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diff --git a/debian/doc/pandoc/encrypted-boot.md b/debian/doc/pandoc/encrypted-boot.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..219e6ef --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/doc/pandoc/encrypted-boot.md @@ -0,0 +1,353 @@ +% Full disk encryption, including `/boot`: Unlocking LUKS devices from GRUB + +Introduction +============ + +So called “full disk encryption” is often a misnomer, because there is +typically a separate plaintext partition holding `/boot`. For instance +the Debian Installer does this in its “encrypted LVM” partitioning method. +Since not all bootloaders are able to unlock _LUKS_ devices, a plaintext +`/boot` is the only solution that works for all of them. + +Since Jessie GRUB2 has been able to unlock LUKS devices with a new +[`cryptomount`](https://www.gnu.org/software/grub/manual/grub/html_node/cryptomount.html) +command, hence enabling encryption of the `/boot` partition as well. +(As unlocking happens before booting the kernel, that feature is not +compatible with remote unlocking.) + +Enabling unlocking LUKS devices from GRUB [isn't exposed to the d-i +interface](https://bugs.debian.org/814798) (as of Buster), hence people +have come up with various custom work-arounds. But since the Buster +release [`cryptsetup`(8)] defaults to a new [LUKS header format +version](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/LUKS2-docs), which isn't +supported by GRUB as of 2.04. +(There is a [ticket open](https://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/?55093) in +GRUB's upstream bug tracker.) _Hence the old custom work-around won't +work anymore_. Until LUKS _version 2_ support is added to GRUB2, the +devices holding `/boot` need to be in _LUKS version 1_ to be unlocked +from the boot loader. + +This document describes a generic way to unlock LUKS devices from GRUB +for Debian Buster. + + +Encrypting the device holding `/boot` +===================================== + +There are two alternatives here: + + * Either format an existing `/boot` partition to LUKS1; or + * Move `/boot` to the root file system. The root device(s) needs to + use LUKS version 1, but existing LUKS2 devices can be converted + (in-place) to LUKS1 if desired. + +These two alternatives are described in the two following sub-sections. + + +Formatting the existing `/boot` partition to LUKS1 +-------------------------------------------------- + +Since the installer creates a separate (cleartext) `/boot` partition by +default in its “encrypted LVM” partitioning method, the simplest solution +is arguably to re-format it as LUKS1. + +That way other partitions, including the one holding the root file +system, can remain in LUKS2 format and benefit from the stronger +security guaranties of the newer version: more secure (memory-hard) Key +Derivation Function, backup header, ability to offload the volume key +offload to the kernel keyring (thus preventing access from userspace), +custom sector size, persistent flags, unattended unlocking via kernel +keyring tokens, etc. + +Furthermore every command in this sub-section can be run in the main +system, no need to run anything from a live CD or an initramfs shell. + +Before copying content of the `/boot` directory, remount it read-only to +make sure data is not modified while it's being copied: + + root@debian:~$ mount -oremount,ro /boot + +Then archive the directory elsewhere (on another device), and unmount it +afterwards: + + root@debian:~$ install -m0600 /dev/null /tmp/boot.tar + root@debian:~$ tar -C /boot --acls --xattrs -cf /tmp/boot.tar . + root@debian:~$ umount /boot + +Optionally, wipe out the underlying block device (assumed to be +`/dev/sda1` in the rest of this sub-section): + + root@debian:~$ dd if=/dev/urandom of=/dev/sda1 bs=1M + dd: error writing '/dev/sda1': No space left on device + 244+0 records in + 243+0 records out + 254803968 bytes (255 MB, 243 MiB) copied, 1.70967 s, 149 MB/s + +Format the underlying block device to LUKS1 (note the `--type luks1` +in the command below, as Buster's [`cryptsetup`(8)] defaults to LUKS2): + + root@debian:~$ cryptsetup luksFormat --type luks1 /dev/sda1 + + WARNING! + ======== + This will overwrite data on /dev/sda1 irrevocably. + + Are you sure? (Type uppercase yes): YES + Enter passphrase for /dev/sda1: + Verify passphrase: + +Add a corresponding entry to [`crypttab`(5)] with mapped device name +`boot_crypt`, and open it afterwards: + + root@debian:~$ uuid="$(blkid -o value -s UUID /dev/sda1)" + root@debian:~$ echo "boot_crypt UUID=$uuid none luks" | tee -a /etc/crypttab + root@debian:~$ cryptdisks_start boot_crypt + Starting crypto disk...boot_crypt (starting)... + Please unlock disk boot_crypt: ******** + boot_crypt (started)...done. + +Now create a file system on the mapped device. Assuming source device +for `/boot` is specified by its UUID in the [`fstab`(5)] -- which the +Debian Installer does by default -- reusing the old UUID avoids editing +the file. + + root@debian:~$ grep /boot /etc/fstab + # /boot was on /dev/sda1 during installation + UUID=c104749f-a0fa-406c-9e9a-3fc01f8e2f78 /boot ext2 defaults 0 2 + root@debian:~$ mkfs.ext2 -m0 -U c104749f-a0fa-406c-9e9a-3fc01f8e2f78 /dev/mapper/boot_crypt + mke2fs 1.44.5 (15-Dec-2018) + Creating filesystem with 246784 1k blocks and 61752 inodes + Filesystem UUID: c104749f-a0fa-406c-9e9a-3fc01f8e2f78 + […] + +Finally, mount `/boot` again from [`fstab`(5)], and copy the saved tarball +to the new (and now encrypted) file system. + + root@debian:~$ mount -v /boot + mount: /dev/mapper/boot_crypt mounted on /boot. + root@debian:~$ tar -C /boot -xf /tmp/boot.tar + +You can skip the next sub-section and go directly to [Enabling +`cryptomount` in GRUB2]. + + +Moving `/boot` to the root file system +-------------------------------------- + +The [above sub-section][Formatting the existing `/boot` partition to LUKS1] +described how to to re-format the `/boot` partition as LUKS1. +Alternatively, it can be moved to the root file system, assuming the +latter is not held by any LUKS2 device. (As shown below, LUKS2 devices +created with default parameters can be “downgraded” to LUKS1.) + +The advantage of this method is that the original `/boot` partition can +be preserved and used in case of disaster recovery (if for some reason +the GRUB image is lacking the `cryptodisk` module and the original +plaintext `/boot` partition is lost, you'd need to boot from a live CD +to recover). Moreover increasing the number of partitions increases +usage pattern visibility: a separate `/boot` partitions, although +encrypted, will likely leak the fact that a kernel update took place to +an attacker with access to pre- and post-update snapshots. + +On the other hand, the inconvenient of that method is that the root file +system can't benefit from the nice LUKS2 improvements over LUKS1, as +listed above. Another minor inconvenient is that space that was +occupied by the former `/boot` partition becomes unused and can't easily +be reclaimed by the root file system. + +### Downgrading LUKS2 to LUKS1 ### + +Check the LUKS format version on the root device (assumed to be +`/dev/sda3` in the rest of this sub-section): + + root@debian:~$ cryptsetup luksDump /dev/sda3 | grep -A1 "^LUKS" + LUKS header information + Version: 2 + +Here the LUKS format version is 2, so the device needs to be converted +to LUKS _version 1_ to be able to unlock from GRUB. Unlike the remaining +of this document, the conversion can't be done on an open device, so +you'll need to use a live CD, or append `break` to the kernel +command-line to break to an initramfs shell. + +Run `cryptsetup convert --type luks1 DEVICE` to downgrade. However if +the device was created with the default parameters the in-place +conversion will fail: + + root@debian:~$ cryptsetup convert --type luks1 /dev/sda3 + + WARNING! + ======== + This operation will convert /dev/sda3 to LUKS1 format. + + + Are you sure? (Type uppercase yes): YES + Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - keyslot 0 is not LUKS1 compatible. + +This is because its first key slot uses Argon2 as Password-Based Key +Derivation Function (PBKDF) algorithm: + + root@debian:~$ cryptsetup luksDump /dev/sda3 | grep PBKDF: + PBKDF: argon2i + +Argon2 is a memory-hard function that was selected as the winner of the +Password-Hashing Competition; LUKS2 devices use it by default, but +LUKS1's only supported PBKDF algorithm is PKBDF2. Hence the key slot +has to be converted to PKBDF2 prior to LUKS format version downgrade. + + root@debian:~$ cryptsetup luksChangeKey --key-slot 0 --pbkdf pbkdf2 /dev/sda3 + Enter passphrase to be changed: + Enter new passphrase: + Verify passphrase: + +(You can reuse the existing passphrase in the above prompts.) Now that +all keyslots use the PBKDF2 algorithm, the device shouldn't have any +remaining LUKS2-only features, and can be converted to LUKS1. + + root@debian:~$ cryptsetup luksDump /dev/sda3 | grep PBKDF: + PBKDF: pbkdf2 + root@debian:~$ cryptsetup convert --type luks1 /dev/sda3 + + WARNING! + ======== + This operation will convert /dev/sda3 to LUKS1 format. + + + Are you sure? (Type uppercase yes): YES + root@debian:~$ cryptsetup luksDump /dev/sda3 | grep -A1 ^LUKS + LUKS header information + +### Moving `/boot` to the root file system ### + +(The moving itself can be done from the normal system, no need to use a +live CD or an initramfs shell.) + +To ensure data is not modified while it's being copied, remount `/boot` +read-only: + + root@debian:~$ mount -oremount,ro /boot + +Then recursively copy the directory to the root file system, and replace +the old `/boot` mountpoint with the new directory. + + root@debian:~$ cp -aT /boot /boot.tmp + root@debian:~$ umount /boot + root@debian:~$ rmdir /boot + root@debian:~$ mv -T /boot.tmp /boot + +Comment out the fstab(5) entry for the `/boot` mountpoint, otherwise +at reboot `init`(1) will mount it hence shadow data in the new `/boot` +directory with data from the plaintext partition. + + root@debian:~$ grep /boot /etc/fstab + ## /boot was on /dev/sda1 during installation + #UUID=c104749f-a0fa-406c-9e9a-3fc01f8e2f78 /boot ext2 defaults 0 2 + + +Enabling `cryptomount` in GRUB2 +=============================== + +Enable the feature and update the GRUB image: + + root@debian:~$ echo "GRUB_ENABLE_CRYPTODISK=y" >>/etc/default/grub + root@debian:~$ echo "GRUB_PRELOAD_MODULES=\"luks cryptodisk\"" >>/etc/default/grub + root@debian:~$ update-grub + root@debian:~$ grub-install /dev/sda + +If everything went well, `/boot/grub/grub.cfg` should contain `insmod +cryptodisk` (and also `insmod lvm` if `/boot` is on a Logical Volume). + + +Avoiding the extra password prompt +================================== + +The device holding the kernel (and the initramfs image) is unlocked by +GRUB, but the root device needs to be unlocked again at initramfs stage, +regardless whether it's the same device or not. This is because GRUB +boots with the given `vmlinuz` and initramfs images, but there currently +is no way to securely pass cryptographic material (or Device Mapper +information) to the kernel. Hence the Device Mapper table is initially +empty at initramfs stage; in other words, all devices are locked, and +the root device needs to be unlocked again. + +To avoid extra passphrase prompts at initramfs stage, a work around is +to unlock via key files stored into the initramfs image. Since the +initramfs image itself now resides on an encrypted device, this still +provides protection for data at rest. With LUKS1 the volume key can +already be found by userspace in the Device Mapper table, so including +key files to the initramfs image -- created with restrictive permissions -- +doesn't change the threat model. (However for LUKS2 the volume key is +offloaded to the kernel keyring by default, thus no longer accessible to +userspace, and having keyfiles readable by root slightly changes the +threat model.) + +To enable unlocking via key files for the root file system, first +generate the shared secret (here with 512 bits of entropy as it's also +the size of the volume key) inside a new file: + + root@debian:~$ mkdir -m0700 /etc/keys + root@debian:~$ ( umask 0077 && dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1 count=64 of=/etc/keys/root.key ) + 64+0 records in + 64+0 records out + 64 bytes copied, 0.000698363 s, 91.6 kB/s + +Now create a new key slot with that key file: + + root@debian:~$ cryptsetup luksAddKey /dev/sda3 /etc/keys/root.key + Enter any existing passphrase: + + root@debian:~$ cryptsetup luksDump /dev/sda3 | grep "^Key Slot" + Key Slot 0: ENABLED + Key Slot 1: ENABLED + Key Slot 2: DISABLED + Key Slot 3: DISABLED + Key Slot 4: DISABLED + Key Slot 5: DISABLED + Key Slot 6: DISABLED + Key Slot 7: DISABLED + +Edit the [`crypttab`(5)] and set the third column to the key file path for +the root device entry: + + root@debian:~$ cat /etc/crypttab + root_crypt UUID=… /etc/keys/root.key luks,discard,key-slot=1 + +(The unlock logic normally runs the PBKDF algorithm through each keyslot +sequentially until a match is found. Since the key file is explicitly +targeting the second key slot, its index can be specified with +`key-slot=1` in the [`crypttab`(5)] to save some expensive PBKDF +computations and reduce boot time.) + +In `/etc/cryptsetup-initramfs/conf-hook`, set `KEYFILE_PATTERN` to a +`glob`(7) expanding to the key files to include to the initramfs image. + + root@debian:~$ echo "KEYFILE_PATTERN=\"/etc/keys/*.key\"" >>/etc/cryptsetup-initramfs/conf-hook + +In `/etc/initramfs-tools/initramfs.conf`, set `UMASK` to a restrictive +value to avoid leaking key material. See [`initramfs.conf`(5)] for +details. + + root@debian:~$ echo UMASK=0077 >>/etc/initramfs-tools/initramfs.conf + +Finally re-generate the initramfs image, and double-check that it has +restrictive permissions and includes the key. + + root@debian:~$ update-initramfs -u + update-initramfs: Generating /boot/initrd.img-4.19.0-4-amd64 + root@debian:~$ stat -L -c "%A %n" /initrd.img + -rw------- /initrd.img + root@debian:~$ lsinitramfs /initrd.img | grep "^cryptroot/keyfiles/" + cryptroot/keyfiles/root_crypt.key + +(`cryptsetup-initramfs` normalises and renames key files inside the +initramfs, hence the new keyfile name.) + +Should be safe to reboot now :-) If all went well you should see a +single passphrase prompt. + +[`cryptsetup`(8)]: https://manpages.debian.org/cryptsetup.8.en.html +[`crypttab`(5)]: https://manpages.debian.org/crypttab.5.en.html +[`fstab`(5)]: https://manpages.debian.org/fstab.5.en.html +[`initramfs.conf`(5)]: https://manpages.debian.org/initramfs.conf.5.en.html + + -- Guilhem Moulin <guilhem@debian.org>, Mon, 09 Jun 2019 16:35:20 +0200 |