Adding upstream version 2.8.0+dfsg.upstream/2.8.0+dfsgupstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

12 files changed, 2085 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/cot.c b/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/cot.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4502ed6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/cot.c
@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2015-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Copyright 2020 NXP
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+#include <drivers/auth/auth_mod.h>
+
+#if USE_TBBR_DEFS
+#include <tools_share/tbbr_oid.h>
+#else
+#include <platform_oid.h>
+#endif
+
+
+static auth_param_type_desc_t sig = AUTH_PARAM_TYPE_DESC(
+		AUTH_PARAM_SIG, 0);
+static auth_param_type_desc_t sig_alg = AUTH_PARAM_TYPE_DESC(
+		AUTH_PARAM_SIG_ALG, 0);
+static auth_param_type_desc_t sig_hash = AUTH_PARAM_TYPE_DESC(
+		AUTH_PARAM_HASH, 0);
+
+static auth_param_type_desc_t non_trusted_world_pk = AUTH_PARAM_TYPE_DESC(
+		AUTH_PARAM_PUB_KEY, NON_TRUSTED_WORLD_PK_OID);
+
+/*
+ * TBBR Chain of trust definition
+ */
+static const auth_img_desc_t bl31_image = {
+	.img_id = BL31_IMAGE_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_PLAT,
+	.parent = NULL,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_SIG,
+			.param.sig = {
+				.pk = &non_trusted_world_pk,
+				.sig = &sig,
+				.alg = &sig_alg,
+				.data = &sig_hash
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+static const auth_img_desc_t scp_bl2_image = {
+	.img_id = SCP_BL2_IMAGE_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_PLAT,
+	.parent = NULL,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_SIG,
+			.param.sig = {
+				.pk = &non_trusted_world_pk,
+				.sig = &sig,
+				.alg = &sig_alg,
+				.data = &sig_hash
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+static const auth_img_desc_t bl32_image = {
+	.img_id = BL32_IMAGE_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_PLAT,
+	.parent = NULL,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_SIG,
+			.param.sig = {
+				.pk = &non_trusted_world_pk,
+				.sig = &sig,
+				.alg = &sig_alg,
+				.data = &sig_hash
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+static const auth_img_desc_t bl33_image = {
+	.img_id = BL33_IMAGE_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_PLAT,
+	.parent = NULL,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_SIG,
+			.param.sig = {
+				.pk = &non_trusted_world_pk,
+				.sig = &sig,
+				.alg = &sig_alg,
+				.data = &sig_hash
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+#ifdef POLICY_FUSE_PROVISION
+static const auth_img_desc_t fuse_prov_img = {
+	.img_id = FUSE_PROV_IMAGE_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_PLAT,
+	.parent = NULL,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_SIG,
+			.param.sig = {
+				.pk = &non_trusted_world_pk,
+				.sig = &sig,
+				.alg = &sig_alg,
+				.data = &sig_hash
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+static const auth_img_desc_t fuse_upgrade_img = {
+	.img_id = FUSE_UP_IMAGE_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_PLAT,
+	.parent = NULL,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_SIG,
+			.param.sig = {
+				.pk = &non_trusted_world_pk,
+				.sig = &sig,
+				.alg = &sig_alg,
+				.data = &sig_hash
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_DDR_FIP_IMAGE
+static const auth_img_desc_t ddr_imem_udimm_1d_img = {
+	.img_id = DDR_IMEM_UDIMM_1D_IMAGE_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_PLAT,
+	.parent = NULL,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_SIG,
+			.param.sig = {
+				.pk = &non_trusted_world_pk,
+				.sig = &sig,
+				.alg = &sig_alg,
+				.data = &sig_hash
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+static const auth_img_desc_t ddr_imem_udimm_2d_img = {
+	.img_id = DDR_IMEM_UDIMM_2D_IMAGE_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_PLAT,
+	.parent = NULL,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_SIG,
+			.param.sig = {
+				.pk = &non_trusted_world_pk,
+				.sig = &sig,
+				.alg = &sig_alg,
+				.data = &sig_hash
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+static const auth_img_desc_t ddr_dmem_udimm_1d_img = {
+	.img_id = DDR_DMEM_UDIMM_1D_IMAGE_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_PLAT,
+	.parent = NULL,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_SIG,
+			.param.sig = {
+				.pk = &non_trusted_world_pk,
+				.sig = &sig,
+				.alg = &sig_alg,
+				.data = &sig_hash
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+static const auth_img_desc_t ddr_dmem_udimm_2d_img = {
+	.img_id = DDR_DMEM_UDIMM_2D_IMAGE_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_PLAT,
+	.parent = NULL,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_SIG,
+			.param.sig = {
+				.pk = &non_trusted_world_pk,
+				.sig = &sig,
+				.alg = &sig_alg,
+				.data = &sig_hash
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+static const auth_img_desc_t ddr_imem_rdimm_1d_img = {
+	.img_id = DDR_IMEM_RDIMM_1D_IMAGE_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_PLAT,
+	.parent = NULL,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_SIG,
+			.param.sig = {
+				.pk = &non_trusted_world_pk,
+				.sig = &sig,
+				.alg = &sig_alg,
+				.data = &sig_hash
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+static const auth_img_desc_t ddr_imem_rdimm_2d_img = {
+	.img_id = DDR_IMEM_RDIMM_2D_IMAGE_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_PLAT,
+	.parent = NULL,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_SIG,
+			.param.sig = {
+				.pk = &non_trusted_world_pk,
+				.sig = &sig,
+				.alg = &sig_alg,
+				.data = &sig_hash
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+static const auth_img_desc_t ddr_dmem_rdimm_1d_img = {
+	.img_id = DDR_DMEM_RDIMM_1D_IMAGE_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_PLAT,
+	.parent = NULL,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_SIG,
+			.param.sig = {
+				.pk = &non_trusted_world_pk,
+				.sig = &sig,
+				.alg = &sig_alg,
+				.data = &sig_hash
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+static const auth_img_desc_t ddr_dmem_rdimm_2d_img = {
+	.img_id = DDR_DMEM_RDIMM_2D_IMAGE_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_PLAT,
+	.parent = NULL,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_SIG,
+			.param.sig = {
+				.pk = &non_trusted_world_pk,
+				.sig = &sig,
+				.alg = &sig_alg,
+				.data = &sig_hash
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+#endif
+
+static const auth_img_desc_t * const cot_desc[] = {
+	[BL31_IMAGE_ID]			=	&bl31_image,
+	[SCP_BL2_IMAGE_ID]		=	&scp_bl2_image,
+	[BL32_IMAGE_ID]			=	&bl32_image,
+	[BL33_IMAGE_ID]			=	&bl33_image,
+#ifdef POLICY_FUSE_PROVISION
+	[FUSE_PROV_IMAGE_ID]		=	&fuse_prov_img,
+	[FUSE_UP_IMAGE_ID]		=	&fuse_upgrade_img,
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_DDR_FIP_IMAGE
+	[DDR_IMEM_UDIMM_1D_IMAGE_ID]	=	&ddr_imem_udimm_1d_img,
+	[DDR_IMEM_UDIMM_2D_IMAGE_ID]	=	&ddr_imem_udimm_2d_img,
+	[DDR_DMEM_UDIMM_1D_IMAGE_ID]	=	&ddr_dmem_udimm_1d_img,
+	[DDR_DMEM_UDIMM_2D_IMAGE_ID]	=	&ddr_dmem_udimm_2d_img,
+	[DDR_IMEM_RDIMM_1D_IMAGE_ID]	=	&ddr_imem_rdimm_1d_img,
+	[DDR_IMEM_RDIMM_2D_IMAGE_ID]	=	&ddr_imem_rdimm_2d_img,
+	[DDR_DMEM_RDIMM_1D_IMAGE_ID]	=	&ddr_dmem_rdimm_1d_img,
+	[DDR_DMEM_RDIMM_2D_IMAGE_ID]	=	&ddr_dmem_rdimm_2d_img,
+#endif
+};
+
+/* Register the CoT in the authentication module */
+REGISTER_COT(cot_desc);
diff --git a/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/csf_hdr.mk b/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/csf_hdr.mk
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1af51f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/csf_hdr.mk
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+#
+# Copyright 2021 NXP
+#
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+#
+#
+
+CSF_HDR_SOURCES	:=  $(PLAT_DRIVERS_PATH)/auth/csf_hdr_parser/csf_hdr_parser.c
+
+CSF_HDR_SOURCES	+=  $(PLAT_DRIVERS_PATH)/auth/csf_hdr_parser/plat_img_parser.c
+
+PLAT_INCLUDES	+= -I$(PLAT_DRIVERS_INCLUDE_PATH)/auth/csf_hdr_parser/
+
+$(eval $(call add_define, CSF_HEADER_PREPENDED))
+
+
+# Path to CST directory is required to generate the CSF header
+# and prepend it to image before fip image gets generated
+ifeq (${CST_DIR},)
+  $(error Error: CST_DIR not set)
+endif
+
+# Rules are created for generating and appending CSF header to images before
+# FIT image generation
+
+# CST_BL31
+define CST_BL31_RULE
+$(1): $(2)
+	@echo " Generating CSF Header for $$@ $$<"
+	$(Q)$(CST_DIR)/create_hdr_esbc --in $(2) --out $(1) --app_off ${CSF_HDR_SZ} \
+					--app $(2) ${BL31_INPUT_FILE}
+endef
+
+CST_BL31_SUFFIX := .cst
+
+# CST_BL32
+define CST_BL32_RULE
+$(1): $(2)
+	@echo " Generating CSF Header for $$@ $$<"
+	$(Q)$(CST_DIR)/create_hdr_esbc --in $(2) --out $(1) --app_off ${CSF_HDR_SZ} \
+					--app $(2) ${BL32_INPUT_FILE}
+endef
+
+CST_BL32_SUFFIX := .cst
+
+# CST_BL33
+define CST_BL33_RULE
+$(1): $(2)
+	@echo " Generating CSF Header for $$@ $$<"
+	$(Q)$(CST_DIR)/create_hdr_esbc --in $(2) --out $(1) --app_off ${CSF_HDR_SZ} \
+					--app $(2) ${BL33_INPUT_FILE}
+endef
+
+CST_BL33_SUFFIX := .cst
+
+# CST_SCP_BL2
+define CST_SCP_BL2_RULE
+$(1): $(2)
+	@echo " Generating CSF Header for $$@ $$<"
+	$(Q)$(CST_DIR)/create_hdr_esbc --in $(2) --out $(1) --app_off ${CSF_HDR_SZ} \
+					--app $(2) ${FUSE_INPUT_FILE}
+endef
+
+CST_SCP_BL2_SUFFIX := .cst
diff --git a/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/csf_hdr_parser.c b/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/csf_hdr_parser.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b878082
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/csf_hdr_parser.c
@@ -0,0 +1,365 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2014-2016, Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
+ * Copyright 2017-2021 NXP
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <arch_helpers.h>
+#include <cassert.h>
+#include <common/debug.h>
+#include <csf_hdr.h>
+#include <dcfg.h>
+#include <drivers/auth/crypto_mod.h>
+#include <lib/utils.h>
+#include <sfp.h>
+
+/* Maximum OID string length ("a.b.c.d.e.f ...") */
+#define MAX_OID_STR_LEN			64
+
+#define LIB_NAME	"NXP CSFv2"
+
+#ifdef CSF_HDR_CH3
+/* Barker Code for LS Ch3 ESBC Header */
+static const uint8_t barker_code[CSF_BARKER_LEN] = { 0x12, 0x19, 0x20, 0x01 };
+#else
+static const uint8_t barker_code[CSF_BARKER_LEN] = { 0x68, 0x39, 0x27, 0x81 };
+#endif
+
+#define CHECK_KEY_LEN(key_len)	(((key_len) == 2 * RSA_1K_KEY_SZ_BYTES) || \
+				 ((key_len) == 2 * RSA_2K_KEY_SZ_BYTES) || \
+				 ((key_len) == 2 * RSA_4K_KEY_SZ_BYTES))
+
+/* Flag to indicate if values are there in rotpk_hash_table */
+bool rotpk_not_dpld =  true;
+uint8_t rotpk_hash_table[MAX_KEY_ENTRIES][SHA256_BYTES];
+uint32_t num_rotpk_hash_entries;
+
+/*
+ * This function deploys the hashes of the various platform keys in
+ * rotpk_hash_table. This is done in case of secure boot after comparison
+ * of table's hash with the hash in SFP fuses. This installation is done
+ * only in the first header parsing.
+ */
+static int deploy_rotpk_hash_table(void *srk_buffer, uint16_t num_srk)
+{
+	void *ctx;
+	int ret = 0;
+	int i, j = 0;
+	unsigned int digest_size = SHA256_BYTES;
+	enum hash_algo algo = SHA256;
+	uint8_t hash[SHA256_BYTES];
+	uint32_t srk_hash[SHA256_BYTES/4] __aligned(CACHE_WRITEBACK_GRANULE);
+	struct srk_table *srktbl = (void *)srk_buffer;
+	struct sfp_ccsr_regs_t *sfp_ccsr_regs = (void *)(get_sfp_addr()
+							+ SFP_FUSE_REGS_OFFSET);
+
+
+	if (num_srk > MAX_KEY_ENTRIES) {
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	ret = hash_init(algo, &ctx);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Update hash with that of SRK table */
+	ret = hash_update(algo, ctx, (uint8_t *)((uint8_t *)srk_buffer),
+			  num_srk * sizeof(struct srk_table));
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Copy hash at destination buffer */
+	ret = hash_final(algo, ctx, hash, digest_size);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Add comparison of hash with SFP hash here */
+	for (i = 0; i < SHA256_BYTES/4; i++) {
+		srk_hash[i] =
+			mmio_read_32((uintptr_t)&sfp_ccsr_regs->srk_hash[i]);
+	}
+
+	VERBOSE("SRK table HASH\n");
+	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+		VERBOSE("%x\n", *((uint32_t *)hash + i));
+	}
+
+	if (memcmp(hash, srk_hash, SHA256_BYTES) != 0) {
+		ERROR("Error in installing ROTPK table\n");
+		ERROR("SRK hash doesn't match the fuse hash\n");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Hash table already deployed */
+	if (rotpk_not_dpld == false) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num_srk; i++) {
+		ret = hash_init(algo, &ctx);
+		if (ret != 0) {
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		/* Update hash with that of SRK table */
+		ret = hash_update(algo, ctx, srktbl[i].pkey, srktbl[i].key_len);
+		if (ret != 0) {
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		/* Copy hash at destination buffer */
+		ret = hash_final(algo, ctx, rotpk_hash_table[i], digest_size);
+		if (ret != 0) {
+			return -1;
+		}
+		VERBOSE("Table key %d HASH\n", i);
+		for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) {
+			VERBOSE("%x\n", *((uint32_t *)rotpk_hash_table[i] + j));
+		}
+	}
+	rotpk_not_dpld = false;
+	num_rotpk_hash_entries = num_srk;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate hash of ESBC hdr and ESBC. This function calculates the
+ * single hash of ESBC header and ESBC image
+ */
+int calc_img_hash(struct csf_hdr *hdr,
+		  void *img_addr, uint32_t img_size,
+		  uint8_t *img_hash, uint32_t *hash_len)
+{
+	void *ctx;
+	int ret = 0;
+	unsigned int digest_size = SHA256_BYTES;
+	enum hash_algo algo = SHA256;
+
+	ret = hash_init(algo, &ctx);
+	/* Copy hash at destination buffer */
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Update hash for CSF Header */
+	ret = hash_update(algo, ctx, (uint8_t *)hdr, sizeof(struct csf_hdr));
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Update hash with that of SRK table */
+	ret = hash_update(algo, ctx,
+			  (uint8_t *)((uint8_t *)hdr + hdr->srk_tbl_off),
+			  hdr->len_kr.num_srk * sizeof(struct srk_table));
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Update hash for actual Image */
+	ret = hash_update(algo, ctx, (uint8_t *)(img_addr), img_size);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Copy hash at destination buffer */
+	ret = hash_final(algo, ctx, img_hash, digest_size);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	*hash_len = digest_size;
+
+	VERBOSE("IMG encoded HASH\n");
+	for (int i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+		VERBOSE("%x\n", *((uint32_t *)img_hash + i));
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* This function checks if selected key is revoked or not.*/
+static uint32_t is_key_revoked(uint32_t keynum, uint32_t rev_flag)
+{
+	if (keynum == UNREVOCABLE_KEY) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (((uint32_t)(1 << (REVOC_KEY_ALIGN - keynum)) & rev_flag) != 0) {
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Parse the header to extract the type of key,
+ * Check if key is not revoked
+ * and return the key , key length and key_type
+ */
+static int32_t get_key(struct csf_hdr *hdr, uint8_t **key, uint32_t *len,
+			enum sig_alg *key_type)
+{
+	int i = 0;
+	uint32_t ret = 0U;
+	uint32_t key_num, key_revoc_flag;
+	void *esbc = hdr;
+	struct srk_table *srktbl = (void *)((uint8_t *)esbc + hdr->srk_tbl_off);
+	bool sb;
+	uint32_t mode;
+
+	/* We currently support only RSA keys and signature */
+	*key_type = RSA;
+
+	/* Check for number of SRK entries */
+	if ((hdr->len_kr.num_srk == 0) ||
+	    (hdr->len_kr.num_srk > MAX_KEY_ENTRIES)) {
+		ERROR("Error in NUM entries in SRK Table\n");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check the key number field. It should be not greater than
+	 * number of entries in SRK table.
+	 */
+	key_num = hdr->len_kr.srk_sel;
+	if ((key_num == 0) || (key_num > hdr->len_kr.num_srk)) {
+		ERROR("Invalid Key number\n");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Get revoc key from sfp */
+	key_revoc_flag = get_key_revoc();
+
+	/* Check if selected key has been revoked */
+	ret = is_key_revoked(key_num, key_revoc_flag);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		ERROR("Selected key has been revoked\n");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Check for valid key length - allowed key sized 1k, 2k and 4K */
+	for (i = 0; i < hdr->len_kr.num_srk; i++) {
+		if (CHECK_KEY_LEN(srktbl[i].key_len) == 0) {
+			ERROR("Invalid key length\n");
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* We don't return error from here. While parsing we just try to
+	 * install the srk table. Failure needs to be taken care of in
+	 * case of secure boot. This failure will be handled at the time
+	 * of rotpk comparison in plat_get_rotpk_info function
+	 */
+	sb = check_boot_mode_secure(&mode);
+	if (sb) {
+		ret = deploy_rotpk_hash_table(srktbl, hdr->len_kr.num_srk);
+		if (ret != 0) {
+			ERROR("ROTPK FAILURE\n");
+			/* For ITS =1 , return failure */
+			if (mode != 0) {
+				return -1;
+			}
+			ERROR("SECURE BOOT DEV-ENV MODE:\n");
+			ERROR("\tCHECK ROTPK !\n");
+			ERROR("\tCONTINUING ON FAILURE...\n");
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Return the length of the selected key */
+	*len = srktbl[key_num - 1].key_len;
+
+	/* Point key to the selected key */
+	*key =  (uint8_t *)&(srktbl[key_num - 1].pkey);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function would parse the CSF header and do the following:
+ * 1. Basic integrity checks
+ * 2. Key checks and extract the key from SRK/IE Table
+ * 3. Key hash comparison with SRKH in fuses in case of SRK Table
+ * 4. OEM/UID checks - To be added
+ * 5. Hash calculation for various components used in signature
+ * 6. Signature integrity checks
+ * return -> 0 on success, -1 on failure
+ */
+int validate_esbc_header(void *img_hdr, void **img_key, uint32_t *key_len,
+			 void **img_sign, uint32_t *sign_len,
+			 enum sig_alg *algo)
+{
+	struct csf_hdr *hdr = img_hdr;
+	uint8_t *s;
+	int32_t ret = 0;
+	void *esbc = (uint8_t *)img_hdr;
+	uint8_t *key;
+	uint32_t klen;
+
+	/* check barker code */
+	if (memcmp(hdr->barker, barker_code, CSF_BARKER_LEN) != 0) {
+		ERROR("Wrong barker code in header\n");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	ret = get_key(hdr, &key, &klen, algo);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* check signaure */
+	if (klen == (2 * hdr->sign_len)) {
+		/* check signature length */
+		if (((hdr->sign_len == RSA_1K_KEY_SZ_BYTES) ||
+		    (hdr->sign_len == RSA_2K_KEY_SZ_BYTES) ||
+		    (hdr->sign_len == RSA_4K_KEY_SZ_BYTES)) == 0) {
+			ERROR("Wrong Signature length in header\n");
+			return -1;
+		}
+	} else {
+		ERROR("RSA key length not twice the signature length\n");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* modulus most significant bit should be set */
+
+	if ((key[0] & 0x80) == 0U) {
+		ERROR("RSA Public key MSB not set\n");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* modulus value should be odd */
+	if ((key[klen / 2 - 1] & 0x1) == 0U) {
+		ERROR("Public key Modulus in header not odd\n");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Check signature value < modulus value */
+	s =  (uint8_t *)(esbc + hdr->psign);
+
+	if (!(memcmp(s, key, hdr->sign_len) < 0)) {
+		ERROR("Signature not less than modulus");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Populate the return addresses */
+	*img_sign = (void *)(s);
+
+	/* Save the length of signature */
+	*sign_len = hdr->sign_len;
+
+	*img_key = (uint8_t *)key;
+
+	*key_len = klen;
+
+	return ret;
+}
diff --git a/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/input_bl2_ch2 b/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/input_bl2_ch2
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bf8934b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/input_bl2_ch2
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2014-2016, Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
+ * Copyright 2017-2020 NXP
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ *
+ */
+
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify the platform. [Mandatory]
+# Choose Platform - 1010/1040/2041/3041/4080/5020/5040/9131/9132/9164/4240/C290/LS1
+PLATFORM=LS1043
+# ESBC Flag. Specify ESBC=0 to sign u-boot and ESBC=1 to sign ESBC images.(default is 0)
+ESBC=0
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Entry Point/Image start address field in the header.[Mandatory]
+# (default=ADDRESS of first file specified in images)
+ENTRY_POINT=10000000
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify the file name of the keys separated by comma.
+# The number of files and key select should lie between 1 and 4 for 1040 and C290.
+# For rest of the platforms only one key is required and key select should not be provided.
+
+# USAGE (for 4080/5020/5040/3041/2041/1010/913x): PRI_KEY = <key1.pri>
+# USAGE (for 1040/C290/9164/4240/LS1): PRI_KEY = <key1.pri>, <key2.pri>, <key3.pri>, <key4.pri>
+
+# PRI_KEY (Default private key :srk.pri) - [Optional]
+PRI_KEY=srk.pri
+# PUB_KEY (Default public key :srk.pub) - [Optional]
+PUB_KEY=srk.pub
+# Please provide KEY_SELECT(between 1 to 4) (Required for 1040/C290/9164/4240/LS1 only) - [Optional]
+KEY_SELECT=
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify SG table address, only for (2041/3041/4080/5020/5040) with ESBC=0 - [Optional]
+SG_TABLE_ADDR=
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify the target where image will be loaded. (Default is NOR_16B) - [Optional]
+# Only required for Non-PBL Devices (1010/1040/9131/9132i/C290)
+# Select from - NOR_8B/NOR_16B/NAND_8B_512/NAND_8B_2K/NAND_8B_4K/NAND_16B_512/NAND_16B_2K/NAND_16B_4K/SD/MMC/SPI
+IMAGE_TARGET=
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify IMAGE, Max 8 images are possible. DST_ADDR is required only for Non-PBL Platform. [Mandatory]
+# USAGE : IMAGE_NO = {IMAGE_NAME, SRC_ADDR, DST_ADDR}
+IMAGE_1={bl2.bin,10000000,ffffffff}
+IMAGE_2={,,}
+IMAGE_3={,,}
+IMAGE_4={,,}
+IMAGE_5={,,}
+IMAGE_6={,,}
+IMAGE_7={,,}
+IMAGE_8={,,}
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify OEM AND FSL ID to be populated in header. [Optional]
+# e.g FSL_UID=11111111
+FSL_UID_0=
+FSL_UID_1=
+OEM_UID_0=
+OEM_UID_1=
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify the file names of csf header and sg table. (Default :hdr.out) [Optional]
+OUTPUT_HDR_FILENAME=hdr_bl2.out
+
+# Specify the file names of hash file and sign file.
+HASH_FILENAME=img_hash.out
+INPUT_SIGN_FILENAME=sign.out
+
+# Specify the signature size.It is mandatory when neither public key nor private key is specified.
+# Signature size would be [0x80 for 1k key, 0x100 for 2k key, and 0x200 for 4k key].
+SIGN_SIZE=
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify the output file name of sg table. (Default :sg_table.out). [Optional]
+# Please note that OUTPUT SG BIN is only required for 2041/3041/4080/5020/5040 when ESBC flag is not set.
+OUTPUT_SG_BIN=
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Following fields are Required for 4240/9164/1040/C290 only
+
+# Specify House keeping Area
+# Required for 4240/9164/1040/C290 only when ESBC flag is not set. [Mandatory]
+HK_AREA_POINTER=
+HK_AREA_SIZE=
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Following field Required for 4240/9164/1040/C290 only
+# Specify Secondary Image Flag. (0 or 1) - [Optional]
+# (Default is 0)
+SEC_IMAGE=0
+# Specify Manufacturing Protection Flag. (0 or 1) - [Optional]
+# Required only for LS1(Default is 0)
+MP_FLAG=1
+---------------------------------------------------
diff --git a/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/input_bl2_ch3 b/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/input_bl2_ch3
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5fdad9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/input_bl2_ch3
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2018-2020 NXP
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ *
+ */
+
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify the platform. [Mandatory]
+# Choose Platform -
+# TRUST 3.2: LX2160
+PLATFORM=LS2088
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Entry Point/Image start address field in the header.[Mandatory]
+# (default=ADDRESS of first file specified in images)
+# Address can be 64 bit
+ENTRY_POINT=1800A000
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify the Key Information.
+# PUB_KEY [Mandatory] Comma Separated List
+# Usage: <srk1.pub> <srk2.pub> .....
+PUB_KEY=srk.pub
+# KEY_SELECT [Mandatory]
+# USAGE (for TRUST 3.x): (between 1 to 8)
+KEY_SELECT=1
+# PRI_KEY [Mandatory] Single Key Used for Signing
+# USAGE: <srk.pri>
+PRI_KEY=srk.pri
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify IMAGE, Max 8 images are possible.
+# DST_ADDR is required only for Non-PBL Platform. [Mandatory]
+# USAGE : IMAGE_NO = {IMAGE_NAME, SRC_ADDR, DST_ADDR}
+# Address can be 64 bit
+IMAGE_1={bl2.bin,1800A000,ffffffff}
+IMAGE_2={,,}
+IMAGE_3={,,}
+IMAGE_4={,,}
+IMAGE_5={,,}
+IMAGE_6={,,}
+IMAGE_7={,,}
+IMAGE_8={,,}
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify OEM AND FSL ID to be populated in header. [Optional]
+# e.g FSL_UID_0=11111111
+FSL_UID_0=
+FSL_UID_1=
+OEM_UID_0=
+OEM_UID_1=
+OEM_UID_2=
+OEM_UID_3=
+OEM_UID_4=
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify the output file names [Optional].
+# Default Values chosen in Tool
+OUTPUT_HDR_FILENAME=hdr_bl2.out
+IMAGE_HASH_FILENAME=
+RSA_SIGN_FILENAME=
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify The Flags. (0 or 1) - [Optional]
+MP_FLAG=0
+ISS_FLAG=1
+LW_FLAG=0
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify VERBOSE as 1, if you want to Display Header Information [Optional]
+VERBOSE=1
diff --git a/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/input_bl2_ch3_2 b/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/input_bl2_ch3_2
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cc7c07c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/input_bl2_ch3_2
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2018-2020 NXP
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ *
+ */
+
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify the platform. [Mandatory]
+# Choose Platform -
+# TRUST 3.2: LX2160
+PLATFORM=LX2160
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Entry Point/Image start address field in the header.[Mandatory]
+# (default=ADDRESS of first file specified in images)
+# Address can be 64 bit
+ENTRY_POINT=1800D000
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify the Key Information.
+# PUB_KEY [Mandatory] Comma Separated List
+# Usage: <srk1.pub> <srk2.pub> .....
+PUB_KEY=srk.pub
+# KEY_SELECT [Mandatory]
+# USAGE (for TRUST 3.x): (between 1 to 8)
+KEY_SELECT=1
+# PRI_KEY [Mandatory] Single Key Used for Signing
+# USAGE: <srk.pri>
+PRI_KEY=srk.pri
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify IMAGE, Max 8 images are possible.
+# DST_ADDR is required only for Non-PBL Platform. [Mandatory]
+# USAGE : IMAGE_NO = {IMAGE_NAME, SRC_ADDR, DST_ADDR}
+# Address can be 64 bit
+IMAGE_1={bl2.bin,1800D000,ffffffff}
+IMAGE_2={,,}
+IMAGE_3={,,}
+IMAGE_4={,,}
+IMAGE_5={,,}
+IMAGE_6={,,}
+IMAGE_7={,,}
+IMAGE_8={,,}
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify OEM AND FSL ID to be populated in header. [Optional]
+# e.g FSL_UID_0=11111111
+FSL_UID_0=
+FSL_UID_1=
+OEM_UID_0=
+OEM_UID_1=
+OEM_UID_2=
+OEM_UID_3=
+OEM_UID_4=
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify the output file names [Optional].
+# Default Values chosen in Tool
+OUTPUT_HDR_FILENAME=hdr_bl2.out
+IMAGE_HASH_FILENAME=
+RSA_SIGN_FILENAME=
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify The Flags. (0 or 1) - [Optional]
+MP_FLAG=0
+ISS_FLAG=1
+LW_FLAG=0
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify VERBOSE as 1, if you want to Display Header Information [Optional]
+VERBOSE=1
diff --git a/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/input_blx_ch2 b/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/input_blx_ch2
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..93b020b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/input_blx_ch2
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2017-2020 NXP
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ *
+ */
+
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify the platform. [Mandatory]
+# Choose Platform - 1010/1040/2041/3041/4080/5020/5040/9131/9132/9164/4240/C290/LS1
+PLATFORM=LS1043
+# ESBC Flag. Specify ESBC=0 to sign u-boot and ESBC=1 to sign ESBC images.(default is 0)
+ESBC=1
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify the file name of the keys separated by comma.
+
+# PRI_KEY (Default private key :srk.pri) - [Optional]
+PRI_KEY=srk.pri
+# PUB_KEY (Default public key :srk.pub) - [Optional]
+PUB_KEY=srk.pub
+# Please provide KEY_SELECT(between 1 to 4) (Required for 1040/C290/9164/4240 only) - [Optional]
+KEY_SELECT=1
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify OEM AND FSL ID to be populated in header. [Optional]
+# e.g FSL_UID=11111111
+FSL_UID_0=
+FSL_UID_1=
+OEM_UID_0=
+OEM_UID_1=
+---------------------------------------------------
diff --git a/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/input_blx_ch3 b/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/input_blx_ch3
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..18e8e3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/input_blx_ch3
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2017-2020 NXP
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ *
+ */
+
+ESBC=1
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify the platform. [Mandatory]
+# Choose Platform -
+# TRUST 3.0: LS2085
+# TRUST 3.1: LS2088, LS1088
+PLATFORM=LS2088
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify the Key Information.
+# PUB_KEY [Mandatory] Comma Separated List
+# Usage: <srk1.pub> <srk2.pub> .....
+PUB_KEY=srk.pub
+# KEY_SELECT [Mandatory]
+# USAGE (for TRUST 3.x): (between 1 to 8)
+KEY_SELECT=1
+# PRI_KEY [Mandatory] Single Key Used for Signing
+# USAGE: <srk.pri>
+PRI_KEY=srk.pri
+
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify OEM AND FSL ID to be populated in header. [Optional]
+# e.g FSL_UID_0=11111111
+FSL_UID_0=
+FSL_UID_1=
+OEM_UID_0=
+OEM_UID_1=
+OEM_UID_2=
+OEM_UID_3=
+OEM_UID_4=
+---------------------------------------------------
diff --git a/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/input_pbi_ch3 b/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/input_pbi_ch3
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9111a2a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/input_pbi_ch3
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016-2020 NXP
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ *
+ */
+
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify the platform. [Mandatory]
+# Choose Platform -
+# TRUST 3.0: LS2085
+# TRUST 3.1: LS2088, LS1088
+PLATFORM=LS2088
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify the Key Information.
+# PUB_KEY [Mandatory] Comma Separated List
+# Usage: <srk1.pub> <srk2.pub> .....
+PUB_KEY=srk.pub
+# KEY_SELECT [Mandatory]
+# USAGE (for TRUST 3.x): (between 1 to 8)
+KEY_SELECT=1
+# PRI_KEY [Mandatory] Single Key Used for Signing
+# USAGE: <srk.pri>
+PRI_KEY=srk.pri
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify OEM AND FSL ID to be populated in header. [Optional]
+# e.g FSL_UID_0=11111111
+FSL_UID_0=
+FSL_UID_1=
+OEM_UID_0=
+OEM_UID_1=
+OEM_UID_2=
+OEM_UID_3=
+OEM_UID_4=
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify The Flags. (0 or 1) - [Optional]
+MP_FLAG=0
+ISS_FLAG=1
+LW_FLAG=0
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify VERBOSE as 1, if you want to Display Header Information [Optional]
+VERBOSE=1
+---------------------------------------------------
diff --git a/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/input_pbi_ch3_2 b/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/input_pbi_ch3_2
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c2d7ce4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/input_pbi_ch3_2
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2017-2020 NXP
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ *
+ */
+
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify the platform. [Mandatory]
+# Choose Platform -
+# TRUST 3.0: LS2085
+# TRUST 3.1: LS2088, LS1088
+PLATFORM=LX2160
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify the Key Information.
+# PUB_KEY [Mandatory] Comma Separated List
+# Usage: <srk1.pub> <srk2.pub> .....
+PUB_KEY=srk.pub
+# KEY_SELECT [Mandatory]
+# USAGE (for TRUST 3.x): (between 1 to 8)
+KEY_SELECT=1
+# PRI_KEY [Mandatory] Single Key Used for Signing
+# USAGE: <srk.pri>
+PRI_KEY=srk.pri
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify OEM AND FSL ID to be populated in header. [Optional]
+# e.g FSL_UID_0=11111111
+FSL_UID_0=
+FSL_UID_1=
+OEM_UID_0=
+OEM_UID_1=
+OEM_UID_2=
+OEM_UID_3=
+OEM_UID_4=
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify The Flags. (0 or 1) - [Optional]
+MP_FLAG=0
+ISS_FLAG=1
+LW_FLAG=0
+---------------------------------------------------
+# Specify VERBOSE as 1, if you want to Display Header Information [Optional]
+VERBOSE=1
+---------------------------------------------------
diff --git a/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/plat_img_parser.c b/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/plat_img_parser.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..43b78e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/plat_img_parser.c
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2014-2016, Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
+ * Copyright 2017-2021 NXP
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <arch_helpers.h>
+#include <common/debug.h>
+#include <csf_hdr.h>
+#include <drivers/auth/crypto_mod.h>
+#include <drivers/auth/img_parser_mod.h>
+#include <lib/utils.h>
+#include <sfp.h>
+
+/* Temporary variables to speed up the authentication parameters search. These
+ * variables are assigned once during the integrity check and used any time an
+ * authentication parameter is requested, so we do not have to parse the image
+ * again.
+ */
+
+/* Hash of Image + CSF Header + SRK table */
+uint8_t img_hash[SHA256_BYTES] __aligned(CACHE_WRITEBACK_GRANULE);
+uint32_t hash_len;
+
+/* Key being used for authentication
+ * Points to the key in CSF header copied in DDR
+ * ESBC client key
+ */
+void *img_key;
+uint32_t key_len;
+
+/* ESBC client signature */
+void *img_sign;
+uint32_t sign_len;
+enum sig_alg alg;
+
+/* Maximum OID string length ("a.b.c.d.e.f ...") */
+#define MAX_OID_STR_LEN			64
+
+#define LIB_NAME	"NXP CSFv2"
+
+/*
+ * Clear all static temporary variables.
+ */
+static void clear_temp_vars(void)
+{
+#define ZERO_AND_CLEAN(x)					\
+	do {							\
+		zeromem(&x, sizeof(x));				\
+		clean_dcache_range((uintptr_t)&x, sizeof(x));	\
+	} while (0)
+
+	ZERO_AND_CLEAN(img_key);
+	ZERO_AND_CLEAN(img_sign);
+	ZERO_AND_CLEAN(img_hash);
+	ZERO_AND_CLEAN(key_len);
+	ZERO_AND_CLEAN(hash_len);
+	ZERO_AND_CLEAN(sign_len);
+
+#undef ZERO_AND_CLEAN
+}
+
+/* Exported functions */
+
+static void init(void)
+{
+	clear_temp_vars();
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function would check the integrity of the CSF header
+ */
+static int check_integrity(void *img, unsigned int img_len)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * The image file has been successfully loaded till here.
+	 *
+	 * Flush the image to main memory so that it can be authenticated
+	 * by CAAM, a HW accelerator regardless of cache and MMU state.
+	 */
+	flush_dcache_range((uintptr_t) img, img_len);
+
+	/*
+	 * Image is appended at an offset of 16K (IMG_OFFSET) to the header.
+	 * So the size in header should be equal to img_len - IMG_OFFSET
+	 */
+	VERBOSE("Barker code is %x\n", *(unsigned int *)img);
+	ret = validate_esbc_header(img, &img_key, &key_len, &img_sign,
+				   &sign_len, &alg);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		ERROR("Header authentication failed\n");
+		clear_temp_vars();
+		return IMG_PARSER_ERR;
+	}
+	/* Calculate the hash of various components from the image */
+	ret = calc_img_hash(img, (uint8_t *)img + CSF_HDR_SZ,
+			    img_len - CSF_HDR_SZ, img_hash, &hash_len);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		ERROR("Issue in hash calculation %d\n", ret);
+		clear_temp_vars();
+		return IMG_PARSER_ERR;
+	}
+
+	return IMG_PARSER_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Extract an authentication parameter from CSF header
+ *
+ * CSF header has already been parsed and the required information like
+ * hash of data, signature, length stored in global variables has been
+ * extracted in chek_integrity function.  This data
+ * is returned back to the caller.
+ */
+static int get_auth_param(const auth_param_type_desc_t *type_desc,
+		void *img, unsigned int img_len,
+		void **param, unsigned int *param_len)
+{
+	int rc = IMG_PARSER_OK;
+
+	/* We do not use img because the check_integrity function has already
+	 * extracted the relevant data ( pk, sig_alg, etc)
+	 */
+
+	switch (type_desc->type) {
+
+	/* Hash will be returned for comparison with signature */
+	case AUTH_PARAM_HASH:
+		*param = (void *)img_hash;
+		*param_len = (unsigned int)SHA256_BYTES;
+		break;
+
+	/* Return the public key used for signature extracted from the SRK table
+	 * after checks with key revocation
+	 */
+	case AUTH_PARAM_PUB_KEY:
+		/* Get the subject public key */
+		/* For a 1K key - the length would be 2k/8 = 0x100 bytes
+		 * 2K RSA key - 0x200 , 4K RSA - 0x400
+		 */
+		*param = img_key;
+		*param_len = (unsigned int)key_len;
+		break;
+
+	/* Call a function to tell if signature is RSA or ECDSA. ECDSA to be
+	 * supported in later platforms like LX2 etc
+	 */
+	case AUTH_PARAM_SIG_ALG:
+		/* Algo will be signature - RSA or ECDSA  on hash */
+		*param = (void *)&alg;
+		*param_len = 4U;
+		break;
+
+	/* Return the signature */
+	case AUTH_PARAM_SIG:
+		*param = img_sign;
+		*param_len = (unsigned int)sign_len;
+		break;
+
+	case AUTH_PARAM_NV_CTR:
+
+	default:
+		rc = IMG_PARSER_ERR_NOT_FOUND;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+REGISTER_IMG_PARSER_LIB(IMG_PLAT, LIB_NAME, init,
+			check_integrity, get_auth_param);
diff --git a/drivers/nxp/auth/tbbr/tbbr_cot.c b/drivers/nxp/auth/tbbr/tbbr_cot.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bb21fa0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/nxp/auth/tbbr/tbbr_cot.c
@@ -0,0 +1,820 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2015-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Copyright 2020 NXP
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+#include <drivers/auth/auth_mod.h>
+
+#if USE_TBBR_DEFS
+#include <tools_share/tbbr_oid.h>
+#else
+#include <platform_oid.h>
+#endif
+
+
+#if TF_MBEDTLS_HASH_ALG_ID == TF_MBEDTLS_SHA256
+#define HASH_DER_LEN			51
+#elif TF_MBEDTLS_HASH_ALG_ID == TF_MBEDTLS_SHA384
+#define HASH_DER_LEN			67
+#elif TF_MBEDTLS_HASH_ALG_ID == TF_MBEDTLS_SHA512
+#define HASH_DER_LEN			83
+#else
+#error "Invalid value for TF_MBEDTLS_HASH_ALG_ID"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * The platform must allocate buffers to store the authentication parameters
+ * extracted from the certificates. In this case, because of the way the CoT is
+ * established, we can reuse some of the buffers on different stages
+ */
+
+static unsigned char nt_world_bl_hash_buf[HASH_DER_LEN];
+
+static unsigned char soc_fw_hash_buf[HASH_DER_LEN];
+static unsigned char tos_fw_hash_buf[HASH_DER_LEN];
+static unsigned char tos_fw_extra1_hash_buf[HASH_DER_LEN];
+static unsigned char tos_fw_extra2_hash_buf[HASH_DER_LEN];
+static unsigned char trusted_world_pk_buf[PK_DER_LEN];
+static unsigned char non_trusted_world_pk_buf[PK_DER_LEN];
+static unsigned char content_pk_buf[PK_DER_LEN];
+static unsigned char soc_fw_config_hash_buf[HASH_DER_LEN];
+static unsigned char tos_fw_config_hash_buf[HASH_DER_LEN];
+static unsigned char nt_fw_config_hash_buf[HASH_DER_LEN];
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_DDR_FIP_IMAGE
+static unsigned char ddr_fw_content_pk_buf[PK_DER_LEN];
+static unsigned char ddr_imem_udimm_1d_hash_buf[HASH_DER_LEN];
+static unsigned char ddr_imem_udimm_2d_hash_buf[HASH_DER_LEN];
+static unsigned char ddr_dmem_udimm_1d_hash_buf[HASH_DER_LEN];
+static unsigned char ddr_dmem_udimm_2d_hash_buf[HASH_DER_LEN];
+
+static unsigned char ddr_imem_rdimm_1d_hash_buf[HASH_DER_LEN];
+static unsigned char ddr_imem_rdimm_2d_hash_buf[HASH_DER_LEN];
+static unsigned char ddr_dmem_rdimm_1d_hash_buf[HASH_DER_LEN];
+static unsigned char ddr_dmem_rdimm_2d_hash_buf[HASH_DER_LEN];
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Parameter type descriptors
+ */
+static auth_param_type_desc_t trusted_nv_ctr = AUTH_PARAM_TYPE_DESC(
+		AUTH_PARAM_NV_CTR, TRUSTED_FW_NVCOUNTER_OID);
+
+static auth_param_type_desc_t subject_pk = AUTH_PARAM_TYPE_DESC(
+		AUTH_PARAM_PUB_KEY, 0);
+static auth_param_type_desc_t sig = AUTH_PARAM_TYPE_DESC(
+		AUTH_PARAM_SIG, 0);
+static auth_param_type_desc_t sig_alg = AUTH_PARAM_TYPE_DESC(
+		AUTH_PARAM_SIG_ALG, 0);
+static auth_param_type_desc_t raw_data = AUTH_PARAM_TYPE_DESC(
+		AUTH_PARAM_RAW_DATA, 0);
+
+
+static auth_param_type_desc_t non_trusted_nv_ctr = AUTH_PARAM_TYPE_DESC(
+		AUTH_PARAM_NV_CTR, NON_TRUSTED_FW_NVCOUNTER_OID);
+static auth_param_type_desc_t trusted_world_pk = AUTH_PARAM_TYPE_DESC(
+		AUTH_PARAM_PUB_KEY, TRUSTED_WORLD_PK_OID);
+static auth_param_type_desc_t non_trusted_world_pk = AUTH_PARAM_TYPE_DESC(
+		AUTH_PARAM_PUB_KEY, NON_TRUSTED_WORLD_PK_OID);
+static auth_param_type_desc_t soc_fw_content_pk = AUTH_PARAM_TYPE_DESC(
+		AUTH_PARAM_PUB_KEY, SOC_FW_CONTENT_CERT_PK_OID);
+static auth_param_type_desc_t tos_fw_content_pk = AUTH_PARAM_TYPE_DESC(
+		AUTH_PARAM_PUB_KEY, TRUSTED_OS_FW_CONTENT_CERT_PK_OID);
+static auth_param_type_desc_t nt_fw_content_pk = AUTH_PARAM_TYPE_DESC(
+		AUTH_PARAM_PUB_KEY, NON_TRUSTED_FW_CONTENT_CERT_PK_OID);
+static auth_param_type_desc_t soc_fw_hash = AUTH_PARAM_TYPE_DESC(
+		AUTH_PARAM_HASH, SOC_AP_FW_HASH_OID);
+static auth_param_type_desc_t soc_fw_config_hash = AUTH_PARAM_TYPE_DESC(
+		AUTH_PARAM_HASH, SOC_FW_CONFIG_HASH_OID);
+static auth_param_type_desc_t tos_fw_hash = AUTH_PARAM_TYPE_DESC(
+		AUTH_PARAM_HASH, TRUSTED_OS_FW_HASH_OID);
+static auth_param_type_desc_t tos_fw_config_hash = AUTH_PARAM_TYPE_DESC(
+		AUTH_PARAM_HASH, TRUSTED_OS_FW_CONFIG_HASH_OID);
+static auth_param_type_desc_t tos_fw_extra1_hash = AUTH_PARAM_TYPE_DESC(
+		AUTH_PARAM_HASH, TRUSTED_OS_FW_EXTRA1_HASH_OID);
+static auth_param_type_desc_t tos_fw_extra2_hash = AUTH_PARAM_TYPE_DESC(
+		AUTH_PARAM_HASH, TRUSTED_OS_FW_EXTRA2_HASH_OID);
+static auth_param_type_desc_t nt_world_bl_hash = AUTH_PARAM_TYPE_DESC(
+		AUTH_PARAM_HASH, NON_TRUSTED_WORLD_BOOTLOADER_HASH_OID);
+static auth_param_type_desc_t nt_fw_config_hash = AUTH_PARAM_TYPE_DESC(
+		AUTH_PARAM_HASH, NON_TRUSTED_FW_CONFIG_HASH_OID);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_DDR_FIP_IMAGE
+static auth_param_type_desc_t ddr_fw_content_pk = AUTH_PARAM_TYPE_DESC(
+		AUTH_PARAM_PUB_KEY, DDR_FW_CONTENT_CERT_PK_OID);
+
+static auth_param_type_desc_t ddr_imem_udimm_1d_fw_hash = AUTH_PARAM_TYPE_DESC(
+		AUTH_PARAM_HASH, DDR_IMEM_UDIMM_1D_HASH_OID);
+static auth_param_type_desc_t ddr_imem_udimm_2d_fw_hash = AUTH_PARAM_TYPE_DESC(
+		AUTH_PARAM_HASH, DDR_IMEM_UDIMM_2D_HASH_OID);
+static auth_param_type_desc_t ddr_dmem_udimm_1d_fw_hash = AUTH_PARAM_TYPE_DESC(
+		AUTH_PARAM_HASH, DDR_DMEM_UDIMM_1D_HASH_OID);
+static auth_param_type_desc_t ddr_dmem_udimm_2d_fw_hash = AUTH_PARAM_TYPE_DESC(
+		AUTH_PARAM_HASH, DDR_DMEM_UDIMM_2D_HASH_OID);
+
+static auth_param_type_desc_t ddr_imem_rdimm_1d_fw_hash = AUTH_PARAM_TYPE_DESC(
+		AUTH_PARAM_HASH, DDR_IMEM_RDIMM_1D_HASH_OID);
+static auth_param_type_desc_t ddr_imem_rdimm_2d_fw_hash = AUTH_PARAM_TYPE_DESC(
+		AUTH_PARAM_HASH, DDR_IMEM_RDIMM_2D_HASH_OID);
+static auth_param_type_desc_t ddr_dmem_rdimm_1d_fw_hash = AUTH_PARAM_TYPE_DESC(
+		AUTH_PARAM_HASH, DDR_DMEM_RDIMM_1D_HASH_OID);
+static auth_param_type_desc_t ddr_dmem_rdimm_2d_fw_hash = AUTH_PARAM_TYPE_DESC(
+		AUTH_PARAM_HASH, DDR_DMEM_RDIMM_2D_HASH_OID);
+#endif
+
+
+/*
+ * Trusted key certificate
+ */
+static const auth_img_desc_t trusted_key_cert = {
+	.img_id = TRUSTED_KEY_CERT_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_CERT,
+	.parent = NULL,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_SIG,
+			.param.sig = {
+				.pk = &subject_pk,
+				.sig = &sig,
+				.alg = &sig_alg,
+				.data = &raw_data
+			}
+		},
+		[1] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_NV_CTR,
+			.param.nv_ctr = {
+				.cert_nv_ctr = &trusted_nv_ctr,
+				.plat_nv_ctr = &trusted_nv_ctr
+			}
+		}
+	},
+	.authenticated_data = (const auth_param_desc_t[COT_MAX_VERIFIED_PARAMS]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type_desc = &trusted_world_pk,
+			.data = {
+				.ptr = (void *)trusted_world_pk_buf,
+				.len = (unsigned int)PK_DER_LEN
+			}
+		},
+		[1] = {
+			.type_desc = &non_trusted_world_pk,
+			.data = {
+				.ptr = (void *)non_trusted_world_pk_buf,
+				.len = (unsigned int)PK_DER_LEN
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+
+/*
+ * SoC Firmware
+ */
+static const auth_img_desc_t soc_fw_key_cert = {
+	.img_id = SOC_FW_KEY_CERT_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_CERT,
+	.parent = &trusted_key_cert,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_SIG,
+			.param.sig = {
+				.pk = &trusted_world_pk,
+				.sig = &sig,
+				.alg = &sig_alg,
+				.data = &raw_data
+			}
+		},
+		[1] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_NV_CTR,
+			.param.nv_ctr = {
+				.cert_nv_ctr = &trusted_nv_ctr,
+				.plat_nv_ctr = &trusted_nv_ctr
+			}
+		}
+	},
+	.authenticated_data = (const auth_param_desc_t[COT_MAX_VERIFIED_PARAMS]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type_desc = &soc_fw_content_pk,
+			.data = {
+				.ptr = (void *)content_pk_buf,
+				.len = (unsigned int)PK_DER_LEN
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+static const auth_img_desc_t soc_fw_content_cert = {
+	.img_id = SOC_FW_CONTENT_CERT_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_CERT,
+	.parent = &soc_fw_key_cert,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_SIG,
+			.param.sig = {
+				.pk = &soc_fw_content_pk,
+				.sig = &sig,
+				.alg = &sig_alg,
+				.data = &raw_data
+			}
+		},
+		[1] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_NV_CTR,
+			.param.nv_ctr = {
+				.cert_nv_ctr = &trusted_nv_ctr,
+				.plat_nv_ctr = &trusted_nv_ctr
+			}
+		}
+	},
+	.authenticated_data = (const auth_param_desc_t[COT_MAX_VERIFIED_PARAMS]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type_desc = &soc_fw_hash,
+			.data = {
+				.ptr = (void *)soc_fw_hash_buf,
+				.len = (unsigned int)HASH_DER_LEN
+			}
+		},
+		[1] = {
+			.type_desc = &soc_fw_config_hash,
+			.data = {
+				.ptr = (void *)soc_fw_config_hash_buf,
+				.len = (unsigned int)HASH_DER_LEN
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+static const auth_img_desc_t bl31_image = {
+	.img_id = BL31_IMAGE_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_RAW,
+	.parent = &soc_fw_content_cert,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_HASH,
+			.param.hash = {
+				.data = &raw_data,
+				.hash = &soc_fw_hash
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+/* SOC FW Config */
+static const auth_img_desc_t soc_fw_config = {
+	.img_id = SOC_FW_CONFIG_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_RAW,
+	.parent = &soc_fw_content_cert,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_HASH,
+			.param.hash = {
+				.data = &raw_data,
+				.hash = &soc_fw_config_hash
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+/*
+ * Trusted OS Firmware
+ */
+static const auth_img_desc_t trusted_os_fw_key_cert = {
+	.img_id = TRUSTED_OS_FW_KEY_CERT_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_CERT,
+	.parent = &trusted_key_cert,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_SIG,
+			.param.sig = {
+				.pk = &trusted_world_pk,
+				.sig = &sig,
+				.alg = &sig_alg,
+				.data = &raw_data
+			}
+		},
+		[1] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_NV_CTR,
+			.param.nv_ctr = {
+				.cert_nv_ctr = &trusted_nv_ctr,
+				.plat_nv_ctr = &trusted_nv_ctr
+			}
+		}
+	},
+	.authenticated_data = (const auth_param_desc_t[COT_MAX_VERIFIED_PARAMS]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type_desc = &tos_fw_content_pk,
+			.data = {
+				.ptr = (void *)content_pk_buf,
+				.len = (unsigned int)PK_DER_LEN
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+static const auth_img_desc_t trusted_os_fw_content_cert = {
+	.img_id = TRUSTED_OS_FW_CONTENT_CERT_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_CERT,
+	.parent = &trusted_os_fw_key_cert,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_SIG,
+			.param.sig = {
+				.pk = &tos_fw_content_pk,
+				.sig = &sig,
+				.alg = &sig_alg,
+				.data = &raw_data
+			}
+		},
+		[1] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_NV_CTR,
+			.param.nv_ctr = {
+				.cert_nv_ctr = &trusted_nv_ctr,
+				.plat_nv_ctr = &trusted_nv_ctr
+			}
+		}
+	},
+	.authenticated_data = (const auth_param_desc_t[COT_MAX_VERIFIED_PARAMS]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type_desc = &tos_fw_hash,
+			.data = {
+				.ptr = (void *)tos_fw_hash_buf,
+				.len = (unsigned int)HASH_DER_LEN
+			}
+		},
+		[1] = {
+			.type_desc = &tos_fw_extra1_hash,
+			.data = {
+				.ptr = (void *)tos_fw_extra1_hash_buf,
+				.len = (unsigned int)HASH_DER_LEN
+			}
+		},
+		[2] = {
+			.type_desc = &tos_fw_extra2_hash,
+			.data = {
+				.ptr = (void *)tos_fw_extra2_hash_buf,
+				.len = (unsigned int)HASH_DER_LEN
+			}
+		},
+		[3] = {
+			.type_desc = &tos_fw_config_hash,
+			.data = {
+				.ptr = (void *)tos_fw_config_hash_buf,
+				.len = (unsigned int)HASH_DER_LEN
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+static const auth_img_desc_t bl32_image = {
+	.img_id = BL32_IMAGE_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_RAW,
+	.parent = &trusted_os_fw_content_cert,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_HASH,
+			.param.hash = {
+				.data = &raw_data,
+				.hash = &tos_fw_hash
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+static const auth_img_desc_t bl32_extra1_image = {
+	.img_id = BL32_EXTRA1_IMAGE_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_RAW,
+	.parent = &trusted_os_fw_content_cert,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_HASH,
+			.param.hash = {
+				.data = &raw_data,
+				.hash = &tos_fw_extra1_hash
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+static const auth_img_desc_t bl32_extra2_image = {
+	.img_id = BL32_EXTRA2_IMAGE_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_RAW,
+	.parent = &trusted_os_fw_content_cert,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_HASH,
+			.param.hash = {
+				.data = &raw_data,
+				.hash = &tos_fw_extra2_hash
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+/* TOS FW Config */
+static const auth_img_desc_t tos_fw_config = {
+	.img_id = TOS_FW_CONFIG_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_RAW,
+	.parent = &trusted_os_fw_content_cert,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_HASH,
+			.param.hash = {
+				.data = &raw_data,
+				.hash = &tos_fw_config_hash
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+/*
+ * Non-Trusted Firmware
+ */
+static const auth_img_desc_t non_trusted_fw_key_cert = {
+	.img_id = NON_TRUSTED_FW_KEY_CERT_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_CERT,
+	.parent = &trusted_key_cert,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_SIG,
+			.param.sig = {
+				.pk = &non_trusted_world_pk,
+				.sig = &sig,
+				.alg = &sig_alg,
+				.data = &raw_data
+			}
+		},
+		[1] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_NV_CTR,
+			.param.nv_ctr = {
+				.cert_nv_ctr = &non_trusted_nv_ctr,
+				.plat_nv_ctr = &non_trusted_nv_ctr
+			}
+		}
+	},
+	.authenticated_data = (const auth_param_desc_t[COT_MAX_VERIFIED_PARAMS]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type_desc = &nt_fw_content_pk,
+			.data = {
+				.ptr = (void *)content_pk_buf,
+				.len = (unsigned int)PK_DER_LEN
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+static const auth_img_desc_t non_trusted_fw_content_cert = {
+	.img_id = NON_TRUSTED_FW_CONTENT_CERT_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_CERT,
+	.parent = &non_trusted_fw_key_cert,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_SIG,
+			.param.sig = {
+				.pk = &nt_fw_content_pk,
+				.sig = &sig,
+				.alg = &sig_alg,
+				.data = &raw_data
+			}
+		},
+		[1] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_NV_CTR,
+			.param.nv_ctr = {
+				.cert_nv_ctr = &non_trusted_nv_ctr,
+				.plat_nv_ctr = &non_trusted_nv_ctr
+			}
+		}
+	},
+	.authenticated_data = (const auth_param_desc_t[COT_MAX_VERIFIED_PARAMS]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type_desc = &nt_world_bl_hash,
+			.data = {
+				.ptr = (void *)nt_world_bl_hash_buf,
+				.len = (unsigned int)HASH_DER_LEN
+			}
+		},
+		[1] = {
+			.type_desc = &nt_fw_config_hash,
+			.data = {
+				.ptr = (void *)nt_fw_config_hash_buf,
+				.len = (unsigned int)HASH_DER_LEN
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+static const auth_img_desc_t bl33_image = {
+	.img_id = BL33_IMAGE_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_RAW,
+	.parent = &non_trusted_fw_content_cert,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_HASH,
+			.param.hash = {
+				.data = &raw_data,
+				.hash = &nt_world_bl_hash
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+/* NT FW Config */
+static const auth_img_desc_t nt_fw_config = {
+	.img_id = NT_FW_CONFIG_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_RAW,
+	.parent = &non_trusted_fw_content_cert,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_HASH,
+			.param.hash = {
+				.data = &raw_data,
+				.hash = &nt_fw_config_hash
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+#ifdef CONFIG_DDR_FIP_IMAGE
+/*
+ * DDR Firmware
+ */
+static const auth_img_desc_t ddr_fw_key_cert = {
+	.img_id = DDR_FW_KEY_CERT_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_CERT,
+	.parent = &trusted_key_cert,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_SIG,
+			.param.sig = {
+				.pk = &trusted_world_pk,
+				.sig = &sig,
+				.alg = &sig_alg,
+				.data = &raw_data
+			}
+		},
+		[1] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_NV_CTR,
+			.param.nv_ctr = {
+				.cert_nv_ctr = &trusted_nv_ctr,
+				.plat_nv_ctr = &trusted_nv_ctr
+			}
+		}
+	},
+	.authenticated_data = (const auth_param_desc_t[COT_MAX_VERIFIED_PARAMS]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type_desc = &ddr_fw_content_pk,
+			.data = {
+				.ptr = (void *)ddr_fw_content_pk_buf,
+				.len = (unsigned int)PK_DER_LEN
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+static const auth_img_desc_t ddr_udimm_fw_content_cert = {
+	.img_id = DDR_UDIMM_FW_CONTENT_CERT_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_CERT,
+	.parent = &ddr_fw_key_cert,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_SIG,
+			.param.sig = {
+				.pk = &ddr_fw_content_pk,
+				.sig = &sig,
+				.alg = &sig_alg,
+				.data = &raw_data
+			}
+		},
+		[1] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_NV_CTR,
+			.param.nv_ctr = {
+				.cert_nv_ctr = &trusted_nv_ctr,
+				.plat_nv_ctr = &trusted_nv_ctr
+			}
+		}
+	},
+	.authenticated_data = (const auth_param_desc_t[COT_MAX_VERIFIED_PARAMS]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type_desc = &ddr_imem_udimm_1d_fw_hash,
+			.data = {
+				.ptr = (void *)ddr_imem_udimm_1d_hash_buf,
+				.len = (unsigned int)HASH_DER_LEN
+			}
+		},
+		[1] = {
+			.type_desc = &ddr_imem_udimm_2d_fw_hash,
+			.data = {
+				.ptr = (void *)ddr_imem_udimm_2d_hash_buf,
+				.len = (unsigned int)HASH_DER_LEN
+			}
+		},
+		[2] = {
+			.type_desc = &ddr_dmem_udimm_1d_fw_hash,
+			.data = {
+				.ptr = (void *)ddr_dmem_udimm_1d_hash_buf,
+				.len = (unsigned int)HASH_DER_LEN
+			}
+		},
+		[3] = {
+			.type_desc = &ddr_dmem_udimm_2d_fw_hash,
+			.data = {
+				.ptr = (void *)ddr_dmem_udimm_2d_hash_buf,
+				.len = (unsigned int)HASH_DER_LEN
+			}
+		},
+	}
+};
+
+static const auth_img_desc_t ddr_imem_udimm_1d_img = {
+	.img_id = DDR_IMEM_UDIMM_1D_IMAGE_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_RAW,
+	.parent = &ddr_udimm_fw_content_cert,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_HASH,
+			.param.hash = {
+				.data = &raw_data,
+				.hash = &ddr_imem_udimm_1d_fw_hash
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+static const auth_img_desc_t ddr_imem_udimm_2d_img = {
+	.img_id = DDR_IMEM_UDIMM_2D_IMAGE_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_RAW,
+	.parent = &ddr_udimm_fw_content_cert,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_HASH,
+			.param.hash = {
+				.data = &raw_data,
+				.hash = &ddr_imem_udimm_2d_fw_hash
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+static const auth_img_desc_t ddr_dmem_udimm_1d_img = {
+	.img_id = DDR_DMEM_UDIMM_1D_IMAGE_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_RAW,
+	.parent = &ddr_udimm_fw_content_cert,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_HASH,
+			.param.hash = {
+				.data = &raw_data,
+				.hash = &ddr_dmem_udimm_1d_fw_hash
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+static const auth_img_desc_t ddr_dmem_udimm_2d_img = {
+	.img_id = DDR_DMEM_UDIMM_2D_IMAGE_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_RAW,
+	.parent = &ddr_udimm_fw_content_cert,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_HASH,
+			.param.hash = {
+				.data = &raw_data,
+				.hash = &ddr_dmem_udimm_2d_fw_hash
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+
+static const auth_img_desc_t ddr_rdimm_fw_content_cert = {
+	.img_id = DDR_RDIMM_FW_CONTENT_CERT_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_CERT,
+	.parent = &ddr_fw_key_cert,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_SIG,
+			.param.sig = {
+				.pk = &ddr_fw_content_pk,
+				.sig = &sig,
+				.alg = &sig_alg,
+				.data = &raw_data
+			}
+		},
+		[1] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_NV_CTR,
+			.param.nv_ctr = {
+				.cert_nv_ctr = &trusted_nv_ctr,
+				.plat_nv_ctr = &trusted_nv_ctr
+			}
+		}
+	},
+	.authenticated_data = (const auth_param_desc_t[COT_MAX_VERIFIED_PARAMS]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type_desc = &ddr_imem_rdimm_1d_fw_hash,
+			.data = {
+				.ptr = (void *)ddr_imem_rdimm_1d_hash_buf,
+				.len = (unsigned int)HASH_DER_LEN
+			}
+		},
+		[1] = {
+			.type_desc = &ddr_imem_rdimm_2d_fw_hash,
+			.data = {
+				.ptr = (void *)ddr_imem_rdimm_2d_hash_buf,
+				.len = (unsigned int)HASH_DER_LEN
+			}
+		},
+		[2] = {
+			.type_desc = &ddr_dmem_rdimm_1d_fw_hash,
+			.data = {
+				.ptr = (void *)ddr_dmem_rdimm_1d_hash_buf,
+				.len = (unsigned int)HASH_DER_LEN
+			}
+		},
+		[3] = {
+			.type_desc = &ddr_dmem_rdimm_2d_fw_hash,
+			.data = {
+				.ptr = (void *)ddr_dmem_rdimm_2d_hash_buf,
+				.len = (unsigned int)HASH_DER_LEN
+			}
+		},
+	}
+};
+
+static const auth_img_desc_t ddr_imem_rdimm_1d_img = {
+	.img_id = DDR_IMEM_RDIMM_1D_IMAGE_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_RAW,
+	.parent = &ddr_rdimm_fw_content_cert,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_HASH,
+			.param.hash = {
+				.data = &raw_data,
+				.hash = &ddr_imem_rdimm_1d_fw_hash
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+static const auth_img_desc_t ddr_imem_rdimm_2d_img = {
+	.img_id = DDR_IMEM_RDIMM_2D_IMAGE_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_RAW,
+	.parent = &ddr_rdimm_fw_content_cert,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_HASH,
+			.param.hash = {
+				.data = &raw_data,
+				.hash = &ddr_imem_rdimm_2d_fw_hash
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+static const auth_img_desc_t ddr_dmem_rdimm_1d_img = {
+	.img_id = DDR_DMEM_RDIMM_1D_IMAGE_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_RAW,
+	.parent = &ddr_rdimm_fw_content_cert,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_HASH,
+			.param.hash = {
+				.data = &raw_data,
+				.hash = &ddr_dmem_rdimm_1d_fw_hash
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+static const auth_img_desc_t ddr_dmem_rdimm_2d_img = {
+	.img_id = DDR_DMEM_RDIMM_2D_IMAGE_ID,
+	.img_type = IMG_RAW,
+	.parent = &ddr_rdimm_fw_content_cert,
+	.img_auth_methods = (const auth_method_desc_t[AUTH_METHOD_NUM]) {
+		[0] = {
+			.type = AUTH_METHOD_HASH,
+			.param.hash = {
+				.data = &raw_data,
+				.hash = &ddr_dmem_rdimm_2d_fw_hash
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * TBBR Chain of trust definition
+ */
+
+static const auth_img_desc_t * const cot_desc[] = {
+	[TRUSTED_KEY_CERT_ID]			=	&trusted_key_cert,
+	[SOC_FW_KEY_CERT_ID]			=	&soc_fw_key_cert,
+	[SOC_FW_CONTENT_CERT_ID]		=	&soc_fw_content_cert,
+	[BL31_IMAGE_ID]				=	&bl31_image,
+	[SOC_FW_CONFIG_ID]			=	&soc_fw_config,
+	[TRUSTED_OS_FW_KEY_CERT_ID]		=	&trusted_os_fw_key_cert,
+	[TRUSTED_OS_FW_CONTENT_CERT_ID]		=	&trusted_os_fw_content_cert,
+	[BL32_IMAGE_ID]				=	&bl32_image,
+	[BL32_EXTRA1_IMAGE_ID]			=	&bl32_extra1_image,
+	[BL32_EXTRA2_IMAGE_ID]			=	&bl32_extra2_image,
+	[TOS_FW_CONFIG_ID]			=	&tos_fw_config,
+	[NON_TRUSTED_FW_KEY_CERT_ID]		=	&non_trusted_fw_key_cert,
+	[NON_TRUSTED_FW_CONTENT_CERT_ID]	=	&non_trusted_fw_content_cert,
+	[BL33_IMAGE_ID]				=	&bl33_image,
+	[NT_FW_CONFIG_ID]			=	&nt_fw_config,
+#ifdef CONFIG_DDR_FIP_IMAGE
+	[DDR_FW_KEY_CERT_ID]			=	&ddr_fw_key_cert,
+	[DDR_UDIMM_FW_CONTENT_CERT_ID]		=	&ddr_udimm_fw_content_cert,
+	[DDR_RDIMM_FW_CONTENT_CERT_ID]		=	&ddr_rdimm_fw_content_cert,
+	[DDR_IMEM_UDIMM_1D_IMAGE_ID]		=	&ddr_imem_udimm_1d_img,
+	[DDR_IMEM_UDIMM_2D_IMAGE_ID]		=	&ddr_imem_udimm_2d_img,
+	[DDR_DMEM_UDIMM_1D_IMAGE_ID]		=	&ddr_dmem_udimm_1d_img,
+	[DDR_DMEM_UDIMM_2D_IMAGE_ID]		=	&ddr_dmem_udimm_2d_img,
+	[DDR_IMEM_RDIMM_1D_IMAGE_ID]		=	&ddr_imem_rdimm_1d_img,
+	[DDR_IMEM_RDIMM_2D_IMAGE_ID]		=	&ddr_imem_rdimm_2d_img,
+	[DDR_DMEM_RDIMM_1D_IMAGE_ID]		=	&ddr_dmem_rdimm_1d_img,
+	[DDR_DMEM_RDIMM_2D_IMAGE_ID]		=	&ddr_dmem_rdimm_2d_img,
+#endif
+};
+
+/* Register the CoT in the authentication module */
+REGISTER_COT(cot_desc);