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Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/http.c | 5399 |
1 files changed, 5399 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/http.c b/src/http.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a01fc57 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/http.c @@ -0,0 +1,5399 @@ +/* HTTP support. + Copyright (C) 1996-2012, 2014-2015, 2018 Free Software Foundation, + Inc. + +This file is part of GNU Wget. + +GNU Wget is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + (at your option) any later version. + +GNU Wget is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +GNU General Public License for more details. + +You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +along with Wget. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + +Additional permission under GNU GPL version 3 section 7 + +If you modify this program, or any covered work, by linking or +combining it with the OpenSSL project's OpenSSL library (or a +modified version of that library), containing parts covered by the +terms of the OpenSSL or SSLeay licenses, the Free Software Foundation +grants you additional permission to convey the resulting work. +Corresponding Source for a non-source form of such a combination +shall include the source code for the parts of OpenSSL used as well +as that of the covered work. */ + +#include "wget.h" + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <time.h> +#include <locale.h> +#include <fcntl.h> + +#include "hash.h" +#include "http.h" +#include "hsts.h" +#include "utils.h" +#include "url.h" +#include "host.h" +#include "retr.h" +#include "connect.h" +#include "netrc.h" +#ifdef HAVE_SSL +# include "ssl.h" +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_NTLM +# include "http-ntlm.h" +#endif +#include "cookies.h" +#include "md5.h" +#include "convert.h" +#include "spider.h" +#include "warc.h" +#include "c-strcase.h" +#include "version.h" +#ifdef HAVE_METALINK +# include "metalink.h" +# include "xstrndup.h" +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_XATTR +#include "xattr.h" +#endif + +#ifdef TESTING +#include "../tests/unit-tests.h" +#endif + +#ifdef __VMS +# include "vms.h" +#endif /* def __VMS */ + + +/* Forward decls. */ +struct http_stat; +static char *create_authorization_line (const char *, const char *, + const char *, const char *, + const char *, bool *, uerr_t *); +static char *basic_authentication_encode (const char *, const char *); +static bool known_authentication_scheme_p (const char *, const char *); +static void ensure_extension (struct http_stat *, const char *, int *); +static void load_cookies (void); + +static bool cookies_loaded_p; +static struct cookie_jar *wget_cookie_jar; + +#define TEXTHTML_S "text/html" +#define TEXTXHTML_S "application/xhtml+xml" +#define TEXTCSS_S "text/css" + +/* Some status code validation macros: */ +#define H_10X(x) (((x) >= 100) && ((x) < 200)) +#define H_20X(x) (((x) >= 200) && ((x) < 300)) +#define H_PARTIAL(x) ((x) == HTTP_STATUS_PARTIAL_CONTENTS) +#define H_REDIRECTED(x) ((x) == HTTP_STATUS_MOVED_PERMANENTLY \ + || (x) == HTTP_STATUS_MOVED_TEMPORARILY \ + || (x) == HTTP_STATUS_SEE_OTHER \ + || (x) == HTTP_STATUS_TEMPORARY_REDIRECT \ + || (x) == HTTP_STATUS_PERMANENT_REDIRECT) + +/* HTTP/1.0 status codes from RFC1945, provided for reference. */ +/* Successful 2xx. */ +#define HTTP_STATUS_OK 200 +#define HTTP_STATUS_CREATED 201 +#define HTTP_STATUS_ACCEPTED 202 +#define HTTP_STATUS_NO_CONTENT 204 +#define HTTP_STATUS_PARTIAL_CONTENTS 206 + +/* Redirection 3xx. */ +#define HTTP_STATUS_MULTIPLE_CHOICES 300 +#define HTTP_STATUS_MOVED_PERMANENTLY 301 +#define HTTP_STATUS_MOVED_TEMPORARILY 302 +#define HTTP_STATUS_SEE_OTHER 303 /* from HTTP/1.1 */ +#define HTTP_STATUS_NOT_MODIFIED 304 +#define HTTP_STATUS_TEMPORARY_REDIRECT 307 /* from HTTP/1.1 */ +#define HTTP_STATUS_PERMANENT_REDIRECT 308 /* from HTTP/1.1 */ + +/* Client error 4xx. */ +#define HTTP_STATUS_BAD_REQUEST 400 +#define HTTP_STATUS_UNAUTHORIZED 401 +#define HTTP_STATUS_FORBIDDEN 403 +#define HTTP_STATUS_NOT_FOUND 404 +#define HTTP_STATUS_RANGE_NOT_SATISFIABLE 416 + +/* Server errors 5xx. */ +#define HTTP_STATUS_INTERNAL 500 +#define HTTP_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 501 +#define HTTP_STATUS_BAD_GATEWAY 502 +#define HTTP_STATUS_UNAVAILABLE 503 +#define HTTP_STATUS_GATEWAY_TIMEOUT 504 + +enum rp { + rel_none, rel_name, rel_value, rel_both +}; + +struct request { + const char *method; + char *arg; + + struct request_header { + char *name, *value; + enum rp release_policy; + } *headers; + int hcount, hcapacity; +}; + + +/* Create a new, empty request. Set the request's method and its + arguments. METHOD should be a literal string (or it should outlive + the request) because it will not be freed. ARG will be freed by + request_free. */ + +static struct request * +request_new (const char *method, char *arg) +{ + struct request *req = xnew0 (struct request); + req->hcapacity = 8; + req->headers = xnew_array (struct request_header, req->hcapacity); + req->method = method; + req->arg = arg; + return req; +} + +/* Return the method string passed with the last call to + request_set_method. */ + +static const char * +request_method (const struct request *req) +{ + return req->method; +} + +/* Free one header according to the release policy specified with + request_set_header. */ + +static void +release_header (struct request_header *hdr) +{ + switch (hdr->release_policy) + { + case rel_none: + break; + case rel_name: + xfree (hdr->name); + break; + case rel_value: + xfree (hdr->value); + break; + case rel_both: + xfree (hdr->name); + xfree (hdr->value); + break; + } +} + +/* Set the request named NAME to VALUE. Specifically, this means that + a "NAME: VALUE\r\n" header line will be used in the request. If a + header with the same name previously existed in the request, its + value will be replaced by this one. A NULL value means do nothing. + + RELEASE_POLICY determines whether NAME and VALUE should be released + (freed) with request_free. Allowed values are: + + - rel_none - don't free NAME or VALUE + - rel_name - free NAME when done + - rel_value - free VALUE when done + - rel_both - free both NAME and VALUE when done + + Setting release policy is useful when arguments come from different + sources. For example: + + // Don't free literal strings! + request_set_header (req, "Pragma", "no-cache", rel_none); + + // Don't free a global variable, we'll need it later. + request_set_header (req, "Referer", opt.referer, rel_none); + + // Value freshly allocated, free it when done. + request_set_header (req, "Range", + aprintf ("bytes=%s-", number_to_static_string (hs->restval)), + rel_value); + */ + +static void +request_set_header (struct request *req, const char *name, const char *value, + enum rp release_policy) +{ + struct request_header *hdr; + int i; + + if (!value) + { + /* A NULL value is a no-op; if freeing the name is requested, + free it now to avoid leaks. */ + if (release_policy == rel_name || release_policy == rel_both) + xfree (name); + return; + } + + for (i = 0; i < req->hcount; i++) + { + hdr = &req->headers[i]; + if (0 == c_strcasecmp (name, hdr->name)) + { + /* Replace existing header. */ + release_header (hdr); + hdr->name = (void *)name; + hdr->value = (void *)value; + hdr->release_policy = release_policy; + return; + } + } + + /* Install new header. */ + + if (req->hcount >= req->hcapacity) + { + req->hcapacity <<= 1; + req->headers = xrealloc (req->headers, req->hcapacity * sizeof (*hdr)); + } + hdr = &req->headers[req->hcount++]; + hdr->name = (void *)name; + hdr->value = (void *)value; + hdr->release_policy = release_policy; +} + +/* Like request_set_header, but sets the whole header line, as + provided by the user using the `--header' option. For example, + request_set_user_header (req, "Foo: bar") works just like + request_set_header (req, "Foo", "bar"). */ + +static void +request_set_user_header (struct request *req, const char *header) +{ + char *name; + const char *p = strchr (header, ':'); + if (!p) + return; + BOUNDED_TO_ALLOCA (header, p, name); + ++p; + while (c_isspace (*p)) + ++p; + request_set_header (req, xstrdup (name), (char *) p, rel_name); +} + +/* Remove the header with specified name from REQ. Returns true if + the header was actually removed, false otherwise. */ + +static bool +request_remove_header (struct request *req, const char *name) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < req->hcount; i++) + { + struct request_header *hdr = &req->headers[i]; + if (0 == c_strcasecmp (name, hdr->name)) + { + release_header (hdr); + /* Move the remaining headers by one. */ + if (i < req->hcount - 1) + memmove (hdr, hdr + 1, (req->hcount - i - 1) * sizeof (*hdr)); + --req->hcount; + return true; + } + } + return false; +} + +#define APPEND(p, str) do { \ + int A_len = strlen (str); \ + memcpy (p, str, A_len); \ + p += A_len; \ +} while (0) + +/* Construct the request and write it to FD using fd_write. + If warc_tmp is set to a file pointer, the request string will + also be written to that file. */ + +static int +request_send (const struct request *req, int fd, FILE *warc_tmp) +{ + char *request_string, *p; + int i, size, write_error; + + /* Count the request size. */ + size = 0; + + /* METHOD " " ARG " " "HTTP/1.0" "\r\n" */ + size += strlen (req->method) + 1 + strlen (req->arg) + 1 + 8 + 2; + + for (i = 0; i < req->hcount; i++) + { + struct request_header *hdr = &req->headers[i]; + /* NAME ": " VALUE "\r\n" */ + size += strlen (hdr->name) + 2 + strlen (hdr->value) + 2; + } + + /* "\r\n\0" */ + size += 3; + + p = request_string = xmalloc (size); + + /* Generate the request. */ + + APPEND (p, req->method); *p++ = ' '; + APPEND (p, req->arg); *p++ = ' '; + memcpy (p, "HTTP/1.1\r\n", 10); p += 10; + + for (i = 0; i < req->hcount; i++) + { + struct request_header *hdr = &req->headers[i]; + APPEND (p, hdr->name); + *p++ = ':', *p++ = ' '; + APPEND (p, hdr->value); + *p++ = '\r', *p++ = '\n'; + } + + *p++ = '\r', *p++ = '\n', *p++ = '\0'; + assert (p - request_string == size); + +#undef APPEND + + DEBUGP (("\n---request begin---\n%s---request end---\n", request_string)); + + /* Send the request to the server. */ + + write_error = fd_write (fd, request_string, size - 1, -1); + if (write_error < 0) + logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Failed writing HTTP request: %s.\n"), + fd_errstr (fd)); + else if (warc_tmp != NULL) + { + /* Write a copy of the data to the WARC record. */ + int warc_tmp_written = fwrite (request_string, 1, size - 1, warc_tmp); + if (warc_tmp_written != size - 1) + write_error = -2; + } + xfree (request_string); + return write_error; +} + +/* Release the resources used by REQ. + It is safe to call it with a vaild pointer to a NULL pointer. + It is not safe to call it with an invalid or NULL pointer. */ + +static void +request_free (struct request **req_ref) +{ + int i; + struct request *req = *req_ref; + + if (!req) + return; + + xfree (req->arg); + for (i = 0; i < req->hcount; i++) + release_header (&req->headers[i]); + xfree (req->headers); + xfree (req); + *req_ref = NULL; +} + +static struct hash_table *basic_authed_hosts; + +/* Find out if this host has issued a Basic challenge yet; if so, give + * it the username, password. A temporary measure until we can get + * proper authentication in place. */ + +static bool +maybe_send_basic_creds (const char *hostname, const char *user, + const char *passwd, struct request *req) +{ + bool do_challenge = false; + + if (opt.auth_without_challenge) + { + DEBUGP (("Auth-without-challenge set, sending Basic credentials.\n")); + do_challenge = true; + } + else if (basic_authed_hosts + && hash_table_contains (basic_authed_hosts, hostname)) + { + DEBUGP (("Found %s in basic_authed_hosts.\n", quote (hostname))); + do_challenge = true; + } + else + { + DEBUGP (("Host %s has not issued a general basic challenge.\n", + quote (hostname))); + } + if (do_challenge) + { + request_set_header (req, "Authorization", + basic_authentication_encode (user, passwd), + rel_value); + } + return do_challenge; +} + +static void +register_basic_auth_host (const char *hostname) +{ + if (!basic_authed_hosts) + { + basic_authed_hosts = make_nocase_string_hash_table (1); + } + if (!hash_table_contains (basic_authed_hosts, hostname)) + { + hash_table_put (basic_authed_hosts, xstrdup (hostname), NULL); + DEBUGP (("Inserted %s into basic_authed_hosts\n", quote (hostname))); + } +} + + +/* Send the contents of FILE_NAME to SOCK. Make sure that exactly + PROMISED_SIZE bytes are sent over the wire -- if the file is + longer, read only that much; if the file is shorter, report an error. + If warc_tmp is set to a file pointer, the post data will + also be written to that file. */ + +static int +body_file_send (int sock, const char *file_name, wgint promised_size, FILE *warc_tmp) +{ + static char chunk[8192]; + wgint written = 0; + int write_error; + FILE *fp; + + DEBUGP (("[writing BODY file %s ... ", file_name)); + + fp = fopen (file_name, "rb"); + if (!fp) + return -1; + while (!feof (fp) && written < promised_size) + { + int towrite; + int length = fread (chunk, 1, sizeof (chunk), fp); + if (length == 0) + break; + towrite = MIN (promised_size - written, length); + write_error = fd_write (sock, chunk, towrite, -1); + if (write_error < 0) + { + fclose (fp); + return -1; + } + if (warc_tmp != NULL) + { + /* Write a copy of the data to the WARC record. */ + int warc_tmp_written = fwrite (chunk, 1, towrite, warc_tmp); + if (warc_tmp_written != towrite) + { + fclose (fp); + return -2; + } + } + written += towrite; + } + fclose (fp); + + /* If we've written less than was promised, report a (probably + nonsensical) error rather than break the promise. */ + if (written < promised_size) + { + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + + assert (written == promised_size); + DEBUGP (("done]\n")); + return 0; +} + +/* Determine whether [START, PEEKED + PEEKLEN) contains an empty line. + If so, return the pointer to the position after the line, otherwise + return NULL. This is used as callback to fd_read_hunk. The data + between START and PEEKED has been read and cannot be "unread"; the + data after PEEKED has only been peeked. */ + +static const char * +response_head_terminator (const char *start, const char *peeked, int peeklen) +{ + const char *p, *end; + + /* If at first peek, verify whether HUNK starts with "HTTP". If + not, this is a HTTP/0.9 request and we must bail out without + reading anything. */ + if (start == peeked && 0 != memcmp (start, "HTTP", MIN (peeklen, 4))) + return start; + + /* Look for "\n[\r]\n", and return the following position if found. + Start two chars before the current to cover the possibility that + part of the terminator (e.g. "\n\r") arrived in the previous + batch. */ + p = peeked - start < 2 ? start : peeked - 2; + end = peeked + peeklen; + + /* Check for \n\r\n or \n\n anywhere in [p, end-2). */ + for (; p < end - 2; p++) + if (*p == '\n') + { + if (p[1] == '\r' && p[2] == '\n') + return p + 3; + else if (p[1] == '\n') + return p + 2; + } + /* p==end-2: check for \n\n directly preceding END. */ + if (p[0] == '\n' && p[1] == '\n') + return p + 2; + + return NULL; +} + +/* The maximum size of a single HTTP response we care to read. Rather + than being a limit of the reader implementation, this limit + prevents Wget from slurping all available memory upon encountering + malicious or buggy server output, thus protecting the user. Define + it to 0 to remove the limit. */ + +#define HTTP_RESPONSE_MAX_SIZE 65536 + +/* Read the HTTP request head from FD and return it. The error + conditions are the same as with fd_read_hunk. + + To support HTTP/0.9 responses, this function tries to make sure + that the data begins with "HTTP". If this is not the case, no data + is read and an empty request is returned, so that the remaining + data can be treated as body. */ + +static char * +read_http_response_head (int fd) +{ + return fd_read_hunk (fd, response_head_terminator, 512, + HTTP_RESPONSE_MAX_SIZE); +} + +struct response { + /* The response data. */ + const char *data; + + /* The array of pointers that indicate where each header starts. + For example, given this HTTP response: + + HTTP/1.0 200 Ok + Description: some + text + Etag: x + + The headers are located like this: + + "HTTP/1.0 200 Ok\r\nDescription: some\r\n text\r\nEtag: x\r\n\r\n" + ^ ^ ^ ^ + headers[0] headers[1] headers[2] headers[3] + + I.e. headers[0] points to the beginning of the request, + headers[1] points to the end of the first header and the + beginning of the second one, etc. */ + + const char **headers; +}; + +/* Create a new response object from the text of the HTTP response, + available in HEAD. That text is automatically split into + constituent header lines for fast retrieval using + resp_header_*. */ + +static struct response * +resp_new (char *head) +{ + char *hdr; + int count, size; + + struct response *resp = xnew0 (struct response); + resp->data = head; + + if (*head == '\0') + { + /* Empty head means that we're dealing with a headerless + (HTTP/0.9) response. In that case, don't set HEADERS at + all. */ + return resp; + } + + /* Split HEAD into header lines, so that resp_header_* functions + don't need to do this over and over again. */ + + size = count = 0; + hdr = head; + while (1) + { + DO_REALLOC (resp->headers, size, count + 1, const char *); + resp->headers[count++] = hdr; + + /* Break upon encountering an empty line. */ + if (!hdr[0] || (hdr[0] == '\r' && hdr[1] == '\n') || hdr[0] == '\n') + break; + + /* Find the end of HDR, including continuations. */ + for (;;) + { + char *end = strchr (hdr, '\n'); + + if (!end) + { + hdr += strlen (hdr); + break; + } + + hdr = end + 1; + + if (*hdr != ' ' && *hdr != '\t') + break; + + // continuation, transform \r and \n into spaces + *end = ' '; + if (end > head && end[-1] == '\r') + end[-1] = ' '; + } + } + DO_REALLOC (resp->headers, size, count + 1, const char *); + resp->headers[count] = NULL; + + return resp; +} + +/* Locate the header named NAME in the request data, starting with + position START. This allows the code to loop through the request + data, filtering for all requests of a given name. Returns the + found position, or -1 for failure. The code that uses this + function typically looks like this: + + for (pos = 0; (pos = resp_header_locate (...)) != -1; pos++) + ... do something with header ... + + If you only care about one header, use resp_header_get instead of + this function. */ + +static int +resp_header_locate (const struct response *resp, const char *name, int start, + const char **begptr, const char **endptr) +{ + int i; + const char **headers = resp->headers; + int name_len; + + if (!headers || !headers[1]) + return -1; + + name_len = strlen (name); + if (start > 0) + i = start; + else + i = 1; + + for (; headers[i + 1]; i++) + { + const char *b = headers[i]; + const char *e = headers[i + 1]; + if (e - b > name_len + && b[name_len] == ':' + && 0 == c_strncasecmp (b, name, name_len)) + { + b += name_len + 1; + while (b < e && c_isspace (*b)) + ++b; + while (b < e && c_isspace (e[-1])) + --e; + *begptr = b; + *endptr = e; + return i; + } + } + return -1; +} + +/* Find and retrieve the header named NAME in the request data. If + found, set *BEGPTR to its starting, and *ENDPTR to its ending + position, and return true. Otherwise return false. + + This function is used as a building block for resp_header_copy + and resp_header_strdup. */ + +static bool +resp_header_get (const struct response *resp, const char *name, + const char **begptr, const char **endptr) +{ + int pos = resp_header_locate (resp, name, 0, begptr, endptr); + return pos != -1; +} + +/* Copy the response header named NAME to buffer BUF, no longer than + BUFSIZE (BUFSIZE includes the terminating 0). If the header + exists, true is returned, false otherwise. If there should be no + limit on the size of the header, use resp_header_strdup instead. + + If BUFSIZE is 0, no data is copied, but the boolean indication of + whether the header is present is still returned. */ + +static bool +resp_header_copy (const struct response *resp, const char *name, + char *buf, int bufsize) +{ + const char *b, *e; + if (!resp_header_get (resp, name, &b, &e)) + return false; + if (bufsize) + { + int len = MIN (e - b, bufsize - 1); + memcpy (buf, b, len); + buf[len] = '\0'; + } + return true; +} + +/* Return the value of header named NAME in RESP, allocated with + malloc. If such a header does not exist in RESP, return NULL. */ + +static char * +resp_header_strdup (const struct response *resp, const char *name) +{ + const char *b, *e; + if (!resp_header_get (resp, name, &b, &e)) + return NULL; + return strdupdelim (b, e); +} + +/* Parse the HTTP status line, which is of format: + + HTTP-Version SP Status-Code SP Reason-Phrase + + The function returns the status-code, or -1 if the status line + appears malformed. The pointer to "reason-phrase" message is + returned in *MESSAGE. */ + +static int +resp_status (const struct response *resp, char **message) +{ + int status; + const char *p, *end; + + if (!resp->headers) + { + /* For a HTTP/0.9 response, assume status 200. */ + if (message) + *message = xstrdup (_("No headers, assuming HTTP/0.9")); + return 200; + } + + p = resp->headers[0]; + end = resp->headers[1]; + + if (!end) + return -1; + + /* "HTTP" */ + if (end - p < 4 || 0 != strncmp (p, "HTTP", 4)) + return -1; + p += 4; + + /* Match the HTTP version. This is optional because Gnutella + servers have been reported to not specify HTTP version. */ + if (p < end && *p == '/') + { + ++p; + while (p < end && c_isdigit (*p)) + ++p; + if (p < end && *p == '.') + ++p; + while (p < end && c_isdigit (*p)) + ++p; + } + + while (p < end && c_isspace (*p)) + ++p; + if (end - p < 3 || !c_isdigit (p[0]) || !c_isdigit (p[1]) || !c_isdigit (p[2])) + return -1; + + status = 100 * (p[0] - '0') + 10 * (p[1] - '0') + (p[2] - '0'); + p += 3; + + if (message) + { + while (p < end && c_isspace (*p)) + ++p; + while (p < end && c_isspace (end[-1])) + --end; + *message = strdupdelim (p, end); + } + + return status; +} + +/* Release the resources used by RESP. + It is safe to call it with a valid pointer to a NULL pointer. + It is not safe to call it with a invalid or NULL pointer. */ + +static void +resp_free (struct response **resp_ref) +{ + struct response *resp = *resp_ref; + + if (!resp) + return; + + xfree (resp->headers); + xfree (resp); + + *resp_ref = NULL; +} + +/* Print a single line of response, the characters [b, e). We tried + getting away with + logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "%s%.*s\n", prefix, (int) (e - b), b); + but that failed to escape the non-printable characters and, in fact, + caused crashes in UTF-8 locales. */ + +static void +print_response_line (const char *prefix, const char *b, const char *e) +{ + char *copy; + BOUNDED_TO_ALLOCA(b, e, copy); + logprintf (LOG_ALWAYS, "%s%s\n", prefix, + quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, copy)); +} + +/* Print the server response, line by line, omitting the trailing CRLF + from individual header lines, and prefixed with PREFIX. */ + +static void +print_server_response (const struct response *resp, const char *prefix) +{ + int i; + if (!resp->headers) + return; + for (i = 0; resp->headers[i + 1]; i++) + { + const char *b = resp->headers[i]; + const char *e = resp->headers[i + 1]; + /* Skip CRLF */ + if (b < e && e[-1] == '\n') + --e; + if (b < e && e[-1] == '\r') + --e; + print_response_line (prefix, b, e); + } +} + +/* Parse the `Content-Range' header and extract the information it + contains. Returns true if successful, false otherwise. */ +static bool +parse_content_range (const char *hdr, wgint *first_byte_ptr, + wgint *last_byte_ptr, wgint *entity_length_ptr) +{ + wgint num; + + /* Ancient versions of Netscape proxy server, presumably predating + rfc2068, sent out `Content-Range' without the "bytes" + specifier. */ + if (0 == strncasecmp (hdr, "bytes", 5)) + { + hdr += 5; + /* "JavaWebServer/1.1.1" sends "bytes: x-y/z", contrary to the + HTTP spec. */ + if (*hdr == ':') + ++hdr; + while (c_isspace (*hdr)) + ++hdr; + if (!*hdr) + return false; + } + if (!c_isdigit (*hdr)) + return false; + for (num = 0; c_isdigit (*hdr); hdr++) + num = 10 * num + (*hdr - '0'); + if (*hdr != '-' || !c_isdigit (*(hdr + 1))) + return false; + *first_byte_ptr = num; + ++hdr; + for (num = 0; c_isdigit (*hdr); hdr++) + num = 10 * num + (*hdr - '0'); + if (*hdr != '/') + return false; + *last_byte_ptr = num; + if (!(c_isdigit (*(hdr + 1)) || *(hdr + 1) == '*')) + return false; + if (*last_byte_ptr < *first_byte_ptr) + return false; + ++hdr; + if (*hdr == '*') + num = -1; + else + for (num = 0; c_isdigit (*hdr); hdr++) + num = 10 * num + (*hdr - '0'); + *entity_length_ptr = num; + if ((*entity_length_ptr <= *last_byte_ptr) && *entity_length_ptr != -1) + return false; + return true; +} + +/* Read the body of the request, but don't store it anywhere and don't + display a progress gauge. This is useful for reading the bodies of + administrative responses to which we will soon issue another + request. The response is not useful to the user, but reading it + allows us to continue using the same connection to the server. + + If reading fails, false is returned, true otherwise. In debug + mode, the body is displayed for debugging purposes. */ + +static bool +skip_short_body (int fd, wgint contlen, bool chunked) +{ + enum { + SKIP_SIZE = 512, /* size of the download buffer */ + SKIP_THRESHOLD = 4096 /* the largest size we read */ + }; + wgint remaining_chunk_size = 0; + char dlbuf[SKIP_SIZE + 1]; + dlbuf[SKIP_SIZE] = '\0'; /* so DEBUGP can safely print it */ + + /* If the body is too large, it makes more sense to simply close the + connection than to try to read the body. */ + if (contlen > SKIP_THRESHOLD) + return false; + + while (contlen > 0 || chunked) + { + int ret; + if (chunked) + { + if (remaining_chunk_size == 0) + { + char *line = fd_read_line (fd); + char *endl; + if (line == NULL) + break; + + remaining_chunk_size = strtol (line, &endl, 16); + xfree (line); + + if (remaining_chunk_size < 0) + return false; + + if (remaining_chunk_size == 0) + { + line = fd_read_line (fd); + xfree (line); + break; + } + } + + contlen = MIN (remaining_chunk_size, SKIP_SIZE); + } + + DEBUGP (("Skipping %s bytes of body: [", number_to_static_string (contlen))); + + ret = fd_read (fd, dlbuf, MIN (contlen, SKIP_SIZE), -1); + if (ret <= 0) + { + /* Don't normally report the error since this is an + optimization that should be invisible to the user. */ + DEBUGP (("] aborting (%s).\n", + ret < 0 ? fd_errstr (fd) : "EOF received")); + return false; + } + contlen -= ret; + + if (chunked) + { + remaining_chunk_size -= ret; + if (remaining_chunk_size == 0) + { + char *line = fd_read_line (fd); + if (line == NULL) + return false; + else + xfree (line); + } + } + + /* Safe even if %.*s bogusly expects terminating \0 because + we've zero-terminated dlbuf above. */ + DEBUGP (("%.*s", ret, dlbuf)); + } + + DEBUGP (("] done.\n")); + return true; +} + +#define NOT_RFC2231 0 +#define RFC2231_NOENCODING 1 +#define RFC2231_ENCODING 2 + +/* extract_param extracts the parameter name into NAME. + However, if the parameter name is in RFC2231 format then + this function adjusts NAME by stripping of the trailing + characters that are not part of the name but are present to + indicate the presence of encoding information in the value + or a fragment of a long parameter value +*/ +static int +modify_param_name (param_token *name) +{ + const char *delim1 = memchr (name->b, '*', name->e - name->b); + const char *delim2 = memrchr (name->b, '*', name->e - name->b); + + int result; + + if (delim1 == NULL) + { + result = NOT_RFC2231; + } + else if (delim1 == delim2) + { + if ((name->e - 1) == delim1) + { + result = RFC2231_ENCODING; + } + else + { + result = RFC2231_NOENCODING; + } + name->e = delim1; + } + else + { + name->e = delim1; + result = RFC2231_ENCODING; + } + return result; +} + +/* extract_param extract the paramater value into VALUE. + Like modify_param_name this function modifies VALUE by + stripping off the encoding information from the actual value +*/ +static void +modify_param_value (param_token *value, int encoding_type ) +{ + if (encoding_type == RFC2231_ENCODING) + { + const char *delim = memrchr (value->b, '\'', value->e - value->b); + if (delim != NULL) + { + value->b = (delim+1); + } + } +} + +/* Extract a parameter from the string (typically an HTTP header) at + **SOURCE and advance SOURCE to the next parameter. Return false + when there are no more parameters to extract. The name of the + parameter is returned in NAME, and the value in VALUE. If the + parameter has no value, the token's value is zeroed out. + + For example, if *SOURCE points to the string "attachment; + filename=\"foo bar\"", the first call to this function will return + the token named "attachment" and no value, and the second call will + return the token named "filename" and value "foo bar". The third + call will return false, indicating no more valid tokens. + + is_url_encoded is an out parameter. If not NULL, a boolean value will be + stored into it, letting the caller know whether or not the extracted value is + URL-encoded. The caller can then decode it with url_unescape(), which however + performs decoding in-place. URL-encoding is used by RFC 2231 to support + non-US-ASCII characters in HTTP header values. */ + +bool +extract_param (const char **source, param_token *name, param_token *value, + char separator, bool *is_url_encoded) +{ + const char *p = *source; + int param_type; + if (is_url_encoded) + *is_url_encoded = false; /* initializing the out parameter */ + + while (c_isspace (*p)) ++p; + if (!*p) + { + *source = p; + return false; /* no error; nothing more to extract */ + } + + /* Extract name. */ + name->b = p; + while (*p && !c_isspace (*p) && *p != '=' && *p != separator) ++p; + name->e = p; + if (name->b == name->e) + return false; /* empty name: error */ + while (c_isspace (*p)) ++p; + if (*p == separator || !*p) /* no value */ + { + xzero (*value); + if (*p == separator) ++p; + *source = p; + return true; + } + if (*p != '=') + return false; /* error */ + + /* *p is '=', extract value */ + ++p; + while (c_isspace (*p)) ++p; + if (*p == '"') /* quoted */ + { + value->b = ++p; + while (*p && *p != '"') ++p; + if (!*p) + return false; + value->e = p++; + /* Currently at closing quote; find the end of param. */ + while (c_isspace (*p)) ++p; + while (*p && *p != separator) ++p; + if (*p == separator) + ++p; + else if (*p) + /* garbage after closed quote, e.g. foo="bar"baz */ + return false; + } + else /* unquoted */ + { + value->b = p; + while (*p && *p != separator) ++p; + value->e = p; + while (value->e != value->b && c_isspace (value->e[-1])) + --value->e; + if (*p == separator) ++p; + } + *source = p; + + param_type = modify_param_name (name); + if (param_type != NOT_RFC2231) + { + if (param_type == RFC2231_ENCODING && is_url_encoded) + *is_url_encoded = true; + modify_param_value (value, param_type); + } + return true; +} + +#undef NOT_RFC2231 +#undef RFC2231_NOENCODING +#undef RFC2231_ENCODING + +/* Appends the string represented by VALUE to FILENAME */ + +static void +append_value_to_filename (char **filename, param_token const * const value, + bool is_url_encoded) +{ + int original_length = strlen (*filename); + int new_length = strlen (*filename) + (value->e - value->b); + *filename = xrealloc (*filename, new_length+1); + memcpy (*filename + original_length, value->b, (value->e - value->b)); + (*filename)[new_length] = '\0'; + if (is_url_encoded) + url_unescape (*filename + original_length); +} + +/* Parse the contents of the `Content-Disposition' header, extracting + the information useful to Wget. Content-Disposition is a header + borrowed from MIME; when used in HTTP, it typically serves for + specifying the desired file name of the resource. For example: + + Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="flora.jpg" + + Wget will skip the tokens it doesn't care about, such as + "attachment" in the previous example; it will also skip other + unrecognized params. If the header is syntactically correct and + contains a file name, a copy of the file name is stored in + *filename and true is returned. Otherwise, the function returns + false. + + The file name is stripped of directory components and must not be + empty. + + Historically, this function returned filename prefixed with opt.dir_prefix, + now that logic is handled by the caller, new code should pay attention, + changed by crq, Sep 2010. + +*/ +static bool +parse_content_disposition (const char *hdr, char **filename) +{ + param_token name, value; + bool is_url_encoded = false; + + char *encodedFilename = NULL; + char *unencodedFilename = NULL; + for ( ; extract_param (&hdr, &name, &value, ';', &is_url_encoded); + is_url_encoded = false) + { + int isFilename = BOUNDED_EQUAL_NO_CASE (name.b, name.e, "filename"); + if ( isFilename && value.b != NULL) + { + /* Make the file name begin at the last slash or backslash. */ + bool isEncodedFilename; + char **outFilename; + const char *last_slash = memrchr (value.b, '/', value.e - value.b); + const char *last_bs = memrchr (value.b, '\\', value.e - value.b); + if (last_slash && last_bs) + value.b = 1 + MAX (last_slash, last_bs); + else if (last_slash || last_bs) + value.b = 1 + (last_slash ? last_slash : last_bs); + if (value.b == value.e) + continue; + + /* Check if the name is "filename*" as specified in RFC 6266. + * Since "filename" could be broken up as "filename*N" (RFC 2231), + * a check is needed to make sure this is not the case */ + isEncodedFilename = *name.e == '*' && !c_isdigit (*(name.e + 1)); + outFilename = isEncodedFilename ? &encodedFilename + : &unencodedFilename; + if (*outFilename) + append_value_to_filename (outFilename, &value, is_url_encoded); + else + { + *outFilename = strdupdelim (value.b, value.e); + if (is_url_encoded) + url_unescape (*outFilename); + } + } + } + if (encodedFilename) + { + xfree (unencodedFilename); + *filename = encodedFilename; + } + else + { + xfree (encodedFilename); + *filename = unencodedFilename; + } + if (*filename) + return true; + else + return false; +} + +#ifdef HAVE_HSTS +static bool +parse_strict_transport_security (const char *header, time_t *max_age, bool *include_subdomains) +{ + param_token name, value; + const char *c_max_age = NULL; + bool is = false; /* includeSubDomains */ + bool is_url_encoded = false; + bool success = false; + + if (header) + { + /* Process the STS header. Keys should be matched case-insensitively. */ + for (; extract_param (&header, &name, &value, ';', &is_url_encoded); is_url_encoded = false) + { + if (BOUNDED_EQUAL_NO_CASE (name.b, name.e, "max-age")) + { + xfree (c_max_age); + c_max_age = strdupdelim (value.b, value.e); + } + else if (BOUNDED_EQUAL_NO_CASE (name.b, name.e, "includeSubDomains")) + is = true; + } + + /* pass the parsed values over */ + if (c_max_age) + { + /* If the string value goes out of a long's bounds, strtol() will return LONG_MIN or LONG_MAX. + * In theory, the HSTS engine should be able to handle it. + * Also, time_t is normally defined as a long, so this should not break. + */ + if (max_age) + *max_age = (time_t) strtol (c_max_age, NULL, 10); + if (include_subdomains) + *include_subdomains = is; + + DEBUGP (("Parsed Strict-Transport-Security max-age = %s, includeSubDomains = %s\n", + c_max_age, (is ? "true" : "false"))); + + xfree (c_max_age); + success = true; + } + else + { + /* something weird happened */ + logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "Could not parse String-Transport-Security header\n"); + success = false; + } + } + + return success; +} +#endif + +/* Persistent connections. Currently, we cache the most recently used + connection as persistent, provided that the HTTP server agrees to + make it such. The persistence data is stored in the variables + below. Ideally, it should be possible to cache an arbitrary fixed + number of these connections. */ + +/* Whether a persistent connection is active. */ +static bool pconn_active; + +static struct { + /* The socket of the connection. */ + int socket; + + /* Host and port of the currently active persistent connection. */ + char *host; + int port; + + /* Whether a ssl handshake has occoured on this connection. */ + bool ssl; + + /* Whether the connection was authorized. This is only done by + NTLM, which authorizes *connections* rather than individual + requests. (That practice is peculiar for HTTP, but it is a + useful optimization.) */ + bool authorized; + +#ifdef ENABLE_NTLM + /* NTLM data of the current connection. */ + struct ntlmdata ntlm; +#endif +} pconn; + +/* Mark the persistent connection as invalid and free the resources it + uses. This is used by the CLOSE_* macros after they forcefully + close a registered persistent connection. */ + +static void +invalidate_persistent (void) +{ + DEBUGP (("Disabling further reuse of socket %d.\n", pconn.socket)); + pconn_active = false; + fd_close (pconn.socket); + xfree (pconn.host); + xzero (pconn); +} + +/* Register FD, which should be a TCP/IP connection to HOST:PORT, as + persistent. This will enable someone to use the same connection + later. In the context of HTTP, this must be called only AFTER the + response has been received and the server has promised that the + connection will remain alive. + + If a previous connection was persistent, it is closed. */ + +static void +register_persistent (const char *host, int port, int fd, bool ssl) +{ + if (pconn_active) + { + if (pconn.socket == fd) + { + /* The connection FD is already registered. */ + return; + } + else + { + /* The old persistent connection is still active; close it + first. This situation arises whenever a persistent + connection exists, but we then connect to a different + host, and try to register a persistent connection to that + one. */ + invalidate_persistent (); + } + } + + pconn_active = true; + pconn.socket = fd; + pconn.host = xstrdup (host); + pconn.port = port; + pconn.ssl = ssl; + pconn.authorized = false; + + DEBUGP (("Registered socket %d for persistent reuse.\n", fd)); +} + +/* Return true if a persistent connection is available for connecting + to HOST:PORT. */ + +static bool +persistent_available_p (const char *host, int port, bool ssl, + bool *host_lookup_failed) +{ + /* First, check whether a persistent connection is active at all. */ + if (!pconn_active) + return false; + + /* If we want SSL and the last connection wasn't or vice versa, + don't use it. Checking for host and port is not enough because + HTTP and HTTPS can apparently coexist on the same port. */ + if (ssl != pconn.ssl) + return false; + + /* If we're not connecting to the same port, we're not interested. */ + if (port != pconn.port) + return false; + + /* If the host is the same, we're in business. If not, there is + still hope -- read below. */ + if (0 != strcasecmp (host, pconn.host)) + { + /* Check if pconn.socket is talking to HOST under another name. + This happens often when both sites are virtual hosts + distinguished only by name and served by the same network + interface, and hence the same web server (possibly set up by + the ISP and serving many different web sites). This + admittedly unconventional optimization does not contradict + HTTP and works well with popular server software. */ + + bool found; + ip_address ip; + struct address_list *al; + + if (ssl) + /* Don't try to talk to two different SSL sites over the same + secure connection! (Besides, it's not clear that + name-based virtual hosting is even possible with SSL.) */ + return false; + + /* If pconn.socket's peer is one of the IP addresses HOST + resolves to, pconn.socket is for all intents and purposes + already talking to HOST. */ + + if (!socket_ip_address (pconn.socket, &ip, ENDPOINT_PEER)) + { + /* Can't get the peer's address -- something must be very + wrong with the connection. */ + invalidate_persistent (); + return false; + } + al = lookup_host (host, 0); + if (!al) + { + *host_lookup_failed = true; + return false; + } + + found = address_list_contains (al, &ip); + address_list_release (al); + + if (!found) + return false; + + /* The persistent connection's peer address was found among the + addresses HOST resolved to; therefore, pconn.sock is in fact + already talking to HOST -- no need to reconnect. */ + } + + /* Finally, check whether the connection is still open. This is + important because most servers implement liberal (short) timeout + on persistent connections. Wget can of course always reconnect + if the connection doesn't work out, but it's nicer to know in + advance. This test is a logical followup of the first test, but + is "expensive" and therefore placed at the end of the list. + + (Current implementation of test_socket_open has a nice side + effect that it treats sockets with pending data as "closed". + This is exactly what we want: if a broken server sends message + body in response to HEAD, or if it sends more than conent-length + data, we won't reuse the corrupted connection.) */ + + if (!test_socket_open (pconn.socket)) + { + /* Oops, the socket is no longer open. Now that we know that, + let's invalidate the persistent connection before returning + 0. */ + invalidate_persistent (); + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +/* The idea behind these two CLOSE macros is to distinguish between + two cases: one when the job we've been doing is finished, and we + want to close the connection and leave, and two when something is + seriously wrong and we're closing the connection as part of + cleanup. + + In case of keep_alive, CLOSE_FINISH should leave the connection + open, while CLOSE_INVALIDATE should still close it. + + Note that the semantics of the flag `keep_alive' is "this + connection *will* be reused (the server has promised not to close + the connection once we're done)", while the semantics of + `pc_active_p && (fd) == pc_last_fd' is "we're *now* using an + active, registered connection". */ + +#define CLOSE_FINISH(fd) do { \ + if (!keep_alive) \ + { \ + if (pconn_active && (fd) == pconn.socket) \ + invalidate_persistent (); \ + else \ + fd_close (fd); \ + fd = -1; \ + } \ +} while (0) + +#define CLOSE_INVALIDATE(fd) do { \ + if (pconn_active && (fd) == pconn.socket) \ + invalidate_persistent (); \ + else \ + fd_close (fd); \ + fd = -1; \ +} while (0) + +typedef enum +{ + ENC_INVALID = -1, /* invalid encoding */ + ENC_NONE = 0, /* no special encoding */ + ENC_GZIP, /* gzip compression */ + ENC_DEFLATE, /* deflate compression */ + ENC_COMPRESS, /* compress compression */ + ENC_BROTLI /* brotli compression */ +} encoding_t; + +struct http_stat +{ + wgint len; /* received length */ + wgint contlen; /* expected length */ + wgint restval; /* the restart value */ + int res; /* the result of last read */ + char *rderrmsg; /* error message from read error */ + char *newloc; /* new location (redirection) */ + char *remote_time; /* remote time-stamp string */ + char *error; /* textual HTTP error */ + int statcode; /* status code */ + char *message; /* status message */ + wgint rd_size; /* amount of data read from socket */ + double dltime; /* time it took to download the data */ + const char *referer; /* value of the referer header. */ + char *local_file; /* local file name. */ + bool existence_checked; /* true if we already checked for a file's + existence after having begun to download + (needed in gethttp for when connection is + interrupted/restarted. */ + bool timestamp_checked; /* true if pre-download time-stamping checks + * have already been performed */ + char *orig_file_name; /* name of file to compare for time-stamping + * (might be != local_file if -K is set) */ + wgint orig_file_size; /* size of file to compare for time-stamping */ + time_t orig_file_tstamp; /* time-stamp of file to compare for + * time-stamping */ +#ifdef HAVE_METALINK + metalink_t *metalink; +#endif + + encoding_t local_encoding; /* the encoding of the local file */ + encoding_t remote_encoding; /* the encoding of the remote file */ + + bool temporary; /* downloading a temporary file */ +}; + +static void +free_hstat (struct http_stat *hs) +{ + xfree (hs->newloc); + xfree (hs->remote_time); + xfree (hs->error); + xfree (hs->rderrmsg); + xfree (hs->local_file); + xfree (hs->orig_file_name); + xfree (hs->message); +#ifdef HAVE_METALINK + metalink_delete (hs->metalink); + hs->metalink = NULL; +#endif +} + +static void +get_file_flags (const char *filename, int *dt) +{ + logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("\ +File %s already there; not retrieving.\n\n"), quote (filename)); + /* If the file is there, we suppose it's retrieved OK. */ + *dt |= RETROKF; + + /* #### Bogusness alert. */ + /* If its suffix is "html" or "htm" or similar, assume text/html. */ + if (has_html_suffix_p (filename)) + *dt |= TEXTHTML; +} + +/* Download the response body from the socket and writes it to + an output file. The headers have already been read from the + socket. If WARC is enabled, the response body will also be + written to a WARC response record. + + hs, contlen, contrange, chunked_transfer_encoding and url are + parameters from the gethttp method. fp is a pointer to the + output file. + + url, warc_timestamp_str, warc_request_uuid, warc_ip, type + and statcode will be saved in the headers of the WARC record. + The head parameter contains the HTTP headers of the response. + + If fp is NULL and WARC is enabled, the response body will be + written only to the WARC file. If WARC is disabled and fp + is a file pointer, the data will be written to the file. + If fp is a file pointer and WARC is enabled, the body will + be written to both destinations. + + Returns the error code. */ +static int +read_response_body (struct http_stat *hs, int sock, FILE *fp, wgint contlen, + wgint contrange, bool chunked_transfer_encoding, + char *url, char *warc_timestamp_str, char *warc_request_uuid, + ip_address *warc_ip, char *type, int statcode, char *head) +{ + int warc_payload_offset = 0; + FILE *warc_tmp = NULL; + int warcerr = 0; + int flags = 0; + + if (opt.warc_filename != NULL) + { + /* Open a temporary file where we can write the response before we + add it to the WARC record. */ + warc_tmp = warc_tempfile (); + if (warc_tmp == NULL) + warcerr = WARC_TMP_FOPENERR; + + if (warcerr == 0) + { + /* We should keep the response headers for the WARC record. */ + int head_len = strlen (head); + int warc_tmp_written = fwrite (head, 1, head_len, warc_tmp); + if (warc_tmp_written != head_len) + warcerr = WARC_TMP_FWRITEERR; + warc_payload_offset = head_len; + } + + if (warcerr != 0) + { + if (warc_tmp != NULL) + fclose (warc_tmp); + return warcerr; + } + } + + if (fp != NULL) + { + /* This confuses the timestamping code that checks for file size. + #### The timestamping code should be smarter about file size. */ + if (opt.save_headers && hs->restval == 0) + fwrite (head, 1, strlen (head), fp); + } + + /* Read the response body. */ + if (contlen != -1) + /* If content-length is present, read that much; otherwise, read + until EOF. The HTTP spec doesn't require the server to + actually close the connection when it's done sending data. */ + flags |= rb_read_exactly; + if (fp != NULL && hs->restval > 0 && contrange == 0) + /* If the server ignored our range request, instruct fd_read_body + to skip the first RESTVAL bytes of body. */ + flags |= rb_skip_startpos; + if (chunked_transfer_encoding) + flags |= rb_chunked_transfer_encoding; + + if (hs->remote_encoding == ENC_GZIP) + flags |= rb_compressed_gzip; + + hs->len = hs->restval; + hs->rd_size = 0; + /* Download the response body and write it to fp. + If we are working on a WARC file, we simultaneously write the + response body to warc_tmp. */ + hs->res = fd_read_body (hs->local_file, sock, fp, contlen != -1 ? contlen : 0, + hs->restval, &hs->rd_size, &hs->len, &hs->dltime, + flags, warc_tmp); + if (hs->res >= 0) + { + if (warc_tmp != NULL) + { + /* Create a response record and write it to the WARC file. + Note: per the WARC standard, the request and response should share + the same date header. We re-use the timestamp of the request. + The response record should also refer to the uuid of the request. */ + bool r = warc_write_response_record (url, warc_timestamp_str, + warc_request_uuid, warc_ip, + warc_tmp, warc_payload_offset, + type, statcode, hs->newloc); + + /* warc_write_response_record has closed warc_tmp. */ + + if (! r) + return WARC_ERR; + } + + return RETRFINISHED; + } + + if (warc_tmp != NULL) + fclose (warc_tmp); + + if (hs->res == -2) + { + /* Error while writing to fd. */ + return FWRITEERR; + } + else if (hs->res == -3) + { + /* Error while writing to warc_tmp. */ + return WARC_TMP_FWRITEERR; + } + else + { + /* A read error! */ + hs->rderrmsg = xstrdup (fd_errstr (sock)); + return RETRFINISHED; + } +} + +#define BEGINS_WITH(line, string_constant) \ + (!c_strncasecmp (line, string_constant, sizeof (string_constant) - 1) \ + && (c_isspace (line[sizeof (string_constant) - 1]) \ + || !line[sizeof (string_constant) - 1])) + +#ifdef __VMS +#define SET_USER_AGENT(req) do { \ + if (!opt.useragent) \ + request_set_header (req, "User-Agent", \ + aprintf ("Wget/%s (VMS %s %s)", \ + version_string, vms_arch(), vms_vers()), \ + rel_value); \ + else if (*opt.useragent) \ + request_set_header (req, "User-Agent", opt.useragent, rel_none); \ +} while (0) +#else /* def __VMS */ +#define SET_USER_AGENT(req) do { \ + if (!opt.useragent) \ + request_set_header (req, "User-Agent", \ + aprintf ("Wget/%s (%s)", \ + version_string, OS_TYPE), \ + rel_value); \ + else if (*opt.useragent) \ + request_set_header (req, "User-Agent", opt.useragent, rel_none); \ +} while (0) +#endif /* def __VMS [else] */ + +/* + Convert time_t to one of valid HTTP date formats + ie. rfc1123-date. + + HTTP-date = rfc1123-date | rfc850-date | asctime-date + rfc1123-date = wkday "," SP date1 SP time SP "GMT" + rfc850-date = weekday "," SP date2 SP time SP "GMT" + asctime-date = wkday SP date3 SP time SP 4DIGIT + date1 = 2DIGIT SP month SP 4DIGIT + ; day month year (e.g., 02 Jun 1982) + date2 = 2DIGIT "-" month "-" 2DIGIT + ; day-month-year (e.g., 02-Jun-82) + date3 = month SP ( 2DIGIT | ( SP 1DIGIT )) + ; month day (e.g., Jun 2) + time = 2DIGIT ":" 2DIGIT ":" 2DIGIT + ; 00:00:00 - 23:59:59 + wkday = "Mon" | "Tue" | "Wed" + | "Thu" | "Fri" | "Sat" | "Sun" + weekday = "Monday" | "Tuesday" | "Wednesday" + | "Thursday" | "Friday" | "Saturday" | "Sunday" + month = "Jan" | "Feb" | "Mar" | "Apr" + | "May" | "Jun" | "Jul" | "Aug" + | "Sep" | "Oct" | "Nov" | "Dec" + + source: RFC2616 */ +static uerr_t +time_to_rfc1123 (time_t time, char *buf, size_t bufsize) +{ + static const char *wkday[] = { "Sun", "Mon", "Tue", "Wed", + "Thu", "Fri", "Sat" }; + static const char *month[] = { "Jan", "Feb", "Mar", "Apr", + "May", "Jun", "Jul", "Aug", + "Sep", "Oct", "Nov", "Dec" }; + /* rfc1123 example: Thu, 01 Jan 1998 22:12:57 GMT */ + static const char *time_format = "%s, %02d %s %04d %02d:%02d:%02d GMT"; + + struct tm *gtm = gmtime (&time); + if (!gtm) + { + logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, + _("gmtime failed. This is probably a bug.\n")); + return TIMECONV_ERR; + } + + snprintf (buf, bufsize, time_format, wkday[gtm->tm_wday], + gtm->tm_mday, month[gtm->tm_mon], + gtm->tm_year + 1900, gtm->tm_hour, + gtm->tm_min, gtm->tm_sec); + + return RETROK; +} + +static struct request * +initialize_request (const struct url *u, struct http_stat *hs, int *dt, struct url *proxy, + bool inhibit_keep_alive, bool *basic_auth_finished, + wgint *body_data_size, char **user, char **passwd, uerr_t *ret) +{ + bool head_only = !!(*dt & HEAD_ONLY); + struct request *req; + + /* Prepare the request to send. */ + { + char *meth_arg; + const char *meth = "GET"; + if (head_only) + meth = "HEAD"; + else if (opt.method) + meth = opt.method; + /* Use the full path, i.e. one that includes the leading slash and + the query string. E.g. if u->path is "foo/bar" and u->query is + "param=value", full_path will be "/foo/bar?param=value". */ + if (proxy +#ifdef HAVE_SSL + /* When using SSL over proxy, CONNECT establishes a direct + connection to the HTTPS server. Therefore use the same + argument as when talking to the server directly. */ + && u->scheme != SCHEME_HTTPS +#endif + ) + meth_arg = xstrdup (u->url); + else + meth_arg = url_full_path (u); + req = request_new (meth, meth_arg); + } + + request_set_header (req, "Referer", (char *) hs->referer, rel_none); + if (*dt & SEND_NOCACHE) + { + /* Cache-Control MUST be obeyed by all HTTP/1.1 caching mechanisms... */ + request_set_header (req, "Cache-Control", "no-cache", rel_none); + + /* ... but some HTTP/1.0 caches doesn't implement Cache-Control. */ + request_set_header (req, "Pragma", "no-cache", rel_none); + } + if (*dt & IF_MODIFIED_SINCE) + { + char strtime[32]; + uerr_t err = time_to_rfc1123 (hs->orig_file_tstamp, strtime, countof (strtime)); + + if (err != RETROK) + { + logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Cannot convert timestamp to http format. " + "Falling back to time 0 as last modification " + "time.\n")); + strcpy (strtime, "Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT"); + } + request_set_header (req, "If-Modified-Since", xstrdup (strtime), rel_value); + } + if (hs->restval) + request_set_header (req, "Range", + aprintf ("bytes=%s-", + number_to_static_string (hs->restval)), + rel_value); + SET_USER_AGENT (req); + request_set_header (req, "Accept", "*/*", rel_none); +#ifdef HAVE_LIBZ + if (opt.compression != compression_none) + request_set_header (req, "Accept-Encoding", "gzip", rel_none); + else +#endif + request_set_header (req, "Accept-Encoding", "identity", rel_none); + + /* Find the username with priority */ + if (u->user) + *user = u->user; + else if (opt.user && (opt.use_askpass || opt.ask_passwd)) + *user = opt.user; + else if (opt.http_user) + *user = opt.http_user; + else if (opt.user) + *user = opt.user; + else + *user = NULL; + + /* Find the password with priority */ + if (u->passwd) + *passwd = u->passwd; + else if (opt.passwd && (opt.use_askpass || opt.ask_passwd)) + *passwd = opt.passwd; + else if (opt.http_passwd) + *passwd = opt.http_passwd; + else if (opt.passwd) + *passwd = opt.passwd; + else + *passwd = NULL; + + /* Check for ~/.netrc if none of the above match */ + if (opt.netrc && (!*user || !*passwd)) + search_netrc (u->host, (const char **) user, (const char **) passwd, 0, NULL); + + /* We only do "site-wide" authentication with "global" user/password + * values unless --auth-no-challenge has been requested; URL user/password + * info overrides. */ + if (*user && *passwd && (!u->user || opt.auth_without_challenge)) + { + /* If this is a host for which we've already received a Basic + * challenge, we'll go ahead and send Basic authentication creds. */ + *basic_auth_finished = maybe_send_basic_creds (u->host, *user, *passwd, req); + } + + /* Generate the Host header, HOST:PORT. Take into account that: + + - Broken server-side software often doesn't recognize the PORT + argument, so we must generate "Host: www.server.com" instead of + "Host: www.server.com:80" (and likewise for https port). + + - IPv6 addresses contain ":", so "Host: 3ffe:8100:200:2::2:1234" + becomes ambiguous and needs to be rewritten as "Host: + [3ffe:8100:200:2::2]:1234". */ + { + /* Formats arranged for hfmt[add_port][add_squares]. */ + static const char *hfmt[][2] = { + { "%s", "[%s]" }, { "%s:%d", "[%s]:%d" } + }; + int add_port = u->port != scheme_default_port (u->scheme); + int add_squares = strchr (u->host, ':') != NULL; + request_set_header (req, "Host", + aprintf (hfmt[add_port][add_squares], u->host, u->port), + rel_value); + } + + if (inhibit_keep_alive) + request_set_header (req, "Connection", "Close", rel_none); + else + { + request_set_header (req, "Connection", "Keep-Alive", rel_none); + if (proxy) + request_set_header (req, "Proxy-Connection", "Keep-Alive", rel_none); + } + + if (opt.method) + { + + if (opt.body_data || opt.body_file) + { + request_set_header (req, "Content-Type", + "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", rel_none); + + if (opt.body_data) + *body_data_size = strlen (opt.body_data); + else + { + *body_data_size = file_size (opt.body_file); + if (*body_data_size == -1) + { + logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("BODY data file %s missing: %s\n"), + quote (opt.body_file), strerror (errno)); + request_free (&req); + *ret = FILEBADFILE; + return NULL; + } + } + request_set_header (req, "Content-Length", + xstrdup (number_to_static_string (*body_data_size)), + rel_value); + } + else if (c_strcasecmp (opt.method, "post") == 0 + || c_strcasecmp (opt.method, "put") == 0 + || c_strcasecmp (opt.method, "patch") == 0) + request_set_header (req, "Content-Length", "0", rel_none); + } + return req; +} + +static void +initialize_proxy_configuration (const struct url *u, struct request *req, + struct url *proxy, char **proxyauth) +{ + char *proxy_user, *proxy_passwd; + /* For normal username and password, URL components override + command-line/wgetrc parameters. With proxy + authentication, it's the reverse, because proxy URLs are + normally the "permanent" ones, so command-line args + should take precedence. */ + if (opt.proxy_user && opt.proxy_passwd) + { + proxy_user = opt.proxy_user; + proxy_passwd = opt.proxy_passwd; + } + else + { + proxy_user = proxy->user; + proxy_passwd = proxy->passwd; + } + /* #### This does not appear right. Can't the proxy request, + say, `Digest' authentication? */ + if (proxy_user && proxy_passwd) + *proxyauth = basic_authentication_encode (proxy_user, proxy_passwd); + + /* Proxy authorization over SSL is handled below. */ +#ifdef HAVE_SSL + if (u->scheme != SCHEME_HTTPS) +#endif + request_set_header (req, "Proxy-Authorization", *proxyauth, rel_value); +} + +static uerr_t +establish_connection (const struct url *u, const struct url **conn_ref, + struct http_stat *hs, struct url *proxy, + char **proxyauth, + struct request **req_ref, bool *using_ssl, + bool inhibit_keep_alive, + int *sock_ref) +{ + bool host_lookup_failed = false; + int sock = *sock_ref; + struct request *req = *req_ref; + const struct url *conn = *conn_ref; + struct response *resp; + int write_error; + int statcode; + + if (! inhibit_keep_alive) + { + /* Look for a persistent connection to target host, unless a + proxy is used. The exception is when SSL is in use, in which + case the proxy is nothing but a passthrough to the target + host, registered as a connection to the latter. */ + const struct url *relevant = conn; +#ifdef HAVE_SSL + if (u->scheme == SCHEME_HTTPS) + relevant = u; +#endif + + if (persistent_available_p (relevant->host, relevant->port, +#ifdef HAVE_SSL + relevant->scheme == SCHEME_HTTPS, +#else + 0, +#endif + &host_lookup_failed)) + { + int family = socket_family (pconn.socket, ENDPOINT_PEER); + sock = pconn.socket; + *using_ssl = pconn.ssl; +#if ENABLE_IPV6 + if (family == AF_INET6) + logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Reusing existing connection to [%s]:%d.\n"), + quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, pconn.host), + pconn.port); + else +#endif + logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Reusing existing connection to %s:%d.\n"), + quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, pconn.host), + pconn.port); + DEBUGP (("Reusing fd %d.\n", sock)); + if (pconn.authorized) + /* If the connection is already authorized, the "Basic" + authorization added by code above is unnecessary and + only hurts us. */ + request_remove_header (req, "Authorization"); + } + else if (host_lookup_failed) + { + logprintf(LOG_NOTQUIET, + _("%s: unable to resolve host address %s\n"), + exec_name, quote (relevant->host)); + return HOSTERR; + } + else if (sock != -1) + { + sock = -1; + } + } + + if (sock < 0) + { + sock = connect_to_host (conn->host, conn->port); + if (sock == E_HOST) + return HOSTERR; + else if (sock < 0) + return (retryable_socket_connect_error (errno) + ? CONERROR : CONIMPOSSIBLE); + +#ifdef HAVE_SSL + if (proxy && u->scheme == SCHEME_HTTPS) + { + char *head; + char *message; + /* When requesting SSL URLs through proxies, use the + CONNECT method to request passthrough. */ + struct request *connreq = request_new ("CONNECT", + aprintf ("%s:%d", u->host, u->port)); + SET_USER_AGENT (connreq); + if (proxyauth) + { + request_set_header (connreq, "Proxy-Authorization", + *proxyauth, rel_value); + /* Now that PROXYAUTH is part of the CONNECT request, + zero it out so we don't send proxy authorization with + the regular request below. */ + *proxyauth = NULL; + } + request_set_header (connreq, "Host", + aprintf ("%s:%d", u->host, u->port), + rel_value); + + write_error = request_send (connreq, sock, 0); + request_free (&connreq); + if (write_error < 0) + { + CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock); + return WRITEFAILED; + } + + head = read_http_response_head (sock); + if (!head) + { + logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Failed reading proxy response: %s\n"), + fd_errstr (sock)); + CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock); + return HERR; + } + message = NULL; + if (!*head) + { + xfree (head); + goto failed_tunnel; + } + DEBUGP (("proxy responded with: [%s]\n", head)); + + resp = resp_new (head); + statcode = resp_status (resp, &message); + if (statcode < 0) + { + char *tms = datetime_str (time (NULL)); + logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "%d\n", statcode); + logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("%s ERROR %d: %s.\n"), tms, statcode, + quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, + _("Malformed status line"))); + xfree (head); + return HERR; + } + xfree (hs->message); + hs->message = xstrdup (message); + resp_free (&resp); + xfree (head); + if (statcode != 200) + { + failed_tunnel: + logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Proxy tunneling failed: %s"), + message ? quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, message) : "?"); + xfree (message); + return CONSSLERR; + } + xfree (message); + + /* SOCK is now *really* connected to u->host, so update CONN + to reflect this. That way register_persistent will + register SOCK as being connected to u->host:u->port. */ + conn = u; + } + + if (conn->scheme == SCHEME_HTTPS) + { + if (!ssl_connect_wget (sock, u->host, NULL)) + { + CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock); + return CONSSLERR; + } + else if (!ssl_check_certificate (sock, u->host)) + { + CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock); + return VERIFCERTERR; + } + *using_ssl = true; + } +#endif /* HAVE_SSL */ + } + *conn_ref = conn; + *req_ref = req; + *sock_ref = sock; + return RETROK; +} + +static uerr_t +set_file_timestamp (struct http_stat *hs) +{ + size_t filename_len = strlen (hs->local_file); + char *filename_plus_orig_suffix = alloca (filename_len + sizeof (ORIG_SFX)); + bool local_dot_orig_file_exists = false; + char *local_filename = NULL; + struct stat st; + + if (opt.backup_converted) + /* If -K is specified, we'll act on the assumption that it was specified + last time these files were downloaded as well, and instead of just + comparing local file X against server file X, we'll compare local + file X.orig (if extant, else X) against server file X. If -K + _wasn't_ specified last time, or the server contains files called + *.orig, -N will be back to not operating correctly with -k. */ + { + /* Would a single s[n]printf() call be faster? --dan + + Definitely not. sprintf() is horribly slow. It's a + different question whether the difference between the two + affects a program. Usually I'd say "no", but at one + point I profiled Wget, and found that a measurable and + non-negligible amount of time was lost calling sprintf() + in url.c. Replacing sprintf with inline calls to + strcpy() and number_to_string() made a difference. + --hniksic */ + memcpy (filename_plus_orig_suffix, hs->local_file, filename_len); + memcpy (filename_plus_orig_suffix + filename_len, + ORIG_SFX, sizeof (ORIG_SFX)); + + /* Try to stat() the .orig file. */ + if (stat (filename_plus_orig_suffix, &st) == 0) + { + local_dot_orig_file_exists = true; + local_filename = filename_plus_orig_suffix; + } + } + + if (!local_dot_orig_file_exists) + /* Couldn't stat() <file>.orig, so try to stat() <file>. */ + if (stat (hs->local_file, &st) == 0) + local_filename = hs->local_file; + + if (local_filename != NULL) + /* There was a local file, so we'll check later to see if the version + the server has is the same version we already have, allowing us to + skip a download. */ + { + hs->orig_file_name = xstrdup (local_filename); + hs->orig_file_size = st.st_size; + hs->orig_file_tstamp = st.st_mtime; +#ifdef WINDOWS + /* Modification time granularity is 2 seconds for Windows, so + increase local time by 1 second for later comparison. */ + ++hs->orig_file_tstamp; +#endif + hs->timestamp_checked = true; + } + + return RETROK; +} + +static uerr_t +check_file_output (const struct url *u, struct http_stat *hs, + struct response *resp, char *hdrval, size_t hdrsize) +{ + /* Determine the local filename if needed. Notice that if -O is used + * hstat.local_file is set by http_loop to the argument of -O. */ + if (!hs->local_file) + { + char *local_file = NULL; + + /* Honor Content-Disposition whether possible. */ + if (!opt.content_disposition + || !resp_header_copy (resp, "Content-Disposition", + hdrval, hdrsize) + || !parse_content_disposition (hdrval, &local_file)) + { + /* The Content-Disposition header is missing or broken. + * Choose unique file name according to given URL. */ + hs->local_file = url_file_name (u, NULL); + } + else + { + DEBUGP (("Parsed filename from Content-Disposition: %s\n", + local_file)); + hs->local_file = url_file_name (u, local_file); + } + + xfree (local_file); + } + + hs->temporary = opt.delete_after || opt.spider || !acceptable (hs->local_file); + if (hs->temporary) + { + char *tmp = aprintf ("%s.tmp", hs->local_file); + xfree (hs->local_file); + hs->local_file = tmp; + } + + /* TODO: perform this check only once. */ + if (!hs->existence_checked && file_exists_p (hs->local_file, NULL)) + { + if (opt.noclobber && !opt.output_document) + { + /* If opt.noclobber is turned on and file already exists, do not + retrieve the file. But if the output_document was given, then this + test was already done and the file didn't exist. Hence the !opt.output_document */ + return RETRUNNEEDED; + } + else if (!ALLOW_CLOBBER) + { + char *unique = unique_name (hs->local_file, true); + if (unique != hs->local_file) + xfree (hs->local_file); + hs->local_file = unique; + } + } + hs->existence_checked = true; + + /* Support timestamping */ + if (opt.timestamping && !hs->timestamp_checked) + { + uerr_t timestamp_err = set_file_timestamp (hs); + if (timestamp_err != RETROK) + return timestamp_err; + } + return RETROK; +} + +static uerr_t +check_auth (const struct url *u, char *user, char *passwd, struct response *resp, + struct request *req, bool *ntlm_seen_ref, bool *retry, + bool *basic_auth_finished_ref, bool *auth_finished_ref) +{ + uerr_t auth_err = RETROK; + bool basic_auth_finished = *basic_auth_finished_ref; + bool auth_finished = *auth_finished_ref; + bool ntlm_seen = *ntlm_seen_ref; + *retry = false; + if (!auth_finished && (user && passwd)) + { + /* IIS sends multiple copies of WWW-Authenticate, one with + the value "negotiate", and other(s) with data. Loop over + all the occurrences and pick the one we recognize. */ + int wapos; + char *buf; + const char *www_authenticate = NULL; + const char *wabeg, *waend; + const char *digest = NULL, *basic = NULL, *ntlm = NULL; + for (wapos = 0; !ntlm + && (wapos = resp_header_locate (resp, "WWW-Authenticate", wapos, + &wabeg, &waend)) != -1; + ++wapos) + { + param_token name, value; + + BOUNDED_TO_ALLOCA (wabeg, waend, buf); + www_authenticate = buf; + + for (;!ntlm;) + { + /* extract the auth-scheme */ + while (c_isspace (*www_authenticate)) www_authenticate++; + name.e = name.b = www_authenticate; + while (*name.e && !c_isspace (*name.e)) name.e++; + + if (name.b == name.e) + break; + + DEBUGP (("Auth scheme found '%.*s'\n", (int) (name.e - name.b), name.b)); + + if (known_authentication_scheme_p (name.b, name.e)) + { + if (BEGINS_WITH (name.b, "NTLM")) + { + ntlm = name.b; + break; /* this is the most secure challenge, stop here */ + } + else if (!digest && BEGINS_WITH (name.b, "Digest")) + digest = name.b; + else if (!basic && BEGINS_WITH (name.b, "Basic")) + basic = name.b; + } + + /* now advance over the auth-params */ + www_authenticate = name.e; + DEBUGP (("Auth param list '%s'\n", www_authenticate)); + while (extract_param (&www_authenticate, &name, &value, ',', NULL) && name.b && value.b) + { + DEBUGP (("Auth param %.*s=%.*s\n", + (int) (name.e - name.b), name.b, (int) (value.e - value.b), value.b)); + } + } + } + + if (!basic && !digest && !ntlm) + { + /* If the authentication header is missing or + unrecognized, there's no sense in retrying. */ + logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Unknown authentication scheme.\n")); + } + else if (!basic_auth_finished + || !basic) + { + char *pth = url_full_path (u); + const char *value; + uerr_t *auth_stat; + auth_stat = xmalloc (sizeof (uerr_t)); + *auth_stat = RETROK; + + if (ntlm) + www_authenticate = ntlm; + else if (digest) + www_authenticate = digest; + else + www_authenticate = basic; + + logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Authentication selected: %s\n"), www_authenticate); + + value = create_authorization_line (www_authenticate, + user, passwd, + request_method (req), + pth, + &auth_finished, + auth_stat); + + auth_err = *auth_stat; + xfree (auth_stat); + xfree (pth); + if (auth_err == RETROK) + { + request_set_header (req, "Authorization", value, rel_value); + + if (BEGINS_WITH (www_authenticate, "NTLM")) + ntlm_seen = true; + else if (!u->user && BEGINS_WITH (www_authenticate, "Basic")) + { + /* Need to register this host as using basic auth, + * so we automatically send creds next time. */ + register_basic_auth_host (u->host); + } + + *retry = true; + goto cleanup; + } + else + { + /* Creating the Authorization header went wrong */ + } + } + else + { + /* We already did Basic auth, and it failed. Gotta + * give up. */ + } + } + + cleanup: + *ntlm_seen_ref = ntlm_seen; + *basic_auth_finished_ref = basic_auth_finished; + *auth_finished_ref = auth_finished; + return auth_err; +} + +static uerr_t +open_output_stream (struct http_stat *hs, int count, FILE **fp) +{ +/* 2005-06-17 SMS. + For VMS, define common fopen() optional arguments. +*/ +#ifdef __VMS +# define FOPEN_OPT_ARGS "fop=sqo", "acc", acc_cb, &open_id +# define FOPEN_BIN_FLAG 3 +#else /* def __VMS */ +# define FOPEN_BIN_FLAG true +#endif /* def __VMS [else] */ + + /* Open the local file. */ + if (!output_stream) + { + mkalldirs (hs->local_file); + if (opt.backups) + rotate_backups (hs->local_file); + if (hs->restval) + { +#ifdef __VMS + int open_id; + + open_id = 21; + *fp = fopen (hs->local_file, "ab", FOPEN_OPT_ARGS); +#else /* def __VMS */ + *fp = fopen (hs->local_file, "ab"); +#endif /* def __VMS [else] */ + } + else if (ALLOW_CLOBBER || count > 0) + { + if (opt.unlink_requested && file_exists_p (hs->local_file, NULL)) + { + if (unlink (hs->local_file) < 0) + { + logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, "%s: %s\n", hs->local_file, + strerror (errno)); + return UNLINKERR; + } + } + +#ifdef __VMS + int open_id; + + open_id = 22; + *fp = fopen (hs->local_file, "wb", FOPEN_OPT_ARGS); +#else /* def __VMS */ + if (hs->temporary) + { + *fp = fdopen (open (hs->local_file, O_BINARY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_WRONLY, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR), "wb"); + } + else + { + *fp = fopen (hs->local_file, "wb"); + } + +#endif /* def __VMS [else] */ + } + else + { + *fp = fopen_excl (hs->local_file, FOPEN_BIN_FLAG); + if (!*fp && errno == EEXIST) + { + /* We cannot just invent a new name and use it (which is + what functions like unique_create typically do) + because we told the user we'd use this name. + Instead, return and retry the download. */ + logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, + _("%s has sprung into existence.\n"), + hs->local_file); + return FOPEN_EXCL_ERR; + } + } + if (!*fp) + { + logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, "%s: %s\n", hs->local_file, strerror (errno)); + return FOPENERR; + } + } + else + *fp = output_stream; + + /* Print fetch message, if opt.verbose. */ + logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Saving to: %s\n"), + HYPHENP (hs->local_file) ? quote ("STDOUT") : quote (hs->local_file)); + + return RETROK; +} + +/* Set proper type flags based on type string. */ +static void +set_content_type (int *dt, const char *type) +{ + /* If content-type is not given, assume text/html. This is because + of the multitude of broken CGI's that "forget" to generate the + content-type. */ + if (!type || + 0 == c_strcasecmp (type, TEXTHTML_S) || + 0 == c_strcasecmp (type, TEXTXHTML_S)) + *dt |= TEXTHTML; + else + *dt &= ~TEXTHTML; + + if (type && + 0 == c_strcasecmp (type, TEXTCSS_S)) + *dt |= TEXTCSS; + else + *dt &= ~TEXTCSS; +} + +#ifdef HAVE_METALINK +/* Will return proper metalink_t structure if enough data was found in + http response resp. Otherwise returns NULL. + Two exit points: one for success and one for failure. */ +static metalink_t * +metalink_from_http (const struct response *resp, const struct http_stat *hs, + const struct url *u) +{ + metalink_t *metalink = NULL; + metalink_file_t *mfile = xnew0 (metalink_file_t); + const char *val_beg, *val_end; + int res_count = 0, meta_count = 0, hash_count = 0, sig_count = 0, i; + + DEBUGP (("Checking for Metalink in HTTP response\n")); + + /* Initialize metalink file for our simple use case. */ + if (hs->local_file) + mfile->name = xstrdup (hs->local_file); + else + mfile->name = url_file_name (u, NULL); + + /* Begin with 1-element array (for 0-termination). */ + mfile->checksums = xnew0 (metalink_checksum_t *); + mfile->resources = xnew0 (metalink_resource_t *); + mfile->metaurls = xnew0 (metalink_metaurl_t *); + + /* Process the Content-Type header. */ + if (resp_header_locate (resp, "Content-Type", 0, &val_beg, &val_end) != -1) + { + metalink_metaurl_t murl = {0}; + + const char *type_beg, *type_end; + char *typestr = NULL; + char *namestr = NULL; + size_t type_len; + + DEBUGP (("Processing Content-Type header...\n")); + + /* Find beginning of type. */ + type_beg = val_beg; + while (type_beg < val_end && c_isspace (*type_beg)) + type_beg++; + + /* Find end of type. */ + type_end = type_beg + 1; + while (type_end < val_end && + *type_end != ';' && + *type_end != ' ' && + *type_end != '\r' && + *type_end != '\n') + type_end++; + + if (type_beg >= val_end || type_end > val_end) + { + DEBUGP (("Invalid Content-Type header. Ignoring.\n")); + goto skip_content_type; + } + + type_len = type_end - type_beg; + typestr = xstrndup (type_beg, type_len); + + DEBUGP (("Content-Type: %s\n", typestr)); + + if (strcmp (typestr, "application/metalink4+xml")) + { + xfree (typestr); + goto skip_content_type; + } + + /* + Valid ranges for the "pri" attribute are from + 1 to 999999. Mirror servers with a lower value of the "pri" + attribute have a higher priority, while mirrors with an undefined + "pri" attribute are considered to have a value of 999999, which is + the lowest priority. + + rfc6249 section 3.1 + */ + murl.priority = DEFAULT_PRI; + + murl.mediatype = typestr; + typestr = NULL; + + if (opt.content_disposition + && resp_header_locate (resp, "Content-Disposition", 0, &val_beg, &val_end) != -1) + { + find_key_value (val_beg, val_end, "filename", &namestr); + murl.name = namestr; + namestr = NULL; + } + + murl.url = xstrdup (u->url); + + DEBUGP (("URL=%s\n", murl.url)); + DEBUGP (("MEDIATYPE=%s\n", murl.mediatype)); + DEBUGP (("NAME=%s\n", murl.name ? murl.name : "")); + DEBUGP (("PRIORITY=%d\n", murl.priority)); + + /* 1 slot from new resource, 1 slot for null-termination. */ + mfile->metaurls = xrealloc (mfile->metaurls, + sizeof (metalink_metaurl_t *) * (meta_count + 2)); + mfile->metaurls[meta_count] = xnew0 (metalink_metaurl_t); + *mfile->metaurls[meta_count] = murl; + meta_count++; + } +skip_content_type: + + /* Find all Link headers. */ + for (i = 0; + (i = resp_header_locate (resp, "Link", i, &val_beg, &val_end)) != -1; + i++) + { + char *rel = NULL, *reltype = NULL; + char *urlstr = NULL; + const char *url_beg, *url_end, *attrs_beg; + size_t url_len; + + /* Sample Metalink Link headers: + + Link: <http://www2.example.com/dir1/dir2/dir3/dir4/dir5/example.ext>; + rel=duplicate; pri=1; pref; geo=gb; depth=4 + + Link: <http://example.com/example.ext.asc>; rel=describedby; + type="application/pgp-signature" + */ + + /* Find beginning of URL. */ + url_beg = val_beg; + while (url_beg < val_end - 1 && c_isspace (*url_beg)) + url_beg++; + + /* Find end of URL. */ + /* The convention here is that end ptr points to one element after + end of string. In this case, it should be pointing to the '>', which + is one element after end of actual URL. Therefore, it should never point + to val_end, which is one element after entire header value string. */ + url_end = url_beg + 1; + while (url_end < val_end - 1 && *url_end != '>') + url_end++; + + if (url_beg >= val_end || url_end >= val_end || + *url_beg != '<' || *url_end != '>') + { + DEBUGP (("This is not a valid Link header. Ignoring.\n")); + continue; + } + + /* Skip <. */ + url_beg++; + url_len = url_end - url_beg; + + /* URL found. Now handle the attributes. */ + attrs_beg = url_end + 1; + + /* First we need to find out what type of link it is. Currently, we + support rel=duplicate and rel=describedby. */ + if (!find_key_value (attrs_beg, val_end, "rel", &rel)) + { + DEBUGP (("No rel value in Link header, skipping.\n")); + continue; + } + + urlstr = xstrndup (url_beg, url_len); + DEBUGP (("URL=%s\n", urlstr)); + DEBUGP (("rel=%s\n", rel)); + + if (!strcmp (rel, "describedby")) + find_key_value (attrs_beg, val_end, "type", &reltype); + + /* Handle signatures. + Libmetalink only supports one signature per file. Therefore we stop + as soon as we successfully get first supported signature. */ + if (sig_count == 0 && + reltype && !strcmp (reltype, "application/pgp-signature")) + { + /* Download the signature to a temporary file. */ + FILE *_output_stream = output_stream; + bool _output_stream_regular = output_stream_regular; + + output_stream = tmpfile (); + if (output_stream) + { + struct iri *iri = iri_new (); + struct url *url; + int url_err; + + set_uri_encoding (iri, opt.locale, true); + url = url_parse (urlstr, &url_err, iri, false); + + if (!url) + { + char *error = url_error (urlstr, url_err); + logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("When downloading signature:\n" + "%s: %s.\n"), urlstr, error); + xfree (error); + iri_free (iri); + } + else + { + /* Avoid recursive Metalink from HTTP headers. */ + bool _metalink_http = opt.metalink_over_http; + uerr_t retr_err; + + opt.metalink_over_http = false; + retr_err = retrieve_url (url, urlstr, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL, false, iri, false); + opt.metalink_over_http = _metalink_http; + + url_free (url); + iri_free (iri); + + if (retr_err == RETROK) + { + /* Signature is in the temporary file. Read it into + metalink resource structure. */ + metalink_signature_t msig; + size_t siglen; + + fseek (output_stream, 0, SEEK_END); + siglen = ftell (output_stream); + fseek (output_stream, 0, SEEK_SET); + + DEBUGP (("siglen=%lu\n", siglen)); + + msig.signature = xmalloc (siglen + 1); + if (fread (msig.signature, siglen, 1, output_stream) != 1) + { + logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, + _("Unable to read signature content from " + "temporary file. Skipping.\n")); + xfree (msig.signature); + } + else + { + msig.signature[siglen] = '\0'; /* Just in case. */ + msig.mediatype = xstrdup ("application/pgp-signature"); + + DEBUGP (("Signature (%s):\n%s\n", + msig.mediatype, msig.signature)); + + mfile->signature = xnew (metalink_signature_t); + *mfile->signature = msig; + + sig_count++; + } + } + } + fclose (output_stream); + } + else + { + logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Could not create temporary file. " + "Skipping signature download.\n")); + } + output_stream_regular = _output_stream_regular; + output_stream = _output_stream; + } /* Iterate over signatures. */ + + /* Handle Metalink resources. */ + else if (!strcmp (rel, "duplicate")) + { + metalink_resource_t mres = {0}; + char *pristr; + + /* + Valid ranges for the "pri" attribute are from + 1 to 999999. Mirror servers with a lower value of the "pri" + attribute have a higher priority, while mirrors with an undefined + "pri" attribute are considered to have a value of 999999, which is + the lowest priority. + + rfc6249 section 3.1 + */ + mres.priority = DEFAULT_PRI; + if (find_key_value (url_end, val_end, "pri", &pristr)) + { + long pri; + char *end_pristr; + /* Do not care for errno since 0 is error in this case. */ + pri = strtol (pristr, &end_pristr, 10); + if (end_pristr != pristr + strlen (pristr) || + !VALID_PRI_RANGE (pri)) + { + /* This is against the specification, so let's inform the user. */ + logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, + _("Invalid pri value. Assuming %d.\n"), + DEFAULT_PRI); + } + else + mres.priority = pri; + xfree (pristr); + } + + switch (url_scheme (urlstr)) + { + case SCHEME_HTTP: + mres.type = xstrdup ("http"); + break; +#ifdef HAVE_SSL + case SCHEME_HTTPS: + mres.type = xstrdup ("https"); + break; + case SCHEME_FTPS: + mres.type = xstrdup ("ftps"); + break; +#endif + case SCHEME_FTP: + mres.type = xstrdup ("ftp"); + break; + default: + DEBUGP (("Unsupported url scheme in %s. Skipping resource.\n", urlstr)); + } + + if (mres.type) + { + DEBUGP (("TYPE=%s\n", mres.type)); + + /* At this point we have validated the new resource. */ + + find_key_value (url_end, val_end, "geo", &mres.location); + + mres.url = urlstr; + urlstr = NULL; + + mres.preference = 0; + if (has_key (url_end, val_end, "pref")) + { + DEBUGP (("This resource has preference\n")); + mres.preference = 1; + } + + /* 1 slot from new resource, 1 slot for null-termination. */ + mfile->resources = xrealloc (mfile->resources, + sizeof (metalink_resource_t *) * (res_count + 2)); + mfile->resources[res_count] = xnew0 (metalink_resource_t); + *mfile->resources[res_count] = mres; + res_count++; + } + } /* Handle resource link (rel=duplicate). */ + + /* Handle Metalink/XML resources. */ + else if (reltype && !strcmp (reltype, "application/metalink4+xml")) + { + metalink_metaurl_t murl = {0}; + char *pristr; + + /* + Valid ranges for the "pri" attribute are from + 1 to 999999. Mirror servers with a lower value of the "pri" + attribute have a higher priority, while mirrors with an undefined + "pri" attribute are considered to have a value of 999999, which is + the lowest priority. + + rfc6249 section 3.1 + */ + murl.priority = DEFAULT_PRI; + if (find_key_value (url_end, val_end, "pri", &pristr)) + { + long pri; + char *end_pristr; + /* Do not care for errno since 0 is error in this case. */ + pri = strtol (pristr, &end_pristr, 10); + if (end_pristr != pristr + strlen (pristr) || + !VALID_PRI_RANGE (pri)) + { + /* This is against the specification, so let's inform the user. */ + logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, + _("Invalid pri value. Assuming %d.\n"), + DEFAULT_PRI); + } + else + murl.priority = pri; + xfree (pristr); + } + + murl.mediatype = xstrdup (reltype); + + DEBUGP (("MEDIATYPE=%s\n", murl.mediatype)); + + /* At this point we have validated the new resource. */ + + find_key_value (url_end, val_end, "name", &murl.name); + + murl.url = urlstr; + urlstr = NULL; + + /* 1 slot from new resource, 1 slot for null-termination. */ + mfile->metaurls = xrealloc (mfile->metaurls, + sizeof (metalink_metaurl_t *) * (meta_count + 2)); + mfile->metaurls[meta_count] = xnew0 (metalink_metaurl_t); + *mfile->metaurls[meta_count] = murl; + meta_count++; + } /* Handle resource link (rel=describedby). */ + else + DEBUGP (("This link header was not used for Metalink\n")); + + xfree (urlstr); + xfree (reltype); + xfree (rel); + } /* Iterate over link headers. */ + + /* Null-terminate resources array. */ + mfile->resources[res_count] = 0; + mfile->metaurls[meta_count] = 0; + + if (res_count == 0 && meta_count == 0) + { + DEBUGP (("No valid metalink references found.\n")); + goto fail; + } + + /* Find all Digest headers. */ + for (i = 0; + (i = resp_header_locate (resp, "Digest", i, &val_beg, &val_end)) != -1; + i++) + { + const char *dig_pos; + char *dig_type, *dig_hash; + + /* Each Digest header can include multiple hashes. Example: + Digest: SHA=thvDyvhfIqlvFe+A9MYgxAfm1q5=,unixsum=30637 + Digest: md5=HUXZLQLMuI/KZ5KDcJPcOA== + */ + for (dig_pos = val_beg; + (dig_pos = find_key_values (dig_pos, val_end, &dig_type, &dig_hash)); + dig_pos++) + { + /* The hash here is assumed to be base64. We need the hash in hex. + Therefore we convert: base64 -> binary -> hex. */ + const size_t dig_hash_str_len = strlen (dig_hash); + char *bin_hash = alloca (dig_hash_str_len * 3 / 4 + 1); + ssize_t hash_bin_len; + + hash_bin_len = wget_base64_decode (dig_hash, bin_hash, dig_hash_str_len * 3 / 4 + 1); + + /* Detect malformed base64 input. */ + if (hash_bin_len < 0) + { + xfree (dig_type); + xfree (dig_hash); + continue; + } + + /* One slot for me, one for zero-termination. */ + mfile->checksums = + xrealloc (mfile->checksums, + sizeof (metalink_checksum_t *) * (hash_count + 2)); + mfile->checksums[hash_count] = xnew (metalink_checksum_t); + mfile->checksums[hash_count]->type = dig_type; + + mfile->checksums[hash_count]->hash = xmalloc ((size_t)hash_bin_len * 2 + 1); + wg_hex_to_string (mfile->checksums[hash_count]->hash, bin_hash, (size_t)hash_bin_len); + + xfree (dig_hash); + + hash_count++; + } + } + + /* Zero-terminate checksums array. */ + mfile->checksums[hash_count] = 0; + + /* + If Instance Digests are not provided by the Metalink servers, the + Link header fields pertaining to this specification MUST be ignored. + + rfc6249 section 6 + */ + if (res_count && hash_count == 0) + { + logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, + _("Could not find acceptable digest for Metalink resources.\n" + "Ignoring them.\n")); + goto fail; + } + + /* Metalink data is OK. Now we just need to sort the resources based + on their priorities, preference, and perhaps location. */ + stable_sort (mfile->resources, res_count, sizeof (metalink_resource_t *), metalink_res_cmp); + stable_sort (mfile->metaurls, meta_count, sizeof (metalink_metaurl_t *), metalink_meta_cmp); + + /* Restore sensible preference values (in case someone cares to look). */ + for (i = 0; i < res_count; ++i) + mfile->resources[i]->preference = 1000000 - mfile->resources[i]->priority; + + metalink = xnew0 (metalink_t); + metalink->files = xmalloc (sizeof (metalink_file_t *) * 2); + metalink->files[0] = mfile; + metalink->files[1] = 0; + metalink->origin = xstrdup (u->url); + metalink->version = METALINK_VERSION_4; + /* Leave other fields set to 0. */ + + return metalink; + +fail: + /* Free all allocated memory. */ + if (metalink) + metalink_delete (metalink); + else + metalink_file_delete (mfile); + return NULL; +} +#endif /* HAVE_METALINK */ + +/* Retrieve a document through HTTP protocol. It recognizes status + code, and correctly handles redirections. It closes the network + socket. If it receives an error from the functions below it, it + will print it if there is enough information to do so (almost + always), returning the error to the caller (i.e. http_loop). + + Various HTTP parameters are stored to hs. + + If PROXY is non-NULL, the connection will be made to the proxy + server, and u->url will be requested. */ +static uerr_t +gethttp (const struct url *u, struct url *original_url, struct http_stat *hs, + int *dt, struct url *proxy, struct iri *iri, int count) +{ + struct request *req = NULL; + + char *type = NULL; + char *user, *passwd; + char *proxyauth; + int statcode; + int write_error; + wgint contlen, contrange; + const struct url *conn; + FILE *fp; + int err; + uerr_t retval; +#ifdef HAVE_HSTS +#ifdef TESTING + /* we don't link against main.o when we're testing */ + hsts_store_t hsts_store = NULL; +#else + extern hsts_store_t hsts_store; +#endif + const char *hsts_params; + time_t max_age; + bool include_subdomains; +#endif + + int sock = -1; + + /* Set to 1 when the authorization has already been sent and should + not be tried again. */ + bool auth_finished = false; + + /* Set to 1 when just globally-set Basic authorization has been sent; + * should prevent further Basic negotiations, but not other + * mechanisms. */ + bool basic_auth_finished = false; + + /* Whether NTLM authentication is used for this request. */ + bool ntlm_seen = false; + + /* Whether our connection to the remote host is through SSL. */ + bool using_ssl = false; + + /* Whether a HEAD request will be issued (as opposed to GET or + POST). */ + bool head_only = !!(*dt & HEAD_ONLY); + + /* Whether conditional get request will be issued. */ + bool cond_get = !!(*dt & IF_MODIFIED_SINCE); + +#ifdef HAVE_METALINK + /* Are we looking for metalink info in HTTP headers? */ + bool metalink = !!(*dt & METALINK_METADATA); +#endif + + char *head = NULL; + struct response *resp = NULL; + char hdrval[512]; + char *message = NULL; + + /* Declare WARC variables. */ + bool warc_enabled = (opt.warc_filename != NULL); + FILE *warc_tmp = NULL; + char warc_timestamp_str [21]; + char warc_request_uuid [48]; + ip_address *warc_ip = NULL; + off_t warc_payload_offset = -1; + + /* Whether this connection will be kept alive after the HTTP request + is done. */ + bool keep_alive; + + /* Is the server using the chunked transfer encoding? */ + bool chunked_transfer_encoding = false; + + /* Whether keep-alive should be inhibited. */ + bool inhibit_keep_alive = + !opt.http_keep_alive || opt.ignore_length; + + /* Headers sent when using POST. */ + wgint body_data_size = 0; + +#ifdef HAVE_SSL + if (u->scheme == SCHEME_HTTPS) + { + /* Initialize the SSL context. After this has once been done, + it becomes a no-op. */ + if (!ssl_init ()) + { + scheme_disable (SCHEME_HTTPS); + logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, + _("Disabling SSL due to encountered errors.\n")); + retval = SSLINITFAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + } +#endif /* HAVE_SSL */ + + /* Initialize certain elements of struct http_stat. */ + hs->len = 0; + hs->contlen = -1; + hs->res = -1; + hs->rderrmsg = NULL; + hs->newloc = NULL; + xfree (hs->remote_time); + hs->error = NULL; + hs->message = NULL; + hs->local_encoding = ENC_NONE; + hs->remote_encoding = ENC_NONE; + + conn = u; + + { + uerr_t ret; + req = initialize_request (u, hs, dt, proxy, inhibit_keep_alive, + &basic_auth_finished, &body_data_size, + &user, &passwd, &ret); + if (req == NULL) + { + retval = ret; + goto cleanup; + } + } + retry_with_auth: + /* We need to come back here when the initial attempt to retrieve + without authorization header fails. (Expected to happen at least + for the Digest authorization scheme.) */ + + if (opt.cookies) + request_set_header (req, "Cookie", + cookie_header (wget_cookie_jar, + u->host, u->port, u->path, +#ifdef HAVE_SSL + u->scheme == SCHEME_HTTPS +#else + 0 +#endif + ), + rel_value); + + /* Add the user headers. */ + if (opt.user_headers) + { + int i; + for (i = 0; opt.user_headers[i]; i++) + request_set_user_header (req, opt.user_headers[i]); + } + + proxyauth = NULL; + if (proxy) + { + conn = proxy; + initialize_proxy_configuration (u, req, proxy, &proxyauth); + } + keep_alive = true; + + /* Establish the connection. */ + if (inhibit_keep_alive) + keep_alive = false; + + { + uerr_t conn_err = establish_connection (u, &conn, hs, proxy, &proxyauth, &req, + &using_ssl, inhibit_keep_alive, &sock); + if (conn_err != RETROK) + { + retval = conn_err; + goto cleanup; + } + } + + /* Open the temporary file where we will write the request. */ + if (warc_enabled) + { + warc_tmp = warc_tempfile (); + if (warc_tmp == NULL) + { + CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock); + retval = WARC_TMP_FOPENERR; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (! proxy) + { + warc_ip = (ip_address *) alloca (sizeof (ip_address)); + socket_ip_address (sock, warc_ip, ENDPOINT_PEER); + } + } + + /* Send the request to server. */ + write_error = request_send (req, sock, warc_tmp); + + if (write_error >= 0) + { + if (opt.body_data) + { + DEBUGP (("[BODY data: %s]\n", opt.body_data)); + write_error = fd_write (sock, opt.body_data, body_data_size, -1); + if (write_error >= 0 && warc_tmp != NULL) + { + int warc_tmp_written; + + /* Remember end of headers / start of payload. */ + warc_payload_offset = ftello (warc_tmp); + + /* Write a copy of the data to the WARC record. */ + warc_tmp_written = fwrite (opt.body_data, 1, body_data_size, warc_tmp); + if (warc_tmp_written != body_data_size) + write_error = -2; + } + } + else if (opt.body_file && body_data_size != 0) + { + if (warc_tmp != NULL) + /* Remember end of headers / start of payload */ + warc_payload_offset = ftello (warc_tmp); + + write_error = body_file_send (sock, opt.body_file, body_data_size, warc_tmp); + } + } + + if (write_error < 0) + { + CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock); + + if (warc_tmp != NULL) + fclose (warc_tmp); + + if (write_error == -2) + retval = WARC_TMP_FWRITEERR; + else + retval = WRITEFAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("%s request sent, awaiting response... "), + proxy ? "Proxy" : "HTTP"); + contlen = -1; + contrange = 0; + *dt &= ~RETROKF; + + + if (warc_enabled) + { + bool warc_result; + + /* Generate a timestamp and uuid for this request. */ + warc_timestamp (warc_timestamp_str, sizeof (warc_timestamp_str)); + warc_uuid_str (warc_request_uuid); + + /* Create a request record and store it in the WARC file. */ + warc_result = warc_write_request_record (u->url, warc_timestamp_str, + warc_request_uuid, warc_ip, + warc_tmp, warc_payload_offset); + if (! warc_result) + { + CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock); + retval = WARC_ERR; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* warc_write_request_record has also closed warc_tmp. */ + } + + /* Repeat while we receive a 10x response code. */ + { + bool _repeat; + + do + { + head = read_http_response_head (sock); + if (!head) + { + if (errno == 0) + { + logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("No data received.\n")); + CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock); + retval = HEOF; + } + else + { + logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Read error (%s) in headers.\n"), + fd_errstr (sock)); + CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock); + retval = HERR; + } + goto cleanup; + } + DEBUGP (("\n---response begin---\n%s---response end---\n", head)); + + resp = resp_new (head); + + /* Check for status line. */ + xfree (message); + statcode = resp_status (resp, &message); + if (statcode < 0) + { + char *tms = datetime_str (time (NULL)); + logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "%d\n", statcode); + logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("%s ERROR %d: %s.\n"), tms, statcode, + quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, + _("Malformed status line"))); + CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock); + retval = HERR; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (H_10X (statcode)) + { + xfree (head); + resp_free (&resp); + _repeat = true; + DEBUGP (("Ignoring response\n")); + } + else + { + _repeat = false; + } + } + while (_repeat); + } + + xfree (hs->message); + hs->message = xstrdup (message); + if (!opt.server_response) + logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "%2d %s\n", statcode, + message ? quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, message) : ""); + else + { + logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); + print_server_response (resp, " "); + } + + if (!opt.ignore_length + && resp_header_copy (resp, "Content-Length", hdrval, sizeof (hdrval))) + { + wgint parsed; + errno = 0; + parsed = str_to_wgint (hdrval, NULL, 10); + if (parsed == WGINT_MAX && errno == ERANGE) + { + /* Out of range. + #### If Content-Length is out of range, it most likely + means that the file is larger than 2G and that we're + compiled without LFS. In that case we should probably + refuse to even attempt to download the file. */ + contlen = -1; + } + else if (parsed < 0) + { + /* Negative Content-Length; nonsensical, so we can't + assume any information about the content to receive. */ + contlen = -1; + } + else + contlen = parsed; + } + + /* Check for keep-alive related responses. */ + if (!inhibit_keep_alive) + { + if (resp_header_copy (resp, "Connection", hdrval, sizeof (hdrval))) + { + if (0 == c_strcasecmp (hdrval, "Close")) + keep_alive = false; + } + } + + chunked_transfer_encoding = false; + if (resp_header_copy (resp, "Transfer-Encoding", hdrval, sizeof (hdrval)) + && 0 == c_strcasecmp (hdrval, "chunked")) + chunked_transfer_encoding = true; + + /* Handle (possibly multiple instances of) the Set-Cookie header. */ + if (opt.cookies) + { + int scpos; + const char *scbeg, *scend; + /* The jar should have been created by now. */ + assert (wget_cookie_jar != NULL); + for (scpos = 0; + (scpos = resp_header_locate (resp, "Set-Cookie", scpos, + &scbeg, &scend)) != -1; + ++scpos) + { + char *set_cookie; BOUNDED_TO_ALLOCA (scbeg, scend, set_cookie); + cookie_handle_set_cookie (wget_cookie_jar, u->host, u->port, + u->path, set_cookie); + } + } + + if (keep_alive) + /* The server has promised that it will not close the connection + when we're done. This means that we can register it. */ + register_persistent (conn->host, conn->port, sock, using_ssl); + +#ifdef HAVE_METALINK + /* We need to check for the Metalink data in the very first response + we get from the server (before redirections, authorization, etc.). */ + if (metalink) + { + hs->metalink = metalink_from_http (resp, hs, u); + /* Bugfix: hs->local_file is NULL (opt.content_disposition). */ + if (!hs->local_file && hs->metalink && hs->metalink->origin) + hs->local_file = xstrdup (hs->metalink->origin); + xfree (hs->message); + retval = RETR_WITH_METALINK; + CLOSE_FINISH (sock); + goto cleanup; + } +#endif + + if (statcode == HTTP_STATUS_UNAUTHORIZED) + { + /* Authorization is required. */ + uerr_t auth_err = RETROK; + bool retry; + /* Normally we are not interested in the response body. + But if we are writing a WARC file we are: we like to keep everything. */ + if (warc_enabled) + { + int _err; + type = resp_header_strdup (resp, "Content-Type"); + _err = read_response_body (hs, sock, NULL, contlen, 0, + chunked_transfer_encoding, + u->url, warc_timestamp_str, + warc_request_uuid, warc_ip, type, + statcode, head); + xfree (type); + + if (_err != RETRFINISHED || hs->res < 0) + { + CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock); + retval = _err; + goto cleanup; + } + else + CLOSE_FINISH (sock); + } + else + { + /* Since WARC is disabled, we are not interested in the response body. */ + if (keep_alive && !head_only + && skip_short_body (sock, contlen, chunked_transfer_encoding)) + CLOSE_FINISH (sock); + else + CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock); + } + + pconn.authorized = false; + + { + auth_err = check_auth (u, user, passwd, resp, req, + &ntlm_seen, &retry, + &basic_auth_finished, + &auth_finished); + if (auth_err == RETROK && retry) + { + xfree (hs->message); + resp_free (&resp); + xfree (message); + xfree (head); + goto retry_with_auth; + } + } + if (auth_err == RETROK) + retval = AUTHFAILED; + else + retval = auth_err; + goto cleanup; + } + else /* statcode != HTTP_STATUS_UNAUTHORIZED */ + { + /* Kludge: if NTLM is used, mark the TCP connection as authorized. */ + if (ntlm_seen) + pconn.authorized = true; + } + + { + uerr_t ret = check_file_output (u, hs, resp, hdrval, sizeof hdrval); + if (ret != RETROK) + { + retval = ret; + goto cleanup; + } + } + + hs->statcode = statcode; + if (statcode == -1) + hs->error = xstrdup (_("Malformed status line")); + else if (!*message) + hs->error = xstrdup (_("(no description)")); + else + hs->error = xstrdup (message); + +#ifdef HAVE_HSTS + if (opt.hsts && hsts_store) + { + hsts_params = resp_header_strdup (resp, "Strict-Transport-Security"); + if (parse_strict_transport_security (hsts_params, &max_age, &include_subdomains)) + { + /* process strict transport security */ + if (hsts_store_entry (hsts_store, u->scheme, u->host, u->port, max_age, include_subdomains)) + DEBUGP(("Added new HSTS host: %s:%u (max-age: %lu, includeSubdomains: %s)\n", + u->host, + (unsigned) u->port, + (unsigned long) max_age, + (include_subdomains ? "true" : "false"))); + else + DEBUGP(("Updated HSTS host: %s:%u (max-age: %lu, includeSubdomains: %s)\n", + u->host, + (unsigned) u->port, + (unsigned long) max_age, + (include_subdomains ? "true" : "false"))); + } + } +#endif + + type = resp_header_strdup (resp, "Content-Type"); + if (type) + { + char *tmp = strchr (type, ';'); + if (tmp) + { +#ifdef ENABLE_IRI + /* sXXXav: only needed if IRI support is enabled */ + char *tmp2 = tmp + 1; +#endif + + while (tmp > type && c_isspace (tmp[-1])) + --tmp; + *tmp = '\0'; + +#ifdef ENABLE_IRI + /* Try to get remote encoding if needed */ + if (opt.enable_iri && !opt.encoding_remote) + { + tmp = parse_charset (tmp2); + if (tmp) + set_content_encoding (iri, tmp); + xfree (tmp); + } +#endif + } + } + hs->newloc = resp_header_strdup (resp, "Location"); + hs->remote_time = resp_header_strdup (resp, "Last-Modified"); + if (!hs->remote_time) // now look for the Wayback Machine's timestamp + hs->remote_time = resp_header_strdup (resp, "X-Archive-Orig-last-modified"); + + if (resp_header_copy (resp, "Content-Range", hdrval, sizeof (hdrval))) + { + wgint first_byte_pos, last_byte_pos, entity_length; + if (parse_content_range (hdrval, &first_byte_pos, &last_byte_pos, + &entity_length)) + { + contrange = first_byte_pos; + contlen = last_byte_pos - first_byte_pos + 1; + } + } + + if (resp_header_copy (resp, "Content-Encoding", hdrval, sizeof (hdrval))) + { + hs->local_encoding = ENC_INVALID; + + switch (hdrval[0]) + { + case 'b': case 'B': + if (0 == c_strcasecmp(hdrval, "br")) + hs->local_encoding = ENC_BROTLI; + break; + case 'c': case 'C': + if (0 == c_strcasecmp(hdrval, "compress")) + hs->local_encoding = ENC_COMPRESS; + break; + case 'd': case 'D': + if (0 == c_strcasecmp(hdrval, "deflate")) + hs->local_encoding = ENC_DEFLATE; + break; + case 'g': case 'G': + if (0 == c_strcasecmp(hdrval, "gzip")) + hs->local_encoding = ENC_GZIP; + break; + case 'i': case 'I': + if (0 == c_strcasecmp(hdrval, "identity")) + hs->local_encoding = ENC_NONE; + break; + case 'x': case 'X': + if (0 == c_strcasecmp(hdrval, "x-compress")) + hs->local_encoding = ENC_COMPRESS; + else if (0 == c_strcasecmp(hdrval, "x-gzip")) + hs->local_encoding = ENC_GZIP; + break; + case '\0': + hs->local_encoding = ENC_NONE; + } + + if (hs->local_encoding == ENC_INVALID) + { + DEBUGP (("Unrecognized Content-Encoding: %s\n", hdrval)); + hs->local_encoding = ENC_NONE; + } +#ifdef HAVE_LIBZ + else if (hs->local_encoding == ENC_GZIP + && opt.compression != compression_none) + { + const char *p; + + /* Make sure the Content-Type is not gzip before decompressing */ + if (type) + { + p = strchr (type, '/'); + if (p == NULL) + { + hs->remote_encoding = ENC_GZIP; + hs->local_encoding = ENC_NONE; + } + else + { + p++; + if (c_tolower(p[0]) == 'x' && p[1] == '-') + p += 2; + if (0 != c_strcasecmp (p, "gzip")) + { + hs->remote_encoding = ENC_GZIP; + hs->local_encoding = ENC_NONE; + } + } + } + else + { + hs->remote_encoding = ENC_GZIP; + hs->local_encoding = ENC_NONE; + } + + /* don't uncompress if a file ends with '.gz' or '.tgz' */ + if (hs->remote_encoding == ENC_GZIP + && (p = strrchr(u->file, '.')) + && (c_strcasecmp(p, ".gz") == 0 || c_strcasecmp(p, ".tgz") == 0)) + { + DEBUGP (("Enabling broken server workaround. Will not decompress this GZip file.\n")); + hs->remote_encoding = ENC_NONE; + } + } +#endif + } + + /* 20x responses are counted among successful by default. */ + if (H_20X (statcode)) + *dt |= RETROKF; + + if (statcode == HTTP_STATUS_NO_CONTENT) + { + /* 204 response has no body (RFC 2616, 4.3) */ + + /* In case the caller cares to look... */ + hs->len = 0; + hs->res = 0; + hs->restval = 0; + + CLOSE_FINISH (sock); + + retval = RETRFINISHED; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Return if redirected. */ + if (H_REDIRECTED (statcode) || statcode == HTTP_STATUS_MULTIPLE_CHOICES) + { + /* RFC2068 says that in case of the 300 (multiple choices) + response, the server can output a preferred URL through + `Location' header; otherwise, the request should be treated + like GET. So, if the location is set, it will be a + redirection; otherwise, just proceed normally. */ + if (statcode == HTTP_STATUS_MULTIPLE_CHOICES && !hs->newloc) + *dt |= RETROKF; + else + { + logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, + _("Location: %s%s\n"), + hs->newloc ? escnonprint_uri (hs->newloc) : _("unspecified"), + hs->newloc ? _(" [following]") : ""); + + /* In case the caller cares to look... */ + hs->len = 0; + hs->res = 0; + hs->restval = 0; + + /* Normally we are not interested in the response body of a redirect. + But if we are writing a WARC file we are: we like to keep everything. */ + if (warc_enabled) + { + int _err = read_response_body (hs, sock, NULL, contlen, 0, + chunked_transfer_encoding, + u->url, warc_timestamp_str, + warc_request_uuid, warc_ip, type, + statcode, head); + + if (_err != RETRFINISHED || hs->res < 0) + { + CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock); + retval = _err; + goto cleanup; + } + else + CLOSE_FINISH (sock); + } + else + { + /* Since WARC is disabled, we are not interested in the response body. */ + if (keep_alive && !head_only + && skip_short_body (sock, contlen, chunked_transfer_encoding)) + CLOSE_FINISH (sock); + else + CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock); + } + + /* From RFC2616: The status codes 303 and 307 have + been added for servers that wish to make unambiguously + clear which kind of reaction is expected of the client. + + A 307 should be redirected using the same method, + in other words, a POST should be preserved and not + converted to a GET in that case. + + With strict adherence to RFC2616, POST requests are not + converted to a GET request on 301 Permanent Redirect + or 302 Temporary Redirect. + + A switch may be provided later based on the HTTPbis draft + that allows clients to convert POST requests to GET + requests on 301 and 302 response codes. */ + switch (statcode) + { + case HTTP_STATUS_TEMPORARY_REDIRECT: + case HTTP_STATUS_PERMANENT_REDIRECT: + retval = NEWLOCATION_KEEP_POST; + goto cleanup; + case HTTP_STATUS_MOVED_PERMANENTLY: + if (opt.method && c_strcasecmp (opt.method, "post") != 0) + { + retval = NEWLOCATION_KEEP_POST; + goto cleanup; + } + break; + case HTTP_STATUS_MOVED_TEMPORARILY: + if (opt.method && c_strcasecmp (opt.method, "post") != 0) + { + retval = NEWLOCATION_KEEP_POST; + goto cleanup; + } + break; + } + retval = NEWLOCATION; + goto cleanup; + } + } + + if (cond_get) + { + if (statcode == HTTP_STATUS_NOT_MODIFIED) + { + logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, + _ ("File %s not modified on server. Omitting download.\n\n"), + quote (hs->local_file)); + *dt |= RETROKF; + CLOSE_FINISH (sock); + retval = RETRUNNEEDED; + goto cleanup; + } + } + + set_content_type (dt, type); + + if (opt.adjust_extension) + { + const char *encoding_ext = NULL; + switch (hs->local_encoding) + { + case ENC_INVALID: + case ENC_NONE: + break; + case ENC_BROTLI: + encoding_ext = ".br"; + break; + case ENC_COMPRESS: + encoding_ext = ".Z"; + break; + case ENC_DEFLATE: + encoding_ext = ".zlib"; + break; + case ENC_GZIP: + encoding_ext = ".gz"; + break; + default: + DEBUGP (("No extension found for encoding %d\n", + hs->local_encoding)); + } + if (encoding_ext != NULL) + { + char *file_ext = strrchr (hs->local_file, '.'); + /* strip Content-Encoding extension (it will be re-added later) */ + if (file_ext != NULL && 0 == strcasecmp (file_ext, encoding_ext)) + *file_ext = '\0'; + } + if (*dt & TEXTHTML) + /* -E / --adjust-extension / adjust_extension = on was specified, + and this is a text/html file. If some case-insensitive + variation on ".htm[l]" isn't already the file's suffix, + tack on ".html". */ + { + ensure_extension (hs, ".html", dt); + } + else if (*dt & TEXTCSS) + { + ensure_extension (hs, ".css", dt); + } + if (encoding_ext != NULL) + { + ensure_extension (hs, encoding_ext, dt); + } + } + + if (cond_get) + { + /* Handle the case when server ignores If-Modified-Since header. */ + if (statcode == HTTP_STATUS_OK && hs->remote_time) + { + time_t tmr = http_atotm (hs->remote_time); + + /* Check if the local file is up-to-date based on Last-Modified header + and content length. */ + if (tmr != (time_t) - 1 && tmr <= hs->orig_file_tstamp + && (contlen == -1 || contlen == hs->orig_file_size)) + { + logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, + _("Server ignored If-Modified-Since header for file %s.\n" + "You might want to add --no-if-modified-since option." + "\n\n"), + quote (hs->local_file)); + *dt |= RETROKF; + CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock); + retval = RETRUNNEEDED; + goto cleanup; + } + } + } + + if (statcode == HTTP_STATUS_RANGE_NOT_SATISFIABLE + || (!opt.timestamping && hs->restval > 0 && statcode == HTTP_STATUS_OK + && contrange == 0 && contlen >= 0 && hs->restval >= contlen)) + { + /* If `-c' is in use and the file has been fully downloaded (or + the remote file has shrunk), Wget effectively requests bytes + after the end of file and the server response with 416 + (or 200 with a <= Content-Length. */ + logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("\ +\n The file is already fully retrieved; nothing to do.\n\n")); + /* In case the caller inspects. */ + hs->len = contlen; + hs->res = 0; + /* Mark as successfully retrieved. */ + *dt |= RETROKF; + + /* Try to maintain the keep-alive connection. It is often cheaper to + * consume some bytes which have already been sent than to negotiate + * a new connection. However, if the body is too large, or we don't + * care about keep-alive, then simply terminate the connection */ + if (keep_alive && + skip_short_body (sock, contlen, chunked_transfer_encoding)) + CLOSE_FINISH (sock); + else + CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock); + retval = RETRUNNEEDED; + goto cleanup; + } + if ((contrange != 0 && contrange != hs->restval) + || (H_PARTIAL (statcode) && !contrange && hs->restval)) + { + /* The Range request was somehow misunderstood by the server. + Bail out. */ + CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock); + retval = RANGEERR; + goto cleanup; + } + if (contlen == -1) + hs->contlen = -1; + /* If the response is gzipped, the uncompressed size is unknown. */ + else if (hs->remote_encoding == ENC_GZIP) + hs->contlen = -1; + else + hs->contlen = contlen + contrange; + + if (opt.verbose) + { + if (*dt & RETROKF) + { + /* No need to print this output if the body won't be + downloaded at all, or if the original server response is + printed. */ + logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Length: ")); + if (contlen != -1) + { + logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, number_to_static_string (contlen + contrange)); + if (contlen + contrange >= 1024) + logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, " (%s)", + human_readable (contlen + contrange, 10, 1)); + if (contrange) + { + if (contlen >= 1024) + logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _(", %s (%s) remaining"), + number_to_static_string (contlen), + human_readable (contlen, 10, 1)); + else + logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _(", %s remaining"), + number_to_static_string (contlen)); + } + } + else + logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, + opt.ignore_length ? _("ignored") : _("unspecified")); + if (type) + logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, " [%s]\n", quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, type)); + else + logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); + } + } + + /* Return if we have no intention of further downloading. */ + if ((!(*dt & RETROKF) && !opt.content_on_error) || head_only || (opt.spider && !opt.recursive)) + { + /* In case the caller cares to look... */ + hs->len = 0; + hs->res = 0; + hs->restval = 0; + + /* Normally we are not interested in the response body of a error responses. + But if we are writing a WARC file we are: we like to keep everything. */ + if (warc_enabled) + { + int _err = read_response_body (hs, sock, NULL, contlen, 0, + chunked_transfer_encoding, + u->url, warc_timestamp_str, + warc_request_uuid, warc_ip, type, + statcode, head); + + if (_err != RETRFINISHED || hs->res < 0) + { + CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock); + retval = _err; + goto cleanup; + } + + CLOSE_FINISH (sock); + } + else + { + /* Since WARC is disabled, we are not interested in the response body. */ + if (head_only) + /* Pre-1.10 Wget used CLOSE_INVALIDATE here. Now we trust the + servers not to send body in response to a HEAD request, and + those that do will likely be caught by test_socket_open. + If not, they can be worked around using + `--no-http-keep-alive'. */ + CLOSE_FINISH (sock); + else if (opt.spider && !opt.recursive) + /* we just want to see if the page exists - no downloading required */ + CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock); + else if (keep_alive + && skip_short_body (sock, contlen, chunked_transfer_encoding)) + /* Successfully skipped the body; also keep using the socket. */ + CLOSE_FINISH (sock); + else + CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock); + } + + if (statcode == HTTP_STATUS_GATEWAY_TIMEOUT) + retval = GATEWAYTIMEOUT; + else + retval = RETRFINISHED; + + goto cleanup; + } + + err = open_output_stream (hs, count, &fp); + if (err != RETROK) + { + CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock); + retval = err; + goto cleanup; + } + +#ifdef ENABLE_XATTR + if (opt.enable_xattr) + { + if (original_url != u) + set_file_metadata (u, original_url, fp); + else + set_file_metadata (u, NULL, fp); + } +#endif + + err = read_response_body (hs, sock, fp, contlen, contrange, + chunked_transfer_encoding, + u->url, warc_timestamp_str, + warc_request_uuid, warc_ip, type, + statcode, head); + + if (hs->res >= 0) + CLOSE_FINISH (sock); + else + CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock); + + if (!output_stream) + fclose (fp); + + retval = err; + + cleanup: + xfree (head); + xfree (type); + xfree (message); + resp_free (&resp); + request_free (&req); + + return retval; +} + +/* Check whether the supplied HTTP status code is among those + listed for the --retry-on-http-error option. */ +static bool +check_retry_on_http_error (const int statcode) +{ + const char *tok = opt.retry_on_http_error; + while (tok && *tok) + { + if (atoi (tok) == statcode) + return true; + if ((tok = strchr (tok, ','))) + ++tok; + } + return false; +} + +/* The genuine HTTP loop! This is the part where the retrieval is + retried, and retried, and retried, and... */ +uerr_t +http_loop (const struct url *u, struct url *original_url, char **newloc, + char **local_file, const char *referer, int *dt, struct url *proxy, + struct iri *iri) +{ + int count; + bool got_head = false; /* used for time-stamping and filename detection */ + bool time_came_from_head = false; + bool got_name = false; + char *tms; + const char *tmrate; + uerr_t err, ret = TRYLIMEXC; + time_t tmr = -1; /* remote time-stamp */ + struct http_stat hstat; /* HTTP status */ + struct stat st; + bool send_head_first = true; + bool force_full_retrieve = false; + + + /* If we are writing to a WARC file: always retrieve the whole file. */ + if (opt.warc_filename != NULL) + force_full_retrieve = true; + + + /* Assert that no value for *LOCAL_FILE was passed. */ + assert (local_file == NULL || *local_file == NULL); + + /* Set LOCAL_FILE parameter. */ + if (local_file && opt.output_document) + *local_file = HYPHENP (opt.output_document) ? NULL : xstrdup (opt.output_document); + + /* Reset NEWLOC parameter. */ + *newloc = NULL; + + /* This used to be done in main, but it's a better idea to do it + here so that we don't go through the hoops if we're just using + FTP or whatever. */ + if (opt.cookies) + load_cookies (); + + /* Warn on (likely bogus) wildcard usage in HTTP. */ + if (opt.ftp_glob && has_wildcards_p (u->path)) + logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Warning: wildcards not supported in HTTP.\n")); + + /* Setup hstat struct. */ + xzero (hstat); + hstat.referer = referer; + + if (opt.output_document) + { + hstat.local_file = xstrdup (opt.output_document); + got_name = true; + } + else if (!opt.content_disposition) + { + hstat.local_file = + url_file_name (opt.trustservernames ? u : original_url, NULL); + got_name = true; + } + + if (got_name && file_exists_p (hstat.local_file, NULL) && opt.noclobber && !opt.output_document) + { + /* If opt.noclobber is turned on and file already exists, do not + retrieve the file. But if the output_document was given, then this + test was already done and the file didn't exist. Hence the !opt.output_document */ + get_file_flags (hstat.local_file, dt); + ret = RETROK; + goto exit; + } + + /* Reset the counter. */ + count = 0; + + /* Reset the document type. */ + *dt = 0; + + /* Skip preliminary HEAD request if we're not in spider mode. */ + if (!opt.spider) + send_head_first = false; + + /* Send preliminary HEAD request if --content-disposition and -c are used + together. */ + if (opt.content_disposition && opt.always_rest) + send_head_first = true; + +#ifdef HAVE_METALINK + if (opt.metalink_over_http) + { + *dt |= METALINK_METADATA; + send_head_first = true; + } +#endif + + if (opt.timestamping) + { + /* Use conditional get request if requested + * and if timestamp is known at this moment. */ + if (opt.if_modified_since && !send_head_first && got_name && file_exists_p (hstat.local_file, NULL)) + { + *dt |= IF_MODIFIED_SINCE; + { + uerr_t timestamp_err = set_file_timestamp (&hstat); + if (timestamp_err != RETROK) + return timestamp_err; + } + } + /* Send preliminary HEAD request if -N is given and we have existing + * destination file or content disposition is enabled. */ + else if (opt.content_disposition || file_exists_p (hstat.local_file, NULL)) + send_head_first = true; + } + + /* THE loop */ + do + { + /* Increment the pass counter. */ + ++count; + sleep_between_retrievals (count); + + /* Get the current time string. */ + tms = datetime_str (time (NULL)); + + if (opt.spider && !got_head) + logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, + _("Spider mode enabled. Check if remote file exists.\n")); + + /* Print fetch message, if opt.verbose. */ + if (opt.verbose) + { + char *hurl = url_string (u, URL_AUTH_HIDE_PASSWD); + + if (count > 1) + { + char tmp[256]; + sprintf (tmp, _("(try:%2d)"), count); + logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, "--%s-- %s %s\n", + tms, tmp, hurl); + } + else + { + logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, "--%s-- %s\n", + tms, hurl); + } + +#ifdef WINDOWS + ws_changetitle (hurl); +#endif + xfree (hurl); + } + + /* Default document type is empty. However, if spider mode is + on or time-stamping is employed, HEAD_ONLY commands is + encoded within *dt. */ + if (send_head_first && !got_head) + *dt |= HEAD_ONLY; + else + *dt &= ~HEAD_ONLY; + + /* Decide whether or not to restart. */ + if (force_full_retrieve) + hstat.restval = hstat.len; + else if (opt.start_pos >= 0) + hstat.restval = opt.start_pos; + else if (opt.always_rest + && got_name + && stat (hstat.local_file, &st) == 0 + && S_ISREG (st.st_mode)) + /* When -c is used, continue from on-disk size. (Can't use + hstat.len even if count>1 because we don't want a failed + first attempt to clobber existing data.) */ + hstat.restval = st.st_size; + else if (count > 1) + /* otherwise, continue where the previous try left off */ + hstat.restval = hstat.len; + else + hstat.restval = 0; + + /* Decide whether to send the no-cache directive. We send it in + two cases: + a) we're using a proxy, and we're past our first retrieval. + Some proxies are notorious for caching incomplete data, so + we require a fresh get. + b) caching is explicitly inhibited. */ + if ((proxy && count > 1) /* a */ + || !opt.allow_cache) /* b */ + *dt |= SEND_NOCACHE; + else + *dt &= ~SEND_NOCACHE; + + /* Try fetching the document, or at least its head. */ + err = gethttp (u, original_url, &hstat, dt, proxy, iri, count); + + /* Time? */ + tms = datetime_str (time (NULL)); + + /* Get the new location (with or without the redirection). */ + if (hstat.newloc) + *newloc = xstrdup (hstat.newloc); + + switch (err) + { + case HERR: case HEOF: case CONSOCKERR: + case CONERROR: case READERR: case WRITEFAILED: + case RANGEERR: case FOPEN_EXCL_ERR: case GATEWAYTIMEOUT: + /* Non-fatal errors continue executing the loop, which will + bring them to "while" statement at the end, to judge + whether the number of tries was exceeded. */ + printwhat (count, opt.ntry); + xfree (hstat.message); + xfree (hstat.error); + continue; + case FWRITEERR: case FOPENERR: + /* Another fatal error. */ + logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); + logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Cannot write to %s (%s).\n"), + quote (hstat.local_file), strerror (errno)); + ret = err; + goto exit; + case HOSTERR: + /* Fatal unless option set otherwise. */ + if ( opt.retry_on_host_error ) + { + printwhat (count, opt.ntry); + xfree (hstat.message); + xfree (hstat.error); + continue; + } + ret = err; + goto exit; + case CONIMPOSSIBLE: case PROXERR: case SSLINITFAILED: + case CONTNOTSUPPORTED: case VERIFCERTERR: case FILEBADFILE: + case UNKNOWNATTR: + /* Fatal errors just return from the function. */ + ret = err; + goto exit; + case ATTRMISSING: + /* A missing attribute in a Header is a fatal Protocol error. */ + logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); + logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Required attribute missing from Header received.\n")); + ret = err; + goto exit; + case AUTHFAILED: + logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); + logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Username/Password Authentication Failed.\n")); + ret = err; + goto exit; + case WARC_ERR: + /* A fatal WARC error. */ + logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); + logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Cannot write to WARC file.\n")); + ret = err; + goto exit; + case WARC_TMP_FOPENERR: case WARC_TMP_FWRITEERR: + /* A fatal WARC error. */ + logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); + logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Cannot write to temporary WARC file.\n")); + ret = err; + goto exit; + case CONSSLERR: + /* Another fatal error. */ + logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Unable to establish SSL connection.\n")); + ret = err; + goto exit; + case UNLINKERR: + /* Another fatal error. */ + logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); + logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Cannot unlink %s (%s).\n"), + quote (hstat.local_file), strerror (errno)); + ret = err; + goto exit; + case NEWLOCATION: + case NEWLOCATION_KEEP_POST: + /* Return the new location to the caller. */ + if (!*newloc) + { + logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, + _("ERROR: Redirection (%d) without location.\n"), + hstat.statcode); + ret = WRONGCODE; + } + else + { + ret = err; + } + goto exit; + case RETRUNNEEDED: + /* The file was already fully retrieved. */ + ret = RETROK; + goto exit; + case RETRFINISHED: + /* Deal with you later. */ + break; +#ifdef HAVE_METALINK + case RETR_WITH_METALINK: + { + if (hstat.metalink == NULL) + { + logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, + _("Could not find Metalink data in HTTP response. " + "Downloading file using HTTP GET.\n")); + *dt &= ~METALINK_METADATA; + *dt &= ~HEAD_ONLY; + got_head = true; + continue; + } + + logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, + _("Metalink headers found. " + "Switching to Metalink mode.\n")); + + ret = retrieve_from_metalink (hstat.metalink); + goto exit; + } + break; +#endif + default: + /* All possibilities should have been exhausted. */ + abort (); + } + + if (!(*dt & RETROKF)) + { + char *hurl = NULL; + if (!opt.verbose) + { + /* #### Ugly ugly ugly! */ + hurl = url_string (u, URL_AUTH_HIDE_PASSWD); + logprintf (LOG_NONVERBOSE, "%s:\n", hurl); + } + + /* Fall back to GET if HEAD fails with a 500 or 501 error code. */ + if (*dt & HEAD_ONLY + && (hstat.statcode == 500 || hstat.statcode == 501)) + { + got_head = true; + xfree (hurl); + continue; + } + /* Maybe we should always keep track of broken links, not just in + * spider mode. + * Don't log error if it was UTF-8 encoded because we will try + * once unencoded. */ + else if (opt.spider && !iri->utf8_encode) + { + /* #### Again: ugly ugly ugly! */ + if (!hurl) + hurl = url_string (u, URL_AUTH_HIDE_PASSWD); + nonexisting_url (hurl); + logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\ +Remote file does not exist -- broken link!!!\n")); + } + else if (check_retry_on_http_error (hstat.statcode)) + { + printwhat (count, opt.ntry); + xfree (hurl); + continue; + } + else + { + logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("%s ERROR %d: %s.\n"), + tms, hstat.statcode, + quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, hstat.error)); + } + logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); + ret = WRONGCODE; + xfree (hurl); + goto exit; + } + + /* Did we get the time-stamp? */ + if (!got_head || (opt.spider && !opt.recursive)) + { + got_head = true; /* no more time-stamping */ + + if (opt.timestamping && !hstat.remote_time) + { + logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\ +Last-modified header missing -- time-stamps turned off.\n")); + } + else if (hstat.remote_time) + { + /* Convert the date-string into struct tm. */ + tmr = http_atotm (hstat.remote_time); + if (tmr == (time_t) (-1)) + logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("\ +Last-modified header invalid -- time-stamp ignored.\n")); + if (*dt & HEAD_ONLY) + time_came_from_head = true; + } + + if (send_head_first) + { + /* The time-stamping section. */ + if (opt.timestamping) + { + if (hstat.orig_file_name) /* Perform the following + checks only if the file + we're supposed to + download already exists. */ + { + if (hstat.remote_time && + tmr != (time_t) (-1)) + { + /* Now time-stamping can be used validly. + Time-stamping means that if the sizes of + the local and remote file match, and local + file is newer than the remote file, it will + not be retrieved. Otherwise, the normal + download procedure is resumed. */ + if (hstat.orig_file_tstamp >= tmr) + { + if (hstat.contlen == -1 + || hstat.orig_file_size == hstat.contlen) + { + logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("\ +Server file no newer than local file %s -- not retrieving.\n\n"), + quote (hstat.orig_file_name)); + ret = RETROK; + goto exit; + } + else + { + logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("\ +The sizes do not match (local %s) -- retrieving.\n"), + number_to_static_string (hstat.orig_file_size)); + } + } + else + { + force_full_retrieve = true; + logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, + _("Remote file is newer, retrieving.\n")); + } + + logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); + } + } + + /* free_hstat (&hstat); */ + hstat.timestamp_checked = true; + } + + if (opt.spider) + { + bool finished = true; + if (opt.recursive) + { + if ((*dt & TEXTHTML) || (*dt & TEXTCSS)) + { + logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("\ +Remote file exists and could contain links to other resources -- retrieving.\n\n")); + finished = false; + } + else + { + logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("\ +Remote file exists but does not contain any link -- not retrieving.\n\n")); + ret = RETROK; /* RETRUNNEEDED is not for caller. */ + } + } + else + { + if ((*dt & TEXTHTML) || (*dt & TEXTCSS)) + { + logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("\ +Remote file exists and could contain further links,\n\ +but recursion is disabled -- not retrieving.\n\n")); + } + else + { + logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("\ +Remote file exists.\n\n")); + } + ret = RETROK; /* RETRUNNEEDED is not for caller. */ + } + + if (finished) + { + logprintf (LOG_NONVERBOSE, + _("%s URL: %s %2d %s\n"), + tms, u->url, hstat.statcode, + hstat.message ? quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, hstat.message) : ""); + goto exit; + } + } + + got_name = true; + *dt &= ~HEAD_ONLY; + count = 0; /* the retrieve count for HEAD is reset */ + xfree (hstat.message); + xfree (hstat.error); + continue; + } /* send_head_first */ + } /* !got_head */ + + if (opt.useservertimestamps + && (tmr != (time_t) (-1)) + && ((hstat.len == hstat.contlen) || + ((hstat.res == 0) && (hstat.contlen == -1)))) + { + const char *fl = NULL; + set_local_file (&fl, hstat.local_file); + if (fl) + { + time_t newtmr = -1; + /* Reparse time header, in case it's changed. */ + if (time_came_from_head + && hstat.remote_time && hstat.remote_time[0]) + { + newtmr = http_atotm (hstat.remote_time); + if (newtmr != (time_t)-1) + tmr = newtmr; + } + touch (fl, tmr); + } + } + /* End of time-stamping section. */ + + tmrate = retr_rate (hstat.rd_size, hstat.dltime); + total_download_time += hstat.dltime; + + if (hstat.len == hstat.contlen) + { + if (*dt & RETROKF || opt.content_on_error) + { + bool write_to_stdout = (opt.output_document && HYPHENP (opt.output_document)); + + logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, + write_to_stdout + ? _("%s (%s) - written to stdout %s[%s/%s]\n\n") + : _("%s (%s) - %s saved [%s/%s]\n\n"), + tms, tmrate, + write_to_stdout ? "" : quote (hstat.local_file), + number_to_static_string (hstat.len), + number_to_static_string (hstat.contlen)); + logprintf (LOG_NONVERBOSE, + "%s URL:%s [%s/%s] -> \"%s\" [%d]\n", + tms, u->url, + number_to_static_string (hstat.len), + number_to_static_string (hstat.contlen), + hstat.local_file, count); + } + ++numurls; + total_downloaded_bytes += hstat.rd_size; + + /* Remember that we downloaded the file for later ".orig" code. */ + if (*dt & ADDED_HTML_EXTENSION) + downloaded_file (FILE_DOWNLOADED_AND_HTML_EXTENSION_ADDED, hstat.local_file); + else + downloaded_file (FILE_DOWNLOADED_NORMALLY, hstat.local_file); + + ret = RETROK; + goto exit; + } + else if (hstat.res == 0) /* No read error */ + { + if (hstat.contlen == -1) /* We don't know how much we were supposed + to get, so assume we succeeded. */ + { + if (*dt & RETROKF || opt.content_on_error) + { + bool write_to_stdout = (opt.output_document && HYPHENP (opt.output_document)); + + logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, + write_to_stdout + ? _("%s (%s) - written to stdout %s[%s]\n\n") + : _("%s (%s) - %s saved [%s]\n\n"), + tms, tmrate, + write_to_stdout ? "" : quote (hstat.local_file), + number_to_static_string (hstat.len)); + logprintf (LOG_NONVERBOSE, + "%s URL:%s [%s] -> \"%s\" [%d]\n", + tms, u->url, number_to_static_string (hstat.len), + hstat.local_file, count); + } + ++numurls; + total_downloaded_bytes += hstat.rd_size; + + /* Remember that we downloaded the file for later ".orig" code. */ + if (*dt & ADDED_HTML_EXTENSION) + downloaded_file (FILE_DOWNLOADED_AND_HTML_EXTENSION_ADDED, hstat.local_file); + else + downloaded_file (FILE_DOWNLOADED_NORMALLY, hstat.local_file); + + ret = RETROK; + goto exit; + } + else if (hstat.len < hstat.contlen) /* meaning we lost the + connection too soon */ + { + logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, + _("%s (%s) - Connection closed at byte %s. "), + tms, tmrate, number_to_static_string (hstat.len)); + printwhat (count, opt.ntry); + continue; + } + else if (hstat.len != hstat.restval) + /* Getting here would mean reading more data than + requested with content-length, which we never do. */ + abort (); + else + { + /* Getting here probably means that the content-length was + * _less_ than the original, local size. We should probably + * truncate or re-read, or something. FIXME */ + ret = RETROK; + goto exit; + } + } + else /* from now on hstat.res can only be -1 */ + { + if (hstat.contlen == -1) + { + logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, + _("%s (%s) - Read error at byte %s (%s)."), + tms, tmrate, number_to_static_string (hstat.len), + hstat.rderrmsg); + printwhat (count, opt.ntry); + continue; + } + else /* hstat.res == -1 and contlen is given */ + { + logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, + _("%s (%s) - Read error at byte %s/%s (%s). "), + tms, tmrate, + number_to_static_string (hstat.len), + number_to_static_string (hstat.contlen), + hstat.rderrmsg); + printwhat (count, opt.ntry); + continue; + } + } + /* not reached */ + } + while (!opt.ntry || (count < opt.ntry)); + +exit: + if ((ret == RETROK || opt.content_on_error) && local_file) + { + xfree (*local_file); + /* Bugfix: Prevent SIGSEGV when hstat.local_file was left NULL + (i.e. due to opt.content_disposition). */ + if (hstat.local_file) + *local_file = xstrdup (hstat.local_file); + } + free_hstat (&hstat); + + return ret; +} + +/* Check whether the result of strptime() indicates success. + strptime() returns the pointer to how far it got to in the string. + The processing has been successful if the string is at `GMT' or + `+X', or at the end of the string. + + In extended regexp parlance, the function returns 1 if P matches + "^ *(GMT|[+-][0-9]|$)", 0 otherwise. P being NULL (which strptime + can return) is considered a failure and 0 is returned. */ +static bool +check_end (const char *p) +{ + if (!p) + return false; + while (c_isspace (*p)) + ++p; + if (!*p + || (p[0] == 'G' && p[1] == 'M' && p[2] == 'T') + || ((p[0] == '+' || p[0] == '-') && c_isdigit (p[1]))) + return true; + else + return false; +} + +/* Convert the textual specification of time in TIME_STRING to the + number of seconds since the Epoch. + + TIME_STRING can be in any of the three formats RFC2616 allows the + HTTP servers to emit -- RFC1123-date, RFC850-date or asctime-date, + as well as the time format used in the Set-Cookie header. + Timezones are ignored, and should be GMT. + + Return the computed time_t representation, or -1 if the conversion + fails. + + This function uses strptime with various string formats for parsing + TIME_STRING. This results in a parser that is not as lenient in + interpreting TIME_STRING as I would like it to be. Being based on + strptime, it always allows shortened months, one-digit days, etc., + but due to the multitude of formats in which time can be + represented, an ideal HTTP time parser would be even more + forgiving. It should completely ignore things like week days and + concentrate only on the various forms of representing years, + months, days, hours, minutes, and seconds. For example, it would + be nice if it accepted ISO 8601 out of the box. + + I've investigated free and PD code for this purpose, but none was + usable. getdate was big and unwieldy, and had potential copyright + issues, or so I was informed. Dr. Marcus Hennecke's atotm(), + distributed with phttpd, is excellent, but we cannot use it because + it is not assigned to the FSF. So I stuck it with strptime. */ + +time_t +http_atotm (const char *time_string) +{ + /* NOTE: Solaris strptime man page claims that %n and %t match white + space, but that's not universally available. Instead, we simply + use ` ' to mean "skip all WS", which works under all strptime + implementations I've tested. */ + + static const char *time_formats[] = { + "%a, %d %b %Y %T", /* rfc1123: Thu, 29 Jan 1998 22:12:57 */ + "%A, %d-%b-%y %T", /* rfc850: Thursday, 29-Jan-98 22:12:57 */ + "%a %b %d %T %Y", /* asctime: Thu Jan 29 22:12:57 1998 */ + "%a, %d-%b-%Y %T" /* cookies: Thu, 29-Jan-1998 22:12:57 + (used in Set-Cookie, defined in the + Netscape cookie specification.) */ + }; + const char *oldlocale; + char savedlocale[256]; + size_t i; + time_t ret = (time_t) -1; + + /* Solaris strptime fails to recognize English month names in + non-English locales, which we work around by temporarily setting + locale to C before invoking strptime. */ + oldlocale = setlocale (LC_TIME, NULL); + if (oldlocale) + { + size_t l = strlen (oldlocale) + 1; + if (l >= sizeof savedlocale) + savedlocale[0] = '\0'; + else + memcpy (savedlocale, oldlocale, l); + } + else savedlocale[0] = '\0'; + + setlocale (LC_TIME, "C"); + + for (i = 0; i < countof (time_formats); i++) + { + struct tm t; + + /* Some versions of strptime use the existing contents of struct + tm to recalculate the date according to format. Zero it out + to prevent stack garbage from influencing strptime. */ + xzero (t); + + if (check_end (strptime (time_string, time_formats[i], &t))) + { + ret = timegm (&t); + break; + } + } + + /* Restore the previous locale. */ + if (savedlocale[0]) + setlocale (LC_TIME, savedlocale); + + return ret; +} + +/* Authorization support: We support three authorization schemes: + + * `Basic' scheme, consisting of base64-ing USER:PASSWORD string; + + * `Digest' scheme, added by Junio Hamano <junio@twinsun.com>, + consisting of answering to the server's challenge with the proper + MD5 digests. + + * `NTLM' ("NT Lan Manager") scheme, based on code written by Daniel + Stenberg for libcurl. Like digest, NTLM is based on a + challenge-response mechanism, but unlike digest, it is non-standard + (authenticates TCP connections rather than requests), undocumented + and Microsoft-specific. */ + +/* Create the authentication header contents for the `Basic' scheme. + This is done by encoding the string "USER:PASS" to base64 and + prepending the string "Basic " in front of it. */ + +static char * +basic_authentication_encode (const char *user, const char *passwd) +{ + char *t1, *t2; + int len1 = strlen (user) + 1 + strlen (passwd); + + t1 = (char *)alloca (len1 + 1); + sprintf (t1, "%s:%s", user, passwd); + + t2 = (char *)alloca (BASE64_LENGTH (len1) + 1); + wget_base64_encode (t1, len1, t2); + + return concat_strings ("Basic ", t2, (char *) 0); +} + +#define SKIP_WS(x) do { \ + while (c_isspace (*(x))) \ + ++(x); \ +} while (0) + +#ifdef ENABLE_DIGEST +/* Dump the hexadecimal representation of HASH to BUF. HASH should be + an array of 16 bytes containing the hash keys, and BUF should be a + buffer of 33 writable characters (32 for hex digits plus one for + zero termination). */ +static void +dump_hash (char *buf, const unsigned char *hash) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < MD5_DIGEST_SIZE; i++, hash++) + { + *buf++ = XNUM_TO_digit (*hash >> 4); + *buf++ = XNUM_TO_digit (*hash & 0xf); + } + *buf = '\0'; +} + +/* Take the line apart to find the challenge, and compose a digest + authorization header. See RFC2069 section 2.1.2. */ +static char * +digest_authentication_encode (const char *au, const char *user, + const char *passwd, const char *method, + const char *path, uerr_t *auth_err) +{ + static char *realm, *opaque, *nonce, *qop, *algorithm; + static struct { + const char *name; + char **variable; + } options[] = { + { "realm", &realm }, + { "opaque", &opaque }, + { "nonce", &nonce }, + { "qop", &qop }, + { "algorithm", &algorithm } + }; + char cnonce[16] = ""; + char *res = NULL; + int res_len; + size_t res_size; + param_token name, value; + + + realm = opaque = nonce = algorithm = qop = NULL; + + au += 6; /* skip over `Digest' */ + while (extract_param (&au, &name, &value, ',', NULL)) + { + size_t i; + size_t namelen = name.e - name.b; + for (i = 0; i < countof (options); i++) + if (namelen == strlen (options[i].name) + && 0 == strncmp (name.b, options[i].name, + namelen)) + { + *options[i].variable = strdupdelim (value.b, value.e); + break; + } + } + + if (qop && strcmp (qop, "auth")) + { + logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Unsupported quality of protection '%s'.\n"), qop); + xfree (qop); /* force freeing mem and continue */ + } + else if (algorithm && strcmp (algorithm,"MD5") && strcmp (algorithm,"MD5-sess")) + { + logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Unsupported algorithm '%s'.\n"), algorithm); + xfree (algorithm); /* force freeing mem and continue */ + } + + if (!realm || !nonce || !user || !passwd || !path || !method) + { + *auth_err = ATTRMISSING; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Calculate the digest value. */ + { + struct md5_ctx ctx; + unsigned char hash[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE]; + char a1buf[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE * 2 + 1], a2buf[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE * 2 + 1]; + char response_digest[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE * 2 + 1]; + + /* A1BUF = H(user ":" realm ":" password) */ + md5_init_ctx (&ctx); + md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)user, strlen (user), &ctx); + md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx); + md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)realm, strlen (realm), &ctx); + md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx); + md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)passwd, strlen (passwd), &ctx); + md5_finish_ctx (&ctx, hash); + + dump_hash (a1buf, hash); + + if (algorithm && !strcmp (algorithm, "MD5-sess")) + { + /* A1BUF = H( H(user ":" realm ":" password) ":" nonce ":" cnonce ) */ + snprintf (cnonce, sizeof (cnonce), "%08x", + (unsigned) random_number (INT_MAX)); + + md5_init_ctx (&ctx); + /* md5_process_bytes (hash, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE, &ctx); */ + md5_process_bytes (a1buf, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, &ctx); + md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx); + md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)nonce, strlen (nonce), &ctx); + md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx); + md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)cnonce, strlen (cnonce), &ctx); + md5_finish_ctx (&ctx, hash); + + dump_hash (a1buf, hash); + } + + /* A2BUF = H(method ":" path) */ + md5_init_ctx (&ctx); + md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)method, strlen (method), &ctx); + md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx); + md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)path, strlen (path), &ctx); + md5_finish_ctx (&ctx, hash); + dump_hash (a2buf, hash); + + if (qop && !strcmp (qop, "auth")) + { + /* RFC 2617 Digest Access Authentication */ + /* generate random hex string */ + if (!*cnonce) + snprintf (cnonce, sizeof (cnonce), "%08x", + (unsigned) random_number (INT_MAX)); + + /* RESPONSE_DIGEST = H(A1BUF ":" nonce ":" noncecount ":" clientnonce ":" qop ": " A2BUF) */ + md5_init_ctx (&ctx); + md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)a1buf, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, &ctx); + md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx); + md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)nonce, strlen (nonce), &ctx); + md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx); + md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)"00000001", 8, &ctx); /* TODO: keep track of server nonce values */ + md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx); + md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)cnonce, strlen (cnonce), &ctx); + md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx); + md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)qop, strlen (qop), &ctx); + md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx); + md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)a2buf, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, &ctx); + md5_finish_ctx (&ctx, hash); + } + else + { + /* RFC 2069 Digest Access Authentication */ + /* RESPONSE_DIGEST = H(A1BUF ":" nonce ":" A2BUF) */ + md5_init_ctx (&ctx); + md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)a1buf, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, &ctx); + md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx); + md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)nonce, strlen (nonce), &ctx); + md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx); + md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)a2buf, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, &ctx); + md5_finish_ctx (&ctx, hash); + } + + dump_hash (response_digest, hash); + + res_size = strlen (user) + + strlen (realm) + + strlen (nonce) + + strlen (path) + + 2 * MD5_DIGEST_SIZE /*strlen (response_digest)*/ + + (opaque ? strlen (opaque) : 0) + + (algorithm ? strlen (algorithm) : 0) + + (qop ? 128: 0) + + strlen (cnonce) + + 128; + + res = xmalloc (res_size); + + if (qop && !strcmp (qop, "auth")) + { + res_len = snprintf (res, res_size, "Digest "\ + "username=\"%s\", realm=\"%s\", nonce=\"%s\", uri=\"%s\", response=\"%s\""\ + ", qop=auth, nc=00000001, cnonce=\"%s\"", + user, realm, nonce, path, response_digest, cnonce); + + } + else + { + res_len = snprintf (res, res_size, "Digest "\ + "username=\"%s\", realm=\"%s\", nonce=\"%s\", uri=\"%s\", response=\"%s\"", + user, realm, nonce, path, response_digest); + } + + if (opaque) + { + res_len += snprintf (res + res_len, res_size - res_len, ", opaque=\"%s\"", opaque); + } + + if (algorithm) + { + snprintf (res + res_len, res_size - res_len, ", algorithm=\"%s\"", algorithm); + } + } + +cleanup: + xfree (realm); + xfree (opaque); + xfree (nonce); + xfree (qop); + xfree (algorithm); + + return res; +} +#endif /* ENABLE_DIGEST */ + +/* Computing the size of a string literal must take into account that + value returned by sizeof includes the terminating \0. */ +#define STRSIZE(literal) (sizeof (literal) - 1) + +/* Whether chars in [b, e) begin with the literal string provided as + first argument and are followed by whitespace or terminating \0. + The comparison is case-insensitive. */ +#define STARTS(literal, b, e) \ + ((e > b) \ + && ((size_t) ((e) - (b))) >= STRSIZE (literal) \ + && 0 == c_strncasecmp (b, literal, STRSIZE (literal)) \ + && ((size_t) ((e) - (b)) == STRSIZE (literal) \ + || c_isspace (b[STRSIZE (literal)]))) + +static bool +known_authentication_scheme_p (const char *hdrbeg, const char *hdrend) +{ + return STARTS ("Basic", hdrbeg, hdrend) +#ifdef ENABLE_DIGEST + || STARTS ("Digest", hdrbeg, hdrend) +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_NTLM + || STARTS ("NTLM", hdrbeg, hdrend) +#endif + ; +} + +#undef STARTS + +/* Create the HTTP authorization request header. When the + `WWW-Authenticate' response header is seen, according to the + authorization scheme specified in that header (`Basic' and `Digest' + are supported by the current implementation), produce an + appropriate HTTP authorization request header. */ +static char * +create_authorization_line (const char *au, const char *user, + const char *passwd, const char *method, + const char *path, bool *finished, uerr_t *auth_err) +{ + /* We are called only with known schemes, so we can dispatch on the + first letter. */ + switch (c_toupper (*au)) + { + case 'B': /* Basic */ + *finished = true; + return basic_authentication_encode (user, passwd); +#ifdef ENABLE_DIGEST + case 'D': /* Digest */ + *finished = true; + return digest_authentication_encode (au, user, passwd, method, path, auth_err); +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_NTLM + case 'N': /* NTLM */ + if (!ntlm_input (&pconn.ntlm, au)) + { + *finished = true; + return NULL; + } + return ntlm_output (&pconn.ntlm, user, passwd, finished); +#endif + default: + /* We shouldn't get here -- this function should be only called + with values approved by known_authentication_scheme_p. */ + abort (); + } +} + +static void +load_cookies (void) +{ + if (!wget_cookie_jar) + wget_cookie_jar = cookie_jar_new (); + if (opt.cookies_input && !cookies_loaded_p) + { + cookie_jar_load (wget_cookie_jar, opt.cookies_input); + cookies_loaded_p = true; + } +} + +void +save_cookies (void) +{ + if (wget_cookie_jar) + cookie_jar_save (wget_cookie_jar, opt.cookies_output); +} + +void +http_cleanup (void) +{ + xfree (pconn.host); + if (wget_cookie_jar) + cookie_jar_delete (wget_cookie_jar); +} + +void +ensure_extension (struct http_stat *hs, const char *ext, int *dt) +{ + char *last_period_in_local_filename = strrchr (hs->local_file, '.'); + char shortext[8]; + int len; + shortext[0] = '\0'; + len = strlen (ext); + if (len == 5) + { + memcpy (shortext, ext, len - 1); + shortext[len - 1] = '\0'; + } + + if (last_period_in_local_filename == NULL + || !(0 == strcasecmp (last_period_in_local_filename, shortext) + || 0 == strcasecmp (last_period_in_local_filename, ext))) + { + int local_filename_len = strlen (hs->local_file); + /* Resize the local file, allowing for ".html" preceded by + optional ".NUMBER". */ + hs->local_file = xrealloc (hs->local_file, + local_filename_len + 24 + len); + strcpy (hs->local_file + local_filename_len, ext); + /* If clobbering is not allowed and the file, as named, + exists, tack on ".NUMBER.html" instead. */ + if (!ALLOW_CLOBBER && file_exists_p (hs->local_file, NULL)) + { + int ext_num = 1; + do + sprintf (hs->local_file + local_filename_len, + ".%d%s", ext_num++, ext); + while (file_exists_p (hs->local_file, NULL)); + } + *dt |= ADDED_HTML_EXTENSION; + } +} + +#ifdef TESTING + +const char * +test_parse_range_header (void) +{ + unsigned i; + static const struct { + const char * rangehdr; + const wgint firstbyte; + const wgint lastbyte; + const wgint length; + const bool shouldPass; + } test_array[] = { + { "bytes 0-1000/1000", 0, 1000, 1000, false }, + { "bytes 0-999/1000", 0, 999, 1000, true }, + { "bytes 100-99/1000", 100, 99, 1000, false }, + { "bytes 100-100/1000", 100, 100, 1000, true }, + { "bytes 0-1000/100000000", 0, 1000, 100000000, true }, + { "bytes 1-999/1000", 1, 999, 1000, true }, + { "bytes 42-1233/1234", 42, 1233, 1234, true }, + { "bytes 42-1233/*", 42, 1233, -1, true }, + { "bytes 0-2147483648/2147483649", 0, 2147483648U, 2147483649U, true }, +#if SIZEOF_WGINT >= 8 + { "bytes 2147483648-4294967296/4294967297", 2147483648U, 4294967296ULL, 4294967297ULL, true }, +#endif + }; + + wgint firstbyteptr[sizeof(wgint)]; + wgint lastbyteptr[sizeof(wgint)]; + wgint lengthptr[sizeof(wgint)]; + bool result; + for (i = 0; i < countof (test_array); i++) + { + result = parse_content_range (test_array[i].rangehdr, firstbyteptr, lastbyteptr, lengthptr); +#if 0 + printf ("%ld %ld\n", test_array[i].firstbyte, *firstbyteptr); + printf ("%ld %ld\n", test_array[i].lastbyte, *lastbyteptr); + printf ("%ld %ld\n", test_array[i].length, *lengthptr); + printf ("\n"); +#endif + mu_assert ("test_parse_range_header: False Negative", result == test_array[i].shouldPass); + mu_assert ("test_parse_range_header: Bad parse", test_array[i].firstbyte == *firstbyteptr && + test_array[i].lastbyte == *lastbyteptr && + test_array[i].length == *lengthptr); + } + + return NULL; +} + +const char * +test_parse_content_disposition (void) +{ + unsigned i; + static const struct { + const char *hdrval; + const char *filename; + bool result; + } test_array[] = { + { "filename=\"file.ext\"", "file.ext", true }, + { "attachment; filename=\"file.ext\"", "file.ext", true }, + { "attachment; filename=\"file.ext\"; dummy", "file.ext", true }, + { "attachment", NULL, false }, + { "attachement; filename*=UTF-8'en-US'hello.txt", "hello.txt", true }, + { "attachement; filename*0=\"hello\"; filename*1=\"world.txt\"", + "helloworld.txt", true }, + { "attachment; filename=\"A.ext\"; filename*=\"B.ext\"", "B.ext", true }, + { "attachment; filename*=\"A.ext\"; filename*0=\"B\"; filename*1=\"B.ext\"", + "A.ext", true }, + { "filename**0=\"A\"; filename**1=\"A.ext\"; filename*0=\"B\";\ +filename*1=\"B\"", "AA.ext", true }, + }; + + for (i = 0; i < countof (test_array); ++i) + { + char *filename; + bool res; + + res = parse_content_disposition (test_array[i].hdrval, &filename); + + mu_assert ("test_parse_content_disposition: wrong result", + res == test_array[i].result + && (res == false + || 0 == strcmp (test_array[i].filename, filename))); + xfree (filename); + } + + return NULL; +} + +#endif /* TESTING */ + +/* + * vim: et sts=2 sw=2 cino+={s + */ |