diff options
author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-28 09:13:47 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-28 09:13:47 +0000 |
commit | 102b0d2daa97dae68d3eed54d8fe37a9cc38a892 (patch) | |
tree | bcf648efac40ca6139842707f0eba5a4496a6dd2 /bl31/aarch64/runtime_exceptions.S | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | arm-trusted-firmware-102b0d2daa97dae68d3eed54d8fe37a9cc38a892.tar.xz arm-trusted-firmware-102b0d2daa97dae68d3eed54d8fe37a9cc38a892.zip |
Adding upstream version 2.8.0+dfsg.upstream/2.8.0+dfsgupstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'bl31/aarch64/runtime_exceptions.S')
-rw-r--r-- | bl31/aarch64/runtime_exceptions.S | 631 |
1 files changed, 631 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/bl31/aarch64/runtime_exceptions.S b/bl31/aarch64/runtime_exceptions.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0283553 --- /dev/null +++ b/bl31/aarch64/runtime_exceptions.S @@ -0,0 +1,631 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <platform_def.h> + +#include <arch.h> +#include <asm_macros.S> +#include <bl31/ea_handle.h> +#include <bl31/interrupt_mgmt.h> +#include <common/runtime_svc.h> +#include <context.h> +#include <el3_common_macros.S> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/cpu_data.h> +#include <lib/smccc.h> + + .globl runtime_exceptions + + .globl sync_exception_sp_el0 + .globl irq_sp_el0 + .globl fiq_sp_el0 + .globl serror_sp_el0 + + .globl sync_exception_sp_elx + .globl irq_sp_elx + .globl fiq_sp_elx + .globl serror_sp_elx + + .globl sync_exception_aarch64 + .globl irq_aarch64 + .globl fiq_aarch64 + .globl serror_aarch64 + + .globl sync_exception_aarch32 + .globl irq_aarch32 + .globl fiq_aarch32 + .globl serror_aarch32 + + /* + * Macro that prepares entry to EL3 upon taking an exception. + * + * With RAS_EXTENSION, this macro synchronizes pending errors with an ESB + * instruction. When an error is thus synchronized, the handling is + * delegated to platform EA handler. + * + * Without RAS_EXTENSION, this macro synchronizes pending errors using + * a DSB, unmasks Asynchronous External Aborts and saves X30 before + * setting the flag CTX_IS_IN_EL3. + */ + .macro check_and_unmask_ea +#if RAS_EXTENSION + /* Synchronize pending External Aborts */ + esb + + /* Unmask the SError interrupt */ + msr daifclr, #DAIF_ABT_BIT + + /* + * Explicitly save x30 so as to free up a register and to enable + * branching + */ + str x30, [sp, #CTX_GPREGS_OFFSET + CTX_GPREG_LR] + + /* Check for SErrors synchronized by the ESB instruction */ + mrs x30, DISR_EL1 + tbz x30, #DISR_A_BIT, 1f + + /* + * Save general purpose and ARMv8.3-PAuth registers (if enabled). + * If Secure Cycle Counter is not disabled in MDCR_EL3 when + * ARMv8.5-PMU is implemented, save PMCR_EL0 and disable Cycle Counter. + * Also set the PSTATE to a known state. + */ + bl prepare_el3_entry + + bl handle_lower_el_ea_esb + + /* Restore general purpose, PMCR_EL0 and ARMv8.3-PAuth registers */ + bl restore_gp_pmcr_pauth_regs +1: +#else + /* + * For SoCs which do not implement RAS, use DSB as a barrier to + * synchronize pending external aborts. + */ + dsb sy + + /* Unmask the SError interrupt */ + msr daifclr, #DAIF_ABT_BIT + + /* Use ISB for the above unmask operation to take effect immediately */ + isb + + /* + * Refer Note 1. No need to restore X30 as both handle_sync_exception + * and handle_interrupt_exception macro which follow this macro modify + * X30 anyway. + */ + str x30, [sp, #CTX_GPREGS_OFFSET + CTX_GPREG_LR] + mov x30, #1 + str x30, [sp, #CTX_EL3STATE_OFFSET + CTX_IS_IN_EL3] + dmb sy +#endif + .endm + +#if !RAS_EXTENSION + /* + * Note 1: The explicit DSB at the entry of various exception vectors + * for handling exceptions from lower ELs can inadvertently trigger an + * SError exception in EL3 due to pending asynchronous aborts in lower + * ELs. This will end up being handled by serror_sp_elx which will + * ultimately panic and die. + * The way to workaround is to update a flag to indicate if the exception + * truly came from EL3. This flag is allocated in the cpu_context + * structure and located at offset "CTX_EL3STATE_OFFSET + CTX_IS_IN_EL3" + * This is not a bullet proof solution to the problem at hand because + * we assume the instructions following "isb" that help to update the + * flag execute without causing further exceptions. + */ + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * This macro handles Asynchronous External Aborts. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + .macro handle_async_ea + /* + * Use a barrier to synchronize pending external aborts. + */ + dsb sy + + /* Unmask the SError interrupt */ + msr daifclr, #DAIF_ABT_BIT + + /* Use ISB for the above unmask operation to take effect immediately */ + isb + + /* Refer Note 1 */ + str x30, [sp, #CTX_GPREGS_OFFSET + CTX_GPREG_LR] + mov x30, #1 + str x30, [sp, #CTX_EL3STATE_OFFSET + CTX_IS_IN_EL3] + dmb sy + + b handle_lower_el_async_ea + .endm + + /* + * This macro checks if the exception was taken due to SError in EL3 or + * because of pending asynchronous external aborts from lower EL that got + * triggered due to explicit synchronization in EL3. Refer Note 1. + */ + .macro check_if_serror_from_EL3 + /* Assumes SP_EL3 on entry */ + str x30, [sp, #CTX_GPREGS_OFFSET + CTX_GPREG_LR] + ldr x30, [sp, #CTX_EL3STATE_OFFSET + CTX_IS_IN_EL3] + cbnz x30, exp_from_EL3 + + /* Handle asynchronous external abort from lower EL */ + b handle_lower_el_async_ea + +exp_from_EL3: + /* Jump to plat_handle_el3_ea which does not return */ + .endm +#endif + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * This macro handles Synchronous exceptions. + * Only SMC exceptions are supported. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + .macro handle_sync_exception +#if ENABLE_RUNTIME_INSTRUMENTATION + /* + * Read the timestamp value and store it in per-cpu data. The value + * will be extracted from per-cpu data by the C level SMC handler and + * saved to the PMF timestamp region. + */ + mrs x30, cntpct_el0 + str x29, [sp, #CTX_GPREGS_OFFSET + CTX_GPREG_X29] + mrs x29, tpidr_el3 + str x30, [x29, #CPU_DATA_PMF_TS0_OFFSET] + ldr x29, [sp, #CTX_GPREGS_OFFSET + CTX_GPREG_X29] +#endif + + mrs x30, esr_el3 + ubfx x30, x30, #ESR_EC_SHIFT, #ESR_EC_LENGTH + + /* Handle SMC exceptions separately from other synchronous exceptions */ + cmp x30, #EC_AARCH32_SMC + b.eq smc_handler32 + + cmp x30, #EC_AARCH64_SMC + b.eq smc_handler64 + + /* Synchronous exceptions other than the above are assumed to be EA */ + ldr x30, [sp, #CTX_GPREGS_OFFSET + CTX_GPREG_LR] + b enter_lower_el_sync_ea + .endm + + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * This macro handles FIQ or IRQ interrupts i.e. EL3, S-EL1 and NS + * interrupts. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + .macro handle_interrupt_exception label + + /* + * Save general purpose and ARMv8.3-PAuth registers (if enabled). + * If Secure Cycle Counter is not disabled in MDCR_EL3 when + * ARMv8.5-PMU is implemented, save PMCR_EL0 and disable Cycle Counter. + * Also set the PSTATE to a known state. + */ + bl prepare_el3_entry + +#if ENABLE_PAUTH + /* Load and program APIAKey firmware key */ + bl pauth_load_bl31_apiakey +#endif + + /* Save the EL3 system registers needed to return from this exception */ + mrs x0, spsr_el3 + mrs x1, elr_el3 + stp x0, x1, [sp, #CTX_EL3STATE_OFFSET + CTX_SPSR_EL3] + + /* Switch to the runtime stack i.e. SP_EL0 */ + ldr x2, [sp, #CTX_EL3STATE_OFFSET + CTX_RUNTIME_SP] + mov x20, sp + msr spsel, #MODE_SP_EL0 + mov sp, x2 + + /* + * Find out whether this is a valid interrupt type. + * If the interrupt controller reports a spurious interrupt then return + * to where we came from. + */ + bl plat_ic_get_pending_interrupt_type + cmp x0, #INTR_TYPE_INVAL + b.eq interrupt_exit_\label + + /* + * Get the registered handler for this interrupt type. + * A NULL return value could be 'cause of the following conditions: + * + * a. An interrupt of a type was routed correctly but a handler for its + * type was not registered. + * + * b. An interrupt of a type was not routed correctly so a handler for + * its type was not registered. + * + * c. An interrupt of a type was routed correctly to EL3, but was + * deasserted before its pending state could be read. Another + * interrupt of a different type pended at the same time and its + * type was reported as pending instead. However, a handler for this + * type was not registered. + * + * a. and b. can only happen due to a programming error. The + * occurrence of c. could be beyond the control of Trusted Firmware. + * It makes sense to return from this exception instead of reporting an + * error. + */ + bl get_interrupt_type_handler + cbz x0, interrupt_exit_\label + mov x21, x0 + + mov x0, #INTR_ID_UNAVAILABLE + + /* Set the current security state in the 'flags' parameter */ + mrs x2, scr_el3 + ubfx x1, x2, #0, #1 + + /* Restore the reference to the 'handle' i.e. SP_EL3 */ + mov x2, x20 + + /* x3 will point to a cookie (not used now) */ + mov x3, xzr + + /* Call the interrupt type handler */ + blr x21 + +interrupt_exit_\label: + /* Return from exception, possibly in a different security state */ + b el3_exit + + .endm + + +vector_base runtime_exceptions + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * Current EL with SP_EL0 : 0x0 - 0x200 + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ +vector_entry sync_exception_sp_el0 +#ifdef MONITOR_TRAPS + stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! + + mrs x30, esr_el3 + ubfx x30, x30, #ESR_EC_SHIFT, #ESR_EC_LENGTH + + /* Check for BRK */ + cmp x30, #EC_BRK + b.eq brk_handler + + ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 +#endif /* MONITOR_TRAPS */ + + /* We don't expect any synchronous exceptions from EL3 */ + b report_unhandled_exception +end_vector_entry sync_exception_sp_el0 + +vector_entry irq_sp_el0 + /* + * EL3 code is non-reentrant. Any asynchronous exception is a serious + * error. Loop infinitely. + */ + b report_unhandled_interrupt +end_vector_entry irq_sp_el0 + + +vector_entry fiq_sp_el0 + b report_unhandled_interrupt +end_vector_entry fiq_sp_el0 + + +vector_entry serror_sp_el0 + no_ret plat_handle_el3_ea +end_vector_entry serror_sp_el0 + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * Current EL with SP_ELx: 0x200 - 0x400 + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ +vector_entry sync_exception_sp_elx + /* + * This exception will trigger if anything went wrong during a previous + * exception entry or exit or while handling an earlier unexpected + * synchronous exception. There is a high probability that SP_EL3 is + * corrupted. + */ + b report_unhandled_exception +end_vector_entry sync_exception_sp_elx + +vector_entry irq_sp_elx + b report_unhandled_interrupt +end_vector_entry irq_sp_elx + +vector_entry fiq_sp_elx + b report_unhandled_interrupt +end_vector_entry fiq_sp_elx + +vector_entry serror_sp_elx +#if !RAS_EXTENSION + check_if_serror_from_EL3 +#endif + no_ret plat_handle_el3_ea +end_vector_entry serror_sp_elx + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * Lower EL using AArch64 : 0x400 - 0x600 + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ +vector_entry sync_exception_aarch64 + /* + * This exception vector will be the entry point for SMCs and traps + * that are unhandled at lower ELs most commonly. SP_EL3 should point + * to a valid cpu context where the general purpose and system register + * state can be saved. + */ + apply_at_speculative_wa + check_and_unmask_ea + handle_sync_exception +end_vector_entry sync_exception_aarch64 + +vector_entry irq_aarch64 + apply_at_speculative_wa + check_and_unmask_ea + handle_interrupt_exception irq_aarch64 +end_vector_entry irq_aarch64 + +vector_entry fiq_aarch64 + apply_at_speculative_wa + check_and_unmask_ea + handle_interrupt_exception fiq_aarch64 +end_vector_entry fiq_aarch64 + +vector_entry serror_aarch64 + apply_at_speculative_wa +#if RAS_EXTENSION + msr daifclr, #DAIF_ABT_BIT + b enter_lower_el_async_ea +#else + handle_async_ea +#endif +end_vector_entry serror_aarch64 + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * Lower EL using AArch32 : 0x600 - 0x800 + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ +vector_entry sync_exception_aarch32 + /* + * This exception vector will be the entry point for SMCs and traps + * that are unhandled at lower ELs most commonly. SP_EL3 should point + * to a valid cpu context where the general purpose and system register + * state can be saved. + */ + apply_at_speculative_wa + check_and_unmask_ea + handle_sync_exception +end_vector_entry sync_exception_aarch32 + +vector_entry irq_aarch32 + apply_at_speculative_wa + check_and_unmask_ea + handle_interrupt_exception irq_aarch32 +end_vector_entry irq_aarch32 + +vector_entry fiq_aarch32 + apply_at_speculative_wa + check_and_unmask_ea + handle_interrupt_exception fiq_aarch32 +end_vector_entry fiq_aarch32 + +vector_entry serror_aarch32 + apply_at_speculative_wa +#if RAS_EXTENSION + msr daifclr, #DAIF_ABT_BIT + b enter_lower_el_async_ea +#else + handle_async_ea +#endif +end_vector_entry serror_aarch32 + +#ifdef MONITOR_TRAPS + .section .rodata.brk_string, "aS" +brk_location: + .asciz "Error at instruction 0x" +brk_message: + .asciz "Unexpected BRK instruction with value 0x" +#endif /* MONITOR_TRAPS */ + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * The following code handles secure monitor calls. + * Depending upon the execution state from where the SMC has been + * invoked, it frees some general purpose registers to perform the + * remaining tasks. They involve finding the runtime service handler + * that is the target of the SMC & switching to runtime stacks (SP_EL0) + * before calling the handler. + * + * Note that x30 has been explicitly saved and can be used here + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ +func smc_handler +smc_handler32: + /* Check whether aarch32 issued an SMC64 */ + tbnz x0, #FUNCID_CC_SHIFT, smc_prohibited + +smc_handler64: + /* NOTE: The code below must preserve x0-x4 */ + + /* + * Save general purpose and ARMv8.3-PAuth registers (if enabled). + * If Secure Cycle Counter is not disabled in MDCR_EL3 when + * ARMv8.5-PMU is implemented, save PMCR_EL0 and disable Cycle Counter. + * Also set the PSTATE to a known state. + */ + bl prepare_el3_entry + +#if ENABLE_PAUTH + /* Load and program APIAKey firmware key */ + bl pauth_load_bl31_apiakey +#endif + + /* + * Populate the parameters for the SMC handler. + * We already have x0-x4 in place. x5 will point to a cookie (not used + * now). x6 will point to the context structure (SP_EL3) and x7 will + * contain flags we need to pass to the handler. + */ + mov x5, xzr + mov x6, sp + + /* + * Restore the saved C runtime stack value which will become the new + * SP_EL0 i.e. EL3 runtime stack. It was saved in the 'cpu_context' + * structure prior to the last ERET from EL3. + */ + ldr x12, [x6, #CTX_EL3STATE_OFFSET + CTX_RUNTIME_SP] + + /* Switch to SP_EL0 */ + msr spsel, #MODE_SP_EL0 + + /* + * Save the SPSR_EL3, ELR_EL3, & SCR_EL3 in case there is a world + * switch during SMC handling. + * TODO: Revisit if all system registers can be saved later. + */ + mrs x16, spsr_el3 + mrs x17, elr_el3 + mrs x18, scr_el3 + stp x16, x17, [x6, #CTX_EL3STATE_OFFSET + CTX_SPSR_EL3] + str x18, [x6, #CTX_EL3STATE_OFFSET + CTX_SCR_EL3] + + /* Clear flag register */ + mov x7, xzr + +#if ENABLE_RME + /* Copy SCR_EL3.NSE bit to the flag to indicate caller's security */ + ubfx x7, x18, #SCR_NSE_SHIFT, 1 + + /* + * Shift copied SCR_EL3.NSE bit by 5 to create space for + * SCR_EL3.NS bit. Bit 5 of the flag corresponds to + * the SCR_EL3.NSE bit. + */ + lsl x7, x7, #5 +#endif /* ENABLE_RME */ + + /* Copy SCR_EL3.NS bit to the flag to indicate caller's security */ + bfi x7, x18, #0, #1 + + /* + * Per SMCCCv1.3 a caller can set the SVE hint bit in the SMC FID + * passed through x0. Copy the SVE hint bit to flags and mask the + * bit in smc_fid passed to the standard service dispatcher. + * A service/dispatcher can retrieve the SVE hint bit state from + * flags using the appropriate helper. + */ + bfi x7, x0, #FUNCID_SVE_HINT_SHIFT, #FUNCID_SVE_HINT_MASK + bic x0, x0, #(FUNCID_SVE_HINT_MASK << FUNCID_SVE_HINT_SHIFT) + + mov sp, x12 + + /* Get the unique owning entity number */ + ubfx x16, x0, #FUNCID_OEN_SHIFT, #FUNCID_OEN_WIDTH + ubfx x15, x0, #FUNCID_TYPE_SHIFT, #FUNCID_TYPE_WIDTH + orr x16, x16, x15, lsl #FUNCID_OEN_WIDTH + + /* Load descriptor index from array of indices */ + adrp x14, rt_svc_descs_indices + add x14, x14, :lo12:rt_svc_descs_indices + ldrb w15, [x14, x16] + + /* Any index greater than 127 is invalid. Check bit 7. */ + tbnz w15, 7, smc_unknown + + /* + * Get the descriptor using the index + * x11 = (base + off), w15 = index + * + * handler = (base + off) + (index << log2(size)) + */ + adr x11, (__RT_SVC_DESCS_START__ + RT_SVC_DESC_HANDLE) + lsl w10, w15, #RT_SVC_SIZE_LOG2 + ldr x15, [x11, w10, uxtw] + + /* + * Call the Secure Monitor Call handler and then drop directly into + * el3_exit() which will program any remaining architectural state + * prior to issuing the ERET to the desired lower EL. + */ +#if DEBUG + cbz x15, rt_svc_fw_critical_error +#endif + blr x15 + + b el3_exit + +smc_unknown: + /* + * Unknown SMC call. Populate return value with SMC_UNK and call + * el3_exit() which will restore the remaining architectural state + * i.e., SYS, GP and PAuth registers(if any) prior to issuing the ERET + * to the desired lower EL. + */ + mov x0, #SMC_UNK + str x0, [x6, #CTX_GPREGS_OFFSET + CTX_GPREG_X0] + b el3_exit + +smc_prohibited: + restore_ptw_el1_sys_regs + ldp x28, x29, [sp, #CTX_GPREGS_OFFSET + CTX_GPREG_X28] + ldr x30, [sp, #CTX_GPREGS_OFFSET + CTX_GPREG_LR] + mov x0, #SMC_UNK + exception_return + +#if DEBUG +rt_svc_fw_critical_error: + /* Switch to SP_ELx */ + msr spsel, #MODE_SP_ELX + no_ret report_unhandled_exception +#endif +endfunc smc_handler + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * The following code handles exceptions caused by BRK instructions. + * Following a BRK instruction, the only real valid cause of action is + * to print some information and panic, as the code that caused it is + * likely in an inconsistent internal state. + * + * This is initially intended to be used in conjunction with + * __builtin_trap. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ +#ifdef MONITOR_TRAPS +func brk_handler + /* Extract the ISS */ + mrs x10, esr_el3 + ubfx x10, x10, #ESR_ISS_SHIFT, #ESR_ISS_LENGTH + + /* Ensure the console is initialized */ + bl plat_crash_console_init + + adr x4, brk_location + bl asm_print_str + mrs x4, elr_el3 + bl asm_print_hex + bl asm_print_newline + + adr x4, brk_message + bl asm_print_str + mov x4, x10 + mov x5, #28 + bl asm_print_hex_bits + bl asm_print_newline + + no_ret plat_panic_handler +endfunc brk_handler +#endif /* MONITOR_TRAPS */ |