summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/src/tls/tls_verify.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-05-06 01:46:30 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-05-06 01:46:30 +0000
commitb5896ba9f6047e7031e2bdee0622d543e11a6734 (patch)
treefd7b460593a2fee1be579bec5697e6d887ea3421 /src/tls/tls_verify.c
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadpostfix-b5896ba9f6047e7031e2bdee0622d543e11a6734.tar.xz
postfix-b5896ba9f6047e7031e2bdee0622d543e11a6734.zip
Adding upstream version 3.4.23.upstream/3.4.23upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/tls/tls_verify.c')
-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_verify.c507
1 files changed, 507 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/tls/tls_verify.c b/src/tls/tls_verify.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..85d5f64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/tls_verify.c
@@ -0,0 +1,507 @@
+/*++
+/* NAME
+/* tls_verify 3
+/* SUMMARY
+/* peer name and peer certificate verification
+/* SYNOPSIS
+/* #define TLS_INTERNAL
+/* #include <tls.h>
+/*
+/* int tls_verify_certificate_callback(ok, ctx)
+/* int ok;
+/* X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
+/*
+/* int tls_log_verify_error(TLScontext)
+/* TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext;
+/*
+/* char *tls_peer_CN(peercert, TLScontext)
+/* X509 *peercert;
+/* TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext;
+/*
+/* char *tls_issuer_CN(peercert, TLScontext)
+/* X509 *peercert;
+/* TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext;
+/*
+/* const char *tls_dns_name(gn, TLScontext)
+/* const GENERAL_NAME *gn;
+/* TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext;
+/* DESCRIPTION
+/* tls_verify_certificate_callback() is called several times (directly
+/* or indirectly) from crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c. It collects errors
+/* and trust information at each element of the trust chain.
+/* The last call at depth 0 sets the verification status based
+/* on the cumulative winner (lowest depth) of errors vs. trust.
+/* We always return 1 (continue the handshake) and handle trust
+/* and peer-name verification problems at the application level.
+/*
+/* tls_log_verify_error() (called only when we care about the
+/* peer certificate, that is not when opportunistic) logs the
+/* reason why the certificate failed to be verified.
+/*
+/* tls_peer_CN() returns the text CommonName for the peer
+/* certificate subject, or an empty string if no CommonName was
+/* found. The result is allocated with mymalloc() and must be
+/* freed by the caller; it contains UTF-8 without non-printable
+/* ASCII characters.
+/*
+/* tls_issuer_CN() returns the text CommonName for the peer
+/* certificate issuer, or an empty string if no CommonName was
+/* found. The result is allocated with mymalloc() and must be
+/* freed by the caller; it contains UTF-8 without non-printable
+/* ASCII characters.
+/*
+/* tls_dns_name() returns the string value of a GENERAL_NAME
+/* from a DNS subjectAltName extension. If non-printable characters
+/* are found, a null string is returned instead. Further sanity
+/* checks may be added if the need arises.
+/*
+/* Arguments:
+/* .IP ok
+/* Result of prior verification: non-zero means success. In
+/* order to reduce the noise level, some tests or error reports
+/* are disabled when verification failed because of some
+/* earlier problem.
+/* .IP ctx
+/* SSL application context. This links to the Postfix TLScontext
+/* with enforcement and logging options.
+/* .IP gn
+/* An OpenSSL GENERAL_NAME structure holding a DNS subjectAltName
+/* to be decoded and checked for validity.
+/* .IP peercert
+/* Server or client X.509 certificate.
+/* .IP TLScontext
+/* Server or client context for warning messages.
+/* DIAGNOSTICS
+/* tls_peer_CN(), tls_issuer_CN() and tls_dns_name() log a warning
+/* when 1) the requested information is not available in the specified
+/* certificate, 2) the result exceeds a fixed limit, 3) the result
+/* contains NUL characters or the result contains non-printable or
+/* non-ASCII characters.
+/* LICENSE
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/* This software is free. You can do with it whatever you want.
+/* The original author kindly requests that you acknowledge
+/* the use of his software.
+/* AUTHOR(S)
+/* Originally written by:
+/* Lutz Jaenicke
+/* BTU Cottbus
+/* Allgemeine Elektrotechnik
+/* Universitaetsplatz 3-4
+/* D-03044 Cottbus, Germany
+/*
+/* Updated by:
+/* Wietse Venema
+/* IBM T.J. Watson Research
+/* P.O. Box 704
+/* Yorktown Heights, NY 10598, USA
+/*
+/* Victor Duchovni
+/* Morgan Stanley
+/*--*/
+
+/* System library. */
+
+#include <sys_defs.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#ifdef USE_TLS
+#include <string.h>
+
+/* Utility library. */
+
+#include <msg.h>
+#include <mymalloc.h>
+#include <stringops.h>
+
+/* TLS library. */
+
+#define TLS_INTERNAL
+#include <tls.h>
+
+/* update_error_state - safely stash away error state */
+
+static void update_error_state(TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext, int depth,
+ X509 *errorcert, int errorcode)
+{
+ /* No news is good news */
+ if (TLScontext->errordepth >= 0 && TLScontext->errordepth <= depth)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * The certificate pointer is stable during the verification callback,
+ * but may be freed after the callback returns. Since we delay error
+ * reporting till later, we bump the refcount so we can rely on it still
+ * being there until later.
+ */
+ if (TLScontext->errorcert != 0)
+ X509_free(TLScontext->errorcert);
+ if (errorcert != 0)
+ X509_up_ref(errorcert);
+ TLScontext->errorcert = errorcert;
+ TLScontext->errorcode = errorcode;
+ TLScontext->errordepth = depth;
+}
+
+/* tls_verify_certificate_callback - verify peer certificate info */
+
+int tls_verify_certificate_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ char buf[CCERT_BUFSIZ];
+ X509 *cert;
+ int err;
+ int depth;
+ int max_depth;
+ SSL *con;
+ TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext;
+
+ /* May be NULL as of OpenSSL 1.0, thanks for the API change! */
+ cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
+ err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+ con = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
+ TLScontext = SSL_get_ex_data(con, TLScontext_index);
+ depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
+
+ /* Don't log the internal root CA unless there's an unexpected error. */
+ if (ok && TLScontext->tadepth > 0 && depth > TLScontext->tadepth)
+ return (1);
+
+ /*
+ * Certificate chain depth limit violations are mis-reported by the
+ * OpenSSL library, from SSL_CTX_set_verify(3):
+ *
+ * The certificate verification depth set with SSL[_CTX]_verify_depth()
+ * stops the verification at a certain depth. The error message produced
+ * will be that of an incomplete certificate chain and not
+ * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG as may be expected.
+ *
+ * We set a limit that is one higher than the user requested limit. If this
+ * higher limit is reached, we raise an error even a trusted root CA is
+ * present at this depth. This disambiguates trust chain truncation from
+ * an incomplete trust chain.
+ */
+ max_depth = SSL_get_verify_depth(con) - 1;
+
+ /*
+ * We never terminate the SSL handshake in the verification callback,
+ * rather we allow the TLS handshake to continue, but mark the session as
+ * unverified. The application is responsible for closing any sessions
+ * with unverified credentials.
+ */
+ if (max_depth >= 0 && depth > max_depth) {
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, err = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG);
+ ok = 0;
+ }
+ if (ok == 0)
+ update_error_state(TLScontext, depth, cert, err);
+
+ if (TLScontext->log_mask & TLS_LOG_VERBOSE) {
+ if (cert)
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), buf, sizeof(buf));
+ else
+ strcpy(buf, "<unknown>");
+ msg_info("%s: depth=%d verify=%d subject=%s",
+ TLScontext->namaddr, depth, ok, printable(buf, '?'));
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+/* tls_log_verify_error - Report final verification error status */
+
+void tls_log_verify_error(TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext)
+{
+ char buf[CCERT_BUFSIZ];
+ int err = TLScontext->errorcode;
+ X509 *cert = TLScontext->errorcert;
+ int depth = TLScontext->errordepth;
+
+#define PURPOSE ((depth>0) ? "CA": TLScontext->am_server ? "client": "server")
+
+ if (err == X509_V_OK)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Specific causes for verification failure.
+ */
+ switch (err) {
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
+
+ /*
+ * We expect the error cert to be the leaf, but it is likely
+ * sufficient to omit it from the log, even less user confusion.
+ */
+ msg_info("certificate verification failed for %s: "
+ "not trusted by local or TLSA policy", TLScontext->namaddr);
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
+ msg_info("certificate verification failed for %s: "
+ "self-signed certificate", TLScontext->namaddr);
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
+ case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
+
+ /*
+ * There is no difference between issuing cert not provided and
+ * provided, but not found in CAfile/CApath. Either way, we don't
+ * trust it.
+ */
+ if (cert)
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), buf, sizeof(buf));
+ else
+ strcpy(buf, "<unknown>");
+ msg_info("certificate verification failed for %s: untrusted issuer %s",
+ TLScontext->namaddr, printable(buf, '?'));
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
+ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
+ msg_info("%s certificate verification failed for %s: certificate not"
+ " yet valid", PURPOSE, TLScontext->namaddr);
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
+ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
+ msg_info("%s certificate verification failed for %s: certificate has"
+ " expired", PURPOSE, TLScontext->namaddr);
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
+ msg_info("certificate verification failed for %s: not designated for "
+ "use as a %s certificate", TLScontext->namaddr, PURPOSE);
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
+ msg_info("certificate verification failed for %s: "
+ "certificate chain longer than limit(%d)",
+ TLScontext->namaddr, depth - 1);
+ break;
+ default:
+ msg_info("%s certificate verification failed for %s: num=%d:%s",
+ PURPOSE, TLScontext->namaddr, err,
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+#ifndef DONT_GRIPE
+#define DONT_GRIPE 0
+#define DO_GRIPE 1
+#endif
+
+/* tls_text_name - extract certificate property value by name */
+
+static char *tls_text_name(X509_NAME *name, int nid, const char *label,
+ const TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext, int gripe)
+{
+ const char *myname = "tls_text_name";
+ int pos;
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry;
+ ASN1_STRING *entry_str;
+ int asn1_type;
+ int utf8_length;
+ unsigned char *utf8_value;
+ int ch;
+ unsigned char *cp;
+
+ if (name == 0 || (pos = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, nid, -1)) < 0) {
+ if (gripe != DONT_GRIPE) {
+ msg_warn("%s: %s: peer certificate has no %s",
+ myname, TLScontext->namaddr, label);
+ tls_print_errors();
+ }
+ return (0);
+ }
+#if 0
+
+ /*
+ * If the match is required unambiguous, insist that that no other values
+ * be present.
+ */
+ if (X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, nid, pos) >= 0) {
+ msg_warn("%s: %s: multiple %ss in peer certificate",
+ myname, TLScontext->namaddr, label);
+ return (0);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if ((entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, pos)) == 0) {
+ /* This should not happen */
+ msg_warn("%s: %s: error reading peer certificate %s entry",
+ myname, TLScontext->namaddr, label);
+ tls_print_errors();
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if ((entry_str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry)) == 0) {
+ /* This should not happen */
+ msg_warn("%s: %s: error reading peer certificate %s data",
+ myname, TLScontext->namaddr, label);
+ tls_print_errors();
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * XXX Convert everything into UTF-8. This is a super-set of ASCII, so we
+ * don't have to bother with separate code paths for ASCII-like content.
+ * If the payload is ASCII then we won't waste lots of CPU cycles
+ * converting it into UTF-8. It's up to OpenSSL to do something
+ * reasonable when converting ASCII formats that contain non-ASCII
+ * content.
+ *
+ * XXX Don't bother optimizing the string length error check. It is not
+ * worth the complexity.
+ */
+ asn1_type = ASN1_STRING_type(entry_str);
+ if ((utf8_length = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&utf8_value, entry_str)) < 0) {
+ msg_warn("%s: %s: error decoding peer %s of ASN.1 type=%d",
+ myname, TLScontext->namaddr, label, asn1_type);
+ tls_print_errors();
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * No returns without cleaning up. A good optimizer will replace multiple
+ * blocks of identical code by jumps to just one such block.
+ */
+#define TLS_TEXT_NAME_RETURN(x) do { \
+ char *__tls_text_name_temp = (x); \
+ OPENSSL_free(utf8_value); \
+ return (__tls_text_name_temp); \
+ } while (0)
+
+ /*
+ * Remove trailing null characters. They would give false alarms with the
+ * length check and with the embedded null check.
+ */
+#define TRIM0(s, l) do { while ((l) > 0 && (s)[(l)-1] == 0) --(l); } while (0)
+
+ TRIM0(utf8_value, utf8_length);
+
+ /*
+ * Enforce the length limit, because the caller will copy the result into
+ * a fixed-length buffer.
+ */
+ if (utf8_length >= CCERT_BUFSIZ) {
+ msg_warn("%s: %s: peer %s too long: %d",
+ myname, TLScontext->namaddr, label, utf8_length);
+ TLS_TEXT_NAME_RETURN(0);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Reject embedded nulls in ASCII or UTF-8 names. OpenSSL is responsible
+ * for producing properly-formatted UTF-8.
+ */
+ if (utf8_length != strlen((char *) utf8_value)) {
+ msg_warn("%s: %s: NULL character in peer %s",
+ myname, TLScontext->namaddr, label);
+ TLS_TEXT_NAME_RETURN(0);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Reject non-printable ASCII characters in UTF-8 content.
+ *
+ * Note: the code below does not find control characters in illegal UTF-8
+ * sequences. It's OpenSSL's job to produce valid UTF-8, and reportedly,
+ * it does validation.
+ */
+ for (cp = utf8_value; (ch = *cp) != 0; cp++) {
+ if (ISASCII(ch) && !ISPRINT(ch)) {
+ msg_warn("%s: %s: non-printable content in peer %s",
+ myname, TLScontext->namaddr, label);
+ TLS_TEXT_NAME_RETURN(0);
+ }
+ }
+ TLS_TEXT_NAME_RETURN(mystrdup((char *) utf8_value));
+}
+
+/* tls_dns_name - Extract valid DNS name from subjectAltName value */
+
+const char *tls_dns_name(const GENERAL_NAME * gn,
+ const TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext)
+{
+ const char *myname = "tls_dns_name";
+ char *cp;
+ const char *dnsname;
+ int len;
+
+ /*
+ * Peername checks are security sensitive, carefully scrutinize the
+ * input!
+ */
+ if (gn->type != GEN_DNS)
+ msg_panic("%s: Non DNS input argument", myname);
+
+ /*
+ * We expect the OpenSSL library to construct GEN_DNS extension objects as
+ * ASN1_IA5STRING values. Check we got the right union member.
+ */
+ if (ASN1_STRING_type(gn->d.ia5) != V_ASN1_IA5STRING) {
+ msg_warn("%s: %s: invalid ASN1 value type in subjectAltName",
+ myname, TLScontext->namaddr);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Safe to treat as an ASCII string possibly holding a DNS name
+ */
+ dnsname = (const char *) ASN1_STRING_get0_data(gn->d.ia5);
+ len = ASN1_STRING_length(gn->d.ia5);
+ TRIM0(dnsname, len);
+
+ /*
+ * Per Dr. Steven Henson of the OpenSSL development team, ASN1_IA5STRING
+ * values can have internal ASCII NUL values in this context because
+ * their length is taken from the decoded ASN1 buffer, a trailing NUL is
+ * always appended to make sure that the string is terminated, but the
+ * ASN.1 length may differ from strlen().
+ */
+ if (len != strlen(dnsname)) {
+ msg_warn("%s: %s: internal NUL in subjectAltName",
+ myname, TLScontext->namaddr);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * XXX: Should we be more strict and call valid_hostname()? So long as
+ * the name is safe to handle, if it is not a valid hostname, it will not
+ * compare equal to the expected peername, so being more strict than
+ * "printable" is likely excessive...
+ */
+ if (*dnsname && !allprint(dnsname)) {
+ cp = mystrdup(dnsname);
+ msg_warn("%s: %s: non-printable characters in subjectAltName: %.100s",
+ myname, TLScontext->namaddr, printable(cp, '?'));
+ myfree(cp);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return (dnsname);
+}
+
+/* tls_peer_CN - extract peer common name from certificate */
+
+char *tls_peer_CN(X509 *peercert, const TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext)
+{
+ char *cn;
+
+ cn = tls_text_name(X509_get_subject_name(peercert), NID_commonName,
+ "subject CN", TLScontext, DONT_GRIPE);
+ return (cn ? cn : mystrdup(""));
+}
+
+/* tls_issuer_CN - extract issuer common name from certificate */
+
+char *tls_issuer_CN(X509 *peer, const TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext)
+{
+ X509_NAME *name;
+ char *cn;
+
+ name = X509_get_issuer_name(peer);
+
+ /*
+ * If no issuer CN field, use Organization instead. CA certs without a CN
+ * are common, so we only complain if the organization is also missing.
+ */
+ if ((cn = tls_text_name(name, NID_commonName,
+ "issuer CN", TLScontext, DONT_GRIPE)) == 0)
+ cn = tls_text_name(name, NID_organizationName,
+ "issuer Organization", TLScontext, DONT_GRIPE);
+ return (cn ? cn : mystrdup(""));
+}
+
+#endif