diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'services/spd')
32 files changed, 5393 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/services/spd/opteed/opteed.mk b/services/spd/opteed/opteed.mk new file mode 100644 index 0000000..643b054 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/opteed/opteed.mk @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +# +# Copyright (c) 2013-2019, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. +# +# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause +# + +OPTEED_DIR := services/spd/opteed +SPD_INCLUDES := + +SPD_SOURCES := services/spd/opteed/opteed_common.c \ + services/spd/opteed/opteed_helpers.S \ + services/spd/opteed/opteed_main.c \ + services/spd/opteed/opteed_pm.c + +NEED_BL32 := yes + +# required so that optee code can control access to the timer registers +NS_TIMER_SWITCH := 1 diff --git a/services/spd/opteed/opteed_common.c b/services/spd/opteed/opteed_common.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9aa19c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/opteed/opteed_common.c @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013-2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <lib/utils.h> + +#include "opteed_private.h" + +/******************************************************************************* + * Given a OPTEE entrypoint info pointer, entry point PC, register width, + * cpu id & pointer to a context data structure, this function will + * initialize OPTEE context and entry point info for OPTEE. + ******************************************************************************/ +void opteed_init_optee_ep_state(struct entry_point_info *optee_entry_point, + uint32_t rw, uint64_t pc, + uint64_t pageable_part, uint64_t mem_limit, + uint64_t dt_addr, optee_context_t *optee_ctx) +{ + uint32_t ep_attr; + + /* Passing a NULL context is a critical programming error */ + assert(optee_ctx); + assert(optee_entry_point); + assert(pc); + + /* Associate this context with the cpu specified */ + optee_ctx->mpidr = read_mpidr_el1(); + optee_ctx->state = 0; + set_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state, OPTEE_PSTATE_OFF); + + cm_set_context(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx, SECURE); + + /* initialise an entrypoint to set up the CPU context */ + ep_attr = SECURE | EP_ST_ENABLE; + if (read_sctlr_el3() & SCTLR_EE_BIT) + ep_attr |= EP_EE_BIG; + SET_PARAM_HEAD(optee_entry_point, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, ep_attr); + optee_entry_point->pc = pc; + if (rw == OPTEE_AARCH64) + optee_entry_point->spsr = SPSR_64(MODE_EL1, MODE_SP_ELX, + DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS); + else + optee_entry_point->spsr = SPSR_MODE32(MODE32_svc, SPSR_T_ARM, + SPSR_E_LITTLE, + DAIF_FIQ_BIT | + DAIF_IRQ_BIT | + DAIF_ABT_BIT); + zeromem(&optee_entry_point->args, sizeof(optee_entry_point->args)); + optee_entry_point->args.arg0 = pageable_part; + optee_entry_point->args.arg1 = mem_limit; + optee_entry_point->args.arg2 = dt_addr; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function takes an OPTEE context pointer and: + * 1. Applies the S-EL1 system register context from optee_ctx->cpu_ctx. + * 2. Saves the current C runtime state (callee saved registers) on the stack + * frame and saves a reference to this state. + * 3. Calls el3_exit() so that the EL3 system and general purpose registers + * from the optee_ctx->cpu_ctx are used to enter the OPTEE image. + ******************************************************************************/ +uint64_t opteed_synchronous_sp_entry(optee_context_t *optee_ctx) +{ + uint64_t rc; + + assert(optee_ctx != NULL); + assert(optee_ctx->c_rt_ctx == 0); + + /* Apply the Secure EL1 system register context and switch to it */ + assert(cm_get_context(SECURE) == &optee_ctx->cpu_ctx); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); + + rc = opteed_enter_sp(&optee_ctx->c_rt_ctx); +#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS + optee_ctx->c_rt_ctx = 0; +#endif + + return rc; +} + + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function takes an OPTEE context pointer and: + * 1. Saves the S-EL1 system register context tp optee_ctx->cpu_ctx. + * 2. Restores the current C runtime state (callee saved registers) from the + * stack frame using the reference to this state saved in opteed_enter_sp(). + * 3. It does not need to save any general purpose or EL3 system register state + * as the generic smc entry routine should have saved those. + ******************************************************************************/ +void opteed_synchronous_sp_exit(optee_context_t *optee_ctx, uint64_t ret) +{ + assert(optee_ctx != NULL); + /* Save the Secure EL1 system register context */ + assert(cm_get_context(SECURE) == &optee_ctx->cpu_ctx); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); + + assert(optee_ctx->c_rt_ctx != 0); + opteed_exit_sp(optee_ctx->c_rt_ctx, ret); + + /* Should never reach here */ + assert(0); +} diff --git a/services/spd/opteed/opteed_helpers.S b/services/spd/opteed/opteed_helpers.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000..075a71b --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/opteed/opteed_helpers.S @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013-2014, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <asm_macros.S> +#include "opteed_private.h" + + .global opteed_enter_sp + /* --------------------------------------------- + * This function is called with SP_EL0 as stack. + * Here we stash our EL3 callee-saved registers + * on to the stack as a part of saving the C + * runtime and enter the secure payload. + * 'x0' contains a pointer to the memory where + * the address of the C runtime context is to be + * saved. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ +func opteed_enter_sp + /* Make space for the registers that we're going to save */ + mov x3, sp + str x3, [x0, #0] + sub sp, sp, #OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_SIZE + + /* Save callee-saved registers on to the stack */ + stp x19, x20, [sp, #OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X19] + stp x21, x22, [sp, #OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X21] + stp x23, x24, [sp, #OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X23] + stp x25, x26, [sp, #OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X25] + stp x27, x28, [sp, #OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X27] + stp x29, x30, [sp, #OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X29] + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * Everything is setup now. el3_exit() will + * use the secure context to restore to the + * general purpose and EL3 system registers to + * ERET into OPTEE. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + b el3_exit +endfunc opteed_enter_sp + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * This function is called 'x0' pointing to a C + * runtime context saved in opteed_enter_sp(). It + * restores the saved registers and jumps to + * that runtime with 'x0' as the new sp. This + * destroys the C runtime context that had been + * built on the stack below the saved context by + * the caller. Later the second parameter 'x1' + * is passed as return value to the caller + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + .global opteed_exit_sp +func opteed_exit_sp + /* Restore the previous stack */ + mov sp, x0 + + /* Restore callee-saved registers on to the stack */ + ldp x19, x20, [x0, #(OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X19 - OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x21, x22, [x0, #(OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X21 - OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x23, x24, [x0, #(OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X23 - OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x25, x26, [x0, #(OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X25 - OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x27, x28, [x0, #(OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X27 - OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x29, x30, [x0, #(OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X29 - OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * This should take us back to the instruction + * after the call to the last opteed_enter_sp(). + * Place the second parameter to x0 so that the + * caller will see it as a return value from the + * original entry call + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + mov x0, x1 + ret +endfunc opteed_exit_sp diff --git a/services/spd/opteed/opteed_main.c b/services/spd/opteed/opteed_main.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..160a693 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/opteed/opteed_main.c @@ -0,0 +1,420 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013-2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + + +/******************************************************************************* + * This is the Secure Payload Dispatcher (SPD). The dispatcher is meant to be a + * plug-in component to the Secure Monitor, registered as a runtime service. The + * SPD is expected to be a functional extension of the Secure Payload (SP) that + * executes in Secure EL1. The Secure Monitor will delegate all SMCs targeting + * the Trusted OS/Applications range to the dispatcher. The SPD will either + * handle the request locally or delegate it to the Secure Payload. It is also + * responsible for initialising and maintaining communication with the SP. + ******************************************************************************/ +#include <assert.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <stddef.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <bl31/bl31.h> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <common/runtime_svc.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> +#include <tools_share/uuid.h> + +#include "opteed_private.h" +#include "teesmc_opteed.h" +#include "teesmc_opteed_macros.h" + +/******************************************************************************* + * Address of the entrypoint vector table in OPTEE. It is + * initialised once on the primary core after a cold boot. + ******************************************************************************/ +struct optee_vectors *optee_vector_table; + +/******************************************************************************* + * Array to keep track of per-cpu OPTEE state + ******************************************************************************/ +optee_context_t opteed_sp_context[OPTEED_CORE_COUNT]; +uint32_t opteed_rw; + +static int32_t opteed_init(void); + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function is the handler registered for S-EL1 interrupts by the + * OPTEED. It validates the interrupt and upon success arranges entry into + * the OPTEE at 'optee_fiq_entry()' for handling the interrupt. + ******************************************************************************/ +static uint64_t opteed_sel1_interrupt_handler(uint32_t id, + uint32_t flags, + void *handle, + void *cookie) +{ + uint32_t linear_id; + optee_context_t *optee_ctx; + + /* Check the security state when the exception was generated */ + assert(get_interrupt_src_ss(flags) == NON_SECURE); + + /* Sanity check the pointer to this cpu's context */ + assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)); + + /* Save the non-secure context before entering the OPTEE */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); + + /* Get a reference to this cpu's OPTEE context */ + linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + optee_ctx = &opteed_sp_context[linear_id]; + assert(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t)&optee_vector_table->fiq_entry); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); + + /* + * Tell the OPTEE that it has to handle an FIQ (synchronously). + * Also the instruction in normal world where the interrupt was + * generated is passed for debugging purposes. It is safe to + * retrieve this address from ELR_EL3 as the secure context will + * not take effect until el3_exit(). + */ + SMC_RET1(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx, read_elr_el3()); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * OPTEE Dispatcher setup. The OPTEED finds out the OPTEE entrypoint and type + * (aarch32/aarch64) if not already known and initialises the context for entry + * into OPTEE for its initialization. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t opteed_setup(void) +{ + entry_point_info_t *optee_ep_info; + uint32_t linear_id; + uint64_t opteed_pageable_part; + uint64_t opteed_mem_limit; + uint64_t dt_addr; + + linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + + /* + * Get information about the Secure Payload (BL32) image. Its + * absence is a critical failure. TODO: Add support to + * conditionally include the SPD service + */ + optee_ep_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE); + if (!optee_ep_info) { + WARN("No OPTEE provided by BL2 boot loader, Booting device" + " without OPTEE initialization. SMC`s destined for OPTEE" + " will return SMC_UNK\n"); + return 1; + } + + /* + * If there's no valid entry point for SP, we return a non-zero value + * signalling failure initializing the service. We bail out without + * registering any handlers + */ + if (!optee_ep_info->pc) + return 1; + + opteed_rw = optee_ep_info->args.arg0; + opteed_pageable_part = optee_ep_info->args.arg1; + opteed_mem_limit = optee_ep_info->args.arg2; + dt_addr = optee_ep_info->args.arg3; + + opteed_init_optee_ep_state(optee_ep_info, + opteed_rw, + optee_ep_info->pc, + opteed_pageable_part, + opteed_mem_limit, + dt_addr, + &opteed_sp_context[linear_id]); + + /* + * All OPTEED initialization done. Now register our init function with + * BL31 for deferred invocation + */ + bl31_register_bl32_init(&opteed_init); + + return 0; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function passes control to the OPTEE image (BL32) for the first time + * on the primary cpu after a cold boot. It assumes that a valid secure + * context has already been created by opteed_setup() which can be directly + * used. It also assumes that a valid non-secure context has been + * initialised by PSCI so it does not need to save and restore any + * non-secure state. This function performs a synchronous entry into + * OPTEE. OPTEE passes control back to this routine through a SMC. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t opteed_init(void) +{ + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + optee_context_t *optee_ctx = &opteed_sp_context[linear_id]; + entry_point_info_t *optee_entry_point; + uint64_t rc; + + /* + * Get information about the OPTEE (BL32) image. Its + * absence is a critical failure. + */ + optee_entry_point = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE); + assert(optee_entry_point); + + cm_init_my_context(optee_entry_point); + + /* + * Arrange for an entry into OPTEE. It will be returned via + * OPTEE_ENTRY_DONE case + */ + rc = opteed_synchronous_sp_entry(optee_ctx); + assert(rc != 0); + + return rc; +} + + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function is responsible for handling all SMCs in the Trusted OS/App + * range from the non-secure state as defined in the SMC Calling Convention + * Document. It is also responsible for communicating with the Secure + * payload to delegate work and return results back to the non-secure + * state. Lastly it will also return any information that OPTEE needs to do + * the work assigned to it. + ******************************************************************************/ +static uintptr_t opteed_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + u_register_t x1, + u_register_t x2, + u_register_t x3, + u_register_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + u_register_t flags) +{ + cpu_context_t *ns_cpu_context; + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + optee_context_t *optee_ctx = &opteed_sp_context[linear_id]; + uint64_t rc; + + /* + * Determine which security state this SMC originated from + */ + + if (is_caller_non_secure(flags)) { + /* + * This is a fresh request from the non-secure client. + * The parameters are in x1 and x2. Figure out which + * registers need to be preserved, save the non-secure + * state and send the request to the secure payload. + */ + assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)); + + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); + + /* + * We are done stashing the non-secure context. Ask the + * OPTEE to do the work now. + */ + + /* + * Verify if there is a valid context to use, copy the + * operation type and parameters to the secure context + * and jump to the fast smc entry point in the secure + * payload. Entry into S-EL1 will take place upon exit + * from this function. + */ + assert(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + + /* Set appropriate entry for SMC. + * We expect OPTEE to manage the PSTATE.I and PSTATE.F + * flags as appropriate. + */ + if (GET_SMC_TYPE(smc_fid) == SMC_TYPE_FAST) { + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t) + &optee_vector_table->fast_smc_entry); + } else { + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t) + &optee_vector_table->yield_smc_entry); + } + + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); + + write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx), + CTX_GPREG_X4, + read_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(handle), + CTX_GPREG_X4)); + write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx), + CTX_GPREG_X5, + read_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(handle), + CTX_GPREG_X5)); + write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx), + CTX_GPREG_X6, + read_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(handle), + CTX_GPREG_X6)); + /* Propagate hypervisor client ID */ + write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx), + CTX_GPREG_X7, + read_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(handle), + CTX_GPREG_X7)); + + SMC_RET4(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx, smc_fid, x1, x2, x3); + } + + /* + * Returning from OPTEE + */ + + switch (smc_fid) { + /* + * OPTEE has finished initialising itself after a cold boot + */ + case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_ENTRY_DONE: + /* + * Stash the OPTEE entry points information. This is done + * only once on the primary cpu + */ + assert(optee_vector_table == NULL); + optee_vector_table = (optee_vectors_t *) x1; + + if (optee_vector_table) { + set_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state, OPTEE_PSTATE_ON); + + /* + * OPTEE has been successfully initialized. + * Register power management hooks with PSCI + */ + psci_register_spd_pm_hook(&opteed_pm); + + /* + * Register an interrupt handler for S-EL1 interrupts + * when generated during code executing in the + * non-secure state. + */ + flags = 0; + set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, NON_SECURE); + rc = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_S_EL1, + opteed_sel1_interrupt_handler, + flags); + if (rc) + panic(); + } + + /* + * OPTEE reports completion. The OPTEED must have initiated + * the original request through a synchronous entry into + * OPTEE. Jump back to the original C runtime context. + */ + opteed_synchronous_sp_exit(optee_ctx, x1); + break; + + + /* + * These function IDs is used only by OP-TEE to indicate it has + * finished: + * 1. turning itself on in response to an earlier psci + * cpu_on request + * 2. resuming itself after an earlier psci cpu_suspend + * request. + */ + case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_ON_DONE: + case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_RESUME_DONE: + + + /* + * These function IDs is used only by the SP to indicate it has + * finished: + * 1. suspending itself after an earlier psci cpu_suspend + * request. + * 2. turning itself off in response to an earlier psci + * cpu_off request. + */ + case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_OFF_DONE: + case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_SUSPEND_DONE: + case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_SYSTEM_OFF_DONE: + case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_SYSTEM_RESET_DONE: + + /* + * OPTEE reports completion. The OPTEED must have initiated the + * original request through a synchronous entry into OPTEE. + * Jump back to the original C runtime context, and pass x1 as + * return value to the caller + */ + opteed_synchronous_sp_exit(optee_ctx, x1); + break; + + /* + * OPTEE is returning from a call or being preempted from a call, in + * either case execution should resume in the normal world. + */ + case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_CALL_DONE: + /* + * This is the result from the secure client of an + * earlier request. The results are in x0-x3. Copy it + * into the non-secure context, save the secure state + * and return to the non-secure state. + */ + assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); + + /* Get a reference to the non-secure context */ + ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); + assert(ns_cpu_context); + + /* Restore non-secure state */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + + SMC_RET4(ns_cpu_context, x1, x2, x3, x4); + + /* + * OPTEE has finished handling a S-EL1 FIQ interrupt. Execution + * should resume in the normal world. + */ + case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_FIQ_DONE: + /* Get a reference to the non-secure context */ + ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); + assert(ns_cpu_context); + + /* + * Restore non-secure state. There is no need to save the + * secure system register context since OPTEE was supposed + * to preserve it during S-EL1 interrupt handling. + */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + + SMC_RET0((uint64_t) ns_cpu_context); + + default: + panic(); + } +} + +/* Define an OPTEED runtime service descriptor for fast SMC calls */ +DECLARE_RT_SVC( + opteed_fast, + + OEN_TOS_START, + OEN_TOS_END, + SMC_TYPE_FAST, + opteed_setup, + opteed_smc_handler +); + +/* Define an OPTEED runtime service descriptor for yielding SMC calls */ +DECLARE_RT_SVC( + opteed_std, + + OEN_TOS_START, + OEN_TOS_END, + SMC_TYPE_YIELD, + NULL, + opteed_smc_handler +); diff --git a/services/spd/opteed/opteed_pm.c b/services/spd/opteed/opteed_pm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..719eeb7 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/opteed/opteed_pm.c @@ -0,0 +1,223 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013-2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> + +#include "opteed_private.h" + +/******************************************************************************* + * The target cpu is being turned on. Allow the OPTEED/OPTEE to perform any + * actions needed. Nothing at the moment. + ******************************************************************************/ +static void opteed_cpu_on_handler(u_register_t target_cpu) +{ +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This cpu is being turned off. Allow the OPTEED/OPTEE to perform any actions + * needed + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t opteed_cpu_off_handler(u_register_t unused) +{ + int32_t rc = 0; + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + optee_context_t *optee_ctx = &opteed_sp_context[linear_id]; + + assert(optee_vector_table); + assert(get_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state) == OPTEE_PSTATE_ON); + + /* Program the entry point and enter OPTEE */ + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t) &optee_vector_table->cpu_off_entry); + rc = opteed_synchronous_sp_entry(optee_ctx); + + /* + * Read the response from OPTEE. A non-zero return means that + * something went wrong while communicating with OPTEE. + */ + if (rc != 0) + panic(); + + /* + * Reset OPTEE's context for a fresh start when this cpu is turned on + * subsequently. + */ + set_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state, OPTEE_PSTATE_OFF); + + return 0; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This cpu is being suspended. S-EL1 state must have been saved in the + * resident cpu (mpidr format) if it is a UP/UP migratable OPTEE. + ******************************************************************************/ +static void opteed_cpu_suspend_handler(u_register_t max_off_pwrlvl) +{ + int32_t rc = 0; + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + optee_context_t *optee_ctx = &opteed_sp_context[linear_id]; + + assert(optee_vector_table); + assert(get_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state) == OPTEE_PSTATE_ON); + + write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx), CTX_GPREG_X0, + max_off_pwrlvl); + + /* Program the entry point and enter OPTEE */ + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t) &optee_vector_table->cpu_suspend_entry); + rc = opteed_synchronous_sp_entry(optee_ctx); + + /* + * Read the response from OPTEE. A non-zero return means that + * something went wrong while communicating with OPTEE. + */ + if (rc != 0) + panic(); + + /* Update its context to reflect the state OPTEE is in */ + set_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state, OPTEE_PSTATE_SUSPEND); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This cpu has been turned on. Enter OPTEE to initialise S-EL1 and other bits + * before passing control back to the Secure Monitor. Entry in S-El1 is done + * after initialising minimal architectural state that guarantees safe + * execution. + ******************************************************************************/ +static void opteed_cpu_on_finish_handler(u_register_t unused) +{ + int32_t rc = 0; + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + optee_context_t *optee_ctx = &opteed_sp_context[linear_id]; + entry_point_info_t optee_on_entrypoint; + + assert(optee_vector_table); + assert(get_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state) == OPTEE_PSTATE_OFF); + + opteed_init_optee_ep_state(&optee_on_entrypoint, opteed_rw, + (uint64_t)&optee_vector_table->cpu_on_entry, + 0, 0, 0, optee_ctx); + + /* Initialise this cpu's secure context */ + cm_init_my_context(&optee_on_entrypoint); + + /* Enter OPTEE */ + rc = opteed_synchronous_sp_entry(optee_ctx); + + /* + * Read the response from OPTEE. A non-zero return means that + * something went wrong while communicating with OPTEE. + */ + if (rc != 0) + panic(); + + /* Update its context to reflect the state OPTEE is in */ + set_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state, OPTEE_PSTATE_ON); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This cpu has resumed from suspend. The OPTEED saved the OPTEE context when it + * completed the preceding suspend call. Use that context to program an entry + * into OPTEE to allow it to do any remaining book keeping + ******************************************************************************/ +static void opteed_cpu_suspend_finish_handler(u_register_t max_off_pwrlvl) +{ + int32_t rc = 0; + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + optee_context_t *optee_ctx = &opteed_sp_context[linear_id]; + + assert(optee_vector_table); + assert(get_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state) == OPTEE_PSTATE_SUSPEND); + + /* Program the entry point, max_off_pwrlvl and enter the SP */ + write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx), + CTX_GPREG_X0, + max_off_pwrlvl); + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t) &optee_vector_table->cpu_resume_entry); + rc = opteed_synchronous_sp_entry(optee_ctx); + + /* + * Read the response from OPTEE. A non-zero return means that + * something went wrong while communicating with OPTEE. + */ + if (rc != 0) + panic(); + + /* Update its context to reflect the state OPTEE is in */ + set_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state, OPTEE_PSTATE_ON); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Return the type of OPTEE the OPTEED is dealing with. Report the current + * resident cpu (mpidr format) if it is a UP/UP migratable OPTEE. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t opteed_cpu_migrate_info(u_register_t *resident_cpu) +{ + return OPTEE_MIGRATE_INFO; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * System is about to be switched off. Allow the OPTEED/OPTEE to perform + * any actions needed. + ******************************************************************************/ +static void opteed_system_off(void) +{ + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + optee_context_t *optee_ctx = &opteed_sp_context[linear_id]; + + assert(optee_vector_table); + assert(get_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state) == OPTEE_PSTATE_ON); + + /* Program the entry point */ + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t) &optee_vector_table->system_off_entry); + + /* Enter OPTEE. We do not care about the return value because we + * must continue the shutdown anyway */ + opteed_synchronous_sp_entry(optee_ctx); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * System is about to be reset. Allow the OPTEED/OPTEE to perform + * any actions needed. + ******************************************************************************/ +static void opteed_system_reset(void) +{ + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + optee_context_t *optee_ctx = &opteed_sp_context[linear_id]; + + assert(optee_vector_table); + assert(get_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state) == OPTEE_PSTATE_ON); + + /* Program the entry point */ + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t) &optee_vector_table->system_reset_entry); + + /* Enter OPTEE. We do not care about the return value because we + * must continue the reset anyway */ + opteed_synchronous_sp_entry(optee_ctx); +} + + +/******************************************************************************* + * Structure populated by the OPTEE Dispatcher to be given a chance to + * perform any OPTEE bookkeeping before PSCI executes a power mgmt. + * operation. + ******************************************************************************/ +const spd_pm_ops_t opteed_pm = { + .svc_on = opteed_cpu_on_handler, + .svc_off = opteed_cpu_off_handler, + .svc_suspend = opteed_cpu_suspend_handler, + .svc_on_finish = opteed_cpu_on_finish_handler, + .svc_suspend_finish = opteed_cpu_suspend_finish_handler, + .svc_migrate = NULL, + .svc_migrate_info = opteed_cpu_migrate_info, + .svc_system_off = opteed_system_off, + .svc_system_reset = opteed_system_reset, +}; diff --git a/services/spd/opteed/opteed_private.h b/services/spd/opteed/opteed_private.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..242154f --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/opteed/opteed_private.h @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013-2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef OPTEED_PRIVATE_H +#define OPTEED_PRIVATE_H + +#include <platform_def.h> + +#include <arch.h> +#include <bl31/interrupt_mgmt.h> +#include <context.h> +#include <lib/psci/psci.h> + +/******************************************************************************* + * OPTEE PM state information e.g. OPTEE is suspended, uninitialised etc + * and macros to access the state information in the per-cpu 'state' flags + ******************************************************************************/ +#define OPTEE_PSTATE_OFF 0 +#define OPTEE_PSTATE_ON 1 +#define OPTEE_PSTATE_SUSPEND 2 +#define OPTEE_PSTATE_SHIFT 0 +#define OPTEE_PSTATE_MASK 0x3 +#define get_optee_pstate(state) ((state >> OPTEE_PSTATE_SHIFT) & \ + OPTEE_PSTATE_MASK) +#define clr_optee_pstate(state) (state &= ~(OPTEE_PSTATE_MASK \ + << OPTEE_PSTATE_SHIFT)) +#define set_optee_pstate(st, pst) do { \ + clr_optee_pstate(st); \ + st |= (pst & OPTEE_PSTATE_MASK) << \ + OPTEE_PSTATE_SHIFT; \ + } while (0) + + +/******************************************************************************* + * OPTEE execution state information i.e. aarch32 or aarch64 + ******************************************************************************/ +#define OPTEE_AARCH32 MODE_RW_32 +#define OPTEE_AARCH64 MODE_RW_64 + +/******************************************************************************* + * The OPTEED should know the type of OPTEE + ******************************************************************************/ +#define OPTEE_TYPE_UP PSCI_TOS_NOT_UP_MIG_CAP +#define OPTEE_TYPE_UPM PSCI_TOS_UP_MIG_CAP +#define OPTEE_TYPE_MP PSCI_TOS_NOT_PRESENT_MP + +/******************************************************************************* + * OPTEE migrate type information as known to the OPTEED. We assume that + * the OPTEED is dealing with an MP Secure Payload. + ******************************************************************************/ +#define OPTEE_MIGRATE_INFO OPTEE_TYPE_MP + +/******************************************************************************* + * Number of cpus that the present on this platform. TODO: Rely on a topology + * tree to determine this in the future to avoid assumptions about mpidr + * allocation + ******************************************************************************/ +#define OPTEED_CORE_COUNT PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT + +/******************************************************************************* + * Constants that allow assembler code to preserve callee-saved registers of the + * C runtime context while performing a security state switch. + ******************************************************************************/ +#define OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X19 0x0 +#define OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X20 0x8 +#define OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X21 0x10 +#define OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X22 0x18 +#define OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X23 0x20 +#define OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X24 0x28 +#define OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X25 0x30 +#define OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X26 0x38 +#define OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X27 0x40 +#define OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X28 0x48 +#define OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X29 0x50 +#define OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X30 0x58 +#define OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_SIZE 0x60 +#define OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_ENTRIES (OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_SIZE >> DWORD_SHIFT) + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__ + +#include <stdint.h> + +#include <lib/cassert.h> + +typedef uint32_t optee_vector_isn_t; + +typedef struct optee_vectors { + optee_vector_isn_t yield_smc_entry; + optee_vector_isn_t fast_smc_entry; + optee_vector_isn_t cpu_on_entry; + optee_vector_isn_t cpu_off_entry; + optee_vector_isn_t cpu_resume_entry; + optee_vector_isn_t cpu_suspend_entry; + optee_vector_isn_t fiq_entry; + optee_vector_isn_t system_off_entry; + optee_vector_isn_t system_reset_entry; +} optee_vectors_t; + +/* + * The number of arguments to save during a SMC call for OPTEE. + * Currently only x1 and x2 are used by OPTEE. + */ +#define OPTEE_NUM_ARGS 0x2 + +/* AArch64 callee saved general purpose register context structure. */ +DEFINE_REG_STRUCT(c_rt_regs, OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_ENTRIES); + +/* + * Compile time assertion to ensure that both the compiler and linker + * have the same double word aligned view of the size of the C runtime + * register context. + */ +CASSERT(OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_SIZE == sizeof(c_rt_regs_t), \ + assert_spd_c_rt_regs_size_mismatch); + +/******************************************************************************* + * Structure which helps the OPTEED to maintain the per-cpu state of OPTEE. + * 'state' - collection of flags to track OPTEE state e.g. on/off + * 'mpidr' - mpidr to associate a context with a cpu + * 'c_rt_ctx' - stack address to restore C runtime context from after + * returning from a synchronous entry into OPTEE. + * 'cpu_ctx' - space to maintain OPTEE architectural state + ******************************************************************************/ +typedef struct optee_context { + uint32_t state; + uint64_t mpidr; + uint64_t c_rt_ctx; + cpu_context_t cpu_ctx; +} optee_context_t; + +/* OPTEED power management handlers */ +extern const spd_pm_ops_t opteed_pm; + +/******************************************************************************* + * Forward declarations + ******************************************************************************/ +struct optee_vectors; + +/******************************************************************************* + * Function & Data prototypes + ******************************************************************************/ +uint64_t opteed_enter_sp(uint64_t *c_rt_ctx); +void __dead2 opteed_exit_sp(uint64_t c_rt_ctx, uint64_t ret); +uint64_t opteed_synchronous_sp_entry(optee_context_t *optee_ctx); +void __dead2 opteed_synchronous_sp_exit(optee_context_t *optee_ctx, uint64_t ret); +void opteed_init_optee_ep_state(struct entry_point_info *optee_entry_point, + uint32_t rw, + uint64_t pc, + uint64_t pageable_part, + uint64_t mem_limit, + uint64_t dt_addr, + optee_context_t *optee_ctx); + +extern optee_context_t opteed_sp_context[OPTEED_CORE_COUNT]; +extern uint32_t opteed_rw; +extern struct optee_vectors *optee_vector_table; +#endif /*__ASSEMBLER__*/ + +#endif /* OPTEED_PRIVATE_H */ diff --git a/services/spd/opteed/teesmc_opteed.h b/services/spd/opteed/teesmc_opteed.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c82b58a --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/opteed/teesmc_opteed.h @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2014-2019, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +/* Copyright (c) 2014, Linaro Limited. All rights reserved. */ + +#ifndef TEESMC_OPTEED_H +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_H + +/* + * This file specifies SMC function IDs used when returning from TEE to the + * secure monitor. + * + * All SMC Function IDs indicates SMC32 Calling Convention but will carry + * full 64 bit values in the argument registers if invoked from Aarch64 + * mode. This violates the SMC Calling Convention, but since this + * convention only coveres API towards Normal World it's something that + * only concerns the OP-TEE Dispatcher in Trusted Firmware-A and OP-TEE + * OS at Secure EL1. + */ + +/* + * Issued when returning from initial entry. + * + * Register usage: + * r0/x0 SMC Function ID, TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_ENTRY_DONE + * r1/x1 Pointer to entry vector + */ +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_ENTRY_DONE 0 +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_ENTRY_DONE \ + TEESMC_OPTEED_RV(TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_ENTRY_DONE) + + + +/* + * Issued when returning from "cpu_on" vector + * + * Register usage: + * r0/x0 SMC Function ID, TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_ON_DONE + * r1/x1 0 on success and anything else to indicate error condition + */ +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_ON_DONE 1 +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_ON_DONE \ + TEESMC_OPTEED_RV(TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_ON_DONE) + +/* + * Issued when returning from "cpu_off" vector + * + * Register usage: + * r0/x0 SMC Function ID, TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_OFF_DONE + * r1/x1 0 on success and anything else to indicate error condition + */ +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_OFF_DONE 2 +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_OFF_DONE \ + TEESMC_OPTEED_RV(TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_OFF_DONE) + +/* + * Issued when returning from "cpu_suspend" vector + * + * Register usage: + * r0/x0 SMC Function ID, TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_SUSPEND_DONE + * r1/x1 0 on success and anything else to indicate error condition + */ +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_SUSPEND_DONE 3 +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_SUSPEND_DONE \ + TEESMC_OPTEED_RV(TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_SUSPEND_DONE) + +/* + * Issued when returning from "cpu_resume" vector + * + * Register usage: + * r0/x0 SMC Function ID, TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_RESUME_DONE + * r1/x1 0 on success and anything else to indicate error condition + */ +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_RESUME_DONE 4 +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_RESUME_DONE \ + TEESMC_OPTEED_RV(TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_RESUME_DONE) + +/* + * Issued when returning from "std_smc" or "fast_smc" vector + * + * Register usage: + * r0/x0 SMC Function ID, TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_CALL_DONE + * r1-4/x1-4 Return value 0-3 which will passed to normal world in + * r0-3/x0-3 + */ +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_CALL_DONE 5 +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_CALL_DONE \ + TEESMC_OPTEED_RV(TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_CALL_DONE) + +/* + * Issued when returning from "fiq" vector + * + * Register usage: + * r0/x0 SMC Function ID, TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_FIQ_DONE + */ +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_FIQ_DONE 6 +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_FIQ_DONE \ + TEESMC_OPTEED_RV(TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_FIQ_DONE) + +/* + * Issued when returning from "system_off" vector + * + * Register usage: + * r0/x0 SMC Function ID, TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_SYSTEM_OFF_DONE + */ +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_SYSTEM_OFF_DONE 7 +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_SYSTEM_OFF_DONE \ + TEESMC_OPTEED_RV(TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_SYSTEM_OFF_DONE) + +/* + * Issued when returning from "system_reset" vector + * + * Register usage: + * r0/x0 SMC Function ID, TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_SYSTEM_RESET_DONE + */ +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_SYSTEM_RESET_DONE 8 +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_SYSTEM_RESET_DONE \ + TEESMC_OPTEED_RV(TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_SYSTEM_RESET_DONE) + +#endif /*TEESMC_OPTEED_H*/ diff --git a/services/spd/opteed/teesmc_opteed_macros.h b/services/spd/opteed/teesmc_opteed_macros.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9d8a169 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/opteed/teesmc_opteed_macros.h @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2014, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ +#ifndef TEESMC_OPTEED_MACROS_H +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_MACROS_H + +#include <common/runtime_svc.h> + +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_RV(func_num) \ + ((SMC_TYPE_FAST << FUNCID_TYPE_SHIFT) | \ + ((SMC_32) << FUNCID_CC_SHIFT) | \ + (62 << FUNCID_OEN_SHIFT) | \ + ((func_num) & FUNCID_NUM_MASK)) + +#endif /* TEESMC_OPTEED_MACROS_H */ diff --git a/services/spd/pncd/pncd.mk b/services/spd/pncd/pncd.mk new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0f8eb25 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/pncd/pncd.mk @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +# Copyright (c) 2021-2022, ProvenRun S.A.S. All rights reserved. +# +# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + +PNCD_DIR := services/spd/pncd +SPD_INCLUDES := -Iinclude/bl32/pnc +SPD_INCLUDES += -Iinclude/common/ + +SPD_SOURCES := services/spd/pncd/pncd_common.c \ + services/spd/pncd/pncd_helpers.S \ + services/spd/pncd/pncd_main.c + +NEED_BL32 := yes + +# The following constants need to be defined: +# - SPD_PNCD_NS_IRQ: IRQ number used to notify NS world when SMC_ACTION_FROM_S is received +# - SPD_PNCD_S_IRQ: IRQ number used to notify S world when SMC_ACTION_FROM_NS is received +$(eval $(call assert_numerics, SPD_PNCD_NS_IRQ SPD_PNCD_S_IRQ)) + +$(eval $(call add_defines,\ + $(sort \ + SPD_PNCD_NS_IRQ \ + SPD_PNCD_S_IRQ \ +))) diff --git a/services/spd/pncd/pncd_common.c b/services/spd/pncd/pncd_common.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6fdb629 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/pncd/pncd_common.c @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2021-2022, ProvenRun S.A.S. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <lib/utils.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> + +#include "pncd_private.h" + +/******************************************************************************* + * Given a secure payload entrypoint info pointer, entry point PC & pointer to a + * context data structure, this function will initialize pnc context and entry + * point info for the secure payload + ******************************************************************************/ +void pncd_init_pnc_ep_state(struct entry_point_info *pnc_entry_point, + uint64_t pc, + pnc_context_t *pnc_ctx) +{ + uint32_t ep_attr; + + /* Passing a NULL context is a critical programming error */ + assert(pnc_ctx); + assert(pnc_entry_point); + assert(pc); + + /* Associate this context with the current cpu */ + pnc_ctx->mpidr = read_mpidr(); + + cm_set_context(&pnc_ctx->cpu_ctx, SECURE); + + /* initialise an entrypoint to set up the CPU context */ + ep_attr = SECURE | EP_ST_ENABLE; + if (read_sctlr_el3() & SCTLR_EE_BIT) { + ep_attr |= EP_EE_BIG; + } + SET_PARAM_HEAD(pnc_entry_point, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, ep_attr); + + pnc_entry_point->pc = pc; + pnc_entry_point->spsr = SPSR_64(MODE_EL1, + MODE_SP_ELX, + DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS); + memset(&pnc_entry_point->args, 0, sizeof(pnc_entry_point->args)); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function takes an SP context pointer and: + * 1. Applies the S-EL1 system register context from pnc_ctx->cpu_ctx. + * 2. Saves the current C runtime state (callee saved registers) on the stack + * frame and saves a reference to this state. + * 3. Calls el3_exit() so that the EL3 system and general purpose registers + * from the pnc_ctx->cpu_ctx are used to enter the secure payload image. + ******************************************************************************/ +uint64_t pncd_synchronous_sp_entry(pnc_context_t *pnc_ctx) +{ + assert(pnc_ctx != NULL); + assert(pnc_ctx->c_rt_ctx == 0U); + + /* Apply the Secure EL1 system register context and switch to it */ + assert(cm_get_context(SECURE) == &pnc_ctx->cpu_ctx); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); +#if CTX_INCLUDE_FPREGS + fpregs_context_restore(get_fpregs_ctx(cm_get_context(SECURE))); +#endif + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); + + return pncd_enter_sp(&pnc_ctx->c_rt_ctx); +} + + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function takes an SP context pointer and: + * 1. Saves the S-EL1 system register context tp pnc_ctx->cpu_ctx. + * 2. Restores the current C runtime state (callee saved registers) from the + * stack frame using the reference to this state saved in pncd_enter_sp(). + * 3. It does not need to save any general purpose or EL3 system register state + * as the generic smc entry routine should have saved those. + ******************************************************************************/ +void pncd_synchronous_sp_exit(pnc_context_t *pnc_ctx, uint64_t ret) +{ + assert(pnc_ctx != NULL); + /* Save the Secure EL1 system register context */ + assert(cm_get_context(SECURE) == &pnc_ctx->cpu_ctx); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); +#if CTX_INCLUDE_FPREGS + fpregs_context_save(get_fpregs_ctx(cm_get_context(SECURE))); +#endif + + assert(pnc_ctx->c_rt_ctx != 0); + pncd_exit_sp(pnc_ctx->c_rt_ctx, ret); + + /* Should never reach here */ + panic(); +} diff --git a/services/spd/pncd/pncd_helpers.S b/services/spd/pncd/pncd_helpers.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000..736b30f --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/pncd/pncd_helpers.S @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2021-2022, ProvenRun S.A.S. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <asm_macros.S> +#include "pncd_private.h" + + .global pncd_enter_sp + /* --------------------------------------------- + * This function is called with SP_EL0 as stack. + * Here we stash our EL3 callee-saved registers + * on to the stack as a part of saving the C + * runtime and enter the secure payload. + * 'x0' contains a pointer to the memory where + * the address of the C runtime context is to be + * saved. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ +func pncd_enter_sp + /* Make space for the registers that we're going to save */ + mov x3, sp + str x3, [x0, #0] + sub sp, sp, #PNCD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE + + /* Save callee-saved registers on to the stack */ + stp x19, x20, [sp, #PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X19] + stp x21, x22, [sp, #PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X21] + stp x23, x24, [sp, #PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X23] + stp x25, x26, [sp, #PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X25] + stp x27, x28, [sp, #PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X27] + stp x29, x30, [sp, #PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X29] + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * Everything is setup now. el3_exit() will + * use the secure context to restore to the + * general purpose and EL3 system registers to + * ERET into the secure payload. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + b el3_exit +endfunc pncd_enter_sp + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * This function is called 'x0' pointing to a C + * runtime context saved in pncd_enter_sp(). It + * restores the saved registers and jumps to + * that runtime with 'x0' as the new sp. This + * destroys the C runtime context that had been + * built on the stack below the saved context by + * the caller. Later the second parameter 'x1' + * is passed as return value to the caller + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + .global pncd_exit_sp +func pncd_exit_sp + /* Restore the previous stack */ + mov sp, x0 + + /* Restore callee-saved registers on to the stack */ + ldp x19, x20, [x0, #(PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X19 - PNCD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x21, x22, [x0, #(PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X21 - PNCD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x23, x24, [x0, #(PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X23 - PNCD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x25, x26, [x0, #(PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X25 - PNCD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x27, x28, [x0, #(PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X27 - PNCD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x29, x30, [x0, #(PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X29 - PNCD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * This should take us back to the instruction + * after the call to the last pncd_enter_sp(). + * Place the second parameter to x0 so that the + * caller will see it as a return value from the + * original entry call + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + mov x0, x1 + ret +endfunc pncd_exit_sp diff --git a/services/spd/pncd/pncd_main.c b/services/spd/pncd/pncd_main.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..99c4aa1 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/pncd/pncd_main.c @@ -0,0 +1,471 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2021-2022, ProvenRun S.A.S. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +/******************************************************************************* + * This is the Secure Payload Dispatcher (SPD). The dispatcher is meant to be a + * plug-in component to the Secure Monitor, registered as a runtime service. The + * SPD is expected to be a functional extension of the Secure Payload (SP) that + * executes in Secure EL1. The Secure Monitor will delegate all SMCs targeting + * the Trusted OS/Applications range to the dispatcher. The SPD will either + * handle the request locally or delegate it to the Secure Payload. It is also + * responsible for initialising and maintaining communication with the SP. + ******************************************************************************/ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <stddef.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <bl31/bl31.h> +#include <bl31/interrupt_mgmt.h> +#include <bl_common.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <common/ep_info.h> +#include <drivers/arm/gic_common.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <lib/spinlock.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> +#include <pnc.h> +#include "pncd_private.h" +#include <runtime_svc.h> +#include <tools_share/uuid.h> + +/******************************************************************************* + * Structure to keep track of ProvenCore state + ******************************************************************************/ +static pnc_context_t pncd_sp_context; + +static bool ree_info; +static uint64_t ree_base_addr; +static uint64_t ree_length; +static uint64_t ree_tag; + +static bool pnc_initialized; + +static spinlock_t smc_handler_lock; + +static int pncd_init(void); + +static void context_save(unsigned long security_state) +{ + assert(sec_state_is_valid(security_state)); + + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save((uint32_t) security_state); +#if CTX_INCLUDE_FPREGS + fpregs_context_save(get_fpregs_ctx(cm_get_context(security_state))); +#endif +} + +static void *context_restore(unsigned long security_state) +{ + void *handle; + + assert(sec_state_is_valid(security_state)); + + /* Get a reference to the next context */ + handle = cm_get_context((uint32_t) security_state); + assert(handle); + + /* Restore state */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore((uint32_t) security_state); +#if CTX_INCLUDE_FPREGS + fpregs_context_restore(get_fpregs_ctx(cm_get_context(security_state))); +#endif + + cm_set_next_eret_context((uint32_t) security_state); + + return handle; +} + +static uint64_t pncd_sel1_interrupt_handler(uint32_t id, + uint32_t flags, void *handle, void *cookie); + +/******************************************************************************* + * Switch context to the specified security state and return the targeted + * handle. Note that the context may remain unchanged if the switch is not + * allowed. + ******************************************************************************/ +void *pncd_context_switch_to(unsigned long security_state) +{ + unsigned long sec_state_from = + security_state == SECURE ? NON_SECURE : SECURE; + + assert(sec_state_is_valid(security_state)); + + /* Check if this is the first world switch */ + if (!pnc_initialized) { + int rc; + uint32_t flags; + + assert(sec_state_from == SECURE); + + INFO("PnC initialization done\n"); + + /* + * Register an interrupt handler for S-EL1 interrupts + * when generated during code executing in the + * non-secure state. + */ + flags = 0U; + set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, NON_SECURE); + rc = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_S_EL1, + pncd_sel1_interrupt_handler, + flags); + if (rc != 0) { + ERROR("Failed to register S-EL1 interrupt handler (%d)\n", + rc); + panic(); + } + + context_save(SECURE); + + pnc_initialized = true; + + /* + * Release the lock before restoring the EL3 context to + * bl31_main. + */ + spin_unlock(&smc_handler_lock); + + /* + * SP reports completion. The SPD must have initiated + * the original request through a synchronous entry + * into the SP. Jump back to the original C runtime + * context. + */ + pncd_synchronous_sp_exit(&pncd_sp_context, (uint64_t) 0x0); + + /* Unreachable */ + ERROR("Returned from pncd_synchronous_sp_exit... Should not happen\n"); + panic(); + } + + /* Check that the world switch is allowed */ + if (read_mpidr() != pncd_sp_context.mpidr) { + if (sec_state_from == SECURE) { + /* + * Secure -> Non-Secure world switch initiated on a CPU where there + * should be no Trusted OS running + */ + WARN("Secure to Non-Secure switch requested on CPU where ProvenCore is not supposed to be running...\n"); + } + + /* + * Secure or Non-Secure world wants to switch world but there is no Secure + * software on this core + */ + return cm_get_context((uint32_t) sec_state_from); + } + + context_save(sec_state_from); + + return context_restore(security_state); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function is the handler registered for S-EL1 interrupts by the PNCD. It + * validates the interrupt and upon success arranges entry into the PNC at + * 'pnc_sel1_intr_entry()' for handling the interrupt. + ******************************************************************************/ +static uint64_t pncd_sel1_interrupt_handler(uint32_t id, + uint32_t flags, + void *handle, + void *cookie) +{ + /* Check the security state when the exception was generated */ + assert(get_interrupt_src_ss(flags) == NON_SECURE); + + /* Sanity check the pointer to this cpu's context */ + assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)); + + /* switch to PnC */ + handle = pncd_context_switch_to(SECURE); + + assert(handle != NULL); + + SMC_RET0(handle); +} + +#pragma weak plat_pncd_setup +int plat_pncd_setup(void) +{ + return 0; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Secure Payload Dispatcher setup. The SPD finds out the SP entrypoint and type + * (aarch32/aarch64) if not already known and initialises the context for entry + * into the SP for its initialisation. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int pncd_setup(void) +{ + entry_point_info_t *pnc_ep_info; + + /* + * Get information about the Secure Payload (BL32) image. Its + * absence is a critical failure. + * + * TODO: Add support to conditionally include the SPD service + */ + pnc_ep_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE); + if (!pnc_ep_info) { + WARN("No PNC provided by BL2 boot loader, Booting device without PNC initialization. SMC`s destined for PNC will return SMC_UNK\n"); + return 1; + } + + /* + * If there's no valid entry point for SP, we return a non-zero value + * signalling failure initializing the service. We bail out without + * registering any handlers + */ + if (!pnc_ep_info->pc) { + return 1; + } + + pncd_init_pnc_ep_state(pnc_ep_info, + pnc_ep_info->pc, + &pncd_sp_context); + + /* + * All PNCD initialization done. Now register our init function with + * BL31 for deferred invocation + */ + bl31_register_bl32_init(&pncd_init); + bl31_set_next_image_type(NON_SECURE); + + return plat_pncd_setup(); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function passes control to the Secure Payload image (BL32) for the first + * time on the primary cpu after a cold boot. It assumes that a valid secure + * context has already been created by pncd_setup() which can be directly used. + * It also assumes that a valid non-secure context has been initialised by PSCI + * so it does not need to save and restore any non-secure state. This function + * performs a synchronous entry into the Secure payload. The SP passes control + * back to this routine through a SMC. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t pncd_init(void) +{ + entry_point_info_t *pnc_entry_point; + uint64_t rc = 0; + + /* + * Get information about the Secure Payload (BL32) image. Its + * absence is a critical failure. + */ + pnc_entry_point = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE); + assert(pnc_entry_point); + + cm_init_my_context(pnc_entry_point); + + /* + * Arrange for an entry into the test secure payload. It will be + * returned via PNC_ENTRY_DONE case + */ + rc = pncd_synchronous_sp_entry(&pncd_sp_context); + + /* + * If everything went well at this point, the return value should be 0. + */ + return rc == 0; +} + +#pragma weak plat_pncd_smc_handler +/******************************************************************************* + * This function is responsible for handling the platform-specific SMCs in the + * Trusted OS/App range as defined in the SMC Calling Convention Document. + ******************************************************************************/ +uintptr_t plat_pncd_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + u_register_t x1, + u_register_t x2, + u_register_t x3, + u_register_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + u_register_t flags) +{ + (void) smc_fid; + (void) x1; + (void) x2; + (void) x3; + (void) x4; + (void) cookie; + (void) flags; + + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function is responsible for handling all SMCs in the Trusted OS/App + * range as defined in the SMC Calling Convention Document. It is also + * responsible for communicating with the Secure payload to delegate work and + * return results back to the non-secure state. Lastly it will also return any + * information that the secure payload needs to do the work assigned to it. + * + * It should only be called with the smc_handler_lock held. + ******************************************************************************/ +static uintptr_t pncd_smc_handler_unsafe(uint32_t smc_fid, + u_register_t x1, + u_register_t x2, + u_register_t x3, + u_register_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + u_register_t flags) +{ + uint32_t ns; + + /* Determine which security state this SMC originated from */ + ns = is_caller_non_secure(flags); + + assert(ns != 0 || read_mpidr() == pncd_sp_context.mpidr); + + switch (smc_fid) { + case SMC_CONFIG_SHAREDMEM: + if (ree_info) { + /* Do not Yield */ + SMC_RET0(handle); + } + + /* + * Fetch the physical base address (x1) and size (x2) of the + * shared memory allocated by the Non-Secure world. This memory + * will be used by PNC to communicate with the Non-Secure world. + * Verifying the validity of these values is up to the Trusted + * OS. + */ + ree_base_addr = x1 | (x2 << 32); + ree_length = x3; + ree_tag = x4; + + INFO("IN SMC_CONFIG_SHAREDMEM: addr=%lx, length=%lx, tag=%lx\n", + (unsigned long) ree_base_addr, + (unsigned long) ree_length, + (unsigned long) ree_tag); + + if ((ree_base_addr % 0x200000) != 0) { + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + } + + if ((ree_length % 0x200000) != 0) { + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + } + + ree_info = true; + + /* Do not Yield */ + SMC_RET4(handle, 0, 0, 0, 0); + + break; + + case SMC_GET_SHAREDMEM: + if (ree_info) { + x1 = (1U << 16) | ree_tag; + x2 = ree_base_addr & 0xFFFFFFFF; + x3 = (ree_base_addr >> 32) & 0xFFFFFFFF; + x4 = ree_length & 0xFFFFFFFF; + SMC_RET4(handle, x1, x2, x3, x4); + } else { + SMC_RET4(handle, 0, 0, 0, 0); + } + + break; + + case SMC_ACTION_FROM_NS: + if (ns == 0) { + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + } + + if (SPD_PNCD_S_IRQ < MIN_PPI_ID) { + plat_ic_raise_s_el1_sgi(SPD_PNCD_S_IRQ, + pncd_sp_context.mpidr); + } else { + plat_ic_set_interrupt_pending(SPD_PNCD_S_IRQ); + } + + SMC_RET0(handle); + + break; + + case SMC_ACTION_FROM_S: + if (ns != 0) { + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + } + + if (SPD_PNCD_NS_IRQ < MIN_PPI_ID) { + /* + * NS SGI is sent to the same core as the one running + * PNC + */ + plat_ic_raise_ns_sgi(SPD_PNCD_NS_IRQ, read_mpidr()); + } else { + plat_ic_set_interrupt_pending(SPD_PNCD_NS_IRQ); + } + + SMC_RET0(handle); + + break; + + case SMC_YIELD: + assert(handle == cm_get_context(ns != 0 ? NON_SECURE : SECURE)); + handle = pncd_context_switch_to(ns != 0 ? SECURE : NON_SECURE); + + assert(handle != NULL); + + SMC_RET0(handle); + + break; + + default: + INFO("Unknown smc: %x\n", smc_fid); + break; + } + + return plat_pncd_smc_handler(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, + cookie, handle, flags); +} + +static uintptr_t pncd_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + u_register_t x1, + u_register_t x2, + u_register_t x3, + u_register_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + u_register_t flags) +{ + uintptr_t ret; + + /* SMC handling is serialized */ + spin_lock(&smc_handler_lock); + ret = pncd_smc_handler_unsafe(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie, handle, + flags); + spin_unlock(&smc_handler_lock); + + return ret; +} + +/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for fast SMC calls */ +DECLARE_RT_SVC( + pncd_fast, + OEN_TOS_START, + OEN_TOS_END, + SMC_TYPE_FAST, + pncd_setup, + pncd_smc_handler +); + +/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for standard SMC calls */ +DECLARE_RT_SVC( + pncd_std, + OEN_TOS_START, + OEN_TOS_END, + SMC_TYPE_YIELD, + NULL, + pncd_smc_handler +); diff --git a/services/spd/pncd/pncd_private.h b/services/spd/pncd/pncd_private.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8c9b634 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/pncd/pncd_private.h @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2021-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * Portions copyright (c) 2021-2022, ProvenRun S.A.S. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef __PNCD_PRIVATE_H__ +#define __PNCD_PRIVATE_H__ + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__ +#include <stdint.h> +#endif /* __ASSEMBLER __ */ + +#include <context.h> +#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__ +#include <lib/cassert.h> +#endif /* __ASSEMBLER __ */ + +#include <platform_def.h> + +/******************************************************************************* + * Constants that allow assembler code to preserve callee-saved registers of the + * C runtime context while performing a security state switch. + ******************************************************************************/ +#define PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X19 U(0x0) +#define PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X20 U(0x8) +#define PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X21 U(0x10) +#define PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X22 U(0x18) +#define PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X23 U(0x20) +#define PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X24 U(0x28) +#define PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X25 U(0x30) +#define PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X26 U(0x38) +#define PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X27 U(0x40) +#define PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X28 U(0x48) +#define PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X29 U(0x50) +#define PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X30 U(0x58) +#define PNCD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE U(0x60) +#define PNCD_C_RT_CTX_ENTRIES (PNCD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE >> DWORD_SHIFT) + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__ + +/* AArch64 callee saved general purpose register context structure. */ +DEFINE_REG_STRUCT(c_rt_regs, PNCD_C_RT_CTX_ENTRIES); + +/* + * Compile time assertion to ensure that both the compiler and linker + * have the same double word aligned view of the size of the C runtime + * register context. + */ +CASSERT(sizeof(c_rt_regs_t) == PNCD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE, + assert_spd_c_rt_regs_size_mismatch); + +/******************************************************************************* + * Structure which helps the SPD to maintain the per-cpu state of the SP. + * 'mpidr' - mpidr of the CPU running PNC + * 'c_rt_ctx' - stack address to restore C runtime context from after + * returning from a synchronous entry into the SP. + * 'cpu_ctx' - space to maintain SP architectural state + ******************************************************************************/ +typedef struct pnc_context { + uint64_t mpidr; + uint64_t c_rt_ctx; + cpu_context_t cpu_ctx; +} pnc_context_t; + +/******************************************************************************* + * Function & Data prototypes + ******************************************************************************/ +uint64_t pncd_enter_sp(uint64_t *c_rt_ctx); +void __dead2 pncd_exit_sp(uint64_t c_rt_ctx, uint64_t ret); +uint64_t pncd_synchronous_sp_entry(pnc_context_t *pnc_ctx); +void __dead2 pncd_synchronous_sp_exit(pnc_context_t *pnc_ctx, uint64_t ret); +void pncd_init_pnc_ep_state(struct entry_point_info *pnc_ep, + uint64_t pc, + pnc_context_t *pnc_ctx); +#endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */ + +#endif /* __PNCD_PRIVATE_H__ */ diff --git a/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd.mk b/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd.mk new file mode 100644 index 0000000..56de0a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd.mk @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +# +# Copyright (c) 2015, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. +# +# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause +# + +ifeq (${ERROR_DEPRECATED},0) +SPD_INCLUDES := -Iinclude/bl32/payloads +endif + +SPD_SOURCES := services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_common.c \ + services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_helpers.S \ + services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_main.c \ + services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_pm.c diff --git a/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_common.c b/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_common.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..820bd8a --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_common.c @@ -0,0 +1,165 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2015-2018, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> + +#include "tlkd_private.h" + +#define AT_MASK 3 + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function helps the SP to translate NS/S virtual addresses. + ******************************************************************************/ +uint64_t tlkd_va_translate(uintptr_t va, int type) +{ + uint64_t pa; + + if (type & TLK_TRANSLATE_NS_VADDR) { + + /* save secure context */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); + + /* restore non-secure context */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); + + /* switch NS bit to start using 64-bit, non-secure mappings */ + write_scr(cm_get_scr_el3(NON_SECURE)); + isb(); + } + + int at = type & AT_MASK; + switch (at) { + case 0: + AT(ats12e1r, va); + break; + case 1: + AT(ats12e1w, va); + break; + case 2: + AT(ats12e0r, va); + break; + case 3: + AT(ats12e0w, va); + break; + default: + assert(0); /* Unreachable */ + break; + } + + /* get the (NS/S) physical address */ + isb(); + pa = read_par_el1(); + + /* Restore secure state */ + if (type & TLK_TRANSLATE_NS_VADDR) { + + /* restore secure context */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); + + /* switch NS bit to start using 32-bit, secure mappings */ + write_scr(cm_get_scr_el3(SECURE)); + isb(); + } + + return pa; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Given a secure payload entrypoint, register width, cpu id & pointer to a + * context data structure, this function will create a secure context ready for + * programming an entry into the secure payload. + ******************************************************************************/ +void tlkd_init_tlk_ep_state(struct entry_point_info *tlk_entry_point, + uint32_t rw, + uint64_t pc, + tlk_context_t *tlk_ctx) +{ + uint32_t ep_attr, spsr; + + /* Passing a NULL context is a critical programming error */ + assert(tlk_ctx); + assert(tlk_entry_point); + assert(pc); + + /* Associate this context with the cpu specified */ + tlk_ctx->mpidr = read_mpidr_el1(); + clr_yield_smc_active_flag(tlk_ctx->state); + cm_set_context(&tlk_ctx->cpu_ctx, SECURE); + + if (rw == SP_AARCH64) + spsr = SPSR_64(MODE_EL1, MODE_SP_ELX, DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS); + else + spsr = SPSR_MODE32(MODE32_svc, + SPSR_T_ARM, + read_sctlr_el3() & SCTLR_EE_BIT, + DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS); + + /* initialise an entrypoint to set up the CPU context */ + ep_attr = SECURE | EP_ST_ENABLE; + if (read_sctlr_el3() & SCTLR_EE_BIT) + ep_attr |= EP_EE_BIG; + SET_PARAM_HEAD(tlk_entry_point, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, ep_attr); + + tlk_entry_point->pc = pc; + tlk_entry_point->spsr = spsr; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function takes a TLK context pointer and: + * 1. Applies the S-EL1 system register context from tlk_ctx->cpu_ctx. + * 2. Saves the current C runtime state (callee saved registers) on the stack + * frame and saves a reference to this state. + * 3. Calls el3_exit() so that the EL3 system and general purpose registers + * from the tlk_ctx->cpu_ctx are used to enter the secure payload image. + ******************************************************************************/ +uint64_t tlkd_synchronous_sp_entry(tlk_context_t *tlk_ctx) +{ + uint64_t rc; + + /* Passing a NULL context is a critical programming error */ + assert(tlk_ctx); + + /* Apply the Secure EL1 system register context and switch to it */ + assert(cm_get_context(SECURE) == &tlk_ctx->cpu_ctx); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); + + rc = tlkd_enter_sp(&tlk_ctx->c_rt_ctx); +#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS + tlk_ctx->c_rt_ctx = 0; +#endif + + return rc; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function takes a TLK context pointer and: + * 1. Saves the S-EL1 system register context to tlk_ctx->cpu_ctx. + * 2. Restores the current C runtime state (callee saved registers) from the + * stack frame using reference to this state saved in tlkd_enter_sp(). + * 3. It does not need to save any general purpose or EL3 system register state + * as the generic smc entry routine should have saved those. + ******************************************************************************/ +void tlkd_synchronous_sp_exit(tlk_context_t *tlk_ctx, uint64_t ret) +{ + /* Passing a NULL context is a critical programming error */ + assert(tlk_ctx); + + /* Save the Secure EL1 system register context */ + assert(cm_get_context(SECURE) == &tlk_ctx->cpu_ctx); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); + + assert(tlk_ctx->c_rt_ctx != 0); + tlkd_exit_sp(tlk_ctx->c_rt_ctx, ret); + + /* Should never reach here */ + assert(0); +} diff --git a/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_helpers.S b/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_helpers.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6e616a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_helpers.S @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2015, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <asm_macros.S> +#include "tlkd_private.h" + + .global tlkd_enter_sp + .global tlkd_exit_sp + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * This function is called with SP_EL0 as stack. + * Here we stash our EL3 callee-saved registers + * on to the stack as a part of saving the C + * runtime and enter the secure payload. + * 'x0' contains a pointer to the memory where + * the address of the C runtime context is to be + * saved. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ +func tlkd_enter_sp + /* Make space for the registers that we're going to save */ + mov x3, sp + str x3, [x0, #0] + sub sp, sp, #TLKD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE + + /* Save callee-saved registers on to the stack */ + stp x19, x20, [sp, #TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X19] + stp x21, x22, [sp, #TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X21] + stp x23, x24, [sp, #TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X23] + stp x25, x26, [sp, #TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X25] + stp x27, x28, [sp, #TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X27] + stp x29, x30, [sp, #TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X29] + + /* ---------------------------------------------- + * Everything is setup now. el3_exit() will + * use the secure context to restore to the + * general purpose and EL3 system registers to + * ERET into the secure payload. + * ---------------------------------------------- + */ + b el3_exit +endfunc tlkd_enter_sp + + /* ---------------------------------------------- + * This function is called with 'x0' pointing to + * a C runtime context saved in tlkd_enter_sp(). + * It restores the saved registers and jumps to + * that runtime with 'x0' as the new sp. This + * destroys the C runtime context that had been + * built on the stack below the saved context by + * the caller. Later the second parameter 'x1' + * is passed as return value to the caller + * ---------------------------------------------- + */ +func tlkd_exit_sp + /* Restore the previous stack */ + mov sp, x0 + + /* Restore callee-saved registers on to the stack */ + ldp x19, x20, [x0, #(TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X19 - TLKD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x21, x22, [x0, #(TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X21 - TLKD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x23, x24, [x0, #(TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X23 - TLKD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x25, x26, [x0, #(TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X25 - TLKD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x27, x28, [x0, #(TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X27 - TLKD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x29, x30, [x0, #(TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X29 - TLKD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + + /* ------------------------------------------------ + * This should take us back to the instruction + * after the call to the last tlkd_enter_sp(). + * Place the second parameter to x0 so that the + * caller will see it as a return value from the + * original entry call + * ------------------------------------------------ + */ + mov x0, x1 + ret +endfunc tlkd_exit_sp diff --git a/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_main.c b/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_main.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ecac435 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_main.c @@ -0,0 +1,546 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2015-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2020, NVIDIA Corporation. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +/******************************************************************************* + * This is the Secure Payload Dispatcher (SPD). The dispatcher is meant to be a + * plug-in component to the Secure Monitor, registered as a runtime service. The + * SPD is expected to be a functional extension of the Secure Payload (SP) that + * executes in Secure EL1. The Secure Monitor will delegate all SMCs targeting + * the Trusted OS/Applications range to the dispatcher. The SPD will either + * handle the request locally or delegate it to the Secure Payload. It is also + * responsible for initialising and maintaining communication with the SP. + ******************************************************************************/ +#include <assert.h> +#include <bl31/interrupt_mgmt.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <stddef.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <bl31/bl31.h> +#include <bl32/payloads/tlk.h> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <common/runtime_svc.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> +#include <tools_share/uuid.h> + +#include "tlkd_private.h" + +extern const spd_pm_ops_t tlkd_pm_ops; + +/******************************************************************************* + * Per-cpu Secure Payload state + ******************************************************************************/ +tlk_context_t tlk_ctx; + +/******************************************************************************* + * CPU number on which TLK booted up + ******************************************************************************/ +static uint32_t boot_cpu; + +/* TLK UID: RFC-4122 compliant UUID (version-5, sha-1) */ +DEFINE_SVC_UUID2(tlk_uuid, + 0xc9e911bd, 0xba2b, 0xee52, 0xb1, 0x72, + 0x46, 0x1f, 0xba, 0x97, 0x7f, 0x63); + +static int32_t tlkd_init(void); + +/******************************************************************************* + * Secure Payload Dispatcher's timer interrupt handler + ******************************************************************************/ +static uint64_t tlkd_interrupt_handler(uint32_t id, + uint32_t flags, + void *handle, + void *cookie) +{ + cpu_context_t *s_cpu_context; + int irq = plat_ic_get_pending_interrupt_id(); + + /* acknowledge the interrupt and mark it complete */ + (void)plat_ic_acknowledge_interrupt(); + plat_ic_end_of_interrupt(irq); + + /* + * Disable the routing of NS interrupts from secure world to + * EL3 while interrupted on this core. + */ + disable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_S_EL1, SECURE); + + /* Check the security state when the exception was generated */ + assert(get_interrupt_src_ss(flags) == NON_SECURE); + assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)); + + /* Save non-secure state */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); + + /* Get a reference to the secure context */ + s_cpu_context = cm_get_context(SECURE); + assert(s_cpu_context); + + /* + * Restore non-secure state. There is no need to save the + * secure system register context since the SP was supposed + * to preserve it during S-EL1 interrupt handling. + */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); + + /* Provide the IRQ number to the SPD */ + SMC_RET4(s_cpu_context, (uint32_t)TLK_IRQ_FIRED, 0, (uint32_t)irq, 0); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Secure Payload Dispatcher setup. The SPD finds out the SP entrypoint and type + * (aarch32/aarch64) if not already known and initialises the context for entry + * into the SP for its initialisation. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t tlkd_setup(void) +{ + entry_point_info_t *tlk_ep_info; + uint32_t flags; + int32_t ret; + + /* + * Get information about the Secure Payload (BL32) image. Its + * absence is a critical failure. + */ + tlk_ep_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE); + if (!tlk_ep_info) { + WARN("No SP provided. Booting device without SP" + " initialization. SMC`s destined for SP" + " will return SMC_UNK\n"); + return 1; + } + + /* + * If there's no valid entry point for SP, we return a non-zero value + * signalling failure initializing the service. We bail out without + * registering any handlers + */ + if (!tlk_ep_info->pc) + return 1; + + /* + * Inspect the SP image's SPSR and determine it's execution state + * i.e whether AArch32 or AArch64. + */ + tlkd_init_tlk_ep_state(tlk_ep_info, + (tlk_ep_info->spsr >> MODE_RW_SHIFT) & MODE_RW_MASK, + tlk_ep_info->pc, + &tlk_ctx); + + /* get a list of all S-EL1 IRQs from the platform */ + + /* register interrupt handler */ + flags = 0; + set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, NON_SECURE); + ret = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_S_EL1, + tlkd_interrupt_handler, + flags); + if (ret != 0) { + ERROR("failed to register tlkd interrupt handler (%d)\n", ret); + } + + /* + * All TLK SPD initialization done. Now register our init function + * with BL31 for deferred invocation + */ + bl31_register_bl32_init(&tlkd_init); + + return 0; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function passes control to the Secure Payload image (BL32) for the first + * time on the primary cpu after a cold boot. It assumes that a valid secure + * context has already been created by tlkd_setup() which can be directly + * used. This function performs a synchronous entry into the Secure payload. + * The SP passes control back to this routine through a SMC. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t tlkd_init(void) +{ + entry_point_info_t *tlk_entry_point; + + /* + * Get information about the Secure Payload (BL32) image. Its + * absence is a critical failure. + */ + tlk_entry_point = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE); + assert(tlk_entry_point); + + cm_init_my_context(tlk_entry_point); + + /* + * TLK runs only on a single CPU. Store the value of the boot + * CPU for sanity checking later. + */ + boot_cpu = plat_my_core_pos(); + + /* + * Arrange for an entry into the test secure payload. + */ + return tlkd_synchronous_sp_entry(&tlk_ctx); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function is responsible for handling all SMCs in the Trusted OS/App + * range from the non-secure state as defined in the SMC Calling Convention + * Document. It is also responsible for communicating with the Secure payload + * to delegate work and return results back to the non-secure state. Lastly it + * will also return any information that the secure payload needs to do the + * work assigned to it. + ******************************************************************************/ +static uintptr_t tlkd_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + u_register_t x1, + u_register_t x2, + u_register_t x3, + u_register_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + u_register_t flags) +{ + cpu_context_t *ns_cpu_context; + gp_regs_t *gp_regs; + uint32_t ns; + uint64_t par; + + /* Passing a NULL context is a critical programming error */ + assert(handle); + + /* These SMCs are only supported by a single CPU */ + if (boot_cpu != plat_my_core_pos()) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + /* Determine which security state this SMC originated from */ + ns = is_caller_non_secure(flags); + + switch (smc_fid) { + + /* + * This function ID is used by SP to indicate that it was + * preempted by a non-secure world IRQ. + */ + case TLK_PREEMPTED: + + if (ns) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); + + /* Get a reference to the non-secure context */ + ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); + assert(ns_cpu_context); + + /* + * Restore non-secure state. There is no need to save the + * secure system register context since the SP was supposed + * to preserve it during S-EL1 interrupt handling. + */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + + SMC_RET1(ns_cpu_context, x1); + + /* + * This is a request from the non-secure context to: + * + * a. register shared memory with the SP for storing it's + * activity logs. + * b. register shared memory with the SP for passing args + * required for maintaining sessions with the Trusted + * Applications. + * c. register shared persistent buffers for secure storage + * d. register NS DRAM ranges passed by Cboot + * e. register Root of Trust parameters from Cboot for Verified Boot + * f. open/close sessions + * g. issue commands to the Trusted Apps + * h. resume the preempted yielding SMC call. + */ + case TLK_REGISTER_LOGBUF: + case TLK_REGISTER_REQBUF: + case TLK_SS_REGISTER_HANDLER: + case TLK_REGISTER_NS_DRAM_RANGES: + case TLK_SET_ROOT_OF_TRUST: + case TLK_OPEN_TA_SESSION: + case TLK_CLOSE_TA_SESSION: + case TLK_TA_LAUNCH_OP: + case TLK_TA_SEND_EVENT: + case TLK_RESUME_FID: + case TLK_SET_BL_VERSION: + case TLK_LOCK_BL_INTERFACE: + case TLK_BL_RPMB_SERVICE: + + if (!ns) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + /* + * This is a fresh request from the non-secure client. + * The parameters are in x1 and x2. Figure out which + * registers need to be preserved, save the non-secure + * state and send the request to the secure payload. + */ + assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)); + + /* + * Check if we are already processing a yielding SMC + * call. Of all the supported fids, only the "resume" + * fid expects the flag to be set. + */ + if (smc_fid == TLK_RESUME_FID) { + if (!get_yield_smc_active_flag(tlk_ctx.state)) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + } else { + if (get_yield_smc_active_flag(tlk_ctx.state)) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + } + + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); + + /* + * Verify if there is a valid context to use. + */ + assert(&tlk_ctx.cpu_ctx == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + + /* + * Mark the SP state as active. + */ + set_yield_smc_active_flag(tlk_ctx.state); + + /* + * We are done stashing the non-secure context. Ask the + * secure payload to do the work now. + */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); + + /* + * TLK is a 32-bit Trusted OS and so expects the SMC + * arguments via r0-r7. TLK expects the monitor frame + * registers to be 64-bits long. Hence, we pass x0 in + * r0-r1, x1 in r2-r3, x3 in r4-r5 and x4 in r6-r7. + * + * As smc_fid is a uint32 value, r1 contains 0. + */ + gp_regs = get_gpregs_ctx(&tlk_ctx.cpu_ctx); + write_ctx_reg(gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X4, (uint32_t)x2); + write_ctx_reg(gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X5, (uint32_t)(x2 >> 32)); + write_ctx_reg(gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X6, (uint32_t)x3); + write_ctx_reg(gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X7, (uint32_t)(x3 >> 32)); + SMC_RET4(&tlk_ctx.cpu_ctx, smc_fid, 0, (uint32_t)x1, + (uint32_t)(x1 >> 32)); + + /* + * Translate NS/EL1-S virtual addresses. + * + * x1 = virtual address + * x3 = type (NS/S) + * + * Returns PA:lo in r0, PA:hi in r1. + */ + case TLK_VA_TRANSLATE: + + /* Should be invoked only by secure world */ + if (ns) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + /* NS virtual addresses are 64-bit long */ + if (x3 & TLK_TRANSLATE_NS_VADDR) + x1 = (uint32_t)x1 | (x2 << 32); + + if (!x1) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + /* + * TODO: Sanity check x1. This would require platform + * support. + */ + + /* virtual address and type: ns/s */ + par = tlkd_va_translate(x1, x3); + + /* return physical address in r0-r1 */ + SMC_RET4(handle, (uint32_t)par, (uint32_t)(par >> 32), 0, 0); + + /* + * This is a request from the SP to mark completion of + * a yielding function ID. + */ + case TLK_REQUEST_DONE: + if (ns) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + /* + * Mark the SP state as inactive. + */ + clr_yield_smc_active_flag(tlk_ctx.state); + + /* Get a reference to the non-secure context */ + ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); + assert(ns_cpu_context); + + /* + * This is a request completion SMC and we must switch to + * the non-secure world to pass the result. + */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); + + /* + * We are done stashing the secure context. Switch to the + * non-secure context and return the result. + */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + SMC_RET1(ns_cpu_context, x1); + + /* + * This function ID is used only by the SP to indicate it has + * finished initialising itself after a cold boot + */ + case TLK_ENTRY_DONE: + if (ns) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + /* + * SP has been successfully initialized. Register power + * management hooks with PSCI + */ + psci_register_spd_pm_hook(&tlkd_pm_ops); + + /* + * TLK reports completion. The SPD must have initiated + * the original request through a synchronous entry + * into the SP. Jump back to the original C runtime + * context. + */ + tlkd_synchronous_sp_exit(&tlk_ctx, x1); + break; + + /* + * These function IDs are used only by TLK to indicate it has + * finished: + * 1. suspending itself after an earlier psci cpu_suspend + * request. + * 2. resuming itself after an earlier psci cpu_suspend + * request. + * 3. powering down after an earlier psci system_off/system_reset + * request. + */ + case TLK_SUSPEND_DONE: + case TLK_RESUME_DONE: + + if (ns) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + /* + * TLK reports completion. TLKD must have initiated the + * original request through a synchronous entry into the SP. + * Jump back to the original C runtime context, and pass x1 as + * return value to the caller + */ + tlkd_synchronous_sp_exit(&tlk_ctx, x1); + break; + + /* + * This function ID is used by SP to indicate that it has completed + * handling the secure interrupt. + */ + case TLK_IRQ_DONE: + + if (ns) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + + /* save secure world context */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); + + /* Get a reference to the non-secure context */ + ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); + assert(ns_cpu_context); + + /* + * Restore non-secure state. There is no need to save the + * secure system register context since the SP was supposed + * to preserve it during S-EL1 interrupt handling. + */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + + SMC_RET0(ns_cpu_context); + + /* + * Return the number of service function IDs implemented to + * provide service to non-secure + */ + case TOS_CALL_COUNT: + SMC_RET1(handle, TLK_NUM_FID); + + /* + * Return TLK's UID to the caller + */ + case TOS_UID: + SMC_UUID_RET(handle, tlk_uuid); + + /* + * Return the version of current implementation + */ + case TOS_CALL_VERSION: + SMC_RET2(handle, TLK_VERSION_MAJOR, TLK_VERSION_MINOR); + + default: + WARN("%s: Unhandled SMC: 0x%x\n", __func__, smc_fid); + break; + } + + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); +} + +/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for fast SMC calls */ +DECLARE_RT_SVC( + tlkd_tos_fast, + + OEN_TOS_START, + OEN_TOS_END, + SMC_TYPE_FAST, + tlkd_setup, + tlkd_smc_handler +); + +/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for yielding SMC calls */ +DECLARE_RT_SVC( + tlkd_tos_std, + + OEN_TOS_START, + OEN_TOS_END, + SMC_TYPE_YIELD, + NULL, + tlkd_smc_handler +); + +/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for fast SMC calls */ +DECLARE_RT_SVC( + tlkd_tap_fast, + + OEN_TAP_START, + OEN_TAP_END, + SMC_TYPE_FAST, + NULL, + tlkd_smc_handler +); + +/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for yielding SMC calls */ +DECLARE_RT_SVC( + tlkd_tap_std, + + OEN_TAP_START, + OEN_TAP_END, + SMC_TYPE_YIELD, + NULL, + tlkd_smc_handler +); diff --git a/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_pm.c b/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_pm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ed5bf77 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_pm.c @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2015, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2020, NVIDIA Corporation. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <bl32/payloads/tlk.h> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <lib/psci/psci.h> + +#include "tlkd_private.h" + +extern tlk_context_t tlk_ctx; + +#define MPIDR_CPU0 0x80000000 + +/******************************************************************************* + * Return the type of payload TLKD is dealing with. Report the current + * resident cpu (mpidr format) if it is a UP/UP migratable payload. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t cpu_migrate_info(u_register_t *resident_cpu) +{ + /* the payload runs only on CPU0 */ + *resident_cpu = MPIDR_CPU0; + + /* Uniprocessor, not migrate capable payload */ + return PSCI_TOS_NOT_UP_MIG_CAP; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This cpu is being suspended. Inform TLK of the SYSTEM_SUSPEND event, so + * that it can pass this information to its Trusted Apps. + ******************************************************************************/ +static void cpu_suspend_handler(u_register_t suspend_level) +{ + gp_regs_t *gp_regs; + int cpu = read_mpidr() & MPIDR_CPU_MASK; + int32_t rc = 0; + + /* + * TLK runs only on CPU0 and suspends its Trusted Apps during + * SYSTEM_SUSPEND. It has no role to play during CPU_SUSPEND. + */ + if ((cpu != 0) || (suspend_level != PLAT_MAX_PWR_LVL)) + return; + + /* pass system suspend event to TLK */ + gp_regs = get_gpregs_ctx(&tlk_ctx.cpu_ctx); + write_ctx_reg(gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X0, TLK_SYSTEM_SUSPEND); + + /* Program the entry point and enter TLK */ + rc = tlkd_synchronous_sp_entry(&tlk_ctx); + + /* + * Read the response from TLK. A non-zero return means that + * something went wrong while communicating with it. + */ + if (rc != 0) + panic(); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This cpu is being resumed. Inform TLK of the SYSTEM_SUSPEND exit, so + * that it can pass this information to its Trusted Apps. + ******************************************************************************/ +static void cpu_resume_handler(u_register_t suspend_level) +{ + gp_regs_t *gp_regs; + int cpu = read_mpidr() & MPIDR_CPU_MASK; + int32_t rc = 0; + + /* + * TLK runs only on CPU0 and resumes its Trusted Apps during + * SYSTEM_SUSPEND exit. It has no role to play during CPU_SUSPEND + * exit. + */ + if ((cpu != 0) || (suspend_level != PLAT_MAX_PWR_LVL)) + return; + + /* pass system resume event to TLK */ + gp_regs = get_gpregs_ctx(&tlk_ctx.cpu_ctx); + write_ctx_reg(gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X0, TLK_SYSTEM_RESUME); + + /* Program the entry point and enter TLK */ + rc = tlkd_synchronous_sp_entry(&tlk_ctx); + + /* + * Read the response from TLK. A non-zero return means that + * something went wrong while communicating with it. + */ + if (rc != 0) + panic(); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Structure populated by the Dispatcher to be given a chance to perform any + * bookkeeping before PSCI executes a power mgmt. operation. + ******************************************************************************/ +const spd_pm_ops_t tlkd_pm_ops = { + .svc_migrate_info = cpu_migrate_info, + .svc_suspend = cpu_suspend_handler, + .svc_suspend_finish = cpu_resume_handler, +}; diff --git a/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_private.h b/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_private.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5d5d0e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_private.h @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2015-2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef TLKD_PRIVATE_H +#define TLKD_PRIVATE_H + +#include <platform_def.h> + +#include <arch.h> +#include <bl31/interrupt_mgmt.h> +#include <context.h> +#include <lib/psci/psci.h> + +/* + * This flag is used by the TLKD to determine if the SP is servicing a yielding + * SMC request prior to programming the next entry into the SP e.g. if SP + * execution is preempted by a non-secure interrupt and handed control to the + * normal world. If another request which is distinct from what the SP was + * previously doing arrives, then this flag will be help the TLKD to either + * reject the new request or service it while ensuring that the previous context + * is not corrupted. + */ +#define YIELD_SMC_ACTIVE_FLAG_SHIFT 2 +#define YIELD_SMC_ACTIVE_FLAG_MASK 1 +#define get_yield_smc_active_flag(state) \ + (((state) >> YIELD_SMC_ACTIVE_FLAG_SHIFT) \ + & YIELD_SMC_ACTIVE_FLAG_MASK) +#define set_yield_smc_active_flag(state) ((state) |= \ + (1 << YIELD_SMC_ACTIVE_FLAG_SHIFT)) +#define clr_yield_smc_active_flag(state) ((state) &= \ + ~(YIELD_SMC_ACTIVE_FLAG_MASK \ + << YIELD_SMC_ACTIVE_FLAG_SHIFT)) + +/******************************************************************************* + * Translate virtual address received from the NS world + ******************************************************************************/ +#define TLK_TRANSLATE_NS_VADDR 4 + +/******************************************************************************* + * Secure Payload execution state information i.e. aarch32 or aarch64 + ******************************************************************************/ +#define SP_AARCH32 MODE_RW_32 +#define SP_AARCH64 MODE_RW_64 + +/******************************************************************************* + * Number of cpus that the present on this platform. TODO: Rely on a topology + * tree to determine this in the future to avoid assumptions about mpidr + * allocation + ******************************************************************************/ +#define TLKD_CORE_COUNT PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT + +/******************************************************************************* + * Constants that allow assembler code to preserve callee-saved registers of the + * C runtime context while performing a security state switch. + ******************************************************************************/ +#define TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X19 0x0 +#define TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X20 0x8 +#define TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X21 0x10 +#define TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X22 0x18 +#define TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X23 0x20 +#define TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X24 0x28 +#define TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X25 0x30 +#define TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X26 0x38 +#define TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X27 0x40 +#define TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X28 0x48 +#define TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X29 0x50 +#define TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X30 0x58 +#define TLKD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE 0x60 +#define TLKD_C_RT_CTX_ENTRIES (TLKD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE >> DWORD_SHIFT) + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__ + +#include <stdint.h> + +#include <lib/cassert.h> + +/* AArch64 callee saved general purpose register context structure. */ +DEFINE_REG_STRUCT(c_rt_regs, TLKD_C_RT_CTX_ENTRIES); + +/* + * Compile time assertion to ensure that both the compiler and linker + * have the same double word aligned view of the size of the C runtime + * register context. + */ +CASSERT(TLKD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE == sizeof(c_rt_regs_t), \ + assert_tlkd_c_rt_regs_size_mismatch); + +/******************************************************************************* + * Structure which helps the SPD to maintain the per-cpu state of the SP. + * 'state' - collection of flags to track SP state e.g. on/off + * 'mpidr' - mpidr to associate a context with a cpu + * 'c_rt_ctx' - stack address to restore C runtime context from after + * returning from a synchronous entry into the SP. + * 'cpu_ctx' - space to maintain SP architectural state + * 'saved_tsp_args' - space to store arguments for TSP arithmetic operations + * which will queried using the TSP_GET_ARGS SMC by TSP. + ******************************************************************************/ +typedef struct tlk_context { + uint32_t state; + uint64_t mpidr; + uint64_t c_rt_ctx; + cpu_context_t cpu_ctx; +} tlk_context_t; + +/******************************************************************************* + * Function & Data prototypes + ******************************************************************************/ +uint64_t tlkd_va_translate(uintptr_t va, int type); +uint64_t tlkd_enter_sp(uint64_t *c_rt_ctx); +void __dead2 tlkd_exit_sp(uint64_t c_rt_ctx, uint64_t ret); +uint64_t tlkd_synchronous_sp_entry(tlk_context_t *tlk_ctx); +void __dead2 tlkd_synchronous_sp_exit(tlk_context_t *tlk_ctx, + uint64_t ret); +void tlkd_init_tlk_ep_state(struct entry_point_info *tlk_entry_point, + uint32_t rw, + uint64_t pc, + tlk_context_t *tlk_ctx); + +#endif /*__ASSEMBLER__*/ + +#endif /* TLKD_PRIVATE_H */ diff --git a/services/spd/trusty/generic-arm64-smcall.c b/services/spd/trusty/generic-arm64-smcall.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5c3a628 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/trusty/generic-arm64-smcall.c @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016-2019, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <stdio.h> + +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <common/runtime_svc.h> +#include <platform_def.h> + +#include "generic-arm64-smcall.h" + +#ifndef PLAT_ARM_GICD_BASE +#ifdef GICD_BASE +#define PLAT_ARM_GICD_BASE GICD_BASE +#define PLAT_ARM_GICC_BASE GICC_BASE +#ifdef GICR_BASE +#define PLAT_ARM_GICR_BASE GICR_BASE +#endif +#else +#error PLAT_ARM_GICD_BASE or GICD_BASE must be defined +#endif +#endif + +#ifndef PLAT_ARM_GICR_BASE +#define PLAT_ARM_GICR_BASE SMC_UNK +#endif + +int trusty_disable_serial_debug; + +struct dputc_state { + char linebuf[128]; + unsigned l; +}; + +static struct dputc_state dputc_state[2]; + +static void trusty_dputc(char ch, int secure) +{ + unsigned i; + struct dputc_state *s = &dputc_state[!secure]; + + if (trusty_disable_serial_debug) + return; + + s->linebuf[s->l++] = ch; + if (s->l == sizeof(s->linebuf) || ch == '\n') { + if (secure) + printf("secure os: "); + else + printf("non-secure os: "); + for (i = 0; i < s->l; i++) { + putchar(s->linebuf[i]); + } + if (ch != '\n') { + printf(" <...>\n"); + } + s->l = 0; + } +} + +static uint64_t trusty_get_reg_base(uint32_t reg) +{ + switch (reg) { + case SMC_GET_GIC_BASE_GICD: + return PLAT_ARM_GICD_BASE; + + case SMC_GET_GIC_BASE_GICC: + return PLAT_ARM_GICC_BASE; + + case SMC_GET_GIC_BASE_GICR: + return PLAT_ARM_GICR_BASE; + + default: + NOTICE("%s(0x%x) unknown reg\n", __func__, reg); + return SMC_UNK; + } +} + +static uintptr_t trusty_generic_platform_smc(uint32_t smc_fid, + u_register_t x1, + u_register_t x2, + u_register_t x3, + u_register_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + u_register_t flags) +{ + switch (smc_fid) { + case SMC_FC_DEBUG_PUTC: + trusty_dputc(x1, is_caller_secure(flags)); + SMC_RET1(handle, 0); + + case SMC_FC_GET_REG_BASE: + case SMC_FC64_GET_REG_BASE: + SMC_RET1(handle, trusty_get_reg_base(x1)); + + default: + NOTICE("%s(0x%x, 0x%lx) unknown smc\n", __func__, smc_fid, x1); + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + } +} + +/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for fast SMC calls */ +DECLARE_RT_SVC( + trusty_fast, + + SMC_ENTITY_PLATFORM_MONITOR, + SMC_ENTITY_PLATFORM_MONITOR, + SMC_TYPE_FAST, + NULL, + trusty_generic_platform_smc +); + diff --git a/services/spd/trusty/generic-arm64-smcall.h b/services/spd/trusty/generic-arm64-smcall.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ac03469 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/trusty/generic-arm64-smcall.h @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include "smcall.h" + +#define SMC_ENTITY_PLATFORM_MONITOR 61 + +/* + * SMC calls implemented by EL3 monitor + */ + +/* + * Write character in r1 to debug console + */ +#define SMC_FC_DEBUG_PUTC SMC_FASTCALL_NR(SMC_ENTITY_PLATFORM_MONITOR, 0x0) + +/* + * Get register base address + * r1: SMC_GET_GIC_BASE_GICD or SMC_GET_GIC_BASE_GICC + */ +#define SMC_GET_GIC_BASE_GICD 0 +#define SMC_GET_GIC_BASE_GICC 1 +#define SMC_GET_GIC_BASE_GICR 2 +#define SMC_FC_GET_REG_BASE SMC_FASTCALL_NR(SMC_ENTITY_PLATFORM_MONITOR, 0x1) +#define SMC_FC64_GET_REG_BASE SMC_FASTCALL64_NR(SMC_ENTITY_PLATFORM_MONITOR, 0x1) diff --git a/services/spd/trusty/sm_err.h b/services/spd/trusty/sm_err.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..80a8748 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/trusty/sm_err.h @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef SM_ERR_H +#define SM_ERR_H + +/* Errors from the secure monitor */ +#define SM_ERR_UNDEFINED_SMC 0xFFFFFFFF /* Unknown SMC (defined by ARM DEN 0028A(0.9.0) */ +#define SM_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETERS -2 +#define SM_ERR_INTERRUPTED -3 /* Got interrupted. Call back with restart SMC */ +#define SM_ERR_UNEXPECTED_RESTART -4 /* Got an restart SMC when we didn't expect it */ +#define SM_ERR_BUSY -5 /* Temporarily busy. Call back with original args */ +#define SM_ERR_INTERLEAVED_SMC -6 /* Got a trusted_service SMC when a restart SMC is required */ +#define SM_ERR_INTERNAL_FAILURE -7 /* Unknown error */ +#define SM_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED -8 +#define SM_ERR_NOT_ALLOWED -9 /* SMC call not allowed */ +#define SM_ERR_END_OF_INPUT -10 + +#endif /* SM_ERR_H */ diff --git a/services/spd/trusty/smcall.h b/services/spd/trusty/smcall.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c66f7db --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/trusty/smcall.h @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016-2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2020, NVIDIA Corporation. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef SMCALL_H +#define SMCALL_H + +#define SMC_NUM_ENTITIES 64U +#define SMC_NUM_ARGS 4U +#define SMC_NUM_PARAMS (SMC_NUM_ARGS - 1U) + +#define SMC_IS_FASTCALL(smc_nr) ((smc_nr) & 0x80000000U) +#define SMC_IS_SMC64(smc_nr) ((smc_nr) & 0x40000000U) +#define SMC_ENTITY(smc_nr) (((smc_nr) & 0x3F000000U) >> 24U) +#define SMC_FUNCTION(smc_nr) ((smc_nr) & 0x0000FFFFU) + +#define SMC_NR(entity, fn, fastcall, smc64) \ + (((((uint32_t)(fastcall)) & 0x1U) << 31U) | \ + (((smc64) & 0x1U) << 30U) | \ + (((entity) & 0x3FU) << 24U) | \ + ((fn) & 0xFFFFU)) + +#define SMC_FASTCALL_NR(entity, fn) SMC_NR((entity), (fn), 1U, 0U) +#define SMC_FASTCALL64_NR(entity, fn) SMC_NR((entity), (fn), 1U, 1U) +#define SMC_YIELDCALL_NR(entity, fn) SMC_NR((entity), (fn), 0U, 0U) +#define SMC_YIELDCALL64_NR(entity, fn) SMC_NR((entity), (fn), 0U, 1U) + +#define SMC_ENTITY_ARCH 0U /* ARM Architecture calls */ +#define SMC_ENTITY_CPU 1U /* CPU Service calls */ +#define SMC_ENTITY_SIP 2U /* SIP Service calls */ +#define SMC_ENTITY_OEM 3U /* OEM Service calls */ +#define SMC_ENTITY_STD 4U /* Standard Service calls */ +#define SMC_ENTITY_RESERVED 5U /* Reserved for future use */ +#define SMC_ENTITY_TRUSTED_APP 48U /* Trusted Application calls */ +#define SMC_ENTITY_TRUSTED_OS 50U /* Trusted OS calls */ +#define SMC_ENTITY_LOGGING 51U /* Used for secure -> nonsecure logging */ +#define SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR 60U /* Trusted OS calls internal to secure monitor */ + +/* FC = Fast call, YC = Yielding call */ +#define SMC_YC_RESTART_LAST SMC_YIELDCALL_NR (SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR, 0U) +#define SMC_YC_NOP SMC_YIELDCALL_NR (SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR, 1U) + +/* + * Return from secure os to non-secure os with return value in r1 + */ +#define SMC_YC_NS_RETURN SMC_YIELDCALL_NR (SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR, 0U) + +#define SMC_FC_RESERVED SMC_FASTCALL_NR (SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR, 0U) +#define SMC_FC_FIQ_EXIT SMC_FASTCALL_NR (SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR, 1U) +#define SMC_FC_REQUEST_FIQ SMC_FASTCALL_NR (SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR, 2U) +#define SMC_FC_GET_NEXT_IRQ SMC_FASTCALL_NR (SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR, 3U) +#define SMC_FC_FIQ_ENTER SMC_FASTCALL_NR (SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR, 4U) + +#define SMC_FC64_SET_FIQ_HANDLER SMC_FASTCALL64_NR(SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR, 5U) +#define SMC_FC64_GET_FIQ_REGS SMC_FASTCALL64_NR (SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR, 6U) + +#define SMC_FC_CPU_SUSPEND SMC_FASTCALL_NR (SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR, 7U) +#define SMC_FC_CPU_RESUME SMC_FASTCALL_NR (SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR, 8U) + +#define SMC_FC_AARCH_SWITCH SMC_FASTCALL_NR (SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR, 9U) +#define SMC_FC_GET_VERSION_STR SMC_FASTCALL_NR (SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR, 10U) + +/* Trusted OS entity calls */ +#define SMC_YC_VIRTIO_GET_DESCR SMC_YIELDCALL_NR(SMC_ENTITY_TRUSTED_OS, 20U) +#define SMC_YC_VIRTIO_START SMC_YIELDCALL_NR(SMC_ENTITY_TRUSTED_OS, 21U) +#define SMC_YC_VIRTIO_STOP SMC_YIELDCALL_NR(SMC_ENTITY_TRUSTED_OS, 22U) + +#define SMC_YC_VDEV_RESET SMC_YIELDCALL_NR(SMC_ENTITY_TRUSTED_OS, 23U) +#define SMC_YC_VDEV_KICK_VQ SMC_YIELDCALL_NR(SMC_ENTITY_TRUSTED_OS, 24U) +#define SMC_YC_SET_ROT_PARAMS SMC_YIELDCALL_NR(SMC_ENTITY_TRUSTED_OS, 65535U) + +/* + * Standard Trusted OS Function IDs that fall under Trusted OS call range + * according to SMC calling convention + */ +#define SMC_FC64_GET_UUID SMC_FASTCALL64_NR(63U, 0xFF01U) /* Implementation UID */ +#define SMC_FC_GET_UUID SMC_FASTCALL_NR(63U, 0xFF01U) /* Implementation.UID */ + +#endif /* SMCALL_H */ diff --git a/services/spd/trusty/trusty.c b/services/spd/trusty/trusty.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7daebcd --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/trusty/trusty.c @@ -0,0 +1,541 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016-2019, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2020, NVIDIA Corporation. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <inttypes.h> +#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_v2.h> +#include <stdbool.h> +#include <stdint.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <bl31/bl31.h> +#include <bl31/interrupt_mgmt.h> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <common/runtime_svc.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <lib/smccc.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> +#include <tools_share/uuid.h> + +#include "sm_err.h" +#include "smcall.h" + +/* Trusty UID: RFC-4122 compliant UUID version 4 */ +DEFINE_SVC_UUID2(trusty_uuid, + 0x40ee25f0, 0xa2bc, 0x304c, 0x8c, 0x4c, + 0xa1, 0x73, 0xc5, 0x7d, 0x8a, 0xf1); + +/* macro to check if Hypervisor is enabled in the HCR_EL2 register */ +#define HYP_ENABLE_FLAG 0x286001U + +/* length of Trusty's input parameters (in bytes) */ +#define TRUSTY_PARAMS_LEN_BYTES (4096U * 2) + +struct trusty_stack { + uint8_t space[PLATFORM_STACK_SIZE] __aligned(16); + uint32_t end; +}; + +struct trusty_cpu_ctx { + cpu_context_t cpu_ctx; + void *saved_sp; + uint32_t saved_security_state; + int32_t fiq_handler_active; + uint64_t fiq_handler_pc; + uint64_t fiq_handler_cpsr; + uint64_t fiq_handler_sp; + uint64_t fiq_pc; + uint64_t fiq_cpsr; + uint64_t fiq_sp_el1; + gp_regs_t fiq_gpregs; + struct trusty_stack secure_stack; +}; + +struct smc_args { + uint64_t r0; + uint64_t r1; + uint64_t r2; + uint64_t r3; + uint64_t r4; + uint64_t r5; + uint64_t r6; + uint64_t r7; +}; + +static struct trusty_cpu_ctx trusty_cpu_ctx[PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT]; + +struct smc_args trusty_init_context_stack(void **sp, void *new_stack); +struct smc_args trusty_context_switch_helper(void **sp, void *smc_params); + +static uint32_t current_vmid; + +static struct trusty_cpu_ctx *get_trusty_ctx(void) +{ + return &trusty_cpu_ctx[plat_my_core_pos()]; +} + +static bool is_hypervisor_mode(void) +{ + uint64_t hcr = read_hcr(); + + return ((hcr & HYP_ENABLE_FLAG) != 0U) ? true : false; +} + +static struct smc_args trusty_context_switch(uint32_t security_state, uint64_t r0, + uint64_t r1, uint64_t r2, uint64_t r3) +{ + struct smc_args args, ret_args; + struct trusty_cpu_ctx *ctx = get_trusty_ctx(); + struct trusty_cpu_ctx *ctx_smc; + + assert(ctx->saved_security_state != security_state); + + args.r7 = 0; + if (is_hypervisor_mode()) { + /* According to the ARM DEN0028A spec, VMID is stored in x7 */ + ctx_smc = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); + assert(ctx_smc != NULL); + args.r7 = SMC_GET_GP(ctx_smc, CTX_GPREG_X7); + } + /* r4, r5, r6 reserved for future use. */ + args.r6 = 0; + args.r5 = 0; + args.r4 = 0; + args.r3 = r3; + args.r2 = r2; + args.r1 = r1; + args.r0 = r0; + + /* + * To avoid the additional overhead in PSCI flow, skip FP context + * saving/restoring in case of CPU suspend and resume, assuming that + * when it's needed the PSCI caller has preserved FP context before + * going here. + */ + if (r0 != SMC_FC_CPU_SUSPEND && r0 != SMC_FC_CPU_RESUME) + fpregs_context_save(get_fpregs_ctx(cm_get_context(security_state))); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(security_state); + + ctx->saved_security_state = security_state; + ret_args = trusty_context_switch_helper(&ctx->saved_sp, &args); + + assert(ctx->saved_security_state == ((security_state == 0U) ? 1U : 0U)); + + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(security_state); + if (r0 != SMC_FC_CPU_SUSPEND && r0 != SMC_FC_CPU_RESUME) + fpregs_context_restore(get_fpregs_ctx(cm_get_context(security_state))); + + cm_set_next_eret_context(security_state); + + return ret_args; +} + +static uint64_t trusty_fiq_handler(uint32_t id, + uint32_t flags, + void *handle, + void *cookie) +{ + struct smc_args ret; + struct trusty_cpu_ctx *ctx = get_trusty_ctx(); + + assert(!is_caller_secure(flags)); + + ret = trusty_context_switch(NON_SECURE, SMC_FC_FIQ_ENTER, 0, 0, 0); + if (ret.r0 != 0U) { + SMC_RET0(handle); + } + + if (ctx->fiq_handler_active != 0) { + INFO("%s: fiq handler already active\n", __func__); + SMC_RET0(handle); + } + + ctx->fiq_handler_active = 1; + (void)memcpy(&ctx->fiq_gpregs, get_gpregs_ctx(handle), sizeof(ctx->fiq_gpregs)); + ctx->fiq_pc = SMC_GET_EL3(handle, CTX_ELR_EL3); + ctx->fiq_cpsr = SMC_GET_EL3(handle, CTX_SPSR_EL3); + ctx->fiq_sp_el1 = read_ctx_reg(get_el1_sysregs_ctx(handle), CTX_SP_EL1); + + write_ctx_reg(get_el1_sysregs_ctx(handle), CTX_SP_EL1, ctx->fiq_handler_sp); + cm_set_elr_spsr_el3(NON_SECURE, ctx->fiq_handler_pc, (uint32_t)ctx->fiq_handler_cpsr); + + SMC_RET0(handle); +} + +static uint64_t trusty_set_fiq_handler(void *handle, uint64_t cpu, + uint64_t handler, uint64_t stack) +{ + struct trusty_cpu_ctx *ctx; + + if (cpu >= (uint64_t)PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT) { + ERROR("%s: cpu %" PRId64 " >= %d\n", __func__, cpu, PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT); + return (uint64_t)SM_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETERS; + } + + ctx = &trusty_cpu_ctx[cpu]; + ctx->fiq_handler_pc = handler; + ctx->fiq_handler_cpsr = SMC_GET_EL3(handle, CTX_SPSR_EL3); + ctx->fiq_handler_sp = stack; + + SMC_RET1(handle, 0); +} + +static uint64_t trusty_get_fiq_regs(void *handle) +{ + struct trusty_cpu_ctx *ctx = get_trusty_ctx(); + uint64_t sp_el0 = read_ctx_reg(&ctx->fiq_gpregs, CTX_GPREG_SP_EL0); + + SMC_RET4(handle, ctx->fiq_pc, ctx->fiq_cpsr, sp_el0, ctx->fiq_sp_el1); +} + +static uint64_t trusty_fiq_exit(void *handle, uint64_t x1, uint64_t x2, uint64_t x3) +{ + struct smc_args ret; + struct trusty_cpu_ctx *ctx = get_trusty_ctx(); + + if (ctx->fiq_handler_active == 0) { + NOTICE("%s: fiq handler not active\n", __func__); + SMC_RET1(handle, (uint64_t)SM_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETERS); + } + + ret = trusty_context_switch(NON_SECURE, SMC_FC_FIQ_EXIT, 0, 0, 0); + if (ret.r0 != 1U) { + INFO("%s(%p) SMC_FC_FIQ_EXIT returned unexpected value, %" PRId64 "\n", + __func__, handle, ret.r0); + } + + /* + * Restore register state to state recorded on fiq entry. + * + * x0, sp_el1, pc and cpsr need to be restored because el1 cannot + * restore them. + * + * x1-x4 and x8-x17 need to be restored here because smc_handler64 + * corrupts them (el1 code also restored them). + */ + (void)memcpy(get_gpregs_ctx(handle), &ctx->fiq_gpregs, sizeof(ctx->fiq_gpregs)); + ctx->fiq_handler_active = 0; + write_ctx_reg(get_el1_sysregs_ctx(handle), CTX_SP_EL1, ctx->fiq_sp_el1); + cm_set_elr_spsr_el3(NON_SECURE, ctx->fiq_pc, (uint32_t)ctx->fiq_cpsr); + + SMC_RET0(handle); +} + +static uintptr_t trusty_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + u_register_t x1, + u_register_t x2, + u_register_t x3, + u_register_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + u_register_t flags) +{ + struct smc_args ret; + uint32_t vmid = 0U; + entry_point_info_t *ep_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE); + + /* + * Return success for SET_ROT_PARAMS if Trusty is not present, as + * Verified Boot is not even supported and returning success here + * would not compromise the boot process. + */ + if ((ep_info == NULL) && (smc_fid == SMC_YC_SET_ROT_PARAMS)) { + SMC_RET1(handle, 0); + } else if (ep_info == NULL) { + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + } else { + ; /* do nothing */ + } + + if (is_caller_secure(flags)) { + if (smc_fid == SMC_YC_NS_RETURN) { + ret = trusty_context_switch(SECURE, x1, 0, 0, 0); + SMC_RET8(handle, ret.r0, ret.r1, ret.r2, ret.r3, + ret.r4, ret.r5, ret.r6, ret.r7); + } + INFO("%s (0x%x, 0x%lx, 0x%lx, 0x%lx, 0x%lx, %p, %p, 0x%lx) \ + cpu %d, unknown smc\n", + __func__, smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie, handle, flags, + plat_my_core_pos()); + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + } else { + switch (smc_fid) { + case SMC_FC64_GET_UUID: + case SMC_FC_GET_UUID: + /* provide the UUID for the service to the client */ + SMC_UUID_RET(handle, trusty_uuid); + break; + case SMC_FC64_SET_FIQ_HANDLER: + return trusty_set_fiq_handler(handle, x1, x2, x3); + case SMC_FC64_GET_FIQ_REGS: + return trusty_get_fiq_regs(handle); + case SMC_FC_FIQ_EXIT: + return trusty_fiq_exit(handle, x1, x2, x3); + default: + /* Not all OENs greater than SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR are supported */ + if (SMC_ENTITY(smc_fid) > SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR) { + VERBOSE("%s: unsupported SMC FID (0x%x)\n", __func__, smc_fid); + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + } + + if (is_hypervisor_mode()) + vmid = SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X7); + + if ((current_vmid != 0) && (current_vmid != vmid)) { + /* This message will cause SMC mechanism + * abnormal in multi-guest environment. + * Change it to WARN in case you need it. + */ + VERBOSE("Previous SMC not finished.\n"); + SMC_RET1(handle, SM_ERR_BUSY); + } + current_vmid = vmid; + ret = trusty_context_switch(NON_SECURE, smc_fid, x1, + x2, x3); + current_vmid = 0; + SMC_RET1(handle, ret.r0); + } + } +} + +static int32_t trusty_init(void) +{ + entry_point_info_t *ep_info; + struct smc_args zero_args = {0}; + struct trusty_cpu_ctx *ctx = get_trusty_ctx(); + uint32_t cpu = plat_my_core_pos(); + uint64_t reg_width = GET_RW(read_ctx_reg(get_el3state_ctx(&ctx->cpu_ctx), + CTX_SPSR_EL3)); + + /* + * Get information about the Trusty image. Its absence is a critical + * failure. + */ + ep_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE); + assert(ep_info != NULL); + + fpregs_context_save(get_fpregs_ctx(cm_get_context(NON_SECURE))); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); + + cm_set_context(&ctx->cpu_ctx, SECURE); + cm_init_my_context(ep_info); + + /* + * Adjust secondary cpu entry point for 32 bit images to the + * end of exception vectors + */ + if ((cpu != 0U) && (reg_width == MODE_RW_32)) { + INFO("trusty: cpu %d, adjust entry point to 0x%lx\n", + cpu, ep_info->pc + (1U << 5)); + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, ep_info->pc + (1U << 5)); + } + + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); + fpregs_context_restore(get_fpregs_ctx(cm_get_context(SECURE))); + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); + + ctx->saved_security_state = ~0U; /* initial saved state is invalid */ + (void)trusty_init_context_stack(&ctx->saved_sp, &ctx->secure_stack.end); + + (void)trusty_context_switch_helper(&ctx->saved_sp, &zero_args); + + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); + fpregs_context_restore(get_fpregs_ctx(cm_get_context(NON_SECURE))); + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + + return 1; +} + +static void trusty_cpu_suspend(uint32_t off) +{ + struct smc_args ret; + + ret = trusty_context_switch(NON_SECURE, SMC_FC_CPU_SUSPEND, off, 0, 0); + if (ret.r0 != 0U) { + INFO("%s: cpu %d, SMC_FC_CPU_SUSPEND returned unexpected value, %" PRId64 "\n", + __func__, plat_my_core_pos(), ret.r0); + } +} + +static void trusty_cpu_resume(uint32_t on) +{ + struct smc_args ret; + + ret = trusty_context_switch(NON_SECURE, SMC_FC_CPU_RESUME, on, 0, 0); + if (ret.r0 != 0U) { + INFO("%s: cpu %d, SMC_FC_CPU_RESUME returned unexpected value, %" PRId64 "\n", + __func__, plat_my_core_pos(), ret.r0); + } +} + +static int32_t trusty_cpu_off_handler(u_register_t max_off_lvl) +{ + trusty_cpu_suspend(max_off_lvl); + + return 0; +} + +static void trusty_cpu_on_finish_handler(u_register_t max_off_lvl) +{ + struct trusty_cpu_ctx *ctx = get_trusty_ctx(); + + if (ctx->saved_sp == NULL) { + (void)trusty_init(); + } else { + trusty_cpu_resume(max_off_lvl); + } +} + +static void trusty_cpu_suspend_handler(u_register_t max_off_lvl) +{ + trusty_cpu_suspend(max_off_lvl); +} + +static void trusty_cpu_suspend_finish_handler(u_register_t max_off_lvl) +{ + trusty_cpu_resume(max_off_lvl); +} + +static const spd_pm_ops_t trusty_pm = { + .svc_off = trusty_cpu_off_handler, + .svc_suspend = trusty_cpu_suspend_handler, + .svc_on_finish = trusty_cpu_on_finish_handler, + .svc_suspend_finish = trusty_cpu_suspend_finish_handler, +}; + +void plat_trusty_set_boot_args(aapcs64_params_t *args); + +#if !defined(TSP_SEC_MEM_SIZE) && defined(BL32_MEM_SIZE) +#define TSP_SEC_MEM_SIZE BL32_MEM_SIZE +#endif + +#ifdef TSP_SEC_MEM_SIZE +#pragma weak plat_trusty_set_boot_args +void plat_trusty_set_boot_args(aapcs64_params_t *args) +{ + args->arg0 = TSP_SEC_MEM_SIZE; +} +#endif + +static int32_t trusty_setup(void) +{ + entry_point_info_t *ep_info; + uint32_t instr; + uint32_t flags; + int32_t ret; + bool aarch32 = false; + + /* Get trusty's entry point info */ + ep_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE); + if (ep_info == NULL) { + VERBOSE("Trusty image missing.\n"); + return -1; + } + + /* memmap first page of trusty's code memory before peeking */ + ret = mmap_add_dynamic_region(ep_info->pc, /* PA */ + ep_info->pc, /* VA */ + PAGE_SIZE, /* size */ + MT_SECURE | MT_RW_DATA); /* attrs */ + assert(ret == 0); + + /* peek into trusty's code to see if we have a 32-bit or 64-bit image */ + instr = *(uint32_t *)ep_info->pc; + + if (instr >> 24 == 0xeaU) { + INFO("trusty: Found 32 bit image\n"); + aarch32 = true; + } else if (instr >> 8 == 0xd53810U || instr >> 16 == 0x9400U) { + INFO("trusty: Found 64 bit image\n"); + } else { + ERROR("trusty: Found unknown image, 0x%x\n", instr); + return -1; + } + + /* unmap trusty's memory page */ + (void)mmap_remove_dynamic_region(ep_info->pc, PAGE_SIZE); + + SET_PARAM_HEAD(ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, SECURE | EP_ST_ENABLE); + if (!aarch32) + ep_info->spsr = SPSR_64(MODE_EL1, MODE_SP_ELX, + DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS); + else + ep_info->spsr = SPSR_MODE32(MODE32_svc, SPSR_T_ARM, + SPSR_E_LITTLE, + DAIF_FIQ_BIT | + DAIF_IRQ_BIT | + DAIF_ABT_BIT); + (void)memset(&ep_info->args, 0, sizeof(ep_info->args)); + plat_trusty_set_boot_args(&ep_info->args); + + /* register init handler */ + bl31_register_bl32_init(trusty_init); + + /* register power management hooks */ + psci_register_spd_pm_hook(&trusty_pm); + + /* register interrupt handler */ + flags = 0; + set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, NON_SECURE); + ret = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_S_EL1, + trusty_fiq_handler, + flags); + if (ret != 0) { + VERBOSE("trusty: failed to register fiq handler, ret = %d\n", ret); + } + + if (aarch32) { + entry_point_info_t *ns_ep_info; + uint32_t spsr; + + ns_ep_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(NON_SECURE); + if (ns_ep_info == NULL) { + NOTICE("Trusty: non-secure image missing.\n"); + return -1; + } + spsr = ns_ep_info->spsr; + if (GET_RW(spsr) == MODE_RW_64 && GET_EL(spsr) == MODE_EL2) { + spsr &= ~(MODE_EL_MASK << MODE_EL_SHIFT); + spsr |= MODE_EL1 << MODE_EL_SHIFT; + } + if (GET_RW(spsr) == MODE_RW_32 && GET_M32(spsr) == MODE32_hyp) { + spsr &= ~(MODE32_MASK << MODE32_SHIFT); + spsr |= MODE32_svc << MODE32_SHIFT; + } + if (spsr != ns_ep_info->spsr) { + NOTICE("Trusty: Switch bl33 from EL2 to EL1 (spsr 0x%x -> 0x%x)\n", + ns_ep_info->spsr, spsr); + ns_ep_info->spsr = spsr; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for fast SMC calls */ +DECLARE_RT_SVC( + trusty_fast, + + OEN_TOS_START, + OEN_TOS_END, + SMC_TYPE_FAST, + trusty_setup, + trusty_smc_handler +); + +/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for yielding SMC calls */ +DECLARE_RT_SVC( + trusty_std, + + OEN_TAP_START, + SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR, + SMC_TYPE_YIELD, + NULL, + trusty_smc_handler +); diff --git a/services/spd/trusty/trusty.mk b/services/spd/trusty/trusty.mk new file mode 100644 index 0000000..43b80bb --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/trusty/trusty.mk @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +# +# Copyright (c) 2016-2019, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. +# +# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause +# + +SPD_INCLUDES := + +SPD_SOURCES := services/spd/trusty/trusty.c \ + services/spd/trusty/trusty_helpers.S + +ifeq (${TRUSTY_SPD_WITH_GENERIC_SERVICES},1) +SPD_SOURCES += services/spd/trusty/generic-arm64-smcall.c +endif + +NEED_BL32 := yes + +CTX_INCLUDE_FPREGS := 1 diff --git a/services/spd/trusty/trusty_helpers.S b/services/spd/trusty/trusty_helpers.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000..da5cb57 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/trusty/trusty_helpers.S @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <asm_macros.S> + +.macro push ra, rb, sp=sp + stp \ra, \rb, [\sp,#-16]! +.endm + +.macro pop ra, rb, sp=sp + ldp \ra, \rb, [\sp], #16 +.endm + + .global trusty_context_switch_helper +func trusty_context_switch_helper + push x8, xzr + push x19, x20 + push x21, x22 + push x23, x24 + push x25, x26 + push x27, x28 + push x29, x30 + + mov x9, sp + ldr x10, [x0] + mov sp, x10 + str x9, [x0] + + pop x29, x30 + pop x27, x28 + pop x25, x26 + pop x23, x24 + pop x21, x22 + pop x19, x20 + pop x8, xzr + + ldr x2, [x1] + ldr x3, [x1, #0x08] + ldr x4, [x1, #0x10] + ldr x5, [x1, #0x18] + ldr x6, [x1, #0x20] + ldr x7, [x1, #0x28] + ldr x10, [x1, #0x30] + ldr x11, [x1, #0x38] + + stp x2, x3, [x8] + stp x4, x5, [x8, #16] + stp x6, x7, [x8, #32] + stp x10, x11, [x8, #48] + + ret +endfunc trusty_context_switch_helper + + .global trusty_init_context_stack +func trusty_init_context_stack + push x8, xzr, x1 + push xzr, xzr, x1 + push xzr, xzr, x1 + push xzr, xzr, x1 + push xzr, xzr, x1 + push xzr, xzr, x1 + adr x9, el3_exit + push xzr, x9, x1 + str x1, [x0] + ret +endfunc trusty_init_context_stack diff --git a/services/spd/tspd/tspd.mk b/services/spd/tspd/tspd.mk new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bda8338 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/tspd/tspd.mk @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +# +# Copyright (c) 2013-2018, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. +# +# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause +# + +TSPD_DIR := services/spd/tspd + +ifeq (${ERROR_DEPRECATED},0) +SPD_INCLUDES := -Iinclude/bl32/tsp +endif + +SPD_SOURCES := services/spd/tspd/tspd_common.c \ + services/spd/tspd/tspd_helpers.S \ + services/spd/tspd/tspd_main.c \ + services/spd/tspd/tspd_pm.c + +# This dispatcher is paired with a Test Secure Payload source and we intend to +# build the Test Secure Payload along with this dispatcher. +# +# In cases where an associated Secure Payload lies outside this build +# system/source tree, the the dispatcher Makefile can either invoke an external +# build command or assume it pre-built + +BL32_ROOT := bl32/tsp + +# Include SP's Makefile. The assumption is that the TSP's build system is +# compatible with that of Trusted Firmware, and it'll add and populate necessary +# build targets and variables +include ${BL32_ROOT}/tsp.mk + +# Let the top-level Makefile know that we intend to build the SP from source +NEED_BL32 := yes + +# Flag used to enable routing of non-secure interrupts to EL3 when they are +# generated while the code is executing in S-EL1/0. +TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT := 0 + +ifeq ($(EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING),1) +ifeq ($(TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT),0) +$(error When EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING=1, TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT must also be 1) +endif +endif + +$(eval $(call assert_boolean,TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT)) +$(eval $(call add_define,TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT)) diff --git a/services/spd/tspd/tspd_common.c b/services/spd/tspd/tspd_common.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..063fd01 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/tspd/tspd_common.c @@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013-2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <bl32/tsp/tsp.h> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <lib/utils.h> + +#include "tspd_private.h" + +/******************************************************************************* + * Given a secure payload entrypoint info pointer, entry point PC, register + * width, cpu id & pointer to a context data structure, this function will + * initialize tsp context and entry point info for the secure payload + ******************************************************************************/ +void tspd_init_tsp_ep_state(struct entry_point_info *tsp_entry_point, + uint32_t rw, + uint64_t pc, + tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx) +{ + uint32_t ep_attr; + + /* Passing a NULL context is a critical programming error */ + assert(tsp_ctx); + assert(tsp_entry_point); + assert(pc); + + /* + * We support AArch64 TSP for now. + * TODO: Add support for AArch32 TSP + */ + assert(rw == TSP_AARCH64); + + /* Associate this context with the cpu specified */ + tsp_ctx->mpidr = read_mpidr_el1(); + tsp_ctx->state = 0; + set_tsp_pstate(tsp_ctx->state, TSP_PSTATE_OFF); + clr_yield_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state); + + cm_set_context(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx, SECURE); + + /* initialise an entrypoint to set up the CPU context */ + ep_attr = SECURE | EP_ST_ENABLE; + if (read_sctlr_el3() & SCTLR_EE_BIT) + ep_attr |= EP_EE_BIG; + SET_PARAM_HEAD(tsp_entry_point, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, ep_attr); + + tsp_entry_point->pc = pc; + tsp_entry_point->spsr = SPSR_64(MODE_EL1, + MODE_SP_ELX, + DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS); + zeromem(&tsp_entry_point->args, sizeof(tsp_entry_point->args)); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function takes an SP context pointer and: + * 1. Applies the S-EL1 system register context from tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx. + * 2. Saves the current C runtime state (callee saved registers) on the stack + * frame and saves a reference to this state. + * 3. Calls el3_exit() so that the EL3 system and general purpose registers + * from the tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx are used to enter the secure payload image. + ******************************************************************************/ +uint64_t tspd_synchronous_sp_entry(tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx) +{ + uint64_t rc; + + assert(tsp_ctx != NULL); + assert(tsp_ctx->c_rt_ctx == 0); + + /* Apply the Secure EL1 system register context and switch to it */ + assert(cm_get_context(SECURE) == &tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); + + rc = tspd_enter_sp(&tsp_ctx->c_rt_ctx); +#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS + tsp_ctx->c_rt_ctx = 0; +#endif + + return rc; +} + + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function takes an SP context pointer and: + * 1. Saves the S-EL1 system register context tp tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx. + * 2. Restores the current C runtime state (callee saved registers) from the + * stack frame using the reference to this state saved in tspd_enter_sp(). + * 3. It does not need to save any general purpose or EL3 system register state + * as the generic smc entry routine should have saved those. + ******************************************************************************/ +void tspd_synchronous_sp_exit(tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx, uint64_t ret) +{ + assert(tsp_ctx != NULL); + /* Save the Secure EL1 system register context */ + assert(cm_get_context(SECURE) == &tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); + + assert(tsp_ctx->c_rt_ctx != 0); + tspd_exit_sp(tsp_ctx->c_rt_ctx, ret); + + /* Should never reach here */ + assert(0); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function takes an SP context pointer and abort any preempted SMC + * request. + * Return 1 if there was a preempted SMC request, 0 otherwise. + ******************************************************************************/ +int tspd_abort_preempted_smc(tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx) +{ + if (!get_yield_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state)) + return 0; + + /* Abort any preempted SMC request */ + clr_yield_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state); + + /* + * Arrange for an entry into the test secure payload. It will + * be returned via TSP_ABORT_DONE case in tspd_smc_handler. + */ + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, + (uint64_t) &tsp_vectors->abort_yield_smc_entry); + uint64_t rc = tspd_synchronous_sp_entry(tsp_ctx); + + if (rc != 0) + panic(); + + return 1; +} + diff --git a/services/spd/tspd/tspd_helpers.S b/services/spd/tspd/tspd_helpers.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f15d66b --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/tspd/tspd_helpers.S @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013-2014, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <asm_macros.S> +#include "tspd_private.h" + + .global tspd_enter_sp + /* --------------------------------------------- + * This function is called with SP_EL0 as stack. + * Here we stash our EL3 callee-saved registers + * on to the stack as a part of saving the C + * runtime and enter the secure payload. + * 'x0' contains a pointer to the memory where + * the address of the C runtime context is to be + * saved. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ +func tspd_enter_sp + /* Make space for the registers that we're going to save */ + mov x3, sp + str x3, [x0, #0] + sub sp, sp, #TSPD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE + + /* Save callee-saved registers on to the stack */ + stp x19, x20, [sp, #TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X19] + stp x21, x22, [sp, #TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X21] + stp x23, x24, [sp, #TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X23] + stp x25, x26, [sp, #TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X25] + stp x27, x28, [sp, #TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X27] + stp x29, x30, [sp, #TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X29] + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * Everything is setup now. el3_exit() will + * use the secure context to restore to the + * general purpose and EL3 system registers to + * ERET into the secure payload. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + b el3_exit +endfunc tspd_enter_sp + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * This function is called 'x0' pointing to a C + * runtime context saved in tspd_enter_sp(). It + * restores the saved registers and jumps to + * that runtime with 'x0' as the new sp. This + * destroys the C runtime context that had been + * built on the stack below the saved context by + * the caller. Later the second parameter 'x1' + * is passed as return value to the caller + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + .global tspd_exit_sp +func tspd_exit_sp + /* Restore the previous stack */ + mov sp, x0 + + /* Restore callee-saved registers on to the stack */ + ldp x19, x20, [x0, #(TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X19 - TSPD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x21, x22, [x0, #(TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X21 - TSPD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x23, x24, [x0, #(TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X23 - TSPD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x25, x26, [x0, #(TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X25 - TSPD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x27, x28, [x0, #(TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X27 - TSPD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x29, x30, [x0, #(TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X29 - TSPD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * This should take us back to the instruction + * after the call to the last tspd_enter_sp(). + * Place the second parameter to x0 so that the + * caller will see it as a return value from the + * original entry call + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + mov x0, x1 + ret +endfunc tspd_exit_sp diff --git a/services/spd/tspd/tspd_main.c b/services/spd/tspd/tspd_main.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6cb4992 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/tspd/tspd_main.c @@ -0,0 +1,819 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + + +/******************************************************************************* + * This is the Secure Payload Dispatcher (SPD). The dispatcher is meant to be a + * plug-in component to the Secure Monitor, registered as a runtime service. The + * SPD is expected to be a functional extension of the Secure Payload (SP) that + * executes in Secure EL1. The Secure Monitor will delegate all SMCs targeting + * the Trusted OS/Applications range to the dispatcher. The SPD will either + * handle the request locally or delegate it to the Secure Payload. It is also + * responsible for initialising and maintaining communication with the SP. + ******************************************************************************/ +#include <assert.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <stddef.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <bl31/bl31.h> +#include <bl31/ehf.h> +#include <bl32/tsp/tsp.h> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <common/runtime_svc.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> +#include <tools_share/uuid.h> + +#include "tspd_private.h" + +/******************************************************************************* + * Address of the entrypoint vector table in the Secure Payload. It is + * initialised once on the primary core after a cold boot. + ******************************************************************************/ +tsp_vectors_t *tsp_vectors; + +/******************************************************************************* + * Array to keep track of per-cpu Secure Payload state + ******************************************************************************/ +tsp_context_t tspd_sp_context[TSPD_CORE_COUNT]; + + +/* TSP UID */ +DEFINE_SVC_UUID2(tsp_uuid, + 0xa056305b, 0x9132, 0x7b42, 0x98, 0x11, + 0x71, 0x68, 0xca, 0x50, 0xf3, 0xfa); + +int32_t tspd_init(void); + +/* + * This helper function handles Secure EL1 preemption. The preemption could be + * due Non Secure interrupts or EL3 interrupts. In both the cases we context + * switch to the normal world and in case of EL3 interrupts, it will again be + * routed to EL3 which will get handled at the exception vectors. + */ +uint64_t tspd_handle_sp_preemption(void *handle) +{ + cpu_context_t *ns_cpu_context; + + assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); + /* Get a reference to the non-secure context */ + ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); + assert(ns_cpu_context); + + /* + * To allow Secure EL1 interrupt handler to re-enter TSP while TSP + * is preempted, the secure system register context which will get + * overwritten must be additionally saved. This is currently done + * by the TSPD S-EL1 interrupt handler. + */ + + /* + * Restore non-secure state. + */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + + /* + * The TSP was preempted during execution of a Yielding SMC Call. + * Return back to the normal world with SMC_PREEMPTED as error + * code in x0. + */ + SMC_RET1(ns_cpu_context, SMC_PREEMPTED); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function is the handler registered for S-EL1 interrupts by the TSPD. It + * validates the interrupt and upon success arranges entry into the TSP at + * 'tsp_sel1_intr_entry()' for handling the interrupt. + * Typically, interrupts for a specific security state get handled in the same + * security execption level if the execution is in the same security state. For + * example, if a non-secure interrupt gets fired when CPU is executing in NS-EL2 + * it gets handled in the non-secure world. + * However, interrupts belonging to the opposite security state typically demand + * a world(context) switch. This is inline with the security principle which + * states a secure interrupt has to be handled in the secure world. + * Hence, the TSPD in EL3 expects the context(handle) for a secure interrupt to + * be non-secure and vice versa. + * However, a race condition between non-secure and secure interrupts can lead to + * a scenario where the above assumptions do not hold true. This is demonstrated + * below through Note 1. + ******************************************************************************/ +static uint64_t tspd_sel1_interrupt_handler(uint32_t id, + uint32_t flags, + void *handle, + void *cookie) +{ + uint32_t linear_id; + tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx; + + /* Get a reference to this cpu's TSP context */ + linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + tsp_ctx = &tspd_sp_context[linear_id]; + +#if TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT + + /* + * Note 1: + * Under the current interrupt routing model, interrupts from other + * world are routed to EL3 when TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT is enabled. + * Consider the following scenario: + * 1/ A non-secure payload(like tftf) requests a secure service from + * TSP by invoking a yielding SMC call. + * 2/ Later, execution jumps to TSP in S-EL1 with the help of TSP + * Dispatcher in Secure Monitor(EL3). + * 3/ While CPU is executing TSP, a Non-secure interrupt gets fired. + * this demands a context switch to the non-secure world through + * secure monitor. + * 4/ Consequently, TSP in S-EL1 get asynchronously pre-empted and + * execution switches to secure monitor(EL3). + * 5/ EL3 tries to triage the (Non-secure) interrupt based on the + * highest pending interrupt. + * 6/ However, while the NS Interrupt was pending, secure timer gets + * fired which makes a S-EL1 interrupt to be pending. + * 7/ Hence, execution jumps to this companion handler of S-EL1 + * interrupt (i.e., tspd_sel1_interrupt_handler) even though the TSP + * was pre-empted due to non-secure interrupt. + * 8/ The above sequence of events explain how TSP was pre-empted by + * S-EL1 interrupt indirectly in an asynchronous way. + * 9/ Hence, we track the TSP pre-emption by S-EL1 interrupt using a + * boolean variable per each core. + * 10/ This helps us to indicate that SMC call for TSP service was + * pre-empted when execution resumes in non-secure world. + */ + + /* Check the security state when the exception was generated */ + if (get_interrupt_src_ss(flags) == NON_SECURE) { + /* Sanity check the pointer to this cpu's context */ + assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)); + + /* Save the non-secure context before entering the TSP */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); + tsp_ctx->preempted_by_sel1_intr = false; + } else { + /* Sanity check the pointer to this cpu's context */ + assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + + /* Save the secure context before entering the TSP for S-EL1 + * interrupt handling + */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); + tsp_ctx->preempted_by_sel1_intr = true; + } +#else + /* Check the security state when the exception was generated */ + assert(get_interrupt_src_ss(flags) == NON_SECURE); + + /* Sanity check the pointer to this cpu's context */ + assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)); + + /* Save the non-secure context before entering the TSP */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); +#endif + + assert(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + + /* + * Determine if the TSP was previously preempted. Its last known + * context has to be preserved in this case. + * The TSP should return control to the TSPD after handling this + * S-EL1 interrupt. Preserve essential EL3 context to allow entry into + * the TSP at the S-EL1 interrupt entry point using the 'cpu_context' + * structure. There is no need to save the secure system register + * context since the TSP is supposed to preserve it during S-EL1 + * interrupt handling. + */ + if (get_yield_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state)) { + tsp_ctx->saved_spsr_el3 = (uint32_t)SMC_GET_EL3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx, + CTX_SPSR_EL3); + tsp_ctx->saved_elr_el3 = SMC_GET_EL3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx, + CTX_ELR_EL3); +#if TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT + memcpy(&tsp_ctx->sp_ctx, &tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx, TSPD_SP_CTX_SIZE); +#endif + } + + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); + cm_set_elr_spsr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t) &tsp_vectors->sel1_intr_entry, + SPSR_64(MODE_EL1, MODE_SP_ELX, DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS)); + + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); + + /* + * Tell the TSP that it has to handle a S-EL1 interrupt synchronously. + * Also the instruction in normal world where the interrupt was + * generated is passed for debugging purposes. It is safe to retrieve + * this address from ELR_EL3 as the secure context will not take effect + * until el3_exit(). + */ + SMC_RET2(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx, TSP_HANDLE_SEL1_INTR_AND_RETURN, read_elr_el3()); +} + +#if TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT +/******************************************************************************* + * This function is the handler registered for Non secure interrupts by the + * TSPD. It validates the interrupt and upon success arranges entry into the + * normal world for handling the interrupt. + ******************************************************************************/ +static uint64_t tspd_ns_interrupt_handler(uint32_t id, + uint32_t flags, + void *handle, + void *cookie) +{ + /* Check the security state when the exception was generated */ + assert(get_interrupt_src_ss(flags) == SECURE); + + /* + * Disable the routing of NS interrupts from secure world to EL3 while + * interrupted on this core. + */ + disable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_NS, SECURE); + + return tspd_handle_sp_preemption(handle); +} +#endif + +/******************************************************************************* + * Secure Payload Dispatcher setup. The SPD finds out the SP entrypoint and type + * (aarch32/aarch64) if not already known and initialises the context for entry + * into the SP for its initialisation. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t tspd_setup(void) +{ + entry_point_info_t *tsp_ep_info; + uint32_t linear_id; + + linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + + /* + * Get information about the Secure Payload (BL32) image. Its + * absence is a critical failure. TODO: Add support to + * conditionally include the SPD service + */ + tsp_ep_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE); + if (!tsp_ep_info) { + WARN("No TSP provided by BL2 boot loader, Booting device" + " without TSP initialization. SMC`s destined for TSP" + " will return SMC_UNK\n"); + return 1; + } + + /* + * If there's no valid entry point for SP, we return a non-zero value + * signalling failure initializing the service. We bail out without + * registering any handlers + */ + if (!tsp_ep_info->pc) + return 1; + + /* + * We could inspect the SP image and determine its execution + * state i.e whether AArch32 or AArch64. Assuming it's AArch64 + * for the time being. + */ + tspd_init_tsp_ep_state(tsp_ep_info, + TSP_AARCH64, + tsp_ep_info->pc, + &tspd_sp_context[linear_id]); + +#if TSP_INIT_ASYNC + bl31_set_next_image_type(SECURE); +#else + /* + * All TSPD initialization done. Now register our init function with + * BL31 for deferred invocation + */ + bl31_register_bl32_init(&tspd_init); +#endif + return 0; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function passes control to the Secure Payload image (BL32) for the first + * time on the primary cpu after a cold boot. It assumes that a valid secure + * context has already been created by tspd_setup() which can be directly used. + * It also assumes that a valid non-secure context has been initialised by PSCI + * so it does not need to save and restore any non-secure state. This function + * performs a synchronous entry into the Secure payload. The SP passes control + * back to this routine through a SMC. + ******************************************************************************/ +int32_t tspd_init(void) +{ + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx = &tspd_sp_context[linear_id]; + entry_point_info_t *tsp_entry_point; + uint64_t rc; + + /* + * Get information about the Secure Payload (BL32) image. Its + * absence is a critical failure. + */ + tsp_entry_point = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE); + assert(tsp_entry_point); + + cm_init_my_context(tsp_entry_point); + + /* + * Arrange for an entry into the test secure payload. It will be + * returned via TSP_ENTRY_DONE case + */ + rc = tspd_synchronous_sp_entry(tsp_ctx); + assert(rc != 0); + + return rc; +} + + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function is responsible for handling all SMCs in the Trusted OS/App + * range from the non-secure state as defined in the SMC Calling Convention + * Document. It is also responsible for communicating with the Secure payload + * to delegate work and return results back to the non-secure state. Lastly it + * will also return any information that the secure payload needs to do the + * work assigned to it. + ******************************************************************************/ +static uintptr_t tspd_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + u_register_t x1, + u_register_t x2, + u_register_t x3, + u_register_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + u_register_t flags) +{ + cpu_context_t *ns_cpu_context; + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(), ns; + tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx = &tspd_sp_context[linear_id]; + uint64_t rc; +#if TSP_INIT_ASYNC + entry_point_info_t *next_image_info; +#endif + + /* Determine which security state this SMC originated from */ + ns = is_caller_non_secure(flags); + + switch (smc_fid) { + + /* + * This function ID is used by TSP to indicate that it was + * preempted by a normal world IRQ. + * + */ + case TSP_PREEMPTED: + if (ns) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + return tspd_handle_sp_preemption(handle); + + /* + * This function ID is used only by the TSP to indicate that it has + * finished handling a S-EL1 interrupt or was preempted by a higher + * priority pending EL3 interrupt. Execution should resume + * in the normal world. + */ + case TSP_HANDLED_S_EL1_INTR: + if (ns) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + + /* + * Restore the relevant EL3 state which saved to service + * this SMC. + */ + if (get_yield_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state)) { + SMC_SET_EL3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx, + CTX_SPSR_EL3, + tsp_ctx->saved_spsr_el3); + SMC_SET_EL3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx, + CTX_ELR_EL3, + tsp_ctx->saved_elr_el3); +#if TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT + /* + * Need to restore the previously interrupted + * secure context. + */ + memcpy(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx, &tsp_ctx->sp_ctx, + TSPD_SP_CTX_SIZE); +#endif + } + + /* Get a reference to the non-secure context */ + ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); + assert(ns_cpu_context); + + /* + * Restore non-secure state. There is no need to save the + * secure system register context since the TSP was supposed + * to preserve it during S-EL1 interrupt handling. + */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + + /* Refer to Note 1 in function tspd_sel1_interrupt_handler()*/ +#if TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT + if (tsp_ctx->preempted_by_sel1_intr) { + /* Reset the flag */ + tsp_ctx->preempted_by_sel1_intr = false; + + SMC_RET1(ns_cpu_context, SMC_PREEMPTED); + } else { + SMC_RET0((uint64_t) ns_cpu_context); + } +#else + SMC_RET0((uint64_t) ns_cpu_context); +#endif + + + /* + * This function ID is used only by the SP to indicate it has + * finished initialising itself after a cold boot + */ + case TSP_ENTRY_DONE: + if (ns) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + /* + * Stash the SP entry points information. This is done + * only once on the primary cpu + */ + assert(tsp_vectors == NULL); + tsp_vectors = (tsp_vectors_t *) x1; + + if (tsp_vectors) { + set_tsp_pstate(tsp_ctx->state, TSP_PSTATE_ON); + + /* + * TSP has been successfully initialized. Register power + * management hooks with PSCI + */ + psci_register_spd_pm_hook(&tspd_pm); + + /* + * Register an interrupt handler for S-EL1 interrupts + * when generated during code executing in the + * non-secure state. + */ + flags = 0; + set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, NON_SECURE); + rc = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_S_EL1, + tspd_sel1_interrupt_handler, + flags); + if (rc) + panic(); + +#if TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT + /* + * Register an interrupt handler for NS interrupts when + * generated during code executing in secure state are + * routed to EL3. + */ + flags = 0; + set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, SECURE); + + rc = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_NS, + tspd_ns_interrupt_handler, + flags); + if (rc) + panic(); + + /* + * Disable the NS interrupt locally. + */ + disable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_NS, SECURE); +#endif + } + + +#if TSP_INIT_ASYNC + /* Save the Secure EL1 system register context */ + assert(cm_get_context(SECURE) == &tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); + + /* Program EL3 registers to enable entry into the next EL */ + next_image_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(NON_SECURE); + assert(next_image_info); + assert(NON_SECURE == + GET_SECURITY_STATE(next_image_info->h.attr)); + + cm_init_my_context(next_image_info); + cm_prepare_el3_exit(NON_SECURE); + SMC_RET0(cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)); +#else + /* + * SP reports completion. The SPD must have initiated + * the original request through a synchronous entry + * into the SP. Jump back to the original C runtime + * context. + */ + tspd_synchronous_sp_exit(tsp_ctx, x1); + break; +#endif + /* + * This function ID is used only by the SP to indicate it has finished + * aborting a preempted Yielding SMC Call. + */ + case TSP_ABORT_DONE: + + /* + * These function IDs are used only by the SP to indicate it has + * finished: + * 1. turning itself on in response to an earlier psci + * cpu_on request + * 2. resuming itself after an earlier psci cpu_suspend + * request. + */ + case TSP_ON_DONE: + case TSP_RESUME_DONE: + + /* + * These function IDs are used only by the SP to indicate it has + * finished: + * 1. suspending itself after an earlier psci cpu_suspend + * request. + * 2. turning itself off in response to an earlier psci + * cpu_off request. + */ + case TSP_OFF_DONE: + case TSP_SUSPEND_DONE: + case TSP_SYSTEM_OFF_DONE: + case TSP_SYSTEM_RESET_DONE: + if (ns) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + /* + * SP reports completion. The SPD must have initiated the + * original request through a synchronous entry into the SP. + * Jump back to the original C runtime context, and pass x1 as + * return value to the caller + */ + tspd_synchronous_sp_exit(tsp_ctx, x1); + break; + + /* + * Request from non-secure client to perform an + * arithmetic operation or response from secure + * payload to an earlier request. + */ + case TSP_FAST_FID(TSP_ADD): + case TSP_FAST_FID(TSP_SUB): + case TSP_FAST_FID(TSP_MUL): + case TSP_FAST_FID(TSP_DIV): + + case TSP_YIELD_FID(TSP_ADD): + case TSP_YIELD_FID(TSP_SUB): + case TSP_YIELD_FID(TSP_MUL): + case TSP_YIELD_FID(TSP_DIV): + /* + * Request from non-secure client to perform a check + * of the DIT PSTATE bit. + */ + case TSP_YIELD_FID(TSP_CHECK_DIT): + if (ns) { + /* + * This is a fresh request from the non-secure client. + * The parameters are in x1 and x2. Figure out which + * registers need to be preserved, save the non-secure + * state and send the request to the secure payload. + */ + assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)); + + /* Check if we are already preempted */ + if (get_yield_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state)) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); + + /* Save x1 and x2 for use by TSP_GET_ARGS call below */ + store_tsp_args(tsp_ctx, x1, x2); + + /* + * We are done stashing the non-secure context. Ask the + * secure payload to do the work now. + */ + + /* + * Verify if there is a valid context to use, copy the + * operation type and parameters to the secure context + * and jump to the fast smc entry point in the secure + * payload. Entry into S-EL1 will take place upon exit + * from this function. + */ + assert(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + + /* Set appropriate entry for SMC. + * We expect the TSP to manage the PSTATE.I and PSTATE.F + * flags as appropriate. + */ + if (GET_SMC_TYPE(smc_fid) == SMC_TYPE_FAST) { + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t) + &tsp_vectors->fast_smc_entry); + } else { + set_yield_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state); + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t) + &tsp_vectors->yield_smc_entry); +#if TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT + /* + * Enable the routing of NS interrupts to EL3 + * during processing of a Yielding SMC Call on + * this core. + */ + enable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_NS, SECURE); +#endif + +#if EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING + /* + * With EL3 exception handling, while an SMC is + * being processed, Non-secure interrupts can't + * preempt Secure execution. However, for + * yielding SMCs, we want preemption to happen; + * so explicitly allow NS preemption in this + * case, and supply the preemption return code + * for TSP. + */ + ehf_allow_ns_preemption(TSP_PREEMPTED); +#endif + } + + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); + SMC_RET3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx, smc_fid, x1, x2); + } else { + /* + * This is the result from the secure client of an + * earlier request. The results are in x1-x3. Copy it + * into the non-secure context, save the secure state + * and return to the non-secure state. + */ + assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); + + /* Get a reference to the non-secure context */ + ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); + assert(ns_cpu_context); + + /* Restore non-secure state */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + if (GET_SMC_TYPE(smc_fid) == SMC_TYPE_YIELD) { + clr_yield_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state); +#if TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT + /* + * Disable the routing of NS interrupts to EL3 + * after processing of a Yielding SMC Call on + * this core is finished. + */ + disable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_NS, SECURE); +#endif + } + + SMC_RET3(ns_cpu_context, x1, x2, x3); + } + assert(0); /* Unreachable */ + + /* + * Request from the non-secure world to abort a preempted Yielding SMC + * Call. + */ + case TSP_FID_ABORT: + /* ABORT should only be invoked by normal world */ + if (!ns) { + assert(0); + break; + } + + assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); + + /* Abort the preempted SMC request */ + if (!tspd_abort_preempted_smc(tsp_ctx)) { + /* + * If there was no preempted SMC to abort, return + * SMC_UNK. + * + * Restoring the NON_SECURE context is not necessary as + * the synchronous entry did not take place if the + * return code of tspd_abort_preempted_smc is zero. + */ + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + break; + } + + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_OK); + + /* + * Request from non secure world to resume the preempted + * Yielding SMC Call. + */ + case TSP_FID_RESUME: + /* RESUME should be invoked only by normal world */ + if (!ns) { + assert(0); + break; + } + + /* + * This is a resume request from the non-secure client. + * save the non-secure state and send the request to + * the secure payload. + */ + assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)); + + /* Check if we are already preempted before resume */ + if (!get_yield_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state)) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); + + /* + * We are done stashing the non-secure context. Ask the + * secure payload to do the work now. + */ +#if TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT + /* + * Enable the routing of NS interrupts to EL3 during resumption + * of a Yielding SMC Call on this core. + */ + enable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_NS, SECURE); +#endif + +#if EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING + /* + * Allow the resumed yielding SMC processing to be preempted by + * Non-secure interrupts. Also, supply the preemption return + * code for TSP. + */ + ehf_allow_ns_preemption(TSP_PREEMPTED); +#endif + + /* We just need to return to the preempted point in + * TSP and the execution will resume as normal. + */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); + SMC_RET0(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx); + + /* + * This is a request from the secure payload for more arguments + * for an ongoing arithmetic operation requested by the + * non-secure world. Simply return the arguments from the non- + * secure client in the original call. + */ + case TSP_GET_ARGS: + if (ns) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + get_tsp_args(tsp_ctx, x1, x2); + SMC_RET2(handle, x1, x2); + + case TOS_CALL_COUNT: + /* + * Return the number of service function IDs implemented to + * provide service to non-secure + */ + SMC_RET1(handle, TSP_NUM_FID); + + case TOS_UID: + /* Return TSP UID to the caller */ + SMC_UUID_RET(handle, tsp_uuid); + + case TOS_CALL_VERSION: + /* Return the version of current implementation */ + SMC_RET2(handle, TSP_VERSION_MAJOR, TSP_VERSION_MINOR); + + default: + break; + } + + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); +} + +/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for fast SMC calls */ +DECLARE_RT_SVC( + tspd_fast, + + OEN_TOS_START, + OEN_TOS_END, + SMC_TYPE_FAST, + tspd_setup, + tspd_smc_handler +); + +/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for Yielding SMC Calls */ +DECLARE_RT_SVC( + tspd_std, + + OEN_TOS_START, + OEN_TOS_END, + SMC_TYPE_YIELD, + NULL, + tspd_smc_handler +); diff --git a/services/spd/tspd/tspd_pm.c b/services/spd/tspd/tspd_pm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b95ee8f --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/tspd/tspd_pm.c @@ -0,0 +1,254 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013-2016, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <bl32/tsp/tsp.h> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> + +#include "tspd_private.h" + +/******************************************************************************* + * The target cpu is being turned on. Allow the TSPD/TSP to perform any actions + * needed. Nothing at the moment. + ******************************************************************************/ +static void tspd_cpu_on_handler(u_register_t target_cpu) +{ +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This cpu is being turned off. Allow the TSPD/TSP to perform any actions + * needed + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t tspd_cpu_off_handler(u_register_t unused) +{ + int32_t rc = 0; + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx = &tspd_sp_context[linear_id]; + + assert(tsp_vectors); + assert(get_tsp_pstate(tsp_ctx->state) == TSP_PSTATE_ON); + + /* + * Abort any preempted SMC request before overwriting the SECURE + * context. + */ + tspd_abort_preempted_smc(tsp_ctx); + + /* Program the entry point and enter the TSP */ + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t) &tsp_vectors->cpu_off_entry); + rc = tspd_synchronous_sp_entry(tsp_ctx); + + /* + * Read the response from the TSP. A non-zero return means that + * something went wrong while communicating with the TSP. + */ + if (rc != 0) + panic(); + + /* + * Reset TSP's context for a fresh start when this cpu is turned on + * subsequently. + */ + set_tsp_pstate(tsp_ctx->state, TSP_PSTATE_OFF); + + return 0; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This cpu is being suspended. S-EL1 state must have been saved in the + * resident cpu (mpidr format) if it is a UP/UP migratable TSP. + ******************************************************************************/ +static void tspd_cpu_suspend_handler(u_register_t max_off_pwrlvl) +{ + int32_t rc = 0; + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx = &tspd_sp_context[linear_id]; + + assert(tsp_vectors); + assert(get_tsp_pstate(tsp_ctx->state) == TSP_PSTATE_ON); + + /* + * Abort any preempted SMC request before overwriting the SECURE + * context. + */ + tspd_abort_preempted_smc(tsp_ctx); + + /* Program the entry point and enter the TSP */ + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t) &tsp_vectors->cpu_suspend_entry); + rc = tspd_synchronous_sp_entry(tsp_ctx); + + /* + * Read the response from the TSP. A non-zero return means that + * something went wrong while communicating with the TSP. + */ + if (rc) + panic(); + + /* Update its context to reflect the state the TSP is in */ + set_tsp_pstate(tsp_ctx->state, TSP_PSTATE_SUSPEND); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This cpu has been turned on. Enter the TSP to initialise S-EL1 and other bits + * before passing control back to the Secure Monitor. Entry in S-EL1 is done + * after initialising minimal architectural state that guarantees safe + * execution. + ******************************************************************************/ +static void tspd_cpu_on_finish_handler(u_register_t unused) +{ + int32_t rc = 0; + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx = &tspd_sp_context[linear_id]; + entry_point_info_t tsp_on_entrypoint; + + assert(tsp_vectors); + assert(get_tsp_pstate(tsp_ctx->state) == TSP_PSTATE_OFF); + + tspd_init_tsp_ep_state(&tsp_on_entrypoint, + TSP_AARCH64, + (uint64_t) &tsp_vectors->cpu_on_entry, + tsp_ctx); + + /* Initialise this cpu's secure context */ + cm_init_my_context(&tsp_on_entrypoint); + +#if TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT + /* + * Disable the NS interrupt locally since it will be enabled globally + * within cm_init_my_context. + */ + disable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_NS, SECURE); +#endif + + /* Enter the TSP */ + rc = tspd_synchronous_sp_entry(tsp_ctx); + + /* + * Read the response from the TSP. A non-zero return means that + * something went wrong while communicating with the SP. + */ + if (rc != 0) + panic(); + + /* Update its context to reflect the state the SP is in */ + set_tsp_pstate(tsp_ctx->state, TSP_PSTATE_ON); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This cpu has resumed from suspend. The SPD saved the TSP context when it + * completed the preceding suspend call. Use that context to program an entry + * into the TSP to allow it to do any remaining book keeping + ******************************************************************************/ +static void tspd_cpu_suspend_finish_handler(u_register_t max_off_pwrlvl) +{ + int32_t rc = 0; + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx = &tspd_sp_context[linear_id]; + + assert(tsp_vectors); + assert(get_tsp_pstate(tsp_ctx->state) == TSP_PSTATE_SUSPEND); + + /* Program the entry point, max_off_pwrlvl and enter the SP */ + write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx), + CTX_GPREG_X0, + max_off_pwrlvl); + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t) &tsp_vectors->cpu_resume_entry); + rc = tspd_synchronous_sp_entry(tsp_ctx); + + /* + * Read the response from the TSP. A non-zero return means that + * something went wrong while communicating with the TSP. + */ + if (rc != 0) + panic(); + + /* Update its context to reflect the state the SP is in */ + set_tsp_pstate(tsp_ctx->state, TSP_PSTATE_ON); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Return the type of TSP the TSPD is dealing with. Report the current resident + * cpu (mpidr format) if it is a UP/UP migratable TSP. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t tspd_cpu_migrate_info(u_register_t *resident_cpu) +{ + return TSP_MIGRATE_INFO; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * System is about to be switched off. Allow the TSPD/TSP to perform + * any actions needed. + ******************************************************************************/ +static void tspd_system_off(void) +{ + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx = &tspd_sp_context[linear_id]; + + assert(tsp_vectors); + assert(get_tsp_pstate(tsp_ctx->state) == TSP_PSTATE_ON); + + /* + * Abort any preempted SMC request before overwriting the SECURE + * context. + */ + tspd_abort_preempted_smc(tsp_ctx); + + /* Program the entry point */ + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t) &tsp_vectors->system_off_entry); + + /* Enter the TSP. We do not care about the return value because we + * must continue the shutdown anyway */ + tspd_synchronous_sp_entry(tsp_ctx); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * System is about to be reset. Allow the TSPD/TSP to perform + * any actions needed. + ******************************************************************************/ +static void tspd_system_reset(void) +{ + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx = &tspd_sp_context[linear_id]; + + assert(tsp_vectors); + assert(get_tsp_pstate(tsp_ctx->state) == TSP_PSTATE_ON); + + /* + * Abort any preempted SMC request before overwriting the SECURE + * context. + */ + tspd_abort_preempted_smc(tsp_ctx); + + /* Program the entry point */ + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t) &tsp_vectors->system_reset_entry); + + /* + * Enter the TSP. We do not care about the return value because we + * must continue the reset anyway + */ + tspd_synchronous_sp_entry(tsp_ctx); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Structure populated by the TSP Dispatcher to be given a chance to perform any + * TSP bookkeeping before PSCI executes a power mgmt. operation. + ******************************************************************************/ +const spd_pm_ops_t tspd_pm = { + .svc_on = tspd_cpu_on_handler, + .svc_off = tspd_cpu_off_handler, + .svc_suspend = tspd_cpu_suspend_handler, + .svc_on_finish = tspd_cpu_on_finish_handler, + .svc_suspend_finish = tspd_cpu_suspend_finish_handler, + .svc_migrate = NULL, + .svc_migrate_info = tspd_cpu_migrate_info, + .svc_system_off = tspd_system_off, + .svc_system_reset = tspd_system_reset +}; diff --git a/services/spd/tspd/tspd_private.h b/services/spd/tspd/tspd_private.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d6c03c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/tspd/tspd_private.h @@ -0,0 +1,233 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013-2021, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef TSPD_PRIVATE_H +#define TSPD_PRIVATE_H + +#include <platform_def.h> + +#include <arch.h> +#include <bl31/interrupt_mgmt.h> +#include <context.h> +#include <lib/psci/psci.h> + +/******************************************************************************* + * Secure Payload PM state information e.g. SP is suspended, uninitialised etc + * and macros to access the state information in the per-cpu 'state' flags + ******************************************************************************/ +#define TSP_PSTATE_OFF 0 +#define TSP_PSTATE_ON 1 +#define TSP_PSTATE_SUSPEND 2 +#define TSP_PSTATE_SHIFT 0 +#define TSP_PSTATE_MASK 0x3 +#define get_tsp_pstate(state) ((state >> TSP_PSTATE_SHIFT) & TSP_PSTATE_MASK) +#define clr_tsp_pstate(state) (state &= ~(TSP_PSTATE_MASK \ + << TSP_PSTATE_SHIFT)) +#define set_tsp_pstate(st, pst) do { \ + clr_tsp_pstate(st); \ + st |= (pst & TSP_PSTATE_MASK) << \ + TSP_PSTATE_SHIFT; \ + } while (0); + + +/* + * This flag is used by the TSPD to determine if the TSP is servicing a yielding + * SMC request prior to programming the next entry into the TSP e.g. if TSP + * execution is preempted by a non-secure interrupt and handed control to the + * normal world. If another request which is distinct from what the TSP was + * previously doing arrives, then this flag will be help the TSPD to either + * reject the new request or service it while ensuring that the previous context + * is not corrupted. + */ +#define YIELD_SMC_ACTIVE_FLAG_SHIFT 2 +#define YIELD_SMC_ACTIVE_FLAG_MASK 1 +#define get_yield_smc_active_flag(state) \ + ((state >> YIELD_SMC_ACTIVE_FLAG_SHIFT) \ + & YIELD_SMC_ACTIVE_FLAG_MASK) +#define set_yield_smc_active_flag(state) (state |= \ + 1 << YIELD_SMC_ACTIVE_FLAG_SHIFT) +#define clr_yield_smc_active_flag(state) (state &= \ + ~(YIELD_SMC_ACTIVE_FLAG_MASK \ + << YIELD_SMC_ACTIVE_FLAG_SHIFT)) + +/******************************************************************************* + * Secure Payload execution state information i.e. aarch32 or aarch64 + ******************************************************************************/ +#define TSP_AARCH32 MODE_RW_32 +#define TSP_AARCH64 MODE_RW_64 + +/******************************************************************************* + * The SPD should know the type of Secure Payload. + ******************************************************************************/ +#define TSP_TYPE_UP PSCI_TOS_NOT_UP_MIG_CAP +#define TSP_TYPE_UPM PSCI_TOS_UP_MIG_CAP +#define TSP_TYPE_MP PSCI_TOS_NOT_PRESENT_MP + +/******************************************************************************* + * Secure Payload migrate type information as known to the SPD. We assume that + * the SPD is dealing with an MP Secure Payload. + ******************************************************************************/ +#define TSP_MIGRATE_INFO TSP_TYPE_MP + +/******************************************************************************* + * Number of cpus that the present on this platform. TODO: Rely on a topology + * tree to determine this in the future to avoid assumptions about mpidr + * allocation + ******************************************************************************/ +#define TSPD_CORE_COUNT PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT + +/******************************************************************************* + * Constants that allow assembler code to preserve callee-saved registers of the + * C runtime context while performing a security state switch. + ******************************************************************************/ +#define TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X19 0x0 +#define TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X20 0x8 +#define TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X21 0x10 +#define TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X22 0x18 +#define TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X23 0x20 +#define TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X24 0x28 +#define TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X25 0x30 +#define TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X26 0x38 +#define TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X27 0x40 +#define TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X28 0x48 +#define TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X29 0x50 +#define TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X30 0x58 +#define TSPD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE 0x60 +#define TSPD_C_RT_CTX_ENTRIES (TSPD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE >> DWORD_SHIFT) + +/******************************************************************************* + * Constants that allow assembler code to preserve caller-saved registers of the + * SP context while performing a TSP preemption. + * Note: These offsets have to match with the offsets for the corresponding + * registers in cpu_context as we are using memcpy to copy the values from + * cpu_context to sp_ctx. + ******************************************************************************/ +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X0 0x0 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X1 0x8 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X2 0x10 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X3 0x18 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X4 0x20 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X5 0x28 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X6 0x30 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X7 0x38 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X8 0x40 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X9 0x48 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X10 0x50 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X11 0x58 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X12 0x60 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X13 0x68 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X14 0x70 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X15 0x78 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X16 0x80 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X17 0x88 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_SIZE 0x90 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_ENTRIES (TSPD_SP_CTX_SIZE >> DWORD_SHIFT) + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__ + +#include <stdint.h> + +#include <lib/cassert.h> + +/* + * The number of arguments to save during a SMC call for TSP. + * Currently only x1 and x2 are used by TSP. + */ +#define TSP_NUM_ARGS 0x2 + +/* AArch64 callee saved general purpose register context structure. */ +DEFINE_REG_STRUCT(c_rt_regs, TSPD_C_RT_CTX_ENTRIES); + +/* + * Compile time assertion to ensure that both the compiler and linker + * have the same double word aligned view of the size of the C runtime + * register context. + */ +CASSERT(TSPD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE == sizeof(c_rt_regs_t), \ + assert_spd_c_rt_regs_size_mismatch); + +/* SEL1 Secure payload (SP) caller saved register context structure. */ +DEFINE_REG_STRUCT(sp_ctx_regs, TSPD_SP_CTX_ENTRIES); + +/* + * Compile time assertion to ensure that both the compiler and linker + * have the same double word aligned view of the size of the C runtime + * register context. + */ +CASSERT(TSPD_SP_CTX_SIZE == sizeof(sp_ctx_regs_t), \ + assert_spd_sp_regs_size_mismatch); + +/******************************************************************************* + * Structure which helps the SPD to maintain the per-cpu state of the SP. + * 'saved_spsr_el3' - temporary copy to allow S-EL1 interrupt handling when + * the TSP has been preempted. + * 'saved_elr_el3' - temporary copy to allow S-EL1 interrupt handling when + * the TSP has been preempted. + * 'state' - collection of flags to track SP state e.g. on/off + * 'mpidr' - mpidr to associate a context with a cpu + * 'c_rt_ctx' - stack address to restore C runtime context from after + * returning from a synchronous entry into the SP. + * 'cpu_ctx' - space to maintain SP architectural state + * 'saved_tsp_args' - space to store arguments for TSP arithmetic operations + * which will queried using the TSP_GET_ARGS SMC by TSP. + * 'sp_ctx' - space to save the SEL1 Secure Payload(SP) caller saved + * register context after it has been preempted by an EL3 + * routed NS interrupt and when a Secure Interrupt is taken + * to SP. + ******************************************************************************/ +typedef struct tsp_context { + uint64_t saved_elr_el3; + uint32_t saved_spsr_el3; + uint32_t state; + uint64_t mpidr; + uint64_t c_rt_ctx; + cpu_context_t cpu_ctx; + uint64_t saved_tsp_args[TSP_NUM_ARGS]; +#if TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT + sp_ctx_regs_t sp_ctx; + bool preempted_by_sel1_intr; +#endif +} tsp_context_t; + +/* Helper macros to store and retrieve tsp args from tsp_context */ +#define store_tsp_args(_tsp_ctx, _x1, _x2) do {\ + _tsp_ctx->saved_tsp_args[0] = _x1;\ + _tsp_ctx->saved_tsp_args[1] = _x2;\ + } while (0) + +#define get_tsp_args(_tsp_ctx, _x1, _x2) do {\ + _x1 = _tsp_ctx->saved_tsp_args[0];\ + _x2 = _tsp_ctx->saved_tsp_args[1];\ + } while (0) + +/* TSPD power management handlers */ +extern const spd_pm_ops_t tspd_pm; + +/******************************************************************************* + * Forward declarations + ******************************************************************************/ +typedef struct tsp_vectors tsp_vectors_t; + +/******************************************************************************* + * Function & Data prototypes + ******************************************************************************/ +uint64_t tspd_enter_sp(uint64_t *c_rt_ctx); +void __dead2 tspd_exit_sp(uint64_t c_rt_ctx, uint64_t ret); +uint64_t tspd_synchronous_sp_entry(tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx); +void __dead2 tspd_synchronous_sp_exit(tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx, uint64_t ret); +void tspd_init_tsp_ep_state(struct entry_point_info *tsp_entry_point, + uint32_t rw, + uint64_t pc, + tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx); +int tspd_abort_preempted_smc(tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx); + +uint64_t tspd_handle_sp_preemption(void *handle); + +extern tsp_context_t tspd_sp_context[TSPD_CORE_COUNT]; +extern tsp_vectors_t *tsp_vectors; +#endif /*__ASSEMBLER__*/ + +#endif /* TSPD_PRIVATE_H */ |