/*++ /* NAME /* tls_misc 3 /* SUMMARY /* miscellaneous TLS support routines /* SYNOPSIS /* .SH Public functions /* .nf /* .na /* #include /* /* void tls_log_summary(role, usage, TLScontext) /* TLS_ROLE role; /* TLS_USAGE usage; /* TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext; /* /* const char *tls_compile_version(void) /* /* const char *tls_run_version(void) /* /* const char **tls_pkey_algorithms(void) /* /* void tls_pre_jail_init(TLS_ROLE) /* TLS_ROLE role; /* /* .SH Internal functions /* .nf /* .na /* #define TLS_INTERNAL /* #include /* /* char *var_tls_high_clist; /* char *var_tls_medium_clist; /* char *var_tls_low_clist; /* char *var_tls_export_clist; /* char *var_tls_null_clist; /* char *var_tls_eecdh_auto; /* char *var_tls_eecdh_strong; /* char *var_tls_eecdh_ultra; /* char *var_tls_dane_digests; /* int var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes; /* bool var_tls_append_def_CA; /* bool var_tls_preempt_clist; /* bool var_tls_bc_pkey_fprint; /* bool var_tls_multi_wildcard; /* char *var_tls_mgr_service; /* char *var_tls_tkt_cipher; /* char *var_openssl_path; /* char *var_tls_server_sni_maps; /* bool var_tls_fast_shutdown; /* /* TLS_APPL_STATE *tls_alloc_app_context(ssl_ctx, log_mask) /* SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx; /* int log_mask; /* /* void tls_free_app_context(app_ctx) /* void *app_ctx; /* /* TLS_SESS_STATE *tls_alloc_sess_context(log_mask, namaddr) /* int log_mask; /* const char *namaddr; /* /* void tls_free_context(TLScontext) /* TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext; /* /* void tls_check_version() /* /* long tls_bug_bits() /* /* void tls_param_init() /* /* int tls_protocol_mask(plist) /* const char *plist; /* /* int tls_cipher_grade(name) /* const char *name; /* /* const char *str_tls_cipher_grade(grade) /* int grade; /* /* const char *tls_set_ciphers(TLScontext, grade, exclusions) /* TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext; /* int grade; /* const char *exclusions; /* /* void tls_get_signature_params(TLScontext) /* TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext; /* /* void tls_print_errors() /* /* void tls_info_callback(ssl, where, ret) /* const SSL *ssl; /* unused */ /* int where; /* int ret; /* /* long tls_bio_dump_cb(bio, cmd, argp, argi, argl, ret) /* BIO *bio; /* int cmd; /* const char *argp; /* int argi; /* long argl; /* unused */ /* long ret; /* /* int tls_log_mask(log_param, log_level) /* const char *log_param; /* const char *log_level; /* /* void tls_update_app_logmask(app_ctx, log_mask) /* TLS_APPL_STATE *app_ctx; /* int log_mask; /* /* int tls_validate_digest(dgst) /* const char *dgst; /* DESCRIPTION /* This module implements public and internal routines that /* support the TLS client and server. /* /* tls_log_summary() logs a summary of a completed TLS connection. /* The "role" argument must be TLS_ROLE_CLIENT for outgoing client /* connections, or TLS_ROLE_SERVER for incoming server connections, /* and the "usage" must be TLS_USAGE_NEW or TLS_USAGE_USED. /* /* tls_compile_version() returns a text string description of /* the compile-time TLS library. /* /* tls_run_version() is just tls_compile_version() but with the runtime /* version instead of the compile-time version. /* /* tls_pkey_algorithms() returns a pointer to null-terminated /* array of string constants with the names of the supported /* public-key algorithms. /* /* tls_alloc_app_context() creates an application context that /* holds the SSL context for the application and related cached state. /* /* tls_free_app_context() deallocates the application context and its /* contents (the application context is stored outside the TLS library). /* /* tls_alloc_sess_context() creates an initialized TLS session context /* structure with the specified log mask and peer name[addr]. /* /* tls_free_context() destroys a TLScontext structure /* together with OpenSSL structures that are attached to it. /* /* tls_check_version() logs a warning when the run-time OpenSSL /* library differs in its major, minor or micro number from /* the compile-time OpenSSL headers. /* /* tls_bug_bits() returns the bug compatibility mask appropriate /* for the run-time library. Some of the bug work-arounds are /* not appropriate for some library versions. /* /* tls_param_init() loads main.cf parameters used internally in /* TLS library. Any errors are fatal. /* /* tls_pre_jail_init() opens any tables that need to be opened before /* entering a chroot jail. The "role" parameter must be TLS_ROLE_CLIENT /* for clients and TLS_ROLE_SERVER for servers. Any errors are fatal. /* /* tls_protocol_mask() returns a bitmask of excluded protocols, given /* a list (plist) of protocols to include or (preceded by a '!') exclude. /* If "plist" contains invalid protocol names, TLS_PROTOCOL_INVALID is /* returned and no warning is logged. /* /* tls_cipher_grade() converts a case-insensitive cipher grade /* name (high, medium, low, export, null) to the corresponding /* TLS_CIPHER_ constant. When the input specifies an unrecognized /* grade, tls_cipher_grade() logs no warning, and returns /* TLS_CIPHER_NONE. /* /* str_tls_cipher_grade() converts a cipher grade to a name. /* When the input specifies an undefined grade, str_tls_cipher_grade() /* logs no warning, returns a null pointer. /* /* tls_set_ciphers() applies the requested cipher grade and exclusions /* to the provided TLS session context, returning the resulting cipher /* list string. The return value is the cipherlist used and is /* overwritten upon each call. When the input is invalid, /* tls_set_ciphers() logs a warning, and returns a null result. /* /* tls_get_signature_params() updates the "TLScontext" with handshake /* signature parameters pertaining to TLS 1.3, where the ciphersuite /* no longer describes the asymmetric algorithms employed in the /* handshake, which are negotiated separately. This function /* has no effect for TLS 1.2 and earlier. /* /* tls_print_errors() queries the OpenSSL error stack, /* logs the error messages, and clears the error stack. /* /* tls_info_callback() is a call-back routine for the /* SSL_CTX_set_info_callback() routine. It logs SSL events /* to the Postfix logfile. /* /* tls_bio_dump_cb() is a call-back routine for the /* BIO_set_callback() routine. It logs SSL content to the /* Postfix logfile. /* /* tls_log_mask() converts a TLS log_level value from string /* to mask. The main.cf parameter name is passed along for /* diagnostics. /* /* tls_update_app_logmask() changes the log mask of the /* application TLS context to the new setting. /* /* tls_validate_digest() returns non-zero if the named digest /* is usable and zero otherwise. /* LICENSE /* .ad /* .fi /* This software is free. You can do with it whatever you want. /* The original author kindly requests that you acknowledge /* the use of his software. /* AUTHOR(S) /* Originally written by: /* Lutz Jaenicke /* BTU Cottbus /* Allgemeine Elektrotechnik /* Universitaetsplatz 3-4 /* D-03044 Cottbus, Germany /* /* Updated by: /* Wietse Venema /* IBM T.J. Watson Research /* P.O. Box 704 /* Yorktown Heights, NY 10598, USA /* /* Victor Duchovni /* Morgan Stanley /* /* Wietse Venema /* Google, Inc. /* 111 8th Avenue /* New York, NY 10011, USA /*--*/ /* System library. */ #include #include #include #ifdef USE_TLS /* Utility library. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include /* * Global library. */ #include #include #include /* * TLS library. */ #define TLS_INTERNAL #include /* Application-specific. */ /* * Tunable parameters. */ char *var_tls_high_clist; char *var_tls_medium_clist; char *var_tls_low_clist; char *var_tls_export_clist; char *var_tls_null_clist; int var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes; char *var_tls_eecdh_auto; char *var_tls_eecdh_strong; char *var_tls_eecdh_ultra; char *var_tls_dane_digests; bool var_tls_append_def_CA; char *var_tls_bug_tweaks; char *var_tls_ssl_options; bool var_tls_bc_pkey_fprint; bool var_tls_multi_wildcard; char *var_tls_mgr_service; char *var_tls_tkt_cipher; char *var_openssl_path; char *var_tls_server_sni_maps; bool var_tls_fast_shutdown; static MAPS *tls_server_sni_maps; #ifdef VAR_TLS_PREEMPT_CLIST bool var_tls_preempt_clist; #endif /* * Index to attach TLScontext pointers to SSL objects, so that they can be * accessed by call-back routines. */ int TLScontext_index = -1; /* * Protocol name <=> mask conversion. */ static const NAME_CODE protocol_table[] = { SSL_TXT_SSLV2, TLS_PROTOCOL_SSLv2, SSL_TXT_SSLV3, TLS_PROTOCOL_SSLv3, SSL_TXT_TLSV1, TLS_PROTOCOL_TLSv1, SSL_TXT_TLSV1_1, TLS_PROTOCOL_TLSv1_1, SSL_TXT_TLSV1_2, TLS_PROTOCOL_TLSv1_2, TLS_PROTOCOL_TXT_TLSV1_3, TLS_PROTOCOL_TLSv1_3, 0, TLS_PROTOCOL_INVALID, }; /* * SSL_OP_MUMBLE bug work-around name <=> mask conversion. */ #define NAMEBUG(x) #x, SSL_OP_##x static const LONG_NAME_MASK ssl_bug_tweaks[] = { #ifndef SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG #define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG 0 #endif NAMEBUG(MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG), #ifndef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG #define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG 0 #endif NAMEBUG(NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG), #ifndef SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT #define SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT 0 #endif NAMEBUG(LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT), #ifndef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG #define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG 0 #endif NAMEBUG(NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG), "CVE-2010-4180", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG, #ifndef SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG #define SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG 0 #endif NAMEBUG(SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG), #ifndef SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER #define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER 0 #endif NAMEBUG(MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER), #ifndef SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING #define SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING 0 #endif NAMEBUG(MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING), "CVE-2005-2969", SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING, #ifndef SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG #define SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG 0 #endif NAMEBUG(SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG), #ifndef SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG #define SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG 0 #endif NAMEBUG(TLS_D5_BUG), #ifndef SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG #define SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG 0 #endif NAMEBUG(TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG), #ifndef SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG #define SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG 0 #endif NAMEBUG(TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG), #ifndef SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS #define SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS 0 #endif NAMEBUG(DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS), #ifndef SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG #define SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG 0 #endif NAMEBUG(CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG), #ifndef SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING #define SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING 0 #endif NAMEBUG(TLSEXT_PADDING), #if 0 /* * XXX: New with OpenSSL 1.1.1, this is turned on implicitly in * SSL_CTX_new() and is not included in SSL_OP_ALL. Allowing users to * disable this would thus be a code change that would require clearing * bug work-around bits in SSL_CTX, after setting SSL_OP_ALL. Since this * is presumably required for TLS 1.3 on today's Internet, the code * change will be done separately later. For now this implicit bug * work-around cannot be disabled via supported Postfix mechanisms. */ #ifndef SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT #define SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT 0 #endif NAMEBUG(ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT), #endif 0, 0, }; /* * SSL_OP_MUMBLE option name <=> mask conversion for options that are not * (or may in the future not be) in SSL_OP_ALL. These enable optional * behavior, rather than bug interoperability work-arounds. */ #define NAME_SSL_OP(x) #x, SSL_OP_##x static const LONG_NAME_MASK ssl_op_tweaks[] = { #ifndef SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT #define SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT 0 #endif NAME_SSL_OP(LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT), #ifndef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET #define SSL_OP_NO_TICKET 0 #endif NAME_SSL_OP(NO_TICKET), #ifndef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION #define SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION 0 #endif NAME_SSL_OP(NO_COMPRESSION), #ifndef SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION #define SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION 0 #endif NAME_SSL_OP(NO_RENEGOTIATION), #ifndef SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION #define SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 0 #endif NAME_SSL_OP(NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION), #ifndef SSL_OP_PRIORITIZE_CHACHA #define SSL_OP_PRIORITIZE_CHACHA 0 #endif NAME_SSL_OP(PRIORITIZE_CHACHA), #ifndef SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT #define SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT 0 #endif NAME_SSL_OP(ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT), 0, 0, }; /* * Once these have been a NOOP long enough, they might some day be removed * from OpenSSL. The defines below will avoid bitrot issues if/when that * happens. */ #ifndef SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE #define SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE 0 #endif #ifndef SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE #define SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE 0 #endif /* * Ciphersuite name <=> code conversion. */ const NAME_CODE tls_cipher_grade_table[] = { "high", TLS_CIPHER_HIGH, "medium", TLS_CIPHER_MEDIUM, "low", TLS_CIPHER_LOW, "export", TLS_CIPHER_EXPORT, "null", TLS_CIPHER_NULL, "invalid", TLS_CIPHER_NONE, 0, TLS_CIPHER_NONE, }; /* * Log keyword <=> mask conversion. */ #define TLS_LOG_0 TLS_LOG_NONE #define TLS_LOG_1 TLS_LOG_SUMMARY #define TLS_LOG_2 (TLS_LOG_1 | TLS_LOG_VERBOSE | TLS_LOG_CACHE | TLS_LOG_DEBUG) #define TLS_LOG_3 (TLS_LOG_2 | TLS_LOG_TLSPKTS) #define TLS_LOG_4 (TLS_LOG_3 | TLS_LOG_ALLPKTS) static const NAME_MASK tls_log_table[] = { "0", TLS_LOG_0, "none", TLS_LOG_NONE, "1", TLS_LOG_1, "routine", TLS_LOG_1, "2", TLS_LOG_2, "debug", TLS_LOG_2, "3", TLS_LOG_3, "ssl-expert", TLS_LOG_3, "4", TLS_LOG_4, "ssl-developer", TLS_LOG_4, "5", TLS_LOG_4, /* for good measure */ "6", TLS_LOG_4, /* for good measure */ "7", TLS_LOG_4, /* for good measure */ "8", TLS_LOG_4, /* for good measure */ "9", TLS_LOG_4, /* for good measure */ "summary", TLS_LOG_SUMMARY, "untrusted", TLS_LOG_UNTRUSTED, "peercert", TLS_LOG_PEERCERT, "certmatch", TLS_LOG_CERTMATCH, "verbose", TLS_LOG_VERBOSE, /* Postfix TLS library verbose */ "cache", TLS_LOG_CACHE, "ssl-debug", TLS_LOG_DEBUG, /* SSL library debug/verbose */ "ssl-handshake-packet-dump", TLS_LOG_TLSPKTS, "ssl-session-packet-dump", TLS_LOG_TLSPKTS | TLS_LOG_ALLPKTS, 0, 0, }; /* * Parsed OpenSSL version number. */ typedef struct { int major; int minor; int micro; int patch; int status; } TLS_VINFO; /* tls_log_mask - Convert user TLS loglevel to internal log feature mask */ int tls_log_mask(const char *log_param, const char *log_level) { int mask; mask = name_mask_opt(log_param, tls_log_table, log_level, NAME_MASK_ANY_CASE | NAME_MASK_RETURN); return (mask); } /* tls_update_app_logmask - update log level after init */ void tls_update_app_logmask(TLS_APPL_STATE *app_ctx, int log_mask) { app_ctx->log_mask = log_mask; } /* tls_protocol_mask - Bitmask of protocols to exclude */ int tls_protocol_mask(const char *plist) { char *save; char *tok; char *cp; int code; int exclude = 0; int include = 0; #define FREE_AND_RETURN(ptr, res) do { \ myfree(ptr); \ return (res); \ } while (0) save = cp = mystrdup(plist); while ((tok = mystrtok(&cp, CHARS_COMMA_SP ":")) != 0) { if (*tok == '!') exclude |= code = name_code(protocol_table, NAME_CODE_FLAG_NONE, ++tok); else include |= code = name_code(protocol_table, NAME_CODE_FLAG_NONE, tok); if (code == TLS_PROTOCOL_INVALID) FREE_AND_RETURN(save, TLS_PROTOCOL_INVALID); } /* * When the include list is empty, use only the explicit exclusions. * Otherwise, also exclude the complement of the include list from the * built-in list of known protocols. There is no way to exclude protocols * we don't know about at compile time, and this is unavoidable because * the OpenSSL API works with compile-time *exclusion* bit-masks. */ FREE_AND_RETURN(save, (include ? (exclude | (TLS_KNOWN_PROTOCOLS & ~include)) : exclude)); } /* tls_param_init - Load TLS related config parameters */ void tls_param_init(void) { /* If this changes, update TLS_CLIENT_PARAMS in tls_proxy.h. */ static const CONFIG_STR_TABLE str_table[] = { VAR_TLS_HIGH_CLIST, DEF_TLS_HIGH_CLIST, &var_tls_high_clist, 1, 0, VAR_TLS_MEDIUM_CLIST, DEF_TLS_MEDIUM_CLIST, &var_tls_medium_clist, 1, 0, VAR_TLS_LOW_CLIST, DEF_TLS_LOW_CLIST, &var_tls_low_clist, 1, 0, VAR_TLS_EXPORT_CLIST, DEF_TLS_EXPORT_CLIST, &var_tls_export_clist, 1, 0, VAR_TLS_NULL_CLIST, DEF_TLS_NULL_CLIST, &var_tls_null_clist, 1, 0, VAR_TLS_EECDH_AUTO, DEF_TLS_EECDH_AUTO, &var_tls_eecdh_auto, 1, 0, VAR_TLS_EECDH_STRONG, DEF_TLS_EECDH_STRONG, &var_tls_eecdh_strong, 1, 0, VAR_TLS_EECDH_ULTRA, DEF_TLS_EECDH_ULTRA, &var_tls_eecdh_ultra, 1, 0, VAR_TLS_BUG_TWEAKS, DEF_TLS_BUG_TWEAKS, &var_tls_bug_tweaks, 0, 0, VAR_TLS_SSL_OPTIONS, DEF_TLS_SSL_OPTIONS, &var_tls_ssl_options, 0, 0, VAR_TLS_DANE_DIGESTS, DEF_TLS_DANE_DIGESTS, &var_tls_dane_digests, 1, 0, VAR_TLS_MGR_SERVICE, DEF_TLS_MGR_SERVICE, &var_tls_mgr_service, 1, 0, VAR_TLS_TKT_CIPHER, DEF_TLS_TKT_CIPHER, &var_tls_tkt_cipher, 0, 0, VAR_OPENSSL_PATH, DEF_OPENSSL_PATH, &var_openssl_path, 1, 0, 0, }; /* If this changes, update TLS_CLIENT_PARAMS in tls_proxy.h. */ static const CONFIG_INT_TABLE int_table[] = { VAR_TLS_DAEMON_RAND_BYTES, DEF_TLS_DAEMON_RAND_BYTES, &var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes, 1, 0, 0, }; /* If this changes, update TLS_CLIENT_PARAMS in tls_proxy.h. */ static const CONFIG_BOOL_TABLE bool_table[] = { VAR_TLS_APPEND_DEF_CA, DEF_TLS_APPEND_DEF_CA, &var_tls_append_def_CA, VAR_TLS_BC_PKEY_FPRINT, DEF_TLS_BC_PKEY_FPRINT, &var_tls_bc_pkey_fprint, VAR_TLS_PREEMPT_CLIST, DEF_TLS_PREEMPT_CLIST, &var_tls_preempt_clist, VAR_TLS_MULTI_WILDCARD, DEF_TLS_MULTI_WILDCARD, &var_tls_multi_wildcard, VAR_TLS_FAST_SHUTDOWN, DEF_TLS_FAST_SHUTDOWN, &var_tls_fast_shutdown, 0, }; static int init_done; if (init_done) return; init_done = 1; get_mail_conf_str_table(str_table); get_mail_conf_int_table(int_table); get_mail_conf_bool_table(bool_table); } /* tls_pre_jail_init - Load TLS related pre-jail tables */ void tls_pre_jail_init(TLS_ROLE role) { static const CONFIG_STR_TABLE str_table[] = { VAR_TLS_SERVER_SNI_MAPS, DEF_TLS_SERVER_SNI_MAPS, &var_tls_server_sni_maps, 0, 0, 0, }; int flags; tls_param_init(); /* Nothing for clients at this time */ if (role != TLS_ROLE_SERVER) return; get_mail_conf_str_table(str_table); if (*var_tls_server_sni_maps == 0) return; flags = DICT_FLAG_LOCK | DICT_FLAG_FOLD_FIX | DICT_FLAG_SRC_RHS_IS_FILE; tls_server_sni_maps = maps_create(VAR_TLS_SERVER_SNI_MAPS, var_tls_server_sni_maps, flags); } /* server_sni_callback - process client's SNI extension */ static int server_sni_callback(SSL *ssl, int *alert, void *arg) { SSL_CTX *sni_ctx = (SSL_CTX *) arg; TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, TLScontext_index); const char *sni = SSL_get_servername(ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name); const char *cp = sni; const char *pem; /* SNI is silently ignored when we don't care or is NULL or empty */ if (!sni_ctx || !tls_server_sni_maps || !sni || !*sni) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; if (!valid_hostname(sni, DONT_GRIPE)) { msg_warn("TLS SNI from %s is invalid: %s", TLScontext->namaddr, sni); return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; } /* * With TLS 1.3, when the client's proposed key share is not supported by * the server, the server may issue a HelloRetryRequest (HRR), and the * client will then retry with a new key share on a curve supported by * the server. This results in the SNI callback running twice for the * same connection. * * When that happens, The client MUST send the essentially the same hello * message, including the SNI name, and since we've already loaded our * certificate chain, we don't need to do it again! Therefore, if we've * already recorded the peer SNI name, just check that it has not * changed, and return success. */ if (TLScontext->peer_sni) { if (strcmp(sni, TLScontext->peer_sni) == 0) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; msg_warn("TLS SNI changed from %s initially %s, %s after hello retry", TLScontext->namaddr, TLScontext->peer_sni, sni); return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; } do { /* Don't silently skip maps opened with the wrong flags. */ pem = maps_file_find(tls_server_sni_maps, cp, 0); } while (!pem && !tls_server_sni_maps->error && (cp = strchr(cp + 1, '.')) != 0); if (!pem) { if (tls_server_sni_maps->error) { msg_warn("%s: %s map lookup problem", tls_server_sni_maps->title, sni); *alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; } msg_info("TLS SNI %s from %s not matched, using default chain", sni, TLScontext->namaddr); /* * XXX: We could lie and pretend to accept the name, but since we've * previously not implemented the callback (with OpenSSL then * declining the extension), and nothing bad happened, declining it * explicitly should be safe. */ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; } SSL_set_SSL_CTX(ssl, sni_ctx); if (tls_load_pem_chain(ssl, pem, sni) != 0) { /* errors already logged */ *alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; } TLScontext->peer_sni = mystrdup(sni); return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } /* tls_set_ciphers - Set SSL context cipher list */ const char *tls_set_ciphers(TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext, const char *grade, const char *exclusions) { const char *myname = "tls_set_ciphers"; static VSTRING *buf; char *save; char *cp; char *tok; if (buf == 0) buf = vstring_alloc(10); VSTRING_RESET(buf); switch (tls_cipher_grade(grade)) { case TLS_CIPHER_NONE: msg_warn("%s: invalid cipher grade: \"%s\"", TLScontext->namaddr, grade); return (0); case TLS_CIPHER_HIGH: vstring_strcpy(buf, var_tls_high_clist); break; case TLS_CIPHER_MEDIUM: vstring_strcpy(buf, var_tls_medium_clist); break; case TLS_CIPHER_LOW: vstring_strcpy(buf, var_tls_low_clist); break; case TLS_CIPHER_EXPORT: vstring_strcpy(buf, var_tls_export_clist); break; case TLS_CIPHER_NULL: vstring_strcpy(buf, var_tls_null_clist); break; default: /* Internal error, valid grade, but missing case label. */ msg_panic("%s: unexpected cipher grade: %s", myname, grade); } /* * The base lists for each grade can't be empty. */ if (VSTRING_LEN(buf) == 0) msg_panic("%s: empty \"%s\" cipherlist", myname, grade); /* * Apply locally-specified exclusions. */ #define CIPHER_SEP CHARS_COMMA_SP ":" if (exclusions != 0) { cp = save = mystrdup(exclusions); while ((tok = mystrtok(&cp, CIPHER_SEP)) != 0) { /* * Can't exclude ciphers that start with modifiers. */ if (strchr("!+-@", *tok)) { msg_warn("%s: invalid unary '!+-@' in cipher exclusion: %s", TLScontext->namaddr, tok); return (0); } vstring_sprintf_append(buf, ":!%s", tok); } myfree(save); } ERR_clear_error(); if (SSL_set_cipher_list(TLScontext->con, vstring_str(buf)) == 0) { msg_warn("%s: error setting cipher grade: \"%s\"", TLScontext->namaddr, grade); tls_print_errors(); return (0); } return (vstring_str(buf)); } /* tls_get_signature_params - TLS 1.3 signature details */ void tls_get_signature_params(TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext) { #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1010100fUL && defined(TLS1_3_VERSION) const char *kex_name = 0; const char *kex_curve = 0; const char *locl_sig_name = 0; const char *locl_sig_curve = 0; const char *locl_sig_dgst = 0; const char *peer_sig_name = 0; const char *peer_sig_curve = 0; const char *peer_sig_dgst = 0; int nid; int got_kex_key; SSL *ssl = TLScontext->con; int srvr = SSL_is_server(ssl); X509 *cert; EVP_PKEY *pkey = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC const EC_KEY *eckey; #endif #define SIG_PROP(c, s, p) (*((s) ? &c->srvr_sig_##p : &c->clnt_sig_##p)) if (SSL_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) return; if (tls_get_peer_dh_pubkey(ssl, &pkey)) { switch (nid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey)) { default: kex_name = OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_PKEY_type(nid)); break; case EVP_PKEY_DH: kex_name = "DHE"; TLScontext->kex_bits = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey); break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case EVP_PKEY_EC: kex_name = "ECDHE"; eckey = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey); nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)); kex_curve = EC_curve_nid2nist(nid); if (!kex_curve) kex_curve = OBJ_nid2sn(nid); break; #endif } EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); } /* * On the client end, the certificate may be preset, but not used, so we * check via SSL_get_signature_nid(). This means that local signature * data on clients requires at least 1.1.1a. */ if (srvr || SSL_get_signature_nid(ssl, &nid)) cert = SSL_get_certificate(ssl); else cert = 0; /* Signature algorithms for the local end of the connection */ if (cert) { pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert); /* * Override the built-in name for the "ECDSA" algorithms OID, with * the more familiar name. For "RSA" keys report "RSA-PSS", which * must be used with TLS 1.3. */ if ((nid = EVP_PKEY_type(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey))) != NID_undef) { switch (nid) { default: locl_sig_name = OBJ_nid2sn(nid); break; case EVP_PKEY_RSA: /* For RSA, TLS 1.3 mandates PSS signatures */ locl_sig_name = "RSA-PSS"; SIG_PROP(TLScontext, srvr, bits) = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey); break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case EVP_PKEY_EC: locl_sig_name = "ECDSA"; eckey = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey); nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)); locl_sig_curve = EC_curve_nid2nist(nid); if (!locl_sig_curve) locl_sig_curve = OBJ_nid2sn(nid); break; #endif } } /* * With Ed25519 and Ed448 there is no pre-signature digest, but the * accessor does not fail, rather we get NID_undef. */ if (SSL_get_signature_nid(ssl, &nid) && nid != NID_undef) locl_sig_dgst = OBJ_nid2sn(nid); } /* Signature algorithms for the peer end of the connection */ if ((cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) != 0) { pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert); /* * Override the built-in name for the "ECDSA" algorithms OID, with * the more familiar name. For "RSA" keys report "RSA-PSS", which * must be used with TLS 1.3. */ if ((nid = EVP_PKEY_type(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey))) != NID_undef) { switch (nid) { default: peer_sig_name = OBJ_nid2sn(nid); break; case EVP_PKEY_RSA: /* For RSA, TLS 1.3 mandates PSS signatures */ peer_sig_name = "RSA-PSS"; SIG_PROP(TLScontext, !srvr, bits) = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey); break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case EVP_PKEY_EC: peer_sig_name = "ECDSA"; eckey = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey); nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)); peer_sig_curve = EC_curve_nid2nist(nid); if (!peer_sig_curve) peer_sig_curve = OBJ_nid2sn(nid); break; #endif } } /* * With Ed25519 and Ed448 there is no pre-signature digest, but the * accessor does not fail, rather we get NID_undef. */ if (SSL_get_peer_signature_nid(ssl, &nid) && nid != NID_undef) peer_sig_dgst = OBJ_nid2sn(nid); X509_free(cert); } if (kex_name) { TLScontext->kex_name = mystrdup(kex_name); if (kex_curve) TLScontext->kex_curve = mystrdup(kex_curve); } if (locl_sig_name) { SIG_PROP(TLScontext, srvr, name) = mystrdup(locl_sig_name); if (locl_sig_curve) SIG_PROP(TLScontext, srvr, curve) = mystrdup(locl_sig_curve); if (locl_sig_dgst) SIG_PROP(TLScontext, srvr, dgst) = mystrdup(locl_sig_dgst); } if (peer_sig_name) { SIG_PROP(TLScontext, !srvr, name) = mystrdup(peer_sig_name); if (peer_sig_curve) SIG_PROP(TLScontext, !srvr, curve) = mystrdup(peer_sig_curve); if (peer_sig_dgst) SIG_PROP(TLScontext, !srvr, dgst) = mystrdup(peer_sig_dgst); } #endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ... */ } /* tls_log_summary - TLS loglevel 1 one-liner, embellished with TLS 1.3 details */ void tls_log_summary(TLS_ROLE role, TLS_USAGE usage, TLS_SESS_STATE *ctx) { VSTRING *msg = vstring_alloc(100); const char *direction = (role == TLS_ROLE_CLIENT) ? "to" : "from"; const char *sni = (role == TLS_ROLE_CLIENT) ? 0 : ctx->peer_sni; /* * When SNI was sent and accepted, the server-side log message now * includes a "to " detail after the "from " detail * identifying the remote client. We don't presently log (purportedly) * accepted SNI on the client side. */ vstring_sprintf(msg, "%s TLS connection %s %s %s%s%s: %s" " with cipher %s (%d/%d bits)", !TLS_CERT_IS_PRESENT(ctx) ? "Anonymous" : TLS_CERT_IS_SECURED(ctx) ? "Verified" : TLS_CERT_IS_TRUSTED(ctx) ? "Trusted" : "Untrusted", usage == TLS_USAGE_NEW ? "established" : "reused", direction, ctx->namaddr, sni ? " to " : "", sni ? sni : "", ctx->protocol, ctx->cipher_name, ctx->cipher_usebits, ctx->cipher_algbits); if (ctx->kex_name && *ctx->kex_name) { vstring_sprintf_append(msg, " key-exchange %s", ctx->kex_name); if (ctx->kex_curve && *ctx->kex_curve) vstring_sprintf_append(msg, " (%s)", ctx->kex_curve); else if (ctx->kex_bits > 0) vstring_sprintf_append(msg, " (%d bits)", ctx->kex_bits); } if (ctx->srvr_sig_name && *ctx->srvr_sig_name) { vstring_sprintf_append(msg, " server-signature %s", ctx->srvr_sig_name); if (ctx->srvr_sig_curve && *ctx->srvr_sig_curve) vstring_sprintf_append(msg, " (%s)", ctx->srvr_sig_curve); else if (ctx->srvr_sig_bits > 0) vstring_sprintf_append(msg, " (%d bits)", ctx->srvr_sig_bits); if (ctx->srvr_sig_dgst && *ctx->srvr_sig_dgst) vstring_sprintf_append(msg, " server-digest %s", ctx->srvr_sig_dgst); } if (ctx->clnt_sig_name && *ctx->clnt_sig_name) { vstring_sprintf_append(msg, " client-signature %s", ctx->clnt_sig_name); if (ctx->clnt_sig_curve && *ctx->clnt_sig_curve) vstring_sprintf_append(msg, " (%s)", ctx->clnt_sig_curve); else if (ctx->clnt_sig_bits > 0) vstring_sprintf_append(msg, " (%d bits)", ctx->clnt_sig_bits); if (ctx->clnt_sig_dgst && *ctx->clnt_sig_dgst) vstring_sprintf_append(msg, " client-digest %s", ctx->clnt_sig_dgst); } msg_info("%s", vstring_str(msg)); vstring_free(msg); } /* tls_alloc_app_context - allocate TLS application context */ TLS_APPL_STATE *tls_alloc_app_context(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx, SSL_CTX *sni_ctx, int log_mask) { TLS_APPL_STATE *app_ctx; app_ctx = (TLS_APPL_STATE *) mymalloc(sizeof(*app_ctx)); /* See portability note below with other memset() call. */ memset((void *) app_ctx, 0, sizeof(*app_ctx)); app_ctx->ssl_ctx = ssl_ctx; app_ctx->sni_ctx = sni_ctx; app_ctx->log_mask = log_mask; /* See also: cache purging code in tls_set_ciphers(). */ app_ctx->cache_type = 0; if (tls_server_sni_maps) { SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ssl_ctx, server_sni_callback); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ssl_ctx, (void *) sni_ctx); } return (app_ctx); } /* tls_free_app_context - Free TLS application context */ void tls_free_app_context(TLS_APPL_STATE *app_ctx) { if (app_ctx->ssl_ctx) SSL_CTX_free(app_ctx->ssl_ctx); if (app_ctx->sni_ctx) SSL_CTX_free(app_ctx->sni_ctx); if (app_ctx->cache_type) myfree(app_ctx->cache_type); myfree((void *) app_ctx); } /* tls_alloc_sess_context - allocate TLS session context */ TLS_SESS_STATE *tls_alloc_sess_context(int log_mask, const char *namaddr) { TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext; /* * PORTABILITY: Do not assume that null pointers are all-zero bits. Use * explicit assignments to initialize pointers. * * See the C language FAQ item 5.17, or if you have time to burn, * http://www.google.com/search?q=zero+bit+null+pointer * * However, it's OK to use memset() to zero integer values. */ TLScontext = (TLS_SESS_STATE *) mymalloc(sizeof(TLS_SESS_STATE)); memset((void *) TLScontext, 0, sizeof(*TLScontext)); TLScontext->con = 0; TLScontext->cache_type = 0; TLScontext->serverid = 0; TLScontext->peer_CN = 0; TLScontext->issuer_CN = 0; TLScontext->peer_sni = 0; TLScontext->peer_cert_fprint = 0; TLScontext->peer_pkey_fprint = 0; TLScontext->protocol = 0; TLScontext->cipher_name = 0; TLScontext->kex_name = 0; TLScontext->kex_curve = 0; TLScontext->clnt_sig_name = 0; TLScontext->clnt_sig_curve = 0; TLScontext->clnt_sig_dgst = 0; TLScontext->srvr_sig_name = 0; TLScontext->srvr_sig_curve = 0; TLScontext->srvr_sig_dgst = 0; TLScontext->log_mask = log_mask; TLScontext->namaddr = lowercase(mystrdup(namaddr)); TLScontext->mdalg = 0; /* Alias for props->mdalg */ TLScontext->dane = 0; /* Alias for props->dane */ TLScontext->errordepth = -1; TLScontext->tadepth = -1; TLScontext->errorcode = X509_V_OK; TLScontext->errorcert = 0; TLScontext->untrusted = 0; TLScontext->trusted = 0; return (TLScontext); } /* tls_free_context - deallocate TLScontext and members */ void tls_free_context(TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext) { /* * Free the SSL structure and the BIOs. Warning: the internal_bio is * connected to the SSL structure and is automatically freed with it. Do * not free it again (core dump)!! Only free the network_bio. */ if (TLScontext->con != 0) SSL_free(TLScontext->con); if (TLScontext->namaddr) myfree(TLScontext->namaddr); if (TLScontext->serverid) myfree(TLScontext->serverid); if (TLScontext->peer_CN) myfree(TLScontext->peer_CN); if (TLScontext->issuer_CN) myfree(TLScontext->issuer_CN); if (TLScontext->peer_sni) myfree(TLScontext->peer_sni); if (TLScontext->peer_cert_fprint) myfree(TLScontext->peer_cert_fprint); if (TLScontext->peer_pkey_fprint) myfree(TLScontext->peer_pkey_fprint); if (TLScontext->kex_name) myfree((void *) TLScontext->kex_name); if (TLScontext->kex_curve) myfree((void *) TLScontext->kex_curve); if (TLScontext->clnt_sig_name) myfree((void *) TLScontext->clnt_sig_name); if (TLScontext->clnt_sig_curve) myfree((void *) TLScontext->clnt_sig_curve); if (TLScontext->clnt_sig_dgst) myfree((void *) TLScontext->clnt_sig_dgst); if (TLScontext->srvr_sig_name) myfree((void *) TLScontext->srvr_sig_name); if (TLScontext->srvr_sig_curve) myfree((void *) TLScontext->srvr_sig_curve); if (TLScontext->srvr_sig_dgst) myfree((void *) TLScontext->srvr_sig_dgst); if (TLScontext->errorcert) X509_free(TLScontext->errorcert); if (TLScontext->untrusted) sk_X509_pop_free(TLScontext->untrusted, X509_free); if (TLScontext->trusted) sk_X509_pop_free(TLScontext->trusted, X509_free); myfree((void *) TLScontext); } /* tls_version_split - Split OpenSSL version number into major, minor, ... */ static void tls_version_split(unsigned long version, TLS_VINFO *info) { /* * OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER(3): * * OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER is a numeric release version identifier: * * MMNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status * * The status nibble has one of the values 0 for development, 1 to e for * betas 1 to 14, and f for release. Parsed OpenSSL version number. for * example * * 0x000906000 == 0.9.6 dev 0x000906023 == 0.9.6b beta 3 0x00090605f == * 0.9.6e release * * Versions prior to 0.9.3 have identifiers < 0x0930. Versions between * 0.9.3 and 0.9.5 had a version identifier with this interpretation: * * MMNNFFRBB major minor fix final beta/patch * * for example * * 0x000904100 == 0.9.4 release 0x000905000 == 0.9.5 dev * * Version 0.9.5a had an interim interpretation that is like the current * one, except the patch level got the highest bit set, to keep continu- * ity. The number was therefore 0x0090581f. */ if (version < 0x0930) { info->status = 0; info->patch = version & 0x0f; version >>= 4; info->micro = version & 0x0f; version >>= 4; info->minor = version & 0x0f; version >>= 4; info->major = version & 0x0f; } else if (version < 0x00905800L) { info->patch = version & 0xff; version >>= 8; info->status = version & 0xf; version >>= 4; info->micro = version & 0xff; version >>= 8; info->minor = version & 0xff; version >>= 8; info->major = version & 0xff; } else { info->status = version & 0xf; version >>= 4; info->patch = version & 0xff; version >>= 8; info->micro = version & 0xff; version >>= 8; info->minor = version & 0xff; version >>= 8; info->major = version & 0xff; if (version < 0x00906000L) info->patch &= ~0x80; } } /* tls_check_version - Detect mismatch between headers and library. */ void tls_check_version(void) { TLS_VINFO hdr_info; TLS_VINFO lib_info; tls_version_split(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, &hdr_info); tls_version_split(OpenSSL_version_num(), &lib_info); /* * Warn if run-time library is different from compile-time library, * allowing later run-time "micro" versions starting with 1.1.0. */ if (lib_info.major != hdr_info.major || lib_info.minor != hdr_info.minor || (lib_info.micro != hdr_info.micro && (lib_info.micro < hdr_info.micro || hdr_info.major == 0 || (hdr_info.major == 1 && hdr_info.minor == 0)))) msg_warn("run-time library vs. compile-time header version mismatch: " "OpenSSL %d.%d.%d may not be compatible with OpenSSL %d.%d.%d", lib_info.major, lib_info.minor, lib_info.micro, hdr_info.major, hdr_info.minor, hdr_info.micro); } /* tls_compile_version - compile-time OpenSSL version */ const char *tls_compile_version(void) { return (OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT); } /* tls_run_version - run-time version "major.minor.micro" */ const char *tls_run_version(void) { return (OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION)); } const char **tls_pkey_algorithms(void) { /* * Return an array, not string, so that the result can be inspected * without parsing. Sort the result alphabetically, not chronologically. */ static const char *algs[] = { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA "dsa", #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA "ecdsa", #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA "rsa", #endif 0, }; return (algs); } /* tls_bug_bits - SSL bug compatibility bits for this OpenSSL version */ long tls_bug_bits(void) { long bits = SSL_OP_ALL; /* Work around all known bugs */ /* * Silently ignore any strings that don't appear in the tweaks table, or * hex bits that are not in SSL_OP_ALL. */ if (*var_tls_bug_tweaks) { bits &= ~long_name_mask_opt(VAR_TLS_BUG_TWEAKS, ssl_bug_tweaks, var_tls_bug_tweaks, NAME_MASK_ANY_CASE | NAME_MASK_NUMBER | NAME_MASK_WARN); #ifdef SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG /* Not relevant to SMTP */ bits &= ~SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG; #endif } /* * Allow users to set options not in SSL_OP_ALL, and not already managed * via other Postfix parameters. */ if (*var_tls_ssl_options) { long enable; enable = long_name_mask_opt(VAR_TLS_SSL_OPTIONS, ssl_op_tweaks, var_tls_ssl_options, NAME_MASK_ANY_CASE | NAME_MASK_NUMBER | NAME_MASK_WARN); enable &= ~(SSL_OP_ALL | TLS_SSL_OP_MANAGED_BITS); bits |= enable; } /* * We unconditionally avoid re-use of ephemeral keys, note that we set DH * keys via a callback, so reuse was never possible, but the ECDH key is * set statically, so that is potentially subject to reuse. Set both * options just in case. */ bits |= SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE | SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE; return (bits); } /* tls_print_errors - print and clear the error stack */ void tls_print_errors(void) { unsigned long err; char buffer[1024]; /* XXX */ const char *file; const char *data; int line; int flags; while ((err = ERR_get_error_line_data(&file, &line, &data, &flags)) != 0) { ERR_error_string_n(err, buffer, sizeof(buffer)); if (flags & ERR_TXT_STRING) msg_warn("TLS library problem: %s:%s:%d:%s:", buffer, file, line, data); else msg_warn("TLS library problem: %s:%s:%d:", buffer, file, line); } } /* tls_info_callback - callback for logging SSL events via Postfix */ void tls_info_callback(const SSL *s, int where, int ret) { char *str; int w; /* Adapted from OpenSSL apps/s_cb.c. */ w = where & ~SSL_ST_MASK; if (w & SSL_ST_CONNECT) str = "SSL_connect"; else if (w & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) str = "SSL_accept"; else str = "unknown"; if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP) { msg_info("%s:%s", str, SSL_state_string_long((SSL *) s)); } else if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT) { str = (where & SSL_CB_READ) ? "read" : "write"; if ((ret & 0xff) != SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) msg_info("SSL3 alert %s:%s:%s", str, SSL_alert_type_string_long(ret), SSL_alert_desc_string_long(ret)); } else if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT) { if (ret == 0) msg_info("%s:failed in %s", str, SSL_state_string_long((SSL *) s)); else if (ret < 0) { #ifndef LOG_NON_ERROR_STATES switch (SSL_get_error((SSL *) s, ret)) { case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: /* Don't log non-error states. */ break; default: #endif msg_info("%s:error in %s", str, SSL_state_string_long((SSL *) s)); #ifndef LOG_NON_ERROR_STATES } #endif } } } /* * taken from OpenSSL crypto/bio/b_dump.c. * * Modified to save a lot of strcpy and strcat by Matti Aarnio. * * Rewritten by Wietse to elimate fixed-size stack buffer, array index * multiplication and division, sprintf() and strcpy(), and lots of strlen() * calls. We could make it a little faster by using a fixed-size stack-based * buffer. * * 200412 - use %lx to print pointers, after casting them to unsigned long. */ #define TRUNCATE_SPACE_NULL #define DUMP_WIDTH 16 #define VERT_SPLIT 7 static void tls_dump_buffer(const unsigned char *start, int len) { VSTRING *buf = vstring_alloc(100); const unsigned char *last = start + len - 1; const unsigned char *row; const unsigned char *col; int ch; #ifdef TRUNCATE_SPACE_NULL while (last >= start && (*last == ' ' || *last == 0)) last--; #endif for (row = start; row <= last; row += DUMP_WIDTH) { VSTRING_RESET(buf); vstring_sprintf(buf, "%04lx ", (unsigned long) (row - start)); for (col = row; col < row + DUMP_WIDTH; col++) { if (col > last) { vstring_strcat(buf, " "); } else { ch = *col; vstring_sprintf_append(buf, "%02x%c", ch, col - row == VERT_SPLIT ? '|' : ' '); } } VSTRING_ADDCH(buf, ' '); for (col = row; col < row + DUMP_WIDTH; col++) { if (col > last) break; ch = *col; if (!ISPRINT(ch)) ch = '.'; VSTRING_ADDCH(buf, ch); if (col - row == VERT_SPLIT) VSTRING_ADDCH(buf, ' '); } VSTRING_TERMINATE(buf); msg_info("%s", vstring_str(buf)); } #ifdef TRUNCATE_SPACE_NULL if ((last + 1) - start < len) msg_info("%04lx - ", (unsigned long) ((last + 1) - start)); #endif vstring_free(buf); } /* taken from OpenSSL apps/s_cb.c */ long tls_bio_dump_cb(BIO *bio, int cmd, const char *argp, int argi, long unused_argl, long ret) { if (cmd == (BIO_CB_READ | BIO_CB_RETURN)) { msg_info("read from %08lX [%08lX] (%d bytes => %ld (0x%lX))", (unsigned long) bio, (unsigned long) argp, argi, ret, (unsigned long) ret); tls_dump_buffer((unsigned char *) argp, (int) ret); } else if (cmd == (BIO_CB_WRITE | BIO_CB_RETURN)) { msg_info("write to %08lX [%08lX] (%d bytes => %ld (0x%lX))", (unsigned long) bio, (unsigned long) argp, argi, ret, (unsigned long) ret); tls_dump_buffer((unsigned char *) argp, (int) ret); } return (ret); } int tls_validate_digest(const char *dgst) { const EVP_MD *md_alg; unsigned int md_len; /* * Register SHA-2 digests, if implemented and not already registered. * Improves interoperability with clients and servers that prematurely * deploy SHA-2 certificates. Also facilitates DANE and TA support. */ #if defined(LN_sha256) && defined(NID_sha256) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256) if (!EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha224)) EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha224()); if (!EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha256)) EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256()); #endif #if defined(LN_sha512) && defined(NID_sha512) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA512) if (!EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha384)) EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha384()); if (!EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha512)) EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha512()); #endif /* * If the administrator specifies an unsupported digest algorithm, fail * now, rather than in the middle of a TLS handshake. */ if ((md_alg = EVP_get_digestbyname(dgst)) == 0) { msg_warn("Digest algorithm \"%s\" not found", dgst); return (0); } /* * Sanity check: Newer shared libraries may use larger digests. */ if ((md_len = EVP_MD_size(md_alg)) > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) { msg_warn("Digest algorithm \"%s\" output size %u too large", dgst, md_len); return (0); } return (1); } #else /* * Broken linker workaround. */ int tls_dummy_for_broken_linkers; #endif