diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'servers/slapd/sasl.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | servers/slapd/sasl.c | 1906 |
1 files changed, 1906 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/servers/slapd/sasl.c b/servers/slapd/sasl.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..64e64d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/servers/slapd/sasl.c @@ -0,0 +1,1906 @@ +/* $OpenLDAP$ */ +/* This work is part of OpenLDAP Software <http://www.openldap.org/>. + * + * Copyright 1998-2018 The OpenLDAP Foundation. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted only as authorized by the OpenLDAP + * Public License. + * + * A copy of this license is available in the file LICENSE in the + * top-level directory of the distribution or, alternatively, at + * <http://www.OpenLDAP.org/license.html>. + */ + +#include "portable.h" + +#include <stdio.h> +#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H +#include <limits.h> +#endif + +#include <ac/stdlib.h> +#include <ac/string.h> + +#include <lber.h> +#include <ldap_log.h> + +#include "slap.h" + +#ifdef ENABLE_REWRITE +#include <rewrite.h> +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_CYRUS_SASL +# ifdef HAVE_SASL_SASL_H +# include <sasl/sasl.h> +# include <sasl/saslplug.h> +# else +# include <sasl.h> +# include <saslplug.h> +# endif + +# define SASL_CONST const + +#define SASL_VERSION_FULL ((SASL_VERSION_MAJOR << 16) |\ + (SASL_VERSION_MINOR << 8) | SASL_VERSION_STEP) + +#if SASL_VERSION_MINOR >= 0x020119 /* 2.1.25 */ +typedef sasl_callback_ft slap_sasl_cb_ft; +#else +typedef int (*slap_sasl_cb_ft)(); +#endif + +static sasl_security_properties_t sasl_secprops; +#elif defined( SLAP_BUILTIN_SASL ) +/* + * built-in SASL implementation + * only supports EXTERNAL + */ +typedef struct sasl_ctx { + slap_ssf_t sc_external_ssf; + struct berval sc_external_id; +} SASL_CTX; + +#endif + +#include <lutil.h> + +static struct berval ext_bv = BER_BVC( "EXTERNAL" ); + +char *slap_sasl_auxprops; + +#ifdef HAVE_CYRUS_SASL + +/* Just use our internal auxprop by default */ +static int +slap_sasl_getopt( + void *context, + const char *plugin_name, + const char *option, + const char **result, + unsigned *len) +{ + if ( strcmp( option, "auxprop_plugin" )) { + return SASL_FAIL; + } + if ( slap_sasl_auxprops ) + *result = slap_sasl_auxprops; + else + *result = "slapd"; + return SASL_OK; +} + +int +slap_sasl_log( + void *context, + int priority, + const char *message) +{ + Connection *conn = context; + int level; + const char * label; + + if ( message == NULL ) { + return SASL_BADPARAM; + } + + switch (priority) { + case SASL_LOG_NONE: + level = LDAP_DEBUG_NONE; + label = "None"; + break; + case SASL_LOG_ERR: + level = LDAP_DEBUG_ANY; + label = "Error"; + break; + case SASL_LOG_FAIL: + level = LDAP_DEBUG_ANY; + label = "Failure"; + break; + case SASL_LOG_WARN: + level = LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE; + label = "Warning"; + break; + case SASL_LOG_NOTE: + level = LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE; + label = "Notice"; + break; + case SASL_LOG_DEBUG: + level = LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE; + label = "Debug"; + break; + case SASL_LOG_TRACE: + level = LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE; + label = "Trace"; + break; + case SASL_LOG_PASS: + level = LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE; + label = "Password Trace"; + break; + default: + return SASL_BADPARAM; + } + + Debug( level, "SASL [conn=%ld] %s: %s\n", + conn ? (long) conn->c_connid: -1L, + label, message ); + + + return SASL_OK; +} + +static const char *slap_propnames[] = { + "*slapConn", "*slapAuthcDNlen", "*slapAuthcDN", + "*slapAuthzDNlen", "*slapAuthzDN", NULL }; + +static Filter generic_filter = { LDAP_FILTER_PRESENT, { 0 }, NULL }; +static struct berval generic_filterstr = BER_BVC("(objectclass=*)"); + +#define SLAP_SASL_PROP_CONN 0 +#define SLAP_SASL_PROP_AUTHCLEN 1 +#define SLAP_SASL_PROP_AUTHC 2 +#define SLAP_SASL_PROP_AUTHZLEN 3 +#define SLAP_SASL_PROP_AUTHZ 4 +#define SLAP_SASL_PROP_COUNT 5 /* Number of properties we used */ + +typedef struct lookup_info { + int flags; + const struct propval *list; + sasl_server_params_t *sparams; +} lookup_info; + +static slap_response sasl_ap_lookup; + +static struct berval sc_cleartext = BER_BVC("{CLEARTEXT}"); + +static int +sasl_ap_lookup( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs ) +{ + BerVarray bv; + AttributeDescription *ad; + Attribute *a; + const char *text; + int rc, i; + lookup_info *sl = (lookup_info *)op->o_callback->sc_private; + + if (rs->sr_type != REP_SEARCH) return 0; + + for( i = 0; sl->list[i].name; i++ ) { + const char *name = sl->list[i].name; + + if ( name[0] == '*' ) { + if ( sl->flags & SASL_AUXPROP_AUTHZID ) continue; + /* Skip our private properties */ + if ( !strcmp( name, slap_propnames[0] )) { + i += SLAP_SASL_PROP_COUNT - 1; + continue; + } + name++; + } else if ( !(sl->flags & SASL_AUXPROP_AUTHZID ) ) + continue; + + if ( sl->list[i].values ) { + if ( !(sl->flags & SASL_AUXPROP_OVERRIDE) ) continue; + } + ad = NULL; + rc = slap_str2ad( name, &ad, &text ); + if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) { + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, + "slap_ap_lookup: str2ad(%s): %s\n", name, text, 0 ); + continue; + } + + /* If it's the rootdn and a rootpw was present, we already set + * it so don't override it here. + */ + if ( ad == slap_schema.si_ad_userPassword && sl->list[i].values && + be_isroot_dn( op->o_bd, &op->o_req_ndn )) + continue; + + a = attr_find( rs->sr_entry->e_attrs, ad ); + if ( !a ) continue; + if ( ! access_allowed( op, rs->sr_entry, ad, NULL, ACL_AUTH, NULL ) ) { + continue; + } + if ( sl->list[i].values && ( sl->flags & SASL_AUXPROP_OVERRIDE ) ) { + sl->sparams->utils->prop_erase( sl->sparams->propctx, + sl->list[i].name ); + } + for ( bv = a->a_vals; bv->bv_val; bv++ ) { + /* ITS#3846 don't give hashed passwords to SASL */ + if ( ad == slap_schema.si_ad_userPassword && + bv->bv_val[0] == '{' /*}*/ ) + { + if ( lutil_passwd_scheme( bv->bv_val ) ) { + /* If it's not a recognized scheme, just assume it's + * a cleartext password that happened to include brackets. + * + * If it's a recognized scheme, skip this value, unless the + * scheme is {CLEARTEXT}. In that case, skip over the + * scheme name and use the remainder. If there is nothing + * past the scheme name, skip this value. + */ +#ifdef SLAPD_CLEARTEXT + if ( !strncasecmp( bv->bv_val, sc_cleartext.bv_val, + sc_cleartext.bv_len )) { + struct berval cbv; + cbv.bv_len = bv->bv_len - sc_cleartext.bv_len; + if ( cbv.bv_len > 0 ) { + cbv.bv_val = bv->bv_val + sc_cleartext.bv_len; + sl->sparams->utils->prop_set( sl->sparams->propctx, + sl->list[i].name, cbv.bv_val, cbv.bv_len ); + } + } +#endif + continue; + } + } + sl->sparams->utils->prop_set( sl->sparams->propctx, + sl->list[i].name, bv->bv_val, bv->bv_len ); + } + } + return LDAP_SUCCESS; +} + +#if SASL_VERSION_FULL >= 0x020118 +static int +#else +static void +#endif +slap_auxprop_lookup( + void *glob_context, + sasl_server_params_t *sparams, + unsigned flags, + const char *user, + unsigned ulen) +{ + OperationBuffer opbuf = {{ NULL }}; + Operation *op = (Operation *)&opbuf; + int i, doit = 0; + Connection *conn = NULL; + lookup_info sl; + int rc = LDAP_SUCCESS; + + sl.list = sparams->utils->prop_get( sparams->propctx ); + sl.sparams = sparams; + sl.flags = flags; + + /* Find our DN and conn first */ + for( i = 0; sl.list[i].name; i++ ) { + if ( sl.list[i].name[0] == '*' ) { + if ( !strcmp( sl.list[i].name, slap_propnames[SLAP_SASL_PROP_CONN] ) ) { + if ( sl.list[i].values && sl.list[i].values[0] ) + AC_MEMCPY( &conn, sl.list[i].values[0], sizeof( conn ) ); + continue; + } + if ( flags & SASL_AUXPROP_AUTHZID ) { + if ( !strcmp( sl.list[i].name, slap_propnames[SLAP_SASL_PROP_AUTHZLEN] )) { + if ( sl.list[i].values && sl.list[i].values[0] ) + AC_MEMCPY( &op->o_req_ndn.bv_len, sl.list[i].values[0], + sizeof( op->o_req_ndn.bv_len ) ); + } else if ( !strcmp( sl.list[i].name, slap_propnames[SLAP_SASL_PROP_AUTHZ] )) { + if ( sl.list[i].values ) + op->o_req_ndn.bv_val = (char *)sl.list[i].values[0]; + break; + } + } + + if ( !strcmp( sl.list[i].name, slap_propnames[SLAP_SASL_PROP_AUTHCLEN] )) { + if ( sl.list[i].values && sl.list[i].values[0] ) + AC_MEMCPY( &op->o_req_ndn.bv_len, sl.list[i].values[0], + sizeof( op->o_req_ndn.bv_len ) ); + } else if ( !strcmp( sl.list[i].name, slap_propnames[SLAP_SASL_PROP_AUTHC] ) ) { + if ( sl.list[i].values ) { + op->o_req_ndn.bv_val = (char *)sl.list[i].values[0]; + if ( !(flags & SASL_AUXPROP_AUTHZID) ) + break; + } + } + } + } + + /* we don't know anything about this, ignore it */ + if ( !conn ) { + rc = LDAP_SUCCESS; + goto done; + } + + /* Now see what else needs to be fetched */ + for( i = 0; sl.list[i].name; i++ ) { + const char *name = sl.list[i].name; + + if ( name[0] == '*' ) { + if ( flags & SASL_AUXPROP_AUTHZID ) continue; + /* Skip our private properties */ + if ( !strcmp( name, slap_propnames[0] )) { + i += SLAP_SASL_PROP_COUNT - 1; + continue; + } + name++; + } else if ( !(flags & SASL_AUXPROP_AUTHZID ) ) + continue; + + if ( sl.list[i].values ) { + if ( !(flags & SASL_AUXPROP_OVERRIDE) ) continue; + } + doit = 1; + break; + } + + if (doit) { + slap_callback cb = { NULL, sasl_ap_lookup, NULL, NULL }; + + cb.sc_private = &sl; + + op->o_bd = select_backend( &op->o_req_ndn, 1 ); + + if ( op->o_bd ) { + /* For rootdn, see if we can use the rootpw */ + if ( be_isroot_dn( op->o_bd, &op->o_req_ndn ) && + !BER_BVISEMPTY( &op->o_bd->be_rootpw )) { + struct berval cbv = BER_BVNULL; + + /* If there's a recognized scheme, see if it's CLEARTEXT */ + if ( lutil_passwd_scheme( op->o_bd->be_rootpw.bv_val )) { + if ( !strncasecmp( op->o_bd->be_rootpw.bv_val, + sc_cleartext.bv_val, sc_cleartext.bv_len )) { + + /* If it's CLEARTEXT, skip past scheme spec */ + cbv.bv_len = op->o_bd->be_rootpw.bv_len - + sc_cleartext.bv_len; + if ( cbv.bv_len ) { + cbv.bv_val = op->o_bd->be_rootpw.bv_val + + sc_cleartext.bv_len; + } + } + /* No scheme, use the whole value */ + } else { + cbv = op->o_bd->be_rootpw; + } + if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &cbv )) { + for( i = 0; sl.list[i].name; i++ ) { + const char *name = sl.list[i].name; + + if ( name[0] == '*' ) { + if ( flags & SASL_AUXPROP_AUTHZID ) continue; + name++; + } else if ( !(flags & SASL_AUXPROP_AUTHZID ) ) + continue; + + if ( !strcasecmp(name,"userPassword") ) { + sl.sparams->utils->prop_set( sl.sparams->propctx, + sl.list[i].name, cbv.bv_val, cbv.bv_len ); + break; + } + } + } + } + + if ( op->o_bd->be_search ) { + SlapReply rs = {REP_RESULT}; + op->o_hdr = conn->c_sasl_bindop->o_hdr; + op->o_controls = opbuf.ob_controls; + op->o_tag = LDAP_REQ_SEARCH; + op->o_dn = conn->c_ndn; + op->o_ndn = conn->c_ndn; + op->o_callback = &cb; + slap_op_time( &op->o_time, &op->o_tincr ); + op->o_do_not_cache = 1; + op->o_is_auth_check = 1; + op->o_req_dn = op->o_req_ndn; + op->ors_scope = LDAP_SCOPE_BASE; + op->ors_deref = LDAP_DEREF_NEVER; + op->ors_tlimit = SLAP_NO_LIMIT; + op->ors_slimit = 1; + op->ors_filter = &generic_filter; + op->ors_filterstr = generic_filterstr; + op->o_authz = conn->c_authz; + /* FIXME: we want all attributes, right? */ + op->ors_attrs = NULL; + + rc = op->o_bd->be_search( op, &rs ); + } + } + } +done:; +#if SASL_VERSION_FULL >= 0x020118 + return rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ? SASL_FAIL : SASL_OK; +#endif +} + +#if SASL_VERSION_FULL >= 0x020110 +static int +slap_auxprop_store( + void *glob_context, + sasl_server_params_t *sparams, + struct propctx *prctx, + const char *user, + unsigned ulen) +{ + Operation op = {0}; + Opheader oph; + SlapReply rs = {REP_RESULT}; + int rc, i; + unsigned j; + Connection *conn = NULL; + const struct propval *pr; + Modifications *modlist = NULL, **modtail = &modlist, *mod; + slap_callback cb = { NULL, slap_null_cb, NULL, NULL }; + char textbuf[SLAP_TEXT_BUFLEN]; + const char *text; + size_t textlen = sizeof(textbuf); + + /* just checking if we are enabled */ + if (!prctx) return SASL_OK; + + if (!sparams || !user) return SASL_BADPARAM; + + pr = sparams->utils->prop_get( sparams->propctx ); + + /* Find our DN and conn first */ + for( i = 0; pr[i].name; i++ ) { + if ( pr[i].name[0] == '*' ) { + if ( !strcmp( pr[i].name, slap_propnames[SLAP_SASL_PROP_CONN] ) ) { + if ( pr[i].values && pr[i].values[0] ) + AC_MEMCPY( &conn, pr[i].values[0], sizeof( conn ) ); + continue; + } + if ( !strcmp( pr[i].name, slap_propnames[SLAP_SASL_PROP_AUTHCLEN] )) { + if ( pr[i].values && pr[i].values[0] ) + AC_MEMCPY( &op.o_req_ndn.bv_len, pr[i].values[0], + sizeof( op.o_req_ndn.bv_len ) ); + } else if ( !strcmp( pr[i].name, slap_propnames[SLAP_SASL_PROP_AUTHC] ) ) { + if ( pr[i].values ) + op.o_req_ndn.bv_val = (char *)pr[i].values[0]; + } + } + } + if (!conn || !op.o_req_ndn.bv_val) return SASL_BADPARAM; + + op.o_bd = select_backend( &op.o_req_ndn, 1 ); + + if ( !op.o_bd || !op.o_bd->be_modify ) return SASL_FAIL; + + pr = sparams->utils->prop_get( prctx ); + if (!pr) return SASL_BADPARAM; + + for (i=0; pr[i].name; i++); + if (!i) return SASL_BADPARAM; + + for (i=0; pr[i].name; i++) { + mod = (Modifications *)ch_malloc( sizeof(Modifications) ); + mod->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_REPLACE; + mod->sml_flags = 0; + ber_str2bv( pr[i].name, 0, 0, &mod->sml_type ); + mod->sml_numvals = pr[i].nvalues; + mod->sml_values = (struct berval *)ch_malloc( (pr[i].nvalues + 1) * + sizeof(struct berval)); + for (j=0; j<pr[i].nvalues; j++) { + ber_str2bv( pr[i].values[j], 0, 1, &mod->sml_values[j]); + } + BER_BVZERO( &mod->sml_values[j] ); + mod->sml_nvalues = NULL; + mod->sml_desc = NULL; + *modtail = mod; + modtail = &mod->sml_next; + } + *modtail = NULL; + + rc = slap_mods_check( &op, modlist, &text, textbuf, textlen, NULL ); + + if ( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS ) { + rc = slap_mods_no_user_mod_check( &op, modlist, + &text, textbuf, textlen ); + + if ( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS ) { + if ( conn->c_sasl_bindop ) { + op.o_hdr = conn->c_sasl_bindop->o_hdr; + } else { + op.o_hdr = &oph; + memset( &oph, 0, sizeof(oph) ); + operation_fake_init( conn, &op, ldap_pvt_thread_pool_context(), 0 ); + } + op.o_tag = LDAP_REQ_MODIFY; + op.o_ndn = op.o_req_ndn; + op.o_callback = &cb; + slap_op_time( &op.o_time, &op.o_tincr ); + op.o_do_not_cache = 1; + op.o_is_auth_check = 1; + op.o_req_dn = op.o_req_ndn; + op.orm_modlist = modlist; + + rc = op.o_bd->be_modify( &op, &rs ); + } + } + slap_mods_free( modlist, 1 ); + return rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ? SASL_FAIL : SASL_OK; +} +#endif /* SASL_VERSION_FULL >= 2.1.16 */ + +static sasl_auxprop_plug_t slap_auxprop_plugin = { + 0, /* Features */ + 0, /* spare */ + NULL, /* glob_context */ + NULL, /* auxprop_free */ + slap_auxprop_lookup, + "slapd", /* name */ +#if SASL_VERSION_FULL >= 0x020110 + slap_auxprop_store /* the declaration of this member changed + * in cyrus SASL from 2.1.15 to 2.1.16 */ +#else + NULL +#endif +}; + +static int +slap_auxprop_init( + const sasl_utils_t *utils, + int max_version, + int *out_version, + sasl_auxprop_plug_t **plug, + const char *plugname) +{ + if ( !out_version || !plug ) return SASL_BADPARAM; + + if ( max_version < SASL_AUXPROP_PLUG_VERSION ) return SASL_BADVERS; + + *out_version = SASL_AUXPROP_PLUG_VERSION; + *plug = &slap_auxprop_plugin; + return SASL_OK; +} + +/* Convert a SASL authcid or authzid into a DN. Store the DN in an + * auxiliary property, so that we can refer to it in sasl_authorize + * without interfering with anything else. Also, the SASL username + * buffer is constrained to 256 characters, and our DNs could be + * much longer (SLAP_LDAPDN_MAXLEN, currently set to 8192) + */ +static int +slap_sasl_canonicalize( + sasl_conn_t *sconn, + void *context, + const char *in, + unsigned inlen, + unsigned flags, + const char *user_realm, + char *out, + unsigned out_max, + unsigned *out_len) +{ + Connection *conn = (Connection *)context; + struct propctx *props = sasl_auxprop_getctx( sconn ); + struct propval auxvals[ SLAP_SASL_PROP_COUNT ] = { { 0 } }; + struct berval dn; + int rc, which; + const char *names[2]; + struct berval bvin; + + *out_len = 0; + + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ARGS, "SASL Canonicalize [conn=%ld]: %s=\"%s\"\n", + conn ? (long) conn->c_connid : -1L, + (flags & SASL_CU_AUTHID) ? "authcid" : "authzid", + in ? in : "<empty>"); + + /* If name is too big, just truncate. We don't care, we're + * using DNs, not the usernames. + */ + if ( inlen > out_max ) + inlen = out_max-1; + + /* This is a Simple Bind using SPASSWD. That means the in-directory + * userPassword of the Binding user already points at SASL, so it + * cannot be used to actually satisfy a password comparison. Just + * ignore it, some other mech will process it. + */ + if ( !conn->c_sasl_bindop || + conn->c_sasl_bindop->orb_method != LDAP_AUTH_SASL ) goto done; + + /* See if we need to add request, can only do it once */ + prop_getnames( props, slap_propnames, auxvals ); + if ( !auxvals[0].name ) + prop_request( props, slap_propnames ); + + if ( flags & SASL_CU_AUTHID ) + which = SLAP_SASL_PROP_AUTHCLEN; + else + which = SLAP_SASL_PROP_AUTHZLEN; + + /* Need to store the Connection for auxprop_lookup */ + if ( !auxvals[SLAP_SASL_PROP_CONN].values ) { + names[0] = slap_propnames[SLAP_SASL_PROP_CONN]; + names[1] = NULL; + prop_set( props, names[0], (char *)&conn, sizeof( conn ) ); + } + + /* Already been here? */ + if ( auxvals[which].values ) + goto done; + + /* Normally we require an authzID to have a u: or dn: prefix. + * However, SASL frequently gives us an authzID that is just + * an exact copy of the authcID, without a prefix. We need to + * detect and allow this condition. If SASL calls canonicalize + * with SASL_CU_AUTHID|SASL_CU_AUTHZID this is a no-brainer. + * But if it's broken into two calls, we need to remember the + * authcID so that we can compare the authzID later. We store + * the authcID temporarily in conn->c_sasl_dn. We necessarily + * finish Canonicalizing before Authorizing, so there is no + * conflict with slap_sasl_authorize's use of this temp var. + * + * The SASL EXTERNAL mech is backwards from all the other mechs, + * it does authzID before the authcID. If we see that authzID + * has already been done, don't do anything special with authcID. + */ + if ( flags == SASL_CU_AUTHID && !auxvals[SLAP_SASL_PROP_AUTHZ].values ) { + conn->c_sasl_dn.bv_val = (char *) in; + conn->c_sasl_dn.bv_len = 0; + } else if ( flags == SASL_CU_AUTHZID && conn->c_sasl_dn.bv_val ) { + rc = strcmp( in, conn->c_sasl_dn.bv_val ); + conn->c_sasl_dn.bv_val = NULL; + /* They were equal, no work needed */ + if ( !rc ) goto done; + } + + bvin.bv_val = (char *)in; + bvin.bv_len = inlen; + rc = slap_sasl_getdn( conn, NULL, &bvin, (char *)user_realm, &dn, + (flags & SASL_CU_AUTHID) ? SLAP_GETDN_AUTHCID : SLAP_GETDN_AUTHZID ); + if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) { + sasl_seterror( sconn, 0, ldap_err2string( rc ) ); + return SASL_NOAUTHZ; + } + + names[0] = slap_propnames[which]; + names[1] = NULL; + prop_set( props, names[0], (char *)&dn.bv_len, sizeof( dn.bv_len ) ); + + which++; + names[0] = slap_propnames[which]; + prop_set( props, names[0], dn.bv_val, dn.bv_len ); + + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ARGS, "SASL Canonicalize [conn=%ld]: %s=\"%s\"\n", + conn ? (long) conn->c_connid : -1L, names[0]+1, + dn.bv_val ? dn.bv_val : "<EMPTY>" ); + + /* Not needed any more, SASL has copied it */ + if ( conn && conn->c_sasl_bindop ) + conn->c_sasl_bindop->o_tmpfree( dn.bv_val, conn->c_sasl_bindop->o_tmpmemctx ); + +done: + AC_MEMCPY( out, in, inlen ); + out[inlen] = '\0'; + + *out_len = inlen; + + return SASL_OK; +} + +static int +slap_sasl_authorize( + sasl_conn_t *sconn, + void *context, + char *requested_user, + unsigned rlen, + char *auth_identity, + unsigned alen, + const char *def_realm, + unsigned urlen, + struct propctx *props) +{ + Connection *conn = (Connection *)context; + /* actually: + * (SLAP_SASL_PROP_COUNT - 1) because we skip "conn", + * + 1 for NULL termination? + */ + struct propval auxvals[ SLAP_SASL_PROP_COUNT ] = { { 0 } }; + struct berval authcDN, authzDN = BER_BVNULL; + int rc; + + /* Simple Binds don't support proxy authorization, ignore it */ + if ( !conn->c_sasl_bindop || + conn->c_sasl_bindop->orb_method != LDAP_AUTH_SASL ) return SASL_OK; + + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ARGS, "SASL proxy authorize [conn=%ld]: " + "authcid=\"%s\" authzid=\"%s\"\n", + conn ? (long) conn->c_connid : -1L, auth_identity, requested_user ); + if ( conn->c_sasl_dn.bv_val ) { + BER_BVZERO( &conn->c_sasl_dn ); + } + + /* Skip SLAP_SASL_PROP_CONN */ + prop_getnames( props, slap_propnames+1, auxvals ); + + /* Should not happen */ + if ( !auxvals[0].values ) { + sasl_seterror( sconn, 0, "invalid authcid" ); + return SASL_NOAUTHZ; + } + + AC_MEMCPY( &authcDN.bv_len, auxvals[0].values[0], sizeof(authcDN.bv_len) ); + authcDN.bv_val = auxvals[1].values ? (char *)auxvals[1].values[0] : NULL; + conn->c_sasl_dn = authcDN; + + /* Nothing to do if no authzID was given */ + if ( !auxvals[2].name || !auxvals[2].values ) { + goto ok; + } + + AC_MEMCPY( &authzDN.bv_len, auxvals[2].values[0], sizeof(authzDN.bv_len) ); + authzDN.bv_val = auxvals[3].values ? (char *)auxvals[3].values[0] : NULL; + + rc = slap_sasl_authorized( conn->c_sasl_bindop, &authcDN, &authzDN ); + if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) { + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "SASL Proxy Authorize [conn=%ld]: " + "proxy authorization disallowed (%d)\n", + conn ? (long) conn->c_connid : -1L, rc, 0 ); + + sasl_seterror( sconn, 0, "not authorized" ); + return SASL_NOAUTHZ; + } + + /* FIXME: we need yet another dup because slap_sasl_getdn() + * is using the bind operation slab */ + ber_dupbv( &conn->c_sasl_authz_dn, &authzDN ); + +ok: + if (conn->c_sasl_bindop) { + Statslog( LDAP_DEBUG_STATS, + "%s BIND authcid=\"%s\" authzid=\"%s\"\n", + conn->c_sasl_bindop->o_log_prefix, + auth_identity, requested_user, 0, 0 ); + } + + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "SASL Authorize [conn=%ld]: " + " proxy authorization allowed authzDN=\"%s\"\n", + conn ? (long) conn->c_connid : -1L, + authzDN.bv_val ? authzDN.bv_val : "", 0 ); + return SASL_OK; +} + +static int +slap_sasl_err2ldap( int saslerr ) +{ + int rc; + + /* map SASL errors to LDAP resultCode returned by: + * sasl_server_new() + * SASL_OK, SASL_NOMEM + * sasl_server_step() + * SASL_OK, SASL_CONTINUE, SASL_TRANS, SASL_BADPARAM, SASL_BADPROT, + * ... + * sasl_server_start() + * + SASL_NOMECH + * sasl_setprop() + * SASL_OK, SASL_BADPARAM + */ + + switch (saslerr) { + case SASL_OK: + rc = LDAP_SUCCESS; + break; + case SASL_CONTINUE: + rc = LDAP_SASL_BIND_IN_PROGRESS; + break; + case SASL_FAIL: + case SASL_NOMEM: + rc = LDAP_OTHER; + break; + case SASL_NOMECH: + rc = LDAP_AUTH_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED; + break; + case SASL_BADAUTH: + case SASL_NOUSER: + case SASL_TRANS: + case SASL_EXPIRED: + rc = LDAP_INVALID_CREDENTIALS; + break; + case SASL_NOAUTHZ: + rc = LDAP_INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS; + break; + case SASL_TOOWEAK: + case SASL_ENCRYPT: + rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH; + break; + case SASL_UNAVAIL: + case SASL_TRYAGAIN: + rc = LDAP_UNAVAILABLE; + break; + case SASL_DISABLED: + rc = LDAP_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM; + break; + default: + rc = LDAP_OTHER; + break; + } + + return rc; +} + +#ifdef SLAPD_SPASSWD + +static struct berval sasl_pwscheme = BER_BVC("{SASL}"); + +static int chk_sasl( + const struct berval *sc, + const struct berval * passwd, + const struct berval * cred, + const char **text ) +{ + unsigned int i; + int rtn; + void *ctx, *sconn = NULL; + + for( i=0; i<cred->bv_len; i++) { + if(cred->bv_val[i] == '\0') { + return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR; /* NUL character in password */ + } + } + + if( cred->bv_val[i] != '\0' ) { + return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR; /* cred must behave like a string */ + } + + for( i=0; i<passwd->bv_len; i++) { + if(passwd->bv_val[i] == '\0') { + return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR; /* NUL character in password */ + } + } + + if( passwd->bv_val[i] != '\0' ) { + return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR; /* passwd must behave like a string */ + } + + rtn = LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR; + + ctx = ldap_pvt_thread_pool_context(); + ldap_pvt_thread_pool_getkey( ctx, (void *)slap_sasl_bind, &sconn, NULL ); + + if( sconn != NULL ) { + int sc; + sc = sasl_checkpass( sconn, + passwd->bv_val, passwd->bv_len, + cred->bv_val, cred->bv_len ); + rtn = ( sc != SASL_OK ) ? LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR : LUTIL_PASSWD_OK; + } + + return rtn; +} +#endif /* SLAPD_SPASSWD */ + +#endif /* HAVE_CYRUS_SASL */ + +#ifdef ENABLE_REWRITE + +typedef struct slapd_map_data { + struct berval base; + struct berval filter; + AttributeName attrs[2]; + int scope; +} slapd_map_data; + +static void * +slapd_rw_config( const char *fname, int lineno, int argc, char **argv ) +{ + slapd_map_data *ret = NULL; + LDAPURLDesc *lud = NULL; + char *uri; + AttributeDescription *ad = NULL; + int rc, flen = 0; + struct berval dn, ndn; + + if ( argc != 1 ) { + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, + "[%s:%d] slapd map needs URI\n", + fname, lineno, 0 ); + return NULL; + } + + uri = argv[0]; + if ( strncasecmp( uri, "uri=", STRLENOF( "uri=" ) ) == 0 ) { + uri += STRLENOF( "uri=" ); + } + + if ( ldap_url_parse( uri, &lud ) != LDAP_URL_SUCCESS ) { + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, + "[%s:%d] illegal URI '%s'\n", + fname, lineno, uri ); + return NULL; + } + + if ( strcasecmp( lud->lud_scheme, "ldap" )) { + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, + "[%s:%d] illegal URI scheme '%s'\n", + fname, lineno, lud->lud_scheme ); + goto done; + } + + if (( lud->lud_host && lud->lud_host[0] ) || lud->lud_exts + || !lud->lud_dn ) { + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, + "[%s:%d] illegal URI '%s'\n", + fname, lineno, uri ); + goto done; + } + + if ( lud->lud_attrs ) { + if ( lud->lud_attrs[1] ) { + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, + "[%s:%d] only one attribute allowed in URI\n", + fname, lineno, 0 ); + goto done; + } + if ( strcasecmp( lud->lud_attrs[0], "dn" ) && + strcasecmp( lud->lud_attrs[0], "entryDN" )) { + const char *text; + rc = slap_str2ad( lud->lud_attrs[0], &ad, &text ); + if ( rc ) + goto done; + } + } + ber_str2bv( lud->lud_dn, 0, 0, &dn ); + if ( dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &dn, &ndn, NULL )) + goto done; + + if ( lud->lud_filter ) { + flen = strlen( lud->lud_filter ) + 1; + } + ret = ch_malloc( sizeof( slapd_map_data ) + flen ); + ret->base = ndn; + if ( flen ) { + ret->filter.bv_val = (char *)(ret+1); + ret->filter.bv_len = flen - 1; + strcpy( ret->filter.bv_val, lud->lud_filter ); + } else { + BER_BVZERO( &ret->filter ); + } + ret->scope = lud->lud_scope; + if ( ad ) { + ret->attrs[0].an_name = ad->ad_cname; + } else { + BER_BVZERO( &ret->attrs[0].an_name ); + } + ret->attrs[0].an_desc = ad; + BER_BVZERO( &ret->attrs[1].an_name ); +done: + ldap_free_urldesc( lud ); + return ret; +} + +struct slapd_rw_info { + slapd_map_data *si_data; + struct berval si_val; +}; + +static int +slapd_rw_cb( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs ) +{ + if ( rs->sr_type == REP_SEARCH ) { + struct slapd_rw_info *si = op->o_callback->sc_private; + + if ( si->si_data->attrs[0].an_desc ) { + Attribute *a; + + a = attr_find( rs->sr_entry->e_attrs, + si->si_data->attrs[0].an_desc ); + if ( a ) { + ber_dupbv( &si->si_val, a->a_vals ); + } + } else { + ber_dupbv( &si->si_val, &rs->sr_entry->e_name ); + } + } + return LDAP_SUCCESS; +} + +static int +slapd_rw_apply( void *private, const char *filter, struct berval *val ) +{ + slapd_map_data *sl = private; + slap_callback cb = { NULL }; + Connection conn = {0}; + OperationBuffer opbuf; + Operation *op; + void *thrctx; + SlapReply rs = {REP_RESULT}; + struct slapd_rw_info si; + char *ptr; + int rc; + + thrctx = ldap_pvt_thread_pool_context(); + connection_fake_init2( &conn, &opbuf, thrctx, 0 ); + op = &opbuf.ob_op; + + op->o_tag = LDAP_REQ_SEARCH; + op->o_req_dn = op->o_req_ndn = sl->base; + op->o_bd = select_backend( &op->o_req_ndn, 1 ); + if ( !op->o_bd ) { + return REWRITE_ERR; + } + si.si_data = sl; + BER_BVZERO( &si.si_val ); + op->ors_scope = sl->scope; + op->ors_deref = LDAP_DEREF_NEVER; + op->ors_slimit = 1; + op->ors_tlimit = SLAP_NO_LIMIT; + if ( sl->attrs[0].an_desc ) { + op->ors_attrs = sl->attrs; + } else { + op->ors_attrs = slap_anlist_no_attrs; + } + if ( filter ) { + rc = strlen( filter ); + } else { + rc = 0; + } + rc += sl->filter.bv_len; + ptr = op->ors_filterstr.bv_val = op->o_tmpalloc( rc + 1, op->o_tmpmemctx ); + if ( sl->filter.bv_len ) { + ptr = lutil_strcopy( ptr, sl->filter.bv_val ); + } else { + *ptr = '\0'; + } + if ( filter ) { + strcpy( ptr, filter ); + } + op->ors_filter = str2filter_x( op, op->ors_filterstr.bv_val ); + if ( !op->ors_filter ) { + op->o_tmpfree( op->ors_filterstr.bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx ); + return REWRITE_ERR; + } + + op->ors_attrsonly = 0; + op->o_dn = op->o_bd->be_rootdn; + op->o_ndn = op->o_bd->be_rootndn; + op->o_do_not_cache = 1; + + cb.sc_response = slapd_rw_cb; + cb.sc_private = &si; + op->o_callback = &cb; + + rc = op->o_bd->be_search( op, &rs ); + if ( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS && !BER_BVISNULL( &si.si_val )) { + *val = si.si_val; + rc = REWRITE_SUCCESS; + } else { + if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &si.si_val )) { + ch_free( si.si_val.bv_val ); + } + rc = REWRITE_ERR; + } + filter_free_x( op, op->ors_filter, 1 ); + op->o_tmpfree( op->ors_filterstr.bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx ); + return rc; +} + +static int +slapd_rw_destroy( void *private ) +{ + slapd_map_data *md = private; + + assert( private != NULL ); + + ch_free( md->base.bv_val ); + ch_free( md ); + + return 0; +} + +static const rewrite_mapper slapd_mapper = { + "slapd", + slapd_rw_config, + slapd_rw_apply, + slapd_rw_destroy +}; +#endif + +int slap_sasl_init( void ) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_CYRUS_SASL + int rc; + static sasl_callback_t server_callbacks[] = { + { SASL_CB_LOG, (slap_sasl_cb_ft)&slap_sasl_log, NULL }, + { SASL_CB_GETOPT, (slap_sasl_cb_ft)&slap_sasl_getopt, NULL }, + { SASL_CB_LIST_END, NULL, NULL } + }; +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_REWRITE + rewrite_mapper_register( &slapd_mapper ); +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_CYRUS_SASL +#ifdef HAVE_SASL_VERSION + /* stringify the version number, sasl.h doesn't do it for us */ +#define VSTR0(maj, min, pat) #maj "." #min "." #pat +#define VSTR(maj, min, pat) VSTR0(maj, min, pat) +#define SASL_VERSION_STRING VSTR(SASL_VERSION_MAJOR, SASL_VERSION_MINOR, \ + SASL_VERSION_STEP) + + sasl_version( NULL, &rc ); + if ( ((rc >> 16) != ((SASL_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)|SASL_VERSION_MINOR)) || + (rc & 0xffff) < SASL_VERSION_STEP) + { + char version[sizeof("xxx.xxx.xxxxx")]; + sprintf( version, "%u.%d.%d", (unsigned)rc >> 24, (rc >> 16) & 0xff, + rc & 0xffff ); + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, "slap_sasl_init: SASL library version mismatch:" + " expected %s, got %s\n", + SASL_VERSION_STRING, version, 0 ); + return -1; + } +#endif + + sasl_set_mutex( + ldap_pvt_sasl_mutex_new, + ldap_pvt_sasl_mutex_lock, + ldap_pvt_sasl_mutex_unlock, + ldap_pvt_sasl_mutex_dispose ); + + generic_filter.f_desc = slap_schema.si_ad_objectClass; + + rc = sasl_auxprop_add_plugin( "slapd", slap_auxprop_init ); + if( rc != SASL_OK ) { + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, "slap_sasl_init: auxprop add plugin failed\n", + 0, 0, 0 ); + return -1; + } + + /* should provide callbacks for logging */ + /* server name should be configurable */ + rc = sasl_server_init( server_callbacks, "slapd" ); + + if( rc != SASL_OK ) { + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, "slap_sasl_init: server init failed\n", + 0, 0, 0 ); + + return -1; + } + +#ifdef SLAPD_SPASSWD + lutil_passwd_add( &sasl_pwscheme, chk_sasl, NULL ); +#endif + + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "slap_sasl_init: initialized!\n", + 0, 0, 0 ); + + /* default security properties */ + memset( &sasl_secprops, '\0', sizeof(sasl_secprops) ); + sasl_secprops.max_ssf = INT_MAX; + sasl_secprops.maxbufsize = 65536; + sasl_secprops.security_flags = SASL_SEC_NOPLAINTEXT|SASL_SEC_NOANONYMOUS; +#endif + + return 0; +} + +int slap_sasl_destroy( void ) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_CYRUS_SASL + sasl_done(); +#endif + free( sasl_host ); + sasl_host = NULL; + + return 0; +} + +static char * +slap_sasl_peer2ipport( struct berval *peer ) +{ + int isv6 = 0; + char *ipport, *p, + *addr = &peer->bv_val[ STRLENOF( "IP=" ) ]; + ber_len_t plen = peer->bv_len - STRLENOF( "IP=" ); + + /* IPv6? */ + if ( addr[0] == '[' ) { + isv6 = 1; + plen--; + } + ipport = ch_strdup( &addr[isv6] ); + + /* Convert IPv6/IPv4 addresses to address;port syntax. */ + p = strrchr( ipport, ':' ); + if ( p != NULL ) { + *p = ';'; + if ( isv6 ) { + assert( p[-1] == ']' ); + AC_MEMCPY( &p[-1], p, plen - ( p - ipport ) + 1 ); + } + + } else if ( isv6 ) { + /* trim ']' */ + plen--; + assert( addr[plen] == ']' ); + addr[plen] = '\0'; + } + + return ipport; +} + +int slap_sasl_open( Connection *conn, int reopen ) +{ + int sc = LDAP_SUCCESS; +#ifdef HAVE_CYRUS_SASL + int cb; + + sasl_conn_t *ctx = NULL; + sasl_callback_t *session_callbacks; + char *ipremoteport = NULL, *iplocalport = NULL; + + assert( conn->c_sasl_authctx == NULL ); + + if ( !reopen ) { + assert( conn->c_sasl_extra == NULL ); + + session_callbacks = + SLAP_CALLOC( 5, sizeof(sasl_callback_t)); + if( session_callbacks == NULL ) { + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, + "slap_sasl_open: SLAP_MALLOC failed", 0, 0, 0 ); + return -1; + } + conn->c_sasl_extra = session_callbacks; + + session_callbacks[cb=0].id = SASL_CB_LOG; + session_callbacks[cb].proc = (slap_sasl_cb_ft)&slap_sasl_log; + session_callbacks[cb++].context = conn; + + session_callbacks[cb].id = SASL_CB_PROXY_POLICY; + session_callbacks[cb].proc = (slap_sasl_cb_ft)&slap_sasl_authorize; + session_callbacks[cb++].context = conn; + + session_callbacks[cb].id = SASL_CB_CANON_USER; + session_callbacks[cb].proc = (slap_sasl_cb_ft)&slap_sasl_canonicalize; + session_callbacks[cb++].context = conn; + + session_callbacks[cb].id = SASL_CB_LIST_END; + session_callbacks[cb].proc = NULL; + session_callbacks[cb++].context = NULL; + } else { + session_callbacks = conn->c_sasl_extra; + } + + conn->c_sasl_layers = 0; + + /* create new SASL context */ + if ( conn->c_sock_name.bv_len != 0 && + strncmp( conn->c_sock_name.bv_val, "IP=", STRLENOF( "IP=" ) ) == 0 ) + { + iplocalport = slap_sasl_peer2ipport( &conn->c_sock_name ); + } + + if ( conn->c_peer_name.bv_len != 0 && + strncmp( conn->c_peer_name.bv_val, "IP=", STRLENOF( "IP=" ) ) == 0 ) + { + ipremoteport = slap_sasl_peer2ipport( &conn->c_peer_name ); + } + + sc = sasl_server_new( "ldap", sasl_host, global_realm, + iplocalport, ipremoteport, session_callbacks, SASL_SUCCESS_DATA, &ctx ); + if ( iplocalport != NULL ) { + ch_free( iplocalport ); + } + if ( ipremoteport != NULL ) { + ch_free( ipremoteport ); + } + + if( sc != SASL_OK ) { + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, "sasl_server_new failed: %d\n", + sc, 0, 0 ); + + return -1; + } + + conn->c_sasl_authctx = ctx; + + if( sc == SASL_OK ) { + sc = sasl_setprop( ctx, + SASL_SEC_PROPS, &sasl_secprops ); + + if( sc != SASL_OK ) { + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, "sasl_setprop failed: %d\n", + sc, 0, 0 ); + + slap_sasl_close( conn ); + return -1; + } + } + + sc = slap_sasl_err2ldap( sc ); + +#elif defined(SLAP_BUILTIN_SASL) + /* built-in SASL implementation */ + SASL_CTX *ctx = (SASL_CTX *) SLAP_MALLOC(sizeof(SASL_CTX)); + if( ctx == NULL ) return -1; + + ctx->sc_external_ssf = 0; + BER_BVZERO( &ctx->sc_external_id ); + + conn->c_sasl_authctx = ctx; +#endif + + return sc; +} + +int slap_sasl_external( + Connection *conn, + slap_ssf_t ssf, + struct berval *auth_id ) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_CYRUS_SASL + int sc; + sasl_conn_t *ctx = conn->c_sasl_authctx; + sasl_ssf_t sasl_ssf = ssf; + + if ( ctx == NULL ) { + return LDAP_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + sc = sasl_setprop( ctx, SASL_SSF_EXTERNAL, &sasl_ssf ); + + if ( sc != SASL_OK ) { + return LDAP_OTHER; + } + + sc = sasl_setprop( ctx, SASL_AUTH_EXTERNAL, + auth_id ? auth_id->bv_val : NULL ); + + if ( sc != SASL_OK ) { + return LDAP_OTHER; + } +#elif defined(SLAP_BUILTIN_SASL) + /* built-in SASL implementation */ + SASL_CTX *ctx = conn->c_sasl_authctx; + if ( ctx == NULL ) return LDAP_UNAVAILABLE; + + ctx->sc_external_ssf = ssf; + if( auth_id ) { + ctx->sc_external_id = *auth_id; + BER_BVZERO( auth_id ); + } else { + BER_BVZERO( &ctx->sc_external_id ); + } +#endif + + return LDAP_SUCCESS; +} + +int slap_sasl_reset( Connection *conn ) +{ + return LDAP_SUCCESS; +} + +char ** slap_sasl_mechs( Connection *conn ) +{ + char **mechs = NULL; + +#ifdef HAVE_CYRUS_SASL + sasl_conn_t *ctx = conn->c_sasl_authctx; + + if( ctx == NULL ) ctx = conn->c_sasl_sockctx; + + if( ctx != NULL ) { + int sc; + SASL_CONST char *mechstr; + + sc = sasl_listmech( ctx, + NULL, NULL, ",", NULL, + &mechstr, NULL, NULL ); + + if( sc != SASL_OK ) { + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, "slap_sasl_listmech failed: %d\n", + sc, 0, 0 ); + + return NULL; + } + + mechs = ldap_str2charray( mechstr, "," ); + } +#elif defined(SLAP_BUILTIN_SASL) + /* builtin SASL implementation */ + SASL_CTX *ctx = conn->c_sasl_authctx; + if ( ctx != NULL && ctx->sc_external_id.bv_val ) { + /* should check ssf */ + mechs = ldap_str2charray( "EXTERNAL", "," ); + } +#endif + + return mechs; +} + +int slap_sasl_close( Connection *conn ) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_CYRUS_SASL + sasl_conn_t *ctx = conn->c_sasl_authctx; + + if( ctx != NULL ) { + sasl_dispose( &ctx ); + } + if ( conn->c_sasl_sockctx && + conn->c_sasl_authctx != conn->c_sasl_sockctx ) + { + ctx = conn->c_sasl_sockctx; + sasl_dispose( &ctx ); + } + + conn->c_sasl_authctx = NULL; + conn->c_sasl_sockctx = NULL; + conn->c_sasl_done = 0; + + free( conn->c_sasl_extra ); + conn->c_sasl_extra = NULL; + +#elif defined(SLAP_BUILTIN_SASL) + SASL_CTX *ctx = conn->c_sasl_authctx; + if( ctx ) { + if( ctx->sc_external_id.bv_val ) { + free( ctx->sc_external_id.bv_val ); + BER_BVZERO( &ctx->sc_external_id ); + } + free( ctx ); + conn->c_sasl_authctx = NULL; + } +#endif + + return LDAP_SUCCESS; +} + +int slap_sasl_bind( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs ) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_CYRUS_SASL + sasl_conn_t *ctx = op->o_conn->c_sasl_authctx; + struct berval response; + unsigned reslen = 0; + int sc; + + Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ARGS, + "==> sasl_bind: dn=\"%s\" mech=%s datalen=%ld\n", + op->o_req_dn.bv_len ? op->o_req_dn.bv_val : "", + op->o_conn->c_sasl_bind_in_progress ? "<continuing>" : + op->o_conn->c_sasl_bind_mech.bv_val, + op->orb_cred.bv_len ); + + if( ctx == NULL ) { + send_ldap_error( op, rs, LDAP_UNAVAILABLE, + "SASL unavailable on this session" ); + return rs->sr_err; + } + +#define START( ctx, mech, cred, clen, resp, rlen, err ) \ + sasl_server_start( ctx, mech, cred, clen, resp, rlen ) +#define STEP( ctx, cred, clen, resp, rlen, err ) \ + sasl_server_step( ctx, cred, clen, resp, rlen ) + + if ( !op->o_conn->c_sasl_bind_in_progress ) { + /* If we already authenticated once, must use a new context */ + if ( op->o_conn->c_sasl_done ) { + sasl_ssf_t ssf = 0; + sasl_ssf_t *ssfp = NULL; + const char *authid = NULL; + + sasl_getprop( ctx, SASL_SSF_EXTERNAL, (void *)&ssfp ); + if ( ssfp ) ssf = *ssfp; + + sasl_getprop( ctx, SASL_AUTH_EXTERNAL, (void *)&authid ); + if ( authid ) authid = ch_strdup( authid ); + + if ( ctx != op->o_conn->c_sasl_sockctx ) { + sasl_dispose( &ctx ); + } + op->o_conn->c_sasl_authctx = NULL; + + slap_sasl_open( op->o_conn, 1 ); + ctx = op->o_conn->c_sasl_authctx; + sasl_setprop( ctx, SASL_SSF_EXTERNAL, &ssf ); + if ( authid ) { + sasl_setprop( ctx, SASL_AUTH_EXTERNAL, authid ); + ch_free( (char *)authid ); + } + } + sc = START( ctx, + op->o_conn->c_sasl_bind_mech.bv_val, + op->orb_cred.bv_val, op->orb_cred.bv_len, + (SASL_CONST char **)&response.bv_val, &reslen, &rs->sr_text ); + + } else { + sc = STEP( ctx, + op->orb_cred.bv_val, op->orb_cred.bv_len, + (SASL_CONST char **)&response.bv_val, &reslen, &rs->sr_text ); + } + + response.bv_len = reslen; + + if ( sc == SASL_OK ) { + sasl_ssf_t *ssf = NULL; + + ber_dupbv_x( &op->orb_edn, &op->o_conn->c_sasl_dn, op->o_tmpmemctx ); + BER_BVZERO( &op->o_conn->c_sasl_dn ); + op->o_conn->c_sasl_done = 1; + + rs->sr_err = LDAP_SUCCESS; + + (void) sasl_getprop( ctx, SASL_SSF, (void *)&ssf ); + op->orb_ssf = ssf ? *ssf : 0; + + ctx = NULL; + if( op->orb_ssf ) { + ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_lock( &op->o_conn->c_mutex ); + op->o_conn->c_sasl_layers++; + + /* If there's an old layer, set sockctx to NULL to + * tell connection_read() to wait for us to finish. + * Otherwise there is a race condition: we have to + * send the Bind response using the old security + * context and then remove it before reading any + * new messages. + */ + if ( op->o_conn->c_sasl_sockctx ) { + ctx = op->o_conn->c_sasl_sockctx; + op->o_conn->c_sasl_sockctx = NULL; + } else { + op->o_conn->c_sasl_sockctx = op->o_conn->c_sasl_authctx; + } + ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_unlock( &op->o_conn->c_mutex ); + } + + /* Must send response using old security layer */ + rs->sr_sasldata = (response.bv_len ? &response : NULL); + send_ldap_sasl( op, rs ); + + /* Now dispose of the old security layer. + */ + if ( ctx ) { + ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_lock( &op->o_conn->c_mutex ); + ldap_pvt_sasl_remove( op->o_conn->c_sb ); + op->o_conn->c_sasl_sockctx = op->o_conn->c_sasl_authctx; + ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_unlock( &op->o_conn->c_mutex ); + sasl_dispose( &ctx ); + } + } else if ( sc == SASL_CONTINUE ) { + rs->sr_err = LDAP_SASL_BIND_IN_PROGRESS, + rs->sr_text = sasl_errdetail( ctx ); + rs->sr_sasldata = &response; + send_ldap_sasl( op, rs ); + + } else { + BER_BVZERO( &op->o_conn->c_sasl_dn ); + rs->sr_text = sasl_errdetail( ctx ); + rs->sr_err = slap_sasl_err2ldap( sc ), + send_ldap_result( op, rs ); + } + + Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "<== slap_sasl_bind: rc=%d\n", rs->sr_err, 0, 0); + +#elif defined(SLAP_BUILTIN_SASL) + /* built-in SASL implementation */ + SASL_CTX *ctx = op->o_conn->c_sasl_authctx; + + if ( ctx == NULL ) { + send_ldap_error( op, rs, LDAP_OTHER, + "Internal SASL Error" ); + + } else if ( bvmatch( &ext_bv, &op->o_conn->c_sasl_bind_mech ) ) { + /* EXTERNAL */ + + if( op->orb_cred.bv_len ) { + rs->sr_text = "proxy authorization not supported"; + rs->sr_err = LDAP_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM; + send_ldap_result( op, rs ); + + } else { + op->orb_edn = ctx->sc_external_id; + rs->sr_err = LDAP_SUCCESS; + rs->sr_sasldata = NULL; + send_ldap_sasl( op, rs ); + } + + } else { + send_ldap_error( op, rs, LDAP_AUTH_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED, + "requested SASL mechanism not supported" ); + } +#else + send_ldap_error( op, rs, LDAP_AUTH_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED, + "SASL not supported" ); +#endif + + return rs->sr_err; +} + +char* slap_sasl_secprops( const char *in ) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_CYRUS_SASL + int rc = ldap_pvt_sasl_secprops( in, &sasl_secprops ); + + return rc == LDAP_SUCCESS ? NULL : "Invalid security properties"; +#else + return "SASL not supported"; +#endif +} + +void slap_sasl_secprops_unparse( struct berval *bv ) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_CYRUS_SASL + ldap_pvt_sasl_secprops_unparse( &sasl_secprops, bv ); +#endif +} + +#ifdef HAVE_CYRUS_SASL +int +slap_sasl_setpass( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs ) +{ + struct berval id = BER_BVNULL; /* needs to come from connection */ + struct berval new = BER_BVNULL; + struct berval old = BER_BVNULL; + + assert( ber_bvcmp( &slap_EXOP_MODIFY_PASSWD, &op->ore_reqoid ) == 0 ); + + rs->sr_err = sasl_getprop( op->o_conn->c_sasl_authctx, SASL_USERNAME, + (SASL_CONST void **)(char *)&id.bv_val ); + + if( rs->sr_err != SASL_OK ) { + rs->sr_text = "unable to retrieve SASL username"; + rs->sr_err = LDAP_OTHER; + goto done; + } + + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ARGS, "==> slap_sasl_setpass: \"%s\"\n", + id.bv_val ? id.bv_val : "", 0, 0 ); + + rs->sr_err = slap_passwd_parse( op->ore_reqdata, + NULL, &old, &new, &rs->sr_text ); + + if( rs->sr_err != LDAP_SUCCESS ) { + goto done; + } + + if( new.bv_len == 0 ) { + slap_passwd_generate(&new); + + if( new.bv_len == 0 ) { + rs->sr_text = "password generation failed."; + rs->sr_err = LDAP_OTHER; + goto done; + } + + rs->sr_rspdata = slap_passwd_return( &new ); + } + + rs->sr_err = sasl_setpass( op->o_conn->c_sasl_authctx, id.bv_val, + new.bv_val, new.bv_len, old.bv_val, old.bv_len, 0 ); + if( rs->sr_err != SASL_OK ) { + rs->sr_text = sasl_errdetail( op->o_conn->c_sasl_authctx ); + } + switch(rs->sr_err) { + case SASL_OK: + rs->sr_err = LDAP_SUCCESS; + break; + + case SASL_NOCHANGE: + case SASL_NOMECH: + case SASL_DISABLED: + case SASL_PWLOCK: + case SASL_FAIL: + case SASL_BADPARAM: + default: + rs->sr_err = LDAP_OTHER; + } + +done: + return rs->sr_err; +} +#endif /* HAVE_CYRUS_SASL */ + +/* Take any sort of identity string and return a DN with the "dn:" prefix. The + * string returned in *dn is in its own allocated memory, and must be free'd + * by the calling process. -Mark Adamson, Carnegie Mellon + * + * The "dn:" prefix is no longer used anywhere inside slapd. It is only used + * on strings passed in directly from SASL. -Howard Chu, Symas Corp. + */ + +#define SET_NONE 0 +#define SET_DN 1 +#define SET_U 2 + +int slap_sasl_getdn( Connection *conn, Operation *op, struct berval *id, + char *user_realm, struct berval *dn, int flags ) +{ + int rc, is_dn = SET_NONE, do_norm = 1; + struct berval dn2, *mech; + + assert( conn != NULL ); + assert( id != NULL ); + + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ARGS, "slap_sasl_getdn: conn %lu id=%s [len=%lu]\n", + conn->c_connid, + BER_BVISNULL( id ) ? "NULL" : ( BER_BVISEMPTY( id ) ? "<empty>" : id->bv_val ), + BER_BVISNULL( id ) ? 0 : ( BER_BVISEMPTY( id ) ? 0 : + (unsigned long) id->bv_len ) ); + + if ( !op ) { + op = conn->c_sasl_bindop; + } + assert( op != NULL ); + + BER_BVZERO( dn ); + + if ( !BER_BVISNULL( id ) ) { + /* Blatantly anonymous ID */ + static struct berval bv_anonymous = BER_BVC( "anonymous" ); + + if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( id, &bv_anonymous ) == 0 ) { + return( LDAP_SUCCESS ); + } + + } else { + /* FIXME: if empty, should we stop? */ + BER_BVSTR( id, "" ); + } + + if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &conn->c_sasl_bind_mech ) ) { + mech = &conn->c_sasl_bind_mech; + } else { + mech = &conn->c_authmech; + } + + /* An authcID needs to be converted to authzID form. Set the + * values directly into *dn; they will be normalized later. (and + * normalizing always makes a new copy.) An ID from a TLS certificate + * is already normalized, so copy it and skip normalization. + */ + if( flags & SLAP_GETDN_AUTHCID ) { + if( bvmatch( mech, &ext_bv )) { + /* EXTERNAL DNs are already normalized */ + assert( !BER_BVISNULL( id ) ); + + do_norm = 0; + is_dn = SET_DN; + ber_dupbv_x( dn, id, op->o_tmpmemctx ); + + } else { + /* convert to u:<username> form */ + is_dn = SET_U; + *dn = *id; + } + } + + if( is_dn == SET_NONE ) { + if( !strncasecmp( id->bv_val, "u:", STRLENOF( "u:" ) ) ) { + is_dn = SET_U; + dn->bv_val = id->bv_val + STRLENOF( "u:" ); + dn->bv_len = id->bv_len - STRLENOF( "u:" ); + + } else if ( !strncasecmp( id->bv_val, "dn:", STRLENOF( "dn:" ) ) ) { + is_dn = SET_DN; + dn->bv_val = id->bv_val + STRLENOF( "dn:" ); + dn->bv_len = id->bv_len - STRLENOF( "dn:" ); + } + } + + /* No other possibilities from here */ + if( is_dn == SET_NONE ) { + BER_BVZERO( dn ); + return( LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH ); + } + + /* Username strings */ + if( is_dn == SET_U ) { + /* ITS#3419: values may need escape */ + LDAPRDN DN[ 5 ]; + LDAPAVA *RDNs[ 4 ][ 2 ]; + LDAPAVA AVAs[ 4 ]; + int irdn; + + irdn = 0; + DN[ irdn ] = RDNs[ irdn ]; + RDNs[ irdn ][ 0 ] = &AVAs[ irdn ]; + AVAs[ irdn ].la_attr = slap_schema.si_ad_uid->ad_cname; + AVAs[ irdn ].la_value = *dn; + AVAs[ irdn ].la_flags = LDAP_AVA_NULL; + AVAs[ irdn ].la_private = NULL; + RDNs[ irdn ][ 1 ] = NULL; + + if ( user_realm && *user_realm ) { + irdn++; + DN[ irdn ] = RDNs[ irdn ]; + RDNs[ irdn ][ 0 ] = &AVAs[ irdn ]; + AVAs[ irdn ].la_attr = slap_schema.si_ad_cn->ad_cname; + ber_str2bv( user_realm, 0, 0, &AVAs[ irdn ].la_value ); + AVAs[ irdn ].la_flags = LDAP_AVA_NULL; + AVAs[ irdn ].la_private = NULL; + RDNs[ irdn ][ 1 ] = NULL; + } + + if ( !BER_BVISNULL( mech ) ) { + irdn++; + DN[ irdn ] = RDNs[ irdn ]; + RDNs[ irdn ][ 0 ] = &AVAs[ irdn ]; + AVAs[ irdn ].la_attr = slap_schema.si_ad_cn->ad_cname; + AVAs[ irdn ].la_value = *mech; + AVAs[ irdn ].la_flags = LDAP_AVA_NULL; + AVAs[ irdn ].la_private = NULL; + RDNs[ irdn ][ 1 ] = NULL; + } + + irdn++; + DN[ irdn ] = RDNs[ irdn ]; + RDNs[ irdn ][ 0 ] = &AVAs[ irdn ]; + AVAs[ irdn ].la_attr = slap_schema.si_ad_cn->ad_cname; + BER_BVSTR( &AVAs[ irdn ].la_value, "auth" ); + AVAs[ irdn ].la_flags = LDAP_AVA_NULL; + AVAs[ irdn ].la_private = NULL; + RDNs[ irdn ][ 1 ] = NULL; + + irdn++; + DN[ irdn ] = NULL; + + rc = ldap_dn2bv_x( DN, dn, LDAP_DN_FORMAT_LDAPV3, + op->o_tmpmemctx ); + if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) { + BER_BVZERO( dn ); + return rc; + } + + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, + "slap_sasl_getdn: u:id converted to %s\n", + dn->bv_val, 0, 0 ); + + } else { + + /* Dup the DN in any case, so we don't risk + * leaks or dangling pointers later, + * and the DN value is '\0' terminated */ + ber_dupbv_x( &dn2, dn, op->o_tmpmemctx ); + dn->bv_val = dn2.bv_val; + } + + /* All strings are in DN form now. Normalize if needed. */ + if ( do_norm ) { + rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, dn, &dn2, op->o_tmpmemctx ); + + /* User DNs were constructed above and must be freed now */ + slap_sl_free( dn->bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx ); + + if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) { + BER_BVZERO( dn ); + return rc; + } + *dn = dn2; + } + + /* Run thru regexp */ + slap_sasl2dn( op, dn, &dn2, flags ); + if( !BER_BVISNULL( &dn2 ) ) { + slap_sl_free( dn->bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx ); + *dn = dn2; + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, + "slap_sasl_getdn: dn:id converted to %s\n", + dn->bv_val, 0, 0 ); + } + + return( LDAP_SUCCESS ); +} |