diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'servers/slapd/overlays/ppolicy.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | servers/slapd/overlays/ppolicy.c | 2526 |
1 files changed, 2526 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/servers/slapd/overlays/ppolicy.c b/servers/slapd/overlays/ppolicy.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..991ed56 --- /dev/null +++ b/servers/slapd/overlays/ppolicy.c @@ -0,0 +1,2526 @@ +/* $OpenLDAP$ */ +/* This work is part of OpenLDAP Software <http://www.openldap.org/>. + * + * Copyright 2004-2018 The OpenLDAP Foundation. + * Portions Copyright 2004-2005 Howard Chu, Symas Corporation. + * Portions Copyright 2004 Hewlett-Packard Company. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted only as authorized by the OpenLDAP + * Public License. + * + * A copy of this license is available in the file LICENSE in the + * top-level directory of the distribution or, alternatively, at + * <http://www.OpenLDAP.org/license.html>. + */ +/* ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: + * This work was developed by Howard Chu for inclusion in + * OpenLDAP Software, based on prior work by Neil Dunbar (HP). + * This work was sponsored by the Hewlett-Packard Company. + */ + +#include "portable.h" + +/* This file implements "Password Policy for LDAP Directories", + * based on draft behera-ldap-password-policy-09 + */ + +#ifdef SLAPD_OVER_PPOLICY + +#include <ldap.h> +#include "lutil.h" +#include "slap.h" +#ifdef SLAPD_MODULES +#define LIBLTDL_DLL_IMPORT /* Win32: don't re-export libltdl's symbols */ +#include <ltdl.h> +#endif +#include <ac/errno.h> +#include <ac/time.h> +#include <ac/string.h> +#include <ac/ctype.h> +#include "config.h" + +#ifndef MODULE_NAME_SZ +#define MODULE_NAME_SZ 256 +#endif + +#ifndef PPOLICY_DEFAULT_MAXRECORDED_FAILURE +#define PPOLICY_DEFAULT_MAXRECORDED_FAILURE 5 +#endif + +/* Per-instance configuration information */ +typedef struct pp_info { + struct berval def_policy; /* DN of default policy subentry */ + int use_lockout; /* send AccountLocked result? */ + int hash_passwords; /* transparently hash cleartext pwds */ + int forward_updates; /* use frontend for policy state updates */ +} pp_info; + +/* Our per-connection info - note, it is not per-instance, it is + * used by all instances + */ +typedef struct pw_conn { + struct berval dn; /* DN of restricted user */ +} pw_conn; + +static pw_conn *pwcons; +static int ppolicy_cid; +static int ov_count; + +typedef struct pass_policy { + AttributeDescription *ad; /* attribute to which the policy applies */ + int pwdMinAge; /* minimum time (seconds) until passwd can change */ + int pwdMaxAge; /* time in seconds until pwd will expire after change */ + int pwdInHistory; /* number of previous passwords kept */ + int pwdCheckQuality; /* 0 = don't check quality, 1 = check if possible, + 2 = check mandatory; fail if not possible */ + int pwdMinLength; /* minimum number of chars in password */ + int pwdExpireWarning; /* number of seconds that warning controls are + sent before a password expires */ + int pwdGraceAuthNLimit; /* number of times you can log in with an + expired password */ + int pwdLockout; /* 0 = do not lockout passwords, 1 = lock them out */ + int pwdLockoutDuration; /* time in seconds a password is locked out for */ + int pwdMaxFailure; /* number of failed binds allowed before lockout */ + int pwdMaxRecordedFailure; /* number of failed binds to store */ + int pwdFailureCountInterval; /* number of seconds before failure + counts are zeroed */ + int pwdMustChange; /* 0 = users can use admin set password + 1 = users must change password after admin set */ + int pwdAllowUserChange; /* 0 = users cannot change their passwords + 1 = users can change them */ + int pwdSafeModify; /* 0 = old password doesn't need to come + with password change request + 1 = password change must supply existing pwd */ + char pwdCheckModule[MODULE_NAME_SZ]; /* name of module to dynamically + load to check password */ +} PassPolicy; + +typedef struct pw_hist { + time_t t; /* timestamp of history entry */ + struct berval pw; /* old password hash */ + struct berval bv; /* text of entire entry */ + struct pw_hist *next; +} pw_hist; + +/* Operational attributes */ +static AttributeDescription *ad_pwdChangedTime, *ad_pwdAccountLockedTime, + *ad_pwdFailureTime, *ad_pwdHistory, *ad_pwdGraceUseTime, *ad_pwdReset, + *ad_pwdPolicySubentry; + +static struct schema_info { + char *def; + AttributeDescription **ad; +} pwd_OpSchema[] = { + { "( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.16 " + "NAME ( 'pwdChangedTime' ) " + "DESC 'The time the password was last changed' " + "EQUALITY generalizedTimeMatch " + "ORDERING generalizedTimeOrderingMatch " + "SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.24 " + "SINGLE-VALUE NO-USER-MODIFICATION USAGE directoryOperation )", + &ad_pwdChangedTime }, + { "( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.17 " + "NAME ( 'pwdAccountLockedTime' ) " + "DESC 'The time an user account was locked' " + "EQUALITY generalizedTimeMatch " + "ORDERING generalizedTimeOrderingMatch " + "SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.24 " + "SINGLE-VALUE " +#if 0 + /* Not until Relax control is released */ + "NO-USER-MODIFICATION " +#endif + "USAGE directoryOperation )", + &ad_pwdAccountLockedTime }, + { "( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.19 " + "NAME ( 'pwdFailureTime' ) " + "DESC 'The timestamps of the last consecutive authentication failures' " + "EQUALITY generalizedTimeMatch " + "ORDERING generalizedTimeOrderingMatch " + "SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.24 " + "NO-USER-MODIFICATION USAGE directoryOperation )", + &ad_pwdFailureTime }, + { "( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.20 " + "NAME ( 'pwdHistory' ) " + "DESC 'The history of users passwords' " + "EQUALITY octetStringMatch " + "SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.40 " + "NO-USER-MODIFICATION USAGE directoryOperation )", + &ad_pwdHistory }, + { "( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.21 " + "NAME ( 'pwdGraceUseTime' ) " + "DESC 'The timestamps of the grace login once the password has expired' " + "EQUALITY generalizedTimeMatch " + "SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.24 " + "NO-USER-MODIFICATION USAGE directoryOperation )", + &ad_pwdGraceUseTime }, + { "( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.22 " + "NAME ( 'pwdReset' ) " + "DESC 'The indication that the password has been reset' " + "EQUALITY booleanMatch " + "SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.7 " + "SINGLE-VALUE USAGE directoryOperation )", + &ad_pwdReset }, + { "( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.23 " + "NAME ( 'pwdPolicySubentry' ) " + "DESC 'The pwdPolicy subentry in effect for this object' " + "EQUALITY distinguishedNameMatch " + "SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.12 " + "SINGLE-VALUE " +#if 0 + /* Not until Relax control is released */ + "NO-USER-MODIFICATION " +#endif + "USAGE directoryOperation )", + &ad_pwdPolicySubentry }, + { NULL, NULL } +}; + +/* User attributes */ +static AttributeDescription *ad_pwdMinAge, *ad_pwdMaxAge, *ad_pwdInHistory, + *ad_pwdCheckQuality, *ad_pwdMinLength, *ad_pwdMaxFailure, + *ad_pwdGraceAuthNLimit, *ad_pwdExpireWarning, *ad_pwdLockoutDuration, + *ad_pwdFailureCountInterval, *ad_pwdCheckModule, *ad_pwdLockout, + *ad_pwdMustChange, *ad_pwdAllowUserChange, *ad_pwdSafeModify, + *ad_pwdAttribute, *ad_pwdMaxRecordedFailure; + +#define TAB(name) { #name, &ad_##name } + +static struct schema_info pwd_UsSchema[] = { + TAB(pwdAttribute), + TAB(pwdMinAge), + TAB(pwdMaxAge), + TAB(pwdInHistory), + TAB(pwdCheckQuality), + TAB(pwdMinLength), + TAB(pwdMaxFailure), + TAB(pwdMaxRecordedFailure), + TAB(pwdGraceAuthNLimit), + TAB(pwdExpireWarning), + TAB(pwdLockout), + TAB(pwdLockoutDuration), + TAB(pwdFailureCountInterval), + TAB(pwdCheckModule), + TAB(pwdMustChange), + TAB(pwdAllowUserChange), + TAB(pwdSafeModify), + { NULL, NULL } +}; + +static ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_t chk_syntax_mutex; + +enum { + PPOLICY_DEFAULT = 1, + PPOLICY_HASH_CLEARTEXT, + PPOLICY_USE_LOCKOUT +}; + +static ConfigDriver ppolicy_cf_default; + +static ConfigTable ppolicycfg[] = { + { "ppolicy_default", "policyDN", 2, 2, 0, + ARG_DN|ARG_QUOTE|ARG_MAGIC|PPOLICY_DEFAULT, ppolicy_cf_default, + "( OLcfgOvAt:12.1 NAME 'olcPPolicyDefault' " + "DESC 'DN of a pwdPolicy object for uncustomized objects' " + "SYNTAX OMsDN SINGLE-VALUE )", NULL, NULL }, + { "ppolicy_hash_cleartext", "on|off", 1, 2, 0, + ARG_ON_OFF|ARG_OFFSET|PPOLICY_HASH_CLEARTEXT, + (void *)offsetof(pp_info,hash_passwords), + "( OLcfgOvAt:12.2 NAME 'olcPPolicyHashCleartext' " + "DESC 'Hash passwords on add or modify' " + "SYNTAX OMsBoolean SINGLE-VALUE )", NULL, NULL }, + { "ppolicy_forward_updates", "on|off", 1, 2, 0, + ARG_ON_OFF|ARG_OFFSET, + (void *)offsetof(pp_info,forward_updates), + "( OLcfgOvAt:12.4 NAME 'olcPPolicyForwardUpdates' " + "DESC 'Allow policy state updates to be forwarded via updateref' " + "SYNTAX OMsBoolean SINGLE-VALUE )", NULL, NULL }, + { "ppolicy_use_lockout", "on|off", 1, 2, 0, + ARG_ON_OFF|ARG_OFFSET|PPOLICY_USE_LOCKOUT, + (void *)offsetof(pp_info,use_lockout), + "( OLcfgOvAt:12.3 NAME 'olcPPolicyUseLockout' " + "DESC 'Warn clients with AccountLocked' " + "SYNTAX OMsBoolean SINGLE-VALUE )", NULL, NULL }, + { NULL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, ARG_IGNORED } +}; + +static ConfigOCs ppolicyocs[] = { + { "( OLcfgOvOc:12.1 " + "NAME 'olcPPolicyConfig' " + "DESC 'Password Policy configuration' " + "SUP olcOverlayConfig " + "MAY ( olcPPolicyDefault $ olcPPolicyHashCleartext $ " + "olcPPolicyUseLockout $ olcPPolicyForwardUpdates ) )", + Cft_Overlay, ppolicycfg }, + { NULL, 0, NULL } +}; + +static int +ppolicy_cf_default( ConfigArgs *c ) +{ + slap_overinst *on = (slap_overinst *)c->bi; + pp_info *pi = (pp_info *)on->on_bi.bi_private; + int rc = ARG_BAD_CONF; + + assert ( c->type == PPOLICY_DEFAULT ); + Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "==> ppolicy_cf_default\n", 0, 0, 0); + + switch ( c->op ) { + case SLAP_CONFIG_EMIT: + Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "==> ppolicy_cf_default emit\n", 0, 0, 0); + rc = 0; + if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &pi->def_policy )) { + rc = value_add_one( &c->rvalue_vals, + &pi->def_policy ); + if ( rc ) return rc; + rc = value_add_one( &c->rvalue_nvals, + &pi->def_policy ); + } + break; + case LDAP_MOD_DELETE: + Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "==> ppolicy_cf_default delete\n", 0, 0, 0); + if ( pi->def_policy.bv_val ) { + ber_memfree ( pi->def_policy.bv_val ); + pi->def_policy.bv_val = NULL; + } + pi->def_policy.bv_len = 0; + rc = 0; + break; + case SLAP_CONFIG_ADD: + /* fallthrough to LDAP_MOD_ADD */ + case LDAP_MOD_ADD: + Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "==> ppolicy_cf_default add\n", 0, 0, 0); + if ( pi->def_policy.bv_val ) { + ber_memfree ( pi->def_policy.bv_val ); + } + pi->def_policy = c->value_ndn; + ber_memfree( c->value_dn.bv_val ); + BER_BVZERO( &c->value_dn ); + BER_BVZERO( &c->value_ndn ); + rc = 0; + break; + default: + abort (); + } + + return rc; +} + +static time_t +parse_time( char *atm ) +{ + struct lutil_tm tm; + struct lutil_timet tt; + time_t ret = (time_t)-1; + + if ( lutil_parsetime( atm, &tm ) == 0) { + lutil_tm2time( &tm, &tt ); + ret = tt.tt_sec; + } + return ret; +} + +static int +account_locked( Operation *op, Entry *e, + PassPolicy *pp, Modifications **mod ) +{ + Attribute *la; + + assert(mod != NULL); + + if ( !pp->pwdLockout ) + return 0; + + if ( (la = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdAccountLockedTime )) != NULL ) { + BerVarray vals = la->a_nvals; + + /* + * there is a lockout stamp - we now need to know if it's + * a valid one. + */ + if (vals[0].bv_val != NULL) { + time_t then, now; + Modifications *m; + + if (!pp->pwdLockoutDuration) + return 1; + + if ((then = parse_time( vals[0].bv_val )) == (time_t)0) + return 1; + + now = slap_get_time(); + + if (now < then + pp->pwdLockoutDuration) + return 1; + + m = ch_calloc( sizeof(Modifications), 1 ); + m->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE; + m->sml_flags = 0; + m->sml_type = ad_pwdAccountLockedTime->ad_cname; + m->sml_desc = ad_pwdAccountLockedTime; + m->sml_next = *mod; + *mod = m; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/* IMPLICIT TAGS, all context-specific */ +#define PPOLICY_WARNING 0xa0L /* constructed + 0 */ +#define PPOLICY_ERROR 0x81L /* primitive + 1 */ + +#define PPOLICY_EXPIRE 0x80L /* primitive + 0 */ +#define PPOLICY_GRACE 0x81L /* primitive + 1 */ + +static const char ppolicy_ctrl_oid[] = LDAP_CONTROL_PASSWORDPOLICYRESPONSE; + +static LDAPControl * +create_passcontrol( Operation *op, int exptime, int grace, LDAPPasswordPolicyError err ) +{ + BerElementBuffer berbuf, bb2; + BerElement *ber = (BerElement *) &berbuf, *b2 = (BerElement *) &bb2; + LDAPControl c = { 0 }, *cp; + struct berval bv; + int rc; + + BER_BVZERO( &c.ldctl_value ); + + ber_init2( ber, NULL, LBER_USE_DER ); + ber_printf( ber, "{" /*}*/ ); + + if ( exptime >= 0 ) { + ber_init2( b2, NULL, LBER_USE_DER ); + ber_printf( b2, "ti", PPOLICY_EXPIRE, exptime ); + rc = ber_flatten2( b2, &bv, 1 ); + (void)ber_free_buf(b2); + if (rc == -1) { + cp = NULL; + goto fail; + } + ber_printf( ber, "tO", PPOLICY_WARNING, &bv ); + ch_free( bv.bv_val ); + } else if ( grace > 0 ) { + ber_init2( b2, NULL, LBER_USE_DER ); + ber_printf( b2, "ti", PPOLICY_GRACE, grace ); + rc = ber_flatten2( b2, &bv, 1 ); + (void)ber_free_buf(b2); + if (rc == -1) { + cp = NULL; + goto fail; + } + ber_printf( ber, "tO", PPOLICY_WARNING, &bv ); + ch_free( bv.bv_val ); + } + + if (err != PP_noError ) { + ber_printf( ber, "te", PPOLICY_ERROR, err ); + } + ber_printf( ber, /*{*/ "N}" ); + + if (ber_flatten2( ber, &c.ldctl_value, 0 ) == -1) { + return NULL; + } + cp = op->o_tmpalloc( sizeof( LDAPControl ) + c.ldctl_value.bv_len, op->o_tmpmemctx ); + cp->ldctl_oid = (char *)ppolicy_ctrl_oid; + cp->ldctl_iscritical = 0; + cp->ldctl_value.bv_val = (char *)&cp[1]; + cp->ldctl_value.bv_len = c.ldctl_value.bv_len; + AC_MEMCPY( cp->ldctl_value.bv_val, c.ldctl_value.bv_val, c.ldctl_value.bv_len ); +fail: + (void)ber_free_buf(ber); + + return cp; +} + +static LDAPControl ** +add_passcontrol( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs, LDAPControl *ctrl ) +{ + LDAPControl **ctrls, **oldctrls = rs->sr_ctrls; + int n; + + n = 0; + if ( oldctrls ) { + for ( ; oldctrls[n]; n++ ) + ; + } + n += 2; + + ctrls = op->o_tmpcalloc( sizeof( LDAPControl * ), n, op->o_tmpmemctx ); + + n = 0; + if ( oldctrls ) { + for ( ; oldctrls[n]; n++ ) { + ctrls[n] = oldctrls[n]; + } + } + ctrls[n] = ctrl; + ctrls[n+1] = NULL; + + rs->sr_ctrls = ctrls; + + return oldctrls; +} + +static void +ppolicy_get_default( PassPolicy *pp ) +{ + memset( pp, 0, sizeof(PassPolicy) ); + + pp->ad = slap_schema.si_ad_userPassword; + + /* Users can change their own password by default */ + pp->pwdAllowUserChange = 1; + if ( !pp->pwdMaxRecordedFailure ) + pp->pwdMaxRecordedFailure = PPOLICY_DEFAULT_MAXRECORDED_FAILURE; +} + + +static void +ppolicy_get( Operation *op, Entry *e, PassPolicy *pp ) +{ + slap_overinst *on = (slap_overinst *)op->o_bd->bd_info; + pp_info *pi = on->on_bi.bi_private; + Attribute *a; + BerVarray vals; + int rc; + Entry *pe = NULL; +#if 0 + const char *text; +#endif + + ppolicy_get_default( pp ); + + if ((a = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdPolicySubentry )) == NULL) { + /* + * entry has no password policy assigned - use default + */ + vals = &pi->def_policy; + if ( !vals->bv_val ) + goto defaultpol; + } else { + vals = a->a_nvals; + if (vals[0].bv_val == NULL) { + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, + "ppolicy_get: NULL value for policySubEntry\n", 0, 0, 0 ); + goto defaultpol; + } + } + + op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info; + rc = be_entry_get_rw( op, vals, NULL, NULL, 0, &pe ); + op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on; + + if ( rc ) goto defaultpol; + +#if 0 /* Only worry about userPassword for now */ + if ((a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdAttribute ))) + slap_bv2ad( &a->a_vals[0], &pp->ad, &text ); +#endif + + if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdMinAge ) ) + && lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdMinAge, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 ) + goto defaultpol; + if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdMaxAge ) ) + && lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdMaxAge, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 ) + goto defaultpol; + if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdInHistory ) ) + && lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdInHistory, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 ) + goto defaultpol; + if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdCheckQuality ) ) + && lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdCheckQuality, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 ) + goto defaultpol; + if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdMinLength ) ) + && lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdMinLength, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 ) + goto defaultpol; + if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdMaxFailure ) ) + && lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdMaxFailure, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 ) + goto defaultpol; + if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdMaxRecordedFailure ) ) + && lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdMaxRecordedFailure, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 ) + goto defaultpol; + if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdGraceAuthNLimit ) ) + && lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdGraceAuthNLimit, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 ) + goto defaultpol; + if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdExpireWarning ) ) + && lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdExpireWarning, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 ) + goto defaultpol; + if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdFailureCountInterval ) ) + && lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdFailureCountInterval, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 ) + goto defaultpol; + if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdLockoutDuration ) ) + && lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdLockoutDuration, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 ) + goto defaultpol; + + if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdCheckModule ) ) ) { + strncpy( pp->pwdCheckModule, a->a_vals[0].bv_val, + sizeof(pp->pwdCheckModule) ); + pp->pwdCheckModule[sizeof(pp->pwdCheckModule)-1] = '\0'; + } + + if ((a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdLockout ))) + pp->pwdLockout = bvmatch( &a->a_nvals[0], &slap_true_bv ); + if ((a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdMustChange ))) + pp->pwdMustChange = bvmatch( &a->a_nvals[0], &slap_true_bv ); + if ((a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdAllowUserChange ))) + pp->pwdAllowUserChange = bvmatch( &a->a_nvals[0], &slap_true_bv ); + if ((a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdSafeModify ))) + pp->pwdSafeModify = bvmatch( &a->a_nvals[0], &slap_true_bv ); + + if ( pp->pwdMaxRecordedFailure < pp->pwdMaxFailure ) + pp->pwdMaxRecordedFailure = pp->pwdMaxFailure; + if ( !pp->pwdMaxRecordedFailure ) + pp->pwdMaxRecordedFailure = PPOLICY_DEFAULT_MAXRECORDED_FAILURE; + + op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info; + be_entry_release_r( op, pe ); + op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on; + + return; + +defaultpol: + if ( pe ) { + op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info; + be_entry_release_r( op, pe ); + op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on; + } + + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, + "ppolicy_get: using default policy\n", 0, 0, 0 ); + + ppolicy_get_default( pp ); + + return; +} + +static int +password_scheme( struct berval *cred, struct berval *sch ) +{ + int e; + + assert( cred != NULL ); + + if (sch) { + sch->bv_val = NULL; + sch->bv_len = 0; + } + + if ((cred->bv_len == 0) || (cred->bv_val == NULL) || + (cred->bv_val[0] != '{')) return LDAP_OTHER; + + for(e = 1; cred->bv_val[e] && cred->bv_val[e] != '}'; e++); + if (cred->bv_val[e]) { + int rc; + rc = lutil_passwd_scheme( cred->bv_val ); + if (rc) { + if (sch) { + sch->bv_val = cred->bv_val; + sch->bv_len = e; + } + return LDAP_SUCCESS; + } + } + return LDAP_OTHER; +} + +static int +check_password_quality( struct berval *cred, PassPolicy *pp, LDAPPasswordPolicyError *err, Entry *e, char **txt ) +{ + int rc = LDAP_SUCCESS, ok = LDAP_SUCCESS; + char *ptr; + struct berval sch; + + assert( cred != NULL ); + assert( pp != NULL ); + assert( txt != NULL ); + + ptr = cred->bv_val; + + *txt = NULL; + + if ((cred->bv_len == 0) || (pp->pwdMinLength > cred->bv_len)) { + rc = LDAP_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION; + if ( err ) *err = PP_passwordTooShort; + return rc; + } + + /* + * We need to know if the password is already hashed - if so + * what scheme is it. The reason being that the "hash" of + * {cleartext} still allows us to check the password. + */ + rc = password_scheme( cred, &sch ); + if (rc == LDAP_SUCCESS) { + if ((sch.bv_val) && (strncasecmp( sch.bv_val, "{cleartext}", + sch.bv_len ) == 0)) { + /* + * We can check the cleartext "hash" + */ + ptr = cred->bv_val + sch.bv_len; + } else { + /* everything else, we can't check */ + if (pp->pwdCheckQuality == 2) { + rc = LDAP_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION; + if (err) *err = PP_insufficientPasswordQuality; + return rc; + } + /* + * We can't check the syntax of the password, but it's not + * mandatory (according to the policy), so we return success. + */ + + return LDAP_SUCCESS; + } + } + + rc = LDAP_SUCCESS; + + if (pp->pwdCheckModule[0]) { +#ifdef SLAPD_MODULES + lt_dlhandle mod; + const char *err; + + if ((mod = lt_dlopen( pp->pwdCheckModule )) == NULL) { + err = lt_dlerror(); + + Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, + "check_password_quality: lt_dlopen failed: (%s) %s.\n", + pp->pwdCheckModule, err, 0 ); + ok = LDAP_OTHER; /* internal error */ + } else { + /* FIXME: the error message ought to be passed thru a + * struct berval, with preallocated buffer and size + * passed in. Module can still allocate a buffer for + * it if the provided one is too small. + */ + int (*prog)( char *passwd, char **text, Entry *ent ); + + if ((prog = lt_dlsym( mod, "check_password" )) == NULL) { + err = lt_dlerror(); + + Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, + "check_password_quality: lt_dlsym failed: (%s) %s.\n", + pp->pwdCheckModule, err, 0 ); + ok = LDAP_OTHER; + } else { + ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_lock( &chk_syntax_mutex ); + ok = prog( ptr, txt, e ); + ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_unlock( &chk_syntax_mutex ); + if (ok != LDAP_SUCCESS) { + Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, + "check_password_quality: module error: (%s) %s.[%d]\n", + pp->pwdCheckModule, *txt ? *txt : "", ok ); + } + } + + lt_dlclose( mod ); + } +#else + Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, "check_password_quality: external modules not " + "supported. pwdCheckModule ignored.\n", 0, 0, 0); +#endif /* SLAPD_MODULES */ + } + + + if (ok != LDAP_SUCCESS) { + rc = LDAP_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION; + if (err) *err = PP_insufficientPasswordQuality; + } + + return rc; +} + +static int +parse_pwdhistory( struct berval *bv, char **oid, time_t *oldtime, struct berval *oldpw ) +{ + char *ptr; + struct berval nv, npw; + ber_len_t i, j; + + assert (bv && (bv->bv_len > 0) && (bv->bv_val) && oldtime && oldpw ); + + if ( oid ) { + *oid = 0; + } + *oldtime = (time_t)-1; + BER_BVZERO( oldpw ); + + ber_dupbv( &nv, bv ); + + /* first get the time field */ + for ( i = 0; (i < nv.bv_len) && (nv.bv_val[i] != '#'); i++ ) + ; + if ( i == nv.bv_len ) { + goto exit_failure; /* couldn't locate the '#' separator */ + } + nv.bv_val[i++] = '\0'; /* terminate the string & move to next field */ + ptr = nv.bv_val; + *oldtime = parse_time( ptr ); + if (*oldtime == (time_t)-1) { + goto exit_failure; + } + + /* get the OID field */ + for (ptr = &(nv.bv_val[i]); (i < nv.bv_len) && (nv.bv_val[i] != '#'); i++ ) + ; + if ( i == nv.bv_len ) { + goto exit_failure; /* couldn't locate the '#' separator */ + } + nv.bv_val[i++] = '\0'; /* terminate the string & move to next field */ + if ( oid ) { + *oid = ber_strdup( ptr ); + } + + /* get the length field */ + for ( ptr = &(nv.bv_val[i]); (i < nv.bv_len) && (nv.bv_val[i] != '#'); i++ ) + ; + if ( i == nv.bv_len ) { + goto exit_failure; /* couldn't locate the '#' separator */ + } + nv.bv_val[i++] = '\0'; /* terminate the string & move to next field */ + oldpw->bv_len = strtol( ptr, NULL, 10 ); + if (errno == ERANGE) { + goto exit_failure; + } + + /* lastly, get the octets of the string */ + for ( j = i, ptr = &(nv.bv_val[i]); i < nv.bv_len; i++ ) + ; + if ( i - j != oldpw->bv_len) { + goto exit_failure; /* length is wrong */ + } + + npw.bv_val = ptr; + npw.bv_len = oldpw->bv_len; + ber_dupbv( oldpw, &npw ); + ber_memfree( nv.bv_val ); + + return LDAP_SUCCESS; + +exit_failure:; + if ( oid && *oid ) { + ber_memfree(*oid); + *oid = NULL; + } + if ( oldpw->bv_val ) { + ber_memfree( oldpw->bv_val); + BER_BVZERO( oldpw ); + } + ber_memfree( nv.bv_val ); + + return LDAP_OTHER; +} + +static void +add_to_pwd_history( pw_hist **l, time_t t, + struct berval *oldpw, struct berval *bv ) +{ + pw_hist *p, *p1, *p2; + + if (!l) return; + + p = ch_malloc( sizeof( pw_hist )); + p->pw = *oldpw; + ber_dupbv( &p->bv, bv ); + p->t = t; + p->next = NULL; + + if (*l == NULL) { + /* degenerate case */ + *l = p; + return; + } + /* + * advance p1 and p2 such that p1 is the node before the + * new one, and p2 is the node after it + */ + for (p1 = NULL, p2 = *l; p2 && p2->t <= t; p1 = p2, p2=p2->next ); + p->next = p2; + if (p1 == NULL) { *l = p; return; } + p1->next = p; +} + +#ifndef MAX_PWD_HISTORY_SZ +#define MAX_PWD_HISTORY_SZ 1024 +#endif /* MAX_PWD_HISTORY_SZ */ + +static void +make_pwd_history_value( char *timebuf, struct berval *bv, Attribute *pa ) +{ + char str[ MAX_PWD_HISTORY_SZ ]; + int nlen; + + snprintf( str, MAX_PWD_HISTORY_SZ, + "%s#%s#%lu#", timebuf, + pa->a_desc->ad_type->sat_syntax->ssyn_oid, + (unsigned long) pa->a_nvals[0].bv_len ); + str[MAX_PWD_HISTORY_SZ-1] = 0; + nlen = strlen(str); + + /* + * We have to assume that the string is a string of octets, + * not readable characters. In reality, yes, it probably is + * a readable (ie, base64) string, but we can't count on that + * Hence, while the first 3 fields of the password history + * are definitely readable (a timestamp, an OID and an integer + * length), the remaining octets of the actual password + * are deemed to be binary data. + */ + AC_MEMCPY( str + nlen, pa->a_nvals[0].bv_val, pa->a_nvals[0].bv_len ); + nlen += pa->a_nvals[0].bv_len; + bv->bv_val = ch_malloc( nlen + 1 ); + AC_MEMCPY( bv->bv_val, str, nlen ); + bv->bv_val[nlen] = '\0'; + bv->bv_len = nlen; +} + +static void +free_pwd_history_list( pw_hist **l ) +{ + pw_hist *p; + + if (!l) return; + p = *l; + while (p) { + pw_hist *pp = p->next; + + free(p->pw.bv_val); + free(p->bv.bv_val); + free(p); + p = pp; + } + *l = NULL; +} + +typedef struct ppbind { + slap_overinst *on; + int send_ctrl; + int set_restrict; + LDAPControl **oldctrls; + Modifications *mod; + LDAPPasswordPolicyError pErr; + PassPolicy pp; +} ppbind; + +static void +ctrls_cleanup( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs, LDAPControl **oldctrls ) +{ + int n; + + assert( rs->sr_ctrls != NULL ); + assert( rs->sr_ctrls[0] != NULL ); + + for ( n = 0; rs->sr_ctrls[n]; n++ ) { + if ( rs->sr_ctrls[n]->ldctl_oid == ppolicy_ctrl_oid ) { + op->o_tmpfree( rs->sr_ctrls[n], op->o_tmpmemctx ); + rs->sr_ctrls[n] = (LDAPControl *)(-1); + break; + } + } + + if ( rs->sr_ctrls[n] == NULL ) { + /* missed? */ + } + + op->o_tmpfree( rs->sr_ctrls, op->o_tmpmemctx ); + + rs->sr_ctrls = oldctrls; +} + +static int +ppolicy_ctrls_cleanup( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs ) +{ + ppbind *ppb = op->o_callback->sc_private; + if ( ppb->send_ctrl ) { + ctrls_cleanup( op, rs, ppb->oldctrls ); + } + return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE; +} + +static int +ppolicy_bind_response( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs ) +{ + ppbind *ppb = op->o_callback->sc_private; + slap_overinst *on = ppb->on; + Modifications *mod = ppb->mod, *m; + int pwExpired = 0; + int ngut = -1, warn = -1, age, rc; + Attribute *a; + time_t now, pwtime = (time_t)-1; + struct lutil_tm now_tm; + struct lutil_timet now_usec; + char nowstr[ LDAP_LUTIL_GENTIME_BUFSIZE ]; + char nowstr_usec[ LDAP_LUTIL_GENTIME_BUFSIZE+8 ]; + struct berval timestamp, timestamp_usec; + BackendInfo *bi = op->o_bd->bd_info; + Entry *e; + + /* If we already know it's locked, just get on with it */ + if ( ppb->pErr != PP_noError ) { + goto locked; + } + + op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info; + rc = be_entry_get_rw( op, &op->o_req_ndn, NULL, NULL, 0, &e ); + op->o_bd->bd_info = bi; + + if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) { + return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE; + } + + ldap_pvt_gettime(&now_tm); /* stored for later consideration */ + lutil_tm2time(&now_tm, &now_usec); + now = now_usec.tt_sec; + timestamp.bv_val = nowstr; + timestamp.bv_len = sizeof(nowstr); + slap_timestamp( &now, ×tamp ); + + /* Separate timestamp for pwdFailureTime with microsecond granularity */ + strcpy(nowstr_usec, nowstr); + timestamp_usec.bv_val = nowstr_usec; + timestamp_usec.bv_len = timestamp.bv_len; + snprintf( timestamp_usec.bv_val + timestamp_usec.bv_len-1, sizeof(".123456Z"), ".%06dZ", now_usec.tt_usec ); + timestamp_usec.bv_len += STRLENOF(".123456"); + + if ( rs->sr_err == LDAP_INVALID_CREDENTIALS ) { + int i = 0, fc = 0; + + m = ch_calloc( sizeof(Modifications), 1 ); + m->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_ADD; + m->sml_flags = 0; + m->sml_type = ad_pwdFailureTime->ad_cname; + m->sml_desc = ad_pwdFailureTime; + m->sml_numvals = 1; + m->sml_values = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), 2 ); + m->sml_nvalues = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), 2 ); + + ber_dupbv( &m->sml_values[0], ×tamp_usec ); + ber_dupbv( &m->sml_nvalues[0], ×tamp_usec ); + m->sml_next = mod; + mod = m; + + /* + * Count the pwdFailureTimes - if it's + * greater than the policy pwdMaxFailure, + * then lock the account. + */ + if ((a = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdFailureTime )) != NULL) { + for(i=0; a->a_nvals[i].bv_val; i++) { + + /* + * If the interval is 0, then failures + * stay on the record until explicitly + * reset by successful authentication. + */ + if (ppb->pp.pwdFailureCountInterval == 0) { + fc++; + } else if (now <= + parse_time(a->a_nvals[i].bv_val) + + ppb->pp.pwdFailureCountInterval) { + + fc++; + } + /* + * We only count those failures + * which are not due to expire. + */ + } + /* Do we have too many timestamps? If so, delete some values. + * We don't bother to sort the values here. OpenLDAP keeps the + * values in order by default. Fundamentally, relying on the + * information here is wrong anyway; monitoring systems should + * be tracking Bind failures in syslog, not here. + */ + if (a->a_numvals >= ppb->pp.pwdMaxRecordedFailure) { + int j = ppb->pp.pwdMaxRecordedFailure-1; + /* If more than 2x, cheaper to perform a Replace */ + if (a->a_numvals >= 2 * ppb->pp.pwdMaxRecordedFailure) { + struct berval v, nv; + + /* Change the mod we constructed above */ + m->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_REPLACE; + m->sml_numvals = ppb->pp.pwdMaxRecordedFailure; + v = m->sml_values[0]; + nv = m->sml_nvalues[0]; + ch_free(m->sml_values); + ch_free(m->sml_nvalues); + m->sml_values = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), ppb->pp.pwdMaxRecordedFailure+1 ); + m->sml_nvalues = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), ppb->pp.pwdMaxRecordedFailure+1 ); + for (i=0; i<j; i++) { + ber_dupbv(&m->sml_values[i], &a->a_vals[a->a_numvals-j+i]); + ber_dupbv(&m->sml_nvalues[i], &a->a_nvals[a->a_numvals-j+i]); + } + m->sml_values[i] = v; + m->sml_nvalues[i] = nv; + } else { + /* else just delete some */ + m = ch_calloc( sizeof(Modifications), 1 ); + m->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE; + m->sml_type = ad_pwdFailureTime->ad_cname; + m->sml_desc = ad_pwdFailureTime; + m->sml_numvals = a->a_numvals - j; + m->sml_values = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), m->sml_numvals+1 ); + m->sml_nvalues = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), m->sml_numvals+1 ); + for (i=0; i<m->sml_numvals; i++) { + ber_dupbv(&m->sml_values[i], &a->a_vals[i]); + ber_dupbv(&m->sml_nvalues[i], &a->a_nvals[i]); + } + m->sml_next = mod; + mod = m; + } + } + } + + if ((ppb->pp.pwdMaxFailure > 0) && + (fc >= ppb->pp.pwdMaxFailure - 1)) { + + /* + * We subtract 1 from the failure max + * because the new failure entry hasn't + * made it to the entry yet. + */ + m = ch_calloc( sizeof(Modifications), 1 ); + m->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_REPLACE; + m->sml_flags = 0; + m->sml_type = ad_pwdAccountLockedTime->ad_cname; + m->sml_desc = ad_pwdAccountLockedTime; + m->sml_numvals = 1; + m->sml_values = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), 2 ); + m->sml_nvalues = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), 2 ); + ber_dupbv( &m->sml_values[0], ×tamp ); + ber_dupbv( &m->sml_nvalues[0], ×tamp ); + m->sml_next = mod; + mod = m; + } + } else if ( rs->sr_err == LDAP_SUCCESS ) { + if ((a = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdChangedTime )) != NULL) + pwtime = parse_time( a->a_nvals[0].bv_val ); + + /* delete all pwdFailureTimes */ + if ( attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdFailureTime )) { + m = ch_calloc( sizeof(Modifications), 1 ); + m->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE; + m->sml_flags = 0; + m->sml_type = ad_pwdFailureTime->ad_cname; + m->sml_desc = ad_pwdFailureTime; + m->sml_next = mod; + mod = m; + } + + /* + * check to see if the password must be changed + */ + if ( ppb->pp.pwdMustChange && + (a = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdReset )) && + bvmatch( &a->a_nvals[0], &slap_true_bv ) ) + { + /* + * need to inject client controls here to give + * more information. For the moment, we ensure + * that we are disallowed from doing anything + * other than change password. + */ + if ( ppb->set_restrict ) { + ber_dupbv( &pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn, + &op->o_conn->c_ndn ); + } + + ppb->pErr = PP_changeAfterReset; + + } else { + /* + * the password does not need to be changed, so + * we now check whether the password has expired. + * + * We can skip this bit if passwords don't age in + * the policy. Also, if there was no pwdChangedTime + * attribute in the entry, the password never expires. + */ + if (ppb->pp.pwdMaxAge == 0) goto grace; + + if (pwtime != (time_t)-1) { + /* + * Check: was the last change time of + * the password older than the maximum age + * allowed. (Ignore case 2 from I-D, it's just silly.) + */ + if (now - pwtime > ppb->pp.pwdMaxAge ) pwExpired = 1; + } + } + +grace: + if (!pwExpired) goto check_expiring_password; + + if ((a = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdGraceUseTime )) == NULL) + ngut = ppb->pp.pwdGraceAuthNLimit; + else { + for(ngut=0; a->a_nvals[ngut].bv_val; ngut++); + ngut = ppb->pp.pwdGraceAuthNLimit - ngut; + } + + /* + * ngut is the number of remaining grace logins + */ + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, + "ppolicy_bind: Entry %s has an expired password: %d grace logins\n", + e->e_name.bv_val, ngut, 0); + + if (ngut < 1) { + ppb->pErr = PP_passwordExpired; + rs->sr_err = LDAP_INVALID_CREDENTIALS; + goto done; + } + + /* + * Add a grace user time to the entry + */ + m = ch_calloc( sizeof(Modifications), 1 ); + m->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_ADD; + m->sml_flags = 0; + m->sml_type = ad_pwdGraceUseTime->ad_cname; + m->sml_desc = ad_pwdGraceUseTime; + m->sml_numvals = 1; + m->sml_values = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), 2 ); + m->sml_nvalues = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), 2 ); + ber_dupbv( &m->sml_values[0], ×tamp ); + ber_dupbv( &m->sml_nvalues[0], ×tamp ); + m->sml_next = mod; + mod = m; + +check_expiring_password: + /* + * Now we need to check to see + * if it is about to expire, and if so, should the user + * be warned about it in the password policy control. + * + * If the password has expired, and we're in the grace period, then + * we don't need to do this bit. Similarly, if we don't have password + * aging, then there's no need to do this bit either. + */ + if ((ppb->pp.pwdMaxAge < 1) || (pwExpired) || (ppb->pp.pwdExpireWarning < 1)) + goto done; + + age = (int)(now - pwtime); + + /* + * We know that there is a password Change Time attribute - if + * there wasn't, then the pwdExpired value would be true, unless + * there is no password aging - and if there is no password aging, + * then this section isn't called anyway - you can't have an + * expiring password if there's no limit to expire. + */ + if (ppb->pp.pwdMaxAge - age < ppb->pp.pwdExpireWarning ) { + /* + * Set the warning value. + */ + warn = ppb->pp.pwdMaxAge - age; /* seconds left until expiry */ + if (warn < 0) warn = 0; /* something weird here - why is pwExpired not set? */ + + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, + "ppolicy_bind: Setting warning for password expiry for %s = %d seconds\n", + op->o_req_dn.bv_val, warn, 0 ); + } + } + +done: + op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info; + be_entry_release_r( op, e ); + +locked: + if ( mod ) { + Operation op2 = *op; + SlapReply r2 = { REP_RESULT }; + slap_callback cb = { NULL, slap_null_cb, NULL, NULL }; + pp_info *pi = on->on_bi.bi_private; + LDAPControl c, *ca[2]; + + op2.o_tag = LDAP_REQ_MODIFY; + op2.o_callback = &cb; + op2.orm_modlist = mod; + op2.orm_no_opattrs = 0; + op2.o_dn = op->o_bd->be_rootdn; + op2.o_ndn = op->o_bd->be_rootndn; + + /* If this server is a shadow and forward_updates is true, + * use the frontend to perform this modify. That will trigger + * the update referral, which can then be forwarded by the + * chain overlay. Obviously the updateref and chain overlay + * must be configured appropriately for this to be useful. + */ + if ( SLAP_SHADOW( op->o_bd ) && pi->forward_updates ) { + op2.o_bd = frontendDB; + + /* Must use Relax control since these are no-user-mod */ + op2.o_relax = SLAP_CONTROL_CRITICAL; + op2.o_ctrls = ca; + ca[0] = &c; + ca[1] = NULL; + BER_BVZERO( &c.ldctl_value ); + c.ldctl_iscritical = 1; + c.ldctl_oid = LDAP_CONTROL_RELAX; + } else { + /* If not forwarding, don't update opattrs and don't replicate */ + if ( SLAP_SINGLE_SHADOW( op->o_bd )) { + op2.orm_no_opattrs = 1; + op2.o_dont_replicate = 1; + } + op2.o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info; + } + rc = op2.o_bd->be_modify( &op2, &r2 ); + slap_mods_free( mod, 1 ); + } + + if ( ppb->send_ctrl ) { + LDAPControl *ctrl = NULL; + pp_info *pi = on->on_bi.bi_private; + + /* Do we really want to tell that the account is locked? */ + if ( ppb->pErr == PP_accountLocked && !pi->use_lockout ) { + ppb->pErr = PP_noError; + } + ctrl = create_passcontrol( op, warn, ngut, ppb->pErr ); + ppb->oldctrls = add_passcontrol( op, rs, ctrl ); + op->o_callback->sc_cleanup = ppolicy_ctrls_cleanup; + } + op->o_bd->bd_info = bi; + return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE; +} + +static int +ppolicy_bind( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs ) +{ + slap_overinst *on = (slap_overinst *)op->o_bd->bd_info; + + /* Reset lockout status on all Bind requests */ + if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn )) { + ch_free( pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn.bv_val ); + BER_BVZERO( &pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn ); + } + + /* Root bypasses policy */ + if ( !be_isroot_dn( op->o_bd, &op->o_req_ndn )) { + Entry *e; + int rc; + ppbind *ppb; + slap_callback *cb; + + op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info; + rc = be_entry_get_rw( op, &op->o_req_ndn, NULL, NULL, 0, &e ); + + if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) { + return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE; + } + + cb = op->o_tmpcalloc( sizeof(ppbind)+sizeof(slap_callback), + 1, op->o_tmpmemctx ); + ppb = (ppbind *)(cb+1); + ppb->on = on; + ppb->pErr = PP_noError; + ppb->set_restrict = 1; + + /* Setup a callback so we can munge the result */ + + cb->sc_response = ppolicy_bind_response; + cb->sc_next = op->o_callback->sc_next; + cb->sc_private = ppb; + op->o_callback->sc_next = cb; + + /* Did we receive a password policy request control? */ + if ( op->o_ctrlflag[ppolicy_cid] ) { + ppb->send_ctrl = 1; + } + + op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on; + ppolicy_get( op, e, &ppb->pp ); + + rc = account_locked( op, e, &ppb->pp, &ppb->mod ); + + op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info; + be_entry_release_r( op, e ); + + if ( rc ) { + ppb->pErr = PP_accountLocked; + send_ldap_error( op, rs, LDAP_INVALID_CREDENTIALS, NULL ); + return rs->sr_err; + } + + } + + return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE; +} + +/* Reset the restricted info for the next session on this connection */ +static int +ppolicy_connection_destroy( BackendDB *bd, Connection *conn ) +{ + if ( pwcons && !BER_BVISEMPTY( &pwcons[conn->c_conn_idx].dn )) { + ch_free( pwcons[conn->c_conn_idx].dn.bv_val ); + BER_BVZERO( &pwcons[conn->c_conn_idx].dn ); + } + return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE; +} + +/* Check if this connection is restricted */ +static int +ppolicy_restrict( + Operation *op, + SlapReply *rs ) +{ + slap_overinst *on = (slap_overinst *)op->o_bd->bd_info; + int send_ctrl = 0; + + /* Did we receive a password policy request control? */ + if ( op->o_ctrlflag[ppolicy_cid] ) { + send_ctrl = 1; + } + + if ( op->o_conn && !BER_BVISEMPTY( &pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn )) { + LDAPControl **oldctrls; + /* if the current authcDN doesn't match the one we recorded, + * then an intervening Bind has succeeded and the restriction + * no longer applies. (ITS#4516) + */ + if ( !dn_match( &op->o_conn->c_ndn, + &pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn )) { + ch_free( pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn.bv_val ); + BER_BVZERO( &pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn ); + return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE; + } + + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, + "connection restricted to password changing only\n", 0, 0, 0); + if ( send_ctrl ) { + LDAPControl *ctrl = NULL; + ctrl = create_passcontrol( op, -1, -1, PP_changeAfterReset ); + oldctrls = add_passcontrol( op, rs, ctrl ); + } + op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info; + send_ldap_error( op, rs, LDAP_INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS, + "Operations are restricted to bind/unbind/abandon/StartTLS/modify password" ); + if ( send_ctrl ) { + ctrls_cleanup( op, rs, oldctrls ); + } + return rs->sr_err; + } + + return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE; +} + +static int +ppolicy_compare_response( + Operation *op, + SlapReply *rs ) +{ + /* map compare responses to bind responses */ + if ( rs->sr_err == LDAP_COMPARE_TRUE ) + rs->sr_err = LDAP_SUCCESS; + else if ( rs->sr_err == LDAP_COMPARE_FALSE ) + rs->sr_err = LDAP_INVALID_CREDENTIALS; + + ppolicy_bind_response( op, rs ); + + /* map back to compare */ + if ( rs->sr_err == LDAP_SUCCESS ) + rs->sr_err = LDAP_COMPARE_TRUE; + else if ( rs->sr_err == LDAP_INVALID_CREDENTIALS ) + rs->sr_err = LDAP_COMPARE_FALSE; + + return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE; +} + +static int +ppolicy_compare( + Operation *op, + SlapReply *rs ) +{ + slap_overinst *on = (slap_overinst *)op->o_bd->bd_info; + + if ( ppolicy_restrict( op, rs ) != SLAP_CB_CONTINUE ) + return rs->sr_err; + + /* Did we receive a password policy request control? + * Are we testing the userPassword? + */ + if ( op->o_ctrlflag[ppolicy_cid] && + op->orc_ava->aa_desc == slap_schema.si_ad_userPassword ) { + Entry *e; + int rc; + ppbind *ppb; + slap_callback *cb; + + op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info; + rc = be_entry_get_rw( op, &op->o_req_ndn, NULL, NULL, 0, &e ); + + if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) { + return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE; + } + + cb = op->o_tmpcalloc( sizeof(ppbind)+sizeof(slap_callback), + 1, op->o_tmpmemctx ); + ppb = (ppbind *)(cb+1); + ppb->on = on; + ppb->pErr = PP_noError; + ppb->send_ctrl = 1; + /* failures here don't lockout the connection */ + ppb->set_restrict = 0; + + /* Setup a callback so we can munge the result */ + + cb->sc_response = ppolicy_compare_response; + cb->sc_next = op->o_callback->sc_next; + cb->sc_private = ppb; + op->o_callback->sc_next = cb; + + op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on; + ppolicy_get( op, e, &ppb->pp ); + + rc = account_locked( op, e, &ppb->pp, &ppb->mod ); + + op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info; + be_entry_release_r( op, e ); + + if ( rc ) { + ppb->pErr = PP_accountLocked; + send_ldap_error( op, rs, LDAP_COMPARE_FALSE, NULL ); + return rs->sr_err; + } + } + return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE; +} + +static int +ppolicy_add( + Operation *op, + SlapReply *rs ) +{ + slap_overinst *on = (slap_overinst *)op->o_bd->bd_info; + pp_info *pi = on->on_bi.bi_private; + PassPolicy pp; + Attribute *pa; + const char *txt; + + if ( ppolicy_restrict( op, rs ) != SLAP_CB_CONTINUE ) + return rs->sr_err; + + /* If this is a replica, assume the master checked everything */ + if ( SLAPD_SYNC_IS_SYNCCONN( op->o_connid ) ) + return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE; + + /* Check for password in entry */ + if ((pa = attr_find( op->oq_add.rs_e->e_attrs, + slap_schema.si_ad_userPassword ))) + { + assert( pa->a_vals != NULL ); + assert( !BER_BVISNULL( &pa->a_vals[ 0 ] ) ); + + if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &pa->a_vals[ 1 ] ) ) { + send_ldap_error( op, rs, LDAP_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION, "Password policy only allows one password value" ); + return rs->sr_err; + } + + /* + * new entry contains a password - if we're not the root user + * then we need to check that the password fits in with the + * security policy for the new entry. + */ + ppolicy_get( op, op->ora_e, &pp ); + if (pp.pwdCheckQuality > 0 && !be_isroot( op )) { + struct berval *bv = &(pa->a_vals[0]); + int rc, send_ctrl = 0; + LDAPPasswordPolicyError pErr = PP_noError; + char *txt; + + /* Did we receive a password policy request control? */ + if ( op->o_ctrlflag[ppolicy_cid] ) { + send_ctrl = 1; + } + rc = check_password_quality( bv, &pp, &pErr, op->ora_e, &txt ); + if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) { + LDAPControl **oldctrls = NULL; + op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info; + if ( send_ctrl ) { + LDAPControl *ctrl = NULL; + ctrl = create_passcontrol( op, -1, -1, pErr ); + oldctrls = add_passcontrol( op, rs, ctrl ); + } + send_ldap_error( op, rs, rc, txt ? txt : "Password fails quality checking policy" ); + if ( txt ) { + free( txt ); + } + if ( send_ctrl ) { + ctrls_cleanup( op, rs, oldctrls ); + } + return rs->sr_err; + } + } + /* + * A controversial bit. We hash cleartext + * passwords provided via add and modify operations + * You're not really supposed to do this, since + * the X.500 model says "store attributes" as they + * get provided. By default, this is what we do + * + * But if the hash_passwords flag is set, we hash + * any cleartext password attribute values via the + * default password hashing scheme. + */ + if ((pi->hash_passwords) && + (password_scheme( &(pa->a_vals[0]), NULL ) != LDAP_SUCCESS)) { + struct berval hpw; + + slap_passwd_hash( &(pa->a_vals[0]), &hpw, &txt ); + if (hpw.bv_val == NULL) { + /* + * hashing didn't work. Emit an error. + */ + rs->sr_err = LDAP_OTHER; + rs->sr_text = txt; + send_ldap_error( op, rs, LDAP_OTHER, "Password hashing failed" ); + return rs->sr_err; + } + + memset( pa->a_vals[0].bv_val, 0, pa->a_vals[0].bv_len); + ber_memfree( pa->a_vals[0].bv_val ); + pa->a_vals[0].bv_val = hpw.bv_val; + pa->a_vals[0].bv_len = hpw.bv_len; + } + + /* If password aging is in effect, set the pwdChangedTime */ + if ( pp.pwdMaxAge || pp.pwdMinAge ) { + struct berval timestamp; + char timebuf[ LDAP_LUTIL_GENTIME_BUFSIZE ]; + time_t now = slap_get_time(); + + timestamp.bv_val = timebuf; + timestamp.bv_len = sizeof(timebuf); + slap_timestamp( &now, ×tamp ); + + attr_merge_one( op->ora_e, ad_pwdChangedTime, ×tamp, ×tamp ); + } + } + return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE; +} + +static int +ppolicy_mod_cb( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs ) +{ + slap_callback *sc = op->o_callback; + op->o_callback = sc->sc_next; + if ( rs->sr_err == LDAP_SUCCESS ) { + ch_free( pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn.bv_val ); + BER_BVZERO( &pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn ); + } + op->o_tmpfree( sc, op->o_tmpmemctx ); + return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE; +} + +static int +ppolicy_modify( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs ) +{ + slap_overinst *on = (slap_overinst *)op->o_bd->bd_info; + pp_info *pi = on->on_bi.bi_private; + int i, rc, mod_pw_only, pwmod, pwmop = -1, deladd, + hsize = 0; + PassPolicy pp; + Modifications *mods = NULL, *modtail = NULL, + *ml, *delmod, *addmod; + Attribute *pa, *ha, at; + const char *txt; + pw_hist *tl = NULL, *p; + int zapReset, send_ctrl = 0, free_txt = 0; + Entry *e; + struct berval newpw = BER_BVNULL, oldpw = BER_BVNULL, + *bv, cr[2]; + LDAPPasswordPolicyError pErr = PP_noError; + LDAPControl *ctrl = NULL; + LDAPControl **oldctrls = NULL; + int is_pwdexop = 0; + int got_del_grace = 0, got_del_lock = 0, got_pw = 0, got_del_fail = 0; + int got_changed = 0, got_history = 0; + + op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info; + rc = be_entry_get_rw( op, &op->o_req_ndn, NULL, NULL, 0, &e ); + op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on; + + if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE; + + /* If this is a replica, we may need to tweak some of the + * master's modifications. Otherwise, just pass it through. + */ + if ( SLAPD_SYNC_IS_SYNCCONN( op->o_connid ) ) { + Modifications **prev; + Attribute *a_grace, *a_lock, *a_fail; + + a_grace = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdGraceUseTime ); + a_lock = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdAccountLockedTime ); + a_fail = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdFailureTime ); + + for( prev = &op->orm_modlist, ml = *prev; ml; ml = *prev ) { + + if ( ml->sml_desc == slap_schema.si_ad_userPassword ) + got_pw = 1; + + /* If we're deleting an attr that didn't exist, + * drop this delete op + */ + if ( ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_DELETE || + ml->sml_op == SLAP_MOD_SOFTDEL ) { + int drop = 0; + + if ( ml->sml_desc == ad_pwdGraceUseTime ) { + if ( !a_grace || got_del_grace ) { + drop = ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_DELETE; + } else { + got_del_grace = 1; + } + } else + if ( ml->sml_desc == ad_pwdAccountLockedTime ) { + if ( !a_lock || got_del_lock ) { + drop = ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_DELETE; + } else { + got_del_lock = 1; + } + } else + if ( ml->sml_desc == ad_pwdFailureTime ) { + if ( !a_fail || got_del_fail ) { + drop = ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_DELETE; + } else { + got_del_fail = 1; + } + } + if ( drop ) { + *prev = ml->sml_next; + ml->sml_next = NULL; + slap_mods_free( ml, 1 ); + continue; + } + } + prev = &ml->sml_next; + } + + /* If we're resetting the password, make sure grace, accountlock, + * and failure also get removed. + */ + if ( got_pw ) { + if ( a_grace && !got_del_grace ) { + ml = (Modifications *) ch_malloc( sizeof( Modifications ) ); + ml->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE; + ml->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL; + ml->sml_type.bv_val = NULL; + ml->sml_desc = ad_pwdGraceUseTime; + ml->sml_numvals = 0; + ml->sml_values = NULL; + ml->sml_nvalues = NULL; + ml->sml_next = NULL; + *prev = ml; + prev = &ml->sml_next; + } + if ( a_lock && !got_del_lock ) { + ml = (Modifications *) ch_malloc( sizeof( Modifications ) ); + ml->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE; + ml->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL; + ml->sml_type.bv_val = NULL; + ml->sml_desc = ad_pwdAccountLockedTime; + ml->sml_numvals = 0; + ml->sml_values = NULL; + ml->sml_nvalues = NULL; + ml->sml_next = NULL; + *prev = ml; + } + if ( a_fail && !got_del_fail ) { + ml = (Modifications *) ch_malloc( sizeof( Modifications ) ); + ml->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE; + ml->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL; + ml->sml_type.bv_val = NULL; + ml->sml_desc = ad_pwdFailureTime; + ml->sml_numvals = 0; + ml->sml_values = NULL; + ml->sml_nvalues = NULL; + ml->sml_next = NULL; + *prev = ml; + } + } + op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info; + be_entry_release_r( op, e ); + return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE; + } + + /* Did we receive a password policy request control? */ + if ( op->o_ctrlflag[ppolicy_cid] ) { + send_ctrl = 1; + } + + /* See if this is a pwdModify exop. If so, we can + * access the plaintext passwords from that request. + */ + { + slap_callback *sc; + + for ( sc = op->o_callback; sc; sc=sc->sc_next ) { + if ( sc->sc_response == slap_null_cb && + sc->sc_private ) { + req_pwdexop_s *qpw = sc->sc_private; + newpw = qpw->rs_new; + oldpw = qpw->rs_old; + is_pwdexop = 1; + break; + } + } + } + + ppolicy_get( op, e, &pp ); + + for ( ml = op->orm_modlist, + pwmod = 0, mod_pw_only = 1, + deladd = 0, delmod = NULL, + addmod = NULL, + zapReset = 1; + ml != NULL; modtail = ml, ml = ml->sml_next ) + { + if ( ml->sml_desc == pp.ad ) { + pwmod = 1; + pwmop = ml->sml_op; + if ((deladd == 0) && (ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_DELETE) && + (ml->sml_values) && !BER_BVISNULL( &ml->sml_values[0] )) + { + deladd = 1; + delmod = ml; + } + + if ((ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_ADD) || + (ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_REPLACE)) + { + if ( ml->sml_values && !BER_BVISNULL( &ml->sml_values[0] )) { + if ( deladd == 1 ) + deladd = 2; + + /* FIXME: there's no easy way to ensure + * that add does not cause multiple + * userPassword values; one way (that + * would be consistent with the single + * password constraint) would be to turn + * add into replace); another would be + * to disallow add. + * + * Let's check at least that a single value + * is being added + */ + if ( addmod || !BER_BVISNULL( &ml->sml_values[ 1 ] ) ) { + rs->sr_err = LDAP_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION; + rs->sr_text = "Password policy only allows one password value"; + goto return_results; + } + + addmod = ml; + } else { + /* replace can have no values, add cannot */ + assert( ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_REPLACE ); + } + } + + } else if ( !(ml->sml_flags & SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL) && !is_at_operational( ml->sml_desc->ad_type ) ) { + mod_pw_only = 0; + /* modifying something other than password */ + } + + /* + * If there is a request to explicitly add a pwdReset + * attribute, then we suppress the normal behaviour on + * password change, which is to remove the pwdReset + * attribute. + * + * This enables an administrator to assign a new password + * and place a "must reset" flag on the entry, which will + * stay until the user explicitly changes his/her password. + */ + if (ml->sml_desc == ad_pwdReset ) { + if ((ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_ADD) || + (ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_REPLACE)) + zapReset = 0; + } + if ( ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_DELETE ) { + if ( ml->sml_desc == ad_pwdGraceUseTime ) { + got_del_grace = 1; + } else if ( ml->sml_desc == ad_pwdAccountLockedTime ) { + got_del_lock = 1; + } else if ( ml->sml_desc == ad_pwdFailureTime ) { + got_del_fail = 1; + } + } + if ( ml->sml_desc == ad_pwdChangedTime ) { + got_changed = 1; + } else if (ml->sml_desc == ad_pwdHistory ) { + got_history = 1; + } + } + + if (!BER_BVISEMPTY( &pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn ) && !mod_pw_only ) { + if ( dn_match( &op->o_conn->c_ndn, + &pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn )) { + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, + "connection restricted to password changing only\n", 0, 0, 0 ); + rs->sr_err = LDAP_INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS; + rs->sr_text = "Operations are restricted to bind/unbind/abandon/StartTLS/modify password"; + pErr = PP_changeAfterReset; + goto return_results; + } else { + ch_free( pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn.bv_val ); + BER_BVZERO( &pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn ); + } + } + + /* + * if we have a "safe password modify policy", then we need to check if we're doing + * a delete (with the old password), followed by an add (with the new password). + * + * If we got just a delete with nothing else, just let it go. We also skip all the checks if + * the root user is bound. Root can do anything, including avoid the policies. + */ + + if (!pwmod) goto do_modify; + + /* + * Build the password history list in ascending time order + * We need this, even if the user is root, in order to maintain + * the pwdHistory operational attributes properly. + */ + if (addmod && pp.pwdInHistory > 0 && (ha = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdHistory ))) { + struct berval oldpw; + time_t oldtime; + + for(i=0; ha->a_nvals[i].bv_val; i++) { + rc = parse_pwdhistory( &(ha->a_nvals[i]), NULL, + &oldtime, &oldpw ); + + if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) continue; /* invalid history entry */ + + if (oldpw.bv_val) { + add_to_pwd_history( &tl, oldtime, &oldpw, + &(ha->a_nvals[i]) ); + oldpw.bv_val = NULL; + oldpw.bv_len = 0; + } + } + for(p=tl; p; p=p->next, hsize++); /* count history size */ + } + + if (be_isroot( op )) goto do_modify; + + /* NOTE: according to draft-behera-ldap-password-policy + * pwdAllowUserChange == FALSE must only prevent pwd changes + * by the user the pwd belongs to (ITS#7021) */ + if (!pp.pwdAllowUserChange && dn_match(&op->o_req_ndn, &op->o_ndn)) { + rs->sr_err = LDAP_INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS; + rs->sr_text = "User alteration of password is not allowed"; + pErr = PP_passwordModNotAllowed; + goto return_results; + } + + /* Just deleting? */ + if (!addmod) { + /* skip everything else */ + pwmod = 0; + goto do_modify; + } + + /* This is a pwdModify exop that provided the old pw. + * We need to create a Delete mod for this old pw and + * let the matching value get found later + */ + if (pp.pwdSafeModify && oldpw.bv_val ) { + ml = (Modifications *)ch_calloc( sizeof( Modifications ), 1 ); + ml->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE; + ml->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL; + ml->sml_desc = pp.ad; + ml->sml_type = pp.ad->ad_cname; + ml->sml_numvals = 1; + ml->sml_values = (BerVarray) ch_malloc( 2 * sizeof( struct berval ) ); + ber_dupbv( &ml->sml_values[0], &oldpw ); + BER_BVZERO( &ml->sml_values[1] ); + ml->sml_next = op->orm_modlist; + op->orm_modlist = ml; + delmod = ml; + deladd = 2; + } + + if (pp.pwdSafeModify && deladd != 2) { + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, + "change password must use DELETE followed by ADD/REPLACE\n", + 0, 0, 0 ); + rs->sr_err = LDAP_INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS; + rs->sr_text = "Must supply old password to be changed as well as new one"; + pErr = PP_mustSupplyOldPassword; + goto return_results; + } + + /* Check age, but only if pwdReset is not TRUE */ + pa = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdReset ); + if ((!pa || !bvmatch( &pa->a_nvals[0], &slap_true_bv )) && + pp.pwdMinAge > 0) { + time_t pwtime = (time_t)-1, now; + int age; + + if ((pa = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdChangedTime )) != NULL) + pwtime = parse_time( pa->a_nvals[0].bv_val ); + now = slap_get_time(); + age = (int)(now - pwtime); + if ((pwtime != (time_t)-1) && (age < pp.pwdMinAge)) { + rs->sr_err = LDAP_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION; + rs->sr_text = "Password is too young to change"; + pErr = PP_passwordTooYoung; + goto return_results; + } + } + + /* pa is used in password history check below, be sure it's set */ + if ((pa = attr_find( e->e_attrs, pp.ad )) != NULL && delmod) { + /* + * we have a password to check + */ + bv = oldpw.bv_val ? &oldpw : delmod->sml_values; + /* FIXME: no access checking? */ + rc = slap_passwd_check( op, NULL, pa, bv, &txt ); + if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) { + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, + "old password check failed: %s\n", txt, 0, 0 ); + + rs->sr_err = LDAP_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM; + rs->sr_text = "Must supply correct old password to change to new one"; + pErr = PP_mustSupplyOldPassword; + goto return_results; + + } else { + int i; + + /* + * replace the delete value with the (possibly hashed) + * value which is currently in the password. + */ + for ( i = 0; !BER_BVISNULL( &delmod->sml_values[i] ); i++ ) { + free( delmod->sml_values[i].bv_val ); + BER_BVZERO( &delmod->sml_values[i] ); + } + free( delmod->sml_values ); + delmod->sml_values = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), 2 ); + BER_BVZERO( &delmod->sml_values[1] ); + ber_dupbv( &(delmod->sml_values[0]), &(pa->a_nvals[0]) ); + } + } + + bv = newpw.bv_val ? &newpw : &addmod->sml_values[0]; + if (pp.pwdCheckQuality > 0) { + + rc = check_password_quality( bv, &pp, &pErr, e, (char **)&txt ); + if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) { + rs->sr_err = rc; + if ( txt ) { + rs->sr_text = txt; + free_txt = 1; + } else { + rs->sr_text = "Password fails quality checking policy"; + } + goto return_results; + } + } + + /* If pwdInHistory is zero, passwords may be reused */ + if (pa && pp.pwdInHistory > 0) { + /* + * Last check - the password history. + */ + /* FIXME: no access checking? */ + if (slap_passwd_check( op, NULL, pa, bv, &txt ) == LDAP_SUCCESS) { + /* + * This is bad - it means that the user is attempting + * to set the password to the same as the old one. + */ + rs->sr_err = LDAP_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION; + rs->sr_text = "Password is not being changed from existing value"; + pErr = PP_passwordInHistory; + goto return_results; + } + + /* + * Iterate through the password history, and fail on any + * password matches. + */ + at = *pa; + at.a_vals = cr; + cr[1].bv_val = NULL; + for(p=tl; p; p=p->next) { + cr[0] = p->pw; + /* FIXME: no access checking? */ + rc = slap_passwd_check( op, NULL, &at, bv, &txt ); + + if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) continue; + + rs->sr_err = LDAP_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION; + rs->sr_text = "Password is in history of old passwords"; + pErr = PP_passwordInHistory; + goto return_results; + } + } + +do_modify: + if (pwmod) { + struct berval timestamp; + char timebuf[ LDAP_LUTIL_GENTIME_BUFSIZE ]; + time_t now = slap_get_time(); + + /* If the conn is restricted, set a callback to clear it + * if the pwmod succeeds + */ + if (!BER_BVISEMPTY( &pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn )) { + slap_callback *sc = op->o_tmpcalloc( 1, sizeof( slap_callback ), + op->o_tmpmemctx ); + sc->sc_next = op->o_callback; + /* Must use sc_response to insure we reset on success, before + * the client sees the response. Must use sc_cleanup to insure + * that it gets cleaned up if sc_response is not called. + */ + sc->sc_response = ppolicy_mod_cb; + sc->sc_cleanup = ppolicy_mod_cb; + op->o_callback = sc; + } + + /* + * keep the necessary pwd.. operational attributes + * up to date. + */ + + if (!got_changed) { + timestamp.bv_val = timebuf; + timestamp.bv_len = sizeof(timebuf); + slap_timestamp( &now, ×tamp ); + + mods = NULL; + if (pwmop != LDAP_MOD_DELETE) { + mods = (Modifications *) ch_calloc( sizeof( Modifications ), 1 ); + mods->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_REPLACE; + mods->sml_numvals = 1; + mods->sml_values = (BerVarray) ch_malloc( 2 * sizeof( struct berval ) ); + ber_dupbv( &mods->sml_values[0], ×tamp ); + BER_BVZERO( &mods->sml_values[1] ); + assert( !BER_BVISNULL( &mods->sml_values[0] ) ); + } else if (attr_find(e->e_attrs, ad_pwdChangedTime )) { + mods = (Modifications *) ch_calloc( sizeof( Modifications ), 1 ); + mods->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE; + } + if (mods) { + mods->sml_desc = ad_pwdChangedTime; + mods->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL; + mods->sml_next = NULL; + modtail->sml_next = mods; + modtail = mods; + } + } + + if (!got_del_grace && attr_find(e->e_attrs, ad_pwdGraceUseTime )) { + mods = (Modifications *) ch_calloc( sizeof( Modifications ), 1 ); + mods->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE; + mods->sml_desc = ad_pwdGraceUseTime; + mods->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL; + mods->sml_next = NULL; + modtail->sml_next = mods; + modtail = mods; + } + + if (!got_del_lock && attr_find(e->e_attrs, ad_pwdAccountLockedTime )) { + mods = (Modifications *) ch_calloc( sizeof( Modifications ), 1 ); + mods->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE; + mods->sml_desc = ad_pwdAccountLockedTime; + mods->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL; + mods->sml_next = NULL; + modtail->sml_next = mods; + modtail = mods; + } + + if (!got_del_fail && attr_find(e->e_attrs, ad_pwdFailureTime )) { + mods = (Modifications *) ch_calloc( sizeof( Modifications ), 1 ); + mods->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE; + mods->sml_desc = ad_pwdFailureTime; + mods->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL; + mods->sml_next = NULL; + modtail->sml_next = mods; + modtail = mods; + } + + /* Delete the pwdReset attribute, since it's being reset */ + if ((zapReset) && (attr_find(e->e_attrs, ad_pwdReset ))) { + mods = (Modifications *) ch_calloc( sizeof( Modifications ), 1 ); + mods->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE; + mods->sml_desc = ad_pwdReset; + mods->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL; + mods->sml_next = NULL; + modtail->sml_next = mods; + modtail = mods; + } + + if (!got_history && pp.pwdInHistory > 0) { + if (hsize >= pp.pwdInHistory) { + /* + * We use the >= operator, since we are going to add + * the existing password attribute value into the + * history - thus the cardinality of history values is + * about to rise by one. + * + * If this would push it over the limit of history + * values (remembering - the password policy could have + * changed since the password was last altered), we must + * delete at least 1 value from the pwdHistory list. + * + * In fact, we delete '(#pwdHistory attrs - max pwd + * history length) + 1' values, starting with the oldest. + * This is easily evaluated, since the linked list is + * created in ascending time order. + */ + mods = (Modifications *) ch_calloc( sizeof( Modifications ), 1 ); + mods->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE; + mods->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL; + mods->sml_desc = ad_pwdHistory; + mods->sml_numvals = hsize - pp.pwdInHistory + 1; + mods->sml_values = ch_calloc( sizeof( struct berval ), + hsize - pp.pwdInHistory + 2 ); + BER_BVZERO( &mods->sml_values[ hsize - pp.pwdInHistory + 1 ] ); + for(i=0,p=tl; i < (hsize - pp.pwdInHistory + 1); i++, p=p->next) { + BER_BVZERO( &mods->sml_values[i] ); + ber_dupbv( &(mods->sml_values[i]), &p->bv ); + } + mods->sml_next = NULL; + modtail->sml_next = mods; + modtail = mods; + } + free_pwd_history_list( &tl ); + + /* + * Now add the existing password into the history list. + * This will be executed even if the operation is to delete + * the password entirely. + * + * This isn't in the spec explicitly, but it seems to make + * sense that the password history list is the list of all + * previous passwords - even if they were deleted. Thus, if + * someone tries to add a historical password at some future + * point, it will fail. + */ + if ((pa = attr_find( e->e_attrs, pp.ad )) != NULL) { + mods = (Modifications *) ch_malloc( sizeof( Modifications ) ); + mods->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_ADD; + mods->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL; + mods->sml_type.bv_val = NULL; + mods->sml_desc = ad_pwdHistory; + mods->sml_nvalues = NULL; + mods->sml_numvals = 1; + mods->sml_values = ch_calloc( sizeof( struct berval ), 2 ); + mods->sml_values[ 1 ].bv_val = NULL; + mods->sml_values[ 1 ].bv_len = 0; + make_pwd_history_value( timebuf, &mods->sml_values[0], pa ); + mods->sml_next = NULL; + modtail->sml_next = mods; + modtail = mods; + + } else { + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, + "ppolicy_modify: password attr lookup failed\n", 0, 0, 0 ); + } + } + + /* + * Controversial bit here. If the new password isn't hashed + * (ie, is cleartext), we probably should hash it according + * to the default hash. The reason for this is that we want + * to use the policy if possible, but if we hash the password + * before, then we're going to run into trouble when it + * comes time to check the password. + * + * Now, the right thing to do is to use the extended password + * modify operation, but not all software can do this, + * therefore it makes sense to hash the new password, now + * we know it passes the policy requirements. + * + * Of course, if the password is already hashed, then we + * leave it alone. + */ + + if ((pi->hash_passwords) && (addmod) && !newpw.bv_val && + (password_scheme( &(addmod->sml_values[0]), NULL ) != LDAP_SUCCESS)) + { + struct berval hpw, bv; + + slap_passwd_hash( &(addmod->sml_values[0]), &hpw, &txt ); + if (hpw.bv_val == NULL) { + /* + * hashing didn't work. Emit an error. + */ + rs->sr_err = LDAP_OTHER; + rs->sr_text = txt; + goto return_results; + } + bv = addmod->sml_values[0]; + /* clear and discard the clear password */ + memset(bv.bv_val, 0, bv.bv_len); + ber_memfree(bv.bv_val); + addmod->sml_values[0] = hpw; + } + } + op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info; + be_entry_release_r( op, e ); + return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE; + +return_results: + free_pwd_history_list( &tl ); + op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info; + be_entry_release_r( op, e ); + if ( send_ctrl ) { + ctrl = create_passcontrol( op, -1, -1, pErr ); + oldctrls = add_passcontrol( op, rs, ctrl ); + } + send_ldap_result( op, rs ); + if ( free_txt ) { + free( (char *)txt ); + rs->sr_text = NULL; + } + if ( send_ctrl ) { + if ( is_pwdexop ) { + if ( rs->sr_flags & REP_CTRLS_MUSTBEFREED ) { + op->o_tmpfree( oldctrls, op->o_tmpmemctx ); + } + oldctrls = NULL; + rs->sr_flags |= REP_CTRLS_MUSTBEFREED; + + } else { + ctrls_cleanup( op, rs, oldctrls ); + } + } + return rs->sr_err; +} + +static int +ppolicy_parseCtrl( + Operation *op, + SlapReply *rs, + LDAPControl *ctrl ) +{ + if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &ctrl->ldctl_value ) ) { + rs->sr_text = "passwordPolicyRequest control value not absent"; + return LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR; + } + op->o_ctrlflag[ppolicy_cid] = ctrl->ldctl_iscritical + ? SLAP_CONTROL_CRITICAL + : SLAP_CONTROL_NONCRITICAL; + + return LDAP_SUCCESS; +} + +static int +attrPretty( + Syntax *syntax, + struct berval *val, + struct berval *out, + void *ctx ) +{ + AttributeDescription *ad = NULL; + const char *err; + int code; + + code = slap_bv2ad( val, &ad, &err ); + if ( !code ) { + ber_dupbv_x( out, &ad->ad_type->sat_cname, ctx ); + } + return code; +} + +static int +attrNormalize( + slap_mask_t use, + Syntax *syntax, + MatchingRule *mr, + struct berval *val, + struct berval *out, + void *ctx ) +{ + AttributeDescription *ad = NULL; + const char *err; + int code; + + code = slap_bv2ad( val, &ad, &err ); + if ( !code ) { + ber_str2bv_x( ad->ad_type->sat_oid, 0, 1, out, ctx ); + } + return code; +} + +static int +ppolicy_db_init( + BackendDB *be, + ConfigReply *cr +) +{ + slap_overinst *on = (slap_overinst *) be->bd_info; + + if ( SLAP_ISGLOBALOVERLAY( be ) ) { + /* do not allow slapo-ppolicy to be global by now (ITS#5858) */ + if ( cr ){ + snprintf( cr->msg, sizeof(cr->msg), + "slapo-ppolicy cannot be global" ); + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, "%s\n", cr->msg, 0, 0 ); + } + return 1; + } + + /* Has User Schema been initialized yet? */ + if ( !pwd_UsSchema[0].ad[0] ) { + const char *err; + int i, code; + + for (i=0; pwd_UsSchema[i].def; i++) { + code = slap_str2ad( pwd_UsSchema[i].def, pwd_UsSchema[i].ad, &err ); + if ( code ) { + if ( cr ){ + snprintf( cr->msg, sizeof(cr->msg), + "User Schema load failed for attribute \"%s\". Error code %d: %s", + pwd_UsSchema[i].def, code, err ); + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, "%s\n", cr->msg, 0, 0 ); + } + return code; + } + } + { + Syntax *syn; + MatchingRule *mr; + + syn = ch_malloc( sizeof( Syntax )); + *syn = *ad_pwdAttribute->ad_type->sat_syntax; + syn->ssyn_pretty = attrPretty; + ad_pwdAttribute->ad_type->sat_syntax = syn; + + mr = ch_malloc( sizeof( MatchingRule )); + *mr = *ad_pwdAttribute->ad_type->sat_equality; + mr->smr_normalize = attrNormalize; + ad_pwdAttribute->ad_type->sat_equality = mr; + } + } + + on->on_bi.bi_private = ch_calloc( sizeof(pp_info), 1 ); + + if ( dtblsize && !pwcons ) { + /* accommodate for c_conn_idx == -1 */ + pwcons = ch_calloc( sizeof(pw_conn), dtblsize + 1 ); + pwcons++; + } + + ov_count++; + + return 0; +} + +static int +ppolicy_db_open( + BackendDB *be, + ConfigReply *cr +) +{ + return overlay_register_control( be, LDAP_CONTROL_PASSWORDPOLICYREQUEST ); +} + +static int +ppolicy_db_close( + BackendDB *be, + ConfigReply *cr +) +{ +#ifdef SLAP_CONFIG_DELETE + overlay_unregister_control( be, LDAP_CONTROL_PASSWORDPOLICYREQUEST ); +#endif /* SLAP_CONFIG_DELETE */ + + return 0; +} + +static int +ppolicy_db_destroy( + BackendDB *be, + ConfigReply *cr +) +{ + slap_overinst *on = (slap_overinst *) be->bd_info; + pp_info *pi = on->on_bi.bi_private; + + on->on_bi.bi_private = NULL; + free( pi->def_policy.bv_val ); + free( pi ); + + ov_count--; + if ( ov_count <=0 && pwcons ) { + pw_conn *pwc = pwcons; + pwcons = NULL; + pwc--; + ch_free( pwc ); + } + return 0; +} + +static char *extops[] = { + LDAP_EXOP_MODIFY_PASSWD, + NULL +}; + +static slap_overinst ppolicy; + +int ppolicy_initialize() +{ + int i, code; + + for (i=0; pwd_OpSchema[i].def; i++) { + code = register_at( pwd_OpSchema[i].def, pwd_OpSchema[i].ad, 0 ); + if ( code ) { + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, + "ppolicy_initialize: register_at failed\n", 0, 0, 0 ); + return code; + } + /* Allow Manager to set these as needed */ + if ( is_at_no_user_mod( (*pwd_OpSchema[i].ad)->ad_type )) { + (*pwd_OpSchema[i].ad)->ad_type->sat_flags |= + SLAP_AT_MANAGEABLE; + } + } + + code = register_supported_control( LDAP_CONTROL_PASSWORDPOLICYREQUEST, + SLAP_CTRL_ADD|SLAP_CTRL_BIND|SLAP_CTRL_MODIFY|SLAP_CTRL_HIDE, extops, + ppolicy_parseCtrl, &ppolicy_cid ); + if ( code != LDAP_SUCCESS ) { + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, "Failed to register control %d\n", code, 0, 0 ); + return code; + } + + ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_init( &chk_syntax_mutex ); + + ppolicy.on_bi.bi_type = "ppolicy"; + ppolicy.on_bi.bi_db_init = ppolicy_db_init; + ppolicy.on_bi.bi_db_open = ppolicy_db_open; + ppolicy.on_bi.bi_db_close = ppolicy_db_close; + ppolicy.on_bi.bi_db_destroy = ppolicy_db_destroy; + + ppolicy.on_bi.bi_op_add = ppolicy_add; + ppolicy.on_bi.bi_op_bind = ppolicy_bind; + ppolicy.on_bi.bi_op_compare = ppolicy_compare; + ppolicy.on_bi.bi_op_delete = ppolicy_restrict; + ppolicy.on_bi.bi_op_modify = ppolicy_modify; + ppolicy.on_bi.bi_op_search = ppolicy_restrict; + ppolicy.on_bi.bi_connection_destroy = ppolicy_connection_destroy; + + ppolicy.on_bi.bi_cf_ocs = ppolicyocs; + code = config_register_schema( ppolicycfg, ppolicyocs ); + if ( code ) return code; + + return overlay_register( &ppolicy ); +} + +#if SLAPD_OVER_PPOLICY == SLAPD_MOD_DYNAMIC +int init_module(int argc, char *argv[]) { + return ppolicy_initialize(); +} +#endif + +#endif /* defined(SLAPD_OVER_PPOLICY) */ |