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+Coding Guidelines
+=================
+
+This document provides some additional guidelines to consider when writing
+|TF-A| code. These are not intended to be strictly-enforced rules like the
+contents of the :ref:`Coding Style`.
+
+Automatic Editor Configuration
+------------------------------
+
+Many of the rules given below (such as indentation size, use of tabs, and
+newlines) can be set automatically using the `EditorConfig`_ configuration file
+in the root of the repository: ``.editorconfig``. With a supported editor, the
+rules set out in this file can be automatically applied when you are editing
+files in the |TF-A| repository.
+
+Several editors include built-in support for EditorConfig files, and many others
+support its functionality through plugins.
+
+Use of the EditorConfig file is suggested but is not required.
+
+.. _automatic-compliance-checking:
+
+Automatic Compliance Checking
+-----------------------------
+
+To assist with coding style compliance, the project Makefile contains two
+targets which both utilise the `checkpatch.pl` script that ships with the Linux
+source tree. The project also defines certain *checkpatch* options in the
+``.checkpatch.conf`` file in the top-level directory.
+
+.. note::
+ Checkpatch errors will gate upstream merging of pull requests.
+ Checkpatch warnings will not gate merging but should be reviewed and fixed if
+ possible.
+
+To check the entire source tree, you must first download copies of
+``checkpatch.pl``, ``spelling.txt`` and ``const_structs.checkpatch`` available
+in the `Linux master tree`_ *scripts* directory, then set the ``CHECKPATCH``
+environment variable to point to ``checkpatch.pl`` (with the other 2 files in
+the same directory) and build the `checkcodebase` target:
+
+.. code:: shell
+
+ make CHECKPATCH=<path-to-linux>/linux/scripts/checkpatch.pl checkcodebase
+
+To just check the style on the files that differ between your local branch and
+the remote master, use:
+
+.. code:: shell
+
+ make CHECKPATCH=<path-to-linux>/linux/scripts/checkpatch.pl checkpatch
+
+If you wish to check your patch against something other than the remote master,
+set the ``BASE_COMMIT`` variable to your desired branch. By default,
+``BASE_COMMIT`` is set to ``origin/master``.
+
+Ignored Checkpatch Warnings
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+Some checkpatch warnings in the TF codebase are deliberately ignored. These
+include:
+
+- ``**WARNING: line over 80 characters**``: Although the codebase should
+ generally conform to the 80 character limit this is overly restrictive in some
+ cases.
+
+- ``**WARNING: Use of volatile is usually wrong``: see
+ `Why the “volatile” type class should not be used`_ . Although this document
+ contains some very useful information, there are several legimate uses of the
+ volatile keyword within the TF codebase.
+
+Performance considerations
+--------------------------
+
+Avoid printf and use logging macros
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+``debug.h`` provides logging macros (for example, ``WARN`` and ``ERROR``)
+which wrap ``tf_log`` and which allow the logging call to be compiled-out
+depending on the ``make`` command. Use these macros to avoid print statements
+being compiled unconditionally into the binary.
+
+Each logging macro has a numerical log level:
+
+.. code:: c
+
+ #define LOG_LEVEL_NONE 0
+ #define LOG_LEVEL_ERROR 10
+ #define LOG_LEVEL_NOTICE 20
+ #define LOG_LEVEL_WARNING 30
+ #define LOG_LEVEL_INFO 40
+ #define LOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE 50
+
+By default, all logging statements with a log level ``<= LOG_LEVEL_INFO`` will
+be compiled into debug builds and all statements with a log level
+``<= LOG_LEVEL_NOTICE`` will be compiled into release builds. This can be
+overridden from the command line or by the platform makefile (although it may be
+necessary to clean the build directory first).
+
+For example, to enable ``VERBOSE`` logging on FVP:
+
+.. code:: shell
+
+ make PLAT=fvp LOG_LEVEL=50 all
+
+Use const data where possible
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+For example, the following code:
+
+.. code:: c
+
+ struct my_struct {
+ int arg1;
+ int arg2;
+ };
+
+ void init(struct my_struct *ptr);
+
+ void main(void)
+ {
+ struct my_struct x;
+ x.arg1 = 1;
+ x.arg2 = 2;
+ init(&x);
+ }
+
+is better written as:
+
+.. code:: c
+
+ struct my_struct {
+ int arg1;
+ int arg2;
+ };
+
+ void init(const struct my_struct *ptr);
+
+ void main(void)
+ {
+ const struct my_struct x = { 1, 2 };
+ init(&x);
+ }
+
+This allows the linker to put the data in a read-only data section instead of a
+writeable data section, which may result in a smaller and faster binary. Note
+that this may require dependent functions (``init()`` in the above example) to
+have ``const`` arguments, assuming they don't need to modify the data.
+
+Libc functions that are banned or to be used with caution
+---------------------------------------------------------
+
+Below is a list of functions that present security risks and either must not be
+used (Banned) or are discouraged from use and must be used with care (Caution).
+
++------------------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+
+| libc function | Status | Comments |
++========================+===========+======================================+
+| ``strcpy, wcscpy``, | Banned | use strlcpy instead |
+| ``strncpy`` | | |
++------------------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+
+| ``strcat, wcscat``, | Banned | use strlcat instead |
+| ``strncat`` | | |
++------------------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+
+| ``sprintf, vsprintf`` | Banned | use snprintf, vsnprintf |
+| | | instead |
++------------------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+
+| ``snprintf`` | Caution | ensure result fits in buffer |
+| | | i.e : snprintf(buf,size...) < size |
++------------------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+
+| ``vsnprintf`` | Caution | inspect va_list match types |
+| | | specified in format string |
++------------------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+
+| ``strtok`` | Banned | use strtok_r or strsep instead |
++------------------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+
+| ``strtok_r, strsep`` | Caution | inspect for terminated input buffer |
++------------------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+
+| ``ato*`` | Banned | use equivalent strto* functions |
++------------------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+
+| ``*toa`` | Banned | Use snprintf instead |
++------------------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+
+
+The `libc` component in the codebase will not add support for the banned APIs.
+
+Error handling and robustness
+-----------------------------
+
+Using CASSERT to check for compile time data errors
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+Where possible, use the ``CASSERT`` macro to check the validity of data known at
+compile time instead of checking validity at runtime, to avoid unnecessary
+runtime code.
+
+For example, this can be used to check that the assembler's and compiler's views
+of the size of an array is the same.
+
+.. code:: c
+
+ #include <cassert.h>
+
+ define MY_STRUCT_SIZE 8 /* Used by assembler source files */
+
+ struct my_struct {
+ uint32_t arg1;
+ uint32_t arg2;
+ };
+
+ CASSERT(MY_STRUCT_SIZE == sizeof(struct my_struct), assert_my_struct_size_mismatch);
+
+
+If ``MY_STRUCT_SIZE`` in the above example were wrong then the compiler would
+emit an error like this:
+
+::
+
+ my_struct.h:10:1: error: size of array ‘assert_my_struct_size_mismatch’ is negative
+
+
+Using assert() to check for programming errors
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+In general, each secure world TF image (BL1, BL2, BL31 and BL32) should be
+treated as a tightly integrated package; the image builder should be aware of
+and responsible for all functionality within the image, even if code within that
+image is provided by multiple entities. This allows us to be more aggressive in
+interpreting invalid state or bad function arguments as programming errors using
+``assert()``, including arguments passed across platform porting interfaces.
+This is in contrast to code in a Linux environment, which is less tightly
+integrated and may attempt to be more defensive by passing the error back up the
+call stack.
+
+Where possible, badly written TF code should fail early using ``assert()``. This
+helps reduce the amount of untested conditional code. By default these
+statements are not compiled into release builds, although this can be overridden
+using the ``ENABLE_ASSERTIONS`` build flag.
+
+Examples:
+
+- Bad argument supplied to library function
+- Bad argument provided by platform porting function
+- Internal secure world image state is inconsistent
+
+
+Handling integration errors
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+Each secure world image may be provided by a different entity (for example, a
+Trusted Boot vendor may provide the BL2 image, a TEE vendor may provide the BL32
+image and the OEM/SoC vendor may provide the other images).
+
+An image may contain bugs that are only visible when the images are integrated.
+The system integrator may not even have access to the debug variants of all the
+images in order to check if asserts are firing. For example, the release variant
+of BL1 may have already been burnt into the SoC. Therefore, TF code that detects
+an integration error should _not_ consider this a programming error, and should
+always take action, even in release builds.
+
+If an integration error is considered non-critical it should be treated as a
+recoverable error. If the error is considered critical it should be treated as
+an unexpected unrecoverable error.
+
+Handling recoverable errors
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+The secure world **must not** crash when supplied with bad data from an external
+source. For example, data from the normal world or a hardware device. Similarly,
+the secure world **must not** crash if it detects a non-critical problem within
+itself or the system. It must make every effort to recover from the problem by
+emitting a ``WARN`` message, performing any necessary error handling and
+continuing.
+
+Examples:
+
+- Secure world receives SMC from normal world with bad arguments.
+- Secure world receives SMC from normal world at an unexpected time.
+- BL31 receives SMC from BL32 with bad arguments.
+- BL31 receives SMC from BL32 at unexpected time.
+- Secure world receives recoverable error from hardware device. Retrying the
+ operation may help here.
+- Non-critical secure world service is not functioning correctly.
+- BL31 SPD discovers minor configuration problem with corresponding SP.
+
+Handling unrecoverable errors
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+In some cases it may not be possible for the secure world to recover from an
+error. This situation should be handled in one of the following ways:
+
+1. If the unrecoverable error is unexpected then emit an ``ERROR`` message and
+ call ``panic()``. This will end up calling the platform-specific function
+ ``plat_panic_handler()``.
+2. If the unrecoverable error is expected to occur in certain circumstances,
+ then emit an ``ERROR`` message and call the platform-specific function
+ ``plat_error_handler()``.
+
+Cases 1 and 2 are subtly different. A platform may implement
+``plat_panic_handler`` and ``plat_error_handler`` in the same way (for example,
+by waiting for a secure watchdog to time-out or by invoking an interface on the
+platform's power controller to reset the platform). However,
+``plat_error_handler`` may take additional action for some errors (for example,
+it may set a flag so the platform resets into a different mode). Also,
+``plat_panic_handler()`` may implement additional debug functionality (for
+example, invoking a hardware breakpoint).
+
+Examples of unexpected unrecoverable errors:
+
+- BL32 receives an unexpected SMC response from BL31 that it is unable to
+ recover from.
+- BL31 Trusted OS SPD code discovers that BL2 has not loaded the corresponding
+ Trusted OS, which is critical for platform operation.
+- Secure world discovers that a critical hardware device is an unexpected and
+ unrecoverable state.
+- Secure world receives an unexpected and unrecoverable error from a critical
+ hardware device.
+- Secure world discovers that it is running on unsupported hardware.
+
+Examples of expected unrecoverable errors:
+
+- BL1/BL2 fails to load the next image due to missing/corrupt firmware on disk.
+- BL1/BL2 fails to authenticate the next image due to an invalid certificate.
+- Secure world continuously receives recoverable errors from a hardware device
+ but is unable to proceed without a valid response.
+
+Handling critical unresponsiveness
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+If the secure world is waiting for a response from an external source (for
+example, the normal world or a hardware device) which is critical for continued
+operation, it must not wait indefinitely. It must have a mechanism (for example,
+a secure watchdog) for resetting itself and/or the external source to prevent
+the system from executing in this state indefinitely.
+
+Examples:
+
+- BL1 is waiting for the normal world to raise an SMC to proceed to the next
+ stage of the secure firmware update process.
+- A Trusted OS is waiting for a response from a proxy in the normal world that
+ is critical for continued operation.
+- Secure world is waiting for a hardware response that is critical for continued
+ operation.
+
+Use of built-in *C* and *libc* data types
+-----------------------------------------
+
+The |TF-A| codebase should be kept as portable as possible, especially since
+both 64-bit and 32-bit platforms are supported. To help with this, the following
+data type usage guidelines should be followed:
+
+- Where possible, use the built-in *C* data types for variable storage (for
+ example, ``char``, ``int``, ``long long``, etc) instead of the standard *C99*
+ types. Most code is typically only concerned with the minimum size of the
+ data stored, which the built-in *C* types guarantee.
+
+- Avoid using the exact-size standard *C99* types in general (for example,
+ ``uint16_t``, ``uint32_t``, ``uint64_t``, etc) since they can prevent the
+ compiler from making optimizations. There are legitimate uses for them,
+ for example to represent data of a known structure. When using them in struct
+ definitions, consider how padding in the struct will work across architectures.
+ For example, extra padding may be introduced in |AArch32| systems if a struct
+ member crosses a 32-bit boundary.
+
+- Use ``int`` as the default integer type - it's likely to be the fastest on all
+ systems. Also this can be assumed to be 32-bit as a consequence of the
+ `Procedure Call Standard for the Arm Architecture`_ and the `Procedure Call
+ Standard for the Arm 64-bit Architecture`_ .
+
+- Avoid use of ``short`` as this may end up being slower than ``int`` in some
+ systems. If a variable must be exactly 16-bit, use ``int16_t`` or
+ ``uint16_t``.
+
+- Avoid use of ``long``. This is guaranteed to be at least 32-bit but, given
+ that `int` is 32-bit on Arm platforms, there is no use for it. For integers of
+ at least 64-bit, use ``long long``.
+
+- Use ``char`` for storing text. Use ``uint8_t`` for storing other 8-bit data.
+
+- Use ``unsigned`` for integers that can never be negative (counts,
+ indices, sizes, etc). TF intends to comply with MISRA "essential type" coding
+ rules (10.X), where signed and unsigned types are considered different
+ essential types. Choosing the correct type will aid this. MISRA static
+ analysers will pick up any implicit signed/unsigned conversions that may lead
+ to unexpected behaviour.
+
+- For pointer types:
+
+ - If an argument in a function declaration is pointing to a known type then
+ simply use a pointer to that type (for example: ``struct my_struct *``).
+
+ - If a variable (including an argument in a function declaration) is pointing
+ to a general, memory-mapped address, an array of pointers or another
+ structure that is likely to require pointer arithmetic then use
+ ``uintptr_t``. This will reduce the amount of casting required in the code.
+ Avoid using ``unsigned long`` or ``unsigned long long`` for this purpose; it
+ may work but is less portable.
+
+ - For other pointer arguments in a function declaration, use ``void *``. This
+ includes pointers to types that are abstracted away from the known API and
+ pointers to arbitrary data. This allows the calling function to pass a
+ pointer argument to the function without any explicit casting (the cast to
+ ``void *`` is implicit). The function implementation can then do the
+ appropriate casting to a specific type.
+
+ - Avoid pointer arithmetic generally (as this violates MISRA C 2012 rule
+ 18.4) and especially on void pointers (as this is only supported via
+ language extensions and is considered non-standard). In TF-A, setting the
+ ``W`` build flag to ``W=3`` enables the *-Wpointer-arith* compiler flag and
+ this will emit warnings where pointer arithmetic is used.
+
+ - Use ``ptrdiff_t`` to compare the difference between 2 pointers.
+
+- Use ``size_t`` when storing the ``sizeof()`` something.
+
+- Use ``ssize_t`` when returning the ``sizeof()`` something from a function that
+ can also return an error code; the signed type allows for a negative return
+ code in case of error. This practice should be used sparingly.
+
+- Use ``u_register_t`` when it's important to store the contents of a register
+ in its native size (32-bit in |AArch32| and 64-bit in |AArch64|). This is not a
+ standard *C99* type but is widely available in libc implementations,
+ including the FreeBSD version included with the TF codebase. Where possible,
+ cast the variable to a more appropriate type before interpreting the data. For
+ example, the following struct in ``ep_info.h`` could use this type to minimize
+ the storage required for the set of registers:
+
+.. code:: c
+
+ typedef struct aapcs64_params {
+ u_register_t arg0;
+ u_register_t arg1;
+ u_register_t arg2;
+ u_register_t arg3;
+ u_register_t arg4;
+ u_register_t arg5;
+ u_register_t arg6;
+ u_register_t arg7;
+ } aapcs64_params_t;
+
+If some code wants to operate on ``arg0`` and knows that it represents a 32-bit
+unsigned integer on all systems, cast it to ``unsigned int``.
+
+These guidelines should be updated if additional types are needed.
+
+Favor C language over assembly language
+---------------------------------------
+
+Generally, prefer code written in C over assembly. Assembly code is less
+portable, harder to understand, maintain and audit security wise. Also, static
+analysis tools generally don't analyze assembly code.
+
+There are, however, legitimate uses of assembly language. These include:
+
+ - Early boot code executed before the C runtime environment is setup.
+
+ - Exception handling code.
+
+ - Low-level code where the exact sequence of instructions executed on the CPU
+ matters, such as CPU reset sequences.
+
+ - Low-level code where specific system-level instructions must be used, such
+ as cache maintenance operations.
+
+--------------
+
+*Copyright (c) 2020, 2022, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.*
+
+.. _`Linux master tree`: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/
+.. _`Procedure Call Standard for the Arm Architecture`: https://github.com/ARM-software/abi-aa/blob/main/aapcs32/aapcs32.rst
+.. _`Procedure Call Standard for the Arm 64-bit Architecture`: https://github.com/ARM-software/abi-aa/blob/main/aapcs64/aapcs64.rst
+.. _`EditorConfig`: http://editorconfig.org/
+.. _`Why the “volatile” type class should not be used`: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/volatile-considered-harmful.html
+.. _`MISRA C:2012 Guidelines`: https://www.misra.org.uk/Activities/MISRAC/tabid/160/Default.aspx
+.. _`a spreadsheet`: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/file/download/lamajxif3w7c4mpjeoo5/PHID-FILE-fp7c7acszn6vliqomyhn/MISRA-and-TF-Analysis-v1.3.ods