diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c | 2855 |
1 files changed, 2855 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c b/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..591f6ae --- /dev/null +++ b/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c @@ -0,0 +1,2855 @@ +/* Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. + * The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0 + * (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with + * the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, + * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* _ _ + * _ __ ___ ___ __| | ___ ___| | mod_ssl + * | '_ ` _ \ / _ \ / _` | / __/ __| | Apache Interface to OpenSSL + * | | | | | | (_) | (_| | \__ \__ \ | + * |_| |_| |_|\___/ \__,_|___|___/___/_| + * |_____| + * ssl_engine_kernel.c + * The SSL engine kernel + */ + /* ``It took me fifteen years to discover + I had no talent for programming, but + I couldn't give it up because by that + time I was too famous.'' + -- Unknown */ +#include "ssl_private.h" +#include "mod_ssl.h" +#include "util_md5.h" +#include "scoreboard.h" + +static void ssl_configure_env(request_rec *r, SSLConnRec *sslconn); +#ifdef HAVE_TLSEXT +static int ssl_find_vhost(void *servername, conn_rec *c, server_rec *s); +#endif + +#define SWITCH_STATUS_LINE "HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols" +#define UPGRADE_HEADER "Upgrade: TLS/1.0, HTTP/1.1" +#define CONNECTION_HEADER "Connection: Upgrade" + +/* Perform an upgrade-to-TLS for the given request, per RFC 2817. */ +static apr_status_t upgrade_connection(request_rec *r) +{ + struct conn_rec *conn = r->connection; + apr_bucket_brigade *bb; + SSLConnRec *sslconn; + apr_status_t rv; + SSL *ssl; + + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(02028) + "upgrading connection to TLS"); + + bb = apr_brigade_create(r->pool, conn->bucket_alloc); + + rv = ap_fputs(conn->output_filters, bb, SWITCH_STATUS_LINE CRLF + UPGRADE_HEADER CRLF CONNECTION_HEADER CRLF CRLF); + if (rv == APR_SUCCESS) { + APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(bb, + apr_bucket_flush_create(conn->bucket_alloc)); + rv = ap_pass_brigade(conn->output_filters, bb); + } + + if (rv) { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02029) + "failed to send 101 interim response for connection " + "upgrade"); + return rv; + } + + ssl_init_ssl_connection(conn, r); + + sslconn = myConnConfig(conn); + ssl = sslconn->ssl; + + /* Perform initial SSL handshake. */ + SSL_set_accept_state(ssl); + SSL_do_handshake(ssl); + + if (!SSL_is_init_finished(ssl)) { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02030) + "TLS upgrade handshake failed"); + ssl_log_ssl_error(SSLLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, r->server); + + return APR_ECONNABORTED; + } + + return APR_SUCCESS; +} + +/* Perform a speculative (and non-blocking) read from the connection + * filters for the given request, to determine whether there is any + * pending data to read. Return non-zero if there is, else zero. */ +static int has_buffered_data(request_rec *r) +{ + apr_bucket_brigade *bb; + apr_off_t len; + apr_status_t rv; + int result; + + bb = apr_brigade_create(r->pool, r->connection->bucket_alloc); + + rv = ap_get_brigade(r->connection->input_filters, bb, AP_MODE_SPECULATIVE, + APR_NONBLOCK_READ, 1); + result = rv == APR_SUCCESS + && apr_brigade_length(bb, 1, &len) == APR_SUCCESS + && len > 0; + + apr_brigade_destroy(bb); + + return result; +} + +/* If a renegotiation is required for the location, and the request + * includes a message body (and the client has not requested a "100 + * Continue" response), then the client will be streaming the request + * body over the wire already. In that case, it is not possible to + * stop and perform a new SSL handshake immediately; once the SSL + * library moves to the "accept" state, it will reject the SSL packets + * which the client is sending for the request body. + * + * To allow authentication to complete in the hook, the solution used + * here is to fill a (bounded) buffer with the request body, and then + * to reinject that request body later. + * + * This function is called to fill the renegotiation buffer for the + * location as required, or fail. Returns zero on success or HTTP_ + * error code on failure. + */ +static int fill_reneg_buffer(request_rec *r, SSLDirConfigRec *dc) +{ + int rv; + apr_size_t rsize; + + /* ### this is HTTP/1.1 specific, special case for protocol? */ + if (r->expecting_100 || !ap_request_has_body(r)) { + return 0; + } + + rsize = dc->nRenegBufferSize == UNSET ? DEFAULT_RENEG_BUFFER_SIZE : dc->nRenegBufferSize; + if (rsize > 0) { + /* Fill the I/O buffer with the request body if possible. */ + rv = ssl_io_buffer_fill(r, rsize); + } + else { + /* If the reneg buffer size is set to zero, just fail. */ + rv = HTTP_REQUEST_ENTITY_TOO_LARGE; + } + + return rv; +} + +#ifdef HAVE_TLSEXT +static int ap_array_same_str_set(apr_array_header_t *s1, apr_array_header_t *s2) +{ + int i; + const char *c; + + if (s1 == s2) { + return 1; + } + else if (!s1 || !s2 || (s1->nelts != s2->nelts)) { + return 0; + } + + for (i = 0; i < s1->nelts; i++) { + c = APR_ARRAY_IDX(s1, i, const char *); + if (!c || !ap_array_str_contains(s2, c)) { + return 0; + } + } + return 1; +} + +static int ssl_pk_server_compatible(modssl_pk_server_t *pks1, + modssl_pk_server_t *pks2) +{ + if (!pks1 || !pks2) { + return 0; + } + /* both have the same certificates? */ + if ((pks1->ca_name_path != pks2->ca_name_path) + && (!pks1->ca_name_path || !pks2->ca_name_path + || strcmp(pks1->ca_name_path, pks2->ca_name_path))) { + return 0; + } + if ((pks1->ca_name_file != pks2->ca_name_file) + && (!pks1->ca_name_file || !pks2->ca_name_file + || strcmp(pks1->ca_name_file, pks2->ca_name_file))) { + return 0; + } + if (!ap_array_same_str_set(pks1->cert_files, pks2->cert_files) + || !ap_array_same_str_set(pks1->key_files, pks2->key_files)) { + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +static int ssl_auth_compatible(modssl_auth_ctx_t *a1, + modssl_auth_ctx_t *a2) +{ + if (!a1 || !a2) { + return 0; + } + /* both have the same verification */ + if ((a1->verify_depth != a2->verify_depth) + || (a1->verify_mode != a2->verify_mode)) { + return 0; + } + /* both have the same ca path/file */ + if ((a1->ca_cert_path != a2->ca_cert_path) + && (!a1->ca_cert_path || !a2->ca_cert_path + || strcmp(a1->ca_cert_path, a2->ca_cert_path))) { + return 0; + } + if ((a1->ca_cert_file != a2->ca_cert_file) + && (!a1->ca_cert_file || !a2->ca_cert_file + || strcmp(a1->ca_cert_file, a2->ca_cert_file))) { + return 0; + } + /* both have the same ca cipher suite string */ + if ((a1->cipher_suite != a2->cipher_suite) + && (!a1->cipher_suite || !a2->cipher_suite + || strcmp(a1->cipher_suite, a2->cipher_suite))) { + return 0; + } + /* both have the same ca cipher suite string */ + if ((a1->tls13_ciphers != a2->tls13_ciphers) + && (!a1->tls13_ciphers || !a2->tls13_ciphers + || strcmp(a1->tls13_ciphers, a2->tls13_ciphers))) { + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +static int ssl_ctx_compatible(modssl_ctx_t *ctx1, + modssl_ctx_t *ctx2) +{ + if (!ctx1 || !ctx2 + || (ctx1->protocol != ctx2->protocol) + || !ssl_auth_compatible(&ctx1->auth, &ctx2->auth) + || !ssl_pk_server_compatible(ctx1->pks, ctx2->pks)) { + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +static int ssl_server_compatible(server_rec *s1, server_rec *s2) +{ + SSLSrvConfigRec *sc1 = s1? mySrvConfig(s1) : NULL; + SSLSrvConfigRec *sc2 = s2? mySrvConfig(s2) : NULL; + + /* both use the same TLS protocol? */ + if (!sc1 || !sc2 + || !ssl_ctx_compatible(sc1->server, sc2->server)) { + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} +#endif + +/* + * Post Read Request Handler + */ +int ssl_hook_ReadReq(request_rec *r) +{ + SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(r->server); + SSLConnRec *sslconn; + const char *upgrade; +#ifdef HAVE_TLSEXT + const char *servername; +#endif + SSL *ssl; + + /* Perform TLS upgrade here if "SSLEngine optional" is configured, + * SSL is not already set up for this connection, and the client + * has sent a suitable Upgrade header. */ + if (sc->enabled == SSL_ENABLED_OPTIONAL && !myConnConfig(r->connection) + && (upgrade = apr_table_get(r->headers_in, "Upgrade")) != NULL + && ap_find_token(r->pool, upgrade, "TLS/1.0")) { + if (upgrade_connection(r)) { + return AP_FILTER_ERROR; + } + } + + /* If we are on a slave connection, we do not expect to have an SSLConnRec, + * but our master connection might. */ + sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection); + if (!(sslconn && sslconn->ssl) && r->connection->master) { + sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection->master); + } + + /* If "SSLEngine optional" is configured, this is not an SSL + * connection, and this isn't a subrequest, send an Upgrade + * response header. Note this must happen before map_to_storage + * and OPTIONS * request processing is completed. + */ + if (sc->enabled == SSL_ENABLED_OPTIONAL && !(sslconn && sslconn->ssl) + && !r->main) { + apr_table_setn(r->headers_out, "Upgrade", "TLS/1.0, HTTP/1.1"); + apr_table_mergen(r->headers_out, "Connection", "upgrade"); + } + + if (!sslconn) { + return DECLINED; + } + + if (sslconn->service_unavailable) { + /* This is set when the SSL properties of this connection are + * incomplete or if this connection was made to challenge a + * particular hostname (ACME). We never serve any request on + * such a connection. */ + /* TODO: a retry-after indicator would be nice here */ + return HTTP_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + if (sslconn->non_ssl_request == NON_SSL_SET_ERROR_MSG) { + apr_table_setn(r->notes, "error-notes", + "Reason: You're speaking plain HTTP to an SSL-enabled " + "server port.<br />\n Instead use the HTTPS scheme to " + "access this URL, please.<br />\n"); + + /* Now that we have caught this error, forget it. we are done + * with using SSL on this request. + */ + sslconn->non_ssl_request = NON_SSL_OK; + + return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST; + } + + /* + * Get the SSL connection structure and perform the + * delayed interlinking from SSL back to request_rec + */ + ssl = sslconn->ssl; + if (!ssl) { + return DECLINED; + } +#ifdef HAVE_TLSEXT + /* + * Perform SNI checks only on the initial request. In particular, + * if these checks detect a problem, the checks shouldn't return an + * error again when processing an ErrorDocument redirect for the + * original problem. + */ + if (r->proxyreq != PROXYREQ_PROXY && ap_is_initial_req(r)) { + server_rec *handshakeserver = sslconn->server; + SSLSrvConfigRec *hssc = mySrvConfig(handshakeserver); + + if ((servername = SSL_get_servername(ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name))) { + /* + * The SNI extension supplied a hostname. So don't accept requests + * with either no hostname or a hostname that selected a different + * virtual host than the one used for the handshake, causing + * different SSL parameters to be applied, such as SSLProtocol, + * SSLCACertificateFile/Path and SSLCADNRequestFile/Path which + * cannot be renegotiated (SSLCA* due to current limitations in + * OpenSSL, see: + * http://mail-archives.apache.org/mod_mbox/httpd-dev/200806.mbox/%3C48592955.2090303@velox.ch%3E + * and + * http://mail-archives.apache.org/mod_mbox/httpd-dev/201312.mbox/%3CCAKQ1sVNpOrdiBm-UPw1hEdSN7YQXRRjeaT-MCWbW_7mN%3DuFiOw%40mail.gmail.com%3E + * ) + */ + if (!r->hostname) { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02031) + "Hostname %s provided via SNI, but no hostname" + " provided in HTTP request", servername); + return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST; + } + if (r->server != handshakeserver + && !ssl_server_compatible(sslconn->server, r->server)) { + /* + * The request does not select the virtual host that was + * selected by the SNI and its SSL parameters are different + */ + + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02032) + "Hostname %s provided via SNI and hostname %s provided" + " via HTTP have no compatible SSL setup", + servername, r->hostname); + return HTTP_MISDIRECTED_REQUEST; + } + } + else if (((sc->strict_sni_vhost_check == SSL_ENABLED_TRUE) + || hssc->strict_sni_vhost_check == SSL_ENABLED_TRUE) + && r->connection->vhost_lookup_data) { + /* + * We are using a name based configuration here, but no hostname was + * provided via SNI. Don't allow that if are requested to do strict + * checking. Check whether this strict checking was set up either in the + * server config we used for handshaking or in our current server. + * This should avoid insecure configuration by accident. + */ + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(02033) + "No hostname was provided via SNI for a name based" + " virtual host"); + apr_table_setn(r->notes, "error-notes", + "Reason: The client software did not provide a " + "hostname using Server Name Indication (SNI), " + "which is required to access this server.<br />\n"); + return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; + } + } +#endif + modssl_set_app_data2(ssl, r); + + /* + * Log information about incoming HTTPS requests + */ + if (APLOGrinfo(r) && ap_is_initial_req(r)) { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02034) + "%s HTTPS request received for child %ld (server %s)", + (r->connection->keepalives <= 0 ? + "Initial (No.1)" : + apr_psprintf(r->pool, "Subsequent (No.%d)", + r->connection->keepalives+1)), + r->connection->id, + ssl_util_vhostid(r->pool, r->server)); + } + + /* SetEnvIf ssl-*-shutdown flags can only be per-server, + * so they won't change across keepalive requests + */ + if (sslconn->shutdown_type == SSL_SHUTDOWN_TYPE_UNSET) { + ssl_configure_env(r, sslconn); + } + + return DECLINED; +} + +/* + * Move SetEnvIf information from request_rec to conn_rec/BUFF + * to allow the close connection handler to use them. + */ + +static void ssl_configure_env(request_rec *r, SSLConnRec *sslconn) +{ + int i; + const apr_array_header_t *arr = apr_table_elts(r->subprocess_env); + const apr_table_entry_t *elts = (const apr_table_entry_t *)arr->elts; + + sslconn->shutdown_type = SSL_SHUTDOWN_TYPE_STANDARD; + + for (i = 0; i < arr->nelts; i++) { + const char *key = elts[i].key; + + switch (*key) { + case 's': + /* being case-sensitive here. + * and not checking for the -shutdown since these are the only + * SetEnvIf "flags" we support + */ + if (!strncmp(key+1, "sl-", 3)) { + key += 4; + if (!strncmp(key, "unclean", 7)) { + sslconn->shutdown_type = SSL_SHUTDOWN_TYPE_UNCLEAN; + } + else if (!strncmp(key, "accurate", 8)) { + sslconn->shutdown_type = SSL_SHUTDOWN_TYPE_ACCURATE; + } + return; /* should only ever be one ssl-*-shutdown */ + } + break; + } + } +} + +static int ssl_check_post_client_verify(request_rec *r, SSLSrvConfigRec *sc, + SSLDirConfigRec *dc, SSLConnRec *sslconn, + SSL *ssl) +{ + X509 *cert; + + /* + * Remember the peer certificate's DN + */ + if ((cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl))) { + if (sslconn->client_cert) { + X509_free(sslconn->client_cert); + } + sslconn->client_cert = cert; + sslconn->client_dn = NULL; + } + + /* + * Finally check for acceptable renegotiation results + */ + if ((dc->nVerifyClient != SSL_CVERIFY_NONE) || + (sc->server->auth.verify_mode != SSL_CVERIFY_NONE)) { + BOOL do_verify = ((dc->nVerifyClient == SSL_CVERIFY_REQUIRE) || + (sc->server->auth.verify_mode == SSL_CVERIFY_REQUIRE)); + + if (do_verify && (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) != X509_V_OK)) { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02262) + "Re-negotiation handshake failed: " + "Client verification failed"); + + return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; + } + + if (do_verify) { + if (cert == NULL) { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02263) + "Re-negotiation handshake failed: " + "Client certificate missing"); + + return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; + } + } + } + return OK; +} + +/* + * Access Handler, classic flavour, for SSL/TLS up to v1.2 + * where everything can be renegotiated and no one is happy. + */ +static int ssl_hook_Access_classic(request_rec *r, SSLSrvConfigRec *sc, SSLDirConfigRec *dc, + SSLConnRec *sslconn, SSL *ssl) +{ + server_rec *handshakeserver = sslconn ? sslconn->server : NULL; + SSLSrvConfigRec *hssc = handshakeserver? mySrvConfig(handshakeserver) : NULL; + SSL_CTX *ctx = ssl ? SSL_get_SSL_CTX(ssl) : NULL; + BOOL renegotiate = FALSE, renegotiate_quick = FALSE; + X509 *peercert; + X509_STORE *cert_store = NULL; + X509_STORE_CTX *cert_store_ctx; + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list_old = NULL, *cipher_list = NULL; + const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; + int depth, verify_old, verify, n, rc; + const char *ncipher_suite; + +#ifdef HAVE_SRP + /* + * Support for per-directory reconfigured SSL connection parameters + * + * We do not force any renegotiation if the user is already authenticated + * via SRP. + * + */ + if (SSL_get_srp_username(ssl)) { + return DECLINED; + } +#endif + + /* + * Support for per-directory reconfigured SSL connection parameters. + * + * This is implemented by forcing an SSL renegotiation with the + * reconfigured parameter suite. But Apache's internal API processing + * makes our life very hard here, because when internal sub-requests occur + * we nevertheless should avoid multiple unnecessary SSL handshakes (they + * require extra network I/O and especially time to perform). + * + * But the optimization for filtering out the unnecessary handshakes isn't + * obvious and trivial. Especially because while Apache is in its + * sub-request processing the client could force additional handshakes, + * too. And these take place perhaps without our notice. So the only + * possibility is to explicitly _ask_ OpenSSL whether the renegotiation + * has to be performed or not. It has to performed when some parameters + * which were previously known (by us) are not those we've now + * reconfigured (as known by OpenSSL) or (in optimized way) at least when + * the reconfigured parameter suite is stronger (more restrictions) than + * the currently active one. + */ + + /* + * Override of SSLCipherSuite + * + * We provide two options here: + * + * o The paranoid and default approach where we force a renegotiation when + * the cipher suite changed in _any_ way (which is straight-forward but + * often forces renegotiations too often and is perhaps not what the + * user actually wanted). + * + * o The optimized and still secure way where we force a renegotiation + * only if the currently active cipher is no longer contained in the + * reconfigured/new cipher suite. Any other changes are not important + * because it's the servers choice to select a cipher from the ones the + * client supports. So as long as the current cipher is still in the new + * cipher suite we're happy. Because we can assume we would have + * selected it again even when other (better) ciphers exists now in the + * new cipher suite. This approach is fine because the user explicitly + * has to enable this via ``SSLOptions +OptRenegotiate''. So we do no + * implicit optimizations. + */ + ncipher_suite = (dc->szCipherSuite? + dc->szCipherSuite : (r->server != handshakeserver)? + sc->server->auth.cipher_suite : NULL); + + if (ncipher_suite && (!sslconn->cipher_suite + || strcmp(ncipher_suite, sslconn->cipher_suite))) { + /* remember old state */ + + if (dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_OPTRENEGOTIATE) { + cipher = SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl); + } + else { + cipher_list_old = (STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *)SSL_get_ciphers(ssl); + + if (cipher_list_old) { + cipher_list_old = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipher_list_old); + } + } + + /* configure new state */ + if (r->connection->master) { + /* TODO: this categorically fails changed cipher suite settings + * on slave connections. We could do better by + * - create a new SSL* from our SSL_CTX and set cipher suite there, + * and retrieve ciphers, free afterwards + * Modifying the SSL on a slave connection is no good. + */ + apr_table_setn(r->notes, "ssl-renegotiate-forbidden", "cipher-suite"); + return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; + } + + if (!SSL_set_cipher_list(ssl, ncipher_suite)) { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r, APLOGNO(02253) + "Unable to reconfigure (per-directory) " + "permitted SSL ciphers"); + ssl_log_ssl_error(SSLLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, r->server); + + if (cipher_list_old) { + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_list_old); + } + + return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; + } + + /* determine whether a renegotiation has to be forced */ + cipher_list = (STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *)SSL_get_ciphers(ssl); + + if (dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_OPTRENEGOTIATE) { + /* optimized way */ + if ((!cipher && cipher_list) || + (cipher && !cipher_list)) + { + renegotiate = TRUE; + } + else if (cipher && cipher_list && + (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(cipher_list, cipher) < 0)) + { + renegotiate = TRUE; + } + } + else { + /* paranoid way */ + if ((!cipher_list_old && cipher_list) || + (cipher_list_old && !cipher_list)) + { + renegotiate = TRUE; + } + else if (cipher_list_old && cipher_list) { + for (n = 0; + !renegotiate && (n < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_list)); + n++) + { + const SSL_CIPHER *value = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_list, n); + + if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(cipher_list_old, value) < 0) { + renegotiate = TRUE; + } + } + + for (n = 0; + !renegotiate && (n < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_list_old)); + n++) + { + const SSL_CIPHER *value = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_list_old, n); + + if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(cipher_list, value) < 0) { + renegotiate = TRUE; + } + } + } + } + + /* cleanup */ + if (cipher_list_old) { + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_list_old); + } + + if (renegotiate) { + if (r->connection->master) { + /* The request causes renegotiation on a slave connection. + * This is not allowed since we might have concurrent requests + * on this connection. + */ + apr_table_setn(r->notes, "ssl-renegotiate-forbidden", "cipher-suite"); + return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; + } + +#ifdef SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE + if (sc->cipher_server_pref == TRUE) { + SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE); + } +#endif + /* tracing */ + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02220) + "Reconfigured cipher suite will force renegotiation"); + } + } + + /* + * override of SSLVerifyClient + * + * We force a renegotiation if the reconfigured/new verify type is + * stronger than the currently active verify type. + * + * The order is: none << optional_no_ca << optional << require + * + * Additionally the following optimization is possible here: When the + * currently active verify type is "none" but a client certificate is + * already known/present, it's enough to manually force a client + * verification but at least skip the I/O-intensive renegotiation + * handshake. + */ + if ((dc->nVerifyClient != SSL_CVERIFY_UNSET) || + (sc->server->auth.verify_mode != SSL_CVERIFY_UNSET)) { + + /* remember old state */ + verify_old = SSL_get_verify_mode(ssl); + /* configure new state */ + verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE; + + if ((dc->nVerifyClient == SSL_CVERIFY_REQUIRE) || + (sc->server->auth.verify_mode == SSL_CVERIFY_REQUIRE)) { + verify |= SSL_VERIFY_PEER_STRICT; + } + + if ((dc->nVerifyClient == SSL_CVERIFY_OPTIONAL) || + (dc->nVerifyClient == SSL_CVERIFY_OPTIONAL_NO_CA) || + (sc->server->auth.verify_mode == SSL_CVERIFY_OPTIONAL) || + (sc->server->auth.verify_mode == SSL_CVERIFY_OPTIONAL_NO_CA)) + { + verify |= SSL_VERIFY_PEER; + } + + /* TODO: this seems premature since we do not know if there + * are any changes required. + */ + SSL_set_verify(ssl, verify, ssl_callback_SSLVerify); + SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, X509_V_OK); + + /* determine whether we've to force a renegotiation */ + if (!renegotiate && verify != verify_old) { + if (((verify_old == SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && + (verify != SSL_VERIFY_NONE)) || + + (!(verify_old & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && + (verify & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) || + + (!(verify_old & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT) && + (verify & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))) + { + renegotiate = TRUE; + if (r->connection->master) { + /* The request causes renegotiation on a slave connection. + * This is not allowed since we might have concurrent requests + * on this connection. + */ + apr_table_setn(r->notes, "ssl-renegotiate-forbidden", "verify-client"); + SSL_set_verify(ssl, verify_old, ssl_callback_SSLVerify); + return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; + } + /* optimization */ + + if ((dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_OPTRENEGOTIATE) && + (verify_old == SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && + ((peercert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) != NULL)) + { + renegotiate_quick = TRUE; + X509_free(peercert); + } + + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02255) + "Changed client verification type will force " + "%srenegotiation", + renegotiate_quick ? "quick " : ""); + } + else if (verify != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) { + /* + * override of SSLVerifyDepth + * + * The depth checks are handled by us manually inside the + * verify callback function and not by OpenSSL internally + * (and our function is aware of both the per-server and + * per-directory contexts). So we cannot ask OpenSSL about + * the currently verify depth. Instead we remember it in our + * SSLConnRec attached to the SSL* of OpenSSL. We've to force + * the renegotiation if the reconfigured/new verify depth is + * less than the currently active/remembered verify depth + * (because this means more restriction on the certificate + * chain). + */ + n = (sslconn->verify_depth != UNSET) + ? sslconn->verify_depth + : hssc->server->auth.verify_depth; + /* determine the new depth */ + sslconn->verify_depth = (dc->nVerifyDepth != UNSET) + ? dc->nVerifyDepth + : sc->server->auth.verify_depth; + if (sslconn->verify_depth < n) { + renegotiate = TRUE; + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02254) + "Reduced client verification depth will " + "force renegotiation"); + } + } + } + /* If we're handling a request for a vhost other than the default one, + * then we need to make sure that client authentication is properly + * enforced. For clients supplying an SNI extension, the peer + * certificate verification has happened in the handshake already + * (and r->server == handshakeserver). For non-SNI requests, + * an additional check is needed here. If client authentication + * is configured as mandatory, then we can only proceed if the + * CA list doesn't have to be changed (OpenSSL doesn't provide + * an option to change the list for an existing session). + */ + if ((r->server != handshakeserver) + && renegotiate + && ((verify & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || + (verify & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))) { +#define MODSSL_CFG_CA_NE(f, sc1, sc2) \ + (sc1->server->auth.f && \ + (!sc2->server->auth.f || \ + strNE(sc1->server->auth.f, sc2->server->auth.f))) + + if (MODSSL_CFG_CA_NE(ca_cert_file, sc, hssc) || + MODSSL_CFG_CA_NE(ca_cert_path, sc, hssc)) { + if (verify & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT) { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(02256) + "Non-default virtual host with SSLVerify set to " + "'require' and VirtualHost-specific CA certificate " + "list is only available to clients with TLS server " + "name indication (SNI) support"); + SSL_set_verify(ssl, verify_old, NULL); + return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; + } else + /* let it pass, possibly with an "incorrect" peer cert, + * so make sure the SSL_CLIENT_VERIFY environment variable + * will indicate partial success only, later on. + */ + sslconn->verify_info = "GENEROUS"; + } + } + } + + /* Fill reneg buffer if required. */ + if (renegotiate && !renegotiate_quick) { + rc = fill_reneg_buffer(r, dc); + if (rc) { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02257) + "could not buffer message body to allow " + "SSL renegotiation to proceed"); + return rc; + } + } + + /* + * now do the renegotiation if anything was actually reconfigured + */ + if (renegotiate) { + /* + * Now we force the SSL renegotiation by sending the Hello Request + * message to the client. Here we have to do a workaround: Actually + * OpenSSL returns immediately after sending the Hello Request (the + * intent AFAIK is because the SSL/TLS protocol says it's not a must + * that the client replies to a Hello Request). But because we insist + * on a reply (anything else is an error for us) we have to go to the + * ACCEPT state manually. Using SSL_set_accept_state() doesn't work + * here because it resets too much of the connection. So we set the + * state explicitly and continue the handshake manually. + */ + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(02221) + "Requesting connection re-negotiation"); + + if (renegotiate_quick) { + STACK_OF(X509) *cert_stack; + X509 *cert; + + /* perform just a manual re-verification of the peer */ + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02258) + "Performing quick renegotiation: " + "just re-verifying the peer"); + + cert_stack = (STACK_OF(X509) *)SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(ssl); + + cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl); + + if (!cert_stack || (sk_X509_num(cert_stack) == 0)) { + if (!cert) { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02222) + "Cannot find peer certificate chain"); + + return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; + } + + /* client cert is in the session cache, but there is + * no chain, since ssl3_get_client_certificate() + * sk_X509_shift-ed the peer cert out of the chain. + * we put it back here for the purpose of quick_renegotiation. + */ + cert_stack = sk_X509_new_null(); + sk_X509_push(cert_stack, cert); + } + + if (!(cert_store || + (cert_store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx)))) + { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02223) + "Cannot find certificate storage"); + + return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; + } + + if (!cert) { + cert = sk_X509_value(cert_stack, 0); + } + + cert_store_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); + X509_STORE_CTX_init(cert_store_ctx, cert_store, cert, cert_stack); + depth = SSL_get_verify_depth(ssl); + + if (depth >= 0) { + X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(cert_store_ctx, depth); + } + + X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(cert_store_ctx, + SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), + (char *)ssl); + + if (!X509_verify_cert(cert_store_ctx)) { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02224) + "Re-negotiation verification step failed"); + ssl_log_ssl_error(SSLLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, r->server); + } + + SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(cert_store_ctx)); + X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(cert_store_ctx); + X509_STORE_CTX_free(cert_store_ctx); + + if (cert_stack != SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(ssl)) { + /* we created this ourselves, so free it */ + sk_X509_pop_free(cert_stack, X509_free); + } + } + else { + char peekbuf[1]; + const char *reneg_support; + request_rec *id = r->main ? r->main : r; + + /* Additional mitigation for CVE-2009-3555: At this point, + * before renegotiating, an (entire) request has been read + * from the connection. An attacker may have sent further + * data to "prefix" any subsequent request by the victim's + * client after the renegotiation; this data may already + * have been read and buffered. Forcing a connection + * closure after the response ensures such data will be + * discarded. Legimately pipelined HTTP requests will be + * retried anyway with this approach. */ + if (has_buffered_data(r)) { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02259) + "insecure SSL re-negotiation required, but " + "a pipelined request is present; keepalive " + "disabled"); + r->connection->keepalive = AP_CONN_CLOSE; + } + +#if defined(SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support) + reneg_support = SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(ssl) ? + "client does" : "client does not"; +#else + reneg_support = "server does not"; +#endif + /* Perform a full renegotiation. */ + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02260) + "Performing full renegotiation: complete handshake " + "protocol (%s support secure renegotiation)", + reneg_support); + + SSL_set_session_id_context(ssl, + (unsigned char *)&id, + sizeof(id)); + + /* Toggle the renegotiation state to allow the new + * handshake to proceed. */ + sslconn->reneg_state = RENEG_ALLOW; + + SSL_renegotiate(ssl); + SSL_do_handshake(ssl); + + if (!SSL_is_init_finished(ssl)) { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02225) + "Re-negotiation request failed"); + ssl_log_ssl_error(SSLLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, r->server); + + r->connection->keepalive = AP_CONN_CLOSE; + return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; + } + + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(02226) + "Awaiting re-negotiation handshake"); + + /* XXX: Should replace setting state with SSL_renegotiate(ssl); + * However, this causes failures in perl-framework currently, + * perhaps pre-test if we have already negotiated? + */ + /* Need to trigger renegotiation handshake by reading. + * Peeking 0 bytes actually works. + * See: http://marc.info/?t=145493359200002&r=1&w=2 + */ + SSL_peek(ssl, peekbuf, 0); + + sslconn->reneg_state = RENEG_REJECT; + + if (!SSL_is_init_finished(ssl)) { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02261) + "Re-negotiation handshake failed"); + ssl_log_ssl_error(SSLLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, r->server); + + r->connection->keepalive = AP_CONN_CLOSE; + return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; + } + + /* Full renegotiation successful, we now have handshaken with + * this server's parameters. + */ + sslconn->server = r->server; + } + + /* + * Finally check for acceptable renegotiation results + */ + if (OK != (rc = ssl_check_post_client_verify(r, sc, dc, sslconn, ssl))) { + return rc; + } + + /* + * Also check that SSLCipherSuite has been enforced as expected. + */ + if (cipher_list) { + cipher = SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl); + if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(cipher_list, cipher) < 0) { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02264) + "SSL cipher suite not renegotiated: " + "access to %s denied using cipher %s", + r->filename, + SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher)); + return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; + } + } + /* remember any new cipher suite used in renegotiation */ + if (ncipher_suite) { + sslconn->cipher_suite = ncipher_suite; + } + } + + return DECLINED; +} + +#if SSL_HAVE_PROTOCOL_TLSV1_3 +/* + * Access Handler, modern flavour, for SSL/TLS v1.3 and onward. + * Only client certificates can be requested, everything else stays. + */ +static int ssl_hook_Access_modern(request_rec *r, SSLSrvConfigRec *sc, SSLDirConfigRec *dc, + SSLConnRec *sslconn, SSL *ssl) +{ + if ((dc->nVerifyClient != SSL_CVERIFY_UNSET) || + (sc->server->auth.verify_mode != SSL_CVERIFY_UNSET)) { + int vmode_inplace, vmode_needed; + int change_vmode = FALSE; + int old_state, n, rc; + + vmode_inplace = SSL_get_verify_mode(ssl); + vmode_needed = SSL_VERIFY_NONE; + + if ((dc->nVerifyClient == SSL_CVERIFY_REQUIRE) || + (sc->server->auth.verify_mode == SSL_CVERIFY_REQUIRE)) { + vmode_needed |= SSL_VERIFY_PEER_STRICT; + } + + if ((dc->nVerifyClient == SSL_CVERIFY_OPTIONAL) || + (dc->nVerifyClient == SSL_CVERIFY_OPTIONAL_NO_CA) || + (sc->server->auth.verify_mode == SSL_CVERIFY_OPTIONAL) || + (sc->server->auth.verify_mode == SSL_CVERIFY_OPTIONAL_NO_CA)) + { + vmode_needed |= SSL_VERIFY_PEER; + } + + if (vmode_needed == SSL_VERIFY_NONE) { + return DECLINED; + } + + vmode_needed |= SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE; + if (vmode_inplace != vmode_needed) { + /* Need to change, if new setting is more restrictive than existing one */ + + if ((vmode_inplace == SSL_VERIFY_NONE) + || (!(vmode_inplace & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) + && (vmode_needed & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) + || (!(vmode_inplace & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT) + && (vmode_needed & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))) { + /* need to change the effective verify mode */ + change_vmode = TRUE; + } + else { + /* FIXME: does this work with TLSv1.3? Is this more than re-inspecting + * the certificate we should already have? */ + /* + * override of SSLVerifyDepth + * + * The depth checks are handled by us manually inside the + * verify callback function and not by OpenSSL internally + * (and our function is aware of both the per-server and + * per-directory contexts). So we cannot ask OpenSSL about + * the currently verify depth. Instead we remember it in our + * SSLConnRec attached to the SSL* of OpenSSL. We've to force + * the renegotiation if the reconfigured/new verify depth is + * less than the currently active/remembered verify depth + * (because this means more restriction on the certificate + * chain). + */ + n = (sslconn->verify_depth != UNSET)? + sslconn->verify_depth : sc->server->auth.verify_depth; + /* determine the new depth */ + sslconn->verify_depth = (dc->nVerifyDepth != UNSET) + ? dc->nVerifyDepth + : sc->server->auth.verify_depth; + if (sslconn->verify_depth < n) { + change_vmode = TRUE; + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(10128) + "Reduced client verification depth will " + "force renegotiation"); + } + } + } + + /* Fill reneg buffer if required. */ + if (change_vmode) { + char peekbuf[1]; + + if (r->connection->master) { + /* FIXME: modifying the SSL on a slave connection is no good. + * We would need to push this back to the master connection + * somehow. + */ + apr_table_setn(r->notes, "ssl-renegotiate-forbidden", "verify-client"); + return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; + } + + rc = fill_reneg_buffer(r, dc); + if (rc) { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(10228) + "could not buffer message body to allow " + "TLS Post-Handshake Authentication to proceed"); + return rc; + } + + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(10129) + "verify client post handshake"); + + SSL_set_verify(ssl, vmode_needed, ssl_callback_SSLVerify); + + if (SSL_verify_client_post_handshake(ssl) != 1) { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(10158) + "cannot perform post-handshake authentication"); + ssl_log_ssl_error(SSLLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, r->server); + apr_table_setn(r->notes, "error-notes", + "Reason: Cannot perform Post-Handshake Authentication.<br />"); + SSL_set_verify(ssl, vmode_inplace, NULL); + return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; + } + + old_state = sslconn->reneg_state; + sslconn->reneg_state = RENEG_ALLOW; + modssl_set_app_data2(ssl, r); + + SSL_do_handshake(ssl); + /* Need to trigger renegotiation handshake by reading. + * Peeking 0 bytes actually works. + * See: http://marc.info/?t=145493359200002&r=1&w=2 + */ + SSL_peek(ssl, peekbuf, 0); + + sslconn->reneg_state = old_state; + modssl_set_app_data2(ssl, NULL); + + /* + * Finally check for acceptable renegotiation results + */ + if (OK != (rc = ssl_check_post_client_verify(r, sc, dc, sslconn, ssl))) { + SSL_set_verify(ssl, vmode_inplace, NULL); + return rc; + } + } + } + + return DECLINED; +} +#endif + +int ssl_hook_Access(request_rec *r) +{ + SSLDirConfigRec *dc = myDirConfig(r); + SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(r->server); + SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection); + SSL *ssl = sslconn ? sslconn->ssl : NULL; + apr_array_header_t *requires; + ssl_require_t *ssl_requires; + int ok, i, ret; + + /* On a slave connection, we do not expect to have an SSLConnRec, but + * our master connection might have one. */ + if (!(sslconn && ssl) && r->connection->master) { + sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection->master); + ssl = sslconn ? sslconn->ssl : NULL; + } + + /* + * We should have handshaken here, otherwise we are being + * redirected (ErrorDocument) from a renegotiation failure below. + * The access is still forbidden in the latter case, let ap_die() handle + * this recursive (same) error. + */ + if (ssl && !SSL_is_init_finished(ssl)) { + return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; + } + + /* + * Support for SSLRequireSSL directive + */ + if (dc->bSSLRequired && !ssl) { + if ((sc->enabled == SSL_ENABLED_OPTIONAL) && !r->connection->master) { + /* This vhost was configured for optional SSL, just tell the + * client that we need to upgrade. + */ + apr_table_setn(r->err_headers_out, "Upgrade", "TLS/1.0, HTTP/1.1"); + apr_table_setn(r->err_headers_out, "Connection", "Upgrade"); + + return HTTP_UPGRADE_REQUIRED; + } + + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02219) + "access to %s failed, reason: %s", + r->filename, "SSL connection required"); + + /* remember forbidden access for strict require option */ + apr_table_setn(r->notes, "ssl-access-forbidden", "1"); + + return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; + } + + /* + * Check to see whether SSL is in use; if it's not, then no + * further access control checks are relevant. (the test for + * sc->enabled is probably strictly unnecessary) + */ + if (sc->enabled == SSL_ENABLED_FALSE || !ssl) { + return DECLINED; + } + +#if SSL_HAVE_PROTOCOL_TLSV1_3 + /* TLSv1.3+ is less complicated here. Branch off into a new codeline + * and avoid messing with the past. */ + if (SSL_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { + ret = ssl_hook_Access_modern(r, sc, dc, sslconn, ssl); + } + else +#endif + { + ret = ssl_hook_Access_classic(r, sc, dc, sslconn, ssl); + } + + if (ret != DECLINED) { + return ret; + } + + /* If we're trying to have the user name set from a client + * certificate then we need to set it here. This should be safe as + * the user name probably isn't important from an auth checking point + * of view as the certificate supplied acts in that capacity. + * However, if FakeAuth is being used then this isn't the case so + * we need to postpone setting the username until later. + */ + if ((dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_FAKEBASICAUTH) == 0 && dc->szUserName) { + char *val = ssl_var_lookup(r->pool, r->server, r->connection, + r, (char *)dc->szUserName); + if (val && val[0]) + r->user = val; + else + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r, APLOGNO(02227) + "Failed to set r->user to '%s'", dc->szUserName); + } + + /* + * Check SSLRequire boolean expressions + */ + requires = dc->aRequirement; + ssl_requires = (ssl_require_t *)requires->elts; + + for (i = 0; i < requires->nelts; i++) { + ssl_require_t *req = &ssl_requires[i]; + const char *errstring; + ok = ap_expr_exec(r, req->mpExpr, &errstring); + + if (ok < 0) { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02265) + "access to %s failed, reason: Failed to execute " + "SSL requirement expression: %s", + r->filename, errstring); + + /* remember forbidden access for strict require option */ + apr_table_setn(r->notes, "ssl-access-forbidden", "1"); + + return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; + } + + if (ok != 1) { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(02266) + "Access to %s denied for %s " + "(requirement expression not fulfilled)", + r->filename, r->useragent_ip); + + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(02228) + "Failed expression: %s", req->cpExpr); + + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02229) + "access to %s failed, reason: %s", + r->filename, + "SSL requirement expression not fulfilled"); + + /* remember forbidden access for strict require option */ + apr_table_setn(r->notes, "ssl-access-forbidden", "1"); + + return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; + } + } + + /* + * Else access is granted from our point of view (except vendor + * handlers override). But we have to return DECLINED here instead + * of OK, because mod_auth and other modules still might want to + * deny access. + */ + + return DECLINED; +} + +/* + * Authentication Handler: + * Fake a Basic authentication from the X509 client certificate. + * + * This must be run fairly early on to prevent a real authentication from + * occurring, in particular it must be run before anything else that + * authenticates a user. This means that the Module statement for this + * module should be LAST in the Configuration file. + */ +int ssl_hook_UserCheck(request_rec *r) +{ + SSLConnRec *sslconn; + SSLDirConfigRec *dc = myDirConfig(r); + char *clientdn; + const char *auth_line, *username, *password; + + /* + * Additionally forbid access (again) + * when strict require option is used. + */ + if ((dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_STRICTREQUIRE) && + (apr_table_get(r->notes, "ssl-access-forbidden"))) + { + return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; + } + + /* + * We decline when we are in a subrequest. The Authorization header + * would already be present if it was added in the main request. + */ + if (!ap_is_initial_req(r)) { + return DECLINED; + } + + /* + * Make sure the user is not able to fake the client certificate + * based authentication by just entering an X.509 Subject DN + * ("/XX=YYY/XX=YYY/..") as the username and "password" as the + * password. + */ + if ((auth_line = apr_table_get(r->headers_in, "Authorization"))) { + if (strcEQ(ap_getword(r->pool, &auth_line, ' '), "Basic")) { + while ((*auth_line == ' ') || (*auth_line == '\t')) { + auth_line++; + } + + auth_line = ap_pbase64decode(r->pool, auth_line); + username = ap_getword_nulls(r->pool, &auth_line, ':'); + password = auth_line; + + if ((username[0] == '/') && strEQ(password, "password")) { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02035) + "Encountered FakeBasicAuth spoof: %s", username); + return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; + } + } + } + + /* + * We decline operation in various situations... + * - TLS not enabled + * - client did not present a certificate + * - SSLOptions +FakeBasicAuth not configured + * - r->user already authenticated + */ + if (!modssl_request_is_tls(r, &sslconn) + || !sslconn->client_cert + || !(dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_FAKEBASICAUTH) + || r->user) { + return DECLINED; + } + + if (!sslconn->client_dn) { + X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(sslconn->client_cert); + char *cp = X509_NAME_oneline(name, NULL, 0); + sslconn->client_dn = apr_pstrdup(r->connection->pool, cp); + OPENSSL_free(cp); + } + + clientdn = (char *)sslconn->client_dn; + + /* + * Fake a password - which one would be immaterial, as, it seems, an empty + * password in the users file would match ALL incoming passwords, if only + * we were using the standard crypt library routine. Unfortunately, OpenSSL + * "fixes" a "bug" in crypt and thus prevents blank passwords from + * working. (IMHO what they really fix is a bug in the users of the code + * - failing to program correctly for shadow passwords). We need, + * therefore, to provide a password. This password can be matched by + * adding the string "xxj31ZMTZzkVA" as the password in the user file. + * This is just the crypted variant of the word "password" ;-) + */ + auth_line = apr_pstrcat(r->pool, "Basic ", + ap_pbase64encode(r->pool, + apr_pstrcat(r->pool, clientdn, + ":password", NULL)), + NULL); + apr_table_setn(r->headers_in, "Authorization", auth_line); + + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(02036) + "Faking HTTP Basic Auth header: \"Authorization: %s\"", + auth_line); + + return DECLINED; +} + +/* authorization phase */ +int ssl_hook_Auth(request_rec *r) +{ + SSLDirConfigRec *dc = myDirConfig(r); + + /* + * Additionally forbid access (again) + * when strict require option is used. + */ + if ((dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_STRICTREQUIRE) && + (apr_table_get(r->notes, "ssl-access-forbidden"))) + { + return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; + } + + return DECLINED; +} + +/* + * Fixup Handler + */ + +static const char *const ssl_hook_Fixup_vars[] = { + "SSL_VERSION_INTERFACE", + "SSL_VERSION_LIBRARY", + "SSL_PROTOCOL", + "SSL_SECURE_RENEG", + "SSL_COMPRESS_METHOD", + "SSL_CIPHER", + "SSL_CIPHER_EXPORT", + "SSL_CIPHER_USEKEYSIZE", + "SSL_CIPHER_ALGKEYSIZE", + "SSL_CLIENT_VERIFY", + "SSL_CLIENT_M_VERSION", + "SSL_CLIENT_M_SERIAL", + "SSL_CLIENT_V_START", + "SSL_CLIENT_V_END", + "SSL_CLIENT_V_REMAIN", + "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN", + "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN", + "SSL_CLIENT_A_KEY", + "SSL_CLIENT_A_SIG", + "SSL_CLIENT_CERT_RFC4523_CEA", + "SSL_SERVER_M_VERSION", + "SSL_SERVER_M_SERIAL", + "SSL_SERVER_V_START", + "SSL_SERVER_V_END", + "SSL_SERVER_S_DN", + "SSL_SERVER_I_DN", + "SSL_SERVER_A_KEY", + "SSL_SERVER_A_SIG", + "SSL_SESSION_ID", + "SSL_SESSION_RESUMED", +#ifdef HAVE_SRP + "SSL_SRP_USER", + "SSL_SRP_USERINFO", +#endif + NULL +}; + +int ssl_hook_Fixup(request_rec *r) +{ + SSLDirConfigRec *dc = myDirConfig(r); + apr_table_t *env = r->subprocess_env; + char *var, *val = ""; +#ifdef HAVE_TLSEXT + const char *servername; +#endif + STACK_OF(X509) *peer_certs; + SSLConnRec *sslconn; + SSL *ssl; + int i; + + if (!modssl_request_is_tls(r, &sslconn)) { + return DECLINED; + } + ssl = sslconn->ssl; + + /* + * Annotate the SSI/CGI environment with standard SSL information + */ + /* the always present HTTPS (=HTTP over SSL) flag! */ + apr_table_setn(env, "HTTPS", "on"); + +#ifdef HAVE_TLSEXT + /* add content of SNI TLS extension (if supplied with ClientHello) */ + if ((servername = SSL_get_servername(ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name))) { + apr_table_set(env, "SSL_TLS_SNI", servername); + } +#endif + + /* standard SSL environment variables */ + if (dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_STDENVVARS) { + modssl_var_extract_dns(env, ssl, r->pool); + modssl_var_extract_san_entries(env, ssl, r->pool); + + for (i = 0; ssl_hook_Fixup_vars[i]; i++) { + var = (char *)ssl_hook_Fixup_vars[i]; + val = ssl_var_lookup(r->pool, r->server, r->connection, r, var); + if (!strIsEmpty(val)) { + apr_table_setn(env, var, val); + } + } + } + + /* + * On-demand bloat up the SSI/CGI environment with certificate data + */ + if (dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_EXPORTCERTDATA) { + val = ssl_var_lookup(r->pool, r->server, r->connection, + r, "SSL_SERVER_CERT"); + + apr_table_setn(env, "SSL_SERVER_CERT", val); + + val = ssl_var_lookup(r->pool, r->server, r->connection, + r, "SSL_CLIENT_CERT"); + + apr_table_setn(env, "SSL_CLIENT_CERT", val); + + if ((peer_certs = (STACK_OF(X509) *)SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(ssl))) { + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(peer_certs); i++) { + var = apr_psprintf(r->pool, "SSL_CLIENT_CERT_CHAIN_%d", i); + val = ssl_var_lookup(r->pool, r->server, r->connection, + r, var); + if (val) { + apr_table_setn(env, var, val); + } + } + } + } + + +#ifdef SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support + apr_table_setn(r->notes, "ssl-secure-reneg", + SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(ssl) ? "1" : "0"); +#endif + + return DECLINED; +} + +/* _________________________________________________________________ +** +** Authz providers for use with mod_authz_core +** _________________________________________________________________ +*/ + +static authz_status ssl_authz_require_ssl_check(request_rec *r, + const char *require_line, + const void *parsed) +{ + if (modssl_request_is_tls(r, NULL)) + return AUTHZ_GRANTED; + else + return AUTHZ_DENIED; +} + +static const char *ssl_authz_require_ssl_parse(cmd_parms *cmd, + const char *require_line, + const void **parsed) +{ + if (require_line && require_line[0]) + return "'Require ssl' does not take arguments"; + + return NULL; +} + +const authz_provider ssl_authz_provider_require_ssl = +{ + &ssl_authz_require_ssl_check, + &ssl_authz_require_ssl_parse, +}; + +static authz_status ssl_authz_verify_client_check(request_rec *r, + const char *require_line, + const void *parsed) +{ + SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection); + SSL *ssl = sslconn ? sslconn->ssl : NULL; + + if (!ssl) + return AUTHZ_DENIED; + + if (sslconn->verify_error == NULL && + sslconn->verify_info == NULL && + SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK) + { + X509 *xs = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl); + + if (xs) { + X509_free(xs); + return AUTHZ_GRANTED; + } + else { + X509_free(xs); + } + } + + return AUTHZ_DENIED; +} + +static const char *ssl_authz_verify_client_parse(cmd_parms *cmd, + const char *require_line, + const void **parsed) +{ + if (require_line && require_line[0]) + return "'Require ssl-verify-client' does not take arguments"; + + return NULL; +} + +const authz_provider ssl_authz_provider_verify_client = +{ + &ssl_authz_verify_client_check, + &ssl_authz_verify_client_parse, +}; + + + +/* _________________________________________________________________ +** +** OpenSSL Callback Functions +** _________________________________________________________________ +*/ + +#if MODSSL_USE_OPENSSL_PRE_1_1_API +/* + * Hand out standard DH parameters, based on the authentication strength + */ +DH *ssl_callback_TmpDH(SSL *ssl, int export, int keylen) +{ + conn_rec *c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl); + EVP_PKEY *pkey; + int type; + +#ifdef SSL_CERT_SET_SERVER + /* + * When multiple certs/keys are configured for the SSL_CTX: make sure + * that we get the private key which is indeed used for the current + * SSL connection (available in OpenSSL 1.0.2 or later only) + */ + SSL_set_current_cert(ssl, SSL_CERT_SET_SERVER); +#endif + pkey = SSL_get_privatekey(ssl); +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L + type = pkey ? EVP_PKEY_type(pkey->type) : EVP_PKEY_NONE; +#else + type = pkey ? EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey) : EVP_PKEY_NONE; +#endif + + /* + * OpenSSL will call us with either keylen == 512 or keylen == 1024 + * (see the definition of SSL_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH in ssl_locl.h). + * Adjust the DH parameter length according to the size of the + * RSA/DSA private key used for the current connection, and always + * use at least 1024-bit parameters. + * Note: This may cause interoperability issues with implementations + * which limit their DH support to 1024 bit - e.g. Java 7 and earlier. + * In this case, SSLCertificateFile can be used to specify fixed + * 1024-bit DH parameters (with the effect that OpenSSL skips this + * callback). + */ + if ((type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)) { + keylen = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey); + } + + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE2, 0, c, + "handing out built-in DH parameters for %d-bit authenticated connection", keylen); + + return modssl_get_dh_params(keylen); +} +#endif + +/* + * This OpenSSL callback function is called when OpenSSL + * does client authentication and verifies the certificate chain. + */ +int ssl_callback_SSLVerify(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) +{ + /* Get Apache context back through OpenSSL context */ + SSL *ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, + SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx()); + conn_rec *conn = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl); + request_rec *r = (request_rec *)modssl_get_app_data2(ssl); + server_rec *s = r ? r->server : mySrvFromConn(conn); + + SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s); + SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(conn); + SSLDirConfigRec *dc = r ? myDirConfig(r) : sslconn->dc; + modssl_ctx_t *mctx = myConnCtxConfig(conn, sc); + int crl_check_mode = mctx->crl_check_mask & ~SSL_CRLCHECK_FLAGS; + + /* Get verify ingredients */ + int errnum = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); + int errdepth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx); + int depth = UNSET; + int verify = SSL_CVERIFY_UNSET; + + /* + * Log verification information + */ + ssl_log_cxerror(SSLLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, conn, + X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx), APLOGNO(02275) + "Certificate Verification, depth %d, " + "CRL checking mode: %s (%x)", errdepth, + crl_check_mode == SSL_CRLCHECK_CHAIN ? "chain" : + crl_check_mode == SSL_CRLCHECK_LEAF ? "leaf" : "none", + mctx->crl_check_mask); + + /* + * Check for optionally acceptable non-verifiable issuer situation + */ + if (dc) { + if (conn->outgoing) { + verify = dc->proxy->auth.verify_mode; + } + else { + verify = dc->nVerifyClient; + } + } + if (!dc || (verify == SSL_CVERIFY_UNSET)) { + verify = mctx->auth.verify_mode; + } + + if (verify == SSL_CVERIFY_NONE) { + /* + * SSLProxyVerify is either not configured or set to "none". + * (this callback doesn't happen in the server context if SSLVerify + * is not configured or set to "none") + */ + return TRUE; + } + + if (ssl_verify_error_is_optional(errnum) && + (verify == SSL_CVERIFY_OPTIONAL_NO_CA)) + { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, conn, APLOGNO(02037) + "Certificate Verification: Verifiable Issuer is " + "configured as optional, therefore we're accepting " + "the certificate"); + + sslconn->verify_info = "GENEROUS"; + ok = TRUE; + } + + /* + * Expired certificates vs. "expired" CRLs: by default, OpenSSL + * turns X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED into a "certificate_expired(45)" + * SSL alert, but that's not really the message we should convey to the + * peer (at the very least, it's confusing, and in many cases, it's also + * inaccurate, as the certificate itself may very well not have expired + * yet). We set the X509_STORE_CTX error to something which OpenSSL's + * s3_both.c:ssl_verify_alarm_type() maps to SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN, + * i.e. the peer will receive a "certificate_unknown(46)" alert. + * We do not touch errnum, though, so that later on we will still log + * the "real" error, as returned by OpenSSL. + */ + if (!ok && errnum == X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED) { + X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, -1); + } + + if (!ok && errnum == X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL + && (mctx->crl_check_mask & SSL_CRLCHECK_NO_CRL_FOR_CERT_OK)) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE3, 0, conn, + "Certificate Verification: Temporary error (%d): %s: " + "optional therefore we're accepting the certificate", + errnum, X509_verify_cert_error_string(errnum)); + X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_OK); + errnum = X509_V_OK; + ok = TRUE; + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP + /* + * Perform OCSP-based revocation checks + */ + if (ok && ((mctx->ocsp_mask & SSL_OCSPCHECK_CHAIN) || + (errdepth == 0 && (mctx->ocsp_mask & SSL_OCSPCHECK_LEAF)))) { + /* If there was an optional verification error, it's not + * possible to perform OCSP validation since the issuer may be + * missing/untrusted. Fail in that case. */ + if (ssl_verify_error_is_optional(errnum)) { + X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION); + errnum = X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION; + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, conn, APLOGNO(02038) + "cannot perform OCSP validation for cert " + "if issuer has not been verified " + "(optional_no_ca configured)"); + ok = FALSE; + } else { + ok = modssl_verify_ocsp(ctx, sc, s, conn, conn->pool); + if (!ok) { + errnum = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); + } + } + } +#endif + + /* + * If we already know it's not ok, log the real reason + */ + if (!ok) { + if (APLOGcinfo(conn)) { + ssl_log_cxerror(SSLLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, conn, + X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx), APLOGNO(02276) + "Certificate Verification: Error (%d): %s", + errnum, X509_verify_cert_error_string(errnum)); + } else { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, conn, APLOGNO(02039) + "Certificate Verification: Error (%d): %s", + errnum, X509_verify_cert_error_string(errnum)); + } + + if (sslconn->client_cert) { + X509_free(sslconn->client_cert); + sslconn->client_cert = NULL; + } + sslconn->client_dn = NULL; + sslconn->verify_error = X509_verify_cert_error_string(errnum); + } + + /* + * Finally check the depth of the certificate verification + */ + if (dc) { + if (conn->outgoing) { + depth = dc->proxy->auth.verify_depth; + } + else { + depth = dc->nVerifyDepth; + } + } + if (!dc || (depth == UNSET)) { + depth = mctx->auth.verify_depth; + } + + if (errdepth > depth) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, conn, APLOGNO(02040) + "Certificate Verification: Certificate Chain too long " + "(chain has %d certificates, but maximum allowed are " + "only %d)", + errdepth, depth); + + errnum = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG; + sslconn->verify_error = X509_verify_cert_error_string(errnum); + + ok = FALSE; + } + + /* + * And finally signal OpenSSL the (perhaps changed) state + */ + return ok; +} + +#define SSLPROXY_CERT_CB_LOG_FMT \ + "Proxy client certificate callback: (%s) " + +static void modssl_proxy_info_log(conn_rec *c, + X509_INFO *info, + const char *msg) +{ + ssl_log_cxerror(SSLLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, c, info->x509, APLOGNO(02277) + SSLPROXY_CERT_CB_LOG_FMT "%s, sending", + (mySrvConfigFromConn(c))->vhost_id, msg); +} + +/* + * caller will decrement the cert and key reference + * so we need to increment here to prevent them from + * being freed. + */ +#if MODSSL_USE_OPENSSL_PRE_1_1_API +#define modssl_set_cert_info(info, cert, pkey) \ + *cert = info->x509; \ + CRYPTO_add(&(*cert)->references, +1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); \ + *pkey = info->x_pkey->dec_pkey; \ + CRYPTO_add(&(*pkey)->references, +1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY) +#else +#define modssl_set_cert_info(info, cert, pkey) \ + *cert = info->x509; \ + X509_up_ref(*cert); \ + *pkey = info->x_pkey->dec_pkey; \ + EVP_PKEY_up_ref(*pkey); +#endif + +int ssl_callback_proxy_cert(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey) +{ + conn_rec *c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl); + server_rec *s = mySrvFromConn(c); + SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s); + SSLDirConfigRec *dc = myDirConfigFromConn(c); + X509_NAME *ca_name, *issuer, *ca_issuer; + X509_INFO *info; + X509 *ca_cert; + STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_list; + STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *certs; + STACK_OF(X509) *ca_certs; + STACK_OF(X509) **ca_cert_chains; + int i, j, k; + + ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s, APLOGNO(02267) + SSLPROXY_CERT_CB_LOG_FMT "entered", + sc->vhost_id); + + certs = (dc && dc->proxy) ? dc->proxy->pkp->certs : NULL; + if (!certs || (sk_X509_INFO_num(certs) <= 0)) { + ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, s, APLOGNO(02268) + SSLPROXY_CERT_CB_LOG_FMT + "downstream server wanted client certificate " + "but none are configured", sc->vhost_id); + return FALSE; + } + + ca_list = SSL_get_client_CA_list(ssl); + + if (!ca_list || (sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_list) <= 0)) { + /* + * downstream server didn't send us a list of acceptable CA certs, + * so we send the first client cert in the list. + */ + info = sk_X509_INFO_value(certs, 0); + + modssl_proxy_info_log(c, info, APLOGNO(02278) "no acceptable CA list"); + + modssl_set_cert_info(info, x509, pkey); + + return TRUE; + } + + ca_cert_chains = dc->proxy->pkp->ca_certs; + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_list); i++) { + ca_name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_list, i); + + for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_INFO_num(certs); j++) { + info = sk_X509_INFO_value(certs, j); + issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(info->x509); + + /* Search certs (by issuer name) one by one*/ + if (X509_NAME_cmp(issuer, ca_name) == 0) { + modssl_proxy_info_log(c, info, APLOGNO(02279) + "found acceptable cert"); + + modssl_set_cert_info(info, x509, pkey); + + return TRUE; + } + + if (ca_cert_chains) { + /* + * Failed to find direct issuer - search intermediates + * (by issuer name), if provided. + */ + ca_certs = ca_cert_chains[j]; + for (k = 0; k < sk_X509_num(ca_certs); k++) { + ca_cert = sk_X509_value(ca_certs, k); + ca_issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(ca_cert); + + if(X509_NAME_cmp(ca_issuer, ca_name) == 0 ) { + modssl_proxy_info_log(c, info, APLOGNO(02280) + "found acceptable cert by intermediate CA"); + + modssl_set_cert_info(info, x509, pkey); + + return TRUE; + } + } /* end loop through chained certs */ + } + } /* end loop through available certs */ + } + + ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s, APLOGNO(02269) + SSLPROXY_CERT_CB_LOG_FMT + "no client certificate found!?", sc->vhost_id); + + return FALSE; +} + +static void ssl_session_log(server_rec *s, + const char *request, + IDCONST unsigned char *id, + unsigned int idlen, + const char *status, + const char *result, + long timeout) +{ + char buf[MODSSL_SESSION_ID_STRING_LEN]; + char timeout_str[56] = {'\0'}; + + if (!APLOGdebug(s)) { + return; + } + + if (timeout) { + apr_snprintf(timeout_str, sizeof(timeout_str), + "timeout=%lds ", timeout); + } + + ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE2, 0, s, + "Inter-Process Session Cache: " + "request=%s status=%s id=%s %s(session %s)", + request, status, + modssl_SSL_SESSION_id2sz(id, idlen, buf, sizeof(buf)), + timeout_str, result); +} + +/* + * This callback function is executed by OpenSSL whenever a new SSL_SESSION is + * added to the internal OpenSSL session cache. We use this hook to spread the + * SSL_SESSION also to the inter-process disk-cache to make share it with our + * other Apache pre-forked server processes. + */ +int ssl_callback_NewSessionCacheEntry(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session) +{ + /* Get Apache context back through OpenSSL context */ + conn_rec *conn = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl); + server_rec *s = mySrvFromConn(conn); + SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s); + long timeout = sc->session_cache_timeout; + BOOL rc; + IDCONST unsigned char *id; + unsigned int idlen; + + /* + * Set the timeout also for the internal OpenSSL cache, because this way + * our inter-process cache is consulted only when it's really necessary. + */ + SSL_set_timeout(session, timeout); + + /* + * Store the SSL_SESSION in the inter-process cache with the + * same expire time, so it expires automatically there, too. + */ +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN + id = (unsigned char *)SSL_SESSION_get_id(session, &idlen); +#else + id = session->session_id; + idlen = session->session_id_length; +#endif + + rc = ssl_scache_store(s, id, idlen, + apr_time_from_sec(SSL_SESSION_get_time(session) + + timeout), + session, conn->pool); + + ssl_session_log(s, "SET", id, idlen, + rc == TRUE ? "OK" : "BAD", + "caching", timeout); + + /* + * return 0 which means to OpenSSL that the session is still + * valid and was not freed by us with SSL_SESSION_free(). + */ + return 0; +} + +/* + * This callback function is executed by OpenSSL whenever a + * SSL_SESSION is looked up in the internal OpenSSL cache and it + * was not found. We use this to lookup the SSL_SESSION in the + * inter-process disk-cache where it was perhaps stored by one + * of our other Apache pre-forked server processes. + */ +SSL_SESSION *ssl_callback_GetSessionCacheEntry(SSL *ssl, + IDCONST unsigned char *id, + int idlen, int *do_copy) +{ + /* Get Apache context back through OpenSSL context */ + conn_rec *conn = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl); + server_rec *s = mySrvFromConn(conn); + SSL_SESSION *session; + + /* + * Try to retrieve the SSL_SESSION from the inter-process cache + */ + session = ssl_scache_retrieve(s, id, idlen, conn->pool); + + ssl_session_log(s, "GET", id, idlen, + session ? "FOUND" : "MISSED", + session ? "reuse" : "renewal", 0); + + /* + * Return NULL or the retrieved SSL_SESSION. But indicate (by + * setting do_copy to 0) that the reference count on the + * SSL_SESSION should not be incremented by the SSL library, + * because we will no longer hold a reference to it ourself. + */ + *do_copy = 0; + + return session; +} + +/* + * This callback function is executed by OpenSSL whenever a + * SSL_SESSION is removed from the internal OpenSSL cache. + * We use this to remove the SSL_SESSION in the inter-process + * disk-cache, too. + */ +void ssl_callback_DelSessionCacheEntry(SSL_CTX *ctx, + SSL_SESSION *session) +{ + server_rec *s; + SSLSrvConfigRec *sc; + IDCONST unsigned char *id; + unsigned int idlen; + + /* + * Get Apache context back through OpenSSL context + */ + if (!(s = (server_rec *)SSL_CTX_get_app_data(ctx))) { + return; /* on server shutdown Apache is already gone */ + } + + sc = mySrvConfig(s); + + /* + * Remove the SSL_SESSION from the inter-process cache + */ +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN + id = (unsigned char *)SSL_SESSION_get_id(session, &idlen); +#else + id = session->session_id; + idlen = session->session_id_length; +#endif + + /* TODO: Do we need a temp pool here, or are we always shutting down? */ + ssl_scache_remove(s, id, idlen, sc->mc->pPool); + + ssl_session_log(s, "REM", id, idlen, + "OK", "dead", 0); + + return; +} + +/* Dump debugginfo trace to the log file. */ +static void log_tracing_state(const SSL *ssl, conn_rec *c, + server_rec *s, int where, int rc) +{ + /* + * create the various trace messages + */ + if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE3, 0, c, + "%s: Handshake: start", MODSSL_LIBRARY_NAME); + } + else if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE3, 0, c, + "%s: Handshake: done", MODSSL_LIBRARY_NAME); + } + else if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE3, 0, c, + "%s: Loop: %s", + MODSSL_LIBRARY_NAME, SSL_state_string_long(ssl)); + } + else if (where & SSL_CB_READ) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE3, 0, c, + "%s: Read: %s", + MODSSL_LIBRARY_NAME, SSL_state_string_long(ssl)); + } + else if (where & SSL_CB_WRITE) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE3, 0, c, + "%s: Write: %s", + MODSSL_LIBRARY_NAME, SSL_state_string_long(ssl)); + } + else if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT) { + char *str = (where & SSL_CB_READ) ? "read" : "write"; + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE3, 0, c, + "%s: Alert: %s:%s:%s", + MODSSL_LIBRARY_NAME, str, + SSL_alert_type_string_long(rc), + SSL_alert_desc_string_long(rc)); + } + else if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT) { + if (rc == 0) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE3, 0, c, + "%s: Exit: failed in %s", + MODSSL_LIBRARY_NAME, SSL_state_string_long(ssl)); + } + else if (rc < 0) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE3, 0, c, + "%s: Exit: error in %s", + MODSSL_LIBRARY_NAME, SSL_state_string_long(ssl)); + } + } + + /* + * Because SSL renegotiations can happen at any time (not only after + * SSL_accept()), the best way to log the current connection details is + * right after a finished handshake. + */ + if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, c, APLOGNO(02041) + "Protocol: %s, Cipher: %s (%s/%s bits)", + ssl_var_lookup(NULL, s, c, NULL, "SSL_PROTOCOL"), + ssl_var_lookup(NULL, s, c, NULL, "SSL_CIPHER"), + ssl_var_lookup(NULL, s, c, NULL, "SSL_CIPHER_USEKEYSIZE"), + ssl_var_lookup(NULL, s, c, NULL, "SSL_CIPHER_ALGKEYSIZE")); + } +} + +/* + * This callback function is executed while OpenSSL processes the SSL + * handshake and does SSL record layer stuff. It's used to trap + * client-initiated renegotiations, and for dumping everything to the + * log. + */ +void ssl_callback_Info(const SSL *ssl, int where, int rc) +{ + conn_rec *c; + server_rec *s; + + /* Retrieve the conn_rec and the associated SSLConnRec. */ + if ((c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data((SSL *)ssl)) == NULL) { + return; + } + + /* With TLS 1.3 this callback may be called multiple times on the first + * negotiation, so the below logic to detect renegotiations can't work. + * Fortunately renegotiations are forbidden starting with TLS 1.3, and + * this is enforced by OpenSSL so there's nothing to be done here. + */ +#if SSL_HAVE_PROTOCOL_TLSV1_3 + if (SSL_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) +#endif + { + SSLConnRec *sslconn; + + if ((sslconn = myConnConfig(c)) == NULL) { + return; + } + + /* If the reneg state is to reject renegotiations, check the SSL + * state machine and move to ABORT if a Client Hello is being + * read. */ + if (!c->outgoing && + (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START) && + sslconn->reneg_state == RENEG_REJECT) { + sslconn->reneg_state = RENEG_ABORT; + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, c, APLOGNO(02042) + "rejecting client initiated renegotiation"); + } + /* If the first handshake is complete, change state to reject any + * subsequent client-initiated renegotiation. */ + else if ((where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE) + && sslconn->reneg_state == RENEG_INIT) { + sslconn->reneg_state = RENEG_REJECT; + } + } + + s = mySrvFromConn(c); + if (s && APLOGdebug(s)) { + log_tracing_state(ssl, c, s, where, rc); + } +} + +#ifdef HAVE_TLSEXT + +static apr_status_t set_challenge_creds(conn_rec *c, const char *servername, + SSL *ssl, X509 *cert, EVP_PKEY *key, + const char *cert_pem, const char *key_pem) +{ + SSLConnRec *sslcon = myConnConfig(c); + apr_status_t rv = APR_SUCCESS; + int our_data = 0; + + sslcon->service_unavailable = 1; + if (cert_pem) { + cert = NULL; + key = NULL; + our_data = 1; + + rv = modssl_read_cert(c->pool, cert_pem, key_pem, NULL, NULL, &cert, &key); + if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, c, APLOGNO(10266) + "Failed to parse PEM of challenge certificate %s", + servername); + goto cleanup; + } + } + + if ((SSL_use_certificate(ssl, cert) < 1)) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, c, APLOGNO(10086) + "Failed to configure challenge certificate %s", + servername); + rv = APR_EGENERAL; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (!SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, key)) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, c, APLOGNO(10087) + "error '%s' using Challenge key: %s", + ERR_error_string(ERR_peek_last_error(), NULL), + servername); + rv = APR_EGENERAL; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (SSL_check_private_key(ssl) < 1) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, c, APLOGNO(10088) + "Challenge certificate and private key %s " + "do not match", servername); + rv = APR_EGENERAL; + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + if (our_data && cert) X509_free(cert); + if (our_data && key) EVP_PKEY_free(key); + return APR_SUCCESS; +} + +/* + * This function sets the virtual host from an extended + * client hello with a server name indication extension ("SNI", cf. RFC 6066). + */ +static apr_status_t init_vhost(conn_rec *c, SSL *ssl, const char *servername) +{ + if (c) { + SSLConnRec *sslcon = myConnConfig(c); + + if (sslcon->vhost_found) { + /* already found the vhost? */ + return sslcon->vhost_found > 0 ? APR_SUCCESS : APR_NOTFOUND; + } + sslcon->vhost_found = -1; + + if (!servername) { + servername = SSL_get_servername(ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name); + } + if (servername) { + if (ap_vhost_iterate_given_conn(c, ssl_find_vhost, + (void *)servername)) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, c, APLOGNO(02043) + "SSL virtual host for servername %s found", + servername); + + sslcon->vhost_found = +1; + return APR_SUCCESS; + } + else { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, c, APLOGNO(02044) + "No matching SSL virtual host for servername " + "%s found (using default/first virtual host)", + servername); + /* + * RFC 6066 section 3 says "It is NOT RECOMMENDED to send + * a warning-level unrecognized_name(112) alert, because + * the client's behavior in response to warning-level alerts + * is unpredictable." + * + * To maintain backwards compatibility in mod_ssl, we + * no longer send any alert (neither warning- nor fatal-level), + * i.e. we take the second action suggested in RFC 6066: + * "If the server understood the ClientHello extension but + * does not recognize the server name, the server SHOULD take + * one of two actions: either abort the handshake by sending + * a fatal-level unrecognized_name(112) alert or continue + * the handshake." + */ + } + } + else { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, c, APLOGNO(02645) + "Server name not provided via TLS extension " + "(using default/first virtual host)"); + } + } + + return APR_NOTFOUND; +} + +/* + * This callback function is executed when OpenSSL encounters an extended + * client hello with a server name indication extension ("SNI", cf. RFC 6066). + */ +int ssl_callback_ServerNameIndication(SSL *ssl, int *al, modssl_ctx_t *mctx) +{ + conn_rec *c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl); + apr_status_t status = init_vhost(c, ssl, NULL); + + return (status == APR_SUCCESS)? SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK : SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; +} + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) +/* + * This callback function is called when the ClientHello is received. + */ +int ssl_callback_ClientHello(SSL *ssl, int *al, void *arg) +{ + char *servername = NULL; + conn_rec *c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl); + const unsigned char *pos; + size_t len, remaining; + (void)arg; + + /* We can't use SSL_get_servername() at this earliest OpenSSL connection + * stage, and there is no SSL_client_hello_get0_servername() provided as + * of OpenSSL 1.1.1. So the code below, that extracts the SNI from the + * ClientHello's TLS extensions, is taken from some test code in OpenSSL, + * i.e. client_hello_select_server_ctx() in "test/handshake_helper.c". + */ + + /* + * The server_name extension was given too much extensibility when it + * was written, so parsing the normal case is a bit complex. + */ + if (!SSL_client_hello_get0_ext(ssl, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, &pos, + &remaining) + || remaining <= 2) + goto give_up; + + /* Extract the length of the supplied list of names. */ + len = (*(pos++) << 8); + len += *(pos++); + if (len + 2 != remaining) + goto give_up; + remaining = len; + + /* + * The list in practice only has a single element, so we only consider + * the first one. + */ + if (remaining <= 3 || *pos++ != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) + goto give_up; + remaining--; + + /* Now we can finally pull out the byte array with the actual hostname. */ + len = (*(pos++) << 8); + len += *(pos++); + if (len + 2 != remaining) + goto give_up; + + /* Use the SNI to switch to the relevant vhost, should it differ from + * c->base_server. + */ + servername = apr_pstrmemdup(c->pool, (const char *)pos, len); + +give_up: + init_vhost(c, ssl, servername); + return SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS; +} +#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10101000L */ + +/* + * Find a (name-based) SSL virtual host where either the ServerName + * or one of the ServerAliases matches the supplied name (to be used + * with ap_vhost_iterate_given_conn()) + */ +static int ssl_find_vhost(void *servername, conn_rec *c, server_rec *s) +{ + SSLSrvConfigRec *sc; + SSL *ssl; + BOOL found; + SSLConnRec *sslcon; + + found = ssl_util_vhost_matches(servername, s); + + /* set SSL_CTX (if matched) */ + sslcon = myConnConfig(c); + if (found && (ssl = sslcon->ssl) && + (sc = mySrvConfig(s))) { + SSL_CTX *ctx = SSL_set_SSL_CTX(ssl, sc->server->ssl_ctx); + + /* + * SSL_set_SSL_CTX() only deals with the server cert, + * so we need to duplicate a few additional settings + * from the ctx by hand + */ + SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_CTX_get_options(ctx)); +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1010007fL \ + && (!defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) \ + || LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x20800000L) + /* + * Don't switch the protocol if none is configured for this vhost, + * the default in this case is still the base server's SSLProtocol. + */ + if (myConnCtxConfig(c, sc)->protocol_set) { + SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, SSL_CTX_get_min_proto_version(ctx)); + SSL_set_max_proto_version(ssl, SSL_CTX_get_max_proto_version(ctx)); + } +#endif + if ((SSL_get_verify_mode(ssl) == SSL_VERIFY_NONE) || + (SSL_num_renegotiations(ssl) == 0)) { + /* + * Only initialize the verification settings from the ctx + * if they are not yet set, or if we're called when a new + * SSL connection is set up (num_renegotiations == 0). + * Otherwise, we would possibly reset a per-directory + * configuration which was put into effect by ssl_hook_Access. + */ + SSL_set_verify(ssl, SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(ctx), + SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(ctx)); + } + + /* + * Adjust the session id context. ssl_init_ssl_connection() + * always picks the configuration of the first vhost when + * calling SSL_new(), but we want to tie the session to the + * vhost we have just switched to. Again, we have to make sure + * that we're not overwriting a session id context which was + * possibly set in ssl_hook_Access(), before triggering + * a renegotiation. + */ + if (SSL_num_renegotiations(ssl) == 0) { + unsigned char *sid_ctx = + (unsigned char *)ap_md5_binary(c->pool, + (unsigned char *)sc->vhost_id, + sc->vhost_id_len); + SSL_set_session_id_context(ssl, sid_ctx, APR_MD5_DIGESTSIZE*2); + } + + /* + * Save the found server into our SSLConnRec for later + * retrieval + */ + sslcon->server = s; + sslcon->cipher_suite = sc->server->auth.cipher_suite; + sslcon->service_unavailable = sc->server->pks? + sc->server->pks->service_unavailable : 0; + + ap_update_child_status_from_server(c->sbh, SERVER_BUSY_READ, c, s); + /* + * There is one special filter callback, which is set + * very early depending on the base_server's log level. + * If this is not the first vhost we're now selecting + * (and the first vhost doesn't use APLOG_TRACE4), then + * we need to set that callback here. + */ + if (APLOGtrace4(s)) { + BIO *rbio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl), + *wbio = SSL_get_wbio(ssl); + BIO_set_callback(rbio, ssl_io_data_cb); + BIO_set_callback_arg(rbio, (void *)ssl); + if (wbio && wbio != rbio) { + BIO_set_callback(wbio, ssl_io_data_cb); + BIO_set_callback_arg(wbio, (void *)ssl); + } + } + + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* HAVE_TLSEXT */ + +#ifdef HAVE_TLS_SESSION_TICKETS +/* + * This callback function is executed when OpenSSL needs a key for encrypting/ + * decrypting a TLS session ticket (RFC 5077) and a ticket key file has been + * configured through SSLSessionTicketKeyFile. + */ +int ssl_callback_SessionTicket(SSL *ssl, + unsigned char *keyname, + unsigned char *iv, + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L + HMAC_CTX *hmac_ctx, +#else + EVP_MAC_CTX *mac_ctx, +#endif + int mode) +{ + conn_rec *c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl); + server_rec *s = mySrvFromConn(c); + SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s); + modssl_ctx_t *mctx = myConnCtxConfig(c, sc); + modssl_ticket_key_t *ticket_key = mctx->ticket_key; + + if (mode == 1) { + /* + * OpenSSL is asking for a key for encrypting a ticket, + * see s3_srvr.c:ssl3_send_newsession_ticket() + */ + + if (ticket_key == NULL) { + /* should never happen, but better safe than sorry */ + return -1; + } + + memcpy(keyname, ticket_key->key_name, 16); + if (RAND_bytes(iv, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) != 1) { + return -1; + } + EVP_EncryptInit_ex(cipher_ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, + ticket_key->aes_key, iv); + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L + HMAC_Init_ex(hmac_ctx, ticket_key->hmac_secret, 16, + tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); +#else + EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(mac_ctx, ticket_key->mac_params); +#endif + + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, c, APLOGNO(02289) + "TLS session ticket key for %s successfully set, " + "creating new session ticket", sc->vhost_id); + + return 1; + } + else if (mode == 0) { + /* + * OpenSSL is asking for the decryption key, + * see t1_lib.c:tls_decrypt_ticket() + */ + + /* check key name */ + if (ticket_key == NULL || memcmp(keyname, ticket_key->key_name, 16)) { + return 0; + } + + EVP_DecryptInit_ex(cipher_ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, + ticket_key->aes_key, iv); + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L + HMAC_Init_ex(hmac_ctx, ticket_key->hmac_secret, 16, + tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); +#else + EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(mac_ctx, ticket_key->mac_params); +#endif + + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, c, APLOGNO(02290) + "TLS session ticket key for %s successfully set, " + "decrypting existing session ticket", sc->vhost_id); + + return 1; + } + + /* OpenSSL is not expected to call us with modes other than 1 or 0 */ + return -1; +} +#endif /* HAVE_TLS_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#ifdef HAVE_TLS_ALPN + +/* + * This callback function is executed when the TLS Application-Layer + * Protocol Negotiation Extension (ALPN, RFC 7301) is triggered by the Client + * Hello, giving a list of desired protocol names (in descending preference) + * to the server. + * The callback has to select a protocol name or return an error if none of + * the clients preferences is supported. + * The selected protocol does not have to be on the client list, according + * to RFC 7301, so no checks are performed. + * The client protocol list is serialized as length byte followed by ASCII + * characters (not null-terminated), followed by the next protocol name. + */ +int ssl_callback_alpn_select(SSL *ssl, + const unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, + const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, + void *arg) +{ + conn_rec *c = (conn_rec*)SSL_get_app_data(ssl); + SSLConnRec *sslconn; + apr_array_header_t *client_protos; + const char *proposed; + size_t len; + int i; + + /* If the connection object is not available, + * then there's nothing for us to do. */ + if (c == NULL) { + return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; + } + sslconn = myConnConfig(c); + + if (inlen == 0) { + /* someone tries to trick us? */ + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, c, APLOGNO(02837) + "ALPN client protocol list empty"); + return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; + } + + client_protos = apr_array_make(c->pool, 0, sizeof(char *)); + for (i = 0; i < inlen; /**/) { + unsigned int plen = in[i++]; + if (plen + i > inlen) { + /* someone tries to trick us? */ + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, c, APLOGNO(02838) + "ALPN protocol identifier too long"); + return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; + } + APR_ARRAY_PUSH(client_protos, char *) = + apr_pstrndup(c->pool, (const char *)in+i, plen); + i += plen; + } + + /* The order the callbacks are invoked from TLS extensions is, unfortunately + * not defined and older openssl versions do call ALPN selection before + * they callback the SNI. We need to make sure that we know which vhost + * we are dealing with so we respect the correct protocols. + */ + init_vhost(c, ssl, NULL); + + proposed = ap_select_protocol(c, NULL, sslconn->server, client_protos); + if (!proposed) { + proposed = ap_get_protocol(c); + } + + len = strlen(proposed); + if (len > 255) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, c, APLOGNO(02840) + "ALPN negotiated protocol name too long"); + return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; + } + *out = (const unsigned char *)proposed; + *outlen = (unsigned char)len; + + if (strcmp(proposed, ap_get_protocol(c))) { + apr_status_t status; + + status = ap_switch_protocol(c, NULL, sslconn->server, proposed); + if (status != APR_SUCCESS) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, status, c, + APLOGNO(02908) "protocol switch to '%s' failed", + proposed); + return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; + } + + /* protocol was switched, this could be a challenge protocol such as "acme-tls/1". + * For that to work, we need to allow overrides to our ssl certificate. + * However, exclude challenge checks on our best known traffic protocol. + * (http/1.1 is the default, we never switch to it anyway.) + */ + if (strcmp("h2", proposed)) { + const char *servername = SSL_get_servername(ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name); + X509 *cert; + EVP_PKEY *key; + const char *cert_pem, *key_pem; + + if (ssl_is_challenge(c, servername, &cert, &key, &cert_pem, &key_pem)) { + if (set_challenge_creds(c, servername, ssl, cert, key, + cert_pem, key_pem) != APR_SUCCESS) { + return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; + } + SSL_set_verify(ssl, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, ssl_callback_SSLVerify); + } + } + } + + return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; +} +#endif /* HAVE_TLS_ALPN */ + +#ifdef HAVE_SRP + +int ssl_callback_SRPServerParams(SSL *ssl, int *ad, void *arg) +{ + modssl_ctx_t *mctx = (modssl_ctx_t *)arg; + char *username = SSL_get_srp_username(ssl); + SRP_user_pwd *u; + + if (username == NULL +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L + || (u = SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(mctx->srp_vbase, username)) == NULL) { +#else + || (u = SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(mctx->srp_vbase, username)) == NULL) { +#endif + *ad = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; + return SSL3_AL_FATAL; + } + + if (SSL_set_srp_server_param(ssl, u->N, u->g, u->s, u->v, u->info) < 0) { +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L + SRP_user_pwd_free(u); +#endif + *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return SSL3_AL_FATAL; + } + + /* reset all other options */ +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L + SRP_user_pwd_free(u); +#endif + SSL_set_verify(ssl, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, ssl_callback_SSLVerify); + return SSL_ERROR_NONE; +} + +#endif /* HAVE_SRP */ + + +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_KEYLOG +/* Callback used with SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback. */ +void modssl_callback_keylog(const SSL *ssl, const char *line) +{ + conn_rec *conn = SSL_get_app_data(ssl); + SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(conn->base_server); + + if (sc && sc->mc->keylog_file) { + apr_file_printf(sc->mc->keylog_file, "%s\n", line); + } +} +#endif |