diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'plat/brcm/common')
| -rw-r--r-- | plat/brcm/common/brcm_bl2_mem_params_desc.c | 106 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | plat/brcm/common/brcm_bl2_setup.c | 202 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | plat/brcm/common/brcm_bl31_setup.c | 291 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | plat/brcm/common/brcm_ccn.c | 36 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | plat/brcm/common/brcm_common.c | 59 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | plat/brcm/common/brcm_gicv3.c | 91 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | plat/brcm/common/brcm_image_load.c | 41 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | plat/brcm/common/brcm_io_storage.c | 408 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | plat/brcm/common/brcm_mhu.c | 131 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | plat/brcm/common/brcm_mhu.h | 19 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | plat/brcm/common/brcm_scpi.c | 252 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | plat/brcm/common/brcm_scpi.h | 107 |
12 files changed, 1743 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/plat/brcm/common/brcm_bl2_mem_params_desc.c b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_bl2_mem_params_desc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aed99d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_bl2_mem_params_desc.c @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2019-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <common/desc_image_load.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> + +#include <platform_def.h> + +/******************************************************************************* + * Following descriptor provides BL image/ep information that gets used + * by BL2 to load the images and also subset of this information is + * passed to next BL image. The image loading sequence is managed by + * populating the images in required loading order. The image execution + * sequence is managed by populating the `next_handoff_image_id` with + * the next executable image id. + ******************************************************************************/ +static bl_mem_params_node_t bl2_mem_params_descs[] = { +#ifdef SCP_BL2_BASE + /* Fill SCP_BL2 related information if it exists */ + { + .image_id = SCP_BL2_IMAGE_ID, + + SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD(ep_info, PARAM_IMAGE_BINARY, + VERSION_2, entry_point_info_t, SECURE | NON_EXECUTABLE), + + SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD(image_info, PARAM_IMAGE_BINARY, + VERSION_2, image_info_t, 0), + .image_info.image_base = SCP_BL2_BASE, + .image_info.image_max_size = PLAT_MAX_SCP_BL2_SIZE, + + .next_handoff_image_id = INVALID_IMAGE_ID, + }, +#endif /* SCP_BL2_BASE */ + + /* Fill BL31 related information */ + { + .image_id = BL31_IMAGE_ID, + + SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD(ep_info, PARAM_EP, + VERSION_2, entry_point_info_t, + SECURE | EXECUTABLE | EP_FIRST_EXE), + .ep_info.pc = BL31_BASE, + .ep_info.spsr = SPSR_64(MODE_EL3, MODE_SP_ELX, + DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS), +#if DEBUG + .ep_info.args.arg3 = BRCM_BL31_PLAT_PARAM_VAL, +#endif + + SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD(image_info, PARAM_EP, + VERSION_2, image_info_t, IMAGE_ATTRIB_PLAT_SETUP), + .image_info.image_base = BL31_BASE, + .image_info.image_max_size = BL31_LIMIT - BL31_BASE, + +#ifdef BL32_BASE + .next_handoff_image_id = BL32_IMAGE_ID, +#else + .next_handoff_image_id = BL33_IMAGE_ID, +#endif + }, + +#ifdef BL32_BASE + /* Fill BL32 related information */ + { + .image_id = BL32_IMAGE_ID, + + SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD(ep_info, PARAM_EP, + VERSION_2, entry_point_info_t, SECURE | EXECUTABLE), + .ep_info.pc = BL32_BASE, + + SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD(image_info, PARAM_EP, + VERSION_2, image_info_t, 0), + .image_info.image_base = BL32_BASE, + .image_info.image_max_size = BL32_LIMIT - BL32_BASE, + + .next_handoff_image_id = BL33_IMAGE_ID, + }, +#endif /* BL32_BASE */ + + /* Fill BL33 related information */ + { + .image_id = BL33_IMAGE_ID, + SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD(ep_info, PARAM_EP, + VERSION_2, entry_point_info_t, NON_SECURE | EXECUTABLE), +#ifdef PRELOADED_BL33_BASE + .ep_info.pc = PRELOADED_BL33_BASE, + + SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD(image_info, PARAM_EP, + VERSION_2, image_info_t, IMAGE_ATTRIB_SKIP_LOADING), +#else + .ep_info.pc = PLAT_BRCM_NS_IMAGE_OFFSET, + + SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD(image_info, PARAM_EP, + VERSION_2, image_info_t, 0), + .image_info.image_base = PLAT_BRCM_NS_IMAGE_OFFSET, + .image_info.image_max_size = BRCM_DRAM1_SIZE, +#endif /* PRELOADED_BL33_BASE */ + + .next_handoff_image_id = INVALID_IMAGE_ID, + } +}; + +REGISTER_BL_IMAGE_DESCS(bl2_mem_params_descs) diff --git a/plat/brcm/common/brcm_bl2_setup.c b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_bl2_setup.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9a7153b --- /dev/null +++ b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_bl2_setup.c @@ -0,0 +1,202 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2019-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <common/desc_image_load.h> +#include <drivers/arm/sp804_delay_timer.h> +#include <lib/mmio.h> + +#include <bcm_console.h> +#include <platform_def.h> +#include <plat/brcm/common/plat_brcm.h> + +/* Data structure which holds the extents of the trusted SRAM for BL2 */ +static meminfo_t bl2_tzram_layout __aligned(CACHE_WRITEBACK_GRANULE); + +/* Weak definitions may be overridden in specific BRCM platform */ +#pragma weak plat_bcm_bl2_platform_setup +#pragma weak plat_bcm_bl2_plat_arch_setup +#pragma weak plat_bcm_security_setup +#pragma weak plat_bcm_bl2_plat_handle_scp_bl2 +#pragma weak plat_bcm_bl2_early_platform_setup + +void plat_bcm_bl2_early_platform_setup(void) +{ +} + +void plat_bcm_bl2_platform_setup(void) +{ +} + +void plat_bcm_bl2_plat_arch_setup(void) +{ +} + +void plat_bcm_security_setup(void) +{ +} + +void bcm_bl2_early_platform_setup(uintptr_t tb_fw_config, + meminfo_t *mem_layout) +{ + /* Initialize the console to provide early debug support */ + bcm_console_boot_init(); + + /* Setup the BL2 memory layout */ + bl2_tzram_layout = *mem_layout; + + /* Initialise the IO layer and register platform IO devices */ + plat_brcm_io_setup(); + + /* Log HW reset event */ + INFO("RESET: 0x%x\n", + mmio_read_32(CRMU_RESET_EVENT_LOG)); +} + +void bl2_early_platform_setup2(u_register_t arg0, u_register_t arg1, + u_register_t arg2, u_register_t arg3) +{ + /* SoC specific setup */ + plat_bcm_bl2_early_platform_setup(); + + /* Initialize delay timer driver using SP804 dual timer 0 */ + sp804_timer_init(SP804_TIMER0_BASE, + SP804_TIMER0_CLKMULT, SP804_TIMER0_CLKDIV); + + /* BRCM platforms generic setup */ + bcm_bl2_early_platform_setup((uintptr_t)arg0, (meminfo_t *)arg1); +} + +/* + * Perform Broadcom platform setup. + */ +void bcm_bl2_platform_setup(void) +{ + /* Initialize the secure environment */ + plat_bcm_security_setup(); +} + +void bl2_platform_setup(void) +{ + bcm_bl2_platform_setup(); + plat_bcm_bl2_platform_setup(); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Perform the very early platform specific architectural setup here. At the + * moment this is only initializes the mmu in a quick and dirty way. + ******************************************************************************/ +void bcm_bl2_plat_arch_setup(void) +{ +#ifndef MMU_DISABLED + if (!(read_sctlr_el1() & SCTLR_M_BIT)) { + const mmap_region_t bl_regions[] = { + MAP_REGION_FLAT(bl2_tzram_layout.total_base, + bl2_tzram_layout.total_size, + MT_MEMORY | MT_RW | MT_SECURE), + MAP_REGION_FLAT(BL_CODE_BASE, + BL_CODE_END - BL_CODE_BASE, + MT_CODE | MT_SECURE), + MAP_REGION_FLAT(BL_RO_DATA_BASE, + BL_RO_DATA_END - BL_RO_DATA_BASE, + MT_RO_DATA | MT_SECURE), +#if USE_COHERENT_MEM + MAP_REGION_FLAT(BL_COHERENT_RAM_BASE, + BL_COHERENT_RAM_END - + BL_COHERENT_RAM_BASE, + MT_DEVICE | MT_RW | MT_SECURE), +#endif + {0} + }; + + setup_page_tables(bl_regions, plat_brcm_get_mmap()); + enable_mmu_el1(0); + } +#endif +} + +void bl2_plat_arch_setup(void) +{ +#ifdef ENA_MMU_BEFORE_DDR_INIT + /* + * Once MMU is enabled before DDR, MEMORY TESTS + * get affected as read/write transaction might occures from + * caches. So For running memory test, one should not set this + * flag. + */ + bcm_bl2_plat_arch_setup(); + plat_bcm_bl2_plat_arch_setup(); +#else + plat_bcm_bl2_plat_arch_setup(); + bcm_bl2_plat_arch_setup(); +#endif +} + +int bcm_bl2_handle_post_image_load(unsigned int image_id) +{ + int err = 0; + + bl_mem_params_node_t *bl_mem_params = get_bl_mem_params_node(image_id); + + assert(bl_mem_params); + + switch (image_id) { + case BL32_IMAGE_ID: + bl_mem_params->ep_info.spsr = brcm_get_spsr_for_bl32_entry(); + break; + + case BL33_IMAGE_ID: + /* BL33 expects to receive the primary CPU MPID (through r0) */ + bl_mem_params->ep_info.args.arg0 = 0xffff & read_mpidr(); + bl_mem_params->ep_info.spsr = brcm_get_spsr_for_bl33_entry(); + break; + +#ifdef SCP_BL2_BASE + case SCP_BL2_IMAGE_ID: + /* The subsequent handling of SCP_BL2 is platform specific */ + err = bcm_bl2_handle_scp_bl2(&bl_mem_params->image_info); + if (err) + WARN("Failure in platform-specific handling of SCP_BL2 image.\n"); + break; +#endif + default: + /* Do nothing in default case */ + break; + } + + return err; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function can be used by the platforms to update/use image + * information for given `image_id`. + ******************************************************************************/ +int bcm_bl2_plat_handle_post_image_load(unsigned int image_id) +{ + return bcm_bl2_handle_post_image_load(image_id); +} + +int bl2_plat_handle_post_image_load(unsigned int image_id) +{ + return bcm_bl2_plat_handle_post_image_load(image_id); +} + +#ifdef SCP_BL2_BASE +int plat_bcm_bl2_plat_handle_scp_bl2(image_info_t *scp_bl2_image_info) +{ + return 0; +} + +int bcm_bl2_handle_scp_bl2(image_info_t *scp_bl2_image_info) +{ + return plat_bcm_bl2_plat_handle_scp_bl2(scp_bl2_image_info); +} +#endif diff --git a/plat/brcm/common/brcm_bl31_setup.c b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_bl31_setup.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d3fa83d --- /dev/null +++ b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_bl31_setup.c @@ -0,0 +1,291 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2015-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> + +#include <arch.h> +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <drivers/arm/sp804_delay_timer.h> +#include <lib/utils.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> + +#include <bcm_console.h> +#include <plat_brcm.h> +#include <platform_def.h> + +#ifdef BL33_SHARED_DDR_BASE +struct bl33_info *bl33_info = (struct bl33_info *)BL33_SHARED_DDR_BASE; +#endif + +/* + * Placeholder variables for copying the arguments that have been passed to + * BL31 from BL2. + */ +static entry_point_info_t bl32_image_ep_info; +static entry_point_info_t bl33_image_ep_info; + +/* Weak definitions may be overridden in specific BRCM platform */ +#pragma weak plat_bcm_bl31_early_platform_setup +#pragma weak plat_brcm_pwrc_setup +#pragma weak plat_brcm_security_setup + +void plat_brcm_security_setup(void) +{ + +} + +void plat_brcm_pwrc_setup(void) +{ + +} + +void plat_bcm_bl31_early_platform_setup(void *from_bl2, + bl_params_t *plat_params_from_bl2) +{ + +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Return a pointer to the 'entry_point_info' structure of the next image for + * the security state specified. BL33 corresponds to the non-secure image type + * while BL32 corresponds to the secure image type. A NULL pointer is returned + * if the image does not exist. + ******************************************************************************/ +struct entry_point_info *bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(uint32_t type) +{ + entry_point_info_t *next_image_info; + + assert(sec_state_is_valid(type)); + next_image_info = (type == NON_SECURE) + ? &bl33_image_ep_info : &bl32_image_ep_info; + /* + * None of the images on the ARM development platforms can have 0x0 + * as the entrypoint + */ + if (next_image_info->pc) + return next_image_info; + else + return NULL; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Perform any BL31 early platform setup common to ARM standard platforms. + * Here is an opportunity to copy parameters passed by the calling EL (S-EL1 + * in BL2 & EL3 in BL1) before they are lost (potentially). This needs to be + * done before the MMU is initialized so that the memory layout can be used + * while creating page tables. BL2 has flushed this information to memory, so + * we are guaranteed to pick up good data. + ******************************************************************************/ +void __init brcm_bl31_early_platform_setup(void *from_bl2, + uintptr_t soc_fw_config, + uintptr_t hw_config, + void *plat_params_from_bl2) +{ + /* Initialize the console to provide early debug support */ + bcm_console_boot_init(); + + /* Initialize delay timer driver using SP804 dual timer 0 */ + sp804_timer_init(SP804_TIMER0_BASE, + SP804_TIMER0_CLKMULT, SP804_TIMER0_CLKDIV); + +#if RESET_TO_BL31 + /* There are no parameters from BL2 if BL31 is a reset vector */ + assert(from_bl2 == NULL); + assert(plat_params_from_bl2 == NULL); + +# ifdef BL32_BASE + /* Populate entry point information for BL32 */ + SET_PARAM_HEAD(&bl32_image_ep_info, + PARAM_EP, + VERSION_1, + 0); + SET_SECURITY_STATE(bl32_image_ep_info.h.attr, SECURE); + bl32_image_ep_info.pc = BL32_BASE; + bl32_image_ep_info.spsr = brcm_get_spsr_for_bl32_entry(); +# endif /* BL32_BASE */ + + /* Populate entry point information for BL33 */ + SET_PARAM_HEAD(&bl33_image_ep_info, + PARAM_EP, + VERSION_1, + 0); + /* + * Tell BL31 where the non-trusted software image + * is located and the entry state information + */ + bl33_image_ep_info.pc = plat_get_ns_image_entrypoint(); + + bl33_image_ep_info.spsr = brcm_get_spsr_for_bl33_entry(); + SET_SECURITY_STATE(bl33_image_ep_info.h.attr, NON_SECURE); + +# if ARM_LINUX_KERNEL_AS_BL33 + /* + * According to the file ``Documentation/arm64/booting.txt`` of the + * Linux kernel tree, Linux expects the physical address of the device + * tree blob (DTB) in x0, while x1-x3 are reserved for future use and + * must be 0. + */ + bl33_image_ep_info.args.arg0 = (u_register_t)PRELOADED_DTB_BASE; + bl33_image_ep_info.args.arg1 = 0U; + bl33_image_ep_info.args.arg2 = 0U; + bl33_image_ep_info.args.arg3 = 0U; +# endif + +#else /* RESET_TO_BL31 */ + + /* + * In debug builds, we pass a special value in 'plat_params_from_bl2' + * to verify platform parameters from BL2 to BL31. + * In release builds, it's not used. + */ + assert(((unsigned long long)plat_params_from_bl2) == + BRCM_BL31_PLAT_PARAM_VAL); + + /* + * Check params passed from BL2 should not be NULL + */ + bl_params_t *params_from_bl2 = (bl_params_t *)from_bl2; + + assert(params_from_bl2 != NULL); + assert(params_from_bl2->h.type == PARAM_BL_PARAMS); + assert(params_from_bl2->h.version >= VERSION_2); + + bl_params_node_t *bl_params = params_from_bl2->head; + + /* + * Copy BL33 and BL32 (if present), entry point information. + * They are stored in Secure RAM, in BL2's address space. + */ + while (bl_params != NULL) { + if (bl_params->image_id == BL32_IMAGE_ID && + bl_params->image_info->h.attr != IMAGE_ATTRIB_SKIP_LOADING) + bl32_image_ep_info = *bl_params->ep_info; + + if (bl_params->image_id == BL33_IMAGE_ID) + bl33_image_ep_info = *bl_params->ep_info; + + bl_params = bl_params->next_params_info; + } + + if (bl33_image_ep_info.pc == 0U) + panic(); +#endif /* RESET_TO_BL31 */ + +#ifdef BL33_SHARED_DDR_BASE + /* Pass information to BL33 thorugh x0 */ + bl33_image_ep_info.args.arg0 = (u_register_t)BL33_SHARED_DDR_BASE; + bl33_image_ep_info.args.arg1 = 0ULL; + bl33_image_ep_info.args.arg2 = 0ULL; + bl33_image_ep_info.args.arg3 = 0ULL; +#endif +} + +void bl31_early_platform_setup2(u_register_t arg0, u_register_t arg1, + u_register_t arg2, u_register_t arg3) +{ +#ifdef BL31_LOG_LEVEL + SET_LOG_LEVEL(BL31_LOG_LEVEL); +#endif + + brcm_bl31_early_platform_setup((void *)arg0, arg1, arg2, (void *)arg3); + + plat_bcm_bl31_early_platform_setup((void *)arg0, (void *)arg3); + +#ifdef DRIVER_CC_ENABLE + /* + * Initialize Interconnect for this cluster during cold boot. + * No need for locks as no other CPU is active. + */ + plat_brcm_interconnect_init(); + + /* + * Enable Interconnect coherency for the primary CPU's cluster. + * Earlier bootloader stages might already do this (e.g. Trusted + * Firmware's BL1 does it) but we can't assume so. There is no harm in + * executing this code twice anyway. + * Platform specific PSCI code will enable coherency for other + * clusters. + */ + plat_brcm_interconnect_enter_coherency(); +#endif +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Perform any BL31 platform setup common to ARM standard platforms + ******************************************************************************/ +void brcm_bl31_platform_setup(void) +{ + /* Initialize the GIC driver, cpu and distributor interfaces */ + plat_brcm_gic_driver_init(); + plat_brcm_gic_init(); + + /* Initialize power controller before setting up topology */ + plat_brcm_pwrc_setup(); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Perform any BL31 platform runtime setup prior to BL31 exit common to ARM + * standard platforms + * Perform BL31 platform setup + ******************************************************************************/ +void brcm_bl31_plat_runtime_setup(void) +{ + console_switch_state(CONSOLE_FLAG_RUNTIME); + + /* Initialize the runtime console */ + bcm_console_runtime_init(); +} + +void bl31_platform_setup(void) +{ + brcm_bl31_platform_setup(); + + /* Initialize the secure environment */ + plat_brcm_security_setup(); +} + +void bl31_plat_runtime_setup(void) +{ + brcm_bl31_plat_runtime_setup(); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Perform the very early platform specific architectural setup shared between + * ARM standard platforms. This only does basic initialization. Later + * architectural setup (bl31_arch_setup()) does not do anything platform + * specific. + ******************************************************************************/ +void __init brcm_bl31_plat_arch_setup(void) +{ +#ifndef MMU_DISABLED + const mmap_region_t bl_regions[] = { + MAP_REGION_FLAT(BL31_BASE, BL31_END - BL31_BASE, + MT_MEMORY | MT_RW | MT_SECURE), + MAP_REGION_FLAT(BL_CODE_BASE, BL_CODE_END - BL_CODE_BASE, + MT_CODE | MT_SECURE), + MAP_REGION_FLAT(BL_RO_DATA_BASE, + BL_RO_DATA_END - BL_RO_DATA_BASE, + MT_RO_DATA | MT_SECURE), +#if USE_COHERENT_MEM + MAP_REGION_FLAT(BL_COHERENT_RAM_BASE, + BL_COHERENT_RAM_END - BL_COHERENT_RAM_BASE, + MT_DEVICE | MT_RW | MT_SECURE), +#endif + {0} + }; + + setup_page_tables(bl_regions, plat_brcm_get_mmap()); + + enable_mmu_el3(0); +#endif +} + +void __init bl31_plat_arch_setup(void) +{ + brcm_bl31_plat_arch_setup(); +} diff --git a/plat/brcm/common/brcm_ccn.c b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_ccn.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9396aaa --- /dev/null +++ b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_ccn.c @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2019-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <arch.h> +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <drivers/arm/ccn.h> + +#include <platform_def.h> + +static const unsigned char master_to_rn_id_map[] = { + PLAT_BRCM_CLUSTER_TO_CCN_ID_MAP +}; + +static const ccn_desc_t bcm_ccn_desc = { + .periphbase = PLAT_BRCM_CCN_BASE, + .num_masters = ARRAY_SIZE(master_to_rn_id_map), + .master_to_rn_id_map = master_to_rn_id_map +}; + +void plat_brcm_interconnect_init(void) +{ + ccn_init(&bcm_ccn_desc); +} + +void plat_brcm_interconnect_enter_coherency(void) +{ + ccn_enter_snoop_dvm_domain(1 << MPIDR_AFFLVL1_VAL(read_mpidr_el1())); +} + +void plat_brcm_interconnect_exit_coherency(void) +{ + ccn_exit_snoop_dvm_domain(1 << MPIDR_AFFLVL1_VAL(read_mpidr_el1())); +} diff --git a/plat/brcm/common/brcm_common.c b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_common.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f23719d --- /dev/null +++ b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_common.c @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2019-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> + +#include <arch.h> +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> + +#include <plat_brcm.h> +#include <platform_def.h> + +/* Weak definitions may be overridden in specific BRCM platform */ +#pragma weak plat_get_ns_image_entrypoint +#pragma weak plat_brcm_get_mmap + +uintptr_t plat_get_ns_image_entrypoint(void) +{ +#ifdef PRELOADED_BL33_BASE + return PRELOADED_BL33_BASE; +#else + return PLAT_BRCM_NS_IMAGE_OFFSET; +#endif +} + +uint32_t brcm_get_spsr_for_bl32_entry(void) +{ + /* + * The Secure Payload Dispatcher service is responsible for + * setting the SPSR prior to entry into the BL32 image. + */ + return 0; +} + +uint32_t brcm_get_spsr_for_bl33_entry(void) +{ + unsigned int mode; + uint32_t spsr; + + /* Figure out what mode we enter the non-secure world in */ + mode = el_implemented(2) ? MODE_EL2 : MODE_EL1; + + /* + * TODO: Consider the possibility of specifying the SPSR in + * the FIP ToC and allowing the platform to have a say as + * well. + */ + spsr = SPSR_64(mode, MODE_SP_ELX, DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS); + return spsr; +} + +const mmap_region_t *plat_brcm_get_mmap(void) +{ + return plat_brcm_mmap; +} diff --git a/plat/brcm/common/brcm_gicv3.c b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_gicv3.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c4137c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_gicv3.c @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2019-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <drivers/arm/gicv3.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> + +#include <platform_def.h> + +/* The GICv3 driver only needs to be initialized in EL3 */ +static uintptr_t brcm_rdistif_base_addrs[PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT]; + +static const interrupt_prop_t brcm_interrupt_props[] = { + /* G1S interrupts */ + PLAT_BRCM_G1S_IRQ_PROPS(INTR_GROUP1S), + /* G0 interrupts */ + PLAT_BRCM_G0_IRQ_PROPS(INTR_GROUP0) +}; + +/* + * MPIDR hashing function for translating MPIDRs read from GICR_TYPER register + * to core position. + * + * Calculating core position is dependent on MPIDR_EL1.MT bit. However, affinity + * values read from GICR_TYPER don't have an MT field. To reuse the same + * translation used for CPUs, we insert MT bit read from the PE's MPIDR into + * that read from GICR_TYPER. + * + * Assumptions: + * + * - All CPUs implemented in the system have MPIDR_EL1.MT bit set; + * - No CPUs implemented in the system use affinity level 3. + */ +static unsigned int brcm_gicv3_mpidr_hash(u_register_t mpidr) +{ + mpidr |= (read_mpidr_el1() & MPIDR_MT_MASK); + return plat_core_pos_by_mpidr(mpidr); +} + +static const gicv3_driver_data_t brcm_gic_data = { + .gicd_base = PLAT_BRCM_GICD_BASE, + .gicr_base = PLAT_BRCM_GICR_BASE, + .interrupt_props = brcm_interrupt_props, + .interrupt_props_num = ARRAY_SIZE(brcm_interrupt_props), + .rdistif_num = PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT, + .rdistif_base_addrs = brcm_rdistif_base_addrs, + .mpidr_to_core_pos = brcm_gicv3_mpidr_hash +}; + +void plat_brcm_gic_driver_init(void) +{ + /* TODO Check if this is required to be initialized here + * after getting initialized in EL3, should we re-init this here + * in S-EL1 + */ + gicv3_driver_init(&brcm_gic_data); +} + +void plat_brcm_gic_init(void) +{ + gicv3_distif_init(); + gicv3_rdistif_init(plat_my_core_pos()); + gicv3_cpuif_enable(plat_my_core_pos()); +} + +void plat_brcm_gic_cpuif_enable(void) +{ + gicv3_cpuif_enable(plat_my_core_pos()); +} + +void plat_brcm_gic_cpuif_disable(void) +{ + gicv3_cpuif_disable(plat_my_core_pos()); +} + +void plat_brcm_gic_pcpu_init(void) +{ + gicv3_rdistif_init(plat_my_core_pos()); +} + +void plat_brcm_gic_redistif_on(void) +{ + gicv3_rdistif_on(plat_my_core_pos()); +} + +void plat_brcm_gic_redistif_off(void) +{ + gicv3_rdistif_off(plat_my_core_pos()); +} diff --git a/plat/brcm/common/brcm_image_load.c b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_image_load.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ba02bda --- /dev/null +++ b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_image_load.c @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2019-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <common/desc_image_load.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> + +#pragma weak plat_flush_next_bl_params +#pragma weak plat_get_bl_image_load_info +#pragma weak plat_get_next_bl_params + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function flushes the data structures so that they are visible + * in memory for the next BL image. + ******************************************************************************/ +void plat_flush_next_bl_params(void) +{ + flush_bl_params_desc(); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function returns the list of loadable images. + ******************************************************************************/ +struct bl_load_info *plat_get_bl_image_load_info(void) +{ + return get_bl_load_info_from_mem_params_desc(); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function returns the list of executable images. + ******************************************************************************/ +struct bl_params *plat_get_next_bl_params(void) +{ + bl_params_t *next_bl_params = get_next_bl_params_from_mem_params_desc(); + + populate_next_bl_params_config(next_bl_params); + return next_bl_params; +} diff --git a/plat/brcm/common/brcm_io_storage.c b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_io_storage.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..66ec292 --- /dev/null +++ b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_io_storage.c @@ -0,0 +1,408 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2019-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <drivers/io/io_driver.h> +#include <drivers/io/io_fip.h> +#include <drivers/io/io_memmap.h> +#include <drivers/io/io_storage.h> +#include <tools_share/firmware_image_package.h> + +#include <cmn_plat_def.h> +#include <cmn_plat_util.h> +#include <plat_brcm.h> +#include <platform_def.h> + +/* IO devices */ +static const io_dev_connector_t *fip_dev_con; +static uintptr_t fip_dev_handle; +static const io_dev_connector_t *memmap_dev_con; +static uintptr_t memmap_dev_handle; + +static const io_block_spec_t fip_block_spec = { + .offset = PLAT_BRCM_FIP_BASE, + .length = PLAT_BRCM_FIP_MAX_SIZE +}; + +static const io_block_spec_t qspi_fip_block_spec = { + .offset = PLAT_BRCM_FIP_QSPI_BASE, + .length = PLAT_BRCM_FIP_MAX_SIZE +}; + +static const io_block_spec_t nand_fip_block_spec = { + .offset = PLAT_BRCM_FIP_NAND_BASE, + .length = PLAT_BRCM_FIP_MAX_SIZE +}; + +static const io_uuid_spec_t bl2_uuid_spec = { + .uuid = UUID_TRUSTED_BOOT_FIRMWARE_BL2, +}; + +static const io_uuid_spec_t scp_bl2_uuid_spec = { + .uuid = UUID_SCP_FIRMWARE_SCP_BL2, +}; + +static const io_uuid_spec_t bl31_uuid_spec = { + .uuid = UUID_EL3_RUNTIME_FIRMWARE_BL31, +}; + +static const io_uuid_spec_t bl32_uuid_spec = { + .uuid = UUID_SECURE_PAYLOAD_BL32, +}; + +static const io_uuid_spec_t bl32_extra1_uuid_spec = { + .uuid = UUID_SECURE_PAYLOAD_BL32_EXTRA1, +}; + +static const io_uuid_spec_t bl32_extra2_uuid_spec = { + .uuid = UUID_SECURE_PAYLOAD_BL32_EXTRA2, +}; + +static const io_uuid_spec_t bl33_uuid_spec = { + .uuid = UUID_NON_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_BL33, +}; + +static const io_uuid_spec_t tb_fw_config_uuid_spec = { + .uuid = UUID_TB_FW_CONFIG, +}; + +static const io_uuid_spec_t hw_config_uuid_spec = { + .uuid = UUID_HW_CONFIG, +}; + +static const io_uuid_spec_t soc_fw_config_uuid_spec = { + .uuid = UUID_SOC_FW_CONFIG, +}; + +static const io_uuid_spec_t tos_fw_config_uuid_spec = { + .uuid = UUID_TOS_FW_CONFIG, +}; + +static const io_uuid_spec_t nt_fw_config_uuid_spec = { + .uuid = UUID_NT_FW_CONFIG, +}; + +#if TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT +static const io_uuid_spec_t tb_fw_cert_uuid_spec = { + .uuid = UUID_TRUSTED_BOOT_FW_CERT, +}; + +static const io_uuid_spec_t trusted_key_cert_uuid_spec = { + .uuid = UUID_TRUSTED_KEY_CERT, +}; + +static const io_uuid_spec_t scp_fw_key_cert_uuid_spec = { + .uuid = UUID_SCP_FW_KEY_CERT, +}; + +static const io_uuid_spec_t soc_fw_key_cert_uuid_spec = { + .uuid = UUID_SOC_FW_KEY_CERT, +}; + +static const io_uuid_spec_t tos_fw_key_cert_uuid_spec = { + .uuid = UUID_TRUSTED_OS_FW_KEY_CERT, +}; + +static const io_uuid_spec_t nt_fw_key_cert_uuid_spec = { + .uuid = UUID_NON_TRUSTED_FW_KEY_CERT, +}; + +static const io_uuid_spec_t scp_fw_cert_uuid_spec = { + .uuid = UUID_SCP_FW_CONTENT_CERT, +}; + +static const io_uuid_spec_t soc_fw_cert_uuid_spec = { + .uuid = UUID_SOC_FW_CONTENT_CERT, +}; + +static const io_uuid_spec_t tos_fw_cert_uuid_spec = { + .uuid = UUID_TRUSTED_OS_FW_CONTENT_CERT, +}; + +static const io_uuid_spec_t nt_fw_cert_uuid_spec = { + .uuid = UUID_NON_TRUSTED_FW_CONTENT_CERT, +}; +#endif /* TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT */ + +static int open_fip(const uintptr_t spec); +static int open_memmap(const uintptr_t spec); +static int open_qspi(const uintptr_t spec); +static int open_nand(const uintptr_t spec); + +struct plat_io_policy { + uintptr_t *dev_handle; + uintptr_t image_spec; + int (*check)(const uintptr_t spec); +}; + +/* By default, BRCM platforms load images from the FIP */ +static const struct plat_io_policy policies[] = { + [FIP_IMAGE_ID] = { + &memmap_dev_handle, + (uintptr_t)&fip_block_spec, + open_memmap + }, + [BL2_IMAGE_ID] = { + &fip_dev_handle, + (uintptr_t)&bl2_uuid_spec, + open_fip + }, + [SCP_BL2_IMAGE_ID] = { + &fip_dev_handle, + (uintptr_t)&scp_bl2_uuid_spec, + open_fip + }, + [BL31_IMAGE_ID] = { + &fip_dev_handle, + (uintptr_t)&bl31_uuid_spec, + open_fip + }, + [BL32_IMAGE_ID] = { + &fip_dev_handle, + (uintptr_t)&bl32_uuid_spec, + open_fip + }, + [BL32_EXTRA1_IMAGE_ID] = { + &fip_dev_handle, + (uintptr_t)&bl32_extra1_uuid_spec, + open_fip + }, + [BL32_EXTRA2_IMAGE_ID] = { + &fip_dev_handle, + (uintptr_t)&bl32_extra2_uuid_spec, + open_fip + }, + [BL33_IMAGE_ID] = { + &fip_dev_handle, + (uintptr_t)&bl33_uuid_spec, + open_fip + }, + [TB_FW_CONFIG_ID] = { + &fip_dev_handle, + (uintptr_t)&tb_fw_config_uuid_spec, + open_fip + }, + [HW_CONFIG_ID] = { + &fip_dev_handle, + (uintptr_t)&hw_config_uuid_spec, + open_fip + }, + [SOC_FW_CONFIG_ID] = { + &fip_dev_handle, + (uintptr_t)&soc_fw_config_uuid_spec, + open_fip + }, + [TOS_FW_CONFIG_ID] = { + &fip_dev_handle, + (uintptr_t)&tos_fw_config_uuid_spec, + open_fip + }, + [NT_FW_CONFIG_ID] = { + &fip_dev_handle, + (uintptr_t)&nt_fw_config_uuid_spec, + open_fip + }, +#if TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT + [TRUSTED_BOOT_FW_CERT_ID] = { + &fip_dev_handle, + (uintptr_t)&tb_fw_cert_uuid_spec, + open_fip + }, + [TRUSTED_KEY_CERT_ID] = { + &fip_dev_handle, + (uintptr_t)&trusted_key_cert_uuid_spec, + open_fip + }, + [SCP_FW_KEY_CERT_ID] = { + &fip_dev_handle, + (uintptr_t)&scp_fw_key_cert_uuid_spec, + open_fip + }, + [SOC_FW_KEY_CERT_ID] = { + &fip_dev_handle, + (uintptr_t)&soc_fw_key_cert_uuid_spec, + open_fip + }, + [TRUSTED_OS_FW_KEY_CERT_ID] = { + &fip_dev_handle, + (uintptr_t)&tos_fw_key_cert_uuid_spec, + open_fip + }, + [NON_TRUSTED_FW_KEY_CERT_ID] = { + &fip_dev_handle, + (uintptr_t)&nt_fw_key_cert_uuid_spec, + open_fip + }, + [SCP_FW_CONTENT_CERT_ID] = { + &fip_dev_handle, + (uintptr_t)&scp_fw_cert_uuid_spec, + open_fip + }, + [SOC_FW_CONTENT_CERT_ID] = { + &fip_dev_handle, + (uintptr_t)&soc_fw_cert_uuid_spec, + open_fip + }, + [TRUSTED_OS_FW_CONTENT_CERT_ID] = { + &fip_dev_handle, + (uintptr_t)&tos_fw_cert_uuid_spec, + open_fip + }, + [NON_TRUSTED_FW_CONTENT_CERT_ID] = { + &fip_dev_handle, + (uintptr_t)&nt_fw_cert_uuid_spec, + open_fip + }, +#endif /* TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT */ +}; + +/* By default, BRCM platforms load images from the FIP */ +static const struct plat_io_policy boot_source_policies[] = { + [BOOT_SOURCE_QSPI] = { + &memmap_dev_handle, + (uintptr_t)&qspi_fip_block_spec, + open_qspi + }, + [BOOT_SOURCE_NAND] = { + &memmap_dev_handle, + (uintptr_t)&nand_fip_block_spec, + open_nand + }, +}; + +/* Weak definitions may be overridden in specific brcm platform */ +#pragma weak plat_brcm_io_setup +#pragma weak plat_brcm_process_flags + +static int open_fip(const uintptr_t spec) +{ + int result; + uintptr_t local_image_handle; + + /* See if a Firmware Image Package is available */ + result = io_dev_init(fip_dev_handle, (uintptr_t)FIP_IMAGE_ID); + if (result == 0) { + result = io_open(fip_dev_handle, spec, &local_image_handle); + if (result == 0) { + VERBOSE("Using FIP\n"); + io_close(local_image_handle); + } + } + return result; +} + + +static int open_memmap(const uintptr_t spec) +{ + int result; + uintptr_t local_image_handle; + + result = io_dev_init(memmap_dev_handle, (uintptr_t)NULL); + if (result == 0) { + result = io_open(memmap_dev_handle, spec, &local_image_handle); + if (result == 0) { + VERBOSE("Using Memmap\n"); + io_close(local_image_handle); + } + } + return result; +} + +static int open_qspi(const uintptr_t spec) +{ + return open_memmap(spec); +} + +static int open_nand(const uintptr_t spec) +{ + return open_memmap(spec); +} + + +void brcm_io_setup(void) +{ + int io_result; + uint32_t boot_source; + + io_result = register_io_dev_fip(&fip_dev_con); + assert(io_result == 0); + + io_result = register_io_dev_memmap(&memmap_dev_con); + assert(io_result == 0); + + /* Open connections to devices and cache the handles */ + io_result = io_dev_open(fip_dev_con, (uintptr_t)NULL, + &fip_dev_handle); + assert(io_result == 0); + + boot_source = boot_source_get(); + switch (boot_source) { + case BOOT_SOURCE_QSPI: + case BOOT_SOURCE_NAND: + default: + io_result = io_dev_open(memmap_dev_con, (uintptr_t)NULL, + &memmap_dev_handle); + break; + } + assert(io_result == 0); + + /* Ignore improbable errors in release builds */ + (void)io_result; +} + +void plat_brcm_io_setup(void) +{ + brcm_io_setup(); +} + +void plat_brcm_process_flags(uint16_t plat_toc_flags __unused) +{ + WARN("%s not implemented\n", __func__); +} + +/* + * Return an IO device handle and specification which can be used to access + * an image. Use this to enforce platform load policy + */ +int plat_get_image_source(unsigned int image_id, uintptr_t *dev_handle, + uintptr_t *image_spec) +{ + int result; + const struct plat_io_policy *policy; + uint32_t boot_source; + uint16_t lcl_plat_toc_flg; + + assert(image_id < ARRAY_SIZE(policies)); + + boot_source = boot_source_get(); + if (image_id == FIP_IMAGE_ID) + policy = &boot_source_policies[boot_source]; + else + policy = &policies[image_id]; + + result = policy->check(policy->image_spec); + if (result == 0) { + *image_spec = policy->image_spec; + *dev_handle = *(policy->dev_handle); + + if (image_id == TRUSTED_BOOT_FW_CERT_ID) { + /* + * Process the header flags to perform + * such custom actions as speeding up PLL. + * CERT seems to be the first image accessed + * by BL1 so this is where we process the flags. + */ + fip_dev_get_plat_toc_flag((io_dev_info_t *)fip_dev_handle, + &lcl_plat_toc_flg); + plat_brcm_process_flags(lcl_plat_toc_flg); + } + } + + return result; +} diff --git a/plat/brcm/common/brcm_mhu.c b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_mhu.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..56f44e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_mhu.c @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2019-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <drivers/delay_timer.h> +#include <lib/bakery_lock.h> + +#include <brcm_mhu.h> +#include <platform_def.h> + +#include "m0_ipc.h" + +#define PLAT_MHU_INTR_REG AP_TO_SCP_MAILBOX1 + +/* SCP MHU secure channel registers */ +#define SCP_INTR_S_STAT CRMU_IHOST_SW_PERSISTENT_REG11 +#define SCP_INTR_S_SET CRMU_IHOST_SW_PERSISTENT_REG11 +#define SCP_INTR_S_CLEAR CRMU_IHOST_SW_PERSISTENT_REG11 + +/* CPU MHU secure channel registers */ +#define CPU_INTR_S_STAT CRMU_IHOST_SW_PERSISTENT_REG10 +#define CPU_INTR_S_SET CRMU_IHOST_SW_PERSISTENT_REG10 +#define CPU_INTR_S_CLEAR CRMU_IHOST_SW_PERSISTENT_REG10 + +static DEFINE_BAKERY_LOCK(bcm_lock); + +/* + * Slot 31 is reserved because the MHU hardware uses this register bit to + * indicate a non-secure access attempt. The total number of available slots is + * therefore 31 [30:0]. + */ +#define MHU_MAX_SLOT_ID 30 + +void mhu_secure_message_start(unsigned int slot_id) +{ + int iter = 1000000; + + assert(slot_id <= MHU_MAX_SLOT_ID); + + bakery_lock_get(&bcm_lock); + /* Make sure any previous command has finished */ + do { + if (!(mmio_read_32(PLAT_BRCM_MHU_BASE + CPU_INTR_S_STAT) & + (1 << slot_id))) + break; + + udelay(1); + + } while (--iter); + + assert(iter != 0); +} + +void mhu_secure_message_send(unsigned int slot_id) +{ + uint32_t response, iter = 1000000; + + assert(slot_id <= MHU_MAX_SLOT_ID); + assert(!(mmio_read_32(PLAT_BRCM_MHU_BASE + CPU_INTR_S_STAT) & + (1 << slot_id))); + + /* Send command to SCP */ + mmio_setbits_32(PLAT_BRCM_MHU_BASE + CPU_INTR_S_SET, 1 << slot_id); + mmio_write_32(CRMU_MAIL_BOX0, MCU_IPC_MCU_CMD_SCPI); + mmio_write_32(PLAT_BRCM_MHU_BASE + PLAT_MHU_INTR_REG, 0x1); + + /* Wait until IPC transport acknowledges reception of SCP command */ + do { + response = mmio_read_32(CRMU_MAIL_BOX0); + if ((response & ~MCU_IPC_CMD_REPLY_MASK) == + (MCU_IPC_CMD_DONE_MASK | MCU_IPC_MCU_CMD_SCPI)) + break; + + udelay(1); + + } while (--iter); + + assert(iter != 0); +} + +uint32_t mhu_secure_message_wait(void) +{ + /* Wait for response from SCP */ + uint32_t response, iter = 1000000; + + do { + response = mmio_read_32(PLAT_BRCM_MHU_BASE + SCP_INTR_S_STAT); + if (!response) + break; + + udelay(1); + } while (--iter); + assert(iter != 0); + + return response; +} + +void mhu_secure_message_end(unsigned int slot_id) +{ + assert(slot_id <= MHU_MAX_SLOT_ID); + + /* + * Clear any response we got by writing one in the relevant slot bit to + * the CLEAR register + */ + mmio_clrbits_32(PLAT_BRCM_MHU_BASE + SCP_INTR_S_CLEAR, 1 << slot_id); + bakery_lock_release(&bcm_lock); +} + +void mhu_secure_init(void) +{ + bakery_lock_init(&bcm_lock); + + /* + * The STAT register resets to zero. Ensure it is in the expected state, + * as a stale or garbage value would make us think it's a message we've + * already sent. + */ + mmio_write_32(PLAT_BRCM_MHU_BASE + CPU_INTR_S_STAT, 0); + mmio_write_32(PLAT_BRCM_MHU_BASE + SCP_INTR_S_STAT, 0); +} + +void plat_brcm_pwrc_setup(void) +{ + mhu_secure_init(); +} diff --git a/plat/brcm/common/brcm_mhu.h b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_mhu.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6c89a34 --- /dev/null +++ b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_mhu.h @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2019-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef BRCM_MHU_H +#define BRCM_MHU_H + +#include <stdint.h> + +void mhu_secure_message_start(unsigned int slot_id); +void mhu_secure_message_send(unsigned int slot_id); +uint32_t mhu_secure_message_wait(void); +void mhu_secure_message_end(unsigned int slot_id); + +void mhu_secure_init(void); + +#endif /* BRCM_MHU_H */ diff --git a/plat/brcm/common/brcm_scpi.c b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_scpi.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0a703cb --- /dev/null +++ b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_scpi.c @@ -0,0 +1,252 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2019-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <lib/utils.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> + +#include <brcm_mhu.h> +#include <brcm_scpi.h> +#include <platform_def.h> + +#define SCPI_SHARED_MEM_SCP_TO_AP (PLAT_SCP_COM_SHARED_MEM_BASE) +#define SCPI_SHARED_MEM_AP_TO_SCP (PLAT_SCP_COM_SHARED_MEM_BASE \ + + 0x100) + +/* Header and payload addresses for commands from AP to SCP */ +#define SCPI_CMD_HEADER_AP_TO_SCP \ + ((scpi_cmd_t *) SCPI_SHARED_MEM_AP_TO_SCP) +#define SCPI_CMD_PAYLOAD_AP_TO_SCP \ + ((void *) (SCPI_SHARED_MEM_AP_TO_SCP + sizeof(scpi_cmd_t))) + +/* Header and payload addresses for responses from SCP to AP */ +#define SCPI_RES_HEADER_SCP_TO_AP \ + ((scpi_cmd_t *) SCPI_SHARED_MEM_SCP_TO_AP) +#define SCPI_RES_PAYLOAD_SCP_TO_AP \ + ((void *) (SCPI_SHARED_MEM_SCP_TO_AP + sizeof(scpi_cmd_t))) + +/* ID of the MHU slot used for the SCPI protocol */ +#define SCPI_MHU_SLOT_ID 0 + +static void scpi_secure_message_start(void) +{ + mhu_secure_message_start(SCPI_MHU_SLOT_ID); +} + +static void scpi_secure_message_send(size_t payload_size) +{ + /* + * Ensure that any write to the SCPI payload area is seen by SCP before + * we write to the MHU register. If these 2 writes were reordered by + * the CPU then SCP would read stale payload data + */ + dmbst(); + + mhu_secure_message_send(SCPI_MHU_SLOT_ID); +} + +static void scpi_secure_message_receive(scpi_cmd_t *cmd) +{ + uint32_t mhu_status; + + assert(cmd != NULL); + + mhu_status = mhu_secure_message_wait(); + + /* Expect an SCPI message, reject any other protocol */ + if (mhu_status != (1 << SCPI_MHU_SLOT_ID)) { + ERROR("MHU: Unexpected protocol (MHU status: 0x%x)\n", + mhu_status); + panic(); + } + + /* + * Ensure that any read to the SCPI payload area is done after reading + * the MHU register. If these 2 reads were reordered then the CPU would + * read invalid payload data + */ + dmbld(); + + memcpy(cmd, (void *) SCPI_SHARED_MEM_SCP_TO_AP, sizeof(*cmd)); +} + +static void scpi_secure_message_end(void) +{ + mhu_secure_message_end(SCPI_MHU_SLOT_ID); +} + +int scpi_wait_ready(void) +{ + scpi_cmd_t scpi_cmd; + + VERBOSE("Waiting for SCP_READY command...\n"); + + /* Get a message from the SCP */ + scpi_secure_message_start(); + scpi_secure_message_receive(&scpi_cmd); + scpi_secure_message_end(); + + /* We are expecting 'SCP Ready', produce correct error if it's not */ + scpi_status_t status = SCP_OK; + + if (scpi_cmd.id != SCPI_CMD_SCP_READY) { + ERROR("Unexpected SCP command: expected #%u, received #%u\n", + SCPI_CMD_SCP_READY, scpi_cmd.id); + status = SCP_E_SUPPORT; + } else if (scpi_cmd.size != 0) { + ERROR("SCP_READY cmd has incorrect size: expected 0, got %u\n", + scpi_cmd.size); + status = SCP_E_SIZE; + } + + VERBOSE("Sending response for SCP_READY command\n"); + + /* + * Send our response back to SCP. + * We are using the same SCPI header, just update the status field. + */ + scpi_cmd.status = status; + scpi_secure_message_start(); + memcpy((void *) SCPI_SHARED_MEM_AP_TO_SCP, &scpi_cmd, sizeof(scpi_cmd)); + scpi_secure_message_send(0); + scpi_secure_message_end(); + + return status == SCP_OK ? 0 : -1; +} + +void scpi_set_brcm_power_state(unsigned int mpidr, + scpi_power_state_t cpu_state, scpi_power_state_t cluster_state, + scpi_power_state_t brcm_state) +{ + scpi_cmd_t *cmd; + uint32_t state = 0; + uint32_t *payload_addr; + +#if ARM_PLAT_MT + /* + * The current SCPI driver only caters for single-threaded platforms. + * Hence we ignore the thread ID (which is always 0) for such platforms. + */ + state |= (mpidr >> MPIDR_AFF1_SHIFT) & 0x0f; /* CPU ID */ + state |= ((mpidr >> MPIDR_AFF2_SHIFT) & 0x0f) << 4; /* Cluster ID */ +#else + state |= mpidr & 0x0f; /* CPU ID */ + state |= (mpidr & 0xf00) >> 4; /* Cluster ID */ +#endif /* ARM_PLAT_MT */ + + state |= cpu_state << 8; + state |= cluster_state << 12; + state |= brcm_state << 16; + + scpi_secure_message_start(); + + /* Populate the command header */ + cmd = SCPI_CMD_HEADER_AP_TO_SCP; + cmd->id = SCPI_CMD_SET_POWER_STATE; + cmd->set = SCPI_SET_NORMAL; + cmd->sender = 0; + cmd->size = sizeof(state); + /* Populate the command payload */ + payload_addr = SCPI_CMD_PAYLOAD_AP_TO_SCP; + *payload_addr = state; + scpi_secure_message_send(sizeof(state)); + + /* + * SCP does not reply to this command in order to avoid MHU interrupts + * from the sender, which could interfere with its power state request. + */ + scpi_secure_message_end(); +} + +/* + * Query and obtain power state from SCP. + * + * In response to the query, SCP returns power states of all CPUs in all + * clusters of the system. The returned response is then filtered based on the + * supplied MPIDR. Power states of requested cluster and CPUs within are updated + * via. supplied non-NULL pointer arguments. + * + * Returns 0 on success, or -1 on errors. + */ +int scpi_get_brcm_power_state(unsigned int mpidr, unsigned int *cpu_state_p, + unsigned int *cluster_state_p) +{ + scpi_cmd_t *cmd; + scpi_cmd_t response; + int power_state, cpu, cluster, rc = -1; + + /* + * Extract CPU and cluster membership of the given MPIDR. SCPI caters + * for only up to 0xf clusters, and 8 CPUs per cluster + */ + cpu = mpidr & MPIDR_AFFLVL_MASK; + cluster = (mpidr >> MPIDR_AFF1_SHIFT) & MPIDR_AFFLVL_MASK; + if (cpu >= 8 || cluster >= 0xf) + return -1; + + scpi_secure_message_start(); + + /* Populate request headers */ + zeromem(SCPI_CMD_HEADER_AP_TO_SCP, sizeof(*cmd)); + cmd = SCPI_CMD_HEADER_AP_TO_SCP; + cmd->id = SCPI_CMD_GET_POWER_STATE; + + /* + * Send message and wait for SCP's response + */ + scpi_secure_message_send(0); + scpi_secure_message_receive(&response); + + if (response.status != SCP_OK) + goto exit; + + /* Validate SCP response */ + if (!CHECK_RESPONSE(response, cluster)) + goto exit; + + /* Extract power states for required cluster */ + power_state = *(((uint16_t *) SCPI_RES_PAYLOAD_SCP_TO_AP) + cluster); + if (CLUSTER_ID(power_state) != cluster) + goto exit; + + /* Update power state via. pointers */ + if (cluster_state_p) + *cluster_state_p = CLUSTER_POWER_STATE(power_state); + if (cpu_state_p) + *cpu_state_p = CPU_POWER_STATE(power_state); + rc = 0; + +exit: + scpi_secure_message_end(); + return rc; +} + +uint32_t scpi_sys_power_state(scpi_system_state_t system_state) +{ + scpi_cmd_t *cmd; + uint8_t *payload_addr; + + scpi_secure_message_start(); + + /* Populate the command header */ + cmd = SCPI_CMD_HEADER_AP_TO_SCP; + cmd->id = SCPI_CMD_SYS_POWER_STATE; + cmd->set = 0; + cmd->sender = 0; + cmd->size = sizeof(*payload_addr); + /* Populate the command payload */ + payload_addr = SCPI_CMD_PAYLOAD_AP_TO_SCP; + *payload_addr = system_state & 0xff; + scpi_secure_message_send(sizeof(*payload_addr)); + + scpi_secure_message_end(); + + return SCP_OK; +} diff --git a/plat/brcm/common/brcm_scpi.h b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_scpi.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f3b658f --- /dev/null +++ b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_scpi.h @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2019-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef BRCM_SCPI_H +#define BRCM_SCPI_H + +#include <stddef.h> +#include <stdint.h> + +/* + * An SCPI command consists of a header and a payload. + * The following structure describes the header. It is 64-bit long. + */ +typedef struct { + /* Command ID */ + uint32_t id : 7; + /* Set ID. Identifies whether this is a standard or extended command. */ + uint32_t set : 1; + /* Sender ID to match a reply. The value is sender specific. */ + uint32_t sender : 8; + /* Size of the payload in bytes (0 - 511) */ + uint32_t size : 9; + uint32_t reserved : 7; + /* + * Status indicating the success of a command. + * See the enum below. + */ + uint32_t status; +} scpi_cmd_t; + +typedef enum { + SCPI_SET_NORMAL = 0, /* Normal SCPI commands */ + SCPI_SET_EXTENDED /* Extended SCPI commands */ +} scpi_set_t; + +enum { + SCP_OK = 0, /* Success */ + SCP_E_PARAM, /* Invalid parameter(s) */ + SCP_E_ALIGN, /* Invalid alignment */ + SCP_E_SIZE, /* Invalid size */ + SCP_E_HANDLER, /* Invalid handler or callback */ + SCP_E_ACCESS, /* Invalid access or permission denied */ + SCP_E_RANGE, /* Value out of range */ + SCP_E_TIMEOUT, /* Time out has ocurred */ + SCP_E_NOMEM, /* Invalid memory area or pointer */ + SCP_E_PWRSTATE, /* Invalid power state */ + SCP_E_SUPPORT, /* Feature not supported or disabled */ + SCPI_E_DEVICE, /* Device error */ + SCPI_E_BUSY, /* Device is busy */ +}; + +typedef uint32_t scpi_status_t; +typedef enum { + SCPI_CMD_SCP_READY = 0x01, + SCPI_CMD_SET_POWER_STATE = 0x03, + SCPI_CMD_GET_POWER_STATE = 0x04, + SCPI_CMD_SYS_POWER_STATE = 0x05 +} scpi_command_t; + +/* + * Macros to parse SCP response to GET_POWER_STATE command + * + * [3:0] : cluster ID + * [7:4] : cluster state: 0 = on; 3 = off; rest are reserved + * [15:8]: on/off state for individual CPUs in the cluster + * + * Payload is in little-endian + */ +#define CLUSTER_ID(_resp) ((_resp) & 0xf) +#define CLUSTER_POWER_STATE(_resp) (((_resp) >> 4) & 0xf) + +/* Result is a bit mask of CPU on/off states in the cluster */ +#define CPU_POWER_STATE(_resp) (((_resp) >> 8) & 0xff) + +/* + * For GET_POWER_STATE, SCP returns the power states of every cluster. The + * size of response depends on the number of clusters in the system. The + * SCP-to-AP payload contains 2 bytes per cluster. Make sure the response is + * large enough to contain power states of a given cluster + */ +#define CHECK_RESPONSE(_resp, _clus) (_resp.size >= (((_clus) + 1) * 2)) + +typedef enum { + scpi_power_on = 0, + scpi_power_retention = 1, + scpi_power_off = 3, +} scpi_power_state_t; + +typedef enum { + scpi_system_shutdown = 0, + scpi_system_reboot = 1, + scpi_system_reset = 2 +} scpi_system_state_t; + +extern int scpi_wait_ready(void); +extern void scpi_set_brcm_power_state(unsigned int mpidr, + scpi_power_state_t cpu_state, + scpi_power_state_t cluster_state, + scpi_power_state_t css_state); +int scpi_get_brcm_power_state(unsigned int mpidr, unsigned int *cpu_state_p, + unsigned int *cluster_state_p); +uint32_t scpi_sys_power_state(scpi_system_state_t system_state); + +#endif /* BRCM_SCPI_H */ |