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Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4901 |
1 files changed, 4901 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4f65d953f --- /dev/null +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -0,0 +1,4901 @@ +/* + * Simplified MAC Kernel (smack) security module + * + * This file contains the smack hook function implementations. + * + * Authors: + * Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> + * Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com> + * + * Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> + * Copyright (C) 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. + * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> + * Copyright (C) 2010 Nokia Corporation + * Copyright (C) 2011 Intel Corporation. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + */ + +#include <linux/xattr.h> +#include <linux/pagemap.h> +#include <linux/mount.h> +#include <linux/stat.h> +#include <linux/kd.h> +#include <asm/ioctls.h> +#include <linux/ip.h> +#include <linux/tcp.h> +#include <linux/udp.h> +#include <linux/dccp.h> +#include <linux/icmpv6.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/mutex.h> +#include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h> +#include <net/cipso_ipv4.h> +#include <net/ip.h> +#include <net/ipv6.h> +#include <linux/audit.h> +#include <linux/magic.h> +#include <linux/dcache.h> +#include <linux/personality.h> +#include <linux/msg.h> +#include <linux/shm.h> +#include <linux/binfmts.h> +#include <linux/parser.h> +#include "smack.h" + +#define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE" +#define TRANS_TRUE_SIZE 4 + +#define SMK_CONNECTING 0 +#define SMK_RECEIVING 1 +#define SMK_SENDING 2 + +#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING +DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_ipv6_lock); +static LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list); +#endif +static struct kmem_cache *smack_inode_cache; +int smack_enabled; + +static const match_table_t smk_mount_tokens = { + {Opt_fsdefault, SMK_FSDEFAULT "%s"}, + {Opt_fsfloor, SMK_FSFLOOR "%s"}, + {Opt_fshat, SMK_FSHAT "%s"}, + {Opt_fsroot, SMK_FSROOT "%s"}, + {Opt_fstransmute, SMK_FSTRANS "%s"}, + {Opt_error, NULL}, +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP +static char *smk_bu_mess[] = { + "Bringup Error", /* Unused */ + "Bringup", /* SMACK_BRINGUP_ALLOW */ + "Unconfined Subject", /* SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT */ + "Unconfined Object", /* SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT */ +}; + +static void smk_bu_mode(int mode, char *s) +{ + int i = 0; + + if (mode & MAY_READ) + s[i++] = 'r'; + if (mode & MAY_WRITE) + s[i++] = 'w'; + if (mode & MAY_EXEC) + s[i++] = 'x'; + if (mode & MAY_APPEND) + s[i++] = 'a'; + if (mode & MAY_TRANSMUTE) + s[i++] = 't'; + if (mode & MAY_LOCK) + s[i++] = 'l'; + if (i == 0) + s[i++] = '-'; + s[i] = '\0'; +} +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP +static int smk_bu_note(char *note, struct smack_known *sskp, + struct smack_known *oskp, int mode, int rc) +{ + char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1]; + + if (rc <= 0) + return rc; + if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT) + rc = 0; + + smk_bu_mode(mode, acc); + pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc], + sskp->smk_known, oskp->smk_known, acc, note); + return 0; +} +#else +#define smk_bu_note(note, sskp, oskp, mode, RC) (RC) +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP +static int smk_bu_current(char *note, struct smack_known *oskp, + int mode, int rc) +{ + struct task_smack *tsp = current_security(); + char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1]; + + if (rc <= 0) + return rc; + if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT) + rc = 0; + + smk_bu_mode(mode, acc); + pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc], + tsp->smk_task->smk_known, oskp->smk_known, + acc, current->comm, note); + return 0; +} +#else +#define smk_bu_current(note, oskp, mode, RC) (RC) +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP +static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc) +{ + struct task_smack *tsp = current_security(); + struct smack_known *smk_task = smk_of_task_struct(otp); + char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1]; + + if (rc <= 0) + return rc; + if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT) + rc = 0; + + smk_bu_mode(mode, acc); + pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s to %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc], + tsp->smk_task->smk_known, smk_task->smk_known, acc, + current->comm, otp->comm); + return 0; +} +#else +#define smk_bu_task(otp, mode, RC) (RC) +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP +static int smk_bu_inode(struct inode *inode, int mode, int rc) +{ + struct task_smack *tsp = current_security(); + struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security; + char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1]; + + if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE) + pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n", + inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm); + + if (rc <= 0) + return rc; + if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT) + rc = 0; + if (rc == SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT && + (mode & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND))) + isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_IMPURE; + + smk_bu_mode(mode, acc); + + pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) inode=(%s %ld) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc], + tsp->smk_task->smk_known, isp->smk_inode->smk_known, acc, + inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm); + return 0; +} +#else +#define smk_bu_inode(inode, mode, RC) (RC) +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP +static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc) +{ + struct task_smack *tsp = current_security(); + struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); + struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security; + char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1]; + + if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE) + pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n", + inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm); + + if (rc <= 0) + return rc; + if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT) + rc = 0; + + smk_bu_mode(mode, acc); + pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc], + sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc, + inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file, + current->comm); + return 0; +} +#else +#define smk_bu_file(file, mode, RC) (RC) +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP +static int smk_bu_credfile(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, + int mode, int rc) +{ + struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security; + struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); + struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security; + char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1]; + + if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE) + pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n", + inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm); + + if (rc <= 0) + return rc; + if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT) + rc = 0; + + smk_bu_mode(mode, acc); + pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc], + sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc, + inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file, + current->comm); + return 0; +} +#else +#define smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, mode, RC) (RC) +#endif + +/** + * smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file. + * @name: type of the label (attribute) + * @ip: a pointer to the inode + * @dp: a pointer to the dentry + * + * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label, + * NULL if there was no label to fetch, or an error code. + */ +static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip, + struct dentry *dp) +{ + int rc; + char *buffer; + struct smack_known *skp = NULL; + + if (!(ip->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) + return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP); + + buffer = kzalloc(SMK_LONGLABEL, GFP_NOFS); + if (buffer == NULL) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + rc = __vfs_getxattr(dp, ip, name, buffer, SMK_LONGLABEL); + if (rc < 0) + skp = ERR_PTR(rc); + else if (rc == 0) + skp = NULL; + else + skp = smk_import_entry(buffer, rc); + + kfree(buffer); + + return skp; +} + +/** + * new_inode_smack - allocate an inode security blob + * @skp: a pointer to the Smack label entry to use in the blob + * + * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available + */ +static struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(struct smack_known *skp) +{ + struct inode_smack *isp; + + isp = kmem_cache_zalloc(smack_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS); + if (isp == NULL) + return NULL; + + isp->smk_inode = skp; + isp->smk_flags = 0; + mutex_init(&isp->smk_lock); + + return isp; +} + +/** + * new_task_smack - allocate a task security blob + * @task: a pointer to the Smack label for the running task + * @forked: a pointer to the Smack label for the forked task + * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation + * + * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available + */ +static struct task_smack *new_task_smack(struct smack_known *task, + struct smack_known *forked, gfp_t gfp) +{ + struct task_smack *tsp; + + tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp); + if (tsp == NULL) + return NULL; + + tsp->smk_task = task; + tsp->smk_forked = forked; + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_rules); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_relabel); + mutex_init(&tsp->smk_rules_lock); + + return tsp; +} + +/** + * smk_copy_rules - copy a rule set + * @nhead: new rules header pointer + * @ohead: old rules header pointer + * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation + * + * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error + */ +static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead, + gfp_t gfp) +{ + struct smack_rule *nrp; + struct smack_rule *orp; + int rc = 0; + + list_for_each_entry_rcu(orp, ohead, list) { + nrp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_rule), gfp); + if (nrp == NULL) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + break; + } + *nrp = *orp; + list_add_rcu(&nrp->list, nhead); + } + return rc; +} + +/** + * smk_copy_relabel - copy smk_relabel labels list + * @nhead: new rules header pointer + * @ohead: old rules header pointer + * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation + * + * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error + */ +static int smk_copy_relabel(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead, + gfp_t gfp) +{ + struct smack_known_list_elem *nklep; + struct smack_known_list_elem *oklep; + + list_for_each_entry(oklep, ohead, list) { + nklep = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_known_list_elem), gfp); + if (nklep == NULL) { + smk_destroy_label_list(nhead); + return -ENOMEM; + } + nklep->smk_label = oklep->smk_label; + list_add(&nklep->list, nhead); + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * smk_ptrace_mode - helper function for converting PTRACE_MODE_* into MAY_* + * @mode - input mode in form of PTRACE_MODE_* + * + * Returns a converted MAY_* mode usable by smack rules + */ +static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode) +{ + if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) + return MAY_READWRITE; + if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) + return MAY_READ; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * smk_ptrace_rule_check - helper for ptrace access + * @tracer: tracer process + * @tracee_known: label entry of the process that's about to be traced + * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*) + * @func: name of the function that called us, used for audit + * + * Returns 0 on access granted, -error on error + */ +static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer, + struct smack_known *tracee_known, + unsigned int mode, const char *func) +{ + int rc; + struct smk_audit_info ad, *saip = NULL; + struct task_smack *tsp; + struct smack_known *tracer_known; + const struct cred *tracercred; + + if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) { + smk_ad_init(&ad, func, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); + smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tracer); + saip = &ad; + } + + rcu_read_lock(); + tracercred = __task_cred(tracer); + tsp = tracercred->security; + tracer_known = smk_of_task(tsp); + + if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) && + (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT || + smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)) { + if (tracer_known->smk_known == tracee_known->smk_known) + rc = 0; + else if (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN) + rc = -EACCES; + else if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_SYS_PTRACE, tracercred)) + rc = 0; + else + rc = -EACCES; + + if (saip) + smack_log(tracer_known->smk_known, + tracee_known->smk_known, + 0, rc, saip); + + rcu_read_unlock(); + return rc; + } + + /* In case of rule==SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT or mode==PTRACE_MODE_READ */ + rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, tracee_known, smk_ptrace_mode(mode), saip); + + rcu_read_unlock(); + return rc; +} + +/* + * LSM hooks. + * We he, that is fun! + */ + +/** + * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH + * @ctp: child task pointer + * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*) + * + * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise + * + * Do the capability checks. + */ +static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode) +{ + struct smack_known *skp; + + skp = smk_of_task_struct(ctp); + + return smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp, mode, __func__); +} + +/** + * smack_ptrace_traceme - Smack approval on PTRACE_TRACEME + * @ptp: parent task pointer + * + * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise + * + * Do the capability checks, and require PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH. + */ +static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp) +{ + int rc; + struct smack_known *skp; + + skp = smk_of_task(current_security()); + + rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(ptp, skp, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, __func__); + return rc; +} + +/** + * smack_syslog - Smack approval on syslog + * @type: message type + * + * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise. + */ +static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); + + if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) + return 0; + + if (smack_syslog_label != NULL && smack_syslog_label != skp) + rc = -EACCES; + + return rc; +} + + +/* + * Superblock Hooks. + */ + +/** + * smack_sb_alloc_security - allocate a superblock blob + * @sb: the superblock getting the blob + * + * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error. + */ +static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) +{ + struct superblock_smack *sbsp; + + sbsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_smack), GFP_KERNEL); + + if (sbsp == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_floor; + sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_floor; + sbsp->smk_floor = &smack_known_floor; + sbsp->smk_hat = &smack_known_hat; + /* + * SMK_SB_INITIALIZED will be zero from kzalloc. + */ + sb->s_security = sbsp; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * smack_sb_free_security - free a superblock blob + * @sb: the superblock getting the blob + * + */ +static void smack_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb) +{ + kfree(sb->s_security); + sb->s_security = NULL; +} + +/** + * smack_sb_copy_data - copy mount options data for processing + * @orig: where to start + * @smackopts: mount options string + * + * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error. + * + * Copy the Smack specific mount options out of the mount + * options list. + */ +static int smack_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *smackopts) +{ + char *cp, *commap, *otheropts, *dp; + + otheropts = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); + if (otheropts == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + for (cp = orig, commap = orig; commap != NULL; cp = commap + 1) { + if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSDEFAULT) == cp) + dp = smackopts; + else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSFLOOR) == cp) + dp = smackopts; + else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSHAT) == cp) + dp = smackopts; + else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSROOT) == cp) + dp = smackopts; + else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSTRANS) == cp) + dp = smackopts; + else + dp = otheropts; + + commap = strchr(cp, ','); + if (commap != NULL) + *commap = '\0'; + + if (*dp != '\0') + strcat(dp, ","); + strcat(dp, cp); + } + + strcpy(orig, otheropts); + free_page((unsigned long)otheropts); + + return 0; +} + +/** + * smack_parse_opts_str - parse Smack specific mount options + * @options: mount options string + * @opts: where to store converted mount opts + * + * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error. + * + * converts Smack specific mount options to generic security option format + */ +static int smack_parse_opts_str(char *options, + struct security_mnt_opts *opts) +{ + char *p; + char *fsdefault = NULL; + char *fsfloor = NULL; + char *fshat = NULL; + char *fsroot = NULL; + char *fstransmute = NULL; + int rc = -ENOMEM; + int num_mnt_opts = 0; + int token; + + opts->num_mnt_opts = 0; + + if (!options) + return 0; + + while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) { + substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; + + if (!*p) + continue; + + token = match_token(p, smk_mount_tokens, args); + + switch (token) { + case Opt_fsdefault: + if (fsdefault) + goto out_opt_err; + fsdefault = match_strdup(&args[0]); + if (!fsdefault) + goto out_err; + break; + case Opt_fsfloor: + if (fsfloor) + goto out_opt_err; + fsfloor = match_strdup(&args[0]); + if (!fsfloor) + goto out_err; + break; + case Opt_fshat: + if (fshat) + goto out_opt_err; + fshat = match_strdup(&args[0]); + if (!fshat) + goto out_err; + break; + case Opt_fsroot: + if (fsroot) + goto out_opt_err; + fsroot = match_strdup(&args[0]); + if (!fsroot) + goto out_err; + break; + case Opt_fstransmute: + if (fstransmute) + goto out_opt_err; + fstransmute = match_strdup(&args[0]); + if (!fstransmute) + goto out_err; + break; + default: + rc = -EINVAL; + pr_warn("Smack: unknown mount option\n"); + goto out_err; + } + } + + opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!opts->mnt_opts) + goto out_err; + + opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) + goto out_err; + + if (fsdefault) { + opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsdefault; + opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSDEFAULT_MNT; + } + if (fsfloor) { + opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsfloor; + opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSFLOOR_MNT; + } + if (fshat) { + opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fshat; + opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSHAT_MNT; + } + if (fsroot) { + opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsroot; + opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSROOT_MNT; + } + if (fstransmute) { + opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fstransmute; + opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSTRANS_MNT; + } + + opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts; + return 0; + +out_opt_err: + rc = -EINVAL; + pr_warn("Smack: duplicate mount options\n"); + +out_err: + kfree(fsdefault); + kfree(fsfloor); + kfree(fshat); + kfree(fsroot); + kfree(fstransmute); + return rc; +} + +/** + * smack_set_mnt_opts - set Smack specific mount options + * @sb: the file system superblock + * @opts: Smack mount options + * @kern_flags: mount option from kernel space or user space + * @set_kern_flags: where to store converted mount opts + * + * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure + * + * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set Smack mount + * labels. + */ +static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, + struct security_mnt_opts *opts, + unsigned long kern_flags, + unsigned long *set_kern_flags) +{ + struct dentry *root = sb->s_root; + struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(root); + struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security; + struct inode_smack *isp; + struct smack_known *skp; + int i; + int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts; + int transmute = 0; + + if (sp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_INITIALIZED) + return 0; + + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) { + /* + * Unprivileged mounts don't get to specify Smack values. + */ + if (num_opts) + return -EPERM; + /* + * Unprivileged mounts get root and default from the caller. + */ + skp = smk_of_current(); + sp->smk_root = skp; + sp->smk_default = skp; + /* + * For a handful of fs types with no user-controlled + * backing store it's okay to trust security labels + * in the filesystem. The rest are untrusted. + */ + if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns && + sb->s_magic != SYSFS_MAGIC && sb->s_magic != TMPFS_MAGIC && + sb->s_magic != RAMFS_MAGIC) { + transmute = 1; + sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED; + } + } + + sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_INITIALIZED; + + for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) { + switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) { + case FSDEFAULT_MNT: + skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0); + if (IS_ERR(skp)) + return PTR_ERR(skp); + sp->smk_default = skp; + break; + case FSFLOOR_MNT: + skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0); + if (IS_ERR(skp)) + return PTR_ERR(skp); + sp->smk_floor = skp; + break; + case FSHAT_MNT: + skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0); + if (IS_ERR(skp)) + return PTR_ERR(skp); + sp->smk_hat = skp; + break; + case FSROOT_MNT: + skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0); + if (IS_ERR(skp)) + return PTR_ERR(skp); + sp->smk_root = skp; + break; + case FSTRANS_MNT: + skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0); + if (IS_ERR(skp)) + return PTR_ERR(skp); + sp->smk_root = skp; + transmute = 1; + break; + default: + break; + } + } + + /* + * Initialize the root inode. + */ + isp = inode->i_security; + if (isp == NULL) { + isp = new_inode_smack(sp->smk_root); + if (isp == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + inode->i_security = isp; + } else + isp->smk_inode = sp->smk_root; + + if (transmute) + isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * smack_sb_kern_mount - Smack specific mount processing + * @sb: the file system superblock + * @flags: the mount flags + * @data: the smack mount options + * + * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure + */ +static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data) +{ + int rc = 0; + char *options = data; + struct security_mnt_opts opts; + + security_init_mnt_opts(&opts); + + if (!options) + goto out; + + rc = smack_parse_opts_str(options, &opts); + if (rc) + goto out_err; + +out: + rc = smack_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL); + +out_err: + security_free_mnt_opts(&opts); + return rc; +} + +/** + * smack_sb_statfs - Smack check on statfs + * @dentry: identifies the file system in question + * + * Returns 0 if current can read the floor of the filesystem, + * and error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security; + int rc; + struct smk_audit_info ad; + + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY); + smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry); + + rc = smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_current("statfs", sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, rc); + return rc; +} + +/* + * BPRM hooks + */ + +/** + * smack_bprm_set_creds - set creds for exec + * @bprm: the exec information + * + * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -EPERM if exec forbidden and -ENOMEM otherwise + */ +static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file); + struct task_smack *bsp = bprm->cred->security; + struct inode_smack *isp; + struct superblock_smack *sbsp; + int rc; + + if (bprm->called_set_creds) + return 0; + + isp = inode->i_security; + if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task) + return 0; + + sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security; + if ((sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) && + isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root) + return 0; + + if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) { + struct task_struct *tracer; + rc = 0; + + rcu_read_lock(); + tracer = ptrace_parent(current); + if (likely(tracer != NULL)) + rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(tracer, + isp->smk_task, + PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, + __func__); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + if (rc != 0) + return rc; + } + if (bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) + return -EPERM; + + bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task; + bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; + + /* Decide if this is a secure exec. */ + if (bsp->smk_task != bsp->smk_forked) + bprm->secureexec = 1; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Inode hooks + */ + +/** + * smack_inode_alloc_security - allocate an inode blob + * @inode: the inode in need of a blob + * + * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -ENOMEM otherwise + */ +static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) +{ + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); + + inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(skp); + if (inode->i_security == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + return 0; +} + +/** + * smack_inode_free_rcu - Free inode_smack blob from cache + * @head: the rcu_head for getting inode_smack pointer + * + * Call back function called from call_rcu() to free + * the i_security blob pointer in inode + */ +static void smack_inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) +{ + struct inode_smack *issp; + + issp = container_of(head, struct inode_smack, smk_rcu); + kmem_cache_free(smack_inode_cache, issp); +} + +/** + * smack_inode_free_security - free an inode blob using call_rcu() + * @inode: the inode with a blob + * + * Clears the blob pointer in inode using RCU + */ +static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) +{ + struct inode_smack *issp = inode->i_security; + + /* + * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and + * a call to smack_inode_permission() can be made + * after smack_inode_free_security() is called. + * To avoid race condition free the i_security via RCU + * and leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact. + * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too. + */ + call_rcu(&issp->smk_rcu, smack_inode_free_rcu); +} + +/** + * smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode + * @inode: the newly created inode + * @dir: containing directory object + * @qstr: unused + * @name: where to put the attribute name + * @value: where to put the attribute value + * @len: where to put the length of the attribute + * + * Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory + */ +static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, + const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name, + void **value, size_t *len) +{ + struct inode_smack *issp = inode->i_security; + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); + struct smack_known *isp = smk_of_inode(inode); + struct smack_known *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir); + int may; + + if (name) + *name = XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX; + + if (value && len) { + rcu_read_lock(); + may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, dsp->smk_known, + &skp->smk_rules); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + /* + * If the access rule allows transmutation and + * the directory requests transmutation then + * by all means transmute. + * Mark the inode as changed. + */ + if (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) && + smk_inode_transmutable(dir)) { + isp = dsp; + issp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_CHANGED; + } + + *value = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_NOFS); + if (*value == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + *len = strlen(isp->smk_known); + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * smack_inode_link - Smack check on link + * @old_dentry: the existing object + * @dir: unused + * @new_dentry: the new object + * + * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, + struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ + struct smack_known *isp; + struct smk_audit_info ad; + int rc; + + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY); + smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry); + + isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)); + rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc); + + if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) { + isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry)); + smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry); + rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc); + } + + return rc; +} + +/** + * smack_inode_unlink - Smack check on inode deletion + * @dir: containing directory object + * @dentry: file to unlink + * + * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory + * and the object, error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) +{ + struct inode *ip = d_backing_inode(dentry); + struct smk_audit_info ad; + int rc; + + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY); + smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry); + + /* + * You need write access to the thing you're unlinking + */ + rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_inode(ip, MAY_WRITE, rc); + if (rc == 0) { + /* + * You also need write access to the containing directory + */ + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE); + smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir); + rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc); + } + return rc; +} + +/** + * smack_inode_rmdir - Smack check on directory deletion + * @dir: containing directory object + * @dentry: directory to unlink + * + * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory + * and the directory, error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) +{ + struct smk_audit_info ad; + int rc; + + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY); + smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry); + + /* + * You need write access to the thing you're removing + */ + rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc); + if (rc == 0) { + /* + * You also need write access to the containing directory + */ + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE); + smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir); + rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc); + } + + return rc; +} + +/** + * smack_inode_rename - Smack check on rename + * @old_inode: unused + * @old_dentry: the old object + * @new_inode: unused + * @new_dentry: the new object + * + * Read and write access is required on both the old and + * new directories. + * + * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, + struct dentry *old_dentry, + struct inode *new_inode, + struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ + int rc; + struct smack_known *isp; + struct smk_audit_info ad; + + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY); + smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry); + + isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)); + rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc); + + if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) { + isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry)); + smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry); + rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc); + } + return rc; +} + +/** + * smack_inode_permission - Smack version of permission() + * @inode: the inode in question + * @mask: the access requested + * + * This is the important Smack hook. + * + * Returns 0 if access is permitted, -EACCES otherwise + */ +static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) +{ + struct superblock_smack *sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security; + struct smk_audit_info ad; + int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK; + int rc; + + mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND); + /* + * No permission to check. Existence test. Yup, it's there. + */ + if (mask == 0) + return 0; + + if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) { + if (smk_of_inode(inode) != sbsp->smk_root) + return -EACCES; + } + + /* May be droppable after audit */ + if (no_block) + return -ECHILD; + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE); + smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, inode); + rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, mask, rc); + return rc; +} + +/** + * smack_inode_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes + * @dentry: the object + * @iattr: for the force flag + * + * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) +{ + struct smk_audit_info ad; + int rc; + + /* + * Need to allow for clearing the setuid bit. + */ + if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) + return 0; + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY); + smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry); + + rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc); + return rc; +} + +/** + * smack_inode_getattr - Smack check for getting attributes + * @mnt: vfsmount of the object + * @dentry: the object + * + * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) +{ + struct smk_audit_info ad; + struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry); + int rc; + + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH); + smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, *path); + rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, MAY_READ, rc); + return rc; +} + +/** + * smack_inode_setxattr - Smack check for setting xattrs + * @dentry: the object + * @name: name of the attribute + * @value: value of the attribute + * @size: size of the value + * @flags: unused + * + * This protects the Smack attribute explicitly. + * + * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, + const void *value, size_t size, int flags) +{ + struct smk_audit_info ad; + struct smack_known *skp; + int check_priv = 0; + int check_import = 0; + int check_star = 0; + int rc = 0; + + /* + * Check label validity here so import won't fail in post_setxattr + */ + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 || + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 || + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) { + check_priv = 1; + check_import = 1; + } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 || + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) { + check_priv = 1; + check_import = 1; + check_star = 1; + } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) { + check_priv = 1; + if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE || + strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0) + rc = -EINVAL; + } else + rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); + + if (check_priv && !smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + rc = -EPERM; + + if (rc == 0 && check_import) { + skp = size ? smk_import_entry(value, size) : NULL; + if (IS_ERR(skp)) + rc = PTR_ERR(skp); + else if (skp == NULL || (check_star && + (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web))) + rc = -EINVAL; + } + + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY); + smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry); + + if (rc == 0) { + rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc); + } + + return rc; +} + +/** + * smack_inode_post_setxattr - Apply the Smack update approved above + * @dentry: object + * @name: attribute name + * @value: attribute value + * @size: attribute size + * @flags: unused + * + * Set the pointer in the inode blob to the entry found + * in the master label list. + */ +static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, + const void *value, size_t size, int flags) +{ + struct smack_known *skp; + struct inode_smack *isp = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security; + + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) { + isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE; + return; + } + + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) { + skp = smk_import_entry(value, size); + if (!IS_ERR(skp)) + isp->smk_inode = skp; + } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) { + skp = smk_import_entry(value, size); + if (!IS_ERR(skp)) + isp->smk_task = skp; + } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) { + skp = smk_import_entry(value, size); + if (!IS_ERR(skp)) + isp->smk_mmap = skp; + } + + return; +} + +/** + * smack_inode_getxattr - Smack check on getxattr + * @dentry: the object + * @name: unused + * + * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) +{ + struct smk_audit_info ad; + int rc; + + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY); + smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry); + + rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_READ, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_READ, rc); + return rc; +} + +/** + * smack_inode_removexattr - Smack check on removexattr + * @dentry: the object + * @name: name of the attribute + * + * Removing the Smack attribute requires CAP_MAC_ADMIN + * + * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) +{ + struct inode_smack *isp; + struct smk_audit_info ad; + int rc = 0; + + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 || + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 || + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 || + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 || + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 || + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) { + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + rc = -EPERM; + } else + rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); + + if (rc != 0) + return rc; + + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY); + smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry); + + rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc); + if (rc != 0) + return rc; + + isp = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security; + /* + * Don't do anything special for these. + * XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN + * XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT + */ + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) { + struct super_block *sbp = dentry->d_sb; + struct superblock_smack *sbsp = sbp->s_security; + + isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_default; + } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) + isp->smk_task = NULL; + else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) + isp->smk_mmap = NULL; + else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) + isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * smack_inode_getsecurity - get smack xattrs + * @inode: the object + * @name: attribute name + * @buffer: where to put the result + * @alloc: duplicate memory + * + * Returns the size of the attribute or an error code + */ +static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, + const char *name, void **buffer, + bool alloc) +{ + struct socket_smack *ssp; + struct socket *sock; + struct super_block *sbp; + struct inode *ip = (struct inode *)inode; + struct smack_known *isp; + + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) + isp = smk_of_inode(inode); + else { + /* + * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets. + */ + sbp = ip->i_sb; + if (sbp->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + sock = SOCKET_I(ip); + if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; + + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0) + isp = ssp->smk_in; + else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) + isp = ssp->smk_out; + else + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + } + + if (alloc) { + *buffer = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL); + if (*buffer == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + } + + return strlen(isp->smk_known); +} + + +/** + * smack_inode_listsecurity - list the Smack attributes + * @inode: the object + * @buffer: where they go + * @buffer_size: size of buffer + */ +static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, + size_t buffer_size) +{ + int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SMACK); + + if (buffer != NULL && len <= buffer_size) + memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, len); + + return len; +} + +/** + * smack_inode_getsecid - Extract inode's security id + * @inode: inode to extract the info from + * @secid: where result will be saved + */ +static void smack_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) +{ + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_inode(inode); + + *secid = skp->smk_secid; +} + +/* + * File Hooks + */ + +/* + * There is no smack_file_permission hook + * + * Should access checks be done on each read or write? + * UNICOS and SELinux say yes. + * Trusted Solaris, Trusted Irix, and just about everyone else says no. + * + * I'll say no for now. Smack does not do the frequent + * label changing that SELinux does. + */ + +/** + * smack_file_alloc_security - assign a file security blob + * @file: the object + * + * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master + * label list, so no allocation is done. + * + * f_security is the owner security information. It + * isn't used on file access checks, it's for send_sigio. + * + * Returns 0 + */ +static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) +{ + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); + + file->f_security = skp; + return 0; +} + +/** + * smack_file_free_security - clear a file security blob + * @file: the object + * + * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master + * label list, so no memory is freed. + */ +static void smack_file_free_security(struct file *file) +{ + file->f_security = NULL; +} + +/** + * smack_file_ioctl - Smack check on ioctls + * @file: the object + * @cmd: what to do + * @arg: unused + * + * Relies heavily on the correct use of the ioctl command conventions. + * + * Returns 0 if allowed, error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, + unsigned long arg) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct smk_audit_info ad; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); + + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) + return 0; + + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH); + smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path); + + if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) { + rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc); + } + + if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)) { + rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_READ, rc); + } + + return rc; +} + +/** + * smack_file_lock - Smack check on file locking + * @file: the object + * @cmd: unused + * + * Returns 0 if current has lock access, error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) +{ + struct smk_audit_info ad; + int rc; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); + + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) + return 0; + + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH); + smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path); + rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc); + return rc; +} + +/** + * smack_file_fcntl - Smack check on fcntl + * @file: the object + * @cmd: what action to check + * @arg: unused + * + * Generally these operations are harmless. + * File locking operations present an obvious mechanism + * for passing information, so they require write access. + * + * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, + unsigned long arg) +{ + struct smk_audit_info ad; + int rc = 0; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); + + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) + return 0; + + switch (cmd) { + case F_GETLK: + break; + case F_SETLK: + case F_SETLKW: + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH); + smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path); + rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc); + break; + case F_SETOWN: + case F_SETSIG: + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH); + smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path); + rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc); + break; + default: + break; + } + + return rc; +} + +/** + * smack_mmap_file : + * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g. + * if mapping anonymous memory. + * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL). + * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application. + * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel. + * @flags contains the operational flags. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + */ +static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file, + unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot, + unsigned long flags) +{ + struct smack_known *skp; + struct smack_known *mkp; + struct smack_rule *srp; + struct task_smack *tsp; + struct smack_known *okp; + struct inode_smack *isp; + struct superblock_smack *sbsp; + int may; + int mmay; + int tmay; + int rc; + + if (file == NULL) + return 0; + + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)))) + return 0; + + isp = file_inode(file)->i_security; + if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL) + return 0; + sbsp = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_security; + if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED && + isp->smk_mmap != sbsp->smk_root) + return -EACCES; + mkp = isp->smk_mmap; + + tsp = current_security(); + skp = smk_of_current(); + rc = 0; + + rcu_read_lock(); + /* + * For each Smack rule associated with the subject + * label verify that the SMACK64MMAP also has access + * to that rule's object label. + */ + list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &skp->smk_rules, list) { + okp = srp->smk_object; + /* + * Matching labels always allows access. + */ + if (mkp->smk_known == okp->smk_known) + continue; + /* + * If there is a matching local rule take + * that into account as well. + */ + may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject->smk_known, + okp->smk_known, + &tsp->smk_rules); + if (may == -ENOENT) + may = srp->smk_access; + else + may &= srp->smk_access; + /* + * If may is zero the SMACK64MMAP subject can't + * possibly have less access. + */ + if (may == 0) + continue; + + /* + * Fetch the global list entry. + * If there isn't one a SMACK64MMAP subject + * can't have as much access as current. + */ + mmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known, + &mkp->smk_rules); + if (mmay == -ENOENT) { + rc = -EACCES; + break; + } + /* + * If there is a local entry it modifies the + * potential access, too. + */ + tmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known, + &tsp->smk_rules); + if (tmay != -ENOENT) + mmay &= tmay; + + /* + * If there is any access available to current that is + * not available to a SMACK64MMAP subject + * deny access. + */ + if ((may | mmay) != mmay) { + rc = -EACCES; + break; + } + } + + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return rc; +} + +/** + * smack_file_set_fowner - set the file security blob value + * @file: object in question + * + */ +static void smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) +{ + file->f_security = smk_of_current(); +} + +/** + * smack_file_send_sigiotask - Smack on sigio + * @tsk: The target task + * @fown: the object the signal come from + * @signum: unused + * + * Allow a privileged task to get signals even if it shouldn't + * + * Returns 0 if a subject with the object's smack could + * write to the task, an error code otherwise. + */ +static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, + struct fown_struct *fown, int signum) +{ + struct smack_known *skp; + struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(tsk->cred->security); + const struct cred *tcred; + struct file *file; + int rc; + struct smk_audit_info ad; + + /* + * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file + */ + file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner); + + /* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */ + skp = file->f_security; + rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, NULL); + rc = smk_bu_note("sigiotask", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc); + + rcu_read_lock(); + tcred = __task_cred(tsk); + if (rc != 0 && smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, tcred)) + rc = 0; + rcu_read_unlock(); + + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); + smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk); + smack_log(skp->smk_known, tkp->smk_known, MAY_DELIVER, rc, &ad); + return rc; +} + +/** + * smack_file_receive - Smack file receive check + * @file: the object + * + * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file) +{ + int rc; + int may = 0; + struct smk_audit_info ad; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); + struct socket *sock; + struct task_smack *tsp; + struct socket_smack *ssp; + + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) + return 0; + + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH); + smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path); + + if (inode->i_sb->s_magic == SOCKFS_MAGIC) { + sock = SOCKET_I(inode); + ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; + tsp = current_security(); + /* + * If the receiving process can't write to the + * passed socket or if the passed socket can't + * write to the receiving process don't accept + * the passed socket. + */ + rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, ssp->smk_out, MAY_WRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc); + if (rc < 0) + return rc; + rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_in, tsp->smk_task, MAY_WRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc); + return rc; + } + /* + * This code relies on bitmasks. + */ + if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) + may = MAY_READ; + if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) + may |= MAY_WRITE; + + rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), may, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc); + return rc; +} + +/** + * smack_file_open - Smack dentry open processing + * @file: the object + * @cred: task credential + * + * Set the security blob in the file structure. + * Allow the open only if the task has read access. There are + * many read operations (e.g. fstat) that you can do with an + * fd even if you have the file open write-only. + * + * Returns 0 + */ +static int smack_file_open(struct file *file) +{ + struct task_smack *tsp = file->f_cred->security; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); + struct smk_audit_info ad; + int rc; + + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH); + smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path); + rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_credfile(file->f_cred, file, MAY_READ, rc); + + return rc; +} + +/* + * Task hooks + */ + +/** + * smack_cred_alloc_blank - "allocate" blank task-level security credentials + * @new: the new credentials + * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations + * + * Prepare a blank set of credentials for modification. This must allocate all + * the memory the LSM module might require such that cred_transfer() can + * complete without error. + */ +static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) +{ + struct task_smack *tsp; + + tsp = new_task_smack(NULL, NULL, gfp); + if (tsp == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + cred->security = tsp; + + return 0; +} + + +/** + * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials + * @cred: the credentials in question + * + */ +static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred) +{ + struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security; + struct smack_rule *rp; + struct list_head *l; + struct list_head *n; + + if (tsp == NULL) + return; + cred->security = NULL; + + smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel); + + list_for_each_safe(l, n, &tsp->smk_rules) { + rp = list_entry(l, struct smack_rule, list); + list_del(&rp->list); + kfree(rp); + } + kfree(tsp); +} + +/** + * smack_cred_prepare - prepare new set of credentials for modification + * @new: the new credentials + * @old: the original credentials + * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations + * + * Prepare a new set of credentials for modification. + */ +static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, + gfp_t gfp) +{ + struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security; + struct task_smack *new_tsp; + int rc; + + new_tsp = new_task_smack(old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task, gfp); + if (new_tsp == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + new->security = new_tsp; + + rc = smk_copy_rules(&new_tsp->smk_rules, &old_tsp->smk_rules, gfp); + if (rc != 0) + return rc; + + rc = smk_copy_relabel(&new_tsp->smk_relabel, &old_tsp->smk_relabel, + gfp); + if (rc != 0) + return rc; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * smack_cred_transfer - Transfer the old credentials to the new credentials + * @new: the new credentials + * @old: the original credentials + * + * Fill in a set of blank credentials from another set of credentials. + */ +static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) +{ + struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security; + struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security; + + new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task; + new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task; + mutex_init(&new_tsp->smk_rules_lock); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_tsp->smk_rules); + + + /* cbs copy rule list */ +} + +/** + * smack_cred_getsecid - get the secid corresponding to a creds structure + * @c: the object creds + * @secid: where to put the result + * + * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label. + */ +static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) +{ + struct smack_known *skp; + + rcu_read_lock(); + skp = smk_of_task(c->security); + *secid = skp->smk_secid; + rcu_read_unlock(); +} + +/** + * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials + * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified. + * @secid: specifies the security ID to be set + * + * Set the security data for a kernel service. + */ +static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) +{ + struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security; + + new_tsp->smk_task = smack_from_secid(secid); + return 0; +} + +/** + * smack_kernel_create_files_as - Set the file creation label in a set of creds + * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified + * @inode: points to the inode to use as a reference + * + * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to the same + * as the objective context of the specified inode + */ +static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, + struct inode *inode) +{ + struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security; + struct task_smack *tsp = new->security; + + tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode; + tsp->smk_task = tsp->smk_forked; + return 0; +} + +/** + * smk_curacc_on_task - helper to log task related access + * @p: the task object + * @access: the access requested + * @caller: name of the calling function for audit + * + * Return 0 if access is permitted + */ +static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access, + const char *caller) +{ + struct smk_audit_info ad; + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p); + int rc; + + smk_ad_init(&ad, caller, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); + smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p); + rc = smk_curacc(skp, access, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_task(p, access, rc); + return rc; +} + +/** + * smack_task_setpgid - Smack check on setting pgid + * @p: the task object + * @pgid: unused + * + * Return 0 if write access is permitted + */ +static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) +{ + return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__); +} + +/** + * smack_task_getpgid - Smack access check for getpgid + * @p: the object task + * + * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) +{ + return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__); +} + +/** + * smack_task_getsid - Smack access check for getsid + * @p: the object task + * + * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) +{ + return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__); +} + +/** + * smack_task_getsecid - get the secid of the task + * @p: the object task + * @secid: where to put the result + * + * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label. + */ +static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +{ + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p); + + *secid = skp->smk_secid; +} + +/** + * smack_task_setnice - Smack check on setting nice + * @p: the task object + * @nice: unused + * + * Return 0 if write access is permitted + */ +static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) +{ + return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__); +} + +/** + * smack_task_setioprio - Smack check on setting ioprio + * @p: the task object + * @ioprio: unused + * + * Return 0 if write access is permitted + */ +static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) +{ + return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__); +} + +/** + * smack_task_getioprio - Smack check on reading ioprio + * @p: the task object + * + * Return 0 if read access is permitted + */ +static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) +{ + return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__); +} + +/** + * smack_task_setscheduler - Smack check on setting scheduler + * @p: the task object + * @policy: unused + * @lp: unused + * + * Return 0 if read access is permitted + */ +static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p) +{ + return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__); +} + +/** + * smack_task_getscheduler - Smack check on reading scheduler + * @p: the task object + * + * Return 0 if read access is permitted + */ +static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) +{ + return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__); +} + +/** + * smack_task_movememory - Smack check on moving memory + * @p: the task object + * + * Return 0 if write access is permitted + */ +static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) +{ + return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__); +} + +/** + * smack_task_kill - Smack check on signal delivery + * @p: the task object + * @info: unused + * @sig: unused + * @cred: identifies the cred to use in lieu of current's + * + * Return 0 if write access is permitted + * + */ +static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, + int sig, const struct cred *cred) +{ + struct smk_audit_info ad; + struct smack_known *skp; + struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task_struct(p); + int rc; + + if (!sig) + return 0; /* null signal; existence test */ + + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); + smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p); + /* + * Sending a signal requires that the sender + * can write the receiver. + */ + if (cred == NULL) { + rc = smk_curacc(tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_task(p, MAY_DELIVER, rc); + return rc; + } + /* + * If the cred isn't NULL we're dealing with some USB IO + * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing + * we can't take privilege into account. + */ + skp = smk_of_task(cred->security); + rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_note("USB signal", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc); + return rc; +} + +/** + * smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob + * @p: task to copy from + * @inode: inode to copy to + * + * Sets the smack pointer in the inode security blob + */ +static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) +{ + struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security; + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p); + + isp->smk_inode = skp; + isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT; +} + +/* + * Socket hooks. + */ + +/** + * smack_sk_alloc_security - Allocate a socket blob + * @sk: the socket + * @family: unused + * @gfp_flags: memory allocation flags + * + * Assign Smack pointers to current + * + * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM is there's no memory + */ +static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags) +{ + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); + struct socket_smack *ssp; + + ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags); + if (ssp == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* + * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label. + */ + if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) { + ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web; + ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web; + } else { + ssp->smk_in = skp; + ssp->smk_out = skp; + } + ssp->smk_packet = NULL; + + sk->sk_security = ssp; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob + * @sk: the socket + * + * Clears the blob pointer + */ +static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) +{ +#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING + struct smk_port_label *spp; + + if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) { + rcu_read_lock(); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) { + if (spp->smk_sock != sk) + continue; + spp->smk_can_reuse = 1; + break; + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + } +#endif + kfree(sk->sk_security); +} + +/** +* smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions +* @sip: the object end +* +* looks for host based access restrictions +* +* This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label +* hosts. The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is +* taken before calling this function. +* +* Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special. +*/ +static struct smack_known *smack_ipv4host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip) +{ + struct smk_net4addr *snp; + struct in_addr *siap = &sip->sin_addr; + + if (siap->s_addr == 0) + return NULL; + + list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net4addr_list, list) + /* + * we break after finding the first match because + * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask + * so we have found the most specific match + */ + if (snp->smk_host.s_addr == + (siap->s_addr & snp->smk_mask.s_addr)) + return snp->smk_label; + + return NULL; +} + +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) +/* + * smk_ipv6_localhost - Check for local ipv6 host address + * @sip: the address + * + * Returns boolean true if this is the localhost address + */ +static bool smk_ipv6_localhost(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip) +{ + __be16 *be16p = (__be16 *)&sip->sin6_addr; + __be32 *be32p = (__be32 *)&sip->sin6_addr; + + if (be32p[0] == 0 && be32p[1] == 0 && be32p[2] == 0 && be16p[6] == 0 && + ntohs(be16p[7]) == 1) + return true; + return false; +} + +/** +* smack_ipv6host_label - check host based restrictions +* @sip: the object end +* +* looks for host based access restrictions +* +* This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label +* hosts. The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is +* taken before calling this function. +* +* Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special. +*/ +static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip) +{ + struct smk_net6addr *snp; + struct in6_addr *sap = &sip->sin6_addr; + int i; + int found = 0; + + /* + * It's local. Don't look for a host label. + */ + if (smk_ipv6_localhost(sip)) + return NULL; + + list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net6addr_list, list) { + /* + * If the label is NULL the entry has + * been renounced. Ignore it. + */ + if (snp->smk_label == NULL) + continue; + /* + * we break after finding the first match because + * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask + * so we have found the most specific match + */ + for (found = 1, i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + if ((sap->s6_addr16[i] & snp->smk_mask.s6_addr16[i]) != + snp->smk_host.s6_addr16[i]) { + found = 0; + break; + } + } + if (found) + return snp->smk_label; + } + + return NULL; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */ + +/** + * smack_netlabel - Set the secattr on a socket + * @sk: the socket + * @labeled: socket label scheme + * + * Convert the outbound smack value (smk_out) to a + * secattr and attach it to the socket. + * + * Returns 0 on success or an error code + */ +static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled) +{ + struct smack_known *skp; + struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security; + int rc = 0; + + /* + * Usually the netlabel code will handle changing the + * packet labeling based on the label. + * The case of a single label host is different, because + * a single label host should never get a labeled packet + * even though the label is usually associated with a packet + * label. + */ + local_bh_disable(); + bh_lock_sock_nested(sk); + + if (ssp->smk_out == smack_net_ambient || + labeled == SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET) + netlbl_sock_delattr(sk); + else { + skp = ssp->smk_out; + rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, sk->sk_family, &skp->smk_netlabel); + } + + bh_unlock_sock(sk); + local_bh_enable(); + + return rc; +} + +/** + * smack_netlbel_send - Set the secattr on a socket and perform access checks + * @sk: the socket + * @sap: the destination address + * + * Set the correct secattr for the given socket based on the destination + * address and perform any outbound access checks needed. + * + * Returns 0 on success or an error code. + * + */ +static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap) +{ + struct smack_known *skp; + int rc; + int sk_lbl; + struct smack_known *hkp; + struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security; + struct smk_audit_info ad; + + rcu_read_lock(); + hkp = smack_ipv4host_label(sap); + if (hkp != NULL) { +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + struct lsm_network_audit net; + + smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net); + ad.a.u.net->family = sap->sin_family; + ad.a.u.net->dport = sap->sin_port; + ad.a.u.net->v4info.daddr = sap->sin_addr.s_addr; +#endif + sk_lbl = SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET; + skp = ssp->smk_out; + rc = smk_access(skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 host check", skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, rc); + } else { + sk_lbl = SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET; + rc = 0; + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + if (rc != 0) + return rc; + + return smack_netlabel(sk, sk_lbl); +} + +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) +/** + * smk_ipv6_check - check Smack access + * @subject: subject Smack label + * @object: object Smack label + * @address: address + * @act: the action being taken + * + * Check an IPv6 access + */ +static int smk_ipv6_check(struct smack_known *subject, + struct smack_known *object, + struct sockaddr_in6 *address, int act) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + struct lsm_network_audit net; +#endif + struct smk_audit_info ad; + int rc; + +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net); + ad.a.u.net->family = PF_INET6; + ad.a.u.net->dport = address->sin6_port; + if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) + ad.a.u.net->v6info.saddr = address->sin6_addr; + else + ad.a.u.net->v6info.daddr = address->sin6_addr; +#endif + rc = smk_access(subject, object, MAY_WRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 check", subject, object, MAY_WRITE, rc); + return rc; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */ + +#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING +/** + * smk_ipv6_port_label - Smack port access table management + * @sock: socket + * @address: address + * + * Create or update the port list entry + */ +static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address) +{ + struct sock *sk = sock->sk; + struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6; + struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; + struct smk_port_label *spp; + unsigned short port = 0; + + if (address == NULL) { + /* + * This operation is changing the Smack information + * on the bound socket. Take the changes to the port + * as well. + */ + rcu_read_lock(); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) { + if (sk != spp->smk_sock) + continue; + spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in; + spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out; + rcu_read_unlock(); + return; + } + /* + * A NULL address is only used for updating existing + * bound entries. If there isn't one, it's OK. + */ + rcu_read_unlock(); + return; + } + + addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address; + port = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port); + /* + * This is a special case that is safely ignored. + */ + if (port == 0) + return; + + /* + * Look for an existing port list entry. + * This is an indication that a port is getting reused. + */ + rcu_read_lock(); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) { + if (spp->smk_port != port || spp->smk_sock_type != sock->type) + continue; + if (spp->smk_can_reuse != 1) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + return; + } + spp->smk_port = port; + spp->smk_sock = sk; + spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in; + spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out; + spp->smk_can_reuse = 0; + rcu_read_unlock(); + return; + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + /* + * A new port entry is required. + */ + spp = kzalloc(sizeof(*spp), GFP_KERNEL); + if (spp == NULL) + return; + + spp->smk_port = port; + spp->smk_sock = sk; + spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in; + spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out; + spp->smk_sock_type = sock->type; + spp->smk_can_reuse = 0; + + mutex_lock(&smack_ipv6_lock); + list_add_rcu(&spp->list, &smk_ipv6_port_list); + mutex_unlock(&smack_ipv6_lock); + return; +} + +/** + * smk_ipv6_port_check - check Smack port access + * @sock: socket + * @address: address + * + * Create or update the port list entry + */ +static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address, + int act) +{ + struct smk_port_label *spp; + struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security; + struct smack_known *skp = NULL; + unsigned short port; + struct smack_known *object; + + if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) { + skp = smack_ipv6host_label(address); + object = ssp->smk_in; + } else { + skp = ssp->smk_out; + object = smack_ipv6host_label(address); + } + + /* + * The other end is a single label host. + */ + if (skp != NULL && object != NULL) + return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act); + if (skp == NULL) + skp = smack_net_ambient; + if (object == NULL) + object = smack_net_ambient; + + /* + * It's remote, so port lookup does no good. + */ + if (!smk_ipv6_localhost(address)) + return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act); + + /* + * It's local so the send check has to have passed. + */ + if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) + return 0; + + port = ntohs(address->sin6_port); + rcu_read_lock(); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) { + if (spp->smk_port != port || spp->smk_sock_type != sk->sk_type) + continue; + object = spp->smk_in; + if (act == SMK_CONNECTING) + ssp->smk_packet = spp->smk_out; + break; + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act); +} +#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */ + +/** + * smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs + * @inode: the object + * @name: attribute name + * @value: attribute value + * @size: size of the attribute + * @flags: unused + * + * Sets the named attribute in the appropriate blob + * + * Returns 0 on success, or an error code + */ +static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, + const void *value, size_t size, int flags) +{ + struct smack_known *skp; + struct inode_smack *nsp = inode->i_security; + struct socket_smack *ssp; + struct socket *sock; + int rc = 0; + + if (value == NULL || size > SMK_LONGLABEL || size == 0) + return -EINVAL; + + skp = smk_import_entry(value, size); + if (IS_ERR(skp)) + return PTR_ERR(skp); + + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) { + nsp->smk_inode = skp; + nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT; + return 0; + } + /* + * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets. + */ + if (inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + sock = SOCKET_I(inode); + if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; + + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0) + ssp->smk_in = skp; + else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) { + ssp->smk_out = skp; + if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET) { + rc = smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET); + if (rc != 0) + printk(KERN_WARNING + "Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n", + __func__, -rc); + } + } else + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + +#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING + if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) + smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, NULL); +#endif + + return 0; +} + +/** + * smack_socket_post_create - finish socket setup + * @sock: the socket + * @family: protocol family + * @type: unused + * @protocol: unused + * @kern: unused + * + * Sets the netlabel information on the socket + * + * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, + int type, int protocol, int kern) +{ + struct socket_smack *ssp; + + if (sock->sk == NULL) + return 0; + + /* + * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label. + */ + if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) { + ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; + ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web; + ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web; + } + + if (family != PF_INET) + return 0; + /* + * Set the outbound netlbl. + */ + return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET); +} + +/** + * smack_socket_socketpair - create socket pair + * @socka: one socket + * @sockb: another socket + * + * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC + * + * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, + struct socket *sockb) +{ + struct socket_smack *asp = socka->sk->sk_security; + struct socket_smack *bsp = sockb->sk->sk_security; + + asp->smk_packet = bsp->smk_out; + bsp->smk_packet = asp->smk_out; + + return 0; +} + +#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING +/** + * smack_socket_bind - record port binding information. + * @sock: the socket + * @address: the port address + * @addrlen: size of the address + * + * Records the label bound to a port. + * + * Returns 0 + */ +static int smack_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, + int addrlen) +{ + if (sock->sk != NULL && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) + smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, address); + return 0; +} +#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */ + +/** + * smack_socket_connect - connect access check + * @sock: the socket + * @sap: the other end + * @addrlen: size of sap + * + * Verifies that a connection may be possible + * + * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap, + int addrlen) +{ + int rc = 0; +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) + struct sockaddr_in6 *sip = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sap; +#endif +#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING + struct smack_known *rsp; + struct socket_smack *ssp; +#endif + + if (sock->sk == NULL) + return 0; + +#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING + ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; +#endif + + switch (sock->sk->sk_family) { + case PF_INET: + if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) + return -EINVAL; + rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in *)sap); + break; + case PF_INET6: + if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)) + return -EINVAL; +#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING + rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sip); + if (rsp != NULL) + rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sip, + SMK_CONNECTING); +#endif +#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING + rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sip, SMK_CONNECTING); +#endif + break; + } + return rc; +} + +/** + * smack_flags_to_may - convert S_ to MAY_ values + * @flags: the S_ value + * + * Returns the equivalent MAY_ value + */ +static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags) +{ + int may = 0; + + if (flags & S_IRUGO) + may |= MAY_READ; + if (flags & S_IWUGO) + may |= MAY_WRITE; + if (flags & S_IXUGO) + may |= MAY_EXEC; + + return may; +} + +/** + * smack_msg_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg_msg + * @msg: the object + * + * Returns 0 + */ +static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg) +{ + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); + + msg->security = skp; + return 0; +} + +/** + * smack_msg_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg_msg + * @msg: the object + * + * Clears the blob pointer + */ +static void smack_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg) +{ + msg->security = NULL; +} + +/** + * smack_of_ipc - the smack pointer for the ipc + * @isp: the object + * + * Returns a pointer to the smack value + */ +static struct smack_known *smack_of_ipc(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp) +{ + return (struct smack_known *)isp->security; +} + +/** + * smack_ipc_alloc_security - Set the security blob for ipc + * @isp: the object + * + * Returns 0 + */ +static int smack_ipc_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp) +{ + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); + + isp->security = skp; + return 0; +} + +/** + * smack_ipc_free_security - Clear the security blob for ipc + * @isp: the object + * + * Clears the blob pointer + */ +static void smack_ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp) +{ + isp->security = NULL; +} + +/** + * smk_curacc_shm : check if current has access on shm + * @isp : the object + * @access : access requested + * + * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise + */ +static int smk_curacc_shm(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int access) +{ + struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_ipc(isp); + struct smk_audit_info ad; + int rc; + +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC); + ad.a.u.ipc_id = isp->id; +#endif + rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_current("shm", ssp, access, rc); + return rc; +} + +/** + * smack_shm_associate - Smack access check for shm + * @isp: the object + * @shmflg: access requested + * + * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int shmflg) +{ + int may; + + may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg); + return smk_curacc_shm(isp, may); +} + +/** + * smack_shm_shmctl - Smack access check for shm + * @isp: the object + * @cmd: what it wants to do + * + * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int cmd) +{ + int may; + + switch (cmd) { + case IPC_STAT: + case SHM_STAT: + case SHM_STAT_ANY: + may = MAY_READ; + break; + case IPC_SET: + case SHM_LOCK: + case SHM_UNLOCK: + case IPC_RMID: + may = MAY_READWRITE; + break; + case IPC_INFO: + case SHM_INFO: + /* + * System level information. + */ + return 0; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + return smk_curacc_shm(isp, may); +} + +/** + * smack_shm_shmat - Smack access for shmat + * @isp: the object + * @shmaddr: unused + * @shmflg: access requested + * + * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc, char __user *shmaddr, + int shmflg) +{ + int may; + + may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg); + return smk_curacc_shm(ipc, may); +} + +/** + * smk_curacc_sem : check if current has access on sem + * @isp : the object + * @access : access requested + * + * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise + */ +static int smk_curacc_sem(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int access) +{ + struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_ipc(isp); + struct smk_audit_info ad; + int rc; + +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC); + ad.a.u.ipc_id = isp->id; +#endif + rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_current("sem", ssp, access, rc); + return rc; +} + +/** + * smack_sem_associate - Smack access check for sem + * @isp: the object + * @semflg: access requested + * + * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int semflg) +{ + int may; + + may = smack_flags_to_may(semflg); + return smk_curacc_sem(isp, may); +} + +/** + * smack_sem_shmctl - Smack access check for sem + * @isp: the object + * @cmd: what it wants to do + * + * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int cmd) +{ + int may; + + switch (cmd) { + case GETPID: + case GETNCNT: + case GETZCNT: + case GETVAL: + case GETALL: + case IPC_STAT: + case SEM_STAT: + case SEM_STAT_ANY: + may = MAY_READ; + break; + case SETVAL: + case SETALL: + case IPC_RMID: + case IPC_SET: + may = MAY_READWRITE; + break; + case IPC_INFO: + case SEM_INFO: + /* + * System level information + */ + return 0; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + + return smk_curacc_sem(isp, may); +} + +/** + * smack_sem_semop - Smack checks of semaphore operations + * @isp: the object + * @sops: unused + * @nsops: unused + * @alter: unused + * + * Treated as read and write in all cases. + * + * Returns 0 if access is allowed, error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, struct sembuf *sops, + unsigned nsops, int alter) +{ + return smk_curacc_sem(isp, MAY_READWRITE); +} + +/** + * smk_curacc_msq : helper to check if current has access on msq + * @isp : the msq + * @access : access requested + * + * return 0 if current has access, error otherwise + */ +static int smk_curacc_msq(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int access) +{ + struct smack_known *msp = smack_of_ipc(isp); + struct smk_audit_info ad; + int rc; + +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC); + ad.a.u.ipc_id = isp->id; +#endif + rc = smk_curacc(msp, access, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_current("msq", msp, access, rc); + return rc; +} + +/** + * smack_msg_queue_associate - Smack access check for msg_queue + * @isp: the object + * @msqflg: access requested + * + * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int msqflg) +{ + int may; + + may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg); + return smk_curacc_msq(isp, may); +} + +/** + * smack_msg_queue_msgctl - Smack access check for msg_queue + * @isp: the object + * @cmd: what it wants to do + * + * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int cmd) +{ + int may; + + switch (cmd) { + case IPC_STAT: + case MSG_STAT: + case MSG_STAT_ANY: + may = MAY_READ; + break; + case IPC_SET: + case IPC_RMID: + may = MAY_READWRITE; + break; + case IPC_INFO: + case MSG_INFO: + /* + * System level information + */ + return 0; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + + return smk_curacc_msq(isp, may); +} + +/** + * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue + * @isp: the object + * @msg: unused + * @msqflg: access requested + * + * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, struct msg_msg *msg, + int msqflg) +{ + int may; + + may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg); + return smk_curacc_msq(isp, may); +} + +/** + * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue + * @isp: the object + * @msg: unused + * @target: unused + * @type: unused + * @mode: unused + * + * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, struct msg_msg *msg, + struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode) +{ + return smk_curacc_msq(isp, MAY_READWRITE); +} + +/** + * smack_ipc_permission - Smack access for ipc_permission() + * @ipp: the object permissions + * @flag: access requested + * + * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag) +{ + struct smack_known *iskp = ipp->security; + int may = smack_flags_to_may(flag); + struct smk_audit_info ad; + int rc; + +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC); + ad.a.u.ipc_id = ipp->id; +#endif + rc = smk_curacc(iskp, may, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_current("svipc", iskp, may, rc); + return rc; +} + +/** + * smack_ipc_getsecid - Extract smack security id + * @ipp: the object permissions + * @secid: where result will be saved + */ +static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid) +{ + struct smack_known *iskp = ipp->security; + + *secid = iskp->smk_secid; +} + +/** + * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode + * @opt_dentry: dentry where inode will be attached + * @inode: the object + * + * Set the inode's security blob if it hasn't been done already. + */ +static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) +{ + struct super_block *sbp; + struct superblock_smack *sbsp; + struct inode_smack *isp; + struct smack_known *skp; + struct smack_known *ckp = smk_of_current(); + struct smack_known *final; + char trattr[TRANS_TRUE_SIZE]; + int transflag = 0; + int rc; + struct dentry *dp; + + if (inode == NULL) + return; + + isp = inode->i_security; + + mutex_lock(&isp->smk_lock); + /* + * If the inode is already instantiated + * take the quick way out + */ + if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_INSTANT) + goto unlockandout; + + sbp = inode->i_sb; + sbsp = sbp->s_security; + /* + * We're going to use the superblock default label + * if there's no label on the file. + */ + final = sbsp->smk_default; + + /* + * If this is the root inode the superblock + * may be in the process of initialization. + * If that is the case use the root value out + * of the superblock. + */ + if (opt_dentry->d_parent == opt_dentry) { + switch (sbp->s_magic) { + case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC: + case CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC: + /* + * The cgroup filesystem is never mounted, + * so there's no opportunity to set the mount + * options. + */ + sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_star; + sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_star; + isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root; + break; + case TMPFS_MAGIC: + /* + * What about shmem/tmpfs anonymous files with dentry + * obtained from d_alloc_pseudo()? + */ + isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current(); + break; + case PIPEFS_MAGIC: + isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current(); + break; + case SOCKFS_MAGIC: + /* + * Socket access is controlled by the socket + * structures associated with the task involved. + */ + isp->smk_inode = &smack_known_star; + break; + default: + isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root; + break; + } + isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT; + goto unlockandout; + } + + /* + * This is pretty hackish. + * Casey says that we shouldn't have to do + * file system specific code, but it does help + * with keeping it simple. + */ + switch (sbp->s_magic) { + case SMACK_MAGIC: + case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC: + case CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC: + /* + * Casey says that it's a little embarrassing + * that the smack file system doesn't do + * extended attributes. + * + * Cgroupfs is special + */ + final = &smack_known_star; + break; + case DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC: + /* + * devpts seems content with the label of the task. + * Programs that change smack have to treat the + * pty with respect. + */ + final = ckp; + break; + case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC: + /* + * Casey says procfs appears not to care. + * The superblock default suffices. + */ + break; + case TMPFS_MAGIC: + /* + * Device labels should come from the filesystem, + * but watch out, because they're volitile, + * getting recreated on every reboot. + */ + final = &smack_known_star; + /* + * No break. + * + * If a smack value has been set we want to use it, + * but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity + * to set mount options simulate setting the + * superblock default. + */ + default: + /* + * This isn't an understood special case. + * Get the value from the xattr. + */ + + /* + * UNIX domain sockets use lower level socket data. + */ + if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) { + final = &smack_known_star; + break; + } + /* + * No xattr support means, alas, no SMACK label. + * Use the aforeapplied default. + * It would be curious if the label of the task + * does not match that assigned. + */ + if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) + break; + /* + * Get the dentry for xattr. + */ + dp = dget(opt_dentry); + skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp); + if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(skp)) + final = skp; + + /* + * Transmuting directory + */ + if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) { + /* + * If this is a new directory and the label was + * transmuted when the inode was initialized + * set the transmute attribute on the directory + * and mark the inode. + * + * If there is a transmute attribute on the + * directory mark the inode. + */ + if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_CHANGED) { + isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_CHANGED; + rc = __vfs_setxattr(dp, inode, + XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE, + TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE, + 0); + } else { + rc = __vfs_getxattr(dp, inode, + XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE, trattr, + TRANS_TRUE_SIZE); + if (rc >= 0 && strncmp(trattr, TRANS_TRUE, + TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0) + rc = -EINVAL; + } + if (rc >= 0) + transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE; + } + /* + * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@". + */ + skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp); + if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star || + skp == &smack_known_web) + skp = NULL; + isp->smk_task = skp; + + skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp); + if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star || + skp == &smack_known_web) + skp = NULL; + isp->smk_mmap = skp; + + dput(dp); + break; + } + + if (final == NULL) + isp->smk_inode = ckp; + else + isp->smk_inode = final; + + isp->smk_flags |= (SMK_INODE_INSTANT | transflag); + +unlockandout: + mutex_unlock(&isp->smk_lock); + return; +} + +/** + * smack_getprocattr - Smack process attribute access + * @p: the object task + * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr + * @value: where to put the result + * + * Places a copy of the task Smack into value + * + * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code + */ +static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) +{ + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p); + char *cp; + int slen; + + if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL); + if (cp == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + slen = strlen(cp); + *value = cp; + return slen; +} + +/** + * smack_setprocattr - Smack process attribute setting + * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr + * @value: the value to set + * @size: the size of the value + * + * Sets the Smack value of the task. Only setting self + * is permitted and only with privilege + * + * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code + */ +static int smack_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size) +{ + struct task_smack *tsp = current_security(); + struct cred *new; + struct smack_known *skp; + struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep; + int rc; + + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel)) + return -EPERM; + + if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL) + return -EINVAL; + + if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + skp = smk_import_entry(value, size); + if (IS_ERR(skp)) + return PTR_ERR(skp); + + /* + * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label + * and the star ("*") label. + */ + if (skp == &smack_known_web || skp == &smack_known_star) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) { + rc = -EPERM; + list_for_each_entry(sklep, &tsp->smk_relabel, list) + if (sklep->smk_label == skp) { + rc = 0; + break; + } + if (rc) + return rc; + } + + new = prepare_creds(); + if (new == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + tsp = new->security; + tsp->smk_task = skp; + /* + * process can change its label only once + */ + smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel); + + commit_creds(new); + return size; +} + +/** + * smack_unix_stream_connect - Smack access on UDS + * @sock: one sock + * @other: the other sock + * @newsk: unused + * + * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access + * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code + */ +static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, + struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk) +{ + struct smack_known *skp; + struct smack_known *okp; + struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security; + struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security; + struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security; + struct smk_audit_info ad; + int rc = 0; +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + struct lsm_network_audit net; +#endif + + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) { + skp = ssp->smk_out; + okp = osp->smk_in; +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net); + smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other); +#endif + rc = smk_access(skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, rc); + if (rc == 0) { + okp = osp->smk_out; + skp = ssp->smk_in; + rc = smk_access(okp, skp, MAY_WRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", okp, skp, + MAY_WRITE, rc); + } + } + + /* + * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC. + */ + if (rc == 0) { + nsp->smk_packet = ssp->smk_out; + ssp->smk_packet = osp->smk_out; + } + + return rc; +} + +/** + * smack_unix_may_send - Smack access on UDS + * @sock: one socket + * @other: the other socket + * + * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access + * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code + */ +static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) +{ + struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; + struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security; + struct smk_audit_info ad; + int rc; + +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + struct lsm_network_audit net; + + smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net); + smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk); +#endif + + if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) + return 0; + + rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_note("UDS send", ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc); + return rc; +} + +/** + * smack_socket_sendmsg - Smack check based on destination host + * @sock: the socket + * @msg: the message + * @size: the size of the message + * + * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination host. + * For IPv4 this is only a question if the destination is a single label host. + * For IPv6 this is a check against the label of the port. + */ +static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, + int size) +{ + struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name; +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) + struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name; +#endif +#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING + struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; + struct smack_known *rsp; +#endif + int rc = 0; + + /* + * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL + */ + if (sip == NULL) + return 0; + + switch (sock->sk->sk_family) { + case AF_INET: + rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip); + break; + case AF_INET6: +#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING + rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sap); + if (rsp != NULL) + rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sap, + SMK_CONNECTING); +#endif +#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING + rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sap, SMK_SENDING); +#endif + break; + } + return rc; +} + +/** + * smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel attr.mls.lvl/attr.mls.cat pair to smack + * @sap: netlabel secattr + * @ssp: socket security information + * + * Returns a pointer to a Smack label entry found on the label list. + */ +static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap, + struct socket_smack *ssp) +{ + struct smack_known *skp; + int found = 0; + int acat; + int kcat; + + if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) { + /* + * Looks like a CIPSO packet. + * If there are flags but no level netlabel isn't + * behaving the way we expect it to. + * + * Look it up in the label table + * Without guidance regarding the smack value + * for the packet fall back on the network + * ambient value. + */ + rcu_read_lock(); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, &smack_known_list, list) { + if (sap->attr.mls.lvl != skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl) + continue; + /* + * Compare the catsets. Use the netlbl APIs. + */ + if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0) { + if ((skp->smk_netlabel.flags & + NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0) + found = 1; + break; + } + for (acat = -1, kcat = -1; acat == kcat; ) { + acat = netlbl_catmap_walk(sap->attr.mls.cat, + acat + 1); + kcat = netlbl_catmap_walk( + skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat, + kcat + 1); + if (acat < 0 || kcat < 0) + break; + } + if (acat == kcat) { + found = 1; + break; + } + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + + if (found) + return skp; + + if (ssp != NULL && ssp->smk_in == &smack_known_star) + return &smack_known_web; + return &smack_known_star; + } + if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0) + /* + * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid. + */ + return smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid); + /* + * Without guidance regarding the smack value + * for the packet fall back on the network + * ambient value. + */ + return smack_net_ambient; +} + +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) +static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip) +{ + u8 nexthdr; + int offset; + int proto = -EINVAL; + struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h; + struct ipv6hdr *ip6; + __be16 frag_off; + struct tcphdr _tcph, *th; + struct udphdr _udph, *uh; + struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh; + + sip->sin6_port = 0; + + offset = skb_network_offset(skb); + ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h); + if (ip6 == NULL) + return -EINVAL; + sip->sin6_addr = ip6->saddr; + + nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr; + offset += sizeof(_ipv6h); + offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off); + if (offset < 0) + return -EINVAL; + + proto = nexthdr; + switch (proto) { + case IPPROTO_TCP: + th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph); + if (th != NULL) + sip->sin6_port = th->source; + break; + case IPPROTO_UDP: + case IPPROTO_UDPLITE: + uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph); + if (uh != NULL) + sip->sin6_port = uh->source; + break; + case IPPROTO_DCCP: + dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph); + if (dh != NULL) + sip->sin6_port = dh->dccph_sport; + break; + } + return proto; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */ + +/** + * smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb - Smack packet delivery access check + * @sk: socket + * @skb: packet + * + * Returns 0 if the packet should be delivered, an error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; + struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security; + struct smack_known *skp = NULL; + int rc = 0; + struct smk_audit_info ad; + u16 family = sk->sk_family; +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + struct lsm_network_audit net; +#endif +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) + struct sockaddr_in6 sadd; + int proto; + + if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) + family = PF_INET; +#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */ + + switch (family) { + case PF_INET: +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER + /* + * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label. + * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO. + * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better. + */ + if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) { + skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark); + goto access_check; + } +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */ + /* + * Translate what netlabel gave us. + */ + netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr); + + rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr); + if (rc == 0) + skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp); + else + skp = smack_net_ambient; + + netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr); + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER +access_check: +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net); + ad.a.u.net->family = family; + ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; + ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL); +#endif + /* + * Receiving a packet requires that the other end + * be able to write here. Read access is not required. + * This is the simplist possible security model + * for networking. + */ + rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in, + MAY_WRITE, rc); + if (rc != 0) + netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, family, rc, 0); + break; +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) + case PF_INET6: + proto = smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(skb, &sadd); + if (proto != IPPROTO_UDP && proto != IPPROTO_UDPLITE && + proto != IPPROTO_TCP && proto != IPPROTO_DCCP) + break; +#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING + if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) + skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark); + else + skp = smack_ipv6host_label(&sadd); + if (skp == NULL) + skp = smack_net_ambient; + if (skb == NULL) + break; +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net); + ad.a.u.net->family = family; + ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; + ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL); +#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ + rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in, + MAY_WRITE, rc); +#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING */ +#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING + rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sk, &sadd, SMK_RECEIVING); +#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */ + if (rc != 0) + icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH, + ICMPV6_ADM_PROHIBITED, 0); + break; +#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */ + } + + return rc; +} + +/** + * smack_socket_getpeersec_stream - pull in packet label + * @sock: the socket + * @optval: user's destination + * @optlen: size thereof + * @len: max thereof + * + * returns zero on success, an error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, + char __user *optval, + int __user *optlen, unsigned len) +{ + struct socket_smack *ssp; + char *rcp = ""; + int slen = 1; + int rc = 0; + + ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; + if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) { + rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known; + slen = strlen(rcp) + 1; + } + + if (slen > len) + rc = -ERANGE; + else if (copy_to_user(optval, rcp, slen) != 0) + rc = -EFAULT; + + if (put_user(slen, optlen) != 0) + rc = -EFAULT; + + return rc; +} + + +/** + * smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram - pull in packet label + * @sock: the peer socket + * @skb: packet data + * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet + * + * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent + */ +static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, + struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) + +{ + struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; + struct socket_smack *ssp = NULL; + struct smack_known *skp; + int family = PF_UNSPEC; + u32 s = 0; /* 0 is the invalid secid */ + int rc; + + if (skb != NULL) { + if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) + family = PF_INET; +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) + else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) + family = PF_INET6; +#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */ + } + if (family == PF_UNSPEC && sock != NULL) + family = sock->sk->sk_family; + + switch (family) { + case PF_UNIX: + ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; + s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid; + break; + case PF_INET: +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER + s = skb->secmark; + if (s != 0) + break; +#endif + /* + * Translate what netlabel gave us. + */ + if (sock != NULL && sock->sk != NULL) + ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; + netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr); + rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr); + if (rc == 0) { + skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp); + s = skp->smk_secid; + } + netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr); + break; + case PF_INET6: +#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING + s = skb->secmark; +#endif + break; + } + *secid = s; + if (s == 0) + return -EINVAL; + return 0; +} + +/** + * smack_sock_graft - Initialize a newly created socket with an existing sock + * @sk: child sock + * @parent: parent socket + * + * Set the smk_{in,out} state of an existing sock based on the process that + * is creating the new socket. + */ +static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) +{ + struct socket_smack *ssp; + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); + + if (sk == NULL || + (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)) + return; + + ssp = sk->sk_security; + ssp->smk_in = skp; + ssp->smk_out = skp; + /* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */ +} + +/** + * smack_inet_conn_request - Smack access check on connect + * @sk: socket involved + * @skb: packet + * @req: unused + * + * Returns 0 if a task with the packet label could write to + * the socket, otherwise an error code + */ +static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct request_sock *req) +{ + u16 family = sk->sk_family; + struct smack_known *skp; + struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security; + struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; + struct sockaddr_in addr; + struct iphdr *hdr; + struct smack_known *hskp; + int rc; + struct smk_audit_info ad; +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + struct lsm_network_audit net; +#endif + +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) + if (family == PF_INET6) { + /* + * Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving + * via IPv6 sockets. Don't set up netlabel + * processing on IPv6. + */ + if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) + family = PF_INET; + else + return 0; + } +#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER + /* + * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label. + * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO. + * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better. + */ + if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) { + skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark); + goto access_check; + } +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */ + + netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr); + rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr); + if (rc == 0) + skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp); + else + skp = &smack_known_huh; + netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr); + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER +access_check: +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net); + ad.a.u.net->family = family; + ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; + ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL); +#endif + /* + * Receiving a packet requires that the other end be able to write + * here. Read access is not required. + */ + rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 connect", skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc); + if (rc != 0) + return rc; + + /* + * Save the peer's label in the request_sock so we can later setup + * smk_packet in the child socket so that SO_PEERCRED can report it. + */ + req->peer_secid = skp->smk_secid; + + /* + * We need to decide if we want to label the incoming connection here + * if we do we only need to label the request_sock and the stack will + * propagate the wire-label to the sock when it is created. + */ + hdr = ip_hdr(skb); + addr.sin_addr.s_addr = hdr->saddr; + rcu_read_lock(); + hskp = smack_ipv4host_label(&addr); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + if (hskp == NULL) + rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &skp->smk_netlabel); + else + netlbl_req_delattr(req); + + return rc; +} + +/** + * smack_inet_csk_clone - Copy the connection information to the new socket + * @sk: the new socket + * @req: the connection's request_sock + * + * Transfer the connection's peer label to the newly created socket. + */ +static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, + const struct request_sock *req) +{ + struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security; + struct smack_known *skp; + + if (req->peer_secid != 0) { + skp = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid); + ssp->smk_packet = skp; + } else + ssp->smk_packet = NULL; +} + +/* + * Key management security hooks + * + * Casey has not tested key support very heavily. + * The permission check is most likely too restrictive. + * If you care about keys please have a look. + */ +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + +/** + * smack_key_alloc - Set the key security blob + * @key: object + * @cred: the credentials to use + * @flags: unused + * + * No allocation required + * + * Returns 0 + */ +static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred, + unsigned long flags) +{ + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(cred->security); + + key->security = skp; + return 0; +} + +/** + * smack_key_free - Clear the key security blob + * @key: the object + * + * Clear the blob pointer + */ +static void smack_key_free(struct key *key) +{ + key->security = NULL; +} + +/** + * smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key + * @key_ref: gets to the object + * @cred: the credentials to use + * @perm: requested key permissions + * + * Return 0 if the task has read and write to the object, + * an error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, + const struct cred *cred, unsigned perm) +{ + struct key *keyp; + struct smk_audit_info ad; + struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(cred->security); + int request = 0; + int rc; + + /* + * Validate requested permissions + */ + if (perm & ~KEY_NEED_ALL) + return -EINVAL; + + keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); + if (keyp == NULL) + return -EINVAL; + /* + * If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that + * it may do so. + */ + if (keyp->security == NULL) + return 0; + /* + * This should not occur + */ + if (tkp == NULL) + return -EACCES; + + if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, cred)) + return 0; + +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY); + ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial; + ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description; +#endif + if (perm & (KEY_NEED_READ | KEY_NEED_SEARCH | KEY_NEED_VIEW)) + request |= MAY_READ; + if (perm & (KEY_NEED_WRITE | KEY_NEED_LINK | KEY_NEED_SETATTR)) + request |= MAY_WRITE; + rc = smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, request, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, keyp->security, request, rc); + return rc; +} + +/* + * smack_key_getsecurity - Smack label tagging the key + * @key points to the key to be queried + * @_buffer points to a pointer that should be set to point to the + * resulting string (if no label or an error occurs). + * Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if + * an error. + * May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label. + */ +static int smack_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) +{ + struct smack_known *skp = key->security; + size_t length; + char *copy; + + if (key->security == NULL) { + *_buffer = NULL; + return 0; + } + + copy = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL); + if (copy == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + length = strlen(copy) + 1; + + *_buffer = copy; + return length; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ + +/* + * Smack Audit hooks + * + * Audit requires a unique representation of each Smack specific + * rule. This unique representation is used to distinguish the + * object to be audited from remaining kernel objects and also + * works as a glue between the audit hooks. + * + * Since repository entries are added but never deleted, we'll use + * the smack_known label address related to the given audit rule as + * the needed unique representation. This also better fits the smack + * model where nearly everything is a label. + */ +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + +/** + * smack_audit_rule_init - Initialize a smack audit rule + * @field: audit rule fields given from user-space (audit.h) + * @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...) + * @rulestr: smack label to be audited + * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation + * + * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true. + * The label to be audited is created if necessay. + */ +static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) +{ + struct smack_known *skp; + char **rule = (char **)vrule; + *rule = NULL; + + if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER) + return -EINVAL; + + if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal) + return -EINVAL; + + skp = smk_import_entry(rulestr, 0); + if (IS_ERR(skp)) + return PTR_ERR(skp); + + *rule = skp->smk_known; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * smack_audit_rule_known - Distinguish Smack audit rules + * @krule: rule of interest, in Audit kernel representation format + * + * This is used to filter Smack rules from remaining Audit ones. + * If it's proved that this rule belongs to us, the + * audit_rule_match hook will be called to do the final judgement. + */ +static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) +{ + struct audit_field *f; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < krule->field_count; i++) { + f = &krule->fields[i]; + + if (f->type == AUDIT_SUBJ_USER || f->type == AUDIT_OBJ_USER) + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * smack_audit_rule_match - Audit given object ? + * @secid: security id for identifying the object to test + * @field: audit rule flags given from user-space + * @op: required testing operator + * @vrule: smack internal rule presentation + * @actx: audit context associated with the check + * + * The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of + * whether to audit or not to audit a given object. + */ +static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule, + struct audit_context *actx) +{ + struct smack_known *skp; + char *rule = vrule; + + if (unlikely(!rule)) { + WARN_ONCE(1, "Smack: missing rule\n"); + return -ENOENT; + } + + if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER) + return 0; + + skp = smack_from_secid(secid); + + /* + * No need to do string comparisons. If a match occurs, + * both pointers will point to the same smack_known + * label. + */ + if (op == Audit_equal) + return (rule == skp->smk_known); + if (op == Audit_not_equal) + return (rule != skp->smk_known); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * There is no need for a smack_audit_rule_free hook. + * No memory was allocated. + */ + +#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ + +/** + * smack_ismaclabel - check if xattr @name references a smack MAC label + * @name: Full xattr name to check. + */ +static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name) +{ + return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0); +} + + +/** + * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid + * @secid: incoming integer + * @secdata: destination + * @seclen: how long it is + * + * Exists for networking code. + */ +static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) +{ + struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid); + + if (secdata) + *secdata = skp->smk_known; + *seclen = strlen(skp->smk_known); + return 0; +} + +/** + * smack_secctx_to_secid - return the secid for a smack label + * @secdata: smack label + * @seclen: how long result is + * @secid: outgoing integer + * + * Exists for audit and networking code. + */ +static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) +{ + struct smack_known *skp = smk_find_entry(secdata); + + if (skp) + *secid = skp->smk_secid; + else + *secid = 0; + return 0; +} + +/* + * There used to be a smack_release_secctx hook + * that did nothing back when hooks were in a vector. + * Now that there's a list such a hook adds cost. + */ + +static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) +{ + return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0); +} + +static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) +{ + return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, ctx, ctxlen, 0); +} + +static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) +{ + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_inode(inode); + + *ctx = skp->smk_known; + *ctxlen = strlen(skp->smk_known); + return 0; +} + +static int smack_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *dentry, struct cred **new) +{ + + struct task_smack *tsp; + struct smack_known *skp; + struct inode_smack *isp; + struct cred *new_creds = *new; + + if (new_creds == NULL) { + new_creds = prepare_creds(); + if (new_creds == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + } + + tsp = new_creds->security; + + /* + * Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid + */ + isp = d_inode(dentry->d_parent)->i_security; + skp = isp->smk_inode; + tsp->smk_task = skp; + *new = new_creds; + return 0; +} + +static int smack_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) +{ + /* + * Return 1 if this is the smack access Smack attribute. + */ + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) + return 1; + + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +static int smack_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, + struct qstr *name, + const struct cred *old, + struct cred *new) +{ + struct task_smack *otsp = old->security; + struct task_smack *ntsp = new->security; + struct inode_smack *isp; + int may; + + /* + * Use the process credential unless all of + * the transmuting criteria are met + */ + ntsp->smk_task = otsp->smk_task; + + /* + * the attribute of the containing directory + */ + isp = d_inode(dentry->d_parent)->i_security; + + if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE) { + rcu_read_lock(); + may = smk_access_entry(otsp->smk_task->smk_known, + isp->smk_inode->smk_known, + &otsp->smk_task->smk_rules); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + /* + * If the directory is transmuting and the rule + * providing access is transmuting use the containing + * directory label instead of the process label. + */ + if (may > 0 && (may & MAY_TRANSMUTE)) + ntsp->smk_task = isp->smk_inode; + } + return 0; +} + +static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, smack_syslog), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, smack_sb_free_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, smack_sb_copy_data), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, smack_sb_kern_mount), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, smack_set_mnt_opts), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str, smack_parse_opts_str), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, smack_bprm_set_creds), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, smack_inode_alloc_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, smack_inode_free_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, smack_inode_init_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, smack_inode_link), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, smack_inode_unlink), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, smack_inode_rmdir), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, smack_inode_rename), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, smack_inode_permission), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, smack_inode_setattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, smack_inode_getattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, smack_inode_setxattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, smack_inode_post_setxattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, smack_inode_getxattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, smack_inode_removexattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, smack_inode_getsecurity), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, smack_inode_setsecurity), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, smack_inode_listsecurity), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, smack_inode_getsecid), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, smack_file_alloc_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, smack_file_free_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, smack_file_ioctl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, smack_file_lock), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, smack_file_fcntl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, smack_mmap_file), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, smack_file_set_fowner), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, smack_file_send_sigiotask), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, smack_file_receive), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, smack_file_open), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, smack_cred_alloc_blank), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, smack_cred_free), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, smack_cred_prepare), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, smack_cred_transfer), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, smack_cred_getsecid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, smack_kernel_act_as), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, smack_kernel_create_files_as), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, smack_task_getsecid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, smack_task_setscheduler), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, smack_task_getscheduler), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, smack_task_movememory), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, smack_task_kill), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, smack_task_to_inode), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, smack_ipc_permission), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, smack_ipc_getsecid), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, smack_msg_msg_alloc_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security, smack_msg_msg_free_security), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security, smack_ipc_alloc_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security, smack_ipc_free_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, smack_msg_queue_associate), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, smack_msg_queue_msgctl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, smack_msg_queue_msgsnd), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, smack_msg_queue_msgrcv), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, smack_ipc_alloc_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security, smack_ipc_free_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, smack_shm_associate), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, smack_shm_shmctl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, smack_shm_shmat), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, smack_ipc_alloc_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security, smack_ipc_free_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, smack_sem_associate), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, smack_sem_semctl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, smack_sem_semop), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, smack_d_instantiate), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, smack_getprocattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, smack_setprocattr), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, smack_unix_stream_connect), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, smack_unix_may_send), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, smack_socket_post_create), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, smack_socket_socketpair), +#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, smack_socket_bind), +#endif + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, smack_socket_connect), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, smack_socket_sendmsg), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone), + + /* key management security hooks */ +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, smack_key_alloc), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, smack_key_free), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, smack_key_permission), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, smack_key_getsecurity), +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ + + /* Audit hooks */ +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, smack_audit_rule_init), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, smack_audit_rule_known), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, smack_audit_rule_match), +#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, smack_inode_copy_up), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, smack_inode_copy_up_xattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, smack_dentry_create_files_as), +}; + + +static __init void init_smack_known_list(void) +{ + /* + * Initialize rule list locks + */ + mutex_init(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules_lock); + mutex_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules_lock); + mutex_init(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules_lock); + mutex_init(&smack_known_star.smk_rules_lock); + mutex_init(&smack_known_web.smk_rules_lock); + /* + * Initialize rule lists + */ + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_star.smk_rules); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_web.smk_rules); + /* + * Create the known labels list + */ + smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_huh); + smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_hat); + smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_star); + smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_floor); + smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_web); +} + +/** + * smack_init - initialize the smack system + * + * Returns 0 + */ +static __init int smack_init(void) +{ + struct cred *cred; + struct task_smack *tsp; + + if (!security_module_enable("smack")) + return 0; + + smack_inode_cache = KMEM_CACHE(inode_smack, 0); + if (!smack_inode_cache) + return -ENOMEM; + + tsp = new_task_smack(&smack_known_floor, &smack_known_floor, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (tsp == NULL) { + kmem_cache_destroy(smack_inode_cache); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + smack_enabled = 1; + + pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n"); +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER + pr_info("Smack: Netfilter enabled.\n"); +#endif +#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING + pr_info("Smack: IPv6 port labeling enabled.\n"); +#endif +#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING + pr_info("Smack: IPv6 Netfilter enabled.\n"); +#endif + + /* + * Set the security state for the initial task. + */ + cred = (struct cred *) current->cred; + cred->security = tsp; + + /* initialize the smack_known_list */ + init_smack_known_list(); + + /* + * Register with LSM + */ + security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack"); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Smack requires early initialization in order to label + * all processes and objects when they are created. + */ +security_initcall(smack_init); |