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-rw-r--r--src/libdnssec/sign/der.c229
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diff --git a/src/libdnssec/sign/der.c b/src/libdnssec/sign/der.c
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+/* Copyright (C) 2018 CZ.NIC, z.s.p.o. <knot-dns@labs.nic.cz>
+
+ This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include <stdbool.h>
+
+#include "libdnssec/shared/bignum.h"
+#include "libdnssec/binary.h"
+#include "libdnssec/error.h"
+#include "libdnssec/sign/der.h"
+#include "libdnssec/shared/binary_wire.h"
+
+/*
+ * In fact, this is a very tiny subset of ASN.1 encoding format implementation,
+ * which is necessary for the purpose of DNSSEC.
+ *
+ * References: RFC 3279 (X.509 PKI), X.690, RFC 6605 (ECDSA), RFC8080 (EDDSA)
+ *
+ * Dss-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE { r INTEGER, s INTEGER }
+ */
+
+#define ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE 0x30
+#define ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER 0x02
+
+#define ASN1_MAX_SIZE 127
+
+/*!
+ * Check if the next object has a given type.
+ */
+static bool asn1_expect_type(wire_ctx_t *wire, uint8_t type)
+{
+ assert(wire);
+ return (wire_ctx_available(wire) >= 1 && wire_ctx_read_u8(wire) == type);
+}
+
+/*!
+ * Decode the size of the object (only short format is supported).
+ */
+static int asn1_decode_size(wire_ctx_t *wire, size_t *size)
+{
+ assert(wire);
+ assert(size);
+
+ if (wire_ctx_available(wire) < 1) {
+ return DNSSEC_MALFORMED_DATA;
+ }
+
+ uint8_t byte = wire_ctx_read_u8(wire);
+ if (byte & 0x80) {
+ // long form, we do not need it for DNSSEC
+ return DNSSEC_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ *size = byte;
+
+ return DNSSEC_EOK;
+}
+
+/*!
+ * Decode an unsigned integer object.
+ */
+static int asn1_decode_integer(wire_ctx_t *wire, dnssec_binary_t *_value)
+{
+ assert(wire);
+ assert(_value);
+
+ if (!asn1_expect_type(wire, ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER)) {
+ return DNSSEC_MALFORMED_DATA;
+ }
+
+ size_t size;
+ int result = asn1_decode_size(wire, &size);
+ if (result != DNSSEC_EOK) {
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ if (size == 0 || size > wire_ctx_available(wire)) {
+ return DNSSEC_MALFORMED_DATA;
+ }
+
+ dnssec_binary_t value = { .data = wire->position, .size = size };
+ wire->position += size;
+
+ // skip leading zeroes (unless equal to zero)
+ while (value.size > 1 && value.data[0] == 0) {
+ value.data += 1;
+ value.size -= 1;
+ }
+
+ *_value = value;
+
+ return DNSSEC_EOK;
+}
+
+/*!
+ * Encode object header (type and length).
+ */
+static void asn1_write_header(wire_ctx_t *wire, uint8_t type, size_t length)
+{
+ assert(wire);
+ assert(length < ASN1_MAX_SIZE);
+
+ wire_ctx_write_u8(wire, type);
+ wire_ctx_write_u8(wire, length);
+}
+
+/*!
+ * Encode unsigned integer object.
+ */
+static void asn1_write_integer(wire_ctx_t *wire, size_t integer_size,
+ const dnssec_binary_t *integer)
+{
+ assert(wire);
+ assert(integer);
+ assert(integer->data);
+
+ asn1_write_header(wire, ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, integer_size);
+ bignum_write(wire, integer_size, integer);
+}
+
+/*!
+ * Decode signature parameters from X.509 ECDSA signature.
+ */
+int dss_sig_value_decode(const dnssec_binary_t *der,
+ dnssec_binary_t *r, dnssec_binary_t *s)
+{
+ if (!der || !der->data || !r || !s) {
+ return DNSSEC_EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ wire_ctx_t wire = binary_init(der);
+
+ size_t size;
+ int result;
+
+ // decode the sequence
+
+ if (!asn1_expect_type(&wire, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE)) {
+ return DNSSEC_MALFORMED_DATA;
+ }
+
+ result = asn1_decode_size(&wire, &size);
+ if (result != DNSSEC_EOK) {
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ if (size != wire_ctx_available(&wire)) {
+ return DNSSEC_MALFORMED_DATA;
+ }
+
+ // decode the 'r' and 's' values
+
+ dnssec_binary_t der_r;
+ result = asn1_decode_integer(&wire, &der_r);
+ if (result != DNSSEC_EOK) {
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ dnssec_binary_t der_s;
+ result = asn1_decode_integer(&wire, &der_s);
+ if (result != DNSSEC_EOK) {
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ if (wire_ctx_available(&wire) != 0) {
+ return DNSSEC_MALFORMED_DATA;
+ }
+
+ *r = der_r;
+ *s = der_s;
+
+ return DNSSEC_EOK;
+}
+
+/*!
+ * Encode signature parameters from X.509 ECDSA signature.
+ */
+int dss_sig_value_encode(const dnssec_binary_t *r, const dnssec_binary_t *s,
+ dnssec_binary_t *der)
+{
+ if (!r || !r->data || !s || !s->data || !der) {
+ return DNSSEC_EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ size_t r_size = bignum_size_s(r);
+ size_t s_size = bignum_size_s(s);
+
+ // check supported inputs range
+
+ if (r_size > ASN1_MAX_SIZE || s_size > ASN1_MAX_SIZE) {
+ return DNSSEC_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ size_t seq_size = 2 + r_size + 2 + s_size;
+ if (seq_size > ASN1_MAX_SIZE) {
+ return DNSSEC_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ // encode result
+
+ size_t total_size = 2 + seq_size;
+
+ dnssec_binary_t _der = { 0 };
+ if (dnssec_binary_alloc(&_der, total_size)) {
+ return DNSSEC_ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ wire_ctx_t wire = binary_init(&_der);
+ asn1_write_header(&wire, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE, seq_size);
+ asn1_write_integer(&wire, r_size, r);
+ asn1_write_integer(&wire, s_size, s);
+ assert(wire_ctx_available(&wire) == 0);
+
+ *der = _der;
+
+ return DNSSEC_EOK;
+}