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+========================================================
+Linux Security Modules: General Security Hooks for Linux
+========================================================
+
+:Author: Stephen Smalley
+:Author: Timothy Fraser
+:Author: Chris Vance
+
+.. note::
+
+   The APIs described in this book are outdated.
+
+Introduction
+============
+
+In March 2001, the National Security Agency (NSA) gave a presentation
+about Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) at the 2.5 Linux Kernel Summit.
+SELinux is an implementation of flexible and fine-grained
+nondiscretionary access controls in the Linux kernel, originally
+implemented as its own particular kernel patch. Several other security
+projects (e.g. RSBAC, Medusa) have also developed flexible access
+control architectures for the Linux kernel, and various projects have
+developed particular access control models for Linux (e.g. LIDS, DTE,
+SubDomain). Each project has developed and maintained its own kernel
+patch to support its security needs.
+
+In response to the NSA presentation, Linus Torvalds made a set of
+remarks that described a security framework he would be willing to
+consider for inclusion in the mainstream Linux kernel. He described a
+general framework that would provide a set of security hooks to control
+operations on kernel objects and a set of opaque security fields in
+kernel data structures for maintaining security attributes. This
+framework could then be used by loadable kernel modules to implement any
+desired model of security. Linus also suggested the possibility of
+migrating the Linux capabilities code into such a module.
+
+The Linux Security Modules (LSM) project was started by WireX to develop
+such a framework. LSM is a joint development effort by several security
+projects, including Immunix, SELinux, SGI and Janus, and several
+individuals, including Greg Kroah-Hartman and James Morris, to develop a
+Linux kernel patch that implements this framework. The patch is
+currently tracking the 2.4 series and is targeted for integration into
+the 2.5 development series. This technical report provides an overview
+of the framework and the example capabilities security module provided
+by the LSM kernel patch.
+
+LSM Framework
+=============
+
+The LSM kernel patch provides a general kernel framework to support
+security modules. In particular, the LSM framework is primarily focused
+on supporting access control modules, although future development is
+likely to address other security needs such as auditing. By itself, the
+framework does not provide any additional security; it merely provides
+the infrastructure to support security modules. The LSM kernel patch
+also moves most of the capabilities logic into an optional security
+module, with the system defaulting to the traditional superuser logic.
+This capabilities module is discussed further in
+`LSM Capabilities Module <#cap>`__.
+
+The LSM kernel patch adds security fields to kernel data structures and
+inserts calls to hook functions at critical points in the kernel code to
+manage the security fields and to perform access control. It also adds
+functions for registering and unregistering security modules, and adds a
+general :c:func:`security()` system call to support new system calls
+for security-aware applications.
+
+The LSM security fields are simply ``void*`` pointers. For process and
+program execution security information, security fields were added to
+:c:type:`struct task_struct <task_struct>` and
+:c:type:`struct linux_binprm <linux_binprm>`. For filesystem
+security information, a security field was added to :c:type:`struct
+super_block <super_block>`. For pipe, file, and socket security
+information, security fields were added to :c:type:`struct inode
+<inode>` and :c:type:`struct file <file>`. For packet and
+network device security information, security fields were added to
+:c:type:`struct sk_buff <sk_buff>` and :c:type:`struct
+net_device <net_device>`. For System V IPC security information,
+security fields were added to :c:type:`struct kern_ipc_perm
+<kern_ipc_perm>` and :c:type:`struct msg_msg
+<msg_msg>`; additionally, the definitions for :c:type:`struct
+msg_msg <msg_msg>`, struct msg_queue, and struct shmid_kernel
+were moved to header files (``include/linux/msg.h`` and
+``include/linux/shm.h`` as appropriate) to allow the security modules to
+use these definitions.
+
+Each LSM hook is a function pointer in a global table, security_ops.
+This table is a :c:type:`struct security_operations
+<security_operations>` structure as defined by
+``include/linux/security.h``. Detailed documentation for each hook is
+included in this header file. At present, this structure consists of a
+collection of substructures that group related hooks based on the kernel
+object (e.g. task, inode, file, sk_buff, etc) as well as some top-level
+hook function pointers for system operations. This structure is likely
+to be flattened in the future for performance. The placement of the hook
+calls in the kernel code is described by the "called:" lines in the
+per-hook documentation in the header file. The hook calls can also be
+easily found in the kernel code by looking for the string
+"security_ops->".
+
+Linus mentioned per-process security hooks in his original remarks as a
+possible alternative to global security hooks. However, if LSM were to
+start from the perspective of per-process hooks, then the base framework
+would have to deal with how to handle operations that involve multiple
+processes (e.g. kill), since each process might have its own hook for
+controlling the operation. This would require a general mechanism for
+composing hooks in the base framework. Additionally, LSM would still
+need global hooks for operations that have no process context (e.g.
+network input operations). Consequently, LSM provides global security
+hooks, but a security module is free to implement per-process hooks
+(where that makes sense) by storing a security_ops table in each
+process' security field and then invoking these per-process hooks from
+the global hooks. The problem of composition is thus deferred to the
+module.
+
+The global security_ops table is initialized to a set of hook functions
+provided by a dummy security module that provides traditional superuser
+logic. A :c:func:`register_security()` function (in
+``security/security.c``) is provided to allow a security module to set
+security_ops to refer to its own hook functions, and an
+:c:func:`unregister_security()` function is provided to revert
+security_ops to the dummy module hooks. This mechanism is used to set
+the primary security module, which is responsible for making the final
+decision for each hook.
+
+LSM also provides a simple mechanism for stacking additional security
+modules with the primary security module. It defines
+:c:func:`register_security()` and
+:c:func:`unregister_security()` hooks in the :c:type:`struct
+security_operations <security_operations>` structure and
+provides :c:func:`mod_reg_security()` and
+:c:func:`mod_unreg_security()` functions that invoke these hooks
+after performing some sanity checking. A security module can call these
+functions in order to stack with other modules. However, the actual
+details of how this stacking is handled are deferred to the module,
+which can implement these hooks in any way it wishes (including always
+returning an error if it does not wish to support stacking). In this
+manner, LSM again defers the problem of composition to the module.
+
+Although the LSM hooks are organized into substructures based on kernel
+object, all of the hooks can be viewed as falling into two major
+categories: hooks that are used to manage the security fields and hooks
+that are used to perform access control. Examples of the first category
+of hooks include the :c:func:`alloc_security()` and
+:c:func:`free_security()` hooks defined for each kernel data
+structure that has a security field. These hooks are used to allocate
+and free security structures for kernel objects. The first category of
+hooks also includes hooks that set information in the security field
+after allocation, such as the :c:func:`post_lookup()` hook in
+:c:type:`struct inode_security_ops <inode_security_ops>`.
+This hook is used to set security information for inodes after
+successful lookup operations. An example of the second category of hooks
+is the :c:func:`permission()` hook in :c:type:`struct
+inode_security_ops <inode_security_ops>`. This hook checks
+permission when accessing an inode.
+
+LSM Capabilities Module
+=======================
+
+The LSM kernel patch moves most of the existing POSIX.1e capabilities
+logic into an optional security module stored in the file
+``security/capability.c``. This change allows users who do not want to
+use capabilities to omit this code entirely from their kernel, instead
+using the dummy module for traditional superuser logic or any other
+module that they desire. This change also allows the developers of the
+capabilities logic to maintain and enhance their code more freely,
+without needing to integrate patches back into the base kernel.
+
+In addition to moving the capabilities logic, the LSM kernel patch could
+move the capability-related fields from the kernel data structures into
+the new security fields managed by the security modules. However, at
+present, the LSM kernel patch leaves the capability fields in the kernel
+data structures. In his original remarks, Linus suggested that this
+might be preferable so that other security modules can be easily stacked
+with the capabilities module without needing to chain multiple security
+structures on the security field. It also avoids imposing extra overhead
+on the capabilities module to manage the security fields. However, the
+LSM framework could certainly support such a move if it is determined to
+be desirable, with only a few additional changes described below.
+
+At present, the capabilities logic for computing process capabilities on
+:c:func:`execve()` and :c:func:`set\*uid()`, checking
+capabilities for a particular process, saving and checking capabilities
+for netlink messages, and handling the :c:func:`capget()` and
+:c:func:`capset()` system calls have been moved into the
+capabilities module. There are still a few locations in the base kernel
+where capability-related fields are directly examined or modified, but
+the current version of the LSM patch does allow a security module to
+completely replace the assignment and testing of capabilities. These few
+locations would need to be changed if the capability-related fields were
+moved into the security field. The following is a list of known
+locations that still perform such direct examination or modification of
+capability-related fields:
+
+-  ``fs/open.c``::c:func:`sys_access()`
+
+-  ``fs/lockd/host.c``::c:func:`nlm_bind_host()`
+
+-  ``fs/nfsd/auth.c``::c:func:`nfsd_setuser()`
+
+-  ``fs/proc/array.c``::c:func:`task_cap()`