From 55c1e35c59b51018319d65f62b054c7682d95dd0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Baumann Date: Mon, 6 May 2024 04:23:57 +0200 Subject: Adding debian version 1.8.27-1+deb10u3. Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann --- ...al-buffer-overflow-when-unescaping-backsl.patch | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 71 insertions(+) create mode 100644 debian/patches/Fix-potential-buffer-overflow-when-unescaping-backsl.patch (limited to 'debian/patches/Fix-potential-buffer-overflow-when-unescaping-backsl.patch') diff --git a/debian/patches/Fix-potential-buffer-overflow-when-unescaping-backsl.patch b/debian/patches/Fix-potential-buffer-overflow-when-unescaping-backsl.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..414c0d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/Fix-potential-buffer-overflow-when-unescaping-backsl.patch @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +From 1e94630a10326635ea5cdd8dc575f43e40a80469 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Todd C. Miller" +Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2021 09:03:43 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 3/5] Fix potential buffer overflow when unescaping backslashes + in user_args. + +Do not try to unescaping backslashes unless in run mode *and* we are +running the command via a shell. +Found by Qualys. + +[Salvatore Bonaccorso: Backport to 1.8.27: Context changes] +--- + plugins/sudoers/sudoers.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +--- a/plugins/sudoers/sudoers.c ++++ b/plugins/sudoers/sudoers.c +@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ sudoers_policy_main(int argc, char * con + + /* If run as root with SUDO_USER set, set sudo_user.pw to that user. */ + /* XXX - causes confusion when root is not listed in sudoers */ +- if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT) && prev_user != NULL) { ++ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN|MODE_EDIT) && prev_user != NULL) { + if (user_uid == 0 && strcmp(prev_user, "root") != 0) { + struct passwd *pw; + +@@ -784,8 +784,8 @@ set_cmnd(void) + if (user_cmnd == NULL) + user_cmnd = NewArgv[0]; + +- if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT | MODE_CHECK)) { +- if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN | MODE_CHECK)) { ++ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN|MODE_EDIT|MODE_CHECK)) { ++ if (!ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) { + if (def_secure_path && !user_is_exempt()) + path = def_secure_path; + if (!set_perms(PERM_RUNAS)) +@@ -823,7 +823,8 @@ set_cmnd(void) + sudo_warnx(U_("%s: %s"), __func__, U_("unable to allocate memory")); + debug_return_int(-1); + } +- if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) { ++ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL) && ++ ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN)) { + /* + * When running a command via a shell, the sudo front-end + * escapes potential meta chars. We unescape non-spaces +@@ -831,10 +832,22 @@ set_cmnd(void) + */ + for (to = user_args, av = NewArgv + 1; (from = *av); av++) { + while (*from) { +- if (from[0] == '\\' && !isspace((unsigned char)from[1])) ++ if (from[0] == '\\' && from[1] != '\0' && ++ !isspace((unsigned char)from[1])) { + from++; ++ } ++ if (size - (to - user_args) < 1) { ++ sudo_warnx(U_("internal error, %s overflow"), ++ __func__); ++ debug_return_int(NOT_FOUND_ERROR); ++ } + *to++ = *from++; + } ++ if (size - (to - user_args) < 1) { ++ sudo_warnx(U_("internal error, %s overflow"), ++ __func__); ++ debug_return_int(NOT_FOUND_ERROR); ++ } + *to++ = ' '; + } + *--to = '\0'; -- cgit v1.2.3