Adding upstream version 1.8.27.upstream/1.8.27upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 741 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/doc/sudo.cat b/doc/sudo.cat
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+SUDO(1m)                     System Manager's Manual                    SUDO(1m)
+
+NNAAMMEE
+     ssuuddoo, ssuuddooeeddiitt - execute a command as another user
+
+SSYYNNOOPPSSIISS
+     ssuuddoo --hh | --KK | --kk | --VV
+     ssuuddoo --vv [--AAkknnSS] [--aa _t_y_p_e] [--gg _g_r_o_u_p] [--hh _h_o_s_t] [--pp _p_r_o_m_p_t] [--uu _u_s_e_r]
+     ssuuddoo --ll [--AAkknnSS] [--aa _t_y_p_e] [--gg _g_r_o_u_p] [--hh _h_o_s_t] [--pp _p_r_o_m_p_t] [--UU _u_s_e_r]
+          [--uu _u_s_e_r] [_c_o_m_m_a_n_d]
+     ssuuddoo [--AAbbEEHHnnPPSS] [--aa _t_y_p_e] [--CC _n_u_m] [--cc _c_l_a_s_s] [--gg _g_r_o_u_p] [--hh _h_o_s_t]
+          [--pp _p_r_o_m_p_t] [--rr _r_o_l_e] [--tt _t_y_p_e] [--TT _t_i_m_e_o_u_t] [--uu _u_s_e_r] [_V_A_R=_v_a_l_u_e]
+          [--ii | --ss] [_c_o_m_m_a_n_d]
+     ssuuddooeeddiitt [--AAkknnSS] [--aa _t_y_p_e] [--CC _n_u_m] [--cc _c_l_a_s_s] [--gg _g_r_o_u_p] [--hh _h_o_s_t]
+              [--pp _p_r_o_m_p_t] [--TT _t_i_m_e_o_u_t] [--uu _u_s_e_r] _f_i_l_e _._._.
+
+DDEESSCCRRIIPPTTIIOONN
+     ssuuddoo allows a permitted user to execute a _c_o_m_m_a_n_d as the superuser or
+     another user, as specified by the security policy.  The invoking user's
+     real (_n_o_t effective) user ID is used to determine the user name with
+     which to query the security policy.
+
+     ssuuddoo supports a plugin architecture for security policies and
+     input/output logging.  Third parties can develop and distribute their own
+     policy and I/O logging plugins to work seamlessly with the ssuuddoo front
+     end.  The default security policy is _s_u_d_o_e_r_s, which is configured via the
+     file _/_e_t_c_/_s_u_d_o_e_r_s, or via LDAP.  See the _P_l_u_g_i_n_s section for more
+     information.
+
+     The security policy determines what privileges, if any, a user has to run
+     ssuuddoo.  The policy may require that users authenticate themselves with a
+     password or another authentication mechanism.  If authentication is
+     required, ssuuddoo will exit if the user's password is not entered within a
+     configurable time limit.  This limit is policy-specific; the default
+     password prompt timeout for the _s_u_d_o_e_r_s security policy is 5 minutes.
+
+     Security policies may support credential caching to allow the user to run
+     ssuuddoo again for a period of time without requiring authentication.  The
+     _s_u_d_o_e_r_s policy caches credentials for 5 minutes, unless overridden in
+     sudoers(4).  By running ssuuddoo with the --vv option, a user can update the
+     cached credentials without running a _c_o_m_m_a_n_d.
+
+     When invoked as ssuuddooeeddiitt, the --ee option (described below), is implied.
+
+     Security policies may log successful and failed attempts to use ssuuddoo.  If
+     an I/O plugin is configured, the running command's input and output may
+     be logged as well.
+
+     The options are as follows:
+
+     --AA, ----aasskkppaassss
+                 Normally, if ssuuddoo requires a password, it will read it from
+                 the user's terminal.  If the --AA (_a_s_k_p_a_s_s) option is
+                 specified, a (possibly graphical) helper program is executed
+                 to read the user's password and output the password to the
+                 standard output.  If the SUDO_ASKPASS environment variable is
+                 set, it specifies the path to the helper program.  Otherwise,
+                 if sudo.conf(4) contains a line specifying the askpass
+                 program, that value will be used.  For example:
+
+                     # Path to askpass helper program
+                     Path askpass /usr/X11R6/bin/ssh-askpass
+
+                 If no askpass program is available, ssuuddoo will exit with an
+                 error.
+
+     --aa _t_y_p_e, ----aauutthh--ttyyppee=_t_y_p_e
+                 Use the specified BSD authentication _t_y_p_e when validating the
+                 user, if allowed by _/_e_t_c_/_l_o_g_i_n_._c_o_n_f.  The system
+                 administrator may specify a list of sudo-specific
+                 authentication methods by adding an "auth-sudo" entry in
+                 _/_e_t_c_/_l_o_g_i_n_._c_o_n_f.  This option is only available on systems
+                 that support BSD authentication.
+
+     --bb, ----bbaacckkggrroouunndd
+                 Run the given command in the background.  Note that it is not
+                 possible to use shell job control to manipulate background
+                 processes started by ssuuddoo.  Most interactive commands will
+                 fail to work properly in background mode.
+
+     --CC _n_u_m, ----cclloossee--ffrroomm=_n_u_m
+                 Close all file descriptors greater than or equal to _n_u_m
+                 before executing a command.  Values less than three are not
+                 permitted.  By default, ssuuddoo will close all open file
+                 descriptors other than standard input, standard output and
+                 standard error when executing a command.  The security policy
+                 may restrict the user's ability to use this option.  The
+                 _s_u_d_o_e_r_s policy only permits use of the --CC option when the
+                 administrator has enabled the _c_l_o_s_e_f_r_o_m___o_v_e_r_r_i_d_e option.
+
+     --cc _c_l_a_s_s, ----llooggiinn--ccllaassss=_c_l_a_s_s
+                 Run the command with resource limits and scheduling priority
+                 of the specified login _c_l_a_s_s.  The _c_l_a_s_s argument can be
+                 either a class name as defined in _/_e_t_c_/_l_o_g_i_n_._c_o_n_f, or a
+                 single `-' character.  If _c_l_a_s_s is --, the default login class
+                 of the target user will be used.  Otherwise, the command must
+                 be run as the superuser (user ID 0), or ssuuddoo must be run from
+                 a shell that is already running as the superuser.  If the
+                 command is being run as a login shell, additional
+                 _/_e_t_c_/_l_o_g_i_n_._c_o_n_f settings, such as the umask and environment
+                 variables, will be applied, if present.  This option is only
+                 available on systems with BSD login classes.
+
+     --EE, ----pprreesseerrvvee--eennvv
+                 Indicates to the security policy that the user wishes to
+                 preserve their existing environment variables.  The security
+                 policy may return an error if the user does not have
+                 permission to preserve the environment.
+
+     ----pprreesseerrvvee--eennvv==lliisstt
+                 Indicates to the security policy that the user wishes to add
+                 the comma-separated list of environment variables to those
+                 preserved from the user's environment.  The security policy
+                 may return an error if the user does not have permission to
+                 preserve the environment.
+
+     --ee, ----eeddiitt  Edit one or more files instead of running a command.  In lieu
+                 of a path name, the string "sudoedit" is used when consulting
+                 the security policy.  If the user is authorized by the
+                 policy, the following steps are taken:
+
+                  1.   Temporary copies are made of the files to be edited
+                       with the owner set to the invoking user.
+
+                  2.   The editor specified by the policy is run to edit the
+                       temporary files.  The _s_u_d_o_e_r_s policy uses the
+                       SUDO_EDITOR, VISUAL and EDITOR environment variables
+                       (in that order).  If none of SUDO_EDITOR, VISUAL or
+                       EDITOR are set, the first program listed in the _e_d_i_t_o_r
+                       sudoers(4) option is used.
+
+                  3.   If they have been modified, the temporary files are
+                       copied back to their original location and the
+                       temporary versions are removed.
+
+                 To help prevent the editing of unauthorized files, the
+                 following restrictions are enforced unless explicitly allowed
+                 by the security policy:
+
+                  ++oo  Symbolic links may not be edited (version 1.8.15 and
+                     higher).
+
+                  ++oo  Symbolic links along the path to be edited are not
+                     followed when the parent directory is writable by the
+                     invoking user unless that user is root (version 1.8.16
+                     and higher).
+
+                  ++oo  Files located in a directory that is writable by the
+                     invoking user may not be edited unless that user is root
+                     (version 1.8.16 and higher).
+
+                 Users are never allowed to edit device special files.
+
+                 If the specified file does not exist, it will be created.
+                 Note that unlike most commands run by _s_u_d_o, the editor is run
+                 with the invoking user's environment unmodified.  If, for
+                 some reason, ssuuddoo is unable to update a file with its edited
+                 version, the user will receive a warning and the edited copy
+                 will remain in a temporary file.
+
+     --gg _g_r_o_u_p, ----ggrroouupp=_g_r_o_u_p
+                 Run the command with the primary group set to _g_r_o_u_p instead
+                 of the primary group specified by the target user's password
+                 database entry.  The _g_r_o_u_p may be either a group name or a
+                 numeric group ID (GID) prefixed with the `#' character (e.g.,
+                 #0 for GID 0).  When running a command as a GID, many shells
+                 require that the `#' be escaped with a backslash (`\').  If
+                 no --uu option is specified, the command will be run as the
+                 invoking user.  In either case, the primary group will be set
+                 to _g_r_o_u_p.  The _s_u_d_o_e_r_s policy permits any of the target
+                 user's groups to be specified via the --gg option as long as
+                 the --PP option is not in use.
+
+     --HH, ----sseett--hhoommee
+                 Request that the security policy set the HOME environment
+                 variable to the home directory specified by the target user's
+                 password database entry.  Depending on the policy, this may
+                 be the default behavior.
+
+     --hh, ----hheellpp  Display a short help message to the standard output and exit.
+
+     --hh _h_o_s_t, ----hhoosstt=_h_o_s_t
+                 Run the command on the specified _h_o_s_t if the security policy
+                 plugin supports remote commands.  Note that the _s_u_d_o_e_r_s
+                 plugin does not currently support running remote commands.
+                 This may also be used in conjunction with the --ll option to
+                 list a user's privileges for the remote host.
+
+     --ii, ----llooggiinn
+                 Run the shell specified by the target user's password
+                 database entry as a login shell.  This means that login-
+                 specific resource files such as _._p_r_o_f_i_l_e, _._b_a_s_h___p_r_o_f_i_l_e or
+                 _._l_o_g_i_n will be read by the shell.  If a command is specified,
+                 it is passed to the shell for execution via the shell's --cc
+                 option.  If no command is specified, an interactive shell is
+                 executed.  ssuuddoo attempts to change to that user's home
+                 directory before running the shell.  The command is run with
+                 an environment similar to the one a user would receive at log
+                 in.  Note that most shells behave differently when a command
+                 is specified as compared to an interactive session; consult
+                 the shell's manual for details.  The _C_o_m_m_a_n_d _e_n_v_i_r_o_n_m_e_n_t
+                 section in the sudoers(4) manual documents how the --ii option
+                 affects the environment in which a command is run when the
+                 _s_u_d_o_e_r_s policy is in use.
+
+     --KK, ----rreemmoovvee--ttiimmeessttaammpp
+                 Similar to the --kk option, except that it removes the user's
+                 cached credentials entirely and may not be used in
+                 conjunction with a command or other option.  This option does
+                 not require a password.  Not all security policies support
+                 credential caching.
+
+     --kk, ----rreesseett--ttiimmeessttaammpp
+                 When used without a command, invalidates the user's cached
+                 credentials.  In other words, the next time ssuuddoo is run a
+                 password will be required.  This option does not require a
+                 password and was added to allow a user to revoke ssuuddoo
+                 permissions from a _._l_o_g_o_u_t file.
+
+                 When used in conjunction with a command or an option that may
+                 require a password, this option will cause ssuuddoo to ignore the
+                 user's cached credentials.  As a result, ssuuddoo will prompt for
+                 a password (if one is required by the security policy) and
+                 will not update the user's cached credentials.
+
+                 Not all security policies support credential caching.
+
+     --ll, ----lliisstt  If no _c_o_m_m_a_n_d is specified, list the allowed (and forbidden)
+                 commands for the invoking user (or the user specified by the
+                 --UU option) on the current host.  A longer list format is used
+                 if this option is specified multiple times and the security
+                 policy supports a verbose output format.
+
+                 If a _c_o_m_m_a_n_d is specified and is permitted by the security
+                 policy, the fully-qualified path to the command is displayed
+                 along with any command line arguments.  If a _c_o_m_m_a_n_d is
+                 specified but not allowed by the policy, ssuuddoo will exit with
+                 a status value of 1.
+
+     --nn, ----nnoonn--iinntteerraaccttiivvee
+                 Avoid prompting the user for input of any kind.  If a
+                 password is required for the command to run, ssuuddoo will
+                 display an error message and exit.
+
+     --PP, ----pprreesseerrvvee--ggrroouuppss
+                 Preserve the invoking user's group vector unaltered.  By
+                 default, the _s_u_d_o_e_r_s policy will initialize the group vector
+                 to the list of groups the target user is a member of.  The
+                 real and effective group IDs, however, are still set to match
+                 the target user.
+
+     --pp _p_r_o_m_p_t, ----pprroommpptt=_p_r_o_m_p_t
+                 Use a custom password prompt with optional escape sequences.
+                 The following percent (`%') escape sequences are supported by
+                 the _s_u_d_o_e_r_s policy:
+
+                 %H  expanded to the host name including the domain name (on
+                     if the machine's host name is fully qualified or the _f_q_d_n
+                     option is set in sudoers(4))
+
+                 %h  expanded to the local host name without the domain name
+
+                 %p  expanded to the name of the user whose password is being
+                     requested (respects the _r_o_o_t_p_w, _t_a_r_g_e_t_p_w, and _r_u_n_a_s_p_w
+                     flags in sudoers(4))
+
+                 %U  expanded to the login name of the user the command will
+                     be run as (defaults to root unless the --uu option is also
+                     specified)
+
+                 %u  expanded to the invoking user's login name
+
+                 %%  two consecutive `%' characters are collapsed into a
+                     single `%' character
+
+                 The custom prompt will override the default prompt specified
+                 by either the security policy or the SUDO_PROMPT environment
+                 variable.  On systems that use PAM, the custom prompt will
+                 also override the prompt specified by a PAM module unless the
+                 _p_a_s_s_p_r_o_m_p_t___o_v_e_r_r_i_d_e flag is disabled in _s_u_d_o_e_r_s.
+
+     --rr _r_o_l_e, ----rroollee=_r_o_l_e
+                 Run the command with an SELinux security context that
+                 includes the specified _r_o_l_e.
+
+     --SS, ----ssttddiinn
+                 Write the prompt to the standard error and read the password
+                 from the standard input instead of using the terminal device.
+
+     --ss, ----sshheellll
+                 Run the shell specified by the SHELL environment variable if
+                 it is set or the shell specified by the invoking user's
+                 password database entry.  If a command is specified, it is
+                 passed to the shell for execution via the shell's --cc option.
+                 If no command is specified, an interactive shell is executed.
+                 Note that most shells behave differently when a command is
+                 specified as compared to an interactive session; consult the
+                 shell's manual for details.
+
+     --tt _t_y_p_e, ----ttyyppee=_t_y_p_e
+                 Run the command with an SELinux security context that
+                 includes the specified _t_y_p_e.  If no _t_y_p_e is specified, the
+                 default type is derived from the role.
+
+     --UU _u_s_e_r, ----ootthheerr--uusseerr=_u_s_e_r
+                 Used in conjunction with the --ll option to list the privileges
+                 for _u_s_e_r instead of for the invoking user.  The security
+                 policy may restrict listing other users' privileges.  The
+                 _s_u_d_o_e_r_s policy only allows root or a user with the ALL
+                 privilege on the current host to use this option.
+
+     --TT _t_i_m_e_o_u_t, ----ccoommmmaanndd--ttiimmeeoouutt=_t_i_m_e_o_u_t
+                 Used to set a timeout for the command.  If the timeout
+                 expires before the command has exited, the command will be
+                 terminated.  The security policy may restrict the ability to
+                 set command timeouts.  The _s_u_d_o_e_r_s policy requires that user-
+                 specified timeouts be explicitly enabled.
+
+     --uu _u_s_e_r, ----uusseerr=_u_s_e_r
+                 Run the command as a user other than the default target user
+                 (usually _r_o_o_t).  The _u_s_e_r may be either a user name or a
+                 numeric user ID (UID) prefixed with the `#' character (e.g.,
+                 #0 for UID 0).  When running commands as a UID, many shells
+                 require that the `#' be escaped with a backslash (`\').  Some
+                 security policies may restrict UIDs to those listed in the
+                 password database.  The _s_u_d_o_e_r_s policy allows UIDs that are
+                 not in the password database as long as the _t_a_r_g_e_t_p_w option
+                 is not set.  Other security policies may not support this.
+
+     --VV, ----vveerrssiioonn
+                 Print the ssuuddoo version string as well as the version string
+                 of the security policy plugin and any I/O plugins.  If the
+                 invoking user is already root the --VV option will display the
+                 arguments passed to configure when ssuuddoo was built and plugins
+                 may display more verbose information such as default options.
+
+     --vv, ----vvaalliiddaattee
+                 Update the user's cached credentials, authenticating the user
+                 if necessary.  For the _s_u_d_o_e_r_s plugin, this extends the ssuuddoo
+                 timeout for another 5 minutes by default, but does not run a
+                 command.  Not all security policies support cached
+                 credentials.
+
+     ----          The ---- option indicates that ssuuddoo should stop processing
+                 command line arguments.
+
+     Environment variables to be set for the command may also be passed on the
+     command line in the form of _V_A_R=_v_a_l_u_e, e.g.,
+     LD_LIBRARY_PATH=_/_u_s_r_/_l_o_c_a_l_/_p_k_g_/_l_i_b.  Variables passed on the command line
+     are subject to restrictions imposed by the security policy plugin.  The
+     _s_u_d_o_e_r_s policy subjects variables passed on the command line to the same
+     restrictions as normal environment variables with one important
+     exception.  If the _s_e_t_e_n_v option is set in _s_u_d_o_e_r_s, the command to be run
+     has the SETENV tag set or the command matched is ALL, the user may set
+     variables that would otherwise be forbidden.  See sudoers(4) for more
+     information.
+
+CCOOMMMMAANNDD EEXXEECCUUTTIIOONN
+     When ssuuddoo executes a command, the security policy specifies the execution
+     environment for the command.  Typically, the real and effective user and
+     group and IDs are set to match those of the target user, as specified in
+     the password database, and the group vector is initialized based on the
+     group database (unless the --PP option was specified).
+
+     The following parameters may be specified by security policy:
+
+     ++oo  real and effective user ID
+
+     ++oo  real and effective group ID
+
+     ++oo  supplementary group IDs
+
+     ++oo  the environment list
+
+     ++oo  current working directory
+
+     ++oo  file creation mode mask (umask)
+
+     ++oo  SELinux role and type
+
+     ++oo  Solaris project
+
+     ++oo  Solaris privileges
+
+     ++oo  BSD login class
+
+     ++oo  scheduling priority (aka nice value)
+
+   PPrroocceessss mmooddeell
+     There are two distinct ways ssuuddoo can run a command.
+
+     If an I/O logging plugin is configured or if the security policy
+     explicitly requests it, a new pseudo-terminal ("pty") is allocated and
+     fork(2) is used to create a second ssuuddoo process, referred to as the
+     _m_o_n_i_t_o_r.  The _m_o_n_i_t_o_r creates a new terminal session with itself as the
+     leader and the pty as its controlling terminal, calls fork(2), sets up
+     the execution environment as described above, and then uses the execve(2)
+     system call to run the command in the child process.  The _m_o_n_i_t_o_r exists
+     to relay job control signals between the user's existing terminal and the
+     pty the command is being run in.  This makes it possible to suspend and
+     resume the command.  Without the monitor, the command would be in what
+     POSIX terms an "orphaned process group" and it would not receive any job
+     control signals from the kernel.  When the command exits or is terminated
+     by a signal, the _m_o_n_i_t_o_r passes the command's exit status to the main
+     ssuuddoo process and exits.  After receiving the command's exit status, the
+     main ssuuddoo passes the command's exit status to the security policy's close
+     function and exits.
+
+     If no pty is used, ssuuddoo calls fork(2), sets up the execution environment
+     as described above, and uses the execve(2) system call to run the command
+     in the child process.  The main ssuuddoo process waits until the command has
+     completed, then passes the command's exit status to the security policy's
+     close function and exits.  As a special case, if the policy plugin does
+     not define a close function, ssuuddoo will execute the command directly
+     instead of calling fork(2) first.  The _s_u_d_o_e_r_s policy plugin will only
+     define a close function when I/O logging is enabled, a pty is required,
+     or the _p_a_m___s_e_s_s_i_o_n or _p_a_m___s_e_t_c_r_e_d options are enabled.  Note that
+     _p_a_m___s_e_s_s_i_o_n and _p_a_m___s_e_t_c_r_e_d are enabled by default on systems using PAM.
+
+   SSiiggnnaall hhaannddlliinngg
+     When the command is run as a child of the ssuuddoo process, ssuuddoo will relay
+     signals it receives to the command.  The SIGINT and SIGQUIT signals are
+     only relayed when the command is being run in a new pty or when the
+     signal was sent by a user process, not the kernel.  This prevents the
+     command from receiving SIGINT twice each time the user enters control-C.
+     Some signals, such as SIGSTOP and SIGKILL, cannot be caught and thus will
+     not be relayed to the command.  As a general rule, SIGTSTP should be used
+     instead of SIGSTOP when you wish to suspend a command being run by ssuuddoo.
+
+     As a special case, ssuuddoo will not relay signals that were sent by the
+     command it is running.  This prevents the command from accidentally
+     killing itself.  On some systems, the reboot(1m) command sends SIGTERM to
+     all non-system processes other than itself before rebooting the system.
+     This prevents ssuuddoo from relaying the SIGTERM signal it received back to
+     reboot(1m), which might then exit before the system was actually rebooted,
+     leaving it in a half-dead state similar to single user mode.  Note,
+     however, that this check only applies to the command run by ssuuddoo and not
+     any other processes that the command may create.  As a result, running a
+     script that calls reboot(1m) or shutdown(1m) via ssuuddoo may cause the system
+     to end up in this undefined state unless the reboot(1m) or shutdown(1m) are
+     run using the eexxeecc() family of functions instead of ssyysstteemm() (which
+     interposes a shell between the command and the calling process).
+
+     If no I/O logging plugins are loaded and the policy plugin has not
+     defined a cclloossee() function, set a command timeout or required that the
+     command be run in a new pty, ssuuddoo may execute the command directly
+     instead of running it as a child process.
+
+   PPlluuggiinnss
+     Plugins may be specified via Plugin directives in the sudo.conf(4) file.
+     They may be loaded as dynamic shared objects (on systems that support
+     them), or compiled directly into the ssuuddoo binary.  If no sudo.conf(4)
+     file is present, or it contains no Plugin lines, ssuuddoo will use the
+     traditional _s_u_d_o_e_r_s security policy and I/O logging.  See the
+     sudo.conf(4) manual for details of the _/_e_t_c_/_s_u_d_o_._c_o_n_f file and the
+     sudo_plugin(4) manual for more information about the ssuuddoo plugin
+     architecture.
+
+EEXXIITT VVAALLUUEE
+     Upon successful execution of a command, the exit status from ssuuddoo will be
+     the exit status of the program that was executed.  If the command
+     terminated due to receipt of a signal, ssuuddoo will send itself the same
+     signal that terminated the command.
+
+     If the --ll option was specified without a command, ssuuddoo will exit with a
+     value of 0 if the user is allowed to run ssuuddoo and they authenticated
+     successfully (as required by the security policy).  If a command is
+     specified with the --ll option, the exit value will only be 0 if the
+     command is permitted by the security policy, otherwise it will be 1.
+
+     If there is an authentication failure, a configuration/permission problem
+     or if the given command cannot be executed, ssuuddoo exits with a value of 1.
+     In the latter case, the error string is printed to the standard error.
+     If ssuuddoo cannot stat(2) one or more entries in the user's PATH, an error
+     is printed to the standard error.  (If the directory does not exist or if
+     it is not really a directory, the entry is ignored and no error is
+     printed.)  This should not happen under normal circumstances.  The most
+     common reason for stat(2) to return "permission denied" is if you are
+     running an automounter and one of the directories in your PATH is on a
+     machine that is currently unreachable.
+
+SSEECCUURRIITTYY NNOOTTEESS
+     ssuuddoo tries to be safe when executing external commands.
+
+     To prevent command spoofing, ssuuddoo checks "." and "" (both denoting
+     current directory) last when searching for a command in the user's PATH
+     (if one or both are in the PATH).  Note, however, that the actual PATH
+     environment variable is _n_o_t modified and is passed unchanged to the
+     program that ssuuddoo executes.
+
+     Users should _n_e_v_e_r be granted ssuuddoo privileges to execute files that are
+     writable by the user or that reside in a directory that is writable by
+     the user.  If the user can modify or replace the command there is no way
+     to limit what additional commands they can run.
+
+     Please note that ssuuddoo will normally only log the command it explicitly
+     runs.  If a user runs a command such as sudo su or sudo sh, subsequent
+     commands run from that shell are not subject to ssuuddoo's security policy.
+     The same is true for commands that offer shell escapes (including most
+     editors).  If I/O logging is enabled, subsequent commands will have their
+     input and/or output logged, but there will not be traditional logs for
+     those commands.  Because of this, care must be taken when giving users
+     access to commands via ssuuddoo to verify that the command does not
+     inadvertently give the user an effective root shell.  For more
+     information, please see the _P_r_e_v_e_n_t_i_n_g _s_h_e_l_l _e_s_c_a_p_e_s section in
+     sudoers(4).
+
+     To prevent the disclosure of potentially sensitive information, ssuuddoo
+     disables core dumps by default while it is executing (they are re-enabled
+     for the command that is run).  This historical practice dates from a time
+     when most operating systems allowed setuid processes to dump core by
+     default.  To aid in debugging ssuuddoo crashes, you may wish to re-enable
+     core dumps by setting "disable_coredump" to false in the sudo.conf(4)
+     file as follows:
+
+           Set disable_coredump false
+
+     See the sudo.conf(4) manual for more information.
+
+EENNVVIIRROONNMMEENNTT
+     ssuuddoo utilizes the following environment variables.  The security policy
+     has control over the actual content of the command's environment.
+
+     EDITOR           Default editor to use in --ee (sudoedit) mode if neither
+                      SUDO_EDITOR nor VISUAL is set.
+
+     MAIL             Set to the mail spool of the target user when the --ii
+                      option is specified or when _e_n_v___r_e_s_e_t is enabled in
+                      _s_u_d_o_e_r_s (unless MAIL is present in the _e_n_v___k_e_e_p list).
+
+     HOME             Set to the home directory of the target user when the --ii
+                      or --HH options are specified, when the --ss option is
+                      specified and _s_e_t___h_o_m_e is set in _s_u_d_o_e_r_s, when
+                      _a_l_w_a_y_s___s_e_t___h_o_m_e is enabled in _s_u_d_o_e_r_s, or when _e_n_v___r_e_s_e_t
+                      is enabled in _s_u_d_o_e_r_s and _H_O_M_E is not present in the
+                      _e_n_v___k_e_e_p list.
+
+     LOGNAME          Set to the login name of the target user when the --ii
+                      option is specified, when the _s_e_t___l_o_g_n_a_m_e option is
+                      enabled in _s_u_d_o_e_r_s or when the _e_n_v___r_e_s_e_t option is
+                      enabled in _s_u_d_o_e_r_s (unless LOGNAME is present in the
+                      _e_n_v___k_e_e_p list).
+
+     PATH             May be overridden by the security policy.
+
+     SHELL            Used to determine shell to run with --ss option.
+
+     SUDO_ASKPASS     Specifies the path to a helper program used to read the
+                      password if no terminal is available or if the --AA option
+                      is specified.
+
+     SUDO_COMMAND     Set to the command run by sudo.
+
+     SUDO_EDITOR      Default editor to use in --ee (sudoedit) mode.
+
+     SUDO_GID         Set to the group ID of the user who invoked sudo.
+
+     SUDO_PROMPT      Used as the default password prompt unless the --pp option
+                      was specified.
+
+     SUDO_PS1         If set, PS1 will be set to its value for the program
+                      being run.
+
+     SUDO_UID         Set to the user ID of the user who invoked sudo.
+
+     SUDO_USER        Set to the login name of the user who invoked sudo.
+
+     USER             Set to the same value as LOGNAME, described above.
+
+     VISUAL           Default editor to use in --ee (sudoedit) mode if
+                      SUDO_EDITOR is not set.
+
+FFIILLEESS
+     _/_e_t_c_/_s_u_d_o_._c_o_n_f            ssuuddoo front end configuration
+
+EEXXAAMMPPLLEESS
+     Note: the following examples assume a properly configured security
+     policy.
+
+     To get a file listing of an unreadable directory:
+
+           $ sudo ls /usr/local/protected
+
+     To list the home directory of user yaz on a machine where the file system
+     holding ~yaz is not exported as root:
+
+           $ sudo -u yaz ls ~yaz
+
+     To edit the _i_n_d_e_x_._h_t_m_l file as user www:
+
+           $ sudoedit -u www ~www/htdocs/index.html
+
+     To view system logs only accessible to root and users in the adm group:
+
+           $ sudo -g adm more /var/log/syslog
+
+     To run an editor as jim with a different primary group:
+
+           $ sudoedit -u jim -g audio ~jim/sound.txt
+
+     To shut down a machine:
+
+           $ sudo shutdown -r +15 "quick reboot"
+
+     To make a usage listing of the directories in the /home partition.  Note
+     that this runs the commands in a sub-shell to make the cd and file
+     redirection work.
+
+           $ sudo sh -c "cd /home ; du -s * | sort -rn > USAGE"
+
+DDIIAAGGNNOOSSTTIICCSS
+     Error messages produced by ssuuddoo include:
+
+     editing files in a writable directory is not permitted
+           By default, ssuuddooeeddiitt does not permit editing a file when any of the
+           parent directories are writable by the invoking user.  This avoids
+           a race condition that could allow the user to overwrite an
+           arbitrary file.  See the _s_u_d_o_e_d_i_t___c_h_e_c_k_d_i_r option in sudoers(4) for
+           more information.
+
+     editing symbolic links is not permitted
+           By default, ssuuddooeeddiitt does not follow symbolic links when opening
+           files.  See the _s_u_d_o_e_d_i_t___f_o_l_l_o_w option in sudoers(4) for more
+           information.
+
+     effective uid is not 0, is sudo installed setuid root?
+           ssuuddoo was not run with root privileges.  The ssuuddoo binary must be
+           owned by the root user and have the Set-user-ID bit set.  Also, it
+           must not be located on a file system mounted with the `nosuid'
+           option or on an NFS file system that maps uid 0 to an unprivileged
+           uid.
+
+     effective uid is not 0, is sudo on a file system with the 'nosuid' option
+           set or an NFS file system without root privileges?
+           ssuuddoo was not run with root privileges.  The ssuuddoo binary has the
+           proper owner and permissions but it still did not run with root
+           privileges.  The most common reason for this is that the file
+           system the ssuuddoo binary is located on is mounted with the `nosuid'
+           option or it is an NFS file system that maps uid 0 to an
+           unprivileged uid.
+
+     fatal error, unable to load plugins
+           An error occurred while loading or initializing the plugins
+           specified in sudo.conf(4).
+
+     invalid environment variable name
+           One or more environment variable names specified via the --EE option
+           contained an equal sign (`=').  The arguments to the --EE option
+           should be environment variable names without an associated value.
+
+     no password was provided
+           When ssuuddoo tried to read the password, it did not receive any
+           characters.  This may happen if no terminal is available (or the --SS
+           option is specified) and the standard input has been redirected
+           from _/_d_e_v_/_n_u_l_l.
+
+     no tty present and no askpass program specified
+           ssuuddoo needs to read the password but there is no mechanism available
+           to do so.  A terminal is not present to read the password from,
+           ssuuddoo has not been configured to read from the standard input, and
+           no askpass program has been specified either via the --AA option or
+           the SUDO_ASKPASS environment variable.
+
+     no writable temporary directory found
+           ssuuddooeeddiitt was unable to find a usable temporary directory in which
+           to store its intermediate files.
+
+     sudo must be owned by uid 0 and have the setuid bit set
+           ssuuddoo was not run with root privileges.  The ssuuddoo binary does not
+           have the correct owner or permissions.  It must be owned by the
+           root user and have the Set-user-ID bit set.
+
+     sudoedit is not supported on this platform
+           It is only possible to run ssuuddooeeddiitt on systems that support setting
+           the effective user-ID.
+
+     timed out reading password
+           The user did not enter a password before the password timeout (5
+           minutes by default) expired.
+
+     you do not exist in the passwd database
+           Your user ID does not appear in the system passwd database.
+
+     you may not specify environment variables in edit mode
+           It is only possible to specify environment variables when running a
+           command.  When editing a file, the editor is run with the user's
+           environment unmodified.
+
+SSEEEE AALLSSOO
+     su(1), stat(2), login_cap(3), passwd(4), sudo.conf(4), sudo_plugin(4),
+     sudoers(4), sudoreplay(1m), visudo(1m)
+
+HHIISSTTOORRYY
+     See the HISTORY file in the ssuuddoo distribution
+     (https://www.sudo.ws/history.html) for a brief history of sudo.
+
+AAUUTTHHOORRSS
+     Many people have worked on ssuuddoo over the years; this version consists of
+     code written primarily by:
+
+           Todd C. Miller
+
+     See the CONTRIBUTORS file in the ssuuddoo distribution
+     (https://www.sudo.ws/contributors.html) for an exhaustive list of people
+     who have contributed to ssuuddoo.
+
+CCAAVVEEAATTSS
+     There is no easy way to prevent a user from gaining a root shell if that
+     user is allowed to run arbitrary commands via ssuuddoo.  Also, many programs
+     (such as editors) allow the user to run commands via shell escapes, thus
+     avoiding ssuuddoo's checks.  However, on most systems it is possible to
+     prevent shell escapes with the sudoers(4) plugin's _n_o_e_x_e_c functionality.
+
+     It is not meaningful to run the cd command directly via sudo, e.g.,
+
+           $ sudo cd /usr/local/protected
+
+     since when the command exits the parent process (your shell) will still
+     be the same.  Please see the _E_X_A_M_P_L_E_S section for more information.
+
+     Running shell scripts via ssuuddoo can expose the same kernel bugs that make
+     setuid shell scripts unsafe on some operating systems (if your OS has a
+     /dev/fd/ directory, setuid shell scripts are generally safe).
+
+BBUUGGSS
+     If you feel you have found a bug in ssuuddoo, please submit a bug report at
+     https://bugzilla.sudo.ws/
+
+SSUUPPPPOORRTT
+     Limited free support is available via the sudo-users mailing list, see
+     https://www.sudo.ws/mailman/listinfo/sudo-users to subscribe or search
+     the archives.
+
+DDIISSCCLLAAIIMMEERR
+     ssuuddoo is provided "AS IS" and any express or implied warranties,
+     including, but not limited to, the implied warranties of merchantability
+     and fitness for a particular purpose are disclaimed.  See the LICENSE
+     file distributed with ssuuddoo or https://www.sudo.ws/license.html for
+     complete details.
+
+Sudo 1.8.26                    November 25, 2018                   Sudo 1.8.26