Adding upstream version 2.8.0+dfsg.upstream/2.8.0+dfsgupstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

5 files changed, 1290 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/services/std_svc/spmd/aarch64/spmd_helpers.S b/services/std_svc/spmd/aarch64/spmd_helpers.S
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d7bffca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/services/std_svc/spmd/aarch64/spmd_helpers.S
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <asm_macros.S>
+#include "../spmd_private.h"
+
+	.global spmd_spm_core_enter
+	.global spmd_spm_core_exit
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * This function is called with SP_EL0 as stack. Here we stash our EL3
+	 * callee-saved registers on to the stack as a part of saving the C
+	 * runtime and enter the secure payload.
+	 * 'x0' contains a pointer to the memory where the address of the C
+	 *  runtime context is to be saved.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+func spmd_spm_core_enter
+	/* Make space for the registers that we're going to save */
+	mov	x3, sp
+	str	x3, [x0, #0]
+	sub	sp, sp, #SPMD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE
+
+	/* Save callee-saved registers on to the stack */
+	stp	x19, x20, [sp, #SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X19]
+	stp	x21, x22, [sp, #SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X21]
+	stp	x23, x24, [sp, #SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X23]
+	stp	x25, x26, [sp, #SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X25]
+	stp	x27, x28, [sp, #SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X27]
+	stp	x29, x30, [sp, #SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X29]
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * Everything is setup now. el3_exit() will use the secure context to
+	 * restore to the general purpose and EL3 system registers to ERET
+	 * into the secure payload.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	b	el3_exit
+endfunc spmd_spm_core_enter
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * This function is called with 'x0' pointing to a C runtime context.
+	 * It restores the saved registers and jumps to that runtime with 'x0'
+	 * as the new SP register. This destroys the C runtime context that had
+	 * been built on the stack below the saved context by the caller. Later
+	 * the second parameter 'x1' is passed as a return value to the caller.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+func spmd_spm_core_exit
+	/* Restore the previous stack */
+	mov	sp, x0
+
+	/* Restore callee-saved registers on to the stack */
+	ldp	x19, x20, [x0, #(SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X19 - SPMD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)]
+	ldp	x21, x22, [x0, #(SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X21 - SPMD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)]
+	ldp	x23, x24, [x0, #(SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X23 - SPMD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)]
+	ldp	x25, x26, [x0, #(SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X25 - SPMD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)]
+	ldp	x27, x28, [x0, #(SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X27 - SPMD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)]
+	ldp	x29, x30, [x0, #(SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X29 - SPMD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)]
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * This should take us back to the instruction after the call to the
+	 * last spm_secure_partition_enter().* Place the second parameter to x0
+	 * so that the caller will see it as a return value from the original
+	 * entry call.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	mov	x0, x1
+	ret
+endfunc spmd_spm_core_exit
diff --git a/services/std_svc/spmd/spmd.mk b/services/std_svc/spmd/spmd.mk
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8efbdc8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/services/std_svc/spmd/spmd.mk
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+#
+# Copyright (c) 2021, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+#
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+#
+
+ifneq (${ARCH},aarch64)
+	$(error "Error: SPMD is only supported on aarch64.")
+endif
+
+ifeq (${ENABLE_SME_FOR_NS},1)
+	$(error "Error: SPMD is not compatible with ENABLE_SME_FOR_NS")
+endif
+
+SPMD_SOURCES	+=	$(addprefix services/std_svc/spmd/,	\
+			${ARCH}/spmd_helpers.S			\
+			spmd_pm.c				\
+			spmd_main.c)
+
+# Let the top-level Makefile know that we intend to include a BL32 image
+NEED_BL32		:=	yes
+
+# Enable dynamic memory mapping
+# The SPMD component maps the SPMC DTB within BL31 virtual space.
+PLAT_XLAT_TABLES_DYNAMIC :=	1
+$(eval $(call add_define,PLAT_XLAT_TABLES_DYNAMIC))
diff --git a/services/std_svc/spmd/spmd_main.c b/services/std_svc/spmd/spmd_main.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7e6c89d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/services/std_svc/spmd/spmd_main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,937 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2020-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <inttypes.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <arch_helpers.h>
+#include <arch/aarch64/arch_features.h>
+#include <bl31/bl31.h>
+#include <bl31/interrupt_mgmt.h>
+#include <common/debug.h>
+#include <common/runtime_svc.h>
+#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h>
+#include <lib/smccc.h>
+#include <lib/spinlock.h>
+#include <lib/utils.h>
+#include <plat/common/common_def.h>
+#include <plat/common/platform.h>
+#include <platform_def.h>
+#include <services/ffa_svc.h>
+#include <services/spmc_svc.h>
+#include <services/spmd_svc.h>
+#include <smccc_helpers.h>
+#include "spmd_private.h"
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * SPM Core context information.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static spmd_spm_core_context_t spm_core_context[PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT];
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * SPM Core attribute information is read from its manifest if the SPMC is not
+ * at EL3. Else, it is populated from the SPMC directly.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static spmc_manifest_attribute_t spmc_attrs;
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * SPM Core entry point information. Discovered on the primary core and reused
+ * on secondary cores.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static entry_point_info_t *spmc_ep_info;
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * SPM Core context on CPU based on mpidr.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+spmd_spm_core_context_t *spmd_get_context_by_mpidr(uint64_t mpidr)
+{
+	int core_idx = plat_core_pos_by_mpidr(mpidr);
+
+	if (core_idx < 0) {
+		ERROR("Invalid mpidr: %" PRIx64 ", returned ID: %d\n", mpidr, core_idx);
+		panic();
+	}
+
+	return &spm_core_context[core_idx];
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * SPM Core context on current CPU get helper.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+spmd_spm_core_context_t *spmd_get_context(void)
+{
+	return spmd_get_context_by_mpidr(read_mpidr());
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * SPM Core ID getter.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+uint16_t spmd_spmc_id_get(void)
+{
+	return spmc_attrs.spmc_id;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Static function declaration.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static int32_t spmd_init(void);
+static int spmd_spmc_init(void *pm_addr);
+static uint64_t spmd_ffa_error_return(void *handle,
+				       int error_code);
+static uint64_t spmd_smc_forward(uint32_t smc_fid,
+				 bool secure_origin,
+				 uint64_t x1,
+				 uint64_t x2,
+				 uint64_t x3,
+				 uint64_t x4,
+				 void *cookie,
+				 void *handle,
+				 uint64_t flags);
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ * Builds an SPMD to SPMC direct message request.
+ *****************************************************************************/
+void spmd_build_spmc_message(gp_regs_t *gpregs, uint8_t target_func,
+			     unsigned long long message)
+{
+	write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X0, FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_REQ_SMC32);
+	write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X1,
+		(SPMD_DIRECT_MSG_ENDPOINT_ID << FFA_DIRECT_MSG_SOURCE_SHIFT) |
+		 spmd_spmc_id_get());
+	write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X2, BIT(31) | target_func);
+	write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X3, message);
+}
+
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function takes an SPMC context pointer and performs a synchronous
+ * SPMC entry.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+uint64_t spmd_spm_core_sync_entry(spmd_spm_core_context_t *spmc_ctx)
+{
+	uint64_t rc;
+
+	assert(spmc_ctx != NULL);
+
+	cm_set_context(&(spmc_ctx->cpu_ctx), SECURE);
+
+	/* Restore the context assigned above */
+#if SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2
+	cm_el2_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE);
+#else
+	cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE);
+#endif
+	cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE);
+
+	/* Enter SPMC */
+	rc = spmd_spm_core_enter(&spmc_ctx->c_rt_ctx);
+
+	/* Save secure state */
+#if SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2
+	cm_el2_sysregs_context_save(SECURE);
+#else
+	cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE);
+#endif
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function returns to the place where spmd_spm_core_sync_entry() was
+ * called originally.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+__dead2 void spmd_spm_core_sync_exit(uint64_t rc)
+{
+	spmd_spm_core_context_t *ctx = spmd_get_context();
+
+	/* Get current CPU context from SPMC context */
+	assert(cm_get_context(SECURE) == &(ctx->cpu_ctx));
+
+	/*
+	 * The SPMD must have initiated the original request through a
+	 * synchronous entry into SPMC. Jump back to the original C runtime
+	 * context with the value of rc in x0;
+	 */
+	spmd_spm_core_exit(ctx->c_rt_ctx, rc);
+
+	panic();
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Jump to the SPM Core for the first time.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static int32_t spmd_init(void)
+{
+	spmd_spm_core_context_t *ctx = spmd_get_context();
+	uint64_t rc;
+
+	VERBOSE("SPM Core init start.\n");
+
+	/* Primary boot core enters the SPMC for initialization. */
+	ctx->state = SPMC_STATE_ON_PENDING;
+
+	rc = spmd_spm_core_sync_entry(ctx);
+	if (rc != 0ULL) {
+		ERROR("SPMC initialisation failed 0x%" PRIx64 "\n", rc);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	ctx->state = SPMC_STATE_ON;
+
+	VERBOSE("SPM Core init end.\n");
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * spmd_secure_interrupt_handler
+ * Enter the SPMC for further handling of the secure interrupt by the SPMC
+ * itself or a Secure Partition.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static uint64_t spmd_secure_interrupt_handler(uint32_t id,
+					      uint32_t flags,
+					      void *handle,
+					      void *cookie)
+{
+	spmd_spm_core_context_t *ctx = spmd_get_context();
+	gp_regs_t *gpregs = get_gpregs_ctx(&ctx->cpu_ctx);
+	unsigned int linear_id = plat_my_core_pos();
+	int64_t rc;
+
+	/* Sanity check the security state when the exception was generated */
+	assert(get_interrupt_src_ss(flags) == NON_SECURE);
+
+	/* Sanity check the pointer to this cpu's context */
+	assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE));
+
+	/* Save the non-secure context before entering SPMC */
+	cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE);
+#if SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2
+	cm_el2_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE);
+#endif
+
+	/* Convey the event to the SPMC through the FFA_INTERRUPT interface. */
+	write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X0, FFA_INTERRUPT);
+	write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X1, 0);
+	write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X2, 0);
+	write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X3, 0);
+	write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X4, 0);
+	write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X5, 0);
+	write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X6, 0);
+	write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X7, 0);
+
+	/* Mark current core as handling a secure interrupt. */
+	ctx->secure_interrupt_ongoing = true;
+
+	rc = spmd_spm_core_sync_entry(ctx);
+	if (rc != 0ULL) {
+		ERROR("%s failed (%" PRId64 ") on CPU%u\n", __func__, rc, linear_id);
+	}
+
+	ctx->secure_interrupt_ongoing = false;
+
+	cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
+#if SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2
+	cm_el2_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
+#endif
+	cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE);
+
+	SMC_RET0(&ctx->cpu_ctx);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Loads SPMC manifest and inits SPMC.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static int spmd_spmc_init(void *pm_addr)
+{
+	cpu_context_t *cpu_ctx;
+	unsigned int core_id;
+	uint32_t ep_attr, flags;
+	int rc;
+
+	/* Load the SPM Core manifest */
+	rc = plat_spm_core_manifest_load(&spmc_attrs, pm_addr);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		WARN("No or invalid SPM Core manifest image provided by BL2\n");
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensure that the SPM Core version is compatible with the SPM
+	 * Dispatcher version.
+	 */
+	if ((spmc_attrs.major_version != FFA_VERSION_MAJOR) ||
+	    (spmc_attrs.minor_version > FFA_VERSION_MINOR)) {
+		WARN("Unsupported FFA version (%u.%u)\n",
+		     spmc_attrs.major_version, spmc_attrs.minor_version);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	VERBOSE("FFA version (%u.%u)\n", spmc_attrs.major_version,
+	     spmc_attrs.minor_version);
+
+	VERBOSE("SPM Core run time EL%x.\n",
+	     SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2 ? MODE_EL2 : MODE_EL1);
+
+	/* Validate the SPMC ID, Ensure high bit is set */
+	if (((spmc_attrs.spmc_id >> SPMC_SECURE_ID_SHIFT) &
+			SPMC_SECURE_ID_MASK) == 0U) {
+		WARN("Invalid ID (0x%x) for SPMC.\n", spmc_attrs.spmc_id);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Validate the SPM Core execution state */
+	if ((spmc_attrs.exec_state != MODE_RW_64) &&
+	    (spmc_attrs.exec_state != MODE_RW_32)) {
+		WARN("Unsupported %s%x.\n", "SPM Core execution state 0x",
+		     spmc_attrs.exec_state);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	VERBOSE("%s%x.\n", "SPM Core execution state 0x",
+		spmc_attrs.exec_state);
+
+#if SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2
+	/* Ensure manifest has not requested AArch32 state in S-EL2 */
+	if (spmc_attrs.exec_state == MODE_RW_32) {
+		WARN("AArch32 state at S-EL2 is not supported.\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check if S-EL2 is supported on this system if S-EL2
+	 * is required for SPM
+	 */
+	if (!is_armv8_4_sel2_present()) {
+		WARN("SPM Core run time S-EL2 is not supported.\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+#endif /* SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2 */
+
+	/* Initialise an entrypoint to set up the CPU context */
+	ep_attr = SECURE | EP_ST_ENABLE;
+	if ((read_sctlr_el3() & SCTLR_EE_BIT) != 0ULL) {
+		ep_attr |= EP_EE_BIG;
+	}
+
+	SET_PARAM_HEAD(spmc_ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, ep_attr);
+
+	/*
+	 * Populate SPSR for SPM Core based upon validated parameters from the
+	 * manifest.
+	 */
+	if (spmc_attrs.exec_state == MODE_RW_32) {
+		spmc_ep_info->spsr = SPSR_MODE32(MODE32_svc, SPSR_T_ARM,
+						 SPSR_E_LITTLE,
+						 DAIF_FIQ_BIT |
+						 DAIF_IRQ_BIT |
+						 DAIF_ABT_BIT);
+	} else {
+
+#if SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2
+		static const uint32_t runtime_el = MODE_EL2;
+#else
+		static const uint32_t runtime_el = MODE_EL1;
+#endif
+		spmc_ep_info->spsr = SPSR_64(runtime_el,
+					     MODE_SP_ELX,
+					     DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS);
+	}
+
+	/* Set an initial SPMC context state for all cores. */
+	for (core_id = 0U; core_id < PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT; core_id++) {
+		spm_core_context[core_id].state = SPMC_STATE_OFF;
+
+		/* Setup an initial cpu context for the SPMC. */
+		cpu_ctx = &spm_core_context[core_id].cpu_ctx;
+		cm_setup_context(cpu_ctx, spmc_ep_info);
+
+		/*
+		 * Pass the core linear ID to the SPMC through x4.
+		 * (TF-A implementation defined behavior helping
+		 * a legacy TOS migration to adopt FF-A).
+		 */
+		write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(cpu_ctx), CTX_GPREG_X4, core_id);
+	}
+
+	/* Register power management hooks with PSCI */
+	psci_register_spd_pm_hook(&spmd_pm);
+
+	/* Register init function for deferred init. */
+	bl31_register_bl32_init(&spmd_init);
+
+	INFO("SPM Core setup done.\n");
+
+	/*
+	 * Register an interrupt handler routing secure interrupts to SPMD
+	 * while the NWd is running.
+	 */
+	flags = 0;
+	set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, NON_SECURE);
+	rc = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_S_EL1,
+					     spmd_secure_interrupt_handler,
+					     flags);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		panic();
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Initialize context of SPM Core.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int spmd_setup(void)
+{
+	int rc;
+	void *spmc_manifest;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the SPMC is at EL3, then just initialise it directly. The
+	 * shenanigans of when it is at a lower EL are not needed.
+	 */
+	if (is_spmc_at_el3()) {
+		/* Allow the SPMC to populate its attributes directly. */
+		spmc_populate_attrs(&spmc_attrs);
+
+		rc = spmc_setup();
+		if (rc != 0) {
+			ERROR("SPMC initialisation failed 0x%x.\n", rc);
+		}
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	spmc_ep_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE);
+	if (spmc_ep_info == NULL) {
+		WARN("No SPM Core image provided by BL2 boot loader.\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Under no circumstances will this parameter be 0 */
+	assert(spmc_ep_info->pc != 0ULL);
+
+	/*
+	 * Check if BL32 ep_info has a reference to 'tos_fw_config'. This will
+	 * be used as a manifest for the SPM Core at the next lower EL/mode.
+	 */
+	spmc_manifest = (void *)spmc_ep_info->args.arg0;
+	if (spmc_manifest == NULL) {
+		ERROR("Invalid or absent SPM Core manifest.\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Load manifest, init SPMC */
+	rc = spmd_spmc_init(spmc_manifest);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		WARN("Booting device without SPM initialization.\n");
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Forward FF-A SMCs to the other security state.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+uint64_t spmd_smc_switch_state(uint32_t smc_fid,
+			       bool secure_origin,
+			       uint64_t x1,
+			       uint64_t x2,
+			       uint64_t x3,
+			       uint64_t x4,
+			       void *handle)
+{
+	unsigned int secure_state_in = (secure_origin) ? SECURE : NON_SECURE;
+	unsigned int secure_state_out = (!secure_origin) ? SECURE : NON_SECURE;
+
+	/* Save incoming security state */
+#if SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2
+	if (secure_state_in == NON_SECURE) {
+		cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(secure_state_in);
+	}
+	cm_el2_sysregs_context_save(secure_state_in);
+#else
+	cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(secure_state_in);
+#endif
+
+	/* Restore outgoing security state */
+#if SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2
+	if (secure_state_out == NON_SECURE) {
+		cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(secure_state_out);
+	}
+	cm_el2_sysregs_context_restore(secure_state_out);
+#else
+	cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(secure_state_out);
+#endif
+	cm_set_next_eret_context(secure_state_out);
+
+	SMC_RET8(cm_get_context(secure_state_out), smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4,
+			SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X5),
+			SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X6),
+			SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X7));
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Forward SMCs to the other security state.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static uint64_t spmd_smc_forward(uint32_t smc_fid,
+				 bool secure_origin,
+				 uint64_t x1,
+				 uint64_t x2,
+				 uint64_t x3,
+				 uint64_t x4,
+				 void *cookie,
+				 void *handle,
+				 uint64_t flags)
+{
+	if (is_spmc_at_el3() && !secure_origin) {
+		return spmc_smc_handler(smc_fid, secure_origin, x1, x2, x3, x4,
+					cookie, handle, flags);
+	}
+	return spmd_smc_switch_state(smc_fid, secure_origin, x1, x2, x3, x4,
+				     handle);
+
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Return FFA_ERROR with specified error code
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static uint64_t spmd_ffa_error_return(void *handle, int error_code)
+{
+	SMC_RET8(handle, (uint32_t) FFA_ERROR,
+		 FFA_TARGET_INFO_MBZ, (uint32_t)error_code,
+		 FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ,
+		 FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * spmd_check_address_in_binary_image
+ ******************************************************************************/
+bool spmd_check_address_in_binary_image(uint64_t address)
+{
+	assert(!check_uptr_overflow(spmc_attrs.load_address, spmc_attrs.binary_size));
+
+	return ((address >= spmc_attrs.load_address) &&
+		(address < (spmc_attrs.load_address + spmc_attrs.binary_size)));
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ * spmd_is_spmc_message
+ *****************************************************************************/
+static bool spmd_is_spmc_message(unsigned int ep)
+{
+	if (is_spmc_at_el3()) {
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	return ((ffa_endpoint_destination(ep) == SPMD_DIRECT_MSG_ENDPOINT_ID)
+		&& (ffa_endpoint_source(ep) == spmc_attrs.spmc_id));
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ * spmd_handle_spmc_message
+ *****************************************************************************/
+static int spmd_handle_spmc_message(unsigned long long msg,
+		unsigned long long parm1, unsigned long long parm2,
+		unsigned long long parm3, unsigned long long parm4)
+{
+	VERBOSE("%s %llx %llx %llx %llx %llx\n", __func__,
+		msg, parm1, parm2, parm3, parm4);
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function forwards FF-A SMCs to either the main SPMD handler or the
+ * SPMC at EL3, depending on the origin security state, if enabled.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+uint64_t spmd_ffa_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid,
+			      uint64_t x1,
+			      uint64_t x2,
+			      uint64_t x3,
+			      uint64_t x4,
+			      void *cookie,
+			      void *handle,
+			      uint64_t flags)
+{
+	if (is_spmc_at_el3()) {
+		/*
+		 * If we have an SPMC at EL3 allow handling of the SMC first.
+		 * The SPMC will call back through to SPMD handler if required.
+		 */
+		if (is_caller_secure(flags)) {
+			return spmc_smc_handler(smc_fid,
+						is_caller_secure(flags),
+						x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie,
+						handle, flags);
+		}
+	}
+	return spmd_smc_handler(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie,
+				handle, flags);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function handles all SMCs in the range reserved for FFA. Each call is
+ * either forwarded to the other security state or handled by the SPM dispatcher
+ ******************************************************************************/
+uint64_t spmd_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid,
+			  uint64_t x1,
+			  uint64_t x2,
+			  uint64_t x3,
+			  uint64_t x4,
+			  void *cookie,
+			  void *handle,
+			  uint64_t flags)
+{
+	unsigned int linear_id = plat_my_core_pos();
+	spmd_spm_core_context_t *ctx = spmd_get_context();
+	bool secure_origin;
+	int32_t ret;
+	uint32_t input_version;
+
+	/* Determine which security state this SMC originated from */
+	secure_origin = is_caller_secure(flags);
+
+	VERBOSE("SPM(%u): 0x%x 0x%" PRIx64 " 0x%" PRIx64 " 0x%" PRIx64 " 0x%" PRIx64
+		" 0x%" PRIx64 " 0x%" PRIx64 " 0x%" PRIx64 "\n",
+		    linear_id, smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4,
+		    SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X5),
+		    SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X6),
+		    SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X7));
+
+	switch (smc_fid) {
+	case FFA_ERROR:
+		/*
+		 * Check if this is the first invocation of this interface on
+		 * this CPU. If so, then indicate that the SPM Core initialised
+		 * unsuccessfully.
+		 */
+		if (secure_origin && (ctx->state == SPMC_STATE_ON_PENDING)) {
+			spmd_spm_core_sync_exit(x2);
+		}
+
+		return spmd_smc_forward(smc_fid, secure_origin,
+					x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie,
+					handle, flags);
+		break; /* not reached */
+
+	case FFA_VERSION:
+		input_version = (uint32_t)(0xFFFFFFFF & x1);
+		/*
+		 * If caller is secure and SPMC was initialized,
+		 * return FFA_VERSION of SPMD.
+		 * If caller is non secure and SPMC was initialized,
+		 * forward to the EL3 SPMC if enabled, otherwise return
+		 * the SPMC version if implemented at a lower EL.
+		 * Sanity check to "input_version".
+		 * If the EL3 SPMC is enabled, ignore the SPMC state as
+		 * this is not used.
+		 */
+		if ((input_version & FFA_VERSION_BIT31_MASK) ||
+		    (!is_spmc_at_el3() && (ctx->state == SPMC_STATE_RESET))) {
+			ret = FFA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+		} else if (!secure_origin) {
+			if (is_spmc_at_el3()) {
+				/*
+				 * Forward the call directly to the EL3 SPMC, if
+				 * enabled, as we don't need to wrap the call in
+				 * a direct request.
+				 */
+				return spmd_smc_forward(smc_fid, secure_origin,
+							x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie,
+							handle, flags);
+			}
+
+			gp_regs_t *gpregs = get_gpregs_ctx(&ctx->cpu_ctx);
+			uint64_t rc;
+
+			if (spmc_attrs.major_version == 1 &&
+			    spmc_attrs.minor_version == 0) {
+				ret = MAKE_FFA_VERSION(spmc_attrs.major_version,
+						       spmc_attrs.minor_version);
+				SMC_RET8(handle, (uint32_t)ret,
+					 FFA_TARGET_INFO_MBZ,
+					 FFA_TARGET_INFO_MBZ,
+					 FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ,
+					 FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ,
+					 FFA_PARAM_MBZ);
+				break;
+			}
+			/* Save non-secure system registers context */
+			cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE);
+#if SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2
+			cm_el2_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE);
+#endif
+
+			/*
+			 * The incoming request has FFA_VERSION as X0 smc_fid
+			 * and requested version in x1. Prepare a direct request
+			 * from SPMD to SPMC with FFA_VERSION framework function
+			 * identifier in X2 and requested version in X3.
+			 */
+			spmd_build_spmc_message(gpregs,
+						SPMD_FWK_MSG_FFA_VERSION_REQ,
+						input_version);
+
+			rc = spmd_spm_core_sync_entry(ctx);
+
+			if ((rc != 0ULL) ||
+			    (SMC_GET_GP(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X0) !=
+				FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_RESP_SMC32) ||
+			    (SMC_GET_GP(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X2) !=
+				(FFA_FWK_MSG_BIT |
+				 SPMD_FWK_MSG_FFA_VERSION_RESP))) {
+				ERROR("Failed to forward FFA_VERSION\n");
+				ret = FFA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+			} else {
+				ret = SMC_GET_GP(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X3);
+			}
+
+			/*
+			 * Return here after SPMC has handled FFA_VERSION.
+			 * The returned SPMC version is held in X3.
+			 * Forward this version in X0 to the non-secure caller.
+			 */
+			return spmd_smc_forward(ret, true, FFA_PARAM_MBZ,
+						FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ,
+						FFA_PARAM_MBZ, cookie, gpregs,
+						flags);
+		} else {
+			ret = MAKE_FFA_VERSION(FFA_VERSION_MAJOR,
+					       FFA_VERSION_MINOR);
+		}
+
+		SMC_RET8(handle, (uint32_t)ret, FFA_TARGET_INFO_MBZ,
+			 FFA_TARGET_INFO_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ,
+			 FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ);
+		break; /* not reached */
+
+	case FFA_FEATURES:
+		/*
+		 * This is an optional interface. Do the minimal checks and
+		 * forward to SPM Core which will handle it if implemented.
+		 */
+
+		/* Forward SMC from Normal world to the SPM Core */
+		if (!secure_origin) {
+			return spmd_smc_forward(smc_fid, secure_origin,
+						x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie,
+						handle, flags);
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Return success if call was from secure world i.e. all
+		 * FFA functions are supported. This is essentially a
+		 * nop.
+		 */
+		SMC_RET8(handle, FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32, x1, x2, x3, x4,
+			 SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X5),
+			 SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X6),
+			 SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X7));
+
+		break; /* not reached */
+
+	case FFA_ID_GET:
+		/*
+		 * Returns the ID of the calling FFA component.
+		 */
+		if (!secure_origin) {
+			SMC_RET8(handle, FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32,
+				 FFA_TARGET_INFO_MBZ, FFA_NS_ENDPOINT_ID,
+				 FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ,
+				 FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ,
+				 FFA_PARAM_MBZ);
+		}
+
+		SMC_RET8(handle, FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32,
+			 FFA_TARGET_INFO_MBZ, spmc_attrs.spmc_id,
+			 FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ,
+			 FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ,
+			 FFA_PARAM_MBZ);
+
+		break; /* not reached */
+
+	case FFA_SECONDARY_EP_REGISTER_SMC64:
+		if (secure_origin) {
+			ret = spmd_pm_secondary_ep_register(x1);
+
+			if (ret < 0) {
+				SMC_RET8(handle, FFA_ERROR_SMC64,
+					FFA_TARGET_INFO_MBZ, ret,
+					FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ,
+					FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ,
+					FFA_PARAM_MBZ);
+			} else {
+				SMC_RET8(handle, FFA_SUCCESS_SMC64,
+					FFA_TARGET_INFO_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ,
+					FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ,
+					FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ,
+					FFA_PARAM_MBZ);
+			}
+		}
+
+		return spmd_ffa_error_return(handle, FFA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+		break; /* Not reached */
+
+	case FFA_SPM_ID_GET:
+		if (MAKE_FFA_VERSION(1, 1) > FFA_VERSION_COMPILED) {
+			return spmd_ffa_error_return(handle,
+						     FFA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Returns the ID of the SPMC or SPMD depending on the FF-A
+		 * instance where this function is invoked
+		 */
+		if (!secure_origin) {
+			SMC_RET8(handle, FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32,
+				 FFA_TARGET_INFO_MBZ, spmc_attrs.spmc_id,
+				 FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ,
+				 FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ,
+				 FFA_PARAM_MBZ);
+		}
+		SMC_RET8(handle, FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32,
+			 FFA_TARGET_INFO_MBZ, SPMD_DIRECT_MSG_ENDPOINT_ID,
+			 FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ,
+			 FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ,
+			 FFA_PARAM_MBZ);
+
+		break; /* not reached */
+
+	case FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_REQ_SMC32:
+	case FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_REQ_SMC64:
+		if (!secure_origin) {
+			/* Validate source endpoint is non-secure for non-secure caller. */
+			if (ffa_is_secure_world_id(ffa_endpoint_source(x1))) {
+				return spmd_ffa_error_return(handle,
+						FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+			}
+		}
+		if (secure_origin && spmd_is_spmc_message(x1)) {
+			ret = spmd_handle_spmc_message(x3, x4,
+				SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X5),
+				SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X6),
+				SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X7));
+
+			SMC_RET8(handle, FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32,
+				FFA_TARGET_INFO_MBZ, ret,
+				FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ,
+				FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ,
+				FFA_PARAM_MBZ);
+		} else {
+			/* Forward direct message to the other world */
+			return spmd_smc_forward(smc_fid, secure_origin,
+						x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie,
+						handle, flags);
+		}
+		break; /* Not reached */
+
+	case FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_RESP_SMC32:
+		if (secure_origin && spmd_is_spmc_message(x1)) {
+			spmd_spm_core_sync_exit(0ULL);
+		} else {
+			/* Forward direct message to the other world */
+			return spmd_smc_forward(smc_fid, secure_origin,
+						x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie,
+						handle, flags);
+		}
+		break; /* Not reached */
+
+	case FFA_RX_RELEASE:
+	case FFA_RXTX_MAP_SMC32:
+	case FFA_RXTX_MAP_SMC64:
+	case FFA_RXTX_UNMAP:
+	case FFA_PARTITION_INFO_GET:
+#if MAKE_FFA_VERSION(1, 1) <= FFA_VERSION_COMPILED
+	case FFA_NOTIFICATION_BITMAP_CREATE:
+	case FFA_NOTIFICATION_BITMAP_DESTROY:
+	case FFA_NOTIFICATION_BIND:
+	case FFA_NOTIFICATION_UNBIND:
+	case FFA_NOTIFICATION_SET:
+	case FFA_NOTIFICATION_GET:
+	case FFA_NOTIFICATION_INFO_GET:
+	case FFA_NOTIFICATION_INFO_GET_SMC64:
+	case FFA_MSG_SEND2:
+	case FFA_RX_ACQUIRE:
+#endif
+	case FFA_MSG_RUN:
+		/*
+		 * Above calls should be invoked only by the Normal world and
+		 * must not be forwarded from Secure world to Normal world.
+		 */
+		if (secure_origin) {
+			return spmd_ffa_error_return(handle,
+						     FFA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+		}
+
+		/* Fall through to forward the call to the other world */
+	case FFA_MSG_SEND:
+	case FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_RESP_SMC64:
+	case FFA_MEM_DONATE_SMC32:
+	case FFA_MEM_DONATE_SMC64:
+	case FFA_MEM_LEND_SMC32:
+	case FFA_MEM_LEND_SMC64:
+	case FFA_MEM_SHARE_SMC32:
+	case FFA_MEM_SHARE_SMC64:
+	case FFA_MEM_RETRIEVE_REQ_SMC32:
+	case FFA_MEM_RETRIEVE_REQ_SMC64:
+	case FFA_MEM_RETRIEVE_RESP:
+	case FFA_MEM_RELINQUISH:
+	case FFA_MEM_RECLAIM:
+	case FFA_MEM_FRAG_TX:
+	case FFA_MEM_FRAG_RX:
+	case FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32:
+	case FFA_SUCCESS_SMC64:
+		/*
+		 * TODO: Assume that no requests originate from EL3 at the
+		 * moment. This will change if a SP service is required in
+		 * response to secure interrupts targeted to EL3. Until then
+		 * simply forward the call to the Normal world.
+		 */
+
+		return spmd_smc_forward(smc_fid, secure_origin,
+					x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie,
+					handle, flags);
+		break; /* not reached */
+
+	case FFA_MSG_WAIT:
+		/*
+		 * Check if this is the first invocation of this interface on
+		 * this CPU from the Secure world. If so, then indicate that the
+		 * SPM Core initialised successfully.
+		 */
+		if (secure_origin && (ctx->state == SPMC_STATE_ON_PENDING)) {
+			spmd_spm_core_sync_exit(0ULL);
+		}
+
+		/* Fall through to forward the call to the other world */
+	case FFA_INTERRUPT:
+	case FFA_MSG_YIELD:
+		/* This interface must be invoked only by the Secure world */
+		if (!secure_origin) {
+			return spmd_ffa_error_return(handle,
+						      FFA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+		}
+
+		return spmd_smc_forward(smc_fid, secure_origin,
+					x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie,
+					handle, flags);
+		break; /* not reached */
+
+	case FFA_NORMAL_WORLD_RESUME:
+		if (secure_origin && ctx->secure_interrupt_ongoing) {
+			spmd_spm_core_sync_exit(0ULL);
+		} else {
+			return spmd_ffa_error_return(handle, FFA_ERROR_DENIED);
+		}
+		break; /* Not reached */
+
+	default:
+		WARN("SPM: Unsupported call 0x%08x\n", smc_fid);
+		return spmd_ffa_error_return(handle, FFA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+	}
+}
diff --git a/services/std_svc/spmd/spmd_pm.c b/services/std_svc/spmd/spmd_pm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a2704dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/services/std_svc/spmd/spmd_pm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2020-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <inttypes.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h>
+#include <lib/spinlock.h>
+#include "spmd_private.h"
+
+static struct {
+	bool secondary_ep_locked;
+	uintptr_t secondary_ep;
+	spinlock_t lock;
+} g_spmd_pm;
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * spmd_pm_secondary_ep_register
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int spmd_pm_secondary_ep_register(uintptr_t entry_point)
+{
+	int ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+
+	spin_lock(&g_spmd_pm.lock);
+
+	if (g_spmd_pm.secondary_ep_locked == true) {
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check entry_point address is a PA within
+	 * load_address <= entry_point < load_address + binary_size
+	 */
+	if (!spmd_check_address_in_binary_image(entry_point)) {
+		ERROR("%s entry point is not within image boundaries\n",
+			__func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	g_spmd_pm.secondary_ep = entry_point;
+	g_spmd_pm.secondary_ep_locked = true;
+
+	VERBOSE("%s %lx\n", __func__, entry_point);
+
+	ret = 0;
+
+out:
+	spin_unlock(&g_spmd_pm.lock);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This CPU has been turned on. Enter SPMC to initialise S-EL1 or S-EL2. As part
+ * of the SPMC initialization path, they will initialize any SPs that they
+ * manage. Entry into SPMC is done after initialising minimal architectural
+ * state that guarantees safe execution.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static void spmd_cpu_on_finish_handler(u_register_t unused)
+{
+	spmd_spm_core_context_t *ctx = spmd_get_context();
+	unsigned int linear_id = plat_my_core_pos();
+	el3_state_t *el3_state;
+	uintptr_t entry_point;
+	uint64_t rc;
+
+	assert(ctx != NULL);
+	assert(ctx->state != SPMC_STATE_ON);
+
+	spin_lock(&g_spmd_pm.lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * Leave the possibility that the SPMC does not call
+	 * FFA_SECONDARY_EP_REGISTER in which case re-use the
+	 * primary core address for booting secondary cores.
+	 */
+	if (g_spmd_pm.secondary_ep_locked == true) {
+		/*
+		 * The CPU context has already been initialized at boot time
+		 * (in spmd_spmc_init by a call to cm_setup_context). Adjust
+		 * below the target core entry point based on the address
+		 * passed to by FFA_SECONDARY_EP_REGISTER.
+		 */
+		entry_point = g_spmd_pm.secondary_ep;
+		el3_state = get_el3state_ctx(&ctx->cpu_ctx);
+		write_ctx_reg(el3_state, CTX_ELR_EL3, entry_point);
+	}
+
+	spin_unlock(&g_spmd_pm.lock);
+
+	/* Mark CPU as initiating ON operation. */
+	ctx->state = SPMC_STATE_ON_PENDING;
+
+	rc = spmd_spm_core_sync_entry(ctx);
+	if (rc != 0ULL) {
+		ERROR("%s failed (%" PRIu64 ") on CPU%u\n", __func__, rc,
+			linear_id);
+		ctx->state = SPMC_STATE_OFF;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	ctx->state = SPMC_STATE_ON;
+
+	VERBOSE("CPU %u on!\n", linear_id);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * spmd_cpu_off_handler
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static int32_t spmd_cpu_off_handler(u_register_t unused)
+{
+	spmd_spm_core_context_t *ctx = spmd_get_context();
+	unsigned int linear_id = plat_my_core_pos();
+	int64_t rc;
+
+	assert(ctx != NULL);
+	assert(ctx->state != SPMC_STATE_OFF);
+
+	/* Build an SPMD to SPMC direct message request. */
+	spmd_build_spmc_message(get_gpregs_ctx(&ctx->cpu_ctx),
+				FFA_FWK_MSG_PSCI, PSCI_CPU_OFF);
+
+	rc = spmd_spm_core_sync_entry(ctx);
+	if (rc != 0ULL) {
+		ERROR("%s failed (%" PRIu64 ") on CPU%u\n", __func__, rc, linear_id);
+	}
+
+	/* Expect a direct message response from the SPMC. */
+	u_register_t ffa_resp_func = read_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(&ctx->cpu_ctx),
+						  CTX_GPREG_X0);
+	if (ffa_resp_func != FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_RESP_SMC32) {
+		ERROR("%s invalid SPMC response (%lx).\n",
+			__func__, ffa_resp_func);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	ctx->state = SPMC_STATE_OFF;
+
+	VERBOSE("CPU %u off!\n", linear_id);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Structure populated by the SPM Dispatcher to perform any bookkeeping before
+ * PSCI executes a power mgmt. operation.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+const spd_pm_ops_t spmd_pm = {
+	.svc_on_finish = spmd_cpu_on_finish_handler,
+	.svc_off = spmd_cpu_off_handler
+};
diff --git a/services/std_svc/spmd/spmd_private.h b/services/std_svc/spmd/spmd_private.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d21a622
--- /dev/null
+++ b/services/std_svc/spmd/spmd_private.h
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#ifndef SPMD_PRIVATE_H
+#define SPMD_PRIVATE_H
+
+#include <common/bl_common.h>
+#include <context.h>
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Constants that allow assembler code to preserve callee-saved registers of the
+ * C runtime context while performing a security state switch.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+#define SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X19		0x0
+#define SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X20		0x8
+#define SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X21		0x10
+#define SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X22		0x18
+#define SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X23		0x20
+#define SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X24		0x28
+#define SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X25		0x30
+#define SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X26		0x38
+#define SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X27		0x40
+#define SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X28		0x48
+#define SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X29		0x50
+#define SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X30		0x58
+
+#define SPMD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE		0x60
+#define SPMD_C_RT_CTX_ENTRIES		(SPMD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE >> DWORD_SHIFT)
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <lib/psci/psci_lib.h>
+#include <plat/common/platform.h>
+#include <services/ffa_svc.h>
+
+typedef enum spmc_state {
+	SPMC_STATE_RESET = 0,
+	SPMC_STATE_OFF,
+	SPMC_STATE_ON_PENDING,
+	SPMC_STATE_ON
+} spmc_state_t;
+
+/*
+ * Data structure used by the SPM dispatcher (SPMD) in EL3 to track context of
+ * the SPM core (SPMC) at the next lower EL.
+ */
+typedef struct spmd_spm_core_context {
+	uint64_t c_rt_ctx;
+	cpu_context_t cpu_ctx;
+	spmc_state_t state;
+	bool secure_interrupt_ongoing;
+} spmd_spm_core_context_t;
+
+/*
+ * Reserve ID for NS physical FFA Endpoint.
+ */
+#define FFA_NS_ENDPOINT_ID			U(0)
+
+/* Define SPMD target function IDs for framework messages to the SPMC */
+#define SPMD_FWK_MSG_FFA_VERSION_REQ		U(0x8)
+#define SPMD_FWK_MSG_FFA_VERSION_RESP		U(0x9)
+
+/* Function to build SPMD to SPMC message */
+void spmd_build_spmc_message(gp_regs_t *gpregs, uint8_t target,
+			     unsigned long long message);
+
+/* Functions used to enter/exit SPMC synchronously */
+uint64_t spmd_spm_core_sync_entry(spmd_spm_core_context_t *ctx);
+__dead2 void spmd_spm_core_sync_exit(uint64_t rc);
+
+/* Assembly helpers */
+uint64_t spmd_spm_core_enter(uint64_t *c_rt_ctx);
+void __dead2 spmd_spm_core_exit(uint64_t c_rt_ctx, uint64_t ret);
+
+/* SPMD SPD power management handlers */
+extern const spd_pm_ops_t spmd_pm;
+
+/* SPMC entry point information helper */
+entry_point_info_t *spmd_spmc_ep_info_get(void);
+
+/* SPMC ID getter */
+uint16_t spmd_spmc_id_get(void);
+
+/* SPMC context on CPU based on mpidr */
+spmd_spm_core_context_t *spmd_get_context_by_mpidr(uint64_t mpidr);
+
+/* SPMC context on current CPU get helper */
+spmd_spm_core_context_t *spmd_get_context(void);
+
+int spmd_pm_secondary_ep_register(uintptr_t entry_point);
+bool spmd_check_address_in_binary_image(uint64_t address);
+
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */
+
+#endif /* SPMD_PRIVATE_H */