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-rw-r--r--modules/policy/policy.lua756
1 files changed, 756 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/modules/policy/policy.lua b/modules/policy/policy.lua
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6e9492f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/policy/policy.lua
@@ -0,0 +1,756 @@
+local kres = require('kres')
+local ffi = require('ffi')
+
+local todname = kres.str2dname -- not available during module load otherwise
+
+-- Counter of unique rules
+local nextid = 0
+local function getruleid()
+ local newid = nextid
+ nextid = nextid + 1
+ return newid
+end
+
+-- Support for client sockets from inside policy actions
+local socket_client = function () return error("missing luasocket, can't create socket client") end
+local has_socket, socket = pcall(require, 'socket')
+if has_socket then
+ socket_client = function (host, port)
+ local s, err, status
+ if host:find(':') then
+ s, err = socket.udp6()
+ else
+ s, err = socket.udp()
+ end
+ if not s then
+ return nil, err
+ end
+ status, err = s:setpeername(host, port)
+ if not status then
+ return nil, err
+ end
+ return s
+ end
+end
+
+local function addr_split_port(target, default_port)
+ assert(default_port)
+ assert(type(default_port) == 'number')
+ local addr, port = target:match '([^@]*)@?(.*)'
+ local nport
+ if port ~= "" then
+ nport = tonumber(port)
+ if not nport or nport < 1 or nport > 65535 then
+ error('port "'.. port ..'" is not valid')
+ end
+ end
+ return addr, nport or default_port
+end
+
+-- String address@port -> sockaddr.
+local function addr2sock(target, default_port)
+ local addr, port = addr_split_port(target, default_port)
+ local sock = ffi.gc(ffi.C.kr_straddr_socket(addr, port), ffi.C.free);
+ if sock == nil then
+ error("target '"..target..'" is not a valid IP address')
+ end
+ return sock
+end
+
+-- policy functions are defined below
+local policy = {}
+
+function policy.PASS(state, _)
+ return state
+end
+
+-- Mirror request elsewhere, and continue solving
+function policy.MIRROR(target)
+ local addr, port = addr_split_port(target, 53)
+ local sink, err = socket_client(addr, port)
+ if not sink then panic('MIRROR target %s is not a valid: %s', target, err) end
+ return function(state, req)
+ if state == kres.FAIL then return state end
+ local query = req.qsource.packet
+ if query ~= nil then
+ sink:send(ffi.string(query.wire, query.size))
+ end
+ return -- Chain action to next
+ end
+end
+
+-- Override the list of nameservers (forwarders)
+local function set_nslist(qry, list)
+ local ns_i = 0
+ for _, ns in ipairs(list) do
+ -- kr_nsrep_set() can return kr_error(ENOENT), it's OK
+ if ffi.C.kr_nsrep_set(qry, ns_i, ns) == 0 then
+ ns_i = ns_i + 1
+ end
+ end
+ -- If less than maximum NSs, insert guard to terminate the list
+ if ns_i < 3 then
+ assert(ffi.C.kr_nsrep_set(qry, ns_i, nil) == 0);
+ end
+ if ns_i == 0 then
+ -- would use assert() but don't want to compose the message if not triggered
+ error('no usable address in NS set (check net.ipv4 and '
+ .. 'net.ipv6 config):\n' .. table_print(list, 2))
+ end
+end
+
+-- Forward request, and solve as stub query
+function policy.STUB(target)
+ local list = {}
+ if type(target) == 'table' then
+ for _, v in pairs(target) do
+ table.insert(list, addr2sock(v, 53))
+ assert(#list <= 4, 'at most 4 STUB targets are supported')
+ end
+ else
+ table.insert(list, addr2sock(target, 53))
+ end
+ return function(state, req)
+ local qry = req:current()
+ -- Switch mode to stub resolver, do not track origin zone cut since it's not real authority NS
+ qry.flags.STUB = true
+ qry.flags.ALWAYS_CUT = false
+ set_nslist(qry, list)
+ return state
+ end
+end
+
+-- Forward request and all subrequests to upstream; validate answers
+function policy.FORWARD(target)
+ local list = {}
+ if type(target) == 'table' then
+ for _, v in pairs(target) do
+ table.insert(list, addr2sock(v, 53))
+ assert(#list <= 4, 'at most 4 FORWARD targets are supported')
+ end
+ else
+ table.insert(list, addr2sock(target, 53))
+ end
+ return function(state, req)
+ local qry = req:current()
+ req.options.FORWARD = true
+ req.options.NO_MINIMIZE = true
+ qry.flags.FORWARD = true
+ qry.flags.ALWAYS_CUT = false
+ qry.flags.NO_MINIMIZE = true
+ qry.flags.AWAIT_CUT = true
+ set_nslist(qry, list)
+ return state
+ end
+end
+
+-- object must be non-empty string or non-empty table of non-empty strings
+local function is_nonempty_string_or_table(object)
+ if type(object) == 'string' then
+ return #object ~= 0
+ elseif type(object) ~= 'table' or not next(object) then
+ return false
+ end
+ for _, val in pairs(object) do
+ if type(val) ~= 'string' or #val == 0 then
+ return false
+ end
+ end
+ return true
+end
+
+local function insert_from_string_or_table(source, destination)
+ if type(source) == 'table' then
+ for _, v in pairs(source) do
+ table.insert(destination, v)
+ end
+ else
+ table.insert(destination, source)
+ end
+end
+
+-- Check for allowed authentication types and return type for the current target
+local function tls_forward_target_authtype(idx, target)
+ if (target.pin_sha256 and not (target.ca_file or target.hostname or target.insecure)) then
+ if not is_nonempty_string_or_table(target.pin_sha256) then
+ error('TLS_FORWARD target authentication is invalid at position '
+ .. idx .. '; pin_sha256 must be string or list of strings')
+ end
+ return 'pin_sha256'
+ elseif (target.insecure and not (target.ca_file or target.hostname or target.pin_sha256)) then
+ return 'insecure'
+ elseif (target.hostname and not (target.insecure or target.pin_sha256)) then
+ if not (is_nonempty_string_or_table(target.hostname)) then
+ error('TLS_FORWARD target authentication is invalid at position '
+ .. idx .. '; hostname must be string or list of strings')
+ end
+ -- if target.ca_file is empty, system CA will be used
+ return 'cert'
+ else
+ error('TLS_FORWARD authentication options at position ' .. idx
+ .. ' are invalid; specify one of: pin_sha256 / hostname [+ca_file] / insecure')
+ end
+end
+
+local function tls_forward_target_check_syntax(idx, list_entry)
+ if type(list_entry) ~= 'table' then
+ error('TLS_FORWARD target must be a non-empty table (found '
+ .. type(list_entry) .. ' at position ' .. idx .. ')')
+ end
+ if type(list_entry[1]) ~= 'string' then
+ error('TLS_FORWARD target must start with an IP address (found '
+ .. type(list_entry[1]) .. ' at the beginning of target position ' .. idx .. ')')
+ end
+end
+
+-- Forward request and all subrequests to upstream over TLS; validate answers
+function policy.TLS_FORWARD(target)
+ local sockaddr_c_list = {}
+ local sockaddr_config = {} -- items: { string_addr=<addr string>, auth_type=<auth type> }
+ local ca_files = {}
+ local hostnames = {}
+ local pins = {}
+ if type(target) ~= 'table' or #target < 1 then
+ error('TLS_FORWARD argument must be a non-empty table')
+ end
+ for idx, upstream_list_entry in pairs(target) do
+ tls_forward_target_check_syntax(idx, upstream_list_entry)
+ local auth_type = tls_forward_target_authtype(idx, upstream_list_entry)
+ local string_addr = upstream_list_entry[1]
+ local sockaddr_c = addr2sock(string_addr, 853)
+ local sockaddr_lua = ffi.string(sockaddr_c, ffi.C.kr_sockaddr_len(sockaddr_c))
+ if sockaddr_config[sockaddr_lua] then
+ error('TLS_FORWARD configuration cannot declare two configs for IP address ' .. string_addr)
+ end
+ table.insert(sockaddr_c_list, sockaddr_c)
+ sockaddr_config[sockaddr_lua] = {string_addr=string_addr, auth_type=auth_type}
+ if auth_type == 'cert' then
+ ca_files[sockaddr_lua] = {}
+ hostnames[sockaddr_lua] = {}
+ insert_from_string_or_table(upstream_list_entry.ca_file, ca_files[sockaddr_lua])
+ insert_from_string_or_table(upstream_list_entry.hostname, hostnames[sockaddr_lua])
+ elseif auth_type == 'pin_sha256' then
+ pins[sockaddr_lua] = {}
+ insert_from_string_or_table(upstream_list_entry.pin_sha256, pins[sockaddr_lua])
+ elseif auth_type ~= 'insecure' then
+ -- insecure does nothing, user does not want authentication
+ assert(false, 'unsupported auth_type')
+ end
+ end
+
+ -- Update the global table of authentication data only if all checks above passed
+ for sockaddr_lua, config in pairs(sockaddr_config) do
+ assert(#config.string_addr > 0)
+ if config.auth_type == 'insecure' then
+ net.tls_client(config.string_addr)
+ elseif config.auth_type == 'pin_sha256' then
+ assert(#pins[sockaddr_lua] > 0)
+ net.tls_client(config.string_addr, pins[sockaddr_lua])
+ elseif config.auth_type == 'cert' then
+ assert(#hostnames[sockaddr_lua] > 0)
+ net.tls_client(config.string_addr, ca_files[sockaddr_lua], hostnames[sockaddr_lua])
+ else
+ assert(false, 'unsupported auth_type')
+ end
+ end
+
+ return function(state, req)
+ local qry = req:current()
+ req.options.FORWARD = true
+ req.options.NO_MINIMIZE = true
+ qry.flags.FORWARD = true
+ qry.flags.ALWAYS_CUT = false
+ qry.flags.NO_MINIMIZE = true
+ qry.flags.AWAIT_CUT = true
+ req.options.TCP = true
+ qry.flags.TCP = true
+ set_nslist(qry, sockaddr_c_list)
+ return state
+ end
+end
+
+-- Rewrite records in packet
+function policy.REROUTE(tbl, names)
+ -- Import renumbering rules
+ local ren = require('renumber')
+ local prefixes = {}
+ for from, to in pairs(tbl) do
+ table.insert(prefixes, names and ren.name(from, to) or ren.prefix(from, to))
+ end
+ -- Return rule closure
+ return ren.rule(prefixes)
+end
+
+-- Set and clear some query flags
+function policy.FLAGS(opts_set, opts_clear)
+ return function(_, req)
+ local qry = req:current()
+ ffi.C.kr_qflags_set (qry.flags, kres.mk_qflags(opts_set or {}))
+ ffi.C.kr_qflags_clear(qry.flags, kres.mk_qflags(opts_clear or {}))
+ return nil -- chain rule
+ end
+end
+
+local function mkauth_soa(answer, dname, mname)
+ if mname == nil then
+ mname = dname
+ end
+ return answer:put(dname, 10800, answer:qclass(), kres.type.SOA,
+ mname .. '\6nobody\7invalid\0\0\0\0\1\0\0\14\16\0\0\4\176\0\9\58\128\0\0\42\48')
+end
+
+local dname_localhost = todname('localhost.')
+
+-- Rule for localhost. zone; see RFC6303, sec. 3
+local function localhost(_, req)
+ local qry = req:current()
+ local answer = req.answer
+ ffi.C.kr_pkt_make_auth_header(answer)
+
+ local is_exact = ffi.C.knot_dname_is_equal(qry.sname, dname_localhost)
+
+ answer:rcode(kres.rcode.NOERROR)
+ answer:begin(kres.section.ANSWER)
+ if qry.stype == kres.type.AAAA then
+ answer:put(qry.sname, 900, answer:qclass(), kres.type.AAAA,
+ '\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\1')
+ elseif qry.stype == kres.type.A then
+ answer:put(qry.sname, 900, answer:qclass(), kres.type.A, '\127\0\0\1')
+ elseif is_exact and qry.stype == kres.type.SOA then
+ mkauth_soa(answer, dname_localhost)
+ elseif is_exact and qry.stype == kres.type.NS then
+ answer:put(dname_localhost, 900, answer:qclass(), kres.type.NS, dname_localhost)
+ else
+ answer:begin(kres.section.AUTHORITY)
+ mkauth_soa(answer, dname_localhost)
+ end
+ return kres.DONE
+end
+
+local dname_rev4_localhost = todname('1.0.0.127.in-addr.arpa');
+local dname_rev4_localhost_apex = todname('127.in-addr.arpa');
+
+-- Rule for reverse localhost.
+-- Answer with locally served minimal 127.in-addr.arpa domain, only having
+-- a PTR record in 1.0.0.127.in-addr.arpa, and with 1.0...0.ip6.arpa. zone.
+-- TODO: much of this would better be left to the hints module (or coordinated).
+local function localhost_reversed(_, req)
+ local qry = req:current()
+ local answer = req.answer
+
+ -- classify qry.sname:
+ local is_exact -- exact dname for localhost
+ local is_apex -- apex of a locally-served localhost zone
+ local is_nonterm -- empty non-terminal name
+ if ffi.C.knot_dname_in_bailiwick(qry.sname, todname('ip6.arpa.')) > 0 then
+ -- exact ::1 query (relying on the calling rule)
+ is_exact = true
+ is_apex = true
+ else
+ -- within 127.in-addr.arpa.
+ local labels = ffi.C.knot_dname_labels(qry.sname, nil)
+ if labels == 3 then
+ is_exact = false
+ is_apex = true
+ elseif labels == 4+2 and ffi.C.knot_dname_is_equal(
+ qry.sname, dname_rev4_localhost) then
+ is_exact = true
+ else
+ is_exact = false
+ is_apex = false
+ is_nonterm = ffi.C.knot_dname_in_bailiwick(dname_rev4_localhost, qry.sname) > 0
+ end
+ end
+
+ ffi.C.kr_pkt_make_auth_header(answer)
+ answer:rcode(kres.rcode.NOERROR)
+ answer:begin(kres.section.ANSWER)
+ if is_exact and qry.stype == kres.type.PTR then
+ answer:put(qry.sname, 900, answer:qclass(), kres.type.PTR, dname_localhost)
+ elseif is_apex and qry.stype == kres.type.SOA then
+ mkauth_soa(answer, dname_rev4_localhost_apex, dname_localhost)
+ elseif is_apex and qry.stype == kres.type.NS then
+ answer:put(dname_rev4_localhost_apex, 900, answer:qclass(), kres.type.NS,
+ dname_localhost)
+ else
+ if not is_nonterm then
+ answer:rcode(kres.rcode.NXDOMAIN)
+ end
+ answer:begin(kres.section.AUTHORITY)
+ mkauth_soa(answer, dname_rev4_localhost_apex, dname_localhost)
+ end
+ return kres.DONE
+end
+
+-- All requests
+function policy.all(action)
+ return function(_, _) return action end
+end
+
+-- Requests which QNAME matches given zone list (i.e. suffix match)
+function policy.suffix(action, zone_list)
+ local AC = require('ahocorasick')
+ local tree = AC.create(zone_list)
+ return function(_, query)
+ local match = AC.match(tree, query:name(), false)
+ if match ~= nil then
+ return action
+ end
+ return nil
+ end
+end
+
+-- Check for common suffix first, then suffix match (specialized version of suffix match)
+function policy.suffix_common(action, suffix_list, common_suffix)
+ local common_len = string.len(common_suffix)
+ local suffix_count = #suffix_list
+ return function(_, query)
+ -- Preliminary check
+ local qname = query:name()
+ if not string.find(qname, common_suffix, -common_len, true) then
+ return nil
+ end
+ -- String match
+ for i = 1, suffix_count do
+ local zone = suffix_list[i]
+ if string.find(qname, zone, -string.len(zone), true) then
+ return action
+ end
+ end
+ return nil
+ end
+end
+
+-- Filter QNAME pattern
+function policy.pattern(action, pattern)
+ return function(_, query)
+ if string.find(query:name(), pattern) then
+ return action
+ end
+ return nil
+ end
+end
+
+local function rpz_parse(action, path)
+ local rules = {}
+ local action_map = {
+ -- RPZ Policy Actions
+ ['\0'] = action,
+ ['\1*\0'] = action, -- deviates from RPZ spec
+ ['\012rpz-passthru\0'] = policy.PASS, -- the grammar...
+ ['\008rpz-drop\0'] = policy.DROP,
+ ['\012rpz-tcp-only\0'] = policy.TC,
+ -- Policy triggers @NYI@
+ }
+ local parser = require('zonefile').new()
+ if not parser:open(path) then error(string.format('failed to parse "%s"', path)) end
+ while parser:parse() do
+ local name = ffi.string(parser.r_owner, parser.r_owner_length)
+ local name_action = ffi.string(parser.r_data, parser.r_data_length)
+ rules[name] = action_map[name_action]
+ -- Warn when NYI
+ if #name > 1 and not action_map[name_action] then
+ print(string.format('[ rpz ] %s:%d: unsupported policy action', path, tonumber(parser.line_counter)))
+ end
+ end
+ return rules
+end
+
+-- RPZ policy set
+-- Create RPZ from zone file
+function policy.rpz(action, path)
+ local rules = rpz_parse(action, path)
+ collectgarbage()
+ return function(_, query)
+ local label = query:name()
+ local rule = rules[label]
+ while rule == nil and string.len(label) > 0 do
+ label = string.sub(label, string.byte(label) + 2)
+ rule = rules['\1*'..label]
+ end
+ return rule
+ end
+end
+
+function policy.DENY_MSG(msg)
+ if msg and (type(msg) ~= 'string' or #msg >= 255) then
+ error('DENY_MSG: optional msg must be string shorter than 256 characters')
+ end
+
+ return function (_, req)
+ -- Write authority information
+ local answer = req.answer
+ ffi.C.kr_pkt_make_auth_header(answer)
+ answer:rcode(kres.rcode.NXDOMAIN)
+ answer:begin(kres.section.AUTHORITY)
+ mkauth_soa(answer, answer:qname())
+ if msg then
+ answer:begin(kres.section.ADDITIONAL)
+ answer:put('\11explanation\7invalid', 10800, answer:qclass(), kres.type.TXT,
+ string.char(#msg) .. msg)
+
+ end
+ return kres.DONE
+ end
+end
+policy.DENY = policy.DENY_MSG() -- compatibility with < 2.0
+
+function policy.DROP(_, _)
+ return kres.FAIL
+end
+
+function policy.REFUSE(_, req)
+ local answer = req.answer
+ answer:rcode(kres.rcode.REFUSED)
+ answer:ad(false)
+ return kres.DONE
+end
+
+function policy.TC(state, req)
+ local answer = req.answer
+ if answer.max_size ~= 65535 then
+ answer:tc(1) -- ^ Only UDP queries
+ answer:ad(false)
+ return kres.DONE
+ else
+ return state
+ end
+end
+
+function policy.QTRACE(_, req)
+ local qry = req:current()
+ req.options.TRACE = true
+ qry.flags.TRACE = true
+ return -- this allows to continue iterating over policy list
+end
+
+-- Evaluate packet in given rules to determine policy action
+function policy.evaluate(rules, req, query, state)
+ for i = 1, #rules do
+ local rule = rules[i]
+ if not rule.suspended then
+ local action = rule.cb(req, query)
+ if action ~= nil then
+ rule.count = rule.count + 1
+ local next_state = action(state, req)
+ if next_state then -- Not a chain rule,
+ return next_state -- stop on first match
+ end
+ end
+ end
+ end
+ return
+end
+
+-- Top-down policy list walk until we hit a match
+-- the caller is responsible for reordering policy list
+-- from most specific to least specific.
+-- Some rules may be chained, in this case they are evaluated
+-- as a dependency chain, e.g. r1,r2,r3 -> r3(r2(r1(state)))
+policy.layer = {
+ begin = function(state, req)
+ -- Don't act on "resolved" cases.
+ if bit.band(state, bit.bor(kres.FAIL, kres.DONE)) ~= 0 then return state end
+
+ req = kres.request_t(req)
+ return policy.evaluate(policy.rules, req, req:current(), state) or
+ policy.evaluate(policy.special_names, req, req:current(), state) or
+ state
+ end,
+ finish = function(state, req)
+ -- Don't act on "resolved" cases.
+ if bit.band(state, bit.bor(kres.FAIL, kres.DONE)) ~= 0 then return state end
+
+ req = kres.request_t(req)
+ return policy.evaluate(policy.postrules, req, req:current(), state) or state
+ end
+}
+
+-- Add rule to policy list
+function policy.add(rule, postrule)
+ -- Compatibility with 1.0.0 API
+ -- it will be dropped in 1.2.0
+ if rule == policy then
+ rule = postrule
+ postrule = nil
+ end
+ -- End of compatibility shim
+ local desc = {id=getruleid(), cb=rule, count=0}
+ table.insert(postrule and policy.postrules or policy.rules, desc)
+ return desc
+end
+
+-- Remove rule from a list
+local function delrule(rules, id)
+ for i, r in ipairs(rules) do
+ if r.id == id then
+ table.remove(rules, i)
+ return true
+ end
+ end
+ return false
+end
+
+-- Delete rule from policy list
+function policy.del(id)
+ if not delrule(policy.rules, id) then
+ if not delrule(policy.postrules, id) then
+ return false
+ end
+ end
+ return true
+end
+
+-- Convert list of string names to domain names
+function policy.todnames(names)
+ for i, v in ipairs(names) do
+ names[i] = kres.str2dname(v)
+ end
+ return names
+end
+
+-- RFC1918 Private, local, broadcast, test and special zones
+-- Considerations: RFC6761, sec 6.1.
+-- https://www.iana.org/assignments/locally-served-dns-zones
+local private_zones = {
+ -- RFC6303
+ '10.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '16.172.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '17.172.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '18.172.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '19.172.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '20.172.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '21.172.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '22.172.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '23.172.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '24.172.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '25.172.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '26.172.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '27.172.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '28.172.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '29.172.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '30.172.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '31.172.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '168.192.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '0.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '254.169.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '2.0.192.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '100.51.198.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '113.0.203.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '255.255.255.255.in-addr.arpa.',
+ -- RFC7793
+ '64.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '65.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '66.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '67.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '68.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '69.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '70.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '71.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '72.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '73.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '74.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '75.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '76.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '77.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '78.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '79.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '80.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '81.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '82.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '83.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '84.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '85.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '86.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '87.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '88.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '89.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '90.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '91.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '92.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '93.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '94.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '95.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '96.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '97.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '98.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '99.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '100.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '101.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '102.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '103.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '104.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '105.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '106.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '107.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '108.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '109.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '110.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '111.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '112.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '113.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '114.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '115.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '116.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '117.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '118.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '119.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '120.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '121.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '122.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '123.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '124.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '125.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '126.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+ '127.100.in-addr.arpa.',
+
+ -- RFC6303
+ -- localhost_reversed handles ::1
+ '0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.ip6.arpa.',
+ 'd.f.ip6.arpa.',
+ '8.e.f.ip6.arpa.',
+ '9.e.f.ip6.arpa.',
+ 'a.e.f.ip6.arpa.',
+ 'b.e.f.ip6.arpa.',
+ '8.b.d.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa.',
+}
+policy.todnames(private_zones)
+
+-- @var Default rules
+policy.rules = {}
+policy.postrules = {}
+policy.special_names = {
+ {
+ cb=policy.suffix_common(policy.DENY_MSG(
+ 'Blocking is mandated by standards, see references on '
+ .. 'https://www.iana.org/assignments/'
+ .. 'locally-served-dns-zones/locally-served-dns-zones.xhtml'),
+ private_zones, todname('arpa.')),
+ count=0
+ },
+ {
+ cb=policy.suffix(policy.DENY_MSG(
+ 'Blocking is mandated by standards, see references on '
+ .. 'https://www.iana.org/assignments/'
+ .. 'special-use-domain-names/special-use-domain-names.xhtml'),
+ {
+ todname('test.'),
+ todname('onion.'),
+ todname('invalid.'),
+ }),
+ count=0
+ },
+ {
+ cb=policy.suffix(localhost, {dname_localhost}),
+ count=0
+ },
+ {
+ cb=policy.suffix_common(localhost_reversed, {
+ todname('127.in-addr.arpa.'),
+ todname('1.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.ip6.arpa.')},
+ todname('arpa.')),
+ count=0
+ },
+}
+
+return policy