tabort> <enhet>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1924
+msgid "Add or remove keyring token"
+msgstr "Lägg till eller ta bort token för nyckelring"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1941 src/veritysetup.c:378 src/integritysetup.c:442
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<action> is one of:\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<åtgärd> är en av:\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1947
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"You can also use old <action> syntax aliases:\n"
+"\topen: create (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen\n"
+"\tclose: remove (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tcryptClose\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Du kan också använda gamla <åtgärd> syntaxalias:\n"
+"\topen: create (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen\n"
+"\tclose: remove (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tcryptClose\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1951
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<device> is the encrypted device\n"
+"<key slot> is the LUKS key slot number to modify\n"
+"<key file> optional key file for the new key for luksAddKey action\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<namn> är enheten att skapa under %s\n"
+"<enhet> är den krypterade enheten\n"
+"<nyckelplats> är numret för LUKS-nyckelplatsen att ändra\n"
+"<nyckelfil> valfri nyckelfil för den nya nyckeln för luksAddKey-åtgärden\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1958
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in key and passphrase parameters:\n"
+"\tMaximum keyfile size: %dkB, Maximum interactive passphrase length %d (characters)\n"
+"Default PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS: %d (ms)\n"
+"Default PBKDF for LUKS2: %s\n"
+"\tIteration time: %d, Memory required: %dkB, Parallel threads: %d\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Inkompilerade standardnyckel- och standardlösenfrasparametrar:\n"
+"\tStörsta nyckelfilstorlek: %dkB, Största interaktiv lösenfraslängd %d (tecken)\n"
+"Standard PBKDF2-iterationstid för LUKS: %d (ms)\n"
+"Standard PBKDF för LUKS2: %s\n"
+"\tIterationstid: %d, Minne: %dkB, Parallella trådar: %d\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1968
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in device cipher parameters:\n"
+"\tloop-AES: %s, Key %d bits\n"
+"\tplain: %s, Key: %d bits, Password hashing: %s\n"
+"\tLUKS1: %s, Key: %d bits, LUKS header hashing: %s, RNG: %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Inkompilerade standardchifferparametrar för enheter:\n"
+"\tloop-AES: %s, Nyckel %d bitar\n"
+"\tplain: %s, Nyckel: %d bitar, Lösenordshashning: %s\n"
+"\tLUKS1: %s, Nyckel: %d bitar, LUKS-lösenordshashning %s, RNG: %s\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1985 src/veritysetup.c:534 src/integritysetup.c:579
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s: requires %s as arguments"
+msgstr "%s: kräver %s som argument"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2018 src/veritysetup.c:418 src/integritysetup.c:476
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1347
+msgid "Show this help message"
+msgstr "Visa detta hjälpmeddelande"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2019 src/veritysetup.c:419 src/integritysetup.c:477
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1348
+msgid "Display brief usage"
+msgstr "Visa kort information om användning"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2023 src/veritysetup.c:423 src/integritysetup.c:481
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1352
+msgid "Help options:"
+msgstr "Hjälpflaggor:"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2024 src/veritysetup.c:424 src/integritysetup.c:482
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1353
+msgid "Print package version"
+msgstr "Skriv ut paketversion"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2025 src/veritysetup.c:425 src/integritysetup.c:483
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1354
+msgid "Shows more detailed error messages"
+msgstr "Visar mer detaljerade felmeddelanden"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2026 src/veritysetup.c:426 src/integritysetup.c:484
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1355
+msgid "Show debug messages"
+msgstr "Visa felsökningsmeddelanden"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2027 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1357
+msgid "The cipher used to encrypt the disk (see /proc/crypto)"
+msgstr "Chiffret som används för att kryptera disken (se /proc/crypto)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2028 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1359
+msgid "The hash used to create the encryption key from the passphrase"
+msgstr "Hashen som används för att skapa krypteringsnyckel från lösenfras"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2029
+msgid "Verifies the passphrase by asking for it twice"
+msgstr "Verifierar lösenfrasen genom att fråga efter den två gånger"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2030 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1361
+msgid "Read the key from a file."
+msgstr "Läs nyckeln från en fil."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2031
+msgid "Read the volume (master) key from file."
+msgstr "Läs volymnyckeln (master) från fil."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2032
+msgid "Dump volume (master) key instead of keyslots info."
+msgstr "Skriv ut volymnyckel (master) istället för nyckelplatsinfo."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2033 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1358
+msgid "The size of the encryption key"
+msgstr "Storleken för krypteringsnyckeln"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2033 src/integritysetup.c:498 src/integritysetup.c:502
+#: src/integritysetup.c:506 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1358
+msgid "BITS"
+msgstr "BITAR"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2034 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1373
+msgid "Limits the read from keyfile"
+msgstr "Begränsa läsningen från nyckelfil"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2034 src/cryptsetup.c:2035 src/cryptsetup.c:2036
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2037 src/veritysetup.c:429 src/veritysetup.c:430
+#: src/veritysetup.c:431 src/veritysetup.c:434 src/veritysetup.c:435
+#: src/integritysetup.c:489 src/integritysetup.c:493 src/integritysetup.c:494
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1372 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1373
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1374 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1375
+msgid "bytes"
+msgstr "byte"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2035 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1372
+msgid "Number of bytes to skip in keyfile"
+msgstr "Antal byte att hoppa över i nyckelfil"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2036
+msgid "Limits the read from newly added keyfile"
+msgstr "Begränsa läsningen från nyligen tillagd nyckelfil"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2037
+msgid "Number of bytes to skip in newly added keyfile"
+msgstr "Antal byte att hoppa över i nyligen tillagd nyckelfil"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2038
+msgid "Slot number for new key (default is first free)"
+msgstr "Platsnummer för ny nyckel (standard är första lediga)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2039
+msgid "The size of the device"
+msgstr "Storleken för enheten"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2039 src/cryptsetup.c:2040 src/cryptsetup.c:2041
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2047 src/integritysetup.c:490 src/integritysetup.c:495
+msgid "SECTORS"
+msgstr "SEKTORER"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2040
+msgid "The start offset in the backend device"
+msgstr "Startoffset i bakändesenheten"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2041
+msgid "How many sectors of the encrypted data to skip at the beginning"
+msgstr "Hur många sektorer av krypterat data som ska hoppas över i början"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2042
+msgid "Create a readonly mapping"
+msgstr "Skapa en skrivskyddad mappning"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2043 src/integritysetup.c:485
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1363
+msgid "Do not ask for confirmation"
+msgstr "Fråga inte efter bekräftelse"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2044
+msgid "Timeout for interactive passphrase prompt (in seconds)"
+msgstr "Tidsgräns för interaktiv lösenfrasprompt (i sekunder)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2044 src/cryptsetup.c:2045 src/integritysetup.c:486
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1364
+msgid "secs"
+msgstr "s"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2045 src/integritysetup.c:486
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1364
+msgid "Progress line update (in seconds)"
+msgstr "Uppdatering av förloppslinje (i sekunder)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2046 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1365
+msgid "How often the input of the passphrase can be retried"
+msgstr "Hur många inmatningsförsök av lösenfrasen som kan göras"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2047
+msgid "Align payload at <n> sector boundaries - for luksFormat"
+msgstr "Justera nyttolast i <n> sektorgränser - för luksFormat"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2048
+msgid "File with LUKS header and keyslots backup."
+msgstr "Fil med säkerhetskopior av LUKS-huvud och nyckelplatser."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2049 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1366
+msgid "Use /dev/random for generating volume key."
+msgstr "Använd /dev/random för att generera volymnyckel."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2050 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1367
+msgid "Use /dev/urandom for generating volume key."
+msgstr "Använd /dev/urandom för att generera volymnyckel."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2051
+msgid "Share device with another non-overlapping crypt segment."
+msgstr "Dela enhet med ett annat ej överlappande krypteringssegment."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2052 src/veritysetup.c:438
+msgid "UUID for device to use."
+msgstr "UUID använda för enheten."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2053
+msgid "Allow discards (aka TRIM) requests for device."
+msgstr "Tillåt avvisningsbegäran (TRIM) för enhet."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2054
+msgid "Device or file with separated LUKS header."
+msgstr "Enhet eller fil med separerat LUKS-huvud."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2055
+msgid "Do not activate device, just check passphrase."
+msgstr "Aktivera inte enhet, kontrollera endast lösenfrasen."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2056
+msgid "Use hidden header (hidden TCRYPT device)."
+msgstr "Använd gömt huvud (gömd TCRYPT-enhet)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2057
+msgid "Device is system TCRYPT drive (with bootloader)."
+msgstr "Enheten är system-TCRYPT-disk (med starthanterare)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2058
+msgid "Use backup (secondary) TCRYPT header."
+msgstr "Använd säkerhetskopia (sekundär) för TCRYPT-huvud."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2059
+msgid "Scan also for VeraCrypt compatible device."
+msgstr "Sök också efter VeraCrypt-kompatibel enhet."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2060
+msgid "Personal Iteration Multiplier for VeraCrypt compatible device."
+msgstr "Personlig iteration för VeraCrypt-kompatibel enhet."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2061
+msgid "Query Personal Iteration Multiplier for VeraCrypt compatible device."
+msgstr "Query Personal Iteration Multiplier för VeraCrypt-kompatibel enhet."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2062
+msgid "Type of device metadata: luks, plain, loopaes, tcrypt."
+msgstr "Typer av enhetsmetadata: luks, plain, loopaes, tcrypt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2063
+msgid "Disable password quality check (if enabled)."
+msgstr "Inaktivera kvalitetskontroll av lösenord (om aktiverat)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2064
+msgid "Use dm-crypt same_cpu_crypt performance compatibility option."
+msgstr "Använd flaggan dm-crypt same_cpu_crypt för prestandakompatibilitet."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2065
+msgid "Use dm-crypt submit_from_crypt_cpus performance compatibility option."
+msgstr "Använd flaggan dm-crypt submit_from_crypt_cpus för prestandakompatibilitet."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2066
+msgid "Device removal is deferred until the last user closes it."
+msgstr "Enhetsborttagning är förskjuten tills den sista användaren stänger den."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2067
+msgid "PBKDF iteration time for LUKS (in ms)"
+msgstr "PBKDF-iterationstid för LUKS (i ms)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2067 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1362
+msgid "msecs"
+msgstr "ms"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2068
+msgid "PBKDF algorithm (for LUKS2) (argon2i/argon2id/pbkdf2)."
+msgstr "PBKDF-algoritm (för LUKS2) (argon2i/argon2id/pbkdf2)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2069
+msgid "PBKDF memory cost limit"
+msgstr "Minneskostnadsgräns för PBKDF"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2069
+msgid "kilobytes"
+msgstr "kilobyte"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2070
+msgid "PBKDF parallel cost "
+msgstr "Parallellkostnad för PBKDF "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2070
+msgid "threads"
+msgstr "trådar"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2071
+msgid "PBKDF iterations cost (forced, disables benchmark)"
+msgstr "Iterationskostnad för PBKDF (tvingad, inaktiverar prestandamätning)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2072
+msgid "Keyslot priority (ignore/normal/prefer)"
+msgstr "Nyckelplats-prioritet  (ignore/normal/prefer)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2073
+msgid "Disable locking of on-disk metadata"
+msgstr "Inaktivera låsning av metadata på disk"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2074
+msgid "Disable loading volume keys via kernel keyring"
+msgstr "Inaktivera att läsa in volymnycklar via kärnans nyckelring"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2075
+msgid "Data integrity algorithm (LUKS2 only)"
+msgstr "Algoritm för dataintegritet (endast LUKS2)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2076 src/integritysetup.c:509
+msgid "Disable journal for integrity device."
+msgstr "Inaktivera journal för integritetsenhet."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2077 src/integritysetup.c:487
+msgid "Do not wipe device after format"
+msgstr "Rensa inte enhet efter formatering"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2078
+msgid "Do not ask for passphrase if activation by token fails"
+msgstr "Fråga inte efter lösenfras om aktivering med token misslyckas"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2079
+msgid "Token number (default: any)"
+msgstr "Tokenantal (standardvärde: any)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2080
+msgid "Key description"
+msgstr "Nyckelbeskrivning"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2081
+msgid "Encryption sector size (default: 512 bytes)"
+msgstr "Sektorstorlek för kryptering (standardvärde 512 byte)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2082
+msgid "Set activation flags persistent for device."
+msgstr "Sätt och spara undan aktiveringsflaggorna för enheten."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2083
+msgid "Set label for the LUKS2 device."
+msgstr "Ange etikett för LUKS2-enhet."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2084
+msgid "Set subsystem label for the LUKS2 device."
+msgstr "Ange undersystemsetikett för LUKS2-enheten."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2100 src/veritysetup.c:458 src/integritysetup.c:526
+msgid "[OPTION...] <action> <action-specific>"
+msgstr "[FLAGGA…] <åtgärd> <åtgärdsspecifik>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2151 src/veritysetup.c:498 src/integritysetup.c:543
+msgid "Argument <action> missing."
+msgstr "Argumentet <åtgärd> saknas."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2207 src/veritysetup.c:529 src/integritysetup.c:574
+msgid "Unknown action."
+msgstr "Okänd åtgärd."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2217
+msgid "Option --deferred is allowed only for close command.\n"
+msgstr "Flaggan --deferred är endast tillåten för kommandot close.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2222
+msgid "Option --shared is allowed only for open of plain device.\n"
+msgstr "Flaggan --shared är endast tillåten för öppning för enkel enhet.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2227
+msgid "Option --allow-discards is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "Flaggan --allow-discards är endast tillåten för operationen open.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2232
+msgid "Option --persistent is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "Flaggan --persistent  är endast tillåten för operationen open.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2240
+msgid ""
+"Option --key-size is allowed only for luksFormat, open and benchmark.\n"
+"To limit read from keyfile use --keyfile-size=(bytes)."
+msgstr ""
+"Flaggan --key-size är endast tillåten för luksFormat, open och benchmark.\n"
+"För att begränsa läsning från nyckelfil, använd --keyfile-size=(byte)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2246
+msgid "Option --integrity is allowed only for luksFormat (LUKS2).\n"
+msgstr "Flaggan --integrity är endast tillåten för luksFormat (LUKS2).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2251
+msgid "Option --integrity-no-wipe can be used only for format action with integrity extension.\n"
+msgstr "Flaggan --integrity-no-wipe kan användas endast för åtgärden formatera med integritetsutökningar.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2257
+msgid "Options --label and --subsystem are allowed only for luksFormat and config LUKS2 operations.\n"
+msgstr "Flaggorna --label och --subsystem tillåts endast för luksFormat och konfiguration av LUKS2-åtgärder.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2263
+msgid "Option --test-passphrase is allowed only for open of LUKS and TCRYPT devices.\n"
+msgstr "Flaggan --test-passphrase är endast tillåten för open för LUKS- och TCRYPT-enheter.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2268 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1436
+msgid "Key size must be a multiple of 8 bits"
+msgstr "Nyckelstorlek måste vara en multipel av 8 bitar"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2274 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1441
+msgid "Key slot is invalid."
+msgstr "Nyckelplatsen är ogiltig."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2281
+msgid "Option --key-file takes precedence over specified key file argument.\n"
+msgstr "Flaggan --key-file åsidosätter specificerade nyckelfilsargument.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2289 src/veritysetup.c:541 src/integritysetup.c:593
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1425
+msgid "Negative number for option not permitted."
+msgstr "Negativt tal för flagga ej tillåtet."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2293
+msgid "Only one --key-file argument is allowed."
+msgstr "Endast ett argument för --key-file är tillåtet."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2297 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1419
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1445
+msgid "Only one of --use-[u]random options is allowed."
+msgstr "Endast en av flaggorna --use-[u]random är tillåten."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2301
+msgid "Option --use-[u]random is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgstr "Flaggan --use-[u]random är endast tillåten för luksFormat."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2305
+msgid "Option --uuid is allowed only for luksFormat and luksUUID."
+msgstr "Flaggan --uuid är endast tillåten för luksFormat och luksUUID."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2309
+msgid "Option --align-payload is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgstr "Flaggan --align-payload är endast tillåten för luksFormat."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2315
+msgid "Option --skip is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices.\n"
+msgstr "Flaggan --skip stöds endast för öppning av vanliga enheter och loopaes-enheter.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2321
+msgid "Option --offset is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices.\n"
+msgstr "Flaggan --offset stöds endast för öppning av vanliga och loopaes-enheter.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2327
+msgid "Option --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system or --tcrypt-backup is supported only for TCRYPT device.\n"
+msgstr "Flaggorna --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system eller --tcrypt-backup stöds endast på TCRYPT-enhet.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2332
+msgid "Option --tcrypt-hidden cannot be combined with --allow-discards.\n"
+msgstr "Flaggan --tcrypt-hidden kan inte kombineras med --allow-discards.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2337
+msgid "Option --veracrypt is supported only for TCRYPT device type.\n"
+msgstr "Flaggan --veracrypt stöds endast för TCRYPT-enhetstyper.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2343
+msgid "Invalid argument for parameter --veracrypt-pim supplied.\n"
+msgstr "Angav ett ogiltigt argument för parametern --veracrypt-pim.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2347
+msgid "Option --veracrypt-pim is supported only for VeraCrypt compatible devices.\n"
+msgstr "Flaggan --veracrypt-pim stöds endast för VeraCrypt-kompatibla enheter.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2355
+msgid "Option --veracrypt-query-pim is supported only for VeraCrypt compatible devices.\n"
+msgstr "Flaggan --veracrypt-query-pim stöds endast för VeraCrypt-kompatibla enheter.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2359
+msgid "The options --veracrypt-pim and --veracrypt-query-pim are mutually exclusive.\n"
+msgstr "Flaggorna --veracrypt-pim och --veracrypt-query-pim är ömsesidigt uteslutande.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2366
+msgid "Option --priority can be only ignore/normal/prefer.\n"
+msgstr "Flaggan  --priority kan endast vara ignore/normal/prefer.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2371
+msgid "Keyslot specification is required.\n"
+msgstr "Specifikation för nyckelplats krävs.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2376
+msgid "Password-based key derivation function (PBKDF) can be only pbkdf2 or argon2i/argon2id.\n"
+msgstr "Password-based key derivation function (PBKDF) kan endast vara pbkdf2 eller argon2i/argon2id.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2381
+msgid "PBKDF forced iterations cannot be combined with iteration time option.\n"
+msgstr "Tvingade PBKDF-iterationer går inte att kombinera med flaggan iteration time.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2387
+msgid "Sector size option is not supported for this command.\n"
+msgstr "Flaggan för sektorstorlek stöds inte för detta kommando.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2403
+msgid "Cannot disable metadata locking.\n"
+msgstr "Det går inte att inaktivera metadatalås.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:66
+msgid "Invalid salt string specified.\n"
+msgstr "Angav ogiltig saltsträng.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:97
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create hash image %s for writing.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte skapa hashavbild %s för skrivning.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:107
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create FEC image %s for writing.\n"
+msgstr "Det går inte att skapa FEC-avbild %s för skrivning.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:178
+msgid "Invalid root hash string specified.\n"
+msgstr "Angav ogiltig rothashsträng.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:358
+msgid "<data_device> <hash_device>"
+msgstr "<dataenhet> <hashenhet>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:358 src/integritysetup.c:423
+msgid "format device"
+msgstr "formatera enhet"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:359
+msgid "<data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgstr "<dataenhet> <hashenhet> <rothash>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:359
+msgid "verify device"
+msgstr "verifiera enhet"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:360
+msgid "<data_device> <name> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgstr "<dataenhet> <namn> <hashenhet> <rothash>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:360 src/integritysetup.c:424
+msgid "open device as <name>"
+msgstr "öppna enhet som <namn>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:361 src/integritysetup.c:425
+msgid "close device (deactivate and remove mapping)"
+msgstr "stäng enhet (inaktivera och ta bort mappning)"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:362 src/integritysetup.c:426
+msgid "show active device status"
+msgstr "visa statistik för aktiv enhet"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:363
+msgid "<hash_device>"
+msgstr "<hash_enhet>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:363 src/integritysetup.c:427
+msgid "show on-disk information"
+msgstr "visa information från disk"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:382
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<data_device> is the data device\n"
+"<hash_device> is the device containing verification data\n"
+"<root_hash> hash of the root node on <hash_device>\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<namn> är enheten att skapa under %s\n"
+"<dataenhet> är dataenheten\n"
+"<hashenhet> är enheten som innehåller verifieringsdata\n"
+"<rothash> hash för rotnoden på <hashenhet>\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:389
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in dm-verity parameters:\n"
+"\tHash: %s, Data block (bytes): %u, Hash block (bytes): %u, Salt size: %u, Hash format: %u\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Inkompilerade standardparametrar för dm-verity:\n"
+"\tHash: %s, Datablock (byte): %u, Hashblock (byte): %u, Saltstorlek: %u, Hashformat: %u\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:427
+msgid "Do not use verity superblock"
+msgstr "Använd inte verity superblock"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:428
+msgid "Format type (1 - normal, 0 - original Chrome OS)"
+msgstr "Formattyp (1 - normal, 0 - ursprungliga Chrome OS)"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:428
+msgid "number"
+msgstr "antal"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:429
+msgid "Block size on the data device"
+msgstr "Blockstorlek på dataenheten"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:430
+msgid "Block size on the hash device"
+msgstr "Blockstorlek på hashenheten"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:431
+msgid "FEC parity bytes"
+msgstr "FEC paritetsbyte"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:432
+msgid "The number of blocks in the data file"
+msgstr "Antalet block i datafilen"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:432
+msgid "blocks"
+msgstr "block"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:433
+msgid "Path to device with error correction data"
+msgstr "Sökväg till enhet med felkorrigeringsdata"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:433
+msgid "path"
+msgstr "sökväg"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:434
+msgid "Starting offset on the hash device"
+msgstr "Startoffset på hashenheten"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:435
+msgid "Starting offset on the FEC device"
+msgstr "Startoffset på FEC-enheten"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:436
+msgid "Hash algorithm"
+msgstr "Hashalgoritm"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:436
+msgid "string"
+msgstr "sträng"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:437
+msgid "Salt"
+msgstr "Salt"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:437
+msgid "hex string"
+msgstr "hexsträng"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:439
+msgid "Restart kernel if corruption is detected"
+msgstr "Starta om kärna om något skadat identifieras"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:440
+msgid "Ignore corruption, log it only"
+msgstr "Ignorera om något är skadat, logga endast"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:441
+msgid "Do not verify zeroed blocks"
+msgstr "Verifiera inte nollställda block"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:547
+msgid "Option --ignore-corruption, --restart-on-corruption or --ignore-zero-blocks is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "Flaggorna --ignore-corruption, --restart-on-corruption eller --ignore-zero-blocks är endast tillåtna för operationen open.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:552
+msgid "Option --ignore-corruption and --restart-on-corruption cannot be used together.\n"
+msgstr "Flaggorna --ignore-corruption och --restart-on-corruption kan inte användas tillsammans.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:224
+#, c-format
+msgid "Formatted with tag size %u, internal integrity %s.\n"
+msgstr "Formaterad med taggstorlek %u, intern integritet %s.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:423 src/integritysetup.c:427
+msgid "<integrity_device>"
+msgstr "<integrity_enhet>"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:424
+msgid "<integrity_device> <name>"
+msgstr "<integritet_enhet> <namn>"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:446
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<integrity_device> is the device containing data with integrity tags\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<namn> är enheten att skapa under %s\n"
+"<integritetsenhet> är enheten som innehåller data med integritetstaggar\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:451
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in dm-integrity parameters:\n"
+"\tTag size: %u bytes, Checksum algorithm: %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Inkompilerade standardparametrar för dm-integrity:\n"
+"\tTaggstorlek: %u byte, Kontrollsummealgoritm: %s\n"
+"\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:489
+msgid "Journal size"
+msgstr "Journalstorlek"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:490
+msgid "Interleave sectors"
+msgstr "Infoga sektorer"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:491
+msgid "Journal watermark"
+msgstr "Journalvattenmärke"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:491
+msgid "percent"
+msgstr "procent"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:492
+msgid "Journal commit time"
+msgstr "Journalincheckningstid"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:492
+msgid "ms"
+msgstr "ms"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:493
+msgid "Tag size per-sector"
+msgstr "Taggstorlek per sektor"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:494
+msgid "Sector size"
+msgstr "Sektorstorlek"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:495
+msgid "Buffers size"
+msgstr "Bufferstorlek"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:497
+msgid "Data integrity algorithm (default "
+msgstr "Dataintegritetsalgoritm (standard "
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:498
+msgid "The size of the data integrity key"
+msgstr "Storleken för dataintegritetsnyckeln"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:499
+msgid "Read the integrity key from a file."
+msgstr "Läs integritetsnyckeln från en fil."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:501
+msgid "Journal integrity algorithm"
+msgstr "Integritetsalgoritm för journal"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:502
+msgid "The size of the journal integrity key"
+msgstr "Storleken för journalens integritetssnyckel"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:503
+msgid "Read the journal integrity key from a file."
+msgstr "Läs journalens integritetsnyckel från en fil."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:505
+msgid "Journal encryption algorithm"
+msgstr "Krypteringsalgoritm för journal"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:506
+msgid "The size of the journal encryption key"
+msgstr "Storleken för journalens krypteringsnyckel"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:507
+msgid "Read the journal encryption key from a file."
+msgstr "Läs journalens krypteringsnyckel från en fil."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:510
+msgid "Recovery mode (no journal, no tag checking)."
+msgstr "Återhämtningsläge (ingen journal, ingen taggkontroll)."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:599
+msgid "Options --journal-size, --interleave-sectors, --sector-size, --tag-size and --no-wipe can be used only for format action.\n"
+msgstr "Flaggorna --journal-size, --interleave-sectors, --sector-size, --tag-size och --no-wipe kan endast användas för åtgärden formatera.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:605
+msgid "Invalid journal size specification."
+msgstr "Ogiltig storlekspecifikation på journal."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:610
+msgid "Both key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "Både flaggor för nyckelfil och nyckelstorlek måste specifiiceras."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:613
+msgid "Integrity algorithm must be specified if integrity key is used."
+msgstr "Integritetsalgoritm måste specificieras om integritetsnyckel används."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:618
+msgid "Both journal integrity key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "Både flaggor för nyckelfil för journalintegritet och nyckelstorlek måste specificeras."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:621
+msgid "Journal integrity algorithm must be specified if journal integrity key is used."
+msgstr "Integritetsalgoritm för journal måste anges om integritetsnyckel för journal används."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:626
+msgid "Both journal encryption key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "Både flaggor för nyckelfil för journalkryptering och nyckelstorlek måste specificeras."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:629
+msgid "Journal encryption algorithm must be specified if journal encryption key is used."
+msgstr "Krypteringsalgoritm för journal måste anges om integritetsnyckel för journal används."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:158
+msgid "Reencryption already in-progress.\n"
+msgstr "Kryptering pågår redan.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:164
+msgid "Reencryption of device with integrity profile is not supported.\n"
+msgstr "Kryptering för enhet med integritetsprofil stöds ej.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:187
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot exclusively open %s, device in use.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte öppna %s exklusivt, enheten används.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:201 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:961
+msgid "Allocation of aligned memory failed.\n"
+msgstr "Misslyckades med allokering av justerat minne.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:208
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte läsa enheten %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:219
+#, c-format
+msgid "Marking LUKS1 device %s unusable.\n"
+msgstr "Markerar LUKS1-enhet %s som oanvändbar.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:223
+#, c-format
+msgid "Setting LUKS2 offline reencrypt flag on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Sätter LUKS2 flaggan för att kryptera om på enheten %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:240
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte skriva till enheten %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:324
+msgid "Cannot write reencryption log file.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte skriva loggfil för omkryptering.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:380
+msgid "Cannot read reencryption log file.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte läsa loggfil för omkryptering.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:418
+#, c-format
+msgid "Log file %s exists, resuming reencryption.\n"
+msgstr "Loggfilen %s existerar, återupptar kryptering.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:468
+msgid "Activating temporary device using old LUKS header.\n"
+msgstr "Aktiverar temporär enhet användandes gammalt LUKS-huvud.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:479
+msgid "Activating temporary device using new LUKS header.\n"
+msgstr "Aktiverar temporär enhet användandes nytt LUKS-huvud.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:489
+msgid "Activation of temporary devices failed.\n"
+msgstr "Aktivering av temporära enheter misslyckades.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:516
+#, c-format
+msgid "New LUKS header for device %s created.\n"
+msgstr "Skapade nytt LUKS-huvud för enhet %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:524
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activated keyslot %i.\n"
+msgstr "Aktiverade nyckelplats %i.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:564
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s header backup of device %s created.\n"
+msgstr "Skapade säkerhetskopia av %s-huvud på enhet %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:604
+msgid "Using default pbkdf parameters for new LUKS2 header.\n"
+msgstr "Använder pbkdf-standardparametrar för nya LUKS2-huvuden.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:618
+msgid "Creation of LUKS backup headers failed.\n"
+msgstr "Misslyckades med att skapa en säkerhetskopia av LUKS-huvuden.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:731
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot restore %s header on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Det går inte återställa %s-huvudet på enheten %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:733
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s header on device %s restored.\n"
+msgstr "Återställde %s-huvudet på enheten %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:771 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:851
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:894
+msgid "Cannot seek to device offset.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte söka till enhetsoffset.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:933 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:939
+msgid "Cannot open temporary LUKS device.\n"
+msgstr "Misslyckades med att öppna temporär LUKS-enhet.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:944 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:949
+msgid "Cannot get device size.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte hämta enhetsstorlek.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:986
+msgid "Interrupted by a signal.\n"
+msgstr "Avbruten av en signal.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:988
+msgid "IO error during reencryption.\n"
+msgstr "In-/utfel under återkryptering.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1019
+msgid "Provided UUID is invalid.\n"
+msgstr "Angivet UUID är ogiltigt.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1110
+msgid "Key file can be used only with --key-slot or with exactly one key slot active.\n"
+msgstr "Nyckelfil kan endast användas med --key-slot eller exakt en aktiv nyckelplats.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1154 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1169
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for key slot %u: "
+msgstr "Ange lösenfras för nyckelplats %u: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1223
+msgid "Cannot open reencryption log file.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte öppna loggfilen för omkryptering.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1229
+msgid "No decryption in progress, provided UUID can be used only to resume suspended decryption process.\n"
+msgstr "Ingen dekryptering pågår, givet UUID kan endast användas för att återuppta vilande dekrypteringsprocess.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1356
+msgid "Reencryption block size"
+msgstr "Blockstorlek för omkryptering"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1356
+msgid "MiB"
+msgstr "MiB"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1360
+msgid "Do not change key, no data area reencryption."
+msgstr "Ändra inte nyckel, ingen omkryptering av dataområde."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1362
+msgid "PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS (in ms)"
+msgstr "PBKDF2-iterationstid för LUKS (i ms)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1368
+msgid "Use direct-io when accessing devices."
+msgstr "Använd direct-io vid enhetsåtkomst."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1369
+msgid "Use fsync after each block."
+msgstr "Använd fsync efter varje block."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1370
+msgid "Update log file after every block."
+msgstr "Uppdatera loggfilen efter varje block."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1371
+msgid "Use only this slot (others will be disabled)."
+msgstr "Använd endast denna plats (andra kommer att inaktiveras)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1374
+msgid "Reduce data device size (move data offset). DANGEROUS!"
+msgstr "Förminska dataenhetsstorleken (flytta dataoffset). FARLIGT!"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1375
+msgid "Use only specified device size (ignore rest of device). DANGEROUS!"
+msgstr "Använd endast specificerad enhetsstorlek (ignorera resten av enheten). FARLIGT!"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1376
+msgid "Create new header on not encrypted device."
+msgstr "Skapa nytt huvud på icke-krypterad enhet."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1377
+msgid "Permanently decrypt device (remove encryption)."
+msgstr "Dekryptera enheten permanent (ta bort kryptering)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1378
+msgid "The uuid used to resume decryption."
+msgstr "Det uuid som används för att återuppta kryptering."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1379
+msgid "Type of LUKS metadata (luks1 or luks2)."
+msgstr "Type av LUKS-metadata (luks1 or luks2)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1395
+msgid "[OPTION...] <device>"
+msgstr "[FLAGGA…] <enhet>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1409
+#, c-format
+msgid "Reencryption will change: volume key%s%s%s%s.\n"
+msgstr "Omkryptering kommer att ändra: volymnyckel%s%s%s%s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1410
+msgid ", set hash to "
+msgstr ", sätt hash till "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1411
+msgid ", set cipher to "
+msgstr ", sätt chiffer till "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1415
+msgid "Argument required."
+msgstr "Kräver argument."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1431
+msgid "Only values between 1 MiB and 64 MiB allowed for reencryption block size."
+msgstr "Endast värden mellan 1 MiB och 64 MiB är tillåtna som blockstorlek för omkryptering."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1450 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1455
+msgid "Invalid device size specification."
+msgstr "Ogiltig storlekspecifikation på enhet."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1458
+msgid "Maximum device reduce size is 64 MiB."
+msgstr "Högsta förminskningsstorlek för enhet är 64 MiB."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1461
+msgid "Reduce size must be multiple of 512 bytes sector."
+msgstr "Minskningsstorlek måste vara en multipel av 512-bytesektor."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1465
+msgid "Option --new must be used together with --reduce-device-size."
+msgstr "Flaggan --new måste användas tillsammans med --reduce-device-size."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1469
+msgid "Option --keep-key can be used only with --hash or --iter-time."
+msgstr "Flaggan --keep-key kan endast användas med --hash eller --iter-time."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1473
+msgid "Option --new cannot be used together with --decrypt."
+msgstr "Flaggan --new kan inte användas tillsammans med --decrypt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1477
+msgid "Option --decrypt is incompatible with specified parameters."
+msgstr "Flaggan --decrypt är inkompatibel med specificerade parametrar."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1481
+msgid "Option --uuid is allowed only together with --decrypt."
+msgstr "Flaggan --uuid är endast tillåten tillsammans med --decrypt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1485
+msgid "Invalid luks type. Use one of these: 'luks', 'luks1' or 'luks2'."
+msgstr "Ogiltig luks-typ. Använd en av dessa: 'luks', 'luks1' or 'luks2'."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:153
+msgid "Error reading response from terminal.\n"
+msgstr "Fel vid läsning av svar från terminal.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:175
+msgid "Command successful.\n"
+msgstr "Kommandot lyckades.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:183
+msgid "wrong or missing parameters"
+msgstr "fel eller saknar parametrar"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:185
+msgid "no permission or bad passphrase"
+msgstr "ingen behörighet eller dålig lösenfras"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:187
+msgid "out of memory"
+msgstr "slut på minne"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:189
+msgid "wrong device or file specified"
+msgstr "angav fel enhet eller fil"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:191
+msgid "device already exists or device is busy"
+msgstr "enheten existerar redan eller så är enheten upptagen"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:193
+msgid "unknown error"
+msgstr "okänt fel"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:195
+#, c-format
+msgid "Command failed with code %i (%s).\n"
+msgstr "Kommandot misslyckades med kod %i (%s).\n"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:43 src/utils_password.c:75
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot check password quality: %s\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte kontrollera lösenordskvalitet: %s\n"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:51
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Password quality check failed:\n"
+" %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Misslyckades med kvalitetskontroll av lösenord:\n"
+"%s\n"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:83
+#, c-format
+msgid "Password quality check failed: Bad passphrase (%s)\n"
+msgstr "Misslyckades med kvalitetskontroll av lösenord: Dålig lösenfras (%s)\n"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:212 src/utils_password.c:227
+msgid "Error reading passphrase from terminal.\n"
+msgstr "Fel vid läsning av lösenfras från terminal.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:225
+msgid "Verify passphrase: "
+msgstr "Verifiera lösenfras: "
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:232
+msgid "Passphrases do not match.\n"
+msgstr "Lösenfraserna stämmer inte överens.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:269
+msgid "Cannot use offset with terminal input.\n"
+msgstr "Kan inte använda offset med terminalinmatning.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:272
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase: "
+msgstr "Ange lösenfras: "
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:274
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for %s: "
+msgstr "Ange lösenfras för %s: "
+
+#~ msgid "Too many tree levels for verity volume.\n"
+#~ msgstr "För många trädnivåer för verity-volym.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Key %d not active. Can't wipe.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Nyckel %d är inte aktiv. Kan inte rensa.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "<name> <data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+#~ msgstr "<namn> <dataenhet> <hashenhet> <rothash>"
+
+#~ msgid "create active device"
+#~ msgstr "skapa aktiv enhet"
+
+#~ msgid "remove (deactivate) device"
+#~ msgstr "ta bort (inaktivera) enhet"
+
+#~ msgid "Progress: %5.1f%%, ETA %02llu:%02llu, %4llu MiB written, speed %5.1f MiB/s%s"
+#~ msgstr "Förlopp: %5.1f%%, ETA %02llu:%02llu, %4llu MiB skrivna, hastighet %5.1f MiB/s%s"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot find a free loopback device.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Kan inte hitta en ledig loopback-enhet.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot open device %s\n"
+#~ msgstr "Kan inte öppna enheten %s\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot use passed UUID unless decryption in progress.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Kan inte använda insänt UUID om inte dekryptering pågår.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Key slot %d verified.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Nyckelplats %d har verifierats.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Enter LUKS passphrase: "
+#~ msgstr "Ange LUKS-lösenfras: "
+
+#~ msgid "Warning: exhausting read requested, but key file %s is not a regular file, function might never return.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Varning: utförlig läsning begärd men nyckelfilen %s är inte en vanlig fil, funktionen kanske aldrig avslutas.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "exclusive "
+#~ msgstr "exklusiv"
+
+#~ msgid "writable"
+#~ msgstr "skrivbar"
+
+#~ msgid "read-only"
+#~ msgstr "skrivskyddad"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot open device: %s\n"
+#~ msgstr "Kan inte öppna enheten: %s\n"
+
+#~ msgid "BLKROGET failed on device %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "BLKROGET misslyckades på enheten %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "BLKGETSIZE failed on device %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "BLKGETSIZE misslyckades på enheten %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "WARNING!!! Possibly insecure memory. Are you root?\n"
+#~ msgstr "VARNING!!! Potentiellt osäkert minne. Är du root?\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Unable to obtain sector size for %s"
+#~ msgstr "Kunde inte läsa av sektorstorlek för %s"
+
+#~ msgid "Failed to obtain device mapper directory."
+#~ msgstr "Misslyckades med att läsa av katalog för enhetsmappning."
+
+#~ msgid "Backup file %s doesn't exist.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Säkerhetskopian %s finns inte.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "%s is not LUKS device.\n"
+#~ msgstr "%s är inte en LUKS-enhet.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot open file %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Kan inte öppna filen %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "remove LUKS mapping"
+#~ msgstr "ta bort LUKS-mappning"
+
+#~ msgid "identical to luksKillSlot - DEPRECATED - see man page"
+#~ msgstr "identisk med luksKillSlot - FÖRÅLDRAD - se manualsida"
+
+#~ msgid "modify active device - DEPRECATED - see man page"
+#~ msgstr "ändra aktiv enhet - FÖRÅLDRAD - se manualsida"
+
+#~ msgid ""
+#~ "The reload action is deprecated. Please use \"dmsetup reload\" in case you really need this functionality.\n"
+#~ "WARNING: do not use reload to touch LUKS devices. If that is the case, hit Ctrl-C now.\n"
+#~ msgstr ""
+#~ "Omläsningsåtgärden är föråldrad. Använd ”dmsetup reload” om du verkligen behöver denna funktion.\n"
+#~ "VARNING: använd inte omläsning för ”touch” på LUKS-enheter. Om så är fallet, tryck Ctrl-C nu.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Obsolete option --non-exclusive is ignored.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Föråldrad flagga --non-exclusive ignoreras.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Read the key from a file (can be /dev/random)"
+#~ msgstr "Läs nyckeln från en fil (kan vara /dev/random)"
+
+#~ msgid "(Obsoleted, see man page.)"
+#~ msgstr "(Föråldrad, se manualsida)"
diff --git a/po/uk.po b/po/uk.po
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0f252c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/po/uk.po
@@ -0,0 +1,3251 @@
+# Ukrainian translation for cryptsetup.
+# Copyright (C) 2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+# This file is put in the public domain.
+#
+# Yuri Chornoivan <yurchor@ukr.net>, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019.
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: cryptsetup 2.1.0\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: dm-crypt@saout.de\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-01-26 19:02+0100\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2019-01-27 10:29+0200\n"
+"Last-Translator: Yuri Chornoivan <yurchor@ukr.net>\n"
+"Language-Team: Ukrainian <translation-team-uk@lists.sourceforge.net>\n"
+"Language: uk\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+"X-Bugs: Report translation errors to the Language-Team address.\n"
+"Plural-Forms: nplurals=1; plural=0;\n"
+"X-Generator: Lokalize 2.0\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:336
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper, running as non-root user."
+msgstr "Не можна ініціалізувати device-mapper, якщо програму запущено не від імені адміністратора (root)."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:339
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper. Is dm_mod kernel module loaded?"
+msgstr "Не вдалося ініціалізувати device-mapper. Чи завантажено модуль ядра dm_mod?"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1010
+msgid "Requested deferred flag is not supported."
+msgstr "Підтримки бажаного прапорця відкладення, %s, не передбачено."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1077
+#, c-format
+msgid "DM-UUID for device %s was truncated."
+msgstr "DM-UUID для пристрою %s було обрізано."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1486
+msgid "Requested dm-crypt performance options are not supported."
+msgstr "Підтримки вказаних параметрів швидкодії dm-crypt не передбачено."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1493
+msgid "Requested dm-verity data corruption handling options are not supported."
+msgstr "Підтримки вказаних параметрів обробки пошкоджених даних за допомогою dm-verity не передбачено."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1497
+msgid "Requested dm-verity FEC options are not supported."
+msgstr "Підтримки вказаних параметрів FEC за допомогою dm-verity не передбачено."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1501
+msgid "Requested data integrity options are not supported."
+msgstr "Підтримки вказаних параметрів цілісності даних не передбачено."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1503
+msgid "Requested sector_size option is not supported."
+msgstr "Підтримки вказаного параметра sector_size не передбачено."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1508
+msgid "Requested automatic recalculation of integrity tags is not supported."
+msgstr "Підтримки потрібного вам автоматичного повторного обчислення міток цілісності не передбачено."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1534
+msgid "Requested dmcrypt performance options are not supported."
+msgstr "Підтримки вказаних параметрів швидкодії dmcrypt не передбачено."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1537
+msgid "Discard/TRIM is not supported."
+msgstr "Підтримки відкидання або обрізання не передбачено."
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:2413
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to query dm-%s segment."
+msgstr "Не вдалося опитати сегмент dm-%s."
+
+#: lib/random.c:80
+msgid ""
+"System is out of entropy while generating volume key.\n"
+"Please move mouse or type some text in another window to gather some random events.\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Під час створення ключа тому було вичерпано буфер ентропії системи.\n"
+"Будь ласка, пересуньте вказівник миші або наберіть якийсь текст у іншому вікні, щоб зібрати додаткові дані на основі випадкових подій.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:84
+#, c-format
+msgid "Generating key (%d%% done).\n"
+msgstr "Створення ключа (виконано %d%%).\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:170
+msgid "Running in FIPS mode."
+msgstr "Працюємо у режимі FIPS."
+
+#: lib/random.c:176
+msgid "Fatal error during RNG initialisation."
+msgstr "Критична помилка під час ініціалізації генератора псевдовипадкових чисел."
+
+#: lib/random.c:213
+msgid "Unknown RNG quality requested."
+msgstr "Надійшов запит щодо невідомої якості псевдовипадкових чисел."
+
+#: lib/random.c:218
+msgid "Error reading from RNG."
+msgstr "Помилка читання з генератора псевдовипадкових чисел."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:214
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto RNG backend."
+msgstr "Не вдалося ініціалізувати допоміжну програму шифрування генератора псевдовипадкових чисел."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:220
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto backend."
+msgstr "Не вдалося ініціалізувати допоміжну програму шифрування."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:251 lib/setup.c:1899 lib/verity/verity.c:123
+#, c-format
+msgid "Hash algorithm %s not supported."
+msgstr "Підтримки алгоритму хешування %s не передбачено."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:254 lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:90
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key processing error (using hash %s)."
+msgstr "Помилка під час обробки ключа (на основі хешу %s)."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:315 lib/setup.c:342
+msgid "Cannot determine device type. Incompatible activation of device?"
+msgstr "Не вдалося визначити тип пристрою. Несумісна дія з активації пристрою?"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:321 lib/setup.c:2892
+msgid "This operation is supported only for LUKS device."
+msgstr "Підтримку цієї дії передбачено лише для пристроїв LUKS."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:348
+msgid "This operation is supported only for LUKS2 device."
+msgstr "Підтримку цієї дії передбачено лише для пристроїв LUKS2."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:396
+msgid "All key slots full."
+msgstr "Заповнено всі слоти ключів."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:407
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select between 0 and %d."
+msgstr "Слот ключа %d є некоректним, будь ласка, виберіть число від 0 до %d."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:413
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is full, please select another one."
+msgstr "Слот ключа %d заповнено, будь ласка, виберіть інший."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:589
+#, c-format
+msgid "Header detected but device %s is too small."
+msgstr "Виявлено заголовок, але об’єм пристрою %s є надто малим."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:626
+msgid "This operation is not supported for this device type."
+msgstr "Підтримки цієї дії для цього типу пристроїв не передбачено."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:791 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:481
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported LUKS version %d."
+msgstr "Непідтримувана версія LUKS, %d."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:808 lib/setup.c:1403 lib/setup.c:1812
+msgid "Detached metadata device is not supported for this crypt type."
+msgstr "Підтримки пристрою від'єднаних метаданих для цього типу шифрування не передбачено."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1288 lib/setup.c:2392 lib/setup.c:2464 lib/setup.c:2476
+#: lib/setup.c:2625 lib/setup.c:4021
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not active."
+msgstr "Пристрій %s є неактивним."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1310
+#, c-format
+msgid "Underlying device for crypt device %s disappeared."
+msgstr "Зник основний пристрій для пристрою для шифрування %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1388
+msgid "Invalid plain crypt parameters."
+msgstr "Некоректні параметри звичайного шифрування."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1393 lib/setup.c:1802 src/integritysetup.c:72
+msgid "Invalid key size."
+msgstr "Некоректний розмір ключа."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1398 lib/setup.c:1807 lib/setup.c:2009
+msgid "UUID is not supported for this crypt type."
+msgstr "Підтримки UUID для цього типу шифрування не передбачено."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1413 lib/setup.c:1603 src/cryptsetup.c:1045
+msgid "Unsupported encryption sector size."
+msgstr "Непідтримуваний розмір сектора шифрування."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1421 lib/setup.c:1720
+msgid "Device size is not aligned to requested sector size."
+msgstr "Розмір пристрою не вирівняно за вказаним розміром сектора."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1472 lib/setup.c:1591
+msgid "Can't format LUKS without device."
+msgstr "Форматування LUKS без пристрою неможливе."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1478 lib/setup.c:1597
+msgid "Requested data alignment is not compatible with data offset."
+msgstr "Потрібне вам вирівнювання даних є несумісним із відступом у даних."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1546 lib/setup.c:1715
+msgid "WARNING: Data offset is outside of currently available data device.\n"
+msgstr "Увага: відступ у даних виходить за межі поточного доступного пристрою для зберігання даних.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1556 lib/setup.c:1735 lib/setup.c:1754 lib/setup.c:2021
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe header on device %s."
+msgstr "Не можна витирати заголовок на пристрої %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1608
+msgid "WARNING: The device activation will fail, dm-crypt is missing support for requested encryption sector size.\n"
+msgstr "Увага: спроба активувати пристрій завершиться невдало, у dm-crypt не передбачено підтримки для вказаного розміру сектора шифрування.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1630
+msgid "Volume key is too small for encryption with integrity extensions."
+msgstr "Ключ тому є надто малим для шифрування із розширеннями цілісності."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1685
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cipher %s-%s (key size %zd bits) is not available."
+msgstr "Шифрування  %s-%s (розмір ключа — %zd бітів) є недоступним."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1747
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s which is still in use."
+msgstr "Не можна форматувати пристрій %s, який перебуває у користуванні."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1750 lib/setup.c:1775
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "Не можна форматувати пристрій %s, недостатні права доступу."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1762 lib/setup.c:2073
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format integrity for device %s."
+msgstr "Не вдалося форматувати цілісність для пристрою %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1772
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s in use."
+msgstr "Не можна форматувати пристрій %s, який перебуває у користуванні."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1779
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s."
+msgstr "Не вдалося форматувати пристрій %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1797
+msgid "Can't format LOOPAES without device."
+msgstr "Не можна форматувати LOOPAES без пристрою."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1842
+msgid "Can't format VERITY without device."
+msgstr "Форматування VERITY без пристрою неможливе."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1853 lib/verity/verity.c:106
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash type %d."
+msgstr "Непідтримуваний тип хешування VERITY, %d."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1859 lib/verity/verity.c:114
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY block size."
+msgstr "Непідтримуваний розмір блоку VERITY."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1864 lib/verity/verity.c:75
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash offset."
+msgstr "Непідтримуваний відступ хешу VERITY."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1869
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY FEC offset."
+msgstr "Непідтримуваний зсув FEC VERITY."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1893
+msgid "Data area overlaps with hash area."
+msgstr "Область даних перекривається із областю хешу."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1918
+msgid "Hash area overlaps with FEC area."
+msgstr "Область хешування перекриваються з областю FEC."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1925
+msgid "Data area overlaps with FEC area."
+msgstr "Область даних перекривається із областю FEC."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2130
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unknown crypt device type %s requested."
+msgstr "Надіслано запит щодо невідомого типу пристрою шифрування, %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2398 lib/setup.c:2470 lib/setup.c:2483
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported parameters on device %s."
+msgstr "Непідтримувані параметри на пристрої %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2404 lib/setup.c:2489
+#, c-format
+msgid "Mismatching parameters on device %s."
+msgstr "Невідповідність параметрів на пристрої %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2657
+msgid "Cannot resize loop device."
+msgstr "Неможливо змінити розмір петльового пристрою."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2666
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s size is not aligned to requested sector size (%u bytes)."
+msgstr "Розмір пристрою %s не вирівняно за вказаним розміром сектора (%u байтів)."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2725
+msgid "Do you really want to change UUID of device?"
+msgstr "Ви справді хочете змінити UUID пристрою?"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2801
+msgid "Header backup file does not contain compatible LUKS header."
+msgstr "Файл резервної копії заголовка не містить сумісного із LUKS заголовка."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2900
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not active."
+msgstr "Том %s не є активним."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2911
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is already suspended."
+msgstr "Том %s вже приспано."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2925
+#, c-format
+msgid "Suspend is not supported for device %s."
+msgstr "Підтримки присипляння для пристрою %s не передбачено."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2927
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during suspending device %s."
+msgstr "Помилка під час спроби приспати пристрій %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2960 lib/setup.c:3027
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not suspended."
+msgstr "Том %s не приспано."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2989
+#, c-format
+msgid "Resume is not supported for device %s."
+msgstr "Підтримки дії з пробудження для пристрою %s не передбачено."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2991 lib/setup.c:3059
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during resuming device %s."
+msgstr "Помилка під час спроби пробудити пристрій %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3127 lib/setup.c:3315
+msgid "Cannot add key slot, all slots disabled and no volume key provided."
+msgstr "Не вдалося додати слот ключа, всі слоти вимкнено і не вказано ключа тому."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3267
+msgid "Failed to swap new key slot."
+msgstr "Не вдалося зарезервувати новий слот ключа."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3432 lib/setup.c:3865 lib/setup.c:3878 lib/setup.c:3886
+#: lib/setup.c:3899 lib/setup.c:4198 lib/setup.c:5274
+msgid "Volume key does not match the volume."
+msgstr "Ключ тому не відповідає тому."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3453
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid."
+msgstr "Слот ключа %d є некоректним."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3459
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is not used."
+msgstr "Слот ключа %d не використовується."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3478
+msgid "Device header overlaps with data area."
+msgstr "Заголовок пристрою перекривається із областю даних."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3684 lib/setup.c:3952
+msgid "Device type is not properly initialised."
+msgstr "Тип пристрою не ініціалізовано належним чином."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3726
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s, name is invalid or still in use."
+msgstr "Неможливо скористатися пристроєм %s, некоректна назва або пристрій усе ще використовується."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3729
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s already exists."
+msgstr "Пристрій %s вже існує."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3852
+msgid "Incorrect volume key specified for plain device."
+msgstr "Для пристрою зі звичайним шифруванням вказано помилковий ключ тому."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3918
+msgid "Incorrect root hash specified for verity device."
+msgstr "Для пристрою перевірки вказано помилковий кореневий хеш."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3995 lib/setup.c:4010
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is still in use."
+msgstr "Пристрій %s все ще використовується."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4025
+#, c-format
+msgid "Invalid device %s."
+msgstr "Некоректний пристрій %s."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4134
+msgid "Function not available in FIPS mode."
+msgstr "Ця функція недоступна у режимі FIPS."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4148
+msgid "Volume key buffer too small."
+msgstr "Буфер ключів тому є занадто малим."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4156
+msgid "Cannot retrieve volume key for plain device."
+msgstr "Неможливо отримати ключ тому для пристрою зі звичайним шифруванням."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4167
+#, c-format
+msgid "This operation is not supported for %s crypt device."
+msgstr "Підтримки цієї дії для шифрованого пристрою %s не передбачено."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4354
+msgid "Dump operation is not supported for this device type."
+msgstr "Підтримки дії зі створення дампу для цього типу пристроїв не передбачено."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4930
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert device %s which is still in use."
+msgstr "Не можна перетворити пристрій %s, який перебуває у користуванні."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5213
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign keyslot %u as the new volume key."
+msgstr "Не вдалося прив'язати слот ключа %u як новий ключ тому."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5280
+msgid "Failed to initialise default LUKS2 keyslot parameters."
+msgstr "Не вдалося ініціалізувати типові параметри слоту ключів LUKS2."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5286
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign keyslot %d to digest."
+msgstr "Не вдалося прив'язати слот ключа %d до контрольної суми."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5370
+msgid "Failed to load key in kernel keyring."
+msgstr "Не вдалося завантажити ключ до сховища ключів ядра."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5425
+msgid "Kernel keyring is not supported by the kernel."
+msgstr "У ядрі не передбачено підтримки сховища ключів ядра."
+
+#: lib/setup.c:5435
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read passphrase from keyring (error %d)."
+msgstr "Не вдалося прочитати пароль із ключа зі сховища ключів (помилка %d)."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:81
+msgid "Cannot get process priority."
+msgstr "Не вдалося отримати значення пріоритетності процесу."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:95
+msgid "Cannot unlock memory."
+msgstr "Не вдалося розблокувати пам’ять."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:169 lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:498
+msgid "Failed to open key file."
+msgstr "Не вдалося відкрити файл ключа."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:174
+msgid "Cannot read keyfile from a terminal."
+msgstr "Не вдалося прочитати файл ключа з термінала."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:191
+msgid "Failed to stat key file."
+msgstr "Не вдалося отримати статистичні дані щодо файла ключа."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:199 lib/utils.c:220
+msgid "Cannot seek to requested keyfile offset."
+msgstr "Не вдалося встановити потрібну позицію у файлі ключа."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:214 lib/utils.c:229 src/utils_password.c:188
+#: src/utils_password.c:201
+msgid "Out of memory while reading passphrase."
+msgstr "Під час читання пароля вичерпано пам’ять."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:249
+msgid "Error reading passphrase."
+msgstr "Помилка під час читання пароля."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:266
+msgid "Nothing to read on input."
+msgstr "Нічого читати з вхідних даних."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:273
+msgid "Maximum keyfile size exceeded."
+msgstr "Перевищено максимальний розмір файла ключа."
+
+#: lib/utils.c:278
+msgid "Cannot read requested amount of data."
+msgstr "Не вдалося прочитати бажаний об’єм даних."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:184 lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:92
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s doesn't exist or access denied."
+msgstr "Пристрою %s не існує або доступ до цього пристрою заборонено."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:194
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not compatible."
+msgstr "Пристрій %s є сумісним."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:560
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small. Need at least %<PRIu64> bytes."
+msgstr "Обсяг пристрою %s є надто малим. Потрібно принаймні %<PRIu64> байтів."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:641
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s which is in use (already mapped or mounted)."
+msgstr "Не можна використовувати пристрій %s, оскільки його вже використано (призначено або змонтовано)."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:645
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "Не можна скористатися пристроєм %s, недостатні права доступу."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:648
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot get info about device %s."
+msgstr "Не вдалося отримати дані щодо пристрою %s."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:671
+msgid "Cannot use a loopback device, running as non-root user."
+msgstr "Не можна використовувати петльовий пристрій, програму запущено не від імені адміністративного користувача (root)."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:681
+msgid "Attaching loopback device failed (loop device with autoclear flag is required)."
+msgstr "Спроба долучення петльового пристрою зазнала невдачі (потрібен петльовий пристрій з встановленим прапорцем автоматичного спорожнення)."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:727
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested offset is beyond real size of device %s."
+msgstr "Бажана точка відступу перебуває за межами об’єму пристрою %s."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:735
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s has zero size."
+msgstr "Об’єм пристрою %s є нульовим."
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:746 lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:252
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small."
+msgstr "Об’єм пристрою %s є надто малим."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:100
+msgid "Requested PBKDF target time cannot be zero."
+msgstr "Вказаний час PBKDF не може бути нульовим."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:106
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unknown PBKDF type %s."
+msgstr "Невідомий тип PBKDF, %s."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:111
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested hash %s is not supported."
+msgstr "Підтримки бажаного хешування, %s, не передбачено."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:122
+msgid "Requested PBKDF type is not supported for LUKS1."
+msgstr "Підтримки бажаного типу PBKDF для LUKS1 не передбачено."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:128
+msgid "PBKDF max memory or parallel threads must not be set with pbkdf2."
+msgstr "Максимальний об'єм пам'яті PBKDF або кількість паралельних потоків обробки не можна встановлювати разом із pbkdf2."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:133 lib/utils_pbkdf.c:143
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forced iteration count is too low for %s (minimum is %u)."
+msgstr "Задане значення кількості ітерацій для %s є надто низьким (мінімальним є %u)."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:148
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forced memory cost is too low for %s (minimum is %u kilobytes)."
+msgstr "Задане значення об'єму пам'яті для %s є надто низьким (мінімальним є %u кілобайтів)."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:155
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested maximum PBKDF memory cost is too high (maximum is %d kilobytes)."
+msgstr "Бажана максимальна вартість пам'яті PBKDF є надто високою (максимальною є %d кілобайтів)."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:160
+msgid "Requested maximum PBKDF memory cannot be zero."
+msgstr "Бажаний максимальний обсяг пам'яті PBKDF не може бути нульовим."
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:164
+msgid "Requested PBKDF parallel threads cannot be zero."
+msgstr "Вказана кількість паралельних потоків обробки PBKDF не може бути нульовою."
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:317
+msgid "PBKDF benchmark disabled but iterations not set."
+msgstr "Тестування PBKDF вимкнено, але кількість ітерацій не встановлено."
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:336
+#, c-format
+msgid "Not compatible PBKDF2 options (using hash algorithm %s)."
+msgstr "Несумісні параметри PBKDF2 (з використанням алгоритму хешування %s)."
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:356
+msgid "Not compatible PBKDF options."
+msgstr "Несумісні параметри PBKDF."
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:80
+#, c-format
+msgid "Locking aborted. The locking path %s/%s is unusable (not a directory or missing)."
+msgstr "Блокування перервано. Шлях блокування %s/%s є непридатним для користування (не є каталогом або його не вказано)."
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:87
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Locking directory %s/%s is missing!\n"
+msgstr "ПОПЕРЕДЖЕННЯ: не вистачає блокування каталогу %s/%s!\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:97
+#, c-format
+msgid "Locking aborted. The locking path %s/%s is unusable (%s is not a directory)."
+msgstr "Блокування перервано Шлях блокування %s/%s є непридатним для користування (%s не є каталогом)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:40
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Failed to setup dm-crypt key mapping for device %s.\n"
+"Check that kernel supports %s cipher (check syslog for more info)."
+msgstr ""
+"Не вдалося визначити призначення ключа dm-crypt для пристрою %s.\n"
+"Перевірте, чи передбачено у ядрі підтримку шифрування %s (докладніші дані можна знайти у журналі системи (syslog))."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:45
+msgid "Key size in XTS mode must be 256 or 512 bits."
+msgstr "Розмір ключа у режимі XTS має бути рівним 256 або 512 бітів."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:47
+msgid "Cipher specification should be in [cipher]-[mode]-[iv] format."
+msgstr "Специфікацію шифрування слід вказувати так: [алгоритм]-[режим]-[iv]."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:98 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:345
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:642 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1079
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1157 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:448
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write to device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "Не вдалося виконати запис на пристрій %s, недостатні права доступу."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:120
+msgid "Failed to open temporary keystore device."
+msgstr "Не вдалося відкрити пристрій тимчасового сховища ключів."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:127
+msgid "Failed to access temporary keystore device."
+msgstr "Не вдалося отримати доступ до пристрою тимчасового сховища ключів."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:200 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:91
+msgid "IO error while encrypting keyslot."
+msgstr "Помилка введення-виведення під час шифрування слоту ключів."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:243 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:348
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:594 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:645 lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:663
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:81 lib/verity/verity.c:182 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:308
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:319 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:339
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:242 lib/verity/verity_fec.c:254
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:259 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1160
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:208
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open device %s."
+msgstr "Не вдалося відкрити пристрій %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:254 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:152
+msgid "IO error while decrypting keyslot."
+msgstr "Помилка введення-виведення під час розшифрування слоту ключів."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:111
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small. (LUKS1 requires at least %<PRIu64> bytes.)"
+msgstr "Обсяг пристрою %s є надто малим. (LUKS1 потрібно принаймні %<PRIu64> байтів.)"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:132 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:140
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:152 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:163
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:175
+#, c-format
+msgid "LUKS keyslot %u is invalid."
+msgstr "Слот ключа LUKS %u є некоректним."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:228 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:478
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:991 src/cryptsetup.c:1236
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1355 src/cryptsetup.c:1412 src/cryptsetup.c:1468
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1535 src/cryptsetup.c:1631 src/cryptsetup.c:1695
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1855 src/cryptsetup.c:2044 src/cryptsetup.c:2104
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2170 src/cryptsetup.c:2334 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1397
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."
+msgstr "Пристрій %s не є коректним пристроєм LUKS."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:247 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1010
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested header backup file %s already exists."
+msgstr "Потрібний вам файл резервної копії заголовка, %s, вже існує."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:249 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1012
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Не вдалося створити файл резервної копії заголовка, %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:254 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1017
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Не вдалося записати файл резервної копії заголовка, %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:287 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1066
+msgid "Backup file doesn't contain valid LUKS header."
+msgstr "Файл резервної копії не містить коректного заголовка LUKS."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:300 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:555
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1087
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Не вдалося відкрити файл резервної копії заголовка, %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:306 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1093
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read header backup file %s."
+msgstr "Не вдалося прочитати дані з файла резервної копії заголовка, %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:318
+msgid "Data offset or key size differs on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "Відступ у даних або розмір ключа на пристрої і у резервній копії є різними. Відновлення неможливе."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:326
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s %s%s"
+msgstr "Пристрій %s %s%s"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:327
+msgid "does not contain LUKS header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device."
+msgstr "не містить заголовка LUKS. Заміна заголовка може зруйнувати дані, що зберігаються на пристрої."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:328
+msgid "already contains LUKS header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."
+msgstr "вже містить заголовок LUKS. Заміна заголовка призведе до руйнування вже створених слотів ключів."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:329 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1129
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: real device header has different UUID than backup!"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"ПОПЕРЕДЖЕННЯ: заголовок, що зберігається на пристрої, має інший UUID, ніж заголовок у резервній копії!"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:381
+msgid "Non standard key size, manual repair required."
+msgstr "Нестандартний розмір ключа, слід виправити дані вручну."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:386
+msgid "Non standard keyslots alignment, manual repair required."
+msgstr "Нестандартне вирівнювання слотів ключів, слід виправити дані вручну."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:396
+msgid "Repairing keyslots."
+msgstr "Виправлення слотів ключів."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:415
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: offset repaired (%u -> %u)."
+msgstr "Слот ключа %i: виправлено відступ (%u -> %u)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:423
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: stripes repaired (%u -> %u)."
+msgstr "Слот ключа %i: виправлено смужки (%u -> %u)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:432
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: bogus partition signature."
+msgstr "Слот ключа %i: зайвий підпис розділу."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:437
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: salt wiped."
+msgstr "Слот ключа %i: дані ініціалізації (сіль) витерто."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:454
+msgid "Writing LUKS header to disk."
+msgstr "Запис заголовка LUKS на диск."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:459
+msgid "Repair failed."
+msgstr "Спроба виправлення зазнала невдачі."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:487 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:758
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested LUKS hash %s is not supported."
+msgstr "Підтримки бажаного хешування LUKS, %s, не передбачено."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:515 src/cryptsetup.c:960
+msgid "No known problems detected for LUKS header."
+msgstr "У заголовку LUKS не виявлено жодних проблем."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:667
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during update of LUKS header on device %s."
+msgstr "Помилка під час оновлення заголовка LUKS на пристрої %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:676
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error re-reading LUKS header after update on device %s."
+msgstr "Помилка під час спроби повторного читання заголовка LUKS після оновлення на пристрої %s."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:752
+msgid "Data offset for LUKS header must be either 0 or higher than header size."
+msgstr "Відступ даних для заголовка LUKS має бути або рівним нулеві, або перевищувати розмір заголовка."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:763 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:828
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:207 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:909
+msgid "Wrong LUKS UUID format provided."
+msgstr "Вказано UUID LUKS у помилковому форматі."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:786
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: reading random salt failed."
+msgstr "Не вдалося створити заголовок LUKS: помилка читання випадкових даних для ініціалізації."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:807
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: header digest failed (using hash %s)."
+msgstr "Не вдалося створити заголовок LUKS: помилка під час обчислення контрольної суми заголовка (з використанням хешу %s)."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:851
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d active, purge first."
+msgstr "Слот ключа %d є активним. Його слід спочатку спорожнити."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:857
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d material includes too few stripes. Header manipulation?"
+msgstr "Ентропія даних слота ключа %d є надто низькою. Маніпуляції з заголовком?"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1065
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select keyslot between 0 and %d."
+msgstr "Слот ключа %d є некоректним, будь ласка, виберіть слот ключа з номером від 0 до %d."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1083 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:452
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe device %s."
+msgstr "Не вдалося витерти пристрій %s."
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:146
+msgid "Detected not yet supported GPG encrypted keyfile."
+msgstr "Виявлено файл ключа, підтримки шифрування GPG у якому ще не передбачено."
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:147
+msgid "Please use gpg --decrypt <KEYFILE> | cryptsetup --keyfile=- ...\n"
+msgstr "Будь ласка, скористайтеся командою gpg --decrypt <ФАЙЛ_КЛЮЧА> | cryptsetup --keyfile=- ...\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:168 lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:188
+msgid "Incompatible loop-AES keyfile detected."
+msgstr "Виявлено несумісний з loop-AES файл ключа."
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:245
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support loop-AES compatible mapping."
+msgstr "У ядрі не передбачено підтримки призначення, сумісного з loop-AES."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:505
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error reading keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Помилка під час спроби читання файла ключа %s."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:545
+#, c-format
+msgid "Maximum TCRYPT passphrase length (%d) exceeded."
+msgstr "Перевищено максимальну можливу довжину пароля TCRYPT (%d)."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:586
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2 hash algorithm %s not available, skipping."
+msgstr "Засіб створення хешів PBKDF2 за алгоритмом %s недоступний, пропускаємо."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:604 src/cryptsetup.c:915
+msgid "Required kernel crypto interface not available."
+msgstr "Потрібний для роботи інтерфейс ядра для шифрування недоступний."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:606 src/cryptsetup.c:917
+msgid "Ensure you have algif_skcipher kernel module loaded."
+msgstr "Переконайтеся, що завантажено модуль ядра algif_skcipher."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:746
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activation is not supported for %d sector size."
+msgstr "Підтримки активації для розміру сектора %d не передбачено."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:752
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support activation for this TCRYPT legacy mode."
+msgstr "У ядрі не передбачено підтримки вмикання цього застарілого режиму TCRYPT."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:786
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activating TCRYPT system encryption for partition %s."
+msgstr "Активуємо шифрування системи за допомогою TCRYPT для розділу %s."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:864
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support TCRYPT compatible mapping."
+msgstr "У ядрі не передбачено підтримки призначення, сумісного з TCRYPT."
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:1085
+msgid "This function is not supported without TCRYPT header load."
+msgstr "Підтримки цієї дії без завантаження заголовка TCRYPT."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:69 lib/verity/verity.c:175
+#, c-format
+msgid "Verity device %s doesn't use on-disk header."
+msgstr "На пристрої VERITY %s не використовується вбудований заголовок."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:94
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not a valid VERITY device."
+msgstr "Пристрій %s не є коректним пристроєм VERITY."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:101
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY version %d."
+msgstr "Непідтримувана версія VERITY, %d."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:132
+msgid "VERITY header corrupted."
+msgstr "Пошкоджено заголовок VERITY."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:169
+#, c-format
+msgid "Wrong VERITY UUID format provided on device %s."
+msgstr "На пристрої %s вказано UUID VERITY у помилковому форматі."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:202
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during update of verity header on device %s."
+msgstr "Помилка під час оновлення заголовка verity на пристрої %s."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:266
+msgid "Errors cannot be repaired with FEC device."
+msgstr "Помилки не може бути виправлено за допомогою пристрою FEC."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:268
+#, c-format
+msgid "Found %u repairable errors with FEC device."
+msgstr "За допомогою пристрою FEC виявлено %u придатних до виправлення помилок."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:306
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support dm-verity mapping."
+msgstr "У ядрі не передбачено підтримки призначення за dm-verity."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:317
+msgid "Verity device detected corruption after activation."
+msgstr "Виявлено пошкодження даних на пристрої перевірки після активації."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:59
+#, c-format
+msgid "Spare area is not zeroed at position %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Резервну область не занулено у позиції %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:160 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:287
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:300
+msgid "Device offset overflow."
+msgstr "Переповнення відступу на пристрої."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:200
+#, c-format
+msgid "Verification failed at position %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Помилка під час перевірки за позицією %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:273
+msgid "Invalid size parameters for verity device."
+msgstr "Некоректні параметри розміру для пристрою перевірки."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:293
+msgid "Hash area overflow."
+msgstr "Переповнення області хешу."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:370
+msgid "Verification of data area failed."
+msgstr "Не вдалося перевірити область даних."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:375
+msgid "Verification of root hash failed."
+msgstr "Не вдалося перевірити кореневий хеш."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:381
+msgid "Input/output error while creating hash area."
+msgstr "Під час створення області хешу сталася помилка введення або виведення даних."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:383
+msgid "Creation of hash area failed."
+msgstr "Не вдалося створити область хешу."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:430
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Kernel cannot activate device if data block size exceeds page size (%u)."
+msgstr "Попередження: ядро не зможе задіяти пристрій, якщо розмір блоку перевищуватиме розмір сторінки (%u)."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:132
+msgid "Failed to allocate RS context."
+msgstr "Не вдалося розмістити контекст RS."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:147
+msgid "Failed to allocate buffer."
+msgstr "Не вдалося розмістити у пам'яті буфер."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:157
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read RS block %<PRIu64> byte %d."
+msgstr "Не вдалося прочитати блок RS %<PRIu64>, байт %d."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:170
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read parity for RS block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Не вдалося прочитати парність для блоку RS %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:178
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to repair parity for block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Не вдалося відновити парність для блоку %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:189
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to write parity for RS block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "Не вдалося прочитати парність для блоку RS %<PRIu64>."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:224
+msgid "Block sizes must match for FEC."
+msgstr "Розміри блоків для FEC мають бути однаковими."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:230
+msgid "Invalid number of parity bytes."
+msgstr "Некоректна кількість байтів парності."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:266
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to determine size for device %s."
+msgstr "Не вдалося визначити розмір для пристрою %s."
+
+#: lib/integrity/integrity.c:239 lib/integrity/integrity.c:304
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support dm-integrity mapping."
+msgstr "У ядрі не передбачено підтримки прив'язки dm-integrity."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:413
+msgid "Failed to acquire write device lock."
+msgstr "Не вдалося отримати блокування запису для пристрою."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:654 lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:675
+msgid ""
+"Device contains ambiguous signatures, cannot auto-recover LUKS2.\n"
+"Please run \"cryptsetup repair\" for recovery."
+msgstr ""
+"Пристрій містить неоднозначні підписи. Автоматичне відновлення LUKS2 неможливе.\n"
+"Будь ласка, запустіть «cryptsetup repair» для відновлення."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:99
+msgid "No space for new keyslot."
+msgstr "Немає простору для нового слоту ключа."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:158
+msgid "Requested data offset is too small."
+msgstr "Вказаний відступ у даних є надто малим."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:195
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: keyslots area (%<PRIu64> bytes) is very small, available LUKS2 keyslot count is very limited.\n"
+msgstr "Увага: область слоту ключів є надто малою (%<PRIu64> байтів), доступна кількість слотів ключів LUKS2 буде дуже обмеженою.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:866 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:982
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1055 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:105
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:128
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to acquire read lock on device %s."
+msgstr "Не вдалося отримати блокування читання на пристрої %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:878 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1149
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:431 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:40
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:69
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to acquire write lock on device %s."
+msgstr "Не вдалося отримати блокування запису на пристрої %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1072
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forbidden LUKS2 requirements detected in backup %s."
+msgstr "У резервній копії %s виявлено заборонені вимоги щодо LUKS2."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1113
+msgid "Data offset differ on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "Зсуви даних на пристрої і на резервній копії різняться, не вдалося відновити."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1119
+msgid "Binary header with keyslot areas size differ on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "Двійкові заголовки із розмірами областей слотів ключів на пристрої і у резервній копії різняться, не вдалося відновити копію."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1126
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s %s%s%s%s"
+msgstr "Пристрій %s %s%s%s%s"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1127
+msgid "does not contain LUKS2 header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device."
+msgstr "не містить заголовка LUKS2. Заміна заголовка може зруйнувати дані, що зберігаються на пристрої."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1128
+msgid "already contains LUKS2 header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."
+msgstr "вже містить заголовок LUKS2. Заміна заголовка призведе до руйнування вже створених слотів ключів."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1130
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: unknown LUKS2 requirements detected in real device header!\n"
+"Replacing header with backup may corrupt the data on that device!"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"ПОПЕРЕДЖЕННЯ: виявлено невідомі вимоги LUKS2 у справжньому заголовку пристрою!\n"
+"Заміна заголовка резервною копією може пошкодити дані на пристрої!"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1132
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: Unfinished offline reencryption detected on the device!\n"
+"Replacing header with backup may corrupt data."
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"ПОПЕРЕДЖЕННЯ: на пристрої виявлено дані незавершеного повторного шифрування!\n"
+"Заміна заголовка заголовком із резервної копії може пошкодити дані."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1234
+#, c-format
+msgid "Ignored unknown flag %s."
+msgstr "Проігноровано невідомий прапорець %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1869
+msgid "Failed to read LUKS2 requirements."
+msgstr "Не вдалося прочитати вимоги LUKS2."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1876
+msgid "Unmet LUKS2 requirements detected."
+msgstr "Виявлено невідповідність вимог LUKS2."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1884
+msgid "Offline reencryption in progress. Aborting."
+msgstr "Виконується автономне повторне шифрування. Перериваємо."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:474
+#, c-format
+msgid "Can not check status of device with uuid: %s."
+msgstr "Не вдалося перевірити стан пристрою з uuid %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:500
+msgid "Unable to convert header with LUKSMETA additional metadata."
+msgstr "Не вдалося перетворити заголовок з додатковими метаданими LUKSMETA."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:537
+msgid "Unable to move keyslot area. Not enough space."
+msgstr "Не вдалося пересунути область слотів ключів. Недостатньо місця."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:577 lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:854
+msgid "Unable to move keyslot area."
+msgstr "Не вдалося пересунути область слотів ключів."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:672
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - key slot digests are not LUKS1 compatible."
+msgstr "Не вдалося перетворити до формату LUKS1 — контрольні суми слотів ключів не сумісні з LUKS1."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:684
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - device uses wrapped key cipher %s."
+msgstr "Не вдалося перетворити до формату LUKS1 — на пристрої використовується загорнуте шифрування ключів %s."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:692
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - LUKS2 header contains %u token(s)."
+msgstr "Не вдалося перетворити до формату LUKS1 - заголовок LUKS2 містить %u ключів."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:706
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - keyslot %u is in invalid state."
+msgstr "Не вдалося перетворити до формату LUKS1 - слот ключа %u перебуває у некоректному стані."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:711
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - slot %u (over maximum slots) is still active."
+msgstr "Не вдалося перетворити до формату LUKS1 — слот %u (перевищує максимальну кількість слотів) усе ще є активним."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:716
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - keyslot %u is not LUKS1 compatible."
+msgstr "не вдалося перетворити до формату LUKS1 — слот ключів %u є несумісним з LUKS1."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_token.c:262
+msgid "No free token slot."
+msgstr "Немає вільного слоту ключів."
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_token.c:269
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to create builtin token %s."
+msgstr "Не вдалося створити вбудований ключ %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:141
+msgid "Can't do passphrase verification on non-tty inputs."
+msgstr "Перевірку паролів не можна виконувати на основі вхідних даних, які надходять не з tty."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:182
+msgid "Keyslot encryption parameters can be set only for LUKS2 device."
+msgstr "Параметри шифрування слоту ключів можна встановлювати лише для пристроїв LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:212 src/cryptsetup.c:849 src/cryptsetup.c:1088
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:749 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:814
+msgid "No known cipher specification pattern detected."
+msgstr "Не виявлено жодного відомого зразка специфікації шифрування."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:220
+msgid "WARNING: The --hash parameter is being ignored in plain mode with keyfile specified.\n"
+msgstr "Попередження: параметр --hash у простому режимі із вказаним файлом ключа ігнорується.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:228
+msgid "WARNING: The --keyfile-size option is being ignored, the read size is the same as the encryption key size.\n"
+msgstr "Попередження: параметр --keyfile-size проігноровано, розмір прочитаних даних збігається із розміром ключа шифрування.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:268
+#, c-format
+msgid "Detected device signature(s) on %s. Proceeding further may damage existing data."
+msgstr "На %s виявлено підписи пристроїв. Подальша обробка може пошкодити наявні дані."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:274 src/cryptsetup.c:969 src/cryptsetup.c:1065
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1138 src/cryptsetup.c:1763 src/integritysetup.c:230
+msgid "Operation aborted.\n"
+msgstr "Дію перервано.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:342
+msgid "Option --key-file is required."
+msgstr "Слід вказати параметр --key-file."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:395
+msgid "Enter VeraCrypt PIM: "
+msgstr "Введіть PIM VeraCrypt: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:404
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: parse error."
+msgstr "Некоректне значення PIM: помилка обробки."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:407
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: 0."
+msgstr "Некоректне значення PIM: 0."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:410
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: outside of range."
+msgstr "Некоректне значення PIM: поза межами діапазону."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:433
+msgid "No device header detected with this passphrase."
+msgstr "Для цього пароля не виявлено заголовка пристрою."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:495 src/cryptsetup.c:1790
+msgid ""
+"Header dump with volume key is sensitive information\n"
+"which allows access to encrypted partition without passphrase.\n"
+"This dump should be always stored encrypted on safe place."
+msgstr ""
+"Дамп заголовка з ключем тому є конфіденційними даними,\n"
+"за допомогою яких можна отримати доступ до шифрованого розділу\n"
+"без пароля. Цей дамп слід зберігати у зашифрованому форматі\n"
+"у безпечному місці."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:574
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is still active and scheduled for deferred removal.\n"
+msgstr "Пристрій %s усе ще є активним, його заплановано для відкладеного вилучення.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:602
+msgid "Resize of active device requires volume key in keyring but --disable-keyring option is set."
+msgstr "Зміна розмірів актвиного пристрою потребує наявності ключа тому у сховищі ключів, але вказано параметр --disable-keyring."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:727
+msgid "Benchmark interrupted."
+msgstr "Тестування перервано."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:748
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2-%-9s     N/A\n"
+msgstr "PBKDF2-%-9s     н/д\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:750
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2-%-9s %7u iterations per second for %zu-bit key\n"
+msgstr "PBKDF2-%-9s %7u ітерацій за секунду для %zu-бітового ключа\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:764
+#, c-format
+msgid "%-10s N/A\n"
+msgstr "%-10s н/д\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:766
+#, c-format
+msgid "%-10s %4u iterations, %5u memory, %1u parallel threads (CPUs) for %zu-bit key (requested %u ms time)\n"
+msgstr "%-10s %4u ітерацій, пам'ять: %5u, %1u паралельних потоків (процесорів) для %zu-бітового ключа (запит на %u мс часу)\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:790
+msgid "Result of benchmark is not reliable."
+msgstr "Результат тестування є ненадійним."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:841
+msgid "# Tests are approximate using memory only (no storage IO).\n"
+msgstr "# Наближені значення під час перевірки визначаються лише за допомогою оперативної пам’яті (без запису на диск).\n"
+
+#. TRANSLATORS: The string is header of a table and must be exactly (right side) aligned.
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:875
+#, c-format
+msgid "#%*s Algorithm |       Key |      Encryption |      Decryption\n"
+msgstr "№%*s Алгоритм |      Ключ |      Шифрування |   Розшифрування\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:879
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cipher %s is not available."
+msgstr "Шифрування %s є недоступним."
+
+#. TRANSLATORS: The string is header of a table and must be exactly (right side) aligned.
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:899
+msgid "#     Algorithm |       Key |      Encryption |      Decryption\n"
+msgstr "№      Алгоритм |      Ключ |      Шифрування |   Розшифрування\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:908
+msgid "N/A"
+msgstr "н/д"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:968
+msgid "Really try to repair LUKS device header?"
+msgstr "Спробувати відновити заголовок пристрою LUKS?"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:984 src/integritysetup.c:144
+msgid ""
+"Wiping device to initialize integrity checksum.\n"
+"You can interrupt this by pressing CTRL+c (rest of not wiped device will contain invalid checksum).\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Витираємо пристрій для ініціалізації контрольних сум для цілісності.\n"
+"Ви можете перервати цей процес натисканням комбінації клавіш CTRL+C (решта невитертого пристрою міститиме некоректну контрольну суму).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1006 src/integritysetup.c:166
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot deactivate temporary device %s."
+msgstr "Не можна скасувати активацію тимчасового пристрою %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1050
+msgid "Integrity option can be used only for LUKS2 format."
+msgstr "Параметр цілісності може бути використано лише для формату LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1055 src/cryptsetup.c:1115
+msgid "Unsupported LUKS2 metadata size options."
+msgstr "Непідтримувані параметри розміру метаданих LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1072
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create header file %s."
+msgstr "Не вдалося створити файл заголовка %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1095 src/integritysetup.c:192 src/integritysetup.c:201
+#: src/integritysetup.c:210 src/integritysetup.c:276 src/integritysetup.c:285
+#: src/integritysetup.c:295
+msgid "No known integrity specification pattern detected."
+msgstr "Не виявлено жодного відомого зразка специфікації цілісності."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1108
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use %s as on-disk header."
+msgstr "Не можна використовувати %s як заголовок на диску."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1132 src/integritysetup.c:224
+#, c-format
+msgid "This will overwrite data on %s irrevocably."
+msgstr "Дані на %s буде перезаписано без можливості відновлення."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1173 src/cryptsetup.c:1484 src/cryptsetup.c:1551
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1646 src/cryptsetup.c:1712
+msgid "Failed to set pbkdf parameters."
+msgstr "Не вдалося встановити параметри pbkdf."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1242
+msgid "Reduced data offset is allowed only for detached LUKS header."
+msgstr "Зменшений відступ даних можна використовувати лише для від’єднаних заголовків LUKS."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1284
+msgid "Device activated but cannot make flags persistent."
+msgstr "Пристрій задіяно, але не вдалося зробити прапорці сталими."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1365
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %d is selected for deletion."
+msgstr "Слот ключа %d позначено для вилучення."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1368 src/cryptsetup.c:1706
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %d is not active."
+msgstr "Слот ключа %d не є активним."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1377 src/cryptsetup.c:1438
+msgid "This is the last keyslot. Device will become unusable after purging this key."
+msgstr "Це останній слот ключа. Пристрій стане непридатним для використання після спорожнення цього ключа."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1378
+msgid "Enter any remaining passphrase: "
+msgstr "Введіть будь-який інший пароль: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1379 src/cryptsetup.c:1440
+msgid "Operation aborted, the keyslot was NOT wiped.\n"
+msgstr "Дію перервано, слот ключів НЕ витерто.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1417
+msgid "Enter passphrase to be deleted: "
+msgstr "Введіть пароль, який слід вилучити: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1435
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d selected for deletion."
+msgstr "Слот ключа %d позначено для вилучення."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1498 src/cryptsetup.c:1565 src/cryptsetup.c:1599
+msgid "Enter new passphrase for key slot: "
+msgstr "Введіть новий пароль для слота ключа: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1582 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1352
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter any existing passphrase: "
+msgstr "Введіть будь-який пароль: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1650
+msgid "Enter passphrase to be changed: "
+msgstr "Введіть пароль, який слід змінити: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1666 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1338
+msgid "Enter new passphrase: "
+msgstr "Введіть новий пароль: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1716
+msgid "Enter passphrase for keyslot to be converted: "
+msgstr "Вкажіть пароль для слоту ключа, який буде перетворено: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1740
+msgid "Only one device argument for isLuks operation is supported."
+msgstr "У команді isLuks можна використовувати лише один аргумент назви пристрою."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1924 src/cryptsetup.c:1945
+msgid "Option --header-backup-file is required."
+msgstr "Слід вказати параметр --header-backup-file."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1975
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s is not cryptsetup managed device."
+msgstr "%s не є керованим cryptsetup пристроєм."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1986
+#, c-format
+msgid "Refresh is not supported for device type %s"
+msgstr "Підтримки дії з оновлення для пристрою типу %s не передбачено."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2024
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unrecognized metadata device type %s."
+msgstr "Нерозпізнаний тип пристрою метаданих, %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2027
+msgid "Command requires device and mapped name as arguments."
+msgstr "Аргументами команди мають бути назва пристрою та призначена до нього назва."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2049
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"This operation will erase all keyslots on device %s.\n"
+"Device will become unusable after this operation."
+msgstr ""
+"У результаті виконання цієї операції буде витерто усі слоти ключів на пристрої %s.\n"
+"Після виконання цієї дії пристроєм не можна буде скористатися."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2056
+msgid "Operation aborted, keyslots were NOT wiped.\n"
+msgstr "Дію перервано, слоти ключів НЕ витерто.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2093
+msgid "Invalid LUKS type, only luks1 and luks2 are supported."
+msgstr "Некоректний тип LUKS. Передбачено підтримку лише luks1 і luks2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2111
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device is already %s type."
+msgstr "Пристрій вже належить до типу %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2116
+#, c-format
+msgid "This operation will convert %s to %s format.\n"
+msgstr "Ця дія перетворить %s до формату %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2122
+msgid "Operation aborted, device was NOT converted.\n"
+msgstr "Дію перервано, дані пристрою НЕ перетворено.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2162
+msgid "Option --priority, --label or --subsystem is missing."
+msgstr "Пропущено параметр --priority, --label або --subsystem."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2196 src/cryptsetup.c:2229 src/cryptsetup.c:2252
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %d is invalid."
+msgstr "Ключ %d є некоректним."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2199 src/cryptsetup.c:2255
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %d in use."
+msgstr "Ключ %d використовується."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2206
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to add luks2-keyring token %d."
+msgstr "Не вдалося додати ключ %d зі сховища ключів luks2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2215 src/cryptsetup.c:2277
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign token %d to keyslot %d."
+msgstr "Не вдалося прив'язати ключ %d до слоту ключа %d."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2232
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %d is not in use."
+msgstr "Ключ %d не використовується."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2267
+msgid "Failed to import token from file."
+msgstr "Не вдалося імпортувати ключ з файла."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2292
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to get token %d for export."
+msgstr "Не вдалося отримати ключ %d для експортування."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2307
+msgid "--key-description parameter is mandatory for token add action."
+msgstr "Параметр --key-description є обов'язковим для дій із додавання ключів."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2313 src/cryptsetup.c:2321
+msgid "Action requires specific token. Use --token-id parameter."
+msgstr "Для виконання дії потрібен специфічний ключ. Скористайтеся параметром --token-id."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2326
+#, c-format
+msgid "Invalid token operation %s."
+msgstr "Некоректна дія з ключем %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2366
+msgid "<device> [--type <type>] [<name>]"
+msgstr "<пристрій> [--type <тип>] [<назва>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2366
+msgid "open device as mapping <name>"
+msgstr "відкрити пристрій як призначення <назва>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2367 src/cryptsetup.c:2368 src/cryptsetup.c:2369
+#: src/veritysetup.c:363 src/veritysetup.c:364 src/integritysetup.c:464
+#: src/integritysetup.c:465
+msgid "<name>"
+msgstr "<назва>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2367
+msgid "close device (remove mapping)"
+msgstr "закрити пристрій (вилучити призначення)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2368
+msgid "resize active device"
+msgstr "змінити розмір активного пристрою"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2369
+msgid "show device status"
+msgstr "показати стан пристрою"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2370
+msgid "[--cipher <cipher>]"
+msgstr "[--cipher <шифр>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2370
+msgid "benchmark cipher"
+msgstr "перевірити швидкодію шифрування"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2371 src/cryptsetup.c:2372 src/cryptsetup.c:2373
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2374 src/cryptsetup.c:2381 src/cryptsetup.c:2382
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2383 src/cryptsetup.c:2384 src/cryptsetup.c:2385
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2386 src/cryptsetup.c:2387 src/cryptsetup.c:2388
+msgid "<device>"
+msgstr "<пристрій>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2371
+msgid "try to repair on-disk metadata"
+msgstr "спробувати виправити метадані на диску"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2372
+msgid "erase all keyslots (remove encryption key)"
+msgstr "витерти усі слоти ключів (вилучити ключ шифрування)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2373
+msgid "convert LUKS from/to LUKS2 format"
+msgstr "перетворити LUKS із формату LUKS2 або навпаки"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2374
+msgid "set permanent configuration options for LUKS2"
+msgstr "встановити сталі параметри налаштування для LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2375 src/cryptsetup.c:2376
+msgid "<device> [<new key file>]"
+msgstr "<пристрій> [<новий файл ключа>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2375
+msgid "formats a LUKS device"
+msgstr "форматує пристрій LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2376
+msgid "add key to LUKS device"
+msgstr "додати ключ до пристрою LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2377 src/cryptsetup.c:2378 src/cryptsetup.c:2379
+msgid "<device> [<key file>]"
+msgstr "<пристрій> [<файл ключа>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2377
+msgid "removes supplied key or key file from LUKS device"
+msgstr "вилучає наданий ключ або файл ключа з пристрою LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2378
+msgid "changes supplied key or key file of LUKS device"
+msgstr "змінює наданий ключ або файл ключа пристрою LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2379
+msgid "converts a key to new pbkdf parameters"
+msgstr "перетворює ключ до нових параметрів pbkdf"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2380
+msgid "<device> <key slot>"
+msgstr "<пристрій> <слот ключа>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2380
+msgid "wipes key with number <key slot> from LUKS device"
+msgstr "вилучає ключ з номером <слот ключа> з пристрою LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2381
+msgid "print UUID of LUKS device"
+msgstr "вивести UUID пристрою LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2382
+msgid "tests <device> for LUKS partition header"
+msgstr "виконати спробу виявлення заголовка розділу LUKS на пристрої <пристрій>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2383
+msgid "dump LUKS partition information"
+msgstr "створити дамп даних щодо розділу LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2384
+msgid "dump TCRYPT device information"
+msgstr "створити дамп даних пристрою TCRYPT"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2385
+msgid "Suspend LUKS device and wipe key (all IOs are frozen)"
+msgstr "Приспати пристрій LUKS і витерти ключ (роботу всіх каналів введення-виведення буде заморожено)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2386
+msgid "Resume suspended LUKS device"
+msgstr "Відновити роботу приспаного пристрою LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2387
+msgid "Backup LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "Створити резервну копію заголовка пристрою LUKS і слотів ключів"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2388
+msgid "Restore LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "Відновити заголовок пристрою LUKS і слоти ключів"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2389
+msgid "<add|remove|import|export> <device>"
+msgstr "<add|remove|import|export> <пристрій>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2389
+msgid "Manipulate LUKS2 tokens"
+msgstr "Керування ключами LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2407 src/veritysetup.c:380 src/integritysetup.c:481
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<action> is one of:\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<дія> є однією з таких:\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2413
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"You can also use old <action> syntax aliases:\n"
+"\topen: create (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen\n"
+"\tclose: remove (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tcryptClose\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Ви також можете скористатися застарілими альтернативними\n"
+"синтаксичними конструкціями для запису <дія>:\n"
+"\tвідкрити: create (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen\n"
+"\tзакрити: remove (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tcryptClose\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2417
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<device> is the encrypted device\n"
+"<key slot> is the LUKS key slot number to modify\n"
+"<key file> optional key file for the new key for luksAddKey action\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<назва> — пристрій для створення у %s\n"
+"<пристрій> — зашифрований пристрій\n"
+"<слот ключа> — номер слота ключа LUKS, який слід змінити\n"
+"<файл ключа> — необов’язковий файл ключа для нового ключа для дії luksAddKey\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2424
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in metadata format is %s (for luksFormat action).\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Типовий укомпільований формат метаданих — %s (для дії luksFormat).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2429
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in key and passphrase parameters:\n"
+"\tMaximum keyfile size: %dkB, Maximum interactive passphrase length %d (characters)\n"
+"Default PBKDF for LUKS1: %s, iteration time: %d (ms)\n"
+"Default PBKDF for LUKS2: %s\n"
+"\tIteration time: %d, Memory required: %dkB, Parallel threads: %d\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Типові вбудовані параметри ключа і пароля:\n"
+"\tМаксимальний розмір файла ключа: %d кБ, максимальна довжина інтерактивного пароля: %d (символів)\n"
+"Типовий час ітерації PBKDF для LUKS1: %s, час ітерації: %d мс\n"
+"Типовий PBKDF для LUKS2: %s\n"
+"\tЧас ітерації: %d, потрібний обсяг пам'яті: %d кБ, паралельних потоків: %d\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2440
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in device cipher parameters:\n"
+"\tloop-AES: %s, Key %d bits\n"
+"\tplain: %s, Key: %d bits, Password hashing: %s\n"
+"\tLUKS: %s, Key: %d bits, LUKS header hashing: %s, RNG: %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Типові вбудовані параметри шифрування на пристрої:\n"
+"\tloop-AES: %s, %d-бітовий ключ\n"
+"\tзвичайне: %s, ключ: %d-бітовий, хешування пароля: %s\n"
+"\tLUKS: %s, ключ: %d-бітовий, хешування заголовка LUKS: %s, RNG: %s\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2449
+msgid "\tLUKS: Default keysize with XTS mode (two internal keys) will be doubled.\n"
+msgstr "\tLUKS: типовий розмір ключа у режимі XTS (два вбудованих ключа) буде подвоєно.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2460 src/veritysetup.c:537 src/integritysetup.c:621
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s: requires %s as arguments"
+msgstr "%s: слід вказати у параметрах %s"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2498 src/veritysetup.c:420 src/integritysetup.c:515
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1611
+msgid "Show this help message"
+msgstr "Показати цю довідку"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2499 src/veritysetup.c:421 src/integritysetup.c:516
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1612
+msgid "Display brief usage"
+msgstr "Показати короткі настанови щодо користування"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2503 src/veritysetup.c:425 src/integritysetup.c:520
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1616
+msgid "Help options:"
+msgstr "Пункти довідки:"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2504 src/veritysetup.c:426 src/integritysetup.c:521
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1617
+msgid "Print package version"
+msgstr "Вивести дані щодо версії пакунка"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2505 src/veritysetup.c:427 src/integritysetup.c:522
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1618
+msgid "Shows more detailed error messages"
+msgstr "Показувати докладні повідомлення про помилки"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2506 src/veritysetup.c:428 src/integritysetup.c:523
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1619
+msgid "Show debug messages"
+msgstr "Показувати діагностичні повідомлення"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2507
+msgid "Show debug messages including JSON metadata"
+msgstr "Показувати діагностичні повідомлення, зокрема метадані JSON"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2508 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1621
+msgid "The cipher used to encrypt the disk (see /proc/crypto)"
+msgstr "Шифр, який використано для шифрування даних диска (див. /proc/crypto)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2509 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1623
+msgid "The hash used to create the encryption key from the passphrase"
+msgstr "Хеш, використаний для створення ключа шифрування на основі пароля"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2510
+msgid "Verifies the passphrase by asking for it twice"
+msgstr "Перевіряє пароль повторним запитом щодо нього"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2511 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1625
+msgid "Read the key from a file"
+msgstr "Прочитати ключ з файла"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2512
+msgid "Read the volume (master) key from file."
+msgstr "Прочитати ключ тому (основний ключ) з файла."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2513
+msgid "Dump volume (master) key instead of keyslots info"
+msgstr "Створити дамп ключа тому (основного ключа) замість показу даних щодо слотів ключів"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2514 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1622
+msgid "The size of the encryption key"
+msgstr "Розмір ключа шифрування"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2514 src/cryptsetup.c:2571 src/integritysetup.c:539
+#: src/integritysetup.c:543 src/integritysetup.c:547
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1622
+msgid "BITS"
+msgstr "БІТИ"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2515 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1638
+msgid "Limits the read from keyfile"
+msgstr "Обмежує читання з файла ключа"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2515 src/cryptsetup.c:2516 src/cryptsetup.c:2517
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2518 src/cryptsetup.c:2568 src/cryptsetup.c:2569
+#: src/veritysetup.c:431 src/veritysetup.c:432 src/veritysetup.c:433
+#: src/veritysetup.c:436 src/veritysetup.c:437 src/integritysetup.c:530
+#: src/integritysetup.c:534 src/integritysetup.c:535
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1637 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1638
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1639 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1640
+msgid "bytes"
+msgstr "байти"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2516 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1637
+msgid "Number of bytes to skip in keyfile"
+msgstr "Кількість байтів, які слід пропустити у файлі ключа"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2517
+msgid "Limits the read from newly added keyfile"
+msgstr "Обмежує читання з щойно доданого файла ключа"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2518
+msgid "Number of bytes to skip in newly added keyfile"
+msgstr "Кількість байтів, які слід пропустити у щойно доданому файлі ключа"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2519
+msgid "Slot number for new key (default is first free)"
+msgstr "Номер слоту для нового ключа (типовим слотом є перший вільний слот)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2520
+msgid "The size of the device"
+msgstr "Розмір пристрою"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2520 src/cryptsetup.c:2521 src/cryptsetup.c:2522
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2528 src/integritysetup.c:531 src/integritysetup.c:536
+msgid "SECTORS"
+msgstr "СЕКТОРИ"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2521
+msgid "The start offset in the backend device"
+msgstr "Початковий відступ на допоміжному пристрої"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2522
+msgid "How many sectors of the encrypted data to skip at the beginning"
+msgstr "Кількість секторів зашифрованих даних, які слід пропустити на початку"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2523
+msgid "Create a readonly mapping"
+msgstr "Створити призначення у режимі лише читання"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2524 src/integritysetup.c:524
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1628
+msgid "Do not ask for confirmation"
+msgstr "Не питати про підтвердження"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2525
+msgid "Timeout for interactive passphrase prompt (in seconds)"
+msgstr "Час очікування у інтерактивному запиті щодо пароля (у секундах)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2525 src/cryptsetup.c:2526 src/integritysetup.c:525
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1629
+msgid "secs"
+msgstr "секунди"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2526 src/integritysetup.c:525
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1629
+msgid "Progress line update (in seconds)"
+msgstr "Оновлення лінії поступу (у секундах)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2527 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1630
+msgid "How often the input of the passphrase can be retried"
+msgstr "Частота повторень спроб отримання вхідних даних пароля"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2528
+msgid "Align payload at <n> sector boundaries - for luksFormat"
+msgstr "Вирівняти дані за областями у <n> секторів, для luksFormat"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2529
+msgid "File with LUKS header and keyslots backup"
+msgstr "Файл з заголовком LUKS та резервною копію слотів ключів"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2530 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1631
+msgid "Use /dev/random for generating volume key"
+msgstr "Використовувати для створення ключа тому /dev/random"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2531 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1632
+msgid "Use /dev/urandom for generating volume key"
+msgstr "Використовувати для створення ключа тому /dev/urandom"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2532
+msgid "Share device with another non-overlapping crypt segment"
+msgstr "Використовувати пристрій спільно з іншим сегментом шифрування, без перекриття"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2533 src/veritysetup.c:440
+msgid "UUID for device to use"
+msgstr "UUID пристрою, який слід використати"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2534
+msgid "Allow discards (aka TRIM) requests for device"
+msgstr "Дозволити запити відкидання (або TRIM) до пристрою"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2535 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1649
+msgid "Device or file with separated LUKS header"
+msgstr "Пристрій або файл з окремим заголовком LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2536
+msgid "Do not activate device, just check passphrase"
+msgstr "Не задіювати пристрій, просто перевірити пароль"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2537
+msgid "Use hidden header (hidden TCRYPT device)"
+msgstr "Використовувати прихований заголовок (прихований пристрій TCRYPT)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2538
+msgid "Device is system TCRYPT drive (with bootloader)"
+msgstr "Пристрій є системним диском TCRYPT (диском з завантажувачем)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2539
+msgid "Use backup (secondary) TCRYPT header"
+msgstr "Використовувати резервний (вторинний) заголовок TCRYPT"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2540
+msgid "Scan also for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "Виконати також пошук сумісних із VeraCrypt пристроїв"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2541
+msgid "Personal Iteration Multiplier for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "Особистий множник ітерації (Personal Iteration Multiplier або PIM) для сумісного з VeraCrypt пристрою"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2542
+msgid "Query Personal Iteration Multiplier for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "Особистий множник ітерації (Personal Iteration Multiplier або PIM) запису для сумісного з VeraCrypt пристрою"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2543
+msgid "Type of device metadata: luks, plain, loopaes, tcrypt"
+msgstr "Типи метаданих пристрою: luks, plain, loopaes, tcrypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2544
+msgid "Disable password quality check (if enabled)"
+msgstr "Вимкнути перевірку якості пароля (якщо її увімкнено)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2545
+msgid "Use dm-crypt same_cpu_crypt performance compatibility option"
+msgstr "Скористатися параметром сумісності швидкодії dm-crypt same_cpu_crypt"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2546
+msgid "Use dm-crypt submit_from_crypt_cpus performance compatibility option"
+msgstr "Скористатися параметром сумісності швидкодії dm-crypt submit_from_crypt_cpus"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2547
+msgid "Device removal is deferred until the last user closes it"
+msgstr "Вилучення пристрою відкладено до часу, коли останній користувач закриє його"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2548
+msgid "PBKDF iteration time for LUKS (in ms)"
+msgstr "Тривалість ітерації PBKDF для LUKS (у мс)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2548 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1627
+msgid "msecs"
+msgstr "мс"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2549 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1645
+msgid "PBKDF algorithm (for LUKS2): argon2i, argon2id, pbkdf2"
+msgstr "Алгоритм PBKDF (для LUKS2) (argon2i/argon2id/pbkdf2)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2550 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1646
+msgid "PBKDF memory cost limit"
+msgstr "Обмеження вартості пам'яті PBKDF"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2550 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1646
+msgid "kilobytes"
+msgstr "кілобайти"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2551 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1647
+msgid "PBKDF parallel cost"
+msgstr "Вартість розпаралелювання PBKDF"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2551 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1647
+msgid "threads"
+msgstr "threads"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2552 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1648
+msgid "PBKDF iterations cost (forced, disables benchmark)"
+msgstr "Вартість ітерацій PBKDF (примусово, вимикає тестування)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2553
+msgid "Keyslot priority: ignore, normal, prefer"
+msgstr "Пріоритетність слотів ключів: ignore, normal, prefer"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2554
+msgid "Disable locking of on-disk metadata"
+msgstr "Вимкнути блокування метаданих на диску"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2555
+msgid "Disable loading volume keys via kernel keyring"
+msgstr "Вимкнути завантаження ключів тому за допомогою сховища ключів ядра"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2556
+msgid "Data integrity algorithm (LUKS2 only)"
+msgstr "Алгоритм перевірки цілісності даних (лише LUKS2)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2557 src/integritysetup.c:550
+msgid "Disable journal for integrity device"
+msgstr "Вимкнути журнал для пристрою забезпечення цілісності"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2558 src/integritysetup.c:526
+msgid "Do not wipe device after format"
+msgstr "Не витирати пристрій після форматування"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2559
+msgid "Do not ask for passphrase if activation by token fails"
+msgstr "Не просити ввести пароль, якщо не вдасться скористатися активацією за ключем"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2560
+msgid "Token number (default: any)"
+msgstr "Номер ключа (типове значення: будь-який)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2561
+msgid "Key description"
+msgstr "Опис ключа"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2562
+msgid "Encryption sector size (default: 512 bytes)"
+msgstr "Розмір сектора шифрування (типове значення: 512 байтів)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2563
+msgid "Set activation flags persistent for device"
+msgstr "Встановити сталі прапорці активації для пристрою"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2564
+msgid "Set label for the LUKS2 device"
+msgstr "Встановити мітку для пристрою LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2565
+msgid "Set subsystem label for the LUKS2 device"
+msgstr "Встановити мітку підтому для пристрою LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2566
+msgid "Create unbound (no assigned data segment) LUKS2 keyslot"
+msgstr "Створити непов'язаний (без пов'язаного сегмента даних) слот ключів LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2567
+msgid "Read or write the json from or to a file"
+msgstr "Прочитати json з файла або записати json до файла"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2568
+msgid "LUKS2 header metadata area size"
+msgstr "Розмір області метаданих у заголовку LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2569
+msgid "LUKS2 header keyslots area size"
+msgstr "Розмір області слотів ключів у заголовку LUKS2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2570
+msgid "Refresh (reactivate) device with new parameters"
+msgstr "Оновити (повторно активувати) пристрій згідно з новими параметрами"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2571
+msgid "LUKS2 keyslot: The size of the encryption key"
+msgstr "Слот ключів LUKS2: розмір ключа шифрування"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2572
+msgid "LUKS2 keyslot: The cipher used for keyslot encryption"
+msgstr "Слот ключа LUKS2: шифрування, яке використано для слоту ключів"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2588 src/veritysetup.c:461 src/integritysetup.c:568
+msgid "[OPTION...] <action> <action-specific>"
+msgstr "[ПАРАМЕТР...] <дія> <параметри_дії>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2645 src/veritysetup.c:501 src/integritysetup.c:585
+msgid "Argument <action> missing."
+msgstr "Не вказано аргумент <дія>."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2708 src/veritysetup.c:532 src/integritysetup.c:616
+msgid "Unknown action."
+msgstr "Невідома дія."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2718
+msgid "Parameter --refresh is only allowed with open or refresh commands.\n"
+msgstr "Параметром --refresh можна користуватися лише для команд open або refresh.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2723
+msgid "Options --refresh and --test-passphrase are mutually exclusive.\n"
+msgstr "Не можна поєднувати параметри --refresh і --test-passphrase.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2728
+msgid "Option --deferred is allowed only for close command.\n"
+msgstr "Параметр --deferred можна використовувати лише для команди закриття (close).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2733
+msgid "Option --shared is allowed only for open of plain device.\n"
+msgstr "Параметр --shared можна використовувати лише для відкриття незашифрованого пристрою.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2738
+msgid "Option --allow-discards is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "Параметр --shared можна використовувати лише для дії з відкриття.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2743
+msgid "Option --persistent is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "Параметр --persistent можна використовувати лише для дії з відкриття.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2748
+msgid "Option --persistent is not allowed with --test-passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "Параметр --persistent не можна використовувати разом із --test-passphrase.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2757
+msgid ""
+"Option --key-size is allowed only for luksFormat, luksAddKey (with --unbound),\n"
+"open and benchmark actions. To limit read from keyfile use --keyfile-size=(bytes)."
+msgstr ""
+"Параметр --key-size можна використовувати лише для luksFormat, luksAddKey (з --unbound),\n"
+"дій open і benchmark. Щоб обмежити читання з файла ключа, скористайтеся параметром --keyfile-size=(об’єм у байтах)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2763
+msgid "Option --integrity is allowed only for luksFormat (LUKS2).\n"
+msgstr "Параметр --integrity можна використовувати лише для luksFormat (LUKS2).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2768
+msgid "Option --integrity-no-wipe can be used only for format action with integrity extension.\n"
+msgstr "Параметром --integrity-no-wipe можна користуватися лише для дії з форматування із розширенням забезпечення цілісності.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2774
+msgid "Options --label and --subsystem are allowed only for luksFormat and config LUKS2 operations.\n"
+msgstr "Параметри --label і --subsystem можна використовувати лише для дій luksFormat та config для LUKS2.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2780
+msgid "Option --test-passphrase is allowed only for open of LUKS and TCRYPT devices.\n"
+msgstr "Параметр --test-passphrase можна використовувати лише для відкриття пристроїв LUKS та TCRYPT.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2785 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1718
+msgid "Key size must be a multiple of 8 bits"
+msgstr "Розмір ключа має бути кратним 8 бітам"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2791 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1403
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1723
+msgid "Key slot is invalid."
+msgstr "Некоректний слот ключа."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2798
+msgid "Option --key-file takes precedence over specified key file argument."
+msgstr "Параметр --key-file має пріоритет над вказаним параметром файла ключа."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2805 src/veritysetup.c:544 src/integritysetup.c:640
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1697
+msgid "Negative number for option not permitted."
+msgstr "Не можна використовувати від’ємні значення для параметра."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2809
+msgid "Only one --key-file argument is allowed."
+msgstr "Можна використовувати лише один аргумент --key-file."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2813 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1689
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1727
+msgid "Only one of --use-[u]random options is allowed."
+msgstr "Можна використовувати лише один з параметрів --use-[u]random."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2817
+msgid "Option --use-[u]random is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgstr "Параметр --use-[u]random можна використовувати лише для дії luksFormat."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2821
+msgid "Option --uuid is allowed only for luksFormat and luksUUID."
+msgstr "Параметр --uuid можна використовувати лише для дій luksFormat і luksUUID."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2825
+msgid "Option --align-payload is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgstr "Параметр --align-payload можна використовувати лише для дії luksFormat."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2829
+msgid "Options --luks2-metadata-size and --opt-luks2-keyslots-size are allowed only for luksFormat with LUKS2."
+msgstr "Параметрами --luks2-metadata-size і --opt-luks2-keyslots-size можна користуватися лише для luksFormat з LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2834
+msgid "Invalid LUKS2 metadata size specification."
+msgstr "Некоректна специфікація розміру метаданих LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2838
+msgid "Invalid LUKS2 keyslots size specification."
+msgstr "Некоректна специфікація розміру слоту ключів LUKS2."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2842
+msgid "Option --align-payload and --offset cannot be combined."
+msgstr "Не можна одночасно використовувати параметр --align-payload і --offset."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2848
+msgid "Option --skip is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices.\n"
+msgstr "Підтримку параметра --skip передбачено лише для відкриття незашифрованих пристроїв та пристроїв loopaes.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2855
+msgid "Option --offset is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices and for luksFormat.\n"
+msgstr "Підтримку параметра --offset передбачено лише для відкриття незашифрованих пристроїв та пристроїв loopaes і для luksFormat.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2861
+msgid "Option --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system or --tcrypt-backup is supported only for TCRYPT device.\n"
+msgstr "Підтримку параметрів --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system і --tcrypt-backup передбачено лише для пристроїв TCRYPT.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2866
+msgid "Option --tcrypt-hidden cannot be combined with --allow-discards.\n"
+msgstr "Параметр --tcrypt-hidden не можна поєднувати з --allow-discards.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2871
+msgid "Option --veracrypt is supported only for TCRYPT device type.\n"
+msgstr "Підтримку параметра --veracrypt передбачено лише для пристроїв TCRYPT.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2877
+msgid "Invalid argument for parameter --veracrypt-pim supplied.\n"
+msgstr "Надано некоректний аргумент для параметра --veracrypt-pim.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2881
+msgid "Option --veracrypt-pim is supported only for VeraCrypt compatible devices.\n"
+msgstr "Параметр --veracrypt-pim можна використовувати лише для сумісних із VeraCrypt пристроїв.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2889
+msgid "Option --veracrypt-query-pim is supported only for VeraCrypt compatible devices.\n"
+msgstr "Параметр --veracrypt-query-pim можна використовувати лише для сумісних із VeraCrypt пристроїв.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2893
+msgid "The options --veracrypt-pim and --veracrypt-query-pim are mutually exclusive.\n"
+msgstr "Не можна поєднувати параметри --veracrypt-pim і --veracrypt-query-pim.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2900
+msgid "Option --priority can be only ignore/normal/prefer.\n"
+msgstr "Значенням для параметра --priority може бути лише один з таких рядків: ignore, normal або prefer.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2905
+msgid "Keyslot specification is required.\n"
+msgstr "Слід вказати специфікація слотів ключів.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2910 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1703
+msgid "Password-based key derivation function (PBKDF) can be only pbkdf2 or argon2i/argon2id.\n"
+msgstr "Функцією отримання ключа на основі пароля (PBKDF) може бути лише pbkdf2 або argon2i/argon2id.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2915 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1708
+msgid "PBKDF forced iterations cannot be combined with iteration time option.\n"
+msgstr "Примусові ітерації PBKDF не можна поєднувати із параметром тривалості ітерацій.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2921
+msgid "Sector size option is not supported for this command.\n"
+msgstr "У цій команді не передбачено підтримки параметра розміру сектора.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2927
+msgid "Unsupported encryption sector size.\n"
+msgstr "Непідтримуваний розмір сектора шифрування.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2932
+msgid "Key size is required with --unbound option.\n"
+msgstr "Разом із параметром --unbound слід вказувати розмір ключа.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2937
+msgid "Option --unbound may be used only with luksAddKey action.\n"
+msgstr "Параметр --unbound можна використовувати лише з дією luksAddKey.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2942
+msgid "Option --refresh may be used only with open action.\n"
+msgstr "Параметр --refresh можна використовувати лише під час дії з відкриття (open).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2953
+msgid "Cannot disable metadata locking.\n"
+msgstr "Не вдалося вимкнути блокування метаданих.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:67
+msgid "Invalid salt string specified."
+msgstr "Вказано некоректний рядок солі."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:98
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create hash image %s for writing."
+msgstr "Не вдалося створити образ хешу %s для запису."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:108
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create FEC image %s for writing."
+msgstr "Не вдалося створити образ FEC %s для запису."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:178
+msgid "Invalid root hash string specified."
+msgstr "Вказано некоректний рядок кореневого хешу."
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:360
+msgid "<data_device> <hash_device>"
+msgstr "<пристрій_даних> <пристрій_хешу>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:360 src/integritysetup.c:462
+msgid "format device"
+msgstr "форматувати пристрій"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:361
+msgid "<data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgstr "<пристрій_даних> <пристрій_хешу> <кореневий_хеш>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:361
+msgid "verify device"
+msgstr "перевірити пристрій"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:362
+msgid "<data_device> <name> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgstr "<пристрій_даних> <назва> <пристрій_хешу> <кореневий_хеш>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:362 src/integritysetup.c:463
+msgid "open device as <name>"
+msgstr "відкрити пристрій як <назва>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:363 src/integritysetup.c:464
+msgid "close device (deactivate and remove mapping)"
+msgstr "закрити пристрій (скасувати активацію і вилучити призначення)"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:364 src/integritysetup.c:465
+msgid "show active device status"
+msgstr "показати стан активного пристрою"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:365
+msgid "<hash_device>"
+msgstr "<пристрій_хешу>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:365 src/integritysetup.c:466
+msgid "show on-disk information"
+msgstr "показати вбудовані дані"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:384
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<data_device> is the data device\n"
+"<hash_device> is the device containing verification data\n"
+"<root_hash> hash of the root node on <hash_device>\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<назва> — назва пристрою, який слід створити у %s\n"
+"<пристрій_даних> — пристрій даних\n"
+"<пристрій_хешу> — пристрій, на якому зберігаються дані для перевірки\n"
+"<кореневий_хеш> — хеш кореневого вузла на пристрої <пристрій_хешу>\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:391
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in dm-verity parameters:\n"
+"\tHash: %s, Data block (bytes): %u, Hash block (bytes): %u, Salt size: %u, Hash format: %u\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Типові вбудовані параметри dm-verity:\n"
+"\tхеш: %s, блок даних (у байтах): %u, блок хешу (у байтах): %u, розмір солі: %u, формат хешування: %u\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:429
+msgid "Do not use verity superblock"
+msgstr "Не використовувати суперблок verity"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:430
+msgid "Format type (1 - normal, 0 - original Chrome OS)"
+msgstr "Тип форматування (1 — звичайне, 0 — початкове Chrome OS)"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:430
+msgid "number"
+msgstr "номер"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:431
+msgid "Block size on the data device"
+msgstr "Розмір блоку на пристрої даних"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:432
+msgid "Block size on the hash device"
+msgstr "Розмір блоку на пристрої хешу"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:433
+msgid "FEC parity bytes"
+msgstr "Байти парності FEC"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:434
+msgid "The number of blocks in the data file"
+msgstr "Кількість блоків у файлі даних"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:434
+msgid "blocks"
+msgstr "блоки"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:435
+msgid "Path to device with error correction data"
+msgstr "Шлях до пристрою із даними для виправлення помилок"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:435 src/integritysetup.c:528
+msgid "path"
+msgstr "шлях"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:436
+msgid "Starting offset on the hash device"
+msgstr "Початковий відступ на пристрої хешу"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:437
+msgid "Starting offset on the FEC device"
+msgstr "Початковий відступ на пристрої FEC"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:438
+msgid "Hash algorithm"
+msgstr "Алгоритм хешування"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:438
+msgid "string"
+msgstr "рядок"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:439
+msgid "Salt"
+msgstr "Сіль"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:439
+msgid "hex string"
+msgstr "шістнадцятковий рядок"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:441
+msgid "Restart kernel if corruption is detected"
+msgstr "Перезапустити ядро, якщо виявлено пошкодження"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:442
+msgid "Ignore corruption, log it only"
+msgstr "Ігнорувати пошкодження, лише записати повідомлення до журналу"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:443
+msgid "Do not verify zeroed blocks"
+msgstr "Не перевіряти занулені блоки"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:444
+msgid "Verify data block only the first time it is read"
+msgstr "Перевіряти блок даних лише під час його першого читання"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:550
+msgid "Option --ignore-corruption, --restart-on-corruption or --ignore-zero-blocks is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "Параметри --ignore-corruption, --restart-on-corruption та --ignore-zero-blocks можна використовувати лише для дії з відкриття (open).\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:555
+msgid "Option --ignore-corruption and --restart-on-corruption cannot be used together.\n"
+msgstr "Параметри --ignore-corruption і --restart-on-corruption не можна використовувати одночасно.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:82 src/utils_password.c:298
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Не вдалося прочитати файл ключа %s."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:86 src/utils_password.c:302
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read %d bytes from keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Не вдалося прочитати %d байтів з файла ключа %s."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:248
+#, c-format
+msgid "Formatted with tag size %u, internal integrity %s.\n"
+msgstr "Форматовано із розміром мітки %u, внутрішня цілісність %s.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:462 src/integritysetup.c:466
+msgid "<integrity_device>"
+msgstr "<пристрій_цілісності>"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:463
+msgid "<integrity_device> <name>"
+msgstr "<пристрій_цілісності> <назва>"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:485
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<integrity_device> is the device containing data with integrity tags\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<назва> є пристроєм, який слід створити у %s\n"
+"<пристрій_цілісності> є пристроєм, на якому зберігаються дані із мітками цілісності\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:490
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in dm-integrity parameters:\n"
+"\tTag size: %u bytes, Checksum algorithm: %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Типові компільовані параметри dm-integrity:\n"
+"\tРозмір міток: %u байтів, алгоритм перевірки контрольних сум: %s\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:528
+msgid "Path to data device (if separated)"
+msgstr "Шлях до пристрою даних (якщо відокремлено)"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:530
+msgid "Journal size"
+msgstr "Розмір журналу"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:531
+msgid "Interleave sectors"
+msgstr "Перемежовування секторів"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:532
+msgid "Journal watermark"
+msgstr "«Водяний знак» журналу"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:532
+msgid "percent"
+msgstr "відсоток"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:533
+msgid "Journal commit time"
+msgstr "Час внесення до журналу"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:533
+msgid "ms"
+msgstr "мс"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:534
+msgid "Tag size (per-sector)"
+msgstr "Розмір мітки на сектор"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:535
+msgid "Sector size"
+msgstr "Розмір сектора"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:536
+msgid "Buffers size"
+msgstr "Розмір буферів"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:538
+msgid "Data integrity algorithm"
+msgstr "Алгоритм забезпечення цілісності даних"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:539
+msgid "The size of the data integrity key"
+msgstr "Розмір ключа цілісності даних"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:540
+msgid "Read the integrity key from a file"
+msgstr "Прочитати ключ цілісності з файла"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:542
+msgid "Journal integrity algorithm"
+msgstr "Алгоритм забезпечення цілісності журналу"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:543
+msgid "The size of the journal integrity key"
+msgstr "Розмір ключа цілісності журналу"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:544
+msgid "Read the journal integrity key from a file"
+msgstr "Прочитати ключ цілісності журналу з файла"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:546
+msgid "Journal encryption algorithm"
+msgstr "Алгоритм шифрування журналу"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:547
+msgid "The size of the journal encryption key"
+msgstr "Розмір ключа шифрування журналу"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:548
+msgid "Read the journal encryption key from a file"
+msgstr "Читати ключ шифрування журналу з файла"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:551
+msgid "Recovery mode (no journal, no tag checking)"
+msgstr "Режим відновлення (без журналу, без перевірки міток)"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:552
+msgid "Recalculate initial tags automatically."
+msgstr "Обчислювати початкові мітки автоматично."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:631
+msgid "Option --integrity-recalculate can be used only for open action."
+msgstr "Параметр --integrity-recalculate можна використовувати лише під час дії з відкриття (open)."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:646
+msgid "Options --journal-size, --interleave-sectors, --sector-size, --tag-size and --no-wipe can be used only for format action.\n"
+msgstr "Параметри --journal-size, --interleave-sectors, --sector-size, --tag-size та --no-wipe можна використовувати лише для дії з форматування.\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:652
+msgid "Invalid journal size specification."
+msgstr "Некоректна специфікація розміру журналу."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:657
+msgid "Both key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "Не можна одночасно вказувати параметри файла ключа і розміру ключа."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:660
+msgid "Integrity algorithm must be specified if integrity key is used."
+msgstr "Якщо використано ключ цілісності, має бути вказано алгоритм забезпечення цілісності."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:665
+msgid "Both journal integrity key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "Не можна одночасно вказувати параметри файла ключа цілісності журналу і розміру ключа."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:668
+msgid "Journal integrity algorithm must be specified if journal integrity key is used."
+msgstr "Якщо використано ключ цілісності журналу, має бути вказано алгоритм забезпечення цілісності журналу."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:673
+msgid "Both journal encryption key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "Не можна одночасно вказувати параметри файла ключа шифрування журналу і розміру ключа."
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:676
+msgid "Journal encryption algorithm must be specified if journal encryption key is used."
+msgstr "Якщо використано ключ шифрування журналу, має бути вказано алгоритм забезпечення шифрування журналу."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:175
+msgid "Reencryption already in-progress."
+msgstr "Вже виконується повторне шифрування."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:181
+msgid "Reencryption of device with integrity profile is not supported."
+msgstr "Підтримки повторного шифрування пристрою із профілем цілісності не передбачено."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:204
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot exclusively open %s, device in use."
+msgstr "Не можна відкрити %s у виключному режимі, пристрій вже використовується."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:218 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1148
+msgid "Allocation of aligned memory failed."
+msgstr "Спроба розподілу вирівняних ділянок пам’яті зазнала невдачі."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:225
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read device %s."
+msgstr "Не вдалося виконати читання з пристрою %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:236
+#, c-format
+msgid "Marking LUKS1 device %s unusable."
+msgstr "Позначаємо пристрій LUKS1 %s як непридатний."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:240
+#, c-format
+msgid "Setting LUKS2 offline reencrypt flag on device %s."
+msgstr "Встановлюємо прапорець повторного автономного шифрування LUKS2 на пристрій %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:257
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write device %s."
+msgstr "Не вдалося виконати запис на пристрій %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:345
+msgid "Cannot write reencryption log file."
+msgstr "Не вдалося записати файл журналу повторного шифрування."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:401
+msgid "Cannot read reencryption log file."
+msgstr "Не вдалося прочитати файл журналу повторного шифрування."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:439
+#, c-format
+msgid "Log file %s exists, resuming reencryption.\n"
+msgstr "Файл журналу %s вже існує, поновлюємо повторне шифрування.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:488
+msgid "Activating temporary device using old LUKS header."
+msgstr "Спроба задіяти тимчасовий пристрій за допомогою старого заголовка LUKS."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:498
+msgid "Activating temporary device using new LUKS header."
+msgstr "Спроба задіяти тимчасовий пристрій за допомогою нового заголовка LUKS."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:508
+msgid "Activation of temporary devices failed."
+msgstr "Спроба задіяти тимчасові пристрої зазнала невдачі."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:586
+msgid "Failed to set PBKDF parameters."
+msgstr "Не вдалося встановити параметри PBKDF."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:592
+msgid "Failed to set data offset."
+msgstr "Не вдалося встановити відступ у даних."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:600
+#, c-format
+msgid "New LUKS header for device %s created."
+msgstr "Створено новий заголовок LUKS для пристрою %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:660
+#, c-format
+msgid "This version of cryptsetup-reencrypt can't handle new internal token type %s."
+msgstr "Ця версія cryptsetup-reencrypt не може обробляти новий тип вбудованих ключів %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:682
+msgid "Failed to read activation flags from backup header."
+msgstr "Не вдалося прочитати прапорці активації з резервного заголовка."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:686
+msgid "Failed to write activation flags to new header."
+msgstr "Не вдалося записати прапорці активації до нового заголовка."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:690 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:694
+msgid "Failed to read requirements from backup header."
+msgstr "Не вдалося прочитати вимоги із резервного заголовка."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:731
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s header backup of device %s created."
+msgstr "Створено резервну копію заголовка %s пристрою %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:789
+msgid "Creation of LUKS backup headers failed."
+msgstr "Спроба створення заголовків резервних копій LUKS зазнала невдачі."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:918
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot restore %s header on device %s."
+msgstr "Не вдалося відновити заголовок %s на пристрої %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:920
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s header on device %s restored."
+msgstr "Відновлено заголовок %s на пристрої %s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:958 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1038
+msgid "Cannot seek to device offset."
+msgstr "Не вдалося встановити вказану позицію на пристрої."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1081
+msgid "Cannot seek to device offset.\n"
+msgstr "Не вдалося встановити вказану позицію на пристрої.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1120 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1126
+msgid "Cannot open temporary LUKS device."
+msgstr "Неможливо відкрити тимчасовий пристрій LUKS."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1131 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1136
+msgid "Cannot get device size."
+msgstr "Не вдалося отримати дані щодо розміру пристрою."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1173
+msgid "Interrupted by a signal."
+msgstr "Перервано за сигналом."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1175
+msgid "IO error during reencryption."
+msgstr "Помилка введення-виведення під час повторного шифрування."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1206
+msgid "Provided UUID is invalid."
+msgstr "Наданий UUID є некоректним."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1309
+msgid "Key file can be used only with --key-slot or with exactly one key slot active."
+msgstr "Файлом ключа можна користуватися лише з --key-slot, або якщо активним є лише один слот ключа."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1350 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1361
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for key slot %u: "
+msgstr "Вкажіть пароль для слоту ключа %u: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1432
+msgid "Cannot open reencryption log file."
+msgstr "Не вдалося відкрити файл журналу повторного шифрування."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1438
+msgid "No decryption in progress, provided UUID can be used only to resume suspended decryption process."
+msgstr "Розшифровування не виконується. Наданий UUID можна використовувати лише для відновлення призупиненого процесу розшифровування."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1513
+#, c-format
+msgid "Changed pbkdf parameters in keyslot %i."
+msgstr "Змінено параметри pbkdf у слоті ключа %i."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1620
+msgid "Reencryption block size"
+msgstr "Розмір блоку повторного шифрування"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1620
+msgid "MiB"
+msgstr "МіБ"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1624
+msgid "Do not change key, no data area reencryption"
+msgstr "Не змінювати ключ, не виконувати повторного шифрування області даних"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1626
+msgid "Read new volume (master) key from file"
+msgstr "Прочитати новий ключ тому (основний ключ) з файла"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1627
+msgid "PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS (in ms)"
+msgstr "Тривалість ітерації PBKDF2 для LUKS (у мс)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1633
+msgid "Use direct-io when accessing devices"
+msgstr "Використовувати безпосереднє введення-виведення під час доступу до пристроїв"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1634
+msgid "Use fsync after each block"
+msgstr "Використовувати fsync після кожного блоку"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1635
+msgid "Update log file after every block"
+msgstr "Оновлювати файл журналу після кожного блоку"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1636
+msgid "Use only this slot (others will be disabled)"
+msgstr "Використовувати лише цей слот (інші буде вимкнено)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1639
+msgid "Reduce data device size (move data offset). DANGEROUS!"
+msgstr "Зменшити розмір пристрою зберігання даних (змістити відступ даних). НЕБЕЗПЕЧНО!"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1640
+msgid "Use only specified device size (ignore rest of device). DANGEROUS!"
+msgstr "Використовувати лише вказаний розмір пристрою (ігнорувати решту об’єму). НЕБЕЗПЕЧНО!"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1641
+msgid "Create new header on not encrypted device"
+msgstr "Створити новий заголовок на незашифрованому пристрої"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1642
+msgid "Permanently decrypt device (remove encryption)"
+msgstr "Остаточно розшифрувати пристрій (скасувати шифрування)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1643
+msgid "The UUID used to resume decryption"
+msgstr "UUID, що використовується для відновлення розшифровування"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1644
+msgid "Type of LUKS metadata: luks1, luks2"
+msgstr "Тип метаданих LUKS (luks1 або luks2)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1663
+msgid "[OPTION...] <device>"
+msgstr "[ПАРАМЕТР...] <пристрій>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1677
+#, c-format
+msgid "Reencryption will change: %s%s%s%s%s%s."
+msgstr "Повторне шифрування призведе до зміни: %s%s%s%s%s%s."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1678
+msgid "volume key"
+msgstr "ключ тому"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1680
+msgid "set hash to "
+msgstr "встановити хеш у значення "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1681
+msgid ", set cipher to "
+msgstr ", встановити шифрування "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1685
+msgid "Argument required."
+msgstr "Слід вказати аргумент."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1713
+msgid "Only values between 1 MiB and 64 MiB allowed for reencryption block size."
+msgstr "Розмір блоку повторного шифрування повинен належати діапазону від 1 МіБ до 64 МІБ."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1732 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1737
+msgid "Invalid device size specification."
+msgstr "Некоректна специфікація розміру пристрою."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1740
+msgid "Maximum device reduce size is 64 MiB."
+msgstr "Максимальний розмір зменшення розміру пристрою дорівнює 64 МіБ."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1743
+msgid "Reduce size must be multiple of 512 bytes sector."
+msgstr "Розмір зменшення має бути кратним до 512-байтового сектора."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1747
+msgid "Option --new must be used together with --reduce-device-size or --header."
+msgstr "Параметр --new слід використовувати разом з --reduce-device-size або --header."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1751
+msgid "Option --keep-key can be used only with --hash, --iter-time or --pbkdf-force-iterations."
+msgstr "Параметр --keep-key можна використовувати лише разом з параметром --hash --iter-time або --pbkdf-force-iterations."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1755
+msgid "Option --new cannot be used together with --decrypt."
+msgstr "Параметр --new не можна використовувати разом з --decrypt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1759
+msgid "Option --decrypt is incompatible with specified parameters."
+msgstr "Параметр --decrypt є несумісним із вказаними параметрами."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1763
+msgid "Option --uuid is allowed only together with --decrypt."
+msgstr "Параметр --uuid можна використовувати лише разом із --decrypt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1767
+msgid "Invalid luks type. Use one of these: 'luks', 'luks1' or 'luks2'."
+msgstr "Некоректний тип luks. Скористайтеся одним з таких типів: luks, luks1 або luks2."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:150
+msgid "Error reading response from terminal."
+msgstr "Помилка під час спроби читання відповіді з термінала."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:175
+msgid "Command successful.\n"
+msgstr "Команду виконано успішно.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:183
+msgid "wrong or missing parameters"
+msgstr "помилкові параметри або параметри не вказано"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:185
+msgid "no permission or bad passphrase"
+msgstr "немає права доступу або помилковий пароль"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:187
+msgid "out of memory"
+msgstr "недостатньо пам'яті"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:189
+msgid "wrong device or file specified"
+msgstr "вказано помилковий пристрій або файл"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:191
+msgid "device already exists or device is busy"
+msgstr "пристрій вже існує або пристрій зайнято"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:193
+msgid "unknown error"
+msgstr "невідома помилка"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:195
+#, c-format
+msgid "Command failed with code %i (%s).\n"
+msgstr "Спроба виконання команди завершилася повідомленням про помилку з кодом %i (%s).\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:272
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %i created."
+msgstr "Створено слот ключа %i."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:274
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %i unlocked."
+msgstr "Слот ключа %i розблоковано."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:276
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %i removed."
+msgstr "Слот ключа %i вилучено."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:285
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %i created."
+msgstr "Створено ключ %i."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:287
+#, c-format
+msgid "Token %i removed."
+msgstr "Ключ %i вилучено."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:453
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Device %s already contains a '%s' partition signature.\n"
+msgstr "Попередження: пристрій %s вже містить підпис розділу «%s».\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:461
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Device %s already contains a '%s' superblock signature.\n"
+msgstr "Попередження: пристрій %s вже містить підпис суперблоку «%s».\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:482 src/utils_tools.c:546
+msgid "Failed to initialize device signature probes."
+msgstr "Не вдалося ініціалізувати зондування підписів пристроїв."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:526
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to stat device %s."
+msgstr "Не вдалося зібрати статистичні дані щодо пристрою %s."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:539
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is in use. Can not proceed with format operation."
+msgstr "Пристрій %s використовується сторонньою програмою. Продовження дій з форматування неможливе."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:541
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to open file %s in read/write mode."
+msgstr "Не вдалося відкрити файл %s у режимі читання-запису."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:561
+msgid "Failed to wipe device signature."
+msgstr "Не вдалося витерти підпис пристрою."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:568
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to probe device %s for a signature."
+msgstr "Не вдалося виконати зондування пристрою %s з метою виявлення підпису."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:43 src/utils_password.c:75
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot check password quality: %s"
+msgstr "Не вдалося перевірити якість пароля: %s"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:51
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Password quality check failed:\n"
+" %s"
+msgstr ""
+"Помилка під час спроби оцінити якість пароля:\n"
+" %s"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:83
+#, c-format
+msgid "Password quality check failed: Bad passphrase (%s)"
+msgstr "Помилка під час спроби оцінити якість пароля: некоректний пароль (%s)"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:193 src/utils_password.c:208
+msgid "Error reading passphrase from terminal."
+msgstr "Помилка під час читання пароля з термінала."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:206
+msgid "Verify passphrase: "
+msgstr "Перевірка пароля: "
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:213
+msgid "Passphrases do not match."
+msgstr "Паролі не збігаються."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:250
+msgid "Cannot use offset with terminal input."
+msgstr "Не можна використовувати відступ у даних, що надходять з термінала."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:253
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase: "
+msgstr "Введіть пароль: "
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:255
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for %s: "
+msgstr "Введіть пароль до %s: "
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:285
+msgid "No key available with this passphrase."
+msgstr "Для цього пароля немає відповідного ключа."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:320
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open keyfile %s for write."
+msgstr "Не вдалося відкрити файл ключа %s для запису."
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:327
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write to keyfile %s."
+msgstr "Не вдалося виконати запису до файла ключа %s."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:47
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to open file %s in read-only mode."
+msgstr "Не вдалося відкрити файл %s у режимі лише читання."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:60
+msgid "Provide valid LUKS2 token JSON:\n"
+msgstr "Надайте коректний ключ JSON LUKS2:\n"
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:67
+msgid "Failed to read JSON file."
+msgstr "Не вдалося прочитати файл JSON."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:72
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Read interrupted."
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Читання перервано."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:113
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to open file %s in write mode."
+msgstr "Не вдалося відкрити файл %s у режимі запису."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:122
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Write interrupted."
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Запис перервано."
+
+#: src/utils_luks2.c:126
+msgid "Failed to write JSON file."
+msgstr "Не вдалося записати файл JSON."
+
+#~ msgid "Device %s is too small. (LUKS2 requires at least %<PRIu64> bytes.)"
+#~ msgstr "Обсяг пристрою %s є надто малим. (LUKS2 потрібно принаймні %<PRIu64> байтів.)"
+
+#~ msgid "Replaced with key slot %d."
+#~ msgstr "Замінено слотом ключа %d."
+
+#~ msgid "Missing LUKS target type, option --type is required."
+#~ msgstr "Не вказано типу призначення LUKS, слід вказати параметр --type."
+
+#~ msgid "Missing --token option specifying token for removal."
+#~ msgstr "Пропущено параметр --token, який задає ключ, який слід вилучити."
+
+#~ msgid "Failed to remove token %d."
+#~ msgstr "Не вдалося вилучити ключ %d."
+
+#~ msgid "Add or remove keyring token"
+#~ msgstr "Додати або вилучити ключ зі сховища ключів"
+
+#~ msgid "Activated keyslot %i."
+#~ msgstr "Задіяний слот ключа %i."
+
+#~ msgid "memory allocation error in action_luksFormat"
+#~ msgstr "помилка під час отримання області пам’яті у action_luksFormat"
+
+#~ msgid "Key slot is invalid.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Слот ключа є некоректним.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Using default pbkdf parameters for new LUKS2 header.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Використовуємо типові параметри pbkdf для нового заголовка LUKS2.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Too many tree levels for verity volume.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Занадто високий рівень вкладеності для тому перевірки.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Key %d not active. Can't wipe.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Ключ %d не є активним. Його не можна витерти.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "<name> <data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+#~ msgstr "<назва> <пристрій_даних> <пристрій_хешу> <кореневий_хеш>"
+
+#~ msgid "create active device"
+#~ msgstr "створити активний пристрій"
+
+#~ msgid "remove (deactivate) device"
+#~ msgstr "вилучити пристрій (скасувати активацію)"
+
+#~ msgid "Progress: %5.1f%%, ETA %02llu:%02llu, %4llu MiB written, speed %5.1f MiB/s%s"
+#~ msgstr "Поступ: %5.1f%%, час до завершення: %02llu:%02llu, записано %4llu МіБ, швидкість %5.1f МіБ/с%s"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot find a free loopback device.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Не вдалося знайти вільний петльовий пристрій.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot open device %s\n"
+#~ msgstr "Не вдалося відкрити пристрій %s\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot use passed UUID unless decryption in progress.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Не можна використовувати переданий UUID, якщо не виконується дія з розшифровування.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Marking LUKS device %s usable.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Позначаємо пристрій LUKS %s як придатний\n"
+
+#~ msgid "WARNING: this is experimental code, it can completely break your data.\n"
+#~ msgstr "ПОПЕРЕДЖЕННЯ: цей код не перевірено достатнім чином, його використання може призвести до незворотного пошкодження даних.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "FIPS checksum verification failed.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Контрольні суми FIPS не збігаються.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "WARNING: device %s is a partition, for TCRYPT system encryption you usually need to use whole block device path.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Попередження: пристрій %s є розділом; для шифрування системи за допомогою TCRYPT, зазвичай, вам слід використовувати шлях до цілого блокового пристрою.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Kernel doesn't support plain64 IV.\n"
+#~ msgstr "У ядрі не передбачено підтримки plain64 IV.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Enter LUKS passphrase: "
+#~ msgstr "Введіть пароль LUKS: "
+
+#~ msgid "Enter new LUKS passphrase: "
+#~ msgstr "Введіть новий пароль LUKS: "
+
+#~ msgid "Enter any LUKS passphrase: "
+#~ msgstr "Введіть довільний пароль LUKS: "
+
+#~ msgid "Backup file %s doesn't exist.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Файла резервної копії, %s, не існує.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "create device"
+#~ msgstr "створити пристрій"
+
+#~ msgid "remove device"
+#~ msgstr "вилучити пристрій"
+
+#~ msgid "remove LUKS mapping"
+#~ msgstr "вилучити призначення LUKS"
+
+#~ msgid "open loop-AES device as mapping <name>"
+#~ msgstr "відкрити пристрій loop-AES як призначення <назва>"
+
+#~ msgid "remove loop-AES mapping"
+#~ msgstr "вилучити призначення loop-AES"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot open device %s for %s%s access.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Не вдалося відкрити пристрій %s для доступу %s%s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "exclusive "
+#~ msgstr "ексклюзивний "
+
+#~ msgid "writable"
+#~ msgstr "придатний до запису"
+
+#~ msgid "read-only"
+#~ msgstr "тільки читання"
+
+#~ msgid "WARNING!!! Possibly insecure memory. Are you root?\n"
+#~ msgstr "УВАГА!!! Небезпека доступу до даних у пам’яті. Працюєте від імені адміністратора?\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Unable to obtain sector size for %s"
+#~ msgstr "Не вдалося отримати розмір сектора %s"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot use device %s (crypt segments overlaps or in use by another device).\n"
+#~ msgstr "Використання пристрою %s неможливе (сегменти шифрування перекриваються або використовуються іншим пристроєм).\n"
diff --git a/po/vi.po b/po/vi.po
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5656302
--- /dev/null
+++ b/po/vi.po
@@ -0,0 +1,1958 @@
+# Vietnamese translation for CryptSetup.
+# Bản dịch tiếng Việt dành cho cryptsetup.
+# Copyright © 2016 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+# This file is distributed under the same license as the cryptsetup package.
+# Clytie Siddall <clytie@riverland.net.au>, 2010.
+# Trần Ngọc Quân <vnwildman@gmail.com>, 2012-2014, 2015, 2016, 2017.
+#
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: cryptsetup 1.7.4\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: dm-crypt@saout.de\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2017-03-02 09:40+0100\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2017-03-05 15:08+0700\n"
+"Last-Translator: Trần Ngọc Quân <vnwildman@gmail.com>\n"
+"Language-Team: Vietnamese <translation-team-vi@lists.sourceforge.net>\n"
+"Language: vi\n"
+"X-Bugs: Report translation errors to the Language-Team address.\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+"Plural-Forms: nplurals=1; plural=0;\n"
+"X-Generator: Gtranslator 2.91.7\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:262
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper, running as non-root user.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể khởi tạo ánh-xạ-thiết-bị (device-mapper), do không chạy dưới quyền siêu người dùng.\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:265
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper. Is dm_mod kernel module loaded?\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Không thể khởi tạo tiến trình ánh xạ thiết bị.\n"
+"Mô-đun hạt nhân “dm_mod” được nạp chưa?\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:581
+#, c-format
+msgid "DM-UUID for device %s was truncated.\n"
+msgstr "Mã số DM-UUID cho thiết bị %s bị cắt ngắn.\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:729
+msgid "Requested dm-crypt performance options are not supported.\n"
+msgstr "Không hỗ trợ tùy chọn hiệu năng dm-crypt đã yêu cầu.\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:735
+msgid "Requested dm-verity data corruption handling options are not supported.\n"
+msgstr "Không hỗ trợ tùy chọn xử lý dữ liệu sai hỏng dm-verity đã yêu cầu.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:80
+msgid ""
+"System is out of entropy while generating volume key.\n"
+"Please move mouse or type some text in another window to gather some random events.\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Hệ thống bị nằm ngoài en-trô-pi trong khi tạo khóa vùng chứa.\n"
+"Xin hãy di chuyển con chuột hay gõ vài chữ trong cửa sổ khác để thu thập sự kiện ngẫu nhiên.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:84
+#, c-format
+msgid "Generating key (%d%% done).\n"
+msgstr "Đang tạo khóa (xong %d%%).\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:170
+msgid "Running in FIPS mode.\n"
+msgstr "Đang chạy trong chế độ FIPS.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:176
+msgid "Fatal error during RNG initialisation.\n"
+msgstr "Gặp lỗi nghiêm trọng trong quá trình khởi tạo RNG.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:213
+msgid "Unknown RNG quality requested.\n"
+msgstr "Không hiểu chất lượng RNG đã yêu cầu.\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:218
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error %d reading from RNG: %s\n"
+msgstr "Lỗi %d khi đọc từ RNG: %s\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:200
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto RNG backend.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể khởi tạo ứng dụng chạy ở phía sau (backend) mã hóa RNG.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:206
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto backend.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể khởi ứng dụng mã hóa chạy ở phía sau (backend).\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:237 lib/setup.c:1199 lib/verity/verity.c:123
+#, c-format
+msgid "Hash algorithm %s not supported.\n"
+msgstr "Thuật toán băm %s không được hỗ trợ.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:240 lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:90
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key processing error (using hash %s).\n"
+msgstr "Lỗi xử lý khóa (dùng mã băm %s).\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:285
+msgid "Cannot determine device type. Incompatible activation of device?\n"
+msgstr "Không thể dò tìm kiểu thiết bị. Phần hoạt hóa của thiết bị không tương thích à?\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:289 lib/setup.c:1552
+msgid "This operation is supported only for LUKS device.\n"
+msgstr "Thao tác này được hỗ trợ chỉ cho thiết bị LUKS.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:321
+msgid "All key slots full.\n"
+msgstr "Mọi khe khóa đều đã đầy.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:328
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select between 0 and %d.\n"
+msgstr "Khe khóa %d không đúng, hãy chọn một giá trị trong phạm vi từ 0 đến %d.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:334
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is full, please select another one.\n"
+msgstr "Khe khóa %d bị đầy, hãy chọn một khe khác.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:473
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for %s: "
+msgstr "Nhập cụm từ mật khẩu cho %s: "
+
+#: lib/setup.c:654
+#, c-format
+msgid "Header detected but device %s is too small.\n"
+msgstr "Phát hiện được phần đầu nhưng mà thiết bị %s quá nhỏ.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:670 lib/setup.c:1435
+msgid "This operation is not supported for this device type.\n"
+msgstr "Thao tác này không được hỗ trợ cho kiểu thiết bị này.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:909 lib/setup.c:1388 lib/setup.c:2279
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not active.\n"
+msgstr "Thiết bị %s không hoạt động.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:926
+#, c-format
+msgid "Underlying device for crypt device %s disappeared.\n"
+msgstr "Thiết bị nằm dưới cho thiết bị crypt %s đã bị biến mất.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:995
+msgid "Invalid plain crypt parameters.\n"
+msgstr "Đặt sai tham số mã hóa bình thường.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1000 lib/setup.c:1120
+msgid "Invalid key size.\n"
+msgstr "Kích cỡ khóa không đúng.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1005 lib/setup.c:1125
+msgid "UUID is not supported for this crypt type.\n"
+msgstr "UUID không hỗ trợ kiểu mã hóa này.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1047
+msgid "Can't format LUKS without device.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể định dạng “LUKS” mà không có thiết bị.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1090
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s which is still in use.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể định dạng thiết bị %s mà nó lại vẫn đang được sử dụng.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1093
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s, permission denied.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể định dạng thiết bị %s, không đủ thẩm quyền.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1097
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe header on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể tẩy xóa phần đầu trên thiết bị %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1115
+msgid "Can't format LOOPAES without device.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể định dạng “LOOPAES” bên ngoài thiết bị.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1153
+msgid "Can't format VERITY without device.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể định dạng “VERITY” mà không có thiết bị.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1161 lib/verity/verity.c:106
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash type %d.\n"
+msgstr "Kiểu băm “VERITY” %d không được hỗ trợ.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1167 lib/verity/verity.c:114
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY block size.\n"
+msgstr "Kích thước khối “VERITY” không được hỗ trợ.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1172 lib/verity/verity.c:76
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash offset.\n"
+msgstr "Khoảng bù (offset) mã băm “VERITY” không được hỗ trợ.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1193
+msgid "Data area overlaps with hash area.\n"
+msgstr "Vùng dữ liệu chồng lấn với vùng mã băm.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1292
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unknown crypt device type %s requested.\n"
+msgstr "Không rõ kiểu thiết bị mã hóa %s được yêu cầu.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1402
+msgid "Cannot resize loop device.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể đổi cỡ thiết bị vòng ngược (loopback).\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1450
+msgid "Do you really want to change UUID of device?"
+msgstr "Bạn có thực sự muốn thay đổi UUID cho thiết bị?"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1560
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not active.\n"
+msgstr "Khối tin %s không hoạt động.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1571
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is already suspended.\n"
+msgstr "Khối %s đã bị ngưng.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1578
+#, c-format
+msgid "Suspend is not supported for device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Tạm dừng không được hỗ trợ cho kiểu thiết bị %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1580
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during suspending device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Gặp lỗi khi tạm dừng thiết bị %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1606 lib/setup.c:1653
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not suspended.\n"
+msgstr "Vùng %s không bị treo.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1620
+#, c-format
+msgid "Resume is not supported for device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Thao tác phục hồi không được hỗ trợ cho kiểu thiết bị %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1622 lib/setup.c:1674
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during resuming device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Gặp lỗi khi cho hoạt động trở lại thiết bị %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1660 lib/setup.c:2095 lib/setup.c:2109 src/cryptsetup.c:184
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:248 src/cryptsetup.c:736 src/cryptsetup.c:1171
+msgid "Enter passphrase: "
+msgstr "Gõ cụm từ mật khẩu: "
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1722 lib/setup.c:1858
+msgid "Cannot add key slot, all slots disabled and no volume key provided.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể thêm khe khóa vì mọi khe đều bị tắt và không cung cấp khóa khối tin.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1731 lib/setup.c:1864 lib/setup.c:1868
+msgid "Enter any passphrase: "
+msgstr "Nhập bất cứ cụm từ mật khẩu nào: "
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1748 lib/setup.c:1881 lib/setup.c:1885 lib/setup.c:1947
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1001 src/cryptsetup.c:1032
+msgid "Enter new passphrase for key slot: "
+msgstr "Gõ cụm từ mật khẩu mới cho khe khóa: "
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1813
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d changed.\n"
+msgstr "Khe khóa %d đã thay đổi.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1816
+#, c-format
+msgid "Replaced with key slot %d.\n"
+msgstr "Đã thay thế với khe khóa %d.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1821
+msgid "Failed to swap new key slot.\n"
+msgstr "Gặp lỗi khi hoán đổi khe khóa mới.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1938 lib/setup.c:2199 lib/setup.c:2212 lib/setup.c:2354
+msgid "Volume key does not match the volume.\n"
+msgstr "Khóa khối tin không tương ứng với khối tin đó.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1976
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid.\n"
+msgstr "Khe khóa %d không đúng.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1981
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is not used.\n"
+msgstr "Khe khóa %d không được dùng.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2011 lib/setup.c:2083 lib/setup.c:2175
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s already exists.\n"
+msgstr "Thiết bị %s đã sẵn có.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2186
+msgid "Incorrect volume key specified for plain device.\n"
+msgstr "Khóa vùng chứa đã chỉ định không đúng cho thiết bị thường.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2219
+msgid "Incorrect root hash specified for verity device.\n"
+msgstr "Mã băm gốc đã chỉ định không đúng cho thiết bị chứng thực (verity).\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2242
+msgid "Device type is not properly initialised.\n"
+msgstr "Kiểu thiết bị gần như chắc chắn là chưa được thiết lập.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2274
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is still in use.\n"
+msgstr "Thiết bị %s vẫn đang được sử dụng.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2283
+#, c-format
+msgid "Invalid device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Thiết bị không đúng %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2304
+msgid "Function not available in FIPS mode.\n"
+msgstr "Chức năng không khả dụng trong chế độ “FIPS”.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2310
+msgid "Volume key buffer too small.\n"
+msgstr "Vùng đệm khóa khối tin quá nhỏ.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2318
+msgid "Cannot retrieve volume key for plain device.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể lấy khóa khối tin cho thiết bị bình thường.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2325
+#, c-format
+msgid "This operation is not supported for %s crypt device.\n"
+msgstr "Thao tác này không được hỗ trợ cho thiết bị mã hóa %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2521
+msgid "Dump operation is not supported for this device type.\n"
+msgstr "Thao tác đổ đống (dump) không được hỗ trợ cho kiểu thiết bị này.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:244
+msgid "Cannot get process priority.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể lấy mức ưu tiên của tiến trình.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:258
+msgid "Cannot unlock memory.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể mở khóa bộ nhớ.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:242 lib/utils_crypt.c:255 lib/utils_crypt.c:402
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:417
+msgid "Out of memory while reading passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "Tràn bộ nhớ trong khi đọc cụm từ mật khẩu.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:247 lib/utils_crypt.c:262
+msgid "Error reading passphrase from terminal.\n"
+msgstr "Gặp lỗi khi đọc cụm từ mật khẩu từ thiết bị cuối.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:260
+msgid "Verify passphrase: "
+msgstr "Nhập lại mật khẩu: "
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:267
+msgid "Passphrases do not match.\n"
+msgstr "Hai cụm từ mật khẩu không trùng nhau.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:351
+msgid "Cannot use offset with terminal input.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể sử dụng khoảng bù (offset) với đầu vào là thiết bị cuối.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:370 lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:468
+msgid "Failed to open key file.\n"
+msgstr "Gặp lỗi khi mở tập tin khóa.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:379
+msgid "Failed to stat key file.\n"
+msgstr "Gặp lỗi khi lấy thông tin tập tin khóa.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:387 lib/utils_crypt.c:408
+msgid "Cannot seek to requested keyfile offset.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể di chuyển vị trí đầu đọc tới vị trí tương đối (offset) tập tin khóa đã yêu cầu.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:425
+msgid "Error reading passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "Lỗi đọc cụm từ mật khẩu.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:448
+msgid "Maximum keyfile size exceeded.\n"
+msgstr "Đã vượt quá kích thước tập tin khóa tối đa.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_crypt.c:453
+msgid "Cannot read requested amount of data.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể đọc đống dữ liệu đã yêu cầu.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:138 lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:90
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s doesn't exist or access denied.\n"
+msgstr "Thiết bị %s không tồn tại hoặc không đủ quyền truy cập.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:429
+msgid "Cannot use a loopback device, running as non-root user.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể sử dụng thiết-bị vòng ngược (loopback), do không chạy dưới quyền siêu người dùng.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:439
+msgid "Attaching loopback device failed (loop device with autoclear flag is required).\n"
+msgstr "Gặp lỗi khi gắn thiết bị vòng ngược (loopback) (thiết bị lặp với cờ autoclear là bắt buộc).\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:483
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s which is in use (already mapped or mounted).\n"
+msgstr "Không thể sử dụng thiết bị %s mà nó lại đang được sử dụng (đang được ánh xạ hoặc gắn).\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:487
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot get info about device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể lấy thông tin về thiết bị %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:493
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested offset is beyond real size of device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Khoảng bù (offset) đã yêu cầu nằm ngoài kích thước thật của thiết bị %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:501
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s has zero size.\n"
+msgstr "Thiết bị %s có kích cỡ là không.\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:512
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small.\n"
+msgstr "Thiết bị %s có kích cỡ quá nhỏ.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:37
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Failed to setup dm-crypt key mapping for device %s.\n"
+"Check that kernel supports %s cipher (check syslog for more info).\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Gặp lỗi khi cài đặt ánh xạ khóa dm-crypt cho thiết bị %s.\n"
+"Kiểm tra lại hạt nhân hỗ trợ mật mã %s (kiểu tra sổ theo dõi hệ thống để tìm thêm thông tin.)\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:42
+msgid "Key size in XTS mode must be 256 or 512 bits.\n"
+msgstr "Kích thước khóa trong chế độ “XTS” phải là 256 hay 512 bit.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:96 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:296
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:583 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1033
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write to device %s, permission denied.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể ghi thiết bị %s, không đủ thẩm quyền.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:111
+msgid "Failed to open temporary keystore device.\n"
+msgstr "Gặp lỗi khi mở thiết bị lưu trữ khóa tạm thời.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:118
+msgid "Failed to access temporary keystore device.\n"
+msgstr "Gl khi truy cập đến thiết bị lưu trữ khóa tạm thời.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:191
+msgid "IO error while encrypting keyslot.\n"
+msgstr "Lỗi IO (vào/ra) trong quá trình mã hóa khe khóa.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:256
+msgid "IO error while decrypting keyslot.\n"
+msgstr "Lỗi IO (vào/ra) trong quá trình giải mã khe khóa.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:90
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small. (LUKS requires at least %<PRIu64> bytes.)\n"
+msgstr "Thiết bị %s quá nhỏ. (LUKS cần ít nhất %<PRIu64> byte.)\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:180 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:419
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1152
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not a valid LUKS device.\n"
+msgstr "Thiết bị %s không phải là một thiết bị kiểu LUKS đúng.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:198
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested header backup file %s already exists.\n"
+msgstr "Phần đầu tập tin sao lưu dự phòng đã yêu cầu %s đã sẵn có.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:200
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create header backup file %s.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể tạo phần đầu của tập tin sao lưu dự phòng %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:205
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write header backup file %s.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể ghi tập tin sao lưu phần đầu %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:238
+msgid "Backup file doesn't contain valid LUKS header.\n"
+msgstr "Tập tin sao lưu không chứa phần đầu LUKS hợp lệ.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:251 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:497
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open header backup file %s.\n"
+msgstr "Không mở được tập tin sao lưu phần đầu %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:257
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read header backup file %s.\n"
+msgstr "Không đọc được tập tin sao lưu phần đầu %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:269
+msgid "Data offset or key size differs on device and backup, restore failed.\n"
+msgstr "Khoảng bù dữ liệu hoặc kích cỡ khóa vẫn khác nhau trên thiết bị và bản sao lưu thì chức năng phục hồi bị lỗi.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:277
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s %s%s"
+msgstr "Thiết bị %s %s%s"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:278
+msgid "does not contain LUKS header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device."
+msgstr "không chứa phần đầu LUKS. Thay thế phần đầu thì cũng có thể hủy dữ liệu trên thiết bị đó."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:279
+msgid "already contains LUKS header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."
+msgstr "đã chứa phần đầu LUKS. Thay thế phần đầu thì cũng hủy các khe khóa đã có."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:280
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: real device header has different UUID than backup!"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"CẢNH BÁO: phần đầu thiết bị thật có mã số “UUID” khác với bản sao lưu!"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:299 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:536
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:586 lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:625 lib/verity/verity.c:82
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:180 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:292
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:303 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:323
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:154
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể mở thiết bị %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:330
+msgid "Non standard key size, manual repair required.\n"
+msgstr "Kích thước khóa không tiêu chuẩn, yêu cầu sửa chữa bằng tay.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:335
+msgid "Non standard keyslots alignment, manual repair required.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể đồng chỉnh các khe khóa (keyslot) tiêu chuẩn, yêu cầu sửa chữa bằng tay.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:341
+msgid "Repairing keyslots.\n"
+msgstr "Đang chuẩn bị các khe khóa (keyslots).\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:352
+msgid "Repair failed."
+msgstr "Gặp lỗi khi sửa chữa."
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:364
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: offset repaired (%u -> %u).\n"
+msgstr "Khe-khóa (keyslot) %i: khoảng bù (offset) được sửa chữa (%u -> %u).\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:372
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: stripes repaired (%u -> %u).\n"
+msgstr "Khe-khóa (keyslot) %i: stripes được sửa chữa (%u -> %u).\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:381
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: bogus partition signature.\n"
+msgstr "Khe-khóa (keyslot) %i: chữ ký phân vùng không có thật.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:386
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: salt wiped.\n"
+msgstr "Khe-khóa (keyslot) %i: muối bị tẩy xóa.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:397
+msgid "Writing LUKS header to disk.\n"
+msgstr "Đang ghi phần đầu của LUKS lên đĩa.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:422
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported LUKS version %d.\n"
+msgstr "Phiên bản LUKS không được hỗ trợ %d.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:428 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:672
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested LUKS hash %s is not supported.\n"
+msgstr "Không hỗ trợ chuỗi duy nhất LUKS %s được yêu cầu.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:443
+#, c-format
+msgid "LUKS keyslot %u is invalid.\n"
+msgstr "khe-khóa LUKS %u là không hợp lệ.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:457 src/cryptsetup.c:668
+msgid "No known problems detected for LUKS header.\n"
+msgstr "Không phát hiện thấy vấn đề với phần đầu LUKS.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:607
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during update of LUKS header on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Gặp lỗi trong khi cập nhật phần đầu LUKS trên thiết bị %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:614
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error re-reading LUKS header after update on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Gặp lỗi trong khi đọc lại phần đầu LUKS sau khi cập nhật trên thiết bị %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:665
+#, c-format
+msgid "Data offset for detached LUKS header must be either 0 or higher than header size (%d sectors).\n"
+msgstr "Khoảng bù dữ liệu cho phần đầu LUKS tách rời phải hoặc là 0 hoặc là lớn hơn kích thước phần đầu (%d cung từ).\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:677 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:768
+msgid "Wrong LUKS UUID format provided.\n"
+msgstr "Đưa ra định dạng mã số UUID LUKS không đúng.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:706
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: reading random salt failed.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể tạo phần đầu LUKS: lỗi đọc salt ngẫu nhiên.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:713 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:809
+#, c-format
+msgid "Not compatible PBKDF2 options (using hash algorithm %s).\n"
+msgstr "Gặp các tùy chọn PBKDF2 không tương thích (dùng thuật toán chuỗi duy nhất %s).\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:728
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: header digest failed (using hash %s).\n"
+msgstr "Không thể tạo phần đầu LUKS: lỗi tạo bản tóm tắt (dùng chuỗi duy nhất %s).\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:793
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d active, purge first.\n"
+msgstr "Khe khóa %d vẫn hoạt động: cần tẩy trước.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:799
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d material includes too few stripes. Header manipulation?\n"
+msgstr "Nguyên liệu khe khóa %d gồm có quá ít sọc. Có nên thao tác phần đầu không?\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:966
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d unlocked.\n"
+msgstr "Khe khóa %d được mở khóa.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1001 src/cryptsetup.c:867
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1041 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1078
+msgid "No key available with this passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "Không có khóa sẵn sàng dùng với cụm từ mật khẩu này.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1019
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select keyslot between 0 and %d.\n"
+msgstr "Khe khóa %d không đúng: hãy chọn khe khóa trong phạm vi 0 đến %d.\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1037
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể tẩy thiết bị %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:146
+msgid "Detected not yet supported GPG encrypted keyfile.\n"
+msgstr "Tìm thấy tập tin khóa mã hóa GPG vẫn chưa được hỗ trợ.\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:147
+msgid "Please use gpg --decrypt <KEYFILE> | cryptsetup --keyfile=- ...\n"
+msgstr "Hãy dùng gpg --decrypt <TẬP-TIN-KHÓA> | cryptsetup --keyfile=- …\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:168 lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:188
+msgid "Incompatible loop-AES keyfile detected.\n"
+msgstr "Tập tin khóa (keyfile) loop-AES không tương thích được tìm thấy.\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:244
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support loop-AES compatible mapping.\n"
+msgstr "Nhân không hỗ trợ ánh xạ tương thích loop-AES.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:476
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error reading keyfile %s.\n"
+msgstr "Gặp lỗi khi đọc tập-tin khóa %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:514
+#, c-format
+msgid "Maximum TCRYPT passphrase length (%d) exceeded.\n"
+msgstr "Độ dài cụm từ mật khẩu TCRYPT tối đa (%d) đã bị vượt quá.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:544
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2 hash algorithm %s not available, skipping.\n"
+msgstr "Thuật toán băm PBKDF2 không khả dụng %s, bỏ qua.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:562 src/cryptsetup.c:621
+msgid "Required kernel crypto interface not available.\n"
+msgstr "Giao diện mã hóa từ nhân đã yêu cầu không khả dụng.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:564 src/cryptsetup.c:623
+msgid "Ensure you have algif_skcipher kernel module loaded.\n"
+msgstr "Bạn cần chắc chắn là mô-đun nhân algif_skcipher đã được tải.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:708
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activation is not supported for %d sector size.\n"
+msgstr "Hoạt hóa không được hỗ trợ cho kích thước cung %d.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:714
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support activation for this TCRYPT legacy mode.\n"
+msgstr "Nhân không hỗ trợ hoạt hóa cho chế độ cũ của TCRYPT.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:748
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activating TCRYPT system encryption for partition %s.\n"
+msgstr "Đang kích hoạt mã hóa hệ thống TCRYPT cho phân vùng %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:815
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support TCRYPT compatible mapping.\n"
+msgstr "Nhân không hỗ trợ ánh xạ tương thích TCRYPT.\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:1030
+msgid "This function is not supported without TCRYPT header load."
+msgstr "Chức năng này không được hỗ trợ mà không có phần tải đầu TCRYPT."
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:70 lib/verity/verity.c:173
+#, c-format
+msgid "Verity device %s doesn't use on-disk header.\n"
+msgstr "Thiết bị xác thực %s không sử dụng phần đầu on-disk.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:94
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not a valid VERITY device.\n"
+msgstr "Thiết bị %s không phải là thiết bị VERITY thích hợp.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:101
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY version %d.\n"
+msgstr "Không hỗ trợ phiên bản VERITY %d.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:131
+msgid "VERITY header corrupted.\n"
+msgstr "phần đầu VERITY sai hỏng.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:167
+#, c-format
+msgid "Wrong VERITY UUID format provided on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Đưa ra định dạng mã số VERITY không đúng trên thiết bị %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:199
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during update of verity header on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Gặp lỗi trong khi cập nhật phần đầu xác thực trên thiết bị %s.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:279
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support dm-verity mapping.\n"
+msgstr "Nhân không hỗ trợ ánh xạ dm-verity.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:290
+msgid "Verity device detected corruption after activation.\n"
+msgstr "Thiết bị xác thực đã được phát hiện sai hỏng sau khi hoạt hóa.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:59
+#, c-format
+msgid "Spare area is not zeroed at position %<PRIu64>.\n"
+msgstr "Vùng để dành không được điền đầy bằng số không tại vị trí %<PRIu64>.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:121 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:249
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:277 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:284
+msgid "Device offset overflow.\n"
+msgstr "Khoảng bù (offset) thiết bị bị tràn.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:161
+#, c-format
+msgid "Verification failed at position %<PRIu64>.\n"
+msgstr "Thẩm tra gặp lỗi tại vị trí %<PRIu64>.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:235
+msgid "Invalid size parameters for verity device.\n"
+msgstr "Các tham số kích thước cho thiết bị xác thực không hợp lệ.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:266
+msgid "Too many tree levels for verity volume.\n"
+msgstr "Có quá nhiều mức cây cho mỗi vùng xác thực.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:354
+msgid "Verification of data area failed.\n"
+msgstr "Việc thẩm tra vùng dữ liệu gặp lỗi.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:359
+msgid "Verification of root hash failed.\n"
+msgstr "Việc thẩm tra mã băm gốc gặp lỗi.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:365
+msgid "Input/output error while creating hash area.\n"
+msgstr "Lỗi Vào/Ra trong khi đang tạo vùng băm.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:367
+msgid "Creation of hash area failed.\n"
+msgstr "Việc tạo vùng dữ liệu băm gặp lỗi.\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:414
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Kernel cannot activate device if data block size exceeds page size (%u).\n"
+msgstr "CẢNH BÁO: Nhân (kernel) không thể kích hoạt thiết bị nếu kích thước khối dữ liệu vượt quá kích cỡ trang (%u).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:92
+msgid "Can't do passphrase verification on non-tty inputs.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể thẩm tra cụm từ mật khẩu trên đầu vào khác TTY.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:133 src/cryptsetup.c:564 src/cryptsetup.c:711
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:524 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:578
+msgid "No known cipher specification pattern detected.\n"
+msgstr "Không phát hiện mẫu đặc tả mã hóa đã biết.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:141
+msgid "WARNING: The --hash parameter is being ignored in plain mode with keyfile specified.\n"
+msgstr "CẢNH BÁO: Tham số --hash bị bỏ qua trong chế độ thường với tập tin khóa đã cho.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:149
+msgid "WARNING: The --keyfile-size option is being ignored, the read size is the same as the encryption key size.\n"
+msgstr "CẢNH BÁO: Đang bỏ qua các tùy chọn kích thước tập-tin-khóa --keyfile-size --, kích thước đọc giống với kích thước khóa mã hóa.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:215
+msgid "Option --key-file is required.\n"
+msgstr "Cần tùy chọn “--key-file”.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:267
+msgid "No device header detected with this passphrase.\n"
+msgstr "Không có phần đầu thiết bị cho cụm từ mật khẩu này.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:327 src/cryptsetup.c:1160
+msgid ""
+"Header dump with volume key is sensitive information\n"
+"which allows access to encrypted partition without passphrase.\n"
+"This dump should be always stored encrypted on safe place."
+msgstr ""
+"Đổ đống phần đầu với khóa vùng chứa là thông tin phân biệt hoa thường\n"
+"cái mà cho phép truy cập phân vùng được mã hóa mà không cần mật khẩu.\n"
+"Việc đổ đống này nên luôn được lưu trữ mã hóa tại một nơi an toàn."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:517
+msgid "Result of benchmark is not reliable.\n"
+msgstr "Kết quả đo kiểm không đáng tin cậy.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:558
+msgid "# Tests are approximate using memory only (no storage IO).\n"
+msgstr "# Các kiểm tra là chỉ ước lượng việc sử dụng bộ nhớ (không tính IO ổ đĩa).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:583 src/cryptsetup.c:605
+msgid "#  Algorithm | Key |  Encryption |  Decryption\n"
+msgstr "#  Thuật toán| Khóa|  Mã hóa     |  Giải mã\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:587
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cipher %s is not available.\n"
+msgstr "Mã hóa kiểu %s không sẵn có.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:614
+msgid "N/A"
+msgstr "N/A"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:639
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read keyfile %s.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể đọc tập-tin khóa %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:643
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read %d bytes from keyfile %s.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể đọc %d byte từ tập tin khóa %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:672
+msgid "Really try to repair LUKS device header?"
+msgstr "Bạn có thực sự muốn thử sửa chữa phần đầu thiết bị LUKS không?"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:697
+#, c-format
+msgid "This will overwrite data on %s irrevocably."
+msgstr "Thao tác này sẽ ghi đè lên dữ liệu trên thiết bị %s một cách không phục hồi được."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:699
+msgid "memory allocation error in action_luksFormat"
+msgstr "gặp lỗi phân cấp vùng nhớ trong“action_luksFormat”"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:721
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use %s as on-disk header.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể sử dụng %s như là phần đầu on-disk.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:788
+msgid "Reduced data offset is allowed only for detached LUKS header.\n"
+msgstr "Giảm khoảng bù (offset) dữ liệu chỉ cho phép khi phần đầu LUKS được tách rời.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:890 src/cryptsetup.c:946
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d selected for deletion.\n"
+msgstr "Khe khóa %d đã được chọn để xóa.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:893
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key %d not active. Can't wipe.\n"
+msgstr "Khóa %d không hoạt động thì không xóa được.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:901 src/cryptsetup.c:949
+msgid "This is the last keyslot. Device will become unusable after purging this key."
+msgstr "Đây là khe khóa cuối cùng. Sau khi tẩy khóa này thì thiết bị không dùng được."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:902
+msgid "Enter any remaining passphrase: "
+msgstr "Gõ cụm từ mật khẩu bất kỳ còn lại: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:930
+msgid "Enter passphrase to be deleted: "
+msgstr "Gõ cụm từ mật khẩu cần xóa: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1017 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1116
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter any existing passphrase: "
+msgstr "Hãy nhập mật khẩu bất kỳ sẵn có: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1072
+msgid "Enter passphrase to be changed: "
+msgstr "Gõ cụm từ mật khẩu cần được thay đổi: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1086 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1101
+msgid "Enter new passphrase: "
+msgstr "Gõ cụm từ mật khẩu mới: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1110
+msgid "Only one device argument for isLuks operation is supported.\n"
+msgstr "Chỉ hỗ trợ một đối số thiết-bị dành cho thao tác isLuks.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1266 src/cryptsetup.c:1287
+msgid "Option --header-backup-file is required.\n"
+msgstr "Cần tùy chọn“--header-backup-file”.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1324
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unrecognized metadata device type %s.\n"
+msgstr "Không nhận ra siêu dữ liệu của kiểu thiết bị %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1327
+msgid "Command requires device and mapped name as arguments.\n"
+msgstr "Lệnh cần thiết bị và tên ánh xạ như là các tham số.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1346
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"This operation will erase all keyslots on device %s.\n"
+"Device will become unusable after this operation."
+msgstr ""
+"Thao tác này sẽ tẩy mọi khe khóa trên thiết bị %s.\n"
+"Thiết bị sẽ không dùng được sau thao tác này."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1380
+msgid "<device> [--type <type>] [<name>]"
+msgstr "<thiết-bị> [--type <kiểu>] [<tên>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1380
+msgid "open device as mapping <name>"
+msgstr "mở thiết bị như là ánh xạ <tên>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1381 src/cryptsetup.c:1382 src/cryptsetup.c:1383
+#: src/veritysetup.c:329 src/veritysetup.c:330
+msgid "<name>"
+msgstr "<tên>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1381
+msgid "close device (remove mapping)"
+msgstr "đóng thiết bị (gỡ bỏ ánh xạ)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1382
+msgid "resize active device"
+msgstr "thay đổi kích cỡ của thiết bị hoạt động"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1383
+msgid "show device status"
+msgstr "hiển thị trạng thái về thiết bị"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1384
+msgid "[--cipher <cipher>]"
+msgstr "[--cipher <bộ mã hóa>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1384
+msgid "benchmark cipher"
+msgstr "đo kiểm tốc độ mã hóa"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1385 src/cryptsetup.c:1386 src/cryptsetup.c:1392
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1393 src/cryptsetup.c:1394 src/cryptsetup.c:1395
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1396 src/cryptsetup.c:1397 src/cryptsetup.c:1398
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1399
+msgid "<device>"
+msgstr "<thiết_bị>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1385
+msgid "try to repair on-disk metadata"
+msgstr "thử sửa chữa siêu dữ liệu (metadata) on-disk"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1386
+msgid "erase all keyslots (remove encryption key)"
+msgstr "tẩy mọi khe khóa (gỡ bỏ khóa mã hóa)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1387 src/cryptsetup.c:1388
+msgid "<device> [<new key file>]"
+msgstr "<thiết_bị> [<tập_tin_khóa_mới>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1387
+msgid "formats a LUKS device"
+msgstr "định dạng một thiết bị kiểu LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1388
+msgid "add key to LUKS device"
+msgstr "thêm khóa vào thiết bị LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1389 src/cryptsetup.c:1390
+msgid "<device> [<key file>]"
+msgstr "<thiết_bị> [<tập_tin_khóa>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1389
+msgid "removes supplied key or key file from LUKS device"
+msgstr "gỡ bỏ khỏi thiết bị LUKS khóa hoặc tập tin khóa đưa ra"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1390
+msgid "changes supplied key or key file of LUKS device"
+msgstr "thay đổi khóa hay tập tin khóa đã áp dụng của thiết bị LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1391
+msgid "<device> <key slot>"
+msgstr "<thiết_bị> <khe_khóa>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1391
+msgid "wipes key with number <key slot> from LUKS device"
+msgstr "xóa khỏi thiết bị LUKS khóa có số <khe_khóa>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1392
+msgid "print UUID of LUKS device"
+msgstr "in ra mã số UUID của thiết bị LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1393
+msgid "tests <device> for LUKS partition header"
+msgstr "thử <thiết_bị> có phần đầu phân vùng LUKS không"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1394
+msgid "dump LUKS partition information"
+msgstr "đổ thông tin về phân vùng LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1395
+msgid "dump TCRYPT device information"
+msgstr "dump thông tin thiết bị TCRYPT"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1396
+msgid "Suspend LUKS device and wipe key (all IOs are frozen)."
+msgstr "Ngưng thiết bị LUKS và tẩy khóa (thì mọi việc V/R đều đông cứng)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1397
+msgid "Resume suspended LUKS device."
+msgstr "Tiếp tục lại sử dụng thiết bị LUKS bị ngưng."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1398
+msgid "Backup LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "Sao lưu phần đầu và các khe khóa của thiết bị LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1399
+msgid "Restore LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "Phục hồi phần đầu và các khe khóa của thiết bị LUKS"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1416 src/veritysetup.c:346
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<action> is one of:\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<thao-tác> là một trong:\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1422
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"You can also use old <action> syntax aliases:\n"
+"\topen: create (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen\n"
+"\tclose: remove (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tcryptClose\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Bạn còn có thể sử dụng cú pháp bí danh <thao-tác> kiểu cũ:\n"
+"\topen: create (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen\n"
+"\tclose: remove (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tcryptClose\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1426
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<device> is the encrypted device\n"
+"<key slot> is the LUKS key slot number to modify\n"
+"<key file> optional key file for the new key for luksAddKey action\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<tên> là thiết bị cần tạo dưới %s\n"
+"<thiết_bị> là thiết bị đã mã hóa\n"
+"<khe_khóa> là số thứ tự khe khóa LUKS cần sửa đổi\n"
+"<tập_tin_khóa> là tập tin khóa tùy chọn cho khóa mới trong thao tác luksAddKey\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1433
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in key and passphrase parameters:\n"
+"\tMaximum keyfile size: %dkB, Maximum interactive passphrase length %d (characters)\n"
+"Default PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS: %d (ms)\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Các tham số mặc định liên quan đến khóa và mật khẩu được biên dịch sẵn:\n"
+"\tĐộ dài tập tin khóa tối đa: %dkB, Độ dài mật khẩu tương tác tối đa %d (ký tự)\n"
+"Thời gian tương tác PBKDF2 mặc định cho LUKS: %d (ms)\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1440
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in device cipher parameters:\n"
+"\tloop-AES: %s, Key %d bits\n"
+"\tplain: %s, Key: %d bits, Password hashing: %s\n"
+"\tLUKS1: %s, Key: %d bits, LUKS header hashing: %s, RNG: %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Các tham số mặc định liên quan đến việc mã hóa được đặt sẵn:\n"
+"\tloop-AES: %s, Khóa %d bit\n"
+"\tdữ liệu thô: %s, Khóa: %d bit, Kiểu băm mật khẩu: %s\n"
+"\tLUKS1: %s, Khóa: %d bit, Kiểu băm cho phần đầu LUKS: %s, RNG: %s\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1457 src/veritysetup.c:481
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s: requires %s as arguments"
+msgstr "%s: cần thiết %s làm đối số"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1490 src/veritysetup.c:386 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1302
+msgid "Show this help message"
+msgstr "Hiển thị trợ giúp này"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1491 src/veritysetup.c:387 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1303
+msgid "Display brief usage"
+msgstr "Hiển thị thông tin ngắn về cách sử dụng"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1495 src/veritysetup.c:391 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1307
+msgid "Help options:"
+msgstr "Tùy chọn trợ giúp:"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1496 src/veritysetup.c:392 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1308
+msgid "Print package version"
+msgstr "Hiển thị phiên bản của gói"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1497 src/veritysetup.c:393 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1309
+msgid "Shows more detailed error messages"
+msgstr "Hiển thị các thông điệp lỗi chi tiết hơn"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1498 src/veritysetup.c:394 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1310
+msgid "Show debug messages"
+msgstr "Hiển thị thông điệp gỡ lỗi"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1499 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1312
+msgid "The cipher used to encrypt the disk (see /proc/crypto)"
+msgstr "Mật mã dùng để bảo vệ đĩa (xem “/proc/crypto”)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1500 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1314
+msgid "The hash used to create the encryption key from the passphrase"
+msgstr "Chuỗi duy nhất dùng để tạo khóa mã hóa từ cụm từ mật khẩu"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1501
+msgid "Verifies the passphrase by asking for it twice"
+msgstr "Thẩm tra cụm từ mật khẩu bằng cách yêu cầu nó hai lần"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1502 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1316
+msgid "Read the key from a file."
+msgstr "Đọc khóa từ một tập tin."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1503
+msgid "Read the volume (master) key from file."
+msgstr "Đọc khóa khối tin (chủ) từ tập tin."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1504
+msgid "Dump volume (master) key instead of keyslots info."
+msgstr "Dump (đổ thành đống) khóa vùng chứa (master) thay vì thông tin khe-khóa."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1505 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1313
+msgid "The size of the encryption key"
+msgstr "Kích cỡ của khóa mã hóa"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1505 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1313
+msgid "BITS"
+msgstr "BIT"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1506 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1327
+msgid "Limits the read from keyfile"
+msgstr "Giới hạn việc đọc từ tập-tin-khóa"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1506 src/cryptsetup.c:1507 src/cryptsetup.c:1508
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1509 src/veritysetup.c:397 src/veritysetup.c:398
+#: src/veritysetup.c:400 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1326
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1327 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1328
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1329
+msgid "bytes"
+msgstr "byte"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1507 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1326
+msgid "Number of bytes to skip in keyfile"
+msgstr "Số lượng byte nhảy qua trong tập tin khóa"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1508
+msgid "Limits the read from newly added keyfile"
+msgstr "Giới hạn đọc từ tập tin khóa mới thêm vào"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1509
+msgid "Number of bytes to skip in newly added keyfile"
+msgstr "Số lượng byte để nhảy qua trong tập tin khóa mới thêm"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1510
+msgid "Slot number for new key (default is first free)"
+msgstr "Số thứ tự khe cho khóa mới (mặc định là khe trống thứ nhất)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1511
+msgid "The size of the device"
+msgstr "Kích cỡ của thiết bị"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1511 src/cryptsetup.c:1512 src/cryptsetup.c:1513
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1519
+msgid "SECTORS"
+msgstr "CUNG-TỪ"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1512
+msgid "The start offset in the backend device"
+msgstr "Khoảng bù đầu tiên trong thiết bị thật chạy ở phía sau"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1513
+msgid "How many sectors of the encrypted data to skip at the beginning"
+msgstr "Bao nhiêu cung từ dữ liệu mã hóa cần bỏ qua ở đầu"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1514
+msgid "Create a readonly mapping"
+msgstr "Tạo một sự ánh xạ chỉ cho đọc"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1515 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1317
+msgid "PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS (in ms)"
+msgstr "Thời gian lặp lại PBKDF2 cho LUKS (theo mili-giây)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1515 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1317
+msgid "msecs"
+msgstr "mili-giây"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1516 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1318
+msgid "Do not ask for confirmation"
+msgstr "Không cần xác nhận"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1517
+msgid "Timeout for interactive passphrase prompt (in seconds)"
+msgstr "Thời gian chờ gõ cụm từ mật khẩu tối đa (theo giây)"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1517
+msgid "secs"
+msgstr "giây"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1518 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1319
+msgid "How often the input of the passphrase can be retried"
+msgstr "Số các lần có cho phép thử gõ lại cụm từ mật khẩu"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1519
+msgid "Align payload at <n> sector boundaries - for luksFormat"
+msgstr "Căn chỉnh trọng tải ở <n> biên giới cung từ — cho định dạng “luksFormat”"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1520
+msgid "File with LUKS header and keyslots backup."
+msgstr "Tập tin chứa bản sao lưu phần đầu và các khe khóa của thiết bị LUKS."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1521 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1320
+msgid "Use /dev/random for generating volume key."
+msgstr "Dùng /dev/random để tạo khóa volume."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1522 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1321
+msgid "Use /dev/urandom for generating volume key."
+msgstr "Dùng /dev/urandom để tạo khóa vùng."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1523
+msgid "Share device with another non-overlapping crypt segment."
+msgstr "Thiết bị chia sẻ với đoạn crypt không-chồng-lên-nhau khác."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1524 src/veritysetup.c:403
+msgid "UUID for device to use."
+msgstr "UUID dành cho tập tin sử dụng."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1525
+msgid "Allow discards (aka TRIM) requests for device."
+msgstr "Cho phép hủy bỏ (được biết đến như là TRIM) các yêu cầu cho thiết bị."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1526
+msgid "Device or file with separated LUKS header."
+msgstr "Thiết bị hay tập tin với phần đầu LUKS tách nhau."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1527
+msgid "Do not activate device, just check passphrase."
+msgstr "Không kích hoạt thiết bị, chỉ cần kiểm tra mật khẩu."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1528
+msgid "Use hidden header (hidden TCRYPT device)."
+msgstr "Dùng phần đầu ẩn (thiết bị TCRYPT ẩn)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1529
+msgid "Device is system TCRYPT drive (with bootloader)."
+msgstr "Thiết bị là ổ đĩa TCRYPT hệ thống (có bootloader)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1530
+msgid "Use backup (secondary) TCRYPT header."
+msgstr "Dùng phần đầu (thứ cấp) TCRYPT."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1531
+msgid "Scan also for VeraCrypt compatible device."
+msgstr "Cũng quét cho thiết bị tương thích VeraCrypt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1532
+msgid "Type of device metadata: luks, plain, loopaes, tcrypt."
+msgstr "Kiểu của siêu dữ liệu thiết bị: luks, plain, loopaes, tcrypt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1533
+msgid "Disable password quality check (if enabled)."
+msgstr "Tắt chức năng kiểm tra chất lượng mật khẩu (nếu nó đang bật)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1534
+msgid "Use dm-crypt same_cpu_crypt performance compatibility option."
+msgstr "Dùng tùy chọn tương thích hiệu năng same_cpu_crypt dm-crypt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1535
+msgid "Use dm-crypt submit_from_crypt_cpus performance compatibility option."
+msgstr "Dùng tùy chọn tương thích hiệu năng submit_from_crypt_cpus dm-crypt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1551 src/veritysetup.c:423
+msgid "[OPTION...] <action> <action-specific>"
+msgstr "[TÙY CHỌN…] <thao-tác> <đặc-tả-thao-tác>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1602 src/veritysetup.c:460
+msgid "Argument <action> missing."
+msgstr "Còn thiếu đối số <thao-tác>."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1655 src/veritysetup.c:466
+msgid "Unknown action."
+msgstr "Không hiểu thao-tác."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1665
+msgid "Option --shared is allowed only for open of plain device.\n"
+msgstr "Tùy chọn “--shared” chỉ cho phép với thao tác tạo mở của thiết bị thường.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1670
+msgid "Option --allow-discards is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "Tùy chọn “--allow-discards” chỉ cho phép với thao tác mở.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1678
+msgid ""
+"Option --key-size is allowed only for luksFormat, open and benchmark.\n"
+"To limit read from keyfile use --keyfile-size=(bytes)."
+msgstr ""
+"Tùy chọn --key-size thì chỉ cho phép với các thao tác luksFormat, mở và đo kiểm.\n"
+"Để giới hạn đọc từ tập-tin-khóa, hãy sử dụng tùy chọn --keyfile-size=(bytes)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1685
+msgid "Option --test-passphrase is allowed only for open of LUKS and TCRYPT devices.\n"
+msgstr "Tùy chọn “--test-passphrase” chỉ được phép cho lệnh mở thiết bị LUKS và TCRYPT.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1690 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1389
+msgid "Key size must be a multiple of 8 bits"
+msgstr "Kích cỡ khóa phải là bội số của 8 bít"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1697 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1394
+msgid "Key slot is invalid."
+msgstr "Khe khóa không đúng."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1704
+msgid "Option --key-file takes precedence over specified key file argument.\n"
+msgstr "Tùy chọn --key-file giữ quyền ưu tiên cao hơn tham số tập tin khóa đã chỉ định.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1712 src/veritysetup.c:488 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1378
+msgid "Negative number for option not permitted."
+msgstr "Tùy chọn không chấp nhận giá trị là số âm."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1716
+msgid "Only one --key-file argument is allowed."
+msgstr "Chỉ cho phép một tùy chọn --key-file."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1720 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1372
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1398
+msgid "Only one of --use-[u]random options is allowed."
+msgstr "Chỉ cho phép một tùy chọn “--use-[u]random”."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1724
+msgid "Option --use-[u]random is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgstr "Tùy chọn “--use-[u]random” chỉ được phép cho “luksFormat”."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1728
+msgid "Option --uuid is allowed only for luksFormat and luksUUID."
+msgstr "Tùy chọn “--uuid” thì chỉ cho phép với “luksFormat” và “luksUUID”."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1732
+msgid "Option --align-payload is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgstr "Tùy chọn “--align-payload” chỉ được phép cho “luksFormat”."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1738
+msgid "Option --skip is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices.\n"
+msgstr "Tùy chọn “--skip” chỉ hỗ trợ cho lệnh mở (open) của thiết bị thường và “loopaes”.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1744
+msgid "Option --offset is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices.\n"
+msgstr "Tùy chọn “--offset” chỉ hỗ trợ cho lệnh mở (open) của thiết bị thường và “loopaes”.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1750
+msgid "Option --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system or --tcrypt-backup is supported only for TCRYPT device.\n"
+msgstr "Tùy chọn --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system hay --tcrypt-backup chỉ được hỗ trợ trên thiết bị TCRYPT.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1755
+msgid "Option --tcrypt-hidden cannot be combined with --allow-discards.\n"
+msgstr "Tùy chọn --tcrypt-hidden không thể được tổ hợp cùng với --allow-discards.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1760
+msgid "Option --veracrypt is supported only for TCRYPT device type.\n"
+msgstr "Tùy chọn --veracrypt chỉ được hỗ trợ trên thiết bị TCRYPT.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:61
+msgid "Invalid salt string specified.\n"
+msgstr "Chuỗi salt (muối) đã cho không hợp lệ.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:91
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create hash image %s for writing.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể tạo ảnh băm %s để ghi.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:158
+msgid "Invalid root hash string specified.\n"
+msgstr "Chuỗi mã băm gốc (thư mục root) đã chỉ ra không hợp lệ.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:326
+msgid "<data_device> <hash_device>"
+msgstr "<thiết-bị-dữ-liệu> <thiết-bị-băm>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:326
+msgid "format device"
+msgstr "định dạng thiết bị"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:327
+msgid "<data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgstr "<thiết-bị-dữ-liệu> <thiết-bị-băm> <mã-băm-gốc>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:327
+msgid "verify device"
+msgstr "thẩm tra thiết bị"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:328
+msgid "<name> <data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgstr "<tên> <thiết-bị-dữ-liệu> <thiết-bị-băm> <mã-băm-gốc>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:328
+msgid "create active device"
+msgstr "tạo thiết bị hoạt động"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:329
+msgid "remove (deactivate) device"
+msgstr "gỡ bỏ (dừng hoạt động) thiết bị"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:330
+msgid "show active device status"
+msgstr "hiển thị trạng thái các thiết bị đang hoạt động"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:331
+msgid "<hash_device>"
+msgstr "<thiết_bị_băm>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:331
+msgid "show on-disk information"
+msgstr "hiển thị thông tin trên-đĩa"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:350
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<data_device> is the data device\n"
+"<hash_device> is the device containing verification data\n"
+"<root_hash> hash of the root node on <hash_device>\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<tên> là thiết bị để tạo dưới %s\n"
+"<thiết-bị-dữ-liệu> là thiết bị dữ liệu\n"
+"<thiết-bị-băm> là thiết bị chứa dữ liệu xác thực\n"
+"<mã-băm-gốc> mã băm của nút root (gốc) trên <thiết-bị-băm>\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:357
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in dm-verity parameters:\n"
+"\tHash: %s, Data block (bytes): %u, Hash block (bytes): %u, Salt size: %u, Hash format: %u\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"Các tham số dm-verity dựng sẵn mặc định:\n"
+"\tBăm: %s, Khối dữ liệu (bytes): %u, Khối băm (bytes): %u, Kích thước muối: %u, Định dạng băm: %u\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:395
+msgid "Do not use verity superblock"
+msgstr "Không sử dụng siêu khối thẩm định"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:396
+msgid "Format type (1 - normal, 0 - original Chrome OS)"
+msgstr "Kiểu định dạng (1 - thông thường, 0 - Chrome OS)"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:396
+msgid "number"
+msgstr "số"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:397
+msgid "Block size on the data device"
+msgstr "Kích cỡ khối trên thiết bị dữ liệu"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:398
+msgid "Block size on the hash device"
+msgstr "Kích cỡ của khối trên thiết bị băm"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:399
+msgid "The number of blocks in the data file"
+msgstr "Số lượng khối trong tập tin dữ liệu"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:399
+msgid "blocks"
+msgstr "khối"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:400
+msgid "Starting offset on the hash device"
+msgstr "Khoảng bù (offset) khởi đầu của thiết bị băm"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:401
+msgid "Hash algorithm"
+msgstr "Thuật toán băm"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:401
+msgid "string"
+msgstr "chuỗi"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:402
+msgid "Salt"
+msgstr "Muối"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:402
+msgid "hex string"
+msgstr "chuỗi hex (thập lục phân)"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:404
+msgid "Restart kernel if corruption is detected"
+msgstr "Khởi động lại nhân nếu thấy có sai hỏng"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:405
+msgid "Ignore corruption, log it only"
+msgstr "Bỏ qua sai hỏng, chỉ ghi nhật ký lại"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:406
+msgid "Do not verify zeroed blocks"
+msgstr "Không thẩm tra các khối không"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:494
+msgid "Option --ignore-corruption, --restart-on-corruption or --ignore-zero-blocks is allowed only for create operation.\n"
+msgstr "Tùy chọn --ignore-corruption, --restart-on-corruption hay --ignore-zero-blocks chỉ được phép dùng cho thao tác tạo.\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:499
+msgid "Option --ignore-corruption and --restart-on-corruption cannot be used together.\n"
+msgstr "Không được dùng các tùy chọn --ignore-corruption và --restart-on-corruption cùng một lúc.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:150
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot exclusively open %s, device in use.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể mở %s một cách đệ qui, thiết bị vẫn đang được sử dụng.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:164 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:920
+msgid "Allocation of aligned memory failed.\n"
+msgstr "Phân bổ bộ nhớ điều chỉnh gặp lỗi.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:171
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể đọc thiết bị %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:182
+#, c-format
+msgid "Marking LUKS device %s unusable.\n"
+msgstr "Đánh dấu thiết bị LUKS %s là không thể dùng.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:198
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể ghi thiết bị %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:281
+msgid "Cannot write reencryption log file.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể ghi tập tin nhật ký reencryption (mã hóa lại).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:337
+msgid "Cannot read reencryption log file.\n"
+msgstr "Không đọc được tập tin nhật ký reencryption.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:375
+#, c-format
+msgid "Log file %s exists, resuming reencryption.\n"
+msgstr "Tập tin nhật ký %s đã có sẵn rồi, giả định là reencryption (mã hóa lại).\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:425
+msgid "Activating temporary device using old LUKS header.\n"
+msgstr "Hoạt hóa thiết bị tạm thời sử dụng phần đầu LUKS kiểu cũ.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:436
+msgid "Activating temporary device using new LUKS header.\n"
+msgstr "Hoạt hóa thiết bị tạm thời sử dụng phần đầu LUKS kiểu mới.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:446
+msgid "Activation of temporary devices failed.\n"
+msgstr "Việc hoạt hóa các thiết bị tạm thời gặp lỗi.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:472
+#, c-format
+msgid "New LUKS header for device %s created.\n"
+msgstr "Phần đầu LUKS mới cho thiết bị %s được tạo.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:480
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activated keyslot %i.\n"
+msgstr "Khe-khóa (keyslot) đã được kích hoạt %i.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:506
+#, c-format
+msgid "LUKS header backup of device %s created.\n"
+msgstr "Phần đầu sao lưu LUKS của thiết bị %s được tạo.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:554
+msgid "Creation of LUKS backup headers failed.\n"
+msgstr "Việc tạo phần đầu LUKS sao lưu dự phòng gặp lỗi.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:656
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot restore LUKS header on device %s.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể phục hồi phần đầu LUKS trên thiết bị %s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:658
+#, c-format
+msgid "LUKS header on device %s restored.\n"
+msgstr "Phần đầu LUKS trên thiết bị %s đã được phục hồi.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:693
+#, c-format
+msgid "Progress: %5.1f%%, ETA %02llu:%02llu, %4llu MiB written, speed %5.1f MiB/s%s"
+msgstr "Diễn biến: %5.1f%%, ETA %02llu:%02llu, đã ghi %4llu MiB, tốc độ %5.1f MiB/s%s"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:732 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:811
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:853
+msgid "Cannot seek to device offset.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể di chuyển vị trí tới vị trí tương đối thiết bị.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:892 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:898
+msgid "Cannot open temporary LUKS device.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể r thiết bị LUKS tạm thời.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:903 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:908
+msgid "Cannot get device size.\n"
+msgstr "Không thể lấy kích cỡ thiết bị.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:946
+msgid "Interrupted by a signal.\n"
+msgstr "Bị ngắt bởi tín hiệu signal.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:948
+msgid "IO error during reencryption.\n"
+msgstr "Lỗi IO (vào/ra) trong quá trình mã hóa lại.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:978
+msgid "Provided UUID is invalid.\n"
+msgstr "UUID đã cung cấp không hợp lệ.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1070
+msgid "Key file can be used only with --key-slot or with exactly one key slot active.\n"
+msgstr "Tập tin khóa có thể sử dụng với tùy chọn --key-slot hoặc với chính xác một khe khóa hoạt động.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1114 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1129
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for key slot %u: "
+msgstr "Gõ cụm từ mật khẩu cho khe khóa %u: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1178
+msgid "Cannot open reencryption log file.\n"
+msgstr "Không mở được tập tin nhật ký reencryption.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1184
+msgid "No decryption in progress, provided UUID can be used only to resume suspended decryption process.\n"
+msgstr "Không có quá trình giải mã nào đang xử lý, UUID đã cung cấp có thể chỉ được dùng để phục hồi lại tiến trình giải mã đã tạm dừng.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1311
+msgid "Reencryption block size"
+msgstr "Kích thước khối mã hóa lại"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1311
+msgid "MiB"
+msgstr "MiB"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1315
+msgid "Do not change key, no data area reencryption."
+msgstr "Khôngười thay đổi khóa, không có mã hóa lại vùng dữ liệu."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1322
+msgid "Use direct-io when accessing devices."
+msgstr "Sử dụng vào ra trực tiếp khi truy cập các thiết bị."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1323
+msgid "Use fsync after each block."
+msgstr "Sử dụng fsync sau mỗi khối."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1324
+msgid "Update log file after every block."
+msgstr "Cập nhật tập tin nhật ký sau mỗi khối."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1325
+msgid "Use only this slot (others will be disabled)."
+msgstr "Chỉ sử dụng khe này (những cái khác sẽ bị tắt đi)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1328
+msgid "Reduce data device size (move data offset). DANGEROUS!"
+msgstr "Giảm kích thước dữ liệu thiết bị (di chuyển offset dữ liệu). NGUY HIỂM!"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1329
+msgid "Use only specified device size (ignore rest of device). DANGEROUS!"
+msgstr "Chỉ sử dụng kích thước dữ liệu thiết bị (bỏ qua phần còn lại của thiết bị). NGUY HIỂM!"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1330
+msgid "Create new header on not encrypted device."
+msgstr "Tạo phần đầu mới không trên thiết bị được mã hóa."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1331
+msgid "Permanently decrypt device (remove encryption)."
+msgstr "Thiết bị mã hóa cố định (gỡ bỏ mã hóa)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1332
+msgid "The uuid used to resume decryption."
+msgstr "uuid được dùng để khôi phục việc giải mã."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1348
+msgid "[OPTION...] <device>"
+msgstr "[TÙY_CHỌN…] <thiết-bị>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1362
+#, c-format
+msgid "Reencryption will change: volume key%s%s%s%s.\n"
+msgstr "Reencryption sẽ thay đổi: khóa dung lượng%s%s%s%s.\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1363
+msgid ", set hash to "
+msgstr ", đặt kiểu băm thành "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1364
+msgid ", set cipher to "
+msgstr ", đặt kiểu mã hóa thành "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1368
+msgid "Argument required."
+msgstr "Cần đối số."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1384
+msgid "Only values between 1 MiB and 64 MiB allowed for reencryption block size."
+msgstr "Chỉ những giá trị nằm giữa 1MiB và 64 MiB là cho phép đối với kích thước khối reencryption (mã hóa lại)."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1403 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1408
+msgid "Invalid device size specification."
+msgstr "Đặc tả kích thước thiết bị không đúng."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1411
+msgid "Maximum device reduce size is 64 MiB."
+msgstr "Kích thước thu nhỏ thiết bị tối đa là 64 MiB."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1414
+msgid "Reduce size must be multiple of 512 bytes sector."
+msgstr "Kích cỡ giảm phải là bội số cung từ (sector) 512 byte"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1418
+msgid "Option --new must be used together with --reduce-device-size."
+msgstr "Tùy chọn “--new” phải được sử dụng cùng với “--reduce-device-size”."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1422
+msgid "Option --keep-key can be used only with --hash or --iter-time."
+msgstr "Tùy chọn “--keep-key” có thể dùng với “--hash” hoặc “--iter-time”."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1426
+msgid "Option --new cannot be used together with --decrypt."
+msgstr "Tùy chọn “--new” không được sử dụng cùng với “ --decrypt”."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1430
+msgid "Option --decrypt is incompatible with specified parameters."
+msgstr "Tùy chọn --decrypt không tương thích với các đối số đã cho."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1434
+msgid "Option --uuid is allowed only together with --decrypt."
+msgstr "Tùy chọn “--uuid” chỉ được sử dụng cùng với “ --decrypt”."
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:151
+msgid "Error reading response from terminal.\n"
+msgstr "Gặp lỗi khi đọc phản hồi từ thiết bị cuối.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:173
+msgid "Command successful.\n"
+msgstr "Câu lệnh đã chạy thành công.\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:191
+#, c-format
+msgid "Command failed with code %i"
+msgstr "Câu lệnh đã thất bại với mã %i"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:42 src/utils_password.c:74
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot check password quality: %s\n"
+msgstr "Không thể kiểm tra chất lượng mật khẩu: %s\n"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:50
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Password quality check failed:\n"
+" %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Chất lượng mật khẩu không đạt:\n"
+" %s\n"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:82
+#, c-format
+msgid "Password quality check failed: Bad passphrase (%s)\n"
+msgstr "Gặp lỗi khi kiểm tra chất lượng mật khẩu: mật khẩu sai (%s)\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot find a free loopback device.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Không tìm thấy thiết bị vòng ngược (loopback) nào còn rảnh.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot open device %s\n"
+#~ msgstr "Không thể mở thiết bị %s\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot use passed UUID unless decryption in progress.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Không thể dùng UUID chuyển qua trừ khi việc giải mã đang được thực hiện.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Marking LUKS device %s usable.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Đánh dấu thiết bị LUKS %s là có thể dùng.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "WARNING: this is experimental code, it can completely break your data.\n"
+#~ msgstr "CẢNH BÁO: đây chỉ là mã thử nghiệm, nó có thể phá hoại dữ liệu của bạn.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "FIPS checksum verification failed.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Thẩm tra mã băm FIPS không đạt.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "WARNING: device %s is a partition, for TCRYPT system encryption you usually need to use whole block device path.\n"
+#~ msgstr "CẢNH BÁO: thiết-bị %s là một phân vùng, với mã hóa hệ thống TCRYPT bạn thường cần phải sử dụng toàn bộ đường dẫn thiết-bị khối.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Kernel doesn't support plain64 IV.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Nhân không hỗ trợ plain64 IV.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Enter LUKS passphrase: "
+#~ msgstr "Gõ cụm từ mật khẩu LUKS: "
+
+#~ msgid "Enter new LUKS passphrase: "
+#~ msgstr "Gõ cụm từ mật khẩu LUKS: "
+
+#~ msgid "Enter any LUKS passphrase: "
+#~ msgstr "Nhập mật khẩu LUKS vào: "
+
+#~ msgid "Failed to obtain device mapper directory."
+#~ msgstr "Lỗi lấy thư mục trình ánh xạ thiết bị."
+
+#~ msgid "Backup file %s doesn't exist.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Tập tin sao lưu %s không tồn tại.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot open file %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Không thể mở tập tin %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "<name> <device>"
+#~ msgstr "<tên> <thiết_bị>"
+
+#~ msgid "create device"
+#~ msgstr "tạo thiết bị"
+
+#~ msgid "remove device"
+#~ msgstr "gỡ bỏ thiết bị"
+
+#~ msgid "remove LUKS mapping"
+#~ msgstr "gỡ bỏ sự ánh xạ LUKS"
+
+#~ msgid "open loop-AES device as mapping <name>"
+#~ msgstr "mở thiết bị loop-AES như là ánh xạ <tên>"
+
+#~ msgid "remove loop-AES mapping"
+#~ msgstr "gỡ bỏ ánh xạ loop-AES"
+
+#~ msgid "Option --allow-discards is allowed only for luksOpen, loopaesOpen and create operation.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Tùy chọn “--allow-discards” thì chỉ cho phép với thao tác “luksOpen”, “loopaesOpen” và tạo (create).\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot open device %s for %s%s access.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Không thể mở thiết bị %s cho truy cập %s%s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "exclusive "
+#~ msgstr "dành riêng "
+
+#~ msgid "writable"
+#~ msgstr "ghi được"
+
+#~ msgid "read-only"
+#~ msgstr "chỉ đọc"
+
+#~ msgid "WARNING!!! Possibly insecure memory. Are you root?\n"
+#~ msgstr "CẢNH BÁO!!! Có thể là vùng nhớ không an toàn. Bạn có đang chạy dưới quyền siêu người dùng (root) không?\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Unable to obtain sector size for %s"
+#~ msgstr "Không thể lấy kích cỡ cung từ cho %s"
+
+#~ msgid "Failed to write to key storage.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Lỗi ghi khóa vào kho lưu khóa.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Failed to read from key storage.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Lỗi đọc từ kho lưu khóa.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot use device %s (crypt segments overlaps or in use by another device).\n"
+#~ msgstr "Không thể sử dụng thiết bị %s (các đoạn crypt chồng lên nhau hay đang sử dụng bởi thiết bị khác).\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot find compatible device-mapper kernel modules.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Không tìm thấy mô-đun hạt nhân ánh xạ thiết bị tương thích.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Key slot %d verified.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Khe khóa %d được thẩm định.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Invalid key size %d.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Kích cỡ khóa không đúng %d.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Warning: exhausting read requested, but key file %s is not a regular file, function might never return.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Cảnh báo: yêu cầu một hàm đọc vét kiệt mà tập tin khóa %s không phải là một tập tin thông thường thì có thể là hàm chưa bao giờ trả lại.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot open device: %s\n"
+#~ msgstr "Không thể mở thiết bị: %s\n"
+
+#~ msgid "BLKROGET failed on device %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "BLKROGET bị lỗi trên thiết bị %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "BLKGETSIZE failed on device %s.\n"
+#~ msgstr "BLKGETSIZE bị lỗi trên thiết bị %s.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "identical to luksKillSlot - DEPRECATED - see man page"
+#~ msgstr "trùng với luksKillSlot - BỊ PHẢN ĐỐI - xem trang hướng dẫn"
+
+#~ msgid "modify active device - DEPRECATED - see man page"
+#~ msgstr "sửa đổi thiết bị hoạt động - BỊ PHẢN ĐỐI - xem trang hướng dẫn"
+
+#~ msgid ""
+#~ "The reload action is deprecated. Please use`dmsetup reload' in case you really need this functionality.\n"
+#~ "WARNING: do not use reload to touch LUKS devices. If that is the case, hit Ctrl-C now.\n"
+#~ msgstr ""
+#~ "Thao tác nạp lại bị phản đối. Hãy sử dụng“dmsetup reload” trong trường hợp bạn thực sự yêu cầu chức năng này.\n"
+#~ "CẢNH BÁO: đừng sử dụng chức năng nạp lại để thao tác thiết bị kiểu LUKS. Trong trường hợp đó, bấm tổ hợp phím Ctrl-C ngay bây giờ.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Obsolete option --non-exclusive is ignored.\n"
+#~ msgstr "Tùy chọn cũ“--non-exclusive” bị bỏ qua.\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Read the key from a file (can be /dev/random)"
+#~ msgstr "Đọc khóa từ một tập tin nào đó (có thể là“/dev/random”)"
+
+#~ msgid "(Obsoleted, see man page.)"
+#~ msgstr "(Bị phản đối, xem trang hướng dẫn.)"
diff --git a/po/zh_CN.po b/po/zh_CN.po
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5ab96fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/po/zh_CN.po
@@ -0,0 +1,3075 @@
+# Chinese simplified translation for cryptsetup.
+# Copyright (C) 2015 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+# This file is distributed under the same license as the cryptsetup package.
+# Mingcong Bai <jeffbai@aosc.xyz>, 2015.
+# Mingye Wang <arthur200126@gmail.com>, 2015.
+# Boyuan Yang <073plan@gmail.com>, 2018.
+#
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: cryptsetup 2.0.3.1\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: dm-crypt@saout.de\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2018-04-26 22:11+0200\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2018-04-27 22:41+0800\n"
+"Last-Translator: Boyuan Yang <073plan@gmail.com>\n"
+"Language-Team: Chinese (simplified) <i18n-zh@googlegroups.com>\n"
+"Language: zh_CN\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+"X-Bugs: Report translation errors to the Language-Team address.\n"
+"X-Generator: Poedit 2.0.6\n"
+"Plural-Forms: nplurals=1; plural=0;\n"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:331
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper, running as non-root user."
+msgstr "无法初始化设备映射器，正作为非 root 用户运行。"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:334
+msgid "Cannot initialize device-mapper. Is dm_mod kernel module loaded?"
+msgstr "无法初始化设备映射器。dm_mod 内核模块装载了吗？"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:938
+msgid "Requested deferred flag is not supported."
+msgstr "不支持请求的推迟（deferred）标记。"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1003
+#, c-format
+msgid "DM-UUID for device %s was truncated."
+msgstr "设备 %s 的 DM-UUID 被截断。"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1223
+msgid "Requested dm-crypt performance options are not supported."
+msgstr "不支持请求的 dm-crypt 性能选项。"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1230
+msgid "Requested dm-verity data corruption handling options are not supported."
+msgstr "不支持请求的 dm-verity 数据损坏处理选项。"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1234
+msgid "Requested dm-verity FEC options are not supported."
+msgstr "不支持请求的 dm-verity FEC 选项。"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1238
+msgid "Requested data integrity options are not supported."
+msgstr "不支持请求的数据完整性选项。"
+
+#: lib/libdevmapper.c:1240
+msgid "Requested sector_size option is not supported."
+msgstr "不支持请求的 sector_size 选项。"
+
+#: lib/random.c:80
+msgid ""
+"System is out of entropy while generating volume key.\n"
+"Please move mouse or type some text in another window to gather some random events.\n"
+msgstr ""
+"系统在生成卷密钥时熵不足。\n"
+"请随意移动鼠标或是在别的窗口打字，以便生成随机事件让系统使用。\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:84
+#, c-format
+msgid "Generating key (%d%% done).\n"
+msgstr "正生成密钥（%d%% 已完成）\n"
+
+#: lib/random.c:170
+msgid "Running in FIPS mode."
+msgstr "在 FIPS 模式下运行。"
+
+#: lib/random.c:176
+msgid "Fatal error during RNG initialisation."
+msgstr "随机数生成器初始化时发生致命错误。"
+
+#: lib/random.c:213
+msgid "Unknown RNG quality requested."
+msgstr "未知的随机数生成器质量请求。"
+
+#: lib/random.c:218
+msgid "Error reading from RNG."
+msgstr "从随机数生成器（RNG）读取时出错。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:203
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto RNG backend."
+msgstr "无法初始化加密随机数生成器后端。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:209
+msgid "Cannot initialize crypto backend."
+msgstr "无法初始化加密后端。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:240 lib/setup.c:1766 lib/verity/verity.c:123
+#, c-format
+msgid "Hash algorithm %s not supported."
+msgstr "不支持哈希算法 %s。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:243 lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:90
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key processing error (using hash %s)."
+msgstr "密钥处理错误（使用散列 %s）。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:304 lib/setup.c:331
+msgid "Cannot determine device type. Incompatible activation of device?"
+msgstr "无法确定设备类型。不兼容的设备激活？"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:310 lib/setup.c:2326
+msgid "This operation is supported only for LUKS device."
+msgstr "此操作只适用 LUKS 设备。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:337
+msgid "This operation is supported only for LUKS2 device."
+msgstr "此操作只适用 LUKS2 设备。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:382
+msgid "All key slots full."
+msgstr "密钥槽全都满了。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:393
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select between 0 and %d."
+msgstr "密钥槽 %d 无效，请选择 0 到 %d 间的数字。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:399
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is full, please select another one."
+msgstr "密钥槽 %d 满了，请选择另一个。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:597
+#, c-format
+msgid "Header detected but device %s is too small."
+msgstr "检测到标头但设备 %s 太小。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:616
+msgid "This operation is not supported for this device type."
+msgstr "不支持在这类设备上执行此操作。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1239 lib/setup.c:2066 lib/setup.c:3300
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not active."
+msgstr "设备 %s 未激活。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1256
+#, c-format
+msgid "Underlying device for crypt device %s disappeared."
+msgstr "加密设备 %s 下层的设备消失了。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1336
+msgid "Invalid plain crypt parameters."
+msgstr "无效的纯加密选项。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1341 lib/setup.c:1680 src/integritysetup.c:68
+msgid "Invalid key size."
+msgstr "无效的密钥大小。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1346 lib/setup.c:1685 lib/setup.c:1876
+msgid "UUID is not supported for this crypt type."
+msgstr "此加密类型不支持 UUID。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1356 lib/setup.c:1500 src/cryptsetup.c:950
+msgid "Unsupported encryption sector size."
+msgstr "不支持的加密扇区大小。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1402 lib/setup.c:1494
+msgid "Can't format LUKS without device."
+msgstr "无法在没有设备的情况下格式化 LUKS。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1464 lib/setup.c:1617 lib/setup.c:1888
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe header on device %s."
+msgstr "无法将设备 %s 上的标头擦除。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1523
+msgid "Volume key is too small for encryption with integrity extensions."
+msgstr "卷密钥对于带完整性校验扩展的加密而言过小。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1530 lib/utils_device.c:599
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s which is in use (already mapped or mounted)."
+msgstr "无法使用正被使用的设备 %s（已被映射或挂载）。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1610
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s which is still in use."
+msgstr "无法格式化正在使用的设备 %s。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1613 lib/setup.c:1648
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "无法格式化设备 %s，权限被拒绝。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1625 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:863
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1141 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:429
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:40 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:69
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to acquire write lock on device %s."
+msgstr "无法获取设备 %s 上的写入锁。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1633 lib/setup.c:1940
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "Cannot write device %s.\n"
+msgid "Cannot format integrity for device %s."
+msgstr "无法写入设备 %s。\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1645
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s in use."
+msgstr "无法格式化正在使用的设备 %s。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1652
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot format device %s."
+msgstr "无法格式化设备 %s。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1675
+msgid "Can't format LOOPAES without device."
+msgstr "无法在没有设备的情况下格式化 LOOPAES。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1715
+msgid "Can't format VERITY without device."
+msgstr "无法在没有设备的情况下格式化 VERIFY。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1723 lib/verity/verity.c:106
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash type %d."
+msgstr "不支持的 VERITY 哈希类型 %d。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1729 lib/verity/verity.c:114
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY block size."
+msgstr "不支持的 VERITY 块大小。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1734 lib/verity/verity.c:75
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY hash offset."
+msgstr "不支持的 VERITY 哈希偏移量。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1739
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY FEC offset."
+msgstr "不支持的 VERITY 哈希偏移量。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1760
+msgid "Data area overlaps with hash area."
+msgstr "数据区域重叠覆盖了哈希区域。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1785
+msgid "Hash area overlaps with FEC area."
+msgstr "哈希区域重叠覆盖了 FEC 区域。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1792
+msgid "Data area overlaps with FEC area."
+msgstr "数据区域重叠覆盖了 FEC 区域。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:1997
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unknown crypt device type %s requested."
+msgstr "请求了未知的加密设备类型 %s。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2098
+msgid "Cannot resize loop device."
+msgstr "无法改变回环设备大小。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2107
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s size is not aligned to requested sector size (%u bytes)."
+msgstr "设备 %s 的大小没有和请求的扇区大小对齐（%u 字节）。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2161
+msgid "Do you really want to change UUID of device?"
+msgstr "你真的想改变设备的 UUID 吗？"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2237
+msgid "Header backup file does not contain compatible LUKS header."
+msgstr "标头备份文件不包含兼容的 LUKS 标头。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2334
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not active."
+msgstr "卷 %s 未激活。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2345
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is already suspended."
+msgstr "卷 %s 已挂起。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2359
+#, c-format
+msgid "Suspend is not supported for device %s."
+msgstr "设备 %s 不支持挂起。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2361
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during suspending device %s."
+msgstr "挂起设备 %s 时出错。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2394 lib/setup.c:2461
+#, c-format
+msgid "Volume %s is not suspended."
+msgstr "卷 %s 未挂起。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2423
+#, c-format
+msgid "Resume is not supported for device %s."
+msgstr "设备 %s 不支持恢复。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2425 lib/setup.c:2493
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during resuming device %s."
+msgstr "恢复设备 %s 时出错。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2561 lib/setup.c:2754
+msgid "Cannot add key slot, all slots disabled and no volume key provided."
+msgstr "无法添加密钥槽，所有密钥槽已禁用且未提供卷密钥。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2698
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d changed."
+msgstr "密钥槽 %d 已改变。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2701
+#, c-format
+msgid "Replaced with key slot %d."
+msgstr "替换为密钥槽 %d。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2706
+msgid "Failed to swap new key slot."
+msgstr "交换新密钥槽失败。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2871 lib/setup.c:3145 lib/setup.c:3158 lib/setup.c:3166
+#: lib/setup.c:3179 lib/setup.c:3453 lib/setup.c:4370
+msgid "Volume key does not match the volume."
+msgstr "卷密钥与卷不匹配。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2892
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid."
+msgstr "密钥槽 %d 无效。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2898
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d is not used."
+msgstr "密钥槽 %d 未使用。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:2968 lib/setup.c:3232
+msgid "Device type is not properly initialised."
+msgstr "设备类型未正确初始化。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3010
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s, name is invalid or still in use."
+msgstr "无法使用设备 %s，名称无效或它正被使用。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3013
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s already exists."
+msgstr "设备 %s 已存在。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3132
+msgid "Incorrect volume key specified for plain device."
+msgstr "为普通设备指定的卷密钥有误。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3198
+msgid "Incorrect root hash specified for verity device."
+msgstr "为 verity 设备指定的根 hash 不正确。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3274 lib/setup.c:3289
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is still in use."
+msgstr "设备 %s 仍在使用。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3304
+#, c-format
+msgid "Invalid device %s."
+msgstr "设备 %s 无效。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3389
+msgid "Function not available in FIPS mode."
+msgstr "功能在 FIPS 模式无效。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3403
+msgid "Volume key buffer too small."
+msgstr "卷密钥缓冲区太小。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3411
+msgid "Cannot retrieve volume key for plain device."
+msgstr "无法获取普通设备的卷密钥。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3422
+#, c-format
+msgid "This operation is not supported for %s crypt device."
+msgstr "不支持在 %s 加密设备上执行此操作。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:3609
+msgid "Dump operation is not supported for this device type."
+msgstr "不支持在此类设备上执行导出操作。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4018
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot convert device %s which is still in use."
+msgstr "无法转换正在使用的设备 %s。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4301
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to assign keyslot %u as the new volume key."
+msgstr "将密钥槽 %u 指定为新卷密钥的操作失败。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4364
+msgid "Failed to initialise default LUKS2 keyslot parameters."
+msgstr "初始化默认 LUKS2 密钥槽参数失败。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4376
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "Failed to swap new key slot.\n"
+msgid "Failed to assign keyslot %d to digest."
+msgstr "交换新密钥槽失败。\n"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4460
+msgid "Failed to load key in kernel keyring."
+msgstr "在内核密钥环中加载密钥失败。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4515
+msgid "Kernel keyring is not supported by the kernel."
+msgstr "该内核不支持内核密钥环。"
+
+#: lib/setup.c:4525
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to read passphrase from keyring (error %d)."
+msgstr "从密钥环读取口令失败（错误 %d）。"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:81
+msgid "Cannot get process priority."
+msgstr "无法获取进程优先级。"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:95
+msgid "Cannot unlock memory."
+msgstr "无法解锁内存。"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:169 lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:475
+msgid "Failed to open key file."
+msgstr "打开 (open) 密钥文件失败。"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:174
+msgid "Cannot read keyfile from a terminal."
+msgstr "无法从终端读取密钥文件。"
+
+# stat() 主要就是出来一个各种文件信息……
+#: lib/utils.c:191
+msgid "Failed to stat key file."
+msgstr "获取 (stat) 密钥文件信息失败。"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:199 lib/utils.c:220
+msgid "Cannot seek to requested keyfile offset."
+msgstr "无法寻找 (seek) 到请求的密钥文件偏移量。"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:214 lib/utils.c:229 src/utils_password.c:207
+#: src/utils_password.c:220
+msgid "Out of memory while reading passphrase."
+msgstr "读取密码时内存耗尽。"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:249
+msgid "Error reading passphrase."
+msgstr "读取口令出错。"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:273
+msgid "Maximum keyfile size exceeded."
+msgstr "超出最大密钥文件大小。"
+
+#: lib/utils.c:278
+msgid "Cannot read requested amount of data."
+msgstr "无法读取请求量的数据。"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:184 lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:101
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s doesn't exist or access denied."
+msgstr "设备 %s 不存在或访问被拒绝。"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:603
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "无法使用设备 %s，权限被拒绝。"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:606
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot get info about device %s."
+msgstr "无法获取有关设备 %s 的信息。"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:628
+msgid "Cannot use a loopback device, running as non-root user."
+msgstr "无法使用回环设备，正作为非 root 用户运行。"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:638
+msgid "Attaching loopback device failed (loop device with autoclear flag is required)."
+msgstr "连接回环设备失败（需要有 autoclear 旗标的回环设备）。"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:684
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested offset is beyond real size of device %s."
+msgstr "请求的偏移量超出设备 %s 的真实大小。"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:692
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s has zero size."
+msgstr "设备 %s 大小为零。"
+
+#: lib/utils_device.c:703
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small."
+msgstr "设备 %s 太小。"
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:74
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unknown PBKDF type %s."
+msgstr "未知的 PBKDF 类型 %s。"
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:85
+msgid "Requested PBKDF type is not supported for LUKS1."
+msgstr "请求的 PBKDF 类型不被 LUKS1 支持。"
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:91
+msgid "PBKDF max memory or parallel threads must not be set with pbkdf2."
+msgstr ""
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:96 lib/utils_pbkdf.c:106
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forced iteration count is too low for %s (minimum is %u)."
+msgstr ""
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:111
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forced memory cost is too low for %s (minimum is %u kilobytes)."
+msgstr ""
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:118
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested maximum PBKDF memory cost is too high (maximum is %d kilobytes)."
+msgstr "请求的最大 PBKDF 内存开销过大（最大为 %d 千字节）。"
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:123
+msgid "Requested maximum PBKDF memory can not be zero."
+msgstr "请求的最大 PBKDF 内存使用量不能为零。"
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:127
+msgid "Requested PBKDF parallel threads can not be zero."
+msgstr "请求的 PBKDF 并行线程数不能为零。"
+
+#: lib/utils_pbkdf.c:131
+msgid "Requested PBKDF target time can not be zero."
+msgstr "请求的 PBKDF 目标时间不能为零。"
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:304
+msgid "PBKDF benchmark disabled but iterations not set."
+msgstr ""
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:326
+#, c-format
+msgid "Not compatible PBKDF2 options (using hash algorithm %s)."
+msgstr "PBKDF2 选项不兼容（正在使用哈希算法 %s）。"
+
+#: lib/utils_benchmark.c:340
+msgid "Not compatible PBKDF options."
+msgstr "PBKDF2 选项不兼容。"
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:80
+#, c-format
+msgid "Locking aborted. The locking path %s/%s is unusable (not a directory or missing)."
+msgstr "锁定中止。锁定路径 %s/%s 不可用（不是一个目录或缺失）。"
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:87
+#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: Locking directory %s/%s is missing!\n"
+msgstr "警告：锁定目录 %s/%s 缺失！\n"
+
+#: lib/utils_device_locking.c:97
+#, c-format
+msgid "Locking aborted. The locking path %s/%s is unusable (%s is not a directory)."
+msgstr "锁定中止。锁定路径 %s/%s 不可用（%s 不是目录）。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:39
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Failed to setup dm-crypt key mapping for device %s.\n"
+"Check that kernel supports %s cipher (check syslog for more info)."
+msgstr ""
+"为设备 %s 配置 dm-crypt 键映射失败。\n"
+"请确认内核支持 %s 加密（查看系统日志 (syslog) 以获取更多信息）。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:44
+msgid "Key size in XTS mode must be 256 or 512 bits."
+msgstr "XTS 模式的密钥大小必须是 256 或 512 位。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:46
+msgid "Cipher specification should be in [cipher]-[mode]-[iv] format."
+msgstr ""
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:107 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:362
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:658 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1094
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1149 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:446
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write to device %s, permission denied."
+msgstr "无法写入到设备 %s，访问被拒绝。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:122
+msgid "Failed to open temporary keystore device."
+msgstr "打开临时密钥存储设备失败。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:129
+msgid "Failed to access temporary keystore device."
+msgstr "访问临时密钥存储设备失败。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:199 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:89
+msgid "IO error while encrypting keyslot."
+msgstr "加密密钥槽时发生输入输出错误。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keyencryption.c:261 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:150
+msgid "IO error while decrypting keyslot."
+msgstr "解密密钥槽时发生输入输出错误。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:128
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small. (LUKS1 requires at least %<PRIu64> bytes.)"
+msgstr "设备 %s 过小。（LUKS1 需要至少 %<PRIu64> 字节。）"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:149 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:157
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:169 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:180
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:192
+#, c-format
+msgid "LUKS keyslot %u is invalid."
+msgstr "LUKS 密钥槽 %u 无效。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:245 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:494
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:983 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1396
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."
+msgstr "%s 不是有效的 LUKS 设备。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:264 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1002
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested header backup file %s already exists."
+msgstr "请求的标头备份文件 %s 已存在。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:266 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1004
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create header backup file %s."
+msgstr "无法创建标头备份文件 %s。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:271 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1009
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write header backup file %s."
+msgstr "无法写入标头备份文件 %s。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:304 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1058
+msgid "Backup file doesn't contain valid LUKS header."
+msgstr "备份文件不包含有效 LUKS 标头。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:317 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:571
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1079
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open header backup file %s."
+msgstr "无法打开备份标头文件 %s。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:323 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1085
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read header backup file %s."
+msgstr "无法读取标头备份文件 %s。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:335
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Data offset or key size differs on device and backup, restore failed.\n"
+msgid "Data offset or key size differs on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "源设备和备份上的数据偏移或密钥大小不符，恢复失败。\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:343
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s %s%s"
+msgstr "设备 %s %s%s"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:344
+msgid "does not contain LUKS header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device."
+msgstr "不包含 LUKS 标头。替换标头可能损毁设备上的数据。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:345
+msgid "already contains LUKS header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."
+msgstr "已包含 LUKS 标头。替换标头将损毁已存在的密钥槽。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:346 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1121
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: real device header has different UUID than backup!"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"警告: 真实设备标头 UUID 和备份不符！"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:365 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:610
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:661 lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:640 lib/verity/verity.c:81
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:182 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:308
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:319 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:339
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:241 lib/verity/verity_fec.c:253
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:258 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1152
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:207
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open device %s."
+msgstr "无法打开设备 %s。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:396
+msgid "Non standard key size, manual repair required."
+msgstr "不标准的密钥大小，需要手动修复。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:401
+msgid "Non standard keyslots alignment, manual repair required."
+msgstr "不标准的密钥槽对齐，需要手动修复。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:411
+msgid "Repairing keyslots."
+msgstr "正在修复密钥槽。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:431
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: offset repaired (%u -> %u)."
+msgstr "密钥槽 %i: 偏移已修复 (%u -> %u)。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:439
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: stripes repaired (%u -> %u)."
+msgstr "密钥槽 %i：已修复条带（%u -> %u）。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:448
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: bogus partition signature."
+msgstr "密钥槽 %i：虚假的分区签名。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:453
+#, c-format
+msgid "Keyslot %i: salt wiped."
+msgstr "密钥槽 %i: 已清除盐。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:470
+msgid "Writing LUKS header to disk."
+msgstr "正在将 LUKS 标头写入磁盘。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:475
+msgid "Repair failed."
+msgstr "修复失败。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:497
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported LUKS version %d."
+msgstr "不支持的 LUKS 版本 %d。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:503 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:749
+#, c-format
+msgid "Requested LUKS hash %s is not supported."
+msgstr "不支持请求的 LUKS 哈希 %s。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:531 src/cryptsetup.c:869
+msgid "No known problems detected for LUKS header."
+msgstr "未在 LUKS 标头发现已知问题。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:683
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error during update of LUKS header on device %s."
+msgstr "更新设备 %s 上的 LUKS 标头时出错。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:690
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error re-reading LUKS header after update on device %s."
+msgstr "在更新设备 %s 后重新读取 LUKS 标头失败。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:742
+#, c-format
+msgid "Data offset for detached LUKS header must be either 0 or higher than header size (%d sectors)."
+msgstr "分离的 LUKS 标头的数据偏移量必须为零或高于标头大小（%d 扇区）。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:754 lib/luks1/keymanage.c:840
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:145 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:894
+msgid "Wrong LUKS UUID format provided."
+msgstr "提供了错误的 LUKS UUID 格式。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:779
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: reading random salt failed."
+msgstr "无法创建 LUKS 标头：读取随机盐失败。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:800
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create LUKS header: header digest failed (using hash %s)."
+msgstr "无法创建 LUKS 标头：标头摘要失败（正在使用哈希 %s）。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:863
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d active, purge first."
+msgstr "密钥槽 %d 已激活，请先清除。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:869
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "Key slot %d material includes too few stripes. Header manipulation?\n"
+msgid "Key slot %d material includes too few stripes. Header manipulation?"
+msgstr "密钥槽 %d 条带数过少。标头修改？\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1028
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d unlocked."
+msgstr "密钥槽 %d 已解锁。"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1080
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select keyslot between 0 and %d.\n"
+msgid "Key slot %d is invalid, please select keyslot between 0 and %d."
+msgstr "密钥槽 %d 无效，请选择标号 0 到 %d 间的密钥槽。\n"
+
+#: lib/luks1/keymanage.c:1098 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c:450
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot wipe device %s."
+msgstr "无法擦除设备 %s。"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:146
+msgid "Detected not yet supported GPG encrypted keyfile.\n"
+msgstr "探测到未支持的 GPG 加密密钥文件。\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:147
+msgid "Please use gpg --decrypt <KEYFILE> | cryptsetup --keyfile=- ...\n"
+msgstr "请使用 gpg --decrypt <密钥文件> | cryptsetup --keyfile=- ...\n"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:168 lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:188
+msgid "Incompatible loop-AES keyfile detected."
+msgstr "探测到不兼容的 loop-AES 密钥文件。"
+
+#: lib/loopaes/loopaes.c:246
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Kernel doesn't support loop-AES compatible mapping.\n"
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support loop-AES compatible mapping."
+msgstr "内核不支持 loop-AES 兼容映射。\n"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:482
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error reading keyfile %s."
+msgstr "读取密钥文件 %s 出错。"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:522
+#, c-format
+msgid "Maximum TCRYPT passphrase length (%d) exceeded."
+msgstr "超出 TCRYPT 口令最大长度限制 (%d)。"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:563
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2 hash algorithm %s not available, skipping."
+msgstr "PBKDF2 哈希算法 %s 不可用，将跳过。"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:581 src/cryptsetup.c:820
+msgid "Required kernel crypto interface not available."
+msgstr "无法找到所需的内核加密接口。"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:583 src/cryptsetup.c:822
+msgid "Ensure you have algif_skcipher kernel module loaded."
+msgstr "请确定您已载入内核模块 algif_skcipher。"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:729
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activation is not supported for %d sector size."
+msgstr "扇区大小为 %d 时不支持激活。"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:735
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support activation for this TCRYPT legacy mode."
+msgstr "内核不支持激活此处的旧 TCRYPT 模式。"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:769
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activating TCRYPT system encryption for partition %s."
+msgstr "正在为分区 %s 激活 TCRYPT 系统加密。"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:837
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support TCRYPT compatible mapping."
+msgstr "内核不支持 TCRYPT 兼容映射。"
+
+#: lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c:1052
+msgid "This function is not supported without TCRYPT header load."
+msgstr "未载入 TCRYPT 标头时不支持此功能。"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:69 lib/verity/verity.c:175
+#, c-format
+msgid "Verity device %s doesn't use on-disk header."
+msgstr "Verity 设备 %s 未使用磁盘上的标头。"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:94
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is not a valid VERITY device."
+msgstr "%s 不是有效的 VERITY 设备。"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:101
+#, c-format
+msgid "Unsupported VERITY version %d."
+msgstr "不支持的 VERITY 版本 %d。"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:132
+msgid "VERITY header corrupted."
+msgstr "VERITY 标头损坏。"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:169
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "Wrong VERITY UUID format provided on device %s.\n"
+msgid "Wrong VERITY UUID format provided on device %s."
+msgstr "为设备 %s 提供的 VERITY UUID 错误。\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:202
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "Error during update of verity header on device %s.\n"
+msgid "Error during update of verity header on device %s."
+msgstr "更新设备 %s 上的 VERITY 标头时出错。\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:259
+msgid "Errors cannot be repaired with FEC device."
+msgstr ""
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:261
+#, c-format
+msgid "Found %u repairable errors with FEC device."
+msgstr ""
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:305
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support dm-verity mapping."
+msgstr "内核不支持 dm-verity 映射。"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity.c:316
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Verity device detected corruption after activation.\n"
+msgid "Verity device detected corruption after activation."
+msgstr "在 VERITY 设备激活后探测到损坏。\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:59
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "Spare area is not zeroed at position %<PRIu64>.\n"
+msgid "Spare area is not zeroed at position %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "备用区位置 %<PRIu64> 未清零。\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:160 lib/verity/verity_hash.c:287
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:300
+msgid "Device offset overflow."
+msgstr "设备偏移量溢出。"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:200
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "Verification failed at position %<PRIu64>.\n"
+msgid "Verification failed at position %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "在 %<PRIu64> 上发生检验错误。\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:273
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Invalid size parameters for verity device.\n"
+msgid "Invalid size parameters for verity device."
+msgstr "为 VERITY 设备提供的大小指标无效。\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:293
+msgid "Hash area overflow."
+msgstr "哈希区域溢出。"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:370
+msgid "Verification of data area failed."
+msgstr "数据区检验失败。"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:375
+msgid "Verification of root hash failed."
+msgstr "根哈希值检验失败。"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:381
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Input/output error while creating hash area.\n"
+msgid "Input/output error while creating hash area."
+msgstr "创建哈希数据区时发生输入/输出错误。\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:383
+msgid "Creation of hash area failed."
+msgstr "创建哈希区失败。"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_hash.c:430
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "WARNING: Kernel cannot activate device if data block size exceeds page size (%u).\n"
+msgid "WARNING: Kernel cannot activate device if data block size exceeds page size (%u)."
+msgstr "警告：如数据块大小超过内存分页大小，内核将无法激活设备 (%u)。\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:132
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Failed to open key file.\n"
+msgid "Failed to allocate RS context."
+msgstr "打开 (open) 密钥文件失败。\n"
+
+# stat() 主要就是出来一个各种文件信息……
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:147
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Failed to stat key file.\n"
+msgid "Failed to allocate buffer."
+msgstr "获取 (stat) 密钥文件统计数据失败。\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:157
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "Failed to access temporary keystore device.\n"
+msgid "Failed to read RS block %<PRIu64> byte %d."
+msgstr "无法访问临时密钥存储设备。\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:170
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "Failed to access temporary keystore device.\n"
+msgid "Failed to read parity for RS block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "无法访问临时密钥存储设备。\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:177
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "Failed to access temporary keystore device.\n"
+msgid "Failed to repair parity for block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "无法访问临时密钥存储设备。\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:188
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "Failed to access temporary keystore device.\n"
+msgid "Failed to write parity for RS block %<PRIu64>."
+msgstr "无法访问临时密钥存储设备。\n"
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:223
+msgid "Block sizes must match for FEC."
+msgstr ""
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:229
+msgid "Invalid number of parity bytes."
+msgstr ""
+
+#: lib/verity/verity_fec.c:265
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "Failed to open temporary keystore device.\n"
+msgid "Failed to determine size for device %s."
+msgstr "打开临时密钥存储设备失败。\n"
+
+#: lib/integrity/integrity.c:219 lib/integrity/integrity.c:270
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Kernel doesn't support dm-verity mapping.\n"
+msgid "Kernel doesn't support dm-integrity mapping."
+msgstr "内核不支持 dm-verity 映射。\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:364
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is too small. (LUKS2 requires at least %<PRIu64> bytes.)"
+msgstr "设备 %s 过小。（LUKS2 需要至少 %<PRIu64> 字节。）"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c:428
+msgid "Failed to acquire write device lock."
+msgstr "无法获取写入设备锁。"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c:99
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Failed to swap new key slot.\n"
+msgid "No space for new keyslot."
+msgstr "交换新密钥槽失败。\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:851 lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:974
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1047 lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:103
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c:126
+#, c-format
+msgid "Failed to acquire read lock on device %s."
+msgstr "无法获取设备 %s 的读取锁。"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1064
+#, c-format
+msgid "Forbidden LUKS2 requirements detected in backup %s."
+msgstr ""
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1105
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Data offset or key size differs on device and backup, restore failed.\n"
+msgid "Data offset differ on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "源设备和备份上的数据偏移或密钥大小不符，恢复失败。\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1111
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Data offset or key size differs on device and backup, restore failed.\n"
+msgid "Binary header with keyslot areas size differ on device and backup, restore failed."
+msgstr "源设备和备份上的数据偏移或密钥大小不符，恢复失败。\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1118
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s %s%s%s%s"
+msgstr "设备 %s %s%s%s%s"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1119
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "does not contain LUKS header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device."
+msgid "does not contain LUKS2 header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device."
+msgstr "不包含 LUKS 标头。替换标头可能损毁设备上的数据。"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1120
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "already contains LUKS header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."
+msgid "already contains LUKS2 header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."
+msgstr "已包含 LUKS 标头。替换标头将损毁已存在的密钥槽。"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1122
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: unknown LUKS2 requirements detected in real device header!\n"
+"Replacing header with backup may corrupt the data on that device!"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1124
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"WARNING: Unfinished offline reencryption detected on the device!\n"
+"Replacing header with backup may corrupt data."
+msgstr ""
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1226
+#, c-format
+msgid "Ignored unknown flag %s."
+msgstr "已忽略未知旗标 %s。"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1923
+msgid "Failed to read LUKS2 requirements."
+msgstr "读取 LUKS2 需求时失败。"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1930
+msgid "Unmet LUKS2 requirements detected."
+msgstr "探测到未满足的 LUKS2 需求。"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c:1938
+msgid "Offline reencryption in progress. Aborting."
+msgstr "正在进行离线重加密。中止。"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:477
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "Cannot check password quality: %s\n"
+msgid "Can not check status of device with uuid: %s."
+msgstr "无法检查密码质量：%s\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:503
+msgid "Unable to convert header with LUKSMETA additional metadata."
+msgstr ""
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:540
+msgid "Unable to move keyslot area. Not enough space."
+msgstr "无法移动密钥槽区域。空间不足。"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:580 lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:846
+msgid "Unable to move keyslot area."
+msgstr "无法移动密钥槽区域。"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:668
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "LUKS keyslot %u is invalid.\n"
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - key slot digests are not LUKS1 compatible."
+msgstr "LUKS 密钥槽 %u 无效。\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:677
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "LUKS keyslot %u is invalid.\n"
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - device uses wrapped key cipher %s."
+msgstr "LUKS 密钥槽 %u 无效。\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:685
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "LUKS keyslot %u is invalid.\n"
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - LUKS2 header contains %u token(s)."
+msgstr "LUKS 密钥槽 %u 无效。\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:699
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "LUKS keyslot %u is invalid.\n"
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - keyslot %u is in invalid state."
+msgstr "LUKS 密钥槽 %u 无效。\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:704
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "LUKS keyslot %u is invalid.\n"
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - slot %u (over maximum slots) is still active."
+msgstr "LUKS 密钥槽 %u 无效。\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c:709
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "LUKS keyslot %u is invalid.\n"
+msgid "Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - keyslot %u is not LUKS1 compatible."
+msgstr "LUKS 密钥槽 %u 无效。\n"
+
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_token.c:266
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Failed to swap new key slot.\n"
+msgid "No free token slot."
+msgstr "交换新密钥槽失败。\n"
+
+# stat() 主要就是出来一个各种文件信息……
+#: lib/luks2/luks2_token.c:274
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "Failed to stat key file.\n"
+msgid "Failed to create builtin token %s."
+msgstr "获取 (stat) 密钥文件统计数据失败。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:132
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Can't do passphrase verification on non-tty inputs.\n"
+msgid "Can't do passphrase verification on non-tty inputs."
+msgstr "无法从非 TTY 输入验证密码。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:185 src/cryptsetup.c:760 src/cryptsetup.c:995
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:743 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:817
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "No known cipher specification pattern detected.\n"
+msgid "No known cipher specification pattern detected."
+msgstr "未探测到已知的密文特征。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:193
+msgid "WARNING: The --hash parameter is being ignored in plain mode with keyfile specified.\n"
+msgstr "警告：在纯文本模式下指定密钥文件时将忽略参数 --hash。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:201
+msgid "WARNING: The --keyfile-size option is being ignored, the read size is the same as the encryption key size.\n"
+msgstr "警告：将忽略参数 --keyfile-size，读取大小应与加密密钥大小一致。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:263
+msgid "Option --key-file is required."
+msgstr "需要选项 --key-file。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:308
+msgid "Enter VeraCrypt PIM: "
+msgstr "输入 VeraCrypt PIM: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:317
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: parse error."
+msgstr "无效的 PIM 值：解析错误。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:320
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: 0."
+msgstr "无效的 PIM 值：0。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:323
+msgid "Invalid PIM value: outside of range."
+msgstr "无效的 PIM 值：超出范围。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:346
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "No device header detected with this passphrase.\n"
+msgid "No device header detected with this passphrase."
+msgstr "未从此密码中探测到设备标头。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:408 src/cryptsetup.c:1587
+msgid ""
+"Header dump with volume key is sensitive information\n"
+"which allows access to encrypted partition without passphrase.\n"
+"This dump should be always stored encrypted on safe place."
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:487
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device %s is still active and scheduled for deferred removal.\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:515
+msgid "Resize of active device requires volume key in keyring but --disable-keyring option is set."
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:638
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "benchmark cipher"
+msgid "Benchmark interrupted."
+msgstr "测试密文"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:659
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2-%-9s     N/A\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:661
+#, c-format
+msgid "PBKDF2-%-9s %7u iterations per second for %zu-bit key\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:675
+#, c-format
+msgid "%-10s N/A\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:677
+#, c-format
+msgid "%-10s %4u iterations, %5u memory, %1u parallel threads (CPUs) for %zu-bit key (requested %u ms time)\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:701
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Result of benchmark is not reliable.\n"
+msgid "Result of benchmark is not reliable."
+msgstr "测试结果不可靠。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:752
+msgid "# Tests are approximate using memory only (no storage IO).\n"
+msgstr "# 测试仅使用内存（无存储 IO）。\n"
+
+#. TRANSLATORS: The string is header of a table and must be exactly (right side) aligned.
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:780 src/cryptsetup.c:804
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "#  Algorithm | Key |  Encryption |  Decryption\n"
+msgid "#     Algorithm |       Key |      Encryption |      Decryption\n"
+msgstr "#  算法      | 密钥 | 加密         | 解密\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:784
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "Cipher %s is not available.\n"
+msgid "Cipher %s is not available."
+msgstr "密文 %s 不可用。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:813
+msgid "N/A"
+msgstr "不可用"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:873
+msgid "Really try to repair LUKS device header?"
+msgstr "确定要尝试修复 LUKS 设备标头吗？"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:874 src/cryptsetup.c:965 src/cryptsetup.c:987
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1560
+msgid "Operation aborted.\n"
+msgstr "操作中止。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:889 src/integritysetup.c:140
+msgid ""
+"Wiping device to initialize integrity checksum.\n"
+"You can interrupt this by pressing CTRL+c (rest of not wiped device will contain invalid checksum).\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:911 src/integritysetup.c:162
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "Cannot open temporary LUKS device.\n"
+msgid "Cannot deactivate temporary device %s."
+msgstr "无法打开临时 LUKS 设备。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:955
+msgid "Integrity option can be used only for LUKS2 format."
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:971
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot create header file %s."
+msgstr "无法创建标头文件 %s。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:982
+#, c-format
+msgid "This will overwrite data on %s irrevocably."
+msgstr "这将覆盖 %s 上的数据，该动作不可取消。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1002 src/integritysetup.c:187 src/integritysetup.c:196
+#: src/integritysetup.c:205 src/integritysetup.c:252 src/integritysetup.c:261
+#: src/integritysetup.c:271
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "No known cipher specification pattern detected.\n"
+msgid "No known integrity specification pattern detected."
+msgstr "未探测到已知的密文特征。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1015
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot use %s as on-disk header."
+msgstr "无法将 %s 作为磁盘上的标头使用。"
+
+# stat() 主要就是出来一个各种文件信息……
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1040 src/cryptsetup.c:1314 src/cryptsetup.c:1373
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1459 src/cryptsetup.c:1510
+msgid "Failed to set pbkdf parameters."
+msgstr "设置 pbkdf 参数失败。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1092
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Reduced data offset is allowed only for detached LUKS header.\n"
+msgid "Reduced data offset is allowed only for detached LUKS header."
+msgstr "仅已脱离的 LUKS 数据头可以使用缩减的数据偏移。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1131
+msgid "Device activated but cannot make flags persistent."
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1209
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "Key slot %d selected for deletion.\n"
+msgid "Keyslot %d is selected for deletion."
+msgstr "已选中密钥槽 %d 以删除。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1212
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "Key slot %d is not used.\n"
+msgid "Keyslot %d is not active."
+msgstr "密钥槽 %d 未使用。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1221 src/cryptsetup.c:1276
+msgid "This is the last keyslot. Device will become unusable after purging this key."
+msgstr "这是最后一个密钥槽。设备在清空此密钥后将不可用。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1222
+msgid "Enter any remaining passphrase: "
+msgstr "输入任意剩余的口令: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1223 src/cryptsetup.c:1278
+msgid "Operation aborted, the keyslot was NOT wiped.\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1256
+msgid "Enter passphrase to be deleted: "
+msgstr "输入要移除的口令: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1273
+#, c-format
+msgid "Key slot %d selected for deletion."
+msgstr "已选中密钥槽 %d 以供删除。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1328 src/cryptsetup.c:1387 src/cryptsetup.c:1420
+msgid "Enter new passphrase for key slot: "
+msgstr "输入密钥槽的新口令: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1404 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1351
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter any existing passphrase: "
+msgstr "输入任意已存在的口令: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1463
+msgid "Enter passphrase to be changed: "
+msgstr "输入要更改的口令: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1478 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1336
+msgid "Enter new passphrase: "
+msgstr "输入新口令: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1514
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Enter passphrase for key slot %u: "
+msgid "Enter passphrase for keyslot to be converted: "
+msgstr "输入密钥槽 %u 的密码："
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1537
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Only one device argument for isLuks operation is supported.\n"
+msgid "Only one device argument for isLuks operation is supported."
+msgstr "isLuks 操作仅支持一个设备参数。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1716 src/cryptsetup.c:1737
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Option --header-backup-file is required.\n"
+msgid "Option --header-backup-file is required."
+msgstr "必须指定 --header-backup-file 选项。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1776
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "Unrecognized metadata device type %s.\n"
+msgid "Unrecognized metadata device type %s."
+msgstr "无法识别的元数据设备类型 %s。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1779
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Command requires device and mapped name as arguments.\n"
+msgid "Command requires device and mapped name as arguments."
+msgstr "命令需要设备及映射名作为参数。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1798
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"This operation will erase all keyslots on device %s.\n"
+"Device will become unusable after this operation."
+msgstr ""
+"该操作将清空设备 %s 上所有的密钥槽。\n"
+"设备在此操作后将不可用。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1805
+msgid "Operation aborted, keyslots were NOT wiped.\n"
+msgstr "操作已中止，密钥槽没有被擦除。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1841
+msgid "Missing LUKS target type, option --type is required."
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1857
+#, c-format
+msgid "Device is already %s type."
+msgstr "设备已为 %s 类型。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1862
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "This operation is not supported for %s crypt device.\n"
+msgid "This operation will convert %s to %s format.\n"
+msgstr "不支持在 %s 加密设备上执行此操作。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1868
+msgid "Operation aborted, device was NOT converted.\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1908
+msgid "Option --priority, --label or --subsystem is missing."
+msgstr "选项 --priority、--label 或 --subsystem 缺失。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1939
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "Key slot %d is invalid.\n"
+msgid "Token %d is invalid."
+msgstr "密钥槽 %d 无效。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1942
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "Key slot %d is not used.\n"
+msgid "Token %d in use."
+msgstr "密钥槽 %d 未使用。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1955
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "Failed to swap new key slot.\n"
+msgid "Failed to assign token %d to keyslot %d."
+msgstr "交换新密钥槽失败。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1969
+msgid "--key-description parameter is mandatory for token add action."
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1975
+msgid "Missing --token option specifying token for removal."
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1980
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "Invalid device %s.\n"
+msgid "Invalid token operation %s."
+msgstr "设备 %s 无效。\n"
+
+# stat() 主要就是出来一个各种文件信息……
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1995
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "Failed to stat key file.\n"
+msgid "Failed to add keyring token %d."
+msgstr "获取 (stat) 密钥文件统计数据失败。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:1997
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "Failed to open key file.\n"
+msgid "Failed to remove token %d."
+msgstr "打开 (open) 密钥文件失败。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2013
+msgid "<device> [--type <type>] [<name>]"
+msgstr "<设备> [--type <类型>] [<名称>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2013
+msgid "open device as mapping <name>"
+msgstr "以映射 <名称> 打开设备"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2014 src/cryptsetup.c:2015 src/cryptsetup.c:2016
+#: src/veritysetup.c:366 src/veritysetup.c:367 src/integritysetup.c:427
+#: src/integritysetup.c:428
+msgid "<name>"
+msgstr "<名称>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2014
+msgid "close device (remove mapping)"
+msgstr "关闭设备（移除映射）"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2015
+msgid "resize active device"
+msgstr "改变活动设备大小。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2016
+msgid "show device status"
+msgstr "显示设备状态"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2017
+msgid "[--cipher <cipher>]"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2017
+msgid "benchmark cipher"
+msgstr "测试密文"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2018 src/cryptsetup.c:2019 src/cryptsetup.c:2020
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2021 src/cryptsetup.c:2028 src/cryptsetup.c:2029
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2030 src/cryptsetup.c:2031 src/cryptsetup.c:2032
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2033 src/cryptsetup.c:2034 src/cryptsetup.c:2035
+msgid "<device>"
+msgstr "<设备>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2018
+msgid "try to repair on-disk metadata"
+msgstr "尝试修复磁盘上的元数据"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2019
+msgid "erase all keyslots (remove encryption key)"
+msgstr "清空所有密钥槽（移除加密密钥）"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2020
+msgid "convert LUKS from/to LUKS2 format"
+msgstr "在 LUKS 和 LUKS2 格式之间转换"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2021
+msgid "set permanent configuration options for LUKS2"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2022 src/cryptsetup.c:2023
+msgid "<device> [<new key file>]"
+msgstr "<设备> [<新密钥文件>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2022
+msgid "formats a LUKS device"
+msgstr "格式化一个 LUKS 设备"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2023
+msgid "add key to LUKS device"
+msgstr "向 LUKS 设备添加密钥"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2024 src/cryptsetup.c:2025 src/cryptsetup.c:2026
+msgid "<device> [<key file>]"
+msgstr "<设备> [<密钥文件>]"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2024
+msgid "removes supplied key or key file from LUKS device"
+msgstr "移除 LUKS 设备中指定的密钥或密钥文件"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2025
+msgid "changes supplied key or key file of LUKS device"
+msgstr "更改 LUKS 设备中指定的密钥或密钥文件"
+
+# stat() 主要就是出来一个各种文件信息……
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2026
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Failed to stat key file.\n"
+msgid "converts a key to new pbkdf parameters"
+msgstr "获取 (stat) 密钥文件统计数据失败。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2027
+msgid "<device> <key slot>"
+msgstr "<设备> <密钥槽>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2027
+msgid "wipes key with number <key slot> from LUKS device"
+msgstr "从 LUKS 设备清理标号为 <key slot> 的密钥"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2028
+msgid "print UUID of LUKS device"
+msgstr "输出 LUKS 设备的 UUID（唯一标识符）"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2029
+msgid "tests <device> for LUKS partition header"
+msgstr "从 <device> 探测 LUKS 分区标头"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2030
+msgid "dump LUKS partition information"
+msgstr "调出 LUKS 分区信息"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2031
+msgid "dump TCRYPT device information"
+msgstr "调出 TCRYPT 设备信息"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2032
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Suspend LUKS device and wipe key (all IOs are frozen)."
+msgid "Suspend LUKS device and wipe key (all IOs are frozen)"
+msgstr "挂起 LUKS 设备并清除密钥（冻结所有 IO 操作）。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2033
+msgid "Resume suspended LUKS device"
+msgstr "恢复已挂起的 LUKS 设备"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2034
+msgid "Backup LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "备份 LUKS 设备标头和密钥槽"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2035
+msgid "Restore LUKS device header and keyslots"
+msgstr "恢复 LUKS 设备标头和密钥槽"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2036
+msgid "<add|remove> <device>"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2036
+msgid "Add or remove keyring token"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2054 src/veritysetup.c:383 src/integritysetup.c:444
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<action> is one of:\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<动作> 为其中之一：\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2060
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"You can also use old <action> syntax aliases:\n"
+"\topen: create (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen\n"
+"\tclose: remove (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tcryptClose\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"你亦可使用老的 <动作> 语法别名：\n"
+"\topen: create (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen\n"
+"\tclose: remove (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tcryptClose\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2064
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<device> is the encrypted device\n"
+"<key slot> is the LUKS key slot number to modify\n"
+"<key file> optional key file for the new key for luksAddKey action\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<name> 为要在 %s 创建的设备\n"
+"<device> 为加密设备\n"
+"<key slot> 为需要更改的 LUKS 密钥槽\n"
+"<key file> 提供给 luksAddKey 动作的密钥文件\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2071
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in metadata format is %s (for luksFormat action).\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2076
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid ""
+#| "\n"
+#| "Default compiled-in key and passphrase parameters:\n"
+#| "\tMaximum keyfile size: %dkB, Maximum interactive passphrase length %d (characters)\n"
+#| "Default PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS: %d (ms)\n"
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in key and passphrase parameters:\n"
+"\tMaximum keyfile size: %dkB, Maximum interactive passphrase length %d (characters)\n"
+"Default PBKDF for LUKS1: %s, iteration time: %d (ms)\n"
+"Default PBKDF for LUKS2: %s\n"
+"\tIteration time: %d, Memory required: %dkB, Parallel threads: %d\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"默认集成的密钥和密码参数：\n"
+"\t密钥文件的最大大小：%dkB, 交互式密码的最大长度：%d (字符)\n"
+"LUKS 的默认 PBKDF2 迭代时间：%d (毫秒)\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2087
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in device cipher parameters:\n"
+"\tloop-AES: %s, Key %d bits\n"
+"\tplain: %s, Key: %d bits, Password hashing: %s\n"
+"\tLUKS1: %s, Key: %d bits, LUKS header hashing: %s, RNG: %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"默认集成的设备密文参数：\n"
+"\tloop-AES：%s, %d 位密钥\n"
+"\tplain：%s, 密钥：%d 位, 密码哈希：%s\n"
+"\tLUKS1：%s, 密钥：%d bits, LUKS 数据头哈希：%s, RNG：%s\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2104 src/veritysetup.c:540 src/integritysetup.c:581
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s: requires %s as arguments"
+msgstr "%s: 需要 %s 作为参数"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2137 src/veritysetup.c:423 src/integritysetup.c:478
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1608
+msgid "Show this help message"
+msgstr "显示此帮助"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2138 src/veritysetup.c:424 src/integritysetup.c:479
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1609
+msgid "Display brief usage"
+msgstr "显示简短用法"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2142 src/veritysetup.c:428 src/integritysetup.c:483
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1613
+msgid "Help options:"
+msgstr "帮助选项："
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2143 src/veritysetup.c:429 src/integritysetup.c:484
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1614
+msgid "Print package version"
+msgstr "打印软件包版本"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2144 src/veritysetup.c:430 src/integritysetup.c:485
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1615
+msgid "Shows more detailed error messages"
+msgstr "显示更详细的错误信息"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2145 src/veritysetup.c:431 src/integritysetup.c:486
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1616
+msgid "Show debug messages"
+msgstr "显示调试信息"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2146 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1618
+msgid "The cipher used to encrypt the disk (see /proc/crypto)"
+msgstr "用于加密磁盘的密文（参见 /proc/crypto）"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2147 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1620
+msgid "The hash used to create the encryption key from the passphrase"
+msgstr "用于从密码创建加密密钥的哈希值"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2148
+msgid "Verifies the passphrase by asking for it twice"
+msgstr "两次询问密码以进行验证"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2149 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1622
+msgid "Read the key from a file"
+msgstr "从文件读取密钥"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2150
+msgid "Read the volume (master) key from file."
+msgstr "从文件读取卷（主）密钥。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2151
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Dump volume (master) key instead of keyslots info."
+msgid "Dump volume (master) key instead of keyslots info"
+msgstr "转储卷（主）密钥而不是键槽信息。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2152 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1619
+msgid "The size of the encryption key"
+msgstr "加密密钥大小"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2152 src/integritysetup.c:500 src/integritysetup.c:504
+#: src/integritysetup.c:508 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1619
+msgid "BITS"
+msgstr "位"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2153 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1635
+msgid "Limits the read from keyfile"
+msgstr "限制从密钥文件读取"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2153 src/cryptsetup.c:2154 src/cryptsetup.c:2155
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2156 src/veritysetup.c:434 src/veritysetup.c:435
+#: src/veritysetup.c:436 src/veritysetup.c:439 src/veritysetup.c:440
+#: src/integritysetup.c:491 src/integritysetup.c:495 src/integritysetup.c:496
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1634 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1635
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1636 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1637
+msgid "bytes"
+msgstr "字节"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2154 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1634
+msgid "Number of bytes to skip in keyfile"
+msgstr "要从密钥文件跳过的字节数"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2155
+msgid "Limits the read from newly added keyfile"
+msgstr "限制从新增密钥文件的读取"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2156
+msgid "Number of bytes to skip in newly added keyfile"
+msgstr "要从新增密钥文件跳过的字节数"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2157
+msgid "Slot number for new key (default is first free)"
+msgstr "新密钥的槽号（默认为第一个可用的）"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2158
+msgid "The size of the device"
+msgstr "设备大小"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2158 src/cryptsetup.c:2159 src/cryptsetup.c:2160
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2166 src/integritysetup.c:492 src/integritysetup.c:497
+msgid "SECTORS"
+msgstr "扇区"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2159
+msgid "The start offset in the backend device"
+msgstr "后端设备的起始偏移量"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2160
+msgid "How many sectors of the encrypted data to skip at the beginning"
+msgstr "从开头要跳过的加密数据扇区数量"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2161
+msgid "Create a readonly mapping"
+msgstr "创建只读映射"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2162 src/integritysetup.c:487
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1625
+msgid "Do not ask for confirmation"
+msgstr "不要请求确认"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2163
+msgid "Timeout for interactive passphrase prompt (in seconds)"
+msgstr "交互式密码提示符超时长度（秒）"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2163 src/cryptsetup.c:2164 src/integritysetup.c:488
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1626
+msgid "secs"
+msgstr "秒"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2164 src/integritysetup.c:488
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1626
+msgid "Progress line update (in seconds)"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2165 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1627
+msgid "How often the input of the passphrase can be retried"
+msgstr "输入密码的最大重试频率"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2166
+msgid "Align payload at <n> sector boundaries - for luksFormat"
+msgstr "于 <n> 个扇区边界处对其载荷数据 - 供 luks 格式用"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2167
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "File with LUKS header and keyslots backup."
+msgid "File with LUKS header and keyslots backup"
+msgstr "带有 LUKS 数据头和密钥槽备份的文件。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2168 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1628
+msgid "Use /dev/random for generating volume key"
+msgstr "使用 /dev/random 生成卷密钥"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2169 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1629
+msgid "Use /dev/urandom for generating volume key"
+msgstr "使用 /dev/urandom 生成卷密钥"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2170
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Share device with another non-overlapping crypt segment."
+msgid "Share device with another non-overlapping crypt segment"
+msgstr "与另一个不重合的加密段共享设备。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2171 src/veritysetup.c:443
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "UUID for device to use."
+msgid "UUID for device to use"
+msgstr "设备使用的 UUID 已占用。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2172
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Allow discards (aka TRIM) requests for device."
+msgid "Allow discards (aka TRIM) requests for device"
+msgstr "允许设备的 discard（或称 TRIM）请求。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2173 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1646
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Device or file with separated LUKS header."
+msgid "Device or file with separated LUKS header"
+msgstr "带有分离 LUKS 数据头的设备或文件。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2174
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Do not activate device, just check passphrase."
+msgid "Do not activate device, just check passphrase"
+msgstr "不要激活设备，仅检查密码。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2175
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Use hidden header (hidden TCRYPT device)."
+msgid "Use hidden header (hidden TCRYPT device)"
+msgstr "使用隐藏数据头（隐藏 TCRYPT 设备）"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2176
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Device is system TCRYPT drive (with bootloader)."
+msgid "Device is system TCRYPT drive (with bootloader)"
+msgstr "设备为系统 TCRYPT 驱动器（带有引导器）。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2177
+msgid "Use backup (secondary) TCRYPT header"
+msgstr "使用备份（次级）TCRYPT 标头"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2178
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Scan also for VeraCrypt compatible device."
+msgid "Scan also for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "同时扫描 VeraCrypt 兼容的设备。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2179
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Scan also for VeraCrypt compatible device."
+msgid "Personal Iteration Multiplier for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "同时扫描 VeraCrypt 兼容的设备。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2180
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Scan also for VeraCrypt compatible device."
+msgid "Query Personal Iteration Multiplier for VeraCrypt compatible device"
+msgstr "同时扫描 VeraCrypt 兼容的设备。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2181
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Type of device metadata: luks, plain, loopaes, tcrypt."
+msgid "Type of device metadata: luks, plain, loopaes, tcrypt"
+msgstr "设备元数据类型：luks, 纯粹 (plain), loopaes, tcrypt."
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2182
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Disable password quality check (if enabled)."
+msgid "Disable password quality check (if enabled)"
+msgstr "禁用密码质量检查 (如果已启用)。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2183
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Use dm-crypt same_cpu_crypt performance compatibility option."
+msgid "Use dm-crypt same_cpu_crypt performance compatibility option"
+msgstr "使用 dm-crypt same_cpu_crypt 性能兼容性选项。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2184
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Use dm-crypt submit_from_crypt_cpus performance compatibility option."
+msgid "Use dm-crypt submit_from_crypt_cpus performance compatibility option"
+msgstr "使用 dm-crypt submit_from_crypt_cpus 性能兼容性选项。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2185
+msgid "Device removal is deferred until the last user closes it"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2186
+msgid "PBKDF iteration time for LUKS (in ms)"
+msgstr "LUKS 默认 PBKDF 迭代时间（毫秒）"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2186 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1624
+msgid "msecs"
+msgstr "毫秒"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2187 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1642
+msgid "PBKDF algorithm (for LUKS2): argon2i, argon2id, pbkdf2"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2188 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1643
+msgid "PBKDF memory cost limit"
+msgstr "PBKDF 内存开销限制"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2188 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1643
+msgid "kilobytes"
+msgstr "千字节"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2189 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1644
+msgid "PBKDF parallel cost"
+msgstr "PBKDF 并行开销"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2189 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1644
+msgid "threads"
+msgstr "线程"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2190 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1645
+msgid "PBKDF iterations cost (forced, disables benchmark)"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2191
+msgid "Keyslot priority: ignore, normal, prefer)"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2192
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "try to repair on-disk metadata"
+msgid "Disable locking of on-disk metadata"
+msgstr "尝试修复磁盘上的元数据"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2193
+msgid "Disable loading volume keys via kernel keyring"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2194
+msgid "Data integrity algorithm (LUKS2 only)"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2195 src/integritysetup.c:511
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Invalid size parameters for verity device.\n"
+msgid "Disable journal for integrity device"
+msgstr "为 VERITY 设备提供的大小指标无效。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2196 src/integritysetup.c:489
+msgid "Do not wipe device after format"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2197
+msgid "Do not ask for passphrase if activation by token fails"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2198
+msgid "Token number (default: any)"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2199
+msgid "Key description"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2200
+msgid "Encryption sector size (default: 512 bytes)"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2201
+msgid "Set activation flags persistent for device"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2202
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "formats a LUKS device"
+msgid "Set label for the LUKS2 device"
+msgstr "格式化一个 LUKS 设备"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2203
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "formats a LUKS device"
+msgid "Set subsystem label for the LUKS2 device"
+msgstr "格式化一个 LUKS 设备"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2204
+msgid "Create unbound (no assigned data segment) LUKS2 keyslot"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2220 src/veritysetup.c:464 src/integritysetup.c:528
+msgid "[OPTION...] <action> <action-specific>"
+msgstr "[选项…] <动作> <动作特定参数>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2277 src/veritysetup.c:504 src/integritysetup.c:545
+msgid "Argument <action> missing."
+msgstr "缺失参数 <动作>。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2333 src/veritysetup.c:535 src/integritysetup.c:576
+msgid "Unknown action."
+msgstr "未知动作。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2343
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Option --shared is allowed only for open of plain device.\n"
+msgid "Option --deferred is allowed only for close command.\n"
+msgstr "选项 --shared 只适用于打开纯设备。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2348
+msgid "Option --shared is allowed only for open of plain device.\n"
+msgstr "选项 --shared 只适用于打开纯设备。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2353
+msgid "Option --allow-discards is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "选项 --allow-discards 只适用于打开操作。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2358
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Option --allow-discards is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgid "Option --persistent is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "选项 --allow-discards 只适用于打开操作。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2363
+msgid "Option --persistent is not allowed with --test-passphrase.\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2372
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid ""
+#| "Option --key-size is allowed only for luksFormat, open and benchmark.\n"
+#| "To limit read from keyfile use --keyfile-size=(bytes)."
+msgid ""
+"Option --key-size is allowed only for luksFormat, luksAddKey (with --unbound),\n"
+"open and benchmark actions. To limit read from keyfile use --keyfile-size=(bytes)."
+msgstr ""
+"选项 --key-size 只能用于 luksFormat, 打开和性能测试。\n"
+"要限制密钥文件读取请使用 --keyfile-size=(字节数)。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2378
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Option --align-payload is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgid "Option --integrity is allowed only for luksFormat (LUKS2).\n"
+msgstr "选项 --align-payload 只允许用于 luksFormat。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2383
+msgid "Option --integrity-no-wipe can be used only for format action with integrity extension.\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2389
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Option --uuid is allowed only for luksFormat and luksUUID."
+msgid "Options --label and --subsystem are allowed only for luksFormat and config LUKS2 operations.\n"
+msgstr "选项 --uuid 只允许用于 luksFormat 和 luksUUID。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2395
+msgid "Option --test-passphrase is allowed only for open of LUKS and TCRYPT devices.\n"
+msgstr "选项 --test-passphrase 只能用于打开 LUKS 和 TCRYPT 设备。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2400 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1717
+msgid "Key size must be a multiple of 8 bits"
+msgstr "密钥尺寸必须是 8 的倍数"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2406 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1402
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1722
+msgid "Key slot is invalid."
+msgstr "密钥槽无效。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2413
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Option --key-file takes precedence over specified key file argument.\n"
+msgid "Option --key-file takes precedence over specified key file argument."
+msgstr "选项 --key-file 优先使用指定的密钥文件参数。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2420 src/veritysetup.c:547 src/integritysetup.c:595
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1696
+msgid "Negative number for option not permitted."
+msgstr "不允许在选项中填入负数。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2424
+msgid "Only one --key-file argument is allowed."
+msgstr "只允许存在一个 --key-file 选项。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2428 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1688
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1726
+msgid "Only one of --use-[u]random options is allowed."
+msgstr "--use-[u]random 选项只能用一处。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2432
+msgid "Option --use-[u]random is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgstr "选项 --use-[u]random 只适用于 luksFormat。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2436
+msgid "Option --uuid is allowed only for luksFormat and luksUUID."
+msgstr "选项 --uuid 只允许用于 luksFormat 和 luksUUID。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2440
+msgid "Option --align-payload is allowed only for luksFormat."
+msgstr "选项 --align-payload 只允许用于 luksFormat。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2446
+msgid "Option --skip is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices.\n"
+msgstr "选项 --skip 只适用于打开纯设备和 loopaes 设备。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2452
+msgid "Option --offset is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices.\n"
+msgstr "选项 --offset 只适用于打开纯设备和 loopaes 设备。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2458
+msgid "Option --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system or --tcrypt-backup is supported only for TCRYPT device.\n"
+msgstr "选项 --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system 或 --tcrypt-backup 只支持 TCRYPT 设备。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2463
+msgid "Option --tcrypt-hidden cannot be combined with --allow-discards.\n"
+msgstr "选项 --tcrypt-hidden 不能与 --allow-discards 共用。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2468
+msgid "Option --veracrypt is supported only for TCRYPT device type.\n"
+msgstr "选项 --veracrypt 只支持 TCRYPT 设备类型。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2474
+msgid "Invalid argument for parameter --veracrypt-pim supplied.\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2478
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Option --veracrypt is supported only for TCRYPT device type.\n"
+msgid "Option --veracrypt-pim is supported only for VeraCrypt compatible devices.\n"
+msgstr "选项 --veracrypt 只支持 TCRYPT 设备类型。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2486
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Option --veracrypt is supported only for TCRYPT device type.\n"
+msgid "Option --veracrypt-query-pim is supported only for VeraCrypt compatible devices.\n"
+msgstr "选项 --veracrypt 只支持 TCRYPT 设备类型。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2490
+msgid "The options --veracrypt-pim and --veracrypt-query-pim are mutually exclusive.\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2497
+msgid "Option --priority can be only ignore/normal/prefer.\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2502
+msgid "Keyslot specification is required.\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2507 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1702
+msgid "Password-based key derivation function (PBKDF) can be only pbkdf2 or argon2i/argon2id.\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2512 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1707
+msgid "PBKDF forced iterations cannot be combined with iteration time option.\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2518
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "This operation is not supported for this device type.\n"
+msgid "Sector size option is not supported for this command.\n"
+msgstr "不支持在这类设备上执行此操作。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2524
+msgid "Unsupported encryption sector size.\n"
+msgstr "不支持的加密扇区大小。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2529
+msgid "Key size is required with --unbound option.\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2534
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Option --new cannot be used together with --decrypt."
+msgid "Option --unbound may be used only with luksAddKey action.\n"
+msgstr "选项 --new 不可与 --decrypt 共用。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup.c:2544
+msgid "Cannot disable metadata locking.\n"
+msgstr "无法禁用元数据锁定。\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:67
+msgid "Invalid salt string specified."
+msgstr "指定了无效的盐字串。"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:98
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "Cannot create hash image %s for writing.\n"
+msgid "Cannot create hash image %s for writing."
+msgstr "无法为创建哈希映像 %s 以供写入。\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:108
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "Cannot create hash image %s for writing.\n"
+msgid "Cannot create FEC image %s for writing."
+msgstr "无法为创建哈希映像 %s 以供写入。\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:181
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Invalid root hash string specified.\n"
+msgid "Invalid root hash string specified."
+msgstr "指定了无效的根哈希值字串。\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:363
+msgid "<data_device> <hash_device>"
+msgstr "<数据设备> <哈希设备>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:363 src/integritysetup.c:425
+msgid "format device"
+msgstr "格式化设备"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:364
+msgid "<data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgstr "<数据设备> <哈希设备> <根哈希值>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:364
+msgid "verify device"
+msgstr "验证设备"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:365
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "<data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgid "<data_device> <name> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+msgstr "<数据设备> <哈希设备> <根哈希值>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:365 src/integritysetup.c:426
+msgid "open device as <name>"
+msgstr "以 <名称> 打开设备"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:366 src/integritysetup.c:427
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "close device (remove mapping)"
+msgid "close device (deactivate and remove mapping)"
+msgstr "关闭设备（移除映射）"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:367 src/integritysetup.c:428
+msgid "show active device status"
+msgstr "显示已激活的设备信息"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:368
+msgid "<hash_device>"
+msgstr "<哈希设备>"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:368 src/integritysetup.c:429
+msgid "show on-disk information"
+msgstr "显示磁盘上的信息"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:387
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<data_device> is the data device\n"
+"<hash_device> is the device containing verification data\n"
+"<root_hash> hash of the root node on <hash_device>\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<名称> 是在 %s 下要创建的设备\n"
+"<数据设备> 就是数据设备\n"
+"<哈希设备> 是含有验证信息的设备\n"
+"<根哈希值> 是 <哈希设备> 根节点的哈希值\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:394
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in dm-verity parameters:\n"
+"\tHash: %s, Data block (bytes): %u, Hash block (bytes): %u, Salt size: %u, Hash format: %u\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"编译时决定的默认 dm-verify 参数：\n"
+"\t哈希: %s, 数据块 (字节): %u, 哈希块 (字节): %u, 盐大小: %u, 哈希格式: %u\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:432
+msgid "Do not use verity superblock"
+msgstr "不使用真理超级块"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:433
+msgid "Format type (1 - normal, 0 - original Chrome OS)"
+msgstr "格式类型 (1 - 正常, 0 - 原版 Chrome OS)"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:433
+msgid "number"
+msgstr "数字"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:434
+msgid "Block size on the data device"
+msgstr "数据设备的块大小"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:435
+msgid "Block size on the hash device"
+msgstr "哈希设备的块大小"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:436
+msgid "FEC parity bytes"
+msgstr "FEC 校验字节"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:437
+msgid "The number of blocks in the data file"
+msgstr "数据文件的块数量"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:437
+msgid "blocks"
+msgstr "块"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:438
+msgid "Path to device with error correction data"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:438
+msgid "path"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:439
+msgid "Starting offset on the hash device"
+msgstr "哈希设备开始位置偏移量"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:440
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Starting offset on the hash device"
+msgid "Starting offset on the FEC device"
+msgstr "哈希设备开始位置偏移量"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:441
+msgid "Hash algorithm"
+msgstr "哈希算法"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:441
+msgid "string"
+msgstr "字符串"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:442
+msgid "Salt"
+msgstr "盐"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:442
+msgid "hex string"
+msgstr "十六进制字符串"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:444
+msgid "Restart kernel if corruption is detected"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:445
+msgid "Ignore corruption, log it only"
+msgstr "忽略数据损坏，仅对其进行日志记录"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:446
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Do not use verity superblock"
+msgid "Do not verify zeroed blocks"
+msgstr "不使用真理超级块"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:447
+msgid "Verify data block only the first time it is read"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:553
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Option --allow-discards is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgid "Option --ignore-corruption, --restart-on-corruption or --ignore-zero-blocks is allowed only for open operation.\n"
+msgstr "选项 --allow-discards 只适用于打开操作。\n"
+
+#: src/veritysetup.c:558
+msgid "Option --ignore-corruption and --restart-on-corruption cannot be used together.\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:78 src/utils_password.c:317
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "Cannot read keyfile %s.\n"
+msgid "Cannot read keyfile %s."
+msgstr ""
+"无法读取密钥文件 %s。\n"
+"\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:82 src/utils_password.c:321
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid "Cannot read %d bytes from keyfile %s.\n"
+msgid "Cannot read %d bytes from keyfile %s."
+msgstr "无法从密钥文件 %2$s 读取 %1$d 字节。\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:224
+#, c-format
+msgid "Formatted with tag size %u, internal integrity %s.\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:425 src/integritysetup.c:429
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "verify device"
+msgid "<integrity_device>"
+msgstr "验证设备"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:426
+msgid "<integrity_device> <name>"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:448
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid ""
+#| "\n"
+#| "<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+#| "<data_device> is the data device\n"
+#| "<hash_device> is the device containing verification data\n"
+#| "<root_hash> hash of the root node on <hash_device>\n"
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+"<integrity_device> is the device containing data with integrity tags\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"<名称> 是在 %s 下要创建的设备\n"
+"<数据设备> 就是数据设备\n"
+"<哈希设备> 是含有验证信息的设备\n"
+"<根哈希值> 是 <哈希设备> 根节点的哈希值\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:453
+#, fuzzy, c-format
+#| msgid ""
+#| "\n"
+#| "Default compiled-in dm-verity parameters:\n"
+#| "\tHash: %s, Data block (bytes): %u, Hash block (bytes): %u, Salt size: %u, Hash format: %u\n"
+msgid ""
+"\n"
+"Default compiled-in dm-integrity parameters:\n"
+"\tTag size: %u bytes, Checksum algorithm: %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
+"编译时决定的默认 dm-verify 参数：\n"
+"\t哈希: %s, 数据块 (字节): %u, 哈希块 (字节): %u, 盐大小: %u, 哈希格式: %u\n"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:491
+msgid "Journal size"
+msgstr "日志大小"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:492
+msgid "Interleave sectors"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:493
+msgid "Journal watermark"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:493
+msgid "percent"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:494
+msgid "Journal commit time"
+msgstr "日志提交时间"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:494
+msgid "ms"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:495
+msgid "Tag size (per-sector)"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:496
+msgid "Sector size"
+msgstr "扇区大小"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:497
+msgid "Buffers size"
+msgstr "缓冲大小"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:499
+msgid "Data integrity algorithm"
+msgstr "数据完整性校验算法"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:500
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "The size of the encryption key"
+msgid "The size of the data integrity key"
+msgstr "加密密钥大小"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:501
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Read the key from a file."
+msgid "Read the integrity key from a file"
+msgstr "从文件读取密钥。"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:503
+msgid "Journal integrity algorithm"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:504
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "The size of the encryption key"
+msgid "The size of the journal integrity key"
+msgstr "加密密钥大小"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:505
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Read the key from a file."
+msgid "Read the journal integrity key from a file"
+msgstr "从文件读取密钥。"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:507
+msgid "Journal encryption algorithm"
+msgstr "日志加密算法"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:508
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "The size of the encryption key"
+msgid "The size of the journal encryption key"
+msgstr "加密密钥大小"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:509
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Read the key from a file."
+msgid "Read the journal encryption key from a file"
+msgstr "从文件读取密钥。"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:512
+msgid "Recovery mode (no journal, no tag checking)"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:601
+msgid "Options --journal-size, --interleave-sectors, --sector-size, --tag-size and --no-wipe can be used only for format action.\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:607
+msgid "Invalid journal size specification."
+msgstr "无效的日志大小指标。"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:612
+msgid "Both key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "密钥文件和密钥大小选项均必须指定。"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:615
+msgid "Integrity algorithm must be specified if integrity key is used."
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:620
+msgid "Both journal integrity key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr ""
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:623
+msgid "Journal integrity algorithm must be specified if journal integrity key is used."
+msgstr "如果使用了日志加密密钥，则必须指定日志完整性校验算法。"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:628
+msgid "Both journal encryption key file and key size options must be specified."
+msgstr "日志加密密钥文件和密钥大小选项均必须指定。"
+
+#: src/integritysetup.c:631
+msgid "Journal encryption algorithm must be specified if journal encryption key is used."
+msgstr "如果使用了日志加密密钥，则必须指定日志加密算法。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:174
+msgid "Reencryption already in-progress."
+msgstr "重加密已在进行中。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:180
+msgid "Reencryption of device with integrity profile is not supported."
+msgstr "不支持带有完整性 profile 信息的设备的重加密。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:203
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot exclusively open %s, device in use."
+msgstr "无法独占打开 %s，设备正在使用中。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:217 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1147
+msgid "Allocation of aligned memory failed."
+msgstr "分配对齐内存失败。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:224
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot read device %s."
+msgstr "无法读取设备 %s。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:235
+#, c-format
+msgid "Marking LUKS1 device %s unusable."
+msgstr "正在标记 LUKS1 设备 %s 为不可用状态。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:239
+#, c-format
+msgid "Setting LUKS2 offline reencrypt flag on device %s."
+msgstr "正在设备 %s 上设定 LUKS2 离线重加密旗标。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:256
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write device %s."
+msgstr "无法写入设备 %s。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:340
+msgid "Cannot write reencryption log file."
+msgstr "无法写入重加密日志文件。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:396
+msgid "Cannot read reencryption log file."
+msgstr "无法读取重加密日志文件。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:434
+#, c-format
+msgid "Log file %s exists, resuming reencryption.\n"
+msgstr "日志文件 %s 存在，继续重加密。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:484
+msgid "Activating temporary device using old LUKS header."
+msgstr "正使用旧 LUKS 标头激活临时设备。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:495
+msgid "Activating temporary device using new LUKS header."
+msgstr "正使用新 LUKS 标头激活临时设备。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:505
+msgid "Activation of temporary devices failed."
+msgstr "激活临时设备失败。"
+
+# stat() 主要就是出来一个各种文件信息……
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:587
+msgid "Failed to set PBKDF parameters."
+msgstr "设置 pbkdf 参数失败。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:594
+#, c-format
+msgid "New LUKS header for device %s created."
+msgstr "已创建设备 %s 的新 LUKS 标头。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:603
+#, c-format
+msgid "Activated keyslot %i."
+msgstr "已激活密钥槽 %i。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:653
+#, c-format
+msgid "This version of cryptsetup-reencrypt can't handle new internal token type %s."
+msgstr "该版本的 cryptsetup-reencrypt 无法处理新的内部 token 类型 %s。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:675
+msgid "Failed to read activation flags from backup header."
+msgstr "从备份标头读取活动旗标失败。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:679
+msgid "Failed to write activation flags to new header."
+msgstr "向新表头写入活动旗标失败。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:683 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:687
+msgid "Failed to read requirements from backup header."
+msgstr "从备份标头读取需求失败。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:723
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s header backup of device %s created."
+msgstr "已创建 %s 标头备份（对应设备 %s）。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:783
+msgid "Creation of LUKS backup headers failed."
+msgstr "LUKS 备份标头创建失败。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:917
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot restore %s header on device %s."
+msgstr "无法恢复 %s 标头（在设备 %s 上）。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:919
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s header on device %s restored."
+msgstr "已恢复 %s 标头（在设备 %s 上）。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:957 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1037
+msgid "Cannot seek to device offset."
+msgstr "无法寻找到设备偏移位置。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1080
+msgid "Cannot seek to device offset.\n"
+msgstr "无法寻找到设备偏移位置。\n"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1119 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1125
+msgid "Cannot open temporary LUKS device."
+msgstr "无法打开临时 LUKS 设备。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1130 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1135
+msgid "Cannot get device size."
+msgstr "无法获取设备大小。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1172
+msgid "Interrupted by a signal."
+msgstr "被信号中断。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1174
+msgid "IO error during reencryption."
+msgstr "重加密时发生 IO 错误。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1205
+msgid "Provided UUID is invalid."
+msgstr "提供的 UUID 无效。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1307
+msgid "Key file can be used only with --key-slot or with exactly one key slot active."
+msgstr "密钥文件只能在指定 --key-slot 时或有且只有一个槽启用时使用。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1349 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1360
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for key slot %u: "
+msgstr "输入密钥槽 %u 的口令: "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1431
+msgid "Cannot open reencryption log file."
+msgstr "无法打开重加密日志文件。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1437
+msgid "No decryption in progress, provided UUID can be used only to resume suspended decryption process."
+msgstr "没有正在进行中的解密操作，提供的 UUID 仅能用于继续已挂起的解密操作。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1512
+#, c-format
+msgid "Changed pbkdf parameters in keyslot %i."
+msgstr "已在密钥槽 %i 更改 pbkdf 参数。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1617
+msgid "Reencryption block size"
+msgstr "重加密块大小"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1617
+msgid "MiB"
+msgstr "MiB"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1621
+msgid "Do not change key, no data area reencryption"
+msgstr "不要更改密钥，无数据区重加密"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1623
+msgid "Read new volume (master) key from file"
+msgstr "从文件读取卷（主）密钥"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1624
+msgid "PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS (in ms)"
+msgstr "LUKS 默认 PBKDF2 迭代时间（毫秒）"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1630
+msgid "Use direct-io when accessing devices"
+msgstr "在访问设备时使用 direct-io"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1631
+msgid "Use fsync after each block"
+msgstr "在每个数据块后使用 fsync"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1632
+msgid "Update log file after every block"
+msgstr "在每个数据块后更新日志文件"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1633
+msgid "Use only this slot (others will be disabled)"
+msgstr "仅使用这个密钥槽（其他的密钥槽将被禁用）"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1636
+msgid "Reduce data device size (move data offset). DANGEROUS!"
+msgstr "减少数据设备大小（移动数据偏移量）。危险！"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1637
+msgid "Use only specified device size (ignore rest of device). DANGEROUS!"
+msgstr "只使用指定的设备大小（忽略设备其余部分）。危险！"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1638
+msgid "Create new header on not encrypted device"
+msgstr "在未加密的设备上创建新的标头"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1639
+msgid "Permanently decrypt device (remove encryption)"
+msgstr "永久解密设备（移除加密）"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1640
+msgid "The UUID used to resume decryption"
+msgstr "用于继续解密的 UUID"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1641
+msgid "Type of LUKS metadata: luks1, luks2"
+msgstr "LUKS 元数据类型：luks1、luks2"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1662
+msgid "[OPTION...] <device>"
+msgstr "[选项...] <设备>"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1676
+#, c-format
+msgid "Reencryption will change: %s%s%s%s%s%s."
+msgstr "重加密会改变：%s%s%s%s%s%s。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1677
+msgid "volume key"
+msgstr "卷密钥"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1679
+msgid "set hash to "
+msgstr "设置哈希值为 "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1680
+msgid ", set cipher to "
+msgstr "，设定密文为 "
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1684
+msgid "Argument required."
+msgstr "需要参数。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1712
+msgid "Only values between 1 MiB and 64 MiB allowed for reencryption block size."
+msgstr "重加密块大小只能是 1 MiB 到 64 MiB 之间的值。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1731 src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1736
+msgid "Invalid device size specification."
+msgstr "无效的设备大小指标。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1739
+msgid "Maximum device reduce size is 64 MiB."
+msgstr "最大设备缩减大小为 64 MiB。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1742
+msgid "Reduce size must be multiple of 512 bytes sector."
+msgstr "缩减大小必须为 512 字节扇区的倍数。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1746
+msgid "Option --new must be used together with --reduce-device-size or --header."
+msgstr "选项 --new 必须与 --reduce-device-size 或 --header 共用。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1750
+msgid "Option --keep-key can be used only with --hash, --iter-time or --pbkdf-force-iterations."
+msgstr "选项 --keep-key 只能与 --hash、--iter-time 或 --pbkdf-force-iterations 共用。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1754
+msgid "Option --new cannot be used together with --decrypt."
+msgstr "选项 --new 不可与 --decrypt 共用。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1758
+msgid "Option --decrypt is incompatible with specified parameters."
+msgstr "选项 --decrypt 与选定参数不兼容。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1762
+msgid "Option --uuid is allowed only together with --decrypt."
+msgstr "选项 --uuid 不可与 --decrypt 共用。"
+
+#: src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c:1766
+msgid "Invalid luks type. Use one of these: 'luks', 'luks1' or 'luks2'."
+msgstr "无效的 luks 类型。请使用下列选项之一：'luks'、'luks1' 或 'luks2'。"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:159
+msgid "Error reading response from terminal."
+msgstr "从终端读取响应时失败。"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:184
+msgid "Command successful.\n"
+msgstr "命令成功。\n"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:192
+msgid "wrong or missing parameters"
+msgstr "错误或缺失的参数"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:194
+msgid "no permission or bad passphrase"
+msgstr "无权限或口令错误"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:196
+msgid "out of memory"
+msgstr "内存耗尽"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:198
+msgid "wrong device or file specified"
+msgstr "指定了错误的设备或文件"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:200
+msgid "device already exists or device is busy"
+msgstr "设备已存在或设备正忙"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:202
+msgid "unknown error"
+msgstr "未知错误"
+
+#: src/utils_tools.c:204
+#, c-format
+msgid "Command failed with code %i (%s).\n"
+msgstr "命令失败，代码 %i（%s）。\n"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:43 src/utils_password.c:75
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot check password quality: %s"
+msgstr "无法检查密码质量：%s"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:51
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"Password quality check failed:\n"
+" %s"
+msgstr ""
+"密码质量检查失败：\n"
+" %s"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:83
+#, c-format
+msgid "Password quality check failed: Bad passphrase (%s)"
+msgstr "密码质量检查失败：无效密码 (%s)"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:212 src/utils_password.c:227
+msgid "Error reading passphrase from terminal."
+msgstr "从终端读取口令时出错。"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:225
+msgid "Verify passphrase: "
+msgstr "确认密码："
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:232
+msgid "Passphrases do not match."
+msgstr "口令不匹配。"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:269
+msgid "Cannot use offset with terminal input."
+msgstr "不能将偏移量用于终端输入。"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:272
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase: "
+msgstr "输入口令："
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:274
+#, c-format
+msgid "Enter passphrase for %s: "
+msgstr "输入 %s 的口令："
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:304
+msgid "No key available with this passphrase."
+msgstr "此口令无可用的密钥。"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:339
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot open keyfile %s for write."
+msgstr "无法打开密钥文件 %s 以供写入。"
+
+#: src/utils_password.c:346
+#, c-format
+msgid "Cannot write to keyfile %s."
+msgstr "无法写入密钥文件 %s。"
+
+#~ msgid "memory allocation error in action_luksFormat"
+#~ msgstr "在 action_luksFormat 中发生内存分配错误"
+
+#, fuzzy
+#~| msgid "Key slot is invalid."
+#~ msgid "Key slot is invalid.\n"
+#~ msgstr "密钥槽无效。"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot find a free loopback device.\n"
+#~ msgstr "找不到空闲的回环设备。\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Too many tree levels for verity volume.\n"
+#~ msgstr "VERITY 卷上的目录树层级过多。\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Key %d not active. Can't wipe.\n"
+#~ msgstr "无法清除未激活的密钥 %d。\n"
+
+#~ msgid "<name> <data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+#~ msgstr "<名称> <数据设备> <哈希设备> <根哈希值>"
+
+#~ msgid "create active device"
+#~ msgstr "创建已激活的设备"
+
+#~ msgid "remove (deactivate) device"
+#~ msgstr "移除（禁用）设备"
+
+#~ msgid "Cannot open device %s\n"
+#~ msgstr "无法打开设备 %s。\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Marking LUKS device %s usable.\n"
+#~ msgstr "正将 LUKS 设备 %s 标为可用。\n"
+
+#~ msgid "Progress: %5.1f%%, ETA %02llu:%02llu, %4llu MiB written, speed %5.1f MiB/s%s"
+#~ msgstr "进度：%5.1f%%, 生育 %02llu:%02llu, %4llu MiB 已写入, 速度 %5.1f MiB/s%s"
+
+#~ msgid "WARNING: this is experimental code, it can completely break your data.\n"
+#~ msgstr "警告：此为实验性代码，实验性代码可能完全损毁你的数据。\n"
diff --git a/scripts/Makemodule.am b/scripts/Makemodule.am
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5bf6ddf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/Makemodule.am
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+DISTCLEAN_TARGETS += scripts/cryptsetup.conf
+
+if CRYPTSETUP_TMPFILE
+tmpfilesd_DATA += scripts/cryptsetup.conf
+endif
diff --git a/scripts/cryptsetup.conf.in b/scripts/cryptsetup.conf.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8bbc5af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/cryptsetup.conf.in
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+d @DEFAULT_LUKS2_LOCK_PATH@ @DEFAULT_LUKS2_LOCK_DIR_PERMS@ root root -
diff --git a/src/Makemodule.am b/src/Makemodule.am
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3510f20
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/Makemodule.am
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+# cryptsetup
+if CRYPTSETUP
+
+cryptsetup_SOURCES =		\
+	lib/utils_crypt.c	\
+	lib/utils_loop.c	\
+	lib/utils_io.c		\
+	lib/utils_blkid.c	\
+	src/utils_tools.c	\
+	src/utils_password.c	\
+	src/utils_luks2.c	\
+	src/cryptsetup.c	\
+	src/cryptsetup.h
+
+cryptsetup_LDADD = -lm		\
+	libcryptsetup.la	\
+	@POPT_LIBS@		\
+	@PWQUALITY_LIBS@	\
+	@PASSWDQC_LIBS@		\
+	@UUID_LIBS@		\
+	@BLKID_LIBS@
+
+sbin_PROGRAMS += cryptsetup
+
+if STATIC_TOOLS
+sbin_PROGRAMS += cryptsetup.static
+cryptsetup_static_SOURCES = $(cryptsetup_SOURCES)
+cryptsetup_static_LDFLAGS = $(AM_LDFLAGS) -all-static
+cryptsetup_static_LDADD =	\
+	$(cryptsetup_LDADD)	\
+	@CRYPTO_STATIC_LIBS@	\
+	@PWQUALITY_STATIC_LIBS@	\
+	@DEVMAPPER_STATIC_LIBS@
+endif
+endif
+
+# veritysetup
+if VERITYSETUP
+
+veritysetup_SOURCES =		\
+	lib/utils_crypt.c	\
+	lib/utils_loop.c	\
+	lib/utils_io.c		\
+	lib/utils_blkid.c	\
+	src/utils_tools.c	\
+	src/veritysetup.c	\
+	src/cryptsetup.h
+
+veritysetup_LDADD = -lm		\
+	libcryptsetup.la	\
+	@POPT_LIBS@		\
+	@BLKID_LIBS@
+
+sbin_PROGRAMS += veritysetup
+
+if STATIC_TOOLS
+sbin_PROGRAMS += veritysetup.static
+veritysetup_static_SOURCES = $(veritysetup_SOURCES)
+veritysetup_static_LDFLAGS = $(AM_LDFLAGS) -all-static
+veritysetup_static_LDADD =	\
+	$(veritysetup_LDADD)	\
+	@CRYPTO_STATIC_LIBS@	\
+	@DEVMAPPER_STATIC_LIBS@	\
+	@UUID_LIBS@
+endif
+endif
+
+# integritysetup
+if INTEGRITYSETUP
+
+integritysetup_SOURCES =	\
+	lib/utils_crypt.c	\
+	lib/utils_loop.c	\
+	lib/utils_io.c		\
+	lib/utils_blkid.c	\
+	src/utils_tools.c	\
+	src/integritysetup.c	\
+	src/cryptsetup.h
+
+integritysetup_LDADD = -lm	\
+	libcryptsetup.la	\
+	@POPT_LIBS@		\
+	@UUID_LIBS@		\
+	@BLKID_LIBS@
+
+sbin_PROGRAMS += integritysetup
+
+if STATIC_TOOLS
+sbin_PROGRAMS += integritysetup.static
+integritysetup_static_SOURCES = $(integritysetup_SOURCES)
+integritysetup_static_LDFLAGS = $(AM_LDFLAGS) -all-static
+integritysetup_static_LDADD =	\
+	$(integritysetup_LDADD)	\
+	@CRYPTO_STATIC_LIBS@	\
+	@DEVMAPPER_STATIC_LIBS@	\
+	@UUID_LIBS@
+endif
+endif
+
+# reencrypt
+if REENCRYPT
+cryptsetup_reencrypt_SOURCES =		\
+	lib/utils_crypt.c		\
+	lib/utils_io.c			\
+	lib/utils_blkid.c		\
+	src/utils_tools.c		\
+	src/utils_password.c		\
+	src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c	\
+	src/cryptsetup.h
+
+cryptsetup_reencrypt_LDADD = -lm	\
+	libcryptsetup.la		\
+	@POPT_LIBS@			\
+	@PWQUALITY_LIBS@		\
+	@PASSWDQC_LIBS@			\
+	@UUID_LIBS@			\
+	@BLKID_LIBS@
+
+sbin_PROGRAMS += cryptsetup-reencrypt
+
+if STATIC_TOOLS
+sbin_PROGRAMS += cryptsetup-reencrypt.static
+cryptsetup_reencrypt_static_SOURCES = $(cryptsetup_reencrypt_SOURCES)
+cryptsetup_reencrypt_static_LDFLAGS = $(AM_LDFLAGS) -all-static
+cryptsetup_reencrypt_static_LDADD =	\
+	$(cryptsetup_reencrypt_LDADD)	\
+	@CRYPTO_STATIC_LIBS@		\
+	@PWQUALITY_STATIC_LIBS@		\
+	@DEVMAPPER_STATIC_LIBS@
+endif
+endif
diff --git a/src/cryptsetup.c b/src/cryptsetup.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..13aa656
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/cryptsetup.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2964 @@
+/*
+ * cryptsetup - setup cryptographic volumes for dm-crypt
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include "cryptsetup.h"
+#include <uuid/uuid.h>
+
+static const char *opt_cipher = NULL;
+static const char *opt_keyslot_cipher = NULL;
+static const char *opt_hash = NULL;
+static int opt_verify_passphrase = 0;
+
+static const char *opt_json_file = NULL;
+static const char *opt_key_file = NULL;
+static const char *opt_keyfile_stdin = NULL;
+static int opt_keyfiles_count = 0;
+static const char *opt_keyfiles[MAX_KEYFILES];
+
+static const char *opt_master_key_file = NULL;
+static const char *opt_header_backup_file = NULL;
+static const char *opt_uuid = NULL;
+static const char *opt_header_device = NULL;
+static const char *opt_type = "luks";
+static int opt_key_size = 0;
+static int opt_keyslot_key_size = 0;
+static long opt_keyfile_size = 0;
+static long opt_new_keyfile_size = 0;
+static uint64_t opt_keyfile_offset = 0;
+static uint64_t opt_new_keyfile_offset = 0;
+static int opt_key_slot = CRYPT_ANY_SLOT;
+static int opt_token = CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN;
+static int opt_token_only = 0;
+static uint64_t opt_size = 0;
+static uint64_t opt_offset = 0;
+static uint64_t opt_skip = 0;
+static int opt_skip_valid = 0;
+static int opt_readonly = 0;
+static int opt_version_mode = 0;
+static int opt_timeout = 0;
+static int opt_tries = 3;
+static int opt_align_payload = 0;
+static int opt_random = 0;
+static int opt_urandom = 0;
+static int opt_dump_master_key = 0;
+static int opt_shared = 0;
+static int opt_allow_discards = 0;
+static int opt_perf_same_cpu_crypt = 0;
+static int opt_perf_submit_from_crypt_cpus = 0;
+static int opt_test_passphrase = 0;
+static int opt_tcrypt_hidden = 0;
+static int opt_tcrypt_system = 0;
+static int opt_tcrypt_backup = 0;
+static int opt_veracrypt = 0;
+static int opt_veracrypt_pim = -1;
+static int opt_veracrypt_query_pim = 0;
+static int opt_deferred_remove = 0;
+//FIXME: check uint32 overflow for long type
+static const char *opt_pbkdf = NULL;
+static long opt_pbkdf_memory = DEFAULT_LUKS2_MEMORY_KB;
+static long opt_pbkdf_parallel = DEFAULT_LUKS2_PARALLEL_THREADS;
+static long opt_pbkdf_iterations = 0;
+static int opt_iteration_time = 0;
+static int opt_disable_locks = 0;
+static int opt_disable_keyring = 0;
+static const char *opt_priority = NULL; /* normal */
+static const char *opt_integrity = NULL; /* none */
+static int opt_integrity_nojournal = 0;
+static int opt_integrity_no_wipe = 0;
+static const char *opt_key_description = NULL;
+static int opt_sector_size = SECTOR_SIZE;
+static int opt_persistent = 0;
+static const char *opt_label = NULL;
+static const char *opt_subsystem = NULL;
+static int opt_unbound = 0;
+static int opt_refresh = 0;
+
+static const char *opt_luks2_metadata_size_str = NULL;
+static uint64_t opt_luks2_metadata_size = 0;
+static const char *opt_luks2_keyslots_size_str = NULL;
+static uint64_t opt_luks2_keyslots_size = 0;
+
+static const char **action_argv;
+static int action_argc;
+static const char *null_action_argv[] = {NULL, NULL};
+
+static const char *uuid_or_device_header(const char **data_device)
+{
+	if (data_device)
+		*data_device = opt_header_device ? action_argv[0] : NULL;
+
+	return uuid_or_device(opt_header_device ?: action_argv[0]);
+}
+
+static const char *luksType(const char *type)
+{
+	if (type && !strcmp(type, "luks2"))
+		return CRYPT_LUKS2;
+
+	if (type && !strcmp(type, "luks1"))
+		return CRYPT_LUKS1;
+
+	if (type && !strcmp(type, "luks"))
+		return CRYPT_LUKS; /* NULL */
+
+	if (type && *type)
+		return type;
+
+	return CRYPT_LUKS; /* NULL */
+}
+
+static int _verify_passphrase(int def)
+{
+	/* Batch mode switch off verify - if not overridden by -y */
+	if (opt_verify_passphrase)
+		def = 1;
+	else if (opt_batch_mode)
+		def = 0;
+
+	/* Non-tty input doesn't allow verify */
+	if (def && !isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) {
+		if (opt_verify_passphrase)
+			log_err(_("Can't do passphrase verification on non-tty inputs."));
+		def = 0;
+	}
+
+	return def;
+}
+
+static void _set_activation_flags(uint32_t *flags)
+{
+	if (opt_readonly)
+		*flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+
+	if (opt_allow_discards)
+		*flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS;
+
+	if (opt_perf_same_cpu_crypt)
+		*flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT;
+
+	if (opt_perf_submit_from_crypt_cpus)
+		*flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS;
+
+	if (opt_integrity_nojournal)
+		*flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL;
+
+	/* In persistent mode, we use what is set on command line */
+	if (opt_persistent)
+		*flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_PERSISTENT;
+
+	/* Only for LUKS2 but ignored elsewhere */
+	if (opt_test_passphrase)
+		*flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY;
+}
+
+static int _set_keyslot_encryption_params(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	const char *type = crypt_get_type(cd);
+
+	if (!opt_keyslot_key_size && !opt_keyslot_cipher)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!type || strcmp(type, CRYPT_LUKS2)) {
+		log_err(_("Keyslot encryption parameters can be set only for LUKS2 device."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return crypt_keyslot_set_encryption(cd, opt_keyslot_cipher, opt_keyslot_key_size / 8);
+}
+
+static int action_open_plain(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL, *cd1 = NULL;
+	const char *pcipher, *pmode;
+	char *msg, cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+	struct crypt_active_device cad;
+	struct crypt_params_plain params = {
+		.hash = opt_hash ?: DEFAULT_PLAIN_HASH,
+		.skip = opt_skip,
+		.offset = opt_offset,
+		.size = opt_size,
+		.sector_size = opt_sector_size,
+	};
+	char *password = NULL;
+	const char *activated_name = NULL;
+	size_t passwordLen, key_size_max, signatures = 0,
+	       key_size = (opt_key_size ?: DEFAULT_PLAIN_KEYBITS) / 8;
+	uint32_t activate_flags = 0;
+	int r;
+
+	r = crypt_parse_name_and_mode(opt_cipher ?: DEFAULT_CIPHER(PLAIN),
+				      cipher, NULL, cipher_mode);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(_("No known cipher specification pattern detected."));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* FIXME: temporary hack, no hashing for keyfiles in plain mode */
+	if (opt_key_file && !tools_is_stdin(opt_key_file)) {
+		params.hash = NULL;
+		if (!opt_batch_mode && opt_hash)
+			log_std(_("WARNING: The --hash parameter is being ignored "
+				 "in plain mode with keyfile specified.\n"));
+	}
+
+	if (params.hash && !strcmp(params.hash, "plain"))
+		params.hash = NULL;
+
+	if (!opt_batch_mode && !params.hash && opt_key_file && !tools_is_stdin(opt_key_file) && opt_keyfile_size)
+		log_std(_("WARNING: The --keyfile-size option is being ignored, "
+			 "the read size is the same as the encryption key size.\n"));
+
+	if (opt_refresh) {
+		activated_name = action_argc > 1 ? action_argv[1] : action_argv[0];
+		r = crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd1, activated_name, NULL);
+		if (r)
+			goto out;
+		r = crypt_get_active_device(cd1, activated_name, &cad);
+		if (r)
+			goto out;
+
+		/* copy known parameters from existing device */
+		params.skip = crypt_get_iv_offset(cd1);
+		params.offset = crypt_get_data_offset(cd1);
+		params.size = cad.size;
+		params.sector_size = crypt_get_sector_size(cd1);
+		key_size = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd1);
+
+		if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, crypt_get_device_name(cd1))))
+			goto out;
+
+		activate_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH;
+
+		pcipher = crypt_get_cipher(cd1);
+		pmode = crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd1);
+	} else {
+		activated_name = action_argv[1];
+		if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, action_argv[0])))
+			goto out;
+
+		/* Skip blkid scan when activating plain device with offset */
+		if (!opt_offset) {
+			/* Print all present signatures in read-only mode */
+			r = tools_detect_signatures(action_argv[0], 0, &signatures);
+			if (r < 0)
+				goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (signatures) {
+			r = asprintf(&msg, _("Detected device signature(s) on %s. Proceeding further may damage existing data."), action_argv[0]);
+			if (r == -1) {
+				r = -ENOMEM;
+				goto out;
+			}
+
+			r = yesDialog(msg, _("Operation aborted.\n")) ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+			free(msg);
+			if (r < 0)
+				goto out;
+		}
+
+		pcipher = cipher;
+		pmode = cipher_mode;
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN,
+			 pcipher, pmode,
+			 NULL, NULL,
+			 key_size,
+			 &params);
+	check_signal(&r);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (opt_shared)
+		activate_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED;
+
+	_set_activation_flags(&activate_flags);
+
+	if (!tools_is_stdin(opt_key_file)) {
+		/* If no hash, key is read directly, read size is always key_size
+		 * (possible opt_keyfile_size is ignored.
+		 * If hash is specified, opt_keyfile_size is applied.
+		 * The opt_keyfile_offset is applied always.
+		 */
+		key_size_max = params.hash ? (size_t)opt_keyfile_size : key_size;
+		r = crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, action_argv[1],
+			CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, opt_key_file, key_size_max,
+			opt_keyfile_offset, activate_flags);
+	} else {
+		key_size_max = (opt_key_file && !params.hash) ? key_size : (size_t)opt_keyfile_size;
+		r = tools_get_key(NULL, &password, &passwordLen,
+				  opt_keyfile_offset, key_size_max,
+				  opt_key_file, opt_timeout,
+				  _verify_passphrase(0), 0, cd);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, activated_name,
+			CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, password, passwordLen, activate_flags);
+	}
+out:
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	crypt_free(cd1);
+	crypt_safe_free(password);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int action_open_loopaes(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	struct crypt_params_loopaes params = {
+		.hash = opt_hash ?: NULL,
+		.offset = opt_offset,
+		.skip = opt_skip_valid ? opt_skip : opt_offset,
+	};
+	unsigned int key_size = (opt_key_size ?: DEFAULT_LOOPAES_KEYBITS) / 8;
+	uint32_t activate_flags = 0;
+	const char *activated_name = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!opt_key_file) {
+		log_err(_("Option --key-file is required."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (opt_refresh) {
+		activated_name = action_argc > 1 ? action_argv[1] : action_argv[0];
+		if ((r = crypt_init_by_name(&cd, activated_name)))
+			goto out;
+		activate_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH;
+	} else {
+		activated_name = action_argv[1];
+		if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, action_argv[0])))
+			goto out;
+
+		r = crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LOOPAES, opt_cipher ?: DEFAULT_LOOPAES_CIPHER,
+				 NULL, NULL, NULL, key_size, &params);
+		check_signal(&r);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	_set_activation_flags(&activate_flags);
+
+	r = crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, activated_name, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT,
+		tools_is_stdin(opt_key_file) ? "/dev/stdin" : opt_key_file, opt_keyfile_size,
+		opt_keyfile_offset, activate_flags);
+out:
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int tcrypt_load(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params)
+{
+	int r, tries = opt_tries, eperm = 0;
+
+	if (opt_keyfile_stdin)
+		tries = 1;
+
+	do {
+		/* TCRYPT header is encrypted, get passphrase now */
+		r = tools_get_key(NULL, CONST_CAST(char**)&params->passphrase,
+				  &params->passphrase_size, 0, 0, opt_keyfile_stdin, opt_timeout,
+				 _verify_passphrase(0), 0, cd);
+		if (r < 0)
+			continue;
+
+		if (opt_veracrypt_query_pim) {
+			char *tmp_pim_nptr = NULL;
+			char *tmp_pim_end = NULL;
+			size_t tmp_pim_size = 0;
+			unsigned long long tmp_pim_ull = 0;
+
+			r = tools_get_key(_("Enter VeraCrypt PIM: "),
+					CONST_CAST(char**)&tmp_pim_nptr,
+					&tmp_pim_size, 0, 0, opt_keyfile_stdin, opt_timeout,
+					_verify_passphrase(0), 0, cd);
+			if (r < 0)
+				continue;
+
+			tmp_pim_ull = strtoull(tmp_pim_nptr, &tmp_pim_end, 10);
+			if (*tmp_pim_nptr == '\0' || !tmp_pim_end || *tmp_pim_end != '\0') {
+				log_err(_("Invalid PIM value: parse error."));
+				r = -EINVAL;
+			} else if (tmp_pim_ull == 0) {
+				log_err(_("Invalid PIM value: 0."));
+				r = -EINVAL;
+			} else if (tmp_pim_ull > UINT32_MAX) {
+				log_err(_("Invalid PIM value: outside of range."));
+				r = -ERANGE;
+			}
+			crypt_safe_free(CONST_CAST(char*)tmp_pim_nptr);
+			if (r < 0)
+				continue;
+
+			params->veracrypt_pim = (uint32_t)tmp_pim_ull;
+			crypt_memzero(&tmp_pim_ull, sizeof(tmp_pim_ull));
+		}
+
+		if (opt_tcrypt_hidden)
+			params->flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_HEADER;
+
+		if (opt_tcrypt_system)
+			params->flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER;
+
+		if (opt_tcrypt_backup)
+			params->flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_BACKUP_HEADER;
+
+		r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_TCRYPT, params);
+
+		if (r == -EPERM) {
+			log_err(_("No device header detected with this passphrase."));
+			eperm = 1;
+		}
+
+		if (r < 0) {
+			crypt_safe_free(CONST_CAST(char*)params->passphrase);
+			params->passphrase = NULL;
+			params->passphrase_size = 0;
+		}
+		check_signal(&r);
+	} while ((r == -EPERM || r == -ERANGE) && (--tries > 0));
+
+	/* Report wrong passphrase if at least one try failed */
+	if (eperm && r == -EPIPE)
+		r = -EPERM;
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int action_open_tcrypt(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	struct crypt_params_tcrypt params = {
+		.keyfiles = opt_keyfiles,
+		.keyfiles_count = opt_keyfiles_count,
+		.flags = CRYPT_TCRYPT_LEGACY_MODES |
+			 (opt_veracrypt ? CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES : 0),
+		.veracrypt_pim = (opt_veracrypt_pim > 0) ? opt_veracrypt_pim : 0,
+	};
+	const char *activated_name;
+	uint32_t activate_flags = 0;
+	int r;
+
+	activated_name = opt_test_passphrase ? NULL : action_argv[1];
+
+	if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, action_argv[0])))
+		goto out;
+
+	r = tcrypt_load(cd, &params);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	_set_activation_flags(&activate_flags);
+
+	if (activated_name)
+		r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, activated_name, NULL, 0, activate_flags);
+out:
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	crypt_safe_free(CONST_CAST(char*)params.passphrase);
+	crypt_memzero(&params.veracrypt_pim, sizeof(params.veracrypt_pim));
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int tcryptDump_with_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	char *vk = NULL;
+	size_t vk_size;
+	unsigned i;
+	int r;
+
+	crypt_set_confirm_callback(cd, yesDialog, NULL);
+	if (!yesDialog(
+	    _("Header dump with volume key is sensitive information\n"
+	      "which allows access to encrypted partition without passphrase.\n"
+	      "This dump should be always stored encrypted on safe place."),
+	      NULL))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	vk_size = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+	vk = crypt_safe_alloc(vk_size);
+	if (!vk)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	r = crypt_volume_key_get(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, vk, &vk_size, NULL, 0);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	log_std("TCRYPT header information for %s\n", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+	log_std("Cipher chain:  \t%s\n", crypt_get_cipher(cd));
+	log_std("Cipher mode:   \t%s\n", crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd));
+	log_std("Payload offset:\t%d\n", (int)crypt_get_data_offset(cd));
+	log_std("MK bits:       \t%d\n", (int)vk_size * 8);
+	log_std("MK dump:\t");
+
+	for(i = 0; i < vk_size; i++) {
+		if (i && !(i % 16))
+			log_std("\n\t\t");
+		log_std("%02hhx ", (char)vk[i]);
+	}
+	log_std("\n");
+out:
+	crypt_safe_free(vk);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int action_tcryptDump(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	struct crypt_params_tcrypt params = {
+		.keyfiles = opt_keyfiles,
+		.keyfiles_count = opt_keyfiles_count,
+		.flags = CRYPT_TCRYPT_LEGACY_MODES |
+			 (opt_veracrypt ? CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES : 0),
+		.veracrypt_pim = (opt_veracrypt_pim > 0) ? opt_veracrypt_pim : 0,
+	};
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, action_argv[0])))
+		goto out;
+
+	r = tcrypt_load(cd, &params);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (opt_dump_master_key)
+		r = tcryptDump_with_volume_key(cd);
+	else
+		r = crypt_dump(cd);
+out:
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	crypt_safe_free(CONST_CAST(char*)params.passphrase);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int action_close(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	crypt_status_info ci;
+	uint32_t flags = 0;
+	int r;
+
+	if (opt_deferred_remove)
+		flags |= CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED;
+
+	r = crypt_init_by_name(&cd, action_argv[0]);
+	if (r == 0)
+		r = crypt_deactivate_by_name(cd, action_argv[0], flags);
+
+	if (!r && opt_deferred_remove) {
+		ci = crypt_status(cd, action_argv[0]);
+		if (ci == CRYPT_ACTIVE || ci == CRYPT_BUSY)
+			log_std(_("Device %s is still active and scheduled for deferred removal.\n"),
+				  action_argv[0]);
+	}
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int action_resize(void)
+{
+	int r;
+	size_t passwordLen;
+	struct crypt_active_device cad;
+	char *password = NULL;
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+
+	r = crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd, action_argv[0], opt_header_device);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* FIXME: LUKS2 may enforce fixed size and it must not be changed */
+	r = crypt_get_active_device(cd, action_argv[0], &cad);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) {
+		if (opt_disable_keyring) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			log_err(_("Resize of active device requires volume key "
+				  "in keyring but --disable-keyring option is set."));
+				goto out;
+		}
+
+		/* try load VK in kernel keyring using token */
+		r = crypt_activate_by_token(cd, NULL, opt_token, NULL,
+					    CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY);
+		tools_keyslot_msg(r, UNLOCKED);
+		if (r < 0 && opt_token_only)
+			goto out;
+
+		r = tools_get_key(NULL, &password, &passwordLen,
+				  opt_keyfile_offset, opt_keyfile_size, opt_key_file,
+				  opt_timeout, _verify_passphrase(0), 0, cd);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, opt_key_slot,
+						 password, passwordLen,
+						 CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY);
+		tools_passphrase_msg(r);
+		tools_keyslot_msg(r, UNLOCKED);
+		crypt_safe_free(password);
+	}
+
+	if (r >= 0)
+		r = crypt_resize(cd, action_argv[0], opt_size);
+out:
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int action_status(void)
+{
+	crypt_status_info ci;
+	struct crypt_active_device cad;
+	struct crypt_params_integrity ip = {};
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	char *backing_file;
+	const char *device;
+	int path = 0, r = 0;
+
+	/* perhaps a path, not a dm device name */
+	if (strchr(action_argv[0], '/'))
+		path = 1;
+
+	ci = crypt_status(NULL, action_argv[0]);
+	switch (ci) {
+	case CRYPT_INVALID:
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	case CRYPT_INACTIVE:
+		if (path)
+			log_std("%s is inactive.\n", action_argv[0]);
+		else
+			log_std("%s/%s is inactive.\n", crypt_get_dir(), action_argv[0]);
+		r = -ENODEV;
+		break;
+	case CRYPT_ACTIVE:
+	case CRYPT_BUSY:
+		if (path)
+			log_std("%s is active%s.\n", action_argv[0],
+				ci == CRYPT_BUSY ? " and is in use" : "");
+		else
+			log_std("%s/%s is active%s.\n", crypt_get_dir(), action_argv[0],
+				ci == CRYPT_BUSY ? " and is in use" : "");
+
+		r = crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd, action_argv[0], opt_header_device);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		log_std("  type:    %s\n", crypt_get_type(cd) ?: "n/a");
+
+		r = crypt_get_active_device(cd, action_argv[0], &cad);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		r = crypt_get_integrity_info(cd, &ip);
+		if (r < 0 && r != -ENOTSUP)
+			goto out;
+
+		log_std("  cipher:  %s-%s\n", crypt_get_cipher(cd), crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd));
+		log_std("  keysize: %d bits\n", crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd) * 8);
+		log_std("  key location: %s\n", (cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) ? "keyring" : "dm-crypt");
+		if (ip.integrity)
+			log_std("  integrity: %s\n", ip.integrity);
+		if (ip.integrity_key_size)
+			log_std("  integrity keysize: %d bits\n", ip.integrity_key_size * 8);
+		device = crypt_get_device_name(cd);
+		log_std("  device:  %s\n", device);
+		if (crypt_loop_device(device)) {
+			backing_file = crypt_loop_backing_file(device);
+			log_std("  loop:    %s\n", backing_file);
+			free(backing_file);
+		}
+		log_std("  sector size:  %d\n", crypt_get_sector_size(cd));
+		log_std("  offset:  %" PRIu64 " sectors\n", cad.offset);
+		log_std("  size:    %" PRIu64 " sectors\n", cad.size);
+		if (cad.iv_offset)
+			log_std("  skipped: %" PRIu64 " sectors\n", cad.iv_offset);
+		log_std("  mode:    %s\n", cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY ?
+					   "readonly" : "read/write");
+		if (cad.flags & (CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS|
+				 CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT|
+				 CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS))
+			log_std("  flags:   %s%s%s\n",
+				(cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS) ? "discards " : "",
+				(cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT) ? "same_cpu_crypt " : "",
+				(cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS) ? "submit_from_crypt_cpus" : "");
+	}
+out:
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	if (r == -ENOTSUP)
+		r = 0;
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int benchmark_callback(uint32_t time_ms, void *usrptr)
+{
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf = usrptr;
+	int r = 0;
+
+	check_signal(&r);
+	if (r)
+		log_err(_("Benchmark interrupted."));
+	else
+		log_dbg("PBKDF benchmark: memory cost = %u, iterations = %u, "
+			"threads = %u (took %u ms)", pbkdf->max_memory_kb,
+			pbkdf->iterations, pbkdf->parallel_threads, time_ms);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int action_benchmark_kdf(const char *kdf, const char *hash, size_t key_size)
+{
+	int r;
+	if (!strcmp(kdf, CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2)) {
+		struct crypt_pbkdf_type pbkdf = {
+			.type = CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2,
+			.hash = hash,
+			.time_ms = 1000,
+		};
+
+		r = crypt_benchmark_pbkdf(NULL, &pbkdf, "foo", 3, "bar", 3, key_size,
+					&benchmark_callback, &pbkdf);
+		if (r < 0)
+			log_std(_("PBKDF2-%-9s     N/A\n"), hash);
+		else
+			log_std(_("PBKDF2-%-9s %7u iterations per second for %zu-bit key\n"),
+				hash, pbkdf.iterations, key_size * 8);
+	} else {
+		struct crypt_pbkdf_type pbkdf = {
+			.type = kdf,
+			.time_ms = opt_iteration_time ?: DEFAULT_LUKS2_ITER_TIME,
+			.max_memory_kb = opt_pbkdf_memory,
+			.parallel_threads = opt_pbkdf_parallel,
+		};
+
+		r = crypt_benchmark_pbkdf(NULL, &pbkdf, "foo", 3,
+			"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef", 32,
+			key_size, &benchmark_callback, &pbkdf);
+		if (r < 0)
+			log_std(_("%-10s N/A\n"), kdf);
+		else
+			log_std(_("%-10s %4u iterations, %5u memory, "
+				"%1u parallel threads (CPUs) for "
+				"%zu-bit key (requested %u ms time)\n"), kdf,
+				pbkdf.iterations, pbkdf.max_memory_kb, pbkdf.parallel_threads,
+				key_size * 8, pbkdf.time_ms);
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int benchmark_cipher_loop(const char *cipher, const char *cipher_mode,
+				 size_t volume_key_size, size_t iv_size,
+				 double *encryption_mbs, double *decryption_mbs)
+{
+	int r, buffer_size = 1024 * 1024;
+
+	do {
+		r = crypt_benchmark(NULL, cipher, cipher_mode,
+				    volume_key_size, iv_size, buffer_size,
+				    encryption_mbs, decryption_mbs);
+		if (r == -ERANGE) {
+			if (buffer_size < 1024 * 1024 * 65)
+				buffer_size *= 2;
+			else {
+				log_err(_("Result of benchmark is not reliable."));
+				r = -ENOENT;
+			}
+		}
+	} while (r == -ERANGE);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int action_benchmark(void)
+{
+	static struct {
+		const char *cipher;
+		const char *mode;
+		size_t key_size;
+		size_t iv_size;
+	} bciphers[] = {
+		{ "aes",     "cbc", 16, 16 },
+		{ "serpent", "cbc", 16, 16 },
+		{ "twofish", "cbc", 16, 16 },
+		{ "aes",     "cbc", 32, 16 },
+		{ "serpent", "cbc", 32, 16 },
+		{ "twofish", "cbc", 32, 16 },
+		{ "aes",     "xts", 32, 16 },
+		{ "serpent", "xts", 32, 16 },
+		{ "twofish", "xts", 32, 16 },
+		{ "aes",     "xts", 64, 16 },
+		{ "serpent", "xts", 64, 16 },
+		{ "twofish", "xts", 64, 16 },
+		{  NULL, NULL, 0, 0 }
+	};
+	static struct {
+		const char *type;
+		const char *hash;
+	} bkdfs[] = {
+		{ CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2,   "sha1" },
+		{ CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2,   "sha256" },
+		{ CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2,   "sha512" },
+		{ CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2,   "ripemd160" },
+		{ CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2,   "whirlpool" },
+		{ CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2I,  NULL },
+		{ CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2ID, NULL },
+		{ NULL, NULL }
+	};
+	char cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+	double enc_mbr = 0, dec_mbr = 0;
+	int key_size = (opt_key_size ?: DEFAULT_PLAIN_KEYBITS) / 8;
+	int iv_size = 16, skipped = 0, width;
+	char *c;
+	int i, r;
+
+	log_std(_("# Tests are approximate using memory only (no storage IO).\n"));
+	if (opt_pbkdf || opt_hash) {
+		if (!opt_pbkdf && opt_hash)
+			opt_pbkdf = CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2;
+		r = action_benchmark_kdf(opt_pbkdf, opt_hash, key_size);
+	} else if (opt_cipher) {
+		r = crypt_parse_name_and_mode(opt_cipher, cipher, NULL, cipher_mode);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			log_err(_("No known cipher specification pattern detected."));
+			return r;
+		}
+		if ((c  = strchr(cipher_mode, '-')))
+			*c = '\0';
+
+		/* FIXME: not really clever :) */
+		if (strstr(cipher, "des") ||
+		    strstr(cipher, "blowfish") ||
+		    strstr(cipher, "cast5"))
+			iv_size = 8;
+
+		if (!strcmp(cipher_mode, "ecb"))
+			iv_size = 0;
+
+		if (!strcmp(cipher_mode, "adiantum"))
+			iv_size = 32;
+
+		r = benchmark_cipher_loop(cipher, cipher_mode,
+					  key_size, iv_size,
+					  &enc_mbr, &dec_mbr);
+		if (!r) {
+			width = strlen(cipher) + strlen(cipher_mode) + 1;
+			if (width < 11)
+				width = 11;
+			/* TRANSLATORS: The string is header of a table and must be exactly (right side) aligned. */
+			log_std(_("#%*s Algorithm |       Key |      Encryption |      Decryption\n"), width - 11, "");
+			log_std("%*s-%s  %9db  %10.1f MiB/s  %10.1f MiB/s\n", width - (int)strlen(cipher_mode) - 1,
+				cipher, cipher_mode, key_size*8, enc_mbr, dec_mbr);
+		} else if (r == -ENOENT)
+			log_err(_("Cipher %s is not available."), opt_cipher);
+	} else {
+		for (i = 0; bkdfs[i].type; i++) {
+			r = action_benchmark_kdf(bkdfs[i].type, bkdfs[i].hash, key_size);
+			check_signal(&r);
+			if (r == -EINTR)
+				break;
+		}
+
+		for (i = 0; bciphers[i].cipher; i++) {
+			r = benchmark_cipher_loop(bciphers[i].cipher, bciphers[i].mode,
+					    bciphers[i].key_size, bciphers[i].iv_size,
+					    &enc_mbr, &dec_mbr);
+			check_signal(&r);
+			if (r == -ENOTSUP || r == -EINTR)
+				break;
+			if (r == -ENOENT)
+				skipped++;
+			if (i == 0)
+				/* TRANSLATORS: The string is header of a table and must be exactly (right side) aligned. */
+				log_std(_("#     Algorithm |       Key |      Encryption |      Decryption\n"));
+
+			snprintf(cipher, MAX_CIPHER_LEN, "%s-%s",
+				 bciphers[i].cipher, bciphers[i].mode);
+			if (!r)
+				log_std("%15s  %9zub  %10.1f MiB/s  %10.1f MiB/s\n",
+					cipher, bciphers[i].key_size*8, enc_mbr, dec_mbr);
+			else
+				log_std("%15s  %9zub %17s %17s\n", cipher,
+					bciphers[i].key_size*8, _("N/A"), _("N/A"));
+		}
+		if (skipped && skipped == i)
+			r = -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+
+	if (r == -ENOTSUP) {
+		log_err(_("Required kernel crypto interface not available."));
+#ifdef ENABLE_AF_ALG
+		log_err( _("Ensure you have algif_skcipher kernel module loaded."));
+#endif
+	}
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int set_pbkdf_params(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *dev_type)
+{
+	const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf_default;
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_type pbkdf = {};
+
+	pbkdf_default = crypt_get_pbkdf_default(dev_type);
+	if (!pbkdf_default)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	pbkdf.type = opt_pbkdf ?: pbkdf_default->type;
+	pbkdf.hash = opt_hash ?: pbkdf_default->hash;
+	pbkdf.time_ms = (uint32_t)opt_iteration_time ?: pbkdf_default->time_ms;
+	if (strcmp(pbkdf.type, CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2)) {
+		pbkdf.max_memory_kb = opt_pbkdf_memory ?: pbkdf_default->max_memory_kb;
+		pbkdf.parallel_threads = opt_pbkdf_parallel ?: pbkdf_default->parallel_threads;
+	}
+
+	if (opt_pbkdf_iterations) {
+		pbkdf.iterations = opt_pbkdf_iterations;
+		pbkdf.flags |= CRYPT_PBKDF_NO_BENCHMARK;
+	}
+
+	return crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &pbkdf);
+}
+
+static int action_luksRepair(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, action_argv[0])))
+		goto out;
+
+	crypt_set_log_callback(cd, quiet_log, NULL);
+	r = crypt_load(cd, luksType(opt_type), NULL);
+	crypt_set_log_callback(cd, tool_log, NULL);
+	if (r == 0) {
+		log_verbose(_("No known problems detected for LUKS header."));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = tools_detect_signatures(action_argv[0], 1, NULL);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = yesDialog(_("Really try to repair LUKS device header?"),
+		       _("Operation aborted.\n")) ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+	if (r == 0)
+		r = crypt_repair(cd, luksType(opt_type), NULL);
+out:
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _wipe_data_device(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	char tmp_name[64], tmp_path[128], tmp_uuid[40];
+	uuid_t tmp_uuid_bin;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!opt_batch_mode)
+		log_std(_("Wiping device to initialize integrity checksum.\n"
+			"You can interrupt this by pressing CTRL+c "
+			"(rest of not wiped device will contain invalid checksum).\n"));
+
+	/* Activate the device a temporary one */
+	uuid_generate(tmp_uuid_bin);
+	uuid_unparse(tmp_uuid_bin, tmp_uuid);
+	if (snprintf(tmp_name, sizeof(tmp_name), "temporary-cryptsetup-%s", tmp_uuid) < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (snprintf(tmp_path, sizeof(tmp_path), "%s/%s", crypt_get_dir(), tmp_name) < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, tmp_name, NULL, 0,
+		CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	/* Wipe the device */
+	set_int_handler(0);
+	r = crypt_wipe(cd, tmp_path, CRYPT_WIPE_ZERO, 0, 0, DEFAULT_WIPE_BLOCK,
+		       0, &tools_wipe_progress, NULL);
+	if (crypt_deactivate(cd, tmp_name))
+		log_err(_("Cannot deactivate temporary device %s."), tmp_path);
+	set_int_block(0);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int action_luksFormat(void)
+{
+	int r = -EINVAL, keysize, integrity_keysize = 0, fd, created = 0;
+	struct stat st;
+	const char *header_device, *type;
+	char *msg = NULL, *key = NULL, *password = NULL;
+	char cipher [MAX_CIPHER_LEN], cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], integrity[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+	size_t passwordLen, signatures;
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	struct crypt_params_luks1 params1 = {
+		.hash = opt_hash ?: DEFAULT_LUKS1_HASH,
+		.data_alignment = opt_align_payload,
+		.data_device = opt_header_device ? action_argv[0] : NULL,
+	};
+	struct crypt_params_luks2 params2 = {
+		.data_alignment = params1.data_alignment,
+		.data_device = params1.data_device,
+		.sector_size = opt_sector_size,
+		.label = opt_label,
+		.subsystem = opt_subsystem
+	};
+	void *params;
+
+	type = luksType(opt_type);
+	if (!type)
+		type = crypt_get_default_type();
+
+	if (!strcmp(type, CRYPT_LUKS2)) {
+		params = &params2;
+	} else if (!strcmp(type, CRYPT_LUKS1)) {
+		params = &params1;
+
+		if (opt_sector_size > SECTOR_SIZE) {
+			log_err(_("Unsupported encryption sector size."));
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		if (opt_integrity) {
+			log_err(_("Integrity option can be used only for LUKS2 format."));
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		if (opt_luks2_keyslots_size || opt_luks2_metadata_size) {
+			log_err(_("Unsupported LUKS2 metadata size options."));
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	} else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Create header file (must contain at least one sector)? */
+	if (opt_header_device && stat(opt_header_device, &st) < 0 && errno == ENOENT) {
+		if (!opt_batch_mode &&
+		    !yesDialog("Header file does not exist, do you want to create it?",
+			    _("Operation aborted.\n")))
+		    return -EPERM;
+
+		log_dbg("Creating header file.");
+		/* coverity[toctou] */
+		fd = open(opt_header_device, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR);
+		if (fd == -1 || posix_fallocate(fd, 0, 4096))
+			log_err(_("Cannot create header file %s."), opt_header_device);
+		else {
+			r = 0;
+			created = 1;
+		}
+		if (fd != -1)
+			close(fd);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+
+	header_device = opt_header_device ?: action_argv[0];
+
+	r = crypt_parse_name_and_mode(opt_cipher ?: DEFAULT_CIPHER(LUKS1),
+				      cipher, NULL, cipher_mode);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(_("No known cipher specification pattern detected."));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (opt_integrity) {
+		r = crypt_parse_integrity_mode(opt_integrity, integrity, &integrity_keysize);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			log_err(_("No known integrity specification pattern detected."));
+			goto out;
+		}
+		params2.integrity = integrity;
+		/* FIXME: we use default integrity_params (set to NULL) */
+	}
+
+	/* Never call pwquality if using null cipher */
+	if (tools_is_cipher_null(cipher))
+		opt_force_password = 1;
+
+	if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, header_device))) {
+		if (opt_header_device)
+			log_err(_("Cannot use %s as on-disk header."), header_device);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	if (opt_luks2_keyslots_size || opt_luks2_metadata_size) {
+		r = crypt_set_metadata_size(cd, opt_luks2_metadata_size, opt_luks2_keyslots_size);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			log_err(_("Unsupported LUKS2 metadata size options."));
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (opt_offset) {
+		r = crypt_set_data_offset(cd, opt_offset);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Print all present signatures in read-only mode */
+	r = tools_detect_signatures(header_device, 0, &signatures);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!created) {
+		r = asprintf(&msg, _("This will overwrite data on %s irrevocably."), header_device);
+		if (r == -1) {
+			r = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		r = yesDialog(msg, _("Operation aborted.\n")) ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+		free(msg);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_LUKS_ADJUST_XTS_KEYSIZE
+	if (!opt_key_size && !strncmp(cipher_mode, "xts-", 4)) {
+		if (DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS == 128)
+			opt_key_size = 256;
+		else if (DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS == 256)
+			opt_key_size = 512;
+	}
+#endif
+	keysize = (opt_key_size ?: DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS) / 8 + integrity_keysize;
+
+	if (opt_random)
+		crypt_set_rng_type(cd, CRYPT_RNG_RANDOM);
+	else if (opt_urandom)
+		crypt_set_rng_type(cd, CRYPT_RNG_URANDOM);
+
+	r = tools_get_key(NULL, &password, &passwordLen,
+			  opt_keyfile_offset, opt_keyfile_size, opt_key_file,
+			  opt_timeout, _verify_passphrase(1), 1, cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (opt_master_key_file) {
+		r = tools_read_mk(opt_master_key_file, &key, keysize);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = set_pbkdf_params(cd, type);
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(_("Failed to set pbkdf parameters."));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Signature candidates found */
+	if (signatures && ((r =	tools_wipe_all_signatures(header_device)) < 0))
+		goto out;
+
+	r = crypt_format(cd, type, cipher, cipher_mode,
+			 opt_uuid, key, keysize, params);
+	check_signal(&r);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = _set_keyslot_encryption_params(cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, opt_key_slot,
+					    key, keysize,
+					    password, passwordLen);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		(void) tools_wipe_all_signatures(header_device);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	tools_keyslot_msg(r, CREATED);
+
+	if (opt_integrity && !opt_integrity_no_wipe)
+		r = _wipe_data_device(cd);
+out:
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	crypt_safe_free(key);
+	crypt_safe_free(password);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int action_open_luks(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_active_device cad;
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	const char *data_device, *header_device, *activated_name;
+	char *key = NULL;
+	uint32_t activate_flags = 0;
+	int r, keysize, tries;
+	char *password = NULL;
+	size_t passwordLen;
+
+	if (opt_refresh) {
+		activated_name = action_argc > 1 ? action_argv[1] : action_argv[0];
+		r = crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd, activated_name, opt_header_device);
+		if (r)
+			goto out;
+		activate_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH;
+	} else {
+		header_device = uuid_or_device_header(&data_device);
+
+		activated_name = opt_test_passphrase ? NULL : action_argv[1];
+
+		if ((r = crypt_init_data_device(&cd, header_device, data_device)))
+			goto out;
+
+		if ((r = crypt_load(cd, luksType(opt_type), NULL))) {
+			log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."),
+				header_device);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (!data_device && (crypt_get_data_offset(cd) < 8)) {
+			log_err(_("Reduced data offset is allowed only for detached LUKS header."));
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	_set_activation_flags(&activate_flags);
+
+	if (opt_master_key_file) {
+		keysize = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+		r = tools_read_mk(opt_master_key_file, &key, keysize);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+		r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, activated_name,
+						 key, keysize, activate_flags);
+	} else {
+		r = crypt_activate_by_token(cd, activated_name, opt_token, NULL, activate_flags);
+		tools_keyslot_msg(r, UNLOCKED);
+		if (r >= 0 || opt_token_only)
+			goto out;
+
+		tries = (tools_is_stdin(opt_key_file) && isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) ? opt_tries : 1;
+		do {
+			r = tools_get_key(NULL, &password, &passwordLen,
+					opt_keyfile_offset, opt_keyfile_size, opt_key_file,
+					opt_timeout, _verify_passphrase(0), 0, cd);
+			if (r < 0)
+				goto out;
+
+			r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, activated_name,
+				opt_key_slot, password, passwordLen, activate_flags);
+			tools_keyslot_msg(r, UNLOCKED);
+			tools_passphrase_msg(r);
+			check_signal(&r);
+			crypt_safe_free(password);
+			password = NULL;
+		} while ((r == -EPERM || r == -ERANGE) && (--tries > 0));
+	}
+out:
+	if (r >= 0 && opt_persistent &&
+	    (crypt_get_active_device(cd, activated_name, &cad) ||
+	     crypt_persistent_flags_set(cd, CRYPT_FLAGS_ACTIVATION, cad.flags & activate_flags)))
+		log_err(_("Device activated but cannot make flags persistent."));
+
+	crypt_safe_free(key);
+	crypt_safe_free(password);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int verify_keyslot(struct crypt_device *cd, int key_slot, crypt_keyslot_info ki,
+			  char *msg_last, char *msg_pass, char *msg_fail,
+			  const char *key_file, uint64_t keyfile_offset,
+			  int keyfile_size)
+{
+	char *password = NULL;
+	size_t passwordLen;
+	int i, max, r;
+
+	if (ki == CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST && !opt_batch_mode && !key_file &&
+	    msg_last && !yesDialog(msg_last, msg_fail))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	r = tools_get_key(msg_pass, &password, &passwordLen,
+			  keyfile_offset, keyfile_size, key_file, opt_timeout,
+			  _verify_passphrase(0), 0, cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (ki == CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST) {
+		/* check the last keyslot */
+		r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, key_slot,
+						 password, passwordLen, 0);
+	} else {
+		/* try all other keyslots */
+		r = crypt_keyslot_max(crypt_get_type(cd));
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+		max = r;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < max ; i++) {
+			if (i == key_slot)
+				continue;
+			ki = crypt_keyslot_status(cd, i);
+			if (ki == CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE || ki == CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST)
+				r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, i,
+						 password, passwordLen, 0);
+			if (r == i)
+				break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Handle inactive keyslots the same as bad password here */
+	if (r == -ENOENT)
+		r = -EPERM;
+	tools_passphrase_msg(r);
+out:
+	crypt_safe_free(password);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int action_luksKillSlot(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	crypt_keyslot_info ki;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, uuid_or_device_header(NULL))))
+		goto out;
+
+	crypt_set_confirm_callback(cd, yesDialog, NULL);
+
+	if ((r = crypt_load(cd, luksType(opt_type), NULL))) {
+		log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."),
+			uuid_or_device_header(NULL));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ki = crypt_keyslot_status(cd, opt_key_slot);
+	switch (ki) {
+	case CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST:
+	case CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE:
+	case CRYPT_SLOT_UNBOUND:
+		log_verbose(_("Keyslot %d is selected for deletion."), opt_key_slot);
+		break;
+	case CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE:
+		log_err(_("Keyslot %d is not active."), opt_key_slot);
+		/* fall through */
+	case CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID:
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!opt_batch_mode || opt_key_file || !isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) {
+		r = verify_keyslot(cd, opt_key_slot, ki,
+			_("This is the last keyslot. Device will become unusable after purging this key."),
+			_("Enter any remaining passphrase: "),
+			_("Operation aborted, the keyslot was NOT wiped.\n"),
+			opt_key_file, opt_keyfile_offset, opt_keyfile_size);
+		tools_keyslot_msg(r, UNLOCKED);
+
+		if (r == -EPIPE && (!opt_key_file || tools_is_stdin(opt_key_file))) {
+			log_dbg("Failed read from input, ignoring passphrase.");
+			r = 0;
+		}
+
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, opt_key_slot);
+	tools_keyslot_msg(opt_key_slot, REMOVED);
+out:
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int action_luksRemoveKey(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	char *password = NULL;
+	size_t passwordLen;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, uuid_or_device_header(NULL))))
+		goto out;
+
+	crypt_set_confirm_callback(cd, yesDialog, NULL);
+
+	if ((r = crypt_load(cd, luksType(opt_type), NULL))) {
+		log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."),
+			uuid_or_device_header(NULL));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = tools_get_key(_("Enter passphrase to be deleted: "),
+		      &password, &passwordLen,
+		      opt_keyfile_offset, opt_keyfile_size, opt_key_file,
+		      opt_timeout,
+		      _verify_passphrase(0), 0,
+		      cd);
+	if(r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT,
+					 password, passwordLen, 0);
+	tools_passphrase_msg(r);
+	check_signal(&r);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+	tools_keyslot_msg(r, UNLOCKED);
+
+	opt_key_slot = r;
+	log_verbose(_("Key slot %d selected for deletion."), opt_key_slot);
+
+	if (crypt_keyslot_status(cd, opt_key_slot) == CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST &&
+	    !yesDialog(_("This is the last keyslot. "
+			  "Device will become unusable after purging this key."),
+			_("Operation aborted, the keyslot was NOT wiped.\n"))) {
+		r = -EPERM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, opt_key_slot);
+	tools_keyslot_msg(opt_key_slot, REMOVED);
+out:
+	crypt_safe_free(password);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int luksAddUnboundKey(void)
+{
+	int r = -EINVAL, keysize = 0;
+	char *key = NULL;
+	const char *opt_new_key_file = (action_argc > 1 ? action_argv[1] : NULL);
+	char *password_new = NULL;
+	size_t password_new_size = 0;
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+
+	if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, uuid_or_device_header(NULL))))
+		goto out;
+
+	crypt_set_confirm_callback(cd, yesDialog, NULL);
+
+	if ((r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL))) {
+		log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."),
+			uuid_or_device_header(NULL));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = _set_keyslot_encryption_params(cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Never call pwquality if using null cipher */
+	if (tools_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd)))
+		opt_force_password = 1;
+
+	keysize = opt_key_size / 8;
+	r = set_pbkdf_params(cd, crypt_get_type(cd));
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(_("Failed to set pbkdf parameters."));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (opt_master_key_file) {
+		r = tools_read_mk(opt_master_key_file, &key, keysize);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		check_signal(&r);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = tools_get_key(_("Enter new passphrase for key slot: "),
+			  &password_new, &password_new_size,
+			  opt_new_keyfile_offset, opt_new_keyfile_size,
+			  opt_new_key_file, opt_timeout,
+			  _verify_passphrase(1), 1, cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_key(cd, opt_key_slot, key, keysize,
+			password_new, password_new_size, CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT);
+	tools_keyslot_msg(r, CREATED);
+out:
+	crypt_safe_free(password_new);
+	crypt_safe_free(key);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int action_luksAddKey(void)
+{
+	int r = -EINVAL, keysize = 0;
+	char *key = NULL;
+	const char *opt_new_key_file = (action_argc > 1 ? action_argv[1] : NULL);
+	char *password = NULL, *password_new = NULL;
+	size_t password_size = 0, password_new_size = 0;
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+
+	/* Unbound keyslot (no assigned data segment) is special case */
+	if (opt_unbound)
+		return luksAddUnboundKey();
+
+	if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, uuid_or_device_header(NULL))))
+		goto out;
+
+	crypt_set_confirm_callback(cd, yesDialog, NULL);
+
+	if ((r = crypt_load(cd, luksType(opt_type), NULL))) {
+		log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."),
+			uuid_or_device_header(NULL));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = _set_keyslot_encryption_params(cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Never call pwquality if using null cipher */
+	if (tools_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd)))
+		opt_force_password = 1;
+
+	keysize = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+	r = set_pbkdf_params(cd, crypt_get_type(cd));
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(_("Failed to set pbkdf parameters."));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (opt_master_key_file) {
+		r = tools_read_mk(opt_master_key_file, &key, keysize);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		r = crypt_volume_key_verify(cd, key, keysize);
+		check_signal(&r);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		r = tools_get_key(_("Enter new passphrase for key slot: "),
+				  &password_new, &password_new_size,
+				  opt_new_keyfile_offset, opt_new_keyfile_size,
+				  opt_new_key_file, opt_timeout,
+				  _verify_passphrase(1), 1, cd);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, opt_key_slot, key, keysize,
+						    password_new, password_new_size);
+	} else if (opt_key_file && !tools_is_stdin(opt_key_file) &&
+		   opt_new_key_file && !tools_is_stdin(opt_new_key_file)) {
+		r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, opt_key_slot,
+			opt_key_file, opt_keyfile_size, opt_keyfile_offset,
+			opt_new_key_file, opt_new_keyfile_size, opt_new_keyfile_offset);
+		tools_passphrase_msg(r);
+	} else {
+		r = tools_get_key(_("Enter any existing passphrase: "),
+			      &password, &password_size,
+			      opt_keyfile_offset, opt_keyfile_size, opt_key_file,
+			      opt_timeout, _verify_passphrase(0), 0, cd);
+
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		/* Check password before asking for new one */
+		r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT,
+						 password, password_size, 0);
+		check_signal(&r);
+		tools_passphrase_msg(r);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+		tools_keyslot_msg(r, UNLOCKED);
+
+		r = tools_get_key(_("Enter new passphrase for key slot: "),
+				  &password_new, &password_new_size,
+				  opt_new_keyfile_offset, opt_new_keyfile_size, opt_new_key_file,
+				  opt_timeout, _verify_passphrase(1), 1, cd);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase(cd, opt_key_slot,
+						    password, password_size,
+						    password_new, password_new_size);
+	}
+out:
+	tools_keyslot_msg(r, CREATED);
+	crypt_safe_free(password);
+	crypt_safe_free(password_new);
+	crypt_safe_free(key);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int action_luksChangeKey(void)
+{
+	const char *opt_new_key_file = (action_argc > 1 ? action_argv[1] : NULL);
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	char *password = NULL, *password_new = NULL;
+	size_t password_size = 0, password_new_size = 0;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, uuid_or_device_header(NULL))))
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((r = crypt_load(cd, luksType(opt_type), NULL))) {
+		log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."),
+			uuid_or_device_header(NULL));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = _set_keyslot_encryption_params(cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Never call pwquality if using null cipher */
+	if (tools_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd)))
+		opt_force_password = 1;
+
+	r = set_pbkdf_params(cd, crypt_get_type(cd));
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(_("Failed to set pbkdf parameters."));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = tools_get_key(_("Enter passphrase to be changed: "),
+		      &password, &password_size,
+		      opt_keyfile_offset, opt_keyfile_size, opt_key_file,
+		      opt_timeout, _verify_passphrase(0), 0, cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Check password before asking for new one */
+	r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, opt_key_slot,
+					 password, password_size, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY);
+	tools_passphrase_msg(r);
+	check_signal(&r);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+	tools_keyslot_msg(r, UNLOCKED);
+
+	r = tools_get_key(_("Enter new passphrase: "),
+			  &password_new, &password_new_size,
+			  opt_new_keyfile_offset, opt_new_keyfile_size,
+			  opt_new_key_file,
+			  opt_timeout, _verify_passphrase(1), 1, cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase(cd, opt_key_slot, opt_key_slot,
+		password, password_size, password_new, password_new_size);
+	tools_keyslot_msg(r, CREATED);
+out:
+	crypt_safe_free(password);
+	crypt_safe_free(password_new);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int action_luksConvertKey(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	char *password = NULL;
+	size_t password_size = 0;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, uuid_or_device_header(NULL))))
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL))) {
+		log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."),
+			uuid_or_device_header(NULL));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = _set_keyslot_encryption_params(cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (crypt_keyslot_status(cd, opt_key_slot) == CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE) {
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		log_err(_("Keyslot %d is not active."), opt_key_slot);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = set_pbkdf_params(cd, crypt_get_type(cd));
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(_("Failed to set pbkdf parameters."));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = tools_get_key(_("Enter passphrase for keyslot to be converted: "),
+		      &password, &password_size,
+		      opt_keyfile_offset, opt_keyfile_size, opt_key_file,
+		      opt_timeout, _verify_passphrase(0), 0, cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase(cd, opt_key_slot, opt_key_slot,
+			password, password_size, password, password_size);
+	tools_passphrase_msg(r);
+	tools_keyslot_msg(r, CREATED);
+out:
+	crypt_safe_free(password);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int action_isLuks(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	/* FIXME: argc > max should be checked for other operations as well */
+	if (action_argc > 1) {
+		log_err(_("Only one device argument for isLuks operation is supported."));
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, uuid_or_device_header(NULL))))
+		goto out;
+
+	crypt_set_log_callback(cd, quiet_log, NULL);
+	r = crypt_load(cd, luksType(opt_type), NULL);
+out:
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int action_luksUUID(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	const char *existing_uuid = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, uuid_or_device_header(NULL))))
+		goto out;
+
+	crypt_set_confirm_callback(cd, yesDialog, _("Operation aborted.\n"));
+
+	if ((r = crypt_load(cd, luksType(opt_type), NULL)))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (opt_uuid)
+		r = crypt_set_uuid(cd, opt_uuid);
+	else {
+		existing_uuid = crypt_get_uuid(cd);
+		log_std("%s\n", existing_uuid ?: "");
+		r = existing_uuid ? 0 : 1;
+	}
+out:
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int luksDump_with_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	char *vk = NULL, *password = NULL;
+	size_t passwordLen = 0;
+	size_t vk_size;
+	unsigned i;
+	int r;
+
+	crypt_set_confirm_callback(cd, yesDialog, NULL);
+	if (!yesDialog(
+	    _("Header dump with volume key is sensitive information\n"
+	      "which allows access to encrypted partition without passphrase.\n"
+	      "This dump should be always stored encrypted on safe place."),
+	      NULL))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	vk_size = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+	vk = crypt_safe_alloc(vk_size);
+	if (!vk)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	r = tools_get_key(NULL, &password, &passwordLen,
+			  opt_keyfile_offset, opt_keyfile_size, opt_key_file,
+			  opt_timeout, 0, 0, cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = crypt_volume_key_get(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, vk, &vk_size,
+				 password, passwordLen);
+	tools_passphrase_msg(r);
+	check_signal(&r);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+	tools_keyslot_msg(r, UNLOCKED);
+
+	if (opt_master_key_file) {
+		r = tools_write_mk(opt_master_key_file, vk, vk_size);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	log_std("LUKS header information for %s\n", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+	log_std("Cipher name:   \t%s\n", crypt_get_cipher(cd));
+	log_std("Cipher mode:   \t%s\n", crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd));
+	log_std("Payload offset:\t%d\n", (int)crypt_get_data_offset(cd));
+	log_std("UUID:          \t%s\n", crypt_get_uuid(cd));
+	log_std("MK bits:       \t%d\n", (int)vk_size * 8);
+	if (opt_master_key_file) {
+		log_std("Key stored to file %s.\n", opt_master_key_file);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	log_std("MK dump:\t");
+
+	for(i = 0; i < vk_size; i++) {
+		if (i && !(i % 16))
+			log_std("\n\t\t");
+		log_std("%02hhx ", (char)vk[i]);
+	}
+	log_std("\n");
+
+out:
+	crypt_safe_free(password);
+	crypt_safe_free(vk);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int action_luksDump(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, uuid_or_device_header(NULL))))
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((r = crypt_load(cd, luksType(opt_type), NULL))) {
+		log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."),
+			uuid_or_device_header(NULL));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (opt_dump_master_key)
+		r = luksDump_with_volume_key(cd);
+	else
+		r = crypt_dump(cd);
+out:
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int action_luksSuspend(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	r = crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd, action_argv[0], uuid_or_device(opt_header_device));
+	if (!r)
+		r = crypt_suspend(cd, action_argv[0]);
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int action_luksResume(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	char *password = NULL;
+	size_t passwordLen;
+	int r, tries;
+
+	if ((r = crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd, action_argv[0], uuid_or_device(opt_header_device))))
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((r = crypt_load(cd, luksType(opt_type), NULL)))
+		goto out;
+
+	tries = (tools_is_stdin(opt_key_file) && isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) ? opt_tries : 1;
+	do {
+		r = tools_get_key(NULL, &password, &passwordLen,
+			opt_keyfile_offset, opt_keyfile_size, opt_key_file,
+			opt_timeout, _verify_passphrase(0), 0, cd);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		r = crypt_resume_by_passphrase(cd, action_argv[0], CRYPT_ANY_SLOT,
+					       password, passwordLen);
+		tools_passphrase_msg(r);
+		check_signal(&r);
+		tools_keyslot_msg(r, UNLOCKED);
+
+		crypt_safe_free(password);
+		password = NULL;
+	} while ((r == -EPERM || r == -ERANGE) && (--tries > 0));
+out:
+	crypt_safe_free(password);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int action_luksBackup(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!opt_header_backup_file) {
+		log_err(_("Option --header-backup-file is required."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, uuid_or_device_header(NULL))))
+		goto out;
+
+	crypt_set_confirm_callback(cd, yesDialog, NULL);
+
+	r = crypt_header_backup(cd, NULL, opt_header_backup_file);
+out:
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int action_luksRestore(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	int r = 0;
+
+	if (!opt_header_backup_file) {
+		log_err(_("Option --header-backup-file is required."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, uuid_or_device_header(NULL))))
+		goto out;
+
+	crypt_set_confirm_callback(cd, yesDialog, NULL);
+	r = crypt_header_restore(cd, NULL, opt_header_backup_file);
+out:
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static const char *_get_device_type(void)
+{
+	const char *type, *name = NULL;
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+
+	if (action_argc > 1)
+		name = action_argv[1];
+	else if (action_argc == 1)
+		name = action_argv[0];
+
+	if (crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd, name, opt_header_device))
+		return NULL;
+
+	type = crypt_get_type(cd);
+	if (!type) {
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		log_err(_("%s is not cryptsetup managed device."), name);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!strncmp(type, "LUKS", 4))
+		type = "luks";
+	else if (!strcmp(type, CRYPT_PLAIN))
+		type = "plain";
+	else if (!strcmp(type, CRYPT_LOOPAES))
+		type = "loopaes";
+	else {
+		log_err(_("Refresh is not supported for device type %s"), type);
+		type = NULL;
+	}
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	return type;
+}
+
+static int action_open(void)
+{
+	if (opt_refresh && !opt_type)
+		/* read device type from active mapping */
+		opt_type = _get_device_type();
+
+	if (!opt_type)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(opt_type, "luks") ||
+	    !strcmp(opt_type, "luks1") ||
+	    !strcmp(opt_type, "luks2")) {
+		if (action_argc < 2 && (!opt_test_passphrase && !opt_refresh))
+			goto args;
+		return action_open_luks();
+	} else if (!strcmp(opt_type, "plain")) {
+		if (action_argc < 2 && !opt_refresh)
+			goto args;
+		return action_open_plain();
+	} else if (!strcmp(opt_type, "loopaes")) {
+		if (action_argc < 2 && !opt_refresh)
+			goto args;
+		return action_open_loopaes();
+	} else if (!strcmp(opt_type, "tcrypt")) {
+		if (action_argc < 2 && !opt_test_passphrase)
+			goto args;
+		return action_open_tcrypt();
+	}
+
+	log_err(_("Unrecognized metadata device type %s."), opt_type);
+	return -EINVAL;
+args:
+	log_err(_("Command requires device and mapped name as arguments."));
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int action_luksErase(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	crypt_keyslot_info ki;
+	char *msg = NULL;
+	int i, max, r;
+
+	if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, uuid_or_device_header(NULL))))
+		goto out;
+
+	crypt_set_confirm_callback(cd, yesDialog, NULL);
+
+	if ((r = crypt_load(cd, luksType(opt_type), NULL))) {
+		log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."),
+			uuid_or_device_header(NULL));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if(asprintf(&msg, _("This operation will erase all keyslots on device %s.\n"
+			    "Device will become unusable after this operation."),
+			    uuid_or_device_header(NULL)) == -1) {
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!yesDialog(msg, _("Operation aborted, keyslots were NOT wiped.\n"))) {
+		r = -EPERM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Safety check */
+	max = crypt_keyslot_max(crypt_get_type(cd));
+	if (max <= 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < max; i++) {
+		ki = crypt_keyslot_status(cd, i);
+		if (ki == CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE || ki == CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST) {
+			r = crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, i);
+			if (r < 0)
+				goto out;
+			tools_keyslot_msg(i, REMOVED);
+		}
+	}
+out:
+	free(msg);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int action_luksConvert(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	char *msg = NULL;
+	const char *to_type, *from_type;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!strcmp(opt_type, "luks2")) {
+		to_type = CRYPT_LUKS2;
+	} else if (!strcmp(opt_type, "luks1")) {
+		to_type = CRYPT_LUKS1;
+	} else {
+		log_err(_("Invalid LUKS type, only luks1 and luks2 are supported."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, uuid_or_device_header(NULL))))
+		return r;
+
+	crypt_set_confirm_callback(cd, yesDialog, NULL);
+
+	if ((r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL)) ||
+	    !(from_type = crypt_get_type(cd))) {
+		log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."),
+			uuid_or_device_header(NULL));
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	if (!strcmp(from_type, to_type)) {
+		log_err(_("Device is already %s type."), to_type);
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (asprintf(&msg, _("This operation will convert %s to %s format.\n"),
+			    uuid_or_device_header(NULL), to_type) == -1) {
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (yesDialog(msg, _("Operation aborted, device was NOT converted.\n")))
+		r = crypt_convert(cd, to_type, NULL);
+	else
+		r = -EPERM;
+
+	free(msg);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _config_priority(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	crypt_keyslot_info cs;
+	crypt_keyslot_priority priority = CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_INVALID;
+
+	if (!strcmp("normal", opt_priority))
+		priority = CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_NORMAL;
+	else if (!strcmp("prefer", opt_priority))
+		priority = CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_PREFER;
+	else if (!strcmp("ignore", opt_priority))
+		priority = CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_IGNORE;
+
+	cs = crypt_keyslot_status(cd, opt_key_slot);
+	if (cs != CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID)
+		return crypt_keyslot_set_priority(cd, opt_key_slot, priority);
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int _config_labels(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	return crypt_set_label(cd, opt_label, opt_subsystem);
+}
+
+static int action_luksConfig(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!opt_priority && !opt_label && !opt_subsystem) {
+		log_err(_("Option --priority, --label or --subsystem is missing."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, uuid_or_device_header(NULL))))
+		return r;
+
+	if ((r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL))) {
+		log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."),
+			uuid_or_device_header(NULL));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (opt_priority && (r = _config_priority(cd)))
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((opt_label || opt_subsystem) && (r = _config_labels(cd)))
+		goto out;
+out:
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _token_add(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	int r, token;
+	crypt_token_info token_info;
+	const struct crypt_token_params_luks2_keyring params = {
+		.key_description = opt_key_description
+	};
+
+	if (opt_token != CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN) {
+		token_info = crypt_token_status(cd, opt_token, NULL);
+		if (token_info < CRYPT_TOKEN_INACTIVE) {
+			log_err(_("Token %d is invalid."), opt_token);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		} else if (token_info > CRYPT_TOKEN_INACTIVE) {
+			log_err(_("Token %d in use."), opt_token);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_token_luks2_keyring_set(cd, opt_token, &params);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(_("Failed to add luks2-keyring token %d."), opt_token);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	token = r;
+	tools_token_msg(token, CREATED);
+
+	r = crypt_token_assign_keyslot(cd, token, opt_key_slot);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(_("Failed to assign token %d to keyslot %d."), token, opt_key_slot);
+		(void) crypt_token_json_set(cd, token, NULL);
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _token_remove(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	crypt_token_info token_info;
+	int r;
+
+	token_info = crypt_token_status(cd, opt_token, NULL);
+	if (token_info < CRYPT_TOKEN_INACTIVE) {
+		log_err(_("Token %d is invalid."), opt_token);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	} else if (token_info == CRYPT_TOKEN_INACTIVE) {
+		log_err(_("Token %d is not in use."), opt_token);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_token_json_set(cd, opt_token, NULL);
+	tools_token_msg(r, REMOVED);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _token_import(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	char *json;
+	size_t json_length;
+	crypt_token_info token_info;
+	int r, token;
+
+	if (opt_token != CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN) {
+		token_info = crypt_token_status(cd, opt_token, NULL);
+		if (token_info < CRYPT_TOKEN_INACTIVE) {
+			log_err(_("Token %d is invalid."), opt_token);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		} else if (token_info > CRYPT_TOKEN_INACTIVE) {
+			log_err(_("Token %d in use."), opt_token);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	r = tools_read_json_file(cd, opt_json_file, &json, &json_length);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	r = crypt_token_json_set(cd, opt_token, json);
+	free(json);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(_("Failed to import token from file."));
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	token = r;
+	tools_token_msg(token, CREATED);
+
+	if (opt_key_slot != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT) {
+		r = crypt_token_assign_keyslot(cd, token, opt_key_slot);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			log_err(_("Failed to assign token %d to keyslot %d."), token, opt_key_slot);
+			(void) crypt_token_json_set(cd, token, NULL);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _token_export(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	const char *json;
+	int r;
+
+	r = crypt_token_json_get(cd, opt_token, &json);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(_("Failed to get token %d for export."), opt_token);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	return tools_write_json_file(cd, opt_json_file, json);
+}
+
+static int action_token(void)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	enum { ADD = 0, REMOVE, IMPORT, EXPORT } action;
+
+	if (!strcmp(action_argv[0], "add")) {
+		if (!opt_key_description) {
+			log_err(_("--key-description parameter is mandatory for token add action."));
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		action = ADD;
+	} else if (!strcmp(action_argv[0], "remove")) {
+		if (opt_token == CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN) {
+			log_err(_("Action requires specific token. Use --token-id parameter."));
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		action = REMOVE;
+	} else if (!strcmp(action_argv[0], "import")) {
+		action = IMPORT;
+	} else if (!strcmp(action_argv[0], "export")) {
+		if (opt_token == CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN) {
+			log_err(_("Action requires specific token. Use --token-id parameter."));
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		action = EXPORT;
+	} else {
+		log_err(_("Invalid token operation %s."), action_argv[0]);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, uuid_or_device(opt_header_device ?: action_argv[1]))))
+		return r;
+
+	if ((r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL))) {
+		log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."),
+			uuid_or_device(opt_header_device ?: action_argv[1]));
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	if (action == ADD)
+		r = _token_add(cd); /* adds only luks2-keyring type */
+	else if (action == REMOVE)
+		r = _token_remove(cd);
+	else if (action == IMPORT)
+		r = _token_import(cd);
+	else if (action == EXPORT)
+		r = _token_export(cd);
+	else {
+		log_dbg("Internal token action error.");
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static struct action_type {
+	const char *type;
+	int (*handler)(void);
+	int required_action_argc;
+	int required_memlock;
+	const char *arg_desc;
+	const char *desc;
+} action_types[] = {
+	{ "open",         action_open,         1, 1, N_("<device> [--type <type>] [<name>]"),N_("open device as mapping <name>") },
+	{ "close",        action_close,        1, 1, N_("<name>"), N_("close device (remove mapping)") },
+	{ "resize",       action_resize,       1, 1, N_("<name>"), N_("resize active device") },
+	{ "status",       action_status,       1, 0, N_("<name>"), N_("show device status") },
+	{ "benchmark",    action_benchmark,    0, 0, N_("[--cipher <cipher>]"), N_("benchmark cipher") },
+	{ "repair",       action_luksRepair,   1, 1, N_("<device>"), N_("try to repair on-disk metadata") },
+	{ "erase",        action_luksErase ,   1, 1, N_("<device>"), N_("erase all keyslots (remove encryption key)") },
+	{ "convert",      action_luksConvert,  1, 1, N_("<device>"), N_("convert LUKS from/to LUKS2 format") },
+	{ "config",       action_luksConfig,   1, 1, N_("<device>"), N_("set permanent configuration options for LUKS2") },
+	{ "luksFormat",   action_luksFormat,   1, 1, N_("<device> [<new key file>]"), N_("formats a LUKS device") },
+	{ "luksAddKey",   action_luksAddKey,   1, 1, N_("<device> [<new key file>]"), N_("add key to LUKS device") },
+	{ "luksRemoveKey",action_luksRemoveKey,1, 1, N_("<device> [<key file>]"), N_("removes supplied key or key file from LUKS device") },
+	{ "luksChangeKey",action_luksChangeKey,1, 1, N_("<device> [<key file>]"), N_("changes supplied key or key file of LUKS device") },
+	{ "luksConvertKey",action_luksConvertKey,1, 1, N_("<device> [<key file>]"), N_("converts a key to new pbkdf parameters") },
+	{ "luksKillSlot", action_luksKillSlot, 2, 1, N_("<device> <key slot>"), N_("wipes key with number <key slot> from LUKS device") },
+	{ "luksUUID",     action_luksUUID,     1, 0, N_("<device>"), N_("print UUID of LUKS device") },
+	{ "isLuks",       action_isLuks,       1, 0, N_("<device>"), N_("tests <device> for LUKS partition header") },
+	{ "luksDump",     action_luksDump,     1, 1, N_("<device>"), N_("dump LUKS partition information") },
+	{ "tcryptDump",   action_tcryptDump,   1, 1, N_("<device>"), N_("dump TCRYPT device information") },
+	{ "luksSuspend",  action_luksSuspend,  1, 1, N_("<device>"), N_("Suspend LUKS device and wipe key (all IOs are frozen)") },
+	{ "luksResume",   action_luksResume,   1, 1, N_("<device>"), N_("Resume suspended LUKS device") },
+	{ "luksHeaderBackup", action_luksBackup,1,1, N_("<device>"), N_("Backup LUKS device header and keyslots") },
+	{ "luksHeaderRestore",action_luksRestore,1,1,N_("<device>"), N_("Restore LUKS device header and keyslots") },
+	{ "token",	  action_token,	       2, 0, N_("<add|remove|import|export> <device>"), N_("Manipulate LUKS2 tokens") },
+	{}
+};
+
+static void help(poptContext popt_context,
+		 enum poptCallbackReason reason __attribute__((unused)),
+		 struct poptOption *key,
+		 const char *arg __attribute__((unused)),
+		 void *data __attribute__((unused)))
+{
+	if (key->shortName == '?') {
+		struct action_type *action;
+		const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf_luks1, *pbkdf_luks2;
+
+		log_std("%s\n",PACKAGE_STRING);
+
+		poptPrintHelp(popt_context, stdout, 0);
+
+		log_std(_("\n"
+			 "<action> is one of:\n"));
+
+		for(action = action_types; action->type; action++)
+			log_std("\t%s %s - %s\n", action->type, _(action->arg_desc), _(action->desc));
+
+		log_std(_("\n"
+			  "You can also use old <action> syntax aliases:\n"
+			  "\topen: create (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen\n"
+			  "\tclose: remove (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tcryptClose\n"));
+		log_std(_("\n"
+			 "<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+			 "<device> is the encrypted device\n"
+			 "<key slot> is the LUKS key slot number to modify\n"
+			 "<key file> optional key file for the new key for luksAddKey action\n"),
+			crypt_get_dir());
+
+		log_std(_("\nDefault compiled-in metadata format is %s (for luksFormat action).\n"),
+			  crypt_get_default_type());
+
+		pbkdf_luks1 = crypt_get_pbkdf_default(CRYPT_LUKS1);
+		pbkdf_luks2 = crypt_get_pbkdf_default(CRYPT_LUKS2);
+		log_std(_("\nDefault compiled-in key and passphrase parameters:\n"
+			 "\tMaximum keyfile size: %dkB, "
+			 "Maximum interactive passphrase length %d (characters)\n"
+			 "Default PBKDF for LUKS1: %s, iteration time: %d (ms)\n"
+			 "Default PBKDF for LUKS2: %s\n"
+			 "\tIteration time: %d, Memory required: %dkB, Parallel threads: %d\n"),
+			 DEFAULT_KEYFILE_SIZE_MAXKB, DEFAULT_PASSPHRASE_SIZE_MAX,
+			 pbkdf_luks1->type,  pbkdf_luks1->time_ms,
+			 pbkdf_luks2->type, pbkdf_luks2->time_ms, pbkdf_luks2->max_memory_kb,
+			 pbkdf_luks2->parallel_threads);
+
+		log_std(_("\nDefault compiled-in device cipher parameters:\n"
+			 "\tloop-AES: %s, Key %d bits\n"
+			 "\tplain: %s, Key: %d bits, Password hashing: %s\n"
+			 "\tLUKS: %s, Key: %d bits, LUKS header hashing: %s, RNG: %s\n"),
+			 DEFAULT_LOOPAES_CIPHER, DEFAULT_LOOPAES_KEYBITS,
+			 DEFAULT_CIPHER(PLAIN), DEFAULT_PLAIN_KEYBITS, DEFAULT_PLAIN_HASH,
+			 DEFAULT_CIPHER(LUKS1), DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS, DEFAULT_LUKS1_HASH,
+			 DEFAULT_RNG);
+#if defined(ENABLE_LUKS_ADJUST_XTS_KEYSIZE) && DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS != 512
+		log_std(_("\tLUKS: Default keysize with XTS mode (two internal keys) will be doubled.\n"));
+#endif
+		exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+	} else
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_SUCCESS, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+static void help_args(struct action_type *action, poptContext popt_context)
+{
+	char buf[128];
+
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), _("%s: requires %s as arguments"), action->type, action->arg_desc);
+	usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, buf, poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+}
+
+static int run_action(struct action_type *action)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	log_dbg("Running command %s.", action->type);
+
+	if (action->required_memlock)
+		crypt_memory_lock(NULL, 1);
+
+	set_int_handler(0);
+	r = action->handler();
+
+	if (action->required_memlock)
+		crypt_memory_lock(NULL, 0);
+
+	/* Some functions returns keyslot # */
+	if (r > 0)
+		r = 0;
+	check_signal(&r);
+
+	show_status(r);
+	return translate_errno(r);
+}
+
+static int strcmp_or_null(const char *str, const char *expected)
+{
+	return !str ? 0 : strcmp(str, expected);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+	static char *popt_tmp;
+	static struct poptOption popt_help_options[] = {
+		{ NULL,    '\0', POPT_ARG_CALLBACK, help, 0, NULL,                         NULL },
+		{ "help",  '?',  POPT_ARG_NONE,     NULL, 0, N_("Show this help message"), NULL },
+		{ "usage", '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE,     NULL, 0, N_("Display brief usage"),    NULL },
+		POPT_TABLEEND
+	};
+	static struct poptOption popt_options[] = {
+		{ NULL,                '\0', POPT_ARG_INCLUDE_TABLE, popt_help_options, 0, N_("Help options:"), NULL },
+		{ "version",           '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_version_mode,          0, N_("Print package version"), NULL },
+		{ "verbose",           'v',  POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_verbose,               0, N_("Shows more detailed error messages"), NULL },
+		{ "debug",             '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_debug,                 0, N_("Show debug messages"), NULL },
+		{ "debug-json",        '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_debug_json,            0, N_("Show debug messages including JSON metadata"), NULL },
+		{ "cipher",            'c',  POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_cipher,              0, N_("The cipher used to encrypt the disk (see /proc/crypto)"), NULL },
+		{ "hash",              'h',  POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_hash,                0, N_("The hash used to create the encryption key from the passphrase"), NULL },
+		{ "verify-passphrase", 'y',  POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_verify_passphrase,     0, N_("Verifies the passphrase by asking for it twice"), NULL },
+		{ "key-file",          'd',  POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_key_file,            6, N_("Read the key from a file"), NULL },
+		{ "master-key-file",  '\0',  POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_master_key_file,     0, N_("Read the volume (master) key from file."), NULL },
+		{ "dump-master-key",  '\0',  POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_dump_master_key,       0, N_("Dump volume (master) key instead of keyslots info"), NULL },
+		{ "key-size",          's',  POPT_ARG_INT, &opt_key_size,               0, N_("The size of the encryption key"), N_("BITS") },
+		{ "keyfile-size",      'l',  POPT_ARG_LONG, &opt_keyfile_size,          0, N_("Limits the read from keyfile"), N_("bytes") },
+		{ "keyfile-offset",   '\0',  POPT_ARG_STRING, &popt_tmp,                4, N_("Number of bytes to skip in keyfile"), N_("bytes") },
+		{ "new-keyfile-size", '\0',  POPT_ARG_LONG, &opt_new_keyfile_size,      0, N_("Limits the read from newly added keyfile"), N_("bytes") },
+		{ "new-keyfile-offset",'\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, &popt_tmp,                5, N_("Number of bytes to skip in newly added keyfile"), N_("bytes") },
+		{ "key-slot",          'S',  POPT_ARG_INT, &opt_key_slot,               0, N_("Slot number for new key (default is first free)"), NULL },
+		{ "size",              'b',  POPT_ARG_STRING, &popt_tmp,                1, N_("The size of the device"), N_("SECTORS") },
+		{ "offset",            'o',  POPT_ARG_STRING, &popt_tmp,                2, N_("The start offset in the backend device"), N_("SECTORS") },
+		{ "skip",              'p',  POPT_ARG_STRING, &popt_tmp,                3, N_("How many sectors of the encrypted data to skip at the beginning"), N_("SECTORS") },
+		{ "readonly",          'r',  POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_readonly,              0, N_("Create a readonly mapping"), NULL },
+		{ "batch-mode",        'q',  POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_batch_mode,            0, N_("Do not ask for confirmation"), NULL },
+		{ "timeout",           't',  POPT_ARG_INT, &opt_timeout,                0, N_("Timeout for interactive passphrase prompt (in seconds)"), N_("secs") },
+		{ "progress-frequency",'\0', POPT_ARG_INT, &opt_progress_frequency,     0, N_("Progress line update (in seconds)"), N_("secs") },
+		{ "tries",             'T',  POPT_ARG_INT, &opt_tries,                  0, N_("How often the input of the passphrase can be retried"), NULL },
+		{ "align-payload",     '\0', POPT_ARG_INT, &opt_align_payload,          0, N_("Align payload at <n> sector boundaries - for luksFormat"), N_("SECTORS") },
+		{ "header-backup-file",'\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_header_backup_file,  0, N_("File with LUKS header and keyslots backup"), NULL },
+		{ "use-random",        '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_random,                0, N_("Use /dev/random for generating volume key"), NULL },
+		{ "use-urandom",       '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_urandom,               0, N_("Use /dev/urandom for generating volume key"), NULL },
+		{ "shared",            '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_shared,                0, N_("Share device with another non-overlapping crypt segment"), NULL },
+		{ "uuid",              '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_uuid,                0, N_("UUID for device to use"), NULL },
+		{ "allow-discards",    '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_allow_discards,        0, N_("Allow discards (aka TRIM) requests for device"), NULL },
+		{ "header",            '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_header_device,       0, N_("Device or file with separated LUKS header"), NULL },
+		{ "test-passphrase",   '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_test_passphrase,       0, N_("Do not activate device, just check passphrase"), NULL },
+		{ "tcrypt-hidden",     '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_tcrypt_hidden,         0, N_("Use hidden header (hidden TCRYPT device)"), NULL },
+		{ "tcrypt-system",     '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_tcrypt_system,         0, N_("Device is system TCRYPT drive (with bootloader)"), NULL },
+		{ "tcrypt-backup",     '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_tcrypt_backup,         0, N_("Use backup (secondary) TCRYPT header"), NULL },
+		{ "veracrypt",         '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_veracrypt,             0, N_("Scan also for VeraCrypt compatible device"), NULL },
+		{ "veracrypt-pim",     '\0', POPT_ARG_INT, &opt_veracrypt_pim,          0, N_("Personal Iteration Multiplier for VeraCrypt compatible device"), NULL },
+		{ "veracrypt-query-pim", '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_veracrypt_query_pim, 0, N_("Query Personal Iteration Multiplier for VeraCrypt compatible device"), NULL },
+		{ "type",               'M', POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_type,                0, N_("Type of device metadata: luks, plain, loopaes, tcrypt"), NULL },
+		{ "force-password",    '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_force_password,        0, N_("Disable password quality check (if enabled)"), NULL },
+		{ "perf-same_cpu_crypt",'\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_perf_same_cpu_crypt,  0, N_("Use dm-crypt same_cpu_crypt performance compatibility option"), NULL },
+		{ "perf-submit_from_crypt_cpus",'\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_perf_submit_from_crypt_cpus,0,N_("Use dm-crypt submit_from_crypt_cpus performance compatibility option"), NULL },
+		{ "deferred",          '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_deferred_remove,       0, N_("Device removal is deferred until the last user closes it"), NULL },
+		{ "iter-time",         'i',  POPT_ARG_INT, &opt_iteration_time,         0, N_("PBKDF iteration time for LUKS (in ms)"), N_("msecs") },
+		{ "pbkdf",             '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_pbkdf,               0, N_("PBKDF algorithm (for LUKS2): argon2i, argon2id, pbkdf2"), NULL },
+		{ "pbkdf-memory",      '\0', POPT_ARG_LONG, &opt_pbkdf_memory,          0, N_("PBKDF memory cost limit"), N_("kilobytes") },
+		{ "pbkdf-parallel",    '\0', POPT_ARG_LONG, &opt_pbkdf_parallel,        0, N_("PBKDF parallel cost"), N_("threads") },
+		{ "pbkdf-force-iterations",'\0',POPT_ARG_LONG, &opt_pbkdf_iterations,   0, N_("PBKDF iterations cost (forced, disables benchmark)"), NULL },
+		{ "priority",          '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_priority,            0, N_("Keyslot priority: ignore, normal, prefer"), NULL },
+		{ "disable-locks",     '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_disable_locks,         0, N_("Disable locking of on-disk metadata"), NULL },
+		{ "disable-keyring",   '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_disable_keyring,       0, N_("Disable loading volume keys via kernel keyring"), NULL },
+		{ "integrity",          'I', POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_integrity,           0, N_("Data integrity algorithm (LUKS2 only)"), NULL },
+		{ "integrity-no-journal",'\0',POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_integrity_nojournal,  0, N_("Disable journal for integrity device"), NULL },
+		{ "integrity-no-wipe", '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_integrity_no_wipe,     0, N_("Do not wipe device after format"), NULL },
+		{ "token-only",        '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_token_only,            0, N_("Do not ask for passphrase if activation by token fails"), NULL },
+		{ "token-id",          '\0', POPT_ARG_INT, &opt_token,                  0, N_("Token number (default: any)"), NULL },
+		{ "key-description",   '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_key_description,     0, N_("Key description"), NULL },
+		{ "sector-size",       '\0', POPT_ARG_INT, &opt_sector_size,            0, N_("Encryption sector size (default: 512 bytes)"), NULL },
+		{ "persistent",	       '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_persistent,            0, N_("Set activation flags persistent for device"), NULL },
+		{ "label",	       '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_label,               0, N_("Set label for the LUKS2 device"), NULL },
+		{ "subsystem",	       '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_subsystem,           0, N_("Set subsystem label for the LUKS2 device"), NULL },
+		{ "unbound",           '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_unbound,               0, N_("Create unbound (no assigned data segment) LUKS2 keyslot"), NULL },
+		{ "json-file",	       '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_json_file,           0, N_("Read or write the json from or to a file"), NULL },
+		{ "luks2-metadata-size",'\0',POPT_ARG_STRING,&opt_luks2_metadata_size_str,0,N_("LUKS2 header metadata area size"), N_("bytes") },
+		{ "luks2-keyslots-size",'\0',POPT_ARG_STRING,&opt_luks2_keyslots_size_str,0,N_("LUKS2 header keyslots area size"), N_("bytes") },
+		{ "refresh",           '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_refresh,               0, N_("Refresh (reactivate) device with new parameters"), NULL },
+		{ "keyslot-key-size",  '\0', POPT_ARG_INT, &opt_keyslot_key_size,       0, N_("LUKS2 keyslot: The size of the encryption key"), N_("BITS") },
+		{ "keyslot-cipher",    '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_keyslot_cipher,      0, N_("LUKS2 keyslot: The cipher used for keyslot encryption"), NULL },
+		POPT_TABLEEND
+	};
+	poptContext popt_context;
+	struct action_type *action;
+	const char *aname;
+	int r, total_keyfiles = 0;
+
+	crypt_set_log_callback(NULL, tool_log, NULL);
+
+	setlocale(LC_ALL, "");
+	bindtextdomain(PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
+	textdomain(PACKAGE);
+
+	popt_context = poptGetContext(PACKAGE, argc, argv, popt_options, 0);
+	poptSetOtherOptionHelp(popt_context,
+	                       _("[OPTION...] <action> <action-specific>"));
+
+	while((r = poptGetNextOpt(popt_context)) > 0) {
+		unsigned long long ull_value;
+		char *endp;
+
+		if (r == 6) {
+			const char *kf = poptGetOptArg(popt_context);
+			if (tools_is_stdin(kf))
+				opt_keyfile_stdin = kf;
+			else if (opt_keyfiles_count < MAX_KEYFILES)
+				opt_keyfiles[opt_keyfiles_count++] = kf;
+			total_keyfiles++;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		errno = 0;
+		ull_value = strtoull(popt_tmp, &endp, 0);
+		if (*endp || !*popt_tmp || !isdigit(*popt_tmp) ||
+		    (errno == ERANGE && ull_value == ULLONG_MAX) ||
+		    (errno != 0 && ull_value == 0))
+			r = POPT_ERROR_BADNUMBER;
+
+		switch(r) {
+			case 1:
+				opt_size = ull_value;
+				break;
+			case 2:
+				opt_offset = ull_value;
+				break;
+			case 3:
+				opt_skip = ull_value;
+				opt_skip_valid = 1;
+				break;
+			case 4:
+				opt_keyfile_offset = ull_value;
+				break;
+			case 5:
+				opt_new_keyfile_offset = ull_value;
+				break;
+		}
+
+		if (r < 0)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if (r < -1)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, poptStrerror(r),
+		      poptBadOption(popt_context, POPT_BADOPTION_NOALIAS));
+
+	if (opt_version_mode) {
+		log_std("%s %s\n", PACKAGE_NAME, PACKAGE_VERSION);
+		poptFreeContext(popt_context);
+		exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+	}
+
+	if (!(aname = poptGetArg(popt_context)))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Argument <action> missing."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	action_argc = 0;
+	action_argv = poptGetArgs(popt_context);
+	/* Make return values of poptGetArgs more consistent in case of remaining argc = 0 */
+	if(!action_argv)
+		action_argv = null_action_argv;
+
+	/* Count args, somewhat unnice, change? */
+	while(action_argv[action_argc] != NULL)
+		action_argc++;
+
+	/* Handle aliases */
+	if (!strcmp(aname, "create")) {
+		/* create command had historically switched arguments */
+		if (action_argv[0] && action_argv[1]) {
+			const char *tmp = action_argv[0];
+			action_argv[0] = action_argv[1];
+			action_argv[1] = tmp;
+		}
+		aname = "open";
+		opt_type = "plain";
+	} else if (!strcmp(aname, "plainOpen")) {
+		aname = "open";
+		opt_type = "plain";
+	} else if (!strcmp(aname, "luksOpen")) {
+		aname = "open";
+		opt_type = "luks";
+	} else if (!strcmp(aname, "loopaesOpen")) {
+		aname = "open";
+		opt_type = "loopaes";
+	} else if (!strcmp(aname, "tcryptOpen")) {
+		aname = "open";
+		opt_type = "tcrypt";
+	} else if (!strcmp(aname, "tcryptDump")) {
+		opt_type = "tcrypt";
+	} else if (!strcmp(aname, "remove") ||
+		   !strcmp(aname, "plainClose") ||
+		   !strcmp(aname, "luksClose") ||
+		   !strcmp(aname, "loopaesClose") ||
+		   !strcmp(aname, "tcryptClose")) {
+		aname = "close";
+	} else if (!strcmp(aname, "luksErase")) {
+		aname = "erase";
+		opt_type = "luks";
+	} else if (!strcmp(aname, "luksConfig")) {
+		aname = "config";
+		opt_type = "luks2";
+	} else if (!strcmp(aname, "refresh")) {
+		aname = "open";
+		opt_refresh = 1;
+	}
+
+	/* ignore user supplied type and query device type instead */
+	if (opt_refresh)
+		opt_type = NULL;
+
+	for(action = action_types; action->type; action++)
+		if (strcmp(action->type, aname) == 0)
+			break;
+
+	if (!action->type)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Unknown action."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (action_argc < action->required_action_argc)
+		help_args(action, popt_context);
+
+	/* FIXME: rewrite this from scratch */
+
+	if (opt_refresh && strcmp(aname, "open"))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		      _("Parameter --refresh is only allowed with open or refresh commands.\n"),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_refresh && opt_test_passphrase)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		      _("Options --refresh and --test-passphrase are mutually exclusive.\n"),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_deferred_remove && strcmp(aname, "close"))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		      _("Option --deferred is allowed only for close command.\n"),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_shared && (strcmp(aname, "open") || strcmp_or_null(opt_type, "plain")))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		      _("Option --shared is allowed only for open of plain device.\n"),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_allow_discards && strcmp(aname, "open"))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		      _("Option --allow-discards is allowed only for open operation.\n"),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_persistent && strcmp(aname, "open"))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		      _("Option --persistent is allowed only for open operation.\n"),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_persistent && opt_test_passphrase)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		      _("Option --persistent is not allowed with --test-passphrase.\n"),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_key_size &&
+	   strcmp(aname, "luksFormat") &&
+	   strcmp(aname, "open") &&
+	   strcmp(aname, "benchmark") &&
+	   (strcmp(aname, "luksAddKey") || !opt_unbound))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		      _("Option --key-size is allowed only for luksFormat, luksAddKey (with --unbound),\n"
+			"open and benchmark actions. To limit read from keyfile use --keyfile-size=(bytes)."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_integrity && strcmp(aname, "luksFormat"))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		      _("Option --integrity is allowed only for luksFormat (LUKS2).\n"),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_integrity_no_wipe && !opt_integrity)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		      _("Option --integrity-no-wipe"
+		        " can be used only for format action with integrity extension.\n"),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if ((opt_label || opt_subsystem) && strcmp(aname, "luksFormat") && strcmp(aname, "config"))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		      _("Options --label and --subsystem are allowed only for luksFormat and config LUKS2 operations.\n"),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_test_passphrase && (strcmp(aname, "open") || !opt_type ||
+	    (strncmp(opt_type, "luks", 4) && strcmp(opt_type, "tcrypt"))))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		      _("Option --test-passphrase is allowed only for open of LUKS and TCRYPT devices.\n"),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_key_size % 8 || opt_keyslot_key_size % 8)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		      _("Key size must be a multiple of 8 bits"),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (!strcmp(aname, "luksKillSlot") && action_argc > 1)
+		opt_key_slot = atoi(action_argv[1]);
+	if (opt_key_slot != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT && opt_key_slot < 0)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Key slot is invalid."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if ((!strcmp(aname, "luksRemoveKey") ||
+	     !strcmp(aname, "luksFormat")) &&
+	     action_argc > 1) {
+		if (opt_key_file)
+			log_err(_("Option --key-file takes precedence over specified key file argument."));
+		else
+			opt_key_file = action_argv[1];
+	}
+
+	if (opt_keyfile_size < 0 || opt_new_keyfile_size < 0 || opt_key_size < 0)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		      _("Negative number for option not permitted."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (total_keyfiles > 1 && (strcmp_or_null(opt_type, "tcrypt")))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Only one --key-file argument is allowed."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_random && opt_urandom)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Only one of --use-[u]random options is allowed."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if ((opt_random || opt_urandom) && strcmp(aname, "luksFormat"))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Option --use-[u]random is allowed only for luksFormat."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_uuid && strcmp(aname, "luksFormat") && strcmp(aname, "luksUUID"))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Option --uuid is allowed only for luksFormat and luksUUID."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_align_payload && strcmp(aname, "luksFormat"))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Option --align-payload is allowed only for luksFormat."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if ((opt_luks2_metadata_size_str || opt_luks2_keyslots_size_str) && strcmp(aname, "luksFormat"))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Options --luks2-metadata-size and --opt-luks2-keyslots-size "
+		"are allowed only for luksFormat with LUKS2."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+	if (opt_luks2_metadata_size_str &&
+	    tools_string_to_size(NULL, opt_luks2_metadata_size_str, &opt_luks2_metadata_size))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Invalid LUKS2 metadata size specification."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+	if (opt_luks2_keyslots_size_str &&
+	    tools_string_to_size(NULL, opt_luks2_keyslots_size_str, &opt_luks2_keyslots_size))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Invalid LUKS2 keyslots size specification."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_align_payload && opt_offset)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Options --align-payload and --offset cannot be combined."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_skip && (strcmp(aname, "open") ||
+	    (strcmp_or_null(opt_type, "plain") && strcmp(opt_type, "loopaes"))))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		_("Option --skip is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices.\n"),
+		poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_offset && ((strcmp(aname, "open") && strcmp(aname, "luksFormat")) ||
+	    (!strcmp(aname, "open") && strcmp_or_null(opt_type, "plain") && strcmp(opt_type, "loopaes")) ||
+	    (!strcmp(aname, "luksFormat") && opt_type && strncmp(opt_type, "luks", 4))))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		_("Option --offset is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices and for luksFormat.\n"),
+		poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if ((opt_tcrypt_hidden || opt_tcrypt_system || opt_tcrypt_backup) && strcmp(aname, "tcryptDump") &&
+	    (strcmp(aname, "open") || !opt_type || strcmp(opt_type, "tcrypt")))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		_("Option --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system or --tcrypt-backup is supported only for TCRYPT device.\n"),
+		poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_tcrypt_hidden && opt_allow_discards)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		_("Option --tcrypt-hidden cannot be combined with --allow-discards.\n"),
+		poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_veracrypt && (!opt_type || strcmp(opt_type, "tcrypt")))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		_("Option --veracrypt is supported only for TCRYPT device type.\n"),
+		poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_veracrypt_pim != -1) {
+		if (opt_veracrypt_pim < -1) {
+			usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+			_("Invalid argument for parameter --veracrypt-pim supplied.\n"),
+			poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+		} else if (!opt_veracrypt) {
+			usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+			_("Option --veracrypt-pim is supported only for VeraCrypt compatible devices.\n"),
+			poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (opt_veracrypt_query_pim) {
+		if (!opt_veracrypt) {
+			usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+			_("Option --veracrypt-query-pim is supported only for VeraCrypt compatible devices.\n"),
+			poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+		} else if (opt_veracrypt_pim != -1) {
+			usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+			_("The options --veracrypt-pim and --veracrypt-query-pim are mutually exclusive.\n"),
+			poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (opt_priority && strcmp(opt_priority, "normal") && strcmp(opt_priority, "prefer") && strcmp(opt_priority, "ignore"))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		_("Option --priority can be only ignore/normal/prefer.\n"),
+		poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (!strcmp(aname, "config") && opt_priority && opt_key_slot == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		_("Keyslot specification is required.\n"),
+		poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_pbkdf && crypt_parse_pbkdf(opt_pbkdf, &opt_pbkdf))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		_("Password-based key derivation function (PBKDF) can be only pbkdf2 or argon2i/argon2id.\n"),
+		poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_pbkdf_iterations && opt_iteration_time)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		_("PBKDF forced iterations cannot be combined with iteration time option.\n"),
+		poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_sector_size != SECTOR_SIZE && strcmp(aname, "luksFormat") &&
+	    (strcmp(aname, "open") || strcmp_or_null(opt_type, "plain")))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		      _("Sector size option is not supported for this command.\n"),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_sector_size < SECTOR_SIZE || opt_sector_size > MAX_SECTOR_SIZE ||
+	    (opt_sector_size & (opt_sector_size - 1)))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		      _("Unsupported encryption sector size.\n"),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_unbound && !opt_key_size)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		      _("Key size is required with --unbound option.\n"),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_unbound && strcmp(aname, "luksAddKey"))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		      _("Option --unbound may be used only with luksAddKey action.\n"),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_refresh && strcmp(aname, "open"))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		      _("Option --refresh may be used only with open action.\n"),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_debug || opt_debug_json) {
+		opt_debug = 1;
+		opt_verbose = 1;
+		crypt_set_debug_level(opt_debug_json? CRYPT_DEBUG_JSON : CRYPT_DEBUG_ALL);
+		dbg_version_and_cmd(argc, argv);
+	}
+
+	if (opt_disable_locks && crypt_metadata_locking(NULL, 0)) {
+		log_std(_("Cannot disable metadata locking.\n"));
+		poptFreeContext(popt_context);
+		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+	}
+
+	if (opt_disable_keyring)
+		(void) crypt_volume_key_keyring(NULL, 0);
+
+	r = run_action(action);
+	poptFreeContext(popt_context);
+	return r;
+}
diff --git a/src/cryptsetup.h b/src/cryptsetup.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..153c7aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/cryptsetup.h
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+/*
+ * cryptsetup - setup cryptographic volumes for dm-crypt
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef CRYPTSETUP_H
+#define CRYPTSETUP_H
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <inttypes.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <popt.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+
+#include "lib/nls.h"
+#include "lib/utils_crypt.h"
+#include "lib/utils_loop.h"
+#include "lib/utils_fips.h"
+#include "lib/utils_io.h"
+#include "lib/utils_blkid.h"
+
+#include "libcryptsetup.h"
+
+#define CONST_CAST(x) (x)(uintptr_t)
+#define DEFAULT_CIPHER(type)	(DEFAULT_##type##_CIPHER "-" DEFAULT_##type##_MODE)
+#define SECTOR_SIZE 512
+#define MAX_SECTOR_SIZE 4096
+#define ROUND_SECTOR(x) (((x) + SECTOR_SIZE - 1) / SECTOR_SIZE)
+
+#define DEFAULT_WIPE_BLOCK	1048576 /* 1 MiB */
+
+extern int opt_debug;
+extern int opt_debug_json;
+extern int opt_verbose;
+extern int opt_batch_mode;
+extern int opt_force_password;
+extern int opt_progress_frequency;
+
+/* Common tools */
+void clogger(struct crypt_device *cd, int level, const char *file, int line,
+	     const char *format, ...)  __attribute__ ((format (printf, 5, 6)));
+void tool_log(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr __attribute__((unused)));
+void quiet_log(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr);
+
+int yesDialog(const char *msg, void *usrptr __attribute__((unused)));
+void show_status(int errcode);
+const char *uuid_or_device(const char *spec);
+__attribute__ ((noreturn)) \
+void usage(poptContext popt_context, int exitcode, const char *error, const char *more);
+void dbg_version_and_cmd(int argc, const char **argv);
+int translate_errno(int r);
+
+typedef enum { CREATED, UNLOCKED, REMOVED  } crypt_object_op;
+void tools_keyslot_msg(int keyslot, crypt_object_op op);
+void tools_token_msg(int token, crypt_object_op op);
+
+extern volatile int quit;
+void set_int_block(int block);
+void set_int_handler(int block);
+void check_signal(int *r);
+int tools_signals_blocked(void);
+
+int tools_get_key(const char *prompt,
+		  char **key, size_t *key_size,
+		  uint64_t keyfile_offset, size_t keyfile_size_max,
+		  const char *key_file,
+		  int timeout, int verify, int pwquality,
+		  struct crypt_device *cd);
+void tools_passphrase_msg(int r);
+int tools_is_stdin(const char *key_file);
+int tools_string_to_size(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *s, uint64_t *size);
+int tools_is_cipher_null(const char *cipher);
+
+void tools_clear_line(void);
+
+void tools_time_progress(uint64_t device_size, uint64_t bytes,
+			 struct timeval *start_time, struct timeval *end_time);
+int tools_wipe_progress(uint64_t size, uint64_t offset, void *usrptr);
+
+int tools_read_mk(const char *file, char **key, int keysize);
+int tools_write_mk(const char *file, const char *key, int keysize);
+
+int tools_read_json_file(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *file, char **json, size_t *json_size);
+int tools_write_json_file(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *file, const char *json);
+
+int tools_detect_signatures(const char *device, int ignore_luks, size_t *count);
+int tools_wipe_all_signatures(const char *path);
+
+/* Log */
+#define log_dbg(x...) clogger(NULL, CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG, __FILE__, __LINE__, x)
+#define log_std(x...) clogger(NULL, CRYPT_LOG_NORMAL, __FILE__, __LINE__, x)
+#define log_verbose(x...) clogger(NULL, CRYPT_LOG_VERBOSE, __FILE__, __LINE__, x)
+#define log_err(x...) clogger(NULL, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, __FILE__, __LINE__, x)
+
+#endif /* CRYPTSETUP_H */
diff --git a/src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c b/src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b1c7464
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/cryptsetup_reencrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1761 @@
+/*
+ * cryptsetup-reencrypt - crypt utility for offline re-encryption
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Milan Broz All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include "cryptsetup.h"
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <uuid/uuid.h>
+
+#define PACKAGE_REENC "crypt_reencrypt"
+
+#define NO_UUID "cafecafe-cafe-cafe-cafe-cafecafeeeee"
+
+static const char *opt_cipher = NULL;
+static const char *opt_hash = NULL;
+static const char *opt_key_file = NULL;
+static const char *opt_master_key_file = NULL;
+static const char *opt_uuid = NULL;
+static const char *opt_type = "luks";
+static long opt_keyfile_size = 0;
+static long opt_keyfile_offset = 0;
+static int opt_iteration_time = 0;
+static const char *opt_pbkdf = NULL;
+static long opt_pbkdf_memory = DEFAULT_LUKS2_MEMORY_KB;
+static long opt_pbkdf_parallel = DEFAULT_LUKS2_PARALLEL_THREADS;
+static long opt_pbkdf_iterations = 0;
+static int opt_version_mode = 0;
+static int opt_random = 0;
+static int opt_urandom = 0;
+static int opt_bsize = 4;
+static int opt_directio = 0;
+static int opt_fsync = 0;
+static int opt_write_log = 0;
+static int opt_tries = 3;
+static int opt_key_slot = CRYPT_ANY_SLOT;
+static int opt_key_size = 0;
+static int opt_new = 0;
+static int opt_keep_key = 0;
+static int opt_decrypt = 0;
+static const char *opt_header_device = NULL;
+
+static const char *opt_reduce_size_str = NULL;
+static uint64_t opt_reduce_size = 0;
+
+static const char *opt_device_size_str = NULL;
+static uint64_t opt_device_size = 0;
+
+static const char **action_argv;
+
+#define MAX_SLOT 32
+#define MAX_TOKEN 32
+struct reenc_ctx {
+	char *device;
+	char *device_header;
+	char *device_uuid;
+	const char *type;
+	uint64_t device_size; /* overridden by parameter */
+	uint64_t device_size_new_real;
+	uint64_t device_size_org_real;
+	uint64_t device_offset;
+	uint64_t device_shift;
+	uint64_t data_offset;
+
+	unsigned int stained:1;
+	unsigned int in_progress:1;
+	enum { FORWARD = 0, BACKWARD = 1 } reencrypt_direction;
+	enum { REENCRYPT = 0, ENCRYPT = 1, DECRYPT = 2 } reencrypt_mode;
+
+	char header_file_org[PATH_MAX];
+	char header_file_tmp[PATH_MAX];
+	char header_file_new[PATH_MAX];
+	char log_file[PATH_MAX];
+
+	char crypt_path_org[PATH_MAX];
+	char crypt_path_new[PATH_MAX];
+	int log_fd;
+	char log_buf[SECTOR_SIZE];
+
+	struct {
+		char *password;
+		size_t passwordLen;
+	} p[MAX_SLOT];
+	int keyslot;
+
+	struct timeval start_time, end_time;
+	uint64_t resume_bytes;
+};
+
+char MAGIC[]   = {'L','U','K','S', 0xba, 0xbe};
+char NOMAGIC[] = {'L','U','K','S', 0xde, 0xad};
+int  MAGIC_L = 6;
+
+typedef enum {
+	MAKE_UNUSABLE,
+	MAKE_USABLE,
+	CHECK_UNUSABLE,
+	CHECK_OPEN,
+} header_magic;
+
+static void _quiet_log(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr)
+{
+	if (!opt_debug)
+		return;
+	tool_log(level, msg, usrptr);
+}
+
+static int alignment(int fd)
+{
+	int alignment;
+
+	alignment = fpathconf(fd, _PC_REC_XFER_ALIGN);
+	if (alignment < 0)
+		alignment = 4096;
+	return alignment;
+}
+
+static size_t pagesize(void)
+{
+	long r = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
+	return r < 0 ? 4096 : (size_t)r;
+}
+
+static const char *luksType(const char *type)
+{
+	if (type && !strcmp(type, "luks2"))
+		return CRYPT_LUKS2;
+
+	if (type && !strcmp(type, "luks1"))
+		return CRYPT_LUKS1;
+
+	if (!type || !strcmp(type, "luks"))
+		return crypt_get_default_type();
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static const char *hdr_device(const struct reenc_ctx *rc)
+{
+	return rc->device_header ?: rc->device;
+}
+
+static int set_reencrypt_requirement(const struct reenc_ctx *rc)
+{
+	uint32_t reqs;
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	struct crypt_params_integrity ip = { 0 };
+
+	if (crypt_init(&cd, hdr_device(rc)) ||
+	    crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL) ||
+	    crypt_persistent_flags_get(cd, CRYPT_FLAGS_REQUIREMENTS, &reqs))
+		goto out;
+
+	/* reencrypt already in-progress */
+	if (reqs & CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_OFFLINE_REENCRYPT) {
+		log_err(_("Reencryption already in-progress."));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* raw integrity info is available since 2.0 */
+	if (crypt_get_integrity_info(cd, &ip) || ip.tag_size) {
+		log_err(_("Reencryption of device with integrity profile is not supported."));
+		r = -ENOTSUP;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_persistent_flags_set(cd, CRYPT_FLAGS_REQUIREMENTS, reqs | CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_OFFLINE_REENCRYPT);
+out:
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* Depends on the first two fields of LUKS1 header format, magic and version */
+static int device_check(struct reenc_ctx *rc, const char *device, header_magic set_magic)
+{
+	char *buf = NULL;
+	int r, devfd;
+	ssize_t s;
+	uint16_t version;
+	size_t buf_size = pagesize();
+
+	devfd = open(device, O_RDWR | O_EXCL | O_DIRECT);
+	if (devfd == -1) {
+		if (errno == EBUSY) {
+			log_err(_("Cannot exclusively open %s, device in use."),
+				device);
+			return -EBUSY;
+		}
+		log_err(_("Cannot open device %s."), device);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (set_magic == CHECK_OPEN) {
+		r = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (posix_memalign((void *)&buf, alignment(devfd), buf_size)) {
+		log_err(_("Allocation of aligned memory failed."));
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	s = read(devfd, buf, buf_size);
+	if (s < 0 || s != (ssize_t)buf_size) {
+		log_err(_("Cannot read device %s."), device);
+		r = -EIO;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Be sure that we do not process new version of header */
+	memcpy((void*)&version, &buf[MAGIC_L], sizeof(uint16_t));
+	version = ntohs(version);
+
+	if (set_magic == MAKE_UNUSABLE && !memcmp(buf, MAGIC, MAGIC_L) &&
+	    version == 1) {
+		log_verbose(_("Marking LUKS1 device %s unusable."), device);
+		memcpy(buf, NOMAGIC, MAGIC_L);
+		r = 0;
+	} else if (set_magic == MAKE_UNUSABLE && version == 2) {
+		log_verbose(_("Setting LUKS2 offline reencrypt flag on device %s."), device);
+		r = set_reencrypt_requirement(rc);
+		if (!r)
+			rc->stained = 1;
+	} else if (set_magic == CHECK_UNUSABLE && version == 1) {
+		r = memcmp(buf, NOMAGIC, MAGIC_L) ? -EINVAL : 0;
+		if (!r)
+			rc->device_uuid = strndup(&buf[0xa8], 40);
+		goto out;
+	} else
+		r = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!r && version == 1) {
+		if (lseek(devfd, 0, SEEK_SET) == -1)
+			goto out;
+		s = write(devfd, buf, buf_size);
+		if (s < 0 || s != (ssize_t)buf_size) {
+			log_err(_("Cannot write device %s."), device);
+			r = -EIO;
+		}
+		if (s > 0 && set_magic == MAKE_UNUSABLE)
+			rc->stained = 1;
+	}
+	if (r)
+		log_dbg("LUKS signature check failed for %s.", device);
+out:
+	if (buf)
+		memset(buf, 0, buf_size);
+	free(buf);
+	close(devfd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int create_empty_header(const char *new_file, uint64_t data_sectors)
+{
+	int fd, r = 0;
+
+	data_sectors *= SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+	if (!data_sectors)
+		data_sectors = 4096;
+
+	log_dbg("Creating empty file %s of size %" PRIu64 ".", new_file, data_sectors);
+
+	/* coverity[toctou] */
+	fd = open(new_file, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR);
+	if (fd == -1 || posix_fallocate(fd, 0, data_sectors))
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	if (fd >= 0)
+		close(fd);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int write_log(struct reenc_ctx *rc)
+{
+	ssize_t r;
+
+	memset(rc->log_buf, 0, SECTOR_SIZE);
+	snprintf(rc->log_buf, SECTOR_SIZE, "# LUKS reencryption log, DO NOT EDIT OR DELETE.\n"
+		"version = %d\nUUID = %s\ndirection = %d\nmode = %d\n"
+		"offset = %" PRIu64 "\nshift = %" PRIu64 "\n# EOF\n",
+		2, rc->device_uuid, rc->reencrypt_direction, rc->reencrypt_mode,
+		rc->device_offset, rc->device_shift);
+
+	if (lseek(rc->log_fd, 0, SEEK_SET) == -1)
+		return -EIO;
+
+	r = write(rc->log_fd, rc->log_buf, SECTOR_SIZE);
+	if (r < 0 || r != SECTOR_SIZE) {
+		log_err(_("Cannot write reencryption log file."));
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int parse_line_log(struct reenc_ctx *rc, const char *line)
+{
+	uint64_t u64;
+	int i;
+	char s[64];
+
+	/* whole line is comment */
+	if (*line == '#')
+		return 0;
+
+	if (sscanf(line, "version = %d", &i) == 1) {
+		if (i < 1 || i > 2) {
+			log_dbg("Log: Unexpected version = %i", i);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	} else if (sscanf(line, "UUID = %40s", s) == 1) {
+		if (!rc->device_uuid || strcmp(rc->device_uuid, s)) {
+			log_dbg("Log: Unexpected UUID %s", s);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	} else if (sscanf(line, "direction = %d", &i) == 1) {
+		log_dbg("Log: direction = %i", i);
+		rc->reencrypt_direction = i;
+	} else if (sscanf(line, "offset = %" PRIu64, &u64) == 1) {
+		log_dbg("Log: offset = %" PRIu64, u64);
+		rc->device_offset = u64;
+	} else if (sscanf(line, "shift = %" PRIu64, &u64) == 1) {
+		log_dbg("Log: shift = %" PRIu64, u64);
+		rc->device_shift = u64;
+	} else if (sscanf(line, "mode = %d", &i) == 1) { /* added in v2 */
+		log_dbg("Log: mode = %i", i);
+		rc->reencrypt_mode = i;
+		if (rc->reencrypt_mode != REENCRYPT &&
+		    rc->reencrypt_mode != ENCRYPT &&
+		    rc->reencrypt_mode != DECRYPT)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int parse_log(struct reenc_ctx *rc)
+{
+	char *start, *end;
+	ssize_t s;
+
+	s = read(rc->log_fd, rc->log_buf, SECTOR_SIZE);
+	if (s == -1) {
+		log_err(_("Cannot read reencryption log file."));
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	rc->log_buf[SECTOR_SIZE - 1] = '\0';
+	start = rc->log_buf;
+	do {
+		end = strchr(start, '\n');
+		if (end) {
+			*end++ = '\0';
+			if (parse_line_log(rc, start)) {
+				log_err("Wrong log format.");
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+		}
+
+		start = end;
+	} while (start);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void close_log(struct reenc_ctx *rc)
+{
+	log_dbg("Closing LUKS reencryption log file %s.", rc->log_file);
+	if (rc->log_fd != -1)
+		close(rc->log_fd);
+}
+
+static int open_log(struct reenc_ctx *rc)
+{
+	int flags = opt_fsync ? O_SYNC : 0;
+
+	rc->log_fd = open(rc->log_file, O_RDWR|O_EXCL|O_CREAT|flags, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR);
+	if (rc->log_fd != -1) {
+		log_dbg("Created LUKS reencryption log file %s.", rc->log_file);
+		rc->stained = 0;
+	} else if (errno == EEXIST) {
+		log_std(_("Log file %s exists, resuming reencryption.\n"), rc->log_file);
+		rc->log_fd = open(rc->log_file, O_RDWR|flags);
+		rc->in_progress = 1;
+	}
+
+	if (rc->log_fd == -1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!rc->in_progress && write_log(rc) < 0) {
+		close_log(rc);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	/* Be sure it is correct format */
+	return parse_log(rc);
+}
+
+static int activate_luks_headers(struct reenc_ctx *rc)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL, *cd_new = NULL;
+	const char *pwd_old, *pwd_new, pwd_empty[] = "";
+	size_t pwd_old_len, pwd_new_len;
+	int r;
+
+	log_dbg("Activating LUKS devices from headers.");
+
+	/* Never use real password for empty header processing */
+	if (rc->reencrypt_mode == REENCRYPT) {
+		pwd_old = rc->p[rc->keyslot].password;
+		pwd_old_len = rc->p[rc->keyslot].passwordLen;
+		pwd_new = pwd_old;
+		pwd_new_len = pwd_old_len;
+	} else if (rc->reencrypt_mode == DECRYPT) {
+		pwd_old = rc->p[rc->keyslot].password;
+		pwd_old_len = rc->p[rc->keyslot].passwordLen;
+		pwd_new = pwd_empty;
+		pwd_new_len = 0;
+	} else if (rc->reencrypt_mode == ENCRYPT) {
+		pwd_old = pwd_empty;
+		pwd_old_len = 0;
+		pwd_new = rc->p[rc->keyslot].password;
+		pwd_new_len = rc->p[rc->keyslot].passwordLen;
+	} else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if ((r = crypt_init_data_device(&cd, rc->header_file_org, rc->device)) ||
+	    (r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL)))
+		goto out;
+
+	log_verbose(_("Activating temporary device using old LUKS header."));
+	if ((r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, rc->header_file_org,
+		opt_key_slot, pwd_old, pwd_old_len,
+		CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY|CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE)) < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((r = crypt_init_data_device(&cd_new, rc->header_file_new, rc->device)) ||
+	    (r = crypt_load(cd_new, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL)))
+		goto out;
+
+	log_verbose(_("Activating temporary device using new LUKS header."));
+	if ((r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd_new, rc->header_file_new,
+		opt_key_slot, pwd_new, pwd_new_len,
+		CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED|CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE)) < 0)
+		goto out;
+	r = 0;
+out:
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	crypt_free(cd_new);
+	if (r < 0)
+		log_err(_("Activation of temporary devices failed."));
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int set_pbkdf_params(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *dev_type)
+{
+	const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf_default;
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_type pbkdf = {};
+
+	pbkdf_default = crypt_get_pbkdf_default(dev_type);
+	if (!pbkdf_default)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	pbkdf.type = opt_pbkdf ?: pbkdf_default->type;
+	pbkdf.hash = opt_hash ?: pbkdf_default->hash;
+	pbkdf.time_ms = (uint32_t)opt_iteration_time ?: pbkdf_default->time_ms;
+	if (strcmp(pbkdf.type, CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2)) {
+		pbkdf.max_memory_kb = opt_pbkdf_memory ?: pbkdf_default->max_memory_kb;
+		pbkdf.parallel_threads = opt_pbkdf_parallel ?: pbkdf_default->parallel_threads;
+	}
+
+	if (opt_pbkdf_iterations) {
+		pbkdf.iterations = opt_pbkdf_iterations;
+		pbkdf.flags |= CRYPT_PBKDF_NO_BENCHMARK;
+	}
+
+	return crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &pbkdf);
+}
+
+static int create_new_keyslot(struct reenc_ctx *rc, int keyslot,
+			      struct crypt_device *cd_old,
+			      struct crypt_device *cd_new)
+{
+	int r;
+	char *key = NULL;
+	size_t key_size;
+
+	if (cd_old && crypt_keyslot_status(cd_old, keyslot) == CRYPT_SLOT_UNBOUND) {
+		key_size = 4096;
+		key = crypt_safe_alloc(key_size);
+		if (!key)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		r = crypt_volume_key_get(cd_old, keyslot, key, &key_size,
+			rc->p[keyslot].password, rc->p[keyslot].passwordLen);
+		if (r == keyslot) {
+			r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_key(cd_new, keyslot, key, key_size,
+				rc->p[keyslot].password, rc->p[keyslot].passwordLen,
+				CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT);
+		} else
+			r = -EINVAL;
+		crypt_safe_free(key);
+	} else
+		r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd_new, keyslot, NULL, 0,
+			rc->p[keyslot].password, rc->p[keyslot].passwordLen);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int create_new_header(struct reenc_ctx *rc, struct crypt_device *cd_old,
+			     const char *cipher, const char *cipher_mode,
+			     const char *uuid,
+			     const char *key, int key_size,
+			     const char *type,
+			     uint64_t metadata_size,
+			     uint64_t keyslots_size,
+			     void *params)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd_new = NULL;
+	int i, r;
+
+	if ((r = crypt_init(&cd_new, rc->header_file_new)))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (opt_random)
+		crypt_set_rng_type(cd_new, CRYPT_RNG_RANDOM);
+	else if (opt_urandom)
+		crypt_set_rng_type(cd_new, CRYPT_RNG_URANDOM);
+
+	r = set_pbkdf_params(cd_new, type);
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(_("Failed to set PBKDF parameters."));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_set_data_offset(cd_new, rc->data_offset);
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(_("Failed to set data offset."));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_set_metadata_size(cd_new, metadata_size, keyslots_size);
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(_("Failed to set metadata size."));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_format(cd_new, type, cipher, cipher_mode, uuid, key, key_size, params);
+	check_signal(&r);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+	log_verbose(_("New LUKS header for device %s created."), rc->device);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < crypt_keyslot_max(type); i++) {
+		if (!rc->p[i].password)
+			continue;
+
+		r = create_new_keyslot(rc, i, cd_old, cd_new);
+		check_signal(&r);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+		tools_keyslot_msg(r, CREATED);
+		r = 0;
+	}
+out:
+	crypt_free(cd_new);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int isLUKS2(const char *type)
+{
+	return (type && !strcmp(type, CRYPT_LUKS2));
+}
+
+static int luks2_metadata_copy(struct reenc_ctx *rc)
+{
+	const char *json, *type;
+	crypt_token_info ti;
+	uint32_t flags;
+	int i, r = -EINVAL;
+	struct crypt_device *cd_old = NULL, *cd_new = NULL;
+
+	if (crypt_init(&cd_old, rc->header_file_tmp) ||
+	    crypt_load(cd_old, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (crypt_init(&cd_new, rc->header_file_new) ||
+	    crypt_load(cd_new, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL))
+		goto out;
+
+	/*
+	 * we have to erase keyslots missing in new header so that we can
+	 * transfer tokens from old header to new one
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < crypt_keyslot_max(CRYPT_LUKS2); i++)
+		if (!rc->p[i].password && crypt_keyslot_status(cd_old, i) == CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE) {
+			r = crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd_old, i);
+			if (r < 0)
+				goto out;
+		}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_TOKEN; i++) {
+		ti = crypt_token_status(cd_old, i, &type);
+		switch (ti) {
+		case CRYPT_TOKEN_INVALID:
+			log_dbg("Internal error.");
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		case CRYPT_TOKEN_INACTIVE:
+			break;
+		case CRYPT_TOKEN_INTERNAL_UNKNOWN:
+			log_err(_("This version of cryptsetup-reencrypt can't handle new internal token type %s."), type);
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		case CRYPT_TOKEN_INTERNAL:
+			/* fallthrough */
+		case CRYPT_TOKEN_EXTERNAL:
+			/* fallthrough */
+		case CRYPT_TOKEN_EXTERNAL_UNKNOWN:
+			if (crypt_token_json_get(cd_old, i, &json) != i) {
+				log_dbg("Failed to get %s token (%d).", type, i);
+				r = -EINVAL;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			if (crypt_token_json_set(cd_new, i, json) != i) {
+				log_dbg("Failed to create %s token (%d).", type, i);
+				r = -EINVAL;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if ((r = crypt_persistent_flags_get(cd_old, CRYPT_FLAGS_ACTIVATION, &flags))) {
+		log_err(_("Failed to read activation flags from backup header."));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = crypt_persistent_flags_set(cd_new, CRYPT_FLAGS_ACTIVATION, flags))) {
+		log_err(_("Failed to write activation flags to new header."));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = crypt_persistent_flags_get(cd_old, CRYPT_FLAGS_REQUIREMENTS, &flags))) {
+		log_err(_("Failed to read requirements from backup header."));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = crypt_persistent_flags_set(cd_new, CRYPT_FLAGS_REQUIREMENTS, flags)))
+		log_err(_("Failed to read requirements from backup header."));
+out:
+	crypt_free(cd_old);
+	crypt_free(cd_new);
+	unlink(rc->header_file_tmp);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int backup_luks_headers(struct reenc_ctx *rc)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	struct crypt_params_luks1 params = {0};
+	struct crypt_params_luks2 params2 = {0};
+	struct stat st;
+	char cipher [MAX_CIPHER_LEN], cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+	char *key = NULL;
+	size_t key_size;
+	uint64_t mdata_size = 0, keyslots_size = 0;
+	int r;
+
+	log_dbg("Creating LUKS header backup for device %s.", hdr_device(rc));
+
+	if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, hdr_device(rc))) ||
+	    (r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL)))
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((r = crypt_header_backup(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, rc->header_file_org)))
+		goto out;
+	if (isLUKS2(rc->type)) {
+		if ((r = crypt_header_backup(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, rc->header_file_tmp)))
+			goto out;
+		if ((r = stat(rc->header_file_tmp, &st)))
+			goto out;
+		/* coverity[toctou] */
+		if ((r = chmod(rc->header_file_tmp, st.st_mode | S_IWUSR)))
+			goto out;
+	}
+	log_verbose(_("%s header backup of device %s created."), isLUKS2(rc->type) ? "LUKS2" : "LUKS1", rc->device);
+
+	/* For decrypt, new header will be fake one, so we are done here. */
+	if (rc->reencrypt_mode == DECRYPT)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc->data_offset = crypt_get_data_offset(cd) + ROUND_SECTOR(opt_reduce_size);
+
+	if ((r = create_empty_header(rc->header_file_new, rc->data_offset)))
+		goto out;
+
+	params.hash = opt_hash ?: DEFAULT_LUKS1_HASH;
+	params2.data_device = params.data_device = rc->device;
+	params2.sector_size = crypt_get_sector_size(cd);
+
+	if (opt_cipher) {
+		r = crypt_parse_name_and_mode(opt_cipher, cipher, NULL, cipher_mode);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			log_err(_("No known cipher specification pattern detected."));
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	key_size = opt_key_size ? opt_key_size / 8 : crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+
+	if (opt_keep_key) {
+		log_dbg("Keeping key from old header.");
+		key_size = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+		key = crypt_safe_alloc(key_size);
+		if (!key) {
+			r = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		r = crypt_volume_key_get(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, key, &key_size,
+			rc->p[rc->keyslot].password, rc->p[rc->keyslot].passwordLen);
+	} else if (opt_master_key_file) {
+		log_dbg("Loading new key from file.");
+		r = tools_read_mk(opt_master_key_file, &key, key_size);
+	}
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (isLUKS2(crypt_get_type(cd)) && crypt_get_metadata_size(cd, &mdata_size, &keyslots_size))
+		goto out;
+
+	r = create_new_header(rc, cd,
+		opt_cipher ? cipher : crypt_get_cipher(cd),
+		opt_cipher ? cipher_mode : crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd),
+		crypt_get_uuid(cd),
+		key,
+		key_size,
+		rc->type,
+		mdata_size,
+		keyslots_size,
+		isLUKS2(rc->type) ? (void*)&params2 : (void*)&params);
+
+	if (!r && isLUKS2(rc->type))
+		r = luks2_metadata_copy(rc);
+out:
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	crypt_safe_free(key);
+	if (r)
+		log_err(_("Creation of LUKS backup headers failed."));
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* Create fake header for original device */
+static int backup_fake_header(struct reenc_ctx *rc)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd_new = NULL;
+	struct crypt_params_luks1 params = {0};
+	struct crypt_params_luks2 params2 = {0};
+	char cipher [MAX_CIPHER_LEN], cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+	const char *header_file_fake;
+	int r;
+
+	log_dbg("Creating fake (cipher_null) header for %s device.",
+		(rc->reencrypt_mode == DECRYPT) ? "new" : "original");
+
+	header_file_fake = (rc->reencrypt_mode == DECRYPT) ? rc->header_file_new : rc->header_file_org;
+
+	if (!opt_key_size)
+		opt_key_size = DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS;
+
+	if (opt_cipher) {
+		r = crypt_parse_name_and_mode(opt_cipher, cipher, NULL, cipher_mode);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			log_err(_("No known cipher specification pattern detected."));
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	r = create_empty_header(header_file_fake, 0);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	params.hash = opt_hash ?: DEFAULT_LUKS1_HASH;
+	params2.data_alignment = params.data_alignment = 0;
+	params2.data_device = params.data_device = rc->device;
+	params2.sector_size = crypt_get_sector_size(NULL);
+	params2.pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf_default(CRYPT_LUKS2);
+
+	r = crypt_init(&cd_new, header_file_fake);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = crypt_format(cd_new, CRYPT_LUKS1, "cipher_null", "ecb",
+			 NO_UUID, NULL, opt_key_size / 8, &params);
+	check_signal(&r);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd_new, rc->keyslot, NULL, 0,
+			rc->p[rc->keyslot].password, rc->p[rc->keyslot].passwordLen);
+	check_signal(&r);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* The real header is backup header created in backup_luks_headers() */
+	if (rc->reencrypt_mode == DECRYPT)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = create_empty_header(rc->header_file_new, ROUND_SECTOR(opt_reduce_size));
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	params2.data_alignment = params.data_alignment = ROUND_SECTOR(opt_reduce_size);
+	r = create_new_header(rc, NULL,
+		opt_cipher ? cipher : DEFAULT_LUKS1_CIPHER,
+		opt_cipher ? cipher_mode : DEFAULT_LUKS1_MODE,
+		NULL, NULL,
+		(opt_key_size ? opt_key_size : DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS) / 8,
+		rc->type,
+		0,
+		0,
+		isLUKS2(rc->type) ? (void*)&params2 : (void*)&params);
+out:
+	crypt_free(cd_new);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void remove_headers(struct reenc_ctx *rc)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+
+	log_dbg("Removing headers.");
+
+	if (crypt_init(&cd, NULL))
+		return;
+	crypt_set_log_callback(cd, _quiet_log, NULL);
+	if (*rc->header_file_org)
+		(void)crypt_deactivate(cd, rc->header_file_org);
+	if (*rc->header_file_new)
+		(void)crypt_deactivate(cd, rc->header_file_new);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+}
+
+static int restore_luks_header(struct reenc_ctx *rc)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	int fd, r;
+
+	log_dbg("Restoring header for %s from %s.", hdr_device(rc), rc->header_file_new);
+
+	/*
+	 * For new encryption and new detached header in file just move it.
+	 * For existing file try to ensure we have prealocated space for restore.
+	 */
+	if (opt_new && rc->device_header) {
+		r = stat(rc->device_header, &st);
+		if (r == -1) {
+			r = rename(rc->header_file_new, rc->device_header);
+			goto out;
+		} else if ((st.st_mode & S_IFMT) == S_IFREG &&
+			stat(rc->header_file_new, &st) != -1) {
+			/* coverity[toctou] */
+			fd = open(rc->device_header, O_WRONLY);
+			if (fd != -1) {
+				if (posix_fallocate(fd, 0, st.st_size)) {};
+				close(fd);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_init(&cd, hdr_device(rc));
+	if (r == 0) {
+		r = crypt_header_restore(cd, rc->type, rc->header_file_new);
+	}
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+out:
+	if (r)
+		log_err(_("Cannot restore %s header on device %s."), isLUKS2(rc->type) ? "LUKS2" : "LUKS1", hdr_device(rc));
+	else {
+		log_verbose(_("%s header on device %s restored."), isLUKS2(rc->type) ? "LUKS2" : "LUKS1", hdr_device(rc));
+		rc->stained = 0;
+	}
+	return r;
+}
+
+static ssize_t read_buf(int fd, void *buf, size_t count)
+{
+	size_t read_size = 0;
+	ssize_t s;
+
+	do {
+		/* This expects that partial read is aligned in buffer */
+		s = read(fd, buf, count - read_size);
+		if (s == -1 && errno != EINTR)
+			return s;
+		if (s == 0)
+			return (ssize_t)read_size;
+		if (s > 0) {
+			if (s != (ssize_t)count)
+				log_dbg("Partial read %zd / %zu.", s, count);
+			read_size += (size_t)s;
+			buf = (uint8_t*)buf + s;
+		}
+	} while (read_size != count);
+
+	return (ssize_t)count;
+}
+
+static int copy_data_forward(struct reenc_ctx *rc, int fd_old, int fd_new,
+			     size_t block_size, void *buf, uint64_t *bytes)
+{
+	ssize_t s1, s2;
+
+	log_dbg("Reencrypting in forward direction.");
+
+	if (lseek64(fd_old, rc->device_offset, SEEK_SET) < 0 ||
+	    lseek64(fd_new, rc->device_offset, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
+		log_err(_("Cannot seek to device offset."));
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	rc->resume_bytes = *bytes = rc->device_offset;
+
+	if (write_log(rc) < 0)
+		return -EIO;
+
+	while (!quit && rc->device_offset < rc->device_size) {
+		s1 = read_buf(fd_old, buf, block_size);
+		if (s1 < 0 || ((size_t)s1 != block_size &&
+		    (rc->device_offset + s1) != rc->device_size)) {
+			log_dbg("Read error, expecting %zu, got %zd.",
+				block_size, s1);
+			return -EIO;
+		}
+
+		/* If device_size is forced, never write more than limit */
+		if ((s1 + rc->device_offset) > rc->device_size)
+			s1 = rc->device_size - rc->device_offset;
+
+		s2 = write(fd_new, buf, s1);
+		if (s2 < 0) {
+			log_dbg("Write error, expecting %zu, got %zd.",
+				block_size, s2);
+			return -EIO;
+		}
+
+		rc->device_offset += s1;
+		if (opt_write_log && write_log(rc) < 0)
+			return -EIO;
+
+		if (opt_fsync && fsync(fd_new) < 0) {
+			log_dbg("Write error, fsync.");
+			return -EIO;
+		}
+
+		*bytes += (uint64_t)s2;
+		tools_time_progress(rc->device_size, *bytes,
+				    &rc->start_time, &rc->end_time);
+	}
+
+	return quit ? -EAGAIN : 0;
+}
+
+static int copy_data_backward(struct reenc_ctx *rc, int fd_old, int fd_new,
+			      size_t block_size, void *buf, uint64_t *bytes)
+{
+	ssize_t s1, s2, working_block;
+	off64_t working_offset;
+
+	log_dbg("Reencrypting in backward direction.");
+
+	if (!rc->in_progress) {
+		rc->device_offset = rc->device_size;
+		rc->resume_bytes = 0;
+		*bytes = 0;
+	} else {
+		rc->resume_bytes = rc->device_size - rc->device_offset;
+		*bytes = rc->resume_bytes;
+	}
+
+	if (write_log(rc) < 0)
+		return -EIO;
+
+	/* dirty the device during ENCRYPT mode */
+	rc->stained = 1;
+
+	while (!quit && rc->device_offset) {
+		if (rc->device_offset < block_size) {
+			working_offset = 0;
+			working_block = rc->device_offset;
+		} else {
+			working_offset = rc->device_offset - block_size;
+			working_block = block_size;
+		}
+
+		if (lseek64(fd_old, working_offset, SEEK_SET) < 0 ||
+		    lseek64(fd_new, working_offset, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
+			log_err(_("Cannot seek to device offset."));
+			return -EIO;
+		}
+
+		s1 = read_buf(fd_old, buf, working_block);
+		if (s1 < 0 || (s1 != working_block)) {
+			log_dbg("Read error, expecting %zu, got %zd.",
+				block_size, s1);
+			return -EIO;
+		}
+
+		s2 = write(fd_new, buf, working_block);
+		if (s2 < 0) {
+			log_dbg("Write error, expecting %zu, got %zd.",
+				block_size, s2);
+			return -EIO;
+		}
+
+		rc->device_offset -= s1;
+		if (opt_write_log && write_log(rc) < 0)
+			return -EIO;
+
+		if (opt_fsync && fsync(fd_new) < 0) {
+			log_dbg("Write error, fsync.");
+			return -EIO;
+		}
+
+		*bytes += (uint64_t)s2;
+		tools_time_progress(rc->device_size, *bytes,
+				    &rc->start_time, &rc->end_time);
+	}
+
+	return quit ? -EAGAIN : 0;
+}
+
+static void zero_rest_of_device(int fd, size_t block_size, void *buf,
+				uint64_t *bytes, uint64_t offset)
+{
+	ssize_t s1, s2;
+
+	log_dbg("Zeroing rest of device.");
+
+	if (lseek64(fd, offset, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
+		log_dbg(_("Cannot seek to device offset.\n"));
+		return;
+	}
+
+	memset(buf, 0, block_size);
+	s1 = block_size;
+
+	while (!quit && *bytes) {
+		if (*bytes < (uint64_t)s1)
+			s1 = *bytes;
+
+		s2 = write(fd, buf, s1);
+		if (s2 != s1) {
+			log_dbg("Write error, expecting %zd, got %zd.",
+				s1, s2);
+			return;
+		}
+
+		if (opt_fsync && fsync(fd) < 0) {
+			log_dbg("Write error, fsync.");
+			return;
+		}
+
+		*bytes -= s2;
+	}
+}
+
+static int copy_data(struct reenc_ctx *rc)
+{
+	size_t block_size = opt_bsize * 1024 * 1024;
+	int fd_old = -1, fd_new = -1;
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+	void *buf = NULL;
+	uint64_t bytes = 0;
+
+	log_dbg("Data copy preparation.");
+
+	fd_old = open(rc->crypt_path_org, O_RDONLY | (opt_directio ? O_DIRECT : 0));
+	if (fd_old == -1) {
+		log_err(_("Cannot open temporary LUKS device."));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	fd_new = open(rc->crypt_path_new, O_WRONLY | (opt_directio ? O_DIRECT : 0));
+	if (fd_new == -1) {
+		log_err(_("Cannot open temporary LUKS device."));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (ioctl(fd_old, BLKGETSIZE64, &rc->device_size_org_real) < 0) {
+		log_err(_("Cannot get device size."));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (ioctl(fd_new, BLKGETSIZE64, &rc->device_size_new_real) < 0) {
+		log_err(_("Cannot get device size."));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (opt_device_size)
+		rc->device_size = opt_device_size;
+	else if (rc->reencrypt_mode == DECRYPT)
+		rc->device_size = rc->device_size_org_real;
+	else
+		rc->device_size = rc->device_size_new_real;
+
+	if (posix_memalign((void *)&buf, alignment(fd_new), block_size)) {
+		log_err(_("Allocation of aligned memory failed."));
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	set_int_handler(0);
+	tools_time_progress(rc->device_size, bytes,
+			    &rc->start_time, &rc->end_time);
+
+	if (rc->reencrypt_direction == FORWARD)
+		r = copy_data_forward(rc, fd_old, fd_new, block_size, buf, &bytes);
+	else
+		r = copy_data_backward(rc, fd_old, fd_new, block_size, buf, &bytes);
+
+	/* Zero (wipe) rest of now plain-only device when decrypting.
+	 * (To not leave any sign of encryption here.) */
+	if (!r && rc->reencrypt_mode == DECRYPT &&
+	    rc->device_size_new_real > rc->device_size_org_real) {
+		bytes = rc->device_size_new_real - rc->device_size_org_real;
+		zero_rest_of_device(fd_new, block_size, buf, &bytes, rc->device_size_org_real);
+	}
+
+	set_int_block(1);
+
+	if (r == -EAGAIN)
+		 log_err(_("Interrupted by a signal."));
+	else if (r < 0)
+		log_err(_("IO error during reencryption."));
+
+	(void)write_log(rc);
+out:
+	if (fd_old != -1)
+		close(fd_old);
+	if (fd_new != -1)
+		close(fd_new);
+	free(buf);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int initialize_uuid(struct reenc_ctx *rc)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	int r;
+	uuid_t device_uuid;
+
+	log_dbg("Initialising UUID.");
+
+	if (opt_new) {
+		rc->device_uuid = strdup(NO_UUID);
+		rc->type = luksType(opt_type);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (opt_decrypt && opt_uuid) {
+		r = uuid_parse(opt_uuid, device_uuid);
+		if (!r)
+			rc->device_uuid = strdup(opt_uuid);
+		else
+			log_err(_("Provided UUID is invalid."));
+
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	/* Try to load LUKS from device */
+	if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, hdr_device(rc))))
+		return r;
+	crypt_set_log_callback(cd, _quiet_log, NULL);
+	r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL);
+	if (!r)
+		rc->device_uuid = strdup(crypt_get_uuid(cd));
+	else
+		/* Reencryption already in progress - magic header? */
+		r = device_check(rc, hdr_device(rc), CHECK_UNUSABLE);
+
+	if (!r)
+		rc->type = isLUKS2(crypt_get_type(cd)) ? CRYPT_LUKS2 : CRYPT_LUKS1;
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int init_passphrase1(struct reenc_ctx *rc, struct crypt_device *cd,
+			    const char *msg, int slot_to_check, int check, int verify)
+{
+	crypt_keyslot_info ki;
+	char *password;
+	int r = -EINVAL, retry_count;
+	size_t passwordLen;
+
+	/* mode ENCRYPT call this without header */
+	if (cd && slot_to_check != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT) {
+		ki = crypt_keyslot_status(cd, slot_to_check);
+		if (ki < CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE)
+			return -ENOENT;
+	} else
+		ki = CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE;
+
+	retry_count = opt_tries ?: 1;
+	while (retry_count--) {
+		r = tools_get_key(msg,  &password, &passwordLen, 0, 0,
+				  NULL /*opt_key_file*/, 0, verify, 0 /*pwquality*/, cd);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+		if (quit) {
+			crypt_safe_free(password);
+			password = NULL;
+			passwordLen = 0;
+			return -EAGAIN;
+		}
+
+		if (check)
+			r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, slot_to_check,
+				password, passwordLen, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY);
+		else
+			r = (slot_to_check == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT) ? 0 : slot_to_check;
+
+		if (r < 0) {
+			crypt_safe_free(password);
+			password = NULL;
+			passwordLen = 0;
+		}
+		if (r < 0 && r != -EPERM)
+			return r;
+
+		if (r >= 0) {
+			tools_keyslot_msg(r, UNLOCKED);
+			rc->p[r].password = password;
+			rc->p[r].passwordLen = passwordLen;
+			if (ki != CRYPT_SLOT_UNBOUND)
+				rc->keyslot = r;
+			break;
+		}
+		tools_passphrase_msg(r);
+	}
+
+	password = NULL;
+	passwordLen = 0;
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int init_keyfile(struct reenc_ctx *rc, struct crypt_device *cd, int slot_check)
+{
+	char *password;
+	int r;
+	size_t passwordLen;
+
+	r = tools_get_key(NULL, &password, &passwordLen, opt_keyfile_offset,
+			  opt_keyfile_size, opt_key_file, 0, 0, 0, cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, slot_check, password,
+					 passwordLen, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Allow keyslot only if it is last slot or if user explicitly
+	 * specify which slot to use (IOW others will be disabled).
+	 */
+	if (r >= 0 && opt_key_slot == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT &&
+	    crypt_keyslot_status(cd, r) != CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST) {
+		log_err(_("Key file can be used only with --key-slot or with "
+			  "exactly one key slot active."));
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (r < 0) {
+		crypt_safe_free(password);
+		tools_passphrase_msg(r);
+	} else {
+		rc->keyslot = r;
+		rc->p[r].password = password;
+		rc->p[r].passwordLen = passwordLen;
+	}
+
+	password = NULL;
+	passwordLen = 0;
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int initialize_passphrase(struct reenc_ctx *rc, const char *device)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	char msg[256];
+	int i, r;
+
+	log_dbg("Passphrases initialization.");
+
+	if (rc->reencrypt_mode == ENCRYPT && !rc->in_progress) {
+		r = init_passphrase1(rc, cd, _("Enter new passphrase: "), opt_key_slot, 0, 1);
+		return r > 0 ? 0 : r;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = crypt_init_data_device(&cd, device, rc->device)) ||
+	    (r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL))) {
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	if (opt_key_slot != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
+		snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
+			 _("Enter passphrase for key slot %u: "), opt_key_slot);
+	else
+		snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), _("Enter any existing passphrase: "));
+
+	if (opt_key_file) {
+		r = init_keyfile(rc, cd, opt_key_slot);
+	} else if (rc->in_progress ||
+		   opt_key_slot != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT ||
+		   rc->reencrypt_mode == DECRYPT) {
+		r = init_passphrase1(rc, cd, msg, opt_key_slot, 1, 0);
+	} else for (i = 0; i < crypt_keyslot_max(crypt_get_type(cd)); i++) {
+		snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), _("Enter passphrase for key slot %u: "), i);
+		r = init_passphrase1(rc, cd, msg, i, 1, 0);
+		if (r == -ENOENT) {
+			r = 0;
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (r < 0)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return r > 0 ? 0 : r;
+}
+
+static int initialize_context(struct reenc_ctx *rc, const char *device)
+{
+	log_dbg("Initialising reencryption context.");
+
+	rc->log_fd = -1;
+
+	/* FIXME: replace MAX_KEYSLOT with crypt_keyslot_max(CRYPT_LUKS2) */
+	if (crypt_keyslot_max(CRYPT_LUKS2) > MAX_SLOT) {
+		log_dbg("Internal error");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!(rc->device = strndup(device, PATH_MAX)))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (opt_header_device && !(rc->device_header = strndup(opt_header_device, PATH_MAX)))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (device_check(rc, rc->device, CHECK_OPEN) < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (initialize_uuid(rc)) {
+		log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."), device);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (opt_key_slot != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT &&
+	    opt_key_slot >= crypt_keyslot_max(rc->type)) {
+		log_err(_("Key slot is invalid."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Prepare device names */
+	if (snprintf(rc->log_file, PATH_MAX,
+		     "LUKS-%s.log", rc->device_uuid) < 0)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (snprintf(rc->header_file_org, PATH_MAX,
+		     "LUKS-%s.org", rc->device_uuid) < 0)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (snprintf(rc->header_file_new, PATH_MAX,
+		     "LUKS-%s.new", rc->device_uuid) < 0)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (snprintf(rc->header_file_tmp, PATH_MAX,
+		     "LUKS-%s.tmp", rc->device_uuid) < 0)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* Paths to encrypted devices */
+	if (snprintf(rc->crypt_path_org, PATH_MAX,
+		     "%s/%s", crypt_get_dir(), rc->header_file_org) < 0)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (snprintf(rc->crypt_path_new, PATH_MAX,
+		     "%s/%s", crypt_get_dir(), rc->header_file_new) < 0)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	remove_headers(rc);
+
+	if (open_log(rc) < 0) {
+		log_err(_("Cannot open reencryption log file."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!rc->in_progress) {
+		if (opt_uuid) {
+			log_err(_("No decryption in progress, provided UUID can "
+			"be used only to resume suspended decryption process."));
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		if (!opt_reduce_size)
+			rc->reencrypt_direction = FORWARD;
+		else {
+			rc->reencrypt_direction = BACKWARD;
+			rc->device_offset = (uint64_t)~0;
+		}
+
+		if (opt_new)
+			rc->reencrypt_mode = ENCRYPT;
+		else if (opt_decrypt)
+			rc->reencrypt_mode = DECRYPT;
+		else
+			rc->reencrypt_mode = REENCRYPT;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void destroy_context(struct reenc_ctx *rc)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	log_dbg("Destroying reencryption context.");
+
+	close_log(rc);
+	remove_headers(rc);
+
+	if (!rc->stained) {
+		unlink(rc->log_file);
+		unlink(rc->header_file_org);
+		unlink(rc->header_file_new);
+		unlink(rc->header_file_tmp);
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_SLOT; i++)
+		crypt_safe_free(rc->p[i].password);
+
+	free(rc->device);
+	free(rc->device_header);
+	free(rc->device_uuid);
+}
+
+static int luks2_change_pbkdf_params(struct reenc_ctx *rc)
+{
+	int i, r;
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+
+	if ((r = initialize_passphrase(rc, hdr_device(rc))))
+		return r;
+
+	if (crypt_init(&cd, hdr_device(rc)) ||
+	    crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL)) {
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = set_pbkdf_params(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2)))
+		goto out;
+
+	log_dbg("LUKS2 keyslot pbkdf params change.");
+
+	r = -EINVAL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < crypt_keyslot_max(CRYPT_LUKS2); i++) {
+		if (!rc->p[i].password)
+			continue;
+		if ((r = crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase(cd, i, i,
+			rc->p[i].password, rc->p[i].passwordLen,
+			rc->p[i].password, rc->p[i].passwordLen)) < 0)
+			goto out;
+		log_verbose(_("Changed pbkdf parameters in keyslot %i."), r);
+		r = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* see create_new_header */
+	for (i = 0; i < crypt_keyslot_max(CRYPT_LUKS2); i++)
+		if (!rc->p[i].password)
+			(void)crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, i);
+out:
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int run_reencrypt(const char *device)
+{
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+	static struct reenc_ctx rc = {
+		.stained = 1
+	};
+
+	set_int_handler(0);
+
+	if (initialize_context(&rc, device))
+		goto out;
+
+	/* short-circuit LUKS2 keyslot parameters change */
+	if (opt_keep_key && isLUKS2(rc.type)) {
+		r = luks2_change_pbkdf_params(&rc);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg("Running reencryption.");
+
+	if (!rc.in_progress) {
+		if ((r = initialize_passphrase(&rc, hdr_device(&rc))))
+			goto out;
+
+		log_dbg("Storing backup of LUKS headers.");
+		if (rc.reencrypt_mode == ENCRYPT) {
+			/* Create fake header for existing device */
+			if ((r = backup_fake_header(&rc)))
+				goto out;
+		} else {
+			if ((r = backup_luks_headers(&rc)))
+				goto out;
+			/* Create fake header for decrypted device */
+			if (rc.reencrypt_mode == DECRYPT &&
+			    (r = backup_fake_header(&rc)))
+				goto out;
+			if ((r = device_check(&rc, hdr_device(&rc), MAKE_UNUSABLE)))
+				goto out;
+		}
+	} else {
+		if ((r = initialize_passphrase(&rc, opt_decrypt ? rc.header_file_org : rc.header_file_new)))
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!opt_keep_key) {
+		log_dbg("Running data area reencryption.");
+		if ((r = activate_luks_headers(&rc)))
+			goto out;
+
+		if ((r = copy_data(&rc)))
+			goto out;
+	} else
+		log_dbg("Keeping existing key, skipping data area reencryption.");
+
+	// FIXME: fix error path above to not skip this
+	if (rc.reencrypt_mode != DECRYPT)
+		r = restore_luks_header(&rc);
+	else
+		rc.stained = 0;
+out:
+	destroy_context(&rc);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void help(poptContext popt_context,
+		 enum poptCallbackReason reason __attribute__((unused)),
+		 struct poptOption *key,
+		 const char *arg __attribute__((unused)),
+		 void *data __attribute__((unused)))
+{
+	if (key->shortName == '?') {
+		log_std("%s %s\n", PACKAGE_REENC, PACKAGE_VERSION);
+		poptPrintHelp(popt_context, stdout, 0);
+		exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+	} else
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_SUCCESS, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+	static struct poptOption popt_help_options[] = {
+		{ NULL,    '\0', POPT_ARG_CALLBACK, help, 0, NULL,                         NULL },
+		{ "help",  '?',  POPT_ARG_NONE,     NULL, 0, N_("Show this help message"), NULL },
+		{ "usage", '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE,     NULL, 0, N_("Display brief usage"),    NULL },
+		POPT_TABLEEND
+	};
+	static struct poptOption popt_options[] = {
+		{ NULL,                '\0', POPT_ARG_INCLUDE_TABLE, popt_help_options, 0, N_("Help options:"), NULL },
+		{ "version",           '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_version_mode,          0, N_("Print package version"), NULL },
+		{ "verbose",           'v',  POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_verbose,               0, N_("Shows more detailed error messages"), NULL },
+		{ "debug",             '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_debug,                 0, N_("Show debug messages"), NULL },
+		{ "block-size",        'B',  POPT_ARG_INT, &opt_bsize,                  0, N_("Reencryption block size"), N_("MiB") },
+		{ "cipher",            'c',  POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_cipher,              0, N_("The cipher used to encrypt the disk (see /proc/crypto)"), NULL },
+		{ "key-size",          's',  POPT_ARG_INT, &opt_key_size,               0, N_("The size of the encryption key"), N_("BITS") },
+		{ "hash",              'h',  POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_hash,                0, N_("The hash used to create the encryption key from the passphrase"), NULL },
+		{ "keep-key",          '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_keep_key,              0, N_("Do not change key, no data area reencryption"), NULL },
+		{ "key-file",          'd',  POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_key_file,            0, N_("Read the key from a file"), NULL },
+		{ "master-key-file",   '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_master_key_file,     0, N_("Read new volume (master) key from file"), NULL },
+		{ "iter-time",         'i',  POPT_ARG_INT, &opt_iteration_time,         0, N_("PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS (in ms)"), N_("msecs") },
+		{ "batch-mode",        'q',  POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_batch_mode,            0, N_("Do not ask for confirmation"), NULL },
+		{ "progress-frequency",'\0', POPT_ARG_INT, &opt_progress_frequency,     0, N_("Progress line update (in seconds)"), N_("secs") },
+		{ "tries",             'T',  POPT_ARG_INT, &opt_tries,                  0, N_("How often the input of the passphrase can be retried"), NULL },
+		{ "use-random",        '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_random,                0, N_("Use /dev/random for generating volume key"), NULL },
+		{ "use-urandom",       '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_urandom,               0, N_("Use /dev/urandom for generating volume key"), NULL },
+		{ "use-directio",      '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_directio,              0, N_("Use direct-io when accessing devices"), NULL },
+		{ "use-fsync",         '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_fsync,                 0, N_("Use fsync after each block"), NULL },
+		{ "write-log",         '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_write_log,             0, N_("Update log file after every block"), NULL },
+		{ "key-slot",          'S',  POPT_ARG_INT, &opt_key_slot,               0, N_("Use only this slot (others will be disabled)"), NULL },
+		{ "keyfile-offset",   '\0',  POPT_ARG_LONG, &opt_keyfile_offset,        0, N_("Number of bytes to skip in keyfile"), N_("bytes") },
+		{ "keyfile-size",      'l',  POPT_ARG_LONG, &opt_keyfile_size,          0, N_("Limits the read from keyfile"), N_("bytes") },
+		{ "reduce-device-size",'\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_reduce_size_str,     0, N_("Reduce data device size (move data offset). DANGEROUS!"), N_("bytes") },
+		{ "device-size",       '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_device_size_str,     0, N_("Use only specified device size (ignore rest of device). DANGEROUS!"), N_("bytes") },
+		{ "new",               'N',  POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_new,                   0, N_("Create new header on not encrypted device"), NULL },
+		{ "decrypt",           '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_decrypt,               0, N_("Permanently decrypt device (remove encryption)"), NULL },
+		{ "uuid",              '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_uuid,                0, N_("The UUID used to resume decryption"), NULL },
+		{ "type",              '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_type,                0, N_("Type of LUKS metadata: luks1, luks2"), NULL },
+		{ "pbkdf",             '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_pbkdf,               0, N_("PBKDF algorithm (for LUKS2): argon2i, argon2id, pbkdf2"), NULL },
+		{ "pbkdf-memory",      '\0', POPT_ARG_LONG, &opt_pbkdf_memory,          0, N_("PBKDF memory cost limit"), N_("kilobytes") },
+		{ "pbkdf-parallel",    '\0', POPT_ARG_LONG, &opt_pbkdf_parallel,        0, N_("PBKDF parallel cost"), N_("threads") },
+		{ "pbkdf-force-iterations",'\0',POPT_ARG_LONG, &opt_pbkdf_iterations,   0, N_("PBKDF iterations cost (forced, disables benchmark)"), NULL },
+		{ "header",            '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_header_device,       0, N_("Device or file with separated LUKS header"), NULL },
+		POPT_TABLEEND
+	};
+	poptContext popt_context;
+	int r;
+
+	crypt_set_log_callback(NULL, tool_log, NULL);
+
+	setlocale(LC_ALL, "");
+	bindtextdomain(PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
+	textdomain(PACKAGE);
+
+	popt_context = poptGetContext(PACKAGE, argc, argv, popt_options, 0);
+	poptSetOtherOptionHelp(popt_context,
+	                       _("[OPTION...] <device>"));
+
+	while((r = poptGetNextOpt(popt_context)) > 0) ;
+	if (r < -1)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, poptStrerror(r),
+		      poptBadOption(popt_context, POPT_BADOPTION_NOALIAS));
+
+	if (opt_version_mode) {
+		log_std("%s %s\n", PACKAGE_REENC, PACKAGE_VERSION);
+		poptFreeContext(popt_context);
+		exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+	}
+
+	if (!opt_batch_mode)
+		log_verbose(_("Reencryption will change: %s%s%s%s%s%s."),
+			opt_keep_key ? "" :  _("volume key"),
+			(!opt_keep_key && opt_hash) ? ", " : "",
+			opt_hash   ? _("set hash to ")    : "", opt_hash   ?: "",
+			opt_cipher ? _(", set cipher to "): "", opt_cipher ?: "");
+
+	action_argv = poptGetArgs(popt_context);
+	if(!action_argv)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Argument required."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_random && opt_urandom)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Only one of --use-[u]random options is allowed."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_bsize < 0 || opt_key_size < 0 || opt_iteration_time < 0 ||
+	    opt_tries < 0 || opt_keyfile_offset < 0 || opt_key_size < 0 ||
+	    opt_pbkdf_iterations < 0 || opt_pbkdf_memory < 0 ||
+	    opt_pbkdf_parallel < 0) {
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		      _("Negative number for option not permitted."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+	}
+
+	if (opt_pbkdf && crypt_parse_pbkdf(opt_pbkdf, &opt_pbkdf))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		_("Password-based key derivation function (PBKDF) can be only pbkdf2 or argon2i/argon2id.\n"),
+		poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_pbkdf_iterations && opt_iteration_time)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		_("PBKDF forced iterations cannot be combined with iteration time option.\n"),
+		poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_bsize < 1 || opt_bsize > 64)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		      _("Only values between 1 MiB and 64 MiB allowed for reencryption block size."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_key_size % 8)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		      _("Key size must be a multiple of 8 bits"),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_key_slot != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT &&
+	    (opt_key_slot < 0 || opt_key_slot >= crypt_keyslot_max(CRYPT_LUKS2)))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Key slot is invalid."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_random && opt_urandom)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Only one of --use-[u]random options is allowed."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_device_size_str &&
+	    tools_string_to_size(NULL, opt_device_size_str, &opt_device_size))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Invalid device size specification."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_reduce_size_str &&
+	    tools_string_to_size(NULL, opt_reduce_size_str, &opt_reduce_size))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Invalid device size specification."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+	if (opt_reduce_size > 64 * 1024 * 1024)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Maximum device reduce size is 64 MiB."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+	if (opt_reduce_size % SECTOR_SIZE)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Reduce size must be multiple of 512 bytes sector."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_new && (!opt_reduce_size && !opt_header_device))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Option --new must be used together with --reduce-device-size or --header."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_keep_key && (opt_cipher || opt_new || opt_master_key_file))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Option --keep-key can be used only with --hash, --iter-time or --pbkdf-force-iterations."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_new && opt_decrypt)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Option --new cannot be used together with --decrypt."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_decrypt && (opt_cipher || opt_hash || opt_reduce_size || opt_keep_key || opt_device_size))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Option --decrypt is incompatible with specified parameters."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_uuid && !opt_decrypt)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Option --uuid is allowed only together with --decrypt."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (!luksType(opt_type))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Invalid luks type. Use one of these: 'luks', 'luks1' or 'luks2'."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_debug) {
+		opt_verbose = 1;
+		crypt_set_debug_level(-1);
+		dbg_version_and_cmd(argc, argv);
+	}
+
+	r = run_reencrypt(action_argv[0]);
+
+	poptFreeContext(popt_context);
+
+	return translate_errno(r);
+}
diff --git a/src/integritysetup.c b/src/integritysetup.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f451f9b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/integritysetup.c
@@ -0,0 +1,688 @@
+/*
+ * integritysetup - setup integrity protected volumes for dm-integrity
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2017-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2017-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include "cryptsetup.h"
+#include <uuid/uuid.h>
+
+#define PACKAGE_INTEGRITY "integritysetup"
+
+#define DEFAULT_TAG_SIZE 4
+#define DEFAULT_ALG_NAME "crc32c"
+#define MAX_KEY_SIZE 4096
+
+static const char *opt_journal_size_str = NULL;
+static uint64_t opt_journal_size = 0;
+static int opt_interleave_sectors = 0;
+static int opt_journal_watermark = 0;
+static int opt_journal_commit_time = 0;
+static int opt_tag_size = 0;
+static int opt_sector_size = 0;
+static int opt_buffer_sectors = 0;
+
+static int opt_no_wipe = 0;
+
+static const char *opt_data_device = NULL;
+
+static const char *opt_integrity = DEFAULT_ALG_NAME;
+static const char *opt_integrity_key_file = NULL;
+static int opt_integrity_key_size = 0;
+
+static const char *opt_journal_integrity = NULL; /* none */
+static const char *opt_journal_integrity_key_file = NULL;
+static int opt_journal_integrity_key_size = 0;
+
+static const char *opt_journal_crypt = NULL; /* none */
+static const char *opt_journal_crypt_key_file = NULL;
+static int opt_journal_crypt_key_size = 0;
+
+static int opt_integrity_nojournal = 0;
+static int opt_integrity_recovery = 0;
+
+static int opt_integrity_recalculate = 0;
+
+static int opt_version_mode = 0;
+
+static const char **action_argv;
+static int action_argc;
+
+// FIXME: move this to tools and handle EINTR
+static int _read_mk(const char *file, char **key, int keysize)
+{
+	int fd;
+
+	if (keysize <= 0 || keysize > MAX_KEY_SIZE) {
+		log_err(_("Invalid key size."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	*key = crypt_safe_alloc(keysize);
+	if (!*key)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	fd = open(file, O_RDONLY);
+	if (fd == -1) {
+		log_err(_("Cannot read keyfile %s."), file);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if ((read(fd, *key, keysize) != keysize)) {
+		log_err(_("Cannot read %d bytes from keyfile %s."), keysize, file);
+		close(fd);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	close(fd);
+	return 0;
+fail:
+	crypt_safe_free(*key);
+	*key = NULL;
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int _read_keys(char **integrity_key, struct crypt_params_integrity *params)
+{
+	char *int_key = NULL, *journal_integrity_key = NULL, *journal_crypt_key = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (integrity_key && opt_integrity_key_file) {
+		r = _read_mk(opt_integrity_key_file, &int_key, opt_integrity_key_size);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+		params->integrity_key_size = opt_integrity_key_size;
+	}
+
+	if (opt_journal_integrity_key_file) {
+		r = _read_mk(opt_journal_integrity_key_file, &journal_integrity_key, opt_journal_integrity_key_size);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			crypt_safe_free(int_key);
+			return r;
+		}
+		params->journal_integrity_key = journal_integrity_key;
+		params->journal_integrity_key_size = opt_journal_integrity_key_size;
+	}
+
+	if (opt_journal_crypt_key_file) {
+		r = _read_mk(opt_journal_crypt_key_file, &journal_crypt_key, opt_journal_crypt_key_size);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			crypt_safe_free(int_key);
+			crypt_safe_free(journal_integrity_key);
+			return r;
+		}
+		params->journal_crypt_key = journal_crypt_key;
+		params->journal_crypt_key_size = opt_journal_crypt_key_size;
+	}
+
+	if (integrity_key)
+		*integrity_key = int_key;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int _wipe_data_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *integrity_key)
+{
+	char tmp_name[64], tmp_path[128], tmp_uuid[40];
+	uuid_t tmp_uuid_bin;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!opt_batch_mode)
+		log_std(_("Wiping device to initialize integrity checksum.\n"
+			"You can interrupt this by pressing CTRL+c "
+			"(rest of not wiped device will contain invalid checksum).\n"));
+
+	/* Activate the device a temporary one */
+	uuid_generate(tmp_uuid_bin);
+	uuid_unparse(tmp_uuid_bin, tmp_uuid);
+	if (snprintf(tmp_name, sizeof(tmp_name), "temporary-cryptsetup-%s", tmp_uuid) < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (snprintf(tmp_path, sizeof(tmp_path), "%s/%s", crypt_get_dir(), tmp_name) < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, tmp_name, integrity_key,
+		opt_integrity_key_size, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	/* Wipe the device */
+	set_int_handler(0);
+	r = crypt_wipe(cd, tmp_path, CRYPT_WIPE_ZERO, 0, 0, DEFAULT_WIPE_BLOCK,
+		       0, &tools_wipe_progress, NULL);
+	if (crypt_deactivate(cd, tmp_name))
+		log_err(_("Cannot deactivate temporary device %s."), tmp_path);
+	set_int_block(0);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int action_format(int arg)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	struct crypt_params_integrity params = {
+		.journal_size = opt_journal_size,
+		.interleave_sectors = opt_interleave_sectors,
+		.journal_watermark = opt_journal_watermark,
+		.journal_commit_time = opt_journal_commit_time,
+		.buffer_sectors = opt_buffer_sectors,
+		.tag_size = opt_tag_size,
+		.sector_size = opt_sector_size ?: SECTOR_SIZE,
+	};
+	char integrity[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], journal_integrity[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], journal_crypt[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+	char *integrity_key = NULL, *msg = NULL;
+	int r;
+	size_t signatures;
+
+	if (opt_integrity) {
+		r = crypt_parse_hash_integrity_mode(opt_integrity, integrity);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			log_err(_("No known integrity specification pattern detected."));
+			return r;
+		}
+		params.integrity = integrity;
+	}
+
+	if (opt_journal_integrity) {
+		r = crypt_parse_hash_integrity_mode(opt_journal_integrity, journal_integrity);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			log_err(_("No known integrity specification pattern detected."));
+			return r;
+		}
+		params.journal_integrity = journal_integrity;
+	}
+
+	if (opt_journal_crypt) {
+		r = crypt_parse_hash_integrity_mode(opt_journal_crypt, journal_crypt);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			log_err(_("No known integrity specification pattern detected."));
+			return r;
+		}
+		params.journal_crypt = journal_crypt;
+	}
+
+	r = _read_keys(&integrity_key, &params);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = crypt_init_data_device(&cd, action_argv[0], opt_data_device);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = asprintf(&msg, _("This will overwrite data on %s irrevocably."), action_argv[0]);
+	if (r == -1) {
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = yesDialog(msg, _("Operation aborted.\n")) ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+	free(msg);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = tools_detect_signatures(action_argv[0], 0, &signatures);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Signature candidates found */
+	if (signatures && ((r =	tools_wipe_all_signatures(action_argv[0])) < 0))
+		goto out;
+
+	r = crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_INTEGRITY, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, &params);
+	if (r < 0) /* FIXME: call wipe signatures again */
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!opt_batch_mode)
+		log_std(_("Formatted with tag size %u, internal integrity %s.\n"), opt_tag_size, opt_integrity);
+
+	if (!opt_no_wipe)
+		r = _wipe_data_device(cd, integrity_key);
+out:
+	crypt_safe_free(integrity_key);
+	crypt_safe_free(CONST_CAST(void*)params.journal_integrity_key);
+	crypt_safe_free(CONST_CAST(void*)params.journal_crypt_key);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int action_open(int arg)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	struct crypt_params_integrity params = {
+		.journal_watermark = opt_journal_watermark,
+		.journal_commit_time = opt_journal_commit_time,
+		.buffer_sectors = opt_buffer_sectors,
+	};
+	uint32_t activate_flags = 0;
+	char integrity[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], journal_integrity[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], journal_crypt[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+	char *integrity_key = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (opt_integrity) {
+		r = crypt_parse_hash_integrity_mode(opt_integrity, integrity);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			log_err(_("No known integrity specification pattern detected."));
+			return r;
+		}
+		params.integrity = integrity;
+	}
+
+	if (opt_journal_integrity) {
+		r = crypt_parse_hash_integrity_mode(opt_journal_integrity, journal_integrity);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			log_err(_("No known integrity specification pattern detected."));
+			return r;
+
+		}
+		params.journal_integrity = journal_integrity;
+	}
+
+	if (opt_journal_crypt) {
+		r = crypt_parse_hash_integrity_mode(opt_journal_crypt, journal_crypt);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			log_err(_("No known integrity specification pattern detected."));
+			return r;
+		}
+		params.journal_crypt = journal_crypt;
+	}
+
+	if (opt_integrity_nojournal)
+		activate_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL;
+	if (opt_integrity_recovery)
+		activate_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECOVERY;
+
+	if (opt_integrity_recalculate)
+		activate_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE;
+
+	r = _read_keys(&integrity_key, &params);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((r = crypt_init_data_device(&cd, action_argv[0], opt_data_device)))
+		goto out;
+
+	r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_INTEGRITY, &params);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, action_argv[1], integrity_key,
+					 opt_integrity_key_size, activate_flags);
+out:
+	crypt_safe_free(integrity_key);
+	crypt_safe_free(CONST_CAST(void*)params.journal_integrity_key);
+	crypt_safe_free(CONST_CAST(void*)params.journal_crypt_key);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int action_close(int arg)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	r = crypt_init_by_name(&cd, action_argv[0]);
+	if (r == 0)
+		r = crypt_deactivate(cd, action_argv[0]);
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int action_status(int arg)
+{
+	crypt_status_info ci;
+	struct crypt_active_device cad;
+	struct crypt_params_integrity ip = {};
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	char *backing_file;
+	const char *device, *metadata_device;
+	int path = 0, r = 0;
+
+	/* perhaps a path, not a dm device name */
+	if (strchr(action_argv[0], '/'))
+		path = 1;
+
+	ci = crypt_status(NULL, action_argv[0]);
+	switch (ci) {
+	case CRYPT_INVALID:
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	case CRYPT_INACTIVE:
+		if (path)
+			log_std("%s is inactive.\n", action_argv[0]);
+		else
+			log_std("%s/%s is inactive.\n", crypt_get_dir(), action_argv[0]);
+		r = -ENODEV;
+		break;
+	case CRYPT_ACTIVE:
+	case CRYPT_BUSY:
+		if (path)
+			log_std("%s is active%s.\n", action_argv[0],
+				ci == CRYPT_BUSY ? " and is in use" : "");
+		else
+			log_std("%s/%s is active%s.\n", crypt_get_dir(), action_argv[0],
+				ci == CRYPT_BUSY ? " and is in use" : "");
+
+		r = crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd, action_argv[0], NULL);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		log_std("  type:    %s\n", crypt_get_type(cd) ?: "n/a");
+
+		r = crypt_get_active_device(cd, action_argv[0], &cad);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		r = crypt_get_integrity_info(cd, &ip);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		log_std("  tag size: %u\n", ip.tag_size);
+		log_std("  integrity: %s\n", ip.integrity ?: "(none)");
+		device = crypt_get_device_name(cd);
+		metadata_device = crypt_get_metadata_device_name(cd);
+		log_std("  device:  %s%s\n", device, metadata_device ? " (detached)" : "");
+		if (crypt_loop_device(device)) {
+			backing_file = crypt_loop_backing_file(device);
+			log_std("  loop:    %s\n", backing_file);
+			free(backing_file);
+		}
+		if (metadata_device) {
+			log_std("  metadata device:  %s\n", metadata_device);
+			if (crypt_loop_device(metadata_device)) {
+				backing_file = crypt_loop_backing_file(metadata_device);
+				log_std("  loop:    %s\n", backing_file);
+				free(backing_file);
+			}
+		}
+		log_std("  sector size:  %u bytes\n", crypt_get_sector_size(cd));
+		log_std("  interleave sectors: %u\n", ip.interleave_sectors);
+		log_std("  size:    %" PRIu64 " sectors\n", cad.size);
+		log_std("  mode:    %s%s\n",
+			cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY ? "readonly" : "read/write",
+			cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECOVERY ? " recovery" : "");
+		log_std("  failures: %" PRIu64 "\n",
+			crypt_get_active_integrity_failures(cd, action_argv[0]));
+		if (cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL) {
+			log_std("  journal: not active\n");
+		} else {
+			log_std("  journal size: %" PRIu64 " bytes\n", ip.journal_size);
+			log_std("  journal watermark: %u%%\n", ip.journal_watermark);
+			log_std("  journal commit time: %u ms\n", ip.journal_commit_time);
+			if (ip.journal_integrity)
+				log_std("  journal integrity MAC: %s\n", ip.journal_integrity);
+			if (ip.journal_crypt)
+				log_std("  journal encryption: %s\n", ip.journal_crypt);
+		}
+	}
+out:
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	if (r == -ENOTSUP)
+		r = 0;
+	return r;
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int action_dump(int arg)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	struct crypt_params_integrity params = {};
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, action_argv[0])))
+		return r;
+
+	r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_INTEGRITY, &params);
+	if (!r)
+		crypt_dump(cd);
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static struct action_type {
+	const char *type;
+	int (*handler)(int);
+	int required_action_argc;
+	const char *arg_desc;
+	const char *desc;
+} action_types[] = {
+	{ "format",	action_format, 1, N_("<integrity_device>"),N_("format device") },
+	{ "open",	action_open,   2, N_("<integrity_device> <name>"),N_("open device as <name>") },
+	{ "close",	action_close,  1, N_("<name>"),N_("close device (deactivate and remove mapping)") },
+	{ "status",	action_status, 1, N_("<name>"),N_("show active device status") },
+	{ "dump",	action_dump,   1, N_("<integrity_device>"),N_("show on-disk information") },
+	{ NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+static void help(poptContext popt_context,
+		 enum poptCallbackReason reason __attribute__((unused)),
+		 struct poptOption *key,
+		 const char *arg __attribute__((unused)),
+		 void *data __attribute__((unused)))
+{
+	struct action_type *action;
+
+	if (key->shortName == '?') {
+		log_std("%s %s\n", PACKAGE_INTEGRITY, PACKAGE_VERSION);
+		poptPrintHelp(popt_context, stdout, 0);
+		log_std(_("\n"
+			 "<action> is one of:\n"));
+		for(action = action_types; action->type; action++)
+			log_std("\t%s %s - %s\n", action->type, _(action->arg_desc), _(action->desc));
+		log_std(_("\n"
+			 "<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+			 "<integrity_device> is the device containing data with integrity tags\n"),
+			crypt_get_dir());
+
+		log_std(_("\nDefault compiled-in dm-integrity parameters:\n"
+			  "\tTag size: %u bytes, Checksum algorithm: %s\n"),
+			  DEFAULT_TAG_SIZE, DEFAULT_ALG_NAME);
+		exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+	} else
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_SUCCESS, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+static int run_action(struct action_type *action)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	log_dbg("Running command %s.", action->type);
+
+	r = action->handler(0);
+
+	show_status(r);
+	return translate_errno(r);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+	static const char *null_action_argv[] = {NULL};
+	static struct poptOption popt_help_options[] = {
+		{ NULL,    '\0', POPT_ARG_CALLBACK, help, 0, NULL,                         NULL },
+		{ "help",  '?',  POPT_ARG_NONE,     NULL, 0, N_("Show this help message"), NULL },
+		{ "usage", '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE,     NULL, 0, N_("Display brief usage"),    NULL },
+		POPT_TABLEEND
+	};
+	static struct poptOption popt_options[] = {
+		{ NULL,                 '\0', POPT_ARG_INCLUDE_TABLE, popt_help_options, 0, N_("Help options:"), NULL },
+		{ "version",            '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_version_mode,       0, N_("Print package version"), NULL },
+		{ "verbose",             'v', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_verbose,            0, N_("Shows more detailed error messages"), NULL },
+		{ "debug",              '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_debug,              0, N_("Show debug messages"), NULL },
+		{ "batch-mode",          'q', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_batch_mode,         0, N_("Do not ask for confirmation"), NULL },
+		{ "progress-frequency", '\0', POPT_ARG_INT,  &opt_progress_frequency, 0, N_("Progress line update (in seconds)"), N_("secs") },
+		{ "no-wipe",            '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_no_wipe,            0, N_("Do not wipe device after format"), NULL },
+
+		{ "data-device",        '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_data_device,      0, N_("Path to data device (if separated)"), N_("path") },
+
+		{ "journal-size",        'j', POPT_ARG_STRING,&opt_journal_size_str,  0, N_("Journal size"), N_("bytes") },
+		{ "interleave-sectors", '\0', POPT_ARG_INT,  &opt_interleave_sectors, 0, N_("Interleave sectors"), N_("SECTORS") },
+		{ "journal-watermark",  '\0', POPT_ARG_INT,  &opt_journal_watermark,  0, N_("Journal watermark"),N_("percent") },
+		{ "journal-commit-time",'\0', POPT_ARG_INT,  &opt_journal_commit_time,0, N_("Journal commit time"), N_("ms") },
+		{ "tag-size",            't', POPT_ARG_INT,  &opt_tag_size,           0, N_("Tag size (per-sector)"), N_("bytes") },
+		{ "sector-size",         's', POPT_ARG_INT,  &opt_sector_size,        0, N_("Sector size"), N_("bytes") },
+		{ "buffer-sectors",     '\0', POPT_ARG_INT,  &opt_buffer_sectors,     0, N_("Buffers size"), N_("SECTORS") },
+
+		{ "integrity",                  'I', POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_integrity,                 0, N_("Data integrity algorithm"), NULL },
+		{ "integrity-key-size",        '\0', POPT_ARG_INT,    &opt_integrity_key_size,        0, N_("The size of the data integrity key"), N_("BITS") },
+		{ "integrity-key-file",        '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_integrity_key_file,        0, N_("Read the integrity key from a file"), NULL },
+
+		{ "journal-integrity",         '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_journal_integrity,         0, N_("Journal integrity algorithm"), NULL },
+		{ "journal-integrity-key-size",'\0', POPT_ARG_INT,    &opt_journal_integrity_key_size,0, N_("The size of the journal integrity key"), N_("BITS") },
+		{ "journal-integrity-key-file",'\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_journal_integrity_key_file,0, N_("Read the journal integrity key from a file"), NULL },
+
+		{ "journal-crypt",             '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_journal_crypt,             0, N_("Journal encryption algorithm"), NULL },
+		{ "journal-crypt-key-size",    '\0', POPT_ARG_INT,    &opt_journal_crypt_key_size,    0, N_("The size of the journal encryption key"), N_("BITS") },
+		{ "journal-crypt-key-file",    '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_journal_crypt_key_file,    0, N_("Read the journal encryption key from a file"), NULL },
+
+		{ "integrity-no-journal",       'D', POPT_ARG_NONE,  &opt_integrity_nojournal, 0, N_("Disable journal for integrity device"), NULL },
+		{ "integrity-recovery-mode",    'R', POPT_ARG_NONE,  &opt_integrity_recovery,  0, N_("Recovery mode (no journal, no tag checking)"), NULL },
+		{ "integrity-recalculate",     '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE,  &opt_integrity_recalculate,  0, N_("Recalculate initial tags automatically."), NULL },
+		POPT_TABLEEND
+	};
+	poptContext popt_context;
+	struct action_type *action;
+	const char *aname;
+	int r;
+
+	crypt_set_log_callback(NULL, tool_log, NULL);
+
+	setlocale(LC_ALL, "");
+	bindtextdomain(PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
+	textdomain(PACKAGE);
+
+	popt_context = poptGetContext("integrity", argc, argv, popt_options, 0);
+	poptSetOtherOptionHelp(popt_context,
+	                       _("[OPTION...] <action> <action-specific>"));
+
+
+	while ((r = poptGetNextOpt(popt_context)) >= 0) {
+	}
+
+	if (r < -1)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, poptStrerror(r),
+		      poptBadOption(popt_context, POPT_BADOPTION_NOALIAS));
+
+	if (opt_version_mode) {
+		log_std("%s %s\n", PACKAGE_INTEGRITY, PACKAGE_VERSION);
+		poptFreeContext(popt_context);
+		exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+	}
+
+	if (!(aname = poptGetArg(popt_context)))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Argument <action> missing."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	action_argc = 0;
+	action_argv = poptGetArgs(popt_context);
+	/* Make return values of poptGetArgs more consistent in case of remaining argc = 0 */
+	if (!action_argv)
+		action_argv = null_action_argv;
+
+	/* Count args, somewhat unnice, change? */
+	while (action_argv[action_argc] != NULL)
+		action_argc++;
+
+	/* Handle aliases */
+	if (!strcmp(aname, "create") && action_argc > 1) {
+		/* create command had historically switched arguments */
+		if (action_argv[0] && action_argv[1]) {
+			const char *tmp = action_argv[0];
+			action_argv[0] = action_argv[1];
+			action_argv[1] = tmp;
+		}
+		aname = "open";
+	} else if (!strcmp(aname, "remove")) {
+		aname = "close";
+	}
+
+	for (action = action_types; action->type; action++)
+		if (strcmp(action->type, aname) == 0)
+			break;
+
+	if (!action->type)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Unknown action."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (action_argc < action->required_action_argc) {
+		char buf[128];
+		snprintf(buf, 128,_("%s: requires %s as arguments"), action->type, action->arg_desc);
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, buf,
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+	}
+
+	if (!strcmp(aname, "format") && opt_tag_size == 0)
+		opt_tag_size = DEFAULT_TAG_SIZE;
+
+	if (opt_integrity_recalculate && strcmp(aname, "open"))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		      _("Option --integrity-recalculate can be used only for open action."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_interleave_sectors < 0 || opt_journal_watermark < 0 ||
+	    opt_journal_commit_time < 0 || opt_tag_size < 0 ||
+	    opt_sector_size < 0 || opt_buffer_sectors < 0 ||
+	    opt_integrity_key_size < 0 || opt_journal_integrity_key_size < 0 ||
+	    opt_journal_crypt_key_size < 0)
+                usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+                      _("Negative number for option not permitted."),
+                      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (strcmp(aname, "format") && (opt_journal_size_str || opt_interleave_sectors ||
+		opt_sector_size || opt_tag_size || opt_no_wipe ))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		      _("Options --journal-size, --interleave-sectors, --sector-size, --tag-size"
+		        " and --no-wipe can be used only for format action.\n"),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_journal_size_str &&
+	    tools_string_to_size(NULL, opt_journal_size_str, &opt_journal_size))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Invalid journal size specification."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if ((opt_integrity_key_file && !opt_integrity_key_size) ||
+	   (!opt_integrity_key_file && opt_integrity_key_size))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Both key file and key size options must be specified."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+	if (!opt_integrity && opt_integrity_key_file)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Integrity algorithm must be specified if integrity key is used."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if ((opt_journal_integrity_key_file && !opt_journal_integrity_key_size) ||
+	   (!opt_journal_integrity_key_file && opt_journal_integrity_key_size))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Both journal integrity key file and key size options must be specified."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+	if (!opt_journal_integrity && opt_journal_integrity_key_file)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Journal integrity algorithm must be specified if journal integrity key is used."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if ((opt_journal_crypt_key_file && !opt_journal_crypt_key_size) ||
+	   (!opt_journal_crypt_key_file && opt_journal_crypt_key_size))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Both journal encryption key file and key size options must be specified."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+	if (!opt_journal_crypt && opt_journal_crypt_key_file)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Journal encryption algorithm must be specified if journal encryption key is used."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_debug) {
+		opt_verbose = 1;
+		crypt_set_debug_level(-1);
+		dbg_version_and_cmd(argc, argv);
+	}
+
+	r = run_action(action);
+	poptFreeContext(popt_context);
+	return r;
+}
diff --git a/src/utils_luks2.c b/src/utils_luks2.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d61c430
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/utils_luks2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+/*
+ * Helper utilities for LUKS2 features
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2019 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2019 Ondrej Kozina
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include "cryptsetup.h"
+
+/*
+ * FIXME: 4MiBs is max LUKS2 mda length (including binary header).
+ * In future, read max allowed JSON size from config section.
+ */
+#define LUKS2_MAX_MDA_SIZE 0x400000
+int tools_read_json_file(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *file, char **json, size_t *json_size)
+{
+	ssize_t ret;
+	int fd, block, r;
+	void *buf = NULL;
+
+	block = tools_signals_blocked();
+	if (block)
+		set_int_block(0);
+
+	if (tools_is_stdin(file)) {
+		fd = STDIN_FILENO;
+		log_dbg("STDIN descriptor JSON read requested.");
+	} else {
+		log_dbg("File descriptor JSON read requested.");
+		fd = open(file, O_RDONLY);
+		if (fd < 0) {
+			log_err(_("Failed to open file %s in read-only mode."), file);
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	buf = malloc(LUKS2_MAX_MDA_SIZE);
+	if (!buf) {
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (isatty(fd) && !opt_batch_mode)
+		log_std(_("Provide valid LUKS2 token JSON:\n"));
+
+	/* we expect JSON (string) */
+	r = 0;
+	ret = read_buffer_intr(fd, buf, LUKS2_MAX_MDA_SIZE - 1, &quit);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		r = -EIO;
+		log_err(_("Failed to read JSON file."));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	check_signal(&r);
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(_("\nRead interrupted."));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	*json_size = (size_t)ret;
+	*json = buf;
+	*(*json + ret) = '\0';
+out:
+	if (block && !quit)
+		set_int_block(1);
+	if (fd >= 0 && fd != STDIN_FILENO)
+		close(fd);
+	if (r && buf) {
+		memset(buf, 0, LUKS2_MAX_MDA_SIZE);
+		free(buf);
+	}
+	return r;
+}
+
+int tools_write_json_file(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *file, const char *json)
+{
+	int block, fd, r;
+	size_t json_len;
+	ssize_t ret;
+
+	if (!json || !(json_len = strlen(json)) || json_len >= LUKS2_MAX_MDA_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	block = tools_signals_blocked();
+	if (block)
+		set_int_block(0);
+
+	if (tools_is_stdin(file)) {
+		fd = STDOUT_FILENO;
+		log_dbg("STDOUT descriptor JSON write requested.");
+	} else {
+		log_dbg("File descriptor JSON write requested.");
+		fd = open(file, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+	}
+
+	if (fd < 0) {
+		log_err(_("Failed to open file %s in write mode."), file ?: "");
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = 0;
+	ret = write_buffer_intr(fd, json, json_len, &quit);
+	check_signal(&r);
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(_("\nWrite interrupted."));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret != json_len) {
+		log_err(_("Failed to write JSON file."));
+		r = -EIO;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (isatty(fd))
+		(void) write_buffer_intr(fd, "\n", 1, &quit);
+out:
+	if (block && !quit)
+		set_int_block(1);
+	if (fd >=0 && fd != STDOUT_FILENO)
+		close(fd);
+	return r;
+}
diff --git a/src/utils_password.c b/src/utils_password.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..125b4f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/utils_password.c
@@ -0,0 +1,331 @@
+/*
+ * Password quality check wrapper
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include "cryptsetup.h"
+#include <termios.h>
+
+int opt_force_password = 0;
+
+#if defined ENABLE_PWQUALITY
+#include <pwquality.h>
+
+static int tools_check_pwquality(const char *password)
+{
+	int r;
+	void *auxerror;
+	pwquality_settings_t *pwq; 
+
+	log_dbg("Checking new password using default pwquality settings.");
+	pwq = pwquality_default_settings();
+	if (!pwq)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = pwquality_read_config(pwq, NULL, &auxerror);
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(_("Cannot check password quality: %s"),
+			pwquality_strerror(NULL, 0, r, auxerror));
+		pwquality_free_settings(pwq);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = pwquality_check(pwq, password, NULL, NULL, &auxerror);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(_("Password quality check failed:\n %s"),
+			pwquality_strerror(NULL, 0, r, auxerror));
+		r = -EPERM;
+	} else {
+		log_dbg("New password libpwquality score is %d.", r);
+		r = 0;
+	}
+
+	pwquality_free_settings(pwq);
+	return r;
+}
+#elif defined ENABLE_PASSWDQC
+#include <passwdqc.h>
+
+static int tools_check_pwquality(const char *password)
+{
+	passwdqc_params_t params;
+	char *parse_reason;
+	const char *check_reason;
+	const char *config = PASSWDQC_CONFIG_FILE;
+
+	passwdqc_params_reset(&params);
+
+	if (*config && passwdqc_params_load(&params, &parse_reason, config)) {
+		log_err(_("Cannot check password quality: %s"),
+			(parse_reason ? parse_reason : "Out of memory"));
+		free(parse_reason);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	check_reason = passwdqc_check(&params.qc, password, NULL, NULL);
+	if (check_reason) {
+		log_err(_("Password quality check failed: Bad passphrase (%s)"),
+			check_reason);
+		return -EPERM;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#else /* !(ENABLE_PWQUALITY || ENABLE_PASSWDQC) */
+static int tools_check_pwquality(const char *password)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* ENABLE_PWQUALITY || ENABLE_PASSWDQC */
+
+/* Password reading helpers */
+static int untimed_read(int fd, char *pass, size_t maxlen)
+{
+	ssize_t i;
+
+	i = read(fd, pass, maxlen);
+	if (i > 0) {
+		pass[i-1] = '\0';
+		i = 0;
+	} else if (i == 0) { /* EOF */
+		*pass = 0;
+		i = -1;
+	}
+	return i;
+}
+
+static int timed_read(int fd, char *pass, size_t maxlen, long timeout)
+{
+	struct timeval t;
+	fd_set fds = {}; /* Just to avoid scan-build false report for FD_SET */
+	int failed = -1;
+
+	FD_ZERO(&fds);
+	FD_SET(fd, &fds);
+	t.tv_sec = timeout;
+	t.tv_usec = 0;
+
+	if (select(fd+1, &fds, NULL, NULL, &t) > 0)
+		failed = untimed_read(fd, pass, maxlen);
+
+	return failed;
+}
+
+static int interactive_pass(const char *prompt, char *pass, size_t maxlen,
+		long timeout)
+{
+	struct termios orig, tmp;
+	int failed = -1;
+	int infd, outfd;
+
+	if (maxlen < 1)
+		return failed;
+
+	/* Read and write to /dev/tty if available */
+	infd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR);
+	if (infd == -1) {
+		infd = STDIN_FILENO;
+		outfd = STDERR_FILENO;
+	} else
+		outfd = infd;
+
+	if (tcgetattr(infd, &orig))
+		goto out_err;
+
+	memcpy(&tmp, &orig, sizeof(tmp));
+	tmp.c_lflag &= ~ECHO;
+
+	if (prompt && write(outfd, prompt, strlen(prompt)) < 0)
+		goto out_err;
+
+	tcsetattr(infd, TCSAFLUSH, &tmp);
+	if (timeout)
+		failed = timed_read(infd, pass, maxlen, timeout);
+	else
+		failed = untimed_read(infd, pass, maxlen);
+	tcsetattr(infd, TCSAFLUSH, &orig);
+
+out_err:
+	if (!failed && write(outfd, "\n", 1)) {};
+
+	if (infd != STDIN_FILENO)
+		close(infd);
+	return failed;
+}
+
+static int crypt_get_key_tty(const char *prompt,
+			     char **key, size_t *key_size,
+			     int timeout, int verify,
+			     struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	int key_size_max = DEFAULT_PASSPHRASE_SIZE_MAX;
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+	char *pass = NULL, *pass_verify = NULL;
+
+	*key = NULL;
+	*key_size = 0;
+
+	log_dbg("Interactive passphrase entry requested.");
+
+	pass = crypt_safe_alloc(key_size_max + 1);
+	if (!pass) {
+		log_err( _("Out of memory while reading passphrase."));
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (interactive_pass(prompt, pass, key_size_max, timeout)) {
+		log_err(_("Error reading passphrase from terminal."));
+		goto out_err;
+	}
+	pass[key_size_max] = '\0';
+
+	if (verify) {
+		pass_verify = crypt_safe_alloc(key_size_max);
+		if (!pass_verify) {
+			log_err(_("Out of memory while reading passphrase."));
+			r = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out_err;
+		}
+
+		if (interactive_pass(_("Verify passphrase: "),
+		    pass_verify, key_size_max, timeout)) {
+			log_err(_("Error reading passphrase from terminal."));
+			goto out_err;
+		}
+
+		if (strncmp(pass, pass_verify, key_size_max)) {
+			log_err(_("Passphrases do not match."));
+			r = -EPERM;
+			goto out_err;
+		}
+	}
+
+	*key = pass;
+	*key_size = strlen(pass);
+	r = 0;
+out_err:
+	crypt_safe_free(pass_verify);
+	if (r)
+		crypt_safe_free(pass);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note: --key-file=- is interpreted as a read from a binary file (stdin)
+ * key_size_max == 0 means detect maximum according to input type (tty/file)
+ */
+int tools_get_key(const char *prompt,
+		  char **key, size_t *key_size,
+		  uint64_t keyfile_offset, size_t keyfile_size_max,
+		  const char *key_file,
+		  int timeout, int verify, int pwquality,
+		  struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	char tmp[1024];
+	int r = -EINVAL, block;
+
+	block = tools_signals_blocked();
+	if (block)
+		set_int_block(0);
+
+	if (tools_is_stdin(key_file)) {
+		if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) {
+			if (keyfile_offset) {
+				log_err(_("Cannot use offset with terminal input."));
+			} else {
+				if (!prompt && !crypt_get_device_name(cd))
+					snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), _("Enter passphrase: "));
+				else if (!prompt)
+					snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), _("Enter passphrase for %s: "),
+						crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+				r = crypt_get_key_tty(prompt ?: tmp, key, key_size, timeout, verify, cd);
+			}
+		} else {
+			log_dbg("STDIN descriptor passphrase entry requested.");
+			/* No keyfile means STDIN with EOL handling (\n will end input)). */
+			r = crypt_keyfile_device_read(cd, NULL, key, key_size,
+					keyfile_offset, keyfile_size_max,
+					key_file ? 0 : CRYPT_KEYFILE_STOP_EOL);
+		}
+	} else {
+		log_dbg("File descriptor passphrase entry requested.");
+		r = crypt_keyfile_device_read(cd, key_file, key, key_size,
+					      keyfile_offset, keyfile_size_max, 0);
+	}
+
+	if (block && !quit)
+		set_int_block(1);
+
+	/* Check pwquality for password (not keyfile) */
+	if (pwquality && !opt_force_password && !key_file && !r)
+		r = tools_check_pwquality(*key);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+void tools_passphrase_msg(int r)
+{
+	if (r == -EPERM)
+		log_err(_("No key available with this passphrase."));
+}
+
+int tools_read_mk(const char *file, char **key, int keysize)
+{
+	int fd;
+
+	*key = crypt_safe_alloc(keysize);
+	if (!*key)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	fd = open(file, O_RDONLY);
+	if (fd == -1) {
+		log_err(_("Cannot read keyfile %s."), file);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if ((read(fd, *key, keysize) != keysize)) {
+		log_err(_("Cannot read %d bytes from keyfile %s."), keysize, file);
+		close(fd);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	close(fd);
+	return 0;
+fail:
+	crypt_safe_free(*key);
+	*key = NULL;
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int tools_write_mk(const char *file, const char *key, int keysize)
+{
+	int fd, r = -EINVAL;
+
+	fd = open(file, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY, S_IRUSR);
+	if (fd < 0) {
+		log_err(_("Cannot open keyfile %s for write."), file);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	if (write_buffer(fd, key, keysize) == keysize)
+		r = 0;
+	else
+		log_err(_("Cannot write to keyfile %s."), file);
+
+	close(fd);
+	return r;
+}
diff --git a/src/utils_tools.c b/src/utils_tools.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5b579c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/utils_tools.c
@@ -0,0 +1,594 @@
+/*
+ * cryptsetup - setup cryptographic volumes for dm-crypt
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include "cryptsetup.h"
+#include <math.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+int opt_verbose = 0;
+int opt_debug = 0;
+int opt_debug_json = 0;
+int opt_batch_mode = 0;
+int opt_progress_frequency = 0;
+
+/* interrupt handling */
+volatile int quit = 0;
+static int signals_blocked = 0;
+
+static void int_handler(int sig __attribute__((__unused__)))
+{
+	quit++;
+}
+
+int tools_signals_blocked(void)
+{
+	return signals_blocked;
+}
+
+void set_int_block(int block)
+{
+	sigset_t signals_open;
+
+	log_dbg("%slocking interruption on signal.", block ? "B" : "Unb");
+
+	sigemptyset(&signals_open);
+	sigaddset(&signals_open, SIGINT);
+	sigaddset(&signals_open, SIGTERM);
+	sigprocmask(block ? SIG_SETMASK : SIG_UNBLOCK, &signals_open, NULL);
+	signals_blocked = block;
+	quit = 0;
+}
+
+void set_int_handler(int block)
+{
+	struct sigaction sigaction_open;
+
+	log_dbg("Installing SIGINT/SIGTERM handler.");
+	memset(&sigaction_open, 0, sizeof(struct sigaction));
+	sigaction_open.sa_handler = int_handler;
+	sigaction(SIGINT, &sigaction_open, 0);
+	sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigaction_open, 0);
+	set_int_block(block);
+}
+
+void check_signal(int *r)
+{
+	if (quit && !*r)
+		*r = -EINTR;
+}
+
+#define LOG_MAX_LEN 4096
+
+__attribute__((format(printf, 5, 6)))
+void clogger(struct crypt_device *cd, int level, const char *file, int line,
+	     const char *format, ...)
+{
+	va_list argp;
+	char target[LOG_MAX_LEN + 2];
+
+	va_start(argp, format);
+
+	if (vsnprintf(&target[0], LOG_MAX_LEN, format, argp) > 0) {
+		/* All verbose and error messages in tools end with EOL. */
+		if (level == CRYPT_LOG_VERBOSE || level == CRYPT_LOG_ERROR)
+			strncat(target, "\n", LOG_MAX_LEN);
+
+		crypt_log(cd, level, target);
+	}
+
+	va_end(argp);
+}
+
+void tool_log(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr __attribute__((unused)))
+{
+	switch(level) {
+
+	case CRYPT_LOG_NORMAL:
+		fprintf(stdout, "%s", msg);
+		break;
+	case CRYPT_LOG_VERBOSE:
+		if (opt_verbose)
+			fprintf(stdout, "%s", msg);
+		break;
+	case CRYPT_LOG_ERROR:
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s", msg);
+		break;
+	case CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG_JSON:
+	case CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG:
+		if (opt_debug)
+			fprintf(stdout, "# %s\n", msg);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+void quiet_log(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr)
+{
+	if (!opt_verbose && (level == CRYPT_LOG_ERROR || level == CRYPT_LOG_NORMAL))
+		level = CRYPT_LOG_VERBOSE;
+	tool_log(level, msg, usrptr);
+}
+
+int yesDialog(const char *msg, void *usrptr)
+{
+	const char *fail_msg = (const char *)usrptr;
+	char *answer = NULL;
+	size_t size = 0;
+	int r = 1, block;
+
+	block = tools_signals_blocked();
+	if (block)
+		set_int_block(0);
+
+	if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO) && !opt_batch_mode) {
+		log_std("\nWARNING!\n========\n");
+		log_std("%s\n\nAre you sure? (Type uppercase yes): ", msg);
+		fflush(stdout);
+		if(getline(&answer, &size, stdin) == -1) {
+			r = 0;
+			/* Aborted by signal */
+			if (!quit)
+				log_err(_("Error reading response from terminal."));
+			else
+				log_dbg("Query interrupted on signal.");
+		} else if (strcmp(answer, "YES\n")) {
+			r = 0;
+			if (fail_msg)
+				log_err("%s", fail_msg);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (block && !quit)
+		set_int_block(1);
+
+	free(answer);
+	return r;
+}
+
+void show_status(int errcode)
+{
+	char *crypt_error;
+
+	if(!opt_verbose)
+		return;
+
+	if(!errcode) {
+		log_std(_("Command successful.\n"));
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (errcode < 0)
+		errcode = translate_errno(errcode);
+
+	if (errcode == 1)
+		crypt_error = _("wrong or missing parameters");
+	else if (errcode == 2)
+		crypt_error = _("no permission or bad passphrase");
+	else if (errcode == 3)
+		crypt_error = _("out of memory");
+	else if (errcode == 4)
+		crypt_error = _("wrong device or file specified");
+	else if (errcode == 5)
+		crypt_error = _("device already exists or device is busy");
+	else
+		crypt_error = _("unknown error");
+
+	log_std(_("Command failed with code %i (%s).\n"), -errcode, crypt_error);
+}
+
+const char *uuid_or_device(const char *spec)
+{
+	static char device[PATH_MAX];
+	char s, *ptr;
+	int i = 0, uuid_len = 5;
+
+	/* Check if it is correct UUID=<LUKS_UUID> format */
+	if (spec && !strncmp(spec, "UUID=", uuid_len)) {
+		strcpy(device, "/dev/disk/by-uuid/");
+		ptr = &device[strlen(device)];
+		i = uuid_len;
+		while ((s = spec[i++]) && i < (PATH_MAX - 13)) {
+			if (!isxdigit(s) && s != '-')
+				return spec; /* Bail it out */
+			if (isalpha(s))
+				s = tolower(s);
+			*ptr++ = s;
+		}
+		*ptr = '\0';
+		return device;
+	}
+
+	return spec;
+}
+
+__attribute__ ((noreturn)) void usage(poptContext popt_context,
+					     int exitcode, const char *error,
+					     const char *more)
+{
+	poptPrintUsage(popt_context, stderr, 0);
+	if (error)
+		log_err("%s: %s", more, error);
+	poptFreeContext(popt_context);
+	exit(exitcode);
+}
+
+void dbg_version_and_cmd(int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	log_std("# %s %s processing \"", PACKAGE_NAME, PACKAGE_VERSION);
+	for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+		if (i)
+			log_std(" ");
+		log_std("%s", argv[i]);
+	}
+	log_std("\"\n");
+}
+
+/* Translate exit code to simple codes */
+int translate_errno(int r)
+{
+	switch (r) {
+	case 0: 	r = EXIT_SUCCESS; break;
+	case -EEXIST:
+	case -EBUSY:	r = 5; break;
+	case -ENOTBLK:
+	case -ENODEV:	r = 4; break;
+	case -ENOMEM:	r = 3; break;
+	case -EPERM:	r = 2; break;
+	case -EINVAL:
+	case -ENOENT:
+	case -ENOSYS:
+	default:	r = EXIT_FAILURE;
+	}
+	return r;
+}
+
+void tools_keyslot_msg(int keyslot, crypt_object_op op)
+{
+	if (keyslot < 0)
+		return;
+
+	if (op == CREATED)
+		log_verbose(_("Key slot %i created."), keyslot);
+	else if (op == UNLOCKED)
+		log_verbose(_("Key slot %i unlocked."), keyslot);
+	else if (op == REMOVED)
+		log_verbose(_("Key slot %i removed."), keyslot);
+}
+
+void tools_token_msg(int token, crypt_object_op op)
+{
+	if (token < 0)
+		return;
+
+	if (op == CREATED)
+		log_verbose(_("Token %i created."), token);
+	else if (op == REMOVED)
+		log_verbose(_("Token %i removed."), token);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Device size string parsing, suffixes:
+ * s|S - 512 bytes sectors
+ * k  |K  |m  |M  |g  |G  |t  |T   - 1024 base
+ * kiB|KiB|miB|MiB|giB|GiB|tiB|TiB - 1024 base
+ * kb |KB |mM |MB |gB |GB |tB |TB  - 1000 base
+ */
+int tools_string_to_size(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *s, uint64_t *size)
+{
+	char *endp = NULL;
+	size_t len;
+	uint64_t mult_base, mult, tmp;
+
+	*size = strtoull(s, &endp, 10);
+	if (!isdigit(s[0]) ||
+	    (errno == ERANGE && *size == ULLONG_MAX) ||
+	    (errno != 0 && *size == 0))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!endp || !*endp)
+		return 0;
+
+	len = strlen(endp);
+	/* Allow "B" and "iB" suffixes */
+	if (len > 3 ||
+	   (len == 3 && (endp[1] != 'i' || endp[2] != 'B')) ||
+	   (len == 2 && endp[1] != 'B'))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (len == 1 || len == 3)
+		mult_base = 1024;
+	else
+		mult_base = 1000;
+
+	mult = 1;
+	switch (endp[0]) {
+	case 's':
+	case 'S': mult = 512;
+		break;
+	case 't':
+	case 'T': mult *= mult_base;
+		 /* Fall through */
+	case 'g':
+	case 'G': mult *= mult_base;
+		 /* Fall through */
+	case 'm':
+	case 'M': mult *= mult_base;
+		 /* Fall through */
+	case 'k':
+	case 'K': mult *= mult_base;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	tmp = *size * mult;
+	if (*size && (tmp / *size) != mult) {
+		log_dbg("Device size overflow.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	*size = tmp;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Time progress helper */
+
+/* The difference in seconds between two times in "timeval" format. */
+static double time_diff(struct timeval *start, struct timeval *end)
+{
+	return (end->tv_sec - start->tv_sec)
+		+ (end->tv_usec - start->tv_usec) / 1E6;
+}
+
+void tools_clear_line(void)
+{
+	if (opt_progress_frequency)
+		return;
+	/* vt100 code clear line */
+	log_std("\33[2K\r");
+}
+
+void tools_time_progress(uint64_t device_size, uint64_t bytes,
+			 struct timeval *start_time, struct timeval *end_time)
+{
+	struct timeval now_time;
+	unsigned long long mbytes, eta;
+	double tdiff, mib, frequency;
+	int final = (bytes == device_size);
+	const char *eol;
+
+	if (opt_batch_mode)
+		return;
+
+	gettimeofday(&now_time, NULL);
+	if (start_time->tv_sec == 0 && start_time->tv_usec == 0) {
+		*start_time = now_time;
+		*end_time = now_time;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (opt_progress_frequency) {
+		frequency = (double)opt_progress_frequency;
+		eol = "\n";
+	} else {
+		frequency = 0.5;
+		eol = "";
+	}
+
+	if (!final && time_diff(end_time, &now_time) < frequency)
+		return;
+
+	*end_time = now_time;
+
+	tdiff = time_diff(start_time, end_time);
+	if (!tdiff)
+		return;
+
+	mbytes = bytes  / 1024 / 1024;
+	mib = (double)(mbytes) / tdiff;
+	if (!mib)
+		return;
+
+	/* FIXME: calculate this from last minute only and remaining space */
+	eta = (unsigned long long)(device_size / 1024 / 1024 / mib - tdiff);
+
+	tools_clear_line();
+	if (final)
+		log_std("Finished, time %02llu:%02llu.%03llu, "
+			"%4llu MiB written, speed %5.1f MiB/s\n",
+			(unsigned long long)tdiff / 60,
+			(unsigned long long)tdiff % 60,
+			(unsigned long long)((tdiff - floor(tdiff)) * 1000.0),
+			mbytes, mib);
+	else
+		log_std("Progress: %5.1f%%, ETA %02llu:%02llu, "
+			"%4llu MiB written, speed %5.1f MiB/s%s",
+			(double)bytes / device_size * 100,
+			eta / 60, eta % 60, mbytes, mib, eol);
+	fflush(stdout);
+}
+
+int tools_wipe_progress(uint64_t size, uint64_t offset, void *usrptr)
+{
+	static struct timeval start_time = {}, end_time = {};
+	int r = 0;
+
+	tools_time_progress(size, offset, &start_time, &end_time);
+
+	check_signal(&r);
+	if (r) {
+		tools_clear_line();
+		log_err("\nWipe interrupted.");
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void report_partition(const char *value, const char *device)
+{
+	if (opt_batch_mode)
+		log_dbg("Device %s already contains a '%s' partition signature.", device, value);
+	else
+		log_std(_("WARNING: Device %s already contains a '%s' partition signature.\n"), device, value);
+}
+
+static void report_superblock(const char *value, const char *device)
+{
+	if (opt_batch_mode)
+		log_dbg("Device %s already contains a '%s' superblock signature.", device, value);
+	else
+		log_std(_("WARNING: Device %s already contains a '%s' superblock signature.\n"), device, value);
+}
+
+int tools_detect_signatures(const char *device, int ignore_luks, size_t *count)
+{
+	int r;
+	size_t tmp_count;
+	struct blkid_handle *h;
+	blk_probe_status pr;
+
+	if (!count)
+		count = &tmp_count;
+
+	*count = 0;
+
+	if (!blk_supported()) {
+		log_dbg("Blkid support disabled.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = blk_init_by_path(&h, device))) {
+		log_err(_("Failed to initialize device signature probes."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	blk_set_chains_for_full_print(h);
+
+	if (ignore_luks && blk_superblocks_filter_luks(h)) {
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	while ((pr = blk_probe(h)) < PRB_EMPTY) {
+		if (blk_is_partition(h))
+			report_partition(blk_get_partition_type(h), device);
+		else if (blk_is_superblock(h))
+			report_superblock(blk_get_superblock_type(h), device);
+		else {
+			log_dbg("Internal tools_detect_signatures() error.");
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		(*count)++;
+	}
+
+	if (pr == PRB_FAIL)
+		r = -EINVAL;
+out:
+	blk_free(h);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int tools_wipe_all_signatures(const char *path)
+{
+	int fd, flags, r;
+	blk_probe_status pr;
+	struct stat st;
+	struct blkid_handle *h = NULL;
+
+	if (!blk_supported()) {
+		log_dbg("Blkid support disabled.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (stat(path, &st)) {
+		log_err(_("Failed to stat device %s."), path);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	flags = O_RDWR;
+	if (S_ISBLK(st.st_mode))
+		flags |= O_EXCL;
+
+	/* better than opening regular file with O_EXCL (undefined) */
+	/* coverity[toctou] */
+	fd = open(path, flags);
+	if (fd < 0) {
+		if (errno == EBUSY)
+			log_err(_("Device %s is in use. Can not proceed with format operation."), path);
+		else
+			log_err(_("Failed to open file %s in read/write mode."), path);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = blk_init_by_fd(&h, fd))) {
+		log_err(_("Failed to initialize device signature probes."));
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	blk_set_chains_for_wipes(h);
+
+	while ((pr = blk_probe(h)) < PRB_EMPTY) {
+		if (blk_is_partition(h))
+			log_verbose("Existing '%s' partition signature on device %s will be wiped.",
+				    blk_get_partition_type(h), path);
+		if (blk_is_superblock(h))
+			log_verbose("Existing '%s' superblock signature on device %s will be wiped.",
+				    blk_get_superblock_type(h), path);
+		if (blk_do_wipe(h)) {
+			log_err(_("Failed to wipe device signature."));
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (pr != PRB_EMPTY) {
+		log_err(_("Failed to probe device %s for a signature."), path);
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+out:
+	close(fd);
+	blk_free(h);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int tools_is_cipher_null(const char *cipher)
+{
+	if (!cipher)
+		return 0;
+
+	return !strcmp(cipher, "cipher_null") ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Keyfile - is standard input treated as a binary file (no EOL handling).
+ */
+int tools_is_stdin(const char *key_file)
+{
+	if (!key_file)
+		return 1;
+
+	return strcmp(key_file, "-") ? 0 : 1;
+}
diff --git a/src/veritysetup.c b/src/veritysetup.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a02c5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/veritysetup.c
@@ -0,0 +1,567 @@
+/*
+ * veritysetup - setup cryptographic volumes for dm-verity
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include "cryptsetup.h"
+
+#define PACKAGE_VERITY "veritysetup"
+
+static int use_superblock = 1;
+
+static const char *fec_device = NULL;
+static int fec_roots = DEFAULT_VERITY_FEC_ROOTS;
+static const char *hash_algorithm = NULL;
+static int hash_type = 1;
+static int data_block_size = DEFAULT_VERITY_DATA_BLOCK;
+static int hash_block_size = DEFAULT_VERITY_HASH_BLOCK;
+static uint64_t data_blocks = 0;
+static const char *salt_string = NULL;
+static uint64_t hash_offset = 0;
+static uint64_t fec_offset = 0;
+static const char *opt_uuid = NULL;
+static int opt_restart_on_corruption = 0;
+static int opt_ignore_corruption = 0;
+static int opt_ignore_zero_blocks = 0;
+static int opt_check_at_most_once = 0;
+
+static int opt_version_mode = 0;
+
+static const char **action_argv;
+static int action_argc;
+
+static int _prepare_format(struct crypt_params_verity *params,
+			   const char *data_device,
+			   uint32_t flags)
+{
+	char *salt = NULL;
+	int len;
+
+	params->hash_name = hash_algorithm ?: DEFAULT_VERITY_HASH;
+	params->data_device = data_device;
+	params->fec_device = fec_device;
+	params->fec_roots = fec_roots;
+
+	if (salt_string && !strcmp(salt_string, "-")) {
+		params->salt_size = 0;
+		params->salt = NULL;
+	} else if (salt_string) {
+		len = crypt_hex_to_bytes(salt_string, &salt, 0);
+		if (len < 0) {
+			log_err(_("Invalid salt string specified."));
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		params->salt_size = len;
+		params->salt = salt;
+	} else {
+		params->salt_size = DEFAULT_VERITY_SALT_SIZE;
+		params->salt = NULL;
+	}
+
+	params->data_block_size = data_block_size;
+	params->hash_block_size = hash_block_size;
+	params->data_size = data_blocks;
+	params->hash_area_offset = hash_offset;
+	params->fec_area_offset = fec_offset;
+	params->hash_type = hash_type;
+	params->flags = flags;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int action_format(int arg)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	struct crypt_params_verity params = {};
+	uint32_t flags = CRYPT_VERITY_CREATE_HASH;
+	int r;
+
+	/* Try to create hash image if doesn't exist */
+	r = open(action_argv[1], O_WRONLY | O_EXCL | O_CREAT, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+	if (r < 0 && errno != EEXIST) {
+		log_err(_("Cannot create hash image %s for writing."), action_argv[1]);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	} else if (r >= 0) {
+		log_dbg("Created hash image %s.", action_argv[1]);
+		close(r);
+	}
+	/* Try to create FEC image if doesn't exist */
+	if (fec_device) {
+		r = open(fec_device, O_WRONLY | O_EXCL | O_CREAT, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+		if (r < 0 && errno != EEXIST) {
+			log_err(_("Cannot create FEC image %s for writing."), fec_device);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		} else if (r >= 0) {
+			log_dbg("Created FEC image %s.", fec_device);
+			close(r);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, action_argv[1])))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!use_superblock)
+		flags |= CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER;
+
+	r = _prepare_format(&params, action_argv[0], flags);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_VERITY, NULL, NULL, opt_uuid, NULL, 0, &params);
+	if (!r)
+		crypt_dump(cd);
+out:
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	free(CONST_CAST(char*)params.salt);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _activate(const char *dm_device,
+		      const char *data_device,
+		      const char *hash_device,
+		      const char *root_hash,
+		      uint32_t flags)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	struct crypt_params_verity params = {};
+	uint32_t activate_flags = CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+	char *root_hash_bytes = NULL;
+	ssize_t hash_size;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = crypt_init_data_device(&cd, hash_device, data_device)))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (opt_ignore_corruption)
+		activate_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION;
+	if (opt_restart_on_corruption)
+		activate_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION;
+	if (opt_ignore_zero_blocks)
+		activate_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS;
+	if (opt_check_at_most_once)
+		activate_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CHECK_AT_MOST_ONCE;
+
+	if (use_superblock) {
+		params.flags = flags;
+		params.hash_area_offset = hash_offset;
+		params.fec_area_offset = fec_offset;
+		params.fec_device = fec_device;
+		params.fec_roots = fec_roots;
+		r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_VERITY, &params);
+	} else {
+		r = _prepare_format(&params, data_device, flags | CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+		r = crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_VERITY, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, &params);
+	}
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	hash_size = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+	if (crypt_hex_to_bytes(root_hash, &root_hash_bytes, 0) != hash_size) {
+		log_err(_("Invalid root hash string specified."));
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, dm_device,
+					 root_hash_bytes,
+					 hash_size,
+					 activate_flags);
+out:
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	free(root_hash_bytes);
+	free(CONST_CAST(char*)params.salt);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int action_open(int arg)
+{
+	return _activate(action_argv[1],
+			 action_argv[0],
+			 action_argv[2],
+			 action_argv[3], 0);
+}
+
+static int action_verify(int arg)
+{
+	return _activate(NULL,
+			 action_argv[0],
+			 action_argv[1],
+			 action_argv[2],
+			 CRYPT_VERITY_CHECK_HASH);
+}
+
+static int action_close(int arg)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	r = crypt_init_by_name(&cd, action_argv[0]);
+	if (r == 0)
+		r = crypt_deactivate(cd, action_argv[0]);
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int action_status(int arg)
+{
+	crypt_status_info ci;
+	struct crypt_active_device cad;
+	struct crypt_params_verity vp = {};
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	struct stat st;
+	char *backing_file;
+	unsigned i, path = 0;
+	int r = 0;
+
+	/* perhaps a path, not a dm device name */
+	if (strchr(action_argv[0], '/') && !stat(action_argv[0], &st))
+		path = 1;
+
+	ci = crypt_status(NULL, action_argv[0]);
+	switch (ci) {
+	case CRYPT_INVALID:
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	case CRYPT_INACTIVE:
+		if (path)
+			log_std("%s is inactive.\n", action_argv[0]);
+		else
+			log_std("%s/%s is inactive.\n", crypt_get_dir(), action_argv[0]);
+		r = -ENODEV;
+		break;
+	case CRYPT_ACTIVE:
+	case CRYPT_BUSY:
+		if (path)
+			log_std("%s is active%s.\n", action_argv[0],
+				ci == CRYPT_BUSY ? " and is in use" : "");
+		else
+			log_std("%s/%s is active%s.\n", crypt_get_dir(), action_argv[0],
+				ci == CRYPT_BUSY ? " and is in use" : "");
+
+		r = crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd, action_argv[0], NULL);
+		if (r < 0 || !crypt_get_type(cd))
+			goto out;
+
+		log_std("  type:        %s\n", crypt_get_type(cd));
+
+		r = crypt_get_active_device(cd, action_argv[0], &cad);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		log_std("  status:      %s\n",
+			cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CORRUPTED ? "corrupted" : "verified");
+
+		r = crypt_get_verity_info(cd, &vp);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		log_std("  hash type:   %u\n", vp.hash_type);
+		log_std("  data block:  %u\n", vp.data_block_size);
+		log_std("  hash block:  %u\n", vp.hash_block_size);
+		log_std("  hash name:   %s\n", vp.hash_name);
+		log_std("  salt:        ");
+		if (vp.salt_size)
+			for(i = 0; i < vp.salt_size; i++)
+				log_std("%02hhx", (const char)vp.salt[i]);
+		else
+			log_std("-");
+		log_std("\n");
+
+		log_std("  data device: %s\n", vp.data_device);
+		if (crypt_loop_device(vp.data_device)) {
+			backing_file = crypt_loop_backing_file(vp.data_device);
+			log_std("  data loop:   %s\n", backing_file);
+			free(backing_file);
+		}
+		log_std("  size:        %" PRIu64 " sectors\n", cad.size);
+		log_std("  mode:        %s\n", cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY ?
+					   "readonly" : "read/write");
+
+		log_std("  hash device: %s\n", vp.hash_device);
+		if (crypt_loop_device(vp.hash_device)) {
+			backing_file = crypt_loop_backing_file(vp.hash_device);
+			log_std("  hash loop:   %s\n", backing_file);
+			free(backing_file);
+		}
+		log_std("  hash offset: %" PRIu64 " sectors\n",
+			vp.hash_area_offset * vp.hash_block_size / 512);
+
+		if (vp.fec_device) {
+			log_std("  FEC device:  %s\n", vp.fec_device);
+			if (crypt_loop_device(vp.fec_device)) {
+				backing_file = crypt_loop_backing_file(vp.fec_device);
+				log_std("  FEC loop:    %s\n", backing_file);
+				free(backing_file);
+			}
+			log_std("  FEC offset:  %" PRIu64 " sectors\n",
+				vp.fec_area_offset * vp.hash_block_size / 512);
+			log_std("  FEC roots:   %u\n", vp.fec_roots);
+		}
+		if (cad.flags & (CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION|
+				 CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION|
+				 CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS|
+				 CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CHECK_AT_MOST_ONCE))
+			log_std("  flags:       %s%s%s%s\n",
+				(cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION) ? "ignore_corruption " : "",
+				(cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION) ? "restart_on_corruption " : "",
+				(cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS) ? "ignore_zero_blocks " : "",
+				(cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CHECK_AT_MOST_ONCE) ? "check_at_most_once" : "");
+	}
+out:
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	if (r == -ENOTSUP)
+		r = 0;
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int action_dump(int arg)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	struct crypt_params_verity params = {};
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, action_argv[0])))
+		return r;
+
+	params.hash_area_offset = hash_offset;
+	params.fec_area_offset = fec_offset;
+	r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_VERITY, &params);
+	if (!r)
+		crypt_dump(cd);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static struct action_type {
+	const char *type;
+	int (*handler)(int);
+	int required_action_argc;
+	const char *arg_desc;
+	const char *desc;
+} action_types[] = {
+	{ "format",	action_format, 2, N_("<data_device> <hash_device>"),N_("format device") },
+	{ "verify",	action_verify, 3, N_("<data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"),N_("verify device") },
+	{ "open",	action_open,   4, N_("<data_device> <name> <hash_device> <root_hash>"),N_("open device as <name>") },
+	{ "close",	action_close,  1, N_("<name>"),N_("close device (deactivate and remove mapping)") },
+	{ "status",	action_status, 1, N_("<name>"),N_("show active device status") },
+	{ "dump",	action_dump,   1, N_("<hash_device>"),N_("show on-disk information") },
+	{ NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+static void help(poptContext popt_context,
+		 enum poptCallbackReason reason __attribute__((unused)),
+		 struct poptOption *key,
+		 const char *arg __attribute__((unused)),
+		 void *data __attribute__((unused)))
+{
+	struct action_type *action;
+
+	if (key->shortName == '?') {
+		log_std("%s %s\n", PACKAGE_VERITY, PACKAGE_VERSION);
+		poptPrintHelp(popt_context, stdout, 0);
+		log_std(_("\n"
+			 "<action> is one of:\n"));
+		for(action = action_types; action->type; action++)
+			log_std("\t%s %s - %s\n", action->type, _(action->arg_desc), _(action->desc));
+		log_std(_("\n"
+			 "<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+			 "<data_device> is the data device\n"
+			 "<hash_device> is the device containing verification data\n"
+			 "<root_hash> hash of the root node on <hash_device>\n"),
+			crypt_get_dir());
+
+		log_std(_("\nDefault compiled-in dm-verity parameters:\n"
+			 "\tHash: %s, Data block (bytes): %u, "
+			 "Hash block (bytes): %u, Salt size: %u, Hash format: %u\n"),
+			DEFAULT_VERITY_HASH, DEFAULT_VERITY_DATA_BLOCK,
+			DEFAULT_VERITY_HASH_BLOCK, DEFAULT_VERITY_SALT_SIZE,
+			1);
+		exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+	} else
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_SUCCESS, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+static int run_action(struct action_type *action)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	log_dbg("Running command %s.", action->type);
+
+	r = action->handler(0);
+
+	show_status(r);
+	return translate_errno(r);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+	static char *popt_tmp;
+	static const char *null_action_argv[] = {NULL};
+	static struct poptOption popt_help_options[] = {
+		{ NULL,    '\0', POPT_ARG_CALLBACK, help, 0, NULL,                         NULL },
+		{ "help",  '?',  POPT_ARG_NONE,     NULL, 0, N_("Show this help message"), NULL },
+		{ "usage", '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE,     NULL, 0, N_("Display brief usage"),    NULL },
+		POPT_TABLEEND
+	};
+	static struct poptOption popt_options[] = {
+		{ NULL,              '\0', POPT_ARG_INCLUDE_TABLE, popt_help_options, 0, N_("Help options:"), NULL },
+		{ "version",         '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_version_mode, 0, N_("Print package version"), NULL },
+		{ "verbose",         'v',  POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_verbose,      0, N_("Shows more detailed error messages"), NULL },
+		{ "debug",           '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_debug,        0, N_("Show debug messages"), NULL },
+		{ "no-superblock",   0,    POPT_ARG_VAL,  &use_superblock,   0, N_("Do not use verity superblock"), NULL },
+		{ "format",          0,    POPT_ARG_INT,  &hash_type,        0, N_("Format type (1 - normal, 0 - original Chrome OS)"), N_("number") },
+		{ "data-block-size", 0,    POPT_ARG_INT,  &data_block_size,  0, N_("Block size on the data device"), N_("bytes") },
+		{ "hash-block-size", 0,    POPT_ARG_INT,  &hash_block_size,  0, N_("Block size on the hash device"), N_("bytes") },
+		{ "fec-roots",       0,    POPT_ARG_INT,  &fec_roots,        0, N_("FEC parity bytes"), N_("bytes") },
+		{ "data-blocks",     0,    POPT_ARG_STRING, &popt_tmp,       1, N_("The number of blocks in the data file"), N_("blocks") },
+		{ "fec-device",      0,    POPT_ARG_STRING, &fec_device,     0, N_("Path to device with error correction data"), N_("path") },
+		{ "hash-offset",     0,    POPT_ARG_STRING, &popt_tmp,       2, N_("Starting offset on the hash device"), N_("bytes") },
+		{ "fec-offset",      0,    POPT_ARG_STRING, &popt_tmp,       3, N_("Starting offset on the FEC device"), N_("bytes") },
+		{ "hash",            'h',  POPT_ARG_STRING, &hash_algorithm, 0, N_("Hash algorithm"), N_("string") },
+		{ "salt",            's',  POPT_ARG_STRING, &salt_string,    0, N_("Salt"), N_("hex string") },
+		{ "uuid",            '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, &opt_uuid,       0, N_("UUID for device to use"), NULL },
+		{ "restart-on-corruption", 0,POPT_ARG_NONE,&opt_restart_on_corruption, 0, N_("Restart kernel if corruption is detected"), NULL },
+		{ "ignore-corruption", 0,  POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_ignore_corruption,  0, N_("Ignore corruption, log it only"), NULL },
+		{ "ignore-zero-blocks", 0, POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_ignore_zero_blocks, 0, N_("Do not verify zeroed blocks"), NULL },
+		{ "check-at-most-once", 0, POPT_ARG_NONE, &opt_check_at_most_once, 0, N_("Verify data block only the first time it is read"), NULL },
+		POPT_TABLEEND
+	};
+
+	poptContext popt_context;
+	struct action_type *action;
+	const char *aname;
+	int r;
+
+	crypt_set_log_callback(NULL, tool_log, NULL);
+
+	setlocale(LC_ALL, "");
+	bindtextdomain(PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
+	textdomain(PACKAGE);
+
+	popt_context = poptGetContext("verity", argc, argv, popt_options, 0);
+	poptSetOtherOptionHelp(popt_context,
+	                       _("[OPTION...] <action> <action-specific>"));
+
+	while((r = poptGetNextOpt(popt_context)) > 0) {
+		unsigned long long ull_value;
+		char *endp;
+
+		errno = 0;
+		ull_value = strtoull(popt_tmp, &endp, 10);
+		if (*endp || !*popt_tmp || !isdigit(*popt_tmp) ||
+		    (errno == ERANGE && ull_value == ULLONG_MAX) ||
+		    (errno != 0 && ull_value == 0))
+			r = POPT_ERROR_BADNUMBER;
+
+		switch(r) {
+			case 1:
+				data_blocks = ull_value;
+				break;
+			case 2:
+				hash_offset = ull_value;
+				break;
+			case 3:
+				fec_offset = ull_value;
+				break;
+		}
+
+		if (r < 0)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if (r < -1)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, poptStrerror(r),
+		      poptBadOption(popt_context, POPT_BADOPTION_NOALIAS));
+
+	if (opt_version_mode) {
+		log_std("%s %s\n", PACKAGE_VERITY, PACKAGE_VERSION);
+		poptFreeContext(popt_context);
+		exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+	}
+
+	if (!(aname = poptGetArg(popt_context)))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Argument <action> missing."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	action_argc = 0;
+	action_argv = poptGetArgs(popt_context);
+	/* Make return values of poptGetArgs more consistent in case of remaining argc = 0 */
+	if(!action_argv)
+		action_argv = null_action_argv;
+
+	/* Count args, somewhat unnice, change? */
+	while(action_argv[action_argc] != NULL)
+		action_argc++;
+
+	/* Handle aliases */
+	if (!strcmp(aname, "create") && action_argc > 1) {
+		/* create command had historically switched arguments */
+		if (action_argv[0] && action_argv[1]) {
+			const char *tmp = action_argv[0];
+			action_argv[0] = action_argv[1];
+			action_argv[1] = tmp;
+		}
+		aname = "open";
+	} else if (!strcmp(aname, "remove")) {
+		aname = "close";
+	}
+
+	for (action = action_types; action->type; action++)
+		if (strcmp(action->type, aname) == 0)
+			break;
+
+	if (!action->type)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Unknown action."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (action_argc < action->required_action_argc) {
+		char buf[128];
+		snprintf(buf, 128,_("%s: requires %s as arguments"), action->type, action->arg_desc);
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, buf,
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+	}
+
+	if (data_block_size < 0 || hash_block_size < 0 || hash_type < 0) {
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		      _("Negative number for option not permitted."),
+		      poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+	}
+
+	if ((opt_ignore_corruption || opt_restart_on_corruption || opt_ignore_zero_blocks) && strcmp(aname, "open"))
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		_("Option --ignore-corruption, --restart-on-corruption or --ignore-zero-blocks is allowed only for open operation.\n"),
+		poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_ignore_corruption && opt_restart_on_corruption)
+		usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+		_("Option --ignore-corruption and --restart-on-corruption cannot be used together.\n"),
+		poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+	if (opt_debug) {
+		opt_verbose = 1;
+		crypt_set_debug_level(-1);
+		dbg_version_and_cmd(argc, argv);
+	}
+
+	r = run_action(action);
+	poptFreeContext(popt_context);
+	return r;
+}
diff --git a/tests/00modules-test b/tests/00modules-test
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..ddf08b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/00modules-test
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+echo "Cryptsetup test environment ($(date))"
+uname -a
+
+if [ -f /etc/os-release ] ; then
+	source /etc/os-release
+	echo "$PRETTY_NAME ($NAME) $VERSION"
+fi
+
+[ -x ../cryptsetup ] && ../cryptsetup --version
+[ -x ../veritysetup ] && ../veritysetup --version
+[ -x ../integritysetup ] && ../integritysetup --version
+[ -x ../cryptsetup-reencrypt ] && ../cryptsetup-reencrypt --version
+
+[ $(id -u) != 0 ] && exit 77
+
+modprobe dm-crypt     >/dev/null 2>&1
+modprobe dm-verity    >/dev/null 2>&1
+modprobe dm-integrity >/dev/null 2>&1
+modprobe dm-zero      >/dev/null 2>&1
+
+dmsetup version
+
+echo "Device mapper targets:"
+dmsetup targets
+
+exit 0
diff --git a/tests/Makefile.am b/tests/Makefile.am
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c74ee2b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/Makefile.am
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+TESTS = 00modules-test \
+	api-test \
+	api-test-2 \
+	compat-test \
+	compat-test2 \
+	loopaes-test \
+	align-test \
+	align-test2 \
+	discards-test \
+	mode-test \
+	password-hash-test \
+	tcrypt-compat-test \
+	luks1-compat-test \
+	device-test \
+	keyring-test \
+	keyring-compat-test \
+	luks2-validation-test \
+	luks2-integrity-test \
+	vectors-test \
+	blockwise-compat
+
+if VERITYSETUP
+TESTS += verity-compat-test
+endif
+
+if REENCRYPT
+TESTS += reencryption-compat-test reencryption-compat-test2
+
+endif
+
+if INTEGRITYSETUP
+TESTS += integrity-compat-test
+endif
+
+EXTRA_DIST = compatimage.img.xz compatv10image.img.xz \
+	compatimage2.img.xz \
+	conversion_imgs.tar.xz \
+	luks2_keyslot_unassigned.img.xz \
+	img_fs_ext4.img.xz img_fs_vfat.img.xz img_fs_xfs.img.xz \
+	valid_header_file.xz \
+	luks2_valid_hdr.img.xz \
+	luks2_header_requirements.xz \
+	luks2_header_requirements_free.xz \
+	luks2_mda_images.tar.xz \
+	evil_hdr-payload_overwrite.xz \
+	evil_hdr-stripes_payload_dmg.xz \
+	evil_hdr-luks_hdr_damage.xz \
+	evil_hdr-small_luks_device.xz \
+	evil_hdr-keyslot_overlap.xz \
+	tcrypt-images.tar.xz \
+	luks1-images.tar.xz \
+	00modules-test \
+	compat-test \
+	compat-test2 \
+	loopaes-test align-test discards-test mode-test password-hash-test \
+	align-test2 verity-compat-test \
+	reencryption-compat-test \
+	reencryption-compat-test2 \
+	tcrypt-compat-test \
+	luks1-compat-test \
+	luks2-validation-test generators \
+	luks2-integrity-test \
+	device-test \
+	keyring-test \
+	keyring-compat-test \
+	integrity-compat-test \
+	cryptsetup-valg-supps valg.sh valg-api.sh \
+	blockwise-compat \
+	blkid-luks2-pv.img.xz
+
+CLEANFILES = cryptsetup-tst* valglog* *-fail-*.log
+clean-local:
+	-rm -rf tcrypt-images luks1-images luks2-images conversion_imgs luks2_valid_hdr.img blkid-luks2-pv-img blkid-luks2-pv-img.bcp
+
+differ_SOURCES = differ.c
+differ_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) -Wall -O2
+
+api_test_SOURCES = api-test.c api_test.h test_utils.c
+api_test_LDADD = ../libcryptsetup.la
+api_test_LDFLAGS = $(AM_LDFLAGS) -static
+api_test_CFLAGS = -g -Wall -O0 $(AM_CFLAGS) -I$(top_srcdir)/lib/ -I$(top_srcdir)/lib/luks1
+api_test_CPPFLAGS = $(AM_CPPFLAGS) -include config.h
+
+api_test_2_SOURCES = api-test-2.c api_test.h test_utils.c
+api_test_2_LDADD = ../libcryptsetup.la
+api_test_2_LDFLAGS = $(AM_LDFLAGS) -static
+api_test_2_CFLAGS = -g -Wall -O0 $(AM_CFLAGS) -I$(top_srcdir)/lib/ -I$(top_srcdir)/lib/luks1
+api_test_2_CPPFLAGS = $(AM_CPPFLAGS) -include config.h
+
+vectors_test_SOURCES = crypto-vectors.c
+vectors_test_LDADD = ../libcrypto_backend.la @CRYPTO_LIBS@ @LIBARGON2_LIBS@
+vectors_test_LDFLAGS = $(AM_LDFLAGS) -static
+vectors_test_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) -I$(top_srcdir)/lib/crypto_backend/ @CRYPTO_CFLAGS@
+vectors_test_CPPFLAGS = $(AM_CPPFLAGS) -include config.h
+
+unit_utils_io_SOURCES = unit-utils-io.c
+unit_utils_io_LDADD = ../libutils_io.la
+unit_utils_io_LDFLAGS = $(AM_LDFLAGS) -static
+unit_utils_io_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) -I$(top_srcdir)/lib
+unit_utils_io_CPPFLAGS = $(AM_CPPFLAGS) -include config.h
+
+check_PROGRAMS = api-test api-test-2 differ vectors-test unit-utils-io
+
+conversion_imgs:
+	@tar xJf conversion_imgs.tar.xz
+
+compatimage.img:
+	@xz -k -d compatimage.img.xz
+
+valgrind-check: api-test api-test-2 differ
+	@VALG=1 ./compat-test
+	@VALG=1 ./compat-test2
+	@VALG=1 ./luks2-validation-test
+	@VALG=1 ./verity-compat-test
+	@VALG=1 ./integrity-compat-test
+	@INFOSTRING="api-test-000" ./valg-api.sh ./api-test
+	@INFOSTRING="api-test-002" ./valg-api.sh ./api-test-2
+
+.PHONY: valgrind-check
diff --git a/tests/align-test b/tests/align-test
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..55437ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/align-test
@@ -0,0 +1,318 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+CRYPTSETUP="../cryptsetup"
+DEV=""
+DEV_STACKED="luks0xbabe"
+DEV_NAME="dummyalign"
+MNT_DIR="./mnt_luks"
+PWD1="93R4P4pIqAH8"
+PWD2="mymJeD8ivEhE"
+FAST_PBKDF="--pbkdf-force-iterations 1000"
+
+cleanup() {
+	udevadm settle >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ -d "$MNT_DIR" ] ; then
+	    umount -f $MNT_DIR 2>/dev/null
+	    rmdir $MNT_DIR 2>/dev/null
+	fi
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_STACKED ] && dmsetup remove --retry $DEV_STACKED >/dev/null 2>&1
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME ] && dmsetup remove --retry $DEV_NAME >/dev/null 2>&1
+	# FIXME scsi_debug sometimes in-use here
+	sleep 1
+	rmmod scsi_debug 2>/dev/null
+	sleep 1
+}
+
+fail()
+{
+	if [ -n "$1" ] ; then echo "FAIL $1" ; fi
+	echo "FAILED at line $(caller)"
+	cleanup
+	exit 100
+}
+
+skip()
+{
+	echo "TEST SKIPPED: $1"
+	cleanup
+	exit 0
+}
+
+function dm_crypt_features()
+{
+	VER_STR=$(dmsetup targets | grep crypt | cut -f2 -dv)
+	[ -z "$VER_STR" ] && fail "Failed to parse dm-crypt version."
+
+	VER_MAJ=$(echo $VER_STR | cut -f 1 -d.)
+	VER_MIN=$(echo $VER_STR | cut -f 2 -d.)
+	VER_PTC=$(echo $VER_STR | cut -f 3 -d.)
+
+	[ $VER_MAJ -lt 1 ] && return
+	[ $VER_MAJ -gt 1 ] && {
+		DM_PERF_CPU=1
+		DM_SECTOR_SIZE=1
+		return
+	}
+
+	[ $VER_MIN -lt 14 ] && return
+	DM_PERF_CPU=1
+	if [ $VER_MIN -ge 17 -o \( $VER_MIN -eq 14 -a $VER_PTC -ge 5 \) ]; then
+		DM_SECTOR_SIZE=1
+	fi
+}
+
+add_device() {
+	modprobe scsi_debug $@ delay=0
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ] ; then
+		echo "This kernel seems to not support proper scsi_debug module, test skipped."
+		exit 77
+	fi
+
+	sleep 2
+	DEV=$(grep -l -e scsi_debug /sys/block/*/device/model | cut -f4 -d /)
+
+	if [ ! -e /sys/block/$DEV/alignment_offset ] ; then
+		echo "This kernel seems to not support topology info, test skipped."
+		cleanup
+		exit 77
+	fi
+
+	DEV="/dev/$DEV"
+	[ -b $DEV ] || fail "Cannot find $DEV."
+}
+
+format() # key_bits expected [forced]
+{
+	if [ -z "$3" ] ; then
+		echo -n "Formatting using topology info ($1 bits key)..."
+		echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks1 $DEV -q $FAST_PBKDF -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 -s $1 || fail
+	else
+		echo -n "Formatting using forced sector alignment $3 ($1 bits key)..."
+		echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks1 $DEV -q $FAST_PBKDF -s $1 -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 --align-payload=$3 ||fail
+	fi
+
+	# check the device can be activated
+	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $DEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+	ALIGN=$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $DEV |grep "Payload offset" | sed -e s/.*\\t//)
+	#echo "ALIGN = $ALIGN"
+
+	[ -z "$ALIGN" ] && fail
+	[ $ALIGN -ne $2 ] && fail "Expected alignment differs: expected $2 != detected $ALIGN"
+
+	# test some operation, just in case
+	echo -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $DEV $FAST_PBKDF --key-slot 1
+	[ $? -ne 0 ] && fail "Keyslot add failed."
+
+	$CRYPTSETUP -q luksKillSlot $DEV 1
+	[ $? -ne 0 ] && fail "Keyslot removal failed."
+
+	echo "PASSED"
+}
+
+get_offsets()
+{
+	$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $DEV | grep "$1" | cut -s -d ':' -f 2 | sed  -e 's/\s//g' -e :a -e N -e 's/\n/:/g' -e 's/\s//g' -e ta
+}
+
+format_null()
+{
+	if [ $3 -eq 0 ] ; then
+		echo -n "Formatting using topology info ($1 bits key) [slot 0"
+		echo | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks1 $DEV -q $FAST_PBKDF -c null -s $1 || fail
+	else
+		echo -n "Formatting using forced sector alignment $3 ($1 bits key) [slot 0"
+		echo | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks1 $DEV -q $FAST_PBKDF -c null -s $1 --align-payload=$3 || fail
+	fi
+
+	# check the device can be activated
+	echo | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $DEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+	POFF=$(get_offsets "Payload offset")
+	[ -z "$POFF" ] && fail
+	[ $POFF != $2 ] && fail "Expected data offset differs: expected $2 != detected $POFF"
+	if [ -n "$4" ] ; then
+		for j in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ; do
+			echo -e "\n" | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $DEV -q $FAST_PBKDF --key-slot $j -c null $PARAMS
+			echo -n $j
+			[ $? -ne 0 ] && fail
+		done
+
+		KOFF=$(get_offsets "Key material offset")
+		[ -z "$KOFF" ] && fail
+		[ $KOFF != $4 ] && fail "Expected keyslots offsets differ: expected $4 != detected $KOFF"
+	fi
+
+	echo "]...PASSED"
+}
+
+format_plain() # sector size
+{
+	echo -n "Formatting plain device (sector size $1)..."
+	if [ -n "$DM_SECTOR_SIZE" ] ; then
+		echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open --type plain --hash sha256 --sector-size $1 $DEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+		$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+		echo "PASSED"
+	else
+		echo "N/A"
+	fi
+}
+
+format_plain_fail() # sector size
+{
+	echo -n "Formatting plain device (sector size $1, must fail)..."
+	if [ -n "$DM_SECTOR_SIZE" ] ; then
+		echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open --type plain --hash sha256 --sector-size $1 $DEV $DEV_NAME >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail
+		echo "PASSED"
+	else
+		echo "N/A"
+	fi
+}
+
+if [ $(id -u) != 0 ]; then
+	echo "WARNING: You must be root to run this test, test skipped."
+	exit 77
+fi
+
+dm_crypt_features
+modprobe --dry-run scsi_debug || exit 77
+cleanup
+
+echo "# Create desktop-class 4K drive"
+echo "# (logical_block_size=512, physical_block_size=4096, alignment_offset=0)"
+add_device dev_size_mb=16 sector_size=512 physblk_exp=3 num_tgts=1
+format 256 4096
+format 256 2056 8
+format 128 2048
+format 128 1032 8
+format 256 8192 8192
+format 128 8192 8192
+cleanup
+
+echo "# Create desktop-class 4K drive with misaligned opt-io (some bad USB enclosures)"
+echo "# (logical_block_size=512, physical_block_size=4096, alignment_offset=0, opt-io=1025)"
+add_device dev_size_mb=16 sector_size=512 physblk_exp=3 num_tgts=1 opt_blks=1025
+format 256 4096
+format 256 2056 8
+format 128 2048
+format 128 1032 8
+format 256 8192 8192
+format 128 8192 8192
+cleanup
+
+echo "# Create desktop-class 4K drive w/ 63-sector DOS partition compensation"
+echo "# (logical_block_size=512, physical_block_size=4096, alignment_offset=3584)"
+add_device dev_size_mb=16 sector_size=512 physblk_exp=3 lowest_aligned=7 num_tgts=1
+format 256 4103
+format 256 2056 8
+format 128 2055
+format 128 1032 8
+cleanup
+
+echo "# Create enterprise-class 4K drive"
+echo "# (logical_block_size=4096, physical_block_size=4096, alignment_offset=0)"
+add_device dev_size_mb=16 sector_size=4096 num_tgts=1 opt_blks=64
+format 256 4096
+format 256 2056 8
+format 128 2048
+format 128 1032 8
+cleanup
+
+echo "# Create classic 512B drive and stack dm-linear"
+echo "# (logical_block_size=512, physical_block_size=512, alignment_offset=0)"
+add_device dev_size_mb=16 sector_size=512 num_tgts=1
+DEV2=$DEV
+DEV=/dev/mapper/$DEV_STACKED
+dmsetup create $DEV_STACKED --table "0 32768 linear $DEV2 0"
+format 256 4096
+format 256 2056 8
+format 128 2048
+format 128 1032 8
+format 128 8192 8192
+cleanup
+
+echo "# Create classic 512B drive and stack dm-linear (plain mode)"
+add_device dev_size_mb=16 sector_size=512 num_tgts=1
+DEV2=$DEV
+DEV=/dev/mapper/$DEV_STACKED
+dmsetup create $DEV_STACKED --table "0 32768 linear $DEV2 0"
+format_plain 512
+format_plain 1024
+format_plain 2048
+format_plain 4096
+format_plain_fail 1111
+format_plain_fail 8192
+echo "# Create classic 512B drive, unaligned to 4096 and stack dm-linear (plain mode)"
+dmsetup remove --retry $DEV_STACKED >/dev/null 2>&1
+dmsetup create $DEV_STACKED --table "0 32762 linear $DEV2 0"
+format_plain 512
+format_plain 1024
+format_plain_fail 2048
+format_plain_fail 4096
+cleanup
+
+echo "# Offset check: 512B sector drive"
+add_device dev_size_mb=16 sector_size=512 num_tgts=1
+#           |k| expO reqO expected slot offsets
+format_null  64 2048    0 8:72:136:200:264:328:392:456
+format_null  64  520    1
+format_null  64  520    8
+format_null  64  640  128
+format_null  64 2048 2048
+format_null 128 2048    0 8:136:264:392:520:648:776:904
+format_null 128 1032    1
+format_null 128 1032    8
+format_null 128 1152  128
+format_null 128 2048 2048
+format_null 256 4096    0 8:264:520:776:1032:1288:1544:1800
+format_null 256 2056    1
+format_null 256 2056    8
+format_null 256 2176  128
+format_null 256 4096 2048
+format_null 512 4096    0 8:512:1016:1520:2024:2528:3032:3536
+format_null 512 4040    1
+format_null 512 4040    8
+format_null 512 4096  128
+format_null 512 4096 2048
+cleanup
+
+echo "# Offset check: 4096B sector drive"
+add_device dev_size_mb=16 sector_size=4096 num_tgts=1 opt_blks=64
+format_null  64 2048    0 8:72:136:200:264:328:392:456
+format_null  64  520    1
+format_null  64  520    8
+format_null  64  640  128
+format_null  64 2048 2048
+format_null 128 2048    0 8:136:264:392:520:648:776:904
+format_null 128 1032    1
+format_null 128 1032    8
+format_null 128 1152  128
+format_null 128 2048 2048
+format_null 256 4096    0 8:264:520:776:1032:1288:1544:1800
+format_null 256 2056    1
+format_null 256 2056    8
+format_null 256 2176  128
+format_null 256 4096 2048
+format_null 512 4096    0 8:512:1016:1520:2024:2528:3032:3536
+format_null 512 4040    1
+format_null 512 4040    8
+format_null 512 4096  128
+format_null 512 4096 2048
+cleanup
+
+echo "# Create enterprise-class 4K drive with fs and LUKS images."
+# loop device here presents 512 block but images have 4k block
+# cryptsetup should properly use 4k block on direct-io
+add_device dev_size_mb=32 sector_size=4096 physblk_exp=0 num_tgts=1 opt_blks=64
+for file in $(ls img_fs_*.img.xz) ; do
+    echo "Format using fs image $file."
+    xz -d -c $file | dd of=$DEV bs=1M 2>/dev/null || fail "bad image"
+    [ ! -d $MNT_DIR ] && mkdir $MNT_DIR
+    mount $DEV $MNT_DIR || skip "Mounting image is not available."
+    echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks1 --key-size 256 $FAST_PBKDF $MNT_DIR/luks.img || fail
+    echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks1 --key-size 256 $FAST_PBKDF $MNT_DIR/luks.img --header $MNT_DIR/luks_header.img || fail
+    umount $MNT_DIR
+done
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/align-test2 b/tests/align-test2
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..bedc3dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/align-test2
@@ -0,0 +1,340 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+CRYPTSETUP="../cryptsetup"
+DEV=""
+DEV_STACKED="luks0xbabe"
+DEV_NAME="dummyalign"
+MNT_DIR="./mnt_luks"
+PWD1="93R4P4pIqAH8"
+PWD2="mymJeD8ivEhE"
+FAST_PBKDF="--pbkdf pbkdf2 --pbkdf-force-iterations 1000"
+
+cleanup() {
+	udevadm settle >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ -d "$MNT_DIR" ] ; then
+	    umount -f $MNT_DIR 2>/dev/null
+	    rmdir $MNT_DIR 2>/dev/null
+	fi
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_STACKED ] && dmsetup remove --retry $DEV_STACKED >/dev/null 2>&1
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME ] && dmsetup remove --retry $DEV_NAME >/dev/null 2>&1
+	# FIXME scsi_debug sometimes in-use here
+	sleep 1
+	rmmod scsi_debug 2>/dev/null
+	sleep 1
+}
+
+fail()
+{
+	if [ -n "$1" ] ; then echo "FAIL $1" ; fi
+	echo "FAILED at line $(caller)"
+	cleanup
+	exit 100
+}
+
+skip()
+{
+	echo "TEST SKIPPED: $1"
+	cleanup
+	exit 0
+}
+
+function dm_crypt_features()
+{
+	VER_STR=$(dmsetup targets | grep crypt | cut -f2 -dv)
+	[ -z "$VER_STR" ] && fail "Failed to parse dm-crypt version."
+
+	VER_MAJ=$(echo $VER_STR | cut -f 1 -d.)
+	VER_MIN=$(echo $VER_STR | cut -f 2 -d.)
+	VER_PTC=$(echo $VER_STR | cut -f 3 -d.)
+
+	[ $VER_MAJ -lt 1 ] && return
+	[ $VER_MAJ -gt 1 ] && {
+		DM_PERF_CPU=1
+		DM_SECTOR_SIZE=1
+		return
+	}
+
+	[ $VER_MIN -lt 14 ] && return
+	DM_PERF_CPU=1
+	if [ $VER_MIN -ge 17 -o \( $VER_MIN -eq 14 -a $VER_PTC -ge 5 \) ]; then
+		DM_SECTOR_SIZE=1
+	fi
+}
+
+add_device() {
+	modprobe scsi_debug $@ delay=0
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ] ; then
+		echo "This kernel seems to not support proper scsi_debug module, test skipped."
+		exit 77
+	fi
+
+	sleep 2
+	DEV=$(grep -l -e scsi_debug /sys/block/*/device/model | cut -f4 -d /)
+
+	if [ ! -e /sys/block/$DEV/alignment_offset ] ; then
+		echo "This kernel seems to not support topology info, test skipped."
+		cleanup
+		exit 77
+	fi
+
+	DEV="/dev/$DEV"
+	[ -b $DEV ] || fail "Cannot find $DEV."
+}
+
+format() # expected [forced] [encryption_sector_size]
+{
+	local _sec_size=512
+
+	local _exp=$1
+
+	if [ "${2:0:1}" = "s" ]; then
+		_sec_size=${2:1}
+		shift
+	fi
+
+	test "${3:0:1}" = "s" && _sec_size=${3:1}
+
+	test $_sec_size -eq 512 || local _smsg=" (encryption sector size $_sec_size)"
+
+	if [ -z "$2" ] ; then
+		echo -n "Formatting using topology info$_smsg..."
+		echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF --type luks2 $DEV -q -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 --sector-size $_sec_size >/dev/null || fail
+	else
+		echo -n "Formatting using forced sector alignment $2$_smsg..."
+		echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF --type luks2 $DEV -q -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 --align-payload=$2 --sector-size $_sec_size >/dev/null || fail
+	fi
+
+	# check the device can be activated
+	if [ -n "$DM_SECTOR_SIZE" ] ; then
+		echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $DEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+		$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+	fi
+
+	ALIGN=$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $DEV | tee  /tmp/last_dump | grep -A1 "0: crypt" | grep "offset:" | cut -d ' ' -f2)
+	# echo "ALIGN = $ALIGN"
+
+	[ -z "$ALIGN" ] && fail
+	ALIGN=$((ALIGN/512))
+	[ $ALIGN -ne $_exp ] && fail "Expected alignment differs: expected $_exp != detected $ALIGN"
+
+	# test some operation, just in case
+	echo -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $DEV $FAST_PBKDF --key-slot 1
+	[ $? -ne 0 ] && fail "Keyslot add failed."
+
+	$CRYPTSETUP -q luksKillSlot $DEV 1
+	[ $? -ne 0 ] && fail "Keyslot removal failed."
+
+	echo "PASSED"
+}
+
+format_fail() # expected [forced] [encryption_sector_size]
+{
+	local _sec_size=512
+
+	local _exp=$1
+
+	if [ "${2:0:1}" = "s" ]; then
+		_sec_size=${2:1}
+		shift
+	fi
+
+	test "${3:0:1}" = "s" && _sec_size=${3:1}
+
+	test $_sec_size -eq 512 || local _smsg=" (encryption sector size $_sec_size)"
+
+	if [ -z "$2" ] ; then
+		echo -n "Formatting using topology info$_smsg (must fail)..."
+		echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF --type luks2 $DEV -q -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 --sector-size $_sec_size >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail
+	else
+		echo -n "Formatting using forced sector alignment $2$_smsg (must fail)..."
+		echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF --type luks2 $DEV -q -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 --align-payload=$2 --sector-size $_sec_size >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail
+	fi
+
+	echo "PASSED"
+}
+
+if [ $(id -u) != 0 ]; then
+	echo "WARNING: You must be root to run this test, test skipped."
+	exit 77
+fi
+
+dm_crypt_features
+modprobe --dry-run scsi_debug || exit 77
+cleanup
+
+add_device dev_size_mb=32
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF --type luks2 $DEV -q  >/dev/null || fail
+EXPCT=$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $DEV | grep "offset: " | cut -f 2 -d ' ')
+test "$EXPCT" -gt 512 || fail
+EXPCT=$((EXPCT/512))
+echo "Default alignment detected: $EXPCT sectors"
+cleanup
+
+echo "# Create desktop-class 4K drive"
+echo "# (logical_block_size=512, physical_block_size=4096, alignment_offset=0)"
+add_device dev_size_mb=32 sector_size=512 physblk_exp=3 num_tgts=1
+format $EXPCT
+format $EXPCT s1024
+format $EXPCT s2048
+format $EXPCT s4096
+format $EXPCT 1
+format $EXPCT 1 s1024
+format $EXPCT 1 s2048
+format $EXPCT 1 s4096
+format $EXPCT 8
+format $EXPCT 8 s1024
+format $EXPCT 8 s2048
+format $EXPCT 8 s4096
+format $((EXPCT+1)) $((EXPCT+1))
+format_fail $((EXPCT+1)) $((EXPCT+1)) s1024
+format_fail $((EXPCT+1)) $((EXPCT+1)) s2048
+format_fail $((EXPCT+1)) $((EXPCT+1)) s4096
+format $EXPCT $EXPCT
+format $EXPCT $EXPCT s1024
+format $EXPCT $EXPCT s2048
+format $EXPCT $EXPCT s4096
+cleanup
+
+echo "# Create desktop-class 4K drive with misaligned opt-io (some bad USB enclosures)"
+echo "# (logical_block_size=512, physical_block_size=4096, alignment_offset=0, opt-io=1025)"
+add_device dev_size_mb=32 sector_size=512 physblk_exp=3 num_tgts=1 opt_blks=1025
+format $EXPCT
+format $EXPCT s1024
+format $EXPCT s2048
+format $EXPCT s4096
+format $EXPCT 1
+format $EXPCT 1 s1024
+format $EXPCT 1 s2048
+format $EXPCT 1 s4096
+format $EXPCT 8
+format $EXPCT 8 s1024
+format $EXPCT 8 s2048
+format $EXPCT 8 s4096
+format $((EXPCT+1)) $((EXPCT+1))
+format_fail $((EXPCT+1)) $((EXPCT+1)) s1024
+format_fail $((EXPCT+1)) $((EXPCT+1)) s2048
+format_fail $((EXPCT+1)) $((EXPCT+1)) s4096
+format $EXPCT $EXPCT
+format $EXPCT $EXPCT s1024
+format $EXPCT $EXPCT s2048
+format $EXPCT $EXPCT s4096
+cleanup
+
+echo "# Create desktop-class 4K drive w/ 1-sector shift (original bug report)"
+echo "# (logical_block_size=512, physical_block_size=4096, alignment_offset=512)"
+add_device dev_size_mb=32 sector_size=512 physblk_exp=3 lowest_aligned=1 num_tgts=1
+format $((EXPCT+1))
+format_fail $((EXPCT+1)) s1024
+format_fail $((EXPCT+1)) s2048
+format_fail $((EXPCT+1)) s4096
+format $EXPCT 1
+format $EXPCT 1 s1024
+format $EXPCT 1 s2048
+format $EXPCT 1 s4096
+format $EXPCT 8
+format $EXPCT 8 s1024
+format $EXPCT 8 s2048
+format $EXPCT 8 s4096
+format $((EXPCT+1)) $((EXPCT+1))
+format_fail $((EXPCT+1)) $((EXPCT+1)) s1024
+format_fail $((EXPCT+1)) $((EXPCT+1)) s2048
+format_fail $((EXPCT+1)) $((EXPCT+1)) s4096
+format $EXPCT $EXPCT
+format $EXPCT $EXPCT s1024
+format $EXPCT $EXPCT s2048
+format $EXPCT $EXPCT s4096
+cleanup
+
+echo "# Create desktop-class 4K drive w/ 63-sector DOS partition compensation"
+echo "# (logical_block_size=512, physical_block_size=4096, alignment_offset=3584)"
+add_device dev_size_mb=32 sector_size=512 physblk_exp=3 lowest_aligned=7 num_tgts=1
+format $((EXPCT+7))
+format_fail $((EXPCT+7)) s1024
+format_fail $((EXPCT+7)) s2048
+format_fail $((EXPCT+7)) s4096
+format $EXPCT 1
+format $EXPCT 1 s1024
+format $EXPCT 1 s2048
+format $EXPCT 1 s4096
+format $EXPCT 8
+format $EXPCT 8 s1024
+format $EXPCT 8 s2048
+format $EXPCT 8 s4096
+format $((EXPCT+1)) $((EXPCT+1))
+format_fail $((EXPCT+1)) $((EXPCT+1)) s1024
+format_fail $((EXPCT+1)) $((EXPCT+1)) s2048
+format_fail $((EXPCT+1)) $((EXPCT+1)) s4096
+format $EXPCT $EXPCT
+format $EXPCT $EXPCT s1024
+format $EXPCT $EXPCT s2048
+format $EXPCT $EXPCT s4096
+cleanup
+
+echo "# Create enterprise-class 4K drive"
+echo "# (logical_block_size=4096, physical_block_size=4096, alignment_offset=0)"
+add_device dev_size_mb=32 sector_size=4096 num_tgts=1 opt_blks=64
+format $EXPCT
+format $EXPCT s1024
+format $EXPCT s2048
+format $EXPCT s4096
+format $EXPCT 1
+format $EXPCT 1 s1024
+format $EXPCT 1 s2048
+format $EXPCT 1 s4096
+format $EXPCT 8
+format $EXPCT 8 s1024
+format $EXPCT 8 s2048
+format $EXPCT 8 s4096
+#FIXME: kernel limits issue?
+##format $((EXPCT+1)) $((EXPCT+1))
+format_fail $((EXPCT+1)) $((EXPCT+1)) s1024
+format_fail $((EXPCT+1)) $((EXPCT+1)) s2048
+format_fail $((EXPCT+1)) $((EXPCT+1)) s4096
+format $EXPCT $EXPCT
+format $EXPCT $EXPCT s1024
+format $EXPCT $EXPCT s2048
+format $EXPCT $EXPCT s4096
+cleanup
+
+echo "# Create classic 512B drive and stack dm-linear"
+echo "# (logical_block_size=512, physical_block_size=512, alignment_offset=0)"
+add_device dev_size_mb=32 sector_size=512 num_tgts=1
+DEV2=$DEV
+DEV=/dev/mapper/$DEV_STACKED
+dmsetup create $DEV_STACKED --table "0 65536 linear $DEV2 0"
+format $EXPCT
+format $EXPCT s1024
+format $EXPCT s2048
+format $EXPCT s4096
+format $EXPCT 1
+format $EXPCT 1 s1024
+format $EXPCT 1 s2048
+format $EXPCT 1 s4096
+format $EXPCT 8
+format $EXPCT 8 s1024
+format $EXPCT 8 s2048
+format $EXPCT 8 s4096
+format $((EXPCT+1)) $((EXPCT+1))
+format_fail $((EXPCT+1)) $((EXPCT+1)) s1024
+format_fail $((EXPCT+1)) $((EXPCT+1)) s2048
+format_fail $((EXPCT+1)) $((EXPCT+1)) s4096
+format $EXPCT $EXPCT
+format $EXPCT $EXPCT s1024
+format $EXPCT $EXPCT s2048
+format $EXPCT $EXPCT s4096
+cleanup
+
+echo "# Create enterprise-class 4K drive with fs and LUKS images."
+# loop device here presents 512 block but images have 4k block
+# cryptsetup should properly use 4k block on direct-io
+add_device dev_size_mb=32 sector_size=4096 physblk_exp=0 num_tgts=1 opt_blks=64
+for file in $(ls img_fs_*.img.xz) ; do
+    echo "Format using fs image $file."
+    xz -d -c $file | dd of=$DEV bs=1M 2>/dev/null || fail "bad image"
+    [ ! -d $MNT_DIR ] && mkdir $MNT_DIR
+    mount $DEV $MNT_DIR || skip "Mounting image is not available."
+    echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF --type luks2 $MNT_DIR/luks.img --offset 8192 || fail
+    echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF --type luks2 $MNT_DIR/luks.img --header $MNT_DIR/luks_header.img || fail
+    umount $MNT_DIR
+done
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/api-test-2.c b/tests/api-test-2.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..36d8016
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/api-test-2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3552 @@
+/*
+ * cryptsetup library LUKS2 API check functions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Ondrej Kozina
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <inttypes.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef KERNEL_KEYRING
+#include <linux/keyctl.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#ifndef HAVE_KEY_SERIAL_T
+#define HAVE_KEY_SERIAL_T
+#include <stdint.h>
+typedef int32_t key_serial_t;
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#include "api_test.h"
+#include "luks.h"
+#include "libcryptsetup.h"
+
+#define DMDIR "/dev/mapper/"
+
+#define DEVICE_1_UUID "28632274-8c8a-493f-835b-da802e1c576b"
+#define DEVICE_EMPTY_name "crypt_zero"
+#define DEVICE_EMPTY DMDIR DEVICE_EMPTY_name
+#define DEVICE_ERROR_name "crypt_error"
+#define DEVICE_ERROR DMDIR DEVICE_ERROR_name
+
+#define CDEVICE_1 "ctest1"
+#define CDEVICE_2 "ctest2"
+#define CDEVICE_WRONG "O_o"
+#define H_DEVICE "head_ok"
+#define H_DEVICE_WRONG "head_wr"
+#define L_DEVICE_1S "luks_onesec"
+#define L_DEVICE_0S "luks_zerosec"
+#define L_DEVICE_WRONG "luks_wr"
+#define L_DEVICE_OK "luks_ok"
+#define REQS_LUKS2_HEADER "luks2_header_requirements"
+#define NO_REQS_LUKS2_HEADER "luks2_header_requirements_free"
+#define BACKUP_FILE "csetup_backup_file"
+#define IMAGE1 "compatimage2.img"
+#define IMAGE_EMPTY "empty.img"
+#define IMAGE_PV_LUKS2_SEC "blkid-luks2-pv.img"
+
+#define KEYFILE1 "key1.file"
+#define KEY1 "compatkey"
+
+#define KEYFILE2 "key2.file"
+#define KEY2 "0123456789abcdef"
+
+#define PASSPHRASE "blabla"
+#define PASSPHRASE1 "albalb"
+
+#define DEVICE_TEST_UUID "12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789abc"
+
+#define DEVICE_WRONG "/dev/Ooo_"
+#define DEVICE_CHAR "/dev/zero"
+#define THE_LFILE_TEMPLATE "cryptsetup-tstlp.XXXXXX"
+
+#define KEY_DESC_TEST0 "cs_token_test:test_key0"
+#define KEY_DESC_TEST1 "cs_token_test:test_key1"
+
+#define CONV_DIR "conversion_imgs"
+#define CONV_L1_128 "l1_128b"
+#define CONV_L1_256 "l1_256b"
+#define CONV_L1_512 "l1_512b"
+#define CONV_L2_128 "l2_128b"
+#define CONV_L2_128_FULL "l2_128b_full"
+#define CONV_L2_256 "l2_256b"
+#define CONV_L2_256_FULL "l2_256b_full"
+#define CONV_L2_512 "l2_512b"
+#define CONV_L2_512_FULL "l2_512b_full"
+#define CONV_L1_128_DET "l1_128b_det"
+#define CONV_L1_256_DET "l1_256b_det"
+#define CONV_L1_512_DET "l1_512b_det"
+#define CONV_L2_128_DET "l2_128b_det"
+#define CONV_L2_128_DET_FULL "l2_128b_det_full"
+#define CONV_L2_256_DET "l2_256b_det"
+#define CONV_L2_256_DET_FULL "l2_256b_det_full"
+#define CONV_L2_512_DET "l2_512b_det"
+#define CONV_L2_512_DET_FULL "l2_512b_det_full"
+#define CONV_L1_256_LEGACY "l1_256b_legacy_offset"
+#define CONV_L1_256_UNMOVABLE "l1_256b_unmovable"
+#define PASS0 "aaa"
+#define PASS1 "hhh"
+#define PASS2 "ccc"
+#define PASS3 "ddd"
+#define PASS4 "eee"
+#define PASS5 "fff"
+#define PASS6 "ggg"
+#define PASS7 "bbb"
+#define PASS8 "iii"
+
+static int _fips_mode = 0;
+
+static char *DEVICE_1 = NULL;
+static char *DEVICE_2 = NULL;
+static char *DEVICE_3 = NULL;
+static char *DEVICE_4 = NULL;
+static char *DEVICE_5 = NULL;
+static char *DEVICE_6 = NULL;
+
+static char *tmp_file_1 = NULL;
+static char *test_loop_file = NULL;
+
+// Helpers
+
+static unsigned cpus_online(void)
+{
+	static long r = -1;
+
+	if (r < 0) {
+		r = sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN);
+		if (r < 0)
+			r = 1;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static uint32_t adjusted_pbkdf_memory(void)
+{
+	long pagesize = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
+	long pages = sysconf(_SC_PHYS_PAGES);
+	uint64_t memory_kb;
+
+	if (pagesize <= 0 || pages <= 0)
+		return DEFAULT_LUKS2_MEMORY_KB;
+
+	memory_kb = pagesize / 1024 * pages / 2;
+
+	if (memory_kb < DEFAULT_LUKS2_MEMORY_KB)
+		return (uint32_t)memory_kb;
+
+	return DEFAULT_LUKS2_MEMORY_KB;
+}
+
+static unsigned _min(unsigned a, unsigned b)
+{
+	return a < b ? a : b;
+}
+
+static int get_luks2_offsets(int metadata_device,
+			    unsigned int alignpayload_sec,
+			    unsigned int sector_size,
+			    uint64_t *r_header_size,
+			    uint64_t *r_payload_offset)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	static uint64_t default_header_size = 0;
+
+
+	if (!default_header_size) {
+		if (crypt_init(&cd, THE_LOOP_DEV))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, "aes", "xts-plain64", NULL, NULL, 64, NULL)) {
+			crypt_free(cd);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		default_header_size = crypt_get_data_offset(cd);
+
+		crypt_free(cd);
+	}
+
+	if (!sector_size)
+		sector_size = 512; /* default? */
+
+	if ((sector_size % 512) && (sector_size % 4096))
+		return -1;
+
+	if (r_payload_offset) {
+		if (metadata_device)
+			*r_payload_offset = DIV_ROUND_UP_MODULO(default_header_size * 512, (alignpayload_sec ?: 1) * sector_size);
+		else
+			*r_payload_offset = alignpayload_sec * sector_size;
+
+		*r_payload_offset /= sector_size;
+	}
+
+	if (r_header_size)
+		*r_header_size = default_header_size;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void _remove_keyfiles(void)
+{
+	remove(KEYFILE1);
+	remove(KEYFILE2);
+}
+
+#if HAVE_DECL_DM_TASK_RETRY_REMOVE
+#define DM_RETRY "--retry "
+#else
+#define DM_RETRY ""
+#endif
+
+static void _cleanup_dmdevices(void)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+
+	if (!stat(DMDIR H_DEVICE, &st))
+		_system("dmsetup remove " DM_RETRY H_DEVICE, 0);
+
+	if (!stat(DMDIR H_DEVICE_WRONG, &st))
+		_system("dmsetup remove " DM_RETRY H_DEVICE_WRONG, 0);
+
+	if (!stat(DMDIR L_DEVICE_0S, &st))
+		_system("dmsetup remove " DM_RETRY L_DEVICE_0S, 0);
+
+	if (!stat(DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S, &st))
+		_system("dmsetup remove " DM_RETRY L_DEVICE_1S, 0);
+
+	if (!stat(DMDIR L_DEVICE_WRONG, &st))
+		_system("dmsetup remove " DM_RETRY L_DEVICE_WRONG, 0);
+
+	if (!stat(DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK, &st))
+		_system("dmsetup remove " DM_RETRY L_DEVICE_OK, 0);
+
+	t_dev_offset = 0;
+}
+
+static void _cleanup(void)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+
+	//_system("udevadm settle", 0);
+
+	if (!stat(DMDIR CDEVICE_1, &st))
+		_system("dmsetup remove " CDEVICE_1, 0);
+
+	if (!stat(DMDIR CDEVICE_2, &st))
+		_system("dmsetup remove " CDEVICE_2, 0);
+
+	if (!stat(DEVICE_EMPTY, &st))
+		_system("dmsetup remove " DEVICE_EMPTY_name, 0);
+
+	if (!stat(DEVICE_ERROR, &st))
+		_system("dmsetup remove " DEVICE_ERROR_name, 0);
+
+	_cleanup_dmdevices();
+
+	if (loop_device(THE_LOOP_DEV))
+		loop_detach(THE_LOOP_DEV);
+
+	if (loop_device(DEVICE_1))
+		loop_detach(DEVICE_1);
+
+	if (loop_device(DEVICE_2))
+		loop_detach(DEVICE_2);
+
+	if (loop_device(DEVICE_3))
+		loop_detach(DEVICE_3);
+
+	if (loop_device(DEVICE_4))
+		loop_detach(DEVICE_4);
+
+	if (loop_device(DEVICE_5))
+		loop_detach(DEVICE_5);
+
+	if (loop_device(DEVICE_6))
+		loop_detach(DEVICE_6);
+
+	_system("rm -f " IMAGE_EMPTY, 0);
+	_system("rm -f " IMAGE1, 0);
+	_system("rm -rf " CONV_DIR, 0);
+
+	if (test_loop_file)
+		remove(test_loop_file);
+	if (tmp_file_1)
+		remove(tmp_file_1);
+
+	remove(REQS_LUKS2_HEADER);
+	remove(NO_REQS_LUKS2_HEADER);
+	remove(BACKUP_FILE);
+	remove(IMAGE_PV_LUKS2_SEC);
+	remove(IMAGE_PV_LUKS2_SEC ".bcp");
+
+	_remove_keyfiles();
+
+	free(tmp_file_1);
+	free(test_loop_file);
+	free(THE_LOOP_DEV);
+	free(DEVICE_1);
+	free(DEVICE_2);
+	free(DEVICE_3);
+	free(DEVICE_4);
+	free(DEVICE_5);
+	free(DEVICE_6);
+}
+
+static int _setup(void)
+{
+	int fd, ro = 0;
+	char cmd[128];
+
+	test_loop_file = strdup(THE_LFILE_TEMPLATE);
+	if ((fd=mkstemp(test_loop_file)) == -1) {
+		printf("cannot create temporary file with template %s\n", test_loop_file);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	close(fd);
+	snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "dd if=/dev/zero of=%s bs=%d count=%d 2>/dev/null",
+		 test_loop_file, SECTOR_SIZE, TST_LOOP_FILE_SIZE);
+	if (_system(cmd, 1))
+		return 1;
+
+	fd = loop_attach(&THE_LOOP_DEV, test_loop_file, 0, 0, &ro);
+	close(fd);
+
+	tmp_file_1 = strdup(THE_LFILE_TEMPLATE);
+	if ((fd=mkstemp(tmp_file_1)) == -1) {
+		printf("cannot create temporary file with template %s\n", tmp_file_1);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	close(fd);
+	snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "dd if=/dev/zero of=%s bs=%d count=%d 2>/dev/null",
+		 tmp_file_1, SECTOR_SIZE, 10);
+	if (_system(cmd, 1))
+		return 1;
+
+	_system("dmsetup create " DEVICE_EMPTY_name " --table \"0 10000 zero\"", 1);
+	_system("dmsetup create " DEVICE_ERROR_name " --table \"0 10000 error\"", 1);
+
+	_system(" [ ! -e " IMAGE1 " ] && xz -dk " IMAGE1 ".xz", 1);
+	fd = loop_attach(&DEVICE_1, IMAGE1, 0, 0, &ro);
+	close(fd);
+
+	_system("dd if=/dev/zero of=" IMAGE_EMPTY " bs=1M count=32 2>/dev/null", 1);
+	fd = loop_attach(&DEVICE_2, IMAGE_EMPTY, 0, 0, &ro);
+	close(fd);
+
+	_system(" [ ! -e " NO_REQS_LUKS2_HEADER " ] && xz -dk " NO_REQS_LUKS2_HEADER ".xz", 1);
+	fd = loop_attach(&DEVICE_4, NO_REQS_LUKS2_HEADER, 0, 0, &ro);
+	close(fd);
+
+	_system(" [ ! -e " REQS_LUKS2_HEADER " ] && xz -dk " REQS_LUKS2_HEADER ".xz", 1);
+	fd = loop_attach(&DEVICE_5, REQS_LUKS2_HEADER, 0, 0, &ro);
+	close(fd);
+
+	_system(" [ ! -e " IMAGE_PV_LUKS2_SEC " ] && xz -dk " IMAGE_PV_LUKS2_SEC ".xz", 1);
+	_system(" [ ! -e " IMAGE_PV_LUKS2_SEC ".bcp ] && cp " IMAGE_PV_LUKS2_SEC " " IMAGE_PV_LUKS2_SEC ".bcp", 1);
+	fd = loop_attach(&DEVICE_6, IMAGE_PV_LUKS2_SEC, 0, 0, &ro);
+	close(fd);
+
+	_system(" [ ! -d " CONV_DIR " ] && tar xJf " CONV_DIR ".tar.xz 2>/dev/null", 1);
+
+	if (_system("modprobe dm-crypt", 1))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (t_dm_check_versions())
+		return 1;
+
+	_system("rmmod dm-crypt", 0);
+
+	_fips_mode = fips_mode();
+	if (_debug)
+		printf("FIPS MODE: %d\n", _fips_mode);
+
+	/* Use default log callback */
+	crypt_set_log_callback(NULL, &global_log_callback, NULL);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef KERNEL_KEYRING
+static key_serial_t add_key(const char *type, const char *description, const void *payload, size_t plen, key_serial_t keyring)
+{
+	return syscall(__NR_add_key, type, description, payload, plen, keyring);
+}
+
+static key_serial_t keyctl_unlink(key_serial_t key, key_serial_t keyring)
+{
+	return syscall(__NR_keyctl, KEYCTL_UNLINK, key, keyring);
+}
+
+static key_serial_t request_key(const char *type,
+	const char *description,
+	const char *callout_info,
+	key_serial_t keyring)
+{
+	return syscall(__NR_request_key, type, description, callout_info, keyring);
+}
+
+static key_serial_t _kernel_key_by_segment(struct crypt_device *cd, int segment)
+{
+	char key_description[1024];
+
+	if (snprintf(key_description, sizeof(key_description), "cryptsetup:%s-d%u", crypt_get_uuid(cd), segment) < 1)
+		return -1;
+
+	return request_key("logon", key_description, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+static int _volume_key_in_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd, int segment)
+{
+	return _kernel_key_by_segment(cd, segment) >= 0 ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+static int _drop_keyring_key(struct crypt_device *cd, int segment)
+{
+	key_serial_t kid = _kernel_key_by_segment(cd, segment);
+
+	if (kid < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	return keyctl_unlink(kid, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int test_open(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		     int token,
+		     char **buffer,
+		     size_t *buffer_len,
+		     void *usrptr)
+{
+	const char *str = (const char *)usrptr;
+
+	*buffer = strdup(str);
+	if (!*buffer)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	*buffer_len = strlen(*buffer);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int test_validate(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *json)
+{
+	return (strstr(json, "magic_string") == NULL);
+}
+
+static void UseLuks2Device(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	char key[128];
+	size_t key_size;
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_INACTIVE);
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEY1, strlen(KEY1), 0));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEY1, strlen(KEY1), 0));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEY1, strlen(KEY1), 0), "already open");
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	FAIL_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1), "no such device");
+
+#if KERNEL_KEYRING
+	// repeat previous tests and check kernel keyring is released when not needed
+	if (t_dm_crypt_keyring_support()) {
+		OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEY1, strlen(KEY1), 0));
+		FAIL_(_drop_keyring_key(cd, 0), "");
+		OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEY1, strlen(KEY1), CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY));
+		OK_(_drop_keyring_key(cd, 0));
+		OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEY1, strlen(KEY1), 0));
+		OK_(_drop_keyring_key(cd, 0));
+		FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEY1, strlen(KEY1), 0), "already open");
+		FAIL_(_volume_key_in_keyring(cd, 0), "");
+		OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEY1, strlen(KEY1), 0));
+		OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+		FAIL_(_volume_key_in_keyring(cd, 0), "");
+	}
+#endif
+
+	key_size = 16;
+	OK_(strcmp("aes", crypt_get_cipher(cd)));
+	OK_(strcmp("cbc-essiv:sha256", crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd)));
+	OK_(strcmp(DEVICE_1_UUID, crypt_get_uuid(cd)));
+	EQ_((int)key_size, crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd));
+	EQ_(8192, crypt_get_data_offset(cd));
+
+	if (!_fips_mode) {
+		EQ_(0, crypt_volume_key_get(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, key, &key_size, KEY1, strlen(KEY1)));
+		OK_(crypt_volume_key_verify(cd, key, key_size));
+		OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, NULL, key, key_size, 0));
+		OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0));
+		EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+		OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+
+		key[1] = ~key[1];
+		FAIL_(crypt_volume_key_verify(cd, key, key_size), "key mismatch");
+		FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0), "key mismatch");
+	}
+	crypt_free(cd);
+}
+
+static void SuspendDevice(void)
+{
+	int suspend_status;
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEY1, strlen(KEY1), 0));
+
+	suspend_status = crypt_suspend(cd, CDEVICE_1);
+	if (suspend_status == -ENOTSUP) {
+		printf("WARNING: Suspend/Resume not supported, skipping test.\n");
+		OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	OK_(suspend_status);
+#ifdef KERNEL_KEYRING
+	FAIL_(_volume_key_in_keyring(cd, 0), "");
+#endif
+	FAIL_(crypt_suspend(cd, CDEVICE_1), "already suspended");
+
+	FAIL_(crypt_resume_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEY1, strlen(KEY1)-1), "wrong key");
+	OK_(crypt_resume_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEY1, strlen(KEY1)));
+	FAIL_(crypt_resume_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEY1, strlen(KEY1)), "not suspended");
+
+	OK_(prepare_keyfile(KEYFILE1, KEY1, strlen(KEY1)));
+	OK_(crypt_suspend(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	FAIL_(crypt_resume_by_keyfile(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE1 "blah", 0), "wrong keyfile");
+	FAIL_(crypt_resume_by_keyfile_offset(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE1, 1, 0), "wrong key");
+	OK_(crypt_resume_by_keyfile_offset(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE1, 0, 0));
+	FAIL_(crypt_resume_by_keyfile(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE1, 0), "not suspended");
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	/* create LUKS device with detached header */
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_set_data_device(cd, DEVICE_2));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEY1, strlen(KEY1), 0));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	/* Should be able to suspend but not resume if not header specified */
+	OK_(crypt_init_by_name(&cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_suspend(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	FAIL_(crypt_suspend(cd, CDEVICE_1), "already suspended");
+	FAIL_(crypt_resume_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEY1, strlen(KEY1)-1), "no header");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	OK_(crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd, CDEVICE_1, DEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_resume_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEY1, strlen(KEY1)));
+
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	_remove_keyfiles();
+}
+
+static void AddDeviceLuks2(void)
+{
+	enum { OFFSET_1M = 2048 , OFFSET_2M = 4096, OFFSET_4M = 8192, OFFSET_8M = 16384 };
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_type pbkdf = {
+		.type = CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2I,
+		.hash = "sha256",
+		.parallel_threads = 4,
+		.max_memory_kb = 1024,
+		.time_ms = 1
+	}, pbkdf_tmp;
+	struct crypt_params_luks2 params = {
+		.pbkdf = &pbkdf,
+		.data_device = DEVICE_2,
+		.sector_size = 512
+	};
+	char key[128], key2[128], key3[128];
+
+	const char *passphrase = "blabla", *passphrase2 = "nsdkFI&Y#.sd";
+	const char *mk_hex = "bb21158c733229347bd4e681891e213d94c685be6a5b84818afe7a78a6de7a1a";
+	const char *mk_hex2 = "bb21158c733229347bd4e681891e213d94c685be6a5b84818afe7a78a6de7a1e";
+	size_t key_size = strlen(mk_hex) / 2;
+	const char *cipher = "aes";
+	const char *cipher_mode = "cbc-essiv:sha256";
+	uint64_t r_payload_offset, r_header_size, r_size_1;
+	uint64_t mdata_size, keyslots_size;
+
+	/* Cannot use Argon2 in FIPS */
+	if (_fips_mode) {
+		pbkdf.type = CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2;
+		pbkdf.parallel_threads = 0;
+		pbkdf.max_memory_kb = 0;
+	}
+
+	crypt_decode_key(key, mk_hex, key_size);
+	crypt_decode_key(key3, mk_hex2, key_size);
+
+	// init test devices
+	OK_(get_luks2_offsets(1, 0, 0, &r_header_size, &r_payload_offset));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(H_DEVICE, r_header_size));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(H_DEVICE_WRONG, r_header_size - 1));
+
+	//default metadata sizes
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR H_DEVICE));
+	OK_(crypt_get_metadata_size(cd, &mdata_size, &keyslots_size));
+	EQ_(mdata_size, 0);
+	EQ_(keyslots_size, 0);
+	OK_(crypt_set_metadata_size(cd, 0, 0));
+	OK_(crypt_get_metadata_size(cd, &mdata_size, &keyslots_size));
+	EQ_(mdata_size, 0);
+	EQ_(keyslots_size, 0);
+	OK_(crypt_set_metadata_size(cd, 0x004000, 0x004000));
+	OK_(crypt_get_metadata_size(cd, &mdata_size, &keyslots_size));
+	EQ_(mdata_size, 0x004000);
+	EQ_(keyslots_size, 0x004000);
+	OK_(crypt_set_metadata_size(cd, 0x008000, 0x008000));
+	OK_(crypt_get_metadata_size(cd, &mdata_size, &keyslots_size));
+	EQ_(mdata_size, 0x008000);
+	EQ_(keyslots_size, 0x008000);
+	FAIL_(crypt_set_metadata_size(cd, 0x008001, 0x008000), "Wrong size");
+	FAIL_(crypt_set_metadata_size(cd, 0x008000, 0x008001), "Wrong size");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// metadata settings
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR H_DEVICE));
+	OK_(crypt_set_metadata_size(cd, 0x080000, 0x080000));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 7, key, key_size, passphrase, strlen(passphrase)), 7);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR H_DEVICE));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_get_metadata_size(cd, &mdata_size, &keyslots_size));
+	EQ_(mdata_size, 0x080000);
+	EQ_(keyslots_size, 0x080000);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	// default
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR H_DEVICE));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	OK_(crypt_get_metadata_size(cd, &mdata_size, &keyslots_size));
+	EQ_(mdata_size, 0x04000);
+	EQ_(keyslots_size, (r_header_size * 512) - 2 * 0x04000);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// format
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR H_DEVICE_WRONG));
+	params.data_alignment = 0;
+	FAIL_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params), "Not enough space for keyslots material");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// test payload_offset = 0 for encrypted device with external header device
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR H_DEVICE));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), 0);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	params.data_alignment = 0;
+	params.data_device = NULL;
+
+	// test payload_offset = 0. format() should look up alignment offset from device topology
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_2));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	OK_(!(crypt_get_data_offset(cd) > 0));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// set_data_offset has priority, alignment must be 0 or must be compatible
+	params.data_alignment = 0;
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_2));
+	OK_(crypt_set_data_offset(cd, OFFSET_8M));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), OFFSET_8M);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// Load gets the value from metadata
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_2));
+	OK_(crypt_set_data_offset(cd, OFFSET_2M));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), OFFSET_8M);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	params.data_alignment = OFFSET_4M;
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_2));
+	FAIL_(crypt_set_data_offset(cd, OFFSET_2M + 1), "Not aligned to 4096"); // must be aligned to 4k
+	OK_(crypt_set_data_offset(cd, OFFSET_2M));
+	FAIL_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params), "Alignment not compatible");
+	OK_(crypt_set_data_offset(cd, OFFSET_4M));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), OFFSET_4M);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	/*
+	 * test limit values for backing device size
+	 */
+	params.data_alignment = OFFSET_4M;
+	OK_(get_luks2_offsets(1, params.data_alignment, 0, NULL, &r_payload_offset));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_0S, r_payload_offset));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_1S, r_payload_offset + 1));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_WRONG, r_payload_offset - 1));
+
+	// 1 sector less than required
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_WRONG));
+	FAIL_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params),	"Device too small");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// 0 sectors for encrypted area
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_0S));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0), "Encrypted area too small");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// 1 sector for encrypted area
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), r_payload_offset);
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(t_device_size(DMDIR CDEVICE_1, &r_size_1));
+	EQ_(r_size_1, SECTOR_SIZE);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_INACTIVE);
+	// restrict format only to empty context
+	FAIL_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params), "Context is already formatted");
+	FAIL_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, NULL), "Context is already formatted");
+	// change data device to wrong one
+	OK_(crypt_set_data_device(cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_0S));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0), "Device too small");
+	OK_(crypt_set_data_device(cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	params.data_alignment = 0;
+	params.data_device = DEVICE_2;
+
+	// generate keyslot material at the end of luks header
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR H_DEVICE));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	EQ_((int)key_size, crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd));
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 7, key, key_size, passphrase, strlen(passphrase)), 7);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, 7, passphrase, strlen(passphrase) ,0), 7);
+
+	OK_(crypt_keyslot_get_pbkdf(cd, 7, &pbkdf_tmp));
+	OK_(strcmp(pbkdf_tmp.type, pbkdf.type));
+	NULL_(pbkdf_tmp.hash);
+	EQ_(0, pbkdf_tmp.time_ms); /* not usable in per-keyslot call */
+	OK_(!(pbkdf_tmp.iterations >= 4));
+	OK_(!(pbkdf_tmp.max_memory_kb >= 32));
+	OK_(!(pbkdf_tmp.parallel_threads >= 1));
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd, CDEVICE_1, DMDIR H_DEVICE));
+	FAIL_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params), "Context is already formatted");
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	// check active status without header
+	OK_(crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd, CDEVICE_1, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	NULL_(crypt_get_type(cd));
+	OK_(strcmp(cipher, crypt_get_cipher(cd)));
+	OK_(strcmp(cipher_mode, crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd)));
+	EQ_((int)key_size, crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	params.data_alignment = OFFSET_1M;
+	params.data_device = NULL;
+
+	// test uuid mismatch and _init_by_name_and_header
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	params.data_alignment = 0;
+	params.data_device = DEVICE_2;
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR H_DEVICE));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	// there we've got uuid mismatch
+	OK_(crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd, CDEVICE_1, DMDIR H_DEVICE));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	NULL_(crypt_get_type(cd));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0), "Device is active");
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_2, key, key_size, 0), "Device is active");
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_2), CRYPT_INACTIVE);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	params.data_device = NULL;
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_2));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+
+	// even with no keyslots defined it can be activated by volume key
+	OK_(crypt_volume_key_verify(cd, key, key_size));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_2, key, key_size, 0));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_2), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_2));
+
+	// now with keyslot
+	EQ_(7, crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 7, key, key_size, passphrase, strlen(passphrase)));
+	EQ_(CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST, crypt_keyslot_status(cd, 7));
+	EQ_(7, crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_2, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, passphrase, strlen(passphrase), 0));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_2), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_2));
+
+	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 1);
+	EQ_(1, crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 1, key, key_size, KEY1, strlen(KEY1)));
+	OK_(prepare_keyfile(KEYFILE1, KEY1, strlen(KEY1)));
+	OK_(prepare_keyfile(KEYFILE2, KEY2, strlen(KEY2)));
+	EQ_(2, crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile(cd, 2, KEYFILE1, 0, KEYFILE2, 0));
+	FAIL_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_offset(cd, 3, KEYFILE1, 0, 1, KEYFILE2, 0, 1), "wrong key");
+	EQ_(3, crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_offset(cd, 3, KEYFILE1, 0, 0, KEYFILE2, 0, 1));
+	EQ_(4, crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_offset(cd, 4, KEYFILE2, 0, 1, KEYFILE1, 0, 1));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_keyfile(cd, CDEVICE_2, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE2, strlen(KEY2)-1, 0), "key mismatch");
+	EQ_(2, crypt_activate_by_keyfile(cd, NULL, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE2, 0, 0));
+	EQ_(3, crypt_activate_by_keyfile_offset(cd, NULL, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE2, 0, 1, 0));
+	EQ_(4, crypt_activate_by_keyfile_offset(cd, NULL, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE1, 0, 1, 0));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_keyfile_offset(cd, CDEVICE_2, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE2, strlen(KEY2), 2, 0), "not enough data");
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_keyfile_offset(cd, CDEVICE_2, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE2, 0, strlen(KEY2) + 1, 0), "cannot seek");
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_keyfile_offset(cd, CDEVICE_2, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE2, 0, 2, 0), "wrong key");
+	EQ_(2, crypt_activate_by_keyfile(cd, CDEVICE_2, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE2, 0, 0));
+	OK_(crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, 1));
+	OK_(crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, 2));
+	OK_(crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, 3));
+	OK_(crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, 4));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_2));
+	_remove_keyfiles();
+
+	FAIL_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 7, key, key_size, passphrase, strlen(passphrase)), "slot used");
+	key[1] = ~key[1];
+	FAIL_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 6, key, key_size, passphrase, strlen(passphrase)), "key mismatch");
+	key[1] = ~key[1];
+	EQ_(6, crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 6, key, key_size, passphrase, strlen(passphrase)));
+	EQ_(CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE, crypt_keyslot_status(cd, 6));
+
+	FAIL_(crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, 8), "invalid keyslot");
+	FAIL_(crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT), "invalid keyslot");
+	FAIL_(crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, 0), "keyslot not used");
+	OK_(crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, 7));
+	EQ_(CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE, crypt_keyslot_status(cd, 7));
+	EQ_(CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST, crypt_keyslot_status(cd, 6));
+
+	EQ_(7, crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase(cd, 6, 7, passphrase, strlen(passphrase), passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)));
+	EQ_(CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST, crypt_keyslot_status(cd, 7));
+	EQ_(7, crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 7, passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2), 0));
+	EQ_(6, crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, 6, passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2), passphrase, strlen(passphrase)));
+
+	if (!_fips_mode) {
+		EQ_(6, crypt_volume_key_get(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, key2, &key_size, passphrase, strlen(passphrase)));
+		OK_(crypt_volume_key_verify(cd, key2, key_size));
+
+		OK_(memcmp(key, key2, key_size));
+	}
+	OK_(strcmp(cipher, crypt_get_cipher(cd)));
+	OK_(strcmp(cipher_mode, crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd)));
+	EQ_((int)key_size, crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd));
+	EQ_(r_payload_offset, crypt_get_data_offset(cd));
+	OK_(strcmp(DEVICE_2, crypt_get_device_name(cd)));
+
+	reset_log();
+	OK_(crypt_dump(cd));
+	OK_(!(global_lines != 0));
+	reset_log();
+
+	FAIL_(crypt_set_uuid(cd, "blah"), "wrong UUID format");
+	OK_(crypt_set_uuid(cd, DEVICE_TEST_UUID));
+	OK_(strcmp(DEVICE_TEST_UUID, crypt_get_uuid(cd)));
+
+	FAIL_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_2), "not active");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	_cleanup_dmdevices();
+
+	/* LUKSv2 format tests */
+
+	/* very basic test */
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_2));
+	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 1);
+	FAIL_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL), "Wrong key size");
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, NULL));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	/* some invalid parameters known to cause troubles */
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_2));
+	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 0); /* wrong for argon2 but we don't know the pbkdf type yet, ignored */
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, NULL));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_2));
+	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 1);
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 0, NULL, key_size, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE)), 0);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_2));
+	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 1);
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, key_size, NULL));
+	FAIL_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, key, key_size, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE)), "VK doesn't match any digest");
+	FAIL_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 1, key, key_size, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE)), "VK doesn't match any digest");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_1S, r_payload_offset + 1));
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 1);
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 3, NULL, key_size, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE)), 3);
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key3, key_size, 0), "VK doesn't match any digest assigned to segment 0");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	_cleanup_dmdevices();
+}
+
+static void UseTempVolumes(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	char tmp[256];
+
+	// Tepmporary device without keyslot but with on-disk LUKS header
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_2));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_2, NULL, 0, 0), "not yet formatted");
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, "aes", "cbc-essiv:sha256", NULL, NULL, 16, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_2, NULL, 0, 0));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_2), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	OK_(crypt_init_by_name(&cd, CDEVICE_2));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_2));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// Dirty checks: device without UUID
+	// we should be able to remove it but not manuipulate with it
+	snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "dmsetup create %s --table \""
+		"0 100 crypt aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 deadbabedeadbabedeadbabedeadbabe 0 "
+		"%s 2048\"", CDEVICE_2, DEVICE_2);
+	_system(tmp, 1);
+	OK_(crypt_init_by_name(&cd, CDEVICE_2));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_2));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_2, NULL, 0, 0), "No known device type");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// Dirty checks: device with UUID but LUKS header key fingerprint must fail)
+	snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "dmsetup create %s --table \""
+		"0 100 crypt aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 deadbabedeadbabedeadbabedeadbabe 0 "
+		"%s 2048\" -u CRYPT-LUKS2-aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa-ctest1",
+		 CDEVICE_2, DEVICE_2);
+	_system(tmp, 1);
+	OK_(crypt_init_by_name(&cd, CDEVICE_2));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_2));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_2, NULL, 0, 0), "wrong volume key");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// No slots
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_2));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_2, NULL, 0, 0), "volume key is lost");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+}
+
+static void Luks2HeaderRestore(void)
+{
+	char key[128];
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_type pbkdf = {
+		.type = CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2I,
+		.hash = "sha256",
+		.parallel_threads = 4,
+		.max_memory_kb = 1024,
+		.time_ms = 1
+	};
+	struct crypt_params_luks2 params = {
+		.pbkdf = &pbkdf,
+		.data_alignment = 8192, // 4M, data offset will be 4096
+		.sector_size = 512
+	};
+	struct crypt_params_plain pl_params = {
+		.hash = "sha1",
+		.skip = 0,
+		.offset = 0,
+		.size = 0
+	};
+	struct crypt_params_luks1 luks1 = {
+		.data_alignment = 8192, // 4M offset to pass alignment test
+	};
+	uint32_t flags = 0;
+
+	const char *mk_hex = "bb21158c733229347bd4e681891e213d94c685be6a5b84818afe7a78a6de7a1a";
+	size_t key_size = strlen(mk_hex) / 2;
+	const char *cipher = "aes";
+	const char *cipher_mode = "cbc-essiv:sha256";
+	uint64_t r_payload_offset;
+
+	/* Cannot use Argon2 in FIPS */
+	if (_fips_mode) {
+		pbkdf.type = CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2;
+		pbkdf.parallel_threads = 0;
+		pbkdf.max_memory_kb = 0;
+	}
+
+	crypt_decode_key(key, mk_hex, key_size);
+
+	OK_(get_luks2_offsets(1, params.data_alignment, 0, NULL, &r_payload_offset));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_OK, r_payload_offset + 5000));
+
+	// do not restore header over plain device
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, key_size, &pl_params));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0));
+	FAIL_(crypt_header_restore(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, NO_REQS_LUKS2_HEADER), "Cannot restore header to PLAIN type device");
+	FAIL_(crypt_header_restore(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NO_REQS_LUKS2_HEADER), "Cannot restore header over PLAIN type device");
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// FIXME: does following test make a sense in LUKS2?
+	// volume key_size mismatch
+	// OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	// memcpy(key2, key, key_size / 2);
+	// OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key2, key_size / 2, &params));
+	// FAIL_(crypt_header_restore(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, VALID_LUKS2_HEADER), "Volume keysize mismatch");
+	// crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// payload offset mismatch
+	params.data_alignment = 8193;
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	FAIL_(crypt_header_restore(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NO_REQS_LUKS2_HEADER), "Payload offset mismatch");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	params.data_alignment = 4096;
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	// FIXME: either format has to fail or next line must be true
+	// EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), params.data_alignment);
+	// FAIL_(crypt_header_restore(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, VALID_LUKS2_HEADER), "Payload offset mismatch");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// do not allow restore over LUKS1 header on device
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 1);
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, 32, &luks1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL));
+	FAIL_(crypt_header_restore(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NO_REQS_LUKS2_HEADER), "LUKS1 format detected");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	/* check crypt_header_restore() properly loads crypt_device context */
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(crypt_wipe(cd, NULL, CRYPT_WIPE_ZERO, 0, 1*1024*1024, 1*1024*1024, 0, NULL, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_header_restore(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NO_REQS_LUKS2_HEADER));
+	/* check LUKS2 specific API call returns non-error code */
+	OK_(crypt_persistent_flags_get(cd, CRYPT_FLAGS_REQUIREMENTS, &flags));
+	EQ_(flags, 0);
+	/* same test, any LUKS */
+	OK_(crypt_wipe(cd, NULL, CRYPT_WIPE_ZERO, 0, 1*1024*1024, 1*1024*1024, 0, NULL, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_header_restore(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NO_REQS_LUKS2_HEADER));
+	/* check LUKS2 specific API call returns non-error code */
+	OK_(crypt_persistent_flags_get(cd, CRYPT_FLAGS_REQUIREMENTS, &flags));
+	EQ_(flags, 0);
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	_cleanup_dmdevices();
+}
+
+static void Luks2HeaderLoad(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_type pbkdf = {
+		.type = CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2I,
+		.hash = "sha256",
+		.parallel_threads = 4,
+		.max_memory_kb = 1024,
+		.time_ms = 1
+	};
+	struct crypt_params_luks2 params = {
+		.pbkdf = &pbkdf,
+		.data_alignment = 8192, // 4M, data offset will be 4096
+		.data_device = DEVICE_2,
+		.sector_size = 512
+	};
+	struct crypt_params_plain pl_params = {
+		.hash = "sha1",
+		.skip = 0,
+		.offset = 0,
+		.size = 0
+	};
+	char key[128], cmd[256];
+
+	const char *mk_hex = "bb21158c733229347bd4e681891e213d94c685be6a5b84818afe7a78a6de7a1a";
+	size_t key_size = strlen(mk_hex) / 2;
+	const char *cipher = "aes";
+	const char *cipher_mode = "cbc-essiv:sha256";
+	uint64_t r_payload_offset, r_header_size, img_size;
+
+	/* Cannot use Argon2 in FIPS */
+	if (_fips_mode) {
+		pbkdf.type = CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2;
+		pbkdf.parallel_threads = 0;
+		pbkdf.max_memory_kb = 0;
+	}
+
+	crypt_decode_key(key, mk_hex, key_size);
+
+	// hardcoded values for existing image IMAGE1
+	img_size = 8192;
+	// prepare test env
+	OK_(get_luks2_offsets(1, 0, 0, &r_header_size, &r_payload_offset));
+	// external header device
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(H_DEVICE, r_header_size));
+	// prepared header on a device too small to contain header and payload
+	//OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(H_DEVICE_WRONG, r_payload_offset - 1));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(H_DEVICE_WRONG, img_size - 1));
+	snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "dd if=" IMAGE1 " of=" DMDIR H_DEVICE_WRONG " bs=%" PRIu32 " count=%" PRIu64 " 2>/dev/null", params.sector_size, img_size - 1);
+	OK_(_system(cmd, 1));
+	// some device
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_OK, r_payload_offset + 1000));
+	// 1 sector device
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_1S, r_header_size + 1));
+	// 0 sectors device for payload
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_0S, r_header_size));
+
+	// valid metadata and device size
+	params.data_alignment = 0;
+	params.data_device = DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK;
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR H_DEVICE));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR H_DEVICE));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_set_data_device(cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(!crypt_get_metadata_device_name(cd));
+	EQ_(strcmp(DMDIR H_DEVICE, crypt_get_metadata_device_name(cd)), 0);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// repeat with init with two devices
+	OK_(crypt_init_data_device(&cd, DMDIR H_DEVICE, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init_data_device(&cd, DMDIR H_DEVICE, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	OK_(!crypt_get_metadata_device_name(cd));
+	EQ_(strcmp(DMDIR H_DEVICE, crypt_get_metadata_device_name(cd)), 0);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// bad header: device too small (payloadOffset > device_size)
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR H_DEVICE_WRONG));
+	FAIL_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL), "Device too small");
+	NULL_(crypt_get_type(cd));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// 0 secs for encrypted data area
+	params.data_alignment = 8192;
+	params.data_device = NULL;
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_0S));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	// load should be ok
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_0S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0), "Device too small");
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_INACTIVE);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// damaged header
+	OK_(_system("dd if=/dev/zero of=" DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK " bs=512 count=8 2>/dev/null", 1));
+	OK_(_system("dd if=/dev/zero of=" DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK " bs=512 seek=32 count=8 2>/dev/null", 1));
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	FAIL_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL), "Header not found");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// plain device
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR H_DEVICE));
+	FAIL_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, NULL), "Can't load nonLUKS device type");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR H_DEVICE));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &pl_params));
+	FAIL_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL), "Can't load over nonLUKS device type");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	//LUKSv2 device
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_4));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_4));
+	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 0); /* invalid for argon2 pbkdf, ignored */
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	/* check load sets proper device type */
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_0S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL));
+	EQ_(strcmp(CRYPT_LUKS2, crypt_get_type(cd)), 0);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	_cleanup_dmdevices();
+}
+
+static void Luks2HeaderBackup(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_type pbkdf = {
+		.type = CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2I,
+		.hash = "sha256",
+		.parallel_threads = 4,
+		.max_memory_kb = 1024,
+		.time_ms = 1
+	};
+	struct crypt_params_luks2 params = {
+		.pbkdf = &pbkdf,
+		.data_alignment = 8192, // 4M, data offset will be 4096
+		.data_device = DEVICE_2,
+		.sector_size = 512
+	};
+	char key[128];
+	int fd, ro = O_RDONLY;
+
+	const char *mk_hex = "bb21158c733229347bd4e681891e213d94c685be6a5b84818afe7a78a6de7a1a";
+	size_t key_size = strlen(mk_hex) / 2;
+	const char *cipher = "aes";
+	const char *cipher_mode = "cbc-essiv:sha256";
+	uint64_t r_payload_offset;
+
+	const char *passphrase = PASSPHRASE;
+
+	/* Cannot use Argon2 in FIPS */
+	if (_fips_mode) {
+		pbkdf.type = CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2;
+		pbkdf.parallel_threads = 0;
+		pbkdf.max_memory_kb = 0;
+	}
+
+	crypt_decode_key(key, mk_hex, key_size);
+
+	OK_(get_luks2_offsets(0, params.data_alignment, 0, NULL, &r_payload_offset));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_OK, r_payload_offset + 1));
+
+	// create LUKS device and backup the header
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0));
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 7, key, key_size, passphrase, strlen(passphrase)), 7);
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 0, key, key_size, passphrase, strlen(passphrase)), 0);
+	OK_(crypt_header_backup(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, BACKUP_FILE));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// restore header from backup
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(crypt_header_restore(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, BACKUP_FILE));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// exercise luksOpen using backup header in file
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, BACKUP_FILE));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_set_data_device(cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, 0, passphrase, strlen(passphrase), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, BACKUP_FILE));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_set_data_device(cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, 7, passphrase, strlen(passphrase), 0), 7);
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// exercise luksOpen using backup header on block device
+	fd = loop_attach(&DEVICE_3, BACKUP_FILE, 0, 0, &ro);
+	close(fd);
+	OK_(fd < 0);
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_3));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_set_data_device(cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, 0, passphrase, strlen(passphrase), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_3));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_set_data_device(cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, 7, passphrase, strlen(passphrase), 0), 7);
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	_cleanup_dmdevices();
+}
+
+static void ResizeDeviceLuks2(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd, *cd2;
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_type pbkdf = {
+		.type = CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2I,
+		.hash = "sha256",
+		.parallel_threads = 4,
+		.max_memory_kb = 1024,
+		.time_ms = 1
+	};
+	struct crypt_params_luks2 params = {
+		.pbkdf = &pbkdf,
+		.data_alignment = 8192, // 4M, data offset will be 4096
+		.sector_size = 512
+	};
+	char key[128];
+
+	const char *mk_hex = "bb21158c733229347bd4e681891e213d94c685be6a5b84818afe7a78a6de7a1a";
+	size_t key_size = strlen(mk_hex) / 2;
+	const char *cipher = "aes";
+	const char *cipher_mode = "cbc-essiv:sha256";
+	uint64_t r_payload_offset, r_header_size, r_size;
+
+	/* Cannot use Argon2 in FIPS */
+	if (_fips_mode) {
+		pbkdf.type = CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2;
+		pbkdf.parallel_threads = 0;
+		pbkdf.max_memory_kb = 0;
+	}
+
+	crypt_decode_key(key, mk_hex, key_size);
+
+	// prepare env
+	OK_(get_luks2_offsets(1, params.data_alignment, 0, NULL, &r_payload_offset));
+	OK_(get_luks2_offsets(1, 0, 0, &r_header_size, NULL));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(H_DEVICE, r_header_size));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_OK, r_payload_offset + 1000));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_0S, 1000));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_WRONG, r_payload_offset + 1000));
+
+	// test header and encrypted payload all in one device
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	// disable loading VKs in kernel keyring (compatible mode)
+	OK_(crypt_volume_key_keyring(cd, 0));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0));
+	OK_(crypt_resize(cd, CDEVICE_1, 0));
+	OK_(crypt_resize(cd, CDEVICE_1, 42));
+	if (!t_device_size(DMDIR CDEVICE_1, &r_size))
+		EQ_(42, r_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT);
+	OK_(crypt_resize(cd, CDEVICE_1, 0));
+	// autodetect encrypted device area size
+	OK_(crypt_resize(cd, CDEVICE_1, 0));
+	if (!t_device_size(DMDIR CDEVICE_1, &r_size))
+		EQ_(1000, r_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT);
+	FAIL_(crypt_resize(cd, CDEVICE_1, 1001), "Device too small");
+	if (!t_device_size(DMDIR CDEVICE_1, &r_size))
+		EQ_(1000, r_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT);
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	params.data_alignment = 0;
+	params.data_device = DMDIR L_DEVICE_0S;
+	// test case for external header
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR H_DEVICE));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0));
+	OK_(crypt_resize(cd, CDEVICE_1, 666));
+	if (!t_device_size(DMDIR CDEVICE_1, &r_size))
+		EQ_(666, r_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT);
+	// autodetect encrypted device size
+	OK_(crypt_resize(cd, CDEVICE_1, 0));
+	if (!t_device_size(DMDIR CDEVICE_1, &r_size))
+		EQ_(1000, r_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT);
+	FAIL_(crypt_resize(cd, CDEVICE_1, 1001), "Device too small");
+	if (!t_device_size(DMDIR CDEVICE_1, &r_size))
+		EQ_(1000, r_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT);
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+#ifdef KERNEL_KEYRING
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL));
+	// enable loading VKs in kernel keyring (default mode)
+	OK_(crypt_volume_key_keyring(cd, 1));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0));
+	// erase volume key from kernel keyring
+	if (t_dm_crypt_keyring_support())
+		OK_(_drop_keyring_key(cd, 0));
+	else
+		FAIL_(_drop_keyring_key(cd, 0), "key not found");
+	// same size is ok
+	OK_(crypt_resize(cd, CDEVICE_1, 0));
+	// kernel fails to find the volume key in keyring
+	if (t_dm_crypt_keyring_support())
+		FAIL_(crypt_resize(cd, CDEVICE_1, 42), "Unable to find volume key in keyring");
+	else
+		OK_(crypt_resize(cd, CDEVICE_1, 42));
+	// test mode must not load vk in keyring
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, NULL, key, key_size, 0));
+	if (t_dm_crypt_keyring_support())
+		FAIL_(crypt_resize(cd, CDEVICE_1, 44), "VK must be in keyring to perform resize");
+	else
+		OK_(crypt_resize(cd, CDEVICE_1, 44));
+	// reinstate the volume key in keyring
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, NULL, key, key_size, t_dm_crypt_keyring_support() ? CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY : 0));
+	OK_(crypt_resize(cd, CDEVICE_1, 43));
+	if (!t_device_size(DMDIR CDEVICE_1, &r_size))
+		EQ_(43, r_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL));
+	// check userspace gets hint volume key must be properly loaded in kernel keyring
+	if (t_dm_crypt_keyring_support())
+		EQ_(crypt_resize(cd, CDEVICE_1, 0), -EPERM);
+	else
+		OK_(crypt_resize(cd, CDEVICE_1, 0));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// same as above for handles initialised by name
+	OK_(crypt_init_by_name(&cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	if (t_dm_crypt_keyring_support())
+		EQ_(crypt_resize(cd, CDEVICE_1, 0), -EPERM);
+	else
+		OK_(crypt_resize(cd, CDEVICE_1, 0));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+#endif
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, NULL, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0));
+
+	/* create second LUKS2 device */
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd2, DMDIR L_DEVICE_WRONG));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd2, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, crypt_get_uuid(cd), key, key_size, &params));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd2, CDEVICE_2, key, key_size, 0));
+	/* do not allow resize of other device */
+	FAIL_(crypt_resize(cd2, CDEVICE_1, 1), "Device got resized by wrong device context.");
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd2, CDEVICE_2));
+	crypt_free(cd2);
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd2, DMDIR L_DEVICE_WRONG));
+	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd2, 1);
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd2, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, crypt_get_uuid(cd), key, key_size, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd2, CDEVICE_2, key, key_size, 0));
+	FAIL_(crypt_resize(cd2, CDEVICE_1, 1), "Device got resized by wrong device context.");
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd2, CDEVICE_2));
+	crypt_free(cd2);
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd2, DMDIR L_DEVICE_WRONG));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd2, CRYPT_PLAIN, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd2, CDEVICE_2, key, key_size, 0));
+	FAIL_(crypt_resize(cd2, CDEVICE_1, 1), "Device got resized by wrong device context.");
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd2, CDEVICE_2));
+	crypt_free(cd2);
+
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	_cleanup_dmdevices();
+}
+
+static void TokenActivationByKeyring(void)
+{
+#ifdef KERNEL_KEYRING
+	key_serial_t kid, kid1;
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+
+	const char *cipher = "aes";
+	const char *cipher_mode = "xts-plain64";
+
+	const struct crypt_token_params_luks2_keyring params = {
+		.key_description = KEY_DESC_TEST0
+	}, params2 = {
+		.key_description = KEY_DESC_TEST1
+	};
+	uint64_t r_payload_offset;
+
+	kid = add_key("user", KEY_DESC_TEST0, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE), KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING);
+	if (kid < 0) {
+		printf("Test or kernel keyring are broken.\n");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	OK_(get_luks2_offsets(1, 0, 0, NULL, &r_payload_offset));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_1S, r_payload_offset + 1));
+
+	// prepare the device
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 1);
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, 32, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 0, NULL, 32, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE)), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_token_luks2_keyring_set(cd, 3, &params), 3);
+	EQ_(crypt_token_assign_keyslot(cd, 3, 0), 3);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// test thread keyring key in token 0
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_token(cd, CDEVICE_1, 3, NULL, 0), 0);
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_token(cd, CDEVICE_1, 3, NULL, 0), "already open");
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	if (keyctl_unlink(kid, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING)) {
+		printf("Test or kernel keyring are broken.\n");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	kid = add_key("user", KEY_DESC_TEST0, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE), KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING);
+	if (kid < 0) {
+		printf("Test or kernel keyring are broken.\n");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	// add token 1 with process keyring key
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_token_json_set(cd, 3, NULL), 3);
+	EQ_(crypt_token_luks2_keyring_set(cd, 1, &params), 1);
+	EQ_(crypt_token_assign_keyslot(cd, 1, 0), 1);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// test process keyring key in token 1
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_token(cd, CDEVICE_1, 1, NULL, 0), 0);
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_token(cd, CDEVICE_1, 1, NULL, 0), "already open");
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	if (keyctl_unlink(kid, KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING)) {
+		printf("Test or kernel keyring are broken.\n");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	// create two tokens and let the cryptsetup unlock the volume with the valid one
+	kid = add_key("user", KEY_DESC_TEST0, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE), KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING);
+	if (kid < 0) {
+		printf("Test or kernel keyring are broken.\n");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	kid1 = add_key("user", KEY_DESC_TEST1, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1), KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING);
+	if (kid1 < 0) {
+		printf("Test or kernel keyring are broken.\n");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_token_luks2_keyring_set(cd, 0, &params), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_token_assign_keyslot(cd, 0, 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_token_luks2_keyring_set(cd, 1, &params2), 1);
+	FAIL_(crypt_token_assign_keyslot(cd, 1, 1), "Keyslot 1 doesn't exist");
+	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 1);
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase(cd, 1, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE), PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1)), 1);
+	EQ_(crypt_token_assign_keyslot(cd, 1, 1), 1);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// activate by specific token
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_token(cd, CDEVICE_1, 0, NULL, 0), 0);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_token(cd, CDEVICE_1, 1, NULL, 0), 1);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	if (keyctl_unlink(kid, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING)) {
+		printf("Test or kernel keyring are broken.\n");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	// activate by any token with token 0 having absent pass from keyring
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_token(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, NULL, 0), 1);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	kid = add_key("user", KEY_DESC_TEST0, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE), KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING);
+	if (kid < 0) {
+		printf("Test or kernel keyring are broken.\n");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	// replace pass for keyslot 0 making token 0 invalid
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, 0));
+	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 1);
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase(cd, 0, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1), PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1)), 0);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// activate by any token with token 0 having wrong pass for keyslot 0
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_token(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, NULL, 0), 1);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	 // create new device, with two tokens:
+	 // 1st token being invalid (missing key in keyring)
+	 // 2nd token can activate keyslot 1 after failing to do so w/ keyslot 0 (wrong pass)
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 1);
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, 32, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 0, NULL, 32, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE)), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 1, NULL, 32, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1)), 1);
+	EQ_(crypt_token_luks2_keyring_set(cd, 0, &params), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_token_assign_keyslot(cd, 0, 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_token_luks2_keyring_set(cd, 2, &params2), 2);
+	EQ_(crypt_token_assign_keyslot(cd, 2, 1), 2);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	if (keyctl_unlink(kid, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING)) {
+		printf("Test or kernel keyring are broken.\n");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	kid1 = add_key("user", KEY_DESC_TEST1, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1), KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING);
+	if (kid1 < 0) {
+		printf("Test or kernel keyring are broken.\n");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_token(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, NULL, 0), 1);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	_cleanup_dmdevices();
+#else
+	printf("WARNING: cryptsetup compiled with kernel keyring service disabled, skipping test.\n");
+#endif
+}
+
+static void Tokens(void)
+{
+#define TEST_TOKEN_JSON(x) "{\"type\":\"test_token\",\"keyslots\":[" x "]," \
+			"\"key_length\":32,\"a_field\":\"magic_string\"}"
+
+#define TEST_TOKEN_JSON_INVALID(x) "{\"type\":\"test_token\",\"keyslots\":[" x "]," \
+			"\"key_length\":32}"
+
+#define TEST_TOKEN1_JSON(x) "{\"type\":\"test_token1\",\"keyslots\":[" x "]," \
+			"\"key_length\":32,\"a_field\":\"magic_string\"}"
+
+#define TEST_TOKEN1_JSON_INVALID(x) "{\"type\":\"test_token1\",\"keyslots\":[" x "]," \
+			"\"key_length\":32}"
+
+#define BOGUS_TOKEN0_JSON "{\"type\":\"luks2-\",\"keyslots\":[]}"
+#define BOGUS_TOKEN1_JSON "{\"type\":\"luks2-a\",\"keyslots\":[]}"
+
+#define LUKS2_KEYRING_TOKEN_JSON(x, y) "{\"type\":\"luks2-keyring\",\"keyslots\":[" x "]," \
+			"\"key_description\":" y "}"
+
+#define LUKS2_KEYRING_TOKEN_JSON_BAD(x, y) "{\"type\":\"luks2-keyring\",\"keyslots\":[" x "]," \
+			"\"key_description\":" y ", \"some_field\":\"some_value\"}"
+
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+
+	const char *dummy;
+	const char *cipher = "aes";
+	const char *cipher_mode = "xts-plain64";
+	char passptr[] = PASSPHRASE;
+	char passptr1[] = PASSPHRASE1;
+
+	static const crypt_token_handler th = {
+		.name = "test_token",
+		.open = test_open,
+		.validate = test_validate
+	}, th2 = {
+		.name = "test_token",
+		.open = test_open
+	}, th3 = {
+		.name = "test_token1",
+		.open = test_open,
+		.validate = test_validate
+	}, th_reserved = {
+		.name = "luks2-prefix",
+		.open = test_open
+	};
+
+	struct crypt_token_params_luks2_keyring params = {
+		.key_description = "desc"
+	};
+	uint64_t r_payload_offset;
+
+	OK_(crypt_token_register(&th));
+	FAIL_(crypt_token_register(&th2), "Token handler with the name already registered.");
+
+	FAIL_(crypt_token_register(&th_reserved), "luks2- is reserved prefix");
+
+	OK_(get_luks2_offsets(1, 0, 0, NULL, &r_payload_offset));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_1S, r_payload_offset + 1));
+
+	// basic token API tests
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 1);
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, 32, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_token_status(cd, -1, NULL), CRYPT_TOKEN_INVALID);
+	EQ_(crypt_token_status(cd, 32, NULL), CRYPT_TOKEN_INVALID);
+	EQ_(crypt_token_status(cd, 0, NULL), CRYPT_TOKEN_INACTIVE);
+	EQ_(crypt_token_status(cd, 31, NULL), CRYPT_TOKEN_INACTIVE);
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 0, NULL, 32, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE)), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 1, NULL, 32, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1)), 1);
+	FAIL_(crypt_token_json_set(cd, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, TEST_TOKEN_JSON_INVALID("\"0\"")), "Token validation failed");
+	EQ_(crypt_token_json_set(cd, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, TEST_TOKEN_JSON("\"0\"")), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_token_status(cd, 0, NULL), CRYPT_TOKEN_EXTERNAL);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_token(cd, CDEVICE_1, 0, passptr, 0), 0);
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_token(cd, CDEVICE_1, 0, passptr, 0), "already active");
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+
+	// write invalid token and verify that validate() can detect it after handler being registered
+	EQ_(crypt_token_json_set(cd, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, TEST_TOKEN1_JSON_INVALID("\"1\"")), 1);
+	EQ_(crypt_token_status(cd, 1, NULL), CRYPT_TOKEN_EXTERNAL_UNKNOWN);
+	EQ_(crypt_token_json_set(cd, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, TEST_TOKEN1_JSON("\"1\"")), 2);
+	EQ_(crypt_token_status(cd, 2, &dummy), CRYPT_TOKEN_EXTERNAL_UNKNOWN);
+	OK_(strcmp(dummy, "test_token1"));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_token(cd, CDEVICE_1, 1, passptr1, 0), "Unknown token handler");
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_token(cd, CDEVICE_1, 2, passptr1, 0), "Unknown token handler");
+	OK_(crypt_token_register(&th3));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_token(cd, CDEVICE_1, 1, passptr1, 0), "Token validation failed");
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_token(cd, CDEVICE_1, 2, passptr1, 0), 1);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+
+	// test crypt_token_json_get returns correct token id
+	EQ_(crypt_token_json_get(cd, 2, &dummy), 2);
+
+	// exercise assign/unassign keyslots API
+	EQ_(crypt_token_unassign_keyslot(cd, 2, 1), 2);
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_token(cd, CDEVICE_1, 2, passptr1, 0), "Token assigned to no keyslot");
+	EQ_(crypt_token_assign_keyslot(cd, 2, 0), 2);
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_token(cd, CDEVICE_1, 2, passptr1, 0), "Wrong passphrase");
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_token(cd, CDEVICE_1, 2, passptr, 0), 0);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	EQ_(crypt_token_json_set(cd, 1, NULL), 1);
+	FAIL_(crypt_token_json_get(cd, 1, &dummy), "Token is not there");
+	EQ_(crypt_token_unassign_keyslot(cd, 2, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT), 2);
+	EQ_(crypt_token_unassign_keyslot(cd, 0, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT), 0);
+
+	// various tests related to unassigned keyslot to volume segment
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_key(cd, 3, NULL, 32, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1), CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT), 3);
+	EQ_(crypt_token_assign_keyslot(cd, 2, 0), 2);
+	EQ_(crypt_token_assign_keyslot(cd, 0, 3), 0);
+
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_token(cd, NULL, 2, passptr, 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_token(cd, NULL, 0, passptr1, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY), 3);
+	// FIXME: useless error message here (or missing one to be specific)
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_token(cd, CDEVICE_1, 0, passptr1, 0), "No volume key available in token keyslots");
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_token(cd, CDEVICE_1, 2, passptr, 0), 0);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	EQ_(crypt_token_assign_keyslot(cd, 0, 1), 0);
+	OK_(crypt_token_is_assigned(cd, 0, 1));
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_token(cd, CDEVICE_1, 0, passptr1, 0), 1);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+
+	EQ_(crypt_token_assign_keyslot(cd, 2, 3), 2);
+	OK_(crypt_token_is_assigned(cd, 2, 3));
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_token(cd, NULL, 2, passptr, 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_token(cd, CDEVICE_1, 2, passptr, 0), 0);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+
+#ifdef KERNEL_KEYRING
+	if (t_dm_crypt_keyring_support()) {
+		EQ_(crypt_activate_by_token(cd, NULL, 2, passptr, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY), 0);
+		OK_(_volume_key_in_keyring(cd, 0));
+	}
+	OK_(crypt_volume_key_keyring(cd, 0));
+#endif
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_token(cd, NULL, 2, passptr, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY), "Can't use keyring when disabled in library");
+	OK_(crypt_volume_key_keyring(cd, 1));
+
+	EQ_(crypt_token_luks2_keyring_set(cd, 5, &params), 5);
+	EQ_(crypt_token_status(cd, 5, &dummy), CRYPT_TOKEN_INTERNAL);
+	OK_(strcmp(dummy, "luks2-keyring"));
+
+	FAIL_(crypt_token_luks2_keyring_get(cd, 2, &params), "Token is not luks2-keyring type");
+
+	FAIL_(crypt_token_json_set(cd, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, BOGUS_TOKEN0_JSON), "luks2- reserved prefix.");
+	FAIL_(crypt_token_json_set(cd, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, BOGUS_TOKEN1_JSON), "luks2- reserved prefix.");
+
+	// test we can use crypt_token_json_set for valid luks2-keyring token
+	FAIL_(crypt_token_json_set(cd, 12, LUKS2_KEYRING_TOKEN_JSON_BAD("\"0\"", "\"my_desc_x\"")), "Strict luks2-keyring token validation failed");
+	EQ_(crypt_token_status(cd, 12, NULL), CRYPT_TOKEN_INACTIVE);
+	FAIL_(crypt_token_json_set(cd, 12, LUKS2_KEYRING_TOKEN_JSON("\"5\"", "\"my_desc\"")), "Missing keyslot 5.");
+	EQ_(crypt_token_json_set(cd, 10, LUKS2_KEYRING_TOKEN_JSON("\"1\"", "\"my_desc\"")), 10);
+	EQ_(crypt_token_status(cd, 10, &dummy), CRYPT_TOKEN_INTERNAL);
+	OK_(strcmp(dummy, "luks2-keyring"));
+	params.key_description = NULL;
+	EQ_(crypt_token_luks2_keyring_get(cd, 10, &params), 10);
+	OK_(strcmp(params.key_description, "my_desc"));
+
+	OK_(crypt_token_is_assigned(cd, 10, 1));
+	// unassigned tests
+	EQ_(crypt_token_is_assigned(cd, 10, 21), -ENOENT);
+	EQ_(crypt_token_is_assigned(cd, 21, 1), -ENOENT);
+	// wrong keyslot or token id tests
+	EQ_(crypt_token_is_assigned(cd, -1, 1), -EINVAL);
+	EQ_(crypt_token_is_assigned(cd, 32, 1), -EINVAL);
+	EQ_(crypt_token_is_assigned(cd, 10, -1), -EINVAL);
+	EQ_(crypt_token_is_assigned(cd, 10, 32), -EINVAL);
+	EQ_(crypt_token_is_assigned(cd, -1, -1), -EINVAL);
+	EQ_(crypt_token_is_assigned(cd, 32, 32), -EINVAL);
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	_cleanup_dmdevices();
+}
+
+static void LuksConvert(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	uint64_t offset, r_payload_offset;
+
+	const char *json = "{\"type\":\"convert_block\",\"keyslots\":[]}";
+	const struct crypt_pbkdf_type argon = {
+		.type = CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2I,
+		.hash = "sha512",
+		.time_ms = 1,
+		.max_memory_kb = 1024,
+		.parallel_threads = 1
+	}, pbkdf2 = {
+		.type = CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2,
+		.hash = "sha1",
+		.time_ms = 1
+	};
+
+	struct crypt_params_luks2 luks2 = {
+		.pbkdf = &pbkdf2,
+		.sector_size = 512
+	};
+
+	const char *cipher = "aes";
+	const char *cipher_mode = "xts-plain64";
+
+	// prepare the device
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1));
+	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 1);
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, 32, NULL));
+	offset = crypt_get_data_offset(cd);
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 0, NULL, 32, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE)), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 7, NULL, 32, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1)), 7);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// convert LUKSv1 -> LUKSv2
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL));
+	FAIL_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL), "format is already LUKSv1");
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE), 0), 0);
+	FAIL_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL), "device is active");
+	OK_(strcmp(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS1));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	OK_(strcmp(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS2));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// check result
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1));
+	FAIL_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL), "wrong luks format");
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), offset);
+	OK_(strcmp(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS2));
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE), 0), 0);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1), 0), 7);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	FAIL_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL), "format is already LUKSv2");
+	OK_(strcmp(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS2));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// convert LUKSv2 -> LUKSv1
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), offset);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE), 0), 0);
+	FAIL_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL), "device is active");
+	OK_(strcmp(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS2));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	OK_(strcmp(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// check result
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1));
+	FAIL_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL), "wrong luks format");
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL));
+	OK_(strcmp(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS1));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), offset);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE), 0), 0);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1), 0), 7);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	FAIL_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL), "format is already LUKSv1");
+	OK_(strcmp(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// exercice non-pbkdf2 LUKSv2 conversion
+	if (!_fips_mode) {
+		OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1));
+		OK_(crypt_set_data_offset(cd, offset));
+		OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, 32, NULL));
+		OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &argon));
+		EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 0, NULL, 32, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE)), 0);
+		FAIL_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL), "Incompatible pbkdf with LUKSv1 format");
+		crypt_free(cd);
+	}
+
+	// exercice non LUKS1 compatible keyslot
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_set_data_offset(cd, offset));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, 32, &luks2));
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 0, NULL, 32, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE)), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_key(cd, 1, NULL, 32, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1), CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT), 1);
+	// FIXME: following test fails as expected but for a different reason
+	FAIL_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL), "Unassigned keyslots are incompatible with LUKSv1 format");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// exercice LUKSv2 conversion with single pbkdf2 keyslot being active
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_set_data_offset(cd, offset));
+	OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &pbkdf2));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, 32, NULL));
+	offset = crypt_get_data_offset(cd);
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 0, NULL, 32, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE)), 0);
+	if (!_fips_mode) {
+		OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &argon));
+		EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 1, NULL, 32, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE)), 1);
+		FAIL_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL), "Different hash for digest and keyslot.");
+		OK_(crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, 1));
+	}
+	OK_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), offset);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), offset);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE), 0), 0);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// do not allow conversion on keyslot No > 7
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_set_data_offset(cd, offset));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, 32, &luks2));
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 0, NULL, 32, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE)), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 8, NULL, 32, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1)), 8);
+	FAIL_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL), "Can't convert keyslot No 8");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// do not allow conversion with token
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_set_data_offset(cd, offset));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, 32, &luks2));
+	OK_(crypt_token_json_set(cd, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, json));
+	FAIL_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL), "Can't convert header with token.");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// should be enough for both luks1 and luks2 devices with all vk lengths
+	OK_(get_luks2_offsets(1, 0, 0, NULL, &r_payload_offset));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_1S, r_payload_offset + 1));
+
+	// do not allow conversion for legacy luks1 device (non-aligned keyslot offset)
+	OK_(_system("dd if=" CONV_DIR "/" CONV_L1_256_LEGACY " of=" DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S " bs=1M count=2 oflag=direct 2>/dev/null", 1));
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	FAIL_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL), "Can't convert device with unaligned keyslot offset");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	/*
+	 * do not allow conversion on images if there's not enough space between
+	 * last keyslot and data offset (should not happen on headers created
+	 * with cryptsetup)
+	 */
+	OK_(_system("dd if=" CONV_DIR "/" CONV_L1_256_UNMOVABLE " of=" DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S " bs=1M count=2 oflag=direct 2>/dev/null", 1));
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	FAIL_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL), "Can't convert device with unaligned keyslot offset");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// compat conversion tests
+	// LUKS1 -> LUKS2
+
+	// 128b key
+	OK_(_system("dd if=" CONV_DIR "/" CONV_L1_128 " of=" DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S " bs=1M count=2 oflag=direct 2>/dev/null", 1));
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	offset = crypt_get_data_offset(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), offset);
+	EQ_(strcmp(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS2), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, PASS0, strlen(PASS0), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 7, PASS7, strlen(PASS7), 0), 7);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), offset);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, PASS0, strlen(PASS0), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 7, PASS7, strlen(PASS7), 0), 7);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// 256b key
+	OK_(_system("dd if=" CONV_DIR "/" CONV_L1_256 " of=" DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S " bs=1M count=2 oflag=direct 2>/dev/null", 1));
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	offset = crypt_get_data_offset(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), offset);
+	EQ_(strcmp(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS2), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, PASS0, strlen(PASS0), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 7, PASS7, strlen(PASS7), 0), 7);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), offset);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, PASS0, strlen(PASS0), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 7, PASS7, strlen(PASS7), 0), 7);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// 512b key
+	OK_(_system("dd if=" CONV_DIR "/" CONV_L1_512 " of=" DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S " bs=1M count=2 oflag=direct 2>/dev/null", 1));
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	offset = crypt_get_data_offset(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), offset);
+	EQ_(strcmp(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS2), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, PASS0, strlen(PASS0), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 7, PASS7, strlen(PASS7), 0), 7);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), offset);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, PASS0, strlen(PASS0), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 7, PASS7, strlen(PASS7), 0), 7);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// detached LUKS1 header conversion
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, CONV_DIR "/" CONV_L1_128_DET));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	offset = crypt_get_data_offset(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), offset);
+	EQ_(strcmp(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS2), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, PASS0, strlen(PASS0), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 7, PASS7, strlen(PASS7), 0), 7);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, CONV_DIR "/" CONV_L1_128_DET));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), offset);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, PASS0, strlen(PASS0), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 7, PASS7, strlen(PASS7), 0), 7);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// 256b key
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, CONV_DIR "/" CONV_L1_256_DET));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	offset = crypt_get_data_offset(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), offset);
+	EQ_(strcmp(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS2), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, PASS0, strlen(PASS0), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 7, PASS7, strlen(PASS7), 0), 7);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, CONV_DIR "/" CONV_L1_256_DET));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), offset);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, PASS0, strlen(PASS0), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 7, PASS7, strlen(PASS7), 0), 7);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// 512b key
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, CONV_DIR "/" CONV_L1_512_DET));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	offset = crypt_get_data_offset(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), offset);
+	EQ_(strcmp(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS2), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, PASS0, strlen(PASS0), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 7, PASS7, strlen(PASS7), 0), 7);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, CONV_DIR "/" CONV_L1_512_DET));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), offset);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, PASS0, strlen(PASS0), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 7, PASS7, strlen(PASS7), 0), 7);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// LUKS2 -> LUKS1
+	// 128b key
+	OK_(_system("dd if=" CONV_DIR "/" CONV_L2_128 " of=" DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S " bs=1M count=4 oflag=direct 2>/dev/null", 1));
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	offset = crypt_get_data_offset(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), offset);
+	EQ_(strcmp(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS1), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, PASS0, strlen(PASS0), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 7, PASS7, strlen(PASS7), 0), 7);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), offset);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, PASS0, strlen(PASS0), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 7, PASS7, strlen(PASS7), 0), 7);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// 128b all LUKS1 keyslots used
+	OK_(_system("dd if=" CONV_DIR "/" CONV_L2_128_FULL " of=" DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S " bs=1M count=4 oflag=direct 2>/dev/null", 1));
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	EQ_(strcmp(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS1), 0);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, PASS0, strlen(PASS0), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 7, PASS7, strlen(PASS7), 0), 7);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 1, PASS1, strlen(PASS1), 0), 1);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 2, PASS2, strlen(PASS2), 0), 2);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 3, PASS3, strlen(PASS3), 0), 3);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 4, PASS4, strlen(PASS4), 0), 4);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 5, PASS5, strlen(PASS5), 0), 5);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 6, PASS6, strlen(PASS6), 0), 6);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// 256b key
+	OK_(_system("dd if=" CONV_DIR "/" CONV_L2_256 " of=" DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S " bs=1M count=4 oflag=direct 2>/dev/null", 1));
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	offset = crypt_get_data_offset(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), offset);
+	EQ_(strcmp(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS1), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, PASS0, strlen(PASS0), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 7, PASS7, strlen(PASS7), 0), 7);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), offset);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, PASS0, strlen(PASS0), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 7, PASS7, strlen(PASS7), 0), 7);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// 256b all LUKS1 keyslots used
+	OK_(_system("dd if=" CONV_DIR "/" CONV_L2_256_FULL " of=" DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S " bs=1M count=4 oflag=direct 2>/dev/null", 1));
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	EQ_(strcmp(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS1), 0);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, PASS0, strlen(PASS0), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 7, PASS7, strlen(PASS7), 0), 7);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 1, PASS1, strlen(PASS1), 0), 1);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 2, PASS2, strlen(PASS2), 0), 2);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 3, PASS3, strlen(PASS3), 0), 3);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 4, PASS4, strlen(PASS4), 0), 4);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 5, PASS5, strlen(PASS5), 0), 5);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 6, PASS6, strlen(PASS6), 0), 6);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// 512b key
+	OK_(_system("dd if=" CONV_DIR "/" CONV_L2_512 " of=" DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S " bs=1M count=4 oflag=direct 2>/dev/null", 1));
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	offset = crypt_get_data_offset(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), offset);
+	EQ_(strcmp(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS1), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, PASS0, strlen(PASS0), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 7, PASS7, strlen(PASS7), 0), 7);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), offset);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, PASS0, strlen(PASS0), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 7, PASS7, strlen(PASS7), 0), 7);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// 512b all LUKS1 keyslots used
+	OK_(_system("dd if=" CONV_DIR "/" CONV_L2_512_FULL " of=" DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S " bs=1M count=4 oflag=direct 2>/dev/null", 1));
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	EQ_(strcmp(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS1), 0);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, PASS0, strlen(PASS0), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 7, PASS7, strlen(PASS7), 0), 7);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 1, PASS1, strlen(PASS1), 0), 1);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 2, PASS2, strlen(PASS2), 0), 2);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 3, PASS3, strlen(PASS3), 0), 3);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 4, PASS4, strlen(PASS4), 0), 4);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 5, PASS5, strlen(PASS5), 0), 5);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 6, PASS6, strlen(PASS6), 0), 6);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// detached headers
+	// 128b
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, CONV_DIR "/" CONV_L2_128_DET));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	offset = crypt_get_data_offset(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), offset);
+	EQ_(strcmp(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS1), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, PASS0, strlen(PASS0), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 7, PASS7, strlen(PASS7), 0), 7);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, CONV_DIR "/" CONV_L2_128_DET));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), offset);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, PASS0, strlen(PASS0), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 7, PASS7, strlen(PASS7), 0), 7);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// 128b all LUKS1 keyslots used
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, CONV_DIR "/" CONV_L2_128_DET_FULL));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	EQ_(strcmp(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS1), 0);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, CONV_DIR "/" CONV_L2_128_DET_FULL));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, PASS0, strlen(PASS0), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 7, PASS7, strlen(PASS7), 0), 7);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 1, PASS1, strlen(PASS1), 0), 1);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 2, PASS2, strlen(PASS2), 0), 2);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 3, PASS3, strlen(PASS3), 0), 3);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 4, PASS4, strlen(PASS4), 0), 4);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 5, PASS5, strlen(PASS5), 0), 5);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 6, PASS6, strlen(PASS6), 0), 6);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// 256b key
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, CONV_DIR "/" CONV_L2_256_DET));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	offset = crypt_get_data_offset(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), offset);
+	EQ_(strcmp(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS1), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, PASS0, strlen(PASS0), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 7, PASS7, strlen(PASS7), 0), 7);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, CONV_DIR "/" CONV_L2_256_DET));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), offset);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, PASS0, strlen(PASS0), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 7, PASS7, strlen(PASS7), 0), 7);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// 256b all LUKS1 keyslots used
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, CONV_DIR "/" CONV_L2_256_DET_FULL));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	EQ_(strcmp(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS1), 0);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, CONV_DIR "/" CONV_L2_256_DET_FULL));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, PASS0, strlen(PASS0), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 7, PASS7, strlen(PASS7), 0), 7);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 1, PASS1, strlen(PASS1), 0), 1);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 2, PASS2, strlen(PASS2), 0), 2);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 3, PASS3, strlen(PASS3), 0), 3);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 4, PASS4, strlen(PASS4), 0), 4);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 5, PASS5, strlen(PASS5), 0), 5);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 6, PASS6, strlen(PASS6), 0), 6);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// 512b key
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, CONV_DIR "/" CONV_L2_512_DET));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	offset = crypt_get_data_offset(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), offset);
+	EQ_(strcmp(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS1), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, PASS0, strlen(PASS0), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 7, PASS7, strlen(PASS7), 0), 7);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, CONV_DIR "/" CONV_L2_512_DET));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), offset);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, PASS0, strlen(PASS0), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 7, PASS7, strlen(PASS7), 0), 7);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// 512b all LUKS1 keyslots used
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, CONV_DIR "/" CONV_L2_512_DET_FULL));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	EQ_(strcmp(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS1), 0);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, CONV_DIR "/" CONV_L2_512_DET_FULL));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, PASS0, strlen(PASS0), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 7, PASS7, strlen(PASS7), 0), 7);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 1, PASS1, strlen(PASS1), 0), 1);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 2, PASS2, strlen(PASS2), 0), 2);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 3, PASS3, strlen(PASS3), 0), 3);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 4, PASS4, strlen(PASS4), 0), 4);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 5, PASS5, strlen(PASS5), 0), 5);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 6, PASS6, strlen(PASS6), 0), 6);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	_cleanup_dmdevices();
+}
+
+static void Pbkdf(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf;
+
+	const char *cipher = "aes", *mode="xts-plain64";
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_type argon2 = {
+		.type = CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2I,
+		.hash = DEFAULT_LUKS1_HASH,
+		.time_ms = 6,
+		.max_memory_kb = 1024,
+		.parallel_threads = 1
+	}, pbkdf2 = {
+		.type = CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2,
+		.hash = DEFAULT_LUKS1_HASH,
+		.time_ms = 9
+	}, bad = {
+		.type = "hamster_pbkdf",
+		.hash = DEFAULT_LUKS1_HASH
+	};
+	struct crypt_params_plain params = {
+		.hash = "sha1",
+		.skip = 0,
+		.offset = 0,
+		.size = 0
+	};
+	struct crypt_params_luks1 luks1 = {
+		.hash = "whirlpool", // test non-standard hash
+		.data_alignment = 2048,
+	};
+
+	uint64_t r_payload_offset;
+
+	/* Only PBKDF2 is allowed in FIPS, these tests cannot be run. */
+	if (_fips_mode)
+		return;
+
+	OK_(get_luks2_offsets(1, 0, 0, NULL, &r_payload_offset));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_OK, r_payload_offset + 1));
+
+	NULL_(crypt_get_pbkdf_type_params(NULL));
+	NULL_(crypt_get_pbkdf_type_params("suslik"));
+	NOTNULL_(pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf_type_params(CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2));
+	OK_(strcmp(pbkdf->type, CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2));
+	NOTNULL_(pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf_type_params(CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2I));
+	OK_(strcmp(pbkdf->type, CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2I));
+	NOTNULL_(pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf_type_params(CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2ID));
+	OK_(strcmp(pbkdf->type, CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2ID));
+
+	// test empty context
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	NULL_(crypt_get_pbkdf_type(cd));
+	OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &argon2));
+	NOTNULL_(crypt_get_pbkdf_type(cd));
+	OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &pbkdf2));
+	NOTNULL_(crypt_get_pbkdf_type(cd));
+	OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, NULL));
+	NOTNULL_(crypt_get_pbkdf_type(cd));
+
+	// test plain device
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, cipher, mode, NULL, NULL, 32, &params));
+	OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &argon2));
+	OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &pbkdf2));
+	OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, NULL));
+	NOTNULL_(crypt_get_pbkdf_type(cd));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// test LUKSv1 device
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, mode, NULL, NULL, 32, NULL));
+	FAIL_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &argon2), "Unsupported with non-LUKS2 devices");
+	OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &pbkdf2));
+	OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, NULL));
+	NOTNULL_(pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf_type(cd));
+	EQ_(pbkdf->time_ms, DEFAULT_LUKS1_ITER_TIME);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	// test value set in crypt_set_iteration_time() can be obtained via following crypt_get_pbkdf_type()
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 42);
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, mode, NULL, NULL, 32, NULL));
+	NOTNULL_(pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf_type(cd));
+	EQ_(pbkdf->time_ms, 42);
+	// test crypt_get_pbkdf_type() returns expected values for LUKSv1
+	OK_(strcmp(pbkdf->type, CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2));
+	OK_(strcmp(pbkdf->hash, DEFAULT_LUKS1_HASH));
+	EQ_(pbkdf->max_memory_kb, 0);
+	EQ_(pbkdf->parallel_threads, 0);
+	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 43);
+	NOTNULL_(pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf_type(cd));
+	EQ_(pbkdf->time_ms, 43);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	// test whether crypt_get_pbkdf_type() after double crypt_load()
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL));
+	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 42);
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL));
+	NOTNULL_(pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf_type(cd));
+	EQ_(pbkdf->time_ms, 42);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	// test whether hash passed via *params in crypt_load() has higher priority
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 1);
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, mode, NULL, NULL, 32, &luks1));
+	NOTNULL_(pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf_type(cd));
+	OK_(strcmp(pbkdf->hash, luks1.hash));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL));
+	NOTNULL_(pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf_type(cd));
+	OK_(strcmp(pbkdf->hash, luks1.hash));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// test LUKSv2 device
+	// test default values are set
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, mode, NULL, NULL, 32, NULL));
+	NOTNULL_(pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf_type(cd));
+	OK_(strcmp(pbkdf->type, DEFAULT_LUKS2_PBKDF));
+	OK_(strcmp(pbkdf->hash, DEFAULT_LUKS1_HASH));
+	EQ_(pbkdf->time_ms, DEFAULT_LUKS2_ITER_TIME);
+	EQ_(pbkdf->max_memory_kb, adjusted_pbkdf_memory());
+	EQ_(pbkdf->parallel_threads, _min(cpus_online(), DEFAULT_LUKS2_PARALLEL_THREADS));
+	// set and verify argon2 type
+	OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &argon2));
+	NOTNULL_(pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf_type(cd));
+	OK_(strcmp(pbkdf->type, argon2.type));
+	OK_(strcmp(pbkdf->hash, argon2.hash));
+	EQ_(pbkdf->time_ms, argon2.time_ms);
+	EQ_(pbkdf->max_memory_kb, argon2.max_memory_kb);
+	EQ_(pbkdf->parallel_threads, argon2.parallel_threads);
+	// set and verify pbkdf2 type
+	OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &pbkdf2));
+	NOTNULL_(pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf_type(cd));
+	OK_(strcmp(pbkdf->type, pbkdf2.type));
+	OK_(strcmp(pbkdf->hash, pbkdf2.hash));
+	EQ_(pbkdf->time_ms, pbkdf2.time_ms);
+	EQ_(pbkdf->max_memory_kb, pbkdf2.max_memory_kb);
+	EQ_(pbkdf->parallel_threads, pbkdf2.parallel_threads);
+	// reset and verify default values
+	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 1); // it's supposed to override this call
+	OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, NULL));
+	NOTNULL_(pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf_type(cd));
+	OK_(strcmp(pbkdf->type, DEFAULT_LUKS2_PBKDF));
+	OK_(strcmp(pbkdf->hash, DEFAULT_LUKS1_HASH));
+	EQ_(pbkdf->time_ms, DEFAULT_LUKS2_ITER_TIME);
+	EQ_(pbkdf->max_memory_kb, adjusted_pbkdf_memory());
+	EQ_(pbkdf->parallel_threads, _min(cpus_online(), DEFAULT_LUKS2_PARALLEL_THREADS));
+	// try to pass illegal values
+	argon2.parallel_threads = 0;
+	FAIL_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &argon2), "Parallel threads can't be 0");
+	argon2.parallel_threads = 1;
+	argon2.max_memory_kb = 0;
+	FAIL_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &argon2), "Memory can't be 0");
+	argon2.max_memory_kb = 1024;
+	pbkdf2.parallel_threads = 1;
+	FAIL_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &pbkdf2), "Parallel threads can't be set with pbkdf2 type");
+	pbkdf2.parallel_threads = 0;
+	pbkdf2.max_memory_kb = 512;
+	FAIL_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &pbkdf2), "Memory can't be set with pbkdf2 type");
+	FAIL_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &bad), "Unknown type member");
+	bad.type = CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2;
+	bad.hash = NULL;
+	FAIL_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &bad), "Hash member is empty");
+	bad.type = NULL;
+	bad.hash = DEFAULT_LUKS1_HASH;
+	FAIL_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &bad), "Pbkdf type member is empty");
+	bad.hash = "hamster_hash";
+	FAIL_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &pbkdf2), "Unknown hash member");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	// test whether crypt_get_pbkdf_type() behaves accordingly after second crypt_load() call
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL));
+	NOTNULL_(pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf_type(cd));
+	OK_(strcmp(pbkdf->type, DEFAULT_LUKS2_PBKDF));
+	OK_(strcmp(pbkdf->hash, DEFAULT_LUKS1_HASH));
+	EQ_(pbkdf->time_ms, DEFAULT_LUKS2_ITER_TIME);
+	EQ_(pbkdf->max_memory_kb, adjusted_pbkdf_memory());
+	EQ_(pbkdf->parallel_threads, _min(cpus_online(), DEFAULT_LUKS2_PARALLEL_THREADS));
+	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 1);
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL));
+	OK_(strcmp(pbkdf->type, DEFAULT_LUKS2_PBKDF));
+	OK_(strcmp(pbkdf->hash, DEFAULT_LUKS1_HASH));
+	EQ_(pbkdf->time_ms, 1);
+	EQ_(pbkdf->max_memory_kb, adjusted_pbkdf_memory());
+	EQ_(pbkdf->parallel_threads, _min(cpus_online(), DEFAULT_LUKS2_PARALLEL_THREADS));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// test crypt_set_pbkdf_type() overwrites invalid value set by crypt_set_iteration_time()
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 0);
+	OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &argon2));
+	NOTNULL_(pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf_type(cd));
+	OK_(strcmp(pbkdf->type, argon2.type));
+	EQ_(pbkdf->time_ms, argon2.time_ms);
+
+	// force iterations
+	argon2.iterations = 33;
+	argon2.flags = CRYPT_PBKDF_NO_BENCHMARK;
+	OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &argon2));
+	NOTNULL_(pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf_type(cd));
+	EQ_(pbkdf->iterations, 33);
+	EQ_(pbkdf->flags, CRYPT_PBKDF_NO_BENCHMARK);
+
+	// time may be unset with iterations
+	argon2.time_ms = 0;
+	OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &argon2));
+	argon2.flags &= ~CRYPT_PBKDF_NO_BENCHMARK;
+	FAIL_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &argon2), "Illegal time value.");
+
+	pbkdf2.time_ms = 0;
+	pbkdf2.flags = CRYPT_PBKDF_NO_BENCHMARK;
+	pbkdf2.parallel_threads = 0;
+	pbkdf2.max_memory_kb = 0;
+	pbkdf2.iterations = 1000;
+	OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &pbkdf2));
+	pbkdf2.flags &= ~CRYPT_PBKDF_NO_BENCHMARK;
+	FAIL_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &pbkdf2), "Illegal time value.");
+
+	// hash is relevant only with pbkdf2
+	pbkdf2.time_ms = 9;
+	pbkdf2.hash = NULL;
+	FAIL_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &pbkdf2), "Hash is mandatory for pbkdf2");
+	pbkdf2.hash = "sha1";
+	OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &pbkdf2));
+
+	argon2.time_ms = 9;
+	argon2.hash = "sha1"; // will be ignored
+	OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &argon2));
+	argon2.hash = NULL;
+	OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &argon2));
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	NOTNULL_(pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf_default(CRYPT_LUKS1));
+	OK_(strcmp(pbkdf->type, CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2));
+	EQ_(pbkdf->time_ms, DEFAULT_LUKS1_ITER_TIME);
+	OK_(strcmp(pbkdf->hash, DEFAULT_LUKS1_HASH));
+	EQ_(pbkdf->max_memory_kb, 0);
+	EQ_(pbkdf->parallel_threads, 0);
+
+	NOTNULL_(pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf_default(CRYPT_LUKS2));
+	OK_(strcmp(pbkdf->type, DEFAULT_LUKS2_PBKDF));
+	EQ_(pbkdf->time_ms, DEFAULT_LUKS2_ITER_TIME);
+	OK_(strcmp(pbkdf->hash, DEFAULT_LUKS1_HASH));
+	EQ_(pbkdf->max_memory_kb, DEFAULT_LUKS2_MEMORY_KB);
+	EQ_(pbkdf->parallel_threads, DEFAULT_LUKS2_PARALLEL_THREADS);
+
+	NULL_(pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf_default(CRYPT_PLAIN));
+
+	_cleanup_dmdevices();
+}
+
+static void Luks2KeyslotAdd(void)
+{
+	char key[128], key2[128], key_ret[128];
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	const char *cipher = "aes", *cipher_mode="xts-plain64";
+	const char *mk_hex =  "bb21158c733229347bd4e681891e213d94c685be6a5b84818afe7a78a6de7a1a";
+	const char *mk_hex2 = "bb21158c733229347bd4e681891e213d94c685be6a5b84818afe7a78a6de7a1e";
+	size_t key_ret_len, key_size = strlen(mk_hex) / 2;
+	uint64_t r_payload_offset;
+
+	crypt_decode_key(key, mk_hex, key_size);
+	crypt_decode_key(key2, mk_hex2, key_size);
+
+	OK_(get_luks2_offsets(1, 0, 0, NULL, &r_payload_offset));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_OK, r_payload_offset + 1));
+
+	/* test crypt_keyslot_add_by_key */
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 1);
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_key(cd, 1, key2, key_size, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1), CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT), 1);
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 0, key, key_size, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE)), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_status(cd, 0), CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST);
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_status(cd, 1), CRYPT_SLOT_UNBOUND);
+	/* must not activate volume with keyslot unassigned to a segment */
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key2, key_size, 0), "Key doesn't match volume key digest");
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, 1, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1), 0), "Keyslot not assigned to volume");
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1), 0), "No keyslot assigned to volume with this passphrase");
+	/* unusable for volume activation even in test mode */
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, NULL, key2, key_size, 0), "Key doesn't match volume key digest");
+	/* otoh passphrase check should pass */
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 1, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1), CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY), 1);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1), CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY), 1);
+	/* in general crypt_keyslot_add_by_key must allow any reasonable key size
+	 * even though such keyslot will not be usable for segment encryption */
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_key(cd, 2, key2, key_size-1, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1), CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT), 2);
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_key(cd, 3, key2, 13, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1), CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT), 3);
+
+	FAIL_(crypt_keyslot_get_key_size(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT), "Bad keyslot specification.");
+	EQ_(crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd), key_size);
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_get_key_size(cd, 0), key_size);
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_get_key_size(cd, 1), key_size);
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_get_key_size(cd, 2), key_size-1);
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_get_key_size(cd, 3), 13);
+
+	key_ret_len = key_size - 1;
+	FAIL_(crypt_volume_key_get(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, key_ret, &key_ret_len, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1)), "Wrong size or fips");
+
+	key_ret_len = 13;
+	FAIL_(crypt_volume_key_get(cd, 2, key_ret, &key_ret_len, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1)), "wrong size");
+	EQ_(crypt_volume_key_get(cd, 3, key_ret, &key_ret_len, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1)), 3);
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, NULL, key_ret, key_ret_len, 0), "Not a volume key");
+	key_ret_len = key_size;
+	EQ_(crypt_volume_key_get(cd, 1, key_ret, &key_ret_len, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1)), 1);
+
+	/* test force volume key change works as expected */
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_key(cd, 1, NULL, 0, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1), CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET), 1);
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, NULL, key2, key_size, 0));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, NULL, key_ret, key_ret_len, 0));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key2, key_size, 0));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 1, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1), 0), 1);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, 1, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1), 0), 1);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	/* old keyslot must be unusable */
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0), "Key doesn't match volume key digest");
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, NULL, key, key_size, 0), "Key doesn't match volume key digest");
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, 0, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE), 0), "Keyslot not assigned to volume");
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase(cd, 5, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1), PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1)), 5);
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 6, key2, key_size, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1)), 6);
+	/* regression test. check new keyslot is properly assigned to new volume key digest */
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, 5, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1), 0), 5);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, 6, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1), 0), 6);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	_cleanup_dmdevices();
+}
+
+static void Luks2KeyslotParams(void)
+{
+	char key[128], key2[128];
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	const char *cipher = "aes", *cipher_mode="xts-plain64";
+	const char *cipher_spec = "aes-xts-plain64", *cipher_keyslot = "aes-cbc-essiv:sha256";
+	const char *mk_hex =  "bb21158c733229347bd4e681891e213d94c685be6a5b84818afe7a78a6de7a1a";
+	const char *mk_hex2 = "bb21158c733229347bd4e681891e213d94c685be6a5b84818afe7a78a6de7a1e";
+	size_t key_size_ret, key_size = strlen(mk_hex) / 2, keyslot_key_size = 16;
+	uint64_t r_payload_offset;
+
+	crypt_decode_key(key, mk_hex, key_size);
+	crypt_decode_key(key2, mk_hex2, key_size);
+
+	OK_(prepare_keyfile(KEYFILE1, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE)));
+	OK_(prepare_keyfile(KEYFILE2, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1)));
+
+	OK_(get_luks2_offsets(1, 0, 0, NULL, &r_payload_offset));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_OK, r_payload_offset + 1));
+
+	EQ_(key_size, 2 * keyslot_key_size);
+	/* test crypt_keyslot_add_by_key */
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 1);
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, NULL));
+	NULL_(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 0, &key_size_ret));
+	OK_(strcmp(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, &key_size_ret), cipher_spec));
+	EQ_(key_size_ret, key_size);
+
+	// Normal slots
+	EQ_(0, crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 0, key, key_size, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE)));
+	EQ_(1, crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase(cd, 1, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE), PASSPHRASE1,strlen(PASSPHRASE1)));
+	EQ_(2, crypt_keyslot_add_by_key(cd, 2, key2, key_size, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1), CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT));
+	EQ_(6, crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile(cd, 6, KEYFILE1, 0, KEYFILE2, 0));
+
+	// Slots with different encryption type
+	OK_(crypt_keyslot_set_encryption(cd, cipher_keyslot, keyslot_key_size));
+	OK_(strcmp(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, &key_size_ret), cipher_keyslot));
+	EQ_(key_size_ret, keyslot_key_size);
+
+	EQ_(3, crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 3, key, key_size, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE)));
+	EQ_(4, crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase(cd, 4, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE), PASSPHRASE1,strlen(PASSPHRASE1)));
+	EQ_(5, crypt_keyslot_add_by_key(cd, 5, key2, key_size, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1), CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT));
+	EQ_(7, crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile(cd, 7, KEYFILE1, 0, KEYFILE2, 0));
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_status(cd, 0), CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(strcmp(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 0, &key_size_ret), cipher_spec));
+	EQ_(key_size_ret, key_size);
+
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_status(cd, 1), CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(strcmp(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 1, &key_size_ret), cipher_spec));
+	EQ_(key_size_ret, key_size);
+
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_status(cd, 2), CRYPT_SLOT_UNBOUND);
+	OK_(strcmp(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 2, &key_size_ret), cipher_spec));
+	EQ_(key_size_ret, key_size);
+
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_status(cd, 6), CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(strcmp(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 6, &key_size_ret), cipher_spec));
+	EQ_(key_size_ret, key_size);
+
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_status(cd, 3), CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(strcmp(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 3, &key_size_ret), cipher_keyslot));
+	EQ_(key_size_ret, keyslot_key_size);
+
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_status(cd, 4), CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(strcmp(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 4, &key_size_ret), cipher_keyslot));
+	EQ_(key_size_ret, keyslot_key_size);
+
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_status(cd, 5), CRYPT_SLOT_UNBOUND);
+	OK_(strcmp(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 5, &key_size_ret), cipher_keyslot));
+	EQ_(key_size_ret, keyslot_key_size);
+
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_status(cd, 7), CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(strcmp(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 7, &key_size_ret), cipher_keyslot));
+	EQ_(key_size_ret, keyslot_key_size);
+
+	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 1);
+	EQ_(8, crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase(cd, 1, 8, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1), PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE)));
+	OK_(strcmp(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 8, &key_size_ret), cipher_spec));
+	EQ_(key_size_ret, key_size);
+
+	/* Revert to default */
+	EQ_(9, crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase(cd, 5, 9, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1), PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE)));
+	OK_(strcmp(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 9, &key_size_ret), cipher_spec));
+	EQ_(key_size_ret, key_size);
+
+	/* Set new encryption params */
+	OK_(crypt_keyslot_set_encryption(cd, cipher_keyslot, keyslot_key_size));
+
+	EQ_(1, crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase(cd, 8, 1, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE), PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1)));
+	OK_(strcmp(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 1, &key_size_ret), cipher_keyslot));
+	EQ_(key_size_ret, keyslot_key_size);
+
+	EQ_(10, crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase(cd, 2, 10, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1), PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE)));
+	OK_(strcmp(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 10, &key_size_ret), cipher_keyslot));
+	EQ_(key_size_ret, keyslot_key_size);
+
+	EQ_(0, crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase(cd, 0, 0, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE), PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1)));
+	OK_(strcmp(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 0, &key_size_ret), cipher_keyslot));
+	EQ_(key_size_ret, keyslot_key_size);
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	/* LUKS1 compatible calls */
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 1);
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, NULL));
+	NULL_(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 0, &key_size_ret));
+	OK_(strcmp(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, &key_size_ret), cipher_spec));
+	EQ_(key_size_ret, key_size);
+	EQ_(0, crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 0, key, key_size, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE)));
+	OK_(strcmp(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 0, &key_size_ret), cipher_spec));
+	EQ_(key_size_ret, key_size);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	_cleanup_dmdevices();
+	_remove_keyfiles();
+}
+
+static void Luks2ActivateByKeyring(void)
+{
+#ifdef KERNEL_KEYRING
+
+	key_serial_t kid, kid1;
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	uint64_t r_payload_offset;
+
+	const char *cipher = "aes";
+	const char *cipher_mode = "xts-plain64";
+
+	kid = add_key("user", KEY_DESC_TEST0, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE), KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING);
+	kid1 = add_key("user", KEY_DESC_TEST1, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1), KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING);
+	if (kid < 0 || kid1 < 0) {
+		printf("Test or kernel keyring are broken.\n");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	OK_(get_luks2_offsets(1, 0, 0, NULL, &r_payload_offset));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_OK, r_payload_offset + 1));
+
+	// prepare the device
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 1);
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, 32, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 0, NULL, 32, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE)), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_key(cd, 1, NULL, 32, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1), CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT), 1);
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 2, NULL, 32, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1)), 2);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// FIXME: all following tests work as expected but most error messages are missing
+	// check activate by keyring works exactly same as by passphrase
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_keyring(cd, NULL, KEY_DESC_TEST0, 0, 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_keyring(cd, CDEVICE_1, KEY_DESC_TEST0, 0, 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_keyring(cd, CDEVICE_1, KEY_DESC_TEST0, 0, 0), "already open");
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_INACTIVE);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_keyring(cd, NULL, KEY_DESC_TEST1, 1, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY), 1);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_keyring(cd, NULL, KEY_DESC_TEST1, 2, 0), 2);
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_keyring(cd, CDEVICE_1, KEY_DESC_TEST1, 1, 0), "Keyslot not assigned to volume");
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_keyring(cd, CDEVICE_1, KEY_DESC_TEST1, 2, 0), 2);
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_keyring(cd, CDEVICE_1, KEY_DESC_TEST1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, 0), 2);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_keyring(cd, NULL, KEY_DESC_TEST0, 2, 0), "Failed to unclock keyslot");
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_keyring(cd, NULL, KEY_DESC_TEST1, 0, 0), "Failed to unclock keyslot");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	if (keyctl_unlink(kid, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING)) {
+		printf("Test or kernel keyring are broken.\n");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	if (keyctl_unlink(kid1, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING)) {
+		printf("Test or kernel keyring are broken.\n");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_keyring(cd, NULL, KEY_DESC_TEST0, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, 0), "no such key in keyring");
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_keyring(cd, CDEVICE_1, KEY_DESC_TEST0, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, 0), "no such key in keyring");
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_keyring(cd, CDEVICE_1, KEY_DESC_TEST1, 2, 0), "no such key in keyring");
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_keyring(cd, NULL, KEY_DESC_TEST1, 1, 0), "no such key in keyring");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	_cleanup_dmdevices();
+#else
+	printf("WARNING: cryptsetup compiled with kernel keyring service disabled, skipping test.\n");
+#endif
+}
+
+static void Luks2Requirements(void)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	char key[128];
+	size_t key_size = 128;
+	const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf;
+#ifdef KERNEL_KEYRING
+	key_serial_t kid;
+#endif
+	uint32_t flags;
+	uint64_t dummy, r_payload_offset;
+	struct crypt_active_device cad;
+
+	const char *token, *json = "{\"type\":\"test_token\",\"keyslots\":[]}";
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_type argon2 = {
+		.type = CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2I,
+		.hash = DEFAULT_LUKS1_HASH,
+		.time_ms = 6,
+		.max_memory_kb = 1024,
+		.parallel_threads = 1
+	}, pbkdf2 = {
+		.type = CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2,
+		.hash = DEFAULT_LUKS1_HASH,
+		.time_ms = 9
+	};
+	struct crypt_token_params_luks2_keyring params_get, params = {
+		.key_description = KEY_DESC_TEST0
+	};
+
+	OK_(prepare_keyfile(KEYFILE1, "aaa", 3));
+	OK_(prepare_keyfile(KEYFILE2, "xxx", 3));
+
+	/* crypt_load (unrestricted) */
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_5));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_5));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+
+	/* crypt_dump (unrestricted) */
+	reset_log();
+	OK_(crypt_dump(cd));
+	OK_(!(global_lines != 0));
+	reset_log();
+
+	/* get & set pbkdf params (unrestricted) */
+	if (!_fips_mode) {
+		OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &argon2));
+		NOTNULL_(crypt_get_pbkdf_type(cd));
+	}
+
+	OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &pbkdf2));
+	NOTNULL_(crypt_get_pbkdf_type(cd));
+
+	/* crypt_set_iteration_time (unrestricted) */
+	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 1);
+	pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf_type(cd);
+	NOTNULL_(pbkdf);
+	EQ_(pbkdf->time_ms, 1);
+
+	/* crypt_convert (restricted) */
+	FAIL_((r = crypt_convert(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL)), "Unmet requirements detected");
+	EQ_(r, -ETXTBSY);
+
+	/* crypt_set_uuid (restricted) */
+	FAIL_((r = crypt_set_uuid(cd, NULL)), "Unmet requirements detected");
+	EQ_(r, -ETXTBSY);
+
+	/* crypt_set_label (restricted) */
+	FAIL_((r = crypt_set_label(cd, "label", "subsystem")), "Unmet requirements detected");
+	EQ_(r, -ETXTBSY);
+
+	/* crypt_repair (with current repair capabilities it's unrestricted) */
+	OK_(crypt_repair(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+
+	/* crypt_keyslot_add_passphrase (restricted) */
+	FAIL_((r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, "aaa", 3, "bbb", 3)), "Unmet requirements detected");
+	EQ_(r, -ETXTBSY);
+
+	/* crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase (restricted) */
+	FAIL_((r = crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, 9, "aaa", 3, "bbb", 3)), "Unmet requirements detected");
+	EQ_(r, -ETXTBSY);
+
+	/* crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile (restricted) */
+	FAIL_((r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE1, 0, KEYFILE2, 0)), "Unmet requirements detected");
+	EQ_(r, -ETXTBSY);
+
+	/* crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_offset (restricted) */
+	FAIL_((r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_offset(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE1, 0, 0, KEYFILE2, 0, 0)), "Unmet requirements detected");
+	EQ_(r, -ETXTBSY);
+
+	/* crypt_volume_key_get (unrestricted, but see below) */
+	/* FIXME: FIPS requirement stop this, restructure the whole order of calls */
+	if (_fips_mode)
+		goto out;
+
+	OK_(crypt_volume_key_get(cd, 0, key, &key_size, "aaa", 3));
+
+	/* crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key (restricted) */
+	FAIL_((r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, key, key_size, "xxx", 3)), "Unmet requirements detected");
+	EQ_(r, -ETXTBSY);
+
+	/* crypt_keyslot_add_by_key (restricted) */
+	FAIL_((r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_key(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, NULL, key_size, "xxx", 3, CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT)), "Unmet requirements detected");
+	EQ_(r, -ETXTBSY);
+
+	/* crypt_keyslot_add_by_key (restricted) */
+	FAIL_((r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_key(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, key, key_size, "xxx", 3, 0)), "Unmet requirements detected");
+	EQ_(r, -ETXTBSY);
+
+	/* crypt_persistent_flasgs_set (restricted) */
+	FAIL_((r = crypt_persistent_flags_set(cd, CRYPT_FLAGS_ACTIVATION, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS)), "Unmet requirements detected");
+	EQ_(r, -ETXTBSY);
+
+	/* crypt_persistent_flasgs_get (unrestricted) */
+	OK_(crypt_persistent_flags_get(cd, CRYPT_FLAGS_REQUIREMENTS, &flags));
+	EQ_(flags, (uint32_t) CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_UNKNOWN);
+
+	/* crypt_activate_by_passphrase (restricted for activation only) */
+	FAIL_((r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, 0, "aaa", 3, 0)), "Unmet requirements detected");
+	EQ_(r, -ETXTBSY);
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, "aaa", 3, 0));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, "aaa", 3, t_dm_crypt_keyring_support() ? CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY : 0));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_INACTIVE);
+
+	/* crypt_activate_by_keyfile (restricted for activation only) */
+	FAIL_((r = crypt_activate_by_keyfile(cd, CDEVICE_1, 0, KEYFILE1, 0, 0)), "Unmet requirements detected");
+	EQ_(r, -ETXTBSY);
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_keyfile(cd, NULL, 0, KEYFILE1, 0, 0));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_keyfile(cd, NULL, 0, KEYFILE1, 0, t_dm_crypt_keyring_support() ? CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY : 0));
+
+	/* crypt_activate_by_volume_key (restricted for activation only) */
+	FAIL_((r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0)), "Unmet requirements detected");
+	EQ_(r, -ETXTBSY);
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, NULL, key, key_size, 0));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, NULL, key, key_size, t_dm_crypt_keyring_support() ? CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY : 0));
+
+#ifdef KERNEL_KEYRING
+	kid = add_key("user", KEY_DESC_TEST0, "aaa", 3, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING);
+	if (kid < 0) {
+		printf("Test or kernel keyring are broken.\n");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	/* crypt_activate_by_keyring (restricted for activation only) */
+	FAIL_((r = crypt_activate_by_keyring(cd, CDEVICE_1, KEY_DESC_TEST0, 0, 0)), "Unmet requirements detected");
+	EQ_(r, -ETXTBSY);
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_keyring(cd, NULL, KEY_DESC_TEST0, 0, 0));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_keyring(cd, NULL, KEY_DESC_TEST0, 0, t_dm_crypt_keyring_support() ? CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY : 0));
+#endif
+
+	/* crypt_volume_key_verify (unrestricted) */
+	OK_(crypt_volume_key_verify(cd, key, key_size));
+
+	/* crypt_get_cipher (unrestricted) */
+	OK_(strcmp(crypt_get_cipher(cd)?:"", "aes"));
+
+	/* crypt_get_cipher_mode (unrestricted) */
+	OK_(strcmp(crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd)?:"", "xts-plain64"));
+
+	/* crypt_get_uuid (unrestricted) */
+	NOTNULL_(crypt_get_uuid(cd));
+
+	/* crypt_get_device_name (unrestricted) */
+	NOTNULL_(crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+
+	/* crypt_get_data_offset (unrestricted) */
+	OK_(!crypt_get_data_offset(cd));
+
+	/* crypt_get_iv_offset (unrestricted, nothing to test) */
+
+	/* crypt_get_volume_key_size (unrestricted) */
+	EQ_(crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd), key_size);
+
+	/* crypt_keyslot_status (unrestricted) */
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_status(cd, 0), CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST);
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_status(cd, 1), CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE);
+
+	/* crypt_keyslot_get_priority (unrestricted) */
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_get_priority(cd, 0), CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_NORMAL);
+
+	/* crypt_keyslot_set_priority (restricted) */
+	FAIL_((r = crypt_keyslot_set_priority(cd, 0, CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_PREFER)), "Unmet requirements detected");
+	EQ_(r, -ETXTBSY);
+
+	/* crypt_keyslot_area (unrestricted) */
+	OK_(crypt_keyslot_area(cd, 0, &dummy, &dummy));
+	OK_(!dummy);
+
+	/* crypt_header_backup (unrestricted) */
+	remove(BACKUP_FILE);
+	OK_(crypt_header_backup(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, BACKUP_FILE));
+
+	/* crypt_header_restore (restricted, do not drop the test until we have safe option) */
+	FAIL_((r = crypt_header_restore(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, BACKUP_FILE)), "Unmet requirements detected");
+	EQ_(r, -ETXTBSY);
+	remove(BACKUP_FILE);
+
+	/* crypt_token_json_set (restricted) */
+	FAIL_((r = crypt_token_json_set(cd, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, json)), "Unmet requirements detected");
+	EQ_(r, -ETXTBSY);
+
+	/* crypt_token_json_get (unrestricted) */
+	OK_(crypt_token_json_get(cd, 0, &token));
+	NOTNULL_(strstr(token, "user_type"));
+
+	/* crypt_token_status (unrestricted) */
+	EQ_(crypt_token_status(cd, 0, &token), CRYPT_TOKEN_EXTERNAL_UNKNOWN);
+	OK_(strcmp(token, "user_type"));
+	EQ_(crypt_token_status(cd, 1, &token), CRYPT_TOKEN_INTERNAL);
+	OK_(strcmp(token, "luks2-keyring"));
+	EQ_(crypt_token_status(cd, 2, NULL), CRYPT_TOKEN_INACTIVE);
+	EQ_(crypt_token_status(cd, 6, &token), CRYPT_TOKEN_INTERNAL_UNKNOWN);
+
+	/* crypt_token_luks2_keyring_set (restricted) */
+	FAIL_((r = crypt_token_luks2_keyring_set(cd, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, &params)), "Unmet requirements detected");
+	EQ_(r, -ETXTBSY);
+
+	/* crypt_token_luks2_keyring_get (unrestricted) */
+	EQ_(crypt_token_luks2_keyring_get(cd, 1, &params_get), 1);
+	OK_(strcmp(params_get.key_description, KEY_DESC_TEST0));
+
+	/* crypt_token_assign_keyslot (unrestricted) */
+	FAIL_((r = crypt_token_assign_keyslot(cd, 0, 1)), "Unmet requirements detected");
+	EQ_(r, -ETXTBSY);
+
+	/* crypt_token_unassign_keyslot (unrestricted) */
+	FAIL_((r = crypt_token_unassign_keyslot(cd, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)), "Unmet requirements detected");
+	EQ_(r, -ETXTBSY);
+
+	/* crypt_activate_by_token (restricted for activation only) */
+#ifdef KERNEL_KEYRING
+	FAIL_((r = crypt_activate_by_token(cd, CDEVICE_1, 1, NULL, 0)), ""); // supposed to be silent
+	EQ_(r, -ETXTBSY);
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_token(cd, NULL, 1, NULL, 0));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_token(cd, NULL, 1, NULL, t_dm_crypt_keyring_support() ? CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY : 0));
+#endif
+	OK_(get_luks2_offsets(1, 8192, 0, NULL, &r_payload_offset));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_OK, r_payload_offset + 2));
+	//OK_(_system("dd if=" NO_REQS_LUKS2_HEADER " of=" NO_REQS_LUKS2_HEADER " bs=4096 2>/dev/null", 1));
+	OK_(_system("dd if=" NO_REQS_LUKS2_HEADER " of=" DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK " bs=1M count=4 oflag=direct 2>/dev/null", 1));
+
+	/* need to fake activated LUKSv2 device with requirements features */
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, 0, "aaa", 3, 0));
+	OK_(crypt_header_backup(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, BACKUP_FILE));
+	/* replace header with no requirements */
+	OK_(_system("dd if=" REQS_LUKS2_HEADER " of=" DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK " bs=1M count=4 oflag=direct 2>/dev/null", 1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	OK_(crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd, CDEVICE_1, DEVICE_5));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init_by_name(&cd, CDEVICE_1));
+
+	/* crypt_header_restore (restricted with confirmation required) */
+	/* allow force restore over device header w/ requirements */
+	OK_(crypt_header_restore(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, BACKUP_FILE));
+	remove(BACKUP_FILE);
+	OK_(_system("dd if=" REQS_LUKS2_HEADER " of=" DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK " bs=1M count=4 oflag=direct 2>/dev/null", 1));
+	OK_(crypt_header_backup(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, BACKUP_FILE)); /* create backup with requirements */
+
+	/* crypt_suspend (restricted) */
+	FAIL_((r = crypt_suspend(cd, CDEVICE_1)), "Unmet requirements detected");
+	EQ_(r, -ETXTBSY);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	/* replace header again to suspend the device */
+	OK_(_system("dd if=" NO_REQS_LUKS2_HEADER " of=" DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK " bs=1M count=4 oflag=direct 2>/dev/null", 1));
+	OK_(crypt_init_by_name(&cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_suspend(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+
+	/* crypt_header_restore (restricted, do not drop the test until we have safe option) */
+	/* refuse to overwrite header w/ backup including requirements */
+	FAIL_((r = crypt_header_restore(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, BACKUP_FILE)), "Unmet requirements detected");
+	EQ_(r, -ETXTBSY);
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	OK_(_system("dd if=" REQS_LUKS2_HEADER " of=" DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK " bs=1M count=4 oflag=direct 2>/dev/null", 1));
+	OK_(crypt_init_by_name(&cd, CDEVICE_1));
+
+	/* crypt_resume_by_passphrase (restricted) */
+	FAIL_((r = crypt_resume_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, 0, "aaa", 3)), "Unmet requirements detected");
+	EQ_(r, -ETXTBSY);
+
+	/* crypt_resume_by_keyfile (restricted) */
+	FAIL_((r = crypt_resume_by_keyfile(cd, CDEVICE_1, 0, KEYFILE1, 0)), "Unmet requirements detected");
+	EQ_(r, -ETXTBSY);
+
+	/* crypt_resume_by_keyfile_offset (restricted) */
+	FAIL_((r = crypt_resume_by_keyfile_offset(cd, CDEVICE_1, 0, KEYFILE1, 0, 0)), "Unmet requirements detected");
+	EQ_(r, -ETXTBSY);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	OK_(_system("dd if=" NO_REQS_LUKS2_HEADER " of=" DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK " bs=1M count=4 oflag=direct 2>/dev/null", 1));
+	OK_(crypt_init_by_name(&cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_resume_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, 0, "aaa", 3));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(_system("dd if=" REQS_LUKS2_HEADER " of=" DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK " bs=1M count=4 oflag=direct 2>/dev/null", 1));
+
+	OK_(crypt_init_by_name(&cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	/* load VK in keyring */
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 0, "aaa", 3, t_dm_crypt_keyring_support() ? CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY : 0));
+	/* crypt_resize (restricted) */
+	FAIL_((r = crypt_resize(cd, CDEVICE_1, 1)), "Unmet requirements detected");
+	EQ_(r, -ETXTBSY);
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+
+	/* crypt_get_active_device (unrestricted) */
+	OK_(crypt_get_active_device(cd, CDEVICE_1, &cad));
+#ifdef KERNEL_KEYRING
+	if (t_dm_crypt_keyring_support())
+		EQ_(cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY);
+#endif
+
+	/* crypt_deactivate (unrestricted) */
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+
+	/* crypt_token_is_assigned (unrestricted) */
+	OK_(crypt_token_is_assigned(cd, 1, 0));
+	OK_(crypt_token_is_assigned(cd, 6, 0));
+	EQ_(crypt_token_is_assigned(cd, 0, 0), -ENOENT);
+
+	/* crypt_keyslot_destroy (unrestricted) */
+	OK_(crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, 0));
+out:
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	_cleanup_dmdevices();
+}
+
+static void Luks2Integrity(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	struct crypt_params_integrity ip = {};
+	struct crypt_params_luks2 params = {
+		.sector_size = 512,
+		.integrity = "hmac(sha256)"
+	};
+	size_t key_size = 32 + 32;
+	const char *passphrase = "blabla";
+	const char *cipher = "aes";
+	const char *cipher_mode = "xts-random";
+	int ret;
+
+	// FIXME: This is just a stub
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_2));
+	ret = crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, key_size, &params);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		printf("WARNING: cannot format integrity device, skipping test.\n");
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 7, NULL, key_size, passphrase, strlen(passphrase)), 7);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_2, 7, passphrase, strlen(passphrase) ,0), 7);
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_2), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	OK_(crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd, CDEVICE_2, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_get_integrity_info(cd, &ip));
+	OK_(strcmp(cipher, crypt_get_cipher(cd)));
+	OK_(strcmp(cipher_mode, crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd)));
+	OK_(strcmp("hmac(sha256)", ip.integrity));
+	EQ_(32, ip.integrity_key_size);
+	EQ_(32+16, ip.tag_size);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_2));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_2));
+	FAIL_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, key_size - 32, &params), "Wrong key size.");
+	FAIL_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, "xts-plainx", NULL, NULL, key_size, &params), "Wrong cipher.");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+}
+
+static int set_fast_pbkdf(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_type pbkdf = {
+		.type = "argon2id",
+		.hash = "sha256",
+		.iterations = 4,
+		.max_memory_kb = 32,
+		.parallel_threads = 1,
+		.flags = CRYPT_PBKDF_NO_BENCHMARK
+	};
+
+	/* Cannot use Argon2 in FIPS */
+	if (_fips_mode) {
+		pbkdf.type = CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2;
+		pbkdf.parallel_threads = 0;
+		pbkdf.max_memory_kb = 0;
+		pbkdf.iterations = 1000;
+	}
+	return crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &pbkdf);
+}
+
+static int check_flag(uint32_t flags, uint32_t flag)
+{
+	return (flags & flag) ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+static void Luks2Refresh(void)
+{
+	uint64_t r_payload_offset;
+	struct crypt_device *cd1, *cd2;
+	char key[128], key1[128];
+	const char *cipher = "aes", *mode = "xts-plain64";
+	const char *mk_hex =  "bb21158c733229347bd4e681891e213d94c645be6a5b84818afe7a78a6de7a1a";
+	const char *mk_hex2 = "bb22158c733229347bd4e681891e213d94c685be6a5b84818afe7a78a6de7a1e";
+	size_t key_size = strlen(mk_hex) / 2;
+	struct crypt_params_luks2 params = {
+		.sector_size = 512,
+		.integrity = "aead"
+	};
+	struct crypt_active_device cad = {};
+
+	crypt_decode_key(key, mk_hex, key_size);
+	crypt_decode_key(key1, mk_hex2, key_size);
+
+	OK_(get_luks2_offsets(1, 0, 0, NULL, &r_payload_offset));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_OK, r_payload_offset + 1000));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_WRONG, r_payload_offset + 5000));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_1S, r_payload_offset + 1));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(H_DEVICE, r_payload_offset));
+
+	/* prepare test device */
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd1, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(set_fast_pbkdf(cd1));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd1, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, mode, NULL, key, 32, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, key, 32, "aaa", 3));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd1, CDEVICE_1, 0, "aaa", 3, 0));
+
+	/* check we can refresh significant flags */
+	if (t_dm_crypt_discard_support()) {
+		OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd1, CDEVICE_1, 0, "aaa", 3, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS));
+		OK_(crypt_get_active_device(cd1, CDEVICE_1, &cad));
+		OK_(check_flag(cad.flags, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS));
+		cad.flags = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (t_dm_crypt_cpu_switch_support()) {
+		OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd1, CDEVICE_1, 0, "aaa", 3, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT));
+		OK_(crypt_get_active_device(cd1, CDEVICE_1, &cad));
+		OK_(check_flag(cad.flags, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT));
+		cad.flags = 0;
+
+		OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd1, CDEVICE_1, 0, "aaa", 3, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS));
+		OK_(crypt_get_active_device(cd1, CDEVICE_1, &cad));
+		OK_(check_flag(cad.flags, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS));
+		cad.flags = 0;
+
+		OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd1, CDEVICE_1, 0, "aaa", 3, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS));
+		OK_(crypt_get_active_device(cd1, CDEVICE_1, &cad));
+		OK_(check_flag(cad.flags, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS));
+		cad.flags = 0;
+	}
+
+	OK_(crypt_volume_key_keyring(cd1, 0));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd1, CDEVICE_1, 0, "aaa", 3, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH));
+	OK_(crypt_get_active_device(cd1, CDEVICE_1, &cad));
+	FAIL_(check_flag(cad.flags, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY), "Unexpected flag raised.");
+	cad.flags = 0;
+
+#ifdef KERNEL_KEYRING
+	if (t_dm_crypt_keyring_support()) {
+		OK_(crypt_volume_key_keyring(cd1, 1));
+		OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd1, CDEVICE_1, 0, "aaa", 3, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH));
+		OK_(crypt_get_active_device(cd1, CDEVICE_1, &cad));
+		OK_(check_flag(cad.flags, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY));
+		cad.flags = 0;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/* multiple flags at once */
+	if (t_dm_crypt_discard_support() && t_dm_crypt_cpu_switch_support()) {
+		OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd1, CDEVICE_1, 0, "aaa", 3, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS));
+		OK_(crypt_get_active_device(cd1, CDEVICE_1, &cad));
+		OK_(check_flag(cad.flags, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS));
+		cad.flags = 0;
+	}
+
+	/* do not allow reactivation with read-only (and drop flag silently because activation behaves exactly same) */
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd1, CDEVICE_1, 0, "aaa", 3, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY));
+	OK_(crypt_get_active_device(cd1, CDEVICE_1, &cad));
+	FAIL_(check_flag(cad.flags, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY), "Reactivated with read-only flag.");
+	cad.flags = 0;
+
+	/* reload flag is dropped silently */
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd1, CDEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd1, CDEVICE_1, 0, "aaa", 3, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH));
+
+	/* check read-only flag is not lost after reload */
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd1, CDEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd1, CDEVICE_1, 0, "aaa", 3, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd1, CDEVICE_1, 0, "aaa", 3, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH));
+	OK_(crypt_get_active_device(cd1, CDEVICE_1, &cad));
+	OK_(check_flag(cad.flags, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY));
+	cad.flags = 0;
+
+	/* check LUKS2 with auth. enc. reload */
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd2, DMDIR L_DEVICE_WRONG));
+	if (!crypt_format(cd2, CRYPT_LUKS2, "aes", "gcm-random", crypt_get_uuid(cd1), key, 32, &params)) {
+		OK_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd2, 0, key, 32, "aaa", 3));
+		OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd2, CDEVICE_2, key, 32, 0));
+		OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd2, CDEVICE_2, key, 32, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL));
+		OK_(crypt_get_active_device(cd2, CDEVICE_2, &cad));
+		OK_(check_flag(cad.flags, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL));
+		cad.flags = 0;
+		OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd2, CDEVICE_2, key, 32, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS));
+		OK_(crypt_get_active_device(cd2, CDEVICE_2, &cad));
+		OK_(check_flag(cad.flags, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS));
+		cad.flags = 0;
+		OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd2, CDEVICE_2, 0, "aaa", 3, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH));
+		OK_(crypt_get_active_device(cd2, CDEVICE_2, &cad));
+		FAIL_(check_flag(cad.flags, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL), "");
+		FAIL_(check_flag(cad.flags, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS), "");
+		FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd2, CDEVICE_1, 0, "aaa", 3, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH), "Refreshed LUKS2 device with LUKS2/aead context");
+		OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd2, CDEVICE_2));
+	} else {
+		printf("WARNING: cannot format integrity device, skipping few reload tests.\n");
+	}
+	crypt_free(cd2);
+
+	/* Use LUKS1 context on LUKS2 device */
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd2, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd2, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, mode, crypt_get_uuid(cd1), key, 32, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd2, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, NULL, 32, "aaa", 3));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd2, CDEVICE_1, 0, "aaa", 3, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH), "Refreshed LUKS2 device with LUKS1 context");
+	crypt_free(cd2);
+
+	/* Use PLAIN context on LUKS2 device */
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd2, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd2, CRYPT_PLAIN, cipher, mode, NULL, key, 32, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd2, CDEVICE_2, key, key_size, 0));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd2, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH), "Refreshed LUKS2 device with PLAIN context");
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd2, CDEVICE_2));
+	crypt_free(cd2);
+
+	/* (snapshot-like case) */
+	/* try to refresh almost identical device (differs only in major:minor of data device) */
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd2, DMDIR L_DEVICE_WRONG));
+	OK_(set_fast_pbkdf(cd2));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd2, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, mode, crypt_get_uuid(cd1), key, 32, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd2, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, key, 32, "aaa", 3));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd2, CDEVICE_1, 0, "aaa", 3, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH), "Refreshed dm-crypt mapped over mismatching data device");
+
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd1, CDEVICE_1));
+
+	crypt_free(cd1);
+	crypt_free(cd2);
+
+	_cleanup_dmdevices();
+}
+
+static void Luks2Flags(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	uint32_t flags = 42;
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+
+	/* check library erase passed variable on success when no flags set */
+	OK_(crypt_persistent_flags_get(cd, CRYPT_FLAGS_ACTIVATION, &flags));
+	EQ_(flags, 0);
+
+	/* check set and get behave as expected */
+	flags = CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS;
+	OK_(crypt_persistent_flags_set(cd, CRYPT_FLAGS_ACTIVATION, flags));
+	flags = 0;
+	OK_(crypt_persistent_flags_get(cd, CRYPT_FLAGS_ACTIVATION, &flags));
+	EQ_(flags, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS);
+
+	flags = CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS;
+	OK_(crypt_persistent_flags_set(cd, CRYPT_FLAGS_ACTIVATION, flags));
+	flags = (uint32_t)~0;
+	OK_(crypt_persistent_flags_get(cd, CRYPT_FLAGS_ACTIVATION, &flags));
+	EQ_(flags,CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS);
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+}
+
+static void Luks2Repair(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	char rollback[256];
+
+	snprintf(rollback, sizeof(rollback),
+		 "dd if=" IMAGE_PV_LUKS2_SEC ".bcp of=%s bs=1M 2>/dev/null",
+		 DEVICE_6);
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_6));
+
+	FAIL_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL), "Ambiguous signature detected");
+	FAIL_(crypt_repair(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL), "Not a LUKS2 device");
+
+	/* check explicit LUKS2 repair works */
+	OK_(crypt_repair(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_6));
+
+	/* rollback */
+	OK_(_system(rollback, 1));
+	FAIL_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL), "Ambiguous signature detected");
+
+	/* check repair with type detection works */
+	OK_(crypt_repair(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	/* repeat with locking disabled (must not have any effect) */
+	OK_(_system(rollback, 1));
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_6));
+	OK_(crypt_metadata_locking(cd, 0));
+
+	FAIL_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL), "Ambiguous signature detected");
+	FAIL_(crypt_repair(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL), "Not a LUKS2 device");
+
+	/* check explicit LUKS2 repair works */
+	OK_(crypt_repair(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_6));
+
+	/* rollback */
+	OK_(_system(rollback, 1));
+	FAIL_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL), "Ambiguous signature detected");
+
+	/* check repair with type detection works */
+	OK_(crypt_repair(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+}
+
+static void int_handler(int sig __attribute__((__unused__)))
+{
+	_quit++;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+	struct sigaction sa = { .sa_handler = int_handler };
+	int i;
+
+	if (getuid() != 0) {
+		printf("You must be root to run this test.\n");
+		exit(77);
+	}
+
+	for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
+		if (!strcmp("-v", argv[i]) || !strcmp("--verbose", argv[i]))
+			_verbose = 1;
+		else if (!strcmp("--debug", argv[i]))
+			_debug = _verbose = 1;
+	}
+
+	/* Handle interrupt properly */
+	sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, NULL);
+	sigaction(SIGTERM, &sa, NULL);
+
+	register_cleanup(_cleanup);
+
+	_cleanup();
+	if (_setup())
+		goto out;
+
+	crypt_set_debug_level(_debug ? CRYPT_DEBUG_JSON : CRYPT_DEBUG_NONE);
+
+	RUN_(AddDeviceLuks2, "Format and use LUKS2 device");
+	RUN_(Luks2HeaderLoad, "LUKS2 header load");
+	RUN_(Luks2HeaderRestore, "LUKS2 header restore");
+	RUN_(Luks2HeaderBackup, "LUKS2 header backup");
+	RUN_(ResizeDeviceLuks2, "LUKS2 device resize tests");
+	RUN_(UseLuks2Device, "Use pre-formated LUKS2 device");
+	RUN_(SuspendDevice, "LUKS2 Suspend/Resume");
+	RUN_(UseTempVolumes, "Format and use temporary encrypted device");
+	RUN_(Tokens, "General tokens API");
+	RUN_(TokenActivationByKeyring, "Builtin kernel keyring token");
+	RUN_(LuksConvert, "LUKS1 <-> LUKS2 conversions");
+	RUN_(Pbkdf, "Default PBKDF manipulation routines");
+	RUN_(Luks2KeyslotParams, "Add a new keyslot with different encryption");
+	RUN_(Luks2KeyslotAdd, "Add a new keyslot by unused key");
+	RUN_(Luks2ActivateByKeyring, "LUKS2 activation by passphrase in keyring");
+	RUN_(Luks2Requirements, "LUKS2 requirements flags");
+	RUN_(Luks2Integrity, "LUKS2 with data integrity");
+	RUN_(Luks2Refresh, "Active device table refresh");
+	RUN_(Luks2Flags, "LUKS2 persistent flags");
+	RUN_(Luks2Repair, "LUKS2 repair"); // test disables metadata locking. Run always last!
+out:
+	_cleanup();
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/tests/api-test.c b/tests/api-test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e41e48e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/api-test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1917 @@
+/*
+ * cryptsetup library API check functions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Ondrej Kozina
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <inttypes.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include "api_test.h"
+#include "luks.h"
+#include "libcryptsetup.h"
+
+#define DMDIR "/dev/mapper/"
+
+#define DEVICE_1_UUID "28632274-8c8a-493f-835b-da802e1c576b"
+#define DEVICE_EMPTY_name "crypt_zero"
+#define DEVICE_EMPTY DMDIR DEVICE_EMPTY_name
+#define DEVICE_ERROR_name "crypt_error"
+#define DEVICE_ERROR DMDIR DEVICE_ERROR_name
+
+#define CDEVICE_1 "ctest1"
+#define CDEVICE_2 "ctest2"
+#define CDEVICE_WRONG "O_o"
+#define H_DEVICE "head_ok"
+#define H_DEVICE_WRONG "head_wr"
+#define L_DEVICE_1S "luks_onesec"
+#define L_DEVICE_0S "luks_zerosec"
+#define L_DEVICE_WRONG "luks_wr"
+#define L_DEVICE_OK "luks_ok"
+#define EVL_HEADER_1 "evil_hdr-luks_hdr_damage"
+#define EVL_HEADER_2 "evil_hdr-payload_overwrite"
+#define EVL_HEADER_3 "evil_hdr-stripes_payload_dmg"
+#define EVL_HEADER_4 "evil_hdr-small_luks_device"
+#define EVL_HEADER_5 "evil_hdr-keyslot_overlap"
+#define VALID_HEADER "valid_header_file"
+#define BACKUP_FILE "csetup_backup_file"
+#define IMAGE1 "compatimage.img"
+#define IMAGE_EMPTY "empty.img"
+
+#define KEYFILE1 "key1.file"
+#define KEY1 "compatkey"
+
+#define KEYFILE2 "key2.file"
+#define KEY2 "0123456789abcdef"
+
+#define PASSPHRASE "blabla"
+#define PASSPHRASE1 "albalb"
+
+#define DEVICE_TEST_UUID "12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789abc"
+
+#define DEVICE_WRONG "/dev/Ooo_"
+#define DEVICE_CHAR "/dev/zero"
+#define THE_LFILE_TEMPLATE "cryptsetup-tstlp.XXXXXX"
+
+#define LUKS_PHDR_SIZE_B 1024
+
+static int _fips_mode = 0;
+
+static char *DEVICE_1 = NULL;
+static char *DEVICE_2 = NULL;
+static char *DEVICE_3 = NULL;
+
+static char *tmp_file_1 = NULL;
+static char *test_loop_file = NULL;
+
+// Helpers
+
+static int get_luks_offsets(int metadata_device,
+			    size_t keylength,
+			    unsigned int alignpayload_sec,
+			    unsigned int alignoffset_sec,
+			    uint64_t *r_header_size,
+			    uint64_t *r_payload_offset)
+{
+	int i;
+	uint64_t current_sector;
+	uint32_t sectors_per_stripes_set;
+
+	if (!keylength) {
+		if (r_header_size)
+		    *r_header_size = 0;
+		if (r_payload_offset)
+		    *r_payload_offset = 0;
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	sectors_per_stripes_set = DIV_ROUND_UP(keylength*LUKS_STRIPES, SECTOR_SIZE);
+	current_sector = DIV_ROUND_UP_MODULO(DIV_ROUND_UP(LUKS_PHDR_SIZE_B, SECTOR_SIZE),
+			LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS / SECTOR_SIZE);
+	for (i=0; i < (LUKS_NUMKEYS - 1); i++)
+		current_sector = DIV_ROUND_UP_MODULO(current_sector + sectors_per_stripes_set,
+				LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS / SECTOR_SIZE);
+	if (r_header_size)
+		*r_header_size = current_sector + sectors_per_stripes_set;
+
+	current_sector = DIV_ROUND_UP_MODULO(current_sector + sectors_per_stripes_set,
+				LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS / SECTOR_SIZE);
+
+	if (r_payload_offset) {
+		if (metadata_device)
+			*r_payload_offset = alignpayload_sec;
+		else
+			*r_payload_offset = DIV_ROUND_UP_MODULO(current_sector, alignpayload_sec)
+				+ alignoffset_sec;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void _remove_keyfiles(void)
+{
+	remove(KEYFILE1);
+	remove(KEYFILE2);
+}
+
+#if HAVE_DECL_DM_TASK_RETRY_REMOVE
+#define DM_RETRY "--retry "
+#else
+#define DM_RETRY ""
+#endif
+
+static void _cleanup_dmdevices(void)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+
+	if (!stat(DMDIR H_DEVICE, &st))
+		_system("dmsetup remove " DM_RETRY H_DEVICE, 0);
+
+	if (!stat(DMDIR H_DEVICE_WRONG, &st))
+		_system("dmsetup remove " DM_RETRY H_DEVICE_WRONG, 0);
+
+	if (!stat(DMDIR L_DEVICE_0S, &st))
+		_system("dmsetup remove " DM_RETRY L_DEVICE_0S, 0);
+
+	if (!stat(DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S, &st))
+		_system("dmsetup remove " DM_RETRY L_DEVICE_1S, 0);
+
+	if (!stat(DMDIR L_DEVICE_WRONG, &st))
+		_system("dmsetup remove " DM_RETRY L_DEVICE_WRONG, 0);
+
+	if (!stat(DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK, &st))
+		_system("dmsetup remove " DM_RETRY L_DEVICE_OK, 0);
+
+	t_dev_offset = 0;
+}
+
+static void _cleanup(void)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+
+	//_system("udevadm settle", 0);
+
+	if (!stat(DMDIR CDEVICE_1, &st))
+		_system("dmsetup remove " DM_RETRY CDEVICE_1, 0);
+
+	if (!stat(DMDIR CDEVICE_2, &st))
+		_system("dmsetup remove " DM_RETRY CDEVICE_2, 0);
+
+	if (!stat(DEVICE_EMPTY, &st))
+		_system("dmsetup remove " DM_RETRY DEVICE_EMPTY_name, 0);
+
+	if (!stat(DEVICE_ERROR, &st))
+		_system("dmsetup remove " DM_RETRY DEVICE_ERROR_name, 0);
+
+	_cleanup_dmdevices();
+
+	if (loop_device(THE_LOOP_DEV))
+		loop_detach(THE_LOOP_DEV);
+
+	if (loop_device(DEVICE_1))
+		loop_detach(DEVICE_1);
+
+	if (loop_device(DEVICE_2))
+		loop_detach(DEVICE_2);
+
+	if (loop_device(DEVICE_3))
+		loop_detach(DEVICE_3);
+
+	_system("rm -f " IMAGE_EMPTY, 0);
+	_system("rm -f " IMAGE1, 0);
+
+	if (test_loop_file)
+		remove(test_loop_file);
+	if (tmp_file_1)
+		remove(tmp_file_1);
+
+	remove(EVL_HEADER_1);
+	remove(EVL_HEADER_2);
+	remove(EVL_HEADER_3);
+	remove(EVL_HEADER_4);
+	remove(EVL_HEADER_5);
+	remove(VALID_HEADER);
+	remove(BACKUP_FILE);
+
+	_remove_keyfiles();
+
+	free(tmp_file_1);
+	free(test_loop_file);
+	free(THE_LOOP_DEV);
+	free(DEVICE_1);
+	free(DEVICE_2);
+	free(DEVICE_3);
+}
+
+static int _setup(void)
+{
+	int fd, ro = 0;
+	char cmd[128];
+
+	test_loop_file = strdup(THE_LFILE_TEMPLATE);
+	if ((fd=mkstemp(test_loop_file)) == -1) {
+		printf("cannot create temporary file with template %s\n", test_loop_file);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	close(fd);
+	snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "dd if=/dev/zero of=%s bs=%d count=%d 2>/dev/null",
+		 test_loop_file, SECTOR_SIZE, TST_LOOP_FILE_SIZE);
+	if (_system(cmd, 1))
+		return 1;
+
+	fd = loop_attach(&THE_LOOP_DEV, test_loop_file, 0, 0, &ro);
+	close(fd);
+
+	tmp_file_1 = strdup(THE_LFILE_TEMPLATE);
+	if ((fd=mkstemp(tmp_file_1)) == -1) {
+		printf("cannot create temporary file with template %s\n", tmp_file_1);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	close(fd);
+	snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "dd if=/dev/zero of=%s bs=%d count=%d 2>/dev/null",
+		 tmp_file_1, SECTOR_SIZE, 10);
+	if (_system(cmd, 1))
+		return 1;
+
+	_system("dmsetup create " DEVICE_EMPTY_name " --table \"0 10000 zero\"", 1);
+	_system("dmsetup create " DEVICE_ERROR_name " --table \"0 10000 error\"", 1);
+
+	_system(" [ ! -e " IMAGE1 " ] && xz -dk " IMAGE1 ".xz", 1);
+	fd = loop_attach(&DEVICE_1, IMAGE1, 0, 0, &ro);
+	close(fd);
+
+	_system("dd if=/dev/zero of=" IMAGE_EMPTY " bs=1M count=10 2>/dev/null", 1);
+	fd = loop_attach(&DEVICE_2, IMAGE_EMPTY, 0, 0, &ro);
+	close(fd);
+
+	/* Keymaterial offset is less than 8 sectors */
+	_system(" [ ! -e " EVL_HEADER_1 " ] && xz -dk " EVL_HEADER_1 ".xz", 1);
+	/* keymaterial offset aims into payload area */
+	_system(" [ ! -e " EVL_HEADER_2 " ] && xz -dk " EVL_HEADER_2 ".xz", 1);
+	/* keymaterial offset is valid, number of stripes causes payload area to be overwritten */
+	_system(" [ ! -e " EVL_HEADER_3 " ] && xz -dk " EVL_HEADER_3 ".xz", 1);
+	/* luks device header for data and header on same device. payloadOffset is greater than
+	 * device size (crypt_load() test) */
+	_system(" [ ! -e " EVL_HEADER_4 " ] && xz -dk " EVL_HEADER_4 ".xz", 1);
+	 /* two keyslots with same offset (overlapping keyslots) */
+	_system(" [ ! -e " EVL_HEADER_5 " ] && xz -dk " EVL_HEADER_5 ".xz", 1);
+	/* valid header: payloadOffset=4096, key_size=32,
+	 * volume_key = bb21158c733229347bd4e681891e213d94c685be6a5b84818afe7a78a6de7a1a */
+	_system(" [ ! -e " VALID_HEADER " ] && xz -dk " VALID_HEADER ".xz", 1);
+
+	/* Prepare tcrypt images */
+	_system("tar xJf tcrypt-images.tar.xz 2>/dev/null", 1);
+
+	_system("modprobe dm-crypt", 0);
+	_system("modprobe dm-verity", 0);
+
+	_fips_mode = fips_mode();
+	if (_debug)
+		printf("FIPS MODE: %d\n", _fips_mode);
+
+	/* Use default log callback */
+	crypt_set_log_callback(NULL, &global_log_callback, NULL);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void AddDevicePlain(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	struct crypt_params_plain params = {
+		.hash = "sha1",
+		.skip = 0,
+		.offset = 0,
+		.size = 0
+	};
+	int fd;
+	char key[128], key2[128], path[128];
+
+	const char *passphrase = PASSPHRASE;
+	// hashed hex version of PASSPHRASE
+	const char *mk_hex = "bb21158c733229347bd4e681891e213d94c685be6a5b84818afe7a78a6de7a1a";
+	size_t key_size = strlen(mk_hex) / 2;
+	const char *cipher = "aes";
+	const char *cipher_mode = "cbc-essiv:sha256";
+
+	uint64_t size, r_size;
+
+	crypt_decode_key(key, mk_hex, key_size);
+	FAIL_(crypt_init(&cd, ""), "empty device string");
+	FAIL_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_WRONG), "nonexistent device name ");
+	FAIL_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_CHAR), "character device as backing device");
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, tmp_file_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// test crypt_format, crypt_get_cipher, crypt_get_cipher_mode, crypt_get_volume_key_size
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd,DEVICE_1));
+	params.skip = 3;
+	params.offset = 42;
+	FAIL_(crypt_format(cd,CRYPT_PLAIN,NULL,cipher_mode,NULL,NULL,key_size,&params),"cipher param is null");
+	FAIL_(crypt_format(cd,CRYPT_PLAIN,cipher,NULL,NULL,NULL,key_size,&params),"cipher_mode param is null");
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd,CRYPT_PLAIN,cipher,cipher_mode,NULL,NULL,key_size,&params));
+	OK_(strcmp(cipher_mode,crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd)));
+	OK_(strcmp(cipher,crypt_get_cipher(cd)));
+	EQ_((int)key_size, crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd));
+	EQ_(params.skip, crypt_get_iv_offset(cd));
+	EQ_(params.offset, crypt_get_data_offset(cd));
+	params.skip = 0;
+	params.offset = 0;
+
+	// crypt_set_uuid()
+	FAIL_(crypt_set_uuid(cd,DEVICE_1_UUID),"can't set uuid to plain device");
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// default is "plain" hash - no password hash
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, key_size, NULL));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, NULL, key, key_size, 0), "cannot verify key with plain");
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// test boundaries in offset parameter
+	t_device_size(DEVICE_1,&size);
+	params.hash = NULL;
+	// zero sectors length
+	params.offset = size >> SECTOR_SHIFT;
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, key_size, &params));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd),params.offset);
+	// device size is 0 sectors
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, passphrase, strlen(passphrase), 0), "invalid device size (0 blocks)");
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_INACTIVE);
+	// data part of crypt device is of 1 sector size
+	params.offset = (size >> SECTOR_SHIFT) - 1;
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, key_size, &params));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, passphrase, strlen(passphrase), 0));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s", crypt_get_dir(), CDEVICE_1);
+	if (t_device_size(path, &r_size) >= 0)
+		EQ_(r_size>>SECTOR_SHIFT, 1);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// size > device_size
+	params.offset = 0;
+	params.size = (size >> SECTOR_SHIFT) + 1;
+	crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1);
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, key_size, &params));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, passphrase, strlen(passphrase), 0),"Device too small");
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_INACTIVE);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// offset == device_size (autodetect size)
+	params.offset = (size >> SECTOR_SHIFT);
+	params.size = 0;
+	crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1);
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, key_size, &params));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, passphrase, strlen(passphrase), 0),"Device too small");
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_INACTIVE);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// offset == device_size (user defined size)
+	params.offset = (size >> SECTOR_SHIFT);
+	params.size = 123;
+	crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1);
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, key_size, &params));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, passphrase, strlen(passphrase), 0),"Device too small");
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_INACTIVE);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// offset+size > device_size
+	params.offset = 42;
+	params.size = (size >> SECTOR_SHIFT) - params.offset + 1;
+	crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1);
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, key_size, &params));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, passphrase, strlen(passphrase), 0),"Offset and size are beyond device real size");
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_INACTIVE);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// offset+size == device_size
+	params.offset = 42;
+	params.size = (size >> SECTOR_SHIFT) - params.offset;
+	crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1);
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, key_size, &params));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, passphrase, strlen(passphrase), 0));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	if (!t_device_size(path, &r_size))
+		EQ_((r_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT),params.size);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd,CDEVICE_1));
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	params.hash = "sha1";
+	params.offset = 0;
+	params.size = 0;
+	params.skip = 0;
+
+	// Now use hashed password
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, key_size, &params));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, passphrase, strlen(passphrase), 0),
+	      "cannot verify passphrase with plain" );
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, passphrase, strlen(passphrase), 0));
+
+	// device status check
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s", crypt_get_dir(), CDEVICE_1);
+	fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_BUSY);
+	FAIL_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1), "Device is busy");
+	close(fd);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_INACTIVE);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// crypt_init_by_name_and_header
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd,DEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, key_size, &params));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// init with detached header is not supported
+	OK_(crypt_init_data_device(&cd, DEVICE_2, DEVICE_1));
+	FAIL_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, key_size, &params),
+	      "can't use plain with separate metadata device");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	FAIL_(crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd, CDEVICE_1, H_DEVICE),"can't init plain device by header device");
+	OK_(crypt_init_by_name(&cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	OK_(strcmp(cipher_mode,crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd)));
+	OK_(strcmp(cipher,crypt_get_cipher(cd)));
+	EQ_((int)key_size, crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd));
+	EQ_(params.skip, crypt_get_iv_offset(cd));
+	EQ_(params.offset, crypt_get_data_offset(cd));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd,DEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd,CRYPT_PLAIN,cipher,cipher_mode,NULL,NULL,key_size,&params));
+	params.size = 0;
+	params.offset = 0;
+
+	// crypt_set_data_device
+	FAIL_(crypt_set_data_device(cd,H_DEVICE),"can't set data device for plain device");
+	NULL_(crypt_get_metadata_device_name(cd));
+
+	// crypt_get_type
+	OK_(strcmp(crypt_get_type(cd),CRYPT_PLAIN));
+
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+
+	// crypt_resize()
+	OK_(crypt_resize(cd,CDEVICE_1,size>>SECTOR_SHIFT)); // same size
+	if (!t_device_size(path,&r_size))
+		EQ_(r_size, size);
+
+	// size overlaps
+	FAIL_(crypt_resize(cd, CDEVICE_1, (uint64_t)-1),"Backing device is too small");
+	FAIL_(crypt_resize(cd, CDEVICE_1, (size>>SECTOR_SHIFT)+1),"crypt device overlaps backing device");
+
+	// resize ok
+	OK_(crypt_resize(cd,CDEVICE_1, 123));
+	if (!t_device_size(path,&r_size))
+		EQ_(r_size>>SECTOR_SHIFT, 123);
+	OK_(crypt_resize(cd,CDEVICE_1,0)); // full size (autodetect)
+	if (!t_device_size(path,&r_size))
+		EQ_(r_size, size);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd,CDEVICE_1));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd,CDEVICE_1),CRYPT_INACTIVE);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// offset tests
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd,DEVICE_1));
+	params.offset = 42;
+	params.size = (size>>SECTOR_SHIFT) - params.offset - 10;
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd,CRYPT_PLAIN,cipher,cipher_mode,NULL,NULL,key_size,&params));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd,CDEVICE_1,key,key_size,0));
+	if (!t_device_size(path,&r_size))
+		EQ_(r_size>>SECTOR_SHIFT, params.size);
+	// resize to fill remaining capacity
+	OK_(crypt_resize(cd,CDEVICE_1,params.size + 10));
+	if (!t_device_size(path,&r_size))
+		EQ_(r_size>>SECTOR_SHIFT, params.size + 10);
+
+	// 1 sector beyond real size
+	FAIL_(crypt_resize(cd,CDEVICE_1,params.size + 11), "new device size overlaps backing device"); // with respect to offset
+	if (!t_device_size(path,&r_size))
+		EQ_(r_size>>SECTOR_SHIFT, params.size + 10);
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd,CDEVICE_1),CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
+	close(fd);
+	OK_(fd < 0);
+
+	// resize to minimal size
+	OK_(crypt_resize(cd,CDEVICE_1, 1)); // minimal device size
+	if (!t_device_size(path,&r_size))
+		EQ_(r_size>>SECTOR_SHIFT, 1);
+	// use size of backing device (autodetect with respect to offset)
+	OK_(crypt_resize(cd,CDEVICE_1,0));
+	if (!t_device_size(path,&r_size))
+		EQ_(r_size>>SECTOR_SHIFT, (size >> SECTOR_SHIFT)- 42);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd,CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	params.size = 0;
+	params.offset = 0;
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd,DEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd,CRYPT_PLAIN,cipher,cipher_mode,NULL,NULL,key_size,&params));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd,CDEVICE_1,key,key_size,0));
+
+	// suspend/resume tests
+	FAIL_(crypt_suspend(cd,CDEVICE_1),"cannot suspend plain device");
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	FAIL_(crypt_resume_by_passphrase(cd,CDEVICE_1,CRYPT_ANY_SLOT,passphrase, strlen(passphrase)),"cannot resume plain device");
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+
+	// retrieve volume key check
+	if (!_fips_mode) {
+		memset(key2, 0, key_size);
+		key_size--;
+		// small buffer
+		FAIL_(crypt_volume_key_get(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, key2, &key_size, passphrase, strlen(passphrase)), "small buffer");
+		key_size++;
+		OK_(crypt_volume_key_get(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, key2, &key_size, passphrase, strlen(passphrase)));
+
+		OK_(memcmp(key, key2, key_size));
+	}
+	OK_(strcmp(cipher, crypt_get_cipher(cd)));
+	OK_(strcmp(cipher_mode, crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd)));
+	EQ_((int)key_size, crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd));
+	EQ_(0, crypt_get_data_offset(cd));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+
+	// now with keyfile
+	OK_(prepare_keyfile(KEYFILE1, KEY1, strlen(KEY1)));
+	OK_(prepare_keyfile(KEYFILE2, KEY2, strlen(KEY2)));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_keyfile(cd, NULL, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE1, 0, 0), "cannot verify key with plain");
+	EQ_(0, crypt_activate_by_keyfile(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE1, 0, 0));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_keyfile_offset(cd, NULL, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE1, 0, strlen(KEY1) + 1, 0), "cannot seek");
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, NULL, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE1, 0, strlen(KEY1) + 1, 0), "cannot seek");
+	EQ_(0, crypt_activate_by_keyfile_offset(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE1, 0, 0, 0));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	EQ_(0, crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE1, 0, 0, 0));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	_remove_keyfiles();
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd,DEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd,CRYPT_PLAIN,cipher,cipher_mode,NULL,NULL,key_size,&params));
+
+	// crypt_keyslot_*()
+	FAIL_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase(cd,CRYPT_ANY_SLOT,passphrase,strlen(passphrase),passphrase,strlen(passphrase)), "can't add keyslot to plain device");
+	FAIL_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd,CRYPT_ANY_SLOT	,key,key_size,passphrase,strlen(passphrase)),"can't add keyslot to plain device");
+	FAIL_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile(cd,CRYPT_ANY_SLOT,KEYFILE1,strlen(KEY1),KEYFILE2,strlen(KEY2)),"can't add keyslot to plain device");
+	FAIL_(crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd,1),"can't manipulate keyslots on plain device");
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_status(cd, 0), CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID);
+	_remove_keyfiles();
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+}
+
+static int new_messages = 0;
+static void new_log(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr)
+{
+	if (level == CRYPT_LOG_ERROR)
+		new_messages++;
+	global_log_callback(level, msg, usrptr);
+}
+
+static void CallbacksTest(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	struct crypt_params_plain params = {
+		.hash = "sha1",
+		.skip = 0,
+		.offset = 0,
+	};
+
+	size_t key_size = 256 / 8;
+	const char *cipher = "aes";
+	const char *cipher_mode = "cbc-essiv:sha256";
+	const char *passphrase = PASSPHRASE;
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1));
+	new_messages = 0;
+	crypt_set_log_callback(cd, &new_log, NULL);
+	EQ_(new_messages, 0);
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, key_size, &params));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, passphrase, strlen(passphrase), 0));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	EQ_(new_messages, 0);
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, passphrase, strlen(passphrase), 0), "already exists");
+	EQ_(new_messages, 1);
+	crypt_set_log_callback(cd, NULL, NULL);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+}
+
+static void UseLuksDevice(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	char key[128];
+	size_t key_size;
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_INACTIVE);
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEY1, strlen(KEY1), 0));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEY1, strlen(KEY1), 0));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEY1, strlen(KEY1), 0), "already open");
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	FAIL_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1), "no such device");
+
+	key_size = 16;
+	OK_(strcmp("aes", crypt_get_cipher(cd)));
+	OK_(strcmp("cbc-essiv:sha256", crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd)));
+	OK_(strcmp(DEVICE_1_UUID, crypt_get_uuid(cd)));
+	EQ_((int)key_size, crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd));
+	EQ_(1032, crypt_get_data_offset(cd));
+
+	if (!_fips_mode) {
+		EQ_(0, crypt_volume_key_get(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, key, &key_size, KEY1, strlen(KEY1)));
+		OK_(crypt_volume_key_verify(cd, key, key_size));
+		OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, NULL, key, key_size, 0));
+		OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0));
+		EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+		OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+
+		key[1] = ~key[1];
+		FAIL_(crypt_volume_key_verify(cd, key, key_size), "key mismatch");
+		FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0), "key mismatch");
+	}
+	crypt_free(cd);
+}
+
+static void SuspendDevice(void)
+{
+	int suspend_status;
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEY1, strlen(KEY1), 0));
+
+	suspend_status = crypt_suspend(cd, CDEVICE_1);
+	if (suspend_status == -ENOTSUP) {
+		printf("WARNING: Suspend/Resume not supported, skipping test.\n");
+		OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	OK_(suspend_status);
+	FAIL_(crypt_suspend(cd, CDEVICE_1), "already suspended");
+
+	FAIL_(crypt_resume_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEY1, strlen(KEY1)-1), "wrong key");
+	OK_(crypt_resume_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEY1, strlen(KEY1)));
+	FAIL_(crypt_resume_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEY1, strlen(KEY1)), "not suspended");
+
+	OK_(prepare_keyfile(KEYFILE1, KEY1, strlen(KEY1)));
+	OK_(crypt_suspend(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	FAIL_(crypt_resume_by_keyfile(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE1 "blah", 0), "wrong keyfile");
+	FAIL_(crypt_resume_by_keyfile_offset(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE1, 1, 0), "wrong key");
+	FAIL_(crypt_resume_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE1, 1, 0), "wrong key");
+	OK_(crypt_resume_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE1, 0, 0));
+	FAIL_(crypt_resume_by_keyfile(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE1, 0), "not suspended");
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	/* create LUKS device with detached header */
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_set_data_device(cd, DEVICE_2));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEY1, strlen(KEY1), 0));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	/* Should be able to suspend but not resume if not header specified */
+	OK_(crypt_init_by_name(&cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_suspend(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	FAIL_(crypt_suspend(cd, CDEVICE_1), "already suspended");
+	FAIL_(crypt_resume_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEY1, strlen(KEY1)-1), "no header");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	OK_(crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd, CDEVICE_1, DEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_resume_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEY1, strlen(KEY1)));
+
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	_remove_keyfiles();
+}
+
+static void AddDeviceLuks(void)
+{
+	enum { OFFSET_1M = 2048 , OFFSET_2M = 4096, OFFSET_4M = 8192, OFFSET_8M = 16384 };
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	struct crypt_params_luks1 params = {
+		.hash = "sha512",
+		.data_alignment = OFFSET_1M, // 4M, data offset will be 4096
+		.data_device = DEVICE_2
+	};
+	char key[128], key2[128], key3[128];
+
+	const char *passphrase = "blabla", *passphrase2 = "nsdkFI&Y#.sd";
+	const char *mk_hex = "bb21158c733229347bd4e681891e213d94c685be6a5b84818afe7a78a6de7a1a";
+	const char *mk_hex2 = "bb21158c733229347bd4e681891e213d94c685be6a5b84818afe7a78a6de7a1e";
+	size_t key_size = strlen(mk_hex) / 2;
+	const char *cipher = "aes";
+	const char *cipher_mode = "cbc-essiv:sha256";
+	uint64_t r_payload_offset, r_header_size, r_size_1;
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_type pbkdf;
+
+	crypt_decode_key(key, mk_hex, key_size);
+	crypt_decode_key(key3, mk_hex2, key_size);
+
+	// init test devices
+	OK_(get_luks_offsets(1, key_size, 0, 0, &r_header_size, &r_payload_offset));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(H_DEVICE, r_header_size));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(H_DEVICE_WRONG, r_header_size - 1));
+
+	// format
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR H_DEVICE_WRONG));
+	params.data_alignment = 0;
+	FAIL_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params), "Not enough space for keyslots material");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// test payload_offset = 0 for encrypted device with external header device
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR H_DEVICE));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), 0);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	params.data_alignment = 0;
+	params.data_device = NULL;
+
+	// test payload_offset = 0. format() should look up alignment offset from device topology
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_2));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	OK_(!(crypt_get_data_offset(cd) > 0));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// set_data_offset has priority, alignment must be 0 or must be compatible
+	params.data_alignment = 0;
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_2));
+	OK_(crypt_set_data_offset(cd, OFFSET_8M));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), OFFSET_8M);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// Load gets the value from metadata
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_2));
+	OK_(crypt_set_data_offset(cd, OFFSET_2M));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), OFFSET_8M);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	params.data_alignment = OFFSET_4M;
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_2));
+	FAIL_(crypt_set_data_offset(cd, OFFSET_2M + 1), "Not aligned to 4096"); // must be aligned to 4k
+	OK_(crypt_set_data_offset(cd, OFFSET_2M));
+	FAIL_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params), "Alignment not compatible");
+	OK_(crypt_set_data_offset(cd, OFFSET_4M));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), OFFSET_4M);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	/*
+	 * test limit values for backing device size
+	 */
+	params.data_alignment = OFFSET_2M;
+	OK_(get_luks_offsets(0, key_size, params.data_alignment, 0, NULL, &r_payload_offset));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_0S, r_payload_offset));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_1S, r_payload_offset + 1));
+	//OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_WRONG, r_payload_offset - 1));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_WRONG, 2050 - 1)); //FIXME last keyslot - 1 sector
+
+	// 1 sector less than required
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_WRONG));
+	FAIL_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params),	"Device too small");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// 0 sectors for encrypted area
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_0S));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0), "Encrypted area too small");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// 1 sector for encrypted area
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	EQ_(crypt_get_data_offset(cd), params.data_alignment);
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(t_device_size(DMDIR CDEVICE_1, &r_size_1));
+	EQ_(r_size_1, SECTOR_SIZE);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_INACTIVE);
+	// restrict format only to empty context
+	FAIL_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params), "Context is already formatted");
+	FAIL_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, NULL), "Context is already formatted");
+	// change data device to wrong one
+	OK_(crypt_set_data_device(cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_0S));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0), "Device too small");
+	OK_(crypt_set_data_device(cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	params.data_alignment = 0;
+	params.data_device = DEVICE_2;
+
+	// generate keyslot material at the end of luks header
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR H_DEVICE));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 7, key, key_size, passphrase, strlen(passphrase)), 7);
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, 7, passphrase, strlen(passphrase) ,0), 7);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd, CDEVICE_1, DMDIR H_DEVICE));
+	FAIL_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params), "Context is already formatted");
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	// check active status without header
+	OK_(crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd, CDEVICE_1, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	NULL_(crypt_get_type(cd));
+	OK_(strcmp(cipher, crypt_get_cipher(cd)));
+	OK_(strcmp(cipher_mode, crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd)));
+	EQ_((int)key_size, crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	params.data_alignment = OFFSET_1M;
+	params.data_device = NULL;
+
+	// test uuid mismatch and _init_by_name_and_header
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_1S));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	params.data_alignment = 0;
+	params.data_device = DEVICE_2;
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR H_DEVICE));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	// there we've got uuid mismatch
+	OK_(crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd, CDEVICE_1, DMDIR H_DEVICE));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	NULL_(crypt_get_type(cd));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0), "Device is active");
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_2, key, key_size, 0), "Device is active");
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_2), CRYPT_INACTIVE);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	params.data_device = NULL;
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_2));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+
+	// even with no keyslots defined it can be activated by volume key
+	OK_(crypt_volume_key_verify(cd, key, key_size));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_2, key, key_size, 0));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_2), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_2));
+
+	// now with keyslot
+	EQ_(7, crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 7, key, key_size, passphrase, strlen(passphrase)));
+	EQ_(CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST, crypt_keyslot_status(cd, 7));
+	EQ_(7, crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_2, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, passphrase, strlen(passphrase), 0));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_2), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_2));
+
+	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 1);
+	EQ_(1, crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 1, key, key_size, KEY1, strlen(KEY1)));
+
+	// PBKDF info (in LUKS1 slots are ther same)
+	FAIL_(crypt_keyslot_get_pbkdf(cd, 1, NULL), "PBKDF struct required");
+	OK_(crypt_keyslot_get_pbkdf(cd, 1, &pbkdf));
+	OK_(strcmp(pbkdf.type, CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2));
+	OK_(strcmp(pbkdf.hash, params.hash));
+	EQ_(1000, pbkdf.iterations); /* set by minimum iterations above */
+	EQ_(0, pbkdf.max_memory_kb);
+	EQ_(0, pbkdf.parallel_threads);
+
+	OK_(prepare_keyfile(KEYFILE1, KEY1, strlen(KEY1)));
+	OK_(prepare_keyfile(KEYFILE2, KEY2, strlen(KEY2)));
+	EQ_(2, crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile(cd, 2, KEYFILE1, 0, KEYFILE2, 0));
+	FAIL_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_offset(cd, 3, KEYFILE1, 0, 1, KEYFILE2, 0, 1), "wrong key");
+	EQ_(3, crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_offset(cd, 3, KEYFILE1, 0, 0, KEYFILE2, 0, 1));
+	EQ_(4, crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_offset(cd, 4, KEYFILE2, 0, 1, KEYFILE1, 0, 1));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_keyfile(cd, CDEVICE_2, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE2, strlen(KEY2)-1, 0), "key mismatch");
+	EQ_(2, crypt_activate_by_keyfile(cd, NULL, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE2, 0, 0));
+	EQ_(3, crypt_activate_by_keyfile_offset(cd, NULL, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE2, 0, 1, 0));
+	EQ_(4, crypt_activate_by_keyfile_offset(cd, NULL, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE1, 0, 1, 0));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_keyfile_offset(cd, CDEVICE_2, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE2, strlen(KEY2), 2, 0), "not enough data");
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_keyfile_offset(cd, CDEVICE_2, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE2, 0, strlen(KEY2) + 1, 0), "cannot seek");
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_keyfile_offset(cd, CDEVICE_2, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE2, 0, 2, 0), "wrong key");
+	EQ_(2, crypt_activate_by_keyfile(cd, CDEVICE_2, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE2, 0, 0));
+	OK_(crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, 1));
+	OK_(crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, 2));
+	OK_(crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, 3));
+	OK_(crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, 4));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_2));
+	_remove_keyfiles();
+
+	FAIL_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 7, key, key_size, passphrase, strlen(passphrase)), "slot used");
+	key[1] = ~key[1];
+	FAIL_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 6, key, key_size, passphrase, strlen(passphrase)), "key mismatch");
+	key[1] = ~key[1];
+	EQ_(6, crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 6, key, key_size, passphrase, strlen(passphrase)));
+	EQ_(CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE, crypt_keyslot_status(cd, 6));
+
+	FAIL_(crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, 8), "invalid keyslot");
+	FAIL_(crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT), "invalid keyslot");
+	FAIL_(crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, 0), "keyslot not used");
+	OK_(crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, 7));
+	EQ_(CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE, crypt_keyslot_status(cd, 7));
+	EQ_(CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST, crypt_keyslot_status(cd, 6));
+
+	EQ_(7, crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase(cd, 6, 7, passphrase, strlen(passphrase), passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)));
+	EQ_(CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST, crypt_keyslot_status(cd, 7));
+	EQ_(7, crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, 7, passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2), 0));
+	EQ_(6, crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, 6, passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2), passphrase, strlen(passphrase)));
+
+	if (!_fips_mode) {
+		EQ_(6, crypt_volume_key_get(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, key2, &key_size, passphrase, strlen(passphrase)));
+		OK_(crypt_volume_key_verify(cd, key2, key_size));
+
+		OK_(memcmp(key, key2, key_size));
+	}
+	OK_(strcmp(cipher, crypt_get_cipher(cd)));
+	OK_(strcmp(cipher_mode, crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd)));
+	EQ_((int)key_size, crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd));
+	EQ_(OFFSET_2M, crypt_get_data_offset(cd));
+	OK_(strcmp(DEVICE_2, crypt_get_device_name(cd)));
+
+	reset_log();
+	OK_(crypt_dump(cd));
+	OK_(!(global_lines != 0));
+	reset_log();
+
+	FAIL_(crypt_set_uuid(cd, "blah"), "wrong UUID format");
+	OK_(crypt_set_uuid(cd, DEVICE_TEST_UUID));
+	OK_(strcmp(DEVICE_TEST_UUID, crypt_get_uuid(cd)));
+
+	FAIL_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_2), "not active");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	_cleanup_dmdevices();
+}
+
+static void UseTempVolumes(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	char tmp[256];
+
+	// Tepmporary device without keyslot but with on-disk LUKS header
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_2));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_2, NULL, 0, 0), "not yet formatted");
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, "aes", "cbc-essiv:sha256", NULL, NULL, 16, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_2, NULL, 0, 0));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_2), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	OK_(crypt_init_by_name(&cd, CDEVICE_2));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_2));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// Dirty checks: device without UUID
+	// we should be able to remove it but not manuipulate with it
+	snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "dmsetup create %s --table \""
+		"0 100 crypt aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 deadbabedeadbabedeadbabedeadbabe 0 "
+		"%s 2048\"", CDEVICE_2, DEVICE_2);
+	_system(tmp, 1);
+	OK_(crypt_init_by_name(&cd, CDEVICE_2));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_2));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_2, NULL, 0, 0), "No known device type");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// Dirty checks: device with UUID but LUKS header key fingerprint must fail)
+	snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "dmsetup create %s --table \""
+		"0 100 crypt aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 deadbabedeadbabedeadbabedeadbabe 0 "
+		"%s 2048\" -u CRYPT-LUKS1-aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa-ctest1",
+		 CDEVICE_2, DEVICE_2);
+	_system(tmp, 1);
+	OK_(crypt_init_by_name(&cd, CDEVICE_2));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_2));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_2, NULL, 0, 0), "wrong volume key");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// No slots
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_2));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_2, NULL, 0, 0), "volume key is lost");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// Plain device
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_2));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, "aes", "cbc-essiv:sha256", NULL, NULL, 16, NULL));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, NULL, "xxx", 3, 0), "cannot verify key with plain");
+	FAIL_(crypt_volume_key_verify(cd, "xxx", 3), "cannot verify key with plain");
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_2, "xxx", 3, 0), "wrong key length");
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_2, "volumekeyvolumek", 16, 0));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_2), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_2));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+}
+
+static void LuksHeaderRestore(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	struct crypt_params_luks1 params = {
+		.hash = "sha512",
+		.data_alignment = 2048, // 4M, data offset will be 4096
+	};
+	struct crypt_params_plain pl_params = {
+		.hash = "sha1",
+		.skip = 0,
+		.offset = 0,
+		.size = 0
+	};
+	char key[128], key2[128], cmd[256];
+
+	const char *mk_hex = "bb21158c733229347bd4e681891e213d94c685be6a5b84818afe7a78a6de7a1a";
+	size_t key_size = strlen(mk_hex) / 2;
+	const char *cipher = "aes";
+	const char *cipher_mode = "cbc-essiv:sha256";
+	uint64_t r_payload_offset;
+
+	crypt_decode_key(key, mk_hex, key_size);
+
+	OK_(get_luks_offsets(0, key_size, params.data_alignment, 0, NULL, &r_payload_offset));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_OK, r_payload_offset + 5000));
+
+	// do not restore header over plain device
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, key_size, &pl_params));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0));
+	FAIL_(crypt_header_restore(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, VALID_HEADER), "Cannot restore header to PLAIN type device");
+	FAIL_(crypt_header_restore(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, VALID_HEADER), "Cannot restore header over PLAIN type device");
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// invalid headers
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	FAIL_(crypt_header_restore(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, EVL_HEADER_1), "Header corrupted");
+	FAIL_(crypt_header_restore(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, EVL_HEADER_2), "Header corrupted");
+	FAIL_(crypt_header_restore(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, EVL_HEADER_3), "Header corrupted");
+	FAIL_(crypt_header_restore(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, EVL_HEADER_4), "Header too small");
+	FAIL_(crypt_header_restore(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, EVL_HEADER_5), "Header corrupted");
+	OK_(crypt_header_restore(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, VALID_HEADER));
+	// wipe valid luks header
+	snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "dd if=/dev/zero of=" DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK " bs=512 count=%" PRIu64 " 2>/dev/null", r_payload_offset);
+	OK_(_system(cmd, 1));
+	FAIL_(crypt_header_restore(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, EVL_HEADER_1), "Header corrupted");
+	FAIL_(crypt_header_restore(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, EVL_HEADER_2), "Header corrupted");
+	FAIL_(crypt_header_restore(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, EVL_HEADER_3), "Header corrupted");
+	FAIL_(crypt_header_restore(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, EVL_HEADER_4), "Header too small");
+	FAIL_(crypt_header_restore(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, EVL_HEADER_5), "Header corrupted");
+	OK_(crypt_header_restore(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, VALID_HEADER));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// volume key_size mismatch
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	memcpy(key2, key, key_size / 2);
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key2, key_size / 2, &params));
+	FAIL_(crypt_header_restore(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, VALID_HEADER), "Volume keysize mismatch");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// payload offset mismatch
+	params.data_alignment = 8192;
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	FAIL_(crypt_header_restore(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, VALID_HEADER), "Payload offset mismatch");
+	//_system("dmsetup table;sleep 1",1);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	/* check crypt_header_restore() properly loads crypt_device context */
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(crypt_wipe(cd, NULL, CRYPT_WIPE_ZERO, 0, 1*1024*1024, 1*1024*1024, 0, NULL, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_header_restore(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, VALID_HEADER));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, NULL, key, key_size, 0));
+	/* same test, any LUKS */
+	OK_(crypt_wipe(cd, NULL, CRYPT_WIPE_ZERO, 0, 1*1024*1024, 1*1024*1024, 0, NULL, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_header_restore(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, VALID_HEADER));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, NULL, key, key_size, 0));
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	_cleanup_dmdevices();
+}
+
+static void LuksHeaderLoad(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	struct crypt_params_luks1 params = {
+		.hash = "sha512",
+		.data_alignment = 2048,
+	};
+	struct crypt_params_plain pl_params = {
+		.hash = "sha1",
+		.skip = 0,
+		.offset = 0,
+		.size = 0
+	};
+	char key[128], cmd[256];
+
+	const char *mk_hex = "bb21158c733229347bd4e681891e213d94c685be6a5b84818afe7a78a6de7a1a";
+	size_t key_size = strlen(mk_hex) / 2;
+	const char *cipher = "aes";
+	const char *cipher_mode = "cbc-essiv:sha256";
+	uint64_t r_payload_offset, r_header_size;
+	uint64_t mdata_size, keyslots_size;
+
+	crypt_decode_key(key, mk_hex, key_size);
+
+	// prepare test env
+	OK_(get_luks_offsets(0, key_size, params.data_alignment, 0, &r_header_size, &r_payload_offset));
+	// external header device
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(H_DEVICE, r_header_size));
+	// prepared header on a device too small to contain header and payload
+	//OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(H_DEVICE_WRONG, r_payload_offset - 1));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(H_DEVICE_WRONG, 2050 - 1)); //FIXME
+	//snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "dd if=" EVL_HEADER_4 " of=" DMDIR H_DEVICE_WRONG " bs=512 count=%" PRIu64, r_payload_offset - 1);
+	snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "dd if=" EVL_HEADER_4 " of=" DMDIR H_DEVICE_WRONG " bs=512 count=%d 2>/dev/null", 2050 - 1);
+	OK_(_system(cmd, 1));
+	// some device
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_OK, r_payload_offset + 1000));
+	// 1 sector device
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_1S, r_payload_offset + 1));
+	// 0 sectors device for payload
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_0S, r_payload_offset));
+
+	// valid metadata and device size
+	params.data_alignment = 0;
+	params.data_device = DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK;
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR H_DEVICE));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR H_DEVICE));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_set_data_device(cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(!crypt_get_metadata_device_name(cd));
+	EQ_(strcmp(DMDIR H_DEVICE, crypt_get_metadata_device_name(cd)), 0);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// repeat with init with two devices
+	OK_(crypt_init_data_device(&cd, DMDIR H_DEVICE, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init_data_device(&cd, DMDIR H_DEVICE, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	OK_(!crypt_get_metadata_device_name(cd));
+	EQ_(strcmp(DMDIR H_DEVICE, crypt_get_metadata_device_name(cd)), 0);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// bad header: device too small (payloadOffset > device_size)
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR H_DEVICE_WRONG));
+	FAIL_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL), "Device too small");
+	NULL_(crypt_get_type(cd));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// 0 secs for encrypted data area
+	params.data_alignment = 2048;
+	params.data_device = NULL;
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_0S));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	FAIL_(crypt_set_metadata_size(cd, 0x004000, 0x004000), "Wrong context type");
+	OK_(crypt_get_metadata_size(cd, &mdata_size, &keyslots_size));
+	EQ_(mdata_size, LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS);
+	EQ_(keyslots_size, r_header_size * SECTOR_SIZE - mdata_size);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	// load should be ok
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_0S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0), "Device too small");
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_INACTIVE);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// damaged header
+	OK_(_system("dd if=/dev/zero of=" DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK " bs=512 count=8 2>/dev/null", 1));
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	FAIL_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL), "Header not found");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// plain device
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR H_DEVICE));
+	FAIL_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, NULL), "Can't load nonLUKS device type");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR H_DEVICE));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &pl_params));
+	FAIL_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL), "Can't load over nonLUKS device type");
+	FAIL_(crypt_set_metadata_size(cd, 0x004000, 0x004000), "Wrong context type");
+	FAIL_(crypt_get_metadata_size(cd, &mdata_size, &keyslots_size), "Wrong context type");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	/* check load sets proper device type */
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_0S));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL));
+	EQ_(strcmp(CRYPT_LUKS1, crypt_get_type(cd)), 0);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	_cleanup_dmdevices();
+}
+
+static void LuksHeaderBackup(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	struct crypt_params_luks1 params = {
+		.hash = "sha512",
+		.data_alignment = 2048,
+	};
+	char key[128];
+	int fd, ro = O_RDONLY;
+
+	const char *mk_hex = "bb21158c733229347bd4e681891e213d94c685be6a5b84818afe7a78a6de7a1a";
+	size_t key_size = strlen(mk_hex) / 2;
+	const char *cipher = "aes";
+	const char *cipher_mode = "cbc-essiv:sha256";
+	uint64_t r_payload_offset;
+
+	const char *passphrase = PASSPHRASE;
+
+	crypt_decode_key(key, mk_hex, key_size);
+
+	OK_(get_luks_offsets(0, key_size, params.data_alignment, 0, NULL, &r_payload_offset));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_OK, r_payload_offset + 1));
+
+	// create LUKS device and backup the header
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0));
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 7, key, key_size, passphrase, strlen(passphrase)), 7);
+	EQ_(crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 0, key, key_size, passphrase, strlen(passphrase)), 0);
+	OK_(crypt_header_backup(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, BACKUP_FILE));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// restore header from backup
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(crypt_header_restore(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, BACKUP_FILE));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// exercise luksOpen using backup header in file
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, BACKUP_FILE));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_set_data_device(cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, 0, passphrase, strlen(passphrase), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, BACKUP_FILE));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_set_data_device(cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, 7, passphrase, strlen(passphrase), 0), 7);
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// exercise luksOpen using backup header on block device
+	fd = loop_attach(&DEVICE_3, BACKUP_FILE, 0, 0, &ro);
+	close(fd);
+	OK_(fd < 0);
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_3));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_set_data_device(cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, 0, passphrase, strlen(passphrase), 0), 0);
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_3));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_set_data_device(cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	EQ_(crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, CDEVICE_1, 7, passphrase, strlen(passphrase), 0), 7);
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	_cleanup_dmdevices();
+}
+
+static void ResizeDeviceLuks(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd, *cd2;
+	struct crypt_params_luks1 params = {
+		.hash = "sha512",
+		.data_alignment = 2048,
+	};
+	char key[128];
+
+	const char *mk_hex = "bb21158c733229347bd4e681891e213d94c685be6a5b84818afe7a78a6de7a1a";
+	size_t key_size = strlen(mk_hex) / 2;
+	const char *cipher = "aes";
+	const char *cipher_mode = "cbc-essiv:sha256";
+	uint64_t r_payload_offset, r_header_size, r_size;
+
+	crypt_decode_key(key, mk_hex, key_size);
+
+	// prepare env
+	OK_(get_luks_offsets(0, key_size, params.data_alignment, 0, NULL, &r_payload_offset));
+	OK_(get_luks_offsets(1, key_size, 0, 0, &r_header_size, NULL));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(H_DEVICE, r_header_size));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_OK, r_payload_offset + 1000));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_0S, 1000));
+	OK_(create_dmdevice_over_loop(L_DEVICE_WRONG, r_payload_offset + 1000));
+
+	// test header and encrypted payload all in one device
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0));
+	OK_(crypt_resize(cd, CDEVICE_1, 42));
+	if (!t_device_size(DMDIR CDEVICE_1, &r_size))
+		EQ_(42, r_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT);
+	// autodetect encrypted device area size
+	OK_(crypt_resize(cd, CDEVICE_1, 0));
+	if (!t_device_size(DMDIR CDEVICE_1, &r_size))
+		EQ_(1000, r_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT);
+	FAIL_(crypt_resize(cd, CDEVICE_1, 1001), "Device too small");
+	if (!t_device_size(DMDIR CDEVICE_1, &r_size))
+		EQ_(1000, r_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT);
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	params.data_alignment = 0;
+	params.data_device = DMDIR L_DEVICE_0S;
+	// test case for external header
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR H_DEVICE));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0));
+	OK_(crypt_resize(cd, CDEVICE_1, 666));
+	if (!t_device_size(DMDIR CDEVICE_1, &r_size))
+		EQ_(666, r_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT);
+	// autodetect encrypted device size
+	OK_(crypt_resize(cd, CDEVICE_1, 0));
+	if (!t_device_size(DMDIR CDEVICE_1, &r_size))
+		EQ_(1000, r_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT);
+	FAIL_(crypt_resize(cd, CDEVICE_1, 1001), "Device too small");
+	if (!t_device_size(DMDIR CDEVICE_1, &r_size))
+		EQ_(1000, r_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT);
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, NULL, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, key, key_size, 0));
+
+	/* do not allow resize of other device */
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd2, DMDIR L_DEVICE_WRONG));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd2, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, crypt_get_uuid(cd), key, key_size, &params));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd2, CDEVICE_2, key, key_size, 0));
+	FAIL_(crypt_resize(cd2, CDEVICE_1, 1), "Device got resized by wrong device context.");
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd2, CDEVICE_2));
+	crypt_free(cd2);
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd2, DMDIR L_DEVICE_WRONG));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd2, CRYPT_PLAIN, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, NULL));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd2, CDEVICE_2, key, key_size, 0));
+	FAIL_(crypt_resize(cd2, CDEVICE_1, 1), "Device got resized by wrong device context.");
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd2, CDEVICE_2));
+	crypt_free(cd2);
+
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	_cleanup_dmdevices();
+}
+
+static void HashDevicePlain(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	struct crypt_params_plain params = {
+		.hash = NULL,
+		.skip = 0,
+		.offset = 0,
+	};
+
+	size_t key_size;
+	const char *mk_hex, *keystr;
+	char key[256];
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, "aes", "cbc-essiv:sha256", NULL, NULL, 16, &params));
+
+	// hash PLAIN, short key
+	OK_(prepare_keyfile(KEYFILE1, "tooshort", 8));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_keyfile(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE1, 16, 0), "not enough data in keyfile");
+	_remove_keyfiles();
+
+	// hash PLAIN, exact key
+	//         0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f
+	mk_hex = "caffeecaffeecaffeecaffeecaffee88";
+	key_size = 16;
+	crypt_decode_key(key, mk_hex, key_size);
+	OK_(prepare_keyfile(KEYFILE1, key, key_size));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_keyfile(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE1, key_size, 0));
+	OK_(get_key_dm(CDEVICE_1, key, sizeof(key)));
+	OK_(strcmp(key, mk_hex));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+
+	// Limit plain key
+	mk_hex = "caffeecaffeecaffeecaffeeca000000";
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_keyfile(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE1, key_size - 3, 0));
+	OK_(get_key_dm(CDEVICE_1, key, sizeof(key)));
+	OK_(strcmp(key, mk_hex));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+
+	_remove_keyfiles();
+
+	// hash PLAIN, long key
+	//         0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f
+	mk_hex = "caffeecaffeecaffeecaffeecaffee88babebabe";
+	key_size = 16;
+	crypt_decode_key(key, mk_hex, key_size);
+	OK_(prepare_keyfile(KEYFILE1, key, strlen(mk_hex) / 2));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_keyfile(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE1, key_size, 0));
+	OK_(get_key_dm(CDEVICE_1, key, sizeof(key)));
+	FAIL_(strcmp(key, mk_hex), "only key length used");
+	OK_(strncmp(key, mk_hex, key_size));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+
+	// Now without explicit limit
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_keyfile(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE1, 0, 0));
+	OK_(get_key_dm(CDEVICE_1, key, sizeof(key)));
+	FAIL_(strcmp(key, mk_hex), "only key length used");
+	OK_(strncmp(key, mk_hex, key_size));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	_remove_keyfiles();
+
+	// Handling of legacy "plain" hash (no hash)
+	params.hash = "plain";
+	//         0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f
+	mk_hex = "aabbcaffeecaffeecaffeecaffeecaff";
+	key_size = 16;
+	crypt_decode_key(key, mk_hex, key_size);
+	OK_(prepare_keyfile(KEYFILE1, key, strlen(mk_hex) / 2));
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, "aes", "cbc-essiv:sha256", NULL, NULL, 16, &params));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_keyfile(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE1, key_size, 0));
+	OK_(get_key_dm(CDEVICE_1, key, sizeof(key)));
+	OK_(strcmp(key, mk_hex));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	_remove_keyfiles();
+
+	// hash sha256
+	params.hash = "sha256";
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, "aes", "cbc-essiv:sha256", NULL, NULL, 16, &params));
+
+	//         0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f
+	mk_hex = "c62e4615bd39e222572f3a1bf7c2132e";
+	keystr = "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx";
+	key_size = strlen(keystr); // 32
+	OK_(prepare_keyfile(KEYFILE1, keystr, strlen(keystr)));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_keyfile(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE1, key_size, 0));
+	OK_(get_key_dm(CDEVICE_1, key, sizeof(key)));
+	OK_(strcmp(key, mk_hex));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+
+	// Read full keyfile
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_keyfile(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE1, 0, 0));
+	OK_(get_key_dm(CDEVICE_1, key, sizeof(key)));
+	OK_(strcmp(key, mk_hex));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+
+	_remove_keyfiles();
+
+	// Limit keyfile read
+	keystr = "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxAAAAAAAA";
+	OK_(prepare_keyfile(KEYFILE1, keystr, strlen(keystr)));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_keyfile(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE1, key_size, 0));
+	OK_(get_key_dm(CDEVICE_1, key, sizeof(key)));
+	OK_(strcmp(key, mk_hex));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+
+	// Full keyfile
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_keyfile(cd, CDEVICE_1, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, KEYFILE1, 0, 0));
+	OK_(get_key_dm(CDEVICE_1, key, sizeof(key)));
+	OK_(strcmp(key, "0e49cb34a1dee1df33f6505e4de44a66"));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+
+	_remove_keyfiles();
+
+	// FIXME: add keyfile="-" tests somehow
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+}
+
+static void VerityTest(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	const char *salt_hex =  "20c28ffc129c12360ba6ceea2b6cf04e89c2b41cfe6b8439eb53c1897f50df7b";
+	const char *root_hex =  "ab018b003a967fc782effb293b6dccb60b4f40c06bf80d16391acf686d28b5d6";
+	char salt[256], root_hash[256];
+	struct crypt_active_device cad;
+	struct crypt_params_verity params = {
+		.data_device = DEVICE_EMPTY,
+		.salt = salt,
+		.data_size = 0, /* whole device */
+		.hash_area_offset = 0,
+		.flags = CRYPT_VERITY_CREATE_HASH,
+	};
+
+	crypt_decode_key(salt, salt_hex, strlen(salt_hex) / 2);
+	crypt_decode_key(root_hash, root_hex, strlen(root_hex) / 2);
+
+	/* Format */
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_2));
+
+	/* block size */
+	params.data_block_size = 333;
+	FAIL_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_VERITY, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, &params),
+		"Unsupppored block size.");
+	params.data_block_size = 4096;
+	params.hash_block_size = 333;
+	FAIL_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_VERITY, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, &params),
+		"Unsupppored block size.");
+	params.hash_block_size = 4096;
+
+	/* salt size */
+	params.salt_size = 257;
+	FAIL_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_VERITY, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, &params),
+		"Too large salt.");
+	params.salt_size = 32;
+
+	/* hash_type */
+	params.hash_type = 3;
+	FAIL_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_VERITY, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, &params),
+		"Unsupported hash type.");
+	params.hash_type = 1;
+	params.hash_name = "blah";
+	FAIL_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_VERITY, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, &params),
+		"Unsupported hash name.");
+	params.hash_name = "sha256";
+
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_VERITY, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, &params));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	params.data_device = NULL;
+	OK_(crypt_init_data_device(&cd, DEVICE_2, DEVICE_EMPTY));
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_VERITY, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, &params));
+	EQ_(strcmp(DEVICE_2, crypt_get_metadata_device_name(cd)), 0);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	/* Verify */
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_2));
+	memset(&params, 0, sizeof(params));
+	params.data_device = DEVICE_EMPTY;
+	params.flags = CRYPT_VERITY_CHECK_HASH;
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_VERITY, &params));
+
+	/* check verity params */
+	EQ_(crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd), 32);
+	OK_(strcmp(CRYPT_VERITY, crypt_get_type(cd)));
+	memset(&params, 0, sizeof(params));
+	OK_(crypt_get_verity_info(cd, &params));
+	OK_(strcmp("sha256", params.hash_name));
+	EQ_(strlen(salt_hex) / 2, params.salt_size);
+	OK_(memcmp(salt, params.salt, params.salt_size));
+	EQ_(4096, params.data_block_size);
+	EQ_(4096, params.hash_block_size);
+	EQ_(1, params.hash_type);
+	EQ_(crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd), 32);
+
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, NULL, root_hash, 32, 0));
+	OK_(crypt_set_data_device(cd, DEVICE_1));
+	FAIL_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, NULL, root_hash, 32, 0), "Data corrupted");;
+
+	OK_(crypt_set_data_device(cd, DEVICE_EMPTY));
+	if (crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, root_hash, 32,
+	    CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY) == -ENOTSUP) {
+		printf("WARNING: kernel dm-verity not supported, skipping test.\n");
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return;
+	}
+	OK_(crypt_get_active_device(cd, CDEVICE_1, &cad));
+	EQ_(CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY, cad.flags);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	OK_(crypt_init_by_name(&cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+
+	/* hash fail */
+	root_hash[1] = ~root_hash[1];
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, root_hash, 32, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY));
+	/* Be sure there was some read activity to mark device corrupted. */
+	_system("blkid " DMDIR CDEVICE_1, 0);
+	OK_(crypt_get_active_device(cd, CDEVICE_1, &cad));
+	EQ_(CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY|CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CORRUPTED, cad.flags);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	root_hash[1] = ~root_hash[1];
+
+	/* data fail */
+	OK_(crypt_set_data_device(cd, DEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, root_hash, 32, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY));
+	_system("blkid " DMDIR CDEVICE_1, 0);
+	OK_(crypt_get_active_device(cd, CDEVICE_1, &cad));
+	EQ_(CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY|CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CORRUPTED, cad.flags);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+}
+
+static void TcryptTest(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+	struct crypt_active_device cad;
+	const char *passphrase = "aaaaaaaaaaaa";
+	const char *kf1 = "tcrypt-images/keyfile1";
+	const char *kf2 = "tcrypt-images/keyfile2";
+	const char *keyfiles[] = { kf1, kf2 };
+	struct crypt_params_tcrypt params = {
+		.passphrase = passphrase,
+		.passphrase_size = strlen(passphrase),
+		.keyfiles = keyfiles,
+		.keyfiles_count = 2,
+	};
+	double enc_mbr = 0, dec_mbr = 0;
+	const char *tcrypt_dev = "tcrypt-images/tck_5-sha512-xts-aes";
+	const char *tcrypt_dev2 = "tcrypt-images/tc_5-sha512-xts-serpent-twofish-aes";
+	size_t key_size = 64;
+	char key[key_size], key_def[key_size];
+	const char *key_hex =
+		"98dee64abe44bbf41d171c1f7b3e8eacda6d6b01f459097459a167f8c2872a96"
+		"3979531d1cdc18af62757cf22286f16f8583d848524f128d7594ac2082668c73";
+	int r;
+
+	crypt_decode_key(key_def, key_hex, strlen(key_hex) / 2);
+
+	// First ensure we can use af_alg skcipher interface
+	r = crypt_benchmark(NULL, "aes", "xts", 512, 16, 1024, &enc_mbr, &dec_mbr);
+	if (r == -ENOTSUP || r == -ENOENT) {
+		printf("WARNING: algif_skcipher interface not present, skipping test.\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, tcrypt_dev));
+	params.passphrase_size--;
+	FAIL_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_TCRYPT, &params), "Wrong passphrase");
+	params.passphrase_size++;
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_TCRYPT, &params));
+
+	// check params after load
+	OK_(strcmp("xts-plain64", crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd)));
+	OK_(strcmp("aes", crypt_get_cipher(cd)));
+	EQ_(key_size, crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd));
+	EQ_(256, crypt_get_iv_offset(cd));
+	EQ_(256, crypt_get_data_offset(cd));
+
+	memset(key, 0, key_size);
+	if (!_fips_mode) {
+		key_size--;
+		// small buffer
+		FAIL_(crypt_volume_key_get(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, key, &key_size, NULL, 0), "small buffer");
+		key_size++;
+		OK_(crypt_volume_key_get(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, key, &key_size, NULL, 0));
+		OK_(memcmp(key, key_def, key_size));
+	}
+
+	reset_log();
+	OK_(crypt_dump(cd));
+	OK_(!(global_lines != 0));
+	reset_log();
+
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, NULL, 0, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY));
+	NULL_(crypt_get_metadata_device_name(cd));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	OK_(crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd, CDEVICE_1, NULL));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+
+	FAIL_(crypt_volume_key_get(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, key, &key_size, NULL, 0), "Need crypt_load");
+
+	// check params after init_by_name
+	OK_(strcmp("xts-plain64", crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd)));
+	OK_(strcmp("aes", crypt_get_cipher(cd)));
+	EQ_(key_size, crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd));
+	EQ_(256, crypt_get_iv_offset(cd));
+	EQ_(256, crypt_get_data_offset(cd));
+
+	OK_(crypt_get_active_device(cd, CDEVICE_1, &cad));
+	EQ_(CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY, cad.flags);
+	EQ_(256, cad.offset);
+	EQ_(256, cad.iv_offset);
+	EQ_(72, cad.size);
+
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// init with detached header is not supported
+	OK_(crypt_init_data_device(&cd, tcrypt_dev2, DEVICE_2));
+	FAIL_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_TCRYPT, &params), "can't use tcrypt with separate metadata device");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// Following test uses non-FIPS algorithms in the cipher chain
+	if(_fips_mode)
+		return;
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, tcrypt_dev2));
+	params.keyfiles = NULL;
+	params.keyfiles_count = 0;
+	r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_TCRYPT, &params);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		printf("WARNING: cannot use non-AES encryption, skipping test.\n");
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return;
+	}
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, NULL, 0, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	// Deactivate the whole chain
+	EQ_(crypt_status(NULL, CDEVICE_1 "_1"), CRYPT_BUSY);
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(NULL, CDEVICE_1));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(NULL, CDEVICE_1 "_1"), CRYPT_INACTIVE);
+}
+
+static void IntegrityTest(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	struct crypt_params_integrity params = {
+		.tag_size = 4,
+		.integrity = "crc32c",
+		.sector_size = 4096,
+	}, ip = {};
+	int ret;
+
+	// FIXME: this should be more detailed
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd,DEVICE_1));
+	FAIL_(crypt_format(cd,CRYPT_INTEGRITY,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,0,NULL), "params field required");
+	ret = crypt_format(cd,CRYPT_INTEGRITY,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,0,&params);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		printf("WARNING: cannot format integrity device, skipping test.\n");
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return;
+	}
+	OK_(crypt_get_integrity_info(cd, &ip));
+	EQ_(ip.tag_size, params.tag_size);
+	EQ_(ip.sector_size, params.sector_size);
+	EQ_(crypt_get_sector_size(cd), params.sector_size);
+	EQ_(ip.interleave_sectors, params.interleave_sectors);
+	EQ_(ip.journal_size, params.journal_size);
+	EQ_(ip.journal_watermark, params.journal_watermark);
+	OK_(strcmp(ip.integrity,params.integrity));
+	FAIL_(crypt_set_uuid(cd,DEVICE_1_UUID),"can't set uuid to integrity device");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_INTEGRITY, NULL));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_1));
+	//params.tag_size = 8;
+	//FAIL_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_INTEGRITY, &params), "tag size mismatch");
+	params.tag_size = 4;
+	OK_(crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_INTEGRITY, &params));
+	OK_(crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, CDEVICE_1, NULL, 0, 0));
+	EQ_(crypt_status(cd, CDEVICE_1), CRYPT_ACTIVE);
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	memset(&ip, 0, sizeof(ip));
+	OK_(crypt_init_by_name(&cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	OK_(crypt_get_integrity_info(cd, &ip));
+	EQ_(ip.tag_size, params.tag_size);
+	OK_(strcmp(ip.integrity,params.integrity));
+	OK_(strcmp(CRYPT_INTEGRITY,crypt_get_type(cd)));
+	OK_(crypt_deactivate(cd, CDEVICE_1));
+	crypt_free(cd);
+}
+
+// Check that gcrypt is properly initialised in format
+static void NonFIPSAlg(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	struct crypt_params_luks1 params = {0};
+	char key[128] = "";
+	size_t key_size = 128 / 8;
+	const char *cipher = "aes";
+	const char *cipher_mode = "cbc-essiv:sha256";
+	int ret;
+
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_2));
+	params.hash = "sha256";
+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params));
+	FAIL_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params),
+	      "Already formatted.");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	params.hash = "whirlpool";
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_2));
+	ret = crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		printf("WARNING: whirlpool not supported, skipping test.\n");
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return;
+	}
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	params.hash = "md5";
+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DEVICE_2));
+	FAIL_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, &params),
+	      "MD5 unsupported, too short");
+	crypt_free(cd);
+}
+
+static void int_handler(int sig __attribute__((__unused__)))
+{
+	_quit++;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+	struct sigaction sa = { .sa_handler = int_handler };
+	int i;
+
+	if (getuid() != 0) {
+		printf("You must be root to run this test.\n");
+		exit(77);
+	}
+
+	for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
+		if (!strcmp("-v", argv[i]) || !strcmp("--verbose", argv[i]))
+			_verbose = 1;
+		else if (!strcmp("--debug", argv[i]))
+			_debug = _verbose = 1;
+	}
+
+	/* Handle interrupt properly */
+	sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, NULL);
+	sigaction(SIGTERM, &sa, NULL);
+
+	register_cleanup(_cleanup);
+
+	_cleanup();
+	if (_setup())
+		goto out;
+
+	crypt_set_debug_level(_debug ? CRYPT_DEBUG_ALL : CRYPT_DEBUG_NONE);
+
+	RUN_(NonFIPSAlg, "Crypto is properly initialised in format"); //must be the first!
+	RUN_(AddDevicePlain, "A plain device API creation");
+	RUN_(HashDevicePlain, "A plain device API hash");
+	RUN_(AddDeviceLuks, "Format and use LUKS device");
+	RUN_(LuksHeaderLoad, "Header load");
+	RUN_(LuksHeaderRestore, "LUKS header restore");
+	RUN_(LuksHeaderBackup, "LUKS header backup");
+	RUN_(ResizeDeviceLuks, "LUKS device resize");
+	RUN_(UseLuksDevice, "Use pre-formated LUKS device");
+	RUN_(SuspendDevice, "Suspend/Resume");
+	RUN_(UseTempVolumes, "Format and use temporary encrypted device");
+	RUN_(CallbacksTest, "API callbacks");
+	RUN_(VerityTest, "DM verity");
+	RUN_(TcryptTest, "Tcrypt API");
+	RUN_(IntegrityTest, "Integrity API");
+out:
+	_cleanup();
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/tests/api_test.h b/tests/api_test.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..21154dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/api_test.h
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+/*
+ * cryptsetup library API check functions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Ondrej Kozina
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef API_TEST_H
+#define API_TEST_H
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+extern char *THE_LOOP_DEV;
+extern int _debug;
+extern int global_lines;
+extern int _quit;
+extern int _verbose;
+extern uint64_t t_dev_offset;
+
+int t_device_size(const char *device, uint64_t *size);
+int t_dm_check_versions(void);
+int t_dm_crypt_keyring_support(void);
+int t_dm_crypt_cpu_switch_support(void);
+int t_dm_crypt_discard_support(void);
+
+int fips_mode(void);
+
+int create_dmdevice_over_loop(const char *dm_name, const uint64_t size);
+
+int get_key_dm(const char *name, char *buffer, unsigned int buffer_size);
+
+int prepare_keyfile(const char *name, const char *passphrase, int size);
+
+int crypt_decode_key(char *key, const char *hex, unsigned int size);
+
+void global_log_callback(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr);
+
+void reset_log(void);
+
+int _system(const char *command, int warn);
+
+void register_cleanup(void (*cleanup)(void));
+
+void check_ok(int status, int line, const char *func);
+void check_ko(int status, int line, const char *func);
+void check_equal(int line, const char *func, int64_t x, int64_t y);
+void check_null(int line, const char *func, const void *x);
+void check_notnull(int line, const char *func, const void *x);
+void xlog(const char *msg, const char *tst, const char *func, int line, const char *txt);
+
+/* crypt_device context must be "cd" to parse error properly here */
+#define OK_(x)		do { xlog("(success)", #x, __FUNCTION__, __LINE__, NULL); \
+			     check_ok((x), __LINE__, __FUNCTION__); \
+			} while(0)
+#define FAIL_(x, y)	do { xlog("(fail)   ", #x, __FUNCTION__, __LINE__, y); \
+			     check_ko((x), __LINE__, __FUNCTION__); \
+			} while(0)
+#define EQ_(x, y)	do { int64_t _x = (x), _y = (y); \
+			     xlog("(equal)  ", #x " == " #y, __FUNCTION__, __LINE__, NULL); \
+			     if (_x != _y) check_equal(__LINE__, __FUNCTION__, _x, _y); \
+			} while(0)
+#define NULL_(x)	do { xlog("(null)   ", #x, __FUNCTION__, __LINE__, NULL); \
+			     check_null(__LINE__, __FUNCTION__, (x)); \
+			} while(0)
+#define NOTNULL_(x)	do { xlog("(notnull)", #x, __FUNCTION__, __LINE__, NULL); \
+			     check_notnull(__LINE__, __FUNCTION__, (x)); \
+			} while(0)
+#define RUN_(x, y)	do { reset_log(); \
+			     printf("%s: %s\n", #x, (y)); x(); \
+			} while (0)
+
+#define SECTOR_SHIFT 9L
+#define SECTOR_SIZE 512
+#define TST_LOOP_FILE_SIZE (((1<<20)*100)>>SECTOR_SHIFT)
+#define DIV_ROUND_UP(n,d) (((n) + (d) - 1) / (d))
+#define DIV_ROUND_UP_MODULO(n,d) (DIV_ROUND_UP(n,d)*(d))
+
+/* Device mapper backend - kernel support flags */
+#define T_DM_KEY_WIPE_SUPPORTED (1 << 0)	/* key wipe message */
+#define T_DM_LMK_SUPPORTED      (1 << 1)	/* lmk mode */
+#define T_DM_SECURE_SUPPORTED   (1 << 2)	/* wipe (secure) buffer flag */
+#define T_DM_PLAIN64_SUPPORTED  (1 << 3)	/* plain64 IV */
+#define T_DM_DISCARDS_SUPPORTED (1 << 4)	/* discards/TRIM option is supported */
+#define T_DM_VERITY_SUPPORTED   (1 << 5)	/* dm-verity target supported */
+#define T_DM_TCW_SUPPORTED      (1 << 6)	/* tcw (TCRYPT CBC with whitening) */
+#define T_DM_SAME_CPU_CRYPT_SUPPORTED (1 << 7) /* same_cpu_crypt */
+#define T_DM_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS_SUPPORTED (1 << 8) /* submit_from_crypt_cpus */
+#define T_DM_VERITY_ON_CORRUPTION_SUPPORTED (1 << 9) /* ignore/restart_on_corruption, ignore_zero_block */
+#define T_DM_VERITY_FEC_SUPPORTED (1 << 10) /* Forward Error Correction (FEC) */
+#define T_DM_KERNEL_KEYRING_SUPPORTED (1 << 11) /* dm-crypt allows loading kernel keyring keys */
+#define T_DM_INTEGRITY_SUPPORTED (1 << 12) /* dm-integrity target supported */
+//FIXME add T_DM_SECTOR_SIZE once we have version
+
+/* loop helpers */
+int loop_device(const char *loop);
+int loop_attach(char **loop, const char *file, int offset,
+		      int autoclear, int *readonly);
+int loop_detach(const char *loop);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/tests/blkid-luks2-pv.img.xz b/tests/blkid-luks2-pv.img.xz
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c9d0e57
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/blkid-luks2-pv.img.xz
diff --git a/tests/blockwise-compat b/tests/blockwise-compat
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..c9b08b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/blockwise-compat
@@ -0,0 +1,375 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+# set _FORCE_LOCAL environment variable to run blockwise unit tests even on local
+# nfs. Some tests will fail because nfs is eager to write for example 4095 bytes
+# in O_DIRECT mode.
+
+BW_UNIT=./unit-utils-io
+STRACE=strace
+MNT_DIR=./mnt_bwunit
+LOCAL_FILE=./blockwise_localfile
+
+# $1 path to scsi debug bdev
+scsi_debug_teardown() {
+	local _tries=15;
+
+	while [ -b "$1" -a $_tries -gt 0 ]; do
+		rmmod scsi_debug 2> /dev/null
+		if [ -b "$1" ]; then
+			sleep .1
+			_tries=$((_tries-1))
+		fi
+	done
+
+	test ! -b "$1" || rmmod scsi_debug
+}
+
+cleanup() {
+	if [ -d "$MNT_DIR" ] ; then
+	    umount -f $MNT_DIR 2>/dev/null
+	    rmdir $MNT_DIR 2>/dev/null
+	fi
+	rm -f $LOCAL_FILE 2> /dev/null
+	scsi_debug_teardown "$DEV" || exit 100
+}
+
+fail()
+{
+	if [ -n "$1" ] ; then echo "FAIL $1" ; else echo "FAIL" ; fi
+	cleanup
+	exit 100
+}
+
+fail_count()
+{
+	echo "$MSG[FAIL]"
+	FAILS=$((FAILS+1))
+}
+
+warn_count()
+{
+	echo "$MSG[WARNING]"
+	WARNS=$((WARNS+1))
+}
+
+skip()
+{
+	echo "TEST SKIPPED: $1"
+	cleanup
+	exit 0
+}
+
+add_device() {
+	modprobe scsi_debug $@ delay=0
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ] ; then
+		echo "This kernel seems to not support proper scsi_debug module, test skipped."
+		exit 77
+	fi
+	DEV=$(grep -l -e scsi_debug /sys/block/*/device/model | cut -f4 -d /)
+	DEV="/dev/$DEV"
+	[ -b $DEV ] || fail "Cannot find $DEV."
+}
+
+falloc() {
+	dd if=/dev/zero of=$2 bs=1M count=$1 2> /dev/null
+}
+
+run_all_in_fs() {
+	for file in $(ls img_fs_*.img.xz) ; do
+	    echo "Run tests in $file put on top block device."
+	    xz -d -c $file | dd of=$DEV bs=1M 2>/dev/null || fail "bad image"
+	    [ ! -d $MNT_DIR ] && mkdir $MNT_DIR
+	    mount $DEV $MNT_DIR
+	    if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+	        echo "Mounting image $file failed, skipped."
+	        continue;
+	    fi
+	    rm -rf $MNT_DIR/* 2>/dev/null
+	    local tfile=$MNT_DIR/bwunit_tstfile
+	    falloc $DEVSIZEMB $tfile || fail "enospc?"
+	    local iobsize=$(stat -c "%o" $tfile)
+	    test -n "$iobsize" -a $iobsize -gt 0 || fail
+	    local oldbsize=$BSIZE
+	    BSIZE=$iobsize
+	    run_all $tfile
+	    BSIZE=$oldbsize
+	    umount $MNT_DIR
+	done
+}
+
+trunc_file() {
+	test $1 -eq 0 || truncate -c -s $1 $2 2>/dev/null || dd if=/dev/zero of=$2 bs=$1 count=1 2>/dev/null || fail "Failed to truncate test file $2."
+}
+
+RUN() {
+	local _res=$1
+	shift
+	local _dev=$1
+	shift
+	local _fn=$1
+	shift
+	local _type="bdev"
+	local _fsize=0
+
+	test -b $_dev || {
+		_type="file"
+		_fsize=$(stat -c "%s" $_dev)
+	}
+
+        case "$_res" in
+        P)
+		MSG="Testing $_fn on $_type with params $@ [expecting TRUE]..."
+		$BW_UNIT $_dev $_fn $@
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			if [ $_type = "file" ]; then
+				warn_count
+			else
+				fail_count
+			fi
+			trunc_file $_fsize $_dev
+			test -z "$STRACE" || $STRACE -o ./$BW_UNIT-fail-$FAILS-should-pass.log $BW_UNIT $_dev $_fn $@ 2> /dev/null
+		else
+			MSG="$MSG[OK]"
+		fi
+                ;;
+        F)
+		MSG="Testing $_fn on $_type with params $@ [expecting FALSE]..."
+		$BW_UNIT $_dev $_fn $@ 2> /dev/null
+		if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+			if [ $_type = "file" ]; then
+				warn_count
+			else
+				fail_count
+			fi
+			trunc_file $_fsize $_dev
+			test -z "$STRACE" || $STRACE -o ./$BW_UNIT-fail-$FAILS-should-fail.log $BW_UNIT $_dev $_fn $@ 2> /dev/null
+		else
+			MSG="$MSG[OK]"
+		fi
+                ;;
+        *)
+                fail "Internal test error"
+                ;;
+        esac
+
+	trunc_file $_fsize $_dev
+}
+
+run_all() {
+	if [ -b "$1" ]; then
+		BD_FAIL="F"
+	else
+		BD_FAIL="P"
+	fi
+
+	# buffer io support only blocksize aligned ios
+	# device/file fn_name length
+	RUN "P" $1 read_buffer $BSIZE
+	RUN "P" $1 read_buffer $((2*BSIZE))
+	RUN "F" $1 read_buffer $((BSIZE-1))
+	RUN "F" $1 read_buffer $((BSIZE+1))
+	RUN "P" $1 read_buffer 0
+
+	RUN "P" $1 write_buffer $BSIZE
+	RUN "P" $1 write_buffer $((2*BSIZE))
+
+	RUN "F" $1 write_buffer $((BSIZE-1))
+	RUN "F" $1 write_buffer $((BSIZE+1))
+	RUN "F" $1 write_buffer 0
+
+	# basic blockwise functions
+	# device/file fn_name length bsize
+	RUN "P" $1 read_blockwise 0 $BSIZE
+	RUN "P" $1 read_blockwise $((BSIZE)) $BSIZE
+	RUN "P" $1 read_blockwise $((BSIZE-1)) $BSIZE
+	RUN "P" $1 read_blockwise $((BSIZE+1)) $BSIZE
+	RUN "P" $1 read_blockwise $((DEVSIZE)) $BSIZE
+	RUN "P" $1 read_blockwise $((DEVSIZE-1)) $BSIZE
+	RUN "F" $1 read_blockwise $((DEVSIZE+1)) $BSIZE
+
+	RUN "P" $1 write_blockwise 0 $BSIZE
+	RUN "P" $1 write_blockwise $((BSIZE)) $BSIZE
+	RUN "P" $1 write_blockwise $((BSIZE-1)) $BSIZE
+	RUN "P" $1 write_blockwise $((BSIZE+1)) $BSIZE
+	RUN "P" $1 write_blockwise $((DEVSIZE)) $BSIZE
+	RUN "P" $1 write_blockwise $((DEVSIZE-1)) $BSIZE
+	RUN "$BD_FAIL" $1 write_blockwise $((DEVSIZE+1)) $BSIZE
+
+	# seek variant blockwise functions
+	# device/file fn_name length bsize offset
+	RUN "P" $1 read_lseek_blockwise 0 $BSIZE 0
+	RUN "P" $1 read_lseek_blockwise 0 $BSIZE 1
+	RUN "P" $1 read_lseek_blockwise 0 $BSIZE $((DEVSIZE))
+	# length = 0 is significant here
+	RUN "P" $1 read_lseek_blockwise 0 $BSIZE $((DEVSIZE+1))
+
+	# beginning of device
+	RUN "P" $1 read_lseek_blockwise 1 $BSIZE 0
+	RUN "P" $1 read_lseek_blockwise 1 $BSIZE 1
+	RUN "P" $1 read_lseek_blockwise 1 $BSIZE $((BSIZE-1))
+	RUN "P" $1 read_lseek_blockwise 1 $BSIZE $((BSIZE/2))
+
+	# somewhere in the 'middle'
+	RUN "P" $1 read_lseek_blockwise 1 $BSIZE $BSIZE
+	RUN "P" $1 read_lseek_blockwise 1 $BSIZE $((BSIZE+1))
+	RUN "P" $1 read_lseek_blockwise 1 $BSIZE $((2*BSIZE-1))
+	RUN "P" $1 read_lseek_blockwise 1 $BSIZE $((BSIZE+BSIZE/2-1))
+
+	# cross-sector tests
+	RUN "P" $1 read_lseek_blockwise 2 $BSIZE $((BSIZE-1))
+	RUN "P" $1 read_lseek_blockwise $((BSIZE+1)) $BSIZE $((BSIZE-1))
+	RUN "P" $1 read_lseek_blockwise $((BSIZE+2)) $BSIZE $((BSIZE-1))
+	RUN "P" $1 read_lseek_blockwise 2 $BSIZE $((2*BSIZE-1))
+	RUN "P" $1 read_lseek_blockwise $((BSIZE+1)) $BSIZE $((2*BSIZE-1))
+	RUN "P" $1 read_lseek_blockwise $((BSIZE+2)) $BSIZE $((2*BSIZE-1))
+
+	# including one whole sector
+	RUN "P" $1 read_lseek_blockwise $((BSIZE+2)) $BSIZE $((BSIZE))
+	RUN "P" $1 read_lseek_blockwise $((2*BSIZE)) $BSIZE $((BSIZE+1))
+	RUN "P" $1 read_lseek_blockwise $((2*BSIZE)) $BSIZE $((BSIZE-1))
+	RUN "P" $1 read_lseek_blockwise $((BSIZE+2)) $BSIZE $((BSIZE-1))
+	RUN "P" $1 read_lseek_blockwise $((2*BSIZE)) $BSIZE $((BSIZE+1))
+	RUN "P" $1 read_lseek_blockwise $((3*BSIZE-2)) $BSIZE $((BSIZE+1))
+
+	# hiting exactly the sector boundary
+	RUN "P" $1 read_lseek_blockwise $((BSIZE-1)) $BSIZE 1
+	RUN "P" $1 read_lseek_blockwise $((BSIZE-1)) $BSIZE $((BSIZE+1))
+	RUN "P" $1 read_lseek_blockwise $((BSIZE+1)) $BSIZE $((BSIZE-1))
+	RUN "P" $1 read_lseek_blockwise $((BSIZE+1)) $BSIZE $((2*BSIZE-1))
+
+	# device end
+	RUN "P" $1 read_lseek_blockwise 1 $BSIZE $((DEVSIZE-1))
+	RUN "P" $1 read_lseek_blockwise $((BSIZE-1)) $BSIZE $((DEVSIZE-BSIZE+1))
+	RUN "P" $1 read_lseek_blockwise $((BSIZE)) $BSIZE $((DEVSIZE-BSIZE))
+	RUN "P" $1 read_lseek_blockwise $((BSIZE+1)) $BSIZE $((DEVSIZE-BSIZE-1))
+
+	# this must fail on both device and file
+	RUN "F" $1 read_lseek_blockwise 1 $BSIZE $((DEVSIZE))
+	RUN "F" $1 read_lseek_blockwise $((BSIZE-1)) $BSIZE $((DEVSIZE-BSIZE+2))
+	RUN "F" $1 read_lseek_blockwise $((BSIZE)) $BSIZE $((DEVSIZE-BSIZE+1))
+	RUN "F" $1 read_lseek_blockwise $((BSIZE+1)) $BSIZE $((DEVSIZE-BSIZE))
+
+	RUN "P" $1 write_lseek_blockwise 0 $BSIZE 0
+	# TODO: this may pass but must not write a byte (write(0) is undefined).
+	# 	Test it with underlying dm-error or phony read/write syscalls.
+	#	Skipping read is optimization.
+	# HINT: currently it performs useless write and read as well
+	RUN "P" $1 write_lseek_blockwise 0 $BSIZE 1
+	RUN "P" $1 write_lseek_blockwise 0 $BSIZE $BSIZE
+
+	# beginning of device
+	RUN "P" $1 write_lseek_blockwise 1 $BSIZE 0
+	RUN "P" $1 write_lseek_blockwise 1 $BSIZE 1
+	RUN "P" $1 write_lseek_blockwise 1 $BSIZE $((BSIZE-1))
+	RUN "P" $1 write_lseek_blockwise 1 $BSIZE $((BSIZE/2))
+
+	# somewhere in the 'middle'
+	RUN "P" $1 write_lseek_blockwise 1 $BSIZE $BSIZE
+	RUN "P" $1 write_lseek_blockwise 1 $BSIZE $((BSIZE+1))
+	RUN "P" $1 write_lseek_blockwise 1 $BSIZE $((2*BSIZE-1))
+	RUN "P" $1 write_lseek_blockwise 1 $BSIZE $((BSIZE+BSIZE/2-1))
+
+	# cross-sector tests
+	RUN "P" $1 write_lseek_blockwise 2 $BSIZE $((BSIZE-1))
+	RUN "P" $1 write_lseek_blockwise $((BSIZE+1)) $BSIZE $((BSIZE-1))
+	RUN "P" $1 write_lseek_blockwise $((BSIZE+2)) $BSIZE $((BSIZE-1))
+	RUN "P" $1 write_lseek_blockwise 2 $BSIZE $((2*BSIZE-1))
+	RUN "P" $1 write_lseek_blockwise $((BSIZE+1)) $BSIZE $((2*BSIZE-1))
+	RUN "P" $1 write_lseek_blockwise $((BSIZE+2)) $BSIZE $((2*BSIZE-1))
+
+	# including one whole sector
+	RUN "P" $1 write_lseek_blockwise $((BSIZE+2)) $BSIZE $((BSIZE))
+	RUN "P" $1 write_lseek_blockwise $((2*BSIZE)) $BSIZE $((BSIZE+1))
+	RUN "P" $1 write_lseek_blockwise $((2*BSIZE)) $BSIZE $((BSIZE-1))
+	RUN "P" $1 write_lseek_blockwise $((BSIZE+2)) $BSIZE $((BSIZE-1))
+	RUN "P" $1 write_lseek_blockwise $((2*BSIZE)) $BSIZE $((BSIZE+1))
+	RUN "P" $1 write_lseek_blockwise $((3*BSIZE-2)) $BSIZE $((BSIZE+1))
+
+	# hiting exactly the sector boundary
+	RUN "P" $1 write_lseek_blockwise $((BSIZE-1)) $BSIZE 1
+	RUN "P" $1 write_lseek_blockwise $((BSIZE-1)) $BSIZE $((BSIZE+1))
+	RUN "P" $1 write_lseek_blockwise $((BSIZE+1)) $BSIZE $((BSIZE-1))
+	RUN "P" $1 write_lseek_blockwise $((BSIZE+1)) $BSIZE $((2*BSIZE-1))
+
+	# device end
+	RUN "P" $1 write_lseek_blockwise 1 $BSIZE $((DEVSIZE-1))
+	RUN "P" $1 write_lseek_blockwise $((BSIZE-1)) $BSIZE $((DEVSIZE-BSIZE+1))
+	RUN "P" $1 write_lseek_blockwise $((BSIZE)) $BSIZE $((DEVSIZE-BSIZE))
+	RUN "P" $1 write_lseek_blockwise $((BSIZE+1)) $BSIZE $((DEVSIZE-BSIZE-1))
+
+	# this must fail on device, but pass on file (which is unfortunate and maybe design mistake)
+	RUN "$BD_FAIL" $1 write_lseek_blockwise 1 $BSIZE $((DEVSIZE))
+	RUN "$BD_FAIL" $1 write_lseek_blockwise $((BSIZE-1)) $BSIZE $((DEVSIZE-BSIZE+2))
+	RUN "$BD_FAIL" $1 write_lseek_blockwise $((BSIZE)) $BSIZE $((DEVSIZE-BSIZE+1))
+	RUN "$BD_FAIL" $1 write_lseek_blockwise $((BSIZE+1)) $BSIZE $((DEVSIZE-BSIZE))
+}
+
+which $STRACE > /dev/null 2>&1 || unset STRACE
+test -x $BW_UNIT || skip "Run \"make `basename $BW_UNIT`\" first"
+
+FAILS=0
+WARNS=0
+DEVSIZEMB=2
+DEVSIZE=$((DEVSIZEMB*1024*1024))
+
+PAGE_SIZE=$(getconf PAGE_SIZE)
+echo "System PAGE_SIZE=$PAGE_SIZE"
+
+echo "Run tests in local filesystem"
+falloc $DEVSIZEMB $LOCAL_FILE || fail "Failed to create file in local filesystem."
+BSIZE=$(stat -c "%o" $LOCAL_FILE)
+if [ $BSIZE -gt $((512*1024)) ]; then
+	echo "Detected file block size: $BSIZE bytes"
+	echo "Tuning it down to system page size ($PAGE_SIZE bytes)"
+	BSIZE=$PAGE_SIZE
+fi
+run_all $LOCAL_FILE
+
+[ $(id -u) -eq 0 ] || {
+	echo "WARNING: You must be root to run remaining tests."
+	test $FAILS -eq 0 || fail "($FAILS wrong result(s) in total)"
+	cleanup
+	exit 0
+}
+
+DEVBSIZE=512
+BSIZE=$DEVBSIZE
+EXP=0
+DEVSIZEMBIMG=32
+
+echo "# Create classic 512B drive"
+echo "# (logical_block_size=$DEVBSIZE, physical_block_size=$((DEVBSIZE*(1<<EXP))))"
+add_device dev_size_mb=$DEVSIZEMB sector_size=$DEVBSIZE physblk_exp=$EXP num_tgts=1
+run_all $DEV
+cleanup
+add_device dev_size_mb=$DEVSIZEMBIMG sector_size=$DEVBSIZE physblk_exp=$EXP num_tgts=1
+run_all_in_fs
+cleanup
+
+EXP=3
+echo "# Create desktop-class 4K drive"
+echo "# (logical_block_size=$DEVBSIZE, physical_block_size=$((DEVBSIZE*(1<<EXP))))"
+add_device dev_size_mb=$DEVSIZEMB physblk_exp=$EXP sector_size=$DEVBSIZE num_tgts=1
+run_all $DEV
+BSIZE=$((DEVBSIZE*(1<<EXP)))
+run_all $DEV
+cleanup
+
+add_device dev_size_mb=$DEVSIZEMBIMG physblk_exp=$EXP sector_size=$DEVBSIZE num_tgts=1
+run_all_in_fs
+cleanup
+
+DEVBSIZE=4096
+BSIZE=$DEVBSIZE
+EXP=0
+echo "# Create enterprise-class 4K drive"
+echo "# (logical_block_size=$DEVBSIZE, physical_block_size=$((DEVBSIZE*(1<<EXP))))"
+add_device dev_size_mb=$DEVSIZEMB physblk_exp=$EXP sector_size=$DEVBSIZE num_tgts=1
+run_all $DEV
+cleanup
+add_device dev_size_mb=$DEVSIZEMBIMG sector_size=$DEVBSIZE physblk_exp=$EXP num_tgts=1
+run_all_in_fs
+cleanup
+
+test $WARNS -eq 0 || echo "(WARNING: $WARNS suspicious result(s) in total)"
+test $FAILS -eq 0 || fail "($FAILS wrong result(s) in total)"
diff --git a/tests/compat-test b/tests/compat-test
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..c905f7e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/compat-test
@@ -0,0 +1,952 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+PS4='$LINENO:'
+CRYPTSETUP=../cryptsetup
+
+CRYPTSETUP_VALGRIND=../.libs/cryptsetup
+CRYPTSETUP_LIB_VALGRIND=../.libs
+
+DEV_NAME=dummy
+DEV_NAME2=dummy2
+DEV_NAME3=dummy3
+ORIG_IMG=luks-test-orig
+IMG=luks-test
+IMG10=luks-test-v10
+HEADER_IMG=luks-header
+KEY1=key1
+KEY2=key2
+KEY5=key5
+KEYE=keye
+PWD0="compatkey"
+PWD1="93R4P4pIqAH8"
+PWD2="mymJeD8ivEhE"
+PWD3="ocMakf3fAcQO"
+PWDW="rUkL4RUryBom"
+VK_FILE="compattest_vkfile"
+
+FAST_PBKDF_OPT="--pbkdf pbkdf2 --pbkdf-force-iterations 1000"
+
+LUKS_HEADER="S0-5 S6-7 S8-39 S40-71 S72-103 S104-107 S108-111 R112-131 R132-163 S164-167 S168-207 A0-591"
+KEY_SLOT0="S208-211 S212-215 R216-247 A248-251 A251-255"
+KEY_MATERIAL0="R4096-68096"
+KEY_MATERIAL0_EXT="R4096-68096"
+
+KEY_SLOT1="S256-259 S260-263 R264-295 A296-299 A300-303"
+KEY_MATERIAL1="R69632-133632"
+KEY_MATERIAL1_EXT="S69632-133632"
+
+KEY_SLOT5="S448-451 S452-455 R456-487 A488-491 A492-495"
+KEY_MATERIAL5="R331776-395264"
+KEY_MATERIAL5_EXT="S331776-395264"
+
+TEST_UUID="12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789abc"
+
+LOOPDEV=$(losetup -f 2>/dev/null)
+[ -f /etc/system-fips ] && FIPS_MODE=$(cat /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled 2>/dev/null)
+
+function remove_mapping()
+{
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME3 ] && dmsetup remove $DEV_NAME3 >/dev/null 2>&1
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME2 ] && dmsetup remove $DEV_NAME2 >/dev/null 2>&1
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME ] && dmsetup remove $DEV_NAME >/dev/null 2>&1
+	losetup -d $LOOPDEV >/dev/null 2>&1
+	rm -f $ORIG_IMG $IMG $IMG10 $KEY1 $KEY2 $KEY5 $KEYE $HEADER_IMG $VK_FILE missing-file >/dev/null 2>&1
+}
+
+function force_uevent()
+{
+	DNAME=$(echo $LOOPDEV | cut -f3 -d /)
+	echo "change" >/sys/block/$DNAME/uevent
+}
+
+function fail()
+{
+	[ -n "$1" ] && echo "$1"
+	remove_mapping
+	echo "FAILED at line $(caller)"
+	exit 2
+}
+
+function fips_mode()
+{
+	[ -n "$FIPS_MODE" ] && [ "$FIPS_MODE" -gt 0 ]
+}
+
+function can_fail_fips()
+{
+        # Ignore this fail if running in FIPS mode
+	fips_mode || fail $1
+}
+
+function skip()
+{
+	[ -n "$1" ] && echo "$1"
+	remove_mapping
+	[ -z "$2" ] && exit $2
+	exit 77
+}
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME ] && dmsetup remove $DEV_NAME >/dev/null 2>&1
+
+	case "$2" in
+	file)
+		remove_mapping
+		dd if=/dev/zero of=$IMG bs=1k count=10000 >/dev/null 2>&1
+		sync
+		;;
+	wipe)
+		remove_mapping
+		dd if=/dev/zero of=$IMG bs=1k count=10000 >/dev/null 2>&1
+		sync
+		losetup $LOOPDEV $IMG
+		;;
+	new)
+		remove_mapping
+		xz -cd compatimage.img.xz > $IMG
+		# FIXME: switch to internal loop (no losetup at all)
+		echo "bad" | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen --key-slot 0 --test-passphrase $IMG 2>&1 | \
+			grep "autoclear flag" && skip "WARNING: Too old kernel, test skipped."
+		losetup $LOOPDEV $IMG
+		xz -cd compatv10image.img.xz > $IMG10
+		;;
+	reuse | *)
+		if [ ! -e $IMG ]; then
+			xz -cd compatimage.img.xz > $IMG
+			losetup $LOOPDEV $IMG
+		fi
+		[ ! -e $IMG10 ] && xz -cd compatv10image.img.xz > $IMG10
+		;;
+	esac
+
+	if [ ! -e $KEY1 ]; then
+		#dd if=/dev/urandom of=$KEY1 count=1 bs=32 >/dev/null 2>&1
+                echo -n $'\x48\xc6\x74\x4f\x41\x4e\x50\xc0\x79\xc2\x2d\x5b\x5f\x68\x84\x17' >$KEY1
+                echo -n $'\x9c\x03\x5e\x1b\x4d\x0f\x9a\x75\xb3\x90\x70\x32\x0a\xf8\xae\xc4'>>$KEY1
+	fi
+
+	if [ ! -e $KEY2 ]; then
+		dd if=/dev/urandom of=$KEY2 count=1 bs=16 >/dev/null 2>&1
+	fi
+
+	if [ ! -e $KEY5 ]; then
+		dd if=/dev/urandom of=$KEY5 count=1 bs=16 >/dev/null 2>&1
+	fi
+
+	if [ ! -e $KEYE ]; then
+		touch $KEYE
+	fi
+
+	cp $IMG $ORIG_IMG
+	[ -n "$1" ] && echo "CASE: $1"
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	sync
+	[ -z "$1" ] && return
+	./differ $ORIG_IMG $IMG $1 || fail
+}
+
+function check_exists()
+{
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME ] || fail
+	check $1
+}
+
+function valgrind_setup()
+{
+	which valgrind >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "Cannot find valgrind."
+	[ ! -f $CRYPTSETUP_VALGRIND ] && fail "Unable to get location of cryptsetup executable."
+	export LD_LIBRARY_PATH="$CRYPTSETUP_LIB_VALGRIND:$LD_LIBRARY_PATH"
+}
+
+function valgrind_run()
+{
+	INFOSTRING="$(basename ${BASH_SOURCE[1]})-line-${BASH_LINENO[0]}" ./valg.sh ${CRYPTSETUP_VALGRIND} "$@"
+}
+
+export LANG=C
+
+[ -n "$VALG" ] && valgrind_setup && CRYPTSETUP=valgrind_run
+
+# LUKS non-root-tests
+if [ $(id -u) != 0 ]; then
+	$CRYPTSETUP benchmark -c aes-xts-plain64 >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+		skip "WARNING: Cannot run test without kernel userspace crypto API, test skipped."
+fi
+
+prepare "Image in file tests (root capabilities not required)" file
+echo "[1] format"
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks1 $IMG $FAST_PBKDF_OPT || fail
+echo "[2] open"
+echo $PWD0 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $IMG --test-passphrase 2>/dev/null && fail
+[ $? -ne 2 ] && fail "luksOpen should return EPERM exit code"
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $IMG --test-passphrase || fail
+echo "[3] add key"
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $IMG $FAST_PBKDF_OPT 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $IMG $FAST_PBKDF_OPT || fail
+echo -e "$PWD0\n$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $IMG $FAST_PBKDF_OPT 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo "[4] change key"
+echo -e "$PWD1\n$PWD0\n" | $CRYPTSETUP luksChangeKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $IMG || fail
+echo -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2\n" | $CRYPTSETUP luksChangeKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $IMG 2>/dev/null && fail
+[ $? -ne 2 ] && fail "luksChangeKey should return EPERM exit code"
+echo "[5] remove key"
+# delete active keys PWD0, PWD2
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksRemoveKey $IMG 2>/dev/null && fail
+[ $? -ne 2 ] && fail "luksRemove should return EPERM exit code"
+echo $PWD0 | $CRYPTSETUP luksRemoveKey $IMG || fail
+echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP luksRemoveKey $IMG || fail
+# check if keys were deleted
+echo $PWD0 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $IMG --test-passphrase 2>/dev/null && fail
+[ $? -ne 2 ] && fail "luksOpen should return EPERM exit code"
+echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $IMG --test-passphrase 2>/dev/null && fail
+[ $? -ne 2 ] && fail "luksOpen should return EPERM exit code"
+echo "[6] kill slot"
+# format new luks device with active keys PWD1, PWD2
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $IMG $FAST_PBKDF_OPT || fail
+echo -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $IMG $FAST_PBKDF_OPT || fail
+# deactivate keys by killing slots
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -q "Key Slot 0: ENABLED" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -q "Key Slot 1: ENABLED" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -q "Key Slot 2: DISABLED" || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksKillSlot $IMG 0 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksKillSlot $IMG 0 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -q "Key Slot 0: DISABLED" || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksKillSlot $IMG 1 2>/dev/null && fail
+[ $? -ne 2 ] && fail "luksKill should return EPERM exit code"
+echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksKillSlot $IMG 1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -q "Key Slot 1: DISABLED" || fail
+# check if keys were deactivated
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $IMG --test-passphrase 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $IMG --test-passphrase 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo "[7] header backup"
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $IMG $FAST_PBKDF_OPT || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksHeaderBackup $IMG --header-backup-file $HEADER_IMG || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksRemoveKey $IMG || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $IMG --test-passphrase 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo "[8] header restore"
+$CRYPTSETUP luksHeaderRestore -q $IMG --header-backup-file $HEADER_IMG || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $IMG --test-passphrase || fail
+echo "[9] luksDump"
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --uuid $TEST_UUID $IMG $KEY1 || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $IMG -d $KEY1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -q "Key Slot 0: ENABLED" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -q $TEST_UUID || fail
+echo $PWDW | $CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG --dump-master-key 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG --dump-master-key | grep -q "MK dump:" || can_fail_fips
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump -q $IMG --dump-master-key -d $KEY1 | grep -q "MK dump:" || can_fail_fips
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksDump -q $IMG --dump-master-key --master-key-file $VK_FILE >/dev/null || can_fail_fips
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksDump -q $IMG --dump-master-key --master-key-file $VK_FILE 2>/dev/null && fail
+fips_mode || {
+	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --master-key-file $VK_FILE $IMG || fail
+}
+echo "[10] uuid"
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --uuid $TEST_UUID $IMG || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksUUID $IMG | grep -q $TEST_UUID || fail
+
+[ $(id -u) != 0 ] && skip "WARNING: You must be root to run this test, test skipped."
+[ -z "$LOOPDEV" ] && skip "WARNING: Cannot find free loop device, test skipped."
+
+# LUKS root-tests
+prepare	"[1] open - compat image - acceptance check" new
+echo $PWD0 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+check_exists
+ORG_SHA1=$(sha1sum -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME | cut -f 1 -d' ')
+[ "$ORG_SHA1" = 676062b66ebf36669dab705442ea0762dfc091b0 ] || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksClose  $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+# Check it can be opened from header backup as well
+$CRYPTSETUP luksHeaderBackup $IMG --header-backup-file $HEADER_IMG || fail
+echo $PWD0 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $IMG10 $DEV_NAME --header $HEADER_IMG || fail
+check_exists
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksClose  $DEV_NAME || fail
+# Check restore
+$CRYPTSETUP luksHeaderRestore -q $IMG --header-backup-file $HEADER_IMG || fail
+
+# Repeat for V1.0 header - not aligned first keyslot
+echo $PWD0 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $IMG10 $DEV_NAME || fail
+check_exists
+ORG_SHA1=$(sha1sum -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME | cut -f 1 -d' ')
+[ "$ORG_SHA1" = 51b48c2471a7593ceaf14dc5e66bca86ed05f6cc ] || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksClose  $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+rm -f $HEADER_IMG
+$CRYPTSETUP luksHeaderBackup $IMG10 --header-backup-file $HEADER_IMG
+echo $PWD0 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $IMG10 $DEV_NAME --header $HEADER_IMG || fail
+check_exists
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksClose  $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+prepare "[2] open - compat image - denial check" new
+echo $PWDW | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWDW | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $IMG10 $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+check
+
+# All headers items and first key material section must change
+prepare "[3] format" wipe
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -i 1000 -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 -s 128 luksFormat --type luks1 $LOOPDEV || fail
+check "$LUKS_HEADER $KEY_SLOT0 $KEY_MATERIAL0"
+
+prepare "[4] format using hash sha512" wipe
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -i 1000 -h sha512 -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 -s 128 luksFormat --type luks1 $LOOPDEV || fail
+check "$LUKS_HEADER $KEY_SLOT0 $KEY_MATERIAL0"
+
+prepare "[5] open"
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME --test-passphrase || fail
+echo $PWDW | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME --test-passphrase 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+check_exists
+
+# Key Slot 1 and key material section 1 must change, the rest must not.
+prepare "[6] add key"
+echo -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV || fail
+check "$KEY_SLOT1 $KEY_MATERIAL1"
+echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+# Unsuccessful Key Delete - nothing may change
+prepare "[7] unsuccessful delete"
+echo $PWDW | $CRYPTSETUP luksKillSlot $LOOPDEV 1 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksKillSlot $LOOPDEV 8 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksKillSlot $LOOPDEV 7 2>/dev/null && fail
+check
+
+# Delete Key Test
+# Key Slot 1 and key material section 1 must change, the rest must not
+prepare "[8] successful delete"
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksKillSlot $LOOPDEV 1 || fail
+check "$KEY_SLOT1 $KEY_MATERIAL1_EXT"
+echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2> /dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+# Key Slot 1 and key material section 1 must change, the rest must not
+prepare "[9] add key test for key files"
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV $KEY1 || fail
+check "$KEY_SLOT1 $KEY_MATERIAL1"
+$CRYPTSETUP -d $KEY1 luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+# Key Slot 1 and key material section 1 must change, the rest must not
+prepare "[10] delete key test with key1 as remaining key"
+$CRYPTSETUP -d $KEY1 luksKillSlot $LOOPDEV 0 || fail
+check "$KEY_SLOT0 $KEY_MATERIAL0_EXT"
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -d $KEY1 $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+# Delete last slot
+prepare "[11] delete last key" wipe
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks1 $LOOPDEV $FAST_PBKDF_OPT || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksKillSlot $LOOPDEV 0 || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+
+# Format test for ESSIV, and some other parameters.
+prepare "[12] parameter variation test" wipe
+$CRYPTSETUP -q -i 1000 -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 -s 128 luksFormat --type luks1 $LOOPDEV $KEY1 || fail
+check "$LUKS_HEADER $KEY_SLOT0 $KEY_MATERIAL0"
+$CRYPTSETUP -d $KEY1 luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+prepare	"[13] open/close - stacked devices" wipe
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $LOOPDEV $FAST_PBKDF_OPT || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksOpen /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME $DEV_NAME2 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksClose  $DEV_NAME2 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksClose  $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+prepare	"[14] format/open - passphrase on stdin & new line" wipe
+# stdin defined by "-" must take even newline
+#echo -n -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $LOOPDEV - || fail
+echo -n -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -q --key-file=- luksFormat --type luks1 $LOOPDEV || fail
+echo -n -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP -q --key-file=- luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksClose  $DEV_NAME || fail
+echo -n -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+# now also try --key-file
+echo -n -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -q luksFormat --type luks1 $LOOPDEV --key-file=- || fail
+echo -n -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP -q --key-file=- luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksClose  $DEV_NAME || fail
+# process newline if from stdin
+echo -n -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -q luksFormat --type luks1 $LOOPDEV || fail
+echo "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksClose  $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+prepare "[15] UUID - use and report provided UUID" wipe
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --uuid blah $LOOPDEV 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --uuid $TEST_UUID $LOOPDEV || fail
+tst=$($CRYPTSETUP -q luksUUID $LOOPDEV)
+[ "$tst"x = "$TEST_UUID"x ] || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksUUID --uuid $TEST_UUID $LOOPDEV || fail
+tst=$($CRYPTSETUP -q luksUUID $LOOPDEV)
+[ "$tst"x = "$TEST_UUID"x ] || fail
+
+prepare "[16] luksFormat" wipe
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --master-key-file /dev/urandom $LOOPDEV || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --master-key-file /dev/urandom $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --master-key-file /dev/urandom -s 256 --uuid $TEST_UUID $LOOPDEV $KEY1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -d $KEY1 $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksClose  $DEV_NAME || fail
+# open by UUID
+force_uevent # some systems do not update loop by-uuid
+$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -d $KEY1 UUID=X$TEST_UUID $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -d $KEY1 UUID=$TEST_UUID $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksClose  $DEV_NAME || fail
+# empty keyfile
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV $KEYE || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -d $KEYE $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksClose  $DEV_NAME || fail
+# open by volume key
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -s 256 --master-key-file $KEY1 $LOOPDEV || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen --master-key-file /dev/urandom $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen --master-key-file $KEY1 $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksClose  $DEV_NAME || fail
+# unsupported pe-keyslot encryption
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -s 128 --keyslot-cipher "aes-cbc-plain" $LOOPDEV 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -s 128 --keyslot-key-size 256 $LOOPDEV 2>/dev/null && fail
+
+prepare "[17] AddKey volume key, passphrase and keyfile" wipe
+# masterkey
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV --master-key-file /dev/zero --key-slot 3 || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV --test-passphrase || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "Key Slot 3: ENABLED" || fail
+echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV --master-key-file /dev/zero --key-slot 4 || fail
+echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV --test-passphrase --key-slot 4 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "Key Slot 4: ENABLED" || fail
+echo $PWD3 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV --master-key-file /dev/null --key-slot 5 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV --master-key-file /dev/zero --key-slot 5 $KEY1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV --test-passphrase --key-slot 5 -d $KEY1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "Key Slot 5: ENABLED" || fail
+
+# special "-" handling
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV $KEY1 --key-slot 3 || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 - || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV --test-passphrase 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV -d - --test-passphrase || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV -d - $KEY2 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV -d $KEY2 --test-passphrase || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV -d - -d $KEY1 --test-passphrase 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 -d $KEY1 --test-passphrase 2>/dev/null && fail
+
+# [0]PWD1 [1]PWD2 [2]$KEY1/1 [3]$KEY1 [4]$KEY2
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV $KEY1 --key-slot 3 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "Key Slot 3: ENABLED" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -d $KEY1 $KEY2 --key-slot 3 2>/dev/null && fail
+# keyfile/keyfile
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -d $KEY1 $KEY2 --key-slot 4 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV -d $KEY2 --test-passphrase --key-slot 4 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "Key Slot 4: ENABLED" || fail
+# passphrase/keyfile
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 --key-slot 0 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "Key Slot 0: ENABLED" || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV --test-passphrase --key-slot 0 || fail
+# passphrase/passphrase
+echo -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2\n" | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV --key-slot 1 || fail
+echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV --test-passphrase --key-slot 1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "Key Slot 1: ENABLED" || fail
+# keyfile/passphrase
+echo -e "$PWD2\n" | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV $KEY1 --key-slot 2 --new-keyfile-size 3 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "Key Slot 2: ENABLED" || fail
+
+prepare "[18] RemoveKey passphrase and keyfile" reuse
+$CRYPTSETUP luksRemoveKey $LOOPDEV $KEY1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "Key Slot 3: DISABLED" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksRemoveKey $LOOPDEV $KEY1 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -d $KEY2 $KEY1 --key-slot 3 2>/dev/null || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "Key Slot 3: ENABLED" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksRemoveKey $LOOPDEV $KEY2 --keyfile-size 1 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksRemoveKey $LOOPDEV $KEY2 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "Key Slot 4: DISABLED" || fail
+# if password or keyfile is provided, batch mode must not suppress it
+echo "badpw" | $CRYPTSETUP luksKillSlot $LOOPDEV 2 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo "badpw" | $CRYPTSETUP luksKillSlot $LOOPDEV 2 -q 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo "badpw" | $CRYPTSETUP luksKillSlot $LOOPDEV 2 --key-file=- 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo "badpw" | $CRYPTSETUP luksKillSlot $LOOPDEV 2 --key-file=- -q 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "Key Slot 2: ENABLED" || fail
+# kill slot using passphrase from 1
+echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP luksKillSlot $LOOPDEV 2 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "Key Slot 2: DISABLED" || fail
+# kill slot with redirected stdin
+$CRYPTSETUP luksKillSlot $LOOPDEV 3 </dev/null 2>/dev/null || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "Key Slot 3: DISABLED" || fail
+# remove key0 / slot 0
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksRemoveKey $LOOPDEV || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "Key Slot 0: DISABLED" || fail
+# last keyslot, in batch mode no passphrase needed...
+$CRYPTSETUP luksKillSlot -q $LOOPDEV 1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "Key Slot 1: DISABLED" || fail
+
+prepare "[19] create & status & resize" wipe
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME $LOOPDEV --hash xxx 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME $LOOPDEV --hash sha1 --cipher aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 --offset 3 --skip 4 --readonly || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q status  $DEV_NAME | grep "offset:" | grep -q "3 sectors" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q status  $DEV_NAME | grep "skipped:" | grep -q "4 sectors" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q status  $DEV_NAME | grep "mode:" | grep -q "readonly" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q resize  $DEV_NAME --size 100 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q status  $DEV_NAME | grep "size:" | grep -q "100 sectors" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q resize  $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q status  $DEV_NAME | grep "size:" | grep -q "19997 sectors" || fail
+# Resize underlying loop device as well
+truncate -s 16M $IMG || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q resize  $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q status  $DEV_NAME | grep "size:" | grep -q "32765 sectors" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q remove  $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q status  $DEV_NAME >/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME --hash sha1 $LOOPDEV || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q remove  $DEV_NAME || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q create $DEV_NAME --hash sha1 $LOOPDEV || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q remove  $DEV_NAME || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q create $DEV_NAME --hash sha1 --size 100 $LOOPDEV || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q status  $DEV_NAME | grep "size:" | grep -q "100 sectors" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q remove  $DEV_NAME || fail
+# 4k sector resize (if kernel supports it)
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q open --type plain $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME --sector-size 4096 --size 8  >/dev/null 2>&1
+if [ $? -eq 0 ] ; then
+	$CRYPTSETUP -q status  $DEV_NAME | grep "size:" | grep -q "8 sectors"
+	$CRYPTSETUP -q resize  $DEV_NAME --size 16 || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP -q status  $DEV_NAME | grep "size:" | grep -q "16 sectors"
+	$CRYPTSETUP -q resize  $DEV_NAME --size 9 2>/dev/null && fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP -q remove  $DEV_NAME || fail
+fi
+# verify is ignored on non-tty input
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME $LOOPDEV --hash sha1 --verify-passphrase 2>/dev/null || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q remove  $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 --key-size 255 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 --key-size -1 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 -l -1 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1  || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME $LOOPDEV -d blah 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q remove  $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME $LOOPDEV -d /dev/urandom || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q remove  $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+prepare "[20] Disallow open/create if already mapped." wipe
+$CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME2 $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $LOOPDEV 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP remove  $DEV_NAME || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $LOOPDEV || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME2 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP  luksClose  $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+prepare "[21] luksDump" wipe
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --uuid $TEST_UUID $LOOPDEV $KEY1 || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "Key Slot 0: ENABLED" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q $TEST_UUID || fail
+echo $PWDW | $CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV --dump-master-key 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV --dump-master-key | grep -q "MK dump:" || can_fail_fips
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump -q $LOOPDEV --dump-master-key -d $KEY1 | grep -q "MK dump:" || can_fail_fips
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksDump -q $LOOPDEV --dump-master-key --master-key-file $VK_FILE > /dev/null || can_fail_fips
+fips_mode || {
+	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --master-key-file $VK_FILE $LOOPDEV || fail
+}
+
+prepare "[22] remove disappeared device" wipe
+dmsetup create $DEV_NAME --table "0 5000 linear $LOOPDEV 2" || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q $FAST_PBKDF_OPT luksFormat --type luks1 /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksOpen /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME $DEV_NAME2 || fail
+# underlying device now returns error but node is still present
+dmsetup load $DEV_NAME --table "0 5000 error" || fail
+dmsetup resume $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksClose $DEV_NAME2 || fail
+dmsetup remove $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+prepare "[23] ChangeKey passphrase and keyfile" wipe
+# [0]$KEY1 [1]key0
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $LOOPDEV $KEY1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --key-slot 0 || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -d $KEY1 --key-slot 1 || fail
+# keyfile [0] / keyfile [0]
+$CRYPTSETUP luksChangeKey $LOOPDEV $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -d $KEY1 $KEY2 --key-slot 0 || fail
+# passphrase [1] / passphrase [1]
+echo -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2\n" | $CRYPTSETUP luksChangeKey $LOOPDEV $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --key-slot 1 || fail
+# keyfile [0] / keyfile [new]
+$CRYPTSETUP luksChangeKey $LOOPDEV $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -d $KEY2 $KEY1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "Key Slot 0: DISABLED" || fail
+# passphrase [1] / passphrase [new]
+echo -e "$PWD2\n$PWD1\n" | $CRYPTSETUP luksChangeKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "Key Slot 1: DISABLED" || fail
+# use all slots
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 $KEY2 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 $KEY2 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 $KEY2 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 $KEY2 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 $KEY2 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 $KEY2 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT || fail
+# still allows replace
+$CRYPTSETUP luksChangeKey $LOOPDEV $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -d $KEY1 $KEY2 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksChangeKey $LOOPDEV $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -d $KEY1 $KEY2 2>/dev/null && fail
+
+prepare "[24] Keyfile limit" wipe
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV $KEY1 --key-slot 0 -l 13 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP --key-file=$KEY1 luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP --key-file=$KEY1 -l 0 luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP --key-file=$KEY1 -l -1 luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP --key-file=$KEY1 -l 14 luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP --key-file=$KEY1 -l 13 --keyfile-offset 1 luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP --key-file=$KEY1 -l 13 --keyfile-offset -1 luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP --key-file=$KEY1 -l 13 luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksClose  $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 $KEY2 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 $KEY2 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -l 14 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 $KEY2 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -l -1 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 $KEY2 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -l 13 --new-keyfile-size 12 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksRemoveKey $LOOPDEV $KEY2 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksRemoveKey $LOOPDEV $KEY2 -l 12 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksChangeKey $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 $KEY2 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksChangeKey $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 $KEY2 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -l 14 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksChangeKey $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 $KEY2 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -l 13 || fail
+# -l is ignored for stdin if _only_ passphrase is used
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV -d $KEY2 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT || fail
+# this is stupid, but expected
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksRemoveKey $LOOPDEV -l 11 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWDW"0" | $CRYPTSETUP luksRemoveKey $LOOPDEV -l 12 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo -e "$PWD1\n" | $CRYPTSETUP luksRemoveKey $LOOPDEV -d- -l 12 || fail
+# offset
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV $KEY1 --key-slot 0 -l 13 --keyfile-offset 16 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP --key-file=$KEY1 -l 13 --keyfile-offset 15 luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP --key-file=$KEY1 -l 13 --keyfile-offset 16 luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksClose  $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -d $KEY1 -l 13 --keyfile-offset 16 $KEY2 --new-keyfile-offset 1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP --key-file=$KEY2 --keyfile-offset 11 luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP --key-file=$KEY2 --keyfile-offset 1 luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksClose  $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksChangeKey $LOOPDEV $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -d $KEY2 --keyfile-offset 1 $KEY2 --new-keyfile-offset 0 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -d $KEY2 $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksClose $DEV_NAME || fail
+# large device with keyfile
+echo -e '0 10000000 error'\\n'10000000 1000000 zero' | dmsetup create $DEV_NAME2 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME2 -l 13 --keyfile-offset 5120000000 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP --key-file=/dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME2 -l 13 --keyfile-offset 5119999999 luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP --key-file=/dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME2 -l 13 --keyfile-offset 5120000000 luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksClose $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksChangeKey $LOOPDEV $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -d /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME2 \
+  --keyfile-offset 5120000000 -l 13 /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME2 --new-keyfile-offset 5120000001 --new-keyfile-size 15 || fail
+dmsetup remove $DEV_NAME2
+
+prepare "[25] Create shared segments" wipe
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME $LOOPDEV  --hash sha1 --offset   0 --size 256 || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME2 $LOOPDEV --hash sha1 --offset 512 --size 256 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME2 $LOOPDEV --hash sha1 --offset 512 --size 256 --shared || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q remove  $DEV_NAME2 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q remove  $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+prepare "[26] Suspend/Resume" wipe
+# only LUKS is supported
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME --hash sha1 $LOOPDEV || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksSuspend $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksResume $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q remove  $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksSuspend $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+# LUKS
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksSuspend $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q resize  $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWDW | $CRYPTSETUP luksResume $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+[ $? -ne 2 ] && fail "luksResume should return EPERM exit code"
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksResume $DEV_NAME  || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksClose $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+prepare "[27] luksOpen with specified key slot number" wipe
+# first, let's try passphrase option
+echo $PWD3 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -S 5 $LOOPDEV || fail
+check $LUKS_HEADER $KEY_SLOT5 $KEY_MATERIAL5
+echo $PWD3 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -S 4 $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME && fail
+[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME ] && fail
+echo $PWD3 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -S 5 $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+check_exists
+$CRYPTSETUP luksClose $DEV_NAME || fail
+echo -e "$PWD3\n$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -S 0 $LOOPDEV || fail
+check $LUKS_HEADER $KEY_SLOT0 $KEY_MATERIAL0
+echo $PWD3 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -S 0 $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME ] && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -S 5 $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME ] && fail
+# second, try it with keyfiles
+$CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks1 -q -S 5 -d $KEY5 $LOOPDEV || fail
+check $LUKS_HEADER $KEY_SLOT5 $KEY_MATERIAL5
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -S 1 -d $KEY5 $LOOPDEV $KEY1 || fail
+check $LUKS_HEADER $KEY_SLOT1 $KEY_MATERIAL1
+$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -S 5 -d $KEY5 $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+check_exists
+$CRYPTSETUP luksClose $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -S 1 -d $KEY5 $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME ] && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -S 5 -d $KEY1 $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME ] && fail
+
+prepare "[28] Detached LUKS header" wipe
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV --header $HEADER_IMG || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV --header $HEADER_IMG --align-payload 1 >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV --header $HEADER_IMG --align-payload 8192 || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV --header $HEADER_IMG --align-payload 0 || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV --header $HEADER_IMG --align-payload 8192 --offset 8192 >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail
+truncate -s 4096 $HEADER_IMG
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV --header $HEADER_IMG -S7 >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV --header $HEADER_IMG --offset 80000 >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV --header $HEADER_IMG --offset 8192 || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV --header $HEADER_IMG --offset 0 || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV --header $HEADER_IMG $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q resize  $DEV_NAME --size 100 --header $HEADER_IMG || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q status  $DEV_NAME --header $HEADER_IMG | grep "size:" | grep -q "100 sectors" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q status  $DEV_NAME | grep "type:" | grep -q "n/a" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q status  $DEV_NAME | grep "size:" | grep -q "100 sectors" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksSuspend $DEV_NAME --header $HEADER_IMG || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksResume $DEV_NAME --header $HEADER_IMG || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksSuspend $DEV_NAME || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksResume $DEV_NAME && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksResume $DEV_NAME --header $HEADER_IMG || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksClose $DEV_NAME || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -S 5 _fakedev_ --header $HEADER_IMG $KEY5 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump _fakedev_ --header $HEADER_IMG | grep -q "Key Slot 5: ENABLED" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksKillSlot -q _fakedev_ --header $HEADER_IMG 5 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump _fakedev_ --header $HEADER_IMG | grep -q "Key Slot 5: DISABLED" || fail
+
+prepare "[29] Repair metadata" wipe
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV $KEY1 --key-slot 0 || fail
+# second sector overwrite should corrupt keyslot 6+7
+dd if=/dev/urandom of=$LOOPDEV bs=512 seek=1 count=1 >/dev/null 2>&1
+$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -d $KEY1 $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q repair $LOOPDEV >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -d $KEY1 $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksClose $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+prepare "[30] LUKS erase" wipe
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV $KEY5 --key-slot 5 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -S 1 -d $KEY5 $LOOPDEV $KEY1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "Key Slot 1: ENABLED" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "Key Slot 5: ENABLED" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksErase -q $LOOPDEV || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "Key Slot 1: DISABLED" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "Key Slot 5: DISABLED" || fail
+
+prepare "[31] Deferred removal of device" wipe
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open --type plain --hash sha256 $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP open --type plain --hash sha256 /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME $DEV_NAME2 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q status $DEV_NAME >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP close --deferred $DEV_NAME >/dev/null 2>&1
+if [ $? -eq 0 ] ; then
+  dmsetup info $DEV_NAME | grep -q "DEFERRED REMOVE" || fail
+  $CRYPTSETUP -q status $DEV_NAME >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail
+  $CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME2 || fail
+  $CRYPTSETUP -q status $DEV_NAME >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail
+else
+  $CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME2 >/dev/null 2>&1
+  $CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME >/dev/null 2>&1
+fi
+
+# Interactive tests
+# Do not remove sleep 0.1 below, the password query flushes TTY buffer (so the code is racy).
+which expect >/dev/null 2>&1 || skip "WARNING: expect tool missing, interactive test will be skipped." 0
+
+prepare "[32] Interactive password retry from terminal." new
+expect - >/dev/null <<EOF
+proc abort {} { send_error "Timeout. "; exit 2 }
+set timeout 10
+eval spawn $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -v -T 2 $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME
+expect timeout abort "Enter passphrase for $LOOPDEV:"
+sleep 0.1
+send "$PWD0 x\n"
+expect timeout abort "No key available with this passphrase."
+expect timeout abort "Enter passphrase for $LOOPDEV:"
+sleep 0.1
+send "$PWD0\n"
+expect timeout abort "Key slot 0 unlocked."
+expect timeout abort "Command successful."
+expect timeout abort eof
+exit
+EOF
+[ $? -eq 0 ] || fail "Expect script failed."
+check_exists
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksClose  $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+prepare "[33] Interactive unsuccessful password retry from terminal." new
+expect - >/dev/null <<EOF
+proc abort {} { send_error "Timeout. "; exit 2 }
+set timeout 10
+eval spawn $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -v -T 2 $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME
+expect timeout abort "Enter passphrase for $LOOPDEV:"
+sleep 0.1
+send "$PWD0 x\n"
+expect timeout abort "No key available with this passphrase."
+expect timeout abort "Enter passphrase for $LOOPDEV:"
+sleep 0.1
+send "$PWD0 y\n"
+expect timeout abort "No key available with this passphrase."
+expect timeout abort eof
+exit
+EOF
+[ $? -eq 0 ] || fail "Expect script failed."
+
+prepare "[34] Interactive kill of last key slot." new
+expect - >/dev/null <<EOF
+proc abort {} { send_error "Timeout. "; exit 2 }
+set timeout 10
+eval spawn $CRYPTSETUP luksKillSlot -v $LOOPDEV 0
+expect timeout abort "Are you sure? (Type uppercase yes):"
+send "YES\n"
+expect timeout abort "Enter any remaining passphrase:"
+sleep 0.1
+send "$PWD0\n"
+expect timeout abort "Command successful."
+expect timeout abort eof
+eval spawn $CRYPTSETUP luksKillSlot -v $LOOPDEV 0
+expect timeout abort "Keyslot 0 is not active."
+expect timeout abort eof
+exit
+EOF
+[ $? -eq 0 ] || fail "Expect script failed."
+
+prepare "[35] Interactive format of device." wipe
+expect - >/dev/null <<EOF
+proc abort {} { send_error "Timeout. "; exit 2 }
+set timeout 10
+eval spawn $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -v $LOOPDEV
+expect timeout abort "Are you sure? (Type uppercase yes):"
+send "YES\n"
+expect timeout abort "Enter passphrase for $LOOPDEV:"
+sleep 0.1
+send "$PWD0\n"
+expect timeout abort "Verify passphrase:"
+sleep 0.1
+send "$PWD0\n"
+expect timeout abort "Command successful."
+expect timeout abort eof
+eval spawn $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -v $LOOPDEV --test-passphrase
+expect timeout abort "Enter passphrase for $LOOPDEV:"
+sleep 0.1
+send "$PWD0\n"
+expect timeout abort "Command successful."
+expect timeout abort eof
+exit
+EOF
+[ $? -eq 0 ] || fail "Expect script failed."
+
+prepare "[36] Interactive unsuccessful format of device." new
+expect - >/dev/null <<EOF
+proc abort {} { send_error "Timeout. "; exit 2 }
+set timeout 10
+eval spawn $CRYPTSETUP erase -v $LOOPDEV
+expect timeout abort "Are you sure? (Type uppercase yes):"
+send "YES\n"
+expect timeout abort "Command successful."
+expect timeout abort eof
+eval spawn $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -v $LOOPDEV
+expect timeout abort "Are you sure? (Type uppercase yes):"
+send "YES\n"
+expect timeout abort "Enter passphrase for $LOOPDEV:"
+sleep 0.1
+send "$PWD0\n"
+expect timeout abort "Verify passphrase:"
+sleep 0.1
+send "$PWD0 x\n"
+expect timeout abort "Passphrases do not match."
+expect timeout abort eof
+eval spawn $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -v $LOOPDEV -T 1 --test-passphrase
+expect timeout abort "Enter passphrase for $LOOPDEV:"
+sleep 0.1
+send "$PWD0\n"
+expect timeout abort "No key available with this passphrase."
+expect timeout abort eof
+exit
+EOF
+[ $? -eq 0 ] || fail "Expect script failed."
+
+prepare "[37] Interactive add key." new
+expect - >/dev/null <<EOF
+proc abort {} { send_error "Timeout. "; exit 2 }
+set timeout 10
+eval spawn $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey -S 2 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -v $LOOPDEV
+expect timeout abort "Enter any existing passphrase:"
+sleep 0.1
+send "$PWD0\n"
+expect timeout abort "Enter new passphrase for key slot:"
+sleep 0.1
+send "$PWD1\n"
+expect timeout abort "Verify passphrase:"
+sleep 0.1
+send "$PWD1\n"
+expect timeout abort "Command successful."
+expect timeout abort eof
+eval spawn $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -v $LOOPDEV --test-passphrase
+expect timeout abort "Enter passphrase"
+sleep 0.1
+send "$PWD1\n"
+expect timeout abort "Command successful."
+expect timeout abort eof
+eval spawn $CRYPTSETUP luksKillSlot -v $LOOPDEV 1
+expect timeout abort "Keyslot 1 is not active."
+expect timeout abort eof
+eval spawn $CRYPTSETUP luksKillSlot -v $LOOPDEV 2
+expect timeout abort "Enter any remaining passphrase:"
+sleep 0.1
+send "$PWD0\n"
+expect timeout abort "Key slot 2 removed."
+expect timeout abort eof
+exit
+EOF
+[ $? -eq 0 ] || fail "Expect script failed."
+
+prepare "[38] Interactive change key." new
+expect - >/dev/null <<EOF
+proc abort {} { send_error "Timeout. "; exit 2 }
+set timeout 10
+eval spawn $CRYPTSETUP luksChangeKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -v $LOOPDEV
+expect timeout abort "Enter passphrase to be changed:"
+sleep 0.1
+send "$PWD0\n"
+expect timeout abort "Enter new passphrase:"
+sleep 0.1
+send "$PWD1\n"
+expect timeout abort "Verify passphrase:"
+sleep 0.1
+send "$PWD1\n"
+expect timeout abort "Command successful."
+expect timeout abort eof
+eval spawn $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -v $LOOPDEV --test-passphrase
+expect timeout abort "Enter passphrase for $LOOPDEV:"
+sleep 0.1
+send "$PWD1\n"
+expect timeout abort "Command successful."
+expect timeout abort eof
+exit
+EOF
+[ $? -eq 0 ] || fail "Expect script failed."
+
+prepare "[39] Interactive suspend and resume." new
+echo $PWD0 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+expect - >/dev/null <<EOF
+proc abort {} { send_error "Timeout. "; exit 2 }
+set timeout 10
+eval spawn $CRYPTSETUP luksSuspend -v $DEV_NAME
+expect timeout abort "Command successful."
+expect timeout abort eof
+eval spawn $CRYPTSETUP luksResume -v -T 3  $DEV_NAME
+expect timeout abort "Enter passphrase for $LOOPDEV:"
+sleep 0.1
+send "$PWD0 x\n"
+expect timeout abort "No key available with this passphrase."
+expect timeout abort "Enter passphrase for $LOOPDEV:"
+sleep 0.1
+send "$PWD1\n"
+expect timeout abort "No key available with this passphrase."
+expect timeout abort "Enter passphrase for $LOOPDEV:"
+sleep 0.1
+send "$PWD0 y\n"
+expect timeout abort "No key available with this passphrase."
+expect timeout abort eof
+eval spawn $CRYPTSETUP luksResume -v $DEV_NAME
+expect timeout abort "Enter passphrase for $LOOPDEV:"
+sleep 0.1
+send "$PWD0\n"
+expect timeout abort "Command successful."
+expect timeout abort eof
+exit
+EOF
+[ $? -eq 0 ] || fail "Expect script failed."
+$CRYPTSETUP remove $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+remove_mapping
+exit 0
diff --git a/tests/compat-test2 b/tests/compat-test2
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..893367f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/compat-test2
@@ -0,0 +1,954 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+PS4='$LINENO:'
+CRYPTSETUP=../cryptsetup
+
+CRYPTSETUP_VALGRIND=../.libs/cryptsetup
+CRYPTSETUP_LIB_VALGRIND=../.libs
+
+DEV_NAME=dummy
+DEV_NAME2=dummy2
+DEV_NAME3=dummy3
+ORIG_IMG=luks-test-orig
+IMG=luks-test
+IMG10=luks-test-v10
+HEADER_IMG=luks-header
+HEADER_KEYU=luks2_keyslot_unassigned.img
+HEADER_LUKS2_PV=blkid-luks2-pv.img
+KEY1=key1
+KEY2=key2
+KEY5=key5
+KEYE=keye
+PWD0="compatkey"
+PWD1="93R4P4pIqAH8"
+PWD2="mymJeD8ivEhE"
+PWD3="ocMakf3fAcQO"
+PWD4="Qx3qn46vq0v"
+PWDW="rUkL4RUryBom"
+TEST_KEYRING_NAME="compattest2_keyring"
+TEST_TOKEN0="compattest2_desc0"
+TEST_TOKEN1="compattest2_desc1"
+VK_FILE="compattest2_vkfile"
+IMPORT_TOKEN="{\"type\":\"some_type\",\"keyslots\":[],\"base64_data\":\"zxI7vKB1Qwl4VPB4D-N-OgcC14hPCG0IDu8O7eCqaQ\"}"
+TOKEN_FILE0=test-token-file0
+TOKEN_FILE1=test-token-file1
+
+FAST_PBKDF_OPT="--pbkdf pbkdf2 --pbkdf-force-iterations 1000"
+
+TEST_UUID="12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789abc"
+
+LOOPDEV=$(losetup -f 2>/dev/null)
+[ -f /etc/system-fips ] && FIPS_MODE=$(cat /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled 2>/dev/null)
+
+LOCK_DIR=$(grep DEFAULT_LUKS2_LOCK_PATH ../config.h | cut -d\" -f 2)
+HAVE_KEYRING=$(grep -e "#define KERNEL_KEYRING" ../config.h)
+test -n "$HAVE_KEYRING" || HAVE_KEYRING=0
+HAVE_KEYRING=${HAVE_KEYRING: -1}
+
+function remove_mapping()
+{
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME3 ] && dmsetup remove $DEV_NAME3
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME2 ] && dmsetup remove $DEV_NAME2
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME ] && dmsetup remove $DEV_NAME
+	losetup -d $LOOPDEV >/dev/null 2>&1
+	rm -f $ORIG_IMG $IMG $IMG10 $KEY1 $KEY2 $KEY5 $KEYE $HEADER_IMG $HEADER_KEYU $VK_FILE $HEADER_LUKS2_PV missing-file $TOKEN_FILE0 $TOKEN_FILE1 test_image_* >/dev/null 2>&1
+
+	# unlink whole test keyring
+	[ -n "$TEST_KEYRING" ] && keyctl unlink $TEST_KEYRING "@u" >/dev/null
+	unset TEST_KEYRING
+}
+
+function force_uevent()
+{
+	DNAME=$(echo $LOOPDEV | cut -f3 -d /)
+	echo "change" >/sys/block/$DNAME/uevent
+}
+
+function fail()
+{
+	[ -n "$1" ] && echo "$1"
+	remove_mapping
+	echo "FAILED at line $(caller)"
+	exit 2
+}
+
+function fips_mode()
+{
+	[ -n "$FIPS_MODE" ] && [ "$FIPS_MODE" -gt 0 ]
+}
+
+function can_fail_fips()
+{
+        # Ignore this fail if running in FIPS mode
+	fips_mode || fail $1
+}
+
+function skip()
+{
+	[ -n "$1" ] && echo "$1"
+	remove_mapping
+	exit 77
+}
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME ] && dmsetup remove $DEV_NAME
+
+	case "$2" in
+	wipe)
+		remove_mapping
+		dd if=/dev/zero of=$IMG bs=1M count=40 >/dev/null 2>&1
+		sync
+		losetup $LOOPDEV $IMG
+		;;
+	new)
+		remove_mapping
+		xz -cd compatimage.img.xz > $IMG
+		xz -dk $HEADER_KEYU.xz
+		# FIXME: switch to internal loop (no losetup at all)
+		echo "bad" | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen --key-slot 0 --test-passphrase $IMG 2>&1 | \
+			grep "autoclear flag" && skip "WARNING: Too old kernel, test skipped."
+		losetup $LOOPDEV $IMG
+		xz -cd compatv10image.img.xz > $IMG10
+		;;
+	reuse | *)
+		if [ ! -e $IMG ]; then
+			xz -cd compatimage.img.xz > $IMG
+			losetup $LOOPDEV $IMG
+		fi
+		[ ! -e $IMG10 ] && xz -cd compatv10image.img.xz > $IMG10
+		;;
+	esac
+
+	if [ ! -e $KEY1 ]; then
+		#dd if=/dev/urandom of=$KEY1 count=1 bs=32 >/dev/null 2>&1
+		echo -n $'\x48\xc6\x74\x4f\x41\x4e\x50\xc0\x79\xc2\x2d\x5b\x5f\x68\x84\x17' >$KEY1
+		echo -n $'\x9c\x03\x5e\x1b\x4d\x0f\x9a\x75\xb3\x90\x70\x32\x0a\xf8\xae\xc4'>>$KEY1
+	fi
+
+	if [ ! -e $KEY2 ]; then
+		dd if=/dev/urandom of=$KEY2 count=1 bs=16 >/dev/null 2>&1
+	fi
+
+	if [ ! -e $KEY5 ]; then
+		dd if=/dev/urandom of=$KEY5 count=1 bs=16 >/dev/null 2>&1
+	fi
+
+	if [ ! -e $KEYE ]; then
+		touch $KEYE
+	fi
+
+	cp $IMG $ORIG_IMG
+	[ -n "$1" ] && echo "CASE: $1"
+}
+
+function check_exists()
+{
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME ] || fail
+}
+
+function valgrind_setup()
+{
+	which valgrind >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "Cannot find valgrind."
+	[ ! -f $CRYPTSETUP_VALGRIND ] && fail "Unable to get location of cryptsetup executable."
+	export LD_LIBRARY_PATH="$CRYPTSETUP_LIB_VALGRIND:$LD_LIBRARY_PATH"
+}
+
+function valgrind_run()
+{
+	INFOSTRING="$(basename ${BASH_SOURCE[1]})-line-${BASH_LINENO[0]}" ./valg.sh ${CRYPTSETUP_VALGRIND} "$@"
+}
+
+function dm_crypt_keyring_support()
+{
+	VER_STR=$(dmsetup targets | grep crypt | cut -f2 -dv)
+	[ -z "$VER_STR" ] && fail "Failed to parse dm-crypt version."
+
+	VER_MAJ=$(echo $VER_STR | cut -f 1 -d.)
+	VER_MIN=$(echo $VER_STR | cut -f 2 -d.)
+	VER_PTC=$(echo $VER_STR | cut -f 3 -d.)
+
+	[ $VER_MAJ -gt 1 ] && return 0
+	[ $VER_MAJ -eq 1 -a $VER_MIN -gt 18 ] && return 0
+	[ $VER_MAJ -eq 1 -a $VER_MIN -eq 18 -a $VER_PTC -ge 1 ] && return 0
+	return 1
+}
+
+function dm_crypt_keyring_flawed()
+{
+	dm_crypt_keyring_support && return 1;
+
+	[ $VER_MAJ -gt 1 ] && return 0
+	[ $VER_MAJ -eq 1 -a $VER_MIN -ge 15 ] && return 0
+	return 1
+}
+
+function dm_crypt_keyring_new_kernel()
+{
+	KER_STR=$(uname -r)
+	[ -z "$KER_STR" ] && fail "Failed to parse kernel version."
+	KER_MAJ=$(echo $KER_STR | cut -f 1 -d.)
+	KER_MIN=$(echo $KER_STR | cut -f 2 -d.)
+
+	[ $KER_MAJ -ge 5 ] && return 0
+	[ $KER_MAJ -eq 4 -a $KER_MIN -ge 15 ] && return 0
+	return 1
+}
+
+function test_and_prepare_keyring() {
+	which keyctl > /dev/null 2>&1 || skip "Cannot find keyctl, test skipped"
+	keyctl list "@s" > /dev/null || skip "Current session keyring is unreachable, test skipped"
+	TEST_KEYRING=$(keyctl newring $TEST_KEYRING_NAME "@u" 2> /dev/null)
+	test -n "$TEST_KEYRING" || skip "Failed to create keyring in user keyring"
+	keyctl search "@s" keyring "$TEST_KEYRING" > /dev/null 2>&1 || keyctl link "@u" "@s" > /dev/null 2>&1
+	load_key user test_key test_data "$TEST_KEYRING" || skip "Kernel keyring service is useless on this system, test skipped."
+}
+
+# $1 type
+# $2 description
+# $3 payload
+# $4 keyring
+function load_key()
+{
+	keyctl add $@ >/dev/null
+}
+
+export LANG=C
+
+[ -n "$VALG" ] && valgrind_setup && CRYPTSETUP=valgrind_run
+
+[ $(id -u) != 0 ] && skip "WARNING: You must be root to run this test, test skipped."
+[ -z "$LOOPDEV" ] && skip "WARNING: Cannot find free loop device, test skipped."
+[ -d "$LOCK_DIR" ] || skip "WARNING: LUKS2 locking directory ($LOCK_DIR) is missing, test skipped."
+
+prepare "[1] Data offset" wipe
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV -q --offset 1 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV -q --offset 16385 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV -q --offset 32 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV -q --align-payload 16384 --offset 16384 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV -q --offset 16384 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksDump  $LOOPDEV | grep -q "offset: $((512 * 16384)) \[bytes\]" || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV -q --sector-size 1024 --offset 16384 >/dev/null || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksDump  $LOOPDEV | grep -q "offset: $((512 * 16384)) \[bytes\]" || fail
+truncate -s 4096 $HEADER_IMG
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV --header $HEADER_IMG -q --offset 80000 >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail
+
+prepare "[2] Sector size and old payload alignment" wipe
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV -q --sector-size  511 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV -q --sector-size  256 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV -q --sector-size 8192 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV -q --sector-size  512 || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV -q --align-payload 5 || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV -q --sector-size  512 --align-payload 5 || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV -q --sector-size 2048 --align-payload 32 >/dev/null || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV -q --sector-size 4096 >/dev/null || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV -q --sector-size 2048 --align-payload 32768 >/dev/null || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksDump  $LOOPDEV | grep -q "offset: $((512 * 32768)) \[bytes\]" || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV -q --sector-size 2048 >/dev/null || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV -q --sector-size 4096 --align-payload 32768 >/dev/null || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksDump  $LOOPDEV | grep -q "offset: $((512 * 32768)) \[bytes\]" || fail
+
+prepare "[3] format" wipe
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 -s 128 luksFormat --type luks2 $LOOPDEV || fail
+prepare "[4] format using hash sha512" wipe
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -h sha512 -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 -s 128 luksFormat --type luks2 $LOOPDEV || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksDump  $LOOPDEV | grep "0: pbkdf2" -A2 | grep "Hash:" | grep -qe sha512 || fail
+
+prepare "[5] open"
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME --test-passphrase || fail
+echo $PWDW | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME --test-passphrase 2>/dev/null && fail
+[ $? -ne 2 ] && fail "luksOpen should return EPERM exit code"
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+check_exists
+
+# Key Slot 1 and key material section 1 must change, the rest must not.
+prepare "[6] add key"
+echo -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV $FAST_PBKDF_OPT || fail
+echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+# Unsuccessful Key Delete - nothing may change
+prepare "[7] unsuccessful delete"
+echo $PWDW | $CRYPTSETUP luksKillSlot $LOOPDEV 1 2>/dev/null && fail
+[ $? -ne 2 ] && fail "luksKillSlot should return EPERM exit code"
+#FIXME
+#$CRYPTSETUP -q luksKillSlot $LOOPDEV 8 2>/dev/null && fail
+#$CRYPTSETUP -q luksKillSlot $LOOPDEV 7 2>/dev/null && fail
+
+# Delete Key Test
+# Key Slot 1 and key material section 1 must change, the rest must not
+prepare "[8] successful delete"
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksKillSlot $LOOPDEV 1 || fail
+echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2> /dev/null && fail
+[ $? -ne 2 ] && fail "luksOpen should return EPERM exit code"
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+# Key Slot 1 and key material section 1 must change, the rest must not
+prepare "[9] add key test for key files"
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV $KEY1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -d $KEY1 luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+# Key Slot 1 and key material section 1 must change, the rest must not
+prepare "[10] delete key test with key1 as remaining key"
+$CRYPTSETUP -d $KEY1 luksKillSlot $LOOPDEV 0 || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -d $KEY1 $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+# Delete last slot
+prepare "[11] delete last key" wipe
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks2 $LOOPDEV $FAST_PBKDF_OPT || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksKillSlot $LOOPDEV 0 || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+
+# Format test for ESSIV, and some other parameters.
+prepare "[12] parameter variation test" wipe
+$CRYPTSETUP -q $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 -s 128 luksFormat --type luks2 $LOOPDEV $KEY1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -d $KEY1 luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+prepare	"[13] open/close - stacked devices" wipe
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 $LOOPDEV $FAST_PBKDF_OPT || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME $FAST_PBKDF_OPT || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksOpen /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME $DEV_NAME2 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksClose  $DEV_NAME2 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksClose  $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+prepare	"[14] format/open - passphrase on stdin & new line" wipe
+# stdin defined by "-" must take even newline
+#echo -n -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $LOOPDEV - || fail
+echo -n -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -q --key-file=- luksFormat --type luks2 $LOOPDEV || fail
+echo -n -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP -q --key-file=- luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksClose  $DEV_NAME || fail
+echo -n -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+# now also try --key-file
+echo -n -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -q luksFormat --type luks2 $LOOPDEV --key-file=- || fail
+echo -n -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP -q --key-file=- luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksClose  $DEV_NAME || fail
+# process newline if from stdin
+echo -n -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -q luksFormat --type luks2 $LOOPDEV || fail
+echo "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksClose  $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+prepare "[15] UUID - use and report provided UUID" wipe
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --uuid blah --type luks2 $LOOPDEV 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --uuid $TEST_UUID --type luks2 $LOOPDEV || fail
+tst=$($CRYPTSETUP -q luksUUID $LOOPDEV)
+[ "$tst"x = "$TEST_UUID"x ] || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksUUID --uuid $TEST_UUID $LOOPDEV || fail
+tst=$($CRYPTSETUP -q luksUUID $LOOPDEV)
+[ "$tst"x = "$TEST_UUID"x ] || fail
+
+prepare "[16] luksFormat" wipe
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --master-key-file /dev/urandom --type luks2 $LOOPDEV || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --master-key-file /dev/urandom --type luks2 $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --master-key-file /dev/urandom -s 256 --uuid $TEST_UUID --type luks2 $LOOPDEV $KEY1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -d $KEY1 $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksClose  $DEV_NAME || fail
+# open by UUID
+force_uevent # some systems do not update loop by-uuid
+$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -d $KEY1 UUID=X$TEST_UUID $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -d $KEY1 UUID=$TEST_UUID $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksClose  $DEV_NAME || fail
+# empty keyfile
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV $KEYE || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -d $KEYE $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksClose  $DEV_NAME || fail
+# open by volume key
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -s 256 --master-key-file $KEY1 --type luks2 $LOOPDEV || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen --master-key-file /dev/urandom $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen --master-key-file $KEY1 $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksClose  $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+prepare "[17] AddKey volume key, passphrase and keyfile" wipe
+# masterkey
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV --master-key-file /dev/zero --key-slot 3 || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV --test-passphrase || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "3: luks2" || fail
+echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV --master-key-file /dev/zero --key-slot 4 || fail
+echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV --test-passphrase --key-slot 4 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "4: luks2" || fail
+echo $PWD3 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV --master-key-file /dev/null --key-slot 5 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV --master-key-file /dev/zero --key-slot 5 $KEY1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV --test-passphrase --key-slot 5 -d $KEY1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "5: luks2" || fail
+
+# special "-" handling
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV $KEY1 --key-slot 3 || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 - || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV --test-passphrase 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV -d - --test-passphrase || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV -d - $KEY2 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV -d $KEY2 --test-passphrase || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV -d - -d $KEY1 --test-passphrase 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 -d $KEY1 --test-passphrase 2>/dev/null && fail
+
+# [0]PWD1 [1]PWD2 [2]$KEY1/1 [3]$KEY1 [4]$KEY2
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV $KEY1 --key-slot 3 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "3: luks2" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -d $KEY1 $KEY2 --key-slot 3 2>/dev/null && fail
+# keyfile/keyfile
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -d $KEY1 $KEY2 --key-slot 4 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV -d $KEY2 --test-passphrase --key-slot 4 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "4: luks2" || fail
+# passphrase/keyfile
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 --key-slot 0 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "0: luks2" || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV --test-passphrase --key-slot 0 || fail
+# passphrase/passphrase
+echo -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2\n" | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV --key-slot 1 || fail
+echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV --test-passphrase --key-slot 1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "1: luks2" || fail
+# keyfile/passphrase
+echo -e "$PWD2\n" | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV $KEY1 --key-slot 2 --new-keyfile-size 3 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "2: luks2" || fail
+
+prepare "[18] RemoveKey passphrase and keyfile" reuse
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "3: luks2" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksRemoveKey $LOOPDEV $KEY1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "3: luks2" && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksRemoveKey $LOOPDEV $KEY1 2>/dev/null && fail
+[ $? -ne 2 ] && fail "luksRemoveKey should return EPERM exit code"
+$CRYPTSETUP luksRemoveKey $LOOPDEV $KEY2 --keyfile-size 1 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "4: luks2" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksRemoveKey $LOOPDEV $KEY2 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "4: luks2" && fail
+# if password or keyfile is provided, batch mode must not suppress it
+echo "badpw" | $CRYPTSETUP luksKillSlot $LOOPDEV 2 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo "badpw" | $CRYPTSETUP luksKillSlot $LOOPDEV 2 -q 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo "badpw" | $CRYPTSETUP luksKillSlot $LOOPDEV 2 --key-file=- 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo "badpw" | $CRYPTSETUP luksKillSlot $LOOPDEV 2 --key-file=- -q 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "2: luks2" || fail
+# kill slot using passphrase from 1
+echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP luksKillSlot $LOOPDEV 2 2>/dev/null || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "2: luks2" && fail
+# remove key0 / slot 0
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksRemoveKey $LOOPDEV || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "0: luks2" && fail
+# last keyslot, in batch mode no passphrase needed...
+$CRYPTSETUP luksKillSlot -q $LOOPDEV 1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "1: luks2" && fail
+
+prepare "[19] create & status & resize" wipe
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME $LOOPDEV --hash xxx 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME $LOOPDEV --hash sha1 --cipher aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 --offset 3 --skip 4 --readonly || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q status  $DEV_NAME | grep "offset:" | grep -q "3 sectors" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q status  $DEV_NAME | grep "skipped:" | grep -q "4 sectors" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q status  $DEV_NAME | grep "mode:" | grep -q "readonly" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q resize  $DEV_NAME --size 100 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q status  $DEV_NAME | grep "size:" | grep -q "100 sectors" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q resize  $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q status  $DEV_NAME | grep "size:" | grep -q "81917 sectors" || fail
+# Resize underlying loop device as well
+truncate -s 20M $IMG || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q resize  $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q status  $DEV_NAME | grep "size:" | grep -q "40957 sectors" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q remove  $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q status  $DEV_NAME >/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME --hash sha1 $LOOPDEV || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q remove  $DEV_NAME || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q create $DEV_NAME --hash sha1 $LOOPDEV || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q remove  $DEV_NAME || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q create $DEV_NAME --hash sha1 --size 100 $LOOPDEV || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q status  $DEV_NAME | grep "size:" | grep -q "100 sectors" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q remove  $DEV_NAME || fail
+# verify is ignored on non-tty input
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME $LOOPDEV --hash sha1 --verify-passphrase 2>/dev/null || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q remove  $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 --key-size 255 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 --key-size -1 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 -l -1 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1  || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME $LOOPDEV -d blah 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q remove  $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME $LOOPDEV -d /dev/urandom || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q remove  $DEV_NAME || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+if dm_crypt_keyring_support; then
+	echo | $CRYPTSETUP -q resize --size 100 $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+fi
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q resize --size 100 $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q status  $DEV_NAME | grep "size:" | grep -q "100 sectors" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen --disable-keyring $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+echo | $CRYPTSETUP -q resize --size 100 $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q status  $DEV_NAME | grep "size:" | grep -q "100 sectors" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+if dm_crypt_keyring_support; then
+	$CRYPTSETUP -q resize --disable-keyring --size 100 $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+fi
+
+prepare "[20] Disallow open/create if already mapped." wipe
+$CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME2 $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP remove  $DEV_NAME || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME2 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP  luksClose  $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+prepare "[21] luksDump" wipe
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --uuid $TEST_UUID --type luks2 $LOOPDEV $KEY1 || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "0: luks2" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q $TEST_UUID || fail
+echo $PWDW | $CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV --dump-master-key 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV --dump-master-key | grep -q "MK dump:" || can_fail_fips
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump -q $LOOPDEV --dump-master-key -d $KEY1 | grep -q "MK dump:" || can_fail_fips
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksDump -q $LOOPDEV --dump-master-key --master-key-file $VK_FILE >/dev/null || can_fail_fips
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksDump -q $LOOPDEV --dump-master-key --master-key-file $VK_FILE 2>/dev/null && fail
+fips_mode || {
+	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --master-key-file $VK_FILE $LOOPDEV || fail
+}
+
+prepare "[22] remove disappeared device" wipe
+dmsetup create $DEV_NAME --table "0 39998 linear $LOOPDEV 2" || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q $FAST_PBKDF_OPT luksFormat --type luks2 /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksOpen /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME $DEV_NAME2 || fail
+# underlying device now returns error but node is still present
+dmsetup load $DEV_NAME --table "0 40000 error" || fail
+dmsetup resume $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksClose $DEV_NAME2 || fail
+dmsetup remove $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+prepare "[23] ChangeKey passphrase and keyfile" wipe
+# [0]$KEY1 [1]key0
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 $LOOPDEV $KEY1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --key-slot 0 || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -d $KEY1 --key-slot 1 || fail
+# keyfile [0] / keyfile [0]
+$CRYPTSETUP luksChangeKey $LOOPDEV $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -d $KEY1 $KEY2 --key-slot 0 || fail
+# passphrase [1] / passphrase [1]
+echo -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2\n" | $CRYPTSETUP luksChangeKey $LOOPDEV $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --key-slot 1 || fail
+# keyfile [0] / keyfile [new]
+$CRYPTSETUP luksChangeKey $LOOPDEV $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -d $KEY2 $KEY1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "0: luks2" && fail
+# passphrase [1] / passphrase [new]
+echo -e "$PWD2\n$PWD1\n" | $CRYPTSETUP luksChangeKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "1: luks2" && fail
+# use all slots
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 $KEY2 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 $KEY2 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 $KEY2 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 $KEY2 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 $KEY2 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 $KEY2 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT || fail
+# still allows replace
+#FIXME
+#$CRYPTSETUP luksChangeKey $LOOPDEV $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -d $KEY1 $KEY2 || fail
+#$CRYPTSETUP luksChangeKey $LOOPDEV $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -d $KEY1 $KEY2 2>/dev/null && fail
+
+prepare "[24] Keyfile limit" wipe
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV $KEY1 --key-slot 0 -l 13 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP --key-file=$KEY1 luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP --key-file=$KEY1 -l 0 luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP --key-file=$KEY1 -l -1 luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP --key-file=$KEY1 -l 14 luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP --key-file=$KEY1 -l 13 --keyfile-offset 1 luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP --key-file=$KEY1 -l 13 --keyfile-offset -1 luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP --key-file=$KEY1 -l 13 luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksClose  $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 $KEY2 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 $KEY2 -l 14 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 $KEY2 -l -1 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 $KEY2 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -l 13 --new-keyfile-size 12 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksRemoveKey $LOOPDEV $KEY2 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksRemoveKey $LOOPDEV $KEY2 -l 12 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksChangeKey $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 $KEY2 2>/dev/null && fail
+[ $? -ne 2 ] && fail "luksChangeKey should return EPERM exit code"
+$CRYPTSETUP luksChangeKey $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 $KEY2 -l 14 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksChangeKey $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 $KEY2 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -l 13 || fail
+# -l is ignored for stdin if _only_ passphrase is used
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV -d $KEY2 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT || fail
+# this is stupid, but expected
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksRemoveKey $LOOPDEV -l 11 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWDW"0" | $CRYPTSETUP luksRemoveKey $LOOPDEV -l 12 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo -e "$PWD1\n" | $CRYPTSETUP luksRemoveKey $LOOPDEV -d- -l 12 || fail
+# offset
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV $KEY1 --key-slot 0 -l 13 --keyfile-offset 16 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP --key-file=$KEY1 -l 13 --keyfile-offset 15 luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP --key-file=$KEY1 -l 13 --keyfile-offset 16 luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksClose  $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -d $KEY1 -l 13 --keyfile-offset 16 $KEY2 --new-keyfile-offset 1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP --key-file=$KEY2 --keyfile-offset 11 luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP --key-file=$KEY2 --keyfile-offset 1 luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksClose  $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksChangeKey $LOOPDEV $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -d $KEY2 --keyfile-offset 1 $KEY2 --new-keyfile-offset 0 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -d $KEY2 $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksClose $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+prepare "[25] Create shared segments" wipe
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME $LOOPDEV  --hash sha1 --offset   0 --size 256 || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME2 $LOOPDEV --hash sha1 --offset 512 --size 256 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME2 $LOOPDEV --hash sha1 --offset 512 --size 256 --shared || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q remove  $DEV_NAME2 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q remove  $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+prepare "[26] Suspend/Resume" wipe
+# only LUKS is supported
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP create $DEV_NAME --hash sha1 $LOOPDEV || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksSuspend $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksResume $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q remove  $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksSuspend $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+# LUKS
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksSuspend $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q resize  $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWDW | $CRYPTSETUP luksResume $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+[ $? -ne 2 ] && fail "luksResume should return EPERM exit code"
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksResume $DEV_NAME  || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksClose $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+prepare "[27] luksOpen with specified key slot number" wipe
+# first, let's try passphrase option
+echo $PWD3 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -S 5 --type luks2 $LOOPDEV || fail
+echo $PWD3 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -S 4 $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME && fail
+[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME ] && fail
+echo $PWD3 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -S 5 $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+check_exists
+$CRYPTSETUP luksClose $DEV_NAME || fail
+echo -e "$PWD3\n$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -S 0 $LOOPDEV || fail
+echo $PWD3 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -S 0 $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME ] && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -S 5 $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME ] && fail
+# second, try it with keyfiles
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat -q -S 5 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -d $KEY5 --type luks2 $LOOPDEV || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -S 1 -d $KEY5 $LOOPDEV $KEY1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -S 5 -d $KEY5 $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+check_exists
+$CRYPTSETUP luksClose $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -S 1 -d $KEY5 $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME ] && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -S 5 -d $KEY1 $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME ] && fail
+# test keyslot not assigned to segment is unable to unlock volume
+# otoh it should be allowed to test for proper passphrase
+prepare "" new
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open -S1 --test-passphrase $HEADER_KEYU || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open --test-passphrase $HEADER_KEYU || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open -S1 $HEADER_KEYU $DEV_NAME && fail
+[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME ] && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $HEADER_KEYU $DEV_NAME && fail
+[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME ] && fail
+echo $PWD0 | $CRYPTSETUP open -S1 --test-passphrase $HEADER_KEYU $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksKillSlot -q $HEADER_KEYU 0
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $HEADER_KEYU | grep -q "0: luks2" && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open -S1 --test-passphrase $HEADER_KEYU || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open --test-passphrase $HEADER_KEYU || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open -S1 $HEADER_KEYU $DEV_NAME && fail
+
+prepare "[28] Detached LUKS header" wipe
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV --header $HEADER_IMG || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV --header $HEADER_IMG --align-payload 1 >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV --header $HEADER_IMG --align-payload 8192 || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV --header $HEADER_IMG --align-payload 4096 >/dev/null || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $HEADER_IMG | grep -e "0: crypt" -A1 | grep -qe $((4096*512)) || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV --header $HEADER_IMG --align-payload 0 || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV --header $HEADER_IMG $DEV_NAME || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q resize  $DEV_NAME --size 100 --header $HEADER_IMG || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q status  $DEV_NAME --header $HEADER_IMG | grep "size:" | grep -q "100 sectors" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q status  $DEV_NAME | grep "type:" | grep -q "n/a" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q status  $DEV_NAME | grep "size:" | grep -q "100 sectors" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksSuspend $DEV_NAME --header $HEADER_IMG || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksResume $DEV_NAME --header $HEADER_IMG || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksSuspend $DEV_NAME || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksResume $DEV_NAME && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksResume $DEV_NAME --header $HEADER_IMG || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksClose $DEV_NAME || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -S 5 _fakedev_ --header $HEADER_IMG $KEY5 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump _fakedev_ --header $HEADER_IMG | grep -q "5: luks2" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksKillSlot -q _fakedev_ --header $HEADER_IMG 5 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump _fakedev_ --header $HEADER_IMG | grep -q "5: luks2" && fail
+
+prepare "[29] Repair metadata" wipe
+xz -dk $HEADER_LUKS2_PV.xz
+$CRYPTSETUP isLuks --disable-locks $HEADER_LUKS2_PV && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP isLuks $HEADER_LUKS2_PV && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP isLuks --disable-locks --type luks2 $HEADER_LUKS2_PV && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP isLuks --type luks2 $HEADER_LUKS2_PV && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q repair $HEADER_LUKS2_PV || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP isLuks $HEADER_LUKS2_PV || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP isLuks --type luks2 $HEADER_LUKS2_PV || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP isLuks --type luks1 $HEADER_LUKS2_PV && fail
+
+prepare "[30] LUKS erase" wipe
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV $KEY5 --key-slot 5 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -S 1 -d $KEY5 $LOOPDEV $KEY1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "1: luks2" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "5: luks2" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksErase -q $LOOPDEV || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "1: luks2" && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "5: luks2" && fail
+
+prepare "[31] LUKS convert" wipe
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks1 $LOOPDEV $KEY5 --key-slot 5 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -S 1 -d $KEY5 $LOOPDEV $KEY1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q convert --type luks1 $LOOPDEV >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "Key Slot 1: ENABLED" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "Key Slot 5: ENABLED" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q convert --type luks2 $LOOPDEV || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "1: luks2" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "5: luks2" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q convert --type luks1 $LOOPDEV || fail
+# hash test
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV $KEY5 -S 0 --hash sha1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -S 1 -d $KEY5 $LOOPDEV $KEY1 --hash sha256 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q convert --type luks1 $LOOPDEV >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksKillSlot $LOOPDEV 1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q convert --type luks1 $LOOPDEV || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "Key Slot 0: ENABLED" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV --test-passphrase --key-slot 0 -d $KEY5 || fail
+
+if dm_crypt_keyring_flawed; then
+	prepare "[32a] LUKS2 keyring dm-crypt bug" wipe
+	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV --header $HEADER_IMG || fail
+	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $LOOPDEV --header $HEADER_IMG $DEV_NAME || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP -q status $DEV_NAME | grep "key location:" | grep -q "dm-crypt" || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+	# key must not load in kernel key even when dm-crypt module is missing
+	if rmmod dm-crypt > /dev/null 2>&1; then
+		echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $LOOPDEV --header $HEADER_IMG $DEV_NAME || fail
+		$CRYPTSETUP -q status $DEV_NAME | grep "key location:" | grep -q "dm-crypt" || fail
+		$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+	fi
+fi
+
+if dm_crypt_keyring_support && dm_crypt_keyring_new_kernel; then
+	prepare "[32] LUKS2 key in keyring" wipe
+	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV --header $HEADER_IMG || fail
+
+	# check keyring support detection works as expected
+	rmmod dm-crypt > /dev/null 2>&1 || true
+	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $LOOPDEV --header $HEADER_IMG $DEV_NAME || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP -q status $DEV_NAME | grep "key location:" | grep -q "keyring" || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open  $LOOPDEV --disable-keyring --header $HEADER_IMG $DEV_NAME || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP -q status $DEV_NAME | grep "key location:" | grep -q "dm-crypt" || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $LOOPDEV --disable-keyring --header $HEADER_IMG $DEV_NAME || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP luksSuspend $DEV_NAME || fail
+	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksResume $DEV_NAME --header $HEADER_IMG || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP -q status $DEV_NAME | grep "key location:" | grep -q "keyring" || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $LOOPDEV --header $HEADER_IMG $DEV_NAME || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP luksSuspend $DEV_NAME || fail
+	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksResume --disable-keyring $DEV_NAME --header $HEADER_IMG || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP -q status $DEV_NAME | grep "key location:" | grep -q "dm-crypt" || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+fi
+
+# FIXME: candidate for non-root tests
+prepare "[33] tokens" wipe
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV || fail
+if [ $HAVE_KEYRING -gt 0 ]; then
+
+	test_and_prepare_keyring
+
+	$CRYPTSETUP token add $LOOPDEV --key-description $TEST_TOKEN0 --token-id 3 || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q -e "3: luks2-keyring" || fail
+	# keyslot 5 is inactive
+	$CRYPTSETUP token add $LOOPDEV --key-description $TEST_TOKEN1 --key-slot 5 2> /dev/null && fail
+	# key description is not reachable
+	$CRYPTSETUP open --token-only $LOOPDEV --test-passphrase && fail
+	# wrong passphrase
+	load_key user $TEST_TOKEN0 "blabla" "$TEST_KEYRING" || fail "Cannot load 32 byte user key type"
+	$CRYPTSETUP open --token-only $LOOPDEV --test-passphrase 2>/dev/null && fail
+	load_key user $TEST_TOKEN0 $PWD1 "$TEST_KEYRING" || fail "Cannot load 32 byte user key type"
+	$CRYPTSETUP open --token-only $LOOPDEV --test-passphrase || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP open --token-only $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME > /dev/null || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP token remove --token-id 3 $LOOPDEV || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q -e "3: luks2-keyring" && fail
+
+	# test we can remove keyslot with token
+	echo -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey -S4 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP token add $LOOPDEV --key-description $TEST_TOKEN1 --key-slot 4 || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP -q luksKillSlot $LOOPDEV 4 || fail
+fi
+echo -n "$IMPORT_TOKEN" | $CRYPTSETUP token import $LOOPDEV --token-id 10 || fail
+echo -n "$IMPORT_TOKEN" | $CRYPTSETUP token import $LOOPDEV --token-id 11 --json-file - || fail
+echo -n "$IMPORT_TOKEN" > $TOKEN_FILE0
+$CRYPTSETUP token import $LOOPDEV --token-id 12 --json-file $TOKEN_FILE0 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP token import $LOOPDEV --token-id 12 --json-file $TOKEN_FILE0 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP token export $LOOPDEV --token-id 10 | diff --from-file - $TOKEN_FILE0 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP token export $LOOPDEV --token-id 11 | diff --from-file - $TOKEN_FILE0 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP token export $LOOPDEV --token-id 12 | diff --from-file - $TOKEN_FILE0 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP token export $LOOPDEV --token-id 12 --json-file $TOKEN_FILE1 || fail
+diff $TOKEN_FILE0 $TOKEN_FILE1 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP token export $LOOPDEV --token-id 12 > $TOKEN_FILE1 || fail
+diff $TOKEN_FILE0 $TOKEN_FILE1 || fail
+
+prepare "[34] LUKS keyslot priority" wipe
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV -S 1 || fail
+echo -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -S 5 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP config $LOOPDEV -S 0 --priority prefer && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP config $LOOPDEV -S 1 --priority bla >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP config $LOOPDEV -S 1 --priority ignore || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $LOOPDEV --test-passphrase 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $LOOPDEV --test-passphrase -S 1 || fail
+echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP open $LOOPDEV --test-passphrase || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP config $LOOPDEV -S 1 --priority normal || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $LOOPDEV --test-passphrase || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP config $LOOPDEV -S 1 --priority ignore || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $LOOPDEV --test-passphrase 2>/dev/null && fail
+
+prepare "[35] LUKS label and subsystem" wipe
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep "Subsystem:" | grep -q "(no subsystem)" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep "Label:" | grep -q "(no label)" || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV --subsystem SatelliteTwo --label TheLabel || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep "Subsystem:" | grep -q "SatelliteTwo" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep "Label:" | grep -q "TheLabel" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP config $LOOPDEV --subsystem SatelliteThree
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep "Subsystem:" | grep -q "SatelliteThree" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep "Label:" | grep -q "(no label)" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP config $LOOPDEV --subsystem SatelliteThree --label TheLabel
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep "Subsystem:" | grep -q "SatelliteThree" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep "Label:" | grep -q "TheLabel" || fail
+
+prepare "[36] LUKS PBKDF setting" wipe
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks2 --pbkdf bla $LOOPDEV >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail
+# Force setting, no benchmark. PBKDF2 has 1000 iterations as a minimum
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks2 --pbkdf pbkdf2   --pbkdf-force-iterations 999 $LOOPDEV 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 --pbkdf pbkdf2   --pbkdf-force-iterations 1234 $LOOPDEV || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep "Iterations:" | grep -q "1234" || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 --pbkdf argon2id --pbkdf-force-iterations 3 $LOOPDEV 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 --pbkdf argon2id --pbkdf-force-iterations 4 --pbkdf-memory 100000 $LOOPDEV || can_fail_fips
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep "PBKDF:" | grep -q "argon2id" || can_fail_fips
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 --pbkdf argon2i  --pbkdf-force-iterations 4 \
+	--pbkdf-memory 1234 --pbkdf-parallel 1 $LOOPDEV || can_fail_fips
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep "PBKDF:" | grep -q "argon2i" || can_fail_fips
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep "Time cost:" | grep -q "4" || can_fail_fips
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep "Memory:" | grep -q "1234" || can_fail_fips
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep "Threads:" | grep -q "1" || can_fail_fips
+# Benchmark
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 --pbkdf argon2i -i 500 --pbkdf-memory 1234 --pbkdf-parallel 1 $LOOPDEV || can_fail_fips
+[ 0"$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep "Time cost:" | cut -d: -f 2 | sed -e 's/\ //g')" -gt 0 ] || can_fail_fips
+[ 0"$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep "Memory:" | cut -d: -f 2 | sed -e 's/\ //g')" -gt 0 ] || can_fail_fips
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 --pbkdf pbkdf2 -i 500 $LOOPDEV || fail
+[ 0"$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -m1 "Iterations:" | cut -d' ' -f 2 | sed -e 's/\ //g')" -gt 1000 ] || fail
+
+prepare "[37] LUKS Keyslot convert" wipe
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks1 $LOOPDEV $KEY5 --key-slot 5 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksConvertKey $LOOPDEV --key-file $KEY5 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q convert --type luks2 $LOOPDEV || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "5: luks2" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep "PBKDF:" | grep -q "pbkdf2" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksConvertKey $LOOPDEV -S 5 --key-file $KEY5 --pbkdf argon2i -i1 --pbkdf-memory 32 || can_fail_fips
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "5: luks2" || can_fail_fips
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV -S 1 --key-file $KEY5 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksKillSlot $LOOPDEV 5 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "1: luks2" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep "PBKDF:" | grep -q "pbkdf2" || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksConvertKey $LOOPDEV -S 1 --pbkdf argon2i -i1 --pbkdf-memory 32 || can_fail_fips
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "1: luks2" || can_fail_fips
+echo $PWD3 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -S 21 --unbound -s 16 $LOOPDEV || fail
+echo $PWD3 | $CRYPTSETUP luksConvertKey --pbkdf-force-iterations 1001 --pbkdf pbkdf2 -S 21 $LOOPDEV || fail
+
+prepare "[38] luksAddKey unbound tests" wipe
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV $KEY5 --key-slot 5 || fail
+# unbound key may have arbitrary size
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --unbound -s 16 $LOOPDEV || fail
+echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --unbound -s 32 -S 2 $LOOPDEV || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "2: luks2 (unbound)" || fail
+echo $PWD3 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --unbound -s 8 -S 3 --master-key-file /dev/urandom $LOOPDEV || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "3: luks2 (unbound)" || fail
+# unbound key size is required
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksAddKey --unbound $LOOPDEV 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD3 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksAddKey --unbound --master-key-file /dev/urandom $LOOPDEV 2> /dev/null && fail
+# do not allow to replace keyslot by unbound slot
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksAddKey -S5 --unbound -s 32 $LOOPDEV 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP -q open $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2> /dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP -q open $LOOPDEV --test-passphrase || fail
+echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP -q open -S2 $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2> /dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP -q open -S2 $LOOPDEV --test-passphrase || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q open $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2> /dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q open $LOOPDEV --test-passphrase || fail
+# check we're able to change passphrase for unbound keyslot
+echo -e "$PWD2\n$PWD3" | $CRYPTSETUP luksChangeKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -S 2 $LOOPDEV || fail
+echo $PWD3 | $CRYPTSETUP open --test-passphrase $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -S 2 $LOOPDEV || fail
+echo $PWD3 | $CRYPTSETUP -q open -S 2 $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME 2> /dev/null && fail
+# do not allow adding keyslot by unbound keyslot
+echo -e "$PWD3\n$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksAddKey $LOOPDEV 2> /dev/null && fail
+# check adding keyslot works when there's unbound keyslot
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $LOOPDEV --key-file $KEY5 -S8 || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksKillSlot -q $LOOPDEV 2
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "2: luks2 (unbound)" && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksKillSlot -q $LOOPDEV 3
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep -q "3: luks2 (unbound)" && fail
+
+prepare "[39] LUKS2 metadata variants" wipe
+tar xJf luks2_mda_images.tar.xz
+echo -n "$IMPORT_TOKEN" > $TOKEN_FILE0
+for mda in 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 ; do
+	echo -n "[$mda KiB]"
+	echo $PWD4 | $CRYPTSETUP open test_image_$mda $DEV_NAME || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+	echo -e "$PWD4\n$PWD3" | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey -S9 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT test_image_$mda || fail
+	echo $PWD4 | $CRYPTSETUP open --test-passphrase test_image_$mda || fail
+	echo $PWD3 | $CRYPTSETUP open -S9 --test-passphrase test_image_$mda || fail
+	echo -n "$IMPORT_TOKEN" | $CRYPTSETUP token import test_image_$mda --token-id 10 || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP token export test_image_$mda --token-id 10 | diff --from-file - $TOKEN_FILE0 || fail
+	echo -n "[OK]"
+done
+echo
+
+prepare "[40] LUKS2 metadata areas" wipe
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV 2> /dev/null || fail
+DEFAULT_OFFSET=$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep "offset: " | cut -f 2 -d ' ')
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks1 $LOOPDEV --key-size 256 --luks2-metadata-size=128k --luks2-keyslots-size=128k 2> /dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV --key-size 256 --luks2-metadata-size=128k --luks2-keyslots-size=127k 2> /dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV --key-size 256 --luks2-metadata-size=127k --luks2-keyslots-size=128k 2> /dev/null && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV --key-size 256 --luks2-metadata-size=128k --luks2-keyslots-size=128M >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV --key-size 256 --luks2-metadata-size=128k --luks2-keyslots-size=128k >/dev/null || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep "Metadata area:" | grep -q "131072 \[bytes\]" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep "Keyslots area:" | grep -q "131072 \[bytes\]" || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV --key-size 256 --luks2-metadata-size=128k || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep "Metadata area:" | grep -q "131072 \[bytes\]" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep "Keyslots area:" | grep -q "$((DEFAULT_OFFSET-2*131072)) \[bytes\]" || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV --key-size 256 --luks2-keyslots-size=128k >/dev/null || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep "Metadata area:" | grep -q "16384 \[bytes\]" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep "Keyslots area:" | grep -q "131072 \[bytes\]" || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV --key-size 256 --offset 16384 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep "Metadata area:" | grep -q "16384 \[bytes\]" || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV | grep "Keyslots area:" | grep -q "8355840 \[bytes\]" || fail
+# data offset vs area size
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV --key-size 256 --offset 64 --luks2-keyslots-size=8192 >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV --key-size 256 --offset $((256+56)) >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV --key-size 256 --offset $((256+64)) >/dev/null || fail
+
+prepare "[41] Per-keyslot encryption parameters" wipe
+KEYSLOT_CIPHER="aes-cbc-plain64"
+$CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 $LOOPDEV $KEY1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --key-slot 0 --keyslot-cipher $KEYSLOT_CIPHER --keyslot-key-size 128 || fail
+[ "$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -A8 -m1 "0: luks2" | grep "Cipher:"    | sed -e 's/[[:space:]]\+Cipher:\ \+//g')" = $KEYSLOT_CIPHER ] || fail
+[ "$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -A8 -m1 "0: luks2" | grep "Cipher key:"| sed -e 's/[[:space:]]\+Cipher\ key:\ \+//g')" = "128 bits" ] || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 $KEY2 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --key-slot 1 --keyslot-cipher $KEYSLOT_CIPHER --keyslot-key-size 128 || fail
+[ "$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -A8 -m1 "1: luks2" | grep "Cipher:"    | sed -e 's/[[:space:]]\+Cipher:\ \+//g')" = $KEYSLOT_CIPHER ] || fail
+[ "$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -A8 -m1 "1: luks2" | grep "Cipher key:"| sed -e 's/[[:space:]]\+Cipher\ key:\ \+//g')" = "128 bits" ] || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $LOOPDEV -d $KEY1 $KEY2 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --key-slot 2 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksChangeKey $LOOPDEV $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -d $KEY2 $KEY1 --key-slot 2 --keyslot-cipher $KEYSLOT_CIPHER --keyslot-key-size 128 || fail
+[ "$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -A8 -m1 "2: luks2" | grep "Cipher:"    | sed -e 's/[[:space:]]\+Cipher:\ \+//g')" = $KEYSLOT_CIPHER ] || fail
+[ "$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -A8 -m1 "2: luks2" | grep "Cipher key:"| sed -e 's/[[:space:]]\+Cipher\ key:\ \+//g')" = "128 bits" ] || fail
+# unbound keyslot
+echo $PWD3 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --key-slot 21 --unbound -s 32 --keyslot-cipher $KEYSLOT_CIPHER --keyslot-key-size 128 $LOOPDEV || fail
+[ "$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -A8 -m1 "21: luks2" | grep "Cipher:"    | sed -e 's/[[:space:]]\+Cipher:\ \+//g')" = $KEYSLOT_CIPHER ] || fail
+[ "$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -A8 -m1 "21: luks2" | grep "Cipher key:"| sed -e 's/[[:space:]]\+Cipher\ key:\ \+//g')" = "128 bits" ] || fail
+echo $PWD3 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --key-slot 22 --unbound -s 32 $LOOPDEV || fail
+echo $PWD3 | $CRYPTSETUP luksConvertKey --key-slot 22 $LOOPDEV --keyslot-cipher $KEYSLOT_CIPHER --keyslot-key-size 128 $LOOPDEV || fail
+[ "$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -A8 -m1 "22: luks2" | grep "Cipher:"    | sed -e 's/[[:space:]]\+Cipher:\ \+//g')" = $KEYSLOT_CIPHER ] || fail
+[ "$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -A8 -m1 "22: luks2" | grep "Cipher key:"| sed -e 's/[[:space:]]\+Cipher\ key:\ \+//g')" = "128 bits" ] || fail
+
+remove_mapping
+exit 0
diff --git a/tests/compatimage.img.xz b/tests/compatimage.img.xz
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..37fe163
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/compatimage.img.xz
diff --git a/tests/compatimage2.img.xz b/tests/compatimage2.img.xz
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ceaeafc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/compatimage2.img.xz
diff --git a/tests/compatv10image.img.xz b/tests/compatv10image.img.xz
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2203626
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/compatv10image.img.xz
diff --git a/tests/conversion_imgs.tar.xz b/tests/conversion_imgs.tar.xz
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cdeb961
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/conversion_imgs.tar.xz
diff --git a/tests/crypto-vectors.c b/tests/crypto-vectors.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3ee2414
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/crypto-vectors.c
@@ -0,0 +1,632 @@
+/*
+ * cryptsetup crypto backend test vectors
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "crypto_backend.h"
+
+#define MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 128
+
+static void printhex(const char *s, const char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	printf("%s: ", s);
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+		printf(" %02x", (unsigned char)buf[i]);
+	printf("\n");
+	fflush(stdout);
+}
+
+/*
+ * KDF tests
+ */
+struct kdf_test_vector {
+	const char *type;
+	const char *hash;
+	unsigned int hash_block_length;
+	unsigned int iterations;
+	unsigned int memory;
+	unsigned int parallelism;
+	const char *password;
+	unsigned int password_length;
+	const char *salt;
+	unsigned int salt_length;
+//	const char *key;
+//	unsigned int key_length;
+//	const char *ad;
+//	unsigned int ad_length;
+	const char *output;
+	unsigned int output_length;
+};
+
+struct kdf_test_vector kdf_test_vectors[] = {
+	/* Argon2 RFC (without key and ad values) */
+	{
+		"argon2i", NULL, 0, 3, 32, 4,
+		"\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01"
+		"\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01"
+		"\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01"
+		"\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01", 32,
+		"\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02"
+		"\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02", 16,
+//		"\x03\x03\x03\x03\x03\x03\x03\x03", 8,
+//		"\x04\x04\x04\x04\x04\x04\x04\x04"
+//		"\x04\x04\x04\x04", 12,
+		"\xa9\xa7\x51\x0e\x6d\xb4\xd5\x88"
+		"\xba\x34\x14\xcd\x0e\x09\x4d\x48"
+		"\x0d\x68\x3f\x97\xb9\xcc\xb6\x12"
+		"\xa5\x44\xfe\x8e\xf6\x5b\xa8\xe0", 32
+//		"\xc8\x14\xd9\xd1\xdc\x7f\x37\xaa"
+//		"\x13\xf0\xd7\x7f\x24\x94\xbd\xa1"
+//		"\xc8\xde\x6b\x01\x6d\xd3\x88\xd2"
+//		"\x99\x52\xa4\xc4\x67\x2b\x6c\xe8", 32
+	},
+	{
+		"argon2id", NULL, 0, 3, 32, 4,
+		"\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01"
+		"\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01"
+		"\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01"
+		"\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01", 32,
+		"\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02"
+		"\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02", 16,
+//		"\x03\x03\x03\x03\x03\x03\x03\x03", 8,
+//		"\x04\x04\x04\x04\x04\x04\x04\x04"
+//		"\x04\x04\x04\x04", 12,
+		"\x03\xaa\xb9\x65\xc1\x20\x01\xc9"
+		"\xd7\xd0\xd2\xde\x33\x19\x2c\x04"
+		"\x94\xb6\x84\xbb\x14\x81\x96\xd7"
+		"\x3c\x1d\xf1\xac\xaf\x6d\x0c\x2e", 32
+//		"\x0d\x64\x0d\xf5\x8d\x78\x76\x6c"
+//		"\x08\xc0\x37\xa3\x4a\x8b\x53\xc9"
+//		"\xd0\x1e\xf0\x45\x2d\x75\xb6\x5e"
+//		"\xb5\x25\x20\xe9\x6b\x01\xe6\x59", 32
+	},
+	/* RFC 3962 */
+	{
+		"pbkdf2", "sha1", 64, 1, 0, 0,
+		"password", 8,
+		"ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn", 21,
+		"\xcd\xed\xb5\x28\x1b\xb2\xf8\x01"
+		"\x56\x5a\x11\x22\xb2\x56\x35\x15"
+		"\x0a\xd1\xf7\xa0\x4b\xb9\xf3\xa3"
+		"\x33\xec\xc0\xe2\xe1\xf7\x08\x37", 32
+	}, {
+		"pbkdf2", "sha1", 64, 2, 0, 0,
+		"password", 8,
+		"ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn", 21,
+		"\x01\xdb\xee\x7f\x4a\x9e\x24\x3e"
+		"\x98\x8b\x62\xc7\x3c\xda\x93\x5d"
+		"\xa0\x53\x78\xb9\x32\x44\xec\x8f"
+		"\x48\xa9\x9e\x61\xad\x79\x9d\x86", 32
+	}, {
+		"pbkdf2", "sha1", 64, 1200, 0, 0,
+		"password", 8,
+		"ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn", 21,
+		"\x5c\x08\xeb\x61\xfd\xf7\x1e\x4e"
+		"\x4e\xc3\xcf\x6b\xa1\xf5\x51\x2b"
+		"\xa7\xe5\x2d\xdb\xc5\xe5\x14\x2f"
+		"\x70\x8a\x31\xe2\xe6\x2b\x1e\x13", 32
+	}, {
+		"pbkdf2", "sha1", 64, 5, 0, 0,
+		"password", 8,
+		"\0224VxxV4\022", 8, // "\x1234567878563412
+		"\xd1\xda\xa7\x86\x15\xf2\x87\xe6"
+		"\xa1\xc8\xb1\x20\xd7\x06\x2a\x49"
+		"\x3f\x98\xd2\x03\xe6\xbe\x49\xa6"
+		"\xad\xf4\xfa\x57\x4b\x6e\x64\xee", 32
+	}, {
+		"pbkdf2", "sha1", 64, 1200, 0, 0,
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX", 64,
+		"pass phrase equals block size", 29,
+		"\x13\x9c\x30\xc0\x96\x6b\xc3\x2b"
+		"\xa5\x5f\xdb\xf2\x12\x53\x0a\xc9"
+		"\xc5\xec\x59\xf1\xa4\x52\xf5\xcc"
+		"\x9a\xd9\x40\xfe\xa0\x59\x8e\xd1", 32
+	}, {
+		"pbkdf2", "sha1", 64, 1200, 0, 0,
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX", 65,
+		"pass phrase exceeds block size", 30,
+		"\x9c\xca\xd6\xd4\x68\x77\x0c\xd5"
+		"\x1b\x10\xe6\xa6\x87\x21\xbe\x61"
+		"\x1a\x8b\x4d\x28\x26\x01\xdb\x3b"
+		"\x36\xbe\x92\x46\x91\x5e\xc8\x2a", 32
+	}, {
+		"pbkdf2", "sha1", 64, 50, 0, 0,
+		"\360\235\204\236", 4, // g-clef ("\xf09d849e)
+		"EXAMPLE.COMpianist", 18,
+		"\x6b\x9c\xf2\x6d\x45\x45\x5a\x43"
+		"\xa5\xb8\xbb\x27\x6a\x40\x3b\x39"
+		"\xe7\xfe\x37\xa0\xc4\x1e\x02\xc2"
+		"\x81\xff\x30\x69\xe1\xe9\x4f\x52", 32
+	}, {
+	/* RFC-6070 */
+		"pbkdf2", "sha1", 64, 1, 0, 0,
+		"password", 8,
+		"salt", 4,
+		"\x0c\x60\xc8\x0f\x96\x1f\x0e\x71\xf3\xa9"
+		"\xb5\x24\xaf\x60\x12\x06\x2f\xe0\x37\xa6", 20
+	}, {
+		"pbkdf2", "sha1", 64, 2, 0, 0,
+		"password", 8,
+		"salt", 4,
+		"\xea\x6c\x01\x4d\xc7\x2d\x6f\x8c\xcd\x1e"
+		"\xd9\x2a\xce\x1d\x41\xf0\xd8\xde\x89\x57", 20
+	}, {
+		"pbkdf2", "sha1", 64, 4096, 0, 0,
+		"password", 8,
+		"salt", 4,
+		"\x4b\x00\x79\x01\xb7\x65\x48\x9a\xbe\xad"
+		"\x49\xd9\x26\xf7\x21\xd0\x65\xa4\x29\xc1", 20
+	}, {
+		"pbkdf2", "sha1", 64, 16777216, 0, 0,
+		"password", 8,
+		"salt", 4,
+		"\xee\xfe\x3d\x61\xcd\x4d\xa4\xe4\xe9\x94"
+		"\x5b\x3d\x6b\xa2\x15\x8c\x26\x34\xe9\x84", 20
+	}, {
+		"pbkdf2", "sha1", 64, 4096, 0, 0,
+		"passwordPASSWORDpassword", 24,
+		"saltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsalt", 36,
+		"\x3d\x2e\xec\x4f\xe4\x1c\x84\x9b\x80\xc8"
+		"\xd8\x36\x62\xc0\xe4\x4a\x8b\x29\x1a\x96"
+		"\x4c\xf2\xf0\x70\x38", 25
+	}, {
+		"pbkdf2", "sha1", 64, 4096, 0, 0,
+		"pass\0word", 9,
+		"sa\0lt", 5,
+		"\x56\xfa\x6a\xa7\x55\x48\x09\x9d\xcc\x37"
+		"\xd7\xf0\x34\x25\xe0\xc3", 16
+	}, {
+	/* empty password test */
+		"pbkdf2", "sha1", 64, 2, 0, 0,
+		"", 0,
+		"salt", 4,
+		"\x13\x3a\x4c\xe8\x37\xb4\xd2\x52\x1e\xe2"
+		"\xbf\x03\xe1\x1c\x71\xca\x79\x4e\x07\x97", 20
+	}, {
+	/* Password exceeds block size test */
+		"pbkdf2", "sha256", 64, 1200, 0, 0,
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX", 65,
+		"pass phrase exceeds block size", 30,
+		"\x22\x34\x4b\xc4\xb6\xe3\x26\x75"
+		"\xa8\x09\x0f\x3e\xa8\x0b\xe0\x1d"
+		"\x5f\x95\x12\x6a\x2c\xdd\xc3\xfa"
+		"\xcc\x4a\x5e\x6d\xca\x04\xec\x58", 32
+	}, {
+		"pbkdf2", "sha512", 128, 1200, 0, 0,
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX", 129,
+		"pass phrase exceeds block size", 30,
+		"\x0f\xb2\xed\x2c\x0e\x6e\xfb\x7d"
+		"\x7d\x8e\xdd\x58\x01\xb4\x59\x72"
+		"\x99\x92\x16\x30\x5e\xa4\x36\x8d"
+		"\x76\x14\x80\xf3\xe3\x7a\x22\xb9", 32
+	}, {
+		"pbkdf2", "whirlpool", 64, 1200, 0, 0,
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX", 65,
+		"pass phrase exceeds block size", 30,
+		"\x9c\x1c\x74\xf5\x88\x26\xe7\x6a"
+		"\x53\x58\xf4\x0c\x39\xe7\x80\x89"
+		"\x07\xc0\x31\x19\x9a\x50\xa2\x48"
+		"\xf1\xd9\xfe\x78\x64\xe5\x84\x50", 32
+	}
+};
+
+/*
+ * Hash tests
+ */
+
+struct hash_alg {
+	const char *name;
+	int length;
+};
+
+static struct hash_alg hash_algs[] = {
+	{ "sha1",       20 },
+	{ "sha256",     32 },
+	{ "sha512",     64 },
+	{ "ripemd160",  20 },
+	{ "whirlpool",  64 },
+	{ NULL,          0 }
+};
+
+struct hash_in {
+	const char* buffer;
+	unsigned int length;
+};
+
+struct hash_in hash_inputs[]
+	= { { "", 0 },
+		{ "a", 1 },
+		{ "abc", 3 },
+		{ "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz", 26 },
+		{ "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789", 62 },
+		{ "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq", 56 },
+		{ "message digest", 14 } };
+
+struct hash_out {
+	uint32_t crc32_out;
+	const char* sha1_out;
+	const char* sha256_out;
+	const char* sha512_out;
+	const char* rmd160_out;
+	const char* wp512_out;
+};
+
+struct hash_out hash_outputs[] = {
+    {
+        0x00000000,
+        "\xda\x39\xa3\xee\x5e\x6b\x4b\x0d\x32\x55\xbf\xef\x95\x60\x18\x90\xaf\xd8\x07\x09",
+        "\xe3\xb0\xc4\x42\x98\xfc\x1c\x14\x9a\xfb\xf4\xc8\x99\x6f\xb9\x24\x27\xae\x41\xe4\x64\x9b\x93\x4c\xa4\x95\x99\x1b\x78\x52\xb8\x55",
+        "\xcf\x83\xe1\x35\x7e\xef\xb8\xbd\xf1\x54\x28\x50\xd6\x6d\x80\x07\xd6\x20\xe4\x05\x0b\x57\x15\xdc\x83\xf4\xa9\x21\xd3\x6c\xe9\xce\x47\xd0\xd1\x3c\x5d\x85\xf2\xb0\xff\x83\x18\xd2\x87\x7e\xec\x2f\x63\xb9\x31\xbd\x47\x41\x7a\x81\xa5\x38\x32\x7a\xf9\x27\xda\x3e",
+        "\x9c\x11\x85\xa5\xc5\xe9\xfc\x54\x61\x28\x08\x97\x7e\xe8\xf5\x48\xb2\x25\x8d\x31",
+        "\x19\xfa\x61\xd7\x55\x22\xa4\x66\x9b\x44\xe3\x9c\x1d\x2e\x17\x26\xc5\x30\x23\x21\x30\xd4\x07\xf8\x9a\xfe\xe0\x96\x49\x97\xf7\xa7\x3e\x83\xbe\x69\x8b\x28\x8f\xeb\xcf\x88\xe3\xe0\x3c\x4f\x07\x57\xea\x89\x64\xe5\x9b\x63\xd9\x37\x08\xb1\x38\xcc\x42\xa6\x6e\xb3"
+    },
+    {
+        0xe8b7be43,
+        "\x86\xf7\xe4\x37\xfa\xa5\xa7\xfc\xe1\x5d\x1d\xdc\xb9\xea\xea\xea\x37\x76\x67\xb8",
+        "\xca\x97\x81\x12\xca\x1b\xbd\xca\xfa\xc2\x31\xb3\x9a\x23\xdc\x4d\xa7\x86\xef\xf8\x14\x7c\x4e\x72\xb9\x80\x77\x85\xaf\xee\x48\xbb",
+        "\x1f\x40\xfc\x92\xda\x24\x16\x94\x75\x09\x79\xee\x6c\xf5\x82\xf2\xd5\xd7\xd2\x8e\x18\x33\x5d\xe0\x5a\xbc\x54\xd0\x56\x0e\x0f\x53\x02\x86\x0c\x65\x2b\xf0\x8d\x56\x02\x52\xaa\x5e\x74\x21\x05\x46\xf3\x69\xfb\xbb\xce\x8c\x12\xcf\xc7\x95\x7b\x26\x52\xfe\x9a\x75",
+        "\x0b\xdc\x9d\x2d\x25\x6b\x3e\xe9\xda\xae\x34\x7b\xe6\xf4\xdc\x83\x5a\x46\x7f\xfe",
+        "\x8a\xca\x26\x02\x79\x2a\xec\x6f\x11\xa6\x72\x06\x53\x1f\xb7\xd7\xf0\xdf\xf5\x94\x13\x14\x5e\x69\x73\xc4\x50\x01\xd0\x08\x7b\x42\xd1\x1b\xc6\x45\x41\x3a\xef\xf6\x3a\x42\x39\x1a\x39\x14\x5a\x59\x1a\x92\x20\x0d\x56\x01\x95\xe5\x3b\x47\x85\x84\xfd\xae\x23\x1a"
+    },
+    {
+        0x352441c2,
+        "\xa9\x99\x3e\x36\x47\x06\x81\x6a\xba\x3e\x25\x71\x78\x50\xc2\x6c\x9c\xd0\xd8\x9d",
+        "\xba\x78\x16\xbf\x8f\x01\xcf\xea\x41\x41\x40\xde\x5d\xae\x22\x23\xb0\x03\x61\xa3\x96\x17\x7a\x9c\xb4\x10\xff\x61\xf2\x00\x15\xad",
+        "\xdd\xaf\x35\xa1\x93\x61\x7a\xba\xcc\x41\x73\x49\xae\x20\x41\x31\x12\xe6\xfa\x4e\x89\xa9\x7e\xa2\x0a\x9e\xee\xe6\x4b\x55\xd3\x9a\x21\x92\x99\x2a\x27\x4f\xc1\xa8\x36\xba\x3c\x23\xa3\xfe\xeb\xbd\x45\x4d\x44\x23\x64\x3c\xe8\x0e\x2a\x9a\xc9\x4f\xa5\x4c\xa4\x9f",
+        "\x8e\xb2\x08\xf7\xe0\x5d\x98\x7a\x9b\x04\x4a\x8e\x98\xc6\xb0\x87\xf1\x5a\x0b\xfc",
+        "\x4e\x24\x48\xa4\xc6\xf4\x86\xbb\x16\xb6\x56\x2c\x73\xb4\x02\x0b\xf3\x04\x3e\x3a\x73\x1b\xce\x72\x1a\xe1\xb3\x03\xd9\x7e\x6d\x4c\x71\x81\xee\xbd\xb6\xc5\x7e\x27\x7d\x0e\x34\x95\x71\x14\xcb\xd6\xc7\x97\xfc\x9d\x95\xd8\xb5\x82\xd2\x25\x29\x20\x76\xd4\xee\xf5"
+    },
+    {
+        0x4c2750bd,
+        "\x32\xd1\x0c\x7b\x8c\xf9\x65\x70\xca\x04\xce\x37\xf2\xa1\x9d\x84\x24\x0d\x3a\x89",
+        "\x71\xc4\x80\xdf\x93\xd6\xae\x2f\x1e\xfa\xd1\x44\x7c\x66\xc9\x52\x5e\x31\x62\x18\xcf\x51\xfc\x8d\x9e\xd8\x32\xf2\xda\xf1\x8b\x73",
+        "\x4d\xbf\xf8\x6c\xc2\xca\x1b\xae\x1e\x16\x46\x8a\x05\xcb\x98\x81\xc9\x7f\x17\x53\xbc\xe3\x61\x90\x34\x89\x8f\xaa\x1a\xab\xe4\x29\x95\x5a\x1b\xf8\xec\x48\x3d\x74\x21\xfe\x3c\x16\x46\x61\x3a\x59\xed\x54\x41\xfb\x0f\x32\x13\x89\xf7\x7f\x48\xa8\x79\xc7\xb1\xf1",
+        "\xf7\x1c\x27\x10\x9c\x69\x2c\x1b\x56\xbb\xdc\xeb\x5b\x9d\x28\x65\xb3\x70\x8d\xbc",
+        "\xf1\xd7\x54\x66\x26\x36\xff\xe9\x2c\x82\xeb\xb9\x21\x2a\x48\x4a\x8d\x38\x63\x1e\xad\x42\x38\xf5\x44\x2e\xe1\x3b\x80\x54\xe4\x1b\x08\xbf\x2a\x92\x51\xc3\x0b\x6a\x0b\x8a\xae\x86\x17\x7a\xb4\xa6\xf6\x8f\x67\x3e\x72\x07\x86\x5d\x5d\x98\x19\xa3\xdb\xa4\xeb\x3b"
+    },
+    {
+        0x1fc2e6d2,
+        "\x76\x1c\x45\x7b\xf7\x3b\x14\xd2\x7e\x9e\x92\x65\xc4\x6f\x4b\x4d\xda\x11\xf9\x40",
+        "\xdb\x4b\xfc\xbd\x4d\xa0\xcd\x85\xa6\x0c\x3c\x37\xd3\xfb\xd8\x80\x5c\x77\xf1\x5f\xc6\xb1\xfd\xfe\x61\x4e\xe0\xa7\xc8\xfd\xb4\xc0",
+        "\x1e\x07\xbe\x23\xc2\x6a\x86\xea\x37\xea\x81\x0c\x8e\xc7\x80\x93\x52\x51\x5a\x97\x0e\x92\x53\xc2\x6f\x53\x6c\xfc\x7a\x99\x96\xc4\x5c\x83\x70\x58\x3e\x0a\x78\xfa\x4a\x90\x04\x1d\x71\xa4\xce\xab\x74\x23\xf1\x9c\x71\xb9\xd5\xa3\xe0\x12\x49\xf0\xbe\xbd\x58\x94",
+        "\xb0\xe2\x0b\x6e\x31\x16\x64\x02\x86\xed\x3a\x87\xa5\x71\x30\x79\xb2\x1f\x51\x89",
+        "\xdc\x37\xe0\x08\xcf\x9e\xe6\x9b\xf1\x1f\x00\xed\x9a\xba\x26\x90\x1d\xd7\xc2\x8c\xde\xc0\x66\xcc\x6a\xf4\x2e\x40\xf8\x2f\x3a\x1e\x08\xeb\xa2\x66\x29\x12\x9d\x8f\xb7\xcb\x57\x21\x1b\x92\x81\xa6\x55\x17\xcc\x87\x9d\x7b\x96\x21\x42\xc6\x5f\x5a\x7a\xf0\x14\x67"
+    },
+    {
+        0x171a3f5f,
+        "\x84\x98\x3e\x44\x1c\x3b\xd2\x6e\xba\xae\x4a\xa1\xf9\x51\x29\xe5\xe5\x46\x70\xf1",
+        "\x24\x8d\x6a\x61\xd2\x06\x38\xb8\xe5\xc0\x26\x93\x0c\x3e\x60\x39\xa3\x3c\xe4\x59\x64\xff\x21\x67\xf6\xec\xed\xd4\x19\xdb\x06\xc1",
+        "\x20\x4a\x8f\xc6\xdd\xa8\x2f\x0a\x0c\xed\x7b\xeb\x8e\x08\xa4\x16\x57\xc1\x6e\xf4\x68\xb2\x28\xa8\x27\x9b\xe3\x31\xa7\x03\xc3\x35\x96\xfd\x15\xc1\x3b\x1b\x07\xf9\xaa\x1d\x3b\xea\x57\x78\x9c\xa0\x31\xad\x85\xc7\xa7\x1d\xd7\x03\x54\xec\x63\x12\x38\xca\x34\x45",
+        "\x12\xa0\x53\x38\x4a\x9c\x0c\x88\xe4\x05\xa0\x6c\x27\xdc\xf4\x9a\xda\x62\xeb\x2b",
+        "\x52\x6b\x23\x94\xd8\x56\x83\xe2\x4b\x29\xac\xd0\xfd\x37\xf7\xd5\x02\x7f\x61\x36\x6a\x14\x07\x26\x2d\xc2\xa6\xa3\x45\xd9\xe2\x40\xc0\x17\xc1\x83\x3d\xb1\xe6\xdb\x6a\x46\xbd\x44\x4b\x0c\x69\x52\x0c\x85\x6e\x7c\x6e\x9c\x36\x6d\x15\x0a\x7d\xa3\xae\xb1\x60\xd1"
+    },
+    {
+        0x20159d7f,
+        "\xc1\x22\x52\xce\xda\x8b\xe8\x99\x4d\x5f\xa0\x29\x0a\x47\x23\x1c\x1d\x16\xaa\xe3",
+        "\xf7\x84\x6f\x55\xcf\x23\xe1\x4e\xeb\xea\xb5\xb4\xe1\x55\x0c\xad\x5b\x50\x9e\x33\x48\xfb\xc4\xef\xa3\xa1\x41\x3d\x39\x3c\xb6\x50",
+        "\x10\x7d\xbf\x38\x9d\x9e\x9f\x71\xa3\xa9\x5f\x6c\x05\x5b\x92\x51\xbc\x52\x68\xc2\xbe\x16\xd6\xc1\x34\x92\xea\x45\xb0\x19\x9f\x33\x09\xe1\x64\x55\xab\x1e\x96\x11\x8e\x8a\x90\x5d\x55\x97\xb7\x20\x38\xdd\xb3\x72\xa8\x98\x26\x04\x6d\xe6\x66\x87\xbb\x42\x0e\x7c",
+        "\x5d\x06\x89\xef\x49\xd2\xfa\xe5\x72\xb8\x81\xb1\x23\xa8\x5f\xfa\x21\x59\x5f\x36",
+        "\x37\x8c\x84\xa4\x12\x6e\x2d\xc6\xe5\x6d\xcc\x74\x58\x37\x7a\xac\x83\x8d\x00\x03\x22\x30\xf5\x3c\xe1\xf5\x70\x0c\x0f\xfb\x4d\x3b\x84\x21\x55\x76\x59\xef\x55\xc1\x06\xb4\xb5\x2a\xc5\xa4\xaa\xa6\x92\xed\x92\x00\x52\x83\x8f\x33\x62\xe8\x6d\xbd\x37\xa8\x90\x3e"
+    }
+};
+
+/*
+ * HMAC tests
+ */
+// RFC 4231 - HMAC test vectors for SHA-256, SHA-512
+// RFC 2202 - HMAC test vectors for SHA-1
+
+struct hmac_test_vector {
+	const char *key;
+	unsigned int key_length;
+	const char *data;
+	unsigned int data_length;
+	const char *hmac_sha_1;
+	const char *hmac_sha_256;
+	const char *hmac_sha_512;
+};
+
+struct hmac_test_vector hmac_test_vectors[] = {
+	{
+		"\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b", 20,
+		"\x48\x69\x20\x54\x68\x65\x72\x65", 8, // "Hi There"
+		"\xb6\x17\x31\x86\x55\x05\x72\x64\xe2\x8b\xc0\xb6\xfb\x37\x8c\x8e\xf1\x46\xbe\x00",
+		"\xb0\x34\x4c\x61\xd8\xdb\x38\x53\x5c\xa8\xaf\xce\xaf\x0b\xf1\x2b\x88\x1d\xc2\x00\xc9\x83\x3d\xa7\x26\xe9\x37\x6c\x2e\x32\xcf\xf7",
+		"\x87\xaa\x7c\xde\xa5\xef\x61\x9d\x4f\xf0\xb4\x24\x1a\x1d\x6c\xb0\x23\x79\xf4\xe2\xce\x4e\xc2\x78\x7a\xd0\xb3\x05\x45\xe1\x7c\xde\xda\xa8\x33\xb7\xd6\xb8\xa7\x02\x03\x8b\x27\x4e\xae\xa3\xf4\xe4\xbe\x9d\x91\x4e\xeb\x61\xf1\x70\x2e\x69\x6c\x20\x3a\x12\x68\x54"
+	},
+	{
+		"\x4a\x65\x66\x65", 4, // "Jefe"
+		"\x77\x68\x61\x74\x20\x64\x6f\x20\x79\x61\x20\x77\x61\x6e\x74\x20\x66\x6f\x72\x20\x6e\x6f\x74\x68\x69\x6e\x67\x3f", 28, // "what do ya want for nothing?"
+		"\xef\xfc\xdf\x6a\xe5\xeb\x2f\xa2\xd2\x74\x16\xd5\xf1\x84\xdf\x9c\x25\x9a\x7c\x79",
+		"\x5b\xdc\xc1\x46\xbf\x60\x75\x4e\x6a\x04\x24\x26\x08\x95\x75\xc7\x5a\x00\x3f\x08\x9d\x27\x39\x83\x9d\xec\x58\xb9\x64\xec\x38\x43",
+		"\x16\x4b\x7a\x7b\xfc\xf8\x19\xe2\xe3\x95\xfb\xe7\x3b\x56\xe0\xa3\x87\xbd\x64\x22\x2e\x83\x1f\xd6\x10\x27\x0c\xd7\xea\x25\x05\x54\x97\x58\xbf\x75\xc0\x5a\x99\x4a\x6d\x03\x4f\x65\xf8\xf0\xe6\xfd\xca\xea\xb1\xa3\x4d\x4a\x6b\x4b\x63\x6e\x07\x0a\x38\xbc\xe7\x37"
+	},
+	{
+		"\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa", 20,
+		"\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd", 50,
+		"\x12\x5d\x73\x42\xb9\xac\x11\xcd\x91\xa3\x9a\xf4\x8a\xa1\x7b\x4f\x63\xf1\x75\xd3",
+		"\x77\x3e\xa9\x1e\x36\x80\x0e\x46\x85\x4d\xb8\xeb\xd0\x91\x81\xa7\x29\x59\x09\x8b\x3e\xf8\xc1\x22\xd9\x63\x55\x14\xce\xd5\x65\xfe",
+		"\xfa\x73\xb0\x08\x9d\x56\xa2\x84\xef\xb0\xf0\x75\x6c\x89\x0b\xe9\xb1\xb5\xdb\xdd\x8e\xe8\x1a\x36\x55\xf8\x3e\x33\xb2\x27\x9d\x39\xbf\x3e\x84\x82\x79\xa7\x22\xc8\x06\xb4\x85\xa4\x7e\x67\xc8\x07\xb9\x46\xa3\x37\xbe\xe8\x94\x26\x74\x27\x88\x59\xe1\x32\x92\xfb"
+	},
+	{
+		"\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19", 25,
+		"\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd", 50,
+		"\x4c\x90\x07\xf4\x02\x62\x50\xc6\xbc\x84\x14\xf9\xbf\x50\xc8\x6c\x2d\x72\x35\xda",
+		"\x82\x55\x8a\x38\x9a\x44\x3c\x0e\xa4\xcc\x81\x98\x99\xf2\x08\x3a\x85\xf0\xfa\xa3\xe5\x78\xf8\x07\x7a\x2e\x3f\xf4\x67\x29\x66\x5b",
+		"\xb0\xba\x46\x56\x37\x45\x8c\x69\x90\xe5\xa8\xc5\xf6\x1d\x4a\xf7\xe5\x76\xd9\x7f\xf9\x4b\x87\x2d\xe7\x6f\x80\x50\x36\x1e\xe3\xdb\xa9\x1c\xa5\xc1\x1a\xa2\x5e\xb4\xd6\x79\x27\x5c\xc5\x78\x80\x63\xa5\xf1\x97\x41\x12\x0c\x4f\x2d\xe2\xad\xeb\xeb\x10\xa2\x98\xdd"
+	},
+	{
+		// Long key
+		"\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa", 131,
+		"\x54\x65\x73\x74\x20\x55\x73\x69\x6e\x67\x20\x4c\x61\x72\x67\x65\x72\x20\x54\x68\x61\x6e\x20\x42\x6c\x6f\x63\x6b\x2d\x53\x69\x7a\x65\x20\x4b\x65\x79\x20\x2d\x20\x48\x61\x73\x68\x20\x4b\x65\x79\x20\x46\x69\x72\x73\x74", 54, // "Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key - Hash Key First"
+		"\x90\xd0\xda\xce\x1c\x1b\xdc\x95\x73\x39\x30\x78\x03\x16\x03\x35\xbd\xe6\xdf\x2b",
+		"\x60\xe4\x31\x59\x1e\xe0\xb6\x7f\x0d\x8a\x26\xaa\xcb\xf5\xb7\x7f\x8e\x0b\xc6\x21\x37\x28\xc5\x14\x05\x46\x04\x0f\x0e\xe3\x7f\x54",
+		"\x80\xb2\x42\x63\xc7\xc1\xa3\xeb\xb7\x14\x93\xc1\xdd\x7b\xe8\xb4\x9b\x46\xd1\xf4\x1b\x4a\xee\xc1\x12\x1b\x01\x37\x83\xf8\xf3\x52\x6b\x56\xd0\x37\xe0\x5f\x25\x98\xbd\x0f\xd2\x21\x5d\x6a\x1e\x52\x95\xe6\x4f\x73\xf6\x3f\x0a\xec\x8b\x91\x5a\x98\x5d\x78\x65\x98"
+	},
+	{
+		// Long key and long data
+		"\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa", 131,
+		"\x54\x68\x69\x73\x20\x69\x73\x20\x61\x20\x74\x65\x73\x74\x20\x75\x73\x69\x6e\x67\x20\x61\x20\x6c\x61\x72\x67\x65\x72\x20\x74\x68\x61\x6e\x20\x62\x6c\x6f\x63\x6b\x2d\x73\x69\x7a\x65\x20\x6b\x65\x79\x20\x61\x6e\x64\x20\x61\x20\x6c\x61\x72\x67\x65\x72\x20\x74\x68\x61\x6e\x20\x62\x6c\x6f\x63\x6b\x2d\x73\x69\x7a\x65\x20\x64\x61\x74\x61\x2e\x20\x54\x68\x65\x20\x6b\x65\x79\x20\x6e\x65\x65\x64\x73\x20\x74\x6f\x20\x62\x65\x20\x68\x61\x73\x68\x65\x64\x20\x62\x65\x66\x6f\x72\x65\x20\x62\x65\x69\x6e\x67\x20\x75\x73\x65\x64\x20\x62\x79\x20\x74\x68\x65\x20\x48\x4d\x41\x43\x20\x61\x6c\x67\x6f\x72\x69\x74\x68\x6d\x2e", 152,
+		"\x21\x7e\x44\xbb\x08\xb6\xe0\x6a\x2d\x6c\x30\xf3\xcb\x9f\x53\x7f\x97\xc6\x33\x56",
+		"\x9b\x09\xff\xa7\x1b\x94\x2f\xcb\x27\x63\x5f\xbc\xd5\xb0\xe9\x44\xbf\xdc\x63\x64\x4f\x07\x13\x93\x8a\x7f\x51\x53\x5c\x3a\x35\xe2",
+		"\xe3\x7b\x6a\x77\x5d\xc8\x7d\xba\xa4\xdf\xa9\xf9\x6e\x5e\x3f\xfd\xde\xbd\x71\xf8\x86\x72\x89\x86\x5d\xf5\xa3\x2d\x20\xcd\xc9\x44\xb6\x02\x2c\xac\x3c\x49\x82\xb1\x0d\x5e\xeb\x55\xc3\xe4\xde\x15\x13\x46\x76\xfb\x6d\xe0\x44\x60\x65\xc9\x74\x40\xfa\x8c\x6a\x58"
+	}
+};
+
+static int pbkdf_test_vectors(void)
+{
+	char result[256];
+	unsigned int i;
+	struct kdf_test_vector *vec;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < (sizeof(kdf_test_vectors) / sizeof(*kdf_test_vectors)); i++) {
+		vec = &kdf_test_vectors[i];
+		printf("PBKDF vector %02d %s ", i, vec->type);
+		if (vec->hash && crypt_hash_size(vec->hash) < 0) {
+			printf("[%s N/A]\n", vec->hash);
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (crypt_pbkdf(vec->type, vec->hash,
+		    vec->password, vec->password_length,
+		    vec->salt, vec->salt_length,
+		    result, vec->output_length,
+		    vec->iterations, vec->memory, vec->parallelism)) {
+			printf("crypto backend [FAILED].\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		if (memcmp(result, vec->output, vec->output_length)) {
+			printf("expected output [FAILED].\n");
+			printhex(" got", result, vec->output_length);
+			printhex("want", vec->output, vec->output_length);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		printf("[OK]\n");
+		memset(result, 0, sizeof(result));
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+static const char* get_vec(struct hash_out* out, int i)
+{
+	switch (i) {
+	case 0:
+		return out->sha1_out;
+	case 1:
+		return out->sha256_out;
+	case 2:
+		return out->sha512_out;
+	case 3:
+		return out->rmd160_out;
+	case 4:
+		return out->wp512_out;
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static int hash_test(void)
+{
+	uint32_t crc32;
+	unsigned int i, j;
+	int r, hash_length;
+	struct hash_in* in_vec;
+	struct hash_out* out_vec;
+	struct hash_alg* hash;
+	struct crypt_hash *h;
+	char result[64];
+
+	for (i = 0; i < (sizeof(hash_inputs) / sizeof(*hash_inputs)); i++) {
+		in_vec  = &hash_inputs[i];
+		out_vec = &hash_outputs[i];
+
+		// CRC32 vector test
+		printf("Hash vector %02d: [CRC32]", i);
+		crc32 = crypt_crc32(~0, (const unsigned char*)in_vec->buffer, in_vec->length) ^ ~0;
+		if (crc32 != out_vec->crc32_out) {
+			printf("expected output [FAILED].\n");
+			printf(" got: %x\n", crc32);
+			printf("want: %x\n", out_vec->crc32_out);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		// Other hashes test
+		for (j = 0; j < (sizeof(hash_algs) / sizeof(*hash_algs) - 1); j++) {
+			hash = &hash_algs[j];
+
+			hash_length = crypt_hash_size(hash->name);
+			if (hash_length != hash->length) {
+				if (hash_length < 0) {
+					printf("[%s N/A]", hash->name);
+					continue;
+				}
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+
+			printf("[%s]", hash->name);
+			if (crypt_hash_init(&h, hash->name))
+				return -EINVAL;
+
+			r = crypt_hash_write(h, in_vec->buffer, in_vec->length);
+
+			if (!r)
+				r = crypt_hash_final(h, result, hash->length);
+
+			crypt_hash_destroy(h);
+
+			if (r)
+				return r;
+
+			if (memcmp(result, get_vec(out_vec, j), hash->length)) {
+				printf("expected output [FAILED].\n");
+				printhex(" got", result, hash->length);
+				printhex("want", get_vec(out_vec, j), hash->length);
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+		}
+
+		printf("\n");
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const char* get_hmac_res(struct hmac_test_vector* out, int i)
+{
+	switch (i) {
+	case 0:
+		return out->hmac_sha_1;
+	case 1:
+		return out->hmac_sha_256;
+	case 2:
+		return out->hmac_sha_512;
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+
+static int hmac_test(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_hmac *hmac;
+	struct hmac_test_vector *vector;
+	struct crypt_hash *h;
+	unsigned int i, j;
+	int hmac_length, r;
+
+	char result[64];
+	char key[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+	for (i = 0; i < (sizeof(hmac_test_vectors) / sizeof(*hmac_test_vectors)); i++) {
+		vector = &hmac_test_vectors[i];
+		printf("HMAC vector %02d: ", i);
+
+		for(j = 0; j < 3; j++) {
+			struct hash_alg* hash = &hash_algs[j];
+			hmac_length = crypt_hmac_size(hash->name);
+			if (hmac_length != hash->length) {
+				if (hmac_length < 0) {
+					printf("[%s N/A]", hash->name);
+					continue;
+				}
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+			printf("[%s]", hash->name);
+
+			int key_length = vector->key_length;
+
+			// hash key first if key size is greater than max block size
+			if (key_length > MAX_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+				if (crypt_hash_init(&h, hash->name))
+				return -EINVAL;
+
+				r = crypt_hash_write(h, vector->key, vector->key_length);
+
+				if (!r)
+					r = crypt_hash_final(h, key, hash->length);
+
+				crypt_hash_destroy(h);
+
+				if (r)
+					return r;
+
+				key_length = hash->length;
+			} else {
+				memcpy(key, vector->key, vector->key_length);
+			}
+
+			if (crypt_hmac_init(&hmac, hash->name, key, key_length))
+				return -EINVAL;
+
+			r = crypt_hmac_write(hmac, vector->data, vector->data_length);
+
+			if (!r)
+				r = crypt_hmac_final(hmac, result, hmac_length);
+
+			crypt_hmac_destroy(hmac);
+
+			if (r)
+				return r;
+
+			if (memcmp(result, get_hmac_res(vector, j), hash->length)) {
+				printf("expected output [FAILED].\n");
+				printhex(" got", result, hash->length);
+				printhex("want", get_hmac_res(vector, j), hash->length);
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+		}
+		printf("\n");
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+	if (crypt_backend_init(NULL)) {
+		printf("Crypto backend init error.\n");
+		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+	}
+	printf("Test vectors using %s crypto backend.\n", crypt_backend_version());
+
+	if (pbkdf_test_vectors())
+		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+
+	if (hash_test())
+		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+
+	if (hmac_test())
+		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+
+	crypt_backend_destroy();
+	exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+}
diff --git a/tests/cryptsetup-valg-supps b/tests/cryptsetup-valg-supps
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b2530f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/cryptsetup-valg-supps
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+# Suppresion file for valgrind
+
+# known problem in libgcrypt
+{
+   leak_in_libgcrypt_00
+   Memcheck:Leak
+   fun:malloc
+   obj:/lib64/libgcrypt.so*
+   ...
+   obj:/lib64/libgcrypt.so*
+   fun:crypt_backend_init
+   fun:init_crypto
+   ...
+}
+# following leaks/errors are addressed to libpopt...
+{
+  popt_read_error
+  Memcheck:Addr4
+  obj:/lib*/libpopt.so*
+  fun:poptGetNextOpt
+  fun:main
+}
+{
+  popt_leak_poptGetNextOpt_00
+  Memcheck:Leak
+  fun:realloc
+  fun:poptGetNextOpt
+  fun:main
+}
+{
+  popt_leak_poptGetNextOpt_01
+  Memcheck:Leak
+  fun:malloc
+  fun:poptGetNextOpt
+  fun:main
+}
diff --git a/tests/device-test b/tests/device-test
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..ab5db20
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/device-test
@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+CRYPTSETUP="../cryptsetup"
+MNT_DIR="./mnt_luks"
+DEV_NAME="dummy"
+DEV_NAME2="ymmud"
+PWD1="93R4P4pIqAH8"
+PWD2="mymJeD8ivEhE"
+FAST_PBKDF_OPT="--pbkdf pbkdf2 --pbkdf-force-iterations 1000"
+SKIP_COUNT=0
+
+cleanup() {
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME ] && dmsetup remove $DEV_NAME
+	udevadm settle >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ -d "$MNT_DIR" ] ; then
+	    umount -f $MNT_DIR 2>/dev/null
+	    rmdir $MNT_DIR 2>/dev/null
+	fi
+	sleep 2
+}
+
+fail()
+{
+	if [ -n "$1" ] ; then
+		echo "FAIL $1 at line $(caller)"
+	else
+		echo "FAIL at line $(caller)"
+	fi
+	cleanup
+	exit 100
+}
+
+skip()
+{
+	echo "TEST SKIPPED: $1"
+	cleanup
+	exit 77
+}
+
+function dm_crypt_features()
+{
+	VER_STR=$(dmsetup targets | grep crypt | cut -f2 -dv)
+	[ -z "$VER_STR" ] && fail "Failed to parse dm-crypt version."
+
+	VER_MAJ=$(echo $VER_STR | cut -f 1 -d.)
+	VER_MIN=$(echo $VER_STR | cut -f 2 -d.)
+	VER_PTC=$(echo $VER_STR | cut -f 3 -d.)
+
+	[ $VER_MAJ -lt 1 ] && return
+	[ $VER_MAJ -gt 1 ] && {
+		DM_PERF_CPU=1
+		DM_SECTOR_SIZE=1
+		DM_KEYRING=1
+		return
+	}
+
+	[ $VER_MIN -lt 14 ] && return
+	DM_PERF_CPU=1
+	if [ $VER_MIN -ge 17 -o \( $VER_MIN -eq 14 -a $VER_PTC -ge 5 \) ]; then
+		DM_SECTOR_SIZE=1
+	fi
+	if [ $VER_MIN -gt 18 -o \( $VER_MIN -eq 18 -a $VER_PTC -ge 1 \) ]; then
+		DM_KEYRING=1
+	fi
+}
+
+function dm_crypt_keyring_support()
+{
+	VER_STR=$(dmsetup targets | grep crypt | cut -f2 -dv)
+	[ -z "$VER_STR" ] && fail "Failed to parse dm-crypt version."
+
+	VER_MAJ=$(echo $VER_STR | cut -f 1 -d.)
+	VER_MIN=$(echo $VER_STR | cut -f 2 -d.)
+
+	# run the test with dm-crypt v1.15.0+ on purpose
+	# the fix is in dm-crypt v1.18.1+
+	[ $VER_MAJ -gt 1 ] && return 0
+	[ $VER_MAJ -lt 1 ] && return 1
+	[ $VER_MIN -ge 15 ]
+}
+
+format() # format
+{
+	dd if=/dev/zero of=$DEV bs=1M count=32 >/dev/null 2>&1
+
+	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type $1 $DEV -q  $FAST_PBKDF_OPT -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256
+	[ $? -ne 0 ] && fail "Format failed."
+
+	# test some operation, just in case
+	echo -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $DEV -i1 --key-slot 1
+	[ $? -ne 0 ] && fail "Keyslot add failed."
+
+	$CRYPTSETUP -q luksKillSlot $DEV 1
+	[ $? -ne 0 ] && fail "Keyslot removal failed."
+}
+
+check_sector_size() # $1 expected sector size
+{
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep "sector size" | grep -q $1 || fail
+	if [ $S -gt 512 ]; then
+		dmsetup table $DEV_NAME | grep -q "sector_size:$1" || fail
+	fi
+}
+
+if [ $(id -u) != 0 ]; then
+	skip "You must be root to run this test, test skipped."
+fi
+
+dm_crypt_features
+
+[ ! -d $MNT_DIR ] && mkdir $MNT_DIR
+
+echo "[1] Using tmpfs for image"
+DEV="$MNT_DIR/test.img"
+mount -t tmpfs none $MNT_DIR || skip "Mounting tmpfs not available."
+format luks1
+
+echo "[2] Kernel dmcrypt performance options"
+if [ -z "$DM_PERF_CPU" ]; then
+	echo "TEST SKIPPED: dmcrypt options not available"
+	SKIP_COUNT=$((SKIP_COUNT+1))
+else
+	# plain
+	echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP open -q --type plain --hash sha256 $DEV $DEV_NAME --perf-same_cpu_crypt --perf-submit_from_crypt_cpus || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q same_cpu_crypt || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q submit_from_crypt_cpus || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+	echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP open -q --type plain --hash sha256 $DEV $DEV_NAME --perf-same_cpu_crypt --allow-discards || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q same_cpu_crypt || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q discards || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+	echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP open -q --type plain --hash sha256 $DEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+	echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP refresh --hash sha256 -q $DEV_NAME --perf-same_cpu_crypt --allow-discards || fail
+	# Hash affects volume key for plain device. Check we can detect it
+	echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP refresh -q $DEV_NAME --hash sha512 --perf-same_cpu_crypt --allow-discards 2>/dev/null && fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q same_cpu_crypt || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q discards || fail
+	echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP refresh --hash sha256 -q $DEV_NAME --allow-discards || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q discards || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q same_cpu_crypt && fail
+	echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP refresh --hash sha256 -q $DEV_NAME || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q discards && fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q same_cpu_crypt && fail
+	echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP refresh --hash sha256 $DEV $DEV_NAME2 2>/dev/null && fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+	# LUKS
+	echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP open --type luks1 $DEV $DEV_NAME --perf-same_cpu_crypt --perf-submit_from_crypt_cpus || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q same_cpu_crypt || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q submit_from_crypt_cpus || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+	echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP open --type luks1 $DEV $DEV_NAME --perf-same_cpu_crypt --allow-discards || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q same_cpu_crypt || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q discards || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+	echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+	echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP refresh $DEV_NAME --allow-discards || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q discards || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q same_cpu_crypt && fail
+	echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP refresh $DEV_NAME --allow-discards --perf-same_cpu_crypt || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q discards || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q same_cpu_crypt || fail
+	echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP refresh $DEV_NAME || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q discards && fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q same_cpu_crypt && fail
+	echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP refresh $DEV $DEV_NAME2 2>/dev/null && fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+	format luks2
+	echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME --perf-same_cpu_crypt --perf-submit_from_crypt_cpus --persistent || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q same_cpu_crypt || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q submit_from_crypt_cpus || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+	# Stored in metadata
+	echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q same_cpu_crypt || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q submit_from_crypt_cpus || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+	echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME --perf-same_cpu_crypt --allow-discards --persistent || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q same_cpu_crypt || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q discards || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+	echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q same_cpu_crypt || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q discards || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+	echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME --persistent || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q same_cpu_crypt && fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q discards && fail
+	echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP refresh $DEV $DEV_NAME --perf-same_cpu_crypt --perf-submit_from_crypt_cpus --persistent || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q same_cpu_crypt || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q submit_from_crypt_cpus || fail
+	echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP refresh $DEV_NAME || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q same_cpu_crypt || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q submit_from_crypt_cpus || fail
+	echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP refresh $DEV $DEV_NAME --perf-same_cpu_crypt --allow-discards --persistent || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q same_cpu_crypt || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q discards || fail
+	echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP refresh $DEV_NAME || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q same_cpu_crypt || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q discards || fail
+	echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP refresh $DEV $DEV_NAME --perf-submit_from_crypt_cpus || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q same_cpu_crypt || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q discards || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q submit_from_crypt_cpus || fail
+	echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP refresh $DEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q submit_from_crypt_cpus && fail
+	echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP refresh $DEV $DEV_NAME --persistent || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q same_cpu_crypt && fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q discards && fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q submit_from_crypt_cpus && fail
+	echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP refresh $DEV $DEV_NAME --disable-keyring || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q keyring && fail
+	if [ -n "$DM_KEYRING" ]; then
+		echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP refresh $DEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+		$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q keyring || fail
+	fi
+	echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP refresh $DEV $DEV_NAME2 2>/dev/null && fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+fi
+
+echo "[3] Kernel dmcrypt sector size options"
+echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP open --type plain --hash sha256 $DEV $DEV_NAME --sector-size 4096 >/dev/null 2>&1
+ret=$?
+[ -z "$DM_SECTOR_SIZE" -a $ret -eq 0 ] && fail "cryptsetup activated device with --sector-size option on incompatible kernel!"
+if [ $ret -ne 0 ] ; then
+	SKIP_COUNT=$((SKIP_COUNT+1))
+	if [ $SKIP_COUNT -ge 2 ]; then
+		skip "dmcrypt sector-size option not available"
+	fi
+	echo "TEST SKIPPED: dmcrypt sector-size option not available"
+else
+	$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+	echo -n "PLAIN sector size:"
+	echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP open --type plain --hash sha256 $DEV $DEV_NAME --sector-size 1234 >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail
+	for S in 512 1024 2048 4096; do
+		echo -n "[$S]"
+		echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP open -q --type plain --hash sha256 $DEV $DEV_NAME --sector-size $S || fail
+		check_sector_size $S
+		$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+	done
+	echo
+
+	echo -n "LUKS2 sector size:"
+	echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks2 -$DEV --sector-size 1234 >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail
+	for S in 512 1024 2048 4096; do
+		echo -n "[$S]"
+		echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 --pbkdf pbkdf2 --pbkdf-force-iterations 1000 $DEV --sector-size $S || fail
+		echo -e "$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+		check_sector_size $S
+		$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+	done
+	echo
+fi
+
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/differ.c b/tests/differ.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a94bff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/differ.c
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+/*
+ * cryptsetup file differ check (rewritten Clemens' fileDiffer in Python)
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+
+struct ffile {
+	char *name;
+	int fd;
+	unsigned char *addr;
+	size_t size;
+};
+
+enum df { OK , FAIL };
+
+static void print_diff(off_t from, int max,
+		       const unsigned char *o,
+		       const unsigned char *n)
+{
+	int i, len = max;
+
+	if (len > 16)
+		len = 16;
+
+	printf("OLD:");
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+		printf(" %02x", o[from + i]);
+	printf("%s\n    ", max != len ? " ..." : "");
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+		printf(" %2c", o[from + i] > ' ' ? o[from + i]: '.');
+	printf("\nNEW:");
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+		printf(" %02x", n[from + i]);
+	printf("%s\n    ", max != len ? " ..." : "");
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+		printf(" %2c", n[from + i] > ' ' ? n[from + i]: '.');
+	printf("\n");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Xfrom-to (e.g. R10-15)
+ * A - change allowed
+ * S - change required, semantic
+ * R - change required, random
+ * F - change forbidden
+ */
+static enum df check(const char *range, unsigned char *o, unsigned char *n)
+{
+	char strict;
+	unsigned long long from, to;
+	enum df ret;
+
+	if (sscanf(range, "%c%llu-%llu", &strict, &from, &to) != 3) {
+		printf("Unknown range format %s.\n", range);
+		return FAIL;
+	}
+
+	switch (toupper(strict)) {
+	case 'A':
+		ret = OK;
+		break;
+	case 'S':
+		ret = memcmp(&o[from], &n[from], to - from + 1) != 0 ? OK : FAIL;
+		break;
+	case 'R': /* FIXME - random test */
+		ret = memcmp(&o[from], &n[from], to - from + 1) != 0 ? OK : FAIL;
+		break;
+	case 'F':
+		ret = memcmp(&o[from], &n[from], to - from + 1) == 0 ? OK : FAIL;
+		break;
+	default:
+		ret = FAIL;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (ret == FAIL)
+		print_diff(from,  to - from + 1, o, n);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int open_mmap(struct ffile *f)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+
+	f->fd = open(f->name, O_RDONLY);
+	if (f->fd == -1 || fstat(f->fd, &st) == -1)
+		return 0;
+
+	f->size = st.st_size;
+	f->addr = mmap(NULL, f->size, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, f->fd, 0);
+
+	return (f->addr == MAP_FAILED) ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+static void close_mmap(struct ffile *f)
+{
+	if (f->addr != MAP_FAILED && !munmap(f->addr, f->size))
+		f->addr = MAP_FAILED;
+
+	if (f->fd != -1 && !close(f->fd))
+		f->fd = -1;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+	int i, r = 1;
+	struct ffile file_old = {
+		.fd = -1,
+		.addr = MAP_FAILED,
+	};
+	struct ffile file_new = {
+		.fd = -1,
+		.addr = MAP_FAILED,
+	};
+
+	if (argc < 3) {
+		printf("Use: differ old_file new_file change_list.\n");
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	file_old.name = argv[1];
+	if (!open_mmap(&file_old))
+		goto bad;
+
+	file_new.name = argv[2];
+	if (!open_mmap(&file_new))
+		goto bad;
+
+	for (i = 3; i < argc; i++)
+		if (check(argv[i], file_old.addr, file_new.addr) == FAIL) {
+			printf ("FAILED for %s\n", argv[i]);
+			r = 1;
+			goto bad;
+		}
+
+	r = 0;
+bad:
+	close_mmap(&file_new);
+	close_mmap(&file_old);
+
+	return r;
+}
diff --git a/tests/discards-test b/tests/discards-test
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..dfa7507
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/discards-test
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+CRYPTSETUP="../cryptsetup"
+DEV_NAME="discard-t3st"
+DEV=""
+PWD1="93R4P4pIqAH8"
+
+cleanup() {
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME ] && dmsetup remove $DEV_NAME
+	udevadm settle >/dev/null 2>&1
+	rmmod scsi_debug 2>/dev/null
+	sleep 2
+}
+
+fail()
+{
+	echo "FAILED at line $(caller)"
+	cleanup
+	exit 100
+}
+
+add_device() {
+	modprobe scsi_debug $@ delay=0
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ] ; then
+		echo "This kernel seems to not support proper scsi_debug module, test skipped."
+		exit 77
+	fi
+
+	sleep 2
+	DEV=$(grep -l -e scsi_debug /sys/block/*/device/model | cut -f4 -d /)
+
+	DEV="/dev/$DEV"
+	[ -b $DEV ] || fail "Cannot find $DEV."
+}
+
+function check_version()
+{
+	VER_STR=$(dmsetup targets | grep crypt | cut -f 2 -dv)
+	[ -z "$VER_STR" ] && fail "Failed to parse dm-crypt version."
+
+	VER_MAJ=$(echo $VER_STR | cut -f 1 -d.)
+	VER_MIN=$(echo $VER_STR | cut -f 2 -d.)
+
+	# option supported in 1.11
+	test $VER_MAJ -gt 1 && return 0
+	test $VER_MIN -ge 11 && return 0
+	return 1
+}
+
+if [ $(id -u) != 0 ]; then
+	echo "WARNING: You must be root to run this test, test skipped."
+	exit 77
+fi
+
+modprobe --dry-run scsi_debug || exit 77
+modprobe dm-crypt >/dev/null 2>&1
+if ! check_version ; then
+	echo "Probably old kernel, test skipped."
+	exit 77
+fi
+
+add_device dev_size_mb=16 sector_size=512 num_tgts=1 lbpu=1
+
+# FIXME test hash of device (unmap -> zero)
+# for now just check that flag is enabled
+
+echo "[1] Allowing discards for LUKS device"
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks1 $DEV -q -i1 || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $DEV $DEV_NAME --allow-discards || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep flags | grep discards >/dev/null || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP resize $DEV_NAME --size 100 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep flags | grep discards >/dev/null || fail
+dmsetup table $DEV_NAME | grep allow_discards >/dev/null || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksClose $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+echo "[2] Allowing discards for plain device"
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP create -q $DEV_NAME $DEV --hash sha1 --allow-discards || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep flags | grep discards >/dev/null || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP resize $DEV_NAME --size 100 || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep flags | grep discards >/dev/null || fail
+dmsetup table $DEV_NAME | grep allow_discards >/dev/null || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP remove $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/evil_hdr-keyslot_overlap.xz b/tests/evil_hdr-keyslot_overlap.xz
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6d56368
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/evil_hdr-keyslot_overlap.xz
diff --git a/tests/evil_hdr-luks_hdr_damage.xz b/tests/evil_hdr-luks_hdr_damage.xz
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b0b5254
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/evil_hdr-luks_hdr_damage.xz
diff --git a/tests/evil_hdr-payload_overwrite.xz b/tests/evil_hdr-payload_overwrite.xz
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b9e0e68
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/evil_hdr-payload_overwrite.xz
diff --git a/tests/evil_hdr-small_luks_device.xz b/tests/evil_hdr-small_luks_device.xz
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..700392d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/evil_hdr-small_luks_device.xz
diff --git a/tests/evil_hdr-stripes_payload_dmg.xz b/tests/evil_hdr-stripes_payload_dmg.xz
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc91556
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/evil_hdr-stripes_payload_dmg.xz
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-area-in-json-hdr-space-json0.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-area-in-json-hdr-space-json0.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..3938f7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-area-in-json-hdr-space-json0.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with one area accessing luks
+# header space
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# make area 7 access the luks2 header space
+	OFFS=$((2*LUKS2_HDR_SIZE*512-1))
+	LEN=1
+	json_str=$(jq -c --arg off $OFFS --arg len $LEN \
+		   '.keyslots."0".area.offset = $off | .keyslots."0".area.size = $len' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c --arg off $OFFS --arg len $LEN \
+	    'if (.keyslots."0".area.offset != $off) or (.keyslots."0".area.size != $len)
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-argon2-leftover-params.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-argon2-leftover-params.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..7f003a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-argon2-leftover-params.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with luks2 keyslot kdf object
+# having left over params.
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# add keyslot 1 to second digest
+	obj_len=$(jq -c -M '.keyslots."1".kdf | length' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	json_str=$(jq -r -c -M '.keyslots."1".kdf.type = "pbkdf2" | .keyslots."1".kdf.iterations = 1001 | .keyslots."1".kdf.hash = "sha256"' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	chks_res0=$(read_sha256_checksum $TGT_IMG)
+	test "$chks0" = "$chks_res0" || exit 2
+	new_obj_len=$(jq -c -M '.keyslots."1".kdf | length' $TMPDIR/json_res0)
+	test $((obj_len+2)) -eq $new_obj_len || exit 2
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-correct-full-json0.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-correct-full-json0.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..f32f84b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-correct-full-json0.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate header with correct json of maximal size in primary slot.
+# Secondary header is broken on purpose.
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+PATTERN="\"config\":{"
+KEY="\"config_key\":\""
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	read -r json_str < $TMPDIR/json0
+	json_len=${#json_str}
+	pindex=$(strindex $json_str $PATTERN)
+	test $pindex -gt 0 || exit 2
+
+	offset=${#PATTERN}
+	offset=$((offset+pindex))
+	key_len=${#KEY}
+	remain=$((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512-json_len-key_len-2)) # -2: closing '"' and terminating '\0'
+	if [ ${json_str:offset:1} = "}" ]; then
+		format_str="%s%s%s"
+	else
+		format_str="%s%s,%s"
+		remain=$((remain-1)) # also count with separating ','
+	fi
+	test $remain -gt 0 || exit 2
+
+	fill=$(repeat_str "X" $remain)"\""
+
+	printf $format_str $KEY $fill ${json_str:$offset} | _dd of=$TMPDIR/json0 bs=1 seek=$offset conv=notrunc
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	chks_res0=$(read_sha256_checksum $TGT_IMG)
+	test "$chks0" = "$chks_res0" || exit 2
+	#json_str_res0=$(< $TMPDIR/json_res0)
+	read -r json_str_res0 < $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	test ${#json_str_res0} -eq $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512-1)) || exit 2
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-corrupted-hdr0-with-correct-chks.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-corrupted-hdr0-with-correct-chks.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..3d4f729
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-corrupted-hdr0-with-correct-chks.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate header with malformed json but correct checksum in primary header
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	read -r json_str < $TMPDIR/json0
+	json_len=${#json_str}
+	json_len=$((json_len-1)) # to replace json closing '}'
+	json_new_str="${json_str:0:json_len},\""
+
+	while [ ${#json_new_str} -le $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) ]; do
+		json_new_str=$json_new_str"all_work_and_no_play_makes_Jack_a_dull_boy_"
+	done
+
+	printf "%s" $json_new_str | _dd of=$TMPDIR/json0 bs=512 count=$LUKS2_JSON_SIZE
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	chks_res0=$(read_sha256_checksum $TGT_IMG)
+	test "$chks0" = "$chks_res0" || exit 2
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	read -r json_str_res0 < $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	test ${#json_str_res0} -eq $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-corrupted-hdr1-with-correct-chks.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-corrupted-hdr1-with-correct-chks.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..026393c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-corrupted-hdr1-with-correct-chks.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate header with malformed json but correct checksum in secondary header
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json1
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	read -r json_str < $TMPDIR/json1
+	json_len=${#json_str}
+	json_len=$((json_len-1)) # to replace json closing '}'
+	json_new_str="${json_str:0:json_len},\""
+
+	while [ ${#json_new_str} -le $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) ]; do
+		json_new_str=$json_new_str"all_work_and_no_play_makes_Jack_a_dull_boy_"
+	done
+
+	printf "%s" $json_new_str | _dd of=$TMPDIR/json1 bs=512 count=$LUKS2_JSON_SIZE
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TMPDIR/json1 $TMPDIR/area1
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area1
+	chks1=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area1)
+	write_checksum $chks1 $TMPDIR/area1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/area1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	chks_res1=$(read_sha256_checksum $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$chks1" = "$chks_res1" || exit 2
+	read_luks2_json1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res1
+	read -r json_str_res1 < $TMPDIR/json_res1
+	test ${#json_str_res1} -eq $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-checksum-both-hdrs.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-checksum-both-hdrs.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..be98722
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-checksum-both-hdrs.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate header with bad checksum in both binary headerer
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	chks0=$(echo "Arbitrary chosen string: D'oh!" | calc_sha256_checksum_stdin)
+	chks1=$(echo "D'oh!: arbitrary chosen string" | calc_sha256_checksum_stdin)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TGT_IMG
+	write_checksum $chks1 $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	chks_res0=$(read_sha256_checksum $TGT_IMG)
+	chks_res1=$(read_sha256_checksum $TMPDIR/hdr1)
+	test "$chks0" = "$chks_res0" || exit 2
+	test "$chks1" = "$chks_res1" || exit 2
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-checksum-hdr0.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-checksum-hdr0.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..ac75ccb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-checksum-hdr0.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate header with bad checksum in primary binary header
+#
+
+# 1 full target dir
+# 2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	chks=$(echo "Arbitrary chosen string: D'oh!" | calc_sha256_checksum_stdin)
+	write_checksum $chks $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	chks_res=$(read_sha256_checksum $TGT_IMG)
+	test "$chks" = "$chks_res" || exit 2
+}
+
+#function cleanup()
+#{
+#}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+#cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-checksum-hdr1.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-checksum-hdr1.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..f0ca01a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-checksum-hdr1.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate header with bad checksum in secondary binary header
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	chks=$(echo "Arbitrary chosen string: D'oh!" | calc_sha256_checksum_stdin)
+	write_checksum $chks $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	chks_res=$(read_sha256_checksum $TMPDIR/hdr1)
+	test "$chks" = "$chks_res" || exit 2
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-json-size-c0.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-json-size-c0.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..2866b0b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-json-size-c0.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with invalid json_size in config section
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	JS=$(((LUKS2_HDR_SIZE-LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE)*512+4096))
+	json_str=$(jq -c --arg js $JS '.config.json_size = ($js | tostring)' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test -n "$json_str" || exit 2
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c --arg js $JS 'if .config.json_size != ($js | tostring )
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-json-size-c1.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-json-size-c1.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..dcab9bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-json-size-c1.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with invalid json_size in config section
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	JS=$(((LUKS2_HDR_SIZE-LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE)*512-4096))
+	json_str=$(jq -c --arg js $JS '.config.json_size = ($js | tostring)' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test -n "$json_str" || exit 2
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c --arg js $JS 'if .config.json_size != ($js | tostring )
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-json-size-c2.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-json-size-c2.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..6de411a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-json-size-c2.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with config json size mismatching
+# value in binary header
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	JS=$(((LUKS2_HDR_SIZE-LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE)*512))
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE=$LUKS2_HDR_SIZE_32K
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*512))
+	TEST_JSN_SIZE=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE))
+
+	json_str=$(jq -c '.' $TMPDIR/json0)
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+	write_bin_hdr_offset $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area1
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area1)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area1
+
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/area1 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res0
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 4 $TMPDIR/hdr_res0)
+	test "$str_res1" = "LUKS" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 4 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "SKUL" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c --arg js $JS 'if .config.json_size != ( $js | tostring )
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-keyslots-size-c0.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-keyslots-size-c0.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..c4f002f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-keyslots-size-c0.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with too large keyslots_size set in config section
+# (iow config.keyslots_size = data_offset - keyslots_offset + 512)
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# make area 7 being included in area 6
+	OFFS=$((2*LUKS2_HDR_SIZE*512))
+	json_str=$(jq -c --arg off $OFFS '.config.keyslots_size = (.segments."0".offset | tonumber - ($off | tonumber) + 4096 | tostring)' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test -n "$json_str" || exit 2
+	# [.keyslots[].area.offset | tonumber] | max | tostring ---> max offset in keyslot areas
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c --arg off $OFFS 'if .config.keyslots_size != ( .segments."0".offset | tonumber - ($off | tonumber) + 4096 | tostring )
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-keyslots-size-c1.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-keyslots-size-c1.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..eff2064
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-keyslots-size-c1.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with unaligned keyslots_size config section
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	json_str=$(jq -c '.config.keyslots_size = (.config.keyslots_size | tonumber - 1 | tostring)' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test -n "$json_str" || exit 2
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c 'if (.config.keyslots_size | tonumber % 4096) == 0
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-keyslots-size-c2.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-keyslots-size-c2.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..f70f39f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-keyslots-size-c2.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with keyslots_size less than sum of all keyslots area
+# in json
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	json_str=$(jq '.config.keyslots_size = ([.keyslots[].area.size] | map(tonumber) | add - 4096 | tostring )' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test -n "$json_str" || exit 2
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c 'if .config.keyslots_size != ([.keyslots[].area.size ] | map(tonumber) | add - 4096 | tostring)
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-object-type-json0.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-object-type-json0.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..1063864
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-object-type-json0.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with well-formed json format
+# where top level value is not of type object.
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	read -r json_str < $TMPDIR/json0
+	json_str="[$json_str]" # make top level value an array
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	printf "%s" "$json_str" | _dd of=$TMPDIR/json0 bs=1 conv=notrunc
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	chks_res0=$(read_sha256_checksum $TGT_IMG)
+	test "$chks0" = "$chks_res0" || exit 2
+	read -r json_str_res0 < $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	test "$json_str" = "$json_str_res0" || exit 2
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-opening-char-json0.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-opening-char-json0.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..996d997
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-invalid-opening-char-json0.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with well-formed json prefixed
+# with useless whitespace.
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	read -r json_str < $TMPDIR/json0
+	json_str=" $json_str" # add useless opening whitespace
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	printf "%s" "$json_str" | _dd of=$TMPDIR/json0 bs=1 conv=notrunc
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	chks_res0=$(read_sha256_checksum $TGT_IMG)
+	test "$chks0" = "$chks_res0" || exit 2
+	IFS= read -r json_str_res0 < $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	test "$json_str" = "$json_str_res0" || exit 2
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-keyslot-missing-digest.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-keyslot-missing-digest.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..1914581
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-keyslot-missing-digest.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with luks2 keyslot not assigned
+# to any digest.
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	read -r json_str_orig < $TMPDIR/json0
+	arr_len=$(jq -c -M '.digests."0".keyslots | length' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	# remove first element from digests."0".keyslots array
+	json_str=$(jq -r -c -M 'del(.digests."0".keyslots[0])' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	chks_res0=$(read_sha256_checksum $TGT_IMG)
+	test "$chks0" = "$chks_res0" || exit 2
+	new_arr_len=$(jq -c -M '.digests."0".keyslots | length' $TMPDIR/json_res0)
+	test $((arr_len-1)) -eq $new_arr_len || exit 2
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-keyslot-too-many-digests.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-keyslot-too-many-digests.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..5e1d6ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-keyslot-too-many-digests.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with luks2 keyslot assigned
+# to more than 1 digest.
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# add keyslot 1 to second digest
+	json_str=$(jq -r -c -M '.digests."1" = .digests."0" | .digests."1".keyslots = ["1"]' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	chks_res0=$(read_sha256_checksum $TGT_IMG)
+	test "$chks0" = "$chks_res0" || exit 2
+	new_arr_len=$(jq -c -M '.digests."1".keyslots | length' $TMPDIR/json_res0)
+	test 1 -eq $new_arr_len || exit 2
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-128k-secondary.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-128k-secondary.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..ca6b0c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-128k-secondary.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate secondary header with one of allowed json area
+# size values. Test whether auto-recovery code is able
+# to validate secondary header with non-default json area
+# size.
+#
+# primary header is corrupted on purpose.
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# 128 KiB metadata
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE=$LUKS2_HDR_SIZE_128K
+
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*512))
+	TEST_JSN_SIZE=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE))
+	KEYSLOTS_OFFSET=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*1024))
+	JSON_DIFF=$(((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_HDR_SIZE)*1024))
+	JSON_SIZE=$((TEST_JSN_SIZE*512))
+	DATA_OFFSET=16777216
+
+	json_str=$(jq -c --arg jdiff $JSON_DIFF --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE --arg off $DATA_OFFSET \
+		   '.keyslots[].area.offset |= ( . | tonumber + ($jdiff | tonumber) | tostring) |
+		    .config.json_size = $jsize |
+		    .segments."0".offset = $off' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test -n "$json_str" || exit 2
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+
+	write_bin_hdr_offset $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area1
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area1)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area1
+
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/area0
+
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/area1 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	local str_res0=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res0)
+	test "$str_res0" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+	read_luks2_json1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	jq -c --arg koff $KEYSLOTS_OFFSET --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE \
+		'if ([.keyslots[].area.offset] | map(tonumber) | min | tostring != $koff) or
+		    (.config.json_size != $jsize)
+		then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res1 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-128k.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-128k.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..fe76598
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-128k.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary with predefined json_size. There's only limited
+# set of values allowed as json size in config section of LUKS2
+# metadata
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# 128KiB metadata
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE=$LUKS2_HDR_SIZE_128K
+
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*512))
+	TEST_JSN_SIZE=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE))
+	KEYSLOTS_OFFSET=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*1024))
+	JSON_DIFF=$(((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_HDR_SIZE)*1024))
+	JSON_SIZE=$((TEST_JSN_SIZE*512))
+	DATA_OFFSET=16777216
+
+	json_str=$(jq -c --arg jdiff $JSON_DIFF --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE --arg off $DATA_OFFSET \
+		   '.keyslots[].area.offset |= ( . | tonumber + ($jdiff | tonumber) | tostring) |
+		    .config.json_size = $jsize |
+		    .segments."0".offset = $off' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test -n "$json_str" || exit 2
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area1
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area1)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area1
+
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/area1
+
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/area1 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	jq -c --arg koff $KEYSLOTS_OFFSET --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE \
+		'if ([.keyslots[].area.offset] | map(tonumber) | min | tostring != $koff) or
+		    (.config.json_size != $jsize)
+		then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-16k-secondary.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-16k-secondary.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..14a6613
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-16k-secondary.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate secondary header with one of allowed json area
+# size values. Test whether auto-recovery code is able
+# to validate secondary header with non-default json area
+# size.
+#
+# primary header is corrupted on purpose.
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# 16 KiB metadata
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE=$LUKS2_HDR_SIZE
+
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*512))
+	TEST_JSN_SIZE=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE))
+	KEYSLOTS_OFFSET=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*1024))
+	JSON_DIFF=$(((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_HDR_SIZE)*1024))
+	JSON_SIZE=$((TEST_JSN_SIZE*512))
+	DATA_OFFSET=16777216
+
+	json_str=$(jq -c --arg jdiff $JSON_DIFF --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE --arg off $DATA_OFFSET \
+		   '.keyslots[].area.offset |= ( . | tonumber + ($jdiff | tonumber) | tostring) |
+		    .config.json_size = $jsize |
+		    .segments."0".offset = $off' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test -n "$json_str" || exit 2
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+
+	write_bin_hdr_offset $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area1
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area1)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area1
+
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/area0
+
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/area1 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	local str_res0=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res0)
+	test "$str_res0" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+	read_luks2_json1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	jq -c --arg koff $KEYSLOTS_OFFSET --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE \
+		'if ([.keyslots[].area.offset] | map(tonumber) | min | tostring != $koff) or
+		    (.config.json_size != $jsize)
+		then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res1 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-1m-secondary.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-1m-secondary.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..fdcd715
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-1m-secondary.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate secondary header with one of allowed json area
+# size values. Test whether auto-recovery code is able
+# to validate secondary header with non-default json area
+# size.
+#
+# primary header is corrupted on purpose.
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# 1 MiB metadata
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE=$LUKS2_HDR_SIZE_1M
+
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*512))
+	TEST_JSN_SIZE=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE))
+	KEYSLOTS_OFFSET=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*1024))
+	JSON_DIFF=$(((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_HDR_SIZE)*1024))
+	JSON_SIZE=$((TEST_JSN_SIZE*512))
+	DATA_OFFSET=16777216
+
+	json_str=$(jq -c --arg jdiff $JSON_DIFF --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE --arg off $DATA_OFFSET \
+		   '.keyslots[].area.offset |= ( . | tonumber + ($jdiff | tonumber) | tostring) |
+		    .config.json_size = $jsize |
+		    .segments."0".offset = $off' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test -n "$json_str" || exit 2
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+
+	write_bin_hdr_offset $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area1
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area1)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area1
+
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/area0
+
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/area1 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	local str_res0=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res0)
+	test "$str_res0" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+	read_luks2_json1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	jq -c --arg koff $KEYSLOTS_OFFSET --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE \
+		'if ([.keyslots[].area.offset] | map(tonumber) | min | tostring != $koff) or
+		    (.config.json_size != $jsize)
+		then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res1 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-1m.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-1m.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..25722dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-1m.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary with predefined json_size. There's only limited
+# set of values allowed as json size in config section of LUKS2
+# metadata
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# 1 MiB metadata
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE=$LUKS2_HDR_SIZE_1M
+
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*512))
+	TEST_JSN_SIZE=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE))
+	KEYSLOTS_OFFSET=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*1024))
+	JSON_DIFF=$(((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_HDR_SIZE)*1024))
+	JSON_SIZE=$((TEST_JSN_SIZE*512))
+	DATA_OFFSET=16777216
+
+	json_str=$(jq -c --arg jdiff $JSON_DIFF --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE --arg off $DATA_OFFSET \
+		   '.keyslots[].area.offset |= ( . | tonumber + ($jdiff | tonumber) | tostring) |
+		    .config.json_size = $jsize |
+		    .segments."0".offset = $off' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test -n "$json_str" || exit 2
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area1
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area1)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area1
+
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/area1
+
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/area1 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	jq -c --arg koff $KEYSLOTS_OFFSET --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE \
+		'if ([.keyslots[].area.offset] | map(tonumber) | min | tostring != $koff) or
+		    (.config.json_size != $jsize)
+		then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-256k-secondary.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-256k-secondary.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..0ed66e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-256k-secondary.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate secondary header with one of allowed json area
+# size values. Test whether auto-recovery code is able
+# to validate secondary header with non-default json area
+# size.
+#
+# primary header is corrupted on purpose.
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# 256 KiB metadata
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE=$LUKS2_HDR_SIZE_256K
+
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*512))
+	TEST_JSN_SIZE=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE))
+	KEYSLOTS_OFFSET=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*1024))
+	JSON_DIFF=$(((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_HDR_SIZE)*1024))
+	JSON_SIZE=$((TEST_JSN_SIZE*512))
+	DATA_OFFSET=16777216
+
+	json_str=$(jq -c --arg jdiff $JSON_DIFF --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE --arg off $DATA_OFFSET \
+		   '.keyslots[].area.offset |= ( . | tonumber + ($jdiff | tonumber) | tostring) |
+		    .config.json_size = $jsize |
+		    .segments."0".offset = $off' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test -n "$json_str" || exit 2
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+
+	write_bin_hdr_offset $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area1
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area1)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area1
+
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/area0
+
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/area1 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	local str_res0=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res0)
+	test "$str_res0" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+	read_luks2_json1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	jq -c --arg koff $KEYSLOTS_OFFSET --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE \
+		'if ([.keyslots[].area.offset] | map(tonumber) | min | tostring != $koff) or
+		    (.config.json_size != $jsize)
+		then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res1 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-256k.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-256k.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..aa5df05
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-256k.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary with predefined json_size. There's only limited
+# set of values allowed as json size in config section of LUKS2
+# metadata
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# 256KiB metadata
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE=$LUKS2_HDR_SIZE_256K
+
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*512))
+	TEST_JSN_SIZE=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE))
+	KEYSLOTS_OFFSET=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*1024))
+	JSON_DIFF=$(((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_HDR_SIZE)*1024))
+	JSON_SIZE=$((TEST_JSN_SIZE*512))
+	DATA_OFFSET=16777216
+
+	json_str=$(jq -c --arg jdiff $JSON_DIFF --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE --arg off $DATA_OFFSET \
+		   '.keyslots[].area.offset |= ( . | tonumber + ($jdiff | tonumber) | tostring) |
+		    .config.json_size = $jsize |
+		    .segments."0".offset = $off' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test -n "$json_str" || exit 2
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area1
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area1)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area1
+
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/area1
+
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/area1 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	jq -c --arg koff $KEYSLOTS_OFFSET --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE \
+		'if ([.keyslots[].area.offset] | map(tonumber) | min | tostring != $koff) or
+		    (.config.json_size != $jsize)
+		then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-2m-secondary.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-2m-secondary.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..4773c94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-2m-secondary.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary with predefined json_size. There's only limited
+# set of values allowed as json size in config section of LUKS2
+# metadata
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# 2 MiB metadata
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE=$LUKS2_HDR_SIZE_2M
+
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*512))
+	TEST_JSN_SIZE=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE))
+	KEYSLOTS_OFFSET=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*1024))
+	JSON_DIFF=$(((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_HDR_SIZE)*1024))
+	JSON_SIZE=$((TEST_JSN_SIZE*512))
+	DATA_OFFSET=16777216
+
+	json_str=$(jq -c --arg jdiff $JSON_DIFF --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE --arg off $DATA_OFFSET \
+		   '.keyslots[].area.offset |= ( . | tonumber + ($jdiff | tonumber) | tostring) |
+		    .config.json_size = $jsize |
+		    .segments."0".offset = $off' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test -n "$json_str" || exit 2
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+
+	write_bin_hdr_offset $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area1
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area1)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area1
+
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/area0
+
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/area1 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	local str_res0=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res0)
+	test "$str_res0" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+	read_luks2_json1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	jq -c --arg koff $KEYSLOTS_OFFSET --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE \
+		'if ([.keyslots[].area.offset] | map(tonumber) | min | tostring != $koff) or
+		    (.config.json_size != $jsize)
+		then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res1 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-2m.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-2m.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..ae9bc30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-2m.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary with predefined json_size. There's only limited
+# set of values allowed as json size in config section of LUKS2
+# metadata
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# 2 MiB metadata
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE=$LUKS2_HDR_SIZE_2M
+
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*512))
+	TEST_JSN_SIZE=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE))
+	KEYSLOTS_OFFSET=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*1024))
+	JSON_DIFF=$(((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_HDR_SIZE)*1024))
+	JSON_SIZE=$((TEST_JSN_SIZE*512))
+	DATA_OFFSET=16777216
+
+	json_str=$(jq -c --arg jdiff $JSON_DIFF --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE --arg off $DATA_OFFSET \
+		   '.keyslots[].area.offset |= ( . | tonumber + ($jdiff | tonumber) | tostring) |
+		    .config.json_size = $jsize |
+		    .segments."0".offset = $off' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test -n "$json_str" || exit 2
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area1
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area1)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area1
+
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/area1
+
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/area1 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	jq -c --arg koff $KEYSLOTS_OFFSET --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE \
+		'if ([.keyslots[].area.offset] | map(tonumber) | min | tostring != $koff) or
+		    (.config.json_size != $jsize)
+		then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-32k-secondary.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-32k-secondary.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..af18f43
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-32k-secondary.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate secondary header with one of allowed json area
+# size values. Test whether auto-recovery code is able
+# to validate secondary header with non-default json area
+# size.
+#
+# primary header is corrupted on purpose.
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# 32 KiB metadata
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE=$LUKS2_HDR_SIZE_32K
+
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*512))
+	TEST_JSN_SIZE=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE))
+	KEYSLOTS_OFFSET=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*1024))
+	JSON_DIFF=$(((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_HDR_SIZE)*1024))
+	JSON_SIZE=$((TEST_JSN_SIZE*512))
+	DATA_OFFSET=16777216
+
+	json_str=$(jq -c --arg jdiff $JSON_DIFF --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE --arg off $DATA_OFFSET \
+		   '.keyslots[].area.offset |= ( . | tonumber + ($jdiff | tonumber) | tostring) |
+		    .config.json_size = $jsize |
+		    .segments."0".offset = $off' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test -n "$json_str" || exit 2
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+
+	write_bin_hdr_offset $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area1
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area1)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area1
+
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/area0
+
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/area1 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	local str_res0=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res0)
+	test "$str_res0" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+	read_luks2_json1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	jq -c --arg koff $KEYSLOTS_OFFSET --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE \
+		'if ([.keyslots[].area.offset] | map(tonumber) | min | tostring != $koff) or
+		    (.config.json_size != $jsize)
+		then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res1 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-32k.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-32k.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..40c921e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-32k.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with non-default metadata json_size.
+# There's only limited set of values allowed as json size in
+# config section of LUKS2 metadata
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# 32KiB metadata
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE=$LUKS2_HDR_SIZE_32K
+
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*512))
+	TEST_JSN_SIZE=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE))
+	KEYSLOTS_OFFSET=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*1024))
+	JSON_DIFF=$(((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_HDR_SIZE)*1024))
+	JSON_SIZE=$((TEST_JSN_SIZE*512))
+	DATA_OFFSET=16777216
+
+	json_str=$(jq -c --arg jdiff $JSON_DIFF --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE --arg off $DATA_OFFSET \
+		   '.keyslots[].area.offset |= ( . | tonumber + ($jdiff | tonumber) | tostring) |
+		    .config.json_size = $jsize |
+		    .segments."0".offset = $off' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test -n "$json_str" || exit 2
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area1
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area1)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area1
+
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/area1
+
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/area1 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	jq -c --arg koff $KEYSLOTS_OFFSET --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE \
+		'if ([.keyslots[].area.offset] | map(tonumber) | min | tostring != $koff) or
+		    (.config.json_size != $jsize)
+		then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-4m-secondary.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-4m-secondary.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..332d67e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-4m-secondary.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary with predefined json_size. There's only limited
+# set of values allowed as json size in config section of LUKS2
+# metadata
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# 4 MiB metadata
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE=$LUKS2_HDR_SIZE_4M
+
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*512))
+	TEST_JSN_SIZE=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE))
+	KEYSLOTS_OFFSET=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*1024))
+	JSON_DIFF=$(((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_HDR_SIZE)*1024))
+	JSON_SIZE=$((TEST_JSN_SIZE*512))
+	DATA_OFFSET=16777216
+
+	json_str=$(jq -c --arg jdiff $JSON_DIFF --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE --arg off $DATA_OFFSET \
+		   '.keyslots[].area.offset |= ( . | tonumber + ($jdiff | tonumber) | tostring) |
+		    .config.json_size = $jsize |
+		    .segments."0".offset = $off' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test -n "$json_str" || exit 2
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+
+	write_bin_hdr_offset $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area1
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area1)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area1
+
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/area0
+
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/area1 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	local str_res0=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res0)
+	test "$str_res0" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+	read_luks2_json1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	jq -c --arg koff $KEYSLOTS_OFFSET --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE \
+		'if ([.keyslots[].area.offset] | map(tonumber) | min | tostring != $koff) or
+		    (.config.json_size != $jsize)
+		then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res1 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-4m.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-4m.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..21715fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-4m.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary with predefined json_size. There's only limited
+# set of values allowed as json size in config section of LUKS2
+# metadata
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# 4 MiB metadata
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE=$LUKS2_HDR_SIZE_4M
+
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*512))
+	TEST_JSN_SIZE=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE))
+	KEYSLOTS_OFFSET=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*1024))
+	JSON_DIFF=$(((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_HDR_SIZE)*1024))
+	JSON_SIZE=$((TEST_JSN_SIZE*512))
+	DATA_OFFSET=16777216
+
+	json_str=$(jq -c --arg jdiff $JSON_DIFF --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE --arg off $DATA_OFFSET \
+		   '.keyslots[].area.offset |= ( . | tonumber + ($jdiff | tonumber) | tostring) |
+		    .config.json_size = $jsize |
+		    .segments."0".offset = $off' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test -n "$json_str" || exit 2
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area1
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area1)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area1
+
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/area1
+
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/area1 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	jq -c --arg koff $KEYSLOTS_OFFSET --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE \
+		'if ([.keyslots[].area.offset] | map(tonumber) | min | tostring != $koff) or
+		    (.config.json_size != $jsize)
+		then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-512k-secondary.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-512k-secondary.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..581dea0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-512k-secondary.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate secondary header with one of allowed json area
+# size values. Test whether auto-recovery code is able
+# to validate secondary header with non-default json area
+# size.
+#
+# primary header is corrupted on purpose.
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# 512 KiB metadata
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE=$LUKS2_HDR_SIZE_512K
+
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*512))
+	TEST_JSN_SIZE=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE))
+	KEYSLOTS_OFFSET=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*1024))
+	JSON_DIFF=$(((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_HDR_SIZE)*1024))
+	JSON_SIZE=$((TEST_JSN_SIZE*512))
+	DATA_OFFSET=16777216
+
+	json_str=$(jq -c --arg jdiff $JSON_DIFF --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE --arg off $DATA_OFFSET \
+		   '.keyslots[].area.offset |= ( . | tonumber + ($jdiff | tonumber) | tostring) |
+		    .config.json_size = $jsize |
+		    .segments."0".offset = $off' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test -n "$json_str" || exit 2
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+
+	write_bin_hdr_offset $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area1
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area1)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area1
+
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/area0
+
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/area1 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	local str_res0=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res0)
+	test "$str_res0" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+	read_luks2_json1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	jq -c --arg koff $KEYSLOTS_OFFSET --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE \
+		'if ([.keyslots[].area.offset] | map(tonumber) | min | tostring != $koff) or
+		    (.config.json_size != $jsize)
+		then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res1 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-512k.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-512k.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..8b196e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-512k.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary with predefined json_size. There's only limited
+# set of values allowed as json size in config section of LUKS2
+# metadata
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# 512KiB metadata
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE=$LUKS2_HDR_SIZE_512K
+
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*512))
+	TEST_JSN_SIZE=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE))
+	KEYSLOTS_OFFSET=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*1024))
+	JSON_DIFF=$(((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_HDR_SIZE)*1024))
+	JSON_SIZE=$((TEST_JSN_SIZE*512))
+	DATA_OFFSET=16777216
+
+	json_str=$(jq -c --arg jdiff $JSON_DIFF --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE --arg off $DATA_OFFSET \
+		   '.keyslots[].area.offset |= ( . | tonumber + ($jdiff | tonumber) | tostring) |
+		    .config.json_size = $jsize |
+		    .segments."0".offset = $off' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test -n "$json_str" || exit 2
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area1
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area1)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area1
+
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/area1
+
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/area1 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	jq -c --arg koff $KEYSLOTS_OFFSET --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE \
+		'if ([.keyslots[].area.offset] | map(tonumber) | min | tostring != $koff) or
+		    (.config.json_size != $jsize)
+		then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-64k-inv-area-c0.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-64k-inv-area-c0.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..16e2078
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-64k-inv-area-c0.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with non-default metadata json_size
+# and keyslots area trespassing in json area.
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# 64KiB metadata
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE=$LUKS2_HDR_SIZE_64K
+
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*512))
+	TEST_JSN_SIZE=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE))
+	KEYSLOTS_OFFSET=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*1024-1))
+	# overlap in json area by exactly one byte
+	JSON_DIFF=$(((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_HDR_SIZE)*1024-1))
+	JSON_SIZE=$((TEST_JSN_SIZE*512))
+	DATA_OFFSET=16777216
+
+	json_str=$(jq -c --arg jdiff $JSON_DIFF --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE --arg off $DATA_OFFSET \
+		   '.keyslots[].area.offset |= ( . | tonumber + ($jdiff | tonumber) | tostring) |
+		    .config.json_size = $jsize |
+		    .segments."0".offset = $off' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test -n "$json_str" || exit 2
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area1
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area1)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area1
+
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/area1
+
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/area1 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	jq -c --arg koff $KEYSLOTS_OFFSET --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE \
+		'if ([.keyslots[].area.offset] | map(tonumber) | min | tostring != $koff) or
+		    (.config.json_size != $jsize)
+		then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-64k-inv-area-c1.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-64k-inv-area-c1.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..7ff670b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-64k-inv-area-c1.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with non-default metadata json_size
+# and keyslot area overflowing out of keyslots area.
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# 64KiB metadata
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE=$LUKS2_HDR_SIZE_64K
+
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*512))
+	TEST_JSN_SIZE=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE))
+	KEYSLOTS_OFFSET=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*1024))
+	JSON_DIFF=$(((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_HDR_SIZE)*1024))
+	JSON_SIZE=$((TEST_JSN_SIZE*512))
+	DATA_OFFSET=16777216
+
+	json_str=$(jq -c --arg jdiff $JSON_DIFF --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE --arg off $DATA_OFFSET \
+			 --arg mda $((2*TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES)) \
+		   '.keyslots[].area.offset |= ( . | tonumber + ($jdiff | tonumber) | tostring) |
+		    .keyslots."7".area.offset = ( ((.config.keyslots_size | tonumber) + ($mda | tonumber) - (.keyslots."7".area.size | tonumber) + 1) | tostring ) |
+		    .config.json_size = $jsize |
+		    .segments."0".offset = $off' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test -n "$json_str" || exit 2
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area1
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area1)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area1
+
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/area1
+
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/area1 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+# .keyslots.7.area.offset = ( ((.config.keyslots_size | tonumber) + ($mda | tonumber) - (.keyslots.7.area.size | tonumber) + 1) | tostring ) |
+	jq -c --arg mda $((2*TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES)) --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE \
+		'if (.keyslots."7".area.offset != ( ((.config.keyslots_size | tonumber) + ($mda | tonumber) - (.keyslots."7".area.size | tonumber) + 1) | tostring )) or
+		    (.config.json_size != $jsize)
+		then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-64k-inv-keyslots-size-c0.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-64k-inv-keyslots-size-c0.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..8f3d8d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-64k-inv-keyslots-size-c0.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary with predefined json_size where keyslots size
+# overflows in data area (segment offset)
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# 64KiB metadata
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE=$LUKS2_HDR_SIZE_64K
+
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*512))
+	TEST_JSN_SIZE=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE))
+	KEYSLOTS_OFFSET=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*1024))
+	JSON_DIFF=$(((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_HDR_SIZE)*1024))
+	JSON_SIZE=$((TEST_JSN_SIZE*512))
+	DATA_OFFSET=16777216
+
+	json_str=$(jq -c --arg jdiff $JSON_DIFF --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE --arg off $DATA_OFFSET \
+			 --arg mda $((2*TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES)) \
+		   '.keyslots[].area.offset |= ( . | tonumber + ($jdiff | tonumber) | tostring) |
+		    .config.json_size = $jsize |
+		    .config.keyslots_size = (((($off | tonumber) - ($mda | tonumber) + 4096)) | tostring ) |
+		    .segments."0".offset = $off' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test -n "$json_str" || exit 2
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area1
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area1)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area1
+
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/area1
+
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/area1 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	jq -c --arg koff $KEYSLOTS_OFFSET --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE --arg off $DATA_OFFSET --arg mda $((2*TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES)) \
+		'if ([.keyslots[].area.offset] | map(tonumber) | min | tostring != $koff) or
+		    (.config.json_size != $jsize) or
+		    (.config.keyslots_size != (((($off | tonumber) - ($mda | tonumber) + 4096)) | tostring ))
+		then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-64k-secondary.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-64k-secondary.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..1b246cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-64k-secondary.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate secondary header with one of allowed json area
+# size values. Test whether auto-recovery code is able
+# to validate secondary header with non-default json area
+# size.
+#
+# primary header is corrupted on purpose.
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# 64 KiB metadata
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE=$LUKS2_HDR_SIZE_64K
+
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*512))
+	TEST_JSN_SIZE=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE))
+	KEYSLOTS_OFFSET=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*1024))
+	JSON_DIFF=$(((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_HDR_SIZE)*1024))
+	JSON_SIZE=$((TEST_JSN_SIZE*512))
+	DATA_OFFSET=16777216
+
+	json_str=$(jq -c --arg jdiff $JSON_DIFF --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE --arg off $DATA_OFFSET \
+		   '.keyslots[].area.offset |= ( . | tonumber + ($jdiff | tonumber) | tostring) |
+		    .config.json_size = $jsize |
+		    .segments."0".offset = $off' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test -n "$json_str" || exit 2
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+
+	write_bin_hdr_offset $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area1
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area1)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area1
+
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/area0
+
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/area1 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	local str_res0=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res0)
+	test "$str_res0" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+	read_luks2_json1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	jq -c --arg koff $KEYSLOTS_OFFSET --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE \
+		'if ([.keyslots[].area.offset] | map(tonumber) | min | tostring != $koff) or
+		    (.config.json_size != $jsize)
+		then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res1 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-64k.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-64k.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..4e320f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-64k.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary with predefined json_size. There's only limited
+# set of values allowed as json size in config section of LUKS2
+# metadata
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# 64KiB metadata
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE=$LUKS2_HDR_SIZE_64K
+
+	TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*512))
+	TEST_JSN_SIZE=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE))
+	KEYSLOTS_OFFSET=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*1024))
+	JSON_DIFF=$(((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_HDR_SIZE)*1024))
+	JSON_SIZE=$((TEST_JSN_SIZE*512))
+	DATA_OFFSET=16777216
+
+	json_str=$(jq -c --arg jdiff $JSON_DIFF --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE --arg off $DATA_OFFSET \
+		   '.keyslots[].area.offset |= ( . | tonumber + ($jdiff | tonumber) | tostring) |
+		    .config.json_size = $jsize |
+		    .segments."0".offset = $off' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test -n "$json_str" || exit 2
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area1
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area1)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area1
+
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/area1
+
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/area1 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
+	jq -c --arg koff $KEYSLOTS_OFFSET --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE \
+		'if ([.keyslots[].area.offset] | map(tonumber) | min | tostring != $koff) or
+		    (.config.json_size != $jsize)
+		then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-missing-keyslot-referenced-in-digest.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-missing-keyslot-referenced-in-digest.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..d6ebe3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-missing-keyslot-referenced-in-digest.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with missing keyslot object referenced
+# in digest object
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	read -r json_str_orig < $TMPDIR/json0
+	arr_len=$(jq -c -M '.digests."0".keyslots | length' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	# add missing keyslot reference in keyslots array of digest '0'
+	json_str=$(jq -r -c -M 'def arr: ["digests", "0", "keyslots"];
+	       def missks: getpath(["keyslots"]) | keys | max | tonumber + 1 | tostring;
+	       setpath(arr; getpath(arr) + [ missks ])' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	chks_res0=$(read_sha256_checksum $TGT_IMG)
+	test "$chks0" = "$chks_res0" || exit 2
+	new_arr_len=$(jq -c -M '.digests."0".keyslots | length' $TMPDIR/json_res0)
+	test $((arr_len+1)) -eq $new_arr_len || exit 2
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-missing-keyslot-referenced-in-token.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-missing-keyslot-referenced-in-token.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..85798e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-missing-keyslot-referenced-in-token.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with missing keyslot object referenced
+# in token object
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	read -r json_str_orig < $TMPDIR/json0
+	# add missing keyslot reference in keyslots array of token '0'
+	json_str=$(jq -r -c -M 'def missks: getpath(["keyslots"]) | keys | max | tonumber + 1 | tostring;
+	      .tokens += {"0":{"type":"dummy","keyslots":[ "0", missks ]}}' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	chks_res0=$(read_sha256_checksum $TGT_IMG)
+	test "$chks0" = "$chks_res0" || exit 2
+	new_arr_len=$(jq -c -M '.tokens."0".keyslots | length' $TMPDIR/json_res0)
+	test $new_arr_len -eq 2 || exit 2
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-missing-segment-referenced-in-digest.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-missing-segment-referenced-in-digest.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..333462b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-missing-segment-referenced-in-digest.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with missing segment object referenced
+# in digest object
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	read -r json_str_orig < $TMPDIR/json0
+	arr_len=$(jq -c -M '.digests."0".segments | length' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	# add missing keyslot reference in keyslots array of digest '0'
+	json_str=$(jq -c 'def arr: ["digests", "0", "segments"];
+	       def missseg: getpath(["segments"]) | keys | max | tonumber + 1 | tostring;
+	       setpath(arr; getpath(arr) + [ missseg ])' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	chks_res0=$(read_sha256_checksum $TGT_IMG)
+	test "$chks0" = "$chks_res0" || exit 2
+	new_arr_len=$(jq -c -M '.digests."0".segments | length' $TMPDIR/json_res0)
+	test $((arr_len+1)) -eq $new_arr_len || exit 2
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-missing-trailing-null-byte-json0.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-missing-trailing-null-byte-json0.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..916cff7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-missing-trailing-null-byte-json0.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with well-formed json but missing
+# trailing null byte.
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+PATTERN="\"config\":{"
+KEY="\"config_key\":\""
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	read -r json_str < $TMPDIR/json0
+	json_len=${#json_str}
+	pindex=$(strindex $json_str $PATTERN)
+	test $pindex -gt 0 || exit 2
+
+	offset=${#PATTERN}
+	offset=$((offset+pindex))
+	key_len=${#KEY}
+	remain=$((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512-key_len-json_len-1)) # -1: closing '"'
+	if [ ${json_str:offset:1} = "}" ]; then
+		format_str="%s%s%s"
+	else
+		format_str="%s%s,%s"
+		remain=$((remain-1)) # also count with separating ','
+	fi
+	test $remain -gt 0 || exit 2
+
+	fill=$(repeat_str "X" $remain)
+	fill=$(repeat_str "X" $remain)"\""
+
+	printf $format_str $KEY $fill ${json_str:$offset} | _dd of=$TMPDIR/json0 bs=1 seek=$offset conv=notrunc
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	chks_res0=$(read_sha256_checksum $TGT_IMG)
+	test "$chks0" = "$chks_res0" || exit 2
+	read -r json_str_res0 < $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	test ${#json_str_res0} -eq $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-non-null-byte-beyond-json0.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-non-null-byte-beyond-json0.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..fbd8cd6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-non-null-byte-beyond-json0.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with json area concluded with illegal
+# byte beyond terminating '}' character.
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	read -r json_str < $TMPDIR/json0
+	json_str="$json_str"X # add illegal 'X' beyond json format
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	printf '%s' $json_str | _dd of=$TMPDIR/json0 bs=1 conv=notrunc
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	chks_res0=$(read_sha256_checksum $TGT_IMG)
+	test "$chks0" = "$chks_res0" || exit 2
+	read -r json_str_res0 < $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	local len=${#json_str_res0}
+	len=$((len-1))
+	test ${json_str_res0:len:1} = "X" || exit 2
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-non-null-bytes-beyond-json0.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-non-null-bytes-beyond-json0.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..7d46628
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-non-null-bytes-beyond-json0.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with json area containing illegal bytes
+# beyond well-formed json format.
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+QUOTE="[Homer J. Simpson]: Keep looking shocked and move slowly towards the cake."
+SPACE=20
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	read -r json_str < $TMPDIR/json0
+	json_len_orig=${#json_str}
+	json_len=$((json_len_orig+${#QUOTE}+SPACE))
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	printf '%s' "$QUOTE" | _dd of=$TMPDIR/json0 seek=$((json_len_orig+SPACE)) bs=1 conv=notrunc
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	chks_res0=$(read_sha256_checksum $TGT_IMG)
+	test "$chks0" = "$chks_res0" || exit 2
+
+	_dd if=$TMPDIR/json_res0 of=$TMPDIR/quote skip=$((json_len_orig+SPACE)) count=${#QUOTE} bs=1
+	json_str_res0=$(head -c ${#QUOTE} $TMPDIR/quote)
+	test "$json_str_res0" = "$QUOTE" || exit 2
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-overlapping-areas-c0-json0.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-overlapping-areas-c0-json0.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..c319ca3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-overlapping-areas-c0-json0.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with two exactly same areas in terms of 'offset' and 'length'.
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# copy area 6 offset and length into area 7
+	json_str=$(jq -c '.keyslots."7".area.offset = .keyslots."6".area.offset |
+	       .keyslots."7".area.size = .keyslots."6".area.size' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c 'if (.keyslots."6".area.offset != .keyslots."7".area.offset) or (.keyslots."6".area.size != .keyslots."7".area.size)
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-overlapping-areas-c1-json0.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-overlapping-areas-c1-json0.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..39f0c6a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-overlapping-areas-c1-json0.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with one area included within another one (in terms of 'offset' + 'length')
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# make area 7 being included in area 6
+	json_str=$(jq -c '.keyslots."7".area.offset = (.keyslots."6".area.offset | tonumber + 1 | tostring ) |
+	       .keyslots."7".area.size = ( .keyslots."6".area.size | tonumber - 1 | tostring)' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c 'if (.keyslots."7".area.offset != (.keyslots."6".area.offset | tonumber + 1 | tostring)) or
+		  (.keyslots."7".area.size != (.keyslots."6".area.size | tonumber - 1 | tostring)) or
+		  (.keyslots."7".area.size | tonumber <= 0)
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-overlapping-areas-c2-json0.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-overlapping-areas-c2-json0.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..4c02008
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-overlapping-areas-c2-json0.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with one area slightly cross the boundary of another one
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# make area 7 being included in area 6
+	json_str=$(jq -c '.keyslots."7".area.offset = ([ .keyslots."6".area.offset, .keyslots."6".area.size ] | map(tonumber) | add - 1 | tostring)' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c 'if .keyslots."7".area.offset != ([.keyslots."6".area.offset, .keyslots."6".area.size ] | map(tonumber) | add - 1 | tostring)
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-pbkdf2-leftover-params-0.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-pbkdf2-leftover-params-0.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..1517ed6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-pbkdf2-leftover-params-0.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with luks2 keyslot kdf object
+# having left over params.
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# add keyslot 1 to second digest
+	obj_len=$(jq -c -M '.keyslots."2".kdf | length' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	json_str=$(jq -r -c -M '.keyslots."2".kdf.type = "argon2i" | .keyslots."2".kdf.iterations = 1001 | .keyslots."2".kdf.hash = "sha256"' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	chks_res0=$(read_sha256_checksum $TGT_IMG)
+	test "$chks0" = "$chks_res0" || exit 2
+	new_obj_len=$(jq -c -M '.keyslots."2".kdf | length' $TMPDIR/json_res0)
+	test $((obj_len+2)) -eq $new_obj_len || exit 2
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-pbkdf2-leftover-params-1.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-pbkdf2-leftover-params-1.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..c6aa5bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-pbkdf2-leftover-params-1.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with luks2 keyslot kdf object
+# having left over params.
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# add keyslot 1 to second digest
+	obj_len=$(jq -c -M '.keyslots."2".kdf | length' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	json_str=$(jq -r -c -M '.keyslots."2".kdf.type = "argon2id" | .keyslots."2".kdf.iterations = 1001 | .keyslots."2".kdf.hash = "sha256"' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	chks_res0=$(read_sha256_checksum $TGT_IMG)
+	test "$chks0" = "$chks_res0" || exit 2
+	new_obj_len=$(jq -c -M '.keyslots."2".kdf | length' $TMPDIR/json_res0)
+	test $((obj_len+2)) -eq $new_obj_len || exit 2
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-crypt-missing-encryption.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-crypt-missing-encryption.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..bcd648a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-crypt-missing-encryption.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with segment encryption field missing
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# remove mandatory encryption field
+	json_str=$(jq -c 'del(.segments."0".encryption)' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c 'if .segments."0".encryption
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-crypt-missing-ivoffset.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-crypt-missing-ivoffset.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..e64feef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-crypt-missing-ivoffset.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with segment iv_tweak field missing
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# remove mandatory encryption field
+	json_str=$(jq -c 'del(.segments."0".iv_tweak)' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c 'if .segments."0".iv_tweak
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-crypt-missing-sectorsize.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-crypt-missing-sectorsize.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..de757db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-crypt-missing-sectorsize.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with segment sector_size field missing
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# remove mandatory encryption field
+	json_str=$(jq -c 'del(.segments."0".sector_size)' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c 'if .segments."0".sector_size
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-crypt-wrong-encryption.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-crypt-wrong-encryption.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..59c7345
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-crypt-wrong-encryption.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with segment wrong encryption field
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# remove mandatory encryption field
+	json_str=$(jq -c '.segments."0".encryption = {}' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c 'if .segments."0".encryption | type != "object"
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-crypt-wrong-ivoffset.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-crypt-wrong-ivoffset.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..ca9461e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-crypt-wrong-ivoffset.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with segment iv_tweak field missing
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# remove mandatory encryption field
+	json_str=$(jq -c '.segments."0".iv_tweak = "dynamic"' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c 'if .segments."0".iv_tweak != "dynamic"
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-crypt-wrong-sectorsize-0.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-crypt-wrong-sectorsize-0.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..4ca05eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-crypt-wrong-sectorsize-0.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with wrong segment sector_size field
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# remove mandatory encryption field
+	json_str=$(jq -c '.segments."0".sector_size = 1023' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c 'if .segments."0".sector_size != 1023
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-crypt-wrong-sectorsize-1.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-crypt-wrong-sectorsize-1.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..f8d251c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-crypt-wrong-sectorsize-1.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with wrong segment sector_size field
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# remove mandatory encryption field
+	json_str=$(jq -c '.segments."0".sector_size = "4096"' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c 'if .segments."0".sector_size != "4096"
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-crypt-wrong-sectorsize-2.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-crypt-wrong-sectorsize-2.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..87566ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-crypt-wrong-sectorsize-2.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with wrong segment sector_size field
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# remove mandatory encryption field
+	json_str=$(jq -c '.segments."0".sector_size = -1024' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c 'if .segments."0".sector_size != -1024
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-missing-offset.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-missing-offset.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..6652288
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-missing-offset.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with segment offset field missing
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# remove mandatory encryption field
+	json_str=$(jq -c 'del(.segments."0".offset)' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c 'if .segments."0".offset
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-missing-size.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-missing-size.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..616d8b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-missing-size.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with segment size field missing
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# remove mandatory encryption field
+	json_str=$(jq -c 'del(.segments."0".size)' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c 'if .segments."0".size
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-missing-type.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-missing-type.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..d0014a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-missing-type.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with segment type field missing
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# remove mandatory encryption field
+	json_str=$(jq -c 'del(.segments."0".type)' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c 'if .segments."0".type
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-two.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-two.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..743bbbb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-two.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with two segments
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# remove mandatory encryption field
+	json_str=$(jq -c '.segments."0".size = "512" | .segments."1" = {type:"some", offset: (.segments."0".offset | tonumber + 512 | tostring), size: "dynamic"}' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c 'if .segments."1" | type != "object"
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-unknown-type.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-unknown-type.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..a6ef8ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-unknown-type.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with generic (unknown) segment type.
+# It should pass the validation.
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# remove mandatory encryption field
+	json_str=$(jq -c '.segments."0" = {type:"some_type", offset: .segments."0".offset, size: .segments."0".size, a_field:0}' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c 'if .segments."0".type != "some_type"
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-flags-element.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-flags-element.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..5359954
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-flags-element.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with segment flags containing invalid type
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# remove mandatory encryption field
+	json_str=$(jq -c '.segments."0".flags = [ "hello", 1 ]' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c 'if .segments."0".flags != [ "hello", 1  ]
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-flags.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-flags.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..3ceddbf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-flags.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with segment flags field of invalid type
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# remove mandatory encryption field
+	json_str=$(jq -c '.segments."0".flags = "hello"' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c 'if .segments."0".flags != "hello"
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-offset.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-offset.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..9efc756
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-offset.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with wrong segment offset field
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# remove mandatory encryption field
+	json_str=$(jq -c '.segments."0".offset = "-42"' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c 'if .segments."0".offset != "-42"
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-size-0.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-size-0.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..58b12ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-size-0.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with wrong segment size field
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# remove mandatory encryption field
+	json_str=$(jq -c '.segments."0".size = 4096' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c 'if .segments."0".size != 4096
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-size-1.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-size-1.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..8171445
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-size-1.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with wrong segment size field
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# remove mandatory encryption field
+	json_str=$(jq -c '.segments."0".size = "automatic"' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c 'if .segments."0".size != "automatic"
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-size-2.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-size-2.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..f694cf7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-size-2.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with wrong segment size field
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# remove mandatory encryption field
+	json_str=$(jq -c '.segments."0".size = "511"' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c 'if .segments."0".size != "511"
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-type.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-type.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..4f7fd64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-type.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with wrong segment type field
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# remove mandatory encryption field
+	json_str=$(jq -c '.segments."0".type = 42' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c 'if .segments."0".type != 42
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-uint64-max-segment-size.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-uint64-max-segment-size.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..27d7fd2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-uint64-max-segment-size.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with segment size set to UINT64_MAX - 511
+# (512 sector aligned value)
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# UINT64_MAX - 511 (so that it's sector aligned)
+	json_str=$(jq -c '.segments."0".size = "18446744073709551104"' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c 'if .segments."0".size != "18446744073709551104"
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-uint64-overflow-segment-size.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-uint64-overflow-segment-size.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..01657d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-uint64-overflow-segment-size.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with segment size set to UINT64_MAX + 1
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	json_str=$(jq -c '.segments."0".size = "18446744073709551616"' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c 'if .segments."0".size != "18446744073709551616"
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-uint64-signed-segment-size.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-uint64-signed-segment-size.img.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..0a45a05
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-uint64-signed-segment-size.img.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. lib.sh
+
+#
+# *** Description ***
+#
+# generate primary header with segment size set to -512
+#
+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
+#
+
+# $1 full target dir
+# $2 full source luks2 image
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
+}
+
+function generate()
+{
+	# UINT64_MAX + 1 (it's 512 sector aligned)
+	json_str=$(jq -c '.segments."0".size = "-512"' $TMPDIR/json0)
+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
+
+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
+
+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
+}
+
+function check()
+{
+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
+
+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
+	jq -c 'if .segments."0".size != "-512"
+	       then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
+}
+
+function cleanup()
+{
+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
+}
+
+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
+
+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
+SRC_IMG=$2
+
+prepare
+generate
+check
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/generators/lib.sh b/tests/generators/lib.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9686148
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generators/lib.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+# all in 512 bytes blocks (including binary hdr (4KiB))
+LUKS2_HDR_SIZE=32		#  16 KiB
+LUKS2_HDR_SIZE_32K=64		#  32 KiB
+LUKS2_HDR_SIZE_64K=128		#  64 KiB
+LUKS2_HDR_SIZE_128K=256		# 128 KiB
+LUKS2_HDR_SIZE_256K=512		# 256 KiB
+LUKS2_HDR_SIZE_512K=1024	# 512 KiB
+LUKS2_HDR_SIZE_1M=2048		#   1 MiB
+LUKS2_HDR_SIZE_2M=4096		#   2 MiB
+LUKS2_HDR_SIZE_4M=8192		#   4 MiB
+
+LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE=8		#   4 KiB
+LUKS2_JSON_SIZE=$((LUKS2_HDR_SIZE-LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE))
+
+LUKS2_BIN_HDR_CHKS_OFFSET=0x1C0
+LUKS2_BIN_HDR_CHKS_LENGTH=64
+
+[ -z "$srcdir" ] && srcdir="."
+TMPDIR=$srcdir/tmp
+
+repeat_str() {
+	printf "$1"'%.0s' $(eval "echo {1.."$(($2))"}");
+}
+
+function strindex()
+{
+	local x="${1%%$2*}"
+	[[ $x = $1 ]] && echo -1 || echo ${#x}
+}
+
+function test_img_name()
+{
+	local str=$(basename $1)
+	str=${str#generate-}
+	str=${str%%.sh}
+	echo $str
+}
+
+# read primary bin hdr
+# 1:from 2:to
+function read_luks2_bin_hdr0()
+{
+	_dd if=$1 of=$2 bs=512 count=$LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE
+}
+
+# read primary json area
+# 1:from 2:to 3:[json only size (defaults to 12KiB)]
+function read_luks2_json0()
+{
+	local _js=${4:-$LUKS2_JSON_SIZE}
+	local _js=$((_js*512/4096))
+	_dd if=$1 of=$2 bs=4096 skip=1 count=$_js
+}
+
+# read secondary bin hdr
+# 1:from 2:to 3:[metadata size (defaults to 16KiB)]
+function read_luks2_bin_hdr1()
+{
+	_dd if=$1 of=$2 skip=${3:-$LUKS2_HDR_SIZE} bs=512 count=$LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE
+}
+
+# read secondary json area
+# 1:from 2:to 3:[json only size (defaults to 12KiB)]
+function read_luks2_json1()
+{
+	local _js=${3:-$LUKS2_JSON_SIZE}
+	_dd if=$1 of=$2 bs=512 skip=$((2*LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE+_js)) count=$_js
+}
+
+# read primary metadata area (bin + json)
+# 1:from 2:to 3:[metadata size (defaults to 16KiB)]
+function read_luks2_hdr_area0()
+{
+	local _as=${3:-$LUKS2_HDR_SIZE}
+	local _as=$((_as*512))
+	_dd if=$1 of=$2 bs=$_as count=1
+}
+
+# read secondary metadata area (bin + json)
+# 1:from 2:to 3:[metadata size (defaults to 16KiB)]
+function read_luks2_hdr_area1()
+{
+	local _as=${3:-$LUKS2_HDR_SIZE}
+	local _as=$((_as*512))
+	_dd if=$1 of=$2 bs=$_as skip=1 count=1
+}
+
+# write secondary bin hdr
+# 1:from 2:to 3:[metadata size (defaults to 16KiB)]
+function write_luks2_bin_hdr1()
+{
+	_dd if=$1 of=$2 bs=512 seek=${3:-$LUKS2_HDR_SIZE} count=$LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE conv=notrunc
+}
+
+# write primary metadata area (bin + json)
+# 1:from 2:to 3:[metadata size (defaults to 16KiB)]
+function write_luks2_hdr0()
+{
+	local _as=${3:-$LUKS2_HDR_SIZE}
+	local _as=$((_as*512))
+	_dd if=$1 of=$2 bs=$_as count=1 conv=notrunc
+}
+
+# write secondary metadata area (bin + json)
+# 1:from 2:to 3:[metadata size (defaults to 16KiB)]
+function write_luks2_hdr1()
+{
+	local _as=${3:-$LUKS2_HDR_SIZE}
+	local _as=$((_as*512))
+	_dd if=$1 of=$2 bs=$_as seek=1 count=1 conv=notrunc
+}
+
+# write json (includes padding)
+# 1:json_string 2:to 3:[json size (defaults to 12KiB)]
+function write_luks2_json()
+{
+	local _js=${3:-$LUKS2_JSON_SIZE}
+	local len=${#1}
+	echo -n -E "$1" > $2
+	truncate -s $((_js*512)) $2
+}
+
+function kill_bin_hdr()
+{
+	printf "VACUUM" | _dd of=$1 bs=1 conv=notrunc
+}
+
+function erase_checksum()
+{
+	_dd if=/dev/zero of=$1 bs=1 seek=$(printf %d $LUKS2_BIN_HDR_CHKS_OFFSET) count=$LUKS2_BIN_HDR_CHKS_LENGTH conv=notrunc
+}
+
+function read_sha256_checksum()
+{
+	_dd if=$1 bs=1 skip=$(printf %d $LUKS2_BIN_HDR_CHKS_OFFSET) count=32 | xxd -c 32 -p
+}
+
+# 1 - string with checksum
+function write_checksum()
+{
+	test $# -eq 2 || return 1
+	test $((${#1}/2)) -le $LUKS2_BIN_HDR_CHKS_LENGTH || { echo "too long"; return 1; }
+
+	echo $1 | xxd -r -p | _dd of=$2 bs=1 seek=$(printf %d $LUKS2_BIN_HDR_CHKS_OFFSET) conv=notrunc
+}
+
+function calc_sha256_checksum_file()
+{
+	sha256sum $1 | cut -d ' ' -f 1
+}
+
+function calc_sha256_checksum_stdin()
+{
+	sha256sum - | cut -d ' ' -f 1
+}
+
+# merge bin hdr with json to form metadata area
+# 1:bin_hdr 2:json 3:to 4:[json size (defaults to 12KiB)]
+function merge_bin_hdr_with_json()
+{
+	local _js=${4:-$LUKS2_JSON_SIZE}
+	local _js=$((_js*512/4096))
+	_dd if=$1 of=$3 bs=4096 count=1
+	_dd if=$2 of=$3 bs=4096 seek=1 count=$_js
+}
+
+function _dd()
+{
+	dd $@ status=none
+}
+
+function write_bin_hdr_size() {
+        printf '%016x' $2 | xxd -r -p -l 16 | _dd of=$1 bs=8 count=1 seek=1 conv=notrunc
+}
+
+function write_bin_hdr_offset() {
+        printf '%016x' $2 | xxd -r -p -l 16 | _dd of=$1 bs=8 count=1 seek=32 conv=notrunc
+}
diff --git a/tests/img_fs_ext4.img.xz b/tests/img_fs_ext4.img.xz
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..de688f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/img_fs_ext4.img.xz
diff --git a/tests/img_fs_vfat.img.xz b/tests/img_fs_vfat.img.xz
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5ecfa67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/img_fs_vfat.img.xz
diff --git a/tests/img_fs_xfs.img.xz b/tests/img_fs_xfs.img.xz
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a7034a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/img_fs_xfs.img.xz
diff --git a/tests/integrity-compat-test b/tests/integrity-compat-test
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..58b36e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/integrity-compat-test
@@ -0,0 +1,363 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+#
+# Test integritysetup compatibility.
+#
+INTSETUP=../integritysetup
+INTSETUP_VALGRIND=../.libs/integritysetup
+INTSETUP_LIB_VALGRIND=../.libs
+
+DEV_NAME=dmc_test
+DEV=test123.img
+DEV2=test124.img
+KEY_FILE=key.img
+
+dmremove() { # device
+	udevadm settle >/dev/null 2>&1
+	dmsetup remove $1 >/dev/null 2>&1
+}
+
+cleanup() {
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME ] && dmremove $DEV_NAME
+	rm -f $DEV $DEV2 $KEY_FILE >/dev/null 2>&1
+}
+
+fail()
+{
+	echo
+	echo "FAILED at line $(caller)"
+	cleanup
+	exit 100
+}
+
+skip()
+{
+	[ -n "$1" ] && echo "$1"
+	exit 77
+}
+
+function dm_integrity_features()
+{
+	VER_STR=$(dmsetup targets | grep integrity | cut -f2 -dv)
+	[ -z "$VER_STR" ] && skip "Cannot find dm-integrity target, test skipped."
+
+	VER_MAJ=$(echo $VER_STR | cut -f 1 -d.)
+	VER_MIN=$(echo $VER_STR | cut -f 2 -d.)
+	VER_PTC=$(echo $VER_STR | cut -f 3 -d.)
+
+	[ $VER_MAJ -lt 1 ] && return
+	[ $VER_MIN -gt 1 ] && {
+		DM_INTEGRITY_META=1
+		DM_INTEGRITY_RECALC=1
+	}
+}
+
+add_device() {
+	cleanup
+	dd if=/dev/urandom of=$KEY_FILE bs=1 count=512 >/dev/null 2>&1
+	dd if=/dev/zero of=$DEV bs=1M count=32 >/dev/null 2>&1
+	dd if=/dev/zero of=$DEV2 bs=1M count=32 >/dev/null 2>&1
+	sync
+}
+
+status_check() # name value
+{
+	X=$($INTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep "$1" | sed 's/.*: //' | sed 's/^[[:space:]]*//')
+	if [ "$X" != "$2" ] ; then
+		echo "[status FAIL]"
+		echo " Expecting $1:$2 got \"$X\"."
+		fail
+	fi
+}
+
+dump_check() # name value
+{
+	X=$($INTSETUP dump $DEV | grep "$1" | cut -d' '  -f 2)
+	if [ "$X" != "$2" ] ; then
+		echo "[dump FAIL]"
+		echo " Expecting $1:$2 got \"$X\"."
+		fail
+	fi
+}
+
+kernel_param_check() # number value
+{
+	X=$(dmsetup table $DEV_NAME | cut -d " " -f $1)
+	if [ "$X" != $2 ] ; then
+		echo "[param_check FAIL]"
+		echo "Expecting $2 got \"$X\"."
+		fail
+	fi
+}
+
+function valgrind_setup()
+{
+    which valgrind >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "Cannot find valgrind."
+    [ ! -f $INTSETUP_VALGRIND ] && fail "Unable to get location of cryptsetup executable."
+    export LD_LIBRARY_PATH="$INTSETUP_LIB_VALGRIND:$LD_LIBRARY_PATH"
+}
+
+function valgrind_run()
+{
+    INFOSTRING="$(basename ${BASH_SOURCE[1]})-line-${BASH_LINENO[0]}" ./valg.sh ${INTSETUP_VALGRIND} "$@"
+}
+
+int_check_sum_only() # checksum
+{
+	VSUM=$(sha256sum /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME | cut -d' ' -f 1)
+	if [ "$VSUM" = "$1" ] ; then
+		echo -n "[CHECKSUM OK]"
+	else
+		echo "[FAIL]"
+		echo " Expecting $1 got $VSUM."
+		fail
+	fi
+}
+
+int_check_sum() # alg checksum [keyfile keysize]
+{
+	if [ -n "$4" ] ; then
+		KEY_PARAMS="--integrity-key-file $3 --integrity-key-size $4"
+	else
+		KEY_PARAMS=""
+	fi
+
+	# Fill device with zeroes and reopen it
+	dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME bs=1M oflag=direct >/dev/null 2>&1
+	dmremove $DEV_NAME
+
+	$INTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME --integrity $1 $KEY_PARAMS || fail "Cannot activate device."
+
+	int_check_sum_only $2
+}
+
+intformat() # alg alg_out tagsize sector_size csum [keyfile keysize]
+{
+	if [ -n "$7" ] ; then
+		KEY_PARAMS="--integrity-key-file $6 --integrity-key-size $7"
+	else
+		KEY_PARAMS=""
+	fi
+
+	echo -n "[INTEGRITY:$2:$3:$4]"
+	echo -n "[FORMAT]"
+	$INTSETUP format -q --integrity $1 --tag-size $3 --sector-size $4 $KEY_PARAMS $DEV || fail "Cannot format device."
+	dump_check "tag_size" $3
+	dump_check "sector_size" $4
+	echo -n "[ACTIVATE]"
+	$INTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME --integrity $1 $KEY_PARAMS || fail "Cannot activate device."
+	status_check "tag size" $3
+	status_check "integrity" $2
+	status_check "sector size" "$4 bytes"
+	int_check_sum $1 $5 $6 $7
+	echo -n "[REMOVE]"
+	$INTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail "Cannot deactivate device."
+	echo "[OK]"
+}
+
+int_error_detection() # alg tagsize sector_size key_file key_size
+{
+	if [ -n "$5" ] ; then
+		KEY_PARAMS="--integrity-key-file $4 --integrity-key-size $5"
+	else
+		KEY_PARAMS=""
+	fi
+	dd if=/dev/zero of=$DEV bs=1M count=32 >/dev/null 2>&1
+
+	echo -n "[INTEGRITY:$1:$2:$3]"
+	echo -n "[FORMAT]"
+	$INTSETUP format -q --integrity $1 --tag-size $2 --sector-size $3 $KEY_PARAMS $DEV || fail "Cannot format device."
+	echo -n "[ACTIVATE]"
+	$INTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME --integrity $1 --integrity-no-journal $KEY_PARAMS || fail "Cannot activate device."
+
+	if [ -n "$4" -a -n "$5" ]; then
+		echo -n "[KEYED HASH]"
+		KEY_HEX=$(xxd -c 256 -l $5 -p $4)
+		[ -z "$KEY_HEX" ] && fail "Cannot decode key."
+		dmsetup table --showkeys $DEV_NAME | grep -q $KEY_HEX || fail "Key mismatch."
+	fi
+
+	echo -n "[WRITE DATA]"
+	echo -n "EXAMPLE TEXT" | dd of=/dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "Cannot write to device."
+	$INTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail "Cannot deactivate device."
+
+	# find offset of data area
+	ARR=($(dd if=$DEV bs=512 2>/dev/null | hexdump -C | grep 'EXAMPLE TEXT'))
+	OFF_HEX=${ARR[0]}
+	OFF_DEC=$((16#$OFF_HEX))
+
+	echo -n "[CORRUPT DATA:$OFF_DEC]"
+	echo -n "Z" | dd of=$DEV bs=1 seek=$OFF_DEC conv=notrunc >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "Cannot write to device."
+
+	echo -n "[DETECT ERROR]"
+	$INTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME --integrity $1 $KEY_PARAMS || fail "Cannot activate device."
+	dd if=/dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME  >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail "Error detection failed."
+
+	echo -n "[REMOVE]"
+	$INTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail "Cannot deactivate device."
+	echo "[OK]"
+}
+
+int_journal() # 1 alg, 2 tagsize, 3 sector_size, 4 watermark, 5 commit_time, 6 journal_integrity, 7 key-file, 8 key-size, 9 journal_integrity_out
+{
+    echo -n "[INTEGRITY JOURNAL:$6:${4}%:${5}ms]"
+    echo -n "[FORMAT]"
+    ARGS="--integrity $1 --journal-watermark $4 --journal-commit-time $5 --journal-integrity $6 --journal-integrity-key-file $7 --journal-integrity-key-size $8"
+    $INTSETUP format -q --tag-size $2 --sector-size $3 $ARGS $DEV || fail "Cannot format device."
+
+    echo -n "[ACTIVATE]"
+
+    $INTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME $ARGS || fail "Cannot activate device."
+
+    echo -n "[KEYED HASH]"
+    KEY_HEX=$(xxd -c 256 -l $8 -p $7)
+    [ -z "$KEY_HEX" ] && fail "Cannot decode key."
+    dmsetup table --showkeys $DEV_NAME | grep -q $KEY_HEX || fail "Key mismatch."
+
+    status_check "journal watermark" "${4}%"
+    status_check "journal commit time" "${5} ms"
+    status_check "journal integrity MAC" $9
+
+    echo -n "[REMOVE]"
+    $INTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail "Cannot deactivate device."
+    echo "[OK]"
+}
+
+
+int_journal_crypt() # crypt_alg crypt_alg_kernel crypt_key crypt_key_size
+{
+	echo -n "[JOURNAL CRYPT:$1:${4}B]"
+
+	echo -n "[FORMAT]"
+	ARGS="--journal-crypt $1 --journal-crypt-key-file $3 --journal-crypt-key-size $4"
+	$INTSETUP format -q $ARGS $DEV || fail "Cannot format device."
+
+	echo -n "[ACTIVATE]"
+	$INTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME $ARGS || fail "Cannot activate device."
+
+	KEY_HEX=$(xxd -c 256 -l $4 -p $3)
+	[ -z "$KEY_HEX" ] && fail "Cannot decode key."
+	dmsetup table --showkeys $DEV_NAME | grep -q "journal_crypt:$2:$KEY_HEX" || fail "Key mismatch."
+
+	$INTSETUP close $DEV_NAME
+	echo "[OK]"
+}
+
+int_mode() # alg tag_size sector_size [keyfile keysize]
+{
+	if [ -n "$5" ] ; then
+		KEY_PARAMS="--integrity-key-file $4 --integrity-key-size $5"
+	else
+		KEY_PARAMS=""
+	fi
+
+	echo -n "[MODE TESTS:$1:$2:$3]"
+	ARGS="--tag-size $2 --sector-size $3"
+
+	$INTSETUP format -q $ARGS $KEY_PARAMS $DEV --integrity $1 || fail "Cannot format device."
+
+	echo -n "[JOURNALED WRITES]"
+	$INTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME --integrity $1 $KEY_PARAMS || fail "Cannot activate device with journal."
+	status_check "mode" "read/write"
+	kernel_param_check 7 "J"
+
+	$INTSETUP close $DEV_NAME fail "Cannot deactivate device."
+
+	echo -n "[DIRECT WRITES]"
+	$INTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME --integrity $1 $KEY_PARAMS --integrity-no-journal || fail "Cannot activate device without journal."
+	status_check "mode" "read/write"
+	status_check "journal" "not active"
+	kernel_param_check 7 "D"
+
+	$INTSETUP close $DEV_NAME fail "Cannot deactivate device."
+
+	echo -n "[RECOVERY MODE]"
+	$INTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME --integrity $1 $KEY_PARAMS --integrity-recovery-mode || fail "Cannot activate device in recovery mode."
+	status_check "mode" "read/write recovery"
+	kernel_param_check 7 "R"
+
+	$INTSETUP close $DEV_NAME fail "Cannot deactivate device."
+
+	echo "[OK]"
+}
+
+[ $(id -u) != 0 ] && skip "WARNING: You must be root to run this test, test skipped."
+[ ! -x "$INTSETUP" ] && skip "Cannot find $INTSETUP, test skipped."
+
+[ -n "$VALG" ] && valgrind_setup && INTSETUP=valgrind_run
+which hexdump >/dev/null 2>&1 || skip "WARNING: hexdump tool required."
+modprobe dm-integrity >/dev/null 2>&1
+dm_integrity_features
+
+add_device
+intformat crc32c      crc32c          4  512 08f63eb27fb9ce2ce903b0a56429c68ce5e209253ba42154841ef045a53839d7
+intformat crc32       crc32           4  512 08f63eb27fb9ce2ce903b0a56429c68ce5e209253ba42154841ef045a53839d7
+intformat sha1        sha1           20  512 6eedd6344dab8875cd185fcd6565dfc869ab36bc57e577f40c685290b1fa7fe7
+intformat sha1        sha1           16 4096 e152ec88227b539cd9cafd8bdb587a1072d720cd6bcebe1398d4136c9e7f337b
+intformat sha256      sha256         32  512 8e5fe4119558e117bfc40e3b0f13ade3abe497b52604d4c7cca0cfd6c7f4cf11
+intformat hmac-sha256 hmac\(sha256\) 32  512 8e5fe4119558e117bfc40e3b0f13ade3abe497b52604d4c7cca0cfd6c7f4cf11 $KEY_FILE 32
+intformat sha256      sha256         32 4096 33f7dfa5163ca9f740383fb8b0919574e38a7b20a94a4170fde4238196b7c4b4
+intformat hmac-sha256 hmac\(sha256\) 32 4096 33f7dfa5163ca9f740383fb8b0919574e38a7b20a94a4170fde4238196b7c4b4 $KEY_FILE 32
+
+echo "Error detection tests:"
+int_error_detection crc32c      4  512
+int_error_detection crc32c      4  4096
+int_error_detection crc32       4  512
+int_error_detection crc32       4  4096
+int_error_detection sha1        20 512
+int_error_detection sha1        16 512
+int_error_detection sha1        20 4096
+int_error_detection sha256      32 512
+int_error_detection sha256      32 4096
+
+which xxd >/dev/null 2>&1 || skip "WARNING: xxd tool required."
+int_error_detection hmac-sha256 32 512 $KEY_FILE 32
+int_error_detection hmac-sha256 32 4096 $KEY_FILE 32
+
+echo "Journal parameters tests:"
+# Watermark is calculated in kernel, so it can be rounded down/up
+int_journal crc32  4  512  66 1000 hmac-sha256 $KEY_FILE 32 hmac\(sha256\)
+int_journal sha256 32 4096 34 5000 hmac-sha1   $KEY_FILE 16 hmac\(sha1\)
+int_journal sha1   20 512  75 9999 hmac-sha256 $KEY_FILE 32 hmac\(sha256\)
+
+echo "Journal encryption tests:"
+int_journal_crypt cbc-aes cbc\(aes\) $KEY_FILE 32
+int_journal_crypt cbc-aes cbc\(aes\) $KEY_FILE 16
+int_journal_crypt salsa20 salsa20    $KEY_FILE 32
+int_journal_crypt ctr-aes ctr\(aes\) $KEY_FILE 32
+int_journal_crypt ctr-aes ctr\(aes\) $KEY_FILE 16
+
+echo "Mode tests:"
+int_mode crc32c      4  512
+int_mode crc32       4  512
+int_mode sha1        20 512
+int_mode sha256      32 512
+int_mode hmac-sha256 32 512  $KEY_FILE 32
+int_mode hmac-sha256 32 4096 $KEY_FILE 32
+
+echo -n "Recalculate tags in-kernel:"
+add_device
+if [ -n "$DM_INTEGRITY_RECALC" ] ; then
+	$INTSETUP format -q $DEV --no-wipe || fail "Cannot format device."
+	$INTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME --integrity-recalculate || fail "Cannot activate device."
+	dd if=/dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME of=/dev/null bs=1M 2>/dev/null || fail "Cannot recalculate tags in-kernel"
+	int_check_sum_only 08f63eb27fb9ce2ce903b0a56429c68ce5e209253ba42154841ef045a53839d7
+	$INTSETUP close $DEV_NAME fail "Cannot deactivate device."
+	echo "[OK]"
+else
+	echo "[N/A]"
+fi
+
+echo -n "Separate metadata device:"
+if [ -n "$DM_INTEGRITY_META" ] ; then
+	add_device
+	$INTSETUP format -q $DEV --data-device $DEV2 || fail "Cannot format device."
+	$INTSETUP open $DEV --data-device $DEV2 $DEV_NAME || fail "Cannot activate device."
+	int_check_sum_only 83ee47245398adee79bd9c0a8bc57b821e92aba10f5f9ade8a5d1fae4d8c4302
+	$INTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q 'metadata device:' || fail
+	$INTSETUP close $DEV_NAME fail "Cannot deactivate device."
+	echo "[OK]"
+else
+	echo "[N/A]"
+fi
+
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/keyring-compat-test b/tests/keyring-compat-test
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..a24c344
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/keyring-compat-test
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+CIPHER_XTS_PLAIN="aes-xts-plain64"
+CIPHER_CBC_ESSIV="aes-cbc-essiv:sha256"
+CIPHER_CBC_TCW="serpent-cbc-tcw"
+# TODO: mode with LMK
+
+TEST_KEYRING_NAME="keyringtest_keyring"
+
+LOGON_KEY_16_OK="dmtst:lkey_16"
+LOGON_KEY_32_OK="dmtst:lkey_32"
+LOGON_KEY_64_OK="dmtst:lkey_64"
+
+HEXKEY_16="be21aa8c733229347bd4e681891e213d";
+HEXKEY_32="bb21158c733229347bd4e681891e213d94c685be6a5b84818afe7a78a6de7a1a";
+HEXKEY_64="34f95b96abff946b64f1339ff8653cc77c38697c93b797a496f3786e86eed7781850d5112bbae17d209b8310a8f3a034f1cd297667bc0cd1438fad28d87ef6a1"
+
+DEVSIZEMB=16
+DEVSECTORS=$((DEVSIZEMB*1024*1024/512))
+NAME=testcryptdev
+CHKS_DMCRYPT=vk_in_dmcrypt.chk
+CHKS_KEYRING=vk_in_keyring.chk
+
+PWD="aaa"
+CRYPTSETUP=../cryptsetup
+
+function remove_mapping()
+{
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$NAME ] && dmsetup remove $NAME
+
+	# unlink whole test keyring
+	[ -n "$TEST_KEYRING" ] && keyctl unlink $TEST_KEYRING "@u" >/dev/null
+
+	rmmod scsi_debug 2>/dev/null
+
+	rm -f $CHKS_DMCRYPT $CHKS_KEYRING
+}
+
+function skip()
+{
+	[ -n "$1" ] && echo "$1"
+	remove_mapping
+	exit 77
+}
+
+function fail()
+{
+	[ -n "$1" ] && echo "$1"
+	echo "FAILED at $(caller)"
+	remove_mapping
+	exit 2
+}
+
+# $1 hexbyte key
+# $2 type
+# $3 description
+# $4 keyring
+function load_key()
+{
+	local tmp="$1"
+	shift
+	echo -n "$tmp" | xxd -r -p | keyctl padd $@ >/dev/null
+}
+
+function dm_crypt_keyring_support()
+{
+	VER_STR=$(dmsetup targets | grep crypt | cut -f2 -dv)
+	[ -z "$VER_STR" ] && fail "Failed to parse dm-crypt version."
+
+	VER_MAJ=$(echo $VER_STR | cut -f 1 -d.)
+	VER_MIN=$(echo $VER_STR | cut -f 2 -d.)
+
+	# run the test with dm-crypt v1.15.0+ on purpose
+	# the fix is in dm-crypt v1.18.1+
+	[ $VER_MAJ -gt 1 ] && return 0
+	[ $VER_MAJ -lt 1 ] && return 1
+	[ $VER_MIN -ge 15 ]
+}
+
+function test_and_prepare_keyring() {
+	keyctl list "@s" > /dev/null || skip "Current session keyring is unreachable, test skipped"
+	TEST_KEYRING=$(keyctl newring $TEST_KEYRING_NAME "@u" 2> /dev/null)
+	test -n "$TEST_KEYRING" || skip "Failed to create keyring in user keyring"
+	keyctl search "@s" keyring "$TEST_KEYRING" > /dev/null 2>&1 || keyctl link "@u" "@s" > /dev/null 2>&1
+	load_key "$HEXKEY_16" user test_key "$TEST_KEYRING" || skip "Kernel keyring service is useless on this system, test skipped."
+}
+
+add_device() {
+	modprobe scsi_debug $@ delay=0
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ] ; then
+		echo "This kernel seems to not support proper scsi_debug module, test skipped."
+		exit 77
+	fi
+
+	sleep 2
+	DEV=$(grep -l -e scsi_debug /sys/block/*/device/model | cut -f4 -d /)
+
+	DEV="/dev/$DEV"
+	[ -b $DEV ] || fail "Cannot find $DEV."
+}
+
+[ $(id -u) != 0 ] && skip "WARNING: You must be root to run this test, test skipped."
+which dmsetup >/dev/null 2>&1 || skip "Cannot find dmsetup, test skipped"
+which keyctl >/dev/null 2>&1 || skip "Cannot find keyctl, test skipped"
+which xxd >/dev/null 2>&1 || skip "Cannot find xxd, test skipped"
+which sha1sum > /dev/null 2>&1 || skip "Cannot find sha1sum, test skipped"
+modprobe dm-crypt || fail "dm-crypt failed to load"
+dm_crypt_keyring_support || skip "dm-crypt doesn't support kernel keyring, test skipped."
+
+test_and_prepare_keyring
+
+add_device dev_size_mb=$DEVSIZEMB
+
+dd if=/dev/urandom of=$DEV bs=1M count=$DEVSIZEMB oflag=direct > /dev/null 2>&1 || fail
+
+#test aes cipher with xts mode, plain IV
+echo -n "Testing $CIPHER_XTS_PLAIN..."
+dmsetup create $NAME --table "0 $DEVSECTORS crypt $CIPHER_XTS_PLAIN $HEXKEY_32 0 $DEV 0" || fail
+sha1sum /dev/mapper/$NAME > $CHKS_DMCRYPT || fail
+dmsetup remove $NAME || fail
+load_key "$HEXKEY_32" logon  $LOGON_KEY_32_OK "$TEST_KEYRING" || fail "Cannot load 32 byte logon key type"
+dmsetup create $NAME --table "0 $DEVSECTORS crypt $CIPHER_XTS_PLAIN :32:logon:$LOGON_KEY_32_OK 0 $DEV 0" || fail
+sha1sum /dev/mapper/$NAME > $CHKS_KEYRING || fail
+dmsetup remove $NAME || fail
+diff $CHKS_DMCRYPT $CHKS_KEYRING || fail "Plaintext checksums mismatch (corruption)"
+# same test using message
+dmsetup create $NAME --table "0 $DEVSECTORS crypt $CIPHER_XTS_PLAIN $HEXKEY_32 0 $DEV 0" || fail
+sha1sum /dev/mapper/$NAME > $CHKS_DMCRYPT || fail
+dmsetup remove $NAME || fail
+dmsetup create $NAME --table "0 $DEVSECTORS crypt $CIPHER_XTS_PLAIN $HEXKEY_32 0 $DEV 0" || fail
+dmsetup suspend $NAME || fail
+dmsetup message $NAME 0 key wipe || fail
+dmsetup message $NAME 0 "key set :32:logon:$LOGON_KEY_32_OK" || fail
+dmsetup resume $NAME || fail
+sha1sum /dev/mapper/$NAME > $CHKS_KEYRING || fail
+dmsetup remove $NAME || fail
+diff $CHKS_DMCRYPT $CHKS_KEYRING || fail "Plaintext checksums mismatch (corruption)"
+echo "OK"
+
+#test aes cipher, xts mode, essiv IV
+echo -n "Testing $CIPHER_CBC_ESSIV..."
+dmsetup create $NAME --table "0 $DEVSECTORS crypt $CIPHER_CBC_ESSIV $HEXKEY_16 0 $DEV 0" || fail
+sha1sum /dev/mapper/$NAME > $CHKS_DMCRYPT || fail
+dmsetup remove $NAME || fail
+load_key "$HEXKEY_16" logon  $LOGON_KEY_16_OK "$TEST_KEYRING" || fail "Cannot load 16 byte logon key type"
+dmsetup create $NAME --table "0 $DEVSECTORS crypt $CIPHER_CBC_ESSIV :16:logon:$LOGON_KEY_16_OK 0 $DEV 0" || fail
+sha1sum /dev/mapper/$NAME > $CHKS_KEYRING || fail
+dmsetup remove $NAME || fail
+diff $CHKS_DMCRYPT $CHKS_KEYRING || fail "Plaintext checksums mismatch (corruption)"
+# same test using message
+dmsetup create $NAME --table "0 $DEVSECTORS crypt $CIPHER_CBC_ESSIV $HEXKEY_16 0 $DEV 0" || fail
+sha1sum /dev/mapper/$NAME > $CHKS_DMCRYPT || fail
+dmsetup remove $NAME || fail
+dmsetup create $NAME --table "0 $DEVSECTORS crypt $CIPHER_CBC_ESSIV $HEXKEY_16 0 $DEV 0" || fail
+dmsetup suspend $NAME || fail
+dmsetup message $NAME 0 key wipe || fail
+dmsetup message $NAME 0 "key set :16:logon:$LOGON_KEY_16_OK" || fail
+dmsetup resume $NAME || fail
+sha1sum /dev/mapper/$NAME > $CHKS_KEYRING || fail
+dmsetup remove $NAME || fail
+diff $CHKS_DMCRYPT $CHKS_KEYRING || fail "Plaintext checksums mismatch (corruption)"
+echo "OK"
+
+#test serpent cipher, cbc mode, tcw IV
+echo -n "Testing $CIPHER_CBC_TCW..."
+dmsetup create $NAME --table "0 $DEVSECTORS crypt $CIPHER_CBC_TCW $HEXKEY_64 0 $DEV 0" || fail
+sha1sum /dev/mapper/$NAME > $CHKS_DMCRYPT || fail
+dmsetup remove $NAME || fail
+load_key "$HEXKEY_64" logon  $LOGON_KEY_64_OK "$TEST_KEYRING" || fail "Cannot load 16 byte logon key type"
+dmsetup create $NAME --table "0 $DEVSECTORS crypt $CIPHER_CBC_TCW :64:logon:$LOGON_KEY_64_OK 0 $DEV 0" || fail
+sha1sum /dev/mapper/$NAME > $CHKS_KEYRING || fail
+dmsetup remove $NAME || fail
+diff $CHKS_DMCRYPT $CHKS_KEYRING || fail "Plaintext checksum mismatch (corruption)"
+# same test using message
+dmsetup create $NAME --table "0 $DEVSECTORS crypt $CIPHER_CBC_TCW $HEXKEY_64 0 $DEV 0" || fail
+sha1sum /dev/mapper/$NAME > $CHKS_DMCRYPT || fail
+dmsetup remove $NAME || fail
+dmsetup create $NAME --table "0 $DEVSECTORS crypt $CIPHER_CBC_TCW $HEXKEY_64 0 $DEV 0" || fail
+dmsetup suspend $NAME || fail
+dmsetup message $NAME 0 key wipe || fail
+dmsetup message $NAME 0 "key set :64:logon:$LOGON_KEY_64_OK" || fail
+dmsetup resume $NAME || fail
+sha1sum /dev/mapper/$NAME > $CHKS_KEYRING || fail
+dmsetup remove $NAME || fail
+diff $CHKS_DMCRYPT $CHKS_KEYRING || fail "Plaintext checksums mismatch (corruption)"
+echo "OK"
+
+echo -n "Test LUKS2 key refresh..."
+echo $PWD | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks2 --luks2-metadata-size 16k --luks2-keyslots-size 4064k --pbkdf pbkdf2 --pbkdf-force-iterations 1000 --force-password $DEV || fail
+echo $PWD | $CRYPTSETUP open $DEV $NAME || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP status $NAME | grep -q -i "location:.*keyring" || skip "LUKS2 can't use keyring. Test skipped."
+dd if=/dev/mapper/$NAME bs=1M iflag=direct status=none | sha1sum > $CHKS_KEYRING || fail
+echo $PWD | $CRYPTSETUP refresh $NAME --disable-keyring || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP status $NAME | grep -q -i "location:.*keyring" && fail "Key is still in keyring"
+dd if=/dev/mapper/$NAME bs=1M iflag=direct status=none | sha1sum > $CHKS_DMCRYPT || fail
+diff $CHKS_DMCRYPT $CHKS_KEYRING || fail "Plaintext checksum mismatch (corruption)"
+echo "OK"
+
+remove_mapping
diff --git a/tests/keyring-test b/tests/keyring-test
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..ca90d0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/keyring-test
@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+DEV_ZERO="dmtst-zero"
+DEV_CRYPT="dmtst-crypt"
+
+CIPHER="aes-xts-plain64"
+
+TEST_KEYRING_NAME="keyringtest_keyring"
+
+USER_KEY_32_OK="dmtst:ukey_32_ok"
+USER_KEY_32_WRONG="dmtst:ukey_32_wrong_size"
+
+LOGON_KEY_32_OK="dmtst:lkey_32_ok"
+LOGON_KEY_32_WRONG="dmtst:lkey_32_wrong_size"
+
+PAYLOAD_32="bb21158c733229347bd4e681891e213d"
+PAYLOAD_31="bb21158c733229347bd4e681891e213"
+
+HEXKEY_32="bb21158c733229347bd4e681891e213d94c685be6a5b84818afe7a78a6de7a1a";
+HEXKEY_32_BAD="bb21158c733229347bd4e68189XXXX3d94c685be6a5b84818afe7a78a6de7a1a"
+HEXKEY_31="bb21158c733229347bd4e681891e213d94c685be6a5b84818afe7a78a6de7a"
+
+function remove_mapping()
+{
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_CRYPT ] && dmsetup remove $DEV_CRYPT
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_ZERO ] && dmsetup remove $DEV_ZERO
+
+	# unlink whole test keyring
+	[ -n "$TEST_KEYRING" ] && keyctl unlink $TEST_KEYRING "@u" >/dev/null
+}
+
+function skip()
+{
+	[ -n "$1" ] && echo "$1"
+	remove_mapping
+	exit 77
+}
+
+function fail()
+{
+	[ -n "$1" ] && echo "$1"
+	echo "FAILED at line $(caller)"
+	remove_mapping
+	exit 2
+}
+
+# $1 type
+# $2 description
+# $3 payload
+# $4 keyring
+function load_key()
+{
+	keyctl add $@ >/dev/null
+}
+
+function dm_crypt_keyring_support()
+{
+	VER_STR=$(dmsetup targets | grep crypt | cut -f2 -dv)
+	[ -z "$VER_STR" ] && fail "Failed to parse dm-crypt version."
+
+	VER_MAJ=$(echo $VER_STR | cut -f 1 -d.)
+	VER_MIN=$(echo $VER_STR | cut -f 2 -d.)
+
+	[ $VER_MAJ -gt 1 ] && return 0
+	[ $VER_MAJ -lt 1 ] && return 1
+	[ $VER_MIN -ge 15 ]
+}
+
+function test_and_prepare_keyring() {
+	keyctl list "@s" > /dev/null || skip "Current session keyring is unreachable, test skipped"
+	TEST_KEYRING=$(keyctl newring $TEST_KEYRING_NAME "@u" 2> /dev/null)
+	test -n "$TEST_KEYRING" || skip "Failed to create keyring in user keyring"
+	keyctl search "@s" keyring "$TEST_KEYRING" > /dev/null 2>&1 || keyctl link "@u" "@s" > /dev/null 2>&1
+	load_key user test_key test_data "$TEST_KEYRING" || skip "Kernel keyring service is useless on this system, test skipped."
+}
+
+[ $(id -u) != 0 ] && skip "WARNING: You must be root to run this test, test skipped."
+which dmsetup >/dev/null 2>&1 || skip "Cannot find dmsetup, test skipped"
+which keyctl >/dev/null 2>&1 || skip "Cannot find keyctl, test skipped"
+modprobe dm-crypt || fail "dm-crypt failed to load"
+dm_crypt_keyring_support || skip "dm-crypt doesn't support kernel keyring, test skipped."
+
+test_and_prepare_keyring
+
+load_key logon $LOGON_KEY_32_OK $PAYLOAD_32 "$TEST_KEYRING" || fail "Cannot load 32 byte logon key type"
+load_key user $USER_KEY_32_OK $PAYLOAD_32 "$TEST_KEYRING" || fail "Cannot load 32 byte user key type"
+load_key logon $LOGON_KEY_32_WRONG $PAYLOAD_31 "$TEST_KEYRING" || fail "Cannot load 31 byte logon key type"
+load_key user $USER_KEY_32_WRONG $PAYLOAD_31 "$TEST_KEYRING" || fail "Cannot load 31 byte user key type"
+
+dmsetup create $DEV_ZERO --table "0 100 zero" || fail
+
+echo "[1] Valid keyring keys"
+
+# load logon type kernel key
+KEY=":32:logon:$LOGON_KEY_32_OK"
+dmsetup create $DEV_CRYPT --table "0 100 crypt $CIPHER $KEY 0 /dev/mapper/$DEV_ZERO 0" || fail
+dmsetup table --showkeys $DEV_CRYPT | grep -q "crypt $CIPHER $KEY 0" || fail
+dmsetup remove $DEV_CRYPT || fail
+
+# load user type kernel key
+KEY=":32:user:$USER_KEY_32_OK"
+dmsetup create $DEV_CRYPT --table "0 100 crypt $CIPHER $KEY 0 /dev/mapper/$DEV_ZERO 0" || fail
+dmsetup table --showkeys $DEV_CRYPT | grep -q "crypt $CIPHER $KEY 0" || fail
+dmsetup remove $DEV_CRYPT || fail
+
+# load logon type kernel key...
+KEY=":32:logon:$LOGON_KEY_32_OK"
+dmsetup create $DEV_CRYPT --table "0 100 crypt $CIPHER $KEY 0 /dev/mapper/$DEV_ZERO 0" || fail
+dmsetup suspend $DEV_CRYPT || fail
+dmsetup message $DEV_CRYPT 0 "key wipe" || fail
+# ...replace the key with hexkey...
+dmsetup message $DEV_CRYPT 0 "key set $HEXKEY_32" || fail
+dmsetup table --showkeys $DEV_CRYPT | grep -q "crypt $CIPHER $HEXKEY_32 0" || fail
+dmsetup resume $DEV_CRYPT || fail
+dmsetup suspend $DEV_CRYPT || fail
+# ...and replace it again with user type kernel key...
+dmsetup message $DEV_CRYPT 0 "key set :32:user:$USER_KEY_32_OK" || fail
+dmsetup table --showkeys $DEV_CRYPT | grep -q "crypt $CIPHER :32:user:$USER_KEY_32_OK 0" || fail
+dmsetup message $DEV_CRYPT 0 "key set $HEXKEY_32" || fail
+dmsetup table --showkeys $DEV_CRYPT | grep -q "crypt $CIPHER $HEXKEY_32 0" || fail
+dmsetup resume $DEV_CRYPT || fail
+dmsetup remove $DEV_CRYPT || fail
+
+dmsetup create $DEV_CRYPT --table "0 100 crypt $CIPHER $HEXKEY_32 0 /dev/mapper/$DEV_ZERO 0" || fail
+dmsetup suspend $DEV_CRYPT || fail
+dmsetup message $DEV_CRYPT 0 "key wipe" || fail
+dmsetup message $DEV_CRYPT 0 "key set :32:user:$USER_KEY_32_OK" || fail
+dmsetup resume $DEV_CRYPT || fail
+dmsetup suspend $DEV_CRYPT || fail
+dmsetup message $DEV_CRYPT 0 "key set :32:logon:$LOGON_KEY_32_OK" || fail
+dmsetup resume $DEV_CRYPT || fail
+dmsetup remove $DEV_CRYPT || fail
+
+echo "[2] message ioctl"
+dmsetup create $DEV_CRYPT --table "0 100 crypt $CIPHER $HEXKEY_32 0 /dev/mapper/$DEV_ZERO 0" || fail
+dmsetup suspend $DEV_CRYPT || fail
+dmsetup message $DEV_CRYPT 0 "key set :32:logon:$LOGON_KEY_32_WRONG" 2> /dev/null && fail
+# old key should be intact and valid
+dmsetup table --showkeys $DEV_CRYPT | grep -q "crypt $CIPHER $HEXKEY_32 0" || fail
+dmsetup resume $DEV_CRYPT || fail
+dmsetup suspend $DEV_CRYPT || fail
+# now the key gets destroyed by invalid input
+dmsetup message $DEV_CRYPT 0 "key set $HEXKEY_32_BAD" 2> /dev/null && fail
+dmsetup resume $DEV_CRYPT 2> /dev/null && fail
+# hmm... see the output. don't like it
+# dmsetup table --showkeys $DEV_CRYPT
+
+dmsetup message $DEV_CRYPT 0 "key set :32:user:$USER_KEY_32_OK" || fail
+dmsetup table --showkeys $DEV_CRYPT | grep -q "crypt $CIPHER :32:user:$USER_KEY_32_OK 0" || fail
+dmsetup message $DEV_CRYPT 0 "key set :31:logon:$LOGON_KEY_32_OK" 2> /dev/null && fail
+dmsetup message $DEV_CRYPT 0 "key set :" 2> /dev/null && fail
+dmsetup message $DEV_CRYPT 0 "key set ::::" 2> /dev/null && fail
+dmsetup message $DEV_CRYPT 0 "key set :0:logon:$LOGON_KEY_32_OK" 2> /dev/null && fail
+dmsetup message $DEV_CRYPT 0 "key set :32" 2> /dev/null && fail
+dmsetup message $DEV_CRYPT 0 "key set :32:" 2> /dev/null && fail
+dmsetup message $DEV_CRYPT 0 "key set :32:logon" 2> /dev/null && fail
+dmsetup message $DEV_CRYPT 0 "key set :32:logo" 2> /dev/null && fail
+dmsetup message $DEV_CRYPT 0 "key set :32:logon:" 2> /dev/null && fail
+dmsetup table --showkeys $DEV_CRYPT | grep -q "crypt $CIPHER :32:user:$USER_KEY_32_OK 0" || fail
+dmsetup message $DEV_CRYPT 0 "key set :32:user:$USER_KEY_32_OK" || fail
+dmsetup resume $DEV_CRYPT || fail
+dmsetup remove $DEV_CRYPT || fail
+
+echo "[3] bOrked keys"
+# declare the key having 32 bytes but load key which has in fact 31 bytes only
+KEY=":32:logon:$LOGON_KEY_32_WRONG"
+dmsetup create $DEV_CRYPT --table "0 100 crypt $CIPHER $KEY 0 /dev/mapper/$DEV_ZERO 0" 2> /dev/null && fail "dm-crypt accepted wrong key size"
+
+# declare the key having 31 bytes (incompatible with cipher) and load key with 32 bytes in real
+KEY=":31:logon:$LOGON_KEY_32_WRONG"
+dmsetup create $DEV_CRYPT --table "0 100 crypt $CIPHER $KEY 0 /dev/mapper/$DEV_ZERO 0" 2> /dev/null && fail "dm-crypt accepted wrong key size"
+
+# declare the key being user type but try to load logon one
+KEY=":32:user:$LOGON_KEY_32"
+dmsetup create $DEV_CRYPT --table "0 100 crypt $CIPHER $KEY 0 /dev/mapper/$DEV_ZERO 0" 2> /dev/null  && fail "dm-crypt accepted key description for invalid key type"
+
+# now the other way
+KEY=":32:logon:$USER_KEY_32"
+dmsetup create $DEV_CRYPT --table "0 100 crypt $CIPHER $KEY 0 /dev/mapper/$DEV_ZERO 0" 2> /dev/null  && fail "dm-crypt accepted key description for invalid key type"
+
+BORKED_KEYS=":\ 32:logon:$LOGON_KEY_32_OK
+: 32:logon:$LOGON_KEY_32_OK
+:+32:logon:$LOGON_KEY_32_OK
+:-32:logon:$LOGON_KEY_32_OK
+:32 :logon:$LOGON_KEY_32_OK
+:32\ :logon:$LOGON_KEY_32_OK
+:32_:logon:$LOGON_KEY_32_OK
+:32+:logon:$LOGON_KEY_32_OK
+:30+2:logon:$LOGON_KEY_32_OK
+:32+0:logon:$LOGON_KEY_32_OK
+:32: logon:$LOGON_KEY_32_OK
+:32:\ logon:$LOGON_KEY_32_OK
+:32:logonA:$LOGON_KEY_32_OK
+:32:logo:$LOGON_KEY_32_OK
+:32:llogon:$LOGON_KEY_32_OK
+:32xlogon:$LOGON_KEY_32_OK
+:32logon:$LOGON_KEY_32_OK
+:32:logonx$LOGON_KEY_32_OK
+:32:logon$LOGON_KEY_32_OK
+: 32:user:$USER_KEY_32_OK
+:\ 32:user:$USER_KEY_32_OK
+:+32:user:$USER_KEY_32_OK
+:-32:user:$USER_KEY_32_OK
+:32 :user:$USER_KEY_32_OK
+:32\ :user:$USER_KEY_32_OK
+:32_:user:$USER_KEY_32_OK
+:32+:user:$USER_KEY_32_OK
+:30+2:user:$USER_KEY_32_OK
+:32+0:user:$USER_KEY_32_OK
+:32: user:$USER_KEY_32_OK
+:32:\ user:$USER_KEY_32_OK
+:32:userA:$USER_KEY_32_OK
+:32:use:$USER_KEY_32_OK
+:32:uuser:$USER_KEY_32_OK
+:32xuser:$USER_KEY_32_OK
+:32user:$USER_KEY_32_OK
+:32:userx$USER_KEY_32_OK
+:32:user$USER_KEY_32_OK
+:32:userlogon:$USER_KEY_32_OK
+:32:userlogon:$LOGON_KEY_32_OK
+:32:logonuser:$USER_KEY_32_OK
+:32:logonuser:$LOGON_KEY_32_OK
+:32:logon:user:$USER_KEY_32_OK
+:32:logon:user:$LOGON_KEY_32_OK
+:32:user:logon:$USER_KEY_32_OK
+:32:user:logon:$LOGON_KEY_32_OK"
+
+# TODO: add tests with whitespace in key description (not possible with current libdevmapper)
+
+IFS="
+"
+
+for key in $BORKED_KEYS; do
+	dmsetup create $DEV_CRYPT --table "0 100 crypt $CIPHER $key 0 /dev/mapper/$DEV_ZERO 0" 2> /dev/null && fail "dm-crypt accepted seriously borked key string"
+done
+
+remove_mapping
diff --git a/tests/loopaes-test b/tests/loopaes-test
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..fe593aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/loopaes-test
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+CRYPTSETUP=../cryptsetup
+
+# try to validate using loop-AES losetup/kernel if available
+LOSETUP_AES=/losetup-aes.old
+
+LOOP_DD_PARAM="bs=1k count=10000"
+DEV_NAME=dummy
+IMG=loopaes.img
+KEYv1=key_v1
+KEYv2=key_v2
+KEYv3=key_v3
+LOOPDEV=$(losetup -f 2>/dev/null)
+
+function dmremove() { # device
+	udevadm settle >/dev/null 2>&1
+	dmsetup remove $1 >/dev/null 2>&1
+}
+
+function remove_mapping()
+{
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME2 ] && dmremove $DEV_NAME2
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME ] && dmremove $DEV_NAME
+	losetup -d $LOOPDEV >/dev/null 2>&1
+	rm -f $IMG $KEYv1 $KEYv2 $KEYv3 >/dev/null 2>&1
+}
+
+function fail()
+{
+	echo "FAILED at line $(caller)"
+	remove_mapping
+	exit 2
+}
+
+function skip()
+{
+	[ -n "$1" ] && echo "$1"
+	exit 77
+}
+
+function prepare()
+{
+	remove_mapping
+	dd if=/dev/zero of=$IMG $LOOP_DD_PARAM >/dev/null 2>&1
+	sync
+	losetup $LOOPDEV $IMG
+
+	# Prepare raw key: v1 - one key, v2 - 64 keys, v3 - 64 + one IV
+	if [ ! -e $KEYv3 ]; then
+		head -c 3705 /dev/urandom | uuencode -m - | head -n 66 | tail -n 65 >$KEYv3
+		head -n 1 $KEYv3 > $KEYv1
+		head -n 64 $KEYv3 > $KEYv2
+	fi
+	[ -n "$1" ] && echo -n "$1 "
+}
+
+function check_exists()
+{
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME ] || fail
+}
+
+function get_offset_params() # $offset
+{
+	offset=$1
+	if [ "${offset:0:1}" = "@" ] ; then
+		echo "-o $((${offset:1} / 512)) -p 0"
+	else
+		echo "-o $((offset / 512))"
+	fi
+}
+
+function get_expsum() # $offset
+{
+	case $1 in
+	0)
+	   echo "31e00e0e4c233c89051cd748122fde2c98db0121ca09ba93a3820817ea037bc5"
+	   ;;
+	@8192 | 8192)
+	   echo "bfd94392d1dd8f5d477251d21b3c736e177a4945cd4937847fc7bace82996aed"
+	   ;;
+	@8388608 | 8388608)
+	   echo "33838fe36928a929bd7971bed7e82bd426c88193fcd692c2e6f1b9c9bfecd4d6"
+	   ;;
+	*) fail
+	   ;;
+	esac
+}
+
+function check_sum() # $key $keysize $offset [stdin|keyfile]
+{
+	# Fill device with zeroes and reopen it
+	dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME bs=1k $LOOP_DD_PARAM >/dev/null 2>&1
+	sync
+	dmremove $DEV_NAME
+
+	EXPSUM=$(get_expsum $3)
+	if [ "$4" == "stdin" ] ; then
+		cat $1 | $CRYPTSETUP loopaesOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME -s $2 --key-file - $(get_offset_params $3) >/dev/null 2>&1
+	else
+		$CRYPTSETUP loopaesOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME -s $2 --key-file $1 $(get_offset_params $3) >/dev/null 2>&1
+	fi
+	ret=$?
+	VSUM=$(sha256sum /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME | cut -d' ' -f 1)
+	if [ $ret -eq 0 -a "$VSUM" = "$EXPSUM" ] ; then
+		echo -n "[$4:OK]"
+	else
+		echo "[$4:FAIL]"
+		[ "$VSUM" != "$EXPSUM" ] && echo " Expecting $EXPSUM got $VSUM."
+		fail
+	fi
+}
+
+function check_sum_losetup() # $key $alg
+{
+	[ ! -x $LOSETUP_AES ] && echo && return
+
+	echo -n " Verification using loop-AES: "
+
+	losetup -d $LOOPDEV >/dev/null 2>&1
+	cat $1 | $LOSETUP_AES -p 0 -e $2 -o $3 $LOOPDEV $IMG
+	ret=$?
+	VSUM=$(sha256sum $LOOPDEV | cut -d' ' -f 1)
+	if [ $ret -eq 0 -a "$VSUM" = "$EXPSUM" ] ; then
+		echo "[OK]"
+	else
+		echo "[FAIL]"
+		[ "$VSUM" != "$EXPSUM" ] && echo " Expecting $EXPSUM got $VSUM (loop-AES)."
+		fail
+	fi
+	losetup -d $LOOPDEV >/dev/null 2>&1
+}
+
+function check_version()
+{
+	VER_STR=$(dmsetup version | grep Driver)
+	VER_MIN=$(echo $VER_STR | cut -f 2 -d.)
+	VER_PATCH=$(echo $VER_STR | cut -f 3 -d.)
+
+	test $VER_MIN -lt 19 && return 1
+	test $VER_MIN -eq 19 -a $VER_PATCH -ge 6 && return 1 # RHEL
+	return 0
+}
+
+[ $(id -u) != 0 ] && skip "WARNING: You must be root to run this test, test skipped."
+[ -z "$LOOPDEV" ] && skip "Cannot find free loop device, test skipped."
+which uuencode >/dev/null 2>&1 || skip "WARNING: test require uuencode binary, test skipped."
+check_version || skip "Probably old kernel, test skipped."
+
+# loop-AES tests
+KEY_SIZES="128 256"
+KEY_FILES="$KEYv1 $KEYv2 $KEYv3"
+DEV_OFFSET="0 8192 @8192 8388608 @8388608"
+
+for key_size in $KEY_SIZES ; do
+    for key in $KEY_FILES ; do
+        for offset in $DEV_OFFSET ; do
+		prepare "Open loop-AES $key / AES-$key_size / offset $offset"
+		$CRYPTSETUP loopaesOpen $LOOPDEV $DEV_NAME \
+			-s $key_size --key-file $key $(get_offset_params $offset) \
+			2>/dev/null
+		[ $? -ne 0 ] && echo "[SKIPPED]" && continue
+		check_exists
+		check_sum $key $key_size $offset keyfile
+		$CRYPTSETUP loopaesClose $DEV_NAME || fail
+		check_sum $key $key_size $offset stdin
+		$CRYPTSETUP loopaesClose $DEV_NAME || fail
+		check_sum_losetup $key AES$key_size $offset
+        done
+    done
+done
+
+remove_mapping
+exit 0
diff --git a/tests/luks1-compat-test b/tests/luks1-compat-test
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..2ac6c95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/luks1-compat-test
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+# check luks1 images parsing
+
+# NOTE: if image with whirlpool hash fails, check
+# that you are not using old gcrypt with flawed whirlpool
+# (see cryptsetup debug output)
+
+CRYPTSETUP=../cryptsetup
+TST_DIR=luks1-images
+MAP=luks1tst
+KEYFILE=keyfile1
+
+[ -z "$srcdir" ] && srcdir="."
+
+function remove_mapping()
+{
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$MAP ] && dmsetup remove $MAP
+}
+
+function fail()
+{
+	[ -n "$1" ] && echo "$1"
+	echo " [FAILED]"
+	echo "FAILED at line $(caller)"
+	remove_mapping
+	exit 2
+}
+
+function skip()
+{
+	[ -n "$1" ] && echo "$1"
+	echo "Test skipped."
+	exit 77
+}
+
+function test_one()
+{
+	$CRYPTSETUP benchmark -c "$1" -s "$2" | grep -v "#" || skip
+}
+
+function test_required()
+{
+	which lsblk >/dev/null 2>&1 || skip "WARNING: lsblk tool required."
+
+	echo "REQUIRED KDF TEST"
+	$CRYPTSETUP benchmark -h whirlpool | grep "N/A" && skip
+
+	echo "REQUIRED CIPHERS TEST"
+	echo "#     Algorithm | Key |  Encryption |  Decryption"
+
+	test_one aes-xts 256
+	test_one twofish-xts 256
+	test_one serpent-xts 256
+	test_one aes-cbc 256
+	test_one aes-lrw 256
+}
+
+export LANG=C
+
+test_required
+[ ! -d $TST_DIR ] && tar xJf $srcdir/luks1-images.tar.xz --no-same-owner
+
+echo "PASSPHRASE CHECK"
+for file in $(ls $TST_DIR/luks1_*) ; do
+	echo -n " $file"
+	$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -d $TST_DIR/$KEYFILE $file --test-passphrase 2>/dev/null
+	ret=$?
+	# ignore missing whirlpool (pwd failed is exit code 2)
+	[ $ret -eq 1 ] && (echo $file | grep -q -e "whirlpool") && echo " [N/A]" && continue
+	# ignore flawed whirlpool (pwd failed is exit code 2)
+	[ $ret -eq 2 ] && (echo $file | grep -q -e "whirlpool") && \
+		($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $file --debug | grep -q -e "flawed whirlpool") && \
+		echo " [IGNORED (flawed Whirlpool library)]" && continue
+	[ $ret -ne 0 ] && fail
+	echo " [OK]"
+done
+
+if [ $(id -u) != 0 ]; then
+	echo "WARNING: You must be root to run activation part of test, test skipped."
+	exit 0
+fi
+
+echo "ACTIVATION FS UUID CHECK"
+for file in $(ls $TST_DIR/luks1_*) ; do
+	echo -n " $file"
+	$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -d $TST_DIR/$KEYFILE $file $MAP 2>/dev/null
+	ret=$?
+	# ignore missing whirlpool (pwd failed is exit code 2)
+	[ $ret -eq 1 ] && (echo $file | grep -q -e "whirlpool") && echo " [N/A]" && continue
+	# ignore flawed whirlpool (pwd failed is exit code 2)
+	[ $ret -eq 2 ] && (echo $file | grep -q -e "whirlpool") && \
+		($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $file --debug | grep -q -e "flawed whirlpool") && \
+		echo " [IGNORED (flawed Whirlpool library)]" && continue
+	[ $ret -ne 0 ] && fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $MAP >/dev/null || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status /dev/mapper/$MAP >/dev/null || fail
+	UUID=$(lsblk -n -o UUID /dev/mapper/$MAP)
+	$CRYPTSETUP remove $MAP || fail
+	[ "$UUID" != "DEAD-BABE" ] && fail "UUID check failed."
+	echo " [OK]"
+done
diff --git a/tests/luks1-images.tar.xz b/tests/luks1-images.tar.xz
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dd099c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/luks1-images.tar.xz
diff --git a/tests/luks2-integrity-test b/tests/luks2-integrity-test
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..5d49fce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/luks2-integrity-test
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+#
+# Test cryptsetup/authenticated encryption compatibility.
+#
+CRYPTSETUP=../cryptsetup
+DEV_NAME=dmi_test
+DEV=mode-test.img
+PWD1=nHjJHjI23JK
+KEY_FILE=key.img
+FAST_PBKDF_OPT="--pbkdf pbkdf2 --pbkdf-force-iterations 1000"
+
+dmremove() { # device
+	udevadm settle >/dev/null 2>&1
+	dmsetup remove $1 >/dev/null 2>&1
+}
+
+cleanup() {
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME ] && dmremove $DEV_NAME
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/"$DEV_NAME"_dif ] && dmremove "$DEV_NAME"_dif
+	rm -f $DEV $KEY_FILE >/dev/null 2>&1
+}
+
+fail()
+{
+	echo
+	[ -n "$1" ] && echo "FAIL: $1"
+	echo "FAILED at line $(caller)"
+	cleanup
+	exit 100
+}
+
+skip()
+{
+	[ -n "$1" ] && echo "$1"
+	exit 77
+}
+
+add_device() {
+	cleanup
+	dd if=/dev/urandom of=$KEY_FILE bs=1 count=512 >/dev/null 2>&1
+	dd if=/dev/zero of=$DEV bs=1M count=32 >/dev/null 2>&1
+	sync
+}
+
+status_check() # name value
+{
+	#$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME
+	X=$($CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -m1 "$1" | sed -e 's/.*:[ \t]\+//' | cut -d' ' -f1)
+	if [ "$X" != "$2" ] ; then
+		echo "[status FAIL]"
+		echo " Expecting $1:$2 got \"$X\"."
+		fail
+	fi
+}
+
+dump_check() # name value
+{
+	#$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $DEV
+	X=$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $DEV | grep -m1 "$1" | sed -e 's/.*:[ \t]\+//' | cut -d' ' -f1)
+	if [ "$X" != "$2" ] ; then
+		echo "[dump FAIL]"
+		echo " Expecting $1:$2 got \"$X\"."
+		fail
+	fi
+}
+
+int_check_sum() # alg checksum
+{
+	VSUM=$(sha256sum /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME | cut -d' ' -f 1)
+	if [ "$VSUM" = "$2" ] ; then
+		echo -n "[CHECKSUM]"
+	else
+		echo "[FAIL]"
+		echo " Expecting $2 got $VSUM."
+		fail
+	fi
+}
+
+int_error_detection() # alg int sector_size
+{
+	# FIXME: this is just a trivial failure
+	echo -n "[DETECT_CORRUPTION]"
+	echo -n "XXXXX" | dd of=$DEV bs=1M seek=28 count=1 conv=notrunc >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "Cannot write to device."
+	$CRYPTSETUP open -d $KEY_FILE $DEV $DEV_NAME || fail "Cannot activate device."
+	dd if=/dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME  of=/dev/null >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail "Error detection failed."
+	$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail "Cannot deactivate device."
+}
+
+intformat() # alg integrity integrity_out key_size int_key_size sector_size csum
+{
+	echo -n "[$1:$2:$4:$6]"
+	echo -n "[FORMAT]"
+	$CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks2 -q -c $1 --integrity $2 --sector-size $6 -s $4 \
+		$FAST_PBKDF_OPT -d $KEY_FILE $DEV --offset 8192 >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ] ; then
+		echo "[N/A]"
+		return
+	fi
+	dump_check "cipher" $1
+	dump_check "sector" $6
+	dump_check "integrity" $3
+	dump_check "Key:" $(($4 + $5))
+	echo -n "[ACTIVATE]"
+	$CRYPTSETUP open -d $KEY_FILE $DEV $DEV_NAME || fail "Cannot activate device."
+	status_check "cipher" $1
+	status_check "sector size" $6
+	status_check "integrity:" $3
+	status_check "keysize:" $(($4 + $5))
+	[ $5 -gt 0 ] && status_check "integrity keysize:" $5
+	int_check_sum $1 $7
+	echo -n "[REMOVE]"
+	$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail "Cannot deactivate device."
+	int_error_detection
+	echo "[OK]"
+}
+
+
+[ $(id -u) != 0 ] && skip "WARNING: You must be root to run this test, test skipped."
+[ ! -x "$CRYPTSETUP" ] && skip "Cannot find $CRYPTSETUP, test skipped."
+modprobe dm-integrity >/dev/null 2>&1
+dmsetup targets | grep integrity >/dev/null 2>&1 || skip "Cannot find dm-integrity target, test skipped."
+
+add_device
+
+intformat aes-xts-plain64 hmac-sha256 hmac\(sha256\) 256 256  512 ee501705a084cd0ab6f4a28014bcf62b8bfa3434de00b82743c50b3abf06232c
+intformat aes-xts-random  hmac-sha256 hmac\(sha256\) 256 256  512 492c2d1cc9e222a850c399bfef4ed5a86bf5afc59e54f0f0c7ba8e2a64548323
+intformat aes-xts-plain64 hmac-sha256 hmac\(sha256\) 512 256  512 ee501705a084cd0ab6f4a28014bcf62b8bfa3434de00b82743c50b3abf06232c
+intformat aes-xts-random  hmac-sha256 hmac\(sha256\) 512 256  512 492c2d1cc9e222a850c399bfef4ed5a86bf5afc59e54f0f0c7ba8e2a64548323
+intformat aes-xts-plain64 hmac-sha256 hmac\(sha256\) 256 256 4096 358d6beceddf593aff6b22c31684e0df9c226330aff5812e060950215217d21b
+intformat aes-xts-random  hmac-sha256 hmac\(sha256\) 256 256 4096 8c0463f5ac09613674bdf40b0ff6f985edbc3de04e51fdc688873cb333ef3cda
+intformat aes-xts-plain64 hmac-sha256 hmac\(sha256\) 512 256 4096 358d6beceddf593aff6b22c31684e0df9c226330aff5812e060950215217d21b
+intformat aes-xts-random  hmac-sha256 hmac\(sha256\) 512 256 4096 8c0463f5ac09613674bdf40b0ff6f985edbc3de04e51fdc688873cb333ef3cda
+
+intformat aes-xts-plain64 hmac-sha512 hmac\(sha512\) 512 512 4096 9873d864fccb866521e79c9f0f75ad0c578d6bd7620399bbf4779e698c6e92fd
+intformat aes-xts-random  hmac-sha512 hmac\(sha512\) 512 512 4096 621f6c03f7361c2bf8f10059ae822339223f8471c750b0cf8584fba7134bd4a2
+
+intformat aes-xts-plain64 hmac-sha1 hmac\(sha1\) 512 160 4096 7370c66a92708fb71b186931468be6aa9b26f4f88373b00b1c57360b9ee1304e
+intformat aes-xts-random  hmac-sha1 hmac\(sha1\) 512 160 4096 8c0463f5ac09613674bdf40b0ff6f985edbc3de04e51fdc688873cb333ef3cda
+
+intformat aes-gcm-random aead aead 128 0  512 5f6f3f6be03c74d9aaaeaf40dd310c99a20e2786045f78a1fc6a0b189d231f57
+intformat aes-gcm-random aead aead 128 0 4096 358d6beceddf593aff6b22c31684e0df9c226330aff5812e060950215217d21b
+intformat aes-gcm-random aead aead 256 0  512 5f6f3f6be03c74d9aaaeaf40dd310c99a20e2786045f78a1fc6a0b189d231f57
+intformat aes-gcm-random aead aead 256 0 4096 358d6beceddf593aff6b22c31684e0df9c226330aff5812e060950215217d21b
+
+intformat aes-ccm-random aead aead 152 0  512 288e5e9bc5be6c0bd2a74abbb72c7944da83198b5e3041dcf159e7ae250dafa8
+intformat aes-ccm-random aead aead 152 0 4096 7370c66a92708fb71b186931468be6aa9b26f4f88373b00b1c57360b9ee1304e
+intformat aes-ccm-random aead aead 280 0  512 288e5e9bc5be6c0bd2a74abbb72c7944da83198b5e3041dcf159e7ae250dafa8
+intformat aes-ccm-random aead aead 280 0 4096 7370c66a92708fb71b186931468be6aa9b26f4f88373b00b1c57360b9ee1304e
+
+intformat chacha20-plain64 poly1305 poly1305 256 0  512 3f82eae753ff52a689ddc559c691bbdff838361bbe9a3ce8c7212e16e51b5dbe
+intformat chacha20-random  poly1305 poly1305 256 0  512 5f6f3f6be03c74d9aaaeaf40dd310c99a20e2786045f78a1fc6a0b189d231f57
+intformat chacha20-plain64 poly1305 poly1305 256 0 4096 7370c66a92708fb71b186931468be6aa9b26f4f88373b00b1c57360b9ee1304e
+intformat chacha20-random  poly1305 poly1305 256 0 4096 358d6beceddf593aff6b22c31684e0df9c226330aff5812e060950215217d21b
+
+intformat aegis128-random  aead aead 128 0  512 ee501705a084cd0ab6f4a28014bcf62b8bfa3434de00b82743c50b3abf06232c
+intformat aegis128-random  aead aead 128 0 4096 358d6beceddf593aff6b22c31684e0df9c226330aff5812e060950215217d21b
+intformat aegis128l-random aead aead 128 0  512 ee501705a084cd0ab6f4a28014bcf62b8bfa3434de00b82743c50b3abf06232c
+intformat aegis128l-random aead aead 128 0 4096 358d6beceddf593aff6b22c31684e0df9c226330aff5812e060950215217d21b
+intformat aegis256-random  aead aead 256 0  512 492c2d1cc9e222a850c399bfef4ed5a86bf5afc59e54f0f0c7ba8e2a64548323
+intformat aegis256-random  aead aead 256 0 4096 8c0463f5ac09613674bdf40b0ff6f985edbc3de04e51fdc688873cb333ef3cda
+intformat morus640-random  aead aead 128 0  512 ee501705a084cd0ab6f4a28014bcf62b8bfa3434de00b82743c50b3abf06232c
+intformat morus640-random  aead aead 128 0 4096 358d6beceddf593aff6b22c31684e0df9c226330aff5812e060950215217d21b
+intformat morus1280-random aead aead 128 0  512 ee501705a084cd0ab6f4a28014bcf62b8bfa3434de00b82743c50b3abf06232c
+intformat morus1280-random aead aead 128 0 4096 358d6beceddf593aff6b22c31684e0df9c226330aff5812e060950215217d21b
+intformat morus1280-random aead aead 256 0  512 ee501705a084cd0ab6f4a28014bcf62b8bfa3434de00b82743c50b3abf06232c
+intformat morus1280-random aead aead 256 0 4096 358d6beceddf593aff6b22c31684e0df9c226330aff5812e060950215217d21b
+
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/luks2-validation-test b/tests/luks2-validation-test
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..06869ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/luks2-validation-test
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+#turn on debug mode by following env. variable _DEBUG=1
+
+PS4='$LINENO:'
+CRYPTSETUP=../cryptsetup
+
+CRYPTSETUP_VALGRIND=../.libs/cryptsetup
+CRYPTSETUP_LIB_VALGRIND=../.libs
+
+START_DIR=$(pwd)
+
+IMG=luks2-backend.img
+ORIG_IMG=luks2_valid_hdr.img
+TST_IMGS=$START_DIR/luks2-images
+
+GEN_DIR=generators
+
+FAILS=0
+
+[ -z "$srcdir" ] && srcdir="."
+
+function remove_mapping()
+{
+	rm -rf $IMG $TST_IMGS >/dev/null 2>&1
+}
+
+function fail()
+{
+	[ -n "$1" ] && echo "$1"
+	echo "FAILED at line $(caller)"
+	cd $START_DIR
+	remove_mapping
+	exit 2
+}
+
+fail_count()
+{
+	echo "$1"
+	FAILS=$((FAILS+1))
+}
+
+function skip()
+{
+	[ -n "$1" ] && echo "$1"
+	exit 77
+}
+
+function prepare() # $1 dev1_size
+{
+	remove_mapping
+
+	test -d $TST_IMGS || mkdir $TST_IMGS
+
+	test -e $ORIG_IMG || xz -dkc $srcdir/$ORIG_IMG.xz >$ORIG_IMG
+	cp $ORIG_IMG $TST_IMGS
+	cp $ORIG_IMG $IMG
+}
+
+function test_load()
+{
+	local _debug=
+
+	test -z "$_DEBUG" || _debug="--debug"
+
+	case "$1" in
+	R)
+		if [ -n "$_debug" ]; then
+			$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $_debug $IMG
+		else
+			$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $_debug $IMG > /dev/null 2>&1
+		fi
+		test $? -eq 0 || return 1
+		;;
+	F)
+		if [ -n "$_debug" ]; then
+			$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $_debug $IMG
+		else
+			$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $_debug $IMG > /dev/null 2>&1
+		fi
+		test $? -ne 0 || return 1
+		;;
+	*)
+		fail "Internal test error"
+		;;
+	esac
+}
+
+function RUN()
+{
+	echo -n "Test image: $1..."
+	cp $TST_IMGS/$1 $IMG || fail "Missing test image"
+	test_load $2 "$3"
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail_count "$3"
+	else
+		echo "OK"
+	fi
+}
+
+function valgrind_setup()
+{
+	which valgrind >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "Cannot find valgrind."
+	[ ! -f $CRYPTSETUP_VALGRIND ] && fail "Unable to get location of cryptsetup executable."
+	export LD_LIBRARY_PATH="$CRYPTSETUP_LIB_VALGRIND:$LD_LIBRARY_PATH"
+}
+
+function valgrind_run()
+{
+	INFOSTRING="$(basename ${BASH_SOURCE[1]})-line-${BASH_LINENO[0]}" ./valg.sh ${CRYPTSETUP_VALGRIND} "$@"
+}
+
+[ -n "$VALG" ] && valgrind_setup && CRYPTSETUP=valgrind_run
+
+which jq >/dev/null 2>&1 || skip "Cannot find jq, test skipped."
+
+prepare
+
+echo "[0] Generating test headers"
+cd $srcdir/$GEN_DIR
+for scr in ./generate-*.sh; do
+	echo -n "$(basename $scr)..."
+	$scr $TST_IMGS $TST_IMGS/$ORIG_IMG || fail "Header generator $scr failed: '$?'"
+	echo "done"
+done
+cd $START_DIR
+
+echo "[1] Test basic auto-recovery"
+RUN luks2-invalid-checksum-hdr0.img "R" "Failed to recover from trivial header corruption at offset 0"
+# TODO: check epoch is incresed after recovery
+# TODO: check only sectors related to corrupted hdr at offset 0 are written (dmstats tool/differ.c)
+
+RUN luks2-invalid-checksum-hdr1.img "R" "Failed to recover from trivial header corruption at offset 16384"
+# TODO: check epoch is incresed after recovery
+# TODO: check only sectors related to corrupted hdr at offset 16384 are written (dmstats tool/differ.c)
+
+RUN luks2-invalid-checksum-both-hdrs.img "F" "Failed to recognise corrupted header beyond repair"
+
+echo "[2] Test ability to auto-correct mallformed json area"
+RUN luks2-corrupted-hdr0-with-correct-chks.img "R" "Failed to auto correct malformed json area at offset 512"
+# TODO: check epoch is incresed after recovery
+# TODO: check only sectors related to corrupted hdr at offset 0 are written (dmstats tool/differ.c)
+
+RUN luks2-corrupted-hdr1-with-correct-chks.img "R" "Failed to auto correct malformed json area at offset 16896"
+# TODO: check epoch is incresed after recovery
+# TODO: check only sectors related to corrupted hdr at offset 16384 are written (dmstats tool/differ.c)
+
+RUN luks2-correct-full-json0.img "R" "Failed to parse full and correct json area"
+# TODO: detect noop (norecovery, epoch untouched)
+# TODO: check epoch is NOT incresed after recovery of secondary header
+
+# these tests auto-correct json in-memory only. It'll get fixed on-disk after write operation
+RUN luks2-argon2-leftover-params.img   "R" "Failed to repair keyslot with old argon2 parameters."
+RUN luks2-pbkdf2-leftover-params-0.img "R" "Failed to repair keyslot with old pbkdf2 parameters."
+RUN luks2-pbkdf2-leftover-params-1.img "R" "Failed to repair keyslot with old pbkdf2 parameters."
+
+# Secondary header is always broken in following tests
+echo "[3] Test LUKS2 json area restrictions"
+RUN luks2-non-null-byte-beyond-json0.img		"F" "Failed to detect illegal data right beyond json data string"
+RUN luks2-non-null-bytes-beyond-json0.img		"F" "Failed to detect illegal data in json area"
+RUN luks2-missing-trailing-null-byte-json0.img		"F" "Failed to detect missing terminal null byte"
+RUN luks2-invalid-opening-char-json0.img		"F" "Failed to detect invalid opening character in json area"
+RUN luks2-invalid-object-type-json0.img			"F" "Failed to detect invalid json object type"
+RUN luks2-overlapping-areas-c0-json0.img		"F" "Failed to detect two exactly same area specifications"
+RUN luks2-overlapping-areas-c1-json0.img		"F" "Failed to detect two intersecting area specifications"
+RUN luks2-overlapping-areas-c2-json0.img		"F" "Failed to detect two slightly intersecting area specifications"
+RUN luks2-area-in-json-hdr-space-json0.img		"F" "Failed to detect area referencing LUKS2 header space"
+RUN luks2-missing-keyslot-referenced-in-digest.img	"F" "Failed to detect missing keyslot referenced in digest"
+RUN luks2-missing-segment-referenced-in-digest.img	"F" "Failed to detect missing segment referenced in digest"
+RUN luks2-missing-keyslot-referenced-in-token.img	"F" "Failed to detect missing keyslots referenced in token"
+RUN luks2-keyslot-missing-digest.img			"F" "Failed to detect missing keyslot digest."
+RUN luks2-keyslot-too-many-digests.img			"F" "Failed to detect keyslot has too many digests."
+
+echo "[4] Test integers value limits"
+RUN luks2-uint64-max-segment-size.img			"R" "Validation rejected correct value"
+RUN luks2-uint64-overflow-segment-size.img		"F" "Failed to detect uint64_t overflow"
+RUN luks2-uint64-signed-segment-size.img		"F" "Failed to detect negative value"
+
+echo "[5] Test segments validation"
+RUN luks2-segment-missing-type.img			"F" "Failed to detect missing type field"
+RUN luks2-segment-wrong-type.img			"F" "Failed to detect invalid type field"
+RUN luks2-segment-missing-offset.img			"F" "Failed to detect missing offset field"
+RUN luks2-segment-wrong-offset.img			"F" "Failed to detect invalid offset field"
+RUN luks2-segment-missing-size.img			"F" "Failed to detect missing size field"
+RUN luks2-segment-wrong-size-0.img			"F" "Failed to detect invalid size field"
+RUN luks2-segment-wrong-size-1.img			"F" "Failed to detect invalid size field"
+RUN luks2-segment-wrong-size-2.img			"F" "Failed to detect invalid size field"
+RUN luks2-segment-crypt-missing-encryption.img		"F" "Failed to detect missing encryption field"
+RUN luks2-segment-crypt-wrong-encryption.img		"F" "Failed to detect invalid encryption field"
+RUN luks2-segment-crypt-missing-ivoffset.img		"F" "Failed to detect missing iv_tweak field"
+RUN luks2-segment-crypt-wrong-ivoffset.img		"F" "Failed to detect invalid iv_tweak field"
+RUN luks2-segment-crypt-missing-sectorsize.img		"F" "Failed to detect missing sector_size field"
+RUN luks2-segment-crypt-wrong-sectorsize-0.img		"F" "Failed to detect invalid sector_size field"
+RUN luks2-segment-crypt-wrong-sectorsize-1.img		"F" "Failed to detect invalid sector_size field"
+RUN luks2-segment-crypt-wrong-sectorsize-2.img		"F" "Failed to detect invalid sector_size field"
+RUN luks2-segment-unknown-type.img			"R" "Validation rejected segment with all mandatory fields correct"
+RUN luks2-segment-two.img				"R" "Validation rejected two valid segments"
+RUN luks2-segment-wrong-flags.img			"F" "Failed to detect invalid flags field"
+RUN luks2-segment-wrong-flags-element.img		"F" "Failed to detect invalid flags content"
+
+echo "[6] Test metadata size and keyslots size (config section)"
+RUN luks2-invalid-keyslots-size-c0.img			"F" "Failed to detect too large keyslots_size in config section"
+RUN luks2-invalid-keyslots-size-c1.img			"F" "Failed to detect unaligned keyslots_size in config section"
+RUN luks2-invalid-keyslots-size-c2.img			"F" "Failed to detect too small keyslots_size config section"
+RUN luks2-invalid-json-size-c0.img			"F" "Failed to detect invalid json_size config section"
+RUN luks2-invalid-json-size-c1.img			"F" "Failed to detect invalid json_size config section"
+RUN luks2-invalid-json-size-c2.img			"F" "Failed to detect mismatching json size in config and binary hdr"
+RUN luks2-metadata-size-32k.img				"R" "Valid 32KiB metadata size failed to validate"
+RUN luks2-metadata-size-64k.img				"R" "Valid 64KiB metadata size failed to validate"
+RUN luks2-metadata-size-64k-inv-area-c0.img		"F" "Failed to detect keyslot area trespassing in json area"
+RUN luks2-metadata-size-64k-inv-area-c1.img		"F" "Failed to detect keyslot area overflowing keyslots area"
+RUN luks2-metadata-size-64k-inv-keyslots-size-c0.img	"F" "Failed to detect keyslots size overflowing in data area"
+RUN luks2-metadata-size-128k.img			"R" "Valid 128KiB metadata size failed to validate"
+RUN luks2-metadata-size-256k.img			"R" "Valid 256KiB metadata size failed to validate"
+RUN luks2-metadata-size-512k.img			"R" "Valid 512KiB metadata size failed to validate"
+RUN luks2-metadata-size-1m.img				"R" "Valid 1MiB metadata size failed to validate"
+RUN luks2-metadata-size-2m.img				"R" "Valid 2MiB metadata size failed to validate"
+RUN luks2-metadata-size-4m.img				"R" "Valid 4MiB metadata size failed to validate"
+RUN luks2-metadata-size-16k-secondary.img		"R" "Valid 16KiB metadata size in secondary hdr failed to validate"
+RUN luks2-metadata-size-32k-secondary.img		"R" "Valid 32KiB metadata size in secondary hdr failed to validate"
+RUN luks2-metadata-size-64k-secondary.img		"R" "Valid 64KiB metadata size in secondary hdr failed to validate"
+RUN luks2-metadata-size-128k-secondary.img		"R" "Valid 128KiB metadata size in secondary hdr failed to validate"
+RUN luks2-metadata-size-256k-secondary.img		"R" "Valid 256KiB metadata size in secondary hdr failed to validate"
+RUN luks2-metadata-size-512k-secondary.img		"R" "Valid 512KiB metadata size in secondary hdr failed to validate"
+RUN luks2-metadata-size-1m-secondary.img		"R" "Valid 1MiB metadata size in secondary hdr failed to validate"
+RUN luks2-metadata-size-2m-secondary.img		"R" "Valid 2MiB metadata size in secondary hdr failed to validate"
+RUN luks2-metadata-size-4m-secondary.img		"R" "Valid 4MiB metadata size in secondary hdr failed to validate"
+
+remove_mapping
+
+test $FAILS -eq 0 || fail "($FAILS wrong result(s) in total)"
diff --git a/tests/luks2_header_requirements.xz b/tests/luks2_header_requirements.xz
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eaaa73c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/luks2_header_requirements.xz
diff --git a/tests/luks2_header_requirements_free.xz b/tests/luks2_header_requirements_free.xz
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7617ee6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/luks2_header_requirements_free.xz
diff --git a/tests/luks2_keyslot_unassigned.img.xz b/tests/luks2_keyslot_unassigned.img.xz
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..726cdd7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/luks2_keyslot_unassigned.img.xz
diff --git a/tests/luks2_mda_images.tar.xz b/tests/luks2_mda_images.tar.xz
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a27f5c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/luks2_mda_images.tar.xz
diff --git a/tests/luks2_valid_hdr.img.xz b/tests/luks2_valid_hdr.img.xz
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4e03a20
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/luks2_valid_hdr.img.xz
diff --git a/tests/mode-test b/tests/mode-test
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..671620c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/mode-test
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+#
+# Test mode compatibility, check input + kernel and cryptsetup cipher status
+#
+CRYPTSETUP=../cryptsetup
+DEV_NAME=dmc_test
+HEADER_IMG=mode-test.img
+PASSWORD=3xrododenron
+PASSWORD1=$PASSWORD
+
+# cipher-chainmode-ivopts:ivmode
+CIPHERS="aes twofish serpent"
+MODES="cbc lrw xts"
+IVMODES="null benbi plain plain64 essiv:sha256"
+
+LOOPDEV=$(losetup -f 2>/dev/null)
+
+dmremove() { # device
+	udevadm settle >/dev/null 2>&1
+	dmsetup remove $1 >/dev/null 2>&1
+}
+
+cleanup() {
+	for dev in $(dmsetup status --target crypt | sed s/\:\ .*// | grep "^$DEV_NAME"_); do
+		dmremove $dev
+		sleep 2
+	done
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME ] && dmremove $DEV_NAME
+	losetup -d $LOOPDEV >/dev/null 2>&1
+	rm -f $HEADER_IMG >/dev/null 2>&1
+}
+
+fail()
+{
+	[ -n "$1" ] && echo "$1"
+	echo "FAILED at line $(caller)"
+	cleanup
+	exit 100
+}
+
+skip()
+{
+	[ -n "$1" ] && echo "$1"
+	exit 77
+}
+
+add_device() {
+	cleanup
+	dd if=/dev/zero of=$HEADER_IMG bs=1M count=6 >/dev/null 2>&1
+	sync
+	losetup $LOOPDEV $HEADER_IMG >/dev/null 2>&1
+	dmsetup create $DEV_NAME --table "0 10240 linear $LOOPDEV 8" >/dev/null 2>&1
+}
+
+dmcrypt_check() # device outstring
+{
+	X=$(dmsetup table $1 2>/dev/null | sed 's/.*: //' | cut -d' '  -f 4)
+	if [ "$X" = $2 ] ; then
+		echo -n "[table OK]"
+	else
+		echo "[table FAIL]"
+		echo " Expecting $2 got $X."
+		fail
+	fi
+
+	X=$($CRYPTSETUP status $1 | grep cipher: | sed s/\.\*cipher:\\s*//)
+	if [ $X = $2 ] ; then
+		echo -n "[status OK]"
+	else
+		echo "[status FAIL]"
+		echo " Expecting $2 got \"$X\"."
+		fail
+	fi
+
+	dmremove $1
+}
+
+dmcrypt_check_sum() # cipher device
+{
+	EXPSUM="c036cbb7553a909f8b8877d4461924307f27ecb66cff928eeeafd569c3887e29"
+	# Fill device with zeroes and reopen it
+	dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/mapper/$2 bs=1M count=6 >/dev/null 2>&1
+	sync
+	dmremove $2
+
+	echo $PASSWORD | $CRYPTSETUP create -h sha256 -c $1 -s 256 $2 /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME >/dev/null 2>&1
+	ret=$?
+	VSUM=$(sha256sum /dev/mapper/$2 | cut -d' ' -f 1)
+	if [ $ret -eq 0 -a "$VSUM" = "$EXPSUM" ] ; then
+		echo -n "[OK]"
+	else
+		echo "[FAIL]"
+		echo " Expecting $EXPSUM got $VSUM."
+		fail
+	fi
+
+	dmremove $2
+}
+
+dmcrypt()
+{
+	OUT=$2
+	[ -z "$OUT" ] && OUT=$1
+	printf "%-31s" "$1"
+
+	echo $PASSWORD | $CRYPTSETUP create -h sha256 -c $1 -s 256 "$DEV_NAME"_tstdev /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ] ; then
+		echo -n -e "PLAIN:"
+		dmcrypt_check "$DEV_NAME"_tstdev $OUT
+	else
+		echo -n "[n/a]"
+	fi
+
+	echo $PASSWORD | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks1 -i 1 -c $1 -s 256 /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ] ; then
+		echo -n -e " LUKS1:"
+		echo $PASSWORD | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME "$DEV_NAME"_tstdev >/dev/null 2>&1
+		dmcrypt_check "$DEV_NAME"_tstdev $OUT
+	fi
+
+	echo $PASSWORD | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks2 --pbkdf pbkdf2 -i 1 -c $1 -s 256 /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ] ; then
+		echo -n -e " LUKS2:"
+		echo $PASSWORD | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME "$DEV_NAME"_tstdev >/dev/null 2>&1
+		dmcrypt_check "$DEV_NAME"_tstdev $OUT
+	fi
+
+	# repeated device creation must return the same checksum
+	echo $PASSWORD | $CRYPTSETUP create -h sha256 -c $1 -s 256 "$DEV_NAME"_tstdev /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ] ; then
+		echo -n -e " CHECKSUM:"
+		dmcrypt_check_sum "$1" "$DEV_NAME"_tstdev
+	fi
+	echo
+}
+
+[ $(id -u) != 0 ] && skip "WARNING: You must be root to run this test, test skipped."
+[ -z "$LOOPDEV" ] && skip "Cannot find free loop device, test skipped."
+
+add_device
+
+# compatibility modes
+dmcrypt aes aes-cbc-plain
+dmcrypt aes-plain aes-cbc-plain
+
+# empty cipher
+PASSWORD=""
+dmcrypt null cipher_null-ecb
+dmcrypt cipher_null cipher_null-ecb
+dmcrypt cipher_null-ecb
+
+PASSWORD=$PASSWORD1
+# codebook doesn't support IV at all
+for cipher in $CIPHERS ; do
+	dmcrypt "$cipher-ecb"
+done
+
+for cipher in $CIPHERS ; do
+	for mode in $MODES ; do
+		for ivmode in $IVMODES ; do
+			dmcrypt "$cipher-$mode-$ivmode"
+		done
+	done
+done
+
+dmcrypt xchacha12,aes-adiantum-plain64
+dmcrypt xchacha20,aes-adiantum-plain64
+
+cleanup
diff --git a/tests/password-hash-test b/tests/password-hash-test
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..fbc1f41
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/password-hash-test
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+# check hash processing in create command
+
+CRYPTSETUP=../cryptsetup
+DEV_NAME=dmc_test
+KEY_FILE=keyfile
+
+DEV2=$DEV_NAME"_x"
+
+dmremove() { # device
+	udevadm settle >/dev/null 2>&1
+	dmsetup remove $1 >/dev/null 2>&1
+}
+
+cleanup() {
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV2 ] && dmremove $DEV2
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME ] && dmremove $DEV_NAME
+	rm -f $KEY_FILE
+	exit $1
+}
+
+function fail()
+{
+        echo " $1 [FAILED]"
+	echo "FAILED at line $(caller)"
+	cleanup 2
+}
+
+crypt_key() # hash keysize pwd/file name outkey [limit] [offset]
+{
+	DEV2=$DEV_NAME"_x"
+	LIMIT=""
+	MODE=aes-cbc-essiv:sha256
+	[ $2 -gt 256 ] && MODE=aes-xts-plain
+	[ -n "$6" ] && LIMIT="-l $6"
+	[ -n "$7" ] && LIMIT="$LIMIT --keyfile-offset $7"
+
+	echo -n "HASH: $1 KSIZE: $2 / $3"
+	case "$3" in
+	pwd)
+		echo -e -n "$4" | $CRYPTSETUP create -c $MODE -h $1 -s $2 $LIMIT $DEV2 /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null
+		ret=$?
+		;;
+	std-)
+		echo -e -n "$4" | $CRYPTSETUP create -c $MODE -d "-" -h $1 -s $2 $LIMIT $DEV2 /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null
+		ret=$?
+		;;
+	stdin)
+		echo -e -n "$4" | $CRYPTSETUP create -c $MODE -h $1 -s $2 $LIMIT $DEV2 /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null
+		ret=$?
+		;;
+	cat)
+		cat $4 | $CRYPTSETUP create -c $MODE -h $1 -s $2 $LIMIT $DEV2 /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null
+		ret=$?
+		;;
+	cat-)
+		cat $4 | $CRYPTSETUP create -c $MODE -h $1 -s $2 $LIMIT $DEV2 -d - /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null
+		ret=$?
+		;;
+	file)
+		$CRYPTSETUP create -q -c $MODE -d $4 -h $1 -s $2 $DEV2 /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null
+		ret=$?
+		;;
+	failpwd)
+		echo -e -n "$4" | $CRYPTSETUP create -c $MODE -h $1 -s $2 $LIMIT $DEV2 /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail "Expecting failure"
+		echo " [OK]"
+		return
+		;;
+	*)
+		fail ""
+		;;
+	esac
+
+	# ignore these cases, not all libs/kernel supports it
+	if [ "$1" != "sha1" -a "$1" != "sha256" ] || [ $2 -gt 256 ] ; then
+		if [ $ret -ne 0 ] ; then
+			echo " [N/A] ($ret, SKIPPED)"
+			return
+		fi
+	fi
+
+	VKEY=$(dmsetup table $DEV2 --showkeys 2>/dev/null | sed 's/.*: //' | cut -d' '  -f 5)
+	if [ "$VKEY" != "$5" ] ; then
+		echo " [FAILED]"
+		echo "expected: $5"
+		echo "real key: $VKEY"
+		cleanup 100
+	else
+		echo " [OK]"
+	fi
+
+	dmremove $DEV2
+}
+
+if [ $(id -u) != 0 ]; then
+	echo "WARNING: You must be root to run this test, test skipped."
+	exit 77
+fi
+
+dmsetup create $DEV_NAME --table "0 10240 zero" >/dev/null 2>&1
+
+crypt_key ripemd160   0 pwd "xxx" aeb26d1f69eb6dddfb9381eed4d7299f091e99aa5d3ff06866d4ce9f620f7aca
+crypt_key ripemd160 256 pwd "xxx" aeb26d1f69eb6dddfb9381eed4d7299f091e99aa5d3ff06866d4ce9f620f7aca
+crypt_key ripemd160 128 pwd "xxx" aeb26d1f69eb6dddfb9381eed4d7299f
+crypt_key sha1      256 pwd "xxx" b60d121b438a380c343d5ec3c2037564b82ffef30b1e0a6ad9af7a73aa91c197
+crypt_key sha1      128 pwd "xxx" b60d121b438a380c343d5ec3c2037564
+crypt_key sha256    256 pwd "xxx" cd2eb0837c9b4c962c22d2ff8b5441b7b45805887f051d39bf133b583baf6860
+crypt_key sha256    128 pwd "xxx" cd2eb0837c9b4c962c22d2ff8b5441b7
+
+crypt_key sha256   0 std- "xxx"    cd2eb0837c9b4c962c22d2ff8b5441b7b45805887f051d39bf133b583baf6860
+crypt_key sha256 256 std- "xxx\n"  042aea10a0f14f2d391373599be69d53a75dde9951fc3d3cd10b6100aa7a9f24
+crypt_key sha256 128 std- "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaabbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb" \
+				   2a42b97084779dcedf2c66405c5d296c
+crypt_key sha256 256 stdin "xxx"   cd2eb0837c9b4c962c22d2ff8b5441b7b45805887f051d39bf133b583baf6860
+crypt_key sha256   0 stdin "xxx\n" cd2eb0837c9b4c962c22d2ff8b5441b7b45805887f051d39bf133b583baf6860
+
+# with keyfile, hash is ignored
+crypt_key ripemd160 256 file /dev/zero 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+crypt_key sha256    256 file /dev/zero 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+crypt_key unknown*  256 file /dev/zero 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+
+# limiting key
+crypt_key sha256:20 256 pwd "xxx" cd2eb0837c9b4c962c22d2ff8b5441b7b4580588000000000000000000000000
+crypt_key sha256:32 256 pwd "xxx" cd2eb0837c9b4c962c22d2ff8b5441b7b45805887f051d39bf133b583baf6860
+
+crypt_key sha256:   256 failpwd "xxx" x
+crypt_key sha256:xx 256 failpwd "xxx" x
+
+# key file, 80 chars
+echo -n -e "0123456789abcdef\n\x01\x00\x03\xff\xff\r\xff\xff\n\r" \
+	   "2352j3rkjhadcfasc823rqaw7e1 3dq sdq3d 2dkjqw3h2=====" >$KEY_FILE
+KEY_FILE_HEX="303132333435363738396162636465660a010003ffff0dffff0a0d20323335326a33726b6a686164636661736338323372716177376531203364712073647133"
+
+
+# ignore hash if keyfile is specified
+crypt_key ripemd160 256 file $KEY_FILE ${KEY_FILE_HEX:0:64}
+crypt_key sha256    256 file $KEY_FILE ${KEY_FILE_HEX:0:64}
+crypt_key sha256    128 file $KEY_FILE ${KEY_FILE_HEX:0:32}
+crypt_key sha256    512 file $KEY_FILE $KEY_FILE_HEX
+
+# stdin can be limited
+crypt_key plain     128 cat /dev/zero 00000000000000000000000000000000 16
+crypt_key plain     128 cat /dev/zero 00000000000000000000000000000000 17
+
+# read key only up to \n
+crypt_key plain     128 cat $KEY_FILE ${KEY_FILE_HEX:0:28}0000 14
+
+# read full key, ignore keyfile length
+crypt_key plain     128 cat- $KEY_FILE ${KEY_FILE_HEX:0:32}
+crypt_key plain     128 cat- $KEY_FILE ${KEY_FILE_HEX:0:32} 14
+
+# but do not ignore hash if keysgfile is "-"
+crypt_key sha256    128 cat- $KEY_FILE f3b827c8a6f159ad8c8ed5bd5ab3f8c5
+crypt_key sha256    128 cat- $KEY_FILE f3b827c8a6f159ad8c8ed5bd5ab3f8c5 0
+crypt_key sha256    128 cat- $KEY_FILE f3b827c8a6f159ad8c8ed5bd5ab3f8c5 80
+crypt_key sha256    128 cat- $KEY_FILE a82c9227cc54c7475620ce85ba1fca1e 14
+crypt_key sha256    128 cat- $KEY_FILE 7df3f4a41a33805596be85c781cac3b4 14 2
+crypt_key sha256    128 cat- $KEY_FILE ebbe65a178e886ddbb778e0a5538db72 40 40
+
+# limiting plain (no hash)
+crypt_key plain   256     pwd "xxxxxxxx" 7878787878787878000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+crypt_key plain:2 256     pwd "xxxxxxxx" 7878000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+crypt_key plain:9 256 failpwd "xxxxxxxx" x
+
+crypt_key sha256    128 cat $KEY_FILE a82c9227cc54c7475620ce85ba1fca1e 14
+crypt_key sha256:14 128 cat $KEY_FILE a82c9227cc54c7475620ce85ba1f0000 14
+
+crypt_key sha256    128 pwd "0123456789abcdef" 9f9f5111f7b27a781f1f1ddde5ebc2dd 16
+crypt_key sha256    128 pwd "0123456789abcdef" 1be2e452b46d7a0d9656bbb1f768e824  4
+crypt_key sha256    128 pwd "0123"             1be2e452b46d7a0d9656bbb1f768e824  4
+
+# Test list of various hash algorithms
+crypt_key sha1        256 pwd "0123456789abcdef" fe5567e8d769550852182cdf69d74bb16dff8e295e4b6077d6d3fc73e7fe33b0
+crypt_key sha224      256 pwd "0123456789abcdef" 7330215f6741fd2bacbd3658681a70f65e2e90a02887989018974ce83775a568
+crypt_key sha256      256 pwd "0123456789abcdef" 9f9f5111f7b27a781f1f1ddde5ebc2dd2b796bfc7365c9c28b548e564176929f
+crypt_key sha384      256 pwd "0123456789abcdef" fc6304023487cb6f85ac80e47817760c6b153c02da46c6429649e963b031e525
+crypt_key sha512      256 pwd "0123456789abcdef" 1c043fbe4bca7c7920dae536c680fd44c15d71ec12cd82a2a9491b0043b57f4d
+crypt_key ripemd160   256 pwd "0123456789abcdef" edf4e38018cd71dd489b9c1e54b32054eb42dfad9fdcc22d629d756391a24982
+crypt_key whirlpool   256 pwd "0123456789abcdef" b21fc274d47d79ba45f94d67077f0846f75a7acc1a4dc560eacca300179cc142
+crypt_key sha3-224    256 pwd "0123456789abcdef" bbb7d56cc80a8c80e907f7d9240edc0be264aa173266b30918bc1065d59a9388
+crypt_key sha3-256    256 pwd "0123456789abcdef" a5df4caae9fdb5dbacf667075b709a2f30a115c43168af332062b42d4b0da01f
+crypt_key sha3-384    256 pwd "0123456789abcdef" 56f351f754c418892eab4009e5f85c8d5436a591014503563e9395b895526413
+crypt_key sha3-512    256 pwd "0123456789abcdef" 59d06155d25dffdb982729de8dce9d7855ca094d8bab8124b347c40668477056
+crypt_key sm3         256 pwd "0123456789abcdef" a34fdd8e843802b31a262dce5b1f501bed68ef81520de14b39657aecffaf8a86
+crypt_key stribog512  256 pwd "0123456789abcdef" ab1284a64c2325c0ad52494e696df9aa9b92e701605a9a1258b58be08e8240ea
+
+cleanup 0
diff --git a/tests/reencryption-compat-test b/tests/reencryption-compat-test
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..6029530
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/reencryption-compat-test
@@ -0,0 +1,385 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+CRYPTSETUP=../cryptsetup
+REENC=../cryptsetup-reencrypt
+FAST_PBKDF="--pbkdf-force-iterations 1000"
+
+DEV_NAME=reenc9768
+DEV_NAME2=reenc1273
+IMG=reenc-data
+IMG_HDR=$IMG.hdr
+ORIG_IMG=reenc-data-orig
+KEY1=key1
+PWD1="93R4P4pIqAH8"
+PWD2="1cND4319812f"
+PWD3="1-9Qu5Ejfnqv"
+
+MNT_DIR=./mnt_luks
+START_DIR=$(pwd)
+[ -f /etc/system-fips ] && FIPS_MODE=$(cat /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled 2>/dev/null)
+
+function fips_mode()
+{
+	[ -n "$FIPS_MODE" ] && [ "$FIPS_MODE" -gt 0 ]
+}
+
+function del_scsi_device()
+{
+	rmmod scsi_debug 2>/dev/null
+	sleep 2
+}
+
+function remove_mapping()
+{
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME2 ] && dmsetup remove $DEV_NAME2
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME ] && dmsetup remove $DEV_NAME
+	[ ! -z "$LOOPDEV1" ] && losetup -d $LOOPDEV1 >/dev/null 2>&1
+	rm -f $IMG $IMG_HDR $ORIG_IMG $KEY1 >/dev/null 2>&1
+	umount $MNT_DIR > /dev/null 2>&1
+	rmdir $MNT_DIR > /dev/null 2>&1
+	LOOPDEV1=""
+	del_scsi_device
+}
+
+function fail()
+{
+	[ -n "$1" ] && echo "$1"
+	echo "FAILED at line $(caller)"
+	cd $START_DIR
+	remove_mapping
+	exit 2
+}
+
+function skip()
+{
+	[ -n "$1" ] && echo "$1"
+	exit 77
+}
+
+function add_scsi_device() {
+	del_scsi_device
+        modprobe scsi_debug $@ delay=0
+        if [ $? -ne 0 ] ; then
+                echo "This kernel seems to not support proper scsi_debug module, test skipped."
+                exit 77
+        fi
+
+        sleep 2
+        SCSI_DEV="/dev/"$(grep -l -e scsi_debug /sys/block/*/device/model | cut -f4 -d /)
+        [ -b $SCSI_DEV ] || fail "Cannot find $SCSI_DEV."
+}
+
+function open_crypt() # $1 pwd, $2 hdr
+{
+	if [ -n "$2" ] ; then
+		echo "$1" | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV1 $DEV_NAME --header $2 || fail
+	elif [ -n "$1" ] ; then
+		echo "$1" | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV1 $DEV_NAME || fail
+	else
+		$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -d $KEY1 $LOOPDEV1 $DEV_NAME || fail
+	fi
+}
+
+function wipe_dev() # $1 dev
+{
+	dd if=/dev/zero of=$1 bs=256k >/dev/null 2>&1
+}
+
+function wipe() # $1 pass
+{
+	open_crypt $1
+	wipe_dev /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME
+	udevadm settle >/dev/null 2>&1
+	$CRYPTSETUP luksClose $DEV_NAME || fail
+}
+
+function prepare() # $1 dev1_siz
+{
+	remove_mapping
+
+	dd if=/dev/zero of=$IMG      bs=1k count=$1 >/dev/null 2>&1
+	LOOPDEV1=$(losetup -f 2>/dev/null)
+	[ -z "$LOOPDEV1" ] && fail "No free loop device"
+	losetup $LOOPDEV1 $IMG
+
+	if [ ! -e $KEY1 ]; then
+		dd if=/dev/urandom of=$KEY1 count=1 bs=32 >/dev/null 2>&1
+	fi
+}
+
+function check_hash_dev() # $1 dev, $2 hash
+{
+	HASH=$(sha256sum $1 | cut -d' ' -f 1)
+	[ $HASH != "$2" ] && fail "HASH differs ($HASH)"
+}
+
+function check_hash() # $1 pwd, $2 hash, $3 hdr
+{
+	open_crypt $1 $3
+	check_hash_dev /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME $2
+	$CRYPTSETUP remove $DEV_NAME || fail
+}
+
+function backup_orig()
+{
+	sync
+	losetup -d $LOOPDEV1
+	cp $IMG $ORIG_IMG
+	losetup $LOOPDEV1 $IMG
+}
+
+function rollback()
+{
+	sync
+	losetup -d $LOOPDEV1
+	cp $ORIG_IMG $IMG
+	losetup $LOOPDEV1 $IMG
+}
+
+function check_slot() #space separated list of ENABLED key slots
+{
+	local _KS0=DISABLED
+	local _KS1=$_KS0 _KS2=$_KS0 _KS3=$_KS0 _KS4=$_KS0 _KS5=$_KS0 _KS6=$_KS0 _KS7=$_KS0
+	local _tmp
+
+	for _tmp in $*; do
+		eval _KS$_tmp=ENABLED
+	done
+
+	local _out=$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV1 | grep -e "Key Slot" | cut -d ' ' -f 4)
+
+	local _i=0
+	for _tmp in $_out; do
+		eval local _orig="\${_KS${_i}}"
+		if [ "$_tmp" != "$_orig" ]; then
+			echo "Keyslot $_i is $_tmp, expected result: $_orig"
+			return 1
+		fi
+		_i=$[_i+1]
+	done
+
+	return 0
+}
+
+function simple_scsi_reenc()
+{
+	echo -n "$1"
+	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF $SCSI_DEV || fail
+
+	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $SCSI_DEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+	HASH=$(sha256sum /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME | cut -d' ' -f 1)
+	$CRYPTSETUP luksClose $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+	echo $PWD1 | $REENC -q $FAST_PBKDF $SCSI_DEV || fail
+
+	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $SCSI_DEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+	check_hash_dev /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME $HASH
+	$CRYPTSETUP luksClose $DEV_NAME || fail
+}
+
+function mount_and_test() {
+	test -d $MNT_DIR || mkdir -p $MNT_DIR
+	mount $@ $MNT_DIR 2>/dev/null || {
+		echo -n "failed to mount [SKIP]"
+		return 0
+	}
+	rm $MNT_DIR/* 2>/dev/null
+	cd $MNT_DIR
+	echo $PWD2 | $START_DIR/$REENC $LOOPDEV1 -q --use-fsync --use-directio --write-log $FAST_PBKDF || return 1
+	cd $START_DIR
+	umount $MNT_DIR
+	echo -n [OK]
+}
+
+function test_logging_tmpfs() {
+	echo -n "[tmpfs]"
+	mount_and_test -t tmpfs none -o size=$[25*1024*1024] || return 1
+	echo
+}
+
+function test_logging() {
+	echo -n "$1:"
+	for img in $(ls img_fs*img.xz) ; do
+		wipefs -a $SCSI_DEV > /dev/null
+		echo -n "[${img%.img.xz}]"
+		xz -d -c $img | dd of=$SCSI_DEV bs=4k >/dev/null 2>&1
+		mount_and_test $SCSI_DEV || return 1
+	done
+	echo
+}
+
+[ $(id -u) != 0 ] && skip "WARNING: You must be root to run this test, test skipped."
+[ ! -x "$REENC" ] && skip "Cannot find $REENC, test skipped."
+which wipefs >/dev/null 2>&1 ||  skip "Cannot find wipefs, test skipped."
+fips_mode && skip "This test cannot be run in FIPS mode."
+
+# REENCRYPTION tests
+
+HASH1=b69dae56a14d1a8314ed40664c4033ea0a550eea2673e04df42a66ac6b9faf2c
+HASH2=d85ef2a08aeac2812a648deb875485a6e3848fc3d43ce4aa380937f08199f86b
+HASH3=e4e5749032a5163c45125eccf3e8598ba5ed840df442c97e1d5ad4ad84359605
+HASH4=2daeb1f36095b44b318410b3f4e8b5d989dcc7bb023d1426c492dab0a3053e74
+HASH5=5f70bf18a086007016e948b04aed3b82103a36bea41755b6cddfaf10ace3c6ef
+
+echo "[1] Reencryption"
+prepare 8192
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 -s 128 -c aes-cbc-plain $FAST_PBKDF --align-payload 4096 $LOOPDEV1 || fail
+wipe $PWD1
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $LOOPDEV1 -q $FAST_PBKDF
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $LOOPDEV1 -q -s 256 $FAST_PBKDF
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $LOOPDEV1 -q -s 256 -c aes-xts-plain64 -h sha256 $FAST_PBKDF
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $LOOPDEV1 -q --use-directio $FAST_PBKDF
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $LOOPDEV1 -q --master-key-file /dev/urandom $FAST_PBKDF
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $LOOPDEV1 -q -s 512 --master-key-file /dev/urandom $FAST_PBKDF
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
+$CRYPTSETUP --type luks1 luksDump $LOOPDEV1 > /dev/null || fail
+
+echo "[2] Reencryption with data shift"
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 -s 128 $FAST_PBKDF --align-payload 2048 $LOOPDEV1 || fail
+wipe $PWD1
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $LOOPDEV1 -q -s 256 --reduce-device-size 1024S $FAST_PBKDF || fail
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH2
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $LOOPDEV1 -q $FAST_PBKDF || fail
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH2
+$CRYPTSETUP --type luks1 luksDump $LOOPDEV1 > /dev/null || fail
+
+echo "[3] Reencryption with keyfile"
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 -d $KEY1 -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 -s 128 $FAST_PBKDF --align-payload 4096 $LOOPDEV1 || fail
+wipe
+check_hash "" $HASH1
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksAddKey -d $KEY1 $LOOPDEV1 $FAST_PBKDF || fail
+$REENC $LOOPDEV1 -d $KEY1 $FAST_PBKDF -q 2>/dev/null && fail
+$REENC $LOOPDEV1 -d $KEY1 -S 0 $FAST_PBKDF -q || fail
+check_hash "" $HASH1
+check_slot 0 || fail "Only keyslot 0 expected to be enabled"
+$REENC $LOOPDEV1 -d $KEY1 $FAST_PBKDF -q || fail
+# FIXME echo $PWD1 | $REENC ...
+
+echo "[4] Encryption of not yet encrypted device"
+# well, movin' zeroes :-)
+OFFSET=2048
+SIZE=$(blockdev --getsz $LOOPDEV1)
+wipe_dev $LOOPDEV1
+dmsetup create $DEV_NAME2 --table "0 $(($SIZE - $OFFSET)) linear $LOOPDEV1 0" || fail
+check_hash_dev /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME2 $HASH3
+dmsetup remove $DEV_NAME2 || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $LOOPDEV1 -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 -s 128 --new --type luks1 --reduce-device-size "$OFFSET"S -q $FAST_PBKDF || fail
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH3
+$CRYPTSETUP --type luks1 luksDump $LOOPDEV1 > /dev/null || fail
+# 64MiB + 1 KiB
+prepare 65537
+OFFSET=131072
+SIZE=$(blockdev --getsz $LOOPDEV1)
+wipe_dev $LOOPDEV1
+dmsetup create $DEV_NAME2 --table "0 $(($SIZE - $OFFSET)) linear $LOOPDEV1 0" || fail
+check_hash_dev /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME2 $HASH5
+dmsetup remove $DEV_NAME2 || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $LOOPDEV1 -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 -s 128 --new --type luks1 --reduce-device-size "$OFFSET"S $FAST_PBKDF || fail
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH5
+$CRYPTSETUP --type luks1 luksDump $LOOPDEV1 > /dev/null || fail
+prepare 8192
+
+echo "[5] Reencryption using specific keyslot"
+echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF $LOOPDEV1 || fail
+echo -e "$PWD2\n$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF -S 1 $LOOPDEV1 || fail
+echo -e "$PWD2\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF -S 2 $LOOPDEV1 || fail
+echo -e "$PWD2\n$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF -S 3 $LOOPDEV1 || fail
+echo -e "$PWD2\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF -S 4 $LOOPDEV1 || fail
+echo -e "$PWD2\n$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF -S 5 $LOOPDEV1 || fail
+echo -e "$PWD2\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF -S 6 $LOOPDEV1 || fail
+echo -e "$PWD2\n$PWD3" | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF -S 7 $LOOPDEV1 || fail
+backup_orig
+echo $PWD2 | $REENC $FAST_PBKDF -S 0 -q $LOOPDEV1 || fail
+check_slot 0 || fail "Only keyslot 0 expected to be enabled"
+wipe $PWD2
+rollback
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $FAST_PBKDF -S 1 -q $LOOPDEV1 || fail
+check_slot 1 || fail "Only keyslot 1 expected to be enabled"
+wipe $PWD1
+rollback
+echo $PWD2 | $REENC $FAST_PBKDF -S 6 -q $LOOPDEV1 || fail
+check_slot 6 || fail "Only keyslot 6 expected to be enabled"
+wipe $PWD2
+rollback
+echo $PWD3 | $REENC $FAST_PBKDF -S 7 -q $LOOPDEV1 || fail
+check_slot 7 || fail "Only keyslot 7 expected to be enabled"
+wipe $PWD3
+rollback
+echo $PWD3 | $REENC $FAST_PBKDF -S 8 -q $LOOPDEV1 2>/dev/null && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV1 > /dev/null || fail
+
+echo "[6] Reencryption using all active keyslots"
+echo -e "$PWD2\n$PWD1\n$PWD2\n$PWD1\n$PWD2\n$PWD1\n$PWD2\n$PWD3" | $REENC -q $LOOPDEV1 $FAST_PBKDF || fail
+check_slot 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 || fail "All keyslots expected to be enabled"
+
+echo "[7] Reencryption of block devices with different block size"
+add_scsi_device sector_size=512 dev_size_mb=8
+simple_scsi_reenc "[512 sector]"
+add_scsi_device sector_size=4096 dev_size_mb=8
+simple_scsi_reenc "[4096 sector]"
+add_scsi_device sector_size=512 physblk_exp=3 dev_size_mb=8
+simple_scsi_reenc "[4096/512 sector]"
+echo "[OK]"
+
+echo "[8] Header only reencryption (hash and iteration time)"
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 --hash sha1 $FAST_PBKDF $LOOPDEV1 || fail
+wipe $PWD1
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $LOOPDEV1 -q --keep-key || fail
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $LOOPDEV1 -q --keep-key --pbkdf-force-iterations 999 2>/dev/null && fail
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $LOOPDEV1 -q --keep-key --hash sha256 --pbkdf-force-iterations 1001
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
+[ "$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV1 | grep -A1 -m1 "Key Slot 0" | grep Iterations: | sed -e 's/[[:space:]]\+Iterations:\ \+//g')" -eq 1001 ] || fail
+[ "$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV1 | grep -m1 "Hash spec:" | cut -f2)" = "sha256" ] || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $LOOPDEV1 -q --keep-key --hash sha512 $FAST_PBKDF
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
+[ "$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $LOOPDEV1 | grep -A1 -m1 "Key Slot 0" | grep Iterations: | sed -e 's/[[:space:]]\+Iterations:\ \+//g')" -eq 1000 ] || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $LOOPDEV1 -q --keep-key $FAST_PBKDF
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
+$CRYPTSETUP --type luks1 luksDump $LOOPDEV1 > /dev/null || fail
+
+echo "[9] Test log I/Os on various underlaying block devices"
+prepare 8192
+echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF $LOOPDEV1 || fail
+add_scsi_device sector_size=512 dev_size_mb=32
+test_logging "[512 sector]" || fail
+add_scsi_device sector_size=4096 dev_size_mb=32
+test_logging "[4096 sector]" || fail
+add_scsi_device sector_size=512 dev_size_mb=32 physblk_exp=3
+test_logging "[4096/512 sector]" || fail
+test_logging_tmpfs || fail
+
+echo "[10] Removal of encryption"
+prepare 8192
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF $LOOPDEV1 || fail
+wipe $PWD1
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $LOOPDEV1 -q --decrypt
+check_hash_dev $LOOPDEV1 $HASH4
+
+echo "[11] Detached header - adding encryption/reencryption/decryption"
+prepare 8192
+check_hash_dev $IMG $HASH4
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $LOOPDEV1 -q $FAST_PBKDF --header $IMG_HDR --new --type luks1
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH4 $IMG_HDR
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $LOOPDEV1 -q $FAST_PBKDF --header $IMG_HDR
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH4 $IMG_HDR
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $LOOPDEV1 -q --header $IMG_HDR --decrypt
+check_hash_dev $IMG $HASH4
+# existing header of zero size
+cat /dev/null >$IMG_HDR
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $LOOPDEV1 -q $FAST_PBKDF --header $IMG_HDR --new --type luks1
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH4 $IMG_HDR
+$CRYPTSETUP isLuks $LOOPDEV1 && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP isLuks $IMG_HDR || fail
+
+remove_mapping
+exit 0
diff --git a/tests/reencryption-compat-test2 b/tests/reencryption-compat-test2
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..cb61d23
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/reencryption-compat-test2
@@ -0,0 +1,459 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+CRYPTSETUP=../cryptsetup
+REENC=../cryptsetup-reencrypt
+FAST_PBKDF_ARGON="--pbkdf-force-iterations 4 --pbkdf-memory 32 --pbkdf-parallel 1"
+FAST_PBKDF_PBKDF2="--pbkdf-force-iterations 1000 --pbkdf pbkdf2"
+DEFAULT_ARGON="argon2i"
+
+DEV_NAME=reenc9768
+DEV_NAME2=reenc1273
+IMG=reenc-data
+IMG_HDR=$IMG.hdr
+ORIG_IMG=reenc-data-orig
+KEY1=key1
+PWD1="93R4P4pIqAH8"
+PWD2="1cND4319812f"
+PWD3="1-9Qu5Ejfnqv"
+
+MNT_DIR=./mnt_luks
+START_DIR=$(pwd)
+[ -f /etc/system-fips ] && FIPS_MODE=$(cat /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled 2>/dev/null)
+
+function fips_mode()
+{
+	[ -n "$FIPS_MODE" ] && [ "$FIPS_MODE" -gt 0 ]
+}
+
+function dm_crypt_features()
+{
+	local VER_STR=$(dmsetup targets | grep crypt | cut -f2 -dv)
+	[ -z "$VER_STR" ] && fail "Failed to parse dm-crypt version."
+
+	local VER_MAJ=$(echo $VER_STR | cut -f 1 -d.)
+	local VER_MIN=$(echo $VER_STR | cut -f 2 -d.)
+
+	[ $VER_MAJ -lt 1 ] && return
+	[ $VER_MAJ -eq 1 -a $VER_MIN -lt 11 ] && return
+	ALLOW_DISCARDS=--allow-discards
+	[ $VER_MAJ -eq 1 -a $VER_MIN -lt 14 ] && return
+	PERF_CPU=--perf-same_cpu_crypt
+}
+
+function del_scsi_device()
+{
+	rmmod scsi_debug 2>/dev/null
+	sleep 2
+}
+
+function remove_mapping()
+{
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME2 ] && dmsetup remove $DEV_NAME2
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME ] && dmsetup remove $DEV_NAME
+	rm -f $IMG $IMG_HDR $ORIG_IMG $KEY1 >/dev/null 2>&1
+	umount $MNT_DIR > /dev/null 2>&1
+	rmdir $MNT_DIR > /dev/null 2>&1
+	del_scsi_device
+}
+
+function fail()
+{
+	[ -n "$1" ] && echo "$1"
+	echo "FAILED at line $(caller)"
+	cd $START_DIR
+	remove_mapping
+	exit 2
+}
+
+function skip()
+{
+	[ -n "$1" ] && echo "$1"
+	exit 77
+}
+
+function add_scsi_device() {
+	del_scsi_device
+        modprobe scsi_debug $@ delay=0
+        if [ $? -ne 0 ] ; then
+                echo "This kernel seems to not support proper scsi_debug module, test skipped."
+                exit 77
+        fi
+
+        sleep 2
+        SCSI_DEV="/dev/"$(grep -l -e scsi_debug /sys/block/*/device/model | cut -f4 -d /)
+        [ -b $SCSI_DEV ] || fail "Cannot find $SCSI_DEV."
+}
+
+function open_crypt() # $1 pwd, $2 hdr
+{
+	if [ -n "$2" ] ; then
+		echo "$1" | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $IMG $DEV_NAME --header $2 || fail
+	elif [ -n "$1" ] ; then
+		echo "$1" | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $IMG $DEV_NAME || fail
+	else
+		$CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -d $KEY1 $IMG $DEV_NAME || fail
+	fi
+}
+
+function wipe_dev() # $1 dev
+{
+	dd if=/dev/zero of=$1 bs=256k conv=notrunc >/dev/null 2>&1
+}
+
+function wipe() # $1 pass
+{
+	open_crypt $1
+	wipe_dev /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME
+	udevadm settle >/dev/null 2>&1
+	$CRYPTSETUP luksClose $DEV_NAME || fail
+}
+
+function prepare() # $1 dev1_siz
+{
+	remove_mapping
+
+	dd if=/dev/zero of=$IMG      bs=1k count=$1 >/dev/null 2>&1
+
+	if [ ! -e $KEY1 ]; then
+		dd if=/dev/urandom of=$KEY1 count=1 bs=32 >/dev/null 2>&1
+	fi
+}
+
+function check_hash_dev() # $1 dev, $2 hash, $3 size
+{
+	if [ -n "$3" ]; then
+		HASH=$(head -c $3 $1 | sha256sum | cut -d' ' -f 1)
+	else
+		HASH=$(sha256sum $1 | cut -d' ' -f 1)
+	fi
+	[ $HASH != "$2" ] && fail "HASH differs ($HASH)"
+}
+
+function check_hash() # $1 pwd, $2 hash, $3 hdr
+{
+	open_crypt $1 $3
+	check_hash_dev /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME $2
+	$CRYPTSETUP remove $DEV_NAME || fail
+}
+
+function backup_orig()
+{
+	sync
+	cp $IMG $ORIG_IMG
+}
+
+function rollback()
+{
+	sync
+	cp $ORIG_IMG $IMG
+}
+
+function check_slot() #space separated list of active key slots
+{
+	local _out=$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -e ": luks2" | sed -e 's/[[:space:]]*\([0-9]\+\):.*/\1/g')
+
+	local _req
+	local _hdr
+	local _j
+
+	for _i in $*; do
+		_j=$((_i))
+		_req="$_req $_j"
+	done
+
+	for _i in $_out; do
+		_j=$((_i))
+		_hdr="$_hdr $_j"
+	done
+
+	test "$_req" = "$_hdr"
+}
+
+function simple_scsi_reenc()
+{
+	echo -n "$1"
+	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks2 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $SCSI_DEV || fail
+
+	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $SCSI_DEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+	HASH=$(sha256sum /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME | cut -d' ' -f 1)
+	$CRYPTSETUP luksClose $DEV_NAME || fail
+
+	echo $PWD1 | $REENC -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $SCSI_DEV || fail
+
+	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $SCSI_DEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+	check_hash_dev /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME $HASH
+	$CRYPTSETUP luksClose $DEV_NAME || fail
+}
+
+function mount_and_test() {
+	test -d $MNT_DIR || mkdir -p $MNT_DIR
+	mount $@ $MNT_DIR 2>/dev/null || {
+		echo -n "failed to mount [SKIP]"
+		return 0
+	}
+	rm $MNT_DIR/* 2>/dev/null
+	cd $MNT_DIR
+	echo $PWD2 | $START_DIR/$REENC $START_DIR/$IMG -q --use-fsync --use-directio --write-log $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON || return 1
+	cd $START_DIR
+	umount $MNT_DIR
+	echo -n [OK]
+}
+
+function test_logging_tmpfs() {
+	echo -n "[tmpfs]"
+	mount_and_test -t tmpfs none -o size=$[25*1024*1024] || return 1
+	echo
+}
+
+function test_logging() {
+	echo -n "$1:"
+	for img in $(ls img_fs*img.xz) ; do
+		wipefs -a $SCSI_DEV > /dev/null
+		echo -n "[${img%.img.xz}]"
+		xz -d -c $img | dd of=$SCSI_DEV bs=4k >/dev/null 2>&1
+		mount_and_test $SCSI_DEV || return 1
+	done
+	echo
+}
+
+[ $(id -u) != 0 ] && skip "WARNING: You must be root to run this test, test skipped."
+[ ! -x "$REENC" ] && skip "Cannot find $REENC, test skipped."
+which wipefs >/dev/null ||  skip "Cannot find wipefs, test skipped."
+fips_mode && skip "This test cannot be run in FIPS mode."
+
+# REENCRYPTION tests
+
+HASH1=b69dae56a14d1a8314ed40664c4033ea0a550eea2673e04df42a66ac6b9faf2c
+HASH4=2daeb1f36095b44b318410b3f4e8b5d989dcc7bb023d1426c492dab0a3053e74
+HASH5=bb9f8df61474d25e71fa00722318cd387396ca1736605e1248821cc0de3d3af8
+HASH6=4d9cbaf3aa0935a8c113f139691b3daf9c94c8d6c278aedc8eec66a4b9f6c8ae
+HASH7=5f70bf18a086007016e948b04aed3b82103a36bea41755b6cddfaf10ace3c6ef
+
+echo "[1] Reencryption"
+prepare 8192
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -s 128 -c aes-cbc-plain $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON --offset 8192 $IMG || fail
+wipe $PWD1
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH5
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $IMG -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH5
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $IMG -q -s 256 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH5
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $IMG -q -s 256 -c aes-xts-plain64 -h sha256 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH5
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $IMG -q --use-directio $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH5
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $IMG -q --master-key-file /dev/urandom $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH5
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $IMG -q -s 512 --master-key-file /dev/urandom $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH5
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -q "luks2" > /dev/null || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -s 128 --luks2-metadata-size 128k -c aes-cbc-plain $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON --offset 8192 $IMG > /dev/null || fail
+wipe $PWD1
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH5
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $IMG -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON > /dev/null || fail
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH5
+MDA_SIZE=$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep "Metadata area: " | cut -f 3 -d ' ')
+test "$MDA_SIZE" -eq 131072 || fail "Unexpected Metadata area size $MDA_SIZE"
+
+echo "[2] Reencryption with data shift"
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 -s 128 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON --offset 8192 $IMG || fail
+wipe $PWD1
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $IMG -q -s 256 --reduce-device-size 1024S $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON || fail
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH6
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $IMG -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON || fail
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH6
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -q "luks2" > /dev/null || fail
+
+echo "[3] Reencryption with keyfile"
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -d $KEY1 -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 -s 128 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON --offset 8192 $IMG || fail
+wipe
+check_hash "" $HASH5
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksAddKey -d $KEY1 $IMG $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON || fail
+$REENC $IMG -d $KEY1 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON -q 2>/dev/null && fail
+$REENC $IMG -d $KEY1 -S 0 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON -q || fail
+check_hash "" $HASH5
+check_slot 0 || fail "Only keyslot 0 expected to be enabled"
+$REENC $IMG -d $KEY1 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON -q || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -q "luks2" > /dev/null || fail
+# FIXME echo $PWD1 | $REENC ...
+
+echo "[4] Encryption of not yet encrypted device"
+# well, movin' zeroes :-)
+OFFSET=8192 # default LUKS2 header size
+prepare 8192
+check_hash_dev $IMG $HASH4
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC --type luks2 $IMG -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 -s 128 --new --reduce-device-size "$OFFSET"S -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON || fail
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH5
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -q "luks2" > /dev/null || fail
+# 64MiB + 1 KiB
+prepare 65537
+OFFSET=131072
+check_hash_dev $IMG $HASH7 1024
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC --type luks2 $IMG -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 -s 128 --new --reduce-device-size "$OFFSET"S -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON || fail
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH7
+$CRYPTSETUP --type luks2 luksDump $IMG > /dev/null || fail
+prepare 8192
+
+echo "[5] Reencryption using specific keyslot"
+echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $IMG --offset 8192 || fail
+echo -e "$PWD2\n$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON -S 1 $IMG || fail
+echo -e "$PWD2\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON -S 2 $IMG || fail
+echo -e "$PWD2\n$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON -S 3 $IMG || fail
+echo -e "$PWD2\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON -S 4 $IMG || fail
+echo -e "$PWD2\n$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON -S 5 $IMG || fail
+echo -e "$PWD2\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON -S 6 $IMG || fail
+echo -e "$PWD2\n$PWD3" | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksAddKey $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON -S 22 $IMG || fail
+backup_orig
+echo $PWD2 | $REENC $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON -S 0 -q $IMG || fail
+check_slot 0 || fail "Only keyslot 0 expected to be enabled"
+wipe $PWD2
+rollback
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON -S 1 -q $IMG || fail
+check_slot 1 || fail "Only keyslot 1 expected to be enabled"
+wipe $PWD1
+rollback
+echo $PWD2 | $REENC $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON -S 6 -q $IMG || fail
+check_slot 6 || fail "Only keyslot 6 expected to be enabled"
+wipe $PWD2
+rollback
+echo $PWD3 | $REENC $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON -S 22 -q $IMG || fail
+check_slot 22 || fail "Only keyslot 22 expected to be enabled"
+wipe $PWD3
+rollback
+
+echo "[6] Reencryption using all active keyslots"
+echo -e "$PWD2\n$PWD1\n$PWD2\n$PWD1\n$PWD2\n$PWD1\n$PWD2\n$PWD3" | $REENC -q $IMG $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON || fail
+check_slot 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 22 || fail "All keyslots expected to be enabled"
+
+echo "[7] Reencryption of block devices with different block size"
+add_scsi_device sector_size=512 dev_size_mb=32
+simple_scsi_reenc "[512 sector]"
+add_scsi_device sector_size=4096 dev_size_mb=32
+simple_scsi_reenc "[4096 sector]"
+add_scsi_device sector_size=512 physblk_exp=3 dev_size_mb=32
+simple_scsi_reenc "[4096/512 sector]"
+echo "[OK]"
+
+echo "[8] Header only reencryption (hash and iteration time)"
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $IMG --offset 8192 || fail
+wipe $PWD1
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH5
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $IMG -q --keep-key || fail
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH5
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $IMG -q --keep-key --pbkdf pbkdf2 --pbkdf-force-iterations 999 2>/dev/null && fail
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH5
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $IMG -q --keep-key --pbkdf-force-iterations 3 2>/dev/null && fail
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH5
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $IMG -q --keep-key --pbkdf-force-iterations 4 --pbkdf-memory 31 2>/dev/null && fail
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH5
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $IMG -q --keep-key --pbkdf pbkdf2 --pbkdf-force-iterations 1000 --hash sha512
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH5
+[ "$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -A8 -m1 "0: luks2" | grep PBKDF: | sed -e 's/[[:space:]]\+PBKDF:\ \+//g')" = "pbkdf2" ] || fail
+[ "$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -A8 -m1 "0: luks2" | grep Hash:  | sed -e 's/[[:space:]]\+Hash:\ \+//g')" = "sha512" ] || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $IMG -q --keep-key $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH5
+[ "$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -A8 -m1 "0: luks2" | grep PBKDF:      | sed -e 's/[[:space:]]\+PBKDF:\ \+//g')" = $DEFAULT_ARGON ] || fail
+[ "$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -A8 -m1 "0: luks2" | grep "Time cost" | sed -e 's/[[:space:]]\+Time\ cost:\ \+//g')" -eq 4 ] || fail
+[ "$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -A8 -m1 "0: luks2" | grep Memory      | sed -e 's/[[[:space:]]\+Memory:\ \+//g')" -eq 32 ] || fail
+[ "$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -A8 -m1 "0: luks2" | grep Threads     | sed -e 's/[[[:space:]]\+Threads:\ \+//g')" -eq 1 ] || fail
+echo -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksAddKey -S21 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $IMG || fail
+echo $PWD2 | $REENC -S21 -q --keep-key --pbkdf pbkdf2 --pbkdf-force-iterations 1000 $IMG || fail
+check_hash $PWD2 $HASH5
+check_slot 21 || fail "Only keyslot 21 expected to be enabled"
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -q "luks2" > /dev/null || fail
+
+echo "[9] Test log I/Os on various underlaying block devices"
+echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $IMG --offset 8192 || fail
+add_scsi_device sector_size=512 dev_size_mb=32
+test_logging "[512 sector]" || fail
+add_scsi_device sector_size=4096 dev_size_mb=32
+test_logging "[4096 sector]" || fail
+add_scsi_device sector_size=512 dev_size_mb=32 physblk_exp=3
+test_logging "[4096/512 sector]" || fail
+test_logging_tmpfs || fail
+
+echo "[10] Removal of encryption"
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $IMG --offset 8192 || fail
+wipe $PWD1
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH5
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $IMG -q --decrypt
+check_hash_dev $IMG $HASH4
+
+echo "[11] Reencryption with tokens"
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $IMG --offset 8192 || fail
+wipe $PWD1
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH5
+echo -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksAddKey -S23 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $IMG || fail
+echo -e "$PWD1\n$PWD3" | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksAddKey -S1 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $IMG || fail
+echo -e "$PWD1\n$PWD3" | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksAddKey -S3 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $IMG || fai
+$CRYPTSETUP token add --key-description key-name0 --key-slot 23 --token-id 0 $IMG
+$CRYPTSETUP token add --key-description key-name2 --key-slot 1 --token-id 2 $IMG
+$CRYPTSETUP token add --key-description key-name31 --token-id 31 $IMG
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksKillSlot $IMG 3 || fail
+echo $PWD2 | $REENC $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON -S 23 -q $IMG || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep "0: luks2-keyring" >/dev/null || fail
+[ "$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -A2 -m1 "0: luks2-keyring" | grep Keyslot: | sed -e 's/[[[:space:]]\+Keyslot:\ \+//g')" -eq 23 ] || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep "2: luks2-keyring" >/dev/null || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep "31: luks2-keyring" >/dev/null || fail
+[ "$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -A2 -m1 "31: luks2-keyring" | grep Keyslot: | sed -e 's/[[[:space:]]\+Keyslot:\ \+//g')" -eq 23 ] || fail
+
+echo "[12] Reencryption with persistent flags"
+dm_crypt_features
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $IMG --offset 8192 || fail
+wipe $PWD1
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH5
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $IMG $DEV_NAME $ALLOW_DISCARDS $PERF_CPU --persistent || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON -q $IMG || fail
+if [ -n "$PERF_CPU" ]; then
+	$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -m1 Flags: | grep same-cpu-crypt > /dev/null || fail
+fi
+if [ -n "$ALLOW_DISCARDS" ]; then
+	$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -m1 Flags: | grep allow-discards > /dev/null || fail
+fi
+
+echo "[13] Detached header - adding encryption/reencryption/decryption"
+prepare 8192
+check_hash_dev $IMG $HASH4
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC --type luks2 $IMG -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON --header $IMG_HDR --new
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH4 $IMG_HDR
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $IMG -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON --header $IMG_HDR
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH4 $IMG_HDR
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $IMG -q --header $IMG_HDR --decrypt
+check_hash_dev $IMG $HASH4
+# existing header of zero size
+cat /dev/null >$IMG_HDR
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC --type luks2 $IMG -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON --header $IMG_HDR --new
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH4 $IMG_HDR
+$CRYPTSETUP isLuks $IMG && fail
+$CRYPTSETUP isLuks $IMG_HDR || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG_HDR | grep -q "0: luks2" || fail
+
+echo "[14] Reencryption with unbound keyslot"
+prepare 8192
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $IMG --offset 8192 || fail
+echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksAddKey -S 3 --unbound --key-size 64 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $IMG || fail
+wipe $PWD1
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH5
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -q "3: luks2 (unbound)" || fail
+echo $PWD2 | $REENC $IMG -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON 2>/dev/null && fail
+echo -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2" | $REENC $IMG -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON || fail
+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -q "3: luks2 (unbound)" || fail
+
+echo "[15] Reencryption after conversion"
+prepare 8192
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 $FAST_PBKDF_PBKDF2 $IMG --offset 4096 || fail
+wipe $PWD1
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
+$CRYPTSETUP -q convert --type luks2 $IMG || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $IMG -q $FAST_PBKDF_PBKDF2 || fail
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 $FAST_PBKDF_PBKDF2 $IMG --offset 8192 || fail
+wipe $PWD1
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH5
+$CRYPTSETUP -q convert --type luks1 $IMG || fail
+echo $PWD1 | $REENC $IMG -q $FAST_PBKDF_PBKDF2 || fail
+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH5
+
+remove_mapping
+exit 0
diff --git a/tests/tcrypt-compat-test b/tests/tcrypt-compat-test
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..173b5c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/tcrypt-compat-test
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+# check tcrypt images parsing
+
+CRYPTSETUP=../cryptsetup
+TST_DIR=tcrypt-images
+MAP=tctst
+PASSWORD="aaaaaaaaaaaa"
+PASSWORD_HIDDEN="bbbbbbbbbbbb"
+PIM=1234
+
+[ -z "$srcdir" ] && srcdir="."
+
+function remove_mapping()
+{
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$MAP ] && dmsetup remove --retry $MAP
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/"$MAP"_1 ] && dmsetup remove --retry "$MAP"_1
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/"$MAP"_2 ] && dmsetup remove --retry "$MAP"_2
+}
+
+function fail()
+{
+	[ -n "$1" ] && echo "$1"
+	echo " [FAILED]"
+	echo "FAILED at line $(caller)"
+	remove_mapping
+	exit 2
+}
+
+function skip()
+{
+	[ -n "$1" ] && echo "$1"
+	echo "Test skipped."
+	exit 77
+}
+
+function test_one() # cipher mode keysize rm_pattern
+{
+	$CRYPTSETUP benchmark -c "$1-$2" -s "$3" >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ] ; then
+		echo "$1-$2 [N/A]"
+		IMGS=$(ls $TST_DIR/[tv]c* | grep "$4")
+		[ -n "$IMGS" ] && rm $IMGS
+		#echo $IMGS
+	else
+		echo "$1-$2 [OK]"
+	fi
+}
+
+function test_kdf() # hash
+{
+	$CRYPTSETUP benchmark -h "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ] ; then
+		echo "pbkdf2-$1 [N/A]"
+		IMGS=$(ls $TST_DIR/[tv]c* | grep "$1")
+		[ -n "$IMGS" ] && rm $IMGS
+	else
+		echo "pbkdf2-$1 [OK]"
+	fi
+}
+
+function test_required()
+{
+	which lsblk >/dev/null 2>&1 || skip "WARNING: lsblk tool required."
+
+	echo "REQUIRED KDF TEST"
+	test_kdf sha256
+	test_kdf sha512
+	test_kdf ripemd160
+	test_kdf whirlpool
+	test_kdf stribog512
+
+	echo "REQUIRED CIPHERS TEST"
+	test_one aes cbc 256 cbc-aes
+	test_one aes lrw 384 lrw-aes
+	test_one aes xts 512 xts-aes
+
+	test_one twofish ecb 256 twofish
+	test_one twofish cbc 256 cbc-twofish
+	test_one twofish lrw 384 lrw-twofish
+	test_one twofish xts 512 xts-twofish
+
+	test_one serpent ecb 256 serpent
+	test_one serpent cbc 256 cbc-serpent
+	test_one serpent lrw 384 lrw-serpent
+	test_one serpent xts 512 xts-serpent
+
+	test_one blowfish cbc 256 blowfish
+
+	test_one des3_ede cbc 192 des3_ede
+	test_one cast5 cbc 128 cast5
+
+	test_one camellia xts 512 camellia
+	test_one kuznyechik xts 512 kuznyechik
+
+	ls $TST_DIR/[tv]c* >/dev/null 2>&1 || skip "No remaining images."
+}
+
+export LANG=C
+[ ! -d $TST_DIR ] && tar xJf $srcdir/tcrypt-images.tar.xz --no-same-owner
+test_required
+
+echo "HEADER CHECK"
+for file in $(ls $TST_DIR/[tv]c_* $TST_DIR/vcpim_*) ; do
+	echo -n " $file"
+	PIM_OPT=""
+	[[ $file =~ vcpim.* ]] && PIM_OPT="--veracrypt-pim $PIM"
+	echo $PASSWORD | $CRYPTSETUP tcryptDump --veracrypt $PIM_OPT $file >/dev/null || fail
+	echo " [OK]"
+done
+
+echo "HEADER CHECK (HIDDEN)"
+for file in $(ls $TST_DIR/[tv]c_*-hidden) ; do
+	echo -n " $file (hidden)"
+	echo $PASSWORD_HIDDEN | $CRYPTSETUP tcryptDump --tcrypt-hidden --veracrypt $file >/dev/null || fail
+	echo " [OK]"
+done
+
+echo "HEADER KEYFILES CHECK"
+for file in $(ls $TST_DIR/[tv]ck_*) ; do
+	echo -n " $file"
+	echo $PASSWORD | $CRYPTSETUP tcryptDump --veracrypt -d $TST_DIR/keyfile1 -d $TST_DIR/keyfile2 $file >/dev/null || fail
+	echo " [OK]"
+done
+
+
+if [ $(id -u) != 0 ]; then
+	echo "WARNING: You must be root to run activation part of test, test skipped."
+	exit 0
+fi
+
+echo "ACTIVATION FS UUID CHECK"
+for file in $(ls $TST_DIR/[tv]c_* $TST_DIR/vcpim_*) ; do
+	echo -n " $file"
+	PIM_OPT=""
+	[[ $file =~ vcpim.* ]] && PIM_OPT="--veracrypt-pim $PIM"
+	out=$(echo $PASSWORD | $CRYPTSETUP tcryptOpen --veracrypt $PIM_OPT -r $file $MAP 2>&1)
+	ret=$?
+	[ $ret -eq 1 ] && ( echo "$out" | grep -q -e "TCRYPT legacy mode" ) && echo " [N/A]" && continue
+	[ $ret -eq 1 ] && ( echo "$out" | grep -q -e "TCRYPT compatible mapping" ) && echo " [N/A]" && continue
+	[ $ret -ne 0 ] && fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status $MAP >/dev/null || fail
+	$CRYPTSETUP status /dev/mapper/$MAP >/dev/null || fail
+	UUID=$(lsblk -n -o UUID /dev/mapper/$MAP)
+	$CRYPTSETUP remove $MAP || fail
+	[ "$UUID" != "DEAD-BABE" ] && fail "UUID check failed."
+	echo " [OK]"
+done
+
+echo "ACTIVATION FS UUID (HIDDEN) CHECK"
+for file in $(ls $TST_DIR/[tv]c_*-hidden) ; do
+	echo -n " $file"
+	out=$(echo $PASSWORD_HIDDEN | $CRYPTSETUP tcryptOpen --veracrypt -r $file $MAP --tcrypt-hidden 2>&1)
+	ret=$?
+	[ $ret -eq 1 ] && ( echo "$out" | grep -q -e "TCRYPT legacy mode" ) && echo " [N/A]" && continue
+	[ $ret -eq 1 ] && ( echo "$out" | grep -q -e "TCRYPT compatible mapping" ) && echo " [N/A]" && continue
+	[ $ret -ne 0 ] && fail
+	UUID=$(lsblk -n -o UUID /dev/mapper/$MAP)
+	$CRYPTSETUP remove $MAP || fail
+	[ "$UUID" != "CAFE-BABE" ] && fail "UUID check failed."
+	echo " [OK]"
+done
diff --git a/tests/tcrypt-images.tar.xz b/tests/tcrypt-images.tar.xz
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c50c6f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/tcrypt-images.tar.xz
diff --git a/tests/test_utils.c b/tests/test_utils.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..af1dda7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/test_utils.c
@@ -0,0 +1,600 @@
+/*
+ * cryptsetup library API test utilities
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <inttypes.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <libdevmapper.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
+# include <sys/sysmacros.h>
+#endif
+#include <linux/loop.h>
+
+#include "api_test.h"
+#include "libcryptsetup.h"
+
+static char last_error[256];
+static char global_log[4096];
+static uint32_t t_dm_crypt_flags = 0;
+
+char *THE_LOOP_DEV = NULL;
+int _debug   = 0;
+int global_lines = 0;
+int _quit = 0;
+int _verbose = 0;
+uint64_t t_dev_offset = 0;
+
+static void (*_cleanup)(void);
+
+void register_cleanup(void (*cleanup)(void))
+{
+	_cleanup = cleanup;
+}
+
+void check_ok(int status, int line, const char *func)
+{
+	if (status) {
+		printf("FAIL line %d [%s]: code %d, %s\n", line, func, status, last_error);
+		_cleanup();
+		exit(-1);
+	}
+}
+
+void check_ko(int status, int line, const char *func)
+{
+	if (status >= 0) {
+		printf("FAIL line %d [%s]: code %d, %s\n", line, func, status, last_error);
+		_cleanup();
+		exit(-1);
+	} else if (_verbose)
+		printf("   => errno %d, errmsg: %s\n", status, last_error);
+}
+
+void check_equal(int line, const char *func, int64_t x, int64_t y)
+{
+	printf("FAIL line %d [%s]: expected equal values differs: %"
+		PRIi64 " != %" PRIi64 "\n", line, func, x, y);
+	_cleanup();
+	exit(-1);
+}
+
+void check_null(int line, const char *func, const void *x)
+{
+	if (x) {
+		printf("FAIL line %d [%s]: expected NULL value: %p\n", line, func, x);
+		_cleanup();
+		exit(-1);
+	}
+}
+
+void check_notnull(int line, const char *func, const void *x)
+{
+	if (!x) {
+		printf("FAIL line %d [%s]: expected not NULL value: %p\n", line, func, x);
+		_cleanup();
+		exit(-1);
+	}
+}
+
+void xlog(const char *msg, const char *tst, const char *func, int line, const char *txt)
+{
+	if (_verbose) {
+		if (txt)
+			printf(" [%s,%s:%d] %s [%s]\n", msg, func, line, tst, txt);
+		else
+			printf(" [%s,%s:%d] %s\n", msg, func, line, tst);
+	}
+	if (_quit) {
+		if (_verbose)
+			printf("Interrupted by a signal.\n");
+		_cleanup();
+		exit(-1);
+	}
+}
+
+int t_device_size(const char *device, uint64_t *size)
+{
+	int devfd, r = 0;
+
+	devfd = open(device, O_RDONLY);
+	if(devfd == -1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (ioctl(devfd, BLKGETSIZE64, size) < 0)
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	close(devfd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int fips_mode(void)
+{
+	int fd;
+	char buf = 0;
+
+	fd = open("/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled", O_RDONLY);
+
+	if (fd < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (read(fd, &buf, 1) != 1)
+		buf = '0';
+
+	close(fd);
+
+	return (buf == '1');
+}
+
+/*
+ * Creates dm-linear target over the test loop device. Offset is held in
+ * global variables so that size can be tested whether it fits into remaining
+ * size of the loop device or not
+ */
+int create_dmdevice_over_loop(const char *dm_name, const uint64_t size)
+{
+	char cmd[128];
+	int r;
+	uint64_t r_size;
+
+	if (t_device_size(THE_LOOP_DEV, &r_size) < 0 || r_size <= t_dev_offset || !size)
+		return -1;
+	if ((r_size - t_dev_offset) < size) {
+		printf("No enough space on backing loop device\n.");
+		return -2;
+	}
+	snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
+		 "dmsetup create %s --table \"0 %" PRIu64 " linear %s %" PRIu64 "\"",
+		 dm_name, size, THE_LOOP_DEV, t_dev_offset);
+	if (!(r = _system(cmd, 1)))
+		t_dev_offset += size;
+	return r;
+}
+
+// Get key from kernel dm mapping table using dm-ioctl
+int get_key_dm(const char *name, char *buffer, unsigned int buffer_size)
+{
+	struct dm_task *dmt;
+	struct dm_info dmi;
+	uint64_t start, length;
+	char *target_type, *key, *params;
+	void *next = NULL;
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_TABLE)))
+		goto out;
+	if (!dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
+		goto out;
+	if (!dm_task_run(dmt))
+		goto out;
+	if (!dm_task_get_info(dmt, &dmi))
+		goto out;
+	if (!dmi.exists)
+		goto out;
+
+	next = dm_get_next_target(dmt, next, &start, &length, &target_type, &params);
+	if (!target_type || strcmp(target_type, "crypt") != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	(void)strsep(&params, " "); /* rcipher */
+	key = strsep(&params, " ");
+
+	if (buffer_size <= strlen(key))
+		goto out;
+
+	strncpy(buffer, key, buffer_size);
+	r = 0;
+out:
+	if (dmt)
+		dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int prepare_keyfile(const char *name, const char *passphrase, int size)
+{
+	int fd, r;
+
+	fd = open(name, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR);
+	if (fd != -1) {
+		r = write(fd, passphrase, size);
+		close(fd);
+	} else
+		r = 0;
+
+	return r == size ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+// Decode key from its hex representation
+int crypt_decode_key(char *key, const char *hex, unsigned int size)
+{
+	char buffer[3];
+	char *endp;
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	buffer[2] = '\0';
+
+	for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+		buffer[0] = *hex++;
+		buffer[1] = *hex++;
+
+		key[i] = (unsigned char)strtoul(buffer, &endp, 16);
+
+		if (endp != &buffer[2])
+			return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (*hex != '\0')
+		return -1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void global_log_callback(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr)
+{
+	size_t len;
+
+	if (_debug) {
+		if (level == CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG)
+			fprintf(stdout, "# %s\n", msg);
+		else
+			fprintf(stdout, "%s", msg);
+	}
+
+	if (level <= CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG)
+		return;
+
+	strncat(global_log, msg, sizeof(global_log) - strlen(global_log));
+	global_lines++;
+	if (level == CRYPT_LOG_ERROR) {
+		len = strlen(msg);
+		if (len > sizeof(last_error))
+			len = sizeof(last_error);
+		strncpy(last_error, msg, sizeof(last_error));
+		last_error[len-1] = '\0';
+	}
+}
+
+void reset_log(void)
+{
+	memset(global_log, 0, sizeof(global_log));
+	memset(last_error, 0, sizeof(last_error));
+	global_lines = 0;
+}
+
+int _system(const char *command, int warn)
+{
+	int r;
+	if (_debug)
+		printf("Running system: %s\n", command);
+	if ((r=system(command)) < 0 && warn)
+		printf("System command failed: %s", command);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int t_dm_satisfies_version(unsigned target_maj, unsigned target_min, unsigned target_patch,
+				 unsigned actual_maj, unsigned actual_min, unsigned actual_patch)
+{
+	if (actual_maj > target_maj)
+		return 1;
+	if (actual_maj == target_maj && actual_min > target_min)
+		return 1;
+	if (actual_maj == target_maj && actual_min == target_min && actual_patch >= target_patch)
+		return 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void t_dm_set_crypt_compat(const char *dm_version, unsigned crypt_maj,
+				 unsigned crypt_min, unsigned crypt_patch)
+{
+	unsigned dm_maj = 0, dm_min = 0, dm_patch = 0;
+
+	if (sscanf(dm_version, "%u.%u.%u", &dm_maj, &dm_min, &dm_patch) != 3) {
+		dm_maj = 0;
+		dm_min = 0;
+		dm_patch = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (t_dm_satisfies_version(1, 2, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, 0))
+		t_dm_crypt_flags |= T_DM_KEY_WIPE_SUPPORTED;
+
+	if (t_dm_satisfies_version(1, 10, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, 0))
+		t_dm_crypt_flags |= T_DM_LMK_SUPPORTED;
+
+	if (t_dm_satisfies_version(4, 20, 0, dm_maj, dm_min, 0))
+		t_dm_crypt_flags |= T_DM_SECURE_SUPPORTED;
+
+	if (t_dm_satisfies_version(1, 8, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, 0))
+		t_dm_crypt_flags |= T_DM_PLAIN64_SUPPORTED;
+
+	if (t_dm_satisfies_version(1, 11, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, 0))
+		t_dm_crypt_flags |= T_DM_DISCARDS_SUPPORTED;
+
+	if (t_dm_satisfies_version(1, 13, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, 0))
+		t_dm_crypt_flags |= T_DM_TCW_SUPPORTED;
+
+	if (t_dm_satisfies_version(1, 14, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, 0)) {
+		t_dm_crypt_flags |= T_DM_SAME_CPU_CRYPT_SUPPORTED;
+		t_dm_crypt_flags |= T_DM_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS_SUPPORTED;
+	}
+
+	if (t_dm_satisfies_version(1, 18, 1, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch))
+		t_dm_crypt_flags |= T_DM_KERNEL_KEYRING_SUPPORTED;
+}
+
+static void t_dm_set_verity_compat(const char *dm_version, unsigned verity_maj,
+				   unsigned verity_min, unsigned verity_patch)
+{
+	if (verity_maj > 0)
+		t_dm_crypt_flags |= T_DM_VERITY_SUPPORTED;
+	else
+		return;
+	/*
+	 * ignore_corruption, restart_on corruption is available since 1.2 (kernel 4.1)
+	 * ignore_zero_blocks since 1.3 (kernel 4.5)
+	 * (but some dm-verity targets 1.2 don't support it)
+	 * FEC is added in 1.3 as well.
+	 */
+	if (t_dm_satisfies_version(1, 3, 0, verity_maj, verity_min, 0)) {
+		t_dm_crypt_flags |= T_DM_VERITY_ON_CORRUPTION_SUPPORTED;
+		t_dm_crypt_flags |= T_DM_VERITY_FEC_SUPPORTED;
+	}
+}
+
+static void t_dm_set_integrity_compat(const char *dm_version, unsigned integrity_maj,
+				      unsigned integrity_min, unsigned integrity_patch)
+{
+	if (integrity_maj > 0)
+		t_dm_crypt_flags |= T_DM_INTEGRITY_SUPPORTED;
+}
+
+int t_dm_check_versions(void)
+{
+	struct dm_task *dmt;
+	struct dm_versions *target, *last_target;
+	char dm_version[16];
+	int r = 1;
+
+	if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_LIST_VERSIONS)))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dm_task_run(dmt))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dm_task_get_driver_version(dmt, dm_version, sizeof(dm_version)))
+		goto out;
+
+	target = dm_task_get_versions(dmt);
+	do {
+		last_target = target;
+		if (!strcmp("crypt", target->name)) {
+			t_dm_set_crypt_compat(dm_version,
+					     (unsigned)target->version[0],
+					     (unsigned)target->version[1],
+					     (unsigned)target->version[2]);
+		} else if (!strcmp("verity", target->name)) {
+			t_dm_set_verity_compat(dm_version,
+					     (unsigned)target->version[0],
+					     (unsigned)target->version[1],
+					     (unsigned)target->version[2]);
+		} else if (!strcmp("integrity", target->name)) {
+			t_dm_set_integrity_compat(dm_version,
+					     (unsigned)target->version[0],
+					     (unsigned)target->version[1],
+					     (unsigned)target->version[2]);
+		}
+		target = (struct dm_versions *)((char *) target + target->next);
+	} while (last_target != target);
+
+	r = 0;
+out:
+	if (dmt)
+		dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int t_dm_crypt_keyring_support(void)
+{
+	return t_dm_crypt_flags & T_DM_KERNEL_KEYRING_SUPPORTED;
+}
+
+int t_dm_crypt_cpu_switch_support(void)
+{
+	return t_dm_crypt_flags & (T_DM_SAME_CPU_CRYPT_SUPPORTED |
+				   T_DM_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS_SUPPORTED);
+}
+
+int t_dm_crypt_discard_support(void)
+{
+	return t_dm_crypt_flags & T_DM_DISCARDS_SUPPORTED;
+}
+
+/* loop helpers */
+
+#define LOOP_DEV_MAJOR 7
+
+#ifndef LO_FLAGS_AUTOCLEAR
+#define LO_FLAGS_AUTOCLEAR 4
+#endif
+
+#ifndef LOOP_CTL_GET_FREE
+#define LOOP_CTL_GET_FREE 0x4C82
+#endif
+
+#ifndef LOOP_SET_CAPACITY
+#define LOOP_SET_CAPACITY 0x4C07
+#endif
+
+int loop_device(const char *loop)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+
+	if (!loop)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (stat(loop, &st) || !S_ISBLK(st.st_mode) ||
+	    major(st.st_rdev) != LOOP_DEV_MAJOR)
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static char *crypt_loop_get_device_old(void)
+{
+	char dev[20];
+	int i, loop_fd;
+	struct loop_info64 lo64 = {0};
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
+		sprintf(dev, "/dev/loop%d", i);
+
+		loop_fd = open(dev, O_RDONLY);
+		if (loop_fd < 0)
+			return NULL;
+
+		if (ioctl(loop_fd, LOOP_GET_STATUS64, &lo64) &&
+		    errno == ENXIO) {
+			close(loop_fd);
+			return strdup(dev);
+		}
+		close(loop_fd);
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static char *crypt_loop_get_device(void)
+{
+	char dev[64];
+	int i, loop_fd;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	loop_fd = open("/dev/loop-control", O_RDONLY);
+	if (loop_fd < 0)
+		return crypt_loop_get_device_old();
+
+	i = ioctl(loop_fd, LOOP_CTL_GET_FREE);
+	if (i < 0) {
+		close(loop_fd);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	close(loop_fd);
+
+	if (sprintf(dev, "/dev/loop%d", i) < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (stat(dev, &st) || !S_ISBLK(st.st_mode))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return strdup(dev);
+}
+
+int loop_attach(char **loop, const char *file, int offset,
+		      int autoclear, int *readonly)
+{
+	struct loop_info64 lo64 = {0};
+	char *lo_file_name;
+	int loop_fd = -1, file_fd = -1, r = 1;
+
+	*loop = NULL;
+
+	file_fd = open(file, (*readonly ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR) | O_EXCL);
+	if (file_fd < 0 && (errno == EROFS || errno == EACCES) && !*readonly) {
+		*readonly = 1;
+		file_fd = open(file, O_RDONLY | O_EXCL);
+	}
+	if (file_fd < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	while (loop_fd < 0)  {
+		*loop = crypt_loop_get_device();
+		if (!*loop)
+			goto out;
+
+		loop_fd = open(*loop, *readonly ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR);
+		if (loop_fd < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		if (ioctl(loop_fd, LOOP_SET_FD, file_fd) < 0) {
+			if (errno != EBUSY)
+				goto out;
+			free(*loop);
+			*loop = NULL;
+
+			close(loop_fd);
+			loop_fd = -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	lo_file_name = (char*)lo64.lo_file_name;
+	lo_file_name[LO_NAME_SIZE-1] = '\0';
+	strncpy(lo_file_name, file, LO_NAME_SIZE-1);
+	lo64.lo_offset = offset;
+	if (autoclear)
+		lo64.lo_flags |= LO_FLAGS_AUTOCLEAR;
+
+	if (ioctl(loop_fd, LOOP_SET_STATUS64, &lo64) < 0) {
+		(void)ioctl(loop_fd, LOOP_CLR_FD, 0);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Verify that autoclear is really set */
+	if (autoclear) {
+		memset(&lo64, 0, sizeof(lo64));
+		if (ioctl(loop_fd, LOOP_GET_STATUS64, &lo64) < 0 ||
+		   !(lo64.lo_flags & LO_FLAGS_AUTOCLEAR)) {
+		(void)ioctl(loop_fd, LOOP_CLR_FD, 0);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	r = 0;
+out:
+	if (r && loop_fd >= 0)
+		close(loop_fd);
+	if (file_fd >= 0)
+		close(file_fd);
+	if (r && *loop) {
+		free(*loop);
+		*loop = NULL;
+	}
+	return r ? -1 : loop_fd;
+}
+
+int loop_detach(const char *loop)
+{
+	int loop_fd = -1, r = 1;
+
+	loop_fd = open(loop, O_RDONLY);
+	if (loop_fd < 0)
+                return 1;
+
+	if (!ioctl(loop_fd, LOOP_CLR_FD, 0))
+		r = 0;
+
+	close(loop_fd);
+	return r;
+}
diff --git a/tests/unit-utils-io.c b/tests/unit-utils-io.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2f66d9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/unit-utils-io.c
@@ -0,0 +1,346 @@
+/*
+ * simple unit test for utils_io.c (blockwise low level functions)
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "utils_io.h"
+
+enum fn_enum {
+	READ_BUFFER = 0,
+	WRITE_BUFFER,
+	READ_BLOCKWISE,
+	WRITE_BLOCKWISE,
+	READ_LSEEK_BLOCKWISE,
+	WRITE_LSEEK_BLOCKWISE
+} test_fn;
+
+char		*test_file;
+size_t		test_bsize;
+size_t		test_alignment;
+size_t		test_length;
+off_t		test_offset; //FIXME: check for proper 64bit support (and test it!)
+size_t		test_mem_alignment = 4096;
+
+static int test_read_buffer(void)
+{
+	void *buffer = NULL;
+	int fd = -1;
+	ssize_t ret = -EINVAL;
+
+	//printf("Entering test_read_buffer\n");
+
+	if (posix_memalign(&buffer, test_mem_alignment, test_length)) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to allocate aligned buffer.\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	fd = open(test_file, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECT);
+	if (fd < 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open %s.\n", test_file);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = read_buffer(fd, buffer, test_length);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = (size_t) ret == test_length ? 0 : -EIO;
+out:
+	if (fd >= 0)
+		close(fd);
+	free(buffer);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_write_buffer(void)
+{
+	void *buffer = NULL;
+	int fd = -1;
+	ssize_t ret = -EINVAL;
+
+	//printf("Entering test_write_buffer\n");
+
+	if (posix_memalign(&buffer, test_mem_alignment, test_length)) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to allocate aligned buffer.\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	fd = open(test_file, O_WRONLY | O_DIRECT);
+	if (fd < 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open %s.\n", test_file);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = write_buffer(fd, buffer, test_length);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	return (size_t) ret == test_length ? 0 : -EIO;
+out:
+	if (fd >= 0)
+		close(fd);
+	free(buffer);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_read_blockwise(void)
+{
+	void *buffer = NULL;
+	int fd = -1;
+	ssize_t ret = -EINVAL;
+
+	//printf("Entering test_read_blockwise ");
+	//printf("test_bsize: %zu, test_length: %zu\n", test_bsize, test_length);
+
+	if (posix_memalign(&buffer, test_mem_alignment, test_length)) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to allocate aligned buffer.\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	fd = open(test_file, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECT);
+	if (fd < 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open %s.\n", test_file);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+
+	ret = read_blockwise(fd, test_bsize, test_mem_alignment, buffer, test_length);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = (size_t) ret == test_length ? 0 : -EIO;
+out:
+	if (fd >= 0)
+		close(fd);
+	free(buffer);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_write_blockwise(void)
+{
+	void *buffer = NULL;
+	int fd = -1;
+	ssize_t ret = -EINVAL;
+
+	//printf("Entering test_write_blockwise\n");
+
+	if (posix_memalign(&buffer, test_mem_alignment, test_length)) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to allocate aligned buffer.\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	fd = open(test_file, O_RDWR | O_DIRECT);
+	if (fd < 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open %s.\n", test_file);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = write_blockwise(fd, test_bsize, test_mem_alignment, buffer, test_length);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = (size_t) ret == test_length ? 0 : -EIO;
+out:
+	if (fd >= 0)
+		close(fd);
+	free(buffer);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_read_lseek_blockwise(void)
+{
+	void *buffer = NULL;
+	int fd = -1;
+	ssize_t ret = -EINVAL;
+
+	//printf("Entering test_read_lseek_blockwise\n");
+
+	if (posix_memalign(&buffer, test_mem_alignment, test_length)) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to allocate aligned buffer.\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	fd = open(test_file, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECT);
+	if (fd < 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open %s.\n", test_file);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = read_lseek_blockwise(fd, test_bsize, test_mem_alignment, buffer, test_length, test_offset);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = (size_t) ret == test_length ? 0 : -EIO;
+out:
+	if (fd >= 0)
+		close(fd);
+	free(buffer);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_write_lseek_blockwise(void)
+{
+	void *buffer = NULL;
+	int fd = -1;
+	ssize_t ret = -EINVAL;
+
+	//printf("Entering test_write_lseek_blockwise\n");
+
+	if (posix_memalign(&buffer, test_mem_alignment, test_length)) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to allocate aligned buffer.\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	fd = open(test_file, O_RDWR | O_DIRECT);
+	if (fd < 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open %s.\n", test_file);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = write_lseek_blockwise(fd, test_bsize, test_mem_alignment, buffer, test_length, test_offset);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = (size_t) ret == test_length ? 0 : -EIO;
+out:
+	if (fd >= 0)
+		close(fd);
+	free(buffer);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void usage(void)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "Use:\tunit-utils-io file/device blockwise_fn length  [bsize] [offset].\n");
+}
+
+static int parse_input_params(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+	unsigned long offset;
+
+	if (argc < 4) {
+		usage();
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (stat(argv[1], &st)) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "File/device %s is missing?\n", argv[1]);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	test_file = argv[1];
+	if (sscanf(argv[3], "%zu", &test_length) != 1)
+		return 1;
+	if (argc >= 5 && sscanf(argv[4], "%zu", &test_bsize) != 1)
+		return 1;
+	if (argc >= 6) {
+		if (sscanf(argv[5], "%ld", &offset) != 1)
+			return 1;
+		test_offset = offset;
+	}
+
+	if (!strcmp(argv[2], "read_buffer"))
+		test_fn = READ_BUFFER;
+	else if (!strcmp(argv[2], "write_buffer"))
+		test_fn = WRITE_BUFFER;
+	else if (!strcmp(argv[2], "read_blockwise")) {
+		if (argc < 5) {
+			usage();
+			return 1;
+		}
+		test_fn = READ_BLOCKWISE;
+	} else if (!strcmp(argv[2], "write_blockwise")) {
+		if (argc < 5) {
+			usage();
+			return 1;
+		}
+		test_fn = WRITE_BLOCKWISE;
+	} else if (!strcmp(argv[2], "read_lseek_blockwise")) {
+		if (argc < 6) {
+			usage();
+			return 1;
+		}
+		test_fn = READ_LSEEK_BLOCKWISE;
+	} else if (!strcmp(argv[2], "write_lseek_blockwise")) {
+		if (argc < 6) {
+			usage();
+			return 1;
+		}
+		test_fn = WRITE_LSEEK_BLOCKWISE;
+	} else {
+		usage();
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/* printf("function '%s': length %zu", argv[2], test_length);
+	if (argc >= 5)
+		printf(", bsize %zu", test_bsize);
+	if (argc >= 6)
+		printf(", offset %llu", test_offset);
+	printf("\n"); */
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	long ps;
+	int r = EXIT_FAILURE;
+
+	if (parse_input_params(argc, argv))
+		return r;
+
+	ps = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
+	if (ps > 0)
+		test_mem_alignment = (size_t)ps;
+
+	switch (test_fn) {
+	case READ_BUFFER:
+		r = test_read_buffer();
+		break;
+	case WRITE_BUFFER:
+		r = test_write_buffer();
+		break;
+	case READ_BLOCKWISE:
+		r = test_read_blockwise();
+		break;
+	case WRITE_BLOCKWISE:
+		r = test_write_blockwise();
+		break;
+	case READ_LSEEK_BLOCKWISE:
+		r = test_read_lseek_blockwise();
+		break;
+	case WRITE_LSEEK_BLOCKWISE:
+		r = test_write_lseek_blockwise();
+		break;
+	default :
+		fprintf(stderr, "Internal test error.\n");
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	return r == 0 ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE;
+}
diff --git a/tests/valg-api.sh b/tests/valg-api.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..e27a269
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/valg-api.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+SUP="--suppressions=./cryptsetup-valg-supps"
+CHILD="--trace-children=no --child-silent-after-fork=yes"
+MALLOC="--malloc-fill=aa"
+FREE="--free-fill=21"
+STACK="--max-stackframe=300000"
+EXTRAS="--read-var-info=yes --show-reachable=yes"
+LOGFILE="--log-file=./valglog.$(date +%s)_${INFOSTRING}"
+LEAKCHECK="--leak-check=full --track-origins=yes"
+
+exec valgrind  $SUP $GETSUP $CHILD $MALLOC $FREE $STACK $EXTRAS $LOGFILE  $LEAKCHECK "$@"
diff --git a/tests/valg.sh b/tests/valg.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..3dc0784
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/valg.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+SUP="--suppressions=./cryptsetup-valg-supps"
+CHILD="--trace-children=yes --child-silent-after-fork=yes"
+MALLOC="--malloc-fill=aa"
+FREE="--free-fill=21"
+STACK="--max-stackframe=2000000"
+EXTRAS="--read-var-info=yes --show-reachable=yes"
+LOGFILE="--log-file=./valglog.$(date +%s)_${INFOSTRING}"
+LEAKCHECK="--leak-check=full --track-origins=yes"
+
+exec valgrind  $SUP $GETSUP $CHILD $MALLOC $FREE $STACK $EXTRAS $LOGFILE  $LEAKCHECK "$@"
diff --git a/tests/valid_header_file.xz b/tests/valid_header_file.xz
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4b443ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/valid_header_file.xz
diff --git a/tests/verity-compat-test b/tests/verity-compat-test
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..33e5d57
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/verity-compat-test
@@ -0,0 +1,439 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+VERITYSETUP=../veritysetup
+VERITYSETUP_VALGRIND=../.libs/veritysetup
+VERITYSETUP_LIB_VALGRIND=../.libs
+
+DEV_NAME=verity3273
+DEV_OUT="$DEV_NAME.out"
+IMG=verity-data
+IMG_HASH=verity-hash
+IMG_TMP=tst-dev
+FEC_DEV=tst_fec123
+
+function remove_mapping()
+{
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME ] && dmsetup remove $DEV_NAME >/dev/null 2>&1
+	[ ! -z "$LOOPDEV1" ] && losetup -d $LOOPDEV1 >/dev/null 2>&1
+	rm -f $IMG $IMG_HASH $DEV_OUT $FEC_DEV $IMG_TMP  >/dev/null 2>&1
+	LOOPDEV1=""
+	LOOPDEV2=""
+}
+
+function fail()
+{
+	[ -n "$1" ] && echo "$1"
+	echo "FAILED at line $(caller)"
+	[ -f $DEV_OUT ] && cat $DEV_OUT
+	remove_mapping
+	exit 2
+}
+
+function skip()
+{
+	[ -n "$1" ] && echo "$1"
+	exit 77
+}
+
+function prepare() # $1 dev1_siz [$2 dev2_size]
+{
+	remove_mapping
+
+	dd if=/dev/zero of=$IMG bs=1k count=$1 >/dev/null 2>&1
+	LOOPDEV1=$(losetup -f 2>/dev/null)
+	[ -z "$LOOPDEV1" ] && fail "No free loop device"
+	losetup $LOOPDEV1 $IMG
+
+	[ -z "$2" ] && return
+	LOOPDEV2=$IMG_HASH
+}
+
+function wipe()
+{
+	dd if=/dev/zero of=$LOOPDEV1 bs=256k >/dev/null 2>&1
+	rm -f $IMG_HASH $DEV_OUT >/dev/null 2>&1
+}
+
+function check_exists()
+{
+	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME ] || fail
+}
+
+function check_version() # MAJ MIN
+{
+	VER_STR=$(dmsetup targets | grep verity | cut -f 3 -dv)
+	[ -z "$VER_STR" ] && fail "Failed to parse dm-verity version."
+
+	VER_MAJ=$(echo $VER_STR | cut -f 1 -d.)
+	VER_MIN=$(echo $VER_STR | cut -f 2 -d.)
+
+	test $VER_MAJ -gt $1 && return 0
+	test $VER_MIN -ge $2 && return 0
+	return 1
+}
+
+function compare_out() # $1 what, $2 expected
+{
+	OPT=$(grep -v "^#" $DEV_OUT | grep -i "$1" | sed -e s/.*\:\ // )
+	[ -z "$OPT" ] && fail
+	[ $OPT != $2 ] && fail "$1 differs ($2)"
+}
+
+function check_root_hash() # $1 size, $2 hash, $3 salt, $4 version, $5 hash, [$6 offset]
+{
+	if [ -z "$LOOPDEV2" ] ; then
+		BLOCKS=$(($6 / $1))
+		DEV_PARAMS="$LOOPDEV1 $LOOPDEV1 \
+			   --hash-offset $6 \
+			   --data-blocks=$BLOCKS --debug"
+	else
+		DEV_PARAMS="$LOOPDEV1 $LOOPDEV2"
+	fi
+
+	for sb in yes no; do
+	FORMAT_PARAMS="--format=$4 --data-block-size=$1 --hash-block-size=$1 --hash=$5 --salt=$3"
+	if [ $sb == yes ] ; then
+		VERIFY_PARAMS=""
+	else
+		FORMAT_PARAMS="$FORMAT_PARAMS --no-superblock"
+		VERIFY_PARAMS=$FORMAT_PARAMS
+	fi
+
+	for fail in data hash; do
+	wipe
+	echo -n "V$4(sb=$sb) $5 block size $1: "
+	$VERITYSETUP format $DEV_PARAMS $FORMAT_PARAMS >$DEV_OUT || fail
+
+	echo -n "[root hash]"
+	compare_out "root hash" $2
+	compare_out "salt" "$3"
+
+	$VERITYSETUP verify $DEV_PARAMS $VERIFY_PARAMS $2 >>$DEV_OUT 2>&1 || fail
+	echo -n "[verify]"
+
+	$VERITYSETUP create $DEV_NAME $DEV_PARAMS $VERIFY_PARAMS $2  >>$DEV_OUT 2>&1 || fail
+	check_exists
+	echo -n "[activate]"
+
+	dd if=/dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME of=/dev/null bs=$1 2>/dev/null
+	dmsetup status $DEV_NAME | grep "verity V" >/dev/null || fail
+	echo -n "[in-kernel verify]"
+
+	$VERITYSETUP close $DEV_NAME >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail
+
+	case $fail in
+	data)
+		dd if=/dev/urandom of=$LOOPDEV1 bs=1 seek=3456 count=8 conv=notrunc 2>/dev/null
+		TXT="data_dev"
+		;;
+	hash)
+		if [ -z "$LOOPDEV2" ] ; then
+			dd if=/dev/urandom of=$LOOPDEV1 bs=1 seek=$((8193 + $4)) count=8 conv=notrunc 2>/dev/null
+		else
+			dd if=/dev/urandom of=$LOOPDEV2 bs=1 seek=8193 count=8 conv=notrunc 2>/dev/null
+		fi
+                TXT="hash_dev"
+		;;
+	esac
+
+	$VERITYSETUP verify $DEV_PARAMS $VERIFY_PARAMS $2 >>$DEV_OUT 2>&1 && \
+		fail "userspace check for $TXT corruption"
+	$VERITYSETUP create $DEV_NAME $DEV_PARAMS $VERIFY_PARAMS $2 >>$DEV_OUT 2>&1 || \
+		fail "activation"
+	dd if=/dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME of=/dev/null bs=$1 2>/dev/null
+	dmsetup status $DEV_NAME | grep "verity V" >/dev/null && \
+		fail "in-kernel check for $TXT corruption"
+	$VERITYSETUP close $DEV_NAME >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "deactivation"
+	echo "[$TXT corruption]"
+	done
+	done
+}
+
+function corrupt_device() # $1 device, $2 device_size(in bytes), $3 #{corrupted_bytes}
+{
+	# Repeatable magic corruption :-)
+	CORRUPT=$3
+	RANDOM=43
+	while [ "$CORRUPT" -gt 0 ]; do
+		SEEK=$RANDOM
+		while [ $SEEK -ge $2 ] ; do SEEK=$RANDOM; done
+		echo -n -e "\x55" | dd of=$1 bs=1 count=1 seek=$SEEK conv=notrunc > /dev/null 2>&1
+		CORRUPT=$(($CORRUPT - 1))
+	done
+}
+
+# $1 data_device, $2 hash_device, $3 fec_device, $4 data/hash_block_size(in bytes),
+# $5 data_size(in blocks), $6 device_size(in blocks), $7 hash_offset(in bytes),
+# $8 fec_offset(in bytes), $9 fec_roots, ${10} corrupted_bytes, [${11} superblock(y/n), ${12} salt]
+function check_fec()
+{
+	INDEX=25
+	dd if=/dev/zero of=$1 bs=$4 count=$6 > /dev/null 2>&1
+
+	echo -n "Block_size: $4, Data_size: $(($4 * $5))B, FEC_roots: $9, Corrupted_bytes: ${10} "
+
+	PARAMS=" --data-block-size=$4 --hash-block-size=$4 "
+	if [ "$5" -ne "$6" ]; then
+		PARAMS="$PARAMS --data-blocks=$5"
+	fi
+
+	if [ "$7" -ne 0 ]; then
+		PARAMS="$PARAMS --hash-offset=$7"
+	fi
+
+	if [ "$8" -ne 0 ]; then
+		PARAMS="$PARAMS --fec-offset=$8"
+	fi
+
+	if [ "${11}" == "n" ]; then
+		INDEX=24
+		echo -n "[no-superblock]"
+		PARAMS="$PARAMS --no-superblock -s=${12}"
+	elif [ -n "${12}" ]; then
+		PARAMS="$PARAMS -s=${12}"
+	fi
+
+	if [[ "$1" == "$2" && "$1" == "$3" ]]; then
+		echo -n "[one_device_test]"
+		dd if=/dev/zero of=$IMG_TMP bs=$4 count=$5  > /dev/null 2>&1
+		ARR=(`sha256sum $IMG_TMP`)
+		HASH_ORIG=${ARR[0]}
+	else
+		ARR=(`sha256sum $1`)
+		HASH_ORIG=${ARR[0]}
+	fi
+
+	ARR=(`$VERITYSETUP format $1 $2 --fec-device=$3 $PARAMS`)
+	SALT=${ARR[$INDEX]}
+	ROOT_HASH=${ARR[$(($INDEX+3))]}
+
+	corrupt_device $1 $(($5 * $4)) ${10}
+
+	$VERITYSETUP create $DEV_NAME $1 $2 $ROOT_HASH --fec-device=$3 $PARAMS > /dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ "$?" -ne "0" ] ; then
+		echo "[N/A, test skipped]"
+		return 3
+	fi
+
+	udevadm settle
+
+	dd if=/dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME of=$IMG_TMP > /dev/null 2>&1
+	ARR=(`sha256sum $IMG_TMP`)
+
+	HASH_REPAIRED=${ARR[0]}
+
+	$VERITYSETUP close $DEV_NAME
+	rm $1 $2 $3 $IMG_TMP > /dev/null 2>&1
+
+	if [ "$HASH_ORIG" != "$HASH_REPAIRED" ]; then
+		echo -n "[correction failed]"
+		return 1
+	fi
+
+	echo "[file was repaired][OK]"
+}
+
+function check_option() # $1 size, $2 hash, $3 salt, $4 version, $5 hash, $6 CLI option, $7 status option
+{
+	DEV_PARAMS="$LOOPDEV1 $LOOPDEV2"
+	FORMAT_PARAMS="--format=$4 --data-block-size=$1 --hash-block-size=$1 --hash=$5 --salt=$3"
+
+	echo -n "Option $6 "
+	$VERITYSETUP format $DEV_PARAMS $FORMAT_PARAMS >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail
+	$VERITYSETUP create $DEV_NAME $DEV_PARAMS $2 $6 >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail
+	check_exists
+	$VERITYSETUP status $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null | grep flags | grep -q $7 || fail
+	dmsetup table $DEV_NAME 2>/dev/null | grep -q $7 || fail
+	$VERITYSETUP close $DEV_NAME >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail
+	echo "[OK]"
+}
+
+function valgrind_setup()
+{
+	which valgrind >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "Cannot find valgrind."
+	[ ! -f $VERITYSETUP_VALGRIND ] && fail "Unable to get location of veritysetup executable."
+	export LD_LIBRARY_PATH="$VERITYSETUP_LIB_VALGRIND:$LD_LIBRARY_PATH"
+}
+
+function valgrind_run()
+{
+	INFOSTRING="$(basename ${BASH_SOURCE[1]})-line-${BASH_LINENO[0]}" ./valg.sh ${VERITYSETUP_VALGRIND} "$@"
+}
+
+function checkOffsetBug() # $1 size, $2 hash-offset, $3 data-blocks
+{
+	echo -n "Size :: $1 B | Hash-offset :: $2 blocks | Data-blocks :: $3 "
+	dd if=/dev/zero of=$IMG bs=1 count=0 seek=$1 >/dev/null 2>&1
+	$VERITYSETUP --data-blocks=$3 --hash-offset=$2 format $IMG $IMG >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "Test [hash-offset greater than 2G] failed"
+	echo "[OK]"
+	remove_mapping
+}
+
+function checkOverlapBug() # $1 size, $2 hash-offset, $3 data-blocks, $4 block_size, $5 fec_offset
+{
+	echo -n "Device-size :: $1 B | "
+	[ $# -ge 3 ] && echo -n "Data-blocks :: $3 blocks| "
+	[ $# -lt 3 ] && echo -n "Data-blocks :: whole device | "
+	[ $# -ge 4 ] && echo -n "Block-size :: $4 B | "
+	[ $# -lt 4 ] && echo -n "Block-size :: 4096 B | "
+	echo -n "Hash-offset :: $2 B | "
+
+	dd if=/dev/zero of=$IMG bs=1 count=0 seek=$1 >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ -z $3 ] ; then
+		# veritysetup must fail
+		$VERITYSETUP --hash-offset=$2 format $IMG $IMG >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail "Test [overlap with option \"--data-blocks\" not entered] failed"
+	else
+		$VERITYSETUP --data-block-size=$4 --hash-block-size=$4 --data-blocks=$3 --hash-offset=$2 format $IMG $IMG >/dev/null 2>&1
+		RET=$?
+		[ "$3" -gt "$(($2 / $4))" ] && [ "$RET" -eq "0" ] && fail "Test [overlap - hash-offset in data area] failed"
+	fi
+
+	if [ $# -eq 5 ] ; then
+		echo -n "FEC-offset :: $5 B | "
+		PARAMS="--data-block-size=$4 --hash-block-size=$4 --data-blocks=$3 --fec-device=$IMG --fec-offset=$5"
+
+		# test data-fec area overlap
+		$VERITYSETUP format $IMG $IMG_HASH $PARAMS >/dev/null 2>&1
+		RET=$?
+		[ "$(($3*$4))" -gt "$5" ] && [ "$RET" -eq "0" ] && fail "Test [data/fec area overlap] failed"
+
+		HASH_SIZE=$(stat --printf="%s" $IMG_HASH)
+
+		# test hash-fec area overlap
+		$VERITYSETUP format $IMG $IMG $PARAMS --hash-offset=$2 >/dev/null 2>&1
+		RET=$?
+		[ "$(($2 + $HASH_SIZE))" -gt "$5" ] && [ "$RET" -eq "0" ] && fail "Test [hash/fec area overlap] failed"
+	fi
+
+	echo "[OK]"
+	remove_mapping
+}
+
+# $1 size, $2 block size, $3 roots, $4 hash offset, $5 fec offset,
+# $6 one dev(1 - one device, 2 - one device for data and hash, one device for fec data, 3 - three separate devices),
+# $7 #{corrupted bytes}
+function checkUserSpaceRepair()
+{
+	BS=512
+	COUNT=50000
+	dd if=/dev/zero of=$IMG bs=$BS count=$COUNT >/dev/null 2>&1
+	PARAMS="--data-block-size=$2 --hash-block-size=$2 --fec-roots=$3"
+	[ "$1" -gt 0 ] && PARAMS="$PARAMS --data-blocks=$1" && BS=$2 && COUNT=$1
+
+	# different parameters for different number of devices
+	[ "$6" -eq 1 ] && HASH_DEV=$IMG && FEC=$IMG && PARAMS="$PARAMS --hash-offset=$4 --fec-offset=$5" && echo -n "[One device]"
+	[ "$6" -eq 2 ] && HASH_DEV=$IMG && FEC=$FEC_DEV && PARAMS="$PARAMS --hash-offset=$4" && echo -n "[Two separate data/hash and fec devices]"
+	[ "$6" -eq 3 ] && HASH_DEV=$IMG_HASH && FEC=$FEC_DEV && echo -n "[Three separate devices]"
+
+	echo -n "[nroots::$3]"
+
+	ARR=(`$VERITYSETUP format $IMG $HASH_DEV --fec-device $FEC $PARAMS`)
+	ROOT_HASH=${ARR[28]}
+
+	echo -n "[Errors can be corrected]"
+	corrupt_device $IMG $(($BS*$COUNT)) $7
+	$VERITYSETUP verify $IMG $HASH_DEV $ROOT_HASH --fec-device=$FEC $PARAMS >/dev/null 2>&1
+	RET=$?
+	[ "$RET" -ne 0 ] && fail "Device can be corrected, but it wasn't."
+	echo -n "[OK]"
+
+	echo -n "[Errors cannot be corrected]"
+	dd if=/dev/urandom of=$IMG bs=$BS count=$COUNT conv=notrunc >/dev/null 2>&1
+	$VERITYSETUP verify $IMG $HASH_DEV $ROOT_HASH --fec-device=$FEC $PARAMS >/dev/null 2>&1
+	RET=$?
+	[ "$RET" -eq 0 ] && fail "Device cannot be correct, but it didn't fail."
+	echo "[OK]"
+}
+
+[ $(id -u) != 0 ] && skip "WARNING: You must be root to run this test, test skipped."
+[ ! -x "$VERITYSETUP" ] && skip "Cannot find $VERITYSETUP, test skipped."
+
+[ -n "$VALG" ] && valgrind_setup && VERITYSETUP=valgrind_run
+modprobe dm-verity >/dev/null 2>&1
+dmsetup targets | grep verity >/dev/null 2>&1 || skip "Cannot find dm-verity target, test skipped."
+
+# VERITYSETUP tests
+
+SALT=e48da609055204e89ae53b655ca2216dd983cf3cb829f34f63a297d106d53e2d
+
+echo "Verity tests [separate devices]"
+prepare 8192 1024
+check_root_hash  512 9de18652fe74edfb9b805aaed72ae2aa48f94333f1ba5c452ac33b1c39325174 $SALT 1 sha256
+check_root_hash 1024 54d92778750495d1f80832b486ebd007617d746271511bbf0e295e143da2b3df $SALT 1 sha256
+check_root_hash 4096 e522df0f97da4febb882ac40f30b37dc0b444bf6df418929463fa25280f09d5c $SALT 1 sha256
+# version 0
+check_root_hash 4096 cbbf4ebd004ef65e29b935bb635a39cf754d677f3fa10b0126da725bbdf10f7d $SALT 0 sha256
+# no salt
+check_root_hash 4096 ef29c902d87350f1da4bfa536e16cebc162a909bf89abe448b81ec500d4fb9bf - 1 sha256
+# sha1
+check_root_hash 1024 d0e9163ca8844aaa2e88fe5265a8c5d9ee494a99 $SALT 1 sha1
+check_root_hash 1024 73509e8e868be6b8ac939817a98a3d35121413b2 dadada 1 sha1
+
+echo "Verity tests [one device offset]"
+prepare $((8192 + 1024))
+check_root_hash  512 9de18652fe74edfb9b805aaed72ae2aa48f94333f1ba5c452ac33b1c39325174 $SALT 1 sha256 8388608
+check_root_hash 1024 54d92778750495d1f80832b486ebd007617d746271511bbf0e295e143da2b3df $SALT 1 sha256 8388608
+check_root_hash 4096 e522df0f97da4febb882ac40f30b37dc0b444bf6df418929463fa25280f09d5c $SALT 1 sha256 8388608
+# version 0
+check_root_hash 4096 cbbf4ebd004ef65e29b935bb635a39cf754d677f3fa10b0126da725bbdf10f7d $SALT 0 sha256 8388608
+# no salt
+check_root_hash 4096 ef29c902d87350f1da4bfa536e16cebc162a909bf89abe448b81ec500d4fb9bf - 1 sha256 8388608
+# sha1
+check_root_hash 1024 d0e9163ca8844aaa2e88fe5265a8c5d9ee494a99 $SALT 1 sha1 8388608
+check_root_hash 1024 73509e8e868be6b8ac939817a98a3d35121413b2 dadada 1 sha1 8388608
+
+if check_version 1 3; then
+	echo "Verity data corruption options test."
+	SALT=e48da609055204e89ae53b655ca2216dd983cf3cb829f34f63a297d106d53e2d
+	HASH=9de18652fe74edfb9b805aaed72ae2aa48f94333f1ba5c452ac33b1c39325174
+	prepare 8192 1024
+	check_option 512 $HASH $SALT 1 sha256 "--ignore-corruption" "ignore_corruption"
+	check_option 512 $HASH $SALT 1 sha256 "--restart-on-corruption" "restart_on_corruption"
+	check_option 512 $HASH $SALT 1 sha256 "--ignore-zero-blocks" "ignore_zero_blocks"
+	check_option 512 $HASH $SALT 1 sha256 "--ignore-corruption --ignore-zero-blocks" "ignore_corruption"
+	if check_version 1 4; then
+		check_option 512 $HASH $SALT 1 sha256 "--check-at-most-once" "check_at_most_once"
+	fi
+fi
+
+echo "Veritysetup [hash-offset bigger than 2G works] "
+checkOffsetBug 3000000000 2499997696 256
+checkOffsetBug 10000000000 8000000000 128
+
+echo "Veritysetup [overlap-detection] "
+checkOverlapBug 2097152 1433600
+checkOverlapBug 2097152 1433600 350 4096
+checkOverlapBug 2097152 1228800 350 4096 # data-hash overlap
+checkOverlapBug 2097152 0 350 4096 1228800 # data-fec overlap
+checkOverlapBug 10240000 256000 400 512 256512 # hash-fec overlap
+
+if check_version 1 3; then
+	echo "Veritysetup [FEC tests]"
+	for INDEX in  {1..4}; do
+	  # in the first iteration check if we can use FEC (it can be compiled-out)
+	  (check_fec $IMG $IMG $IMG 4096 30 150 163840 409600 $(($RANDOM % 23 + 2)) $(($INDEX * 4)) )
+	  RET=$?
+	  [ "$RET" -eq "3" ] && break
+	  [ "$RET" -eq "0" ] || fail "FEC repair failed"
+
+	  (check_fec $IMG $IMG_HASH $FEC_DEV 4096 30 30 0 0 $(($RANDOM % 23 + 2)) $(($INDEX * 4)) 'n' $SALT) || fail "FEC repair failed"
+	  (check_fec $IMG $IMG_HASH $FEC_DEV 4096 35 35 0 0 $(($RANDOM % 23 + 2)) $(($INDEX * 4))) || fail "FEC repair failed"
+	  (check_fec $IMG $IMG_HASH $FEC_DEV 512 2000 2000 0 0 $(($RANDOM % 23 + 2)) $(($INDEX * 4))) || fail "FEC repair failed"
+	  (check_fec $IMG $IMG_HASH $FEC_DEV 1024 2000 2000 0 0 $(($RANDOM % 23 + 2)) $(($INDEX * 4))) || fail "FEC repair failed"
+	  # this test should fail
+	  (check_fec $IMG $IMG_HASH $FEC_DEV 4096 30 30 0 0 $(($RANDOM % 23 + 2)) $(($RANDOM % 200 + 200))) && fail "FEC repair must fail"
+	  echo "[OK]"
+	done
+fi
+
+echo "Correction in userspace: "
+# checkUserSpaceRepair <#blocks> <block_size> <roots> <hash_offset> <fec_offset> <#devices> <#corrupted bytes>
+checkUserSpaceRepair -1  512  2 0       0       3 100
+checkUserSpaceRepair 400 512  2 256000  0       2 50
+checkUserSpaceRepair 500 512  2 2457600  4915200  1 1
+checkUserSpaceRepair -1  4096 2 0       0       3 10
+checkUserSpaceRepair 400 4096 2 2048000 0       2 1
+#checkUserSpaceRepair 500 4096 2 2457600 4915200 1 2 # FIXME
+
+remove_mapping
+exit 0