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/*
* Copyright (c) 2016-2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
#include <assert.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <drivers/auth/auth_mod.h>
#include <plat/common/platform.h>
#if USE_TBBR_DEFS
#include <tools_share/tbbr_oid.h>
#else
#include <platform_oid.h>
#endif
/*
* Store a new non-volatile counter value. This implementation
* only allows updating of the platform's Trusted NV counter when a
* certificate protected by the Trusted NV counter is signed with
* the ROT key. This avoids a compromised secondary certificate from
* updating the platform's Trusted NV counter, which could lead to the
* platform becoming unusable. The function is suitable for all TBBR
* compliant platforms.
*
* Return: 0 = success, Otherwise = error
*/
int plat_set_nv_ctr2(void *cookie, const auth_img_desc_t *img_desc,
unsigned int nv_ctr)
{
int trusted_nv_ctr;
assert(cookie != NULL);
assert(img_desc != NULL);
trusted_nv_ctr = strcmp(cookie, TRUSTED_FW_NVCOUNTER_OID) == 0;
/*
* Only update the Trusted NV Counter if the certificate
* has been signed with the ROT key. Non Trusted NV counter
* updates are unconditional.
*/
if (!trusted_nv_ctr || img_desc->parent == NULL)
return plat_set_nv_ctr(cookie, nv_ctr);
/*
* Trusted certificates not signed with the ROT key are not
* allowed to update the Trusted NV Counter.
*/
return 1;
}
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