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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-28 09:13:47 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-28 09:13:47 +0000
commit102b0d2daa97dae68d3eed54d8fe37a9cc38a892 (patch)
treebcf648efac40ca6139842707f0eba5a4496a6dd2 /bl31/aarch64/runtime_exceptions.S
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadarm-trusted-firmware-102b0d2daa97dae68d3eed54d8fe37a9cc38a892.tar.xz
arm-trusted-firmware-102b0d2daa97dae68d3eed54d8fe37a9cc38a892.zip
Adding upstream version 2.8.0+dfsg.upstream/2.8.0+dfsgupstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'bl31/aarch64/runtime_exceptions.S')
-rw-r--r--bl31/aarch64/runtime_exceptions.S631
1 files changed, 631 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/bl31/aarch64/runtime_exceptions.S b/bl31/aarch64/runtime_exceptions.S
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+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <platform_def.h>
+
+#include <arch.h>
+#include <asm_macros.S>
+#include <bl31/ea_handle.h>
+#include <bl31/interrupt_mgmt.h>
+#include <common/runtime_svc.h>
+#include <context.h>
+#include <el3_common_macros.S>
+#include <lib/el3_runtime/cpu_data.h>
+#include <lib/smccc.h>
+
+ .globl runtime_exceptions
+
+ .globl sync_exception_sp_el0
+ .globl irq_sp_el0
+ .globl fiq_sp_el0
+ .globl serror_sp_el0
+
+ .globl sync_exception_sp_elx
+ .globl irq_sp_elx
+ .globl fiq_sp_elx
+ .globl serror_sp_elx
+
+ .globl sync_exception_aarch64
+ .globl irq_aarch64
+ .globl fiq_aarch64
+ .globl serror_aarch64
+
+ .globl sync_exception_aarch32
+ .globl irq_aarch32
+ .globl fiq_aarch32
+ .globl serror_aarch32
+
+ /*
+ * Macro that prepares entry to EL3 upon taking an exception.
+ *
+ * With RAS_EXTENSION, this macro synchronizes pending errors with an ESB
+ * instruction. When an error is thus synchronized, the handling is
+ * delegated to platform EA handler.
+ *
+ * Without RAS_EXTENSION, this macro synchronizes pending errors using
+ * a DSB, unmasks Asynchronous External Aborts and saves X30 before
+ * setting the flag CTX_IS_IN_EL3.
+ */
+ .macro check_and_unmask_ea
+#if RAS_EXTENSION
+ /* Synchronize pending External Aborts */
+ esb
+
+ /* Unmask the SError interrupt */
+ msr daifclr, #DAIF_ABT_BIT
+
+ /*
+ * Explicitly save x30 so as to free up a register and to enable
+ * branching
+ */
+ str x30, [sp, #CTX_GPREGS_OFFSET + CTX_GPREG_LR]
+
+ /* Check for SErrors synchronized by the ESB instruction */
+ mrs x30, DISR_EL1
+ tbz x30, #DISR_A_BIT, 1f
+
+ /*
+ * Save general purpose and ARMv8.3-PAuth registers (if enabled).
+ * If Secure Cycle Counter is not disabled in MDCR_EL3 when
+ * ARMv8.5-PMU is implemented, save PMCR_EL0 and disable Cycle Counter.
+ * Also set the PSTATE to a known state.
+ */
+ bl prepare_el3_entry
+
+ bl handle_lower_el_ea_esb
+
+ /* Restore general purpose, PMCR_EL0 and ARMv8.3-PAuth registers */
+ bl restore_gp_pmcr_pauth_regs
+1:
+#else
+ /*
+ * For SoCs which do not implement RAS, use DSB as a barrier to
+ * synchronize pending external aborts.
+ */
+ dsb sy
+
+ /* Unmask the SError interrupt */
+ msr daifclr, #DAIF_ABT_BIT
+
+ /* Use ISB for the above unmask operation to take effect immediately */
+ isb
+
+ /*
+ * Refer Note 1. No need to restore X30 as both handle_sync_exception
+ * and handle_interrupt_exception macro which follow this macro modify
+ * X30 anyway.
+ */
+ str x30, [sp, #CTX_GPREGS_OFFSET + CTX_GPREG_LR]
+ mov x30, #1
+ str x30, [sp, #CTX_EL3STATE_OFFSET + CTX_IS_IN_EL3]
+ dmb sy
+#endif
+ .endm
+
+#if !RAS_EXTENSION
+ /*
+ * Note 1: The explicit DSB at the entry of various exception vectors
+ * for handling exceptions from lower ELs can inadvertently trigger an
+ * SError exception in EL3 due to pending asynchronous aborts in lower
+ * ELs. This will end up being handled by serror_sp_elx which will
+ * ultimately panic and die.
+ * The way to workaround is to update a flag to indicate if the exception
+ * truly came from EL3. This flag is allocated in the cpu_context
+ * structure and located at offset "CTX_EL3STATE_OFFSET + CTX_IS_IN_EL3"
+ * This is not a bullet proof solution to the problem at hand because
+ * we assume the instructions following "isb" that help to update the
+ * flag execute without causing further exceptions.
+ */
+
+ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * This macro handles Asynchronous External Aborts.
+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+ .macro handle_async_ea
+ /*
+ * Use a barrier to synchronize pending external aborts.
+ */
+ dsb sy
+
+ /* Unmask the SError interrupt */
+ msr daifclr, #DAIF_ABT_BIT
+
+ /* Use ISB for the above unmask operation to take effect immediately */
+ isb
+
+ /* Refer Note 1 */
+ str x30, [sp, #CTX_GPREGS_OFFSET + CTX_GPREG_LR]
+ mov x30, #1
+ str x30, [sp, #CTX_EL3STATE_OFFSET + CTX_IS_IN_EL3]
+ dmb sy
+
+ b handle_lower_el_async_ea
+ .endm
+
+ /*
+ * This macro checks if the exception was taken due to SError in EL3 or
+ * because of pending asynchronous external aborts from lower EL that got
+ * triggered due to explicit synchronization in EL3. Refer Note 1.
+ */
+ .macro check_if_serror_from_EL3
+ /* Assumes SP_EL3 on entry */
+ str x30, [sp, #CTX_GPREGS_OFFSET + CTX_GPREG_LR]
+ ldr x30, [sp, #CTX_EL3STATE_OFFSET + CTX_IS_IN_EL3]
+ cbnz x30, exp_from_EL3
+
+ /* Handle asynchronous external abort from lower EL */
+ b handle_lower_el_async_ea
+
+exp_from_EL3:
+ /* Jump to plat_handle_el3_ea which does not return */
+ .endm
+#endif
+
+ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * This macro handles Synchronous exceptions.
+ * Only SMC exceptions are supported.
+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+ .macro handle_sync_exception
+#if ENABLE_RUNTIME_INSTRUMENTATION
+ /*
+ * Read the timestamp value and store it in per-cpu data. The value
+ * will be extracted from per-cpu data by the C level SMC handler and
+ * saved to the PMF timestamp region.
+ */
+ mrs x30, cntpct_el0
+ str x29, [sp, #CTX_GPREGS_OFFSET + CTX_GPREG_X29]
+ mrs x29, tpidr_el3
+ str x30, [x29, #CPU_DATA_PMF_TS0_OFFSET]
+ ldr x29, [sp, #CTX_GPREGS_OFFSET + CTX_GPREG_X29]
+#endif
+
+ mrs x30, esr_el3
+ ubfx x30, x30, #ESR_EC_SHIFT, #ESR_EC_LENGTH
+
+ /* Handle SMC exceptions separately from other synchronous exceptions */
+ cmp x30, #EC_AARCH32_SMC
+ b.eq smc_handler32
+
+ cmp x30, #EC_AARCH64_SMC
+ b.eq smc_handler64
+
+ /* Synchronous exceptions other than the above are assumed to be EA */
+ ldr x30, [sp, #CTX_GPREGS_OFFSET + CTX_GPREG_LR]
+ b enter_lower_el_sync_ea
+ .endm
+
+
+ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * This macro handles FIQ or IRQ interrupts i.e. EL3, S-EL1 and NS
+ * interrupts.
+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+ .macro handle_interrupt_exception label
+
+ /*
+ * Save general purpose and ARMv8.3-PAuth registers (if enabled).
+ * If Secure Cycle Counter is not disabled in MDCR_EL3 when
+ * ARMv8.5-PMU is implemented, save PMCR_EL0 and disable Cycle Counter.
+ * Also set the PSTATE to a known state.
+ */
+ bl prepare_el3_entry
+
+#if ENABLE_PAUTH
+ /* Load and program APIAKey firmware key */
+ bl pauth_load_bl31_apiakey
+#endif
+
+ /* Save the EL3 system registers needed to return from this exception */
+ mrs x0, spsr_el3
+ mrs x1, elr_el3
+ stp x0, x1, [sp, #CTX_EL3STATE_OFFSET + CTX_SPSR_EL3]
+
+ /* Switch to the runtime stack i.e. SP_EL0 */
+ ldr x2, [sp, #CTX_EL3STATE_OFFSET + CTX_RUNTIME_SP]
+ mov x20, sp
+ msr spsel, #MODE_SP_EL0
+ mov sp, x2
+
+ /*
+ * Find out whether this is a valid interrupt type.
+ * If the interrupt controller reports a spurious interrupt then return
+ * to where we came from.
+ */
+ bl plat_ic_get_pending_interrupt_type
+ cmp x0, #INTR_TYPE_INVAL
+ b.eq interrupt_exit_\label
+
+ /*
+ * Get the registered handler for this interrupt type.
+ * A NULL return value could be 'cause of the following conditions:
+ *
+ * a. An interrupt of a type was routed correctly but a handler for its
+ * type was not registered.
+ *
+ * b. An interrupt of a type was not routed correctly so a handler for
+ * its type was not registered.
+ *
+ * c. An interrupt of a type was routed correctly to EL3, but was
+ * deasserted before its pending state could be read. Another
+ * interrupt of a different type pended at the same time and its
+ * type was reported as pending instead. However, a handler for this
+ * type was not registered.
+ *
+ * a. and b. can only happen due to a programming error. The
+ * occurrence of c. could be beyond the control of Trusted Firmware.
+ * It makes sense to return from this exception instead of reporting an
+ * error.
+ */
+ bl get_interrupt_type_handler
+ cbz x0, interrupt_exit_\label
+ mov x21, x0
+
+ mov x0, #INTR_ID_UNAVAILABLE
+
+ /* Set the current security state in the 'flags' parameter */
+ mrs x2, scr_el3
+ ubfx x1, x2, #0, #1
+
+ /* Restore the reference to the 'handle' i.e. SP_EL3 */
+ mov x2, x20
+
+ /* x3 will point to a cookie (not used now) */
+ mov x3, xzr
+
+ /* Call the interrupt type handler */
+ blr x21
+
+interrupt_exit_\label:
+ /* Return from exception, possibly in a different security state */
+ b el3_exit
+
+ .endm
+
+
+vector_base runtime_exceptions
+
+ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Current EL with SP_EL0 : 0x0 - 0x200
+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+vector_entry sync_exception_sp_el0
+#ifdef MONITOR_TRAPS
+ stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!
+
+ mrs x30, esr_el3
+ ubfx x30, x30, #ESR_EC_SHIFT, #ESR_EC_LENGTH
+
+ /* Check for BRK */
+ cmp x30, #EC_BRK
+ b.eq brk_handler
+
+ ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16
+#endif /* MONITOR_TRAPS */
+
+ /* We don't expect any synchronous exceptions from EL3 */
+ b report_unhandled_exception
+end_vector_entry sync_exception_sp_el0
+
+vector_entry irq_sp_el0
+ /*
+ * EL3 code is non-reentrant. Any asynchronous exception is a serious
+ * error. Loop infinitely.
+ */
+ b report_unhandled_interrupt
+end_vector_entry irq_sp_el0
+
+
+vector_entry fiq_sp_el0
+ b report_unhandled_interrupt
+end_vector_entry fiq_sp_el0
+
+
+vector_entry serror_sp_el0
+ no_ret plat_handle_el3_ea
+end_vector_entry serror_sp_el0
+
+ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Current EL with SP_ELx: 0x200 - 0x400
+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+vector_entry sync_exception_sp_elx
+ /*
+ * This exception will trigger if anything went wrong during a previous
+ * exception entry or exit or while handling an earlier unexpected
+ * synchronous exception. There is a high probability that SP_EL3 is
+ * corrupted.
+ */
+ b report_unhandled_exception
+end_vector_entry sync_exception_sp_elx
+
+vector_entry irq_sp_elx
+ b report_unhandled_interrupt
+end_vector_entry irq_sp_elx
+
+vector_entry fiq_sp_elx
+ b report_unhandled_interrupt
+end_vector_entry fiq_sp_elx
+
+vector_entry serror_sp_elx
+#if !RAS_EXTENSION
+ check_if_serror_from_EL3
+#endif
+ no_ret plat_handle_el3_ea
+end_vector_entry serror_sp_elx
+
+ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Lower EL using AArch64 : 0x400 - 0x600
+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+vector_entry sync_exception_aarch64
+ /*
+ * This exception vector will be the entry point for SMCs and traps
+ * that are unhandled at lower ELs most commonly. SP_EL3 should point
+ * to a valid cpu context where the general purpose and system register
+ * state can be saved.
+ */
+ apply_at_speculative_wa
+ check_and_unmask_ea
+ handle_sync_exception
+end_vector_entry sync_exception_aarch64
+
+vector_entry irq_aarch64
+ apply_at_speculative_wa
+ check_and_unmask_ea
+ handle_interrupt_exception irq_aarch64
+end_vector_entry irq_aarch64
+
+vector_entry fiq_aarch64
+ apply_at_speculative_wa
+ check_and_unmask_ea
+ handle_interrupt_exception fiq_aarch64
+end_vector_entry fiq_aarch64
+
+vector_entry serror_aarch64
+ apply_at_speculative_wa
+#if RAS_EXTENSION
+ msr daifclr, #DAIF_ABT_BIT
+ b enter_lower_el_async_ea
+#else
+ handle_async_ea
+#endif
+end_vector_entry serror_aarch64
+
+ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Lower EL using AArch32 : 0x600 - 0x800
+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+vector_entry sync_exception_aarch32
+ /*
+ * This exception vector will be the entry point for SMCs and traps
+ * that are unhandled at lower ELs most commonly. SP_EL3 should point
+ * to a valid cpu context where the general purpose and system register
+ * state can be saved.
+ */
+ apply_at_speculative_wa
+ check_and_unmask_ea
+ handle_sync_exception
+end_vector_entry sync_exception_aarch32
+
+vector_entry irq_aarch32
+ apply_at_speculative_wa
+ check_and_unmask_ea
+ handle_interrupt_exception irq_aarch32
+end_vector_entry irq_aarch32
+
+vector_entry fiq_aarch32
+ apply_at_speculative_wa
+ check_and_unmask_ea
+ handle_interrupt_exception fiq_aarch32
+end_vector_entry fiq_aarch32
+
+vector_entry serror_aarch32
+ apply_at_speculative_wa
+#if RAS_EXTENSION
+ msr daifclr, #DAIF_ABT_BIT
+ b enter_lower_el_async_ea
+#else
+ handle_async_ea
+#endif
+end_vector_entry serror_aarch32
+
+#ifdef MONITOR_TRAPS
+ .section .rodata.brk_string, "aS"
+brk_location:
+ .asciz "Error at instruction 0x"
+brk_message:
+ .asciz "Unexpected BRK instruction with value 0x"
+#endif /* MONITOR_TRAPS */
+
+ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * The following code handles secure monitor calls.
+ * Depending upon the execution state from where the SMC has been
+ * invoked, it frees some general purpose registers to perform the
+ * remaining tasks. They involve finding the runtime service handler
+ * that is the target of the SMC & switching to runtime stacks (SP_EL0)
+ * before calling the handler.
+ *
+ * Note that x30 has been explicitly saved and can be used here
+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+func smc_handler
+smc_handler32:
+ /* Check whether aarch32 issued an SMC64 */
+ tbnz x0, #FUNCID_CC_SHIFT, smc_prohibited
+
+smc_handler64:
+ /* NOTE: The code below must preserve x0-x4 */
+
+ /*
+ * Save general purpose and ARMv8.3-PAuth registers (if enabled).
+ * If Secure Cycle Counter is not disabled in MDCR_EL3 when
+ * ARMv8.5-PMU is implemented, save PMCR_EL0 and disable Cycle Counter.
+ * Also set the PSTATE to a known state.
+ */
+ bl prepare_el3_entry
+
+#if ENABLE_PAUTH
+ /* Load and program APIAKey firmware key */
+ bl pauth_load_bl31_apiakey
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Populate the parameters for the SMC handler.
+ * We already have x0-x4 in place. x5 will point to a cookie (not used
+ * now). x6 will point to the context structure (SP_EL3) and x7 will
+ * contain flags we need to pass to the handler.
+ */
+ mov x5, xzr
+ mov x6, sp
+
+ /*
+ * Restore the saved C runtime stack value which will become the new
+ * SP_EL0 i.e. EL3 runtime stack. It was saved in the 'cpu_context'
+ * structure prior to the last ERET from EL3.
+ */
+ ldr x12, [x6, #CTX_EL3STATE_OFFSET + CTX_RUNTIME_SP]
+
+ /* Switch to SP_EL0 */
+ msr spsel, #MODE_SP_EL0
+
+ /*
+ * Save the SPSR_EL3, ELR_EL3, & SCR_EL3 in case there is a world
+ * switch during SMC handling.
+ * TODO: Revisit if all system registers can be saved later.
+ */
+ mrs x16, spsr_el3
+ mrs x17, elr_el3
+ mrs x18, scr_el3
+ stp x16, x17, [x6, #CTX_EL3STATE_OFFSET + CTX_SPSR_EL3]
+ str x18, [x6, #CTX_EL3STATE_OFFSET + CTX_SCR_EL3]
+
+ /* Clear flag register */
+ mov x7, xzr
+
+#if ENABLE_RME
+ /* Copy SCR_EL3.NSE bit to the flag to indicate caller's security */
+ ubfx x7, x18, #SCR_NSE_SHIFT, 1
+
+ /*
+ * Shift copied SCR_EL3.NSE bit by 5 to create space for
+ * SCR_EL3.NS bit. Bit 5 of the flag corresponds to
+ * the SCR_EL3.NSE bit.
+ */
+ lsl x7, x7, #5
+#endif /* ENABLE_RME */
+
+ /* Copy SCR_EL3.NS bit to the flag to indicate caller's security */
+ bfi x7, x18, #0, #1
+
+ /*
+ * Per SMCCCv1.3 a caller can set the SVE hint bit in the SMC FID
+ * passed through x0. Copy the SVE hint bit to flags and mask the
+ * bit in smc_fid passed to the standard service dispatcher.
+ * A service/dispatcher can retrieve the SVE hint bit state from
+ * flags using the appropriate helper.
+ */
+ bfi x7, x0, #FUNCID_SVE_HINT_SHIFT, #FUNCID_SVE_HINT_MASK
+ bic x0, x0, #(FUNCID_SVE_HINT_MASK << FUNCID_SVE_HINT_SHIFT)
+
+ mov sp, x12
+
+ /* Get the unique owning entity number */
+ ubfx x16, x0, #FUNCID_OEN_SHIFT, #FUNCID_OEN_WIDTH
+ ubfx x15, x0, #FUNCID_TYPE_SHIFT, #FUNCID_TYPE_WIDTH
+ orr x16, x16, x15, lsl #FUNCID_OEN_WIDTH
+
+ /* Load descriptor index from array of indices */
+ adrp x14, rt_svc_descs_indices
+ add x14, x14, :lo12:rt_svc_descs_indices
+ ldrb w15, [x14, x16]
+
+ /* Any index greater than 127 is invalid. Check bit 7. */
+ tbnz w15, 7, smc_unknown
+
+ /*
+ * Get the descriptor using the index
+ * x11 = (base + off), w15 = index
+ *
+ * handler = (base + off) + (index << log2(size))
+ */
+ adr x11, (__RT_SVC_DESCS_START__ + RT_SVC_DESC_HANDLE)
+ lsl w10, w15, #RT_SVC_SIZE_LOG2
+ ldr x15, [x11, w10, uxtw]
+
+ /*
+ * Call the Secure Monitor Call handler and then drop directly into
+ * el3_exit() which will program any remaining architectural state
+ * prior to issuing the ERET to the desired lower EL.
+ */
+#if DEBUG
+ cbz x15, rt_svc_fw_critical_error
+#endif
+ blr x15
+
+ b el3_exit
+
+smc_unknown:
+ /*
+ * Unknown SMC call. Populate return value with SMC_UNK and call
+ * el3_exit() which will restore the remaining architectural state
+ * i.e., SYS, GP and PAuth registers(if any) prior to issuing the ERET
+ * to the desired lower EL.
+ */
+ mov x0, #SMC_UNK
+ str x0, [x6, #CTX_GPREGS_OFFSET + CTX_GPREG_X0]
+ b el3_exit
+
+smc_prohibited:
+ restore_ptw_el1_sys_regs
+ ldp x28, x29, [sp, #CTX_GPREGS_OFFSET + CTX_GPREG_X28]
+ ldr x30, [sp, #CTX_GPREGS_OFFSET + CTX_GPREG_LR]
+ mov x0, #SMC_UNK
+ exception_return
+
+#if DEBUG
+rt_svc_fw_critical_error:
+ /* Switch to SP_ELx */
+ msr spsel, #MODE_SP_ELX
+ no_ret report_unhandled_exception
+#endif
+endfunc smc_handler
+
+ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * The following code handles exceptions caused by BRK instructions.
+ * Following a BRK instruction, the only real valid cause of action is
+ * to print some information and panic, as the code that caused it is
+ * likely in an inconsistent internal state.
+ *
+ * This is initially intended to be used in conjunction with
+ * __builtin_trap.
+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifdef MONITOR_TRAPS
+func brk_handler
+ /* Extract the ISS */
+ mrs x10, esr_el3
+ ubfx x10, x10, #ESR_ISS_SHIFT, #ESR_ISS_LENGTH
+
+ /* Ensure the console is initialized */
+ bl plat_crash_console_init
+
+ adr x4, brk_location
+ bl asm_print_str
+ mrs x4, elr_el3
+ bl asm_print_hex
+ bl asm_print_newline
+
+ adr x4, brk_message
+ bl asm_print_str
+ mov x4, x10
+ mov x5, #28
+ bl asm_print_hex_bits
+ bl asm_print_newline
+
+ no_ret plat_panic_handler
+endfunc brk_handler
+#endif /* MONITOR_TRAPS */