Adding upstream version 4.19.249.upstream/4.19.249upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

15 files changed, 4915 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/Makefile b/arch/s390/crypto/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a51010ea6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Cryptographic API
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1_S390) += sha1_s390.o sha_common.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256_S390) += sha256_s390.o sha_common.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512_S390) += sha512_s390.o sha_common.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DES_S390) += des_s390.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_S390) += aes_s390.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_PAES_S390) += paes_s390.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_S390_PRNG) += prng.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_GHASH_S390) += ghash_s390.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32_S390) += crc32-vx_s390.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM) += arch_random.o
+
+crc32-vx_s390-y := crc32-vx.o crc32le-vx.o crc32be-vx.o
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c663caf37
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1214 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ *
+ * s390 implementation of the AES Cipher Algorithm.
+ *
+ * s390 Version:
+ *   Copyright IBM Corp. 2005, 2017
+ *   Author(s): Jan Glauber (jang@de.ibm.com)
+ *		Sebastian Siewior (sebastian@breakpoint.cc> SW-Fallback
+ *		Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
+ *		Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * Derived from "crypto/aes_generic.c"
+ */
+
+#define KMSG_COMPONENT "aes_s390"
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KMSG_COMPONENT ": " fmt
+
+#include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
+#include <crypto/ghash.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/fips.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <crypto/xts.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+
+static u8 *ctrblk;
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(ctrblk_lock);
+
+static cpacf_mask_t km_functions, kmc_functions, kmctr_functions,
+		    kma_functions;
+
+struct s390_aes_ctx {
+	u8 key[AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
+	int key_len;
+	unsigned long fc;
+	union {
+		struct crypto_skcipher *blk;
+		struct crypto_cipher *cip;
+	} fallback;
+};
+
+struct s390_xts_ctx {
+	u8 key[32];
+	u8 pcc_key[32];
+	int key_len;
+	unsigned long fc;
+	struct crypto_skcipher *fallback;
+};
+
+struct gcm_sg_walk {
+	struct scatter_walk walk;
+	unsigned int walk_bytes;
+	u8 *walk_ptr;
+	unsigned int walk_bytes_remain;
+	u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	unsigned int buf_bytes;
+	u8 *ptr;
+	unsigned int nbytes;
+};
+
+static int setkey_fallback_cip(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+		unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	int ret;
+
+	sctx->fallback.cip->base.crt_flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK;
+	sctx->fallback.cip->base.crt_flags |= (tfm->crt_flags &
+			CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+
+	ret = crypto_cipher_setkey(sctx->fallback.cip, in_key, key_len);
+	if (ret) {
+		tfm->crt_flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK;
+		tfm->crt_flags |= (sctx->fallback.cip->base.crt_flags &
+				CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+		       unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	unsigned long fc;
+
+	/* Pick the correct function code based on the key length */
+	fc = (key_len == 16) ? CPACF_KM_AES_128 :
+	     (key_len == 24) ? CPACF_KM_AES_192 :
+	     (key_len == 32) ? CPACF_KM_AES_256 : 0;
+
+	/* Check if the function code is available */
+	sctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0;
+	if (!sctx->fc)
+		return setkey_fallback_cip(tfm, in_key, key_len);
+
+	sctx->key_len = key_len;
+	memcpy(sctx->key, in_key, key_len);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void aes_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	if (unlikely(!sctx->fc)) {
+		crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(sctx->fallback.cip, out, in);
+		return;
+	}
+	cpacf_km(sctx->fc, &sctx->key, out, in, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}
+
+static void aes_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	if (unlikely(!sctx->fc)) {
+		crypto_cipher_decrypt_one(sctx->fallback.cip, out, in);
+		return;
+	}
+	cpacf_km(sctx->fc | CPACF_DECRYPT,
+		 &sctx->key, out, in, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}
+
+static int fallback_init_cip(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+	const char *name = tfm->__crt_alg->cra_name;
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	sctx->fallback.cip = crypto_alloc_cipher(name, 0,
+			CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK);
+
+	if (IS_ERR(sctx->fallback.cip)) {
+		pr_err("Allocating AES fallback algorithm %s failed\n",
+		       name);
+		return PTR_ERR(sctx->fallback.cip);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void fallback_exit_cip(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	crypto_free_cipher(sctx->fallback.cip);
+	sctx->fallback.cip = NULL;
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg aes_alg = {
+	.cra_name		=	"aes",
+	.cra_driver_name	=	"aes-s390",
+	.cra_priority		=	300,
+	.cra_flags		=	CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER |
+					CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
+	.cra_blocksize		=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.cra_ctxsize		=	sizeof(struct s390_aes_ctx),
+	.cra_module		=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_init               =       fallback_init_cip,
+	.cra_exit               =       fallback_exit_cip,
+	.cra_u			=	{
+		.cipher = {
+			.cia_min_keysize	=	AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+			.cia_max_keysize	=	AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+			.cia_setkey		=	aes_set_key,
+			.cia_encrypt		=	aes_encrypt,
+			.cia_decrypt		=	aes_decrypt,
+		}
+	}
+};
+
+static int setkey_fallback_blk(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key,
+		unsigned int len)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	unsigned int ret;
+
+	crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(sctx->fallback.blk, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	crypto_skcipher_set_flags(sctx->fallback.blk, tfm->crt_flags &
+						      CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+
+	ret = crypto_skcipher_setkey(sctx->fallback.blk, key, len);
+
+	tfm->crt_flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK;
+	tfm->crt_flags |= crypto_skcipher_get_flags(sctx->fallback.blk) &
+			  CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int fallback_blk_dec(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+		struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+		unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	unsigned int ret;
+	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = desc->tfm;
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, sctx->fallback.blk);
+
+	skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, sctx->fallback.blk);
+	skcipher_request_set_callback(req, desc->flags, NULL, NULL);
+	skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src, dst, nbytes, desc->info);
+
+	ret = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
+
+	skcipher_request_zero(req);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int fallback_blk_enc(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+		struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+		unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	unsigned int ret;
+	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = desc->tfm;
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, sctx->fallback.blk);
+
+	skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, sctx->fallback.blk);
+	skcipher_request_set_callback(req, desc->flags, NULL, NULL);
+	skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src, dst, nbytes, desc->info);
+
+	ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int ecb_aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+			   unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	unsigned long fc;
+
+	/* Pick the correct function code based on the key length */
+	fc = (key_len == 16) ? CPACF_KM_AES_128 :
+	     (key_len == 24) ? CPACF_KM_AES_192 :
+	     (key_len == 32) ? CPACF_KM_AES_256 : 0;
+
+	/* Check if the function code is available */
+	sctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0;
+	if (!sctx->fc)
+		return setkey_fallback_blk(tfm, in_key, key_len);
+
+	sctx->key_len = key_len;
+	memcpy(sctx->key, in_key, key_len);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int ecb_aes_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, unsigned long modifier,
+			 struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+	unsigned int nbytes, n;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, walk);
+	while ((nbytes = walk->nbytes) >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+		/* only use complete blocks */
+		n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+		cpacf_km(sctx->fc | modifier, sctx->key,
+			 walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr, n);
+		ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, nbytes - n);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int ecb_aes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			   struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			   unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	if (unlikely(!sctx->fc))
+		return fallback_blk_enc(desc, dst, src, nbytes);
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return ecb_aes_crypt(desc, 0, &walk);
+}
+
+static int ecb_aes_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			   struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			   unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	if (unlikely(!sctx->fc))
+		return fallback_blk_dec(desc, dst, src, nbytes);
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return ecb_aes_crypt(desc, CPACF_DECRYPT, &walk);
+}
+
+static int fallback_init_blk(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+	const char *name = tfm->__crt_alg->cra_name;
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	sctx->fallback.blk = crypto_alloc_skcipher(name, 0,
+						   CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
+						   CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK);
+
+	if (IS_ERR(sctx->fallback.blk)) {
+		pr_err("Allocating AES fallback algorithm %s failed\n",
+		       name);
+		return PTR_ERR(sctx->fallback.blk);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void fallback_exit_blk(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	crypto_free_skcipher(sctx->fallback.blk);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg ecb_aes_alg = {
+	.cra_name		=	"ecb(aes)",
+	.cra_driver_name	=	"ecb-aes-s390",
+	.cra_priority		=	401,	/* combo: aes + ecb + 1 */
+	.cra_flags		=	CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER |
+					CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
+	.cra_blocksize		=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.cra_ctxsize		=	sizeof(struct s390_aes_ctx),
+	.cra_type		=	&crypto_blkcipher_type,
+	.cra_module		=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_init		=	fallback_init_blk,
+	.cra_exit		=	fallback_exit_blk,
+	.cra_u			=	{
+		.blkcipher = {
+			.min_keysize		=	AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+			.max_keysize		=	AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+			.setkey			=	ecb_aes_set_key,
+			.encrypt		=	ecb_aes_encrypt,
+			.decrypt		=	ecb_aes_decrypt,
+		}
+	}
+};
+
+static int cbc_aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+			   unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	unsigned long fc;
+
+	/* Pick the correct function code based on the key length */
+	fc = (key_len == 16) ? CPACF_KMC_AES_128 :
+	     (key_len == 24) ? CPACF_KMC_AES_192 :
+	     (key_len == 32) ? CPACF_KMC_AES_256 : 0;
+
+	/* Check if the function code is available */
+	sctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0;
+	if (!sctx->fc)
+		return setkey_fallback_blk(tfm, in_key, key_len);
+
+	sctx->key_len = key_len;
+	memcpy(sctx->key, in_key, key_len);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cbc_aes_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, unsigned long modifier,
+			 struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+	unsigned int nbytes, n;
+	int ret;
+	struct {
+		u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+		u8 key[AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
+	} param;
+
+	ret = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, walk);
+	memcpy(param.iv, walk->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	memcpy(param.key, sctx->key, sctx->key_len);
+	while ((nbytes = walk->nbytes) >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+		/* only use complete blocks */
+		n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+		cpacf_kmc(sctx->fc | modifier, &param,
+			  walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr, n);
+		ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, nbytes - n);
+	}
+	memcpy(walk->iv, param.iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int cbc_aes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			   struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			   unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	if (unlikely(!sctx->fc))
+		return fallback_blk_enc(desc, dst, src, nbytes);
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return cbc_aes_crypt(desc, 0, &walk);
+}
+
+static int cbc_aes_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			   struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			   unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	if (unlikely(!sctx->fc))
+		return fallback_blk_dec(desc, dst, src, nbytes);
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return cbc_aes_crypt(desc, CPACF_DECRYPT, &walk);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg cbc_aes_alg = {
+	.cra_name		=	"cbc(aes)",
+	.cra_driver_name	=	"cbc-aes-s390",
+	.cra_priority		=	402,	/* ecb-aes-s390 + 1 */
+	.cra_flags		=	CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER |
+					CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
+	.cra_blocksize		=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.cra_ctxsize		=	sizeof(struct s390_aes_ctx),
+	.cra_type		=	&crypto_blkcipher_type,
+	.cra_module		=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_init		=	fallback_init_blk,
+	.cra_exit		=	fallback_exit_blk,
+	.cra_u			=	{
+		.blkcipher = {
+			.min_keysize		=	AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+			.max_keysize		=	AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+			.ivsize			=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			.setkey			=	cbc_aes_set_key,
+			.encrypt		=	cbc_aes_encrypt,
+			.decrypt		=	cbc_aes_decrypt,
+		}
+	}
+};
+
+static int xts_fallback_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key,
+				   unsigned int len)
+{
+	struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	unsigned int ret;
+
+	crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(xts_ctx->fallback, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	crypto_skcipher_set_flags(xts_ctx->fallback, tfm->crt_flags &
+						     CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+
+	ret = crypto_skcipher_setkey(xts_ctx->fallback, key, len);
+
+	tfm->crt_flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK;
+	tfm->crt_flags |= crypto_skcipher_get_flags(xts_ctx->fallback) &
+			  CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int xts_fallback_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+		struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+		unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = desc->tfm;
+	struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, xts_ctx->fallback);
+	unsigned int ret;
+
+	skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, xts_ctx->fallback);
+	skcipher_request_set_callback(req, desc->flags, NULL, NULL);
+	skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src, dst, nbytes, desc->info);
+
+	ret = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
+
+	skcipher_request_zero(req);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int xts_fallback_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+		struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+		unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = desc->tfm;
+	struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, xts_ctx->fallback);
+	unsigned int ret;
+
+	skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, xts_ctx->fallback);
+	skcipher_request_set_callback(req, desc->flags, NULL, NULL);
+	skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src, dst, nbytes, desc->info);
+
+	ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
+
+	skcipher_request_zero(req);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int xts_aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+			   unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	unsigned long fc;
+	int err;
+
+	err = xts_check_key(tfm, in_key, key_len);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* In fips mode only 128 bit or 256 bit keys are valid */
+	if (fips_enabled && key_len != 32 && key_len != 64) {
+		tfm->crt_flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Pick the correct function code based on the key length */
+	fc = (key_len == 32) ? CPACF_KM_XTS_128 :
+	     (key_len == 64) ? CPACF_KM_XTS_256 : 0;
+
+	/* Check if the function code is available */
+	xts_ctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0;
+	if (!xts_ctx->fc)
+		return xts_fallback_setkey(tfm, in_key, key_len);
+
+	/* Split the XTS key into the two subkeys */
+	key_len = key_len / 2;
+	xts_ctx->key_len = key_len;
+	memcpy(xts_ctx->key, in_key, key_len);
+	memcpy(xts_ctx->pcc_key, in_key + key_len, key_len);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int xts_aes_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, unsigned long modifier,
+			 struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
+{
+	struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+	unsigned int offset, nbytes, n;
+	int ret;
+	struct {
+		u8 key[32];
+		u8 tweak[16];
+		u8 block[16];
+		u8 bit[16];
+		u8 xts[16];
+	} pcc_param;
+	struct {
+		u8 key[32];
+		u8 init[16];
+	} xts_param;
+
+	ret = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, walk);
+	offset = xts_ctx->key_len & 0x10;
+	memset(pcc_param.block, 0, sizeof(pcc_param.block));
+	memset(pcc_param.bit, 0, sizeof(pcc_param.bit));
+	memset(pcc_param.xts, 0, sizeof(pcc_param.xts));
+	memcpy(pcc_param.tweak, walk->iv, sizeof(pcc_param.tweak));
+	memcpy(pcc_param.key + offset, xts_ctx->pcc_key, xts_ctx->key_len);
+	cpacf_pcc(xts_ctx->fc, pcc_param.key + offset);
+
+	memcpy(xts_param.key + offset, xts_ctx->key, xts_ctx->key_len);
+	memcpy(xts_param.init, pcc_param.xts, 16);
+
+	while ((nbytes = walk->nbytes) >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+		/* only use complete blocks */
+		n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+		cpacf_km(xts_ctx->fc | modifier, xts_param.key + offset,
+			 walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr, n);
+		ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, nbytes - n);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int xts_aes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			   struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			   unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	if (!nbytes)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (unlikely(!xts_ctx->fc))
+		return xts_fallback_encrypt(desc, dst, src, nbytes);
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return xts_aes_crypt(desc, 0, &walk);
+}
+
+static int xts_aes_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			   struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			   unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	if (!nbytes)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (unlikely(!xts_ctx->fc))
+		return xts_fallback_decrypt(desc, dst, src, nbytes);
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return xts_aes_crypt(desc, CPACF_DECRYPT, &walk);
+}
+
+static int xts_fallback_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+	const char *name = tfm->__crt_alg->cra_name;
+	struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	xts_ctx->fallback = crypto_alloc_skcipher(name, 0,
+						  CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
+						  CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK);
+
+	if (IS_ERR(xts_ctx->fallback)) {
+		pr_err("Allocating XTS fallback algorithm %s failed\n",
+		       name);
+		return PTR_ERR(xts_ctx->fallback);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void xts_fallback_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+	struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	crypto_free_skcipher(xts_ctx->fallback);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg xts_aes_alg = {
+	.cra_name		=	"xts(aes)",
+	.cra_driver_name	=	"xts-aes-s390",
+	.cra_priority		=	402,	/* ecb-aes-s390 + 1 */
+	.cra_flags		=	CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER |
+					CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
+	.cra_blocksize		=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.cra_ctxsize		=	sizeof(struct s390_xts_ctx),
+	.cra_type		=	&crypto_blkcipher_type,
+	.cra_module		=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_init		=	xts_fallback_init,
+	.cra_exit		=	xts_fallback_exit,
+	.cra_u			=	{
+		.blkcipher = {
+			.min_keysize		=	2 * AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+			.max_keysize		=	2 * AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+			.ivsize			=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			.setkey			=	xts_aes_set_key,
+			.encrypt		=	xts_aes_encrypt,
+			.decrypt		=	xts_aes_decrypt,
+		}
+	}
+};
+
+static int ctr_aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+			   unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	unsigned long fc;
+
+	/* Pick the correct function code based on the key length */
+	fc = (key_len == 16) ? CPACF_KMCTR_AES_128 :
+	     (key_len == 24) ? CPACF_KMCTR_AES_192 :
+	     (key_len == 32) ? CPACF_KMCTR_AES_256 : 0;
+
+	/* Check if the function code is available */
+	sctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0;
+	if (!sctx->fc)
+		return setkey_fallback_blk(tfm, in_key, key_len);
+
+	sctx->key_len = key_len;
+	memcpy(sctx->key, in_key, key_len);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static unsigned int __ctrblk_init(u8 *ctrptr, u8 *iv, unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	unsigned int i, n;
+
+	/* only use complete blocks, max. PAGE_SIZE */
+	memcpy(ctrptr, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	n = (nbytes > PAGE_SIZE) ? PAGE_SIZE : nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+	for (i = (n / AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - 1; i > 0; i--) {
+		memcpy(ctrptr + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, ctrptr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		crypto_inc(ctrptr + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		ctrptr += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	}
+	return n;
+}
+
+static int ctr_aes_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, unsigned long modifier,
+			 struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+	u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], *ctrptr;
+	unsigned int n, nbytes;
+	int ret, locked;
+
+	locked = mutex_trylock(&ctrblk_lock);
+
+	ret = blkcipher_walk_virt_block(desc, walk, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	while ((nbytes = walk->nbytes) >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+		n = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+		if (nbytes >= 2*AES_BLOCK_SIZE && locked)
+			n = __ctrblk_init(ctrblk, walk->iv, nbytes);
+		ctrptr = (n > AES_BLOCK_SIZE) ? ctrblk : walk->iv;
+		cpacf_kmctr(sctx->fc | modifier, sctx->key,
+			    walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr,
+			    n, ctrptr);
+		if (ctrptr == ctrblk)
+			memcpy(walk->iv, ctrptr + n - AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			       AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		crypto_inc(walk->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, nbytes - n);
+	}
+	if (locked)
+		mutex_unlock(&ctrblk_lock);
+	/*
+	 * final block may be < AES_BLOCK_SIZE, copy only nbytes
+	 */
+	if (nbytes) {
+		cpacf_kmctr(sctx->fc | modifier, sctx->key,
+			    buf, walk->src.virt.addr,
+			    AES_BLOCK_SIZE, walk->iv);
+		memcpy(walk->dst.virt.addr, buf, nbytes);
+		crypto_inc(walk->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, 0);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int ctr_aes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			   struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			   unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	if (unlikely(!sctx->fc))
+		return fallback_blk_enc(desc, dst, src, nbytes);
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return ctr_aes_crypt(desc, 0, &walk);
+}
+
+static int ctr_aes_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			   struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			   unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	if (unlikely(!sctx->fc))
+		return fallback_blk_dec(desc, dst, src, nbytes);
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return ctr_aes_crypt(desc, CPACF_DECRYPT, &walk);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg ctr_aes_alg = {
+	.cra_name		=	"ctr(aes)",
+	.cra_driver_name	=	"ctr-aes-s390",
+	.cra_priority		=	402,	/* ecb-aes-s390 + 1 */
+	.cra_flags		=	CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER |
+					CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
+	.cra_blocksize		=	1,
+	.cra_ctxsize		=	sizeof(struct s390_aes_ctx),
+	.cra_type		=	&crypto_blkcipher_type,
+	.cra_module		=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_init		=	fallback_init_blk,
+	.cra_exit		=	fallback_exit_blk,
+	.cra_u			=	{
+		.blkcipher = {
+			.min_keysize		=	AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+			.max_keysize		=	AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+			.ivsize			=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			.setkey			=	ctr_aes_set_key,
+			.encrypt		=	ctr_aes_encrypt,
+			.decrypt		=	ctr_aes_decrypt,
+		}
+	}
+};
+
+static int gcm_aes_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,
+			  unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+
+	switch (keylen) {
+	case AES_KEYSIZE_128:
+		ctx->fc = CPACF_KMA_GCM_AES_128;
+		break;
+	case AES_KEYSIZE_192:
+		ctx->fc = CPACF_KMA_GCM_AES_192;
+		break;
+	case AES_KEYSIZE_256:
+		ctx->fc = CPACF_KMA_GCM_AES_256;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(ctx->key, key, keylen);
+	ctx->key_len = keylen;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int gcm_aes_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm, unsigned int authsize)
+{
+	switch (authsize) {
+	case 4:
+	case 8:
+	case 12:
+	case 13:
+	case 14:
+	case 15:
+	case 16:
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void gcm_walk_start(struct gcm_sg_walk *gw, struct scatterlist *sg,
+			   unsigned int len)
+{
+	memset(gw, 0, sizeof(*gw));
+	gw->walk_bytes_remain = len;
+	scatterwalk_start(&gw->walk, sg);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int _gcm_sg_clamp_and_map(struct gcm_sg_walk *gw)
+{
+	struct scatterlist *nextsg;
+
+	gw->walk_bytes = scatterwalk_clamp(&gw->walk, gw->walk_bytes_remain);
+	while (!gw->walk_bytes) {
+		nextsg = sg_next(gw->walk.sg);
+		if (!nextsg)
+			return 0;
+		scatterwalk_start(&gw->walk, nextsg);
+		gw->walk_bytes = scatterwalk_clamp(&gw->walk,
+						   gw->walk_bytes_remain);
+	}
+	gw->walk_ptr = scatterwalk_map(&gw->walk);
+	return gw->walk_bytes;
+}
+
+static inline void _gcm_sg_unmap_and_advance(struct gcm_sg_walk *gw,
+					     unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	gw->walk_bytes_remain -= nbytes;
+	scatterwalk_unmap(gw->walk_ptr);
+	scatterwalk_advance(&gw->walk, nbytes);
+	scatterwalk_done(&gw->walk, 0, gw->walk_bytes_remain);
+	gw->walk_ptr = NULL;
+}
+
+static int gcm_in_walk_go(struct gcm_sg_walk *gw, unsigned int minbytesneeded)
+{
+	int n;
+
+	if (gw->buf_bytes && gw->buf_bytes >= minbytesneeded) {
+		gw->ptr = gw->buf;
+		gw->nbytes = gw->buf_bytes;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (gw->walk_bytes_remain == 0) {
+		gw->ptr = NULL;
+		gw->nbytes = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!_gcm_sg_clamp_and_map(gw)) {
+		gw->ptr = NULL;
+		gw->nbytes = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!gw->buf_bytes && gw->walk_bytes >= minbytesneeded) {
+		gw->ptr = gw->walk_ptr;
+		gw->nbytes = gw->walk_bytes;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	while (1) {
+		n = min(gw->walk_bytes, AES_BLOCK_SIZE - gw->buf_bytes);
+		memcpy(gw->buf + gw->buf_bytes, gw->walk_ptr, n);
+		gw->buf_bytes += n;
+		_gcm_sg_unmap_and_advance(gw, n);
+		if (gw->buf_bytes >= minbytesneeded) {
+			gw->ptr = gw->buf;
+			gw->nbytes = gw->buf_bytes;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (!_gcm_sg_clamp_and_map(gw)) {
+			gw->ptr = NULL;
+			gw->nbytes = 0;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	return gw->nbytes;
+}
+
+static int gcm_out_walk_go(struct gcm_sg_walk *gw, unsigned int minbytesneeded)
+{
+	if (gw->walk_bytes_remain == 0) {
+		gw->ptr = NULL;
+		gw->nbytes = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!_gcm_sg_clamp_and_map(gw)) {
+		gw->ptr = NULL;
+		gw->nbytes = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (gw->walk_bytes >= minbytesneeded) {
+		gw->ptr = gw->walk_ptr;
+		gw->nbytes = gw->walk_bytes;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	scatterwalk_unmap(gw->walk_ptr);
+	gw->walk_ptr = NULL;
+
+	gw->ptr = gw->buf;
+	gw->nbytes = sizeof(gw->buf);
+
+out:
+	return gw->nbytes;
+}
+
+static int gcm_in_walk_done(struct gcm_sg_walk *gw, unsigned int bytesdone)
+{
+	if (gw->ptr == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (gw->ptr == gw->buf) {
+		int n = gw->buf_bytes - bytesdone;
+		if (n > 0) {
+			memmove(gw->buf, gw->buf + bytesdone, n);
+			gw->buf_bytes = n;
+		} else
+			gw->buf_bytes = 0;
+	} else
+		_gcm_sg_unmap_and_advance(gw, bytesdone);
+
+	return bytesdone;
+}
+
+static int gcm_out_walk_done(struct gcm_sg_walk *gw, unsigned int bytesdone)
+{
+	int i, n;
+
+	if (gw->ptr == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (gw->ptr == gw->buf) {
+		for (i = 0; i < bytesdone; i += n) {
+			if (!_gcm_sg_clamp_and_map(gw))
+				return i;
+			n = min(gw->walk_bytes, bytesdone - i);
+			memcpy(gw->walk_ptr, gw->buf + i, n);
+			_gcm_sg_unmap_and_advance(gw, n);
+		}
+	} else
+		_gcm_sg_unmap_and_advance(gw, bytesdone);
+
+	return bytesdone;
+}
+
+static int gcm_aes_crypt(struct aead_request *req, unsigned int flags)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
+	unsigned int taglen = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
+	unsigned int aadlen = req->assoclen;
+	unsigned int pclen = req->cryptlen;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	unsigned int n, len, in_bytes, out_bytes,
+		     min_bytes, bytes, aad_bytes, pc_bytes;
+	struct gcm_sg_walk gw_in, gw_out;
+	u8 tag[GHASH_DIGEST_SIZE];
+
+	struct {
+		u32 _[3];		/* reserved */
+		u32 cv;			/* Counter Value */
+		u8 t[GHASH_DIGEST_SIZE];/* Tag */
+		u8 h[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];	/* Hash-subkey */
+		u64 taadl;		/* Total AAD Length */
+		u64 tpcl;		/* Total Plain-/Cipher-text Length */
+		u8 j0[GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE];/* initial counter value */
+		u8 k[AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE];	/* Key */
+	} param;
+
+	/*
+	 * encrypt
+	 *   req->src: aad||plaintext
+	 *   req->dst: aad||ciphertext||tag
+	 * decrypt
+	 *   req->src: aad||ciphertext||tag
+	 *   req->dst: aad||plaintext, return 0 or -EBADMSG
+	 * aad, plaintext and ciphertext may be empty.
+	 */
+	if (flags & CPACF_DECRYPT)
+		pclen -= taglen;
+	len = aadlen + pclen;
+
+	memset(&param, 0, sizeof(param));
+	param.cv = 1;
+	param.taadl = aadlen * 8;
+	param.tpcl = pclen * 8;
+	memcpy(param.j0, req->iv, ivsize);
+	*(u32 *)(param.j0 + ivsize) = 1;
+	memcpy(param.k, ctx->key, ctx->key_len);
+
+	gcm_walk_start(&gw_in, req->src, len);
+	gcm_walk_start(&gw_out, req->dst, len);
+
+	do {
+		min_bytes = min_t(unsigned int,
+				  aadlen > 0 ? aadlen : pclen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		in_bytes = gcm_in_walk_go(&gw_in, min_bytes);
+		out_bytes = gcm_out_walk_go(&gw_out, min_bytes);
+		bytes = min(in_bytes, out_bytes);
+
+		if (aadlen + pclen <= bytes) {
+			aad_bytes = aadlen;
+			pc_bytes = pclen;
+			flags |= CPACF_KMA_LAAD | CPACF_KMA_LPC;
+		} else {
+			if (aadlen <= bytes) {
+				aad_bytes = aadlen;
+				pc_bytes = (bytes - aadlen) &
+					   ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+				flags |= CPACF_KMA_LAAD;
+			} else {
+				aad_bytes = bytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+				pc_bytes = 0;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (aad_bytes > 0)
+			memcpy(gw_out.ptr, gw_in.ptr, aad_bytes);
+
+		cpacf_kma(ctx->fc | flags, &param,
+			  gw_out.ptr + aad_bytes,
+			  gw_in.ptr + aad_bytes, pc_bytes,
+			  gw_in.ptr, aad_bytes);
+
+		n = aad_bytes + pc_bytes;
+		if (gcm_in_walk_done(&gw_in, n) != n)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		if (gcm_out_walk_done(&gw_out, n) != n)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		aadlen -= aad_bytes;
+		pclen -= pc_bytes;
+	} while (aadlen + pclen > 0);
+
+	if (flags & CPACF_DECRYPT) {
+		scatterwalk_map_and_copy(tag, req->src, len, taglen, 0);
+		if (crypto_memneq(tag, param.t, taglen))
+			ret = -EBADMSG;
+	} else
+		scatterwalk_map_and_copy(param.t, req->dst, len, taglen, 1);
+
+	memzero_explicit(&param, sizeof(param));
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int gcm_aes_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	return gcm_aes_crypt(req, CPACF_ENCRYPT);
+}
+
+static int gcm_aes_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	return gcm_aes_crypt(req, CPACF_DECRYPT);
+}
+
+static struct aead_alg gcm_aes_aead = {
+	.setkey			= gcm_aes_setkey,
+	.setauthsize		= gcm_aes_setauthsize,
+	.encrypt		= gcm_aes_encrypt,
+	.decrypt		= gcm_aes_decrypt,
+
+	.ivsize			= GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - sizeof(u32),
+	.maxauthsize		= GHASH_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	.chunksize		= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+
+	.base			= {
+		.cra_blocksize		= 1,
+		.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct s390_aes_ctx),
+		.cra_priority		= 900,
+		.cra_name		= "gcm(aes)",
+		.cra_driver_name	= "gcm-aes-s390",
+		.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,
+	},
+};
+
+static struct crypto_alg *aes_s390_algs_ptr[5];
+static int aes_s390_algs_num;
+static struct aead_alg *aes_s390_aead_alg;
+
+static int aes_s390_register_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = crypto_register_alg(alg);
+	if (!ret)
+		aes_s390_algs_ptr[aes_s390_algs_num++] = alg;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void aes_s390_fini(void)
+{
+	while (aes_s390_algs_num--)
+		crypto_unregister_alg(aes_s390_algs_ptr[aes_s390_algs_num]);
+	if (ctrblk)
+		free_page((unsigned long) ctrblk);
+
+	if (aes_s390_aead_alg)
+		crypto_unregister_aead(aes_s390_aead_alg);
+}
+
+static int __init aes_s390_init(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	/* Query available functions for KM, KMC, KMCTR and KMA */
+	cpacf_query(CPACF_KM, &km_functions);
+	cpacf_query(CPACF_KMC, &kmc_functions);
+	cpacf_query(CPACF_KMCTR, &kmctr_functions);
+	cpacf_query(CPACF_KMA, &kma_functions);
+
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_AES_128) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_AES_192) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_AES_256)) {
+		ret = aes_s390_register_alg(&aes_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+		ret = aes_s390_register_alg(&ecb_aes_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_AES_128) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_AES_192) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_AES_256)) {
+		ret = aes_s390_register_alg(&cbc_aes_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_XTS_128) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_XTS_256)) {
+		ret = aes_s390_register_alg(&xts_aes_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_AES_128) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_AES_192) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_AES_256)) {
+		ctrblk = (u8 *) __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!ctrblk) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out_err;
+		}
+		ret = aes_s390_register_alg(&ctr_aes_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&kma_functions, CPACF_KMA_GCM_AES_128) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&kma_functions, CPACF_KMA_GCM_AES_192) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&kma_functions, CPACF_KMA_GCM_AES_256)) {
+		ret = crypto_register_aead(&gcm_aes_aead);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+		aes_s390_aead_alg = &gcm_aes_aead;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+out_err:
+	aes_s390_fini();
+	return ret;
+}
+
+module_cpu_feature_match(MSA, aes_s390_init);
+module_exit(aes_s390_fini);
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("aes-all");
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Rijndael (AES) Cipher Algorithm");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/arch_random.c b/arch/s390/crypto/arch_random.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4cbb4b6d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/arch_random.c
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * s390 arch random implementation.
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2017, 2018
+ * Author(s): Harald Freudenberger
+ *
+ * The s390_arch_random_generate() function may be called from random.c
+ * in interrupt context. So this implementation does the best to be very
+ * fast. There is a buffer of random data which is asynchronously checked
+ * and filled by a workqueue thread.
+ * If there are enough bytes in the buffer the s390_arch_random_generate()
+ * just delivers these bytes. Otherwise false is returned until the
+ * worker thread refills the buffer.
+ * The worker fills the rng buffer by pulling fresh entropy from the
+ * high quality (but slow) true hardware random generator. This entropy
+ * is then spread over the buffer with an pseudo random generator PRNG.
+ * As the arch_get_random_seed_long() fetches 8 bytes and the calling
+ * function add_interrupt_randomness() counts this as 1 bit entropy the
+ * distribution needs to make sure there is in fact 1 bit entropy contained
+ * in 8 bytes of the buffer. The current values pull 32 byte entropy
+ * and scatter this into a 2048 byte buffer. So 8 byte in the buffer
+ * will contain 1 bit of entropy.
+ * The worker thread is rescheduled based on the charge level of the
+ * buffer but at least with 500 ms delay to avoid too much CPU consumption.
+ * So the max. amount of rng data delivered via arch_get_random_seed is
+ * limited to 4k bytes per second.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/static_key.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(s390_arch_random_available);
+
+atomic64_t s390_arch_random_counter = ATOMIC64_INIT(0);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(s390_arch_random_counter);
+
+#define ARCH_REFILL_TICKS (HZ/2)
+#define ARCH_PRNG_SEED_SIZE 32
+#define ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE 2048
+
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(arch_rng_lock);
+static u8 *arch_rng_buf;
+static unsigned int arch_rng_buf_idx;
+
+static void arch_rng_refill_buffer(struct work_struct *);
+static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(arch_rng_work, arch_rng_refill_buffer);
+
+bool s390_arch_random_generate(u8 *buf, unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	/* max hunk is ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE */
+	if (nbytes > ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE)
+		return false;
+
+	/* lock rng buffer */
+	if (!spin_trylock(&arch_rng_lock))
+		return false;
+
+	/* try to resolve the requested amount of bytes from the buffer */
+	arch_rng_buf_idx -= nbytes;
+	if (arch_rng_buf_idx < ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE) {
+		memcpy(buf, arch_rng_buf + arch_rng_buf_idx, nbytes);
+		atomic64_add(nbytes, &s390_arch_random_counter);
+		spin_unlock(&arch_rng_lock);
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	/* not enough bytes in rng buffer, refill is done asynchronously */
+	spin_unlock(&arch_rng_lock);
+
+	return false;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(s390_arch_random_generate);
+
+static void arch_rng_refill_buffer(struct work_struct *unused)
+{
+	unsigned int delay = ARCH_REFILL_TICKS;
+
+	spin_lock(&arch_rng_lock);
+	if (arch_rng_buf_idx > ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE) {
+		/* buffer is exhausted and needs refill */
+		u8 seed[ARCH_PRNG_SEED_SIZE];
+		u8 prng_wa[240];
+		/* fetch ARCH_PRNG_SEED_SIZE bytes of entropy */
+		cpacf_trng(NULL, 0, seed, sizeof(seed));
+		/* blow this entropy up to ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE with PRNG */
+		memset(prng_wa, 0, sizeof(prng_wa));
+		cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_SEED,
+			   &prng_wa, NULL, 0, seed, sizeof(seed));
+		cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN,
+			   &prng_wa, arch_rng_buf, ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE, NULL, 0);
+		arch_rng_buf_idx = ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE;
+	}
+	delay += (ARCH_REFILL_TICKS * arch_rng_buf_idx) / ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE;
+	spin_unlock(&arch_rng_lock);
+
+	/* kick next check */
+	queue_delayed_work(system_long_wq, &arch_rng_work, delay);
+}
+
+static int __init s390_arch_random_init(void)
+{
+	/* all the needed PRNO subfunctions available ? */
+	if (cpacf_query_func(CPACF_PRNO, CPACF_PRNO_TRNG) &&
+	    cpacf_query_func(CPACF_PRNO, CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN)) {
+
+		/* alloc arch random working buffer */
+		arch_rng_buf = kmalloc(ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!arch_rng_buf)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		/* kick worker queue job to fill the random buffer */
+		queue_delayed_work(system_long_wq,
+				   &arch_rng_work, ARCH_REFILL_TICKS);
+
+		/* enable arch random to the outside world */
+		static_branch_enable(&s390_arch_random_available);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+arch_initcall(s390_arch_random_init);
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/crc32-vx.c b/arch/s390/crypto/crc32-vx.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..423ee0588
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/crc32-vx.c
@@ -0,0 +1,314 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Crypto-API module for CRC-32 algorithms implemented with the
+ * z/Architecture Vector Extension Facility.
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2015
+ * Author(s): Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+ */
+#define KMSG_COMPONENT	"crc32-vx"
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)	KMSG_COMPONENT ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <linux/crc32.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
+
+
+#define CRC32_BLOCK_SIZE	1
+#define CRC32_DIGEST_SIZE	4
+
+#define VX_MIN_LEN		64
+#define VX_ALIGNMENT		16L
+#define VX_ALIGN_MASK		(VX_ALIGNMENT - 1)
+
+struct crc_ctx {
+	u32 key;
+};
+
+struct crc_desc_ctx {
+	u32 crc;
+};
+
+/* Prototypes for functions in assembly files */
+u32 crc32_le_vgfm_16(u32 crc, unsigned char const *buf, size_t size);
+u32 crc32_be_vgfm_16(u32 crc, unsigned char const *buf, size_t size);
+u32 crc32c_le_vgfm_16(u32 crc, unsigned char const *buf, size_t size);
+
+/*
+ * DEFINE_CRC32_VX() - Define a CRC-32 function using the vector extension
+ *
+ * Creates a function to perform a particular CRC-32 computation. Depending
+ * on the message buffer, the hardware-accelerated or software implementation
+ * is used.   Note that the message buffer is aligned to improve fetch
+ * operations of VECTOR LOAD MULTIPLE instructions.
+ *
+ */
+#define DEFINE_CRC32_VX(___fname, ___crc32_vx, ___crc32_sw)		    \
+	static u32 __pure ___fname(u32 crc,				    \
+				unsigned char const *data, size_t datalen)  \
+	{								    \
+		struct kernel_fpu vxstate;				    \
+		unsigned long prealign, aligned, remaining;		    \
+									    \
+		if (datalen < VX_MIN_LEN + VX_ALIGN_MASK)		    \
+			return ___crc32_sw(crc, data, datalen);		    \
+									    \
+		if ((unsigned long)data & VX_ALIGN_MASK) {		    \
+			prealign = VX_ALIGNMENT -			    \
+				  ((unsigned long)data & VX_ALIGN_MASK);    \
+			datalen -= prealign;				    \
+			crc = ___crc32_sw(crc, data, prealign);		    \
+			data = (void *)((unsigned long)data + prealign);    \
+		}							    \
+									    \
+		aligned = datalen & ~VX_ALIGN_MASK;			    \
+		remaining = datalen & VX_ALIGN_MASK;			    \
+									    \
+		kernel_fpu_begin(&vxstate, KERNEL_VXR_LOW);		    \
+		crc = ___crc32_vx(crc, data, aligned);			    \
+		kernel_fpu_end(&vxstate, KERNEL_VXR_LOW);		    \
+									    \
+		if (remaining)						    \
+			crc = ___crc32_sw(crc, data + aligned, remaining);  \
+									    \
+		return crc;						    \
+	}
+
+DEFINE_CRC32_VX(crc32_le_vx, crc32_le_vgfm_16, crc32_le)
+DEFINE_CRC32_VX(crc32_be_vx, crc32_be_vgfm_16, crc32_be)
+DEFINE_CRC32_VX(crc32c_le_vx, crc32c_le_vgfm_16, __crc32c_le)
+
+
+static int crc32_vx_cra_init_zero(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+	struct crc_ctx *mctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	mctx->key = 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int crc32_vx_cra_init_invert(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+	struct crc_ctx *mctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	mctx->key = ~0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int crc32_vx_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+	struct crc_ctx *mctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
+	struct crc_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+	ctx->crc = mctx->key;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int crc32_vx_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *newkey,
+			   unsigned int newkeylen)
+{
+	struct crc_ctx *mctx = crypto_shash_ctx(tfm);
+
+	if (newkeylen != sizeof(mctx->key)) {
+		crypto_shash_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	mctx->key = le32_to_cpu(*(__le32 *)newkey);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int crc32be_vx_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *newkey,
+			     unsigned int newkeylen)
+{
+	struct crc_ctx *mctx = crypto_shash_ctx(tfm);
+
+	if (newkeylen != sizeof(mctx->key)) {
+		crypto_shash_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	mctx->key = be32_to_cpu(*(__be32 *)newkey);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int crc32le_vx_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+{
+	struct crc_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+	*(__le32 *)out = cpu_to_le32p(&ctx->crc);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int crc32be_vx_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+{
+	struct crc_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+	*(__be32 *)out = cpu_to_be32p(&ctx->crc);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int crc32c_vx_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+{
+	struct crc_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+	/*
+	 * Perform a final XOR with 0xFFFFFFFF to be in sync
+	 * with the generic crc32c shash implementation.
+	 */
+	*(__le32 *)out = ~cpu_to_le32p(&ctx->crc);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __crc32le_vx_finup(u32 *crc, const u8 *data, unsigned int len,
+			      u8 *out)
+{
+	*(__le32 *)out = cpu_to_le32(crc32_le_vx(*crc, data, len));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __crc32be_vx_finup(u32 *crc, const u8 *data, unsigned int len,
+			      u8 *out)
+{
+	*(__be32 *)out = cpu_to_be32(crc32_be_vx(*crc, data, len));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __crc32c_vx_finup(u32 *crc, const u8 *data, unsigned int len,
+			     u8 *out)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Perform a final XOR with 0xFFFFFFFF to be in sync
+	 * with the generic crc32c shash implementation.
+	 */
+	*(__le32 *)out = ~cpu_to_le32(crc32c_le_vx(*crc, data, len));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+#define CRC32_VX_FINUP(alg, func)					      \
+	static int alg ## _vx_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,  \
+				   unsigned int datalen, u8 *out)	      \
+	{								      \
+		return __ ## alg ## _vx_finup(shash_desc_ctx(desc),	      \
+					      data, datalen, out);	      \
+	}
+
+CRC32_VX_FINUP(crc32le, crc32_le_vx)
+CRC32_VX_FINUP(crc32be, crc32_be_vx)
+CRC32_VX_FINUP(crc32c, crc32c_le_vx)
+
+#define CRC32_VX_DIGEST(alg, func)					      \
+	static int alg ## _vx_digest(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data, \
+				     unsigned int len, u8 *out)		      \
+	{								      \
+		return __ ## alg ## _vx_finup(crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm),    \
+					      data, len, out);		      \
+	}
+
+CRC32_VX_DIGEST(crc32le, crc32_le_vx)
+CRC32_VX_DIGEST(crc32be, crc32_be_vx)
+CRC32_VX_DIGEST(crc32c, crc32c_le_vx)
+
+#define CRC32_VX_UPDATE(alg, func)					      \
+	static int alg ## _vx_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data, \
+				     unsigned int datalen)		      \
+	{								      \
+		struct crc_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);	      \
+		ctx->crc = func(ctx->crc, data, datalen);		      \
+		return 0;						      \
+	}
+
+CRC32_VX_UPDATE(crc32le, crc32_le_vx)
+CRC32_VX_UPDATE(crc32be, crc32_be_vx)
+CRC32_VX_UPDATE(crc32c, crc32c_le_vx)
+
+
+static struct shash_alg crc32_vx_algs[] = {
+	/* CRC-32 LE */
+	{
+		.init		=	crc32_vx_init,
+		.setkey		=	crc32_vx_setkey,
+		.update		=	crc32le_vx_update,
+		.final		=	crc32le_vx_final,
+		.finup		=	crc32le_vx_finup,
+		.digest		=	crc32le_vx_digest,
+		.descsize	=	sizeof(struct crc_desc_ctx),
+		.digestsize	=	CRC32_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		.base		=	{
+			.cra_name	 = "crc32",
+			.cra_driver_name = "crc32-vx",
+			.cra_priority	 = 200,
+			.cra_flags	 = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
+			.cra_blocksize	 = CRC32_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			.cra_ctxsize	 = sizeof(struct crc_ctx),
+			.cra_module	 = THIS_MODULE,
+			.cra_init	 = crc32_vx_cra_init_zero,
+		},
+	},
+	/* CRC-32 BE */
+	{
+		.init		=	crc32_vx_init,
+		.setkey		=	crc32be_vx_setkey,
+		.update		=	crc32be_vx_update,
+		.final		=	crc32be_vx_final,
+		.finup		=	crc32be_vx_finup,
+		.digest		=	crc32be_vx_digest,
+		.descsize	=	sizeof(struct crc_desc_ctx),
+		.digestsize	=	CRC32_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		.base		=	{
+			.cra_name	 = "crc32be",
+			.cra_driver_name = "crc32be-vx",
+			.cra_priority	 = 200,
+			.cra_flags	 = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
+			.cra_blocksize	 = CRC32_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			.cra_ctxsize	 = sizeof(struct crc_ctx),
+			.cra_module	 = THIS_MODULE,
+			.cra_init	 = crc32_vx_cra_init_zero,
+		},
+	},
+	/* CRC-32C LE */
+	{
+		.init		=	crc32_vx_init,
+		.setkey		=	crc32_vx_setkey,
+		.update		=	crc32c_vx_update,
+		.final		=	crc32c_vx_final,
+		.finup		=	crc32c_vx_finup,
+		.digest		=	crc32c_vx_digest,
+		.descsize	=	sizeof(struct crc_desc_ctx),
+		.digestsize	=	CRC32_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		.base		=	{
+			.cra_name	 = "crc32c",
+			.cra_driver_name = "crc32c-vx",
+			.cra_priority	 = 200,
+			.cra_flags	 = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
+			.cra_blocksize	 = CRC32_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			.cra_ctxsize	 = sizeof(struct crc_ctx),
+			.cra_module	 = THIS_MODULE,
+			.cra_init	 = crc32_vx_cra_init_invert,
+		},
+	},
+};
+
+
+static int __init crc_vx_mod_init(void)
+{
+	return crypto_register_shashes(crc32_vx_algs,
+				       ARRAY_SIZE(crc32_vx_algs));
+}
+
+static void __exit crc_vx_mod_exit(void)
+{
+	crypto_unregister_shashes(crc32_vx_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(crc32_vx_algs));
+}
+
+module_cpu_feature_match(VXRS, crc_vx_mod_init);
+module_exit(crc_vx_mod_exit);
+
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com>");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("crc32");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("crc32-vx");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("crc32c");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("crc32c-vx");
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/crc32be-vx.S b/arch/s390/crypto/crc32be-vx.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2bf01ba44
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/crc32be-vx.S
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Hardware-accelerated CRC-32 variants for Linux on z Systems
+ *
+ * Use the z/Architecture Vector Extension Facility to accelerate the
+ * computing of CRC-32 checksums.
+ *
+ * This CRC-32 implementation algorithm processes the most-significant
+ * bit first (BE).
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2015
+ * Author(s): Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-insn.h>
+#include <asm/vx-insn.h>
+
+/* Vector register range containing CRC-32 constants */
+#define CONST_R1R2		%v9
+#define CONST_R3R4		%v10
+#define CONST_R5		%v11
+#define CONST_R6		%v12
+#define CONST_RU_POLY		%v13
+#define CONST_CRC_POLY		%v14
+
+.data
+.align 8
+
+/*
+ * The CRC-32 constant block contains reduction constants to fold and
+ * process particular chunks of the input data stream in parallel.
+ *
+ * For the CRC-32 variants, the constants are precomputed according to
+ * these defintions:
+ *
+ *	R1 = x4*128+64 mod P(x)
+ *	R2 = x4*128    mod P(x)
+ *	R3 = x128+64   mod P(x)
+ *	R4 = x128      mod P(x)
+ *	R5 = x96       mod P(x)
+ *	R6 = x64       mod P(x)
+ *
+ *	Barret reduction constant, u, is defined as floor(x**64 / P(x)).
+ *
+ *	where P(x) is the polynomial in the normal domain and the P'(x) is the
+ *	polynomial in the reversed (bitreflected) domain.
+ *
+ * Note that the constant definitions below are extended in order to compute
+ * intermediate results with a single VECTOR GALOIS FIELD MULTIPLY instruction.
+ * The righmost doubleword can be 0 to prevent contribution to the result or
+ * can be multiplied by 1 to perform an XOR without the need for a separate
+ * VECTOR EXCLUSIVE OR instruction.
+ *
+ * CRC-32 (IEEE 802.3 Ethernet, ...) polynomials:
+ *
+ *	P(x)  = 0x04C11DB7
+ *	P'(x) = 0xEDB88320
+ */
+
+.Lconstants_CRC_32_BE:
+	.quad		0x08833794c, 0x0e6228b11	# R1, R2
+	.quad		0x0c5b9cd4c, 0x0e8a45605	# R3, R4
+	.quad		0x0f200aa66, 1 << 32		# R5, x32
+	.quad		0x0490d678d, 1			# R6, 1
+	.quad		0x104d101df, 0			# u
+	.quad		0x104C11DB7, 0			# P(x)
+
+.previous
+
+	GEN_BR_THUNK %r14
+
+.text
+/*
+ * The CRC-32 function(s) use these calling conventions:
+ *
+ * Parameters:
+ *
+ *	%r2:	Initial CRC value, typically ~0; and final CRC (return) value.
+ *	%r3:	Input buffer pointer, performance might be improved if the
+ *		buffer is on a doubleword boundary.
+ *	%r4:	Length of the buffer, must be 64 bytes or greater.
+ *
+ * Register usage:
+ *
+ *	%r5:	CRC-32 constant pool base pointer.
+ *	V0:	Initial CRC value and intermediate constants and results.
+ *	V1..V4:	Data for CRC computation.
+ *	V5..V8:	Next data chunks that are fetched from the input buffer.
+ *
+ *	V9..V14: CRC-32 constants.
+ */
+ENTRY(crc32_be_vgfm_16)
+	/* Load CRC-32 constants */
+	larl	%r5,.Lconstants_CRC_32_BE
+	VLM	CONST_R1R2,CONST_CRC_POLY,0,%r5
+
+	/* Load the initial CRC value into the leftmost word of V0. */
+	VZERO	%v0
+	VLVGF	%v0,%r2,0
+
+	/* Load a 64-byte data chunk and XOR with CRC */
+	VLM	%v1,%v4,0,%r3		/* 64-bytes into V1..V4 */
+	VX	%v1,%v0,%v1		/* V1 ^= CRC */
+	aghi	%r3,64			/* BUF = BUF + 64 */
+	aghi	%r4,-64			/* LEN = LEN - 64 */
+
+	/* Check remaining buffer size and jump to proper folding method */
+	cghi	%r4,64
+	jl	.Lless_than_64bytes
+
+.Lfold_64bytes_loop:
+	/* Load the next 64-byte data chunk into V5 to V8 */
+	VLM	%v5,%v8,0,%r3
+
+	/*
+	 * Perform a GF(2) multiplication of the doublewords in V1 with
+	 * the reduction constants in V0.  The intermediate result is
+	 * then folded (accumulated) with the next data chunk in V5 and
+	 * stored in V1.  Repeat this step for the register contents
+	 * in V2, V3, and V4 respectively.
+	 */
+	VGFMAG	%v1,CONST_R1R2,%v1,%v5
+	VGFMAG	%v2,CONST_R1R2,%v2,%v6
+	VGFMAG	%v3,CONST_R1R2,%v3,%v7
+	VGFMAG	%v4,CONST_R1R2,%v4,%v8
+
+	/* Adjust buffer pointer and length for next loop */
+	aghi	%r3,64			/* BUF = BUF + 64 */
+	aghi	%r4,-64			/* LEN = LEN - 64 */
+
+	cghi	%r4,64
+	jnl	.Lfold_64bytes_loop
+
+.Lless_than_64bytes:
+	/* Fold V1 to V4 into a single 128-bit value in V1 */
+	VGFMAG	%v1,CONST_R3R4,%v1,%v2
+	VGFMAG	%v1,CONST_R3R4,%v1,%v3
+	VGFMAG	%v1,CONST_R3R4,%v1,%v4
+
+	/* Check whether to continue with 64-bit folding */
+	cghi	%r4,16
+	jl	.Lfinal_fold
+
+.Lfold_16bytes_loop:
+
+	VL	%v2,0,,%r3		/* Load next data chunk */
+	VGFMAG	%v1,CONST_R3R4,%v1,%v2	/* Fold next data chunk */
+
+	/* Adjust buffer pointer and size for folding next data chunk */
+	aghi	%r3,16
+	aghi	%r4,-16
+
+	/* Process remaining data chunks */
+	cghi	%r4,16
+	jnl	.Lfold_16bytes_loop
+
+.Lfinal_fold:
+	/*
+	 * The R5 constant is used to fold a 128-bit value into an 96-bit value
+	 * that is XORed with the next 96-bit input data chunk.  To use a single
+	 * VGFMG instruction, multiply the rightmost 64-bit with x^32 (1<<32) to
+	 * form an intermediate 96-bit value (with appended zeros) which is then
+	 * XORed with the intermediate reduction result.
+	 */
+	VGFMG	%v1,CONST_R5,%v1
+
+	/*
+	 * Further reduce the remaining 96-bit value to a 64-bit value using a
+	 * single VGFMG, the rightmost doubleword is multiplied with 0x1. The
+	 * intermediate result is then XORed with the product of the leftmost
+	 * doubleword with R6.	The result is a 64-bit value and is subject to
+	 * the Barret reduction.
+	 */
+	VGFMG	%v1,CONST_R6,%v1
+
+	/*
+	 * The input values to the Barret reduction are the degree-63 polynomial
+	 * in V1 (R(x)), degree-32 generator polynomial, and the reduction
+	 * constant u.	The Barret reduction result is the CRC value of R(x) mod
+	 * P(x).
+	 *
+	 * The Barret reduction algorithm is defined as:
+	 *
+	 *    1. T1(x) = floor( R(x) / x^32 ) GF2MUL u
+	 *    2. T2(x) = floor( T1(x) / x^32 ) GF2MUL P(x)
+	 *    3. C(x)  = R(x) XOR T2(x) mod x^32
+	 *
+	 * Note: To compensate the division by x^32, use the vector unpack
+	 * instruction to move the leftmost word into the leftmost doubleword
+	 * of the vector register.  The rightmost doubleword is multiplied
+	 * with zero to not contribute to the intermedate results.
+	 */
+
+	/* T1(x) = floor( R(x) / x^32 ) GF2MUL u */
+	VUPLLF	%v2,%v1
+	VGFMG	%v2,CONST_RU_POLY,%v2
+
+	/*
+	 * Compute the GF(2) product of the CRC polynomial in VO with T1(x) in
+	 * V2 and XOR the intermediate result, T2(x),  with the value in V1.
+	 * The final result is in the rightmost word of V2.
+	 */
+	VUPLLF	%v2,%v2
+	VGFMAG	%v2,CONST_CRC_POLY,%v2,%v1
+
+.Ldone:
+	VLGVF	%r2,%v2,3
+	BR_EX	%r14
+
+.previous
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/crc32le-vx.S b/arch/s390/crypto/crc32le-vx.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7d6f568bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/crc32le-vx.S
@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Hardware-accelerated CRC-32 variants for Linux on z Systems
+ *
+ * Use the z/Architecture Vector Extension Facility to accelerate the
+ * computing of bitreflected CRC-32 checksums for IEEE 802.3 Ethernet
+ * and Castagnoli.
+ *
+ * This CRC-32 implementation algorithm is bitreflected and processes
+ * the least-significant bit first (Little-Endian).
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2015
+ * Author(s): Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-insn.h>
+#include <asm/vx-insn.h>
+
+/* Vector register range containing CRC-32 constants */
+#define CONST_PERM_LE2BE	%v9
+#define CONST_R2R1		%v10
+#define CONST_R4R3		%v11
+#define CONST_R5		%v12
+#define CONST_RU_POLY		%v13
+#define CONST_CRC_POLY		%v14
+
+.data
+.align 8
+
+/*
+ * The CRC-32 constant block contains reduction constants to fold and
+ * process particular chunks of the input data stream in parallel.
+ *
+ * For the CRC-32 variants, the constants are precomputed according to
+ * these definitions:
+ *
+ *	R1 = [(x4*128+32 mod P'(x) << 32)]' << 1
+ *	R2 = [(x4*128-32 mod P'(x) << 32)]' << 1
+ *	R3 = [(x128+32 mod P'(x) << 32)]'   << 1
+ *	R4 = [(x128-32 mod P'(x) << 32)]'   << 1
+ *	R5 = [(x64 mod P'(x) << 32)]'	    << 1
+ *	R6 = [(x32 mod P'(x) << 32)]'	    << 1
+ *
+ *	The bitreflected Barret reduction constant, u', is defined as
+ *	the bit reversal of floor(x**64 / P(x)).
+ *
+ *	where P(x) is the polynomial in the normal domain and the P'(x) is the
+ *	polynomial in the reversed (bitreflected) domain.
+ *
+ * CRC-32 (IEEE 802.3 Ethernet, ...) polynomials:
+ *
+ *	P(x)  = 0x04C11DB7
+ *	P'(x) = 0xEDB88320
+ *
+ * CRC-32C (Castagnoli) polynomials:
+ *
+ *	P(x)  = 0x1EDC6F41
+ *	P'(x) = 0x82F63B78
+ */
+
+.Lconstants_CRC_32_LE:
+	.octa		0x0F0E0D0C0B0A09080706050403020100	# BE->LE mask
+	.quad		0x1c6e41596, 0x154442bd4		# R2, R1
+	.quad		0x0ccaa009e, 0x1751997d0		# R4, R3
+	.octa		0x163cd6124				# R5
+	.octa		0x1F7011641				# u'
+	.octa		0x1DB710641				# P'(x) << 1
+
+.Lconstants_CRC_32C_LE:
+	.octa		0x0F0E0D0C0B0A09080706050403020100	# BE->LE mask
+	.quad		0x09e4addf8, 0x740eef02			# R2, R1
+	.quad		0x14cd00bd6, 0xf20c0dfe			# R4, R3
+	.octa		0x0dd45aab8				# R5
+	.octa		0x0dea713f1				# u'
+	.octa		0x105ec76f0				# P'(x) << 1
+
+.previous
+
+	GEN_BR_THUNK %r14
+
+.text
+
+/*
+ * The CRC-32 functions use these calling conventions:
+ *
+ * Parameters:
+ *
+ *	%r2:	Initial CRC value, typically ~0; and final CRC (return) value.
+ *	%r3:	Input buffer pointer, performance might be improved if the
+ *		buffer is on a doubleword boundary.
+ *	%r4:	Length of the buffer, must be 64 bytes or greater.
+ *
+ * Register usage:
+ *
+ *	%r5:	CRC-32 constant pool base pointer.
+ *	V0:	Initial CRC value and intermediate constants and results.
+ *	V1..V4:	Data for CRC computation.
+ *	V5..V8:	Next data chunks that are fetched from the input buffer.
+ *	V9:	Constant for BE->LE conversion and shift operations
+ *
+ *	V10..V14: CRC-32 constants.
+ */
+
+ENTRY(crc32_le_vgfm_16)
+	larl	%r5,.Lconstants_CRC_32_LE
+	j	crc32_le_vgfm_generic
+
+ENTRY(crc32c_le_vgfm_16)
+	larl	%r5,.Lconstants_CRC_32C_LE
+	j	crc32_le_vgfm_generic
+
+
+crc32_le_vgfm_generic:
+	/* Load CRC-32 constants */
+	VLM	CONST_PERM_LE2BE,CONST_CRC_POLY,0,%r5
+
+	/*
+	 * Load the initial CRC value.
+	 *
+	 * The CRC value is loaded into the rightmost word of the
+	 * vector register and is later XORed with the LSB portion
+	 * of the loaded input data.
+	 */
+	VZERO	%v0			/* Clear V0 */
+	VLVGF	%v0,%r2,3		/* Load CRC into rightmost word */
+
+	/* Load a 64-byte data chunk and XOR with CRC */
+	VLM	%v1,%v4,0,%r3		/* 64-bytes into V1..V4 */
+	VPERM	%v1,%v1,%v1,CONST_PERM_LE2BE
+	VPERM	%v2,%v2,%v2,CONST_PERM_LE2BE
+	VPERM	%v3,%v3,%v3,CONST_PERM_LE2BE
+	VPERM	%v4,%v4,%v4,CONST_PERM_LE2BE
+
+	VX	%v1,%v0,%v1		/* V1 ^= CRC */
+	aghi	%r3,64			/* BUF = BUF + 64 */
+	aghi	%r4,-64			/* LEN = LEN - 64 */
+
+	cghi	%r4,64
+	jl	.Lless_than_64bytes
+
+.Lfold_64bytes_loop:
+	/* Load the next 64-byte data chunk into V5 to V8 */
+	VLM	%v5,%v8,0,%r3
+	VPERM	%v5,%v5,%v5,CONST_PERM_LE2BE
+	VPERM	%v6,%v6,%v6,CONST_PERM_LE2BE
+	VPERM	%v7,%v7,%v7,CONST_PERM_LE2BE
+	VPERM	%v8,%v8,%v8,CONST_PERM_LE2BE
+
+	/*
+	 * Perform a GF(2) multiplication of the doublewords in V1 with
+	 * the R1 and R2 reduction constants in V0.  The intermediate result
+	 * is then folded (accumulated) with the next data chunk in V5 and
+	 * stored in V1. Repeat this step for the register contents
+	 * in V2, V3, and V4 respectively.
+	 */
+	VGFMAG	%v1,CONST_R2R1,%v1,%v5
+	VGFMAG	%v2,CONST_R2R1,%v2,%v6
+	VGFMAG	%v3,CONST_R2R1,%v3,%v7
+	VGFMAG	%v4,CONST_R2R1,%v4,%v8
+
+	aghi	%r3,64			/* BUF = BUF + 64 */
+	aghi	%r4,-64			/* LEN = LEN - 64 */
+
+	cghi	%r4,64
+	jnl	.Lfold_64bytes_loop
+
+.Lless_than_64bytes:
+	/*
+	 * Fold V1 to V4 into a single 128-bit value in V1.  Multiply V1 with R3
+	 * and R4 and accumulating the next 128-bit chunk until a single 128-bit
+	 * value remains.
+	 */
+	VGFMAG	%v1,CONST_R4R3,%v1,%v2
+	VGFMAG	%v1,CONST_R4R3,%v1,%v3
+	VGFMAG	%v1,CONST_R4R3,%v1,%v4
+
+	cghi	%r4,16
+	jl	.Lfinal_fold
+
+.Lfold_16bytes_loop:
+
+	VL	%v2,0,,%r3		/* Load next data chunk */
+	VPERM	%v2,%v2,%v2,CONST_PERM_LE2BE
+	VGFMAG	%v1,CONST_R4R3,%v1,%v2	/* Fold next data chunk */
+
+	aghi	%r3,16
+	aghi	%r4,-16
+
+	cghi	%r4,16
+	jnl	.Lfold_16bytes_loop
+
+.Lfinal_fold:
+	/*
+	 * Set up a vector register for byte shifts.  The shift value must
+	 * be loaded in bits 1-4 in byte element 7 of a vector register.
+	 * Shift by 8 bytes: 0x40
+	 * Shift by 4 bytes: 0x20
+	 */
+	VLEIB	%v9,0x40,7
+
+	/*
+	 * Prepare V0 for the next GF(2) multiplication: shift V0 by 8 bytes
+	 * to move R4 into the rightmost doubleword and set the leftmost
+	 * doubleword to 0x1.
+	 */
+	VSRLB	%v0,CONST_R4R3,%v9
+	VLEIG	%v0,1,0
+
+	/*
+	 * Compute GF(2) product of V1 and V0.	The rightmost doubleword
+	 * of V1 is multiplied with R4.  The leftmost doubleword of V1 is
+	 * multiplied by 0x1 and is then XORed with rightmost product.
+	 * Implicitly, the intermediate leftmost product becomes padded
+	 */
+	VGFMG	%v1,%v0,%v1
+
+	/*
+	 * Now do the final 32-bit fold by multiplying the rightmost word
+	 * in V1 with R5 and XOR the result with the remaining bits in V1.
+	 *
+	 * To achieve this by a single VGFMAG, right shift V1 by a word
+	 * and store the result in V2 which is then accumulated.  Use the
+	 * vector unpack instruction to load the rightmost half of the
+	 * doubleword into the rightmost doubleword element of V1; the other
+	 * half is loaded in the leftmost doubleword.
+	 * The vector register with CONST_R5 contains the R5 constant in the
+	 * rightmost doubleword and the leftmost doubleword is zero to ignore
+	 * the leftmost product of V1.
+	 */
+	VLEIB	%v9,0x20,7		  /* Shift by words */
+	VSRLB	%v2,%v1,%v9		  /* Store remaining bits in V2 */
+	VUPLLF	%v1,%v1			  /* Split rightmost doubleword */
+	VGFMAG	%v1,CONST_R5,%v1,%v2	  /* V1 = (V1 * R5) XOR V2 */
+
+	/*
+	 * Apply a Barret reduction to compute the final 32-bit CRC value.
+	 *
+	 * The input values to the Barret reduction are the degree-63 polynomial
+	 * in V1 (R(x)), degree-32 generator polynomial, and the reduction
+	 * constant u.	The Barret reduction result is the CRC value of R(x) mod
+	 * P(x).
+	 *
+	 * The Barret reduction algorithm is defined as:
+	 *
+	 *    1. T1(x) = floor( R(x) / x^32 ) GF2MUL u
+	 *    2. T2(x) = floor( T1(x) / x^32 ) GF2MUL P(x)
+	 *    3. C(x)  = R(x) XOR T2(x) mod x^32
+	 *
+	 *  Note: The leftmost doubleword of vector register containing
+	 *  CONST_RU_POLY is zero and, thus, the intermediate GF(2) product
+	 *  is zero and does not contribute to the final result.
+	 */
+
+	/* T1(x) = floor( R(x) / x^32 ) GF2MUL u */
+	VUPLLF	%v2,%v1
+	VGFMG	%v2,CONST_RU_POLY,%v2
+
+	/*
+	 * Compute the GF(2) product of the CRC polynomial with T1(x) in
+	 * V2 and XOR the intermediate result, T2(x), with the value in V1.
+	 * The final result is stored in word element 2 of V2.
+	 */
+	VUPLLF	%v2,%v2
+	VGFMAG	%v2,CONST_CRC_POLY,%v2,%v1
+
+.Ldone:
+	VLGVF	%r2,%v2,2
+	BR_EX	%r14
+
+.previous
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/des_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/des_s390.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..65bda1178
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/des_s390.c
@@ -0,0 +1,593 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ *
+ * s390 implementation of the DES Cipher Algorithm.
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2003, 2011
+ * Author(s): Thomas Spatzier
+ *	      Jan Glauber (jan.glauber@de.ibm.com)
+ */
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/fips.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
+#include <crypto/des.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+
+#define DES3_KEY_SIZE	(3 * DES_KEY_SIZE)
+
+static u8 *ctrblk;
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(ctrblk_lock);
+
+static cpacf_mask_t km_functions, kmc_functions, kmctr_functions;
+
+struct s390_des_ctx {
+	u8 iv[DES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	u8 key[DES3_KEY_SIZE];
+};
+
+static int des_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key,
+		      unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	u32 tmp[DES_EXPKEY_WORDS];
+
+	/* check for weak keys */
+	if (!des_ekey(tmp, key) &&
+	    (tfm->crt_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY)) {
+		tfm->crt_flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_WEAK_KEY;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(ctx->key, key, key_len);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void des_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in)
+{
+	struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	cpacf_km(CPACF_KM_DEA, ctx->key, out, in, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}
+
+static void des_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in)
+{
+	struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	cpacf_km(CPACF_KM_DEA | CPACF_DECRYPT,
+		 ctx->key, out, in, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg des_alg = {
+	.cra_name		=	"des",
+	.cra_driver_name	=	"des-s390",
+	.cra_priority		=	300,
+	.cra_flags		=	CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER,
+	.cra_blocksize		=	DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.cra_ctxsize		=	sizeof(struct s390_des_ctx),
+	.cra_module		=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_u			=	{
+		.cipher = {
+			.cia_min_keysize	=	DES_KEY_SIZE,
+			.cia_max_keysize	=	DES_KEY_SIZE,
+			.cia_setkey		=	des_setkey,
+			.cia_encrypt		=	des_encrypt,
+			.cia_decrypt		=	des_decrypt,
+		}
+	}
+};
+
+static int ecb_desall_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, unsigned long fc,
+			    struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
+{
+	struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+	unsigned int nbytes, n;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, walk);
+	while ((nbytes = walk->nbytes) >= DES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+		/* only use complete blocks */
+		n = nbytes & ~(DES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+		cpacf_km(fc, ctx->key, walk->dst.virt.addr,
+			 walk->src.virt.addr, n);
+		ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, nbytes - n);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int cbc_desall_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, unsigned long fc,
+			    struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
+{
+	struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+	unsigned int nbytes, n;
+	int ret;
+	struct {
+		u8 iv[DES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+		u8 key[DES3_KEY_SIZE];
+	} param;
+
+	ret = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, walk);
+	memcpy(param.iv, walk->iv, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	memcpy(param.key, ctx->key, DES3_KEY_SIZE);
+	while ((nbytes = walk->nbytes) >= DES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+		/* only use complete blocks */
+		n = nbytes & ~(DES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+		cpacf_kmc(fc, &param, walk->dst.virt.addr,
+			  walk->src.virt.addr, n);
+		ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, nbytes - n);
+	}
+	memcpy(walk->iv, param.iv, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int ecb_des_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			   struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			   unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return ecb_desall_crypt(desc, CPACF_KM_DEA, &walk);
+}
+
+static int ecb_des_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			   struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			   unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return ecb_desall_crypt(desc, CPACF_KM_DEA | CPACF_DECRYPT, &walk);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg ecb_des_alg = {
+	.cra_name		=	"ecb(des)",
+	.cra_driver_name	=	"ecb-des-s390",
+	.cra_priority		=	400,	/* combo: des + ecb */
+	.cra_flags		=	CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER,
+	.cra_blocksize		=	DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.cra_ctxsize		=	sizeof(struct s390_des_ctx),
+	.cra_type		=	&crypto_blkcipher_type,
+	.cra_module		=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_u			=	{
+		.blkcipher = {
+			.min_keysize		=	DES_KEY_SIZE,
+			.max_keysize		=	DES_KEY_SIZE,
+			.setkey			=	des_setkey,
+			.encrypt		=	ecb_des_encrypt,
+			.decrypt		=	ecb_des_decrypt,
+		}
+	}
+};
+
+static int cbc_des_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			   struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			   unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return cbc_desall_crypt(desc, CPACF_KMC_DEA, &walk);
+}
+
+static int cbc_des_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			   struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			   unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return cbc_desall_crypt(desc, CPACF_KMC_DEA | CPACF_DECRYPT, &walk);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg cbc_des_alg = {
+	.cra_name		=	"cbc(des)",
+	.cra_driver_name	=	"cbc-des-s390",
+	.cra_priority		=	400,	/* combo: des + cbc */
+	.cra_flags		=	CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER,
+	.cra_blocksize		=	DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.cra_ctxsize		=	sizeof(struct s390_des_ctx),
+	.cra_type		=	&crypto_blkcipher_type,
+	.cra_module		=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_u			=	{
+		.blkcipher = {
+			.min_keysize		=	DES_KEY_SIZE,
+			.max_keysize		=	DES_KEY_SIZE,
+			.ivsize			=	DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			.setkey			=	des_setkey,
+			.encrypt		=	cbc_des_encrypt,
+			.decrypt		=	cbc_des_decrypt,
+		}
+	}
+};
+
+/*
+ * RFC2451:
+ *
+ *   For DES-EDE3, there is no known need to reject weak or
+ *   complementation keys.  Any weakness is obviated by the use of
+ *   multiple keys.
+ *
+ *   However, if the first two or last two independent 64-bit keys are
+ *   equal (k1 == k2 or k2 == k3), then the DES3 operation is simply the
+ *   same as DES.  Implementers MUST reject keys that exhibit this
+ *   property.
+ *
+ *   In fips mode additinally check for all 3 keys are unique.
+ *
+ */
+static int des3_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key,
+		       unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	if (!(crypto_memneq(key, &key[DES_KEY_SIZE], DES_KEY_SIZE) &&
+	    crypto_memneq(&key[DES_KEY_SIZE], &key[DES_KEY_SIZE * 2],
+			  DES_KEY_SIZE)) &&
+	    (tfm->crt_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY)) {
+		tfm->crt_flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_WEAK_KEY;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* in fips mode, ensure k1 != k2 and k2 != k3 and k1 != k3 */
+	if (fips_enabled &&
+	    !(crypto_memneq(key, &key[DES_KEY_SIZE], DES_KEY_SIZE) &&
+	      crypto_memneq(&key[DES_KEY_SIZE], &key[DES_KEY_SIZE * 2],
+			    DES_KEY_SIZE) &&
+	      crypto_memneq(key, &key[DES_KEY_SIZE * 2], DES_KEY_SIZE))) {
+		tfm->crt_flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_WEAK_KEY;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(ctx->key, key, key_len);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void des3_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
+{
+	struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	cpacf_km(CPACF_KM_TDEA_192, ctx->key, dst, src, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}
+
+static void des3_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
+{
+	struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	cpacf_km(CPACF_KM_TDEA_192 | CPACF_DECRYPT,
+		 ctx->key, dst, src, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg des3_alg = {
+	.cra_name		=	"des3_ede",
+	.cra_driver_name	=	"des3_ede-s390",
+	.cra_priority		=	300,
+	.cra_flags		=	CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER,
+	.cra_blocksize		=	DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.cra_ctxsize		=	sizeof(struct s390_des_ctx),
+	.cra_module		=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_u			=	{
+		.cipher = {
+			.cia_min_keysize	=	DES3_KEY_SIZE,
+			.cia_max_keysize	=	DES3_KEY_SIZE,
+			.cia_setkey		=	des3_setkey,
+			.cia_encrypt		=	des3_encrypt,
+			.cia_decrypt		=	des3_decrypt,
+		}
+	}
+};
+
+static int ecb_des3_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			    struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			    unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return ecb_desall_crypt(desc, CPACF_KM_TDEA_192, &walk);
+}
+
+static int ecb_des3_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			    struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			    unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return ecb_desall_crypt(desc, CPACF_KM_TDEA_192 | CPACF_DECRYPT,
+				&walk);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg ecb_des3_alg = {
+	.cra_name		=	"ecb(des3_ede)",
+	.cra_driver_name	=	"ecb-des3_ede-s390",
+	.cra_priority		=	400,	/* combo: des3 + ecb */
+	.cra_flags		=	CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER,
+	.cra_blocksize		=	DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.cra_ctxsize		=	sizeof(struct s390_des_ctx),
+	.cra_type		=	&crypto_blkcipher_type,
+	.cra_module		=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_u			=	{
+		.blkcipher = {
+			.min_keysize		=	DES3_KEY_SIZE,
+			.max_keysize		=	DES3_KEY_SIZE,
+			.setkey			=	des3_setkey,
+			.encrypt		=	ecb_des3_encrypt,
+			.decrypt		=	ecb_des3_decrypt,
+		}
+	}
+};
+
+static int cbc_des3_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			    struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			    unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return cbc_desall_crypt(desc, CPACF_KMC_TDEA_192, &walk);
+}
+
+static int cbc_des3_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			    struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			    unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return cbc_desall_crypt(desc, CPACF_KMC_TDEA_192 | CPACF_DECRYPT,
+				&walk);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg cbc_des3_alg = {
+	.cra_name		=	"cbc(des3_ede)",
+	.cra_driver_name	=	"cbc-des3_ede-s390",
+	.cra_priority		=	400,	/* combo: des3 + cbc */
+	.cra_flags		=	CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER,
+	.cra_blocksize		=	DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.cra_ctxsize		=	sizeof(struct s390_des_ctx),
+	.cra_type		=	&crypto_blkcipher_type,
+	.cra_module		=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_u			=	{
+		.blkcipher = {
+			.min_keysize		=	DES3_KEY_SIZE,
+			.max_keysize		=	DES3_KEY_SIZE,
+			.ivsize			=	DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			.setkey			=	des3_setkey,
+			.encrypt		=	cbc_des3_encrypt,
+			.decrypt		=	cbc_des3_decrypt,
+		}
+	}
+};
+
+static unsigned int __ctrblk_init(u8 *ctrptr, u8 *iv, unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	unsigned int i, n;
+
+	/* align to block size, max. PAGE_SIZE */
+	n = (nbytes > PAGE_SIZE) ? PAGE_SIZE : nbytes & ~(DES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+	memcpy(ctrptr, iv, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	for (i = (n / DES_BLOCK_SIZE) - 1; i > 0; i--) {
+		memcpy(ctrptr + DES_BLOCK_SIZE, ctrptr, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		crypto_inc(ctrptr + DES_BLOCK_SIZE, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		ctrptr += DES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	}
+	return n;
+}
+
+static int ctr_desall_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, unsigned long fc,
+			    struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
+{
+	struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+	u8 buf[DES_BLOCK_SIZE], *ctrptr;
+	unsigned int n, nbytes;
+	int ret, locked;
+
+	locked = mutex_trylock(&ctrblk_lock);
+
+	ret = blkcipher_walk_virt_block(desc, walk, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	while ((nbytes = walk->nbytes) >= DES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+		n = DES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+		if (nbytes >= 2*DES_BLOCK_SIZE && locked)
+			n = __ctrblk_init(ctrblk, walk->iv, nbytes);
+		ctrptr = (n > DES_BLOCK_SIZE) ? ctrblk : walk->iv;
+		cpacf_kmctr(fc, ctx->key, walk->dst.virt.addr,
+			    walk->src.virt.addr, n, ctrptr);
+		if (ctrptr == ctrblk)
+			memcpy(walk->iv, ctrptr + n - DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+				DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		crypto_inc(walk->iv, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, nbytes - n);
+	}
+	if (locked)
+		mutex_unlock(&ctrblk_lock);
+	/* final block may be < DES_BLOCK_SIZE, copy only nbytes */
+	if (nbytes) {
+		cpacf_kmctr(fc, ctx->key, buf, walk->src.virt.addr,
+			    DES_BLOCK_SIZE, walk->iv);
+		memcpy(walk->dst.virt.addr, buf, nbytes);
+		crypto_inc(walk->iv, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, 0);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int ctr_des_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			   struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			   unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return ctr_desall_crypt(desc, CPACF_KMCTR_DEA, &walk);
+}
+
+static int ctr_des_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			   struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			   unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return ctr_desall_crypt(desc, CPACF_KMCTR_DEA | CPACF_DECRYPT, &walk);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg ctr_des_alg = {
+	.cra_name		=	"ctr(des)",
+	.cra_driver_name	=	"ctr-des-s390",
+	.cra_priority		=	400,	/* combo: des + ctr */
+	.cra_flags		=	CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER,
+	.cra_blocksize		=	1,
+	.cra_ctxsize		=	sizeof(struct s390_des_ctx),
+	.cra_type		=	&crypto_blkcipher_type,
+	.cra_module		=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_u			=	{
+		.blkcipher = {
+			.min_keysize		=	DES_KEY_SIZE,
+			.max_keysize		=	DES_KEY_SIZE,
+			.ivsize			=	DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			.setkey			=	des_setkey,
+			.encrypt		=	ctr_des_encrypt,
+			.decrypt		=	ctr_des_decrypt,
+		}
+	}
+};
+
+static int ctr_des3_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			    struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			    unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return ctr_desall_crypt(desc, CPACF_KMCTR_TDEA_192, &walk);
+}
+
+static int ctr_des3_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			    struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			    unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return ctr_desall_crypt(desc, CPACF_KMCTR_TDEA_192 | CPACF_DECRYPT,
+				&walk);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg ctr_des3_alg = {
+	.cra_name		=	"ctr(des3_ede)",
+	.cra_driver_name	=	"ctr-des3_ede-s390",
+	.cra_priority		=	400,	/* combo: des3 + ede */
+	.cra_flags		=	CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER,
+	.cra_blocksize		=	1,
+	.cra_ctxsize		=	sizeof(struct s390_des_ctx),
+	.cra_type		=	&crypto_blkcipher_type,
+	.cra_module		=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_u			=	{
+		.blkcipher = {
+			.min_keysize		=	DES3_KEY_SIZE,
+			.max_keysize		=	DES3_KEY_SIZE,
+			.ivsize			=	DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			.setkey			=	des3_setkey,
+			.encrypt		=	ctr_des3_encrypt,
+			.decrypt		=	ctr_des3_decrypt,
+		}
+	}
+};
+
+static struct crypto_alg *des_s390_algs_ptr[8];
+static int des_s390_algs_num;
+
+static int des_s390_register_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = crypto_register_alg(alg);
+	if (!ret)
+		des_s390_algs_ptr[des_s390_algs_num++] = alg;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void des_s390_exit(void)
+{
+	while (des_s390_algs_num--)
+		crypto_unregister_alg(des_s390_algs_ptr[des_s390_algs_num]);
+	if (ctrblk)
+		free_page((unsigned long) ctrblk);
+}
+
+static int __init des_s390_init(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	/* Query available functions for KM, KMC and KMCTR */
+	cpacf_query(CPACF_KM, &km_functions);
+	cpacf_query(CPACF_KMC, &kmc_functions);
+	cpacf_query(CPACF_KMCTR, &kmctr_functions);
+
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_DEA)) {
+		ret = des_s390_register_alg(&des_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+		ret = des_s390_register_alg(&ecb_des_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+	}
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_DEA)) {
+		ret = des_s390_register_alg(&cbc_des_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+	}
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_TDEA_192)) {
+		ret = des_s390_register_alg(&des3_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+		ret = des_s390_register_alg(&ecb_des3_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+	}
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_TDEA_192)) {
+		ret = des_s390_register_alg(&cbc_des3_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_DEA) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_TDEA_192)) {
+		ctrblk = (u8 *) __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!ctrblk) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out_err;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_DEA)) {
+		ret = des_s390_register_alg(&ctr_des_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+	}
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_TDEA_192)) {
+		ret = des_s390_register_alg(&ctr_des3_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+out_err:
+	des_s390_exit();
+	return ret;
+}
+
+module_cpu_feature_match(MSA, des_s390_init);
+module_exit(des_s390_exit);
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("des");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("des3_ede");
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("DES & Triple DES EDE Cipher Algorithms");
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/ghash_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/ghash_s390.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..86aed30fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/ghash_s390.c
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ *
+ * s390 implementation of the GHASH algorithm for GCM (Galois/Counter Mode).
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2011
+ * Author(s): Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+
+#define GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE	16
+#define GHASH_DIGEST_SIZE	16
+
+struct ghash_ctx {
+	u8 key[GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+};
+
+struct ghash_desc_ctx {
+	u8 icv[GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	u8 key[GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	u8 buffer[GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	u32 bytes;
+};
+
+static int ghash_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+	struct ghash_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+	struct ghash_ctx *ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
+
+	memset(dctx, 0, sizeof(*dctx));
+	memcpy(dctx->key, ctx->key, GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int ghash_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm,
+			const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	struct ghash_ctx *ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(tfm);
+
+	if (keylen != GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+		crypto_shash_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(ctx->key, key, GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int ghash_update(struct shash_desc *desc,
+			 const u8 *src, unsigned int srclen)
+{
+	struct ghash_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+	unsigned int n;
+	u8 *buf = dctx->buffer;
+
+	if (dctx->bytes) {
+		u8 *pos = buf + (GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - dctx->bytes);
+
+		n = min(srclen, dctx->bytes);
+		dctx->bytes -= n;
+		srclen -= n;
+
+		memcpy(pos, src, n);
+		src += n;
+
+		if (!dctx->bytes) {
+			cpacf_kimd(CPACF_KIMD_GHASH, dctx, buf,
+				   GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		}
+	}
+
+	n = srclen & ~(GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+	if (n) {
+		cpacf_kimd(CPACF_KIMD_GHASH, dctx, src, n);
+		src += n;
+		srclen -= n;
+	}
+
+	if (srclen) {
+		dctx->bytes = GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - srclen;
+		memcpy(buf, src, srclen);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int ghash_flush(struct ghash_desc_ctx *dctx)
+{
+	u8 *buf = dctx->buffer;
+
+	if (dctx->bytes) {
+		u8 *pos = buf + (GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - dctx->bytes);
+
+		memset(pos, 0, dctx->bytes);
+		cpacf_kimd(CPACF_KIMD_GHASH, dctx, buf, GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		dctx->bytes = 0;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int ghash_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *dst)
+{
+	struct ghash_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = ghash_flush(dctx);
+	if (!ret)
+		memcpy(dst, dctx->icv, GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static struct shash_alg ghash_alg = {
+	.digestsize	= GHASH_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	.init		= ghash_init,
+	.update		= ghash_update,
+	.final		= ghash_final,
+	.setkey		= ghash_setkey,
+	.descsize	= sizeof(struct ghash_desc_ctx),
+	.base		= {
+		.cra_name		= "ghash",
+		.cra_driver_name	= "ghash-s390",
+		.cra_priority		= 300,
+		.cra_blocksize		= GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct ghash_ctx),
+		.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,
+	},
+};
+
+static int __init ghash_mod_init(void)
+{
+	if (!cpacf_query_func(CPACF_KIMD, CPACF_KIMD_GHASH))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	return crypto_register_shash(&ghash_alg);
+}
+
+static void __exit ghash_mod_exit(void)
+{
+	crypto_unregister_shash(&ghash_alg);
+}
+
+module_cpu_feature_match(MSA, ghash_mod_init);
+module_exit(ghash_mod_exit);
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("ghash");
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("GHASH Message Digest Algorithm, s390 implementation");
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/paes_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/paes_s390.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ab9a0ebec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/paes_s390.c
@@ -0,0 +1,618 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ *
+ * s390 implementation of the AES Cipher Algorithm with protected keys.
+ *
+ * s390 Version:
+ *   Copyright IBM Corp. 2017
+ *   Author(s): Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
+ *		Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+#define KMSG_COMPONENT "paes_s390"
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KMSG_COMPONENT ": " fmt
+
+#include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <crypto/xts.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+#include <asm/pkey.h>
+
+static u8 *ctrblk;
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ctrblk_lock);
+
+static cpacf_mask_t km_functions, kmc_functions, kmctr_functions;
+
+struct s390_paes_ctx {
+	struct pkey_seckey sk;
+	struct pkey_protkey pk;
+	unsigned long fc;
+};
+
+struct s390_pxts_ctx {
+	struct pkey_seckey sk[2];
+	struct pkey_protkey pk[2];
+	unsigned long fc;
+};
+
+static inline int __paes_convert_key(struct pkey_seckey *sk,
+				     struct pkey_protkey *pk)
+{
+	int i, ret;
+
+	/* try three times in case of failure */
+	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+		ret = pkey_skey2pkey(sk, pk);
+		if (ret == 0)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int __paes_set_key(struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	unsigned long fc;
+
+	if (__paes_convert_key(&ctx->sk, &ctx->pk))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Pick the correct function code based on the protected key type */
+	fc = (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? CPACF_KM_PAES_128 :
+		(ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192) ? CPACF_KM_PAES_192 :
+		(ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256) ? CPACF_KM_PAES_256 : 0;
+
+	/* Check if the function code is available */
+	ctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0;
+
+	return ctx->fc ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int ecb_paes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+			    unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	if (key_len != SECKEYBLOBSIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	memcpy(ctx->sk.seckey, in_key, SECKEYBLOBSIZE);
+	if (__paes_set_key(ctx)) {
+		tfm->crt_flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int ecb_paes_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			  unsigned long modifier,
+			  struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
+{
+	struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+	unsigned int nbytes, n, k;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, walk);
+	while ((nbytes = walk->nbytes) >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+		/* only use complete blocks */
+		n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+		k = cpacf_km(ctx->fc | modifier, ctx->pk.protkey,
+			     walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr, n);
+		if (k)
+			ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, nbytes - k);
+		if (k < n) {
+			if (__paes_set_key(ctx) != 0)
+				return blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, -EIO);
+		}
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int ecb_paes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			    struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			    unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return ecb_paes_crypt(desc, CPACF_ENCRYPT, &walk);
+}
+
+static int ecb_paes_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			    struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			    unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return ecb_paes_crypt(desc, CPACF_DECRYPT, &walk);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg ecb_paes_alg = {
+	.cra_name		=	"ecb(paes)",
+	.cra_driver_name	=	"ecb-paes-s390",
+	.cra_priority		=	401,	/* combo: aes + ecb + 1 */
+	.cra_flags		=	CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER,
+	.cra_blocksize		=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.cra_ctxsize		=	sizeof(struct s390_paes_ctx),
+	.cra_type		=	&crypto_blkcipher_type,
+	.cra_module		=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_list		=	LIST_HEAD_INIT(ecb_paes_alg.cra_list),
+	.cra_u			=	{
+		.blkcipher = {
+			.min_keysize		=	SECKEYBLOBSIZE,
+			.max_keysize		=	SECKEYBLOBSIZE,
+			.setkey			=	ecb_paes_set_key,
+			.encrypt		=	ecb_paes_encrypt,
+			.decrypt		=	ecb_paes_decrypt,
+		}
+	}
+};
+
+static int __cbc_paes_set_key(struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	unsigned long fc;
+
+	if (__paes_convert_key(&ctx->sk, &ctx->pk))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Pick the correct function code based on the protected key type */
+	fc = (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? CPACF_KMC_PAES_128 :
+		(ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192) ? CPACF_KMC_PAES_192 :
+		(ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256) ? CPACF_KMC_PAES_256 : 0;
+
+	/* Check if the function code is available */
+	ctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0;
+
+	return ctx->fc ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int cbc_paes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+			    unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	memcpy(ctx->sk.seckey, in_key, SECKEYBLOBSIZE);
+	if (__cbc_paes_set_key(ctx)) {
+		tfm->crt_flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cbc_paes_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, unsigned long modifier,
+			  struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
+{
+	struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+	unsigned int nbytes, n, k;
+	int ret;
+	struct {
+		u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+		u8 key[MAXPROTKEYSIZE];
+	} param;
+
+	ret = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, walk);
+	memcpy(param.iv, walk->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	memcpy(param.key, ctx->pk.protkey, MAXPROTKEYSIZE);
+	while ((nbytes = walk->nbytes) >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+		/* only use complete blocks */
+		n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+		k = cpacf_kmc(ctx->fc | modifier, &param,
+			      walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr, n);
+		if (k)
+			ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, nbytes - k);
+		if (k < n) {
+			if (__cbc_paes_set_key(ctx) != 0)
+				return blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, -EIO);
+			memcpy(param.key, ctx->pk.protkey, MAXPROTKEYSIZE);
+		}
+	}
+	memcpy(walk->iv, param.iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int cbc_paes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			    struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			    unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return cbc_paes_crypt(desc, 0, &walk);
+}
+
+static int cbc_paes_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			    struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			    unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return cbc_paes_crypt(desc, CPACF_DECRYPT, &walk);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg cbc_paes_alg = {
+	.cra_name		=	"cbc(paes)",
+	.cra_driver_name	=	"cbc-paes-s390",
+	.cra_priority		=	402,	/* ecb-paes-s390 + 1 */
+	.cra_flags		=	CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER,
+	.cra_blocksize		=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.cra_ctxsize		=	sizeof(struct s390_paes_ctx),
+	.cra_type		=	&crypto_blkcipher_type,
+	.cra_module		=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_list		=	LIST_HEAD_INIT(cbc_paes_alg.cra_list),
+	.cra_u			=	{
+		.blkcipher = {
+			.min_keysize		=	SECKEYBLOBSIZE,
+			.max_keysize		=	SECKEYBLOBSIZE,
+			.ivsize			=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			.setkey			=	cbc_paes_set_key,
+			.encrypt		=	cbc_paes_encrypt,
+			.decrypt		=	cbc_paes_decrypt,
+		}
+	}
+};
+
+static int __xts_paes_set_key(struct s390_pxts_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	unsigned long fc;
+
+	if (__paes_convert_key(&ctx->sk[0], &ctx->pk[0]) ||
+	    __paes_convert_key(&ctx->sk[1], &ctx->pk[1]))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (ctx->pk[0].type != ctx->pk[1].type)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Pick the correct function code based on the protected key type */
+	fc = (ctx->pk[0].type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? CPACF_KM_PXTS_128 :
+		(ctx->pk[0].type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256) ?
+		CPACF_KM_PXTS_256 : 0;
+
+	/* Check if the function code is available */
+	ctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0;
+
+	return ctx->fc ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int xts_paes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+			    unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct s390_pxts_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	u8 ckey[2 * AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
+	unsigned int ckey_len;
+
+	memcpy(ctx->sk[0].seckey, in_key, SECKEYBLOBSIZE);
+	memcpy(ctx->sk[1].seckey, in_key + SECKEYBLOBSIZE, SECKEYBLOBSIZE);
+	if (__xts_paes_set_key(ctx)) {
+		tfm->crt_flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * xts_check_key verifies the key length is not odd and makes
+	 * sure that the two keys are not the same. This can be done
+	 * on the two protected keys as well
+	 */
+	ckey_len = (ctx->pk[0].type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ?
+		AES_KEYSIZE_128 : AES_KEYSIZE_256;
+	memcpy(ckey, ctx->pk[0].protkey, ckey_len);
+	memcpy(ckey + ckey_len, ctx->pk[1].protkey, ckey_len);
+	return xts_check_key(tfm, ckey, 2*ckey_len);
+}
+
+static int xts_paes_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, unsigned long modifier,
+			  struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
+{
+	struct s390_pxts_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+	unsigned int keylen, offset, nbytes, n, k;
+	int ret;
+	struct {
+		u8 key[MAXPROTKEYSIZE];	/* key + verification pattern */
+		u8 tweak[16];
+		u8 block[16];
+		u8 bit[16];
+		u8 xts[16];
+	} pcc_param;
+	struct {
+		u8 key[MAXPROTKEYSIZE];	/* key + verification pattern */
+		u8 init[16];
+	} xts_param;
+
+	ret = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, walk);
+	keylen = (ctx->pk[0].type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? 48 : 64;
+	offset = (ctx->pk[0].type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? 16 : 0;
+retry:
+	memset(&pcc_param, 0, sizeof(pcc_param));
+	memcpy(pcc_param.tweak, walk->iv, sizeof(pcc_param.tweak));
+	memcpy(pcc_param.key + offset, ctx->pk[1].protkey, keylen);
+	cpacf_pcc(ctx->fc, pcc_param.key + offset);
+
+	memcpy(xts_param.key + offset, ctx->pk[0].protkey, keylen);
+	memcpy(xts_param.init, pcc_param.xts, 16);
+
+	while ((nbytes = walk->nbytes) >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+		/* only use complete blocks */
+		n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+		k = cpacf_km(ctx->fc | modifier, xts_param.key + offset,
+			     walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr, n);
+		if (k)
+			ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, nbytes - k);
+		if (k < n) {
+			if (__xts_paes_set_key(ctx) != 0)
+				return blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, -EIO);
+			goto retry;
+		}
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int xts_paes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			    struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			    unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return xts_paes_crypt(desc, 0, &walk);
+}
+
+static int xts_paes_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			    struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			    unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return xts_paes_crypt(desc, CPACF_DECRYPT, &walk);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg xts_paes_alg = {
+	.cra_name		=	"xts(paes)",
+	.cra_driver_name	=	"xts-paes-s390",
+	.cra_priority		=	402,	/* ecb-paes-s390 + 1 */
+	.cra_flags		=	CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER,
+	.cra_blocksize		=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.cra_ctxsize		=	sizeof(struct s390_pxts_ctx),
+	.cra_type		=	&crypto_blkcipher_type,
+	.cra_module		=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_list		=	LIST_HEAD_INIT(xts_paes_alg.cra_list),
+	.cra_u			=	{
+		.blkcipher = {
+			.min_keysize		=	2 * SECKEYBLOBSIZE,
+			.max_keysize		=	2 * SECKEYBLOBSIZE,
+			.ivsize			=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			.setkey			=	xts_paes_set_key,
+			.encrypt		=	xts_paes_encrypt,
+			.decrypt		=	xts_paes_decrypt,
+		}
+	}
+};
+
+static int __ctr_paes_set_key(struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	unsigned long fc;
+
+	if (__paes_convert_key(&ctx->sk, &ctx->pk))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Pick the correct function code based on the protected key type */
+	fc = (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_128 :
+		(ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192) ? CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_192 :
+		(ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256) ?
+		CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_256 : 0;
+
+	/* Check if the function code is available */
+	ctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0;
+
+	return ctx->fc ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int ctr_paes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+			    unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	memcpy(ctx->sk.seckey, in_key, key_len);
+	if (__ctr_paes_set_key(ctx)) {
+		tfm->crt_flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static unsigned int __ctrblk_init(u8 *ctrptr, u8 *iv, unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	unsigned int i, n;
+
+	/* only use complete blocks, max. PAGE_SIZE */
+	memcpy(ctrptr, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	n = (nbytes > PAGE_SIZE) ? PAGE_SIZE : nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+	for (i = (n / AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - 1; i > 0; i--) {
+		memcpy(ctrptr + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, ctrptr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		crypto_inc(ctrptr + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		ctrptr += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	}
+	return n;
+}
+
+static int ctr_paes_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, unsigned long modifier,
+			  struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
+{
+	struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+	u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], *ctrptr;
+	unsigned int nbytes, n, k;
+	int ret, locked;
+
+	locked = spin_trylock(&ctrblk_lock);
+
+	ret = blkcipher_walk_virt_block(desc, walk, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	while ((nbytes = walk->nbytes) >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+		n = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+		if (nbytes >= 2*AES_BLOCK_SIZE && locked)
+			n = __ctrblk_init(ctrblk, walk->iv, nbytes);
+		ctrptr = (n > AES_BLOCK_SIZE) ? ctrblk : walk->iv;
+		k = cpacf_kmctr(ctx->fc | modifier, ctx->pk.protkey,
+				walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr,
+				n, ctrptr);
+		if (k) {
+			if (ctrptr == ctrblk)
+				memcpy(walk->iv, ctrptr + k - AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+				       AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+			crypto_inc(walk->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+			ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, nbytes - n);
+		}
+		if (k < n) {
+			if (__ctr_paes_set_key(ctx) != 0) {
+				if (locked)
+					spin_unlock(&ctrblk_lock);
+				return blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, -EIO);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (locked)
+		spin_unlock(&ctrblk_lock);
+	/*
+	 * final block may be < AES_BLOCK_SIZE, copy only nbytes
+	 */
+	if (nbytes) {
+		while (1) {
+			if (cpacf_kmctr(ctx->fc | modifier,
+					ctx->pk.protkey, buf,
+					walk->src.virt.addr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+					walk->iv) == AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+				break;
+			if (__ctr_paes_set_key(ctx) != 0)
+				return blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, -EIO);
+		}
+		memcpy(walk->dst.virt.addr, buf, nbytes);
+		crypto_inc(walk->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, 0);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int ctr_paes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			    struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			    unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return ctr_paes_crypt(desc, 0, &walk);
+}
+
+static int ctr_paes_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			    struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			    unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return ctr_paes_crypt(desc, CPACF_DECRYPT, &walk);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg ctr_paes_alg = {
+	.cra_name		=	"ctr(paes)",
+	.cra_driver_name	=	"ctr-paes-s390",
+	.cra_priority		=	402,	/* ecb-paes-s390 + 1 */
+	.cra_flags		=	CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER,
+	.cra_blocksize		=	1,
+	.cra_ctxsize		=	sizeof(struct s390_paes_ctx),
+	.cra_type		=	&crypto_blkcipher_type,
+	.cra_module		=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_list		=	LIST_HEAD_INIT(ctr_paes_alg.cra_list),
+	.cra_u			=	{
+		.blkcipher = {
+			.min_keysize		=	SECKEYBLOBSIZE,
+			.max_keysize		=	SECKEYBLOBSIZE,
+			.ivsize			=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			.setkey			=	ctr_paes_set_key,
+			.encrypt		=	ctr_paes_encrypt,
+			.decrypt		=	ctr_paes_decrypt,
+		}
+	}
+};
+
+static inline void __crypto_unregister_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg)
+{
+	if (!list_empty(&alg->cra_list))
+		crypto_unregister_alg(alg);
+}
+
+static void paes_s390_fini(void)
+{
+	if (ctrblk)
+		free_page((unsigned long) ctrblk);
+	__crypto_unregister_alg(&ctr_paes_alg);
+	__crypto_unregister_alg(&xts_paes_alg);
+	__crypto_unregister_alg(&cbc_paes_alg);
+	__crypto_unregister_alg(&ecb_paes_alg);
+}
+
+static int __init paes_s390_init(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	/* Query available functions for KM, KMC and KMCTR */
+	cpacf_query(CPACF_KM, &km_functions);
+	cpacf_query(CPACF_KMC, &kmc_functions);
+	cpacf_query(CPACF_KMCTR, &kmctr_functions);
+
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_PAES_128) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_PAES_192) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_PAES_256)) {
+		ret = crypto_register_alg(&ecb_paes_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_PAES_128) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_PAES_192) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_PAES_256)) {
+		ret = crypto_register_alg(&cbc_paes_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_PXTS_128) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_PXTS_256)) {
+		ret = crypto_register_alg(&xts_paes_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_128) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_192) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_256)) {
+		ret = crypto_register_alg(&ctr_paes_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+		ctrblk = (u8 *) __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!ctrblk) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out_err;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+out_err:
+	paes_s390_fini();
+	return ret;
+}
+
+module_init(paes_s390_init);
+module_exit(paes_s390_fini);
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("paes");
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Rijndael (AES) Cipher Algorithm with protected keys");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/prng.c b/arch/s390/crypto/prng.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a97a1802c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/prng.c
@@ -0,0 +1,875 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2006, 2015
+ * Author(s): Jan Glauber <jan.glauber@de.ibm.com>
+ *	      Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>
+ * Driver for the s390 pseudo random number generator
+ */
+
+#define KMSG_COMPONENT "prng"
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KMSG_COMPONENT ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/fips.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+
+#include <asm/debug.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <asm/timex.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("IBM Corporation");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("s390 PRNG interface");
+
+
+#define PRNG_MODE_AUTO	  0
+#define PRNG_MODE_TDES	  1
+#define PRNG_MODE_SHA512  2
+
+static unsigned int prng_mode = PRNG_MODE_AUTO;
+module_param_named(mode, prng_mode, int, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(prng_mode, "PRNG mode: 0 - auto, 1 - TDES, 2 - SHA512");
+
+
+#define PRNG_CHUNKSIZE_TDES_MIN   8
+#define PRNG_CHUNKSIZE_TDES_MAX   (64*1024)
+#define PRNG_CHUNKSIZE_SHA512_MIN 64
+#define PRNG_CHUNKSIZE_SHA512_MAX (64*1024)
+
+static unsigned int prng_chunk_size = 256;
+module_param_named(chunksize, prng_chunk_size, int, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(prng_chunk_size, "PRNG read chunk size in bytes");
+
+
+#define PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_TDES		 4096
+#define PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_TDES_LOWER	 4096
+#define PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_SHA512       100000
+#define PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_SHA512_LOWER	10000
+
+static unsigned int prng_reseed_limit;
+module_param_named(reseed_limit, prng_reseed_limit, int, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(prng_reseed_limit, "PRNG reseed limit");
+
+
+/*
+ * Any one who considers arithmetical methods of producing random digits is,
+ * of course, in a state of sin. -- John von Neumann
+ */
+
+static int prng_errorflag;
+
+#define PRNG_GEN_ENTROPY_FAILED  1
+#define PRNG_SELFTEST_FAILED	 2
+#define PRNG_INSTANTIATE_FAILED  3
+#define PRNG_SEED_FAILED	 4
+#define PRNG_RESEED_FAILED	 5
+#define PRNG_GEN_FAILED		 6
+
+struct prng_ws_s {
+	u8  parm_block[32];
+	u32 reseed_counter;
+	u64 byte_counter;
+};
+
+struct prno_ws_s {
+	u32 res;
+	u32 reseed_counter;
+	u64 stream_bytes;
+	u8  V[112];
+	u8  C[112];
+};
+
+struct prng_data_s {
+	struct mutex mutex;
+	union {
+		struct prng_ws_s prngws;
+		struct prno_ws_s prnows;
+	};
+	u8 *buf;
+	u32 rest;
+	u8 *prev;
+};
+
+static struct prng_data_s *prng_data;
+
+/* initial parameter block for tdes mode, copied from libica */
+static const u8 initial_parm_block[32] __initconst = {
+	0x0F, 0x2B, 0x8E, 0x63, 0x8C, 0x8E, 0xD2, 0x52,
+	0x64, 0xB7, 0xA0, 0x7B, 0x75, 0x28, 0xB8, 0xF4,
+	0x75, 0x5F, 0xD2, 0xA6, 0x8D, 0x97, 0x11, 0xFF,
+	0x49, 0xD8, 0x23, 0xF3, 0x7E, 0x21, 0xEC, 0xA0 };
+
+
+/*** helper functions ***/
+
+/*
+ * generate_entropy:
+ * This algorithm produces 64 bytes of entropy data based on 1024
+ * individual stckf() invocations assuming that each stckf() value
+ * contributes 0.25 bits of entropy. So the caller gets 256 bit
+ * entropy per 64 byte or 4 bits entropy per byte.
+ */
+static int generate_entropy(u8 *ebuf, size_t nbytes)
+{
+	int n, ret = 0;
+	u8 *pg, *h, hash[64];
+
+	/* allocate 2 pages */
+	pg = (u8 *) __get_free_pages(GFP_KERNEL, 1);
+	if (!pg) {
+		prng_errorflag = PRNG_GEN_ENTROPY_FAILED;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	while (nbytes) {
+		/* fill pages with urandom bytes */
+		get_random_bytes(pg, 2*PAGE_SIZE);
+		/* exor pages with 1024 stckf values */
+		for (n = 0; n < 2 * PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(u64); n++) {
+			u64 *p = ((u64 *)pg) + n;
+			*p ^= get_tod_clock_fast();
+		}
+		n = (nbytes < sizeof(hash)) ? nbytes : sizeof(hash);
+		if (n < sizeof(hash))
+			h = hash;
+		else
+			h = ebuf;
+		/* hash over the filled pages */
+		cpacf_kimd(CPACF_KIMD_SHA_512, h, pg, 2*PAGE_SIZE);
+		if (n < sizeof(hash))
+			memcpy(ebuf, hash, n);
+		ret += n;
+		ebuf += n;
+		nbytes -= n;
+	}
+
+	free_pages((unsigned long)pg, 1);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+
+/*** tdes functions ***/
+
+static void prng_tdes_add_entropy(void)
+{
+	__u64 entropy[4];
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+		cpacf_kmc(CPACF_KMC_PRNG, prng_data->prngws.parm_block,
+			  (char *) entropy, (char *) entropy,
+			  sizeof(entropy));
+		memcpy(prng_data->prngws.parm_block, entropy, sizeof(entropy));
+	}
+}
+
+
+static void prng_tdes_seed(int nbytes)
+{
+	char buf[16];
+	int i = 0;
+
+	BUG_ON(nbytes > sizeof(buf));
+
+	get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
+
+	/* Add the entropy */
+	while (nbytes >= 8) {
+		*((__u64 *)prng_data->prngws.parm_block) ^= *((__u64 *)(buf+i));
+		prng_tdes_add_entropy();
+		i += 8;
+		nbytes -= 8;
+	}
+	prng_tdes_add_entropy();
+	prng_data->prngws.reseed_counter = 0;
+}
+
+
+static int __init prng_tdes_instantiate(void)
+{
+	int datalen;
+
+	pr_debug("prng runs in TDES mode with "
+		 "chunksize=%d and reseed_limit=%u\n",
+		 prng_chunk_size, prng_reseed_limit);
+
+	/* memory allocation, prng_data struct init, mutex init */
+	datalen = sizeof(struct prng_data_s) + prng_chunk_size;
+	prng_data = kzalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!prng_data) {
+		prng_errorflag = PRNG_INSTANTIATE_FAILED;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	mutex_init(&prng_data->mutex);
+	prng_data->buf = ((u8 *)prng_data) + sizeof(struct prng_data_s);
+	memcpy(prng_data->prngws.parm_block, initial_parm_block, 32);
+
+	/* initialize the PRNG, add 128 bits of entropy */
+	prng_tdes_seed(16);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+static void prng_tdes_deinstantiate(void)
+{
+	pr_debug("The prng module stopped "
+		 "after running in triple DES mode\n");
+	kzfree(prng_data);
+}
+
+
+/*** sha512 functions ***/
+
+static int __init prng_sha512_selftest(void)
+{
+	/* NIST DRBG testvector for Hash Drbg, Sha-512, Count #0 */
+	static const u8 seed[] __initconst = {
+		0x6b, 0x50, 0xa7, 0xd8, 0xf8, 0xa5, 0x5d, 0x7a,
+		0x3d, 0xf8, 0xbb, 0x40, 0xbc, 0xc3, 0xb7, 0x22,
+		0xd8, 0x70, 0x8d, 0xe6, 0x7f, 0xda, 0x01, 0x0b,
+		0x03, 0xc4, 0xc8, 0x4d, 0x72, 0x09, 0x6f, 0x8c,
+		0x3e, 0xc6, 0x49, 0xcc, 0x62, 0x56, 0xd9, 0xfa,
+		0x31, 0xdb, 0x7a, 0x29, 0x04, 0xaa, 0xf0, 0x25 };
+	static const u8 V0[] __initconst = {
+		0x00, 0xad, 0xe3, 0x6f, 0x9a, 0x01, 0xc7, 0x76,
+		0x61, 0x34, 0x35, 0xf5, 0x4e, 0x24, 0x74, 0x22,
+		0x21, 0x9a, 0x29, 0x89, 0xc7, 0x93, 0x2e, 0x60,
+		0x1e, 0xe8, 0x14, 0x24, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x03, 0xf1,
+		0x65, 0x5d, 0x08, 0x22, 0x72, 0xd5, 0xad, 0x95,
+		0xe1, 0x23, 0x1e, 0x8a, 0xa7, 0x13, 0xd9, 0x2b,
+		0x5e, 0xbc, 0xbb, 0x80, 0xab, 0x8d, 0xe5, 0x79,
+		0xab, 0x5b, 0x47, 0x4e, 0xdd, 0xee, 0x6b, 0x03,
+		0x8f, 0x0f, 0x5c, 0x5e, 0xa9, 0x1a, 0x83, 0xdd,
+		0xd3, 0x88, 0xb2, 0x75, 0x4b, 0xce, 0x83, 0x36,
+		0x57, 0x4b, 0xf1, 0x5c, 0xca, 0x7e, 0x09, 0xc0,
+		0xd3, 0x89, 0xc6, 0xe0, 0xda, 0xc4, 0x81, 0x7e,
+		0x5b, 0xf9, 0xe1, 0x01, 0xc1, 0x92, 0x05, 0xea,
+		0xf5, 0x2f, 0xc6, 0xc6, 0xc7, 0x8f, 0xbc, 0xf4 };
+	static const u8 C0[] __initconst = {
+		0x00, 0xf4, 0xa3, 0xe5, 0xa0, 0x72, 0x63, 0x95,
+		0xc6, 0x4f, 0x48, 0xd0, 0x8b, 0x5b, 0x5f, 0x8e,
+		0x6b, 0x96, 0x1f, 0x16, 0xed, 0xbc, 0x66, 0x94,
+		0x45, 0x31, 0xd7, 0x47, 0x73, 0x22, 0xa5, 0x86,
+		0xce, 0xc0, 0x4c, 0xac, 0x63, 0xb8, 0x39, 0x50,
+		0xbf, 0xe6, 0x59, 0x6c, 0x38, 0x58, 0x99, 0x1f,
+		0x27, 0xa7, 0x9d, 0x71, 0x2a, 0xb3, 0x7b, 0xf9,
+		0xfb, 0x17, 0x86, 0xaa, 0x99, 0x81, 0xaa, 0x43,
+		0xe4, 0x37, 0xd3, 0x1e, 0x6e, 0xe5, 0xe6, 0xee,
+		0xc2, 0xed, 0x95, 0x4f, 0x53, 0x0e, 0x46, 0x8a,
+		0xcc, 0x45, 0xa5, 0xdb, 0x69, 0x0d, 0x81, 0xc9,
+		0x32, 0x92, 0xbc, 0x8f, 0x33, 0xe6, 0xf6, 0x09,
+		0x7c, 0x8e, 0x05, 0x19, 0x0d, 0xf1, 0xb6, 0xcc,
+		0xf3, 0x02, 0x21, 0x90, 0x25, 0xec, 0xed, 0x0e };
+	static const u8 random[] __initconst = {
+		0x95, 0xb7, 0xf1, 0x7e, 0x98, 0x02, 0xd3, 0x57,
+		0x73, 0x92, 0xc6, 0xa9, 0xc0, 0x80, 0x83, 0xb6,
+		0x7d, 0xd1, 0x29, 0x22, 0x65, 0xb5, 0xf4, 0x2d,
+		0x23, 0x7f, 0x1c, 0x55, 0xbb, 0x9b, 0x10, 0xbf,
+		0xcf, 0xd8, 0x2c, 0x77, 0xa3, 0x78, 0xb8, 0x26,
+		0x6a, 0x00, 0x99, 0x14, 0x3b, 0x3c, 0x2d, 0x64,
+		0x61, 0x1e, 0xee, 0xb6, 0x9a, 0xcd, 0xc0, 0x55,
+		0x95, 0x7c, 0x13, 0x9e, 0x8b, 0x19, 0x0c, 0x7a,
+		0x06, 0x95, 0x5f, 0x2c, 0x79, 0x7c, 0x27, 0x78,
+		0xde, 0x94, 0x03, 0x96, 0xa5, 0x01, 0xf4, 0x0e,
+		0x91, 0x39, 0x6a, 0xcf, 0x8d, 0x7e, 0x45, 0xeb,
+		0xdb, 0xb5, 0x3b, 0xbf, 0x8c, 0x97, 0x52, 0x30,
+		0xd2, 0xf0, 0xff, 0x91, 0x06, 0xc7, 0x61, 0x19,
+		0xae, 0x49, 0x8e, 0x7f, 0xbc, 0x03, 0xd9, 0x0f,
+		0x8e, 0x4c, 0x51, 0x62, 0x7a, 0xed, 0x5c, 0x8d,
+		0x42, 0x63, 0xd5, 0xd2, 0xb9, 0x78, 0x87, 0x3a,
+		0x0d, 0xe5, 0x96, 0xee, 0x6d, 0xc7, 0xf7, 0xc2,
+		0x9e, 0x37, 0xee, 0xe8, 0xb3, 0x4c, 0x90, 0xdd,
+		0x1c, 0xf6, 0xa9, 0xdd, 0xb2, 0x2b, 0x4c, 0xbd,
+		0x08, 0x6b, 0x14, 0xb3, 0x5d, 0xe9, 0x3d, 0xa2,
+		0xd5, 0xcb, 0x18, 0x06, 0x69, 0x8c, 0xbd, 0x7b,
+		0xbb, 0x67, 0xbf, 0xe3, 0xd3, 0x1f, 0xd2, 0xd1,
+		0xdb, 0xd2, 0xa1, 0xe0, 0x58, 0xa3, 0xeb, 0x99,
+		0xd7, 0xe5, 0x1f, 0x1a, 0x93, 0x8e, 0xed, 0x5e,
+		0x1c, 0x1d, 0xe2, 0x3a, 0x6b, 0x43, 0x45, 0xd3,
+		0x19, 0x14, 0x09, 0xf9, 0x2f, 0x39, 0xb3, 0x67,
+		0x0d, 0x8d, 0xbf, 0xb6, 0x35, 0xd8, 0xe6, 0xa3,
+		0x69, 0x32, 0xd8, 0x10, 0x33, 0xd1, 0x44, 0x8d,
+		0x63, 0xb4, 0x03, 0xdd, 0xf8, 0x8e, 0x12, 0x1b,
+		0x6e, 0x81, 0x9a, 0xc3, 0x81, 0x22, 0x6c, 0x13,
+		0x21, 0xe4, 0xb0, 0x86, 0x44, 0xf6, 0x72, 0x7c,
+		0x36, 0x8c, 0x5a, 0x9f, 0x7a, 0x4b, 0x3e, 0xe2 };
+
+	u8 buf[sizeof(random)];
+	struct prno_ws_s ws;
+
+	memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws));
+
+	/* initial seed */
+	cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_SEED,
+		   &ws, NULL, 0, seed, sizeof(seed));
+
+	/* check working states V and C */
+	if (memcmp(ws.V, V0, sizeof(V0)) != 0
+	    || memcmp(ws.C, C0, sizeof(C0)) != 0) {
+		pr_err("The prng self test state test "
+		       "for the SHA-512 mode failed\n");
+		prng_errorflag = PRNG_SELFTEST_FAILED;
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	/* generate random bytes */
+	cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN,
+		   &ws, buf, sizeof(buf), NULL, 0);
+	cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN,
+		   &ws, buf, sizeof(buf), NULL, 0);
+
+	/* check against expected data */
+	if (memcmp(buf, random, sizeof(random)) != 0) {
+		pr_err("The prng self test data test "
+		       "for the SHA-512 mode failed\n");
+		prng_errorflag = PRNG_SELFTEST_FAILED;
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int __init prng_sha512_instantiate(void)
+{
+	int ret, datalen;
+	u8 seed[64 + 32 + 16];
+
+	pr_debug("prng runs in SHA-512 mode "
+		 "with chunksize=%d and reseed_limit=%u\n",
+		 prng_chunk_size, prng_reseed_limit);
+
+	/* memory allocation, prng_data struct init, mutex init */
+	datalen = sizeof(struct prng_data_s) + prng_chunk_size;
+	if (fips_enabled)
+		datalen += prng_chunk_size;
+	prng_data = kzalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!prng_data) {
+		prng_errorflag = PRNG_INSTANTIATE_FAILED;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	mutex_init(&prng_data->mutex);
+	prng_data->buf = ((u8 *)prng_data) + sizeof(struct prng_data_s);
+
+	/* selftest */
+	ret = prng_sha512_selftest();
+	if (ret)
+		goto outfree;
+
+	/* generate initial seed bytestring, with 256 + 128 bits entropy */
+	ret = generate_entropy(seed, 64 + 32);
+	if (ret != 64 + 32)
+		goto outfree;
+	/* followed by 16 bytes of unique nonce */
+	get_tod_clock_ext(seed + 64 + 32);
+
+	/* initial seed of the prno drng */
+	cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_SEED,
+		   &prng_data->prnows, NULL, 0, seed, sizeof(seed));
+
+	/* if fips mode is enabled, generate a first block of random
+	   bytes for the FIPS 140-2 Conditional Self Test */
+	if (fips_enabled) {
+		prng_data->prev = prng_data->buf + prng_chunk_size;
+		cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN,
+			   &prng_data->prnows,
+			   prng_data->prev, prng_chunk_size, NULL, 0);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+outfree:
+	kfree(prng_data);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+
+static void prng_sha512_deinstantiate(void)
+{
+	pr_debug("The prng module stopped after running in SHA-512 mode\n");
+	kzfree(prng_data);
+}
+
+
+static int prng_sha512_reseed(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+	u8 seed[64];
+
+	/* fetch 256 bits of fresh entropy */
+	ret = generate_entropy(seed, sizeof(seed));
+	if (ret != sizeof(seed))
+		return ret;
+
+	/* do a reseed of the prno drng with this bytestring */
+	cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_SEED,
+		   &prng_data->prnows, NULL, 0, seed, sizeof(seed));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int prng_sha512_generate(u8 *buf, size_t nbytes)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	/* reseed needed ? */
+	if (prng_data->prnows.reseed_counter > prng_reseed_limit) {
+		ret = prng_sha512_reseed();
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	}
+
+	/* PRNO generate */
+	cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN,
+		   &prng_data->prnows, buf, nbytes, NULL, 0);
+
+	/* FIPS 140-2 Conditional Self Test */
+	if (fips_enabled) {
+		if (!memcmp(prng_data->prev, buf, nbytes)) {
+			prng_errorflag = PRNG_GEN_FAILED;
+			return -EILSEQ;
+		}
+		memcpy(prng_data->prev, buf, nbytes);
+	}
+
+	return nbytes;
+}
+
+
+/*** file io functions ***/
+
+static int prng_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return nonseekable_open(inode, file);
+}
+
+
+static ssize_t prng_tdes_read(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf,
+			      size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	int chunk, n, ret = 0;
+
+	/* lock prng_data struct */
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&prng_data->mutex))
+		return -ERESTARTSYS;
+
+	while (nbytes) {
+		if (need_resched()) {
+			if (signal_pending(current)) {
+				if (ret == 0)
+					ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
+				break;
+			}
+			/* give mutex free before calling schedule() */
+			mutex_unlock(&prng_data->mutex);
+			schedule();
+			/* occopy mutex again */
+			if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&prng_data->mutex)) {
+				if (ret == 0)
+					ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
+				return ret;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * we lose some random bytes if an attacker issues
+		 * reads < 8 bytes, but we don't care
+		 */
+		chunk = min_t(int, nbytes, prng_chunk_size);
+
+		/* PRNG only likes multiples of 8 bytes */
+		n = (chunk + 7) & -8;
+
+		if (prng_data->prngws.reseed_counter > prng_reseed_limit)
+			prng_tdes_seed(8);
+
+		/* if the CPU supports PRNG stckf is present too */
+		*((unsigned long long *)prng_data->buf) = get_tod_clock_fast();
+
+		/*
+		 * Beside the STCKF the input for the TDES-EDE is the output
+		 * of the last operation. We differ here from X9.17 since we
+		 * only store one timestamp into the buffer. Padding the whole
+		 * buffer with timestamps does not improve security, since
+		 * successive stckf have nearly constant offsets.
+		 * If an attacker knows the first timestamp it would be
+		 * trivial to guess the additional values. One timestamp
+		 * is therefore enough and still guarantees unique input values.
+		 *
+		 * Note: you can still get strict X9.17 conformity by setting
+		 * prng_chunk_size to 8 bytes.
+		 */
+		cpacf_kmc(CPACF_KMC_PRNG, prng_data->prngws.parm_block,
+			  prng_data->buf, prng_data->buf, n);
+
+		prng_data->prngws.byte_counter += n;
+		prng_data->prngws.reseed_counter += n;
+
+		if (copy_to_user(ubuf, prng_data->buf, chunk)) {
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		nbytes -= chunk;
+		ret += chunk;
+		ubuf += chunk;
+	}
+
+	/* unlock prng_data struct */
+	mutex_unlock(&prng_data->mutex);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+
+static ssize_t prng_sha512_read(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf,
+				size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	int n, ret = 0;
+	u8 *p;
+
+	/* if errorflag is set do nothing and return 'broken pipe' */
+	if (prng_errorflag)
+		return -EPIPE;
+
+	/* lock prng_data struct */
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&prng_data->mutex))
+		return -ERESTARTSYS;
+
+	while (nbytes) {
+		if (need_resched()) {
+			if (signal_pending(current)) {
+				if (ret == 0)
+					ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
+				break;
+			}
+			/* give mutex free before calling schedule() */
+			mutex_unlock(&prng_data->mutex);
+			schedule();
+			/* occopy mutex again */
+			if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&prng_data->mutex)) {
+				if (ret == 0)
+					ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
+				return ret;
+			}
+		}
+		if (prng_data->rest) {
+			/* push left over random bytes from the previous read */
+			p = prng_data->buf + prng_chunk_size - prng_data->rest;
+			n = (nbytes < prng_data->rest) ?
+				nbytes : prng_data->rest;
+			prng_data->rest -= n;
+		} else {
+			/* generate one chunk of random bytes into read buf */
+			p = prng_data->buf;
+			n = prng_sha512_generate(p, prng_chunk_size);
+			if (n < 0) {
+				ret = n;
+				break;
+			}
+			if (nbytes < prng_chunk_size) {
+				n = nbytes;
+				prng_data->rest = prng_chunk_size - n;
+			} else {
+				n = prng_chunk_size;
+				prng_data->rest = 0;
+			}
+		}
+		if (copy_to_user(ubuf, p, n)) {
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+			break;
+		}
+		ubuf += n;
+		nbytes -= n;
+		ret += n;
+	}
+
+	/* unlock prng_data struct */
+	mutex_unlock(&prng_data->mutex);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+
+/*** sysfs stuff ***/
+
+static const struct file_operations prng_sha512_fops = {
+	.owner		= THIS_MODULE,
+	.open		= &prng_open,
+	.release	= NULL,
+	.read		= &prng_sha512_read,
+	.llseek		= noop_llseek,
+};
+static const struct file_operations prng_tdes_fops = {
+	.owner		= THIS_MODULE,
+	.open		= &prng_open,
+	.release	= NULL,
+	.read		= &prng_tdes_read,
+	.llseek		= noop_llseek,
+};
+
+static struct miscdevice prng_sha512_dev = {
+	.name	= "prandom",
+	.minor	= MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR,
+	.mode	= 0644,
+	.fops	= &prng_sha512_fops,
+};
+static struct miscdevice prng_tdes_dev = {
+	.name	= "prandom",
+	.minor	= MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR,
+	.mode	= 0644,
+	.fops	= &prng_tdes_fops,
+};
+
+
+/* chunksize attribute (ro) */
+static ssize_t prng_chunksize_show(struct device *dev,
+				   struct device_attribute *attr,
+				   char *buf)
+{
+	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%u\n", prng_chunk_size);
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR(chunksize, 0444, prng_chunksize_show, NULL);
+
+/* counter attribute (ro) */
+static ssize_t prng_counter_show(struct device *dev,
+				 struct device_attribute *attr,
+				 char *buf)
+{
+	u64 counter;
+
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&prng_data->mutex))
+		return -ERESTARTSYS;
+	if (prng_mode == PRNG_MODE_SHA512)
+		counter = prng_data->prnows.stream_bytes;
+	else
+		counter = prng_data->prngws.byte_counter;
+	mutex_unlock(&prng_data->mutex);
+
+	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%llu\n", counter);
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR(byte_counter, 0444, prng_counter_show, NULL);
+
+/* errorflag attribute (ro) */
+static ssize_t prng_errorflag_show(struct device *dev,
+				   struct device_attribute *attr,
+				   char *buf)
+{
+	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", prng_errorflag);
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR(errorflag, 0444, prng_errorflag_show, NULL);
+
+/* mode attribute (ro) */
+static ssize_t prng_mode_show(struct device *dev,
+			      struct device_attribute *attr,
+			      char *buf)
+{
+	if (prng_mode == PRNG_MODE_TDES)
+		return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "TDES\n");
+	else
+		return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "SHA512\n");
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR(mode, 0444, prng_mode_show, NULL);
+
+/* reseed attribute (w) */
+static ssize_t prng_reseed_store(struct device *dev,
+				 struct device_attribute *attr,
+				 const char *buf, size_t count)
+{
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&prng_data->mutex))
+		return -ERESTARTSYS;
+	prng_sha512_reseed();
+	mutex_unlock(&prng_data->mutex);
+
+	return count;
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR(reseed, 0200, NULL, prng_reseed_store);
+
+/* reseed limit attribute (rw) */
+static ssize_t prng_reseed_limit_show(struct device *dev,
+				      struct device_attribute *attr,
+				      char *buf)
+{
+	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%u\n", prng_reseed_limit);
+}
+static ssize_t prng_reseed_limit_store(struct device *dev,
+				       struct device_attribute *attr,
+				       const char *buf, size_t count)
+{
+	unsigned limit;
+
+	if (sscanf(buf, "%u\n", &limit) != 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (prng_mode == PRNG_MODE_SHA512) {
+		if (limit < PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_SHA512_LOWER)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else {
+		if (limit < PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_TDES_LOWER)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	prng_reseed_limit = limit;
+
+	return count;
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR(reseed_limit, 0644,
+		   prng_reseed_limit_show, prng_reseed_limit_store);
+
+/* strength attribute (ro) */
+static ssize_t prng_strength_show(struct device *dev,
+				  struct device_attribute *attr,
+				  char *buf)
+{
+	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "256\n");
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR(strength, 0444, prng_strength_show, NULL);
+
+static struct attribute *prng_sha512_dev_attrs[] = {
+	&dev_attr_errorflag.attr,
+	&dev_attr_chunksize.attr,
+	&dev_attr_byte_counter.attr,
+	&dev_attr_mode.attr,
+	&dev_attr_reseed.attr,
+	&dev_attr_reseed_limit.attr,
+	&dev_attr_strength.attr,
+	NULL
+};
+static struct attribute *prng_tdes_dev_attrs[] = {
+	&dev_attr_chunksize.attr,
+	&dev_attr_byte_counter.attr,
+	&dev_attr_mode.attr,
+	NULL
+};
+
+static struct attribute_group prng_sha512_dev_attr_group = {
+	.attrs = prng_sha512_dev_attrs
+};
+static struct attribute_group prng_tdes_dev_attr_group = {
+	.attrs = prng_tdes_dev_attrs
+};
+
+
+/*** module init and exit ***/
+
+static int __init prng_init(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	/* check if the CPU has a PRNG */
+	if (!cpacf_query_func(CPACF_KMC, CPACF_KMC_PRNG))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	/* choose prng mode */
+	if (prng_mode != PRNG_MODE_TDES) {
+		/* check for MSA5 support for PRNO operations */
+		if (!cpacf_query_func(CPACF_PRNO, CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN)) {
+			if (prng_mode == PRNG_MODE_SHA512) {
+				pr_err("The prng module cannot "
+				       "start in SHA-512 mode\n");
+				return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+			}
+			prng_mode = PRNG_MODE_TDES;
+		} else
+			prng_mode = PRNG_MODE_SHA512;
+	}
+
+	if (prng_mode == PRNG_MODE_SHA512) {
+
+		/* SHA512 mode */
+
+		if (prng_chunk_size < PRNG_CHUNKSIZE_SHA512_MIN
+		    || prng_chunk_size > PRNG_CHUNKSIZE_SHA512_MAX)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		prng_chunk_size = (prng_chunk_size + 0x3f) & ~0x3f;
+
+		if (prng_reseed_limit == 0)
+			prng_reseed_limit = PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_SHA512;
+		else if (prng_reseed_limit < PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_SHA512_LOWER)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		ret = prng_sha512_instantiate();
+		if (ret)
+			goto out;
+
+		ret = misc_register(&prng_sha512_dev);
+		if (ret) {
+			prng_sha512_deinstantiate();
+			goto out;
+		}
+		ret = sysfs_create_group(&prng_sha512_dev.this_device->kobj,
+					 &prng_sha512_dev_attr_group);
+		if (ret) {
+			misc_deregister(&prng_sha512_dev);
+			prng_sha512_deinstantiate();
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+	} else {
+
+		/* TDES mode */
+
+		if (prng_chunk_size < PRNG_CHUNKSIZE_TDES_MIN
+		    || prng_chunk_size > PRNG_CHUNKSIZE_TDES_MAX)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		prng_chunk_size = (prng_chunk_size + 0x07) & ~0x07;
+
+		if (prng_reseed_limit == 0)
+			prng_reseed_limit = PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_TDES;
+		else if (prng_reseed_limit < PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_TDES_LOWER)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		ret = prng_tdes_instantiate();
+		if (ret)
+			goto out;
+
+		ret = misc_register(&prng_tdes_dev);
+		if (ret) {
+			prng_tdes_deinstantiate();
+			goto out;
+		}
+		ret = sysfs_create_group(&prng_tdes_dev.this_device->kobj,
+					 &prng_tdes_dev_attr_group);
+		if (ret) {
+			misc_deregister(&prng_tdes_dev);
+			prng_tdes_deinstantiate();
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+	}
+
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+
+static void __exit prng_exit(void)
+{
+	if (prng_mode == PRNG_MODE_SHA512) {
+		sysfs_remove_group(&prng_sha512_dev.this_device->kobj,
+				   &prng_sha512_dev_attr_group);
+		misc_deregister(&prng_sha512_dev);
+		prng_sha512_deinstantiate();
+	} else {
+		sysfs_remove_group(&prng_tdes_dev.this_device->kobj,
+				   &prng_tdes_dev_attr_group);
+		misc_deregister(&prng_tdes_dev);
+		prng_tdes_deinstantiate();
+	}
+}
+
+module_cpu_feature_match(MSA, prng_init);
+module_exit(prng_exit);
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/sha.h b/arch/s390/crypto/sha.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d6f8258b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/sha.h
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ *
+ * s390 generic implementation of the SHA Secure Hash Algorithms.
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2007
+ * Author(s): Jan Glauber (jang@de.ibm.com)
+ */
+#ifndef _CRYPTO_ARCH_S390_SHA_H
+#define _CRYPTO_ARCH_S390_SHA_H
+
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <crypto/sha.h>
+
+/* must be big enough for the largest SHA variant */
+#define SHA_MAX_STATE_SIZE	(SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE / 4)
+#define SHA_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE      SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE
+
+struct s390_sha_ctx {
+	u64 count;              /* message length in bytes */
+	u32 state[SHA_MAX_STATE_SIZE];
+	u8 buf[2 * SHA_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	int func;		/* KIMD function to use */
+};
+
+struct shash_desc;
+
+int s390_sha_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data, unsigned int len);
+int s390_sha_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/sha1_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/sha1_s390.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..009572e82
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/sha1_s390.c
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ *
+ * s390 implementation of the SHA1 Secure Hash Algorithm.
+ *
+ * Derived from cryptoapi implementation, adapted for in-place
+ * scatterlist interface.  Originally based on the public domain
+ * implementation written by Steve Reid.
+ *
+ * s390 Version:
+ *   Copyright IBM Corp. 2003, 2007
+ *   Author(s): Thomas Spatzier
+ *		Jan Glauber (jan.glauber@de.ibm.com)
+ *
+ * Derived from "crypto/sha1_generic.c"
+ *   Copyright (c) Alan Smithee.
+ *   Copyright (c) Andrew McDonald <andrew@mcdonald.org.uk>
+ *   Copyright (c) Jean-Francois Dive <jef@linuxbe.org>
+ */
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <crypto/sha.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+
+#include "sha.h"
+
+static int sha1_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+	sctx->state[0] = SHA1_H0;
+	sctx->state[1] = SHA1_H1;
+	sctx->state[2] = SHA1_H2;
+	sctx->state[3] = SHA1_H3;
+	sctx->state[4] = SHA1_H4;
+	sctx->count = 0;
+	sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sha1_export(struct shash_desc *desc, void *out)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+	struct sha1_state *octx = out;
+
+	octx->count = sctx->count;
+	memcpy(octx->state, sctx->state, sizeof(octx->state));
+	memcpy(octx->buffer, sctx->buf, sizeof(octx->buffer));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sha1_import(struct shash_desc *desc, const void *in)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+	const struct sha1_state *ictx = in;
+
+	sctx->count = ictx->count;
+	memcpy(sctx->state, ictx->state, sizeof(ictx->state));
+	memcpy(sctx->buf, ictx->buffer, sizeof(ictx->buffer));
+	sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct shash_alg alg = {
+	.digestsize	=	SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	.init		=	sha1_init,
+	.update		=	s390_sha_update,
+	.final		=	s390_sha_final,
+	.export		=	sha1_export,
+	.import		=	sha1_import,
+	.descsize	=	sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx),
+	.statesize	=	sizeof(struct sha1_state),
+	.base		=	{
+		.cra_name	=	"sha1",
+		.cra_driver_name=	"sha1-s390",
+		.cra_priority	=	300,
+		.cra_blocksize	=	SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.cra_module	=	THIS_MODULE,
+	}
+};
+
+static int __init sha1_s390_init(void)
+{
+	if (!cpacf_query_func(CPACF_KIMD, CPACF_KIMD_SHA_1))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	return crypto_register_shash(&alg);
+}
+
+static void __exit sha1_s390_fini(void)
+{
+	crypto_unregister_shash(&alg);
+}
+
+module_cpu_feature_match(MSA, sha1_s390_init);
+module_exit(sha1_s390_fini);
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("sha1");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("SHA1 Secure Hash Algorithm");
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/sha256_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/sha256_s390.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..62833a1d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/sha256_s390.c
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ *
+ * s390 implementation of the SHA256 and SHA224 Secure Hash Algorithm.
+ *
+ * s390 Version:
+ *   Copyright IBM Corp. 2005, 2011
+ *   Author(s): Jan Glauber (jang@de.ibm.com)
+ */
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <crypto/sha.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+
+#include "sha.h"
+
+static int sha256_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+	sctx->state[0] = SHA256_H0;
+	sctx->state[1] = SHA256_H1;
+	sctx->state[2] = SHA256_H2;
+	sctx->state[3] = SHA256_H3;
+	sctx->state[4] = SHA256_H4;
+	sctx->state[5] = SHA256_H5;
+	sctx->state[6] = SHA256_H6;
+	sctx->state[7] = SHA256_H7;
+	sctx->count = 0;
+	sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_256;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sha256_export(struct shash_desc *desc, void *out)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+	struct sha256_state *octx = out;
+
+	octx->count = sctx->count;
+	memcpy(octx->state, sctx->state, sizeof(octx->state));
+	memcpy(octx->buf, sctx->buf, sizeof(octx->buf));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sha256_import(struct shash_desc *desc, const void *in)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+	const struct sha256_state *ictx = in;
+
+	sctx->count = ictx->count;
+	memcpy(sctx->state, ictx->state, sizeof(ictx->state));
+	memcpy(sctx->buf, ictx->buf, sizeof(ictx->buf));
+	sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_256;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct shash_alg sha256_alg = {
+	.digestsize	=	SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	.init		=	sha256_init,
+	.update		=	s390_sha_update,
+	.final		=	s390_sha_final,
+	.export		=	sha256_export,
+	.import		=	sha256_import,
+	.descsize	=	sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx),
+	.statesize	=	sizeof(struct sha256_state),
+	.base		=	{
+		.cra_name	=	"sha256",
+		.cra_driver_name=	"sha256-s390",
+		.cra_priority	=	300,
+		.cra_blocksize	=	SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.cra_module	=	THIS_MODULE,
+	}
+};
+
+static int sha224_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+	sctx->state[0] = SHA224_H0;
+	sctx->state[1] = SHA224_H1;
+	sctx->state[2] = SHA224_H2;
+	sctx->state[3] = SHA224_H3;
+	sctx->state[4] = SHA224_H4;
+	sctx->state[5] = SHA224_H5;
+	sctx->state[6] = SHA224_H6;
+	sctx->state[7] = SHA224_H7;
+	sctx->count = 0;
+	sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_256;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct shash_alg sha224_alg = {
+	.digestsize	=	SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	.init		=	sha224_init,
+	.update		=	s390_sha_update,
+	.final		=	s390_sha_final,
+	.export		=	sha256_export,
+	.import		=	sha256_import,
+	.descsize	=	sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx),
+	.statesize	=	sizeof(struct sha256_state),
+	.base		=	{
+		.cra_name	=	"sha224",
+		.cra_driver_name=	"sha224-s390",
+		.cra_priority	=	300,
+		.cra_blocksize	=	SHA224_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.cra_module	=	THIS_MODULE,
+	}
+};
+
+static int __init sha256_s390_init(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!cpacf_query_func(CPACF_KIMD, CPACF_KIMD_SHA_256))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	ret = crypto_register_shash(&sha256_alg);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+	ret = crypto_register_shash(&sha224_alg);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		crypto_unregister_shash(&sha256_alg);
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void __exit sha256_s390_fini(void)
+{
+	crypto_unregister_shash(&sha224_alg);
+	crypto_unregister_shash(&sha256_alg);
+}
+
+module_cpu_feature_match(MSA, sha256_s390_init);
+module_exit(sha256_s390_fini);
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("sha256");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("sha224");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("SHA256 and SHA224 Secure Hash Algorithm");
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/sha512_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/sha512_s390.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..be589c340
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/sha512_s390.c
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ *
+ * s390 implementation of the SHA512 and SHA38 Secure Hash Algorithm.
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2007
+ * Author(s): Jan Glauber (jang@de.ibm.com)
+ */
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/sha.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+
+#include "sha.h"
+
+static int sha512_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[0] = 0x6a09e667f3bcc908ULL;
+	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[2] = 0xbb67ae8584caa73bULL;
+	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[4] = 0x3c6ef372fe94f82bULL;
+	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[6] = 0xa54ff53a5f1d36f1ULL;
+	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[8] = 0x510e527fade682d1ULL;
+	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[10] = 0x9b05688c2b3e6c1fULL;
+	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[12] = 0x1f83d9abfb41bd6bULL;
+	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[14] = 0x5be0cd19137e2179ULL;
+	ctx->count = 0;
+	ctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_512;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sha512_export(struct shash_desc *desc, void *out)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+	struct sha512_state *octx = out;
+
+	octx->count[0] = sctx->count;
+	octx->count[1] = 0;
+	memcpy(octx->state, sctx->state, sizeof(octx->state));
+	memcpy(octx->buf, sctx->buf, sizeof(octx->buf));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sha512_import(struct shash_desc *desc, const void *in)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+	const struct sha512_state *ictx = in;
+
+	if (unlikely(ictx->count[1]))
+		return -ERANGE;
+	sctx->count = ictx->count[0];
+
+	memcpy(sctx->state, ictx->state, sizeof(ictx->state));
+	memcpy(sctx->buf, ictx->buf, sizeof(ictx->buf));
+	sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_512;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct shash_alg sha512_alg = {
+	.digestsize	=	SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	.init		=	sha512_init,
+	.update		=	s390_sha_update,
+	.final		=	s390_sha_final,
+	.export		=	sha512_export,
+	.import		=	sha512_import,
+	.descsize	=	sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx),
+	.statesize	=	sizeof(struct sha512_state),
+	.base		=	{
+		.cra_name	=	"sha512",
+		.cra_driver_name=	"sha512-s390",
+		.cra_priority	=	300,
+		.cra_blocksize	=	SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.cra_module	=	THIS_MODULE,
+	}
+};
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("sha512");
+
+static int sha384_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[0] = 0xcbbb9d5dc1059ed8ULL;
+	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[2] = 0x629a292a367cd507ULL;
+	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[4] = 0x9159015a3070dd17ULL;
+	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[6] = 0x152fecd8f70e5939ULL;
+	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[8] = 0x67332667ffc00b31ULL;
+	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[10] = 0x8eb44a8768581511ULL;
+	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[12] = 0xdb0c2e0d64f98fa7ULL;
+	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[14] = 0x47b5481dbefa4fa4ULL;
+	ctx->count = 0;
+	ctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_512;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct shash_alg sha384_alg = {
+	.digestsize	=	SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	.init		=	sha384_init,
+	.update		=	s390_sha_update,
+	.final		=	s390_sha_final,
+	.export		=	sha512_export,
+	.import		=	sha512_import,
+	.descsize	=	sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx),
+	.statesize	=	sizeof(struct sha512_state),
+	.base		=	{
+		.cra_name	=	"sha384",
+		.cra_driver_name=	"sha384-s390",
+		.cra_priority	=	300,
+		.cra_blocksize	=	SHA384_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.cra_ctxsize	=	sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx),
+		.cra_module	=	THIS_MODULE,
+	}
+};
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("sha384");
+
+static int __init init(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!cpacf_query_func(CPACF_KIMD, CPACF_KIMD_SHA_512))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	if ((ret = crypto_register_shash(&sha512_alg)) < 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((ret = crypto_register_shash(&sha384_alg)) < 0)
+		crypto_unregister_shash(&sha512_alg);
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void __exit fini(void)
+{
+	crypto_unregister_shash(&sha512_alg);
+	crypto_unregister_shash(&sha384_alg);
+}
+
+module_cpu_feature_match(MSA, init);
+module_exit(fini);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("SHA512 and SHA-384 Secure Hash Algorithm");
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/sha_common.c b/arch/s390/crypto/sha_common.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cf0718d12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/sha_common.c
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ *
+ * s390 generic implementation of the SHA Secure Hash Algorithms.
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2007
+ * Author(s): Jan Glauber (jang@de.ibm.com)
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+#include "sha.h"
+
+int s390_sha_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data, unsigned int len)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+	unsigned int bsize = crypto_shash_blocksize(desc->tfm);
+	unsigned int index, n;
+
+	/* how much is already in the buffer? */
+	index = ctx->count & (bsize - 1);
+	ctx->count += len;
+
+	if ((index + len) < bsize)
+		goto store;
+
+	/* process one stored block */
+	if (index) {
+		memcpy(ctx->buf + index, data, bsize - index);
+		cpacf_kimd(ctx->func, ctx->state, ctx->buf, bsize);
+		data += bsize - index;
+		len -= bsize - index;
+		index = 0;
+	}
+
+	/* process as many blocks as possible */
+	if (len >= bsize) {
+		n = len & ~(bsize - 1);
+		cpacf_kimd(ctx->func, ctx->state, data, n);
+		data += n;
+		len -= n;
+	}
+store:
+	if (len)
+		memcpy(ctx->buf + index , data, len);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(s390_sha_update);
+
+int s390_sha_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+	unsigned int bsize = crypto_shash_blocksize(desc->tfm);
+	u64 bits;
+	unsigned int index, end, plen;
+
+	/* SHA-512 uses 128 bit padding length */
+	plen = (bsize > SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) ? 16 : 8;
+
+	/* must perform manual padding */
+	index = ctx->count & (bsize - 1);
+	end = (index < bsize - plen) ? bsize : (2 * bsize);
+
+	/* start pad with 1 */
+	ctx->buf[index] = 0x80;
+	index++;
+
+	/* pad with zeros */
+	memset(ctx->buf + index, 0x00, end - index - 8);
+
+	/*
+	 * Append message length. Well, SHA-512 wants a 128 bit length value,
+	 * nevertheless we use u64, should be enough for now...
+	 */
+	bits = ctx->count * 8;
+	memcpy(ctx->buf + end - 8, &bits, sizeof(bits));
+	cpacf_kimd(ctx->func, ctx->state, ctx->buf, end);
+
+	/* copy digest to out */
+	memcpy(out, ctx->state, crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm));
+	/* wipe context */
+	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof *ctx);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(s390_sha_final);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("s390 SHA cipher common functions");