TLS Forward Secrecy in Postfix
TLS Forward Secrecy in Postfix
Forward secrecy does not protect against active attacks such as forged DNS replies or forged TLS server certificates. If such attacks are a concern, then the SMTP client will need to authenticate the remote SMTP server in a sufficiently-secure manner. For example, by the fingerprint of a (CA or leaf) public key or certificate. Conventional PKI relies on many trusted parties and is easily subverted by a state-funded adversary.
Postfix supports forward secrecy of TLS network communication since version 2.2. This support was adopted from Lutz Jänicke's "Postfix TLS patch" for earlier Postfix versions. This document will focus on TLS Forward Secrecy in the Postfix SMTP client and server. See TLS_README for a general description of Postfix TLS support.
Topics covered in this document:
Give me some background on forward secrecy in Postfix
Never mind, just show me what it takes to get forward secrecy
The term "Forward Secrecy" (or sometimes "Perfect Forward Secrecy") is used to describe security protocols in which the confidentiality of past traffic is not compromised when long-term keys used by either or both sides are later disclosed.
Forward secrecy is accomplished by negotiating session keys using per-session cryptographically-strong random numbers that are not saved, and signing the exchange with long-term authentication keys. Later disclosure of the long-term keys allows impersonation of the key holder from that point on, but not recovery of prior traffic, since with forward secrecy, the discarded random key agreement inputs are not available to the attacker.
Forward secrecy is only "perfect" when brute-force attacks on the key agreement algorithm are impractical even for the best-funded adversary and the random-number generators used by both parties are sufficiently strong. Otherwise, forward secrecy leaves the attacker with the challenge of cracking the key-agreement protocol, which is likely quite computationally intensive, but may be feasible for sessions of sufficiently high value. Thus forward secrecy places cost constraints on the efficacy of bulk surveillance, recovering all past traffic is generally infeasible, and even recovery of individual sessions may be infeasible given a sufficiently-strong key agreement method.
Early implementations of the SSL protocol do not provide forward secrecy (some provide it only with artificially-weakened "export" cipher suites, but we will ignore those here). The client sends a random "pre-master secret" to the server encrypted with the server's RSA public key. The server decrypts this with its private key, and uses it together with other data exchanged in the clear to generate the session key. An attacker with access to the server's private key can perform the same computation at any later time. The TLS library in Windows XP and Windows Server 2003 only supported cipher suites of this type, and Exchange 2003 servers largely do not support forward secrecy.
Later revisions to the TLS protocol introduced forward-secrecy cipher suites in which the client and server implement a key exchange protocol based on ephemeral secrets. Sessions encrypted with one of these newer cipher suites are not compromised by future disclosure of long-term authentication keys.
The key-exchange algorithms used for forward secrecy require the TLS server to designate appropriate "parameters" consisting of a mathematical "group" and an element of that group called a "generator". Presently, there are two flavors of "groups" that work with PFS:
Prime-field groups (EDH): The server needs to be configured with a suitably-large prime and a corresponding "generator". The acronym for forward secrecy over prime fields is EDH for Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (also abbreviated as DHE).
Elliptic-curve groups (EECDH): The server needs to be configured with a "named curve". These offer better security at lower computational cost than prime field groups, but are not as widely implemented. The acronym for the elliptic curve version is EECDH which is short for Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (also abbreviated as ECDHE).
It is not essential to know what these are, but one does need to know that OpenSSL supports EECDH with version 1.0.0 or later. Thus the configuration parameters related to Elliptic-Curve forward secrecy are available when Postfix is linked with OpenSSL ≥ 1.0.0 (provided EC support has not been disabled by the vendor, as in some versions of RedHat Linux).
Elliptic curves used in cryptography are typically identified by a "name" that stands for a set of well-known parameter values, and it is these "names" (or associated ASN.1 object identifiers) that are used in the TLS protocol. On the other hand, with TLS there are no specially designated prime field groups, so each server is free to select its own suitably-strong prime and generator.
The Postfix ≥ 2.2 SMTP server supports forward secrecy in its default configuration. If the remote SMTP client prefers cipher suites with forward secrecy, then the traffic between the server and client will resist decryption even if the server's long-term authentication keys are later compromised.
Some remote SMTP clients may support forward secrecy, but prefer cipher suites without forward secrecy. In that case, Postfix ≥ 2.8 could be configured to ignore the client's preference with the main.cf setting "tls_preempt_cipherlist = yes". However, this will likely cause interoperability issues with older Exchange servers and is not recommended for now.
Postfix ≥ 2.2 support 1024-bit-prime EDH out of the box, with no additional configuration, but you may want to override the default prime to be 2048 bits long, and you may want to regenerate your primes periodically. See the quick-start section for details. With Postfix ≥ 3.1 the out of the box (compiled-in) EDH prime size is 2048 bits.
With prime-field EDH, OpenSSL wants the server to provide two explicitly-selected (prime, generator) combinations. One for the now long-obsolete "export" cipher suites, and another for non-export cipher suites. Postfix has two such default combinations compiled in, but also supports explicitly-configured overrides.
The "export" EDH parameters are used only with the obsolete "export" ciphers. To use a non-default prime, generate a 512-bit DH parameter file and set smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file to the filename (see the quick-start section for details). With Postfix releases after the middle of 2015 the default opportunistic TLS cipher grade (smtpd_tls_ciphers) is "medium" or stronger, and export ciphers are no longer used.
The non-export EDH parameters are used for all other EDH cipher suites. To use a non-default prime, generate a 1024-bit or 2048-bit DH parameter file and set smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file to the filename. Despite the name this is simply the non-export parameter file and the prime need not actually be 1024 bits long (see the quick-start section for details).
As of mid-2015, SMTP clients are starting to reject TLS handshakes with primes smaller than 2048 bits. Each site needs to determine which prime size works best for the majority of its clients. See the quick-start section for the recommended configuration to work around this issue.
Postfix ≥ 2.6 support NIST P-256 EECDH when built with OpenSSL ≥ 1.0.0. When the remote SMTP client also supports EECDH and implements the P-256 curve, forward secrecy just works.
Note: With Postfix 2.6 and 2.7, enable EECDH by setting the main.cf parameter smtpd_tls_eecdh_grade to "strong".
The elliptic curve standards are evolving, with new curves introduced in RFC 8031 to augment or replace the NIST curves tarnished by the Snowden revelations. Fortunately, TLS clients advertise their list of supported curves to the server so that servers can choose newer stronger curves when mutually supported. OpenSSL 1.0.2 released in January 2015 was the first release to implement negotiation of supported curves in TLS servers. In older OpenSSL releases, the server is limited to selecting a single widely supported curve.
With Postfix prior to 3.2 or OpenSSL prior to 1.0.2, only a single server-side curve can be configured, by specifying a suitable EECDH "grade":
smtpd_tls_eecdh_grade = strong | ultra
# Underlying curves, best not changed:
# tls_eecdh_strong_curve = prime256v1
# tls_eecdh_ultra_curve = secp384r1
Postfix ≥ 3.2 supports the curve negotiation API of OpenSSL ≥ 1.0.2. When using this software combination, the default setting of "smtpd_tls_eecdh_grade" changes to "auto", which selects a curve that is supported by both the server and client. The list of candidate curves can be configured via "tls_eecdh_auto_curves", which can be used to configure a prioritized list of supported curves (most preferred first) on both the server and client. The default list is suitable for most users.
The Postfix ≥ 2.2 SMTP client supports forward secrecy in its default configuration. All supported OpenSSL releases support EDH key exchange. OpenSSL releases ≥ 1.0.0 also support EECDH key exchange (provided elliptic-curve support has not been disabled by the vendor as in some versions of RedHat Linux). If the remote SMTP server supports cipher suites with forward secrecy (and does not override the SMTP client's cipher preference), then the traffic between the server and client will resist decryption even if the server's long-term authentication keys are later compromised.
Postfix ≥ 3.2 supports the curve negotiation API of OpenSSL ≥ 1.0.2. The list of candidate curves can be changed via the "tls_eecdh_auto_curves" configuration parameter, which can be used to select a prioritized list of supported curves (most preferred first) on both the Postfix SMTP server and SMTP client. The default list is suitable for most users.
The default Postfix SMTP client cipher lists are correctly ordered to prefer EECDH and EDH cipher suites ahead of similar cipher suites that don't implement forward secrecy. Administrators are strongly discouraged from changing the cipher list definitions.
The default minimum cipher grade for opportunistic TLS is "medium" for Postfix releases after the middle of 2015, "export" for older releases. Changing the minimum cipher grade does not change the cipher preference order. Note that cipher grades higher than "medium" exclude Exchange 2003 and likely other MTAs, thus a "high" cipher grade should be chosen only on a case-by-case basis via the TLS policy table.
This works "out of the box" with no need for additional configuration.
Postfix ≥ 3.2 supports the curve negotiation API of OpenSSL ≥ 1.0.2. The list of candidate curves can be changed via the "tls_eecdh_auto_curves" configuration parameter, which can be used to select a prioritized list of supported curves (most preferred first) on both the Postfix SMTP server and SMTP client. The default list is suitable for most users.
With Postfix 2.6 and 2.7, enable elliptic-curve support in the Postfix SMTP server. This is the default with Postfix ≥ 2.8. Note, however, that elliptic-curve support may be disabled by the vendor, as in some versions of RedHat Linux.
/etc/postfix/main.cf:
# Postfix 2.6 & 2.7 only. EECDH is on by default with Postfix ≥ 2.8.
# The default grade is "auto" with Postfix ≥ 3.2.
smtpd_tls_eecdh_grade = strong
This works "out of the box" without additional configuration.
Optionally generate non-default Postfix SMTP server EDH parameters for improved security against pre-computation attacks and for compatibility with Debian-patched Exim SMTP clients that require a ≥ 2048-bit length for the non-export prime.
Execute as root (prime group generation can take a few seconds to a few minutes):
# cd /etc/postfix # umask 022 # openssl dhparam -out dh512.tmp 512 && mv dh512.tmp dh512.pem # openssl dhparam -out dh1024.tmp 1024 && mv dh1024.tmp dh1024.pem # openssl dhparam -out dh2048.tmp 2048 && mv dh2048.tmp dh2048.pem # chmod 644 dh512.pem dh1024.pem dh2048.pem
The Postfix SMTP server EDH parameter files are not secret, after all these parameters are sent to all remote SMTP clients in the clear. Mode 0644 is fine.
You can improve security against pre-computation attacks further by regenerating the Postfix SMTP server EDH parameters periodically (an hourly or daily cron job running the above commands as root can automate this task).
Once the parameters are in place, update main.cf as follows:
/etc/postfix/main.cf:
smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file = ${config_directory}/dh2048.pem
smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file = ${config_directory}/dh512.pem
If some of your MSA clients don't support 2048-bit EDH, you may need to adjust the submission entry in master.cf accordingly:
/etc/postfix/master.cf:
submission inet n - n - - smtpd
# Some submission clients may not yet do 2048-bit EDH, if such
# clients use your MSA, configure 1024-bit EDH instead. However,
# as of mid-2015, many submission clients no longer accept primes
# with less than 2048-bits. Each site needs to determine which
# type of client is more important to support.
-o smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file=${config_directory}/dh1024.pem
-o smtpd_tls_security_level=encrypt
-o smtpd_sasl_auth_enable=yes
...
Postfix can be configured to report information about the negotiated cipher, the corresponding key lengths, and the remote peer certificate or public-key verification status.
With "smtp_tls_loglevel = 1" and "smtpd_tls_loglevel = 1", the Postfix SMTP client and server will log TLS connection information to the maillog file. The general logfile format is shown below. With TLS 1.3 there may be additional properties logged after the cipher name and bits.
postfix/smtp[process-id]: Untrusted TLS connection established to host.example.com[192.168.0.2]:25: TLSv1 with cipher cipher-name (actual-key-size/raw-key-size bits) postfix/smtpd[process-id]: Anonymous TLS connection established from host.example.com[192.168.0.2]: TLSv1 with cipher cipher-name (actual-key-size/raw-key-size bits)
With "smtpd_tls_received_header = yes", the Postfix SMTP server will record TLS connection information in the Received: header in the form of comments (text inside parentheses). The general format depends on the smtpd_tls_ask_ccert setting. With TLS 1.3 there may be additional properties logged after the cipher name and bits.
Received: from host.example.com (host.example.com [192.168.0.2])
(using TLSv1 with cipher cipher-name
(actual-key-size/raw-key-size bits))
(Client CN "host.example.com", Issuer "John Doe" (not verified))
Received: from host.example.com (host.example.com [192.168.0.2])
(using TLSv1 with cipher cipher-name
(actual-key-size/raw-key-size bits))
(No client certificate requested)
TLS 1.3 examples. Some of the new attributes may not appear when not applicable or not available in older versions of the OpenSSL library.
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
(using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits)
key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256)
(No client certificate requested)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
(using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits)
key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256
client-signature ECDSA (P-256) client-digest SHA256)
(Client CN "example.org", Issuer "example.org" (not verified))
The "key-exchange" attribute records the type of "Diffie-Hellman" group used for key agreement. Possible values include "DHE", "ECDHE", "X25519" and "X448". With "DHE", the bit size of the prime will be reported in parentheses after the algorithm name, with "ECDHE", the curve name.
The "server-signature" attribute shows the public key signature algorithm used by the server. With "RSA-PSS", the bit size of the modulus will be reported in parentheses. With "ECDSA", the curve name. If, for example, the server has both an RSA and an ECDSA private key and certificate, it will be possible to track which one was used for a given connection.
The new "server-digest" attribute records the digest algorithm used by the server to prepare handshake messages for signing. The Ed25519 and Ed448 signature algorithms do not make use of such a digest, so no "server-digest" will be shown for these signature algorithms.
When a client certificate is requested with "smtpd_tls_ask_ccert" and the client uses a TLS client-certificate, the "client-signature" and "client-digest" attributes will record the corresponding properties of the client's TLS handshake signature.
The next sections will explain what cipher-name, key-size, and peer verification status information to expect.
There are dozens of ciphers that support forward secrecy. What follows is the beginning of a list of 51 ciphers available with OpenSSL 1.0.1e. The list is sorted in the default Postfix preference order. It excludes null ciphers that only authenticate and don't encrypt, together with export and low-grade ciphers whose encryption is too weak to offer meaningful secrecy. The first column shows the cipher name, and the second shows the key exchange method.
$ openssl ciphers -v \
'aNULL:-aNULL:kEECDH:kEDH:+RC4:!eNULL:!EXPORT:!LOW:@STRENGTH' |
awk '{printf "%-32s %s\n", $1, $3}'
AECDH-AES256-SHA Kx=ECDH
ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 Kx=ECDH
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 Kx=ECDH
ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 Kx=ECDH
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384 Kx=ECDH
ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA Kx=ECDH
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA Kx=ECDH
ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 Kx=DH
ADH-AES256-SHA256 Kx=DH
ADH-AES256-SHA Kx=DH
ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA Kx=DH
DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384 Kx=DH
DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 Kx=DH
DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256 Kx=DH
...
To date, all ciphers that support forward secrecy have one of five values for the first component of their OpenSSL name: "AECDH", "ECDHE", "ADH", "EDH" or "DHE". Ciphers that don't implement forward secrecy have names that don't start with one of these prefixes. This pattern is likely to persist until some new key-exchange mechanism is invented that also supports forward secrecy.
The actual key length and raw algorithm key length are generally the same with non-export ciphers, but may they differ for the legacy export ciphers where the actual key is artificially shortened.
Starting with TLS 1.3 the cipher name no longer contains enough information to determine which forward-secrecy scheme was employed, but TLS 1.3 always uses forward-secrecy. On the client side, up-to-date Postfix releases log additional information for TLS 1.3 connections, reporting the signature and key exchange algorithms. Two examples below (the long single line messages are folded across multiple lines for readability):
postfix/smtp[process-id]: Untrusted TLS connection established to 127.0.0.1[127.0.0.1]:25: TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256 client-signature ECDSA (P-256) client-digest SHA256 postfix/smtp[process-id]: Untrusted TLS connection established to 127.0.0.1[127.0.0.1]:25: TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange ECDHE (P-256) server-signature ECDSA (P-256) server-digest SHA256
In the above connections, the "key-exchange" value records the "Diffie-Hellman" algorithm used for key agreement. The "server-signature" value records the public key algorithm used by the server to sign the key exchange. The "server-digest" value records any hash algorithm used to prepare the data for signing. With "ED25519" and "ED448", no separate hash algorithm is used.
Examples of Postfix SMTP server logging:
postfix/smtpd[process-id]: Untrusted TLS connection established from localhost[127.0.0.1]:25: TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256 client-signature ECDSA (P-256) client-digest SHA256 postfix/smtpd[process-id]: Anonymous TLS connection established from localhost[127.0.0.1]: TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256 postfix/smtpd[process-id]: Anonymous TLS connection established from localhost[127.0.0.1]: TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) server-signature ED25519
Note that Postfix ≥ 3.4 server logging may also include a "to sni-name" element to record the use of an alternate server certificate chain for the connection in question. This happens when the client uses the TLS SNI extension, and the server selects a non-default certificate chain based on the client's SNI value:
postfix/smtpd[process-id]: Untrusted TLS connection established from client.example[192.0.2.1] to server.example: TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256 client-signature ECDSA (P-256) client-digest SHA256
The verification levels below are subject to man-in-the-middle attacks to different degrees. If such attacks are a concern, then the SMTP client will need to authenticate the remote SMTP server in a sufficiently-secure manner. For example, by the fingerprint of a (CA or leaf) public key or certificate. Remember that conventional PKI relies on many trusted parties and is easily subverted by a state-funded adversary.
Postfix SMTP client: With opportunistic TLS (the "may" security level) the Postfix SMTP client does not verify any information in the peer certificate. In this case it enables and prefers anonymous cipher suites in which the remote SMTP server does not present a certificate (these ciphers offer forward secrecy of necessity). When the remote SMTP server also supports anonymous TLS, and agrees to such a cipher suite, the verification status will be logged as "Anonymous".
Postfix SMTP server: This is by far most common, as client certificates are optional, and the Postfix SMTP server does not request client certificates by default (see smtpd_tls_ask_ccert). Even when client certificates are requested, the remote SMTP client might not send a certificate. Unlike the Postfix SMTP client, the Postfix SMTP server "anonymous" verification status does not imply that the cipher suite is anonymous, which corresponds to the server not sending a certificate.
Postfix SMTP client: The remote SMTP server presented a certificate, but the Postfix SMTP client was unable to check the issuing CA signature. With opportunistic TLS this is common with remote SMTP servers that don't support anonymous cipher suites.
Postfix SMTP server: The remote SMTP client presented a certificate, but the Postfix SMTP server was unable to check the issuing CA signature. This can happen when the server is configured to request client certificates (see smtpd_tls_ask_ccert).
Postfix SMTP client: The remote SMTP server's certificate was signed by a CA that the Postfix SMTP client trusts, but either the client was not configured to verify the destination server name against the certificate, or the server certificate did not contain any matching names. This is common with opportunistic TLS (smtp_tls_security_level is "may" or else "dane" with no usable TLSA DNS records) when the Postfix SMTP client's trusted CAs can verify the authenticity of the remote SMTP server's certificate, but the client is not configured or unable to verify the server name.
Postfix SMTP server: The remote SMTP client certificate was signed by a CA that the Postfix SMTP server trusts. The Postfix SMTP server never verifies the remote SMTP client name against the names in the client certificate. Since the client chooses to connect to the server, the Postfix SMTP server has no expectation of a particular client hostname.
Postfix SMTP client: The remote SMTP server's certificate was signed by a CA that the Postfix SMTP client trusts, and the certificate name matches the destination or server name(s). The Postfix SMTP client was configured to require a verified name, otherwise the verification status would have been just "Trusted".
Postfix SMTP client: The "Verified" status may also mean that the Postfix SMTP client successfully matched the expected fingerprint against the remote SMTP server public key or certificate. The expected fingerprint may come from smtp_tls_policy_maps or from TLSA (secure) DNS records. The Postfix SMTP client ignores the CA signature.
Postfix SMTP server: The status is never "Verified", because the Postfix SMTP server never verifies the remote SMTP client name against the names in the client certificate, and because the Postfix SMTP server does not expect a specific fingerprint in the client public key or certificate.