From 999ae6be3243c7b4a815247199447b53c39a3d65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Baumann Date: Mon, 6 May 2024 03:26:58 +0200 Subject: Adding upstream version 1:7.9p1. Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann --- dns.c | 356 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 356 insertions(+) create mode 100644 dns.c (limited to 'dns.c') diff --git a/dns.c b/dns.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ff1a2c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/dns.c @@ -0,0 +1,356 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.38 2018/02/23 15:58:37 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2003 Jakob Schlyter. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "dns.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "digest.h" + +static const char *errset_text[] = { + "success", /* 0 ERRSET_SUCCESS */ + "out of memory", /* 1 ERRSET_NOMEMORY */ + "general failure", /* 2 ERRSET_FAIL */ + "invalid parameter", /* 3 ERRSET_INVAL */ + "name does not exist", /* 4 ERRSET_NONAME */ + "data does not exist", /* 5 ERRSET_NODATA */ +}; + +static const char * +dns_result_totext(unsigned int res) +{ + switch (res) { + case ERRSET_SUCCESS: + return errset_text[ERRSET_SUCCESS]; + case ERRSET_NOMEMORY: + return errset_text[ERRSET_NOMEMORY]; + case ERRSET_FAIL: + return errset_text[ERRSET_FAIL]; + case ERRSET_INVAL: + return errset_text[ERRSET_INVAL]; + case ERRSET_NONAME: + return errset_text[ERRSET_NONAME]; + case ERRSET_NODATA: + return errset_text[ERRSET_NODATA]; + default: + return "unknown error"; + } +} + +/* + * Read SSHFP parameters from key buffer. + */ +static int +dns_read_key(u_int8_t *algorithm, u_int8_t *digest_type, + u_char **digest, size_t *digest_len, struct sshkey *key) +{ + int r, success = 0; + int fp_alg = -1; + + switch (key->type) { + case KEY_RSA: + *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_RSA; + if (!*digest_type) + *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA1; + break; + case KEY_DSA: + *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_DSA; + if (!*digest_type) + *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA1; + break; + case KEY_ECDSA: + *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_ECDSA; + if (!*digest_type) + *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA256; + break; + case KEY_ED25519: + *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_ED25519; + if (!*digest_type) + *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA256; + break; + case KEY_XMSS: + *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_XMSS; + if (!*digest_type) + *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA256; + break; + default: + *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED; /* 0 */ + *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED; /* 0 */ + } + + switch (*digest_type) { + case SSHFP_HASH_SHA1: + fp_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1; + break; + case SSHFP_HASH_SHA256: + fp_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA256; + break; + default: + *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED; /* 0 */ + } + + if (*algorithm && *digest_type) { + if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, fp_alg, digest, + digest_len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint_raw: %s", __func__, + ssh_err(r)); + success = 1; + } else { + *digest = NULL; + *digest_len = 0; + success = 0; + } + + return success; +} + +/* + * Read SSHFP parameters from rdata buffer. + */ +static int +dns_read_rdata(u_int8_t *algorithm, u_int8_t *digest_type, + u_char **digest, size_t *digest_len, u_char *rdata, int rdata_len) +{ + int success = 0; + + *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED; + *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED; + + if (rdata_len >= 2) { + *algorithm = rdata[0]; + *digest_type = rdata[1]; + *digest_len = rdata_len - 2; + + if (*digest_len > 0) { + *digest = xmalloc(*digest_len); + memcpy(*digest, rdata + 2, *digest_len); + } else { + *digest = (u_char *)xstrdup(""); + } + + success = 1; + } + + return success; +} + +/* + * Check if hostname is numerical. + * Returns -1 if hostname is numeric, 0 otherwise + */ +static int +is_numeric_hostname(const char *hostname) +{ + struct addrinfo hints, *ai; + + /* + * We shouldn't ever get a null host but if we do then log an error + * and return -1 which stops DNS key fingerprint processing. + */ + if (hostname == NULL) { + error("is_numeric_hostname called with NULL hostname"); + return -1; + } + + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; + hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; + + if (getaddrinfo(hostname, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) { + freeaddrinfo(ai); + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Verify the given hostname, address and host key using DNS. + * Returns 0 if lookup succeeds, -1 otherwise + */ +int +verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address, + struct sshkey *hostkey, int *flags) +{ + u_int counter; + int result; + struct rrsetinfo *fingerprints = NULL; + + u_int8_t hostkey_algorithm; + u_int8_t hostkey_digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED; + u_char *hostkey_digest; + size_t hostkey_digest_len; + + u_int8_t dnskey_algorithm; + u_int8_t dnskey_digest_type; + u_char *dnskey_digest; + size_t dnskey_digest_len; + + *flags = 0; + + debug3("verify_host_key_dns"); + if (hostkey == NULL) + fatal("No key to look up!"); + + if (is_numeric_hostname(hostname)) { + debug("skipped DNS lookup for numerical hostname"); + return -1; + } + + result = getrrsetbyname(hostname, DNS_RDATACLASS_IN, + DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, 0, &fingerprints); + if (result) { + verbose("DNS lookup error: %s", dns_result_totext(result)); + return -1; + } + + if (fingerprints->rri_flags & RRSET_VALIDATED) { + *flags |= DNS_VERIFY_SECURE; + debug("found %d secure fingerprints in DNS", + fingerprints->rri_nrdatas); + } else { + debug("found %d insecure fingerprints in DNS", + fingerprints->rri_nrdatas); + } + + /* Initialize default host key parameters */ + if (!dns_read_key(&hostkey_algorithm, &hostkey_digest_type, + &hostkey_digest, &hostkey_digest_len, hostkey)) { + error("Error calculating host key fingerprint."); + freerrset(fingerprints); + return -1; + } + + if (fingerprints->rri_nrdatas) + *flags |= DNS_VERIFY_FOUND; + + for (counter = 0; counter < fingerprints->rri_nrdatas; counter++) { + /* + * Extract the key from the answer. Ignore any badly + * formatted fingerprints. + */ + if (!dns_read_rdata(&dnskey_algorithm, &dnskey_digest_type, + &dnskey_digest, &dnskey_digest_len, + fingerprints->rri_rdatas[counter].rdi_data, + fingerprints->rri_rdatas[counter].rdi_length)) { + verbose("Error parsing fingerprint from DNS."); + continue; + } + + if (hostkey_digest_type != dnskey_digest_type) { + hostkey_digest_type = dnskey_digest_type; + free(hostkey_digest); + + /* Initialize host key parameters */ + if (!dns_read_key(&hostkey_algorithm, + &hostkey_digest_type, &hostkey_digest, + &hostkey_digest_len, hostkey)) { + error("Error calculating key fingerprint."); + freerrset(fingerprints); + return -1; + } + } + + /* Check if the current key is the same as the given key */ + if (hostkey_algorithm == dnskey_algorithm && + hostkey_digest_type == dnskey_digest_type) { + if (hostkey_digest_len == dnskey_digest_len && + timingsafe_bcmp(hostkey_digest, dnskey_digest, + hostkey_digest_len) == 0) + *flags |= DNS_VERIFY_MATCH; + } + free(dnskey_digest); + } + + free(hostkey_digest); /* from sshkey_fingerprint_raw() */ + freerrset(fingerprints); + + if (*flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) + if (*flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) + debug("matching host key fingerprint found in DNS"); + else + debug("mismatching host key fingerprint found in DNS"); + else + debug("no host key fingerprint found in DNS"); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Export the fingerprint of a key as a DNS resource record + */ +int +export_dns_rr(const char *hostname, struct sshkey *key, FILE *f, int generic) +{ + u_int8_t rdata_pubkey_algorithm = 0; + u_int8_t rdata_digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED; + u_int8_t dtype; + u_char *rdata_digest; + size_t i, rdata_digest_len; + int success = 0; + + for (dtype = SSHFP_HASH_SHA1; dtype < SSHFP_HASH_MAX; dtype++) { + rdata_digest_type = dtype; + if (dns_read_key(&rdata_pubkey_algorithm, &rdata_digest_type, + &rdata_digest, &rdata_digest_len, key)) { + if (generic) { + fprintf(f, "%s IN TYPE%d \\# %zu %02x %02x ", + hostname, DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, + 2 + rdata_digest_len, + rdata_pubkey_algorithm, rdata_digest_type); + } else { + fprintf(f, "%s IN SSHFP %d %d ", hostname, + rdata_pubkey_algorithm, rdata_digest_type); + } + for (i = 0; i < rdata_digest_len; i++) + fprintf(f, "%02x", rdata_digest[i]); + fprintf(f, "\n"); + free(rdata_digest); /* from sshkey_fingerprint_raw() */ + success = 1; + } + } + + /* No SSHFP record was generated at all */ + if (success == 0) { + error("%s: unsupported algorithm and/or digest_type", __func__); + } + + return success; +} -- cgit v1.2.3