From 6beeb1b708550be0d4a53b272283e17e5e35fe17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Baumann Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2024 17:01:30 +0200 Subject: Adding upstream version 2.4.57. Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann --- modules/ssl/ssl_engine_io.c | 2419 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 2419 insertions(+) create mode 100644 modules/ssl/ssl_engine_io.c (limited to 'modules/ssl/ssl_engine_io.c') diff --git a/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_io.c b/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_io.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f14fc9b --- /dev/null +++ b/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_io.c @@ -0,0 +1,2419 @@ +/* Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. + * The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0 + * (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with + * the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, + * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* _ _ + * _ __ ___ ___ __| | ___ ___| | mod_ssl + * | '_ ` _ \ / _ \ / _` | / __/ __| | Apache Interface to OpenSSL + * | | | | | | (_) | (_| | \__ \__ \ | + * |_| |_| |_|\___/ \__,_|___|___/___/_| + * |_____| + * ssl_engine_io.c + * I/O Functions + */ + /* ``MY HACK: This universe. + Just one little problem: + core keeps dumping.'' + -- Unknown */ +#include "ssl_private.h" +#include "mod_ssl.h" +#include "mod_ssl_openssl.h" +#include "apr_date.h" + +APR_IMPLEMENT_OPTIONAL_HOOK_RUN_ALL(ssl, SSL, int, proxy_post_handshake, + (conn_rec *c,SSL *ssl), + (c,ssl),OK,DECLINED); + +/* _________________________________________________________________ +** +** I/O Hooks +** _________________________________________________________________ +*/ + +/* This file is designed to be the bridge between OpenSSL and httpd. + * However, we really don't expect anyone (let alone ourselves) to + * remember what is in this file. So, first, a quick overview. + * + * In this file, you will find: + * - ssl_io_filter_input (Apache input filter) + * - ssl_io_filter_output (Apache output filter) + * + * - bio_filter_in_* (OpenSSL input filter) + * - bio_filter_out_* (OpenSSL output filter) + * + * The input chain is roughly: + * + * ssl_io_filter_input->ssl_io_input_read->SSL_read->... + * ...->bio_filter_in_read->ap_get_brigade/next-httpd-filter + * + * In mortal terminology, we do the following: + * - Receive a request for data to the SSL input filter + * - Call a helper function once we know we should perform a read + * - Call OpenSSL's SSL_read() + * - SSL_read() will then call bio_filter_in_read + * - bio_filter_in_read will then try to fetch data from the next httpd filter + * - bio_filter_in_read will flatten that data and return it to SSL_read + * - SSL_read will then decrypt the data + * - ssl_io_input_read will then receive decrypted data as a char* and + * ensure that there were no read errors + * - The char* is placed in a brigade and returned + * + * Since connection-level input filters in httpd need to be able to + * handle AP_MODE_GETLINE calls (namely identifying LF-terminated strings), + * ssl_io_input_getline which will handle this special case. + * + * Due to AP_MODE_GETLINE and AP_MODE_SPECULATIVE, we may sometimes have + * 'leftover' decoded data which must be setaside for the next read. That + * is currently handled by the char_buffer_{read|write} functions. So, + * ssl_io_input_read may be able to fulfill reads without invoking + * SSL_read(). + * + * Note that the filter context of ssl_io_filter_input and bio_filter_in_* + * are shared as bio_filter_in_ctx_t. + * + * Note that the filter is by choice limited to reading at most + * AP_IOBUFSIZE (8192 bytes) per call. + * + */ + +/* this custom BIO allows us to hook SSL_write directly into + * an apr_bucket_brigade and use transient buckets with the SSL + * malloc-ed buffer, rather than copying into a mem BIO. + * also allows us to pass the brigade as data is being written + * rather than buffering up the entire response in the mem BIO. + * + * when SSL needs to flush (e.g. SSL_accept()), it will call BIO_flush() + * which will trigger a call to bio_filter_out_ctrl() -> bio_filter_out_flush(). + * so we only need to flush the output ourselves if we receive an + * EOS or FLUSH bucket. this was not possible with the mem BIO where we + * had to flush all over the place not really knowing when it was required + * to do so. + */ + +typedef struct { + SSL *pssl; + BIO *pbioRead; + BIO *pbioWrite; + ap_filter_t *pInputFilter; + ap_filter_t *pOutputFilter; + SSLConnRec *config; +} ssl_filter_ctx_t; + +typedef struct { + ssl_filter_ctx_t *filter_ctx; + conn_rec *c; + apr_bucket_brigade *bb; /* Brigade used as a buffer. */ + apr_status_t rc; +} bio_filter_out_ctx_t; + +static bio_filter_out_ctx_t *bio_filter_out_ctx_new(ssl_filter_ctx_t *filter_ctx, + conn_rec *c) +{ + bio_filter_out_ctx_t *outctx = apr_palloc(c->pool, sizeof(*outctx)); + + outctx->filter_ctx = filter_ctx; + outctx->c = c; + outctx->bb = apr_brigade_create(c->pool, c->bucket_alloc); + + return outctx; +} + +/* Pass an output brigade down the filter stack; returns 1 on success + * or -1 on failure. */ +static int bio_filter_out_pass(bio_filter_out_ctx_t *outctx) +{ + AP_DEBUG_ASSERT(!APR_BRIGADE_EMPTY(outctx->bb)); + + outctx->rc = ap_pass_brigade(outctx->filter_ctx->pOutputFilter->next, + outctx->bb); + /* Fail if the connection was reset: */ + if (outctx->rc == APR_SUCCESS && outctx->c->aborted) { + outctx->rc = APR_ECONNRESET; + } + return (outctx->rc == APR_SUCCESS) ? 1 : -1; +} + +/* Send a FLUSH bucket down the output filter stack; returns 1 on + * success, -1 on failure. */ +static int bio_filter_out_flush(BIO *bio) +{ + bio_filter_out_ctx_t *outctx = (bio_filter_out_ctx_t *)BIO_get_data(bio); + apr_bucket *e; + + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE6, 0, outctx->c, + "bio_filter_out_write: flush"); + + AP_DEBUG_ASSERT(APR_BRIGADE_EMPTY(outctx->bb)); + + e = apr_bucket_flush_create(outctx->bb->bucket_alloc); + APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(outctx->bb, e); + + return bio_filter_out_pass(outctx); +} + +static int bio_filter_create(BIO *bio) +{ + BIO_set_shutdown(bio, 1); + BIO_set_init(bio, 1); +#if MODSSL_USE_OPENSSL_PRE_1_1_API + /* No setter method for OpenSSL 1.1.0 available, + * but I can't find any functional use of the + * "num" field there either. + */ + bio->num = -1; +#endif + BIO_set_data(bio, NULL); + + return 1; +} + +static int bio_filter_destroy(BIO *bio) +{ + if (bio == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + /* nothing to free here. + * apache will destroy the bucket brigade for us + */ + return 1; +} + +static int bio_filter_out_read(BIO *bio, char *out, int outl) +{ + /* this is never called */ + bio_filter_out_ctx_t *outctx = (bio_filter_out_ctx_t *)BIO_get_data(bio); + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, outctx->c, + "BUG: %s() should not be called", "bio_filter_out_read"); + AP_DEBUG_ASSERT(0); + return -1; +} + +static int bio_filter_out_write(BIO *bio, const char *in, int inl) +{ + bio_filter_out_ctx_t *outctx = (bio_filter_out_ctx_t *)BIO_get_data(bio); + apr_bucket *e; + int need_flush; + + BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); + + /* Abort early if the client has initiated a renegotiation. */ + if (outctx->filter_ctx->config->reneg_state == RENEG_ABORT) { + outctx->rc = APR_ECONNABORTED; + return -1; + } + + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE6, 0, outctx->c, + "bio_filter_out_write: %i bytes", inl); + + /* Use a transient bucket for the output data - any downstream + * filter must setaside if necessary. */ + e = apr_bucket_transient_create(in, inl, outctx->bb->bucket_alloc); + APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(outctx->bb, e); + + /* In theory, OpenSSL should flush as necessary, but it is known + * not to do so correctly in some cases (< 0.9.8m; see PR 46952), + * or on the proxy/client side (after ssl23_client_hello(), e.g. + * ssl/proxy.t test suite). + * + * Historically, this flush call was performed only for an SSLv2 + * connection or for a proxy connection. Calling _out_flush can + * be expensive in cases where requests/responses are pipelined, + * so limit the performance impact to handshake time. + */ +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0009080df + need_flush = !SSL_is_init_finished(outctx->filter_ctx->pssl); +#else + need_flush = SSL_in_connect_init(outctx->filter_ctx->pssl); +#endif + if (need_flush) { + e = apr_bucket_flush_create(outctx->bb->bucket_alloc); + APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(outctx->bb, e); + } + + if (bio_filter_out_pass(outctx) < 0) { + return -1; + } + + return inl; +} + +static long bio_filter_out_ctrl(BIO *bio, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) +{ + long ret = 1; + bio_filter_out_ctx_t *outctx = (bio_filter_out_ctx_t *)BIO_get_data(bio); + + switch (cmd) { + case BIO_CTRL_RESET: + case BIO_CTRL_EOF: + case BIO_C_SET_BUF_MEM_EOF_RETURN: + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE4, 0, outctx->c, + "output bio: unhandled control %d", cmd); + ret = 0; + break; + case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING: + case BIO_CTRL_PENDING: + case BIO_CTRL_INFO: + ret = 0; + break; + case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE: + ret = (long)BIO_get_shutdown(bio); + break; + case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE: + BIO_set_shutdown(bio, (int)num); + break; + case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH: + ret = bio_filter_out_flush(bio); + break; + case BIO_CTRL_DUP: + ret = 1; + break; + /* N/A */ + case BIO_C_SET_BUF_MEM: + case BIO_C_GET_BUF_MEM_PTR: + /* we don't care */ + case BIO_CTRL_PUSH: + case BIO_CTRL_POP: + default: + ret = 0; + break; + } + + return ret; +} + +static int bio_filter_out_gets(BIO *bio, char *buf, int size) +{ + /* this is never called */ + bio_filter_out_ctx_t *outctx = (bio_filter_out_ctx_t *)BIO_get_data(bio); + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, outctx->c, + "BUG: %s() should not be called", "bio_filter_out_gets"); + AP_DEBUG_ASSERT(0); + return -1; +} + +static int bio_filter_out_puts(BIO *bio, const char *str) +{ + /* this is never called */ + bio_filter_out_ctx_t *outctx = (bio_filter_out_ctx_t *)BIO_get_data(bio); + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, outctx->c, + "BUG: %s() should not be called", "bio_filter_out_puts"); + AP_DEBUG_ASSERT(0); + return -1; +} + +typedef struct { + int length; + char *value; +} char_buffer_t; + +typedef struct { + SSL *ssl; + BIO *bio_out; + ap_filter_t *f; + apr_status_t rc; + ap_input_mode_t mode; + apr_read_type_e block; + apr_bucket_brigade *bb; + char_buffer_t cbuf; + apr_pool_t *pool; + char buffer[AP_IOBUFSIZE]; + ssl_filter_ctx_t *filter_ctx; +} bio_filter_in_ctx_t; + +/* + * this char_buffer api might seem silly, but we don't need to copy + * any of this data and we need to remember the length. + */ + +/* Copy up to INL bytes from the char_buffer BUFFER into IN. Note + * that due to the strange way this API is designed/used, the + * char_buffer object is used to cache a segment of inctx->buffer, and + * then this function called to copy (part of) that segment to the + * beginning of inctx->buffer. So the segments to copy cannot be + * presumed to be non-overlapping, and memmove must be used. */ +static int char_buffer_read(char_buffer_t *buffer, char *in, int inl) +{ + if (!buffer->length) { + return 0; + } + + if (buffer->length > inl) { + /* we have enough to fill the caller's buffer */ + memmove(in, buffer->value, inl); + buffer->value += inl; + buffer->length -= inl; + } + else { + /* swallow remainder of the buffer */ + memmove(in, buffer->value, buffer->length); + inl = buffer->length; + buffer->value = NULL; + buffer->length = 0; + } + + return inl; +} + +static int char_buffer_write(char_buffer_t *buffer, char *in, int inl) +{ + buffer->value = in; + buffer->length = inl; + return inl; +} + +/* This function will read from a brigade and discard the read buckets as it + * proceeds. It will read at most *len bytes. + */ +static apr_status_t brigade_consume(apr_bucket_brigade *bb, + apr_read_type_e block, + char *c, apr_size_t *len) +{ + apr_size_t actual = 0; + apr_status_t status = APR_SUCCESS; + + while (!APR_BRIGADE_EMPTY(bb)) { + apr_bucket *b = APR_BRIGADE_FIRST(bb); + const char *str; + apr_size_t str_len; + apr_size_t consume; + + /* Justin points out this is an http-ism that might + * not fit if brigade_consume is added to APR. Perhaps + * apr_bucket_read(eos_bucket) should return APR_EOF? + * Then this becomes mainline instead of a one-off. + */ + if (APR_BUCKET_IS_EOS(b)) { + status = APR_EOF; + break; + } + + /* The reason I'm not offering brigade_consume yet + * across to apr-util is that the following call + * illustrates how borked that API really is. For + * this sort of case (caller provided buffer) it + * would be much more trivial for apr_bucket_consume + * to do all the work that follows, based on the + * particular characteristics of the bucket we are + * consuming here. + */ + status = apr_bucket_read(b, &str, &str_len, block); + + if (status != APR_SUCCESS) { + if (APR_STATUS_IS_EOF(status)) { + /* This stream bucket was consumed */ + apr_bucket_delete(b); + continue; + } + break; + } + + if (str_len > 0) { + /* Do not block once some data has been consumed */ + block = APR_NONBLOCK_READ; + + /* Assure we don't overflow. */ + consume = (str_len + actual > *len) ? *len - actual : str_len; + + memcpy(c, str, consume); + + c += consume; + actual += consume; + + if (consume >= b->length) { + /* This physical bucket was consumed */ + apr_bucket_delete(b); + } + else { + /* Only part of this physical bucket was consumed */ + b->start += consume; + b->length -= consume; + } + } + else if (b->length == 0) { + apr_bucket_delete(b); + } + + /* This could probably be actual == *len, but be safe from stray + * photons. */ + if (actual >= *len) { + break; + } + } + + *len = actual; + return status; +} + +/* + * this is the function called by SSL_read() + */ +static int bio_filter_in_read(BIO *bio, char *in, int inlen) +{ + apr_size_t inl = inlen; + bio_filter_in_ctx_t *inctx = (bio_filter_in_ctx_t *)BIO_get_data(bio); + apr_read_type_e block = inctx->block; + + inctx->rc = APR_SUCCESS; + + /* OpenSSL catches this case, so should we. */ + if (!in) + return 0; + + BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); + + /* Abort early if the client has initiated a renegotiation. */ + if (inctx->filter_ctx->config->reneg_state == RENEG_ABORT) { + inctx->rc = APR_ECONNABORTED; + return -1; + } + + if (!inctx->bb) { + inctx->rc = APR_EOF; + return -1; + } + + if (APR_BRIGADE_EMPTY(inctx->bb)) { + + inctx->rc = ap_get_brigade(inctx->f->next, inctx->bb, + AP_MODE_READBYTES, block, + inl); + + /* If the read returns EAGAIN or success with an empty + * brigade, return an error after setting the retry flag; + * SSL_read() will then return -1, and SSL_get_error() will + * indicate SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ. */ + if (APR_STATUS_IS_EAGAIN(inctx->rc) || APR_STATUS_IS_EINTR(inctx->rc) + || (inctx->rc == APR_SUCCESS && APR_BRIGADE_EMPTY(inctx->bb))) { + BIO_set_retry_read(bio); + return -1; + } + + if (block == APR_BLOCK_READ + && APR_STATUS_IS_TIMEUP(inctx->rc) + && APR_BRIGADE_EMPTY(inctx->bb)) { + /* don't give up, just return the timeout */ + return -1; + } + if (inctx->rc != APR_SUCCESS) { + /* Unexpected errors discard the brigade */ + apr_brigade_cleanup(inctx->bb); + inctx->bb = NULL; + return -1; + } + } + + inctx->rc = brigade_consume(inctx->bb, block, in, &inl); + + if (inctx->rc == APR_SUCCESS) { + return (int)inl; + } + + if (APR_STATUS_IS_EAGAIN(inctx->rc) + || APR_STATUS_IS_EINTR(inctx->rc)) { + BIO_set_retry_read(bio); + return (int)inl; + } + + /* Unexpected errors and APR_EOF clean out the brigade. + * Subsequent calls will return APR_EOF. + */ + apr_brigade_cleanup(inctx->bb); + inctx->bb = NULL; + + if (APR_STATUS_IS_EOF(inctx->rc) && inl) { + /* Provide the results of this read pass, + * without resetting the BIO retry_read flag + */ + return (int)inl; + } + + return -1; +} + +static int bio_filter_in_write(BIO *bio, const char *in, int inl) +{ + bio_filter_in_ctx_t *inctx = (bio_filter_in_ctx_t *)BIO_get_data(bio); + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, inctx->f->c, + "BUG: %s() should not be called", "bio_filter_in_write"); + AP_DEBUG_ASSERT(0); + return -1; +} + +static int bio_filter_in_puts(BIO *bio, const char *str) +{ + bio_filter_in_ctx_t *inctx = (bio_filter_in_ctx_t *)BIO_get_data(bio); + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, inctx->f->c, + "BUG: %s() should not be called", "bio_filter_in_puts"); + AP_DEBUG_ASSERT(0); + return -1; +} + +static int bio_filter_in_gets(BIO *bio, char *buf, int size) +{ + bio_filter_in_ctx_t *inctx = (bio_filter_in_ctx_t *)BIO_get_data(bio); + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, inctx->f->c, + "BUG: %s() should not be called", "bio_filter_in_gets"); + AP_DEBUG_ASSERT(0); + return -1; +} + +static long bio_filter_in_ctrl(BIO *bio, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) +{ + bio_filter_in_ctx_t *inctx = (bio_filter_in_ctx_t *)BIO_get_data(bio); + switch (cmd) { +#ifdef BIO_CTRL_EOF + case BIO_CTRL_EOF: + return inctx->rc == APR_EOF; +#endif + default: + break; + } + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, inctx->f->c, + "BUG: bio_filter_in_ctrl() should not be called with cmd=%i", + cmd); + return 0; +} + +#if MODSSL_USE_OPENSSL_PRE_1_1_API + +static BIO_METHOD bio_filter_out_method = { + BIO_TYPE_MEM, + "APR output filter", + bio_filter_out_write, + bio_filter_out_read, /* read is never called */ + bio_filter_out_puts, /* puts is never called */ + bio_filter_out_gets, /* gets is never called */ + bio_filter_out_ctrl, + bio_filter_create, + bio_filter_destroy, + NULL +}; + +static BIO_METHOD bio_filter_in_method = { + BIO_TYPE_MEM, + "APR input filter", + bio_filter_in_write, /* write is never called */ + bio_filter_in_read, + bio_filter_in_puts, /* puts is never called */ + bio_filter_in_gets, /* gets is never called */ + bio_filter_in_ctrl, /* ctrl is called for EOF check */ + bio_filter_create, + bio_filter_destroy, + NULL +}; + +#else + +static BIO_METHOD *bio_filter_out_method = NULL; +static BIO_METHOD *bio_filter_in_method = NULL; + +void init_bio_methods(void) +{ + bio_filter_out_method = BIO_meth_new(BIO_TYPE_MEM, "APR output filter"); + BIO_meth_set_write(bio_filter_out_method, &bio_filter_out_write); + BIO_meth_set_read(bio_filter_out_method, &bio_filter_out_read); /* read is never called */ + BIO_meth_set_puts(bio_filter_out_method, &bio_filter_out_puts); /* puts is never called */ + BIO_meth_set_gets(bio_filter_out_method, &bio_filter_out_gets); /* gets is never called */ + BIO_meth_set_ctrl(bio_filter_out_method, &bio_filter_out_ctrl); + BIO_meth_set_create(bio_filter_out_method, &bio_filter_create); + BIO_meth_set_destroy(bio_filter_out_method, &bio_filter_destroy); + + bio_filter_in_method = BIO_meth_new(BIO_TYPE_MEM, "APR input filter"); + BIO_meth_set_write(bio_filter_in_method, &bio_filter_in_write); /* write is never called */ + BIO_meth_set_read(bio_filter_in_method, &bio_filter_in_read); + BIO_meth_set_puts(bio_filter_in_method, &bio_filter_in_puts); /* puts is never called */ + BIO_meth_set_gets(bio_filter_in_method, &bio_filter_in_gets); /* gets is never called */ + BIO_meth_set_ctrl(bio_filter_in_method, &bio_filter_in_ctrl); /* ctrl is never called */ + BIO_meth_set_create(bio_filter_in_method, &bio_filter_create); + BIO_meth_set_destroy(bio_filter_in_method, &bio_filter_destroy); +} + +void free_bio_methods(void) +{ + BIO_meth_free(bio_filter_out_method); + BIO_meth_free(bio_filter_in_method); +} +#endif + +static apr_status_t ssl_io_input_read(bio_filter_in_ctx_t *inctx, + char *buf, + apr_size_t *len) +{ + apr_size_t wanted = *len; + apr_size_t bytes = 0; + int rc; + + *len = 0; + + /* If we have something leftover from last time, try that first. */ + if ((bytes = char_buffer_read(&inctx->cbuf, buf, wanted))) { + *len = bytes; + if (inctx->mode == AP_MODE_SPECULATIVE) { + /* We want to rollback this read. */ + if (inctx->cbuf.length > 0) { + inctx->cbuf.value -= bytes; + inctx->cbuf.length += bytes; + } else { + char_buffer_write(&inctx->cbuf, buf, (int)bytes); + } + return APR_SUCCESS; + } + /* This could probably be *len == wanted, but be safe from stray + * photons. + */ + if (*len >= wanted) { + return APR_SUCCESS; + } + if (inctx->mode == AP_MODE_GETLINE) { + if (memchr(buf, APR_ASCII_LF, *len)) { + return APR_SUCCESS; + } + } + else { + /* Down to a nonblock pattern as we have some data already + */ + inctx->block = APR_NONBLOCK_READ; + } + } + + while (1) { + + if (!inctx->filter_ctx->pssl) { + /* Ensure a non-zero error code is returned */ + if (inctx->rc == APR_SUCCESS) { + inctx->rc = APR_EGENERAL; + } + break; + } + + /* We rely on SSL_get_error() after the read, which requires an empty + * error queue before the read in order to work properly. + */ + ERR_clear_error(); + + /* SSL_read may not read because we haven't taken enough data + * from the stack. This is where we want to consider all of + * the blocking and SPECULATIVE semantics + */ + rc = SSL_read(inctx->filter_ctx->pssl, buf + bytes, wanted - bytes); + + if (rc > 0) { + *len += rc; + if (inctx->mode == AP_MODE_SPECULATIVE) { + /* We want to rollback this read. */ + char_buffer_write(&inctx->cbuf, buf, rc); + } + return inctx->rc; + } + else /* (rc <= 0) */ { + int ssl_err; + conn_rec *c; + if (rc == 0) { + /* If EAGAIN, we will loop given a blocking read, + * otherwise consider ourselves at EOF. + */ + if (APR_STATUS_IS_EAGAIN(inctx->rc) + || APR_STATUS_IS_EINTR(inctx->rc)) { + /* Already read something, return APR_SUCCESS instead. + * On win32 in particular, but perhaps on other kernels, + * a blocking call isn't 'always' blocking. + */ + if (*len > 0) { + inctx->rc = APR_SUCCESS; + break; + } + if (inctx->block == APR_NONBLOCK_READ) { + break; + } + } + else { + if (*len > 0) { + inctx->rc = APR_SUCCESS; + break; + } + } + } + ssl_err = SSL_get_error(inctx->filter_ctx->pssl, rc); + c = (conn_rec*)SSL_get_app_data(inctx->filter_ctx->pssl); + + if (ssl_err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) { + /* + * If OpenSSL wants to read more, and we were nonblocking, + * report as an EAGAIN. Otherwise loop, pulling more + * data from network filter. + * + * (This is usually the case when the client forces an SSL + * renegotiation which is handled implicitly by OpenSSL.) + */ + inctx->rc = APR_EAGAIN; + + if (*len > 0) { + inctx->rc = APR_SUCCESS; + break; + } + if (inctx->block == APR_NONBLOCK_READ) { + break; + } + continue; /* Blocking and nothing yet? Try again. */ + } + else if (ssl_err == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL) { + if (APR_STATUS_IS_EAGAIN(inctx->rc) + || APR_STATUS_IS_EINTR(inctx->rc)) { + /* Already read something, return APR_SUCCESS instead. */ + if (*len > 0) { + inctx->rc = APR_SUCCESS; + break; + } + if (inctx->block == APR_NONBLOCK_READ) { + break; + } + continue; /* Blocking and nothing yet? Try again. */ + } + else if (APR_STATUS_IS_TIMEUP(inctx->rc)) { + /* just return it, the calling layer might be fine with it, + and we do not want to bloat the log. */ + } + else { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, inctx->rc, c, APLOGNO(01991) + "SSL input filter read failed."); + } + } + else if (rc == 0 && ssl_err == SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN) { + inctx->rc = APR_EOF; + break; + } + else /* if (ssl_err == SSL_ERROR_SSL) */ { + /* + * Log SSL errors and any unexpected conditions. + */ + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, inctx->rc, c, APLOGNO(01992) + "SSL library error %d reading data", ssl_err); + ssl_log_ssl_error(SSLLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, mySrvFromConn(c)); + + } + if (rc == 0) { + inctx->rc = APR_EOF; + break; + } + if (inctx->rc == APR_SUCCESS) { + inctx->rc = APR_EGENERAL; + } + break; + } + } + return inctx->rc; +} + +/* Read a line of input from the SSL input layer into buffer BUF of + * length *LEN; updating *len to reflect the length of the line + * including the LF character. */ +static apr_status_t ssl_io_input_getline(bio_filter_in_ctx_t *inctx, + char *buf, + apr_size_t *len) +{ + const char *pos = NULL; + apr_status_t status; + apr_size_t tmplen = *len, buflen = *len, offset = 0; + + *len = 0; + + /* + * in most cases we get all the headers on the first SSL_read. + * however, in certain cases SSL_read will only get a partial + * chunk of the headers, so we try to read until LF is seen. + */ + + while (tmplen > 0) { + status = ssl_io_input_read(inctx, buf + offset, &tmplen); + + if (status != APR_SUCCESS) { + if (APR_STATUS_IS_EAGAIN(status) && (*len > 0)) { + /* Save the part of the line we already got */ + char_buffer_write(&inctx->cbuf, buf, *len); + } + return status; + } + + *len += tmplen; + + if ((pos = memchr(buf, APR_ASCII_LF, *len))) { + break; + } + + offset += tmplen; + tmplen = buflen - offset; + } + + if (pos) { + char *value; + int length; + apr_size_t bytes = pos - buf; + + bytes += 1; + value = buf + bytes; + length = *len - bytes; + + char_buffer_write(&inctx->cbuf, value, length); + + *len = bytes; + } + + return APR_SUCCESS; +} + + +static apr_status_t ssl_filter_write(ap_filter_t *f, + const char *data, + apr_size_t len) +{ + ssl_filter_ctx_t *filter_ctx = f->ctx; + bio_filter_out_ctx_t *outctx; + int res; + + /* write SSL */ + if (filter_ctx->pssl == NULL) { + return APR_EGENERAL; + } + + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE6, 0, f->c, + "ssl_filter_write: %"APR_SIZE_T_FMT" bytes", len); + + /* We rely on SSL_get_error() after the write, which requires an empty error + * queue before the write in order to work properly. + */ + ERR_clear_error(); + + outctx = (bio_filter_out_ctx_t *)BIO_get_data(filter_ctx->pbioWrite); + res = SSL_write(filter_ctx->pssl, (unsigned char *)data, len); + + if (res < 0) { + int ssl_err = SSL_get_error(filter_ctx->pssl, res); + conn_rec *c = (conn_rec*)SSL_get_app_data(outctx->filter_ctx->pssl); + + if (ssl_err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE) { + /* + * If OpenSSL wants to write more, and we were nonblocking, + * report as an EAGAIN. Otherwise loop, pushing more + * data at the network filter. + * + * (This is usually the case when the client forces an SSL + * renegotiation which is handled implicitly by OpenSSL.) + */ + outctx->rc = APR_EAGAIN; + } + else if (ssl_err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) { + /* + * If OpenSSL wants to read during write, and we were + * nonblocking, set the sense explicitly to read and + * report as an EAGAIN. + * + * (This is usually the case when the client forces an SSL + * renegotiation which is handled implicitly by OpenSSL.) + */ + outctx->c->cs->sense = CONN_SENSE_WANT_READ; + outctx->rc = APR_EAGAIN; + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE6, 0, outctx->c, + "Want read during nonblocking write"); + } + else if (ssl_err == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, outctx->rc, c, APLOGNO(01993) + "SSL output filter write failed."); + } + else /* if (ssl_err == SSL_ERROR_SSL) */ { + /* + * Log SSL errors + */ + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, outctx->rc, c, APLOGNO(01994) + "SSL library error %d writing data", ssl_err); + ssl_log_ssl_error(SSLLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, mySrvFromConn(c)); + } + if (outctx->rc == APR_SUCCESS) { + outctx->rc = APR_EGENERAL; + } + } + else if ((apr_size_t)res != len) { + conn_rec *c = f->c; + char *reason = "reason unknown"; + + /* XXX: probably a better way to determine this */ + if (SSL_total_renegotiations(filter_ctx->pssl)) { + reason = "likely due to failed renegotiation"; + } + + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, outctx->rc, c, APLOGNO(01995) + "failed to write %" APR_SSIZE_T_FMT + " of %" APR_SIZE_T_FMT " bytes (%s)", + len - (apr_size_t)res, len, reason); + + outctx->rc = APR_EGENERAL; + } + return outctx->rc; +} + +/* Just use a simple request. Any request will work for this, because + * we use a flag in the conn_rec->conn_vector now. The fake request just + * gets the request back to the Apache core so that a response can be sent. + * Since we use an HTTP/1.x request, we also have to inject the empty line + * that terminates the headers, or the core will read more data from the + * socket. + */ +#define HTTP_ON_HTTPS_PORT \ + "GET / HTTP/1.0" CRLF + +#define HTTP_ON_HTTPS_PORT_BUCKET(alloc) \ + apr_bucket_immortal_create(HTTP_ON_HTTPS_PORT, \ + sizeof(HTTP_ON_HTTPS_PORT) - 1, \ + alloc) + +/* Custom apr_status_t error code, used when a plain HTTP request is + * received on an SSL port. */ +#define MODSSL_ERROR_HTTP_ON_HTTPS (APR_OS_START_USERERR + 0) + +/* Custom apr_status_t error code, used when the proxy cannot + * establish an outgoing SSL connection. */ +#define MODSSL_ERROR_BAD_GATEWAY (APR_OS_START_USERERR + 1) + +static void ssl_io_filter_disable(SSLConnRec *sslconn, + bio_filter_in_ctx_t *inctx) +{ + SSL_free(inctx->ssl); + sslconn->ssl = NULL; + inctx->ssl = NULL; + inctx->filter_ctx->pssl = NULL; +} + +static apr_status_t ssl_io_filter_error(bio_filter_in_ctx_t *inctx, + apr_bucket_brigade *bb, + apr_status_t status, + int is_init) +{ + ap_filter_t *f = inctx->f; + SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(f->c); + apr_bucket *bucket; + int send_eos = 1; + + switch (status) { + case MODSSL_ERROR_HTTP_ON_HTTPS: + /* log the situation */ + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, f->c, APLOGNO(01996) + "SSL handshake failed: HTTP spoken on HTTPS port; " + "trying to send HTML error page"); + ssl_log_ssl_error(SSLLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, sslconn->server); + + ssl_io_filter_disable(sslconn, inctx); + f->c->keepalive = AP_CONN_CLOSE; + if (is_init) { + sslconn->non_ssl_request = NON_SSL_SEND_REQLINE; + return APR_EGENERAL; + } + sslconn->non_ssl_request = NON_SSL_SEND_HDR_SEP; + + /* fake the request line */ + bucket = HTTP_ON_HTTPS_PORT_BUCKET(f->c->bucket_alloc); + send_eos = 0; + break; + + case MODSSL_ERROR_BAD_GATEWAY: + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, f->c, APLOGNO(01997) + "SSL handshake failed: sending 502"); + f->c->aborted = 1; + return APR_EGENERAL; + + default: + return status; + } + + APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(bb, bucket); + if (send_eos) { + bucket = apr_bucket_eos_create(f->c->bucket_alloc); + APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(bb, bucket); + } + return APR_SUCCESS; +} + +static const char ssl_io_filter[] = "SSL/TLS Filter"; +static const char ssl_io_buffer[] = "SSL/TLS Buffer"; +static const char ssl_io_coalesce[] = "SSL/TLS Coalescing Filter"; + +/* + * Close the SSL part of the socket connection + * (called immediately _before_ the socket is closed) + * or called with + */ +static void ssl_filter_io_shutdown(ssl_filter_ctx_t *filter_ctx, + conn_rec *c, int abortive) +{ + SSL *ssl = filter_ctx->pssl; + const char *type = ""; + SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(c); + int shutdown_type; + int loglevel = APLOG_DEBUG; + const char *logno; + + if (!ssl) { + return; + } + + /* + * Now close the SSL layer of the connection. We've to take + * the TLSv1 standard into account here: + * + * | 7.2.1. Closure alerts + * | + * | The client and the server must share knowledge that the connection is + * | ending in order to avoid a truncation attack. Either party may + * | initiate the exchange of closing messages. + * | + * | close_notify + * | This message notifies the recipient that the sender will not send + * | any more messages on this connection. The session becomes + * | unresumable if any connection is terminated without proper + * | close_notify messages with level equal to warning. + * | + * | Either party may initiate a close by sending a close_notify alert. + * | Any data received after a closure alert is ignored. + * | + * | Each party is required to send a close_notify alert before closing + * | the write side of the connection. It is required that the other party + * | respond with a close_notify alert of its own and close down the + * | connection immediately, discarding any pending writes. It is not + * | required for the initiator of the close to wait for the responding + * | close_notify alert before closing the read side of the connection. + * + * This means we've to send a close notify message, but haven't to wait + * for the close notify of the client. Actually we cannot wait for the + * close notify of the client because some clients (including Netscape + * 4.x) don't send one, so we would hang. + */ + + /* + * exchange close notify messages, but allow the user + * to force the type of handshake via SetEnvIf directive + */ + if (abortive) { + shutdown_type = SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; + type = "abortive"; + logno = APLOGNO(01998); + loglevel = APLOG_INFO; + } + else switch (sslconn->shutdown_type) { + case SSL_SHUTDOWN_TYPE_UNCLEAN: + /* perform no close notify handshake at all + (violates the SSL/TLS standard!) */ + shutdown_type = SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; + type = "unclean"; + logno = APLOGNO(01999); + break; + case SSL_SHUTDOWN_TYPE_ACCURATE: + /* send close notify and wait for clients close notify + (standard compliant, but usually causes connection hangs) */ + shutdown_type = 0; + type = "accurate"; + logno = APLOGNO(02000); + break; + default: + /* + * case SSL_SHUTDOWN_TYPE_UNSET: + * case SSL_SHUTDOWN_TYPE_STANDARD: + */ + /* send close notify, but don't wait for clients close notify + (standard compliant and safe, so it's the DEFAULT!) */ + shutdown_type = SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; + type = "standard"; + logno = APLOGNO(02001); + break; + } + + SSL_set_shutdown(ssl, shutdown_type); + modssl_smart_shutdown(ssl); + + /* and finally log the fact that we've closed the connection */ + if (APLOG_CS_IS_LEVEL(c, mySrvFromConn(c), loglevel)) { + /* Intentional no APLOGNO */ + /* logno provides APLOGNO */ + ap_log_cserror(APLOG_MARK, loglevel, 0, c, mySrvFromConn(c), + "%sConnection closed to child %ld with %s shutdown " + "(server %s)", + logno, c->id, type, + ssl_util_vhostid(c->pool, mySrvFromConn(c))); + } + + /* deallocate the SSL connection */ + if (sslconn->client_cert) { + X509_free(sslconn->client_cert); + sslconn->client_cert = NULL; + } + SSL_free(ssl); + sslconn->ssl = NULL; + filter_ctx->pssl = NULL; /* so filters know we've been shutdown */ + + if (abortive) { + /* prevent any further I/O */ + c->aborted = 1; + } +} + +static apr_status_t ssl_io_filter_cleanup(void *data) +{ + ssl_filter_ctx_t *filter_ctx = data; + + if (filter_ctx->pssl) { + conn_rec *c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(filter_ctx->pssl); + SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(c); + + SSL_free(filter_ctx->pssl); + sslconn->ssl = filter_ctx->pssl = NULL; + } + + return APR_SUCCESS; +} + +/* + * The hook is NOT registered with ap_hook_process_connection. Instead, it is + * called manually from the churn () before it tries to read any data. + * There is some problem if I accept conn_rec *. Still investigating.. + * Adv. if conn_rec * can be accepted is we can hook this function using the + * ap_hook_process_connection hook. + */ + +/* Perform the SSL handshake (whether in client or server mode), if + * necessary, for the given connection. */ +static apr_status_t ssl_io_filter_handshake(ssl_filter_ctx_t *filter_ctx) +{ + conn_rec *c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(filter_ctx->pssl); + SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(c); + SSLSrvConfigRec *sc; + X509 *cert; + int n; + int ssl_err; + long verify_result; + server_rec *server; + + if (SSL_is_init_finished(filter_ctx->pssl)) { + return APR_SUCCESS; + } + + server = sslconn->server; + if (c->outgoing) { +#ifdef HAVE_TLSEXT + apr_ipsubnet_t *ip; +#ifdef HAVE_TLS_ALPN + const char *alpn_note; + apr_array_header_t *alpn_proposed = NULL; + int alpn_empty_ok = 1; +#endif +#endif + const char *hostname_note = apr_table_get(c->notes, + "proxy-request-hostname"); + BOOL proxy_ssl_check_peer_ok = TRUE; + int post_handshake_rc = OK; + SSLDirConfigRec *dc; + + dc = sslconn->dc; + sc = mySrvConfig(server); + +#ifdef HAVE_TLSEXT +#ifdef HAVE_TLS_ALPN + alpn_note = apr_table_get(c->notes, "proxy-request-alpn-protos"); + if (alpn_note) { + char *protos, *s, *p, *last, *proto; + apr_size_t len; + + /* Transform the note into a protocol formatted byte array: + * (len-byte proto-char+)* + * We need the remote server to agree on one of these, unless 'http/1.1' + * is also among our proposals. Because pre-ALPN remotes will speak this. + */ + alpn_proposed = apr_array_make(c->pool, 3, sizeof(const char*)); + alpn_empty_ok = 0; + s = protos = apr_pcalloc(c->pool, strlen(alpn_note)+1); + p = apr_pstrdup(c->pool, alpn_note); + while ((p = apr_strtok(p, ", ", &last))) { + len = last - p - (*last? 1 : 0); + if (len > 255) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, c, APLOGNO(03309) + "ALPN proxy protocol identifier too long: %s", + p); + ssl_log_ssl_error(SSLLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, server); + return APR_EGENERAL; + } + proto = apr_pstrndup(c->pool, p, len); + APR_ARRAY_PUSH(alpn_proposed, const char*) = proto; + if (!strcmp("http/1.1", proto)) { + alpn_empty_ok = 1; + } + *s++ = (unsigned char)len; + while (len--) { + *s++ = *p++; + } + p = NULL; + } + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, c, + "setting alpn protos from '%s', protolen=%d", + alpn_note, (int)(s - protos)); + if (protos != s && SSL_set_alpn_protos(filter_ctx->pssl, + (unsigned char *)protos, + s - protos)) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, c, APLOGNO(03310) + "error setting alpn protos from '%s'", alpn_note); + ssl_log_ssl_error(SSLLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, server); + /* If ALPN was requested and we cannot do it, we must fail */ + return MODSSL_ERROR_BAD_GATEWAY; + } + } +#endif /* defined HAVE_TLS_ALPN */ + /* + * Enable SNI for backend requests. Make sure we don't do it for + * pure SSLv3 connections, and also prevent IP addresses + * from being included in the SNI extension. (OpenSSL would simply + * pass them on, but RFC 6066 is quite clear on this: "Literal + * IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are not permitted".) + */ + if (hostname_note && +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 + dc->proxy->protocol != SSL_PROTOCOL_SSLV3 && +#endif + apr_ipsubnet_create(&ip, hostname_note, NULL, + c->pool) != APR_SUCCESS) { + if (SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(filter_ctx->pssl, hostname_note)) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE3, 0, c, + "SNI extension for SSL Proxy request set to '%s'", + hostname_note); + } else { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, c, APLOGNO(02002) + "Failed to set SNI extension for SSL Proxy " + "request to '%s'", hostname_note); + ssl_log_ssl_error(SSLLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, server); + } + } +#endif /* defined HAVE_TLSEXT */ + + if ((n = SSL_connect(filter_ctx->pssl)) <= 0) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, c, APLOGNO(02003) + "SSL Proxy connect failed"); + ssl_log_ssl_error(SSLLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, server); + /* ensure that the SSL structures etc are freed, etc: */ + ssl_filter_io_shutdown(filter_ctx, c, 1); + apr_table_setn(c->notes, "SSL_connect_rv", "err"); + return MODSSL_ERROR_BAD_GATEWAY; + } + + cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(filter_ctx->pssl); + + if (dc->proxy->ssl_check_peer_expire != FALSE) { + if (!cert + || (X509_cmp_current_time( + X509_get_notBefore(cert)) >= 0) + || (X509_cmp_current_time( + X509_get_notAfter(cert)) <= 0)) { + proxy_ssl_check_peer_ok = FALSE; + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, c, APLOGNO(02004) + "SSL Proxy: Peer certificate is expired"); + } + } + if ((dc->proxy->ssl_check_peer_name != FALSE) && + ((dc->proxy->ssl_check_peer_cn != FALSE) || + (dc->proxy->ssl_check_peer_name == TRUE)) && + hostname_note) { + if (!cert + || modssl_X509_match_name(c->pool, cert, hostname_note, + TRUE, server) == FALSE) { + proxy_ssl_check_peer_ok = FALSE; + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, c, APLOGNO(02411) + "SSL Proxy: Peer certificate does not match " + "for hostname %s", hostname_note); + } + } + else if ((dc->proxy->ssl_check_peer_cn == TRUE) && + hostname_note) { + const char *hostname; + int match = 0; + + hostname = ssl_var_lookup(NULL, server, c, NULL, + "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_CN"); + + /* Do string match or simplest wildcard match if that + * fails. */ + match = strcasecmp(hostname, hostname_note) == 0; + if (!match && strncmp(hostname, "*.", 2) == 0) { + const char *p = ap_strchr_c(hostname_note, '.'); + + match = p && strcasecmp(p, hostname + 1) == 0; + } + + if (!match) { + proxy_ssl_check_peer_ok = FALSE; + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, c, APLOGNO(02005) + "SSL Proxy: Peer certificate CN mismatch:" + " Certificate CN: %s Requested hostname: %s", + hostname, hostname_note); + } + } + +#ifdef HAVE_TLS_ALPN + /* If we proposed ALPN protocol(s), we need to check if the server + * agreed to one of them. While + * chapter 3.2 says the server SHALL error the handshake in such a case, + * the reality is that some servers fall back to their default, e.g. http/1.1. + * (we also do this right now) + * We need to treat this as an error for security reasons. + */ + if (alpn_proposed && alpn_proposed->nelts > 0) { + const char *selected; + unsigned int slen; + + SSL_get0_alpn_selected(filter_ctx->pssl, (const unsigned char**)&selected, &slen); + if (!selected || !slen) { + /* No ALPN selection reported by the remote server. This could mean + * it does not support ALPN (old server) or that it does not support + * any of our proposals (Apache itself up to 2.4.48 at least did that). */ + if (!alpn_empty_ok) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, c, APLOGNO(10273) + "SSL Proxy: Peer did not select any of our ALPN protocols [%s].", + alpn_note); + proxy_ssl_check_peer_ok = FALSE; + } + } + else { + const char *proto; + int i, found = 0; + for (i = 0; !found && i < alpn_proposed->nelts; ++i) { + proto = APR_ARRAY_IDX(alpn_proposed, i, const char *); + found = !strncmp(selected, proto, slen); + } + if (!found) { + /* From a conforming peer, this should never happen, + * but life always finds a way... */ + proto = apr_pstrndup(c->pool, selected, slen); + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, c, APLOGNO(10274) + "SSL Proxy: Peer proposed ALPN protocol %s which is none " + "of our proposals [%s].", proto, alpn_note); + proxy_ssl_check_peer_ok = FALSE; + } + } + } +#endif + + if (proxy_ssl_check_peer_ok == TRUE) { + /* another chance to fail */ + post_handshake_rc = ssl_run_proxy_post_handshake(c, filter_ctx->pssl); + } + + if (cert) { + X509_free(cert); + } + + if (proxy_ssl_check_peer_ok != TRUE + || (post_handshake_rc != OK && post_handshake_rc != DECLINED)) { + /* ensure that the SSL structures etc are freed, etc: */ + ssl_filter_io_shutdown(filter_ctx, c, 1); + apr_table_setn(c->notes, "SSL_connect_rv", "err"); + return MODSSL_ERROR_BAD_GATEWAY; + } + + apr_table_setn(c->notes, "SSL_connect_rv", "ok"); + return APR_SUCCESS; + } + + /* We rely on SSL_get_error() after the accept, which requires an empty + * error queue before the accept in order to work properly. + */ + ERR_clear_error(); + + if ((n = SSL_accept(filter_ctx->pssl)) <= 0) { + bio_filter_in_ctx_t *inctx = (bio_filter_in_ctx_t *) + BIO_get_data(filter_ctx->pbioRead); + bio_filter_out_ctx_t *outctx = (bio_filter_out_ctx_t *) + BIO_get_data(filter_ctx->pbioWrite); + apr_status_t rc = inctx->rc ? inctx->rc : outctx->rc ; + ssl_err = SSL_get_error(filter_ctx->pssl, n); + + if (ssl_err == SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN) { + /* + * The case where the connection was closed before any data + * was transferred. That's not a real error and can occur + * sporadically with some clients. + */ + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, rc, c, APLOGNO(02006) + "SSL handshake stopped: connection was closed"); + } + else if (ssl_err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) { + /* + * This is in addition to what was present earlier. It is + * borrowed from openssl_state_machine.c [mod_tls]. + * TBD. + */ + outctx->rc = APR_EAGAIN; + return APR_EAGAIN; + } + else if (ERR_GET_LIB(ERR_peek_error()) == ERR_LIB_SSL && + ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_error()) == SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST) { + /* + * The case where OpenSSL has recognized a HTTP request: + * This means the client speaks plain HTTP on our HTTPS port. + * ssl_io_filter_error will disable the ssl filters when it + * sees this status code. + */ + return MODSSL_ERROR_HTTP_ON_HTTPS; + } + else if (ssl_err == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, rc, c, APLOGNO(02007) + "SSL handshake interrupted by system " + "[Hint: Stop button pressed in browser?!]"); + } + else /* if (ssl_err == SSL_ERROR_SSL) */ { + /* + * Log SSL errors and any unexpected conditions. + */ + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, rc, c, APLOGNO(02008) + "SSL library error %d in handshake " + "(server %s)", ssl_err, + ssl_util_vhostid(c->pool, server)); + ssl_log_ssl_error(SSLLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, server); + + } + if (inctx->rc == APR_SUCCESS) { + inctx->rc = APR_EGENERAL; + } + + ssl_filter_io_shutdown(filter_ctx, c, 1); + return inctx->rc; + } + sc = mySrvConfig(sslconn->server); + + /* + * Check for failed client authentication + */ + verify_result = SSL_get_verify_result(filter_ctx->pssl); + + if ((verify_result != X509_V_OK) || + sslconn->verify_error) + { + if (ssl_verify_error_is_optional(verify_result) && + (sc->server->auth.verify_mode == SSL_CVERIFY_OPTIONAL_NO_CA)) + { + /* leaving this log message as an error for the moment, + * according to the mod_ssl docs: + * "level optional_no_ca is actually against the idea + * of authentication (but can be used to establish + * SSL test pages, etc.)" + * optional_no_ca doesn't appear to work as advertised + * in 1.x + */ + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, c, APLOGNO(02009) + "SSL client authentication failed, " + "accepting certificate based on " + "\"SSLVerifyClient optional_no_ca\" " + "configuration"); + ssl_log_ssl_error(SSLLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, server); + } + else { + const char *error = sslconn->verify_error ? + sslconn->verify_error : + X509_verify_cert_error_string(verify_result); + + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, c, APLOGNO(02010) + "SSL client authentication failed: %s", + error ? error : "unknown"); + ssl_log_ssl_error(SSLLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, server); + + ssl_filter_io_shutdown(filter_ctx, c, 1); + return APR_ECONNABORTED; + } + } + + /* + * Remember the peer certificate's DN + */ + if ((cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(filter_ctx->pssl))) { + if (sslconn->client_cert) { + X509_free(sslconn->client_cert); + } + sslconn->client_cert = cert; + sslconn->client_dn = NULL; + } + + /* + * Make really sure that when a peer certificate + * is required we really got one... (be paranoid) + */ + if ((sc->server->auth.verify_mode == SSL_CVERIFY_REQUIRE) && + !sslconn->client_cert) + { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, c, APLOGNO(02011) + "No acceptable peer certificate available"); + + ssl_filter_io_shutdown(filter_ctx, c, 1); + return APR_ECONNABORTED; + } + + return APR_SUCCESS; +} + +static apr_status_t ssl_io_filter_input(ap_filter_t *f, + apr_bucket_brigade *bb, + ap_input_mode_t mode, + apr_read_type_e block, + apr_off_t readbytes) +{ + apr_status_t status; + bio_filter_in_ctx_t *inctx = f->ctx; + const char *start = inctx->buffer; /* start of block to return */ + apr_size_t len = sizeof(inctx->buffer); /* length of block to return */ + int is_init = (mode == AP_MODE_INIT); + apr_bucket *bucket; + + if (f->c->aborted) { + /* XXX: Ok, if we aborted, we ARE at the EOS. We also have + * aborted. This 'double protection' is probably redundant, + * but also effective against just about anything. + */ + bucket = apr_bucket_eos_create(f->c->bucket_alloc); + APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(bb, bucket); + return APR_ECONNABORTED; + } + + if (!inctx->ssl) { + SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(f->c); + if (sslconn->non_ssl_request == NON_SSL_SEND_REQLINE) { + bucket = HTTP_ON_HTTPS_PORT_BUCKET(f->c->bucket_alloc); + APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(bb, bucket); + if (mode != AP_MODE_SPECULATIVE) { + sslconn->non_ssl_request = NON_SSL_SEND_HDR_SEP; + } + return APR_SUCCESS; + } + if (sslconn->non_ssl_request == NON_SSL_SEND_HDR_SEP) { + bucket = apr_bucket_immortal_create(CRLF, 2, f->c->bucket_alloc); + APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(bb, bucket); + if (mode != AP_MODE_SPECULATIVE) { + sslconn->non_ssl_request = NON_SSL_SET_ERROR_MSG; + } + return APR_SUCCESS; + } + return ap_get_brigade(f->next, bb, mode, block, readbytes); + } + + /* XXX: we don't currently support anything other than these modes. */ + if (mode != AP_MODE_READBYTES && mode != AP_MODE_GETLINE && + mode != AP_MODE_SPECULATIVE && mode != AP_MODE_INIT) { + return APR_ENOTIMPL; + } + + inctx->mode = mode; + inctx->block = block; + + /* XXX: we could actually move ssl_io_filter_handshake to an + * ap_hook_process_connection but would still need to call it for + * AP_MODE_INIT for protocols that may upgrade the connection + * rather than have SSLEngine On configured. + */ + if ((status = ssl_io_filter_handshake(inctx->filter_ctx)) != APR_SUCCESS) { + return ssl_io_filter_error(inctx, bb, status, is_init); + } + + if (is_init) { + /* protocol module needs to handshake before sending + * data to client (e.g. NNTP or FTP) + */ + return APR_SUCCESS; + } + + if (inctx->mode == AP_MODE_READBYTES || + inctx->mode == AP_MODE_SPECULATIVE) { + /* Protected from truncation, readbytes < MAX_SIZE_T + * FIXME: No, it's *not* protected. -- jre */ + if (readbytes < len) { + len = (apr_size_t)readbytes; + } + status = ssl_io_input_read(inctx, inctx->buffer, &len); + } + else if (inctx->mode == AP_MODE_GETLINE) { + const char *pos; + + /* Satisfy the read directly out of the buffer if possible; + * invoking ssl_io_input_getline will mean the entire buffer + * is copied once (unnecessarily) for each GETLINE call. */ + if (inctx->cbuf.length + && (pos = memchr(inctx->cbuf.value, APR_ASCII_LF, + inctx->cbuf.length)) != NULL) { + start = inctx->cbuf.value; + len = 1 + pos - start; /* +1 to include LF */ + /* Buffer contents now consumed. */ + inctx->cbuf.value += len; + inctx->cbuf.length -= len; + status = APR_SUCCESS; + } + else { + /* Otherwise fall back to the hard way. */ + status = ssl_io_input_getline(inctx, inctx->buffer, &len); + } + } + else { + /* We have no idea what you are talking about, so return an error. */ + status = APR_ENOTIMPL; + } + + /* It is possible for mod_ssl's BIO to be used outside of the + * direct control of mod_ssl's input or output filter -- notably, + * when mod_ssl initiates a renegotiation. Switching the BIO mode + * back to "blocking" here ensures such operations don't fail with + * SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ. */ + inctx->block = APR_BLOCK_READ; + + /* Handle custom errors. */ + if (status != APR_SUCCESS) { + return ssl_io_filter_error(inctx, bb, status, 0); + } + + /* Create a transient bucket out of the decrypted data. */ + if (len > 0) { + bucket = + apr_bucket_transient_create(start, len, f->c->bucket_alloc); + APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(bb, bucket); + } + + return APR_SUCCESS; +} + + +/* ssl_io_filter_output() produces one SSL/TLS record per bucket + * passed down the output filter stack. This results in a high + * overhead (more network packets & TLS processing) for any output + * comprising many small buckets. SSI output passed through the HTTP + * chunk filter, for example, may produce many brigades containing + * small buckets - [chunk-size CRLF] [chunk-data] [CRLF]. + * + * Sending HTTP response headers as a separate TLS record to the + * response body also reveals information to a network observer (the + * size of headers) which can be significant. + * + * The coalescing filter merges data buckets with the aim of producing + * fewer, larger TLS records - without copying/buffering all content + * and introducing unnecessary overhead. + * + * ### This buffering could be probably be done more comprehensively + * ### in ssl_io_filter_output itself. + * + * ### Another possible performance optimisation in particular for the + * ### [HEAP] [FILE] HTTP response case is using a brigade rather than + * ### a char array to buffer; using apr_brigade_write() to append + * ### will use already-allocated memory from the HEAP, reducing # of + * ### copies. + */ + +#define COALESCE_BYTES (AP_IOBUFSIZE) + +struct coalesce_ctx { + char buffer[COALESCE_BYTES]; + apr_size_t bytes; /* number of bytes of buffer used. */ +}; + +static apr_status_t ssl_io_filter_coalesce(ap_filter_t *f, + apr_bucket_brigade *bb) +{ + apr_bucket *e, *upto; + apr_size_t bytes = 0; + struct coalesce_ctx *ctx = f->ctx; + apr_size_t buffered = ctx ? ctx->bytes : 0; /* space used on entry */ + unsigned count = 0; + + /* The brigade consists of zero-or-more small data buckets which + * can be coalesced (referred to as the "prefix"), followed by the + * remainder of the brigade. + * + * Find the last bucket - if any - of that prefix. count gives + * the number of buckets in the prefix. The "prefix" must contain + * only data buckets with known length, and must be of a total + * size which fits into the buffer. + * + * N.B.: The process here could be repeated throughout the brigade + * (coalesce any run of consecutive data buckets) but this would + * add significant complexity, particularly to memory + * management. */ + for (e = APR_BRIGADE_FIRST(bb); + e != APR_BRIGADE_SENTINEL(bb) + && !APR_BUCKET_IS_METADATA(e) + && e->length != (apr_size_t)-1 + && e->length <= COALESCE_BYTES + && (buffered + bytes + e->length) <= COALESCE_BYTES; + e = APR_BUCKET_NEXT(e)) { + /* don't count zero-length buckets */ + if (e->length) { + bytes += e->length; + count++; + } + } + + /* If there is room remaining and the next bucket is a data + * bucket, try to include it in the prefix to coalesce. For a + * typical [HEAP] [FILE] HTTP response brigade, this handles + * merging the headers and the start of the body into a single TLS + * record. */ + if (bytes + buffered > 0 + && bytes + buffered < COALESCE_BYTES + && e != APR_BRIGADE_SENTINEL(bb) + && !APR_BUCKET_IS_METADATA(e)) { + apr_status_t rv = APR_SUCCESS; + + /* For an indeterminate length bucket (PIPE/CGI/...), try a + * non-blocking read to have it morph into a HEAP. If the + * read fails with EAGAIN, it is harmless to try a split + * anyway, split is ENOTIMPL for most PIPE-like buckets. */ + if (e->length == (apr_size_t)-1) { + const char *discard; + apr_size_t ignore; + + rv = apr_bucket_read(e, &discard, &ignore, APR_NONBLOCK_READ); + if (rv != APR_SUCCESS && !APR_STATUS_IS_EAGAIN(rv)) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, rv, f->c, APLOGNO(10232) + "coalesce failed to read from %s bucket", + e->type->name); + return AP_FILTER_ERROR; + } + } + + if (rv == APR_SUCCESS) { + /* If the read above made the bucket morph, it may now fit + * entirely within the buffer. Otherwise, split it so it does + * fit. */ + if (e->length > COALESCE_BYTES + || e->length + buffered + bytes > COALESCE_BYTES) { + rv = apr_bucket_split(e, COALESCE_BYTES - (buffered + bytes)); + } + + if (rv == APR_SUCCESS && e->length == 0) { + /* As above, don't count in the prefix if the bucket is + * now zero-length. */ + } + else if (rv == APR_SUCCESS) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE4, 0, f->c, + "coalesce: adding %" APR_SIZE_T_FMT " bytes " + "from split %s bucket, total %" APR_SIZE_T_FMT, + e->length, e->type->name, bytes + buffered); + + count++; + bytes += e->length; + e = APR_BUCKET_NEXT(e); + } + else if (rv != APR_ENOTIMPL) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, rv, f->c, APLOGNO(10233) + "coalesce: failed to split data bucket"); + return AP_FILTER_ERROR; + } + } + } + + /* The prefix is zero or more buckets. upto now points to the + * bucket AFTER the end of the prefix, which may be the brigade + * sentinel. */ + upto = e; + + /* Coalesce the prefix, if any of the following are true: + * + * a) the prefix is more than one bucket + * OR + * b) the prefix is the entire brigade, which is a single bucket + * AND the prefix length is smaller than the buffer size, + * OR + * c) the prefix is a single bucket + * AND there is buffered data from a previous pass. + * + * The aim with (b) is to buffer a small bucket so it can be + * coalesced with future invocations of this filter. e.g. three + * calls each with a single 100 byte HEAP bucket should get + * coalesced together. But an invocation with a 8192 byte HEAP + * should pass through untouched. + */ + if (bytes > 0 + && (count > 1 + || (upto == APR_BRIGADE_SENTINEL(bb) + && bytes < COALESCE_BYTES) + || (ctx && ctx->bytes > 0))) { + /* If coalescing some bytes, ensure a context has been + * created. */ + if (!ctx) { + f->ctx = ctx = apr_palloc(f->c->pool, sizeof *ctx); + ctx->bytes = 0; + } + + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE4, 0, f->c, + "coalesce: have %" APR_SIZE_T_FMT " bytes, " + "adding %" APR_SIZE_T_FMT " more (buckets=%u)", + ctx->bytes, bytes, count); + + /* Iterate through the prefix segment. For non-fatal errors + * in this loop it is safe to break out and fall back to the + * normal path of sending the buffer + remaining buckets in + * brigade. */ + e = APR_BRIGADE_FIRST(bb); + while (e != upto) { + apr_size_t len; + const char *data; + apr_bucket *next; + + if (APR_BUCKET_IS_METADATA(e) + || e->length == (apr_size_t)-1) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, f->c, APLOGNO(02012) + "unexpected %s bucket during coalesce", + e->type->name); + break; /* non-fatal error; break out */ + } + + if (e->length) { + apr_status_t rv; + + /* A blocking read should be fine here for a + * known-length data bucket, rather than the usual + * non-block/flush/block. */ + rv = apr_bucket_read(e, &data, &len, APR_BLOCK_READ); + if (rv) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, rv, f->c, APLOGNO(02013) + "coalesce failed to read from data bucket"); + return AP_FILTER_ERROR; + } + + /* Be paranoid. */ + if (len > sizeof ctx->buffer + || (len + ctx->bytes > sizeof ctx->buffer)) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, f->c, APLOGNO(02014) + "unexpected coalesced bucket data length"); + break; /* non-fatal error; break out */ + } + + memcpy(ctx->buffer + ctx->bytes, data, len); + ctx->bytes += len; + } + + next = APR_BUCKET_NEXT(e); + apr_bucket_delete(e); + e = next; + } + } + + if (APR_BRIGADE_EMPTY(bb)) { + /* If the brigade is now empty, our work here is done. */ + return APR_SUCCESS; + } + + /* If anything remains in the brigade, it must now be passed down + * the filter stack, first prepending anything that has been + * coalesced. */ + if (ctx && ctx->bytes) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE4, 0, f->c, + "coalesce: passing on %" APR_SIZE_T_FMT " bytes", ctx->bytes); + + e = apr_bucket_transient_create(ctx->buffer, ctx->bytes, bb->bucket_alloc); + APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_HEAD(bb, e); + ctx->bytes = 0; /* buffer now emptied. */ + } + + return ap_pass_brigade(f->next, bb); +} + +static apr_status_t ssl_io_filter_output(ap_filter_t *f, + apr_bucket_brigade *bb) +{ + apr_status_t status = APR_SUCCESS; + ssl_filter_ctx_t *filter_ctx = f->ctx; + bio_filter_in_ctx_t *inctx; + bio_filter_out_ctx_t *outctx; + apr_read_type_e rblock = APR_NONBLOCK_READ; + + if (f->c->aborted) { + apr_brigade_cleanup(bb); + return APR_ECONNABORTED; + } + + if (!filter_ctx->pssl) { + /* ssl_filter_io_shutdown was called */ + return ap_pass_brigade(f->next, bb); + } + + inctx = (bio_filter_in_ctx_t *)BIO_get_data(filter_ctx->pbioRead); + outctx = (bio_filter_out_ctx_t *)BIO_get_data(filter_ctx->pbioWrite); + + /* When we are the writer, we must initialize the inctx + * mode so that we block for any required ssl input, because + * output filtering is always nonblocking. + */ + inctx->mode = AP_MODE_READBYTES; + inctx->block = APR_BLOCK_READ; + + if ((status = ssl_io_filter_handshake(filter_ctx)) != APR_SUCCESS) { + return ssl_io_filter_error(inctx, bb, status, 0); + } + + while (!APR_BRIGADE_EMPTY(bb) && status == APR_SUCCESS) { + apr_bucket *bucket = APR_BRIGADE_FIRST(bb); + + if (APR_BUCKET_IS_METADATA(bucket)) { + /* Pass through metadata buckets untouched. EOC is + * special; terminate the SSL layer first. */ + if (AP_BUCKET_IS_EOC(bucket)) { + ssl_filter_io_shutdown(filter_ctx, f->c, 0); + } + AP_DEBUG_ASSERT(APR_BRIGADE_EMPTY(outctx->bb)); + + /* Metadata buckets are passed one per brigade; it might + * be more efficient (but also more complex) to use + * outctx->bb as a true buffer and interleave these with + * data buckets. */ + APR_BUCKET_REMOVE(bucket); + APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_HEAD(outctx->bb, bucket); + status = ap_pass_brigade(f->next, outctx->bb); + if (status == APR_SUCCESS && f->c->aborted) + status = APR_ECONNRESET; + apr_brigade_cleanup(outctx->bb); + } + else { + /* Filter a data bucket. */ + const char *data; + apr_size_t len; + + status = apr_bucket_read(bucket, &data, &len, rblock); + + if (APR_STATUS_IS_EAGAIN(status)) { + /* No data available: flush... */ + if (bio_filter_out_flush(filter_ctx->pbioWrite) < 0) { + status = outctx->rc; + break; + } + rblock = APR_BLOCK_READ; + /* and try again with a blocking read. */ + status = APR_SUCCESS; + continue; + } + + rblock = APR_NONBLOCK_READ; + + if (!APR_STATUS_IS_EOF(status) && (status != APR_SUCCESS)) { + break; + } + + status = ssl_filter_write(f, data, len); + apr_bucket_delete(bucket); + } + + } + + return status; +} + +struct modssl_buffer_ctx { + apr_bucket_brigade *bb; +}; + +int ssl_io_buffer_fill(request_rec *r, apr_size_t maxlen) +{ + conn_rec *c = r->connection; + struct modssl_buffer_ctx *ctx; + apr_bucket_brigade *tempb; + apr_off_t total = 0; /* total length buffered */ + int eos = 0; /* non-zero once EOS is seen */ + + /* Create the context which will be passed to the input filter; + * containing a setaside pool and a brigade which constrain the + * lifetime of the buffered data. */ + ctx = apr_palloc(r->pool, sizeof *ctx); + ctx->bb = apr_brigade_create(r->pool, c->bucket_alloc); + + /* ... and a temporary brigade. */ + tempb = apr_brigade_create(r->pool, c->bucket_alloc); + + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE4, 0, c, "filling buffer, max size " + "%" APR_SIZE_T_FMT " bytes", maxlen); + + do { + apr_status_t rv; + apr_bucket *e, *next; + + /* The request body is read from the protocol-level input + * filters; the buffering filter will reinject it from that + * level, allowing content/resource filters to run later, if + * necessary. */ + + rv = ap_get_brigade(r->proto_input_filters, tempb, AP_MODE_READBYTES, + APR_BLOCK_READ, 8192); + if (rv) { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, rv, r, APLOGNO(02015) + "could not read request body for SSL buffer"); + return ap_map_http_request_error(rv, HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); + } + + /* Iterate through the returned brigade: setaside each bucket + * into the context's pool and move it into the brigade. */ + for (e = APR_BRIGADE_FIRST(tempb); + e != APR_BRIGADE_SENTINEL(tempb) && !eos; e = next) { + const char *data; + apr_size_t len; + + next = APR_BUCKET_NEXT(e); + + if (APR_BUCKET_IS_EOS(e)) { + eos = 1; + } else if (!APR_BUCKET_IS_METADATA(e)) { + rv = apr_bucket_read(e, &data, &len, APR_BLOCK_READ); + if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, rv, r, APLOGNO(02016) + "could not read bucket for SSL buffer"); + return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR; + } + total += len; + } + + rv = apr_bucket_setaside(e, r->pool); + if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, rv, r, APLOGNO(02017) + "could not setaside bucket for SSL buffer"); + return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR; + } + + APR_BUCKET_REMOVE(e); + APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(ctx->bb, e); + } + + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE4, 0, c, + "total of %" APR_OFF_T_FMT " bytes in buffer, eos=%d", + total, eos); + + /* Fail if this exceeds the maximum buffer size. */ + if (total > maxlen) { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02018) + "request body exceeds maximum size (%" APR_SIZE_T_FMT + ") for SSL buffer", maxlen); + return HTTP_REQUEST_ENTITY_TOO_LARGE; + } + + } while (!eos); + + apr_brigade_destroy(tempb); + + /* After consuming all protocol-level input, remove all protocol-level + * filters. It should strictly only be necessary to remove filters + * at exactly ftype == AP_FTYPE_PROTOCOL, since this filter will + * precede all > AP_FTYPE_PROTOCOL anyway. */ + while (r->proto_input_filters->frec->ftype < AP_FTYPE_CONNECTION) { + ap_remove_input_filter(r->proto_input_filters); + } + + /* Insert the filter which will supply the buffered content. */ + ap_add_input_filter(ssl_io_buffer, ctx, r, c); + + return 0; +} + +/* This input filter supplies the buffered request body to the caller + * from the brigade stored in f->ctx. Note that the placement of this + * filter in the filter stack is important; it must be the first + * r->proto_input_filter; lower-typed filters will not be preserved + * across internal redirects (see PR 43738). */ +static apr_status_t ssl_io_filter_buffer(ap_filter_t *f, + apr_bucket_brigade *bb, + ap_input_mode_t mode, + apr_read_type_e block, + apr_off_t bytes) +{ + struct modssl_buffer_ctx *ctx = f->ctx; + apr_status_t rv; + apr_bucket *e, *d; + + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE4, 0, f->c, + "read from buffered SSL brigade, mode %d, " + "%" APR_OFF_T_FMT " bytes", + mode, bytes); + + if (mode != AP_MODE_READBYTES && mode != AP_MODE_GETLINE) { + return APR_ENOTIMPL; + } + + if (APR_BRIGADE_EMPTY(ctx->bb)) { + /* Surprisingly (and perhaps, wrongly), the request body can be + * pulled from the input filter stack more than once; a + * handler may read it, and ap_discard_request_body() will + * attempt to do so again after *every* request. So input + * filters must be prepared to give up an EOS if invoked after + * initially reading the request. The HTTP_IN filter does this + * with its ->eos_sent flag. */ + + APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(bb, apr_bucket_eos_create(f->c->bucket_alloc)); + return APR_SUCCESS; + } + + if (mode == AP_MODE_READBYTES) { + /* Partition the buffered brigade. */ + rv = apr_brigade_partition(ctx->bb, bytes, &e); + if (rv && rv != APR_INCOMPLETE) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, rv, f->c, APLOGNO(02019) + "could not partition buffered SSL brigade"); + ap_remove_input_filter(f); + return rv; + } + + /* If the buffered brigade contains less then the requested + * length, just pass it all back. */ + if (rv == APR_INCOMPLETE) { + APR_BRIGADE_CONCAT(bb, ctx->bb); + } else { + d = APR_BRIGADE_FIRST(ctx->bb); + + e = APR_BUCKET_PREV(e); + + /* Unsplice the partitioned segment and move it into the + * passed-in brigade; no convenient way to do this with + * the APR_BRIGADE_* macros. */ + APR_RING_UNSPLICE(d, e, link); + APR_RING_SPLICE_HEAD(&bb->list, d, e, apr_bucket, link); + + APR_BRIGADE_CHECK_CONSISTENCY(bb); + APR_BRIGADE_CHECK_CONSISTENCY(ctx->bb); + } + } + else { + /* Split a line into the passed-in brigade. */ + rv = apr_brigade_split_line(bb, ctx->bb, block, bytes); + + if (rv) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, rv, f->c, APLOGNO(02020) + "could not split line from buffered SSL brigade"); + ap_remove_input_filter(f); + return rv; + } + } + + if (APR_BRIGADE_EMPTY(ctx->bb)) { + e = APR_BRIGADE_LAST(bb); + + /* Ensure that the brigade is terminated by an EOS if the + * buffered request body has been entirely consumed. */ + if (e == APR_BRIGADE_SENTINEL(bb) || !APR_BUCKET_IS_EOS(e)) { + e = apr_bucket_eos_create(f->c->bucket_alloc); + APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(bb, e); + } + + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE4, 0, f->c, + "buffered SSL brigade exhausted"); + /* Note that the filter must *not* be removed here; it may be + * invoked again, see comment above. */ + } + + return APR_SUCCESS; +} + +/* The request_rec pointer is passed in here only to ensure that the + * filter chain is modified correctly when doing a TLS upgrade. It + * must *not* be used otherwise. */ +static void ssl_io_input_add_filter(ssl_filter_ctx_t *filter_ctx, conn_rec *c, + request_rec *r, SSL *ssl) +{ + bio_filter_in_ctx_t *inctx; + + inctx = apr_palloc(c->pool, sizeof(*inctx)); + + filter_ctx->pInputFilter = ap_add_input_filter(ssl_io_filter, inctx, r, c); + +#if MODSSL_USE_OPENSSL_PRE_1_1_API + filter_ctx->pbioRead = BIO_new(&bio_filter_in_method); +#else + filter_ctx->pbioRead = BIO_new(bio_filter_in_method); +#endif + BIO_set_data(filter_ctx->pbioRead, (void *)inctx); + + inctx->ssl = ssl; + inctx->bio_out = filter_ctx->pbioWrite; + inctx->f = filter_ctx->pInputFilter; + inctx->rc = APR_SUCCESS; + inctx->mode = AP_MODE_READBYTES; + inctx->cbuf.length = 0; + inctx->bb = apr_brigade_create(c->pool, c->bucket_alloc); + inctx->block = APR_BLOCK_READ; + inctx->pool = c->pool; + inctx->filter_ctx = filter_ctx; +} + +/* The request_rec pointer is passed in here only to ensure that the + * filter chain is modified correctly when doing a TLS upgrade. It + * must *not* be used otherwise. */ +void ssl_io_filter_init(conn_rec *c, request_rec *r, SSL *ssl) +{ + ssl_filter_ctx_t *filter_ctx; + + filter_ctx = apr_palloc(c->pool, sizeof(ssl_filter_ctx_t)); + + filter_ctx->config = myConnConfig(c); + + ap_add_output_filter(ssl_io_coalesce, NULL, r, c); + + filter_ctx->pOutputFilter = ap_add_output_filter(ssl_io_filter, + filter_ctx, r, c); + +#if MODSSL_USE_OPENSSL_PRE_1_1_API + filter_ctx->pbioWrite = BIO_new(&bio_filter_out_method); +#else + filter_ctx->pbioWrite = BIO_new(bio_filter_out_method); +#endif + BIO_set_data(filter_ctx->pbioWrite, (void *)bio_filter_out_ctx_new(filter_ctx, c)); + + /* write is non blocking for the benefit of async mpm */ + if (c->cs) { + BIO_set_nbio(filter_ctx->pbioWrite, 1); + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE6, 0, c, + "Enabling non-blocking writes"); + } + + ssl_io_input_add_filter(filter_ctx, c, r, ssl); + + SSL_set_bio(ssl, filter_ctx->pbioRead, filter_ctx->pbioWrite); + filter_ctx->pssl = ssl; + + apr_pool_cleanup_register(c->pool, (void*)filter_ctx, + ssl_io_filter_cleanup, apr_pool_cleanup_null); + + if (APLOG_CS_IS_LEVEL(c, mySrvFromConn(c), APLOG_TRACE4)) { + BIO *rbio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl), + *wbio = SSL_get_wbio(ssl); + BIO_set_callback(rbio, ssl_io_data_cb); + BIO_set_callback_arg(rbio, (void *)ssl); + if (wbio && wbio != rbio) { + BIO_set_callback(wbio, ssl_io_data_cb); + BIO_set_callback_arg(wbio, (void *)ssl); + } + } + + return; +} + +void ssl_io_filter_register(apr_pool_t *p) +{ + ap_register_input_filter (ssl_io_filter, ssl_io_filter_input, NULL, AP_FTYPE_CONNECTION + 5); + ap_register_output_filter (ssl_io_coalesce, ssl_io_filter_coalesce, NULL, AP_FTYPE_CONNECTION + 4); + ap_register_output_filter (ssl_io_filter, ssl_io_filter_output, NULL, AP_FTYPE_CONNECTION + 5); + + ap_register_input_filter (ssl_io_buffer, ssl_io_filter_buffer, NULL, AP_FTYPE_PROTOCOL); + + return; +} + +/* _________________________________________________________________ +** +** I/O Data Debugging +** _________________________________________________________________ +*/ + +#define DUMP_WIDTH 16 + +static void ssl_io_data_dump(conn_rec *c, server_rec *s, + const char *b, long len) +{ + char buf[256]; + int i, j, rows, trunc, pos; + unsigned char ch; + + trunc = 0; + for (; (len > 0) && ((b[len-1] == ' ') || (b[len-1] == '\0')); len--) + trunc++; + rows = (len / DUMP_WIDTH); + if ((rows * DUMP_WIDTH) < len) + rows++; + ap_log_cserror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE7, 0, c, s, + "+-------------------------------------------------------------------------+"); + for (i = 0 ; i < rows; i++) { +#if APR_CHARSET_EBCDIC + char ebcdic_text[DUMP_WIDTH]; + j = DUMP_WIDTH; + if ((i * DUMP_WIDTH + j) > len) + j = len % DUMP_WIDTH; + if (j == 0) + j = DUMP_WIDTH; + memcpy(ebcdic_text,(char *)(b) + i * DUMP_WIDTH, j); + ap_xlate_proto_from_ascii(ebcdic_text, j); +#endif /* APR_CHARSET_EBCDIC */ + pos = 0; + pos += apr_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf)-pos, "| %04x: ", i * DUMP_WIDTH); + for (j = 0; j < DUMP_WIDTH; j++) { + if (((i * DUMP_WIDTH) + j) >= len) + pos += apr_snprintf(buf+pos, sizeof(buf)-pos, " "); + else { + ch = ((unsigned char)*((char *)(b) + i * DUMP_WIDTH + j)) & 0xff; + pos += apr_snprintf(buf+pos, sizeof(buf)-pos, "%02x%c", ch , j==7 ? '-' : ' '); + } + } + pos += apr_snprintf(buf+pos, sizeof(buf)-pos, " "); + for (j = 0; j < DUMP_WIDTH; j++) { + if (((i * DUMP_WIDTH) + j) >= len) + pos += apr_snprintf(buf+pos, sizeof(buf)-pos, " "); + else { + ch = ((unsigned char)*((char *)(b) + i * DUMP_WIDTH + j)) & 0xff; +#if APR_CHARSET_EBCDIC + pos += apr_snprintf(buf+pos, sizeof(buf)-pos, "%c", (ch >= 0x20 && ch <= 0x7F) ? ebcdic_text[j] : '.'); +#else /* APR_CHARSET_EBCDIC */ + pos += apr_snprintf(buf+pos, sizeof(buf)-pos, "%c", ((ch >= ' ') && (ch <= '~')) ? ch : '.'); +#endif /* APR_CHARSET_EBCDIC */ + } + } + pos += apr_snprintf(buf+pos, sizeof(buf)-pos, " |"); + ap_log_cserror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE7, 0, c, s, "%s", buf); + } + if (trunc > 0) + ap_log_cserror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE7, 0, c, s, + "| %04ld - ", len + trunc); + ap_log_cserror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE7, 0, c, s, + "+-------------------------------------------------------------------------+"); +} + +long ssl_io_data_cb(BIO *bio, int cmd, + const char *argp, + int argi, long argl, long rc) +{ + SSL *ssl; + conn_rec *c; + server_rec *s; + + if ((ssl = (SSL *)BIO_get_callback_arg(bio)) == NULL) + return rc; + if ((c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl)) == NULL) + return rc; + s = mySrvFromConn(c); + + if ( cmd == (BIO_CB_WRITE|BIO_CB_RETURN) + || cmd == (BIO_CB_READ |BIO_CB_RETURN) ) { + if (rc >= 0) { + const char *dump = ""; + if (APLOG_CS_IS_LEVEL(c, s, APLOG_TRACE7)) { + if (argp != NULL) + dump = "(BIO dump follows)"; + else + dump = "(Oops, no memory buffer?)"; + } + ap_log_cserror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE4, 0, c, s, + "%s: %s %ld/%d bytes %s BIO#%pp [mem: %pp] %s", + MODSSL_LIBRARY_NAME, + (cmd == (BIO_CB_WRITE|BIO_CB_RETURN) ? "write" : "read"), + rc, argi, (cmd == (BIO_CB_WRITE|BIO_CB_RETURN) ? "to" : "from"), + bio, argp, dump); + if (*dump != '\0' && argp != NULL) + ssl_io_data_dump(c, s, argp, rc); + } + else { + ap_log_cserror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE4, 0, c, s, + "%s: I/O error, %d bytes expected to %s on BIO#%pp [mem: %pp]", + MODSSL_LIBRARY_NAME, argi, + (cmd == (BIO_CB_WRITE|BIO_CB_RETURN) ? "write" : "read"), + bio, argp); + } + } + return rc; +} -- cgit v1.2.3