summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/Documentation/siphash.txt
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-05-06 01:02:30 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-05-06 01:02:30 +0000
commit76cb841cb886eef6b3bee341a2266c76578724ad (patch)
treef5892e5ba6cc11949952a6ce4ecbe6d516d6ce58 /Documentation/siphash.txt
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadlinux-76cb841cb886eef6b3bee341a2266c76578724ad.tar.xz
linux-76cb841cb886eef6b3bee341a2266c76578724ad.zip
Adding upstream version 4.19.249.upstream/4.19.249upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/siphash.txt')
-rw-r--r--Documentation/siphash.txt189
1 files changed, 189 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/siphash.txt b/Documentation/siphash.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9965821ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/siphash.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+===========================
+SipHash - a short input PRF
+===========================
+
+:Author: Written by Jason A. Donenfeld <jason@zx2c4.com>
+
+SipHash is a cryptographically secure PRF -- a keyed hash function -- that
+performs very well for short inputs, hence the name. It was designed by
+cryptographers Daniel J. Bernstein and Jean-Philippe Aumasson. It is intended
+as a replacement for some uses of: `jhash`, `md5_transform`, `sha_transform`,
+and so forth.
+
+SipHash takes a secret key filled with randomly generated numbers and either
+an input buffer or several input integers. It spits out an integer that is
+indistinguishable from random. You may then use that integer as part of secure
+sequence numbers, secure cookies, or mask it off for use in a hash table.
+
+Generating a key
+================
+
+Keys should always be generated from a cryptographically secure source of
+random numbers, either using get_random_bytes or get_random_once::
+
+ siphash_key_t key;
+ get_random_bytes(&key, sizeof(key));
+
+If you're not deriving your key from here, you're doing it wrong.
+
+Using the functions
+===================
+
+There are two variants of the function, one that takes a list of integers, and
+one that takes a buffer::
+
+ u64 siphash(const void *data, size_t len, const siphash_key_t *key);
+
+And::
+
+ u64 siphash_1u64(u64, const siphash_key_t *key);
+ u64 siphash_2u64(u64, u64, const siphash_key_t *key);
+ u64 siphash_3u64(u64, u64, u64, const siphash_key_t *key);
+ u64 siphash_4u64(u64, u64, u64, u64, const siphash_key_t *key);
+ u64 siphash_1u32(u32, const siphash_key_t *key);
+ u64 siphash_2u32(u32, u32, const siphash_key_t *key);
+ u64 siphash_3u32(u32, u32, u32, const siphash_key_t *key);
+ u64 siphash_4u32(u32, u32, u32, u32, const siphash_key_t *key);
+
+If you pass the generic siphash function something of a constant length, it
+will constant fold at compile-time and automatically choose one of the
+optimized functions.
+
+Hashtable key function usage::
+
+ struct some_hashtable {
+ DECLARE_HASHTABLE(hashtable, 8);
+ siphash_key_t key;
+ };
+
+ void init_hashtable(struct some_hashtable *table)
+ {
+ get_random_bytes(&table->key, sizeof(table->key));
+ }
+
+ static inline hlist_head *some_hashtable_bucket(struct some_hashtable *table, struct interesting_input *input)
+ {
+ return &table->hashtable[siphash(input, sizeof(*input), &table->key) & (HASH_SIZE(table->hashtable) - 1)];
+ }
+
+You may then iterate like usual over the returned hash bucket.
+
+Security
+========
+
+SipHash has a very high security margin, with its 128-bit key. So long as the
+key is kept secret, it is impossible for an attacker to guess the outputs of
+the function, even if being able to observe many outputs, since 2^128 outputs
+is significant.
+
+Linux implements the "2-4" variant of SipHash.
+
+Struct-passing Pitfalls
+=======================
+
+Often times the XuY functions will not be large enough, and instead you'll
+want to pass a pre-filled struct to siphash. When doing this, it's important
+to always ensure the struct has no padding holes. The easiest way to do this
+is to simply arrange the members of the struct in descending order of size,
+and to use offsetendof() instead of sizeof() for getting the size. For
+performance reasons, if possible, it's probably a good thing to align the
+struct to the right boundary. Here's an example::
+
+ const struct {
+ struct in6_addr saddr;
+ u32 counter;
+ u16 dport;
+ } __aligned(SIPHASH_ALIGNMENT) combined = {
+ .saddr = *(struct in6_addr *)saddr,
+ .counter = counter,
+ .dport = dport
+ };
+ u64 h = siphash(&combined, offsetofend(typeof(combined), dport), &secret);
+
+Resources
+=========
+
+Read the SipHash paper if you're interested in learning more:
+https://131002.net/siphash/siphash.pdf
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+===============================================
+HalfSipHash - SipHash's insecure younger cousin
+===============================================
+
+:Author: Written by Jason A. Donenfeld <jason@zx2c4.com>
+
+On the off-chance that SipHash is not fast enough for your needs, you might be
+able to justify using HalfSipHash, a terrifying but potentially useful
+possibility. HalfSipHash cuts SipHash's rounds down from "2-4" to "1-3" and,
+even scarier, uses an easily brute-forcable 64-bit key (with a 32-bit output)
+instead of SipHash's 128-bit key. However, this may appeal to some
+high-performance `jhash` users.
+
+Danger!
+
+Do not ever use HalfSipHash except for as a hashtable key function, and only
+then when you can be absolutely certain that the outputs will never be
+transmitted out of the kernel. This is only remotely useful over `jhash` as a
+means of mitigating hashtable flooding denial of service attacks.
+
+Generating a key
+================
+
+Keys should always be generated from a cryptographically secure source of
+random numbers, either using get_random_bytes or get_random_once:
+
+hsiphash_key_t key;
+get_random_bytes(&key, sizeof(key));
+
+If you're not deriving your key from here, you're doing it wrong.
+
+Using the functions
+===================
+
+There are two variants of the function, one that takes a list of integers, and
+one that takes a buffer::
+
+ u32 hsiphash(const void *data, size_t len, const hsiphash_key_t *key);
+
+And::
+
+ u32 hsiphash_1u32(u32, const hsiphash_key_t *key);
+ u32 hsiphash_2u32(u32, u32, const hsiphash_key_t *key);
+ u32 hsiphash_3u32(u32, u32, u32, const hsiphash_key_t *key);
+ u32 hsiphash_4u32(u32, u32, u32, u32, const hsiphash_key_t *key);
+
+If you pass the generic hsiphash function something of a constant length, it
+will constant fold at compile-time and automatically choose one of the
+optimized functions.
+
+Hashtable key function usage
+============================
+
+::
+
+ struct some_hashtable {
+ DECLARE_HASHTABLE(hashtable, 8);
+ hsiphash_key_t key;
+ };
+
+ void init_hashtable(struct some_hashtable *table)
+ {
+ get_random_bytes(&table->key, sizeof(table->key));
+ }
+
+ static inline hlist_head *some_hashtable_bucket(struct some_hashtable *table, struct interesting_input *input)
+ {
+ return &table->hashtable[hsiphash(input, sizeof(*input), &table->key) & (HASH_SIZE(table->hashtable) - 1)];
+ }
+
+You may then iterate like usual over the returned hash bucket.
+
+Performance
+===========
+
+HalfSipHash is roughly 3 times slower than JenkinsHash. For many replacements,
+this will not be a problem, as the hashtable lookup isn't the bottleneck. And
+in general, this is probably a good sacrifice to make for the security and DoS
+resistance of HalfSipHash.