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-rw-r--r--auth-pam.c1349
1 files changed, 1349 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1dec53e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth-pam.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1349 @@
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and
+ * NAI Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc.
+ * under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the
+ * DARPA CHATS research program.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003,2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2003,2004 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* Based on FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam-freebsd.c,v 1.11 2003/03/31 13:48:18 des */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+#if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H)
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
+#elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H)
+#include <pam/pam_appl.h>
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE)
+extern char *__progname;
+# define SSHD_PAM_SERVICE __progname
+#endif
+
+/* OpenGroup RFC86.0 and XSSO specify no "const" on arguments */
+#ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE
+# define sshpam_const /* Solaris, HP-UX, SunOS */
+#else
+# define sshpam_const const /* LinuxPAM, OpenPAM, AIX */
+#endif
+
+/* Ambiguity in spec: is it an array of pointers or a pointer to an array? */
+#ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE
+# define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((*(msg))[(n)].member)
+#else
+# define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((msg)[(n)]->member)
+#endif
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-pam.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
+extern u_int utmp_len;
+
+/* so we don't silently change behaviour */
+#ifdef USE_POSIX_THREADS
+# error "USE_POSIX_THREADS replaced by UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Formerly known as USE_POSIX_THREADS, using this is completely unsupported
+ * and generally a bad idea. Use at own risk and do not expect support if
+ * this breaks.
+ */
+#ifdef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
+#include <pthread.h>
+/*
+ * Avoid namespace clash when *not* using pthreads for systems *with*
+ * pthreads, which unconditionally define pthread_t via sys/types.h
+ * (e.g. Linux)
+ */
+typedef pthread_t sp_pthread_t;
+#else
+typedef pid_t sp_pthread_t;
+#define pthread_exit fake_pthread_exit
+#define pthread_create fake_pthread_create
+#define pthread_cancel fake_pthread_cancel
+#define pthread_join fake_pthread_join
+#endif
+
+struct pam_ctxt {
+ sp_pthread_t pam_thread;
+ int pam_psock;
+ int pam_csock;
+ int pam_done;
+};
+
+static void sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
+static struct pam_ctxt *cleanup_ctxt;
+
+#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
+/*
+ * Simulate threads with processes.
+ */
+
+static int sshpam_thread_status = -1;
+static mysig_t sshpam_oldsig;
+
+static void
+sshpam_sigchld_handler(int sig)
+{
+ signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+ if (cleanup_ctxt == NULL)
+ return; /* handler called after PAM cleanup, shouldn't happen */
+ if (waitpid(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, &sshpam_thread_status, WNOHANG)
+ <= 0) {
+ /* PAM thread has not exitted, privsep slave must have */
+ kill(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, SIGTERM);
+ while (waitpid(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread,
+ &sshpam_thread_status, 0) == -1) {
+ if (errno == EINTR)
+ continue;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ if (WIFSIGNALED(sshpam_thread_status) &&
+ WTERMSIG(sshpam_thread_status) == SIGTERM)
+ return; /* terminated by pthread_cancel */
+ if (!WIFEXITED(sshpam_thread_status))
+ sigdie("PAM: authentication thread exited unexpectedly");
+ if (WEXITSTATUS(sshpam_thread_status) != 0)
+ sigdie("PAM: authentication thread exited uncleanly");
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+pthread_exit(void *value)
+{
+ _exit(0);
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+pthread_create(sp_pthread_t *thread, const void *attr,
+ void *(*thread_start)(void *), void *arg)
+{
+ pid_t pid;
+ struct pam_ctxt *ctx = arg;
+
+ sshpam_thread_status = -1;
+ switch ((pid = fork())) {
+ case -1:
+ error("fork(): %s", strerror(errno));
+ return (-1);
+ case 0:
+ close(ctx->pam_psock);
+ ctx->pam_psock = -1;
+ thread_start(arg);
+ _exit(1);
+ default:
+ *thread = pid;
+ close(ctx->pam_csock);
+ ctx->pam_csock = -1;
+ sshpam_oldsig = signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_sigchld_handler);
+ return (0);
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+pthread_cancel(sp_pthread_t thread)
+{
+ signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig);
+ return (kill(thread, SIGTERM));
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+pthread_join(sp_pthread_t thread, void **value)
+{
+ int status;
+
+ if (sshpam_thread_status != -1)
+ return (sshpam_thread_status);
+ signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig);
+ while (waitpid(thread, &status, 0) == -1) {
+ if (errno == EINTR)
+ continue;
+ fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ return (status);
+}
+#endif
+
+
+static pam_handle_t *sshpam_handle = NULL;
+static int sshpam_err = 0;
+static int sshpam_authenticated = 0;
+static int sshpam_session_open = 0;
+static int sshpam_cred_established = 0;
+static int sshpam_account_status = -1;
+static int sshpam_maxtries_reached = 0;
+static char **sshpam_env = NULL;
+static Authctxt *sshpam_authctxt = NULL;
+static const char *sshpam_password = NULL;
+
+/* Some PAM implementations don't implement this */
+#ifndef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST
+static char **
+pam_getenvlist(pam_handle_t *pamh)
+{
+ /*
+ * XXX - If necessary, we can still support envrionment passing
+ * for platforms without pam_getenvlist by searching for known
+ * env vars (e.g. KRB5CCNAME) from the PAM environment.
+ */
+ return NULL;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Some platforms, notably Solaris, do not enforce password complexity
+ * rules during pam_chauthtok() if the real uid of the calling process
+ * is 0, on the assumption that it's being called by "passwd" run by root.
+ * This wraps pam_chauthtok and sets/restore the real uid so PAM will do
+ * the right thing.
+ */
+#ifdef SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID
+static int
+sshpam_chauthtok_ruid(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags)
+{
+ int result;
+
+ if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("PAM: sshpam_authctxt not initialized");
+ if (setreuid(sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, -1) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: setreuid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ result = pam_chauthtok(pamh, flags);
+ if (setreuid(0, -1) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: setreuid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ return result;
+}
+# define pam_chauthtok(a,b) (sshpam_chauthtok_ruid((a), (b)))
+#endif
+
+void
+sshpam_password_change_required(int reqd)
+{
+ extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
+ static int saved_port, saved_agent, saved_x11;
+
+ debug3("%s %d", __func__, reqd);
+ if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: PAM authctxt not initialized", __func__);
+ sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange = reqd;
+ if (reqd) {
+ saved_port = auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag;
+ saved_agent = auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag;
+ saved_x11 = auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag;
+ auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 0;
+ auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
+ auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 0;
+ } else {
+ if (saved_port)
+ auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag = saved_port;
+ if (saved_agent)
+ auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = saved_agent;
+ if (saved_x11)
+ auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = saved_x11;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Import regular and PAM environment from subprocess */
+static void
+import_environments(struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+ char *env;
+ u_int n, i, num_env;
+ int r;
+
+ debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
+
+#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
+ /* Import variables set by do_pam_account */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &n)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (n > INT_MAX)
+ fatal("%s: invalid PAM account status %u", __func__, n);
+ sshpam_account_status = (int)n;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &n)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ sshpam_password_change_required(n != 0);
+
+ /* Import environment from subprocess */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &num_env)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (num_env > 1024)
+ fatal("%s: received %u environment variables, expected <= 1024",
+ __func__, num_env);
+ sshpam_env = xcalloc(num_env + 1, sizeof(*sshpam_env));
+ debug3("PAM: num env strings %d", num_env);
+ for(i = 0; i < num_env; i++) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &(sshpam_env[i]), NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ sshpam_env[num_env] = NULL;
+
+ /* Import PAM environment from subprocess */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &num_env)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ debug("PAM: num PAM env strings %d", num_env);
+ for (i = 0; i < num_env; i++) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &env, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+#ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
+ /* Errors are not fatal here */
+ if ((r = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, env)) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ error("PAM: pam_putenv: %s",
+ pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, r));
+ }
+#endif
+ /* XXX leak env? */
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Conversation function for authentication thread.
+ */
+static int
+sshpam_thread_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
+ struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *buffer;
+ struct pam_ctxt *ctxt;
+ struct pam_response *reply;
+ int r, i;
+ u_char status;
+
+ debug3("PAM: %s entering, %d messages", __func__, n);
+ *resp = NULL;
+
+ if (data == NULL) {
+ error("PAM: conversation function passed a null context");
+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+ }
+ ctxt = data;
+ if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+
+ if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
+ return PAM_CONV_ERR;
+ if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ free(reply);
+ return PAM_CONV_ERR;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
+ switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
+ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
+ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer,
+ PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock,
+ PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), buffer) == -1)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_csock, buffer) == -1)
+ goto fail;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buffer, &status)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (status != PAM_AUTHTOK)
+ goto fail;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buffer,
+ &reply[i].resp, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ break;
+ case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+ case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer,
+ PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock,
+ PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), buffer) == -1)
+ goto fail;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ sshbuf_reset(buffer);
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(buffer);
+ *resp = reply;
+ return (PAM_SUCCESS);
+
+ fail:
+ for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ free(reply[i].resp);
+ }
+ free(reply);
+ sshbuf_free(buffer);
+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Authentication thread.
+ */
+static void *
+sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
+{
+ struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp;
+ struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL;
+ struct pam_conv sshpam_conv;
+ int r, flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ?
+ PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0);
+#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
+ extern char **environ;
+ char **env_from_pam;
+ u_int i;
+ const char *pam_user;
+ const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user;
+ char *tz = getenv("TZ");
+
+ sshpam_err = pam_get_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_USER,
+ (sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user);
+ if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ goto auth_fail;
+
+ environ[0] = NULL;
+ if (tz != NULL)
+ if (setenv("TZ", tz, 1) == -1)
+ error("PAM: could not set TZ environment: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+
+ if (sshpam_authctxt != NULL) {
+ setproctitle("%s [pam]",
+ sshpam_authctxt->valid ? pam_user : "unknown");
+ }
+#endif
+
+ sshpam_conv.conv = sshpam_thread_conv;
+ sshpam_conv.appdata_ptr = ctxt;
+
+ if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: PAM authctxt not initialized", __func__);
+
+ if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+
+ sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
+ (const void *)&sshpam_conv);
+ if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ goto auth_fail;
+ sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags);
+ if (sshpam_err == PAM_MAXTRIES)
+ sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1);
+ if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ goto auth_fail;
+
+ if (!do_pam_account()) {
+ sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
+ goto auth_fail;
+ }
+ if (sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange) {
+ sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle,
+ PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
+ if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ goto auth_fail;
+ sshpam_password_change_required(0);
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, "OK")) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
+ /* Export variables set by do_pam_account */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, sshpam_account_status)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ /* Export any environment strings set in child */
+ for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ /* Count */
+ if (i > INT_MAX)
+ fatal("%s: too many enviornment strings", __func__);
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, i)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, environ[i])) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ /* Export any environment strings set by PAM in child */
+ env_from_pam = pam_getenvlist(sshpam_handle);
+ for (i = 0; env_from_pam != NULL && env_from_pam[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ /* Count */
+ if (i > INT_MAX)
+ fatal("%s: too many PAM enviornment strings", __func__);
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, i)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ for (i = 0; env_from_pam != NULL && env_from_pam[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, env_from_pam[i])) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+#endif /* UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK */
+
+ /* XXX - can't do much about an error here */
+ ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, sshpam_err, buffer);
+ sshbuf_free(buffer);
+ pthread_exit(NULL);
+
+ auth_fail:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer,
+ pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err))) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ /* XXX - can't do much about an error here */
+ if (sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
+ ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED, buffer);
+ else if (sshpam_maxtries_reached)
+ ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MAXTRIES, buffer);
+ else
+ ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_AUTH_ERR, buffer);
+ sshbuf_free(buffer);
+ pthread_exit(NULL);
+
+ return (NULL); /* Avoid warning for non-pthread case */
+}
+
+void
+sshpam_thread_cleanup(void)
+{
+ struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = cleanup_ctxt;
+
+ debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
+ if (ctxt != NULL && ctxt->pam_thread != 0) {
+ pthread_cancel(ctxt->pam_thread);
+ pthread_join(ctxt->pam_thread, NULL);
+ close(ctxt->pam_psock);
+ close(ctxt->pam_csock);
+ memset(ctxt, 0, sizeof(*ctxt));
+ cleanup_ctxt = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+sshpam_null_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
+ struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+{
+ debug3("PAM: %s entering, %d messages", __func__, n);
+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+}
+
+static struct pam_conv null_conv = { sshpam_null_conv, NULL };
+
+static int
+sshpam_store_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
+ struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+{
+ struct pam_response *reply;
+ int r, i;
+
+ debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n);
+ *resp = NULL;
+
+ if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+
+ if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
+ switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
+ case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+ case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, "%s\n",
+ PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+ *resp = reply;
+ return (PAM_SUCCESS);
+
+ fail:
+ for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ free(reply[i].resp);
+ }
+ free(reply);
+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+}
+
+static struct pam_conv store_conv = { sshpam_store_conv, NULL };
+
+void
+sshpam_cleanup(void)
+{
+ if (sshpam_handle == NULL || (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor()))
+ return;
+ debug("PAM: cleanup");
+ pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&null_conv);
+ if (sshpam_session_open) {
+ debug("PAM: closing session");
+ pam_close_session(sshpam_handle, PAM_SILENT);
+ sshpam_session_open = 0;
+ }
+ if (sshpam_cred_established) {
+ debug("PAM: deleting credentials");
+ pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_DELETE_CRED);
+ sshpam_cred_established = 0;
+ }
+ sshpam_authenticated = 0;
+ pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
+ sshpam_handle = NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+sshpam_init(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ const char *pam_rhost, *pam_user, *user = authctxt->user;
+ const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user;
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+
+ if (sshpam_handle != NULL) {
+ /* We already have a PAM context; check if the user matches */
+ sshpam_err = pam_get_item(sshpam_handle,
+ PAM_USER, (sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user);
+ if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && strcmp(user, pam_user) == 0)
+ return (0);
+ pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
+ sshpam_handle = NULL;
+ }
+ debug("PAM: initializing for \"%s\"", user);
+ sshpam_err =
+ pam_start(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE, user, &store_conv, &sshpam_handle);
+ sshpam_authctxt = authctxt;
+
+ if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
+ sshpam_handle = NULL;
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ pam_rhost = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
+ debug("PAM: setting PAM_RHOST to \"%s\"", pam_rhost);
+ sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_RHOST, pam_rhost);
+ if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
+ sshpam_handle = NULL;
+ return (-1);
+ }
+#ifdef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE
+ /*
+ * Some silly PAM modules (e.g. pam_time) require a TTY to operate.
+ * sshd doesn't set the tty until too late in the auth process and
+ * may not even set one (for tty-less connections)
+ */
+ debug("PAM: setting PAM_TTY to \"ssh\"");
+ sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_TTY, "ssh");
+ if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
+ sshpam_handle = NULL;
+ return (-1);
+ }
+#endif
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static void
+expose_authinfo(const char *caller)
+{
+ char *auth_info;
+
+ /*
+ * Expose authentication information to PAM.
+ * The environment variable is versioned. Please increment the
+ * version suffix if the format of session_info changes.
+ */
+ if (sshpam_authctxt->session_info == NULL)
+ auth_info = xstrdup("");
+ else if ((auth_info = sshbuf_dup_string(
+ sshpam_authctxt->session_info)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
+
+ debug2("%s: auth information in SSH_AUTH_INFO_0", caller);
+ do_pam_putenv("SSH_AUTH_INFO_0", auth_info);
+ free(auth_info);
+}
+
+static void *
+sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ struct pam_ctxt *ctxt;
+ int socks[2];
+
+ debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
+ /*
+ * Refuse to start if we don't have PAM enabled or do_pam_account
+ * has previously failed.
+ */
+ if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_account_status == 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* Initialize PAM */
+ if (sshpam_init(authctxt) == -1) {
+ error("PAM: initialization failed");
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+
+ expose_authinfo(__func__);
+ ctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof *ctxt);
+
+ /* Start the authentication thread */
+ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, PF_UNSPEC, socks) == -1) {
+ error("PAM: failed create sockets: %s", strerror(errno));
+ free(ctxt);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ ctxt->pam_psock = socks[0];
+ ctxt->pam_csock = socks[1];
+ if (pthread_create(&ctxt->pam_thread, NULL, sshpam_thread, ctxt) == -1) {
+ error("PAM: failed to start authentication thread: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ close(socks[0]);
+ close(socks[1]);
+ free(ctxt);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ cleanup_ctxt = ctxt;
+ return (ctxt);
+}
+
+static int
+sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
+ u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
+{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ struct sshbuf *buffer;
+ struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx;
+ size_t plen;
+ u_char type;
+ char *msg;
+ size_t len, mlen;
+ int r;
+
+ debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
+ if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ *name = xstrdup("");
+ *info = xstrdup("");
+ *prompts = xmalloc(sizeof(char *));
+ **prompts = NULL;
+ plen = 0;
+ *echo_on = xmalloc(sizeof(u_int));
+ while (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_psock, buffer) == 0) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buffer, &type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buffer, &msg, &mlen)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ switch (type) {
+ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
+ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
+ *num = 1;
+ len = plen + mlen + 1;
+ **prompts = xreallocarray(**prompts, 1, len);
+ strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen);
+ plen += mlen;
+ **echo_on = (type == PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON);
+ free(msg);
+ return (0);
+ case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+ case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+ /* accumulate messages */
+ len = plen + mlen + 2;
+ **prompts = xreallocarray(**prompts, 1, len);
+ strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen);
+ plen += mlen;
+ strlcat(**prompts + plen, "\n", len - plen);
+ plen++;
+ free(msg);
+ break;
+ case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED:
+ case PAM_MAXTRIES:
+ if (type == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
+ sshpam_account_status = 0;
+ if (type == PAM_MAXTRIES)
+ sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1);
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case PAM_AUTH_ERR:
+ debug3("PAM: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, type));
+ if (**prompts != NULL && strlen(**prompts) != 0) {
+ *info = **prompts;
+ **prompts = NULL;
+ *num = 0;
+ **echo_on = 0;
+ ctxt->pam_done = -1;
+ free(msg);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case PAM_SUCCESS:
+ if (**prompts != NULL) {
+ /* drain any accumulated messages */
+ debug("PAM: %s", **prompts);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, **prompts,
+ strlen(**prompts))) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ free(**prompts);
+ **prompts = NULL;
+ }
+ if (type == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ if (!sshpam_authctxt->valid ||
+ (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
+ options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
+ fatal("Internal error: PAM auth "
+ "succeeded when it should have "
+ "failed");
+ import_environments(buffer);
+ *num = 0;
+ **echo_on = 0;
+ ctxt->pam_done = 1;
+ free(msg);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ error("PAM: %s for %s%.100s from %.100s", msg,
+ sshpam_authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ",
+ sshpam_authctxt->user,
+ auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns));
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default:
+ *num = 0;
+ **echo_on = 0;
+ free(msg);
+ ctxt->pam_done = -1;
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ }
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns a junk password of identical length to that the user supplied.
+ * Used to mitigate timing attacks against crypt(3)/PAM stacks that
+ * vary processing time in proportion to password length.
+ */
+static char *
+fake_password(const char *wire_password)
+{
+ const char junk[] = "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT";
+ char *ret = NULL;
+ size_t i, l = wire_password != NULL ? strlen(wire_password) : 0;
+
+ if (l >= INT_MAX)
+ fatal("%s: password length too long: %zu", __func__, l);
+
+ ret = malloc(l + 1);
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < l; i++)
+ ret[i] = junk[i % (sizeof(junk) - 1)];
+ ret[i] = '\0';
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* XXX - see also comment in auth-chall.c:verify_response */
+static int
+sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *buffer;
+ struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx;
+ char *fake;
+ int r;
+
+ debug2("PAM: %s entering, %u responses", __func__, num);
+ switch (ctxt->pam_done) {
+ case 1:
+ sshpam_authenticated = 1;
+ return (0);
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ default:
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ if (num != 1) {
+ error("PAM: expected one response, got %u", num);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if (sshpam_authctxt->valid &&
+ (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid != 0 ||
+ options.permit_root_login == PERMIT_YES)) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, *resp)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ } else {
+ fake = fake_password(*resp);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, fake)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ free(fake);
+ }
+ if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_psock, PAM_AUTHTOK, buffer) == -1) {
+ sshbuf_free(buffer);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(buffer);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+static void
+sshpam_free_ctx(void *ctxtp)
+{
+ struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp;
+
+ debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
+ sshpam_thread_cleanup();
+ free(ctxt);
+ /*
+ * We don't call sshpam_cleanup() here because we may need the PAM
+ * handle at a later stage, e.g. when setting up a session. It's
+ * still on the cleanup list, so pam_end() *will* be called before
+ * the server process terminates.
+ */
+}
+
+KbdintDevice sshpam_device = {
+ "pam",
+ sshpam_init_ctx,
+ sshpam_query,
+ sshpam_respond,
+ sshpam_free_ctx
+};
+
+KbdintDevice mm_sshpam_device = {
+ "pam",
+ mm_sshpam_init_ctx,
+ mm_sshpam_query,
+ mm_sshpam_respond,
+ mm_sshpam_free_ctx
+};
+
+/*
+ * This replaces auth-pam.c
+ */
+void
+start_pam(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ if (!options.use_pam)
+ fatal("PAM: initialisation requested when UsePAM=no");
+
+ if (sshpam_init(authctxt) == -1)
+ fatal("PAM: initialisation failed");
+}
+
+void
+finish_pam(void)
+{
+ sshpam_cleanup();
+}
+
+
+u_int
+do_pam_account(void)
+{
+ debug("%s: called", __func__);
+ if (sshpam_account_status != -1)
+ return (sshpam_account_status);
+
+ expose_authinfo(__func__);
+
+ sshpam_err = pam_acct_mgmt(sshpam_handle, 0);
+ debug3("PAM: %s pam_acct_mgmt = %d (%s)", __func__, sshpam_err,
+ pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+
+ if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS && sshpam_err != PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) {
+ sshpam_account_status = 0;
+ return (sshpam_account_status);
+ }
+
+ if (sshpam_err == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD)
+ sshpam_password_change_required(1);
+
+ sshpam_account_status = 1;
+ return (sshpam_account_status);
+}
+
+void
+do_pam_setcred(int init)
+{
+ sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
+ (const void *)&store_conv);
+ if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s",
+ pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+ if (init) {
+ debug("PAM: establishing credentials");
+ sshpam_err = pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED);
+ } else {
+ debug("PAM: reinitializing credentials");
+ sshpam_err = pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
+ }
+ if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ sshpam_cred_established = 1;
+ return;
+ }
+ if (sshpam_authenticated)
+ fatal("PAM: pam_setcred(): %s",
+ pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+ else
+ debug("PAM: pam_setcred(): %s",
+ pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+}
+
+static int
+sshpam_tty_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
+ struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+{
+ char input[PAM_MAX_MSG_SIZE];
+ struct pam_response *reply;
+ int i;
+
+ debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n);
+
+ *resp = NULL;
+
+ if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG || !isatty(STDIN_FILENO))
+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+
+ if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
+ switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
+ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
+ reply[i].resp =
+ read_passphrase(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg),
+ RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ break;
+ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
+ if (fgets(input, sizeof input, stdin) == NULL)
+ input[0] = '\0';
+ if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(input)) == NULL)
+ goto fail;
+ reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ break;
+ case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+ case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
+ reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+ *resp = reply;
+ return (PAM_SUCCESS);
+
+ fail:
+ for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ free(reply[i].resp);
+ }
+ free(reply);
+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+}
+
+static struct pam_conv tty_conv = { sshpam_tty_conv, NULL };
+
+/*
+ * XXX this should be done in the authentication phase, but ssh1 doesn't
+ * support that
+ */
+void
+do_pam_chauthtok(void)
+{
+ if (use_privsep)
+ fatal("Password expired (unable to change with privsep)");
+ sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
+ (const void *)&tty_conv);
+ if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s",
+ pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+ debug("PAM: changing password");
+ sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
+ if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ fatal("PAM: pam_chauthtok(): %s",
+ pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+}
+
+void
+do_pam_session(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ debug3("PAM: opening session");
+
+ expose_authinfo(__func__);
+
+ sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
+ (const void *)&store_conv);
+ if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s",
+ pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+ sshpam_err = pam_open_session(sshpam_handle, 0);
+ if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS)
+ sshpam_session_open = 1;
+ else {
+ sshpam_session_open = 0;
+ auth_restrict_session(ssh);
+ error("PAM: pam_open_session(): %s",
+ pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+ }
+
+}
+
+int
+is_pam_session_open(void)
+{
+ return sshpam_session_open;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set a PAM environment string. We need to do this so that the session
+ * modules can handle things like Kerberos/GSI credentials that appear
+ * during the ssh authentication process.
+ */
+int
+do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
+{
+ int ret = 1;
+#ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
+ char *compound;
+ size_t len;
+
+ len = strlen(name) + strlen(value) + 2;
+ compound = xmalloc(len);
+
+ snprintf(compound, len, "%s=%s", name, value);
+ ret = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, compound);
+ free(compound);
+#endif
+
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+char **
+fetch_pam_child_environment(void)
+{
+ return sshpam_env;
+}
+
+char **
+fetch_pam_environment(void)
+{
+ return (pam_getenvlist(sshpam_handle));
+}
+
+void
+free_pam_environment(char **env)
+{
+ char **envp;
+
+ if (env == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ for (envp = env; *envp; envp++)
+ free(*envp);
+ free(env);
+}
+
+/*
+ * "Blind" conversation function for password authentication. Assumes that
+ * echo-off prompts are for the password and stores messages for later
+ * display.
+ */
+static int
+sshpam_passwd_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
+ struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+{
+ struct pam_response *reply;
+ int r, i;
+ size_t len;
+
+ debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n);
+
+ *resp = NULL;
+
+ if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+
+ if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
+ switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
+ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
+ if (sshpam_password == NULL)
+ goto fail;
+ if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(sshpam_password)) == NULL)
+ goto fail;
+ reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ break;
+ case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+ case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+ len = strlen(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
+ if (len > 0) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, "%s\n",
+ PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ if ((reply[i].resp = strdup("")) == NULL)
+ goto fail;
+ reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+ *resp = reply;
+ return (PAM_SUCCESS);
+
+ fail:
+ for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ free(reply[i].resp);
+ }
+ free(reply);
+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+}
+
+static struct pam_conv passwd_conv = { sshpam_passwd_conv, NULL };
+
+/*
+ * Attempt password authentication via PAM
+ */
+int
+sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+{
+ int flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ?
+ PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0);
+ char *fake = NULL;
+
+ if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_handle == NULL)
+ fatal("PAM: %s called when PAM disabled or failed to "
+ "initialise.", __func__);
+
+ sshpam_password = password;
+ sshpam_authctxt = authctxt;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user logging in is invalid, or is root but is not permitted
+ * by PermitRootLogin, use an invalid password to prevent leaking
+ * information via timing (eg if the PAM config has a delay on fail).
+ */
+ if (!authctxt->valid || (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
+ options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
+ sshpam_password = fake = fake_password(password);
+
+ sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
+ (const void *)&passwd_conv);
+ if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ fatal("PAM: %s: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", __func__,
+ pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+
+ sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags);
+ sshpam_password = NULL;
+ free(fake);
+ if (sshpam_err == PAM_MAXTRIES)
+ sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1);
+ if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && authctxt->valid) {
+ debug("PAM: password authentication accepted for %.100s",
+ authctxt->user);
+ return 1;
+ } else {
+ debug("PAM: password authentication failed for %.100s: %s",
+ authctxt->valid ? authctxt->user : "an illegal user",
+ pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+int
+sshpam_get_maxtries_reached(void)
+{
+ return sshpam_maxtries_reached;
+}
+
+void
+sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(int reached)
+{
+ if (reached == 0 || sshpam_maxtries_reached)
+ return;
+ sshpam_maxtries_reached = 1;
+ options.password_authentication = 0;
+ options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
+ options.challenge_response_authentication = 0;
+}
+#endif /* USE_PAM */