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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-05-06 01:26:58 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-05-06 01:26:58 +0000
commit999ae6be3243c7b4a815247199447b53c39a3d65 (patch)
tree1f35b42b5e5f462d35ba452e4dcfa188ce0543fd /PROTOCOL.krl
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadopenssh-999ae6be3243c7b4a815247199447b53c39a3d65.tar.xz
openssh-999ae6be3243c7b4a815247199447b53c39a3d65.zip
Adding upstream version 1:7.9p1.upstream/1%7.9p1upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
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+This describes the key/certificate revocation list format for OpenSSH.
+
+1. Overall format
+
+The KRL consists of a header and zero or more sections. The header is:
+
+#define KRL_MAGIC 0x5353484b524c0a00ULL /* "SSHKRL\n\0" */
+#define KRL_FORMAT_VERSION 1
+
+ uint64 KRL_MAGIC
+ uint32 KRL_FORMAT_VERSION
+ uint64 krl_version
+ uint64 generated_date
+ uint64 flags
+ string reserved
+ string comment
+
+Where "krl_version" is a version number that increases each time the KRL
+is modified, "generated_date" is the time in seconds since 1970-01-01
+00:00:00 UTC that the KRL was generated, "comment" is an optional comment
+and "reserved" an extension field whose contents are currently ignored.
+No "flags" are currently defined.
+
+Following the header are zero or more sections, each consisting of:
+
+ byte section_type
+ string section_data
+
+Where "section_type" indicates the type of the "section_data". An exception
+to this is the KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE section, that has a slightly different
+format (see below).
+
+The available section types are:
+
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES 1
+#define KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY 2
+#define KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1 3
+#define KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE 4
+#define KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA256 5
+
+2. Certificate section
+
+These sections use type KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES to revoke certificates by
+serial number or key ID. The consist of the CA key that issued the
+certificates to be revoked and a reserved field whose contents is currently
+ignored.
+
+ string ca_key
+ string reserved
+
+Where "ca_key" is the standard SSH wire serialisation of the CA's
+public key. Alternately, "ca_key" may be an empty string to indicate
+the certificate section applies to all CAs (this is most useful when
+revoking key IDs).
+
+Followed by one or more sections:
+
+ byte cert_section_type
+ string cert_section_data
+
+The certificate section types are:
+
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST 0x20
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE 0x21
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP 0x22
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID 0x23
+
+2.1 Certificate serial list section
+
+This section is identified as KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST. It revokes
+certificates by listing their serial numbers. The cert_section_data in this
+case contains:
+
+ uint64 revoked_cert_serial
+ uint64 ...
+
+This section may appear multiple times.
+
+2.2. Certificate serial range section
+
+These sections use type KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE and hold
+a range of serial numbers of certificates:
+
+ uint64 serial_min
+ uint64 serial_max
+
+All certificates in the range serial_min <= serial <= serial_max are
+revoked.
+
+This section may appear multiple times.
+
+2.3. Certificate serial bitmap section
+
+Bitmap sections use type KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP and revoke keys
+by listing their serial number in a bitmap.
+
+ uint64 serial_offset
+ mpint revoked_keys_bitmap
+
+A bit set at index N in the bitmap corresponds to revocation of a keys with
+serial number (serial_offset + N).
+
+This section may appear multiple times.
+
+2.4. Revoked key ID sections
+
+KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID sections revoke particular certificate "key
+ID" strings. This may be useful in revoking all certificates
+associated with a particular identity, e.g. a host or a user.
+
+ string key_id[0]
+ ...
+
+This section must contain at least one "key_id". This section may appear
+multiple times.
+
+3. Explicit key sections
+
+These sections, identified as KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY, revoke keys
+(not certificates). They are less space efficient than serial numbers,
+but are able to revoke plain keys.
+
+ string public_key_blob[0]
+ ....
+
+This section must contain at least one "public_key_blob". The blob
+must be a raw key (i.e. not a certificate).
+
+This section may appear multiple times.
+
+4. SHA1/SHA256 fingerprint sections
+
+These sections, identified as KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1 and
+KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA256, revoke plain keys (i.e. not
+certificates) by listing their hashes:
+
+ string public_key_hash[0]
+ ....
+
+This section must contain at least one "public_key_hash". The hash blob
+is obtained by taking the SHA1 or SHA256 hash of the public key blob.
+Hashes in this section must appear in numeric order, treating each hash
+as a big-endian integer.
+
+This section may appear multiple times.
+
+5. KRL signature sections
+
+The KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE section serves a different purpose to the
+preceding ones: to provide cryptographic authentication of a KRL that
+is retrieved over a channel that does not provide integrity protection.
+Its format is slightly different to the previously-described sections:
+in order to simplify the signature generation, it includes as a "body"
+two string components instead of one.
+
+ byte KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE
+ string signature_key
+ string signature
+
+The signature is calculated over the entire KRL from the KRL_MAGIC
+to this subsection's "signature_key", including both and using the
+signature generation rules appropriate for the type of "signature_key".
+
+This section must appear last in the KRL. If multiple signature sections
+appear, they must appear consecutively at the end of the KRL file.
+
+Implementations that retrieve KRLs over untrusted channels must verify
+signatures. Signature sections are optional for KRLs distributed by
+trusted means.
+
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.krl,v 1.5 2018/09/12 01:21:34 djm Exp $