From 102b0d2daa97dae68d3eed54d8fe37a9cc38a892 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Baumann Date: Sun, 28 Apr 2024 11:13:47 +0200 Subject: Adding upstream version 2.8.0+dfsg. Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann --- services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_main.c | 546 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 546 insertions(+) create mode 100644 services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_main.c (limited to 'services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_main.c') diff --git a/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_main.c b/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_main.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ecac435 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_main.c @@ -0,0 +1,546 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2015-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2020, NVIDIA Corporation. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +/******************************************************************************* + * This is the Secure Payload Dispatcher (SPD). The dispatcher is meant to be a + * plug-in component to the Secure Monitor, registered as a runtime service. The + * SPD is expected to be a functional extension of the Secure Payload (SP) that + * executes in Secure EL1. The Secure Monitor will delegate all SMCs targeting + * the Trusted OS/Applications range to the dispatcher. The SPD will either + * handle the request locally or delegate it to the Secure Payload. It is also + * responsible for initialising and maintaining communication with the SP. + ******************************************************************************/ +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "tlkd_private.h" + +extern const spd_pm_ops_t tlkd_pm_ops; + +/******************************************************************************* + * Per-cpu Secure Payload state + ******************************************************************************/ +tlk_context_t tlk_ctx; + +/******************************************************************************* + * CPU number on which TLK booted up + ******************************************************************************/ +static uint32_t boot_cpu; + +/* TLK UID: RFC-4122 compliant UUID (version-5, sha-1) */ +DEFINE_SVC_UUID2(tlk_uuid, + 0xc9e911bd, 0xba2b, 0xee52, 0xb1, 0x72, + 0x46, 0x1f, 0xba, 0x97, 0x7f, 0x63); + +static int32_t tlkd_init(void); + +/******************************************************************************* + * Secure Payload Dispatcher's timer interrupt handler + ******************************************************************************/ +static uint64_t tlkd_interrupt_handler(uint32_t id, + uint32_t flags, + void *handle, + void *cookie) +{ + cpu_context_t *s_cpu_context; + int irq = plat_ic_get_pending_interrupt_id(); + + /* acknowledge the interrupt and mark it complete */ + (void)plat_ic_acknowledge_interrupt(); + plat_ic_end_of_interrupt(irq); + + /* + * Disable the routing of NS interrupts from secure world to + * EL3 while interrupted on this core. + */ + disable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_S_EL1, SECURE); + + /* Check the security state when the exception was generated */ + assert(get_interrupt_src_ss(flags) == NON_SECURE); + assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)); + + /* Save non-secure state */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); + + /* Get a reference to the secure context */ + s_cpu_context = cm_get_context(SECURE); + assert(s_cpu_context); + + /* + * Restore non-secure state. There is no need to save the + * secure system register context since the SP was supposed + * to preserve it during S-EL1 interrupt handling. + */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); + + /* Provide the IRQ number to the SPD */ + SMC_RET4(s_cpu_context, (uint32_t)TLK_IRQ_FIRED, 0, (uint32_t)irq, 0); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Secure Payload Dispatcher setup. The SPD finds out the SP entrypoint and type + * (aarch32/aarch64) if not already known and initialises the context for entry + * into the SP for its initialisation. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t tlkd_setup(void) +{ + entry_point_info_t *tlk_ep_info; + uint32_t flags; + int32_t ret; + + /* + * Get information about the Secure Payload (BL32) image. Its + * absence is a critical failure. + */ + tlk_ep_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE); + if (!tlk_ep_info) { + WARN("No SP provided. Booting device without SP" + " initialization. SMC`s destined for SP" + " will return SMC_UNK\n"); + return 1; + } + + /* + * If there's no valid entry point for SP, we return a non-zero value + * signalling failure initializing the service. We bail out without + * registering any handlers + */ + if (!tlk_ep_info->pc) + return 1; + + /* + * Inspect the SP image's SPSR and determine it's execution state + * i.e whether AArch32 or AArch64. + */ + tlkd_init_tlk_ep_state(tlk_ep_info, + (tlk_ep_info->spsr >> MODE_RW_SHIFT) & MODE_RW_MASK, + tlk_ep_info->pc, + &tlk_ctx); + + /* get a list of all S-EL1 IRQs from the platform */ + + /* register interrupt handler */ + flags = 0; + set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, NON_SECURE); + ret = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_S_EL1, + tlkd_interrupt_handler, + flags); + if (ret != 0) { + ERROR("failed to register tlkd interrupt handler (%d)\n", ret); + } + + /* + * All TLK SPD initialization done. Now register our init function + * with BL31 for deferred invocation + */ + bl31_register_bl32_init(&tlkd_init); + + return 0; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function passes control to the Secure Payload image (BL32) for the first + * time on the primary cpu after a cold boot. It assumes that a valid secure + * context has already been created by tlkd_setup() which can be directly + * used. This function performs a synchronous entry into the Secure payload. + * The SP passes control back to this routine through a SMC. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t tlkd_init(void) +{ + entry_point_info_t *tlk_entry_point; + + /* + * Get information about the Secure Payload (BL32) image. Its + * absence is a critical failure. + */ + tlk_entry_point = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE); + assert(tlk_entry_point); + + cm_init_my_context(tlk_entry_point); + + /* + * TLK runs only on a single CPU. Store the value of the boot + * CPU for sanity checking later. + */ + boot_cpu = plat_my_core_pos(); + + /* + * Arrange for an entry into the test secure payload. + */ + return tlkd_synchronous_sp_entry(&tlk_ctx); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function is responsible for handling all SMCs in the Trusted OS/App + * range from the non-secure state as defined in the SMC Calling Convention + * Document. It is also responsible for communicating with the Secure payload + * to delegate work and return results back to the non-secure state. Lastly it + * will also return any information that the secure payload needs to do the + * work assigned to it. + ******************************************************************************/ +static uintptr_t tlkd_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + u_register_t x1, + u_register_t x2, + u_register_t x3, + u_register_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + u_register_t flags) +{ + cpu_context_t *ns_cpu_context; + gp_regs_t *gp_regs; + uint32_t ns; + uint64_t par; + + /* Passing a NULL context is a critical programming error */ + assert(handle); + + /* These SMCs are only supported by a single CPU */ + if (boot_cpu != plat_my_core_pos()) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + /* Determine which security state this SMC originated from */ + ns = is_caller_non_secure(flags); + + switch (smc_fid) { + + /* + * This function ID is used by SP to indicate that it was + * preempted by a non-secure world IRQ. + */ + case TLK_PREEMPTED: + + if (ns) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); + + /* Get a reference to the non-secure context */ + ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); + assert(ns_cpu_context); + + /* + * Restore non-secure state. There is no need to save the + * secure system register context since the SP was supposed + * to preserve it during S-EL1 interrupt handling. + */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + + SMC_RET1(ns_cpu_context, x1); + + /* + * This is a request from the non-secure context to: + * + * a. register shared memory with the SP for storing it's + * activity logs. + * b. register shared memory with the SP for passing args + * required for maintaining sessions with the Trusted + * Applications. + * c. register shared persistent buffers for secure storage + * d. register NS DRAM ranges passed by Cboot + * e. register Root of Trust parameters from Cboot for Verified Boot + * f. open/close sessions + * g. issue commands to the Trusted Apps + * h. resume the preempted yielding SMC call. + */ + case TLK_REGISTER_LOGBUF: + case TLK_REGISTER_REQBUF: + case TLK_SS_REGISTER_HANDLER: + case TLK_REGISTER_NS_DRAM_RANGES: + case TLK_SET_ROOT_OF_TRUST: + case TLK_OPEN_TA_SESSION: + case TLK_CLOSE_TA_SESSION: + case TLK_TA_LAUNCH_OP: + case TLK_TA_SEND_EVENT: + case TLK_RESUME_FID: + case TLK_SET_BL_VERSION: + case TLK_LOCK_BL_INTERFACE: + case TLK_BL_RPMB_SERVICE: + + if (!ns) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + /* + * This is a fresh request from the non-secure client. + * The parameters are in x1 and x2. Figure out which + * registers need to be preserved, save the non-secure + * state and send the request to the secure payload. + */ + assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)); + + /* + * Check if we are already processing a yielding SMC + * call. Of all the supported fids, only the "resume" + * fid expects the flag to be set. + */ + if (smc_fid == TLK_RESUME_FID) { + if (!get_yield_smc_active_flag(tlk_ctx.state)) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + } else { + if (get_yield_smc_active_flag(tlk_ctx.state)) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + } + + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); + + /* + * Verify if there is a valid context to use. + */ + assert(&tlk_ctx.cpu_ctx == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + + /* + * Mark the SP state as active. + */ + set_yield_smc_active_flag(tlk_ctx.state); + + /* + * We are done stashing the non-secure context. Ask the + * secure payload to do the work now. + */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); + + /* + * TLK is a 32-bit Trusted OS and so expects the SMC + * arguments via r0-r7. TLK expects the monitor frame + * registers to be 64-bits long. Hence, we pass x0 in + * r0-r1, x1 in r2-r3, x3 in r4-r5 and x4 in r6-r7. + * + * As smc_fid is a uint32 value, r1 contains 0. + */ + gp_regs = get_gpregs_ctx(&tlk_ctx.cpu_ctx); + write_ctx_reg(gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X4, (uint32_t)x2); + write_ctx_reg(gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X5, (uint32_t)(x2 >> 32)); + write_ctx_reg(gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X6, (uint32_t)x3); + write_ctx_reg(gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X7, (uint32_t)(x3 >> 32)); + SMC_RET4(&tlk_ctx.cpu_ctx, smc_fid, 0, (uint32_t)x1, + (uint32_t)(x1 >> 32)); + + /* + * Translate NS/EL1-S virtual addresses. + * + * x1 = virtual address + * x3 = type (NS/S) + * + * Returns PA:lo in r0, PA:hi in r1. + */ + case TLK_VA_TRANSLATE: + + /* Should be invoked only by secure world */ + if (ns) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + /* NS virtual addresses are 64-bit long */ + if (x3 & TLK_TRANSLATE_NS_VADDR) + x1 = (uint32_t)x1 | (x2 << 32); + + if (!x1) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + /* + * TODO: Sanity check x1. This would require platform + * support. + */ + + /* virtual address and type: ns/s */ + par = tlkd_va_translate(x1, x3); + + /* return physical address in r0-r1 */ + SMC_RET4(handle, (uint32_t)par, (uint32_t)(par >> 32), 0, 0); + + /* + * This is a request from the SP to mark completion of + * a yielding function ID. + */ + case TLK_REQUEST_DONE: + if (ns) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + /* + * Mark the SP state as inactive. + */ + clr_yield_smc_active_flag(tlk_ctx.state); + + /* Get a reference to the non-secure context */ + ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); + assert(ns_cpu_context); + + /* + * This is a request completion SMC and we must switch to + * the non-secure world to pass the result. + */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); + + /* + * We are done stashing the secure context. Switch to the + * non-secure context and return the result. + */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + SMC_RET1(ns_cpu_context, x1); + + /* + * This function ID is used only by the SP to indicate it has + * finished initialising itself after a cold boot + */ + case TLK_ENTRY_DONE: + if (ns) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + /* + * SP has been successfully initialized. Register power + * management hooks with PSCI + */ + psci_register_spd_pm_hook(&tlkd_pm_ops); + + /* + * TLK reports completion. The SPD must have initiated + * the original request through a synchronous entry + * into the SP. Jump back to the original C runtime + * context. + */ + tlkd_synchronous_sp_exit(&tlk_ctx, x1); + break; + + /* + * These function IDs are used only by TLK to indicate it has + * finished: + * 1. suspending itself after an earlier psci cpu_suspend + * request. + * 2. resuming itself after an earlier psci cpu_suspend + * request. + * 3. powering down after an earlier psci system_off/system_reset + * request. + */ + case TLK_SUSPEND_DONE: + case TLK_RESUME_DONE: + + if (ns) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + /* + * TLK reports completion. TLKD must have initiated the + * original request through a synchronous entry into the SP. + * Jump back to the original C runtime context, and pass x1 as + * return value to the caller + */ + tlkd_synchronous_sp_exit(&tlk_ctx, x1); + break; + + /* + * This function ID is used by SP to indicate that it has completed + * handling the secure interrupt. + */ + case TLK_IRQ_DONE: + + if (ns) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + + /* save secure world context */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); + + /* Get a reference to the non-secure context */ + ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); + assert(ns_cpu_context); + + /* + * Restore non-secure state. There is no need to save the + * secure system register context since the SP was supposed + * to preserve it during S-EL1 interrupt handling. + */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + + SMC_RET0(ns_cpu_context); + + /* + * Return the number of service function IDs implemented to + * provide service to non-secure + */ + case TOS_CALL_COUNT: + SMC_RET1(handle, TLK_NUM_FID); + + /* + * Return TLK's UID to the caller + */ + case TOS_UID: + SMC_UUID_RET(handle, tlk_uuid); + + /* + * Return the version of current implementation + */ + case TOS_CALL_VERSION: + SMC_RET2(handle, TLK_VERSION_MAJOR, TLK_VERSION_MINOR); + + default: + WARN("%s: Unhandled SMC: 0x%x\n", __func__, smc_fid); + break; + } + + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); +} + +/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for fast SMC calls */ +DECLARE_RT_SVC( + tlkd_tos_fast, + + OEN_TOS_START, + OEN_TOS_END, + SMC_TYPE_FAST, + tlkd_setup, + tlkd_smc_handler +); + +/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for yielding SMC calls */ +DECLARE_RT_SVC( + tlkd_tos_std, + + OEN_TOS_START, + OEN_TOS_END, + SMC_TYPE_YIELD, + NULL, + tlkd_smc_handler +); + +/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for fast SMC calls */ +DECLARE_RT_SVC( + tlkd_tap_fast, + + OEN_TAP_START, + OEN_TAP_END, + SMC_TYPE_FAST, + NULL, + tlkd_smc_handler +); + +/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for yielding SMC calls */ +DECLARE_RT_SVC( + tlkd_tap_std, + + OEN_TAP_START, + OEN_TAP_END, + SMC_TYPE_YIELD, + NULL, + tlkd_smc_handler +); -- cgit v1.2.3