diff options
Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/selinux.c | 460 |
1 files changed, 460 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/selinux.c b/src/selinux.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ed36d89 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/selinux.c @@ -0,0 +1,460 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2009-2016 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@sudo.ws> + * Copyright (c) 2008 Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> + * + * Borrowed heavily from newrole source code + * Authors: + * Anthony Colatrella + * Tim Fraser + * Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> + * Darrel Goeddel <DGoeddel@trustedcs.com> + * Michael Thompson <mcthomps@us.ibm.com> + * Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* + * This is an open source non-commercial project. Dear PVS-Studio, please check it. + * PVS-Studio Static Code Analyzer for C, C++ and C#: http://www.viva64.com + */ + +#include <config.h> + +#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX + +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <sys/wait.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <signal.h> + +#include <selinux/selinux.h> /* for is_selinux_enabled() */ +#include <selinux/context.h> /* for context-mangling functions */ +#include <selinux/get_default_type.h> +#include <selinux/get_context_list.h> + +#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT +# include <libaudit.h> +#endif + +#include "sudo.h" +#include "sudo_exec.h" + +static struct selinux_state { + security_context_t old_context; + security_context_t new_context; + security_context_t tty_context; + security_context_t new_tty_context; + const char *ttyn; + int ttyfd; + int enforcing; +} se_state; + +#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT +static int +audit_role_change(const security_context_t old_context, + const security_context_t new_context, const char *ttyn, int result) +{ + int au_fd, rc = -1; + char *message; + debug_decl(audit_role_change, SUDO_DEBUG_SELINUX) + + au_fd = audit_open(); + if (au_fd == -1) { + /* Kernel may not have audit support. */ + if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT && errno != EAFNOSUPPORT +) + sudo_fatal(U_("unable to open audit system")); + } else { + /* audit role change using the same format as newrole(1) */ + rc = asprintf(&message, "newrole: old-context=%s new-context=%s", + old_context, new_context); + if (rc == -1) + sudo_fatalx(U_("%s: %s"), __func__, U_("unable to allocate memory")); + rc = audit_log_user_message(au_fd, AUDIT_USER_ROLE_CHANGE, + message, NULL, NULL, ttyn, result); + if (rc <= 0) + sudo_warn(U_("unable to send audit message")); + free(message); + close(au_fd); + } + + debug_return_int(rc); +} +#endif + +/* + * This function attempts to revert the relabeling done to the tty. + * fd - referencing the opened ttyn + * ttyn - name of tty to restore + * + * Returns zero on success, non-zero otherwise + */ +int +selinux_restore_tty(void) +{ + int retval = 0; + security_context_t chk_tty_context = NULL; + debug_decl(selinux_restore_tty, SUDO_DEBUG_SELINUX) + + if (se_state.ttyfd == -1 || se_state.new_tty_context == NULL) + goto skip_relabel; + + /* Verify that the tty still has the context set by sudo. */ + if ((retval = fgetfilecon(se_state.ttyfd, &chk_tty_context)) < 0) { + sudo_warn(U_("unable to fgetfilecon %s"), se_state.ttyn); + goto skip_relabel; + } + + if ((retval = strcmp(chk_tty_context, se_state.new_tty_context))) { + sudo_warnx(U_("%s changed labels"), se_state.ttyn); + goto skip_relabel; + } + + if ((retval = fsetfilecon(se_state.ttyfd, se_state.tty_context)) < 0) + sudo_warn(U_("unable to restore context for %s"), se_state.ttyn); + +skip_relabel: + if (se_state.ttyfd != -1) { + close(se_state.ttyfd); + se_state.ttyfd = -1; + } + if (chk_tty_context != NULL) { + freecon(chk_tty_context); + chk_tty_context = NULL; + } + debug_return_int(retval); +} + +/* + * This function attempts to relabel the tty. If this function fails, then + * the contexts are free'd and -1 is returned. On success, 0 is returned + * and tty_context and new_tty_context are set. + * + * This function will not fail if it can not relabel the tty when selinux is + * in permissive mode. + */ +static int +relabel_tty(const char *ttyn, int ptyfd) +{ + security_context_t tty_con = NULL; + security_context_t new_tty_con = NULL; + struct stat sb; + int fd; + debug_decl(relabel_tty, SUDO_DEBUG_SELINUX) + + se_state.ttyfd = ptyfd; + + /* It is perfectly legal to have no tty. */ + if (ptyfd == -1 && ttyn == NULL) + debug_return_int(0); + + /* If sudo is not allocating a pty for the command, open current tty. */ + if (ptyfd == -1) { + se_state.ttyfd = open(ttyn, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY|O_NONBLOCK); + if (se_state.ttyfd == -1 || fstat(se_state.ttyfd, &sb) == -1) { + sudo_warn(U_("unable to open %s, not relabeling tty"), ttyn); + goto bad; + } + if (!S_ISCHR(sb.st_mode)) { + sudo_warn(U_("%s is not a character device, not relabeling tty"), + ttyn); + goto bad; + } + (void)fcntl(se_state.ttyfd, F_SETFL, + fcntl(se_state.ttyfd, F_GETFL, 0) & ~O_NONBLOCK); + } + + if (fgetfilecon(se_state.ttyfd, &tty_con) < 0) { + sudo_warn(U_("unable to get current tty context, not relabeling tty")); + goto bad; + } + + if (tty_con) { + security_class_t tclass = string_to_security_class("chr_file"); + if (tclass == 0) { + sudo_warn(U_("unknown security class \"chr_file\", not relabeling tty")); + goto bad; + } + if (security_compute_relabel(se_state.new_context, tty_con, + tclass, &new_tty_con) < 0) { + sudo_warn(U_("unable to get new tty context, not relabeling tty")); + goto bad; + } + } + + if (new_tty_con != NULL) { + if (fsetfilecon(se_state.ttyfd, new_tty_con) < 0) { + sudo_warn(U_("unable to set new tty context")); + goto bad; + } + } + + if (ptyfd != -1) { + /* Reopen pty that was relabeled, std{in,out,err} are reset later. */ + se_state.ttyfd = open(ttyn, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY, 0); + if (se_state.ttyfd == -1 || fstat(se_state.ttyfd, &sb) == -1) { + sudo_warn(U_("unable to open %s"), ttyn); + goto bad; + } + if (!S_ISCHR(sb.st_mode)) { + sudo_warn(U_("%s is not a character device, not relabeling tty"), + ttyn); + goto bad; + } + if (dup2(se_state.ttyfd, ptyfd) == -1) { + sudo_warn("dup2"); + goto bad; + } + } else { + /* Re-open tty to get new label and reset std{in,out,err} */ + close(se_state.ttyfd); + se_state.ttyfd = open(ttyn, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY|O_NONBLOCK); + if (se_state.ttyfd == -1 || fstat(se_state.ttyfd, &sb) == -1) { + sudo_warn(U_("unable to open %s"), ttyn); + goto bad; + } + if (!S_ISCHR(sb.st_mode)) { + sudo_warn(U_("%s is not a character device, not relabeling tty"), + ttyn); + goto bad; + } + (void)fcntl(se_state.ttyfd, F_SETFL, + fcntl(se_state.ttyfd, F_GETFL, 0) & ~O_NONBLOCK); + for (fd = STDIN_FILENO; fd <= STDERR_FILENO; fd++) { + if (isatty(fd) && dup2(se_state.ttyfd, fd) == -1) { + sudo_warn("dup2"); + goto bad; + } + } + } + /* Retain se_state.ttyfd so we can restore label when command finishes. */ + (void)fcntl(se_state.ttyfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); + + se_state.ttyn = ttyn; + se_state.tty_context = tty_con; + se_state.new_tty_context = new_tty_con; + debug_return_int(0); + +bad: + if (se_state.ttyfd != -1 && se_state.ttyfd != ptyfd) { + close(se_state.ttyfd); + se_state.ttyfd = -1; + } + freecon(tty_con); + debug_return_int(se_state.enforcing ? -1 : 0); +} + +/* + * Returns a new security context based on the old context and the + * specified role and type. + */ +security_context_t +get_exec_context(security_context_t old_context, const char *role, const char *type) +{ + security_context_t new_context = NULL; + context_t context = NULL; + char *typebuf = NULL; + debug_decl(get_exec_context, SUDO_DEBUG_SELINUX) + + /* We must have a role, the type is optional (we can use the default). */ + if (!role) { + sudo_warnx(U_("you must specify a role for type %s"), type); + errno = EINVAL; + goto bad; + } + if (!type) { + if (get_default_type(role, &typebuf)) { + sudo_warnx(U_("unable to get default type for role %s"), role); + errno = EINVAL; + goto bad; + } + type = typebuf; + } + + /* + * Expand old_context into a context_t so that we extract and modify + * its components easily. + */ + context = context_new(old_context); + + /* + * Replace the role and type in "context" with the role and + * type we will be running the command as. + */ + if (context_role_set(context, role)) { + sudo_warn(U_("failed to set new role %s"), role); + goto bad; + } + if (context_type_set(context, type)) { + sudo_warn(U_("failed to set new type %s"), type); + goto bad; + } + + /* + * Convert "context" back into a string and verify it. + */ + if ((new_context = strdup(context_str(context))) == NULL) { + sudo_warnx(U_("%s: %s"), __func__, U_("unable to allocate memory")); + goto bad; + } + if (security_check_context(new_context) < 0) { + sudo_warnx(U_("%s is not a valid context"), new_context); + errno = EINVAL; + goto bad; + } + +#ifdef DEBUG + sudo_warnx("Your new context is %s", new_context); +#endif + + context_free(context); + debug_return_ptr(new_context); + +bad: + free(typebuf); + context_free(context); + freecon(new_context); + debug_return_ptr(NULL); +} + +/* + * Set the exec and tty contexts in preparation for fork/exec. + * Must run as root, before the uid change. + * If ptyfd is not -1, it indicates we are running + * in a pty and do not need to reset std{in,out,err}. + * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure. + */ +int +selinux_setup(const char *role, const char *type, const char *ttyn, + int ptyfd) +{ + int ret = -1; + debug_decl(selinux_setup, SUDO_DEBUG_SELINUX) + + /* Store the caller's SID in old_context. */ + if (getprevcon(&se_state.old_context)) { + sudo_warn(U_("failed to get old_context")); + goto done; + } + + se_state.enforcing = security_getenforce(); + if (se_state.enforcing < 0) { + sudo_warn(U_("unable to determine enforcing mode.")); + goto done; + } + +#ifdef DEBUG + sudo_warnx("your old context was %s", se_state.old_context); +#endif + se_state.new_context = get_exec_context(se_state.old_context, role, type); + if (!se_state.new_context) { +#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT + audit_role_change(se_state.old_context, "?", + se_state.ttyn, 0); +#endif + goto done; + } + + if (relabel_tty(ttyn, ptyfd) < 0) { + sudo_warn(U_("unable to set tty context to %s"), se_state.new_context); + goto done; + } + +#ifdef DEBUG + if (se_state.ttyfd != -1) { + sudo_warnx("your old tty context is %s", se_state.tty_context); + sudo_warnx("your new tty context is %s", se_state.new_tty_context); + } +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT + audit_role_change(se_state.old_context, se_state.new_context, + se_state.ttyn, 1); +#endif + + ret = 0; + +done: + debug_return_int(ret); +} + +void +selinux_execve(int fd, const char *path, char *const argv[], char *envp[], + bool noexec) +{ + char **nargv; + const char *sesh; + int argc, nargc, serrno; + debug_decl(selinux_execve, SUDO_DEBUG_SELINUX) + + sesh = sudo_conf_sesh_path(); + if (sesh == NULL) { + sudo_warnx("internal error: sesh path not set"); + errno = EINVAL; + debug_return; + } + + if (setexeccon(se_state.new_context)) { + sudo_warn(U_("unable to set exec context to %s"), se_state.new_context); + if (se_state.enforcing) + debug_return; + } + +#ifdef HAVE_SETKEYCREATECON + if (setkeycreatecon(se_state.new_context)) { + sudo_warn(U_("unable to set key creation context to %s"), se_state.new_context); + if (se_state.enforcing) + debug_return; + } +#endif /* HAVE_SETKEYCREATECON */ + + /* + * Build new argv with sesh as argv[0]. + * If argv[0] ends in -noexec, sesh will disable execute + * for the command it runs. + */ + for (argc = 0; argv[argc] != NULL; argc++) + continue; + nargv = reallocarray(NULL, argc + 3, sizeof(char *)); + if (nargv == NULL) { + sudo_warnx(U_("%s: %s"), __func__, U_("unable to allocate memory")); + debug_return; + } + if (noexec) + nargv[0] = *argv[0] == '-' ? "-sesh-noexec" : "sesh-noexec"; + else + nargv[0] = *argv[0] == '-' ? "-sesh" : "sesh"; + nargc = 1; + if (fd != -1 && asprintf(&nargv[nargc++], "--execfd=%d", fd) == -1) { + sudo_warnx(U_("%s: %s"), __func__, U_("unable to allocate memory")); + debug_return; + } + nargv[nargc++] = (char *)path; + memcpy(&nargv[nargc], &argv[1], argc * sizeof(char *)); /* copies NULL */ + + /* sesh will handle noexec for us. */ + sudo_execve(-1, sesh, nargv, envp, false); + serrno = errno; + free(nargv); + errno = serrno; + debug_return; +} + +#endif /* HAVE_SELINUX */ |