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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-28 09:51:24 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-28 09:51:24 +0000
commitf7548d6d28c313cf80e6f3ef89aed16a19815df1 (patch)
treea3f6f2a3f247293bee59ecd28e8cd8ceb6ca064a /src/auth/auth-request-handler.c
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloaddovecot-f7548d6d28c313cf80e6f3ef89aed16a19815df1.tar.xz
dovecot-f7548d6d28c313cf80e6f3ef89aed16a19815df1.zip
Adding upstream version 1:2.3.19.1+dfsg1.upstream/1%2.3.19.1+dfsg1upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/auth/auth-request-handler.c')
-rw-r--r--src/auth/auth-request-handler.c985
1 files changed, 985 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/auth/auth-request-handler.c b/src/auth/auth-request-handler.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d4bf53c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/auth/auth-request-handler.c
@@ -0,0 +1,985 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2005-2018 Dovecot authors, see the included COPYING file */
+
+#include "auth-common.h"
+#include "ioloop.h"
+#include "array.h"
+#include "aqueue.h"
+#include "base64.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "net.h"
+#include "str.h"
+#include "strescape.h"
+#include "str-sanitize.h"
+#include "master-interface.h"
+#include "auth-penalty.h"
+#include "auth-request.h"
+#include "auth-token.h"
+#include "auth-client-connection.h"
+#include "auth-master-connection.h"
+#include "auth-request-handler.h"
+#include "auth-request-handler-private.h"
+#include "auth-policy.h"
+
+#define AUTH_FAILURE_DELAY_CHECK_MSECS 500
+static ARRAY(struct auth_request *) auth_failures_arr;
+static struct aqueue *auth_failures;
+static struct timeout *to_auth_failures;
+
+static void auth_failure_timeout(void *context) ATTR_NULL(1);
+
+
+static void
+auth_request_handler_default_reply_callback(struct auth_request *request,
+ enum auth_client_result result,
+ const void *auth_reply,
+ size_t reply_size);
+
+static void
+auth_request_handler_default_reply_continue(struct auth_request *request,
+ const void *reply,
+ size_t reply_size);
+
+struct auth_request_handler *
+auth_request_handler_create(bool token_auth, auth_client_request_callback_t *callback,
+ struct auth_client_connection *conn,
+ auth_master_request_callback_t *master_callback)
+{
+ struct auth_request_handler *handler;
+ pool_t pool;
+
+ pool = pool_alloconly_create("auth request handler", 4096);
+
+ handler = p_new(pool, struct auth_request_handler, 1);
+ handler->refcount = 1;
+ handler->pool = pool;
+ hash_table_create_direct(&handler->requests, pool, 0);
+ handler->callback = callback;
+ handler->conn = conn;
+ handler->master_callback = master_callback;
+ handler->token_auth = token_auth;
+ handler->reply_callback =
+ auth_request_handler_default_reply_callback;
+ handler->reply_continue_callback =
+ auth_request_handler_default_reply_continue;
+ handler->verify_plain_continue_callback =
+ auth_request_default_verify_plain_continue;
+ return handler;
+}
+
+unsigned int
+auth_request_handler_get_request_count(struct auth_request_handler *handler)
+{
+ return hash_table_count(handler->requests);
+}
+
+void auth_request_handler_abort_requests(struct auth_request_handler *handler)
+{
+ struct hash_iterate_context *iter;
+ void *key;
+ struct auth_request *auth_request;
+
+ iter = hash_table_iterate_init(handler->requests);
+ while (hash_table_iterate(iter, handler->requests, &key, &auth_request)) {
+ switch (auth_request->state) {
+ case AUTH_REQUEST_STATE_NEW:
+ case AUTH_REQUEST_STATE_MECH_CONTINUE:
+ case AUTH_REQUEST_STATE_FINISHED:
+ auth_request->removed_from_handler = TRUE;
+ auth_request_unref(&auth_request);
+ hash_table_remove(handler->requests, key);
+ break;
+ case AUTH_REQUEST_STATE_PASSDB:
+ case AUTH_REQUEST_STATE_USERDB:
+ /* can't abort a pending passdb/userdb lookup */
+ break;
+ case AUTH_REQUEST_STATE_MAX:
+ i_unreached();
+ }
+ }
+ hash_table_iterate_deinit(&iter);
+}
+
+void auth_request_handler_unref(struct auth_request_handler **_handler)
+{
+ struct auth_request_handler *handler = *_handler;
+
+ *_handler = NULL;
+
+ i_assert(handler->refcount > 0);
+ if (--handler->refcount > 0)
+ return;
+
+ i_assert(hash_table_count(handler->requests) == 0);
+
+ /* notify parent that we're done with all requests */
+ handler->callback(NULL, handler->conn);
+
+ hash_table_destroy(&handler->requests);
+ pool_unref(&handler->pool);
+}
+
+void auth_request_handler_destroy(struct auth_request_handler **_handler)
+{
+ struct auth_request_handler *handler = *_handler;
+
+ *_handler = NULL;
+
+ i_assert(!handler->destroyed);
+
+ handler->destroyed = TRUE;
+ auth_request_handler_unref(&handler);
+}
+
+void auth_request_handler_set(struct auth_request_handler *handler,
+ unsigned int connect_uid,
+ unsigned int client_pid)
+{
+ handler->connect_uid = connect_uid;
+ handler->client_pid = client_pid;
+}
+
+static void auth_request_handler_remove(struct auth_request_handler *handler,
+ struct auth_request *request)
+{
+ i_assert(request->handler == handler);
+
+ if (request->removed_from_handler) {
+ /* already removed it */
+ return;
+ }
+ request->removed_from_handler = TRUE;
+
+ /* if db lookup is stuck, this call doesn't actually free the auth
+ request, so make sure we don't get back here. */
+ timeout_remove(&request->to_abort);
+
+ hash_table_remove(handler->requests, POINTER_CAST(request->id));
+ auth_request_unref(&request);
+}
+
+static void
+auth_str_add_keyvalue(string_t *dest, const char *key, const char *value)
+{
+ str_append_c(dest, '\t');
+ str_append(dest, key);
+ str_append_c(dest, '=');
+ str_append_tabescaped(dest, value);
+}
+
+static void
+auth_str_append_extra_fields(struct auth_request *request, string_t *dest)
+{
+ const struct auth_request_fields *fields = &request->fields;
+
+ if (!auth_fields_is_empty(fields->extra_fields)) {
+ str_append_c(dest, '\t');
+ auth_fields_append(fields->extra_fields, dest,
+ AUTH_FIELD_FLAG_HIDDEN, 0);
+ }
+
+ if (fields->original_username != NULL &&
+ null_strcmp(fields->original_username, fields->user) != 0 &&
+ !auth_fields_exists(fields->extra_fields, "original_user")) {
+ auth_str_add_keyvalue(dest, "original_user",
+ fields->original_username);
+ }
+ if (fields->master_user != NULL &&
+ !auth_fields_exists(fields->extra_fields, "auth_user"))
+ auth_str_add_keyvalue(dest, "auth_user", fields->master_user);
+ if (*request->set->anonymous_username != '\0' &&
+ null_strcmp(fields->user, request->set->anonymous_username) == 0) {
+ /* this is an anonymous login, either via ANONYMOUS
+ SASL mechanism or simply logging in as the anonymous
+ user via another mechanism */
+ str_append(dest, "\tanonymous");
+ }
+ if (!request->auth_only &&
+ auth_fields_exists(fields->extra_fields, "proxy")) {
+ /* we're proxying */
+ if (!auth_fields_exists(fields->extra_fields, "pass") &&
+ request->mech_password != NULL) {
+ /* send back the password that was sent by user
+ (not the password in passdb). */
+ auth_str_add_keyvalue(dest, "pass",
+ request->mech_password);
+ }
+ if (fields->master_user != NULL &&
+ !auth_fields_exists(fields->extra_fields, "master") &&
+ *fields->master_user != '\0') {
+ /* the master username needs to be forwarded */
+ auth_str_add_keyvalue(dest, "master",
+ fields->master_user);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+auth_request_handle_failure(struct auth_request *request, const char *reply)
+{
+ struct auth_request_handler *handler = request->handler;
+
+ /* handle failure here */
+ auth_request_log_finished(request);
+
+ if (request->in_delayed_failure_queue) {
+ /* we came here from flush_failures() */
+ handler->callback(reply, handler->conn);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* remove the request from requests-list */
+ auth_request_ref(request);
+ auth_request_handler_remove(handler, request);
+
+ if (request->set->policy_report_after_auth)
+ auth_policy_report(request);
+
+ if (auth_fields_exists(request->fields.extra_fields, "nodelay")) {
+ /* passdb specifically requested not to delay the reply. */
+ handler->callback(reply, handler->conn);
+ auth_request_unref(&request);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* failure. don't announce it immediately to avoid
+ a) timing attacks, b) flooding */
+ request->in_delayed_failure_queue = TRUE;
+ handler->refcount++;
+
+ if (auth_penalty != NULL) {
+ auth_penalty_update(auth_penalty, request,
+ request->last_penalty + 1);
+ }
+
+ auth_request_refresh_last_access(request);
+ aqueue_append(auth_failures, &request);
+ if (to_auth_failures == NULL) {
+ to_auth_failures =
+ timeout_add_short(AUTH_FAILURE_DELAY_CHECK_MSECS,
+ auth_failure_timeout, NULL);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+auth_request_handler_reply_success_finish(struct auth_request *request)
+{
+ struct auth_request_handler *handler = request->handler;
+ string_t *str = t_str_new(128);
+
+ auth_request_log_finished(request);
+
+ if (request->last_penalty != 0 && auth_penalty != NULL) {
+ /* reset penalty */
+ auth_penalty_update(auth_penalty, request, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* sanitize these fields, since the login code currently assumes they
+ are exactly in this format. */
+ auth_fields_booleanize(request->fields.extra_fields, "nologin");
+ auth_fields_booleanize(request->fields.extra_fields, "proxy");
+
+ str_printfa(str, "OK\t%u\tuser=", request->id);
+ str_append_tabescaped(str, request->fields.user);
+ auth_str_append_extra_fields(request, str);
+
+ if (request->set->policy_report_after_auth)
+ auth_policy_report(request);
+
+ if (handler->master_callback == NULL ||
+ auth_fields_exists(request->fields.extra_fields, "nologin") ||
+ auth_fields_exists(request->fields.extra_fields, "proxy")) {
+ /* this request doesn't have to wait for master
+ process to pick it up. delete it */
+ auth_request_handler_remove(handler, request);
+ }
+
+ handler->callback(str_c(str), handler->conn);
+}
+
+static void
+auth_request_handler_reply_failure_finish(struct auth_request *request)
+{
+ const char *code = NULL;
+ string_t *str = t_str_new(128);
+
+ auth_fields_remove(request->fields.extra_fields, "nologin");
+
+ str_printfa(str, "FAIL\t%u", request->id);
+ if (request->fields.user != NULL)
+ auth_str_add_keyvalue(str, "user", request->fields.user);
+ else if (request->fields.original_username != NULL) {
+ auth_str_add_keyvalue(str, "user",
+ request->fields.original_username);
+ }
+
+ if (request->internal_failure) {
+ code = AUTH_CLIENT_FAIL_CODE_TEMPFAIL;
+ } else if (request->fields.master_user != NULL) {
+ /* authentication succeeded, but we can't log in
+ as the wanted user */
+ code = AUTH_CLIENT_FAIL_CODE_AUTHZFAILED;
+ } else {
+ switch (request->passdb_result) {
+ case PASSDB_RESULT_NEXT:
+ case PASSDB_RESULT_INTERNAL_FAILURE:
+ case PASSDB_RESULT_SCHEME_NOT_AVAILABLE:
+ case PASSDB_RESULT_USER_UNKNOWN:
+ case PASSDB_RESULT_PASSWORD_MISMATCH:
+ case PASSDB_RESULT_OK:
+ break;
+ case PASSDB_RESULT_USER_DISABLED:
+ code = AUTH_CLIENT_FAIL_CODE_USER_DISABLED;
+ break;
+ case PASSDB_RESULT_PASS_EXPIRED:
+ code = AUTH_CLIENT_FAIL_CODE_PASS_EXPIRED;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (auth_fields_exists(request->fields.extra_fields, "nodelay")) {
+ /* this is normally a hidden field, need to add it explicitly */
+ str_append(str, "\tnodelay");
+ }
+
+ if (code != NULL) {
+ str_append(str, "\tcode=");
+ str_append(str, code);
+ }
+ auth_str_append_extra_fields(request, str);
+
+ auth_request_handle_failure(request, str_c(str));
+}
+
+static void
+auth_request_handler_proxy_callback(bool success, struct auth_request *request)
+{
+ struct auth_request_handler *handler = request->handler;
+
+ if (success)
+ auth_request_handler_reply_success_finish(request);
+ else
+ auth_request_handler_reply_failure_finish(request);
+ auth_request_handler_unref(&handler);
+}
+
+void auth_request_handler_reply(struct auth_request *request,
+ enum auth_client_result result,
+ const void *auth_reply, size_t reply_size)
+{
+ struct auth_request_handler *handler = request->handler;
+
+ request->handler_pending_reply = FALSE;
+ handler->reply_callback(request, result, auth_reply, reply_size);
+}
+
+static void
+auth_request_handler_default_reply_callback(struct auth_request *request,
+ enum auth_client_result result,
+ const void *auth_reply,
+ size_t reply_size)
+{
+ struct auth_request_handler *handler = request->handler;
+ string_t *str;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (handler->destroyed) {
+ /* the client connection was already closed. we can't do
+ anything but abort this request */
+ request->internal_failure = TRUE;
+ result = AUTH_CLIENT_RESULT_FAILURE;
+ /* make sure this request is set to finished state
+ (it's not with result=continue) */
+ auth_request_set_state(request, AUTH_REQUEST_STATE_FINISHED);
+ }
+
+ switch (result) {
+ case AUTH_CLIENT_RESULT_CONTINUE:
+ str = t_str_new(16 + MAX_BASE64_ENCODED_SIZE(reply_size));
+ str_printfa(str, "CONT\t%u\t", request->id);
+ base64_encode(auth_reply, reply_size, str);
+
+ request->accept_cont_input = TRUE;
+ handler->callback(str_c(str), handler->conn);
+ break;
+ case AUTH_CLIENT_RESULT_SUCCESS:
+ if (reply_size > 0) {
+ str = t_str_new(MAX_BASE64_ENCODED_SIZE(reply_size));
+ base64_encode(auth_reply, reply_size, str);
+ auth_fields_add(request->fields.extra_fields, "resp",
+ str_c(str), 0);
+ }
+ ret = auth_request_proxy_finish(request,
+ auth_request_handler_proxy_callback);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ auth_request_handler_reply_failure_finish(request);
+ else if (ret > 0)
+ auth_request_handler_reply_success_finish(request);
+ else
+ return;
+ break;
+ case AUTH_CLIENT_RESULT_FAILURE:
+ auth_request_proxy_finish_failure(request);
+ auth_request_handler_reply_failure_finish(request);
+ break;
+ }
+ /* NOTE: request may be destroyed now */
+
+ auth_request_handler_unref(&handler);
+}
+
+void auth_request_handler_reply_continue(struct auth_request *request,
+ const void *reply, size_t reply_size)
+{
+ request->handler->reply_continue_callback(request, reply, reply_size);
+}
+
+static void
+auth_request_handler_default_reply_continue(struct auth_request *request,
+ const void *reply,
+ size_t reply_size)
+{
+ auth_request_handler_reply(request, AUTH_CLIENT_RESULT_CONTINUE,
+ reply, reply_size);
+}
+
+void auth_request_handler_abort(struct auth_request *request)
+{
+ i_assert(request->handler_pending_reply);
+
+ /* request destroyed while waiting for auth_request_penalty_finish()
+ to be called. */
+ auth_request_handler_unref(&request->handler);
+}
+
+static void
+auth_request_handler_auth_fail_code(struct auth_request_handler *handler,
+ struct auth_request *request,
+ const char *fail_code, const char *reason)
+{
+ string_t *str = t_str_new(128);
+
+ e_info(request->mech_event, "%s", reason);
+
+ str_printfa(str, "FAIL\t%u", request->id);
+ if (*fail_code != '\0') {
+ str_append(str, "\tcode=");
+ str_append(str, fail_code);
+ }
+ str_append(str, "\treason=");
+ str_append_tabescaped(str, reason);
+
+ handler->callback(str_c(str), handler->conn);
+ auth_request_handler_remove(handler, request);
+}
+
+static void auth_request_handler_auth_fail
+(struct auth_request_handler *handler, struct auth_request *request,
+ const char *reason)
+{
+ auth_request_handler_auth_fail_code(handler, request, "", reason);
+}
+
+static void auth_request_timeout(struct auth_request *request)
+{
+ unsigned int secs = (unsigned int)(time(NULL) - request->last_access);
+
+ if (request->state != AUTH_REQUEST_STATE_MECH_CONTINUE) {
+ /* client's fault */
+ e_error(request->mech_event,
+ "Request %u.%u timed out after %u secs, state=%d",
+ request->handler->client_pid, request->id,
+ secs, request->state);
+ } else if (request->set->verbose) {
+ e_info(request->mech_event,
+ "Request timed out waiting for client to continue authentication "
+ "(%u secs)", secs);
+ }
+ auth_request_handler_remove(request->handler, request);
+}
+
+static void auth_request_penalty_finish(struct auth_request *request)
+{
+ timeout_remove(&request->to_penalty);
+ auth_request_initial(request);
+}
+
+static void
+auth_penalty_callback(unsigned int penalty, struct auth_request *request)
+{
+ unsigned int secs;
+
+ request->last_penalty = penalty;
+
+ if (penalty == 0)
+ auth_request_initial(request);
+ else {
+ secs = auth_penalty_to_secs(penalty);
+ request->to_penalty = timeout_add(secs * 1000,
+ auth_request_penalty_finish,
+ request);
+ }
+}
+
+bool auth_request_handler_auth_begin(struct auth_request_handler *handler,
+ const char *args)
+{
+ const struct mech_module *mech;
+ struct auth_request *request;
+ const char *const *list, *name, *arg, *initial_resp;
+ void *initial_resp_data;
+ unsigned int id;
+ buffer_t *buf;
+
+ i_assert(!handler->destroyed);
+
+ /* <id> <mechanism> [...] */
+ list = t_strsplit_tabescaped(args);
+ if (list[0] == NULL || list[1] == NULL ||
+ str_to_uint(list[0], &id) < 0 || id == 0) {
+ e_error(handler->conn->event,
+ "BUG: Authentication client %u "
+ "sent broken AUTH request", handler->client_pid);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if (handler->token_auth) {
+ mech = &mech_dovecot_token;
+ if (strcmp(list[1], mech->mech_name) != 0) {
+ /* unsupported mechanism */
+ e_error(handler->conn->event,
+ "BUG: Authentication client %u requested invalid "
+ "authentication mechanism %s (DOVECOT-TOKEN required)",
+ handler->client_pid, str_sanitize(list[1], MAX_MECH_NAME_LEN));
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ } else {
+ struct auth *auth_default = auth_default_service();
+ mech = mech_register_find(auth_default->reg, list[1]);
+ if (mech == NULL) {
+ /* unsupported mechanism */
+ e_error(handler->conn->event,
+ "BUG: Authentication client %u requested unsupported "
+ "authentication mechanism %s", handler->client_pid,
+ str_sanitize(list[1], MAX_MECH_NAME_LEN));
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ request = auth_request_new(mech, handler->conn->event);
+ request->handler = handler;
+ request->connect_uid = handler->connect_uid;
+ request->client_pid = handler->client_pid;
+ request->id = id;
+ request->auth_only = handler->master_callback == NULL;
+
+ /* parse optional parameters */
+ initial_resp = NULL;
+ for (list += 2; *list != NULL; list++) {
+ arg = strchr(*list, '=');
+ if (arg == NULL) {
+ name = *list;
+ arg = "";
+ } else {
+ name = t_strdup_until(*list, arg);
+ arg++;
+ }
+
+ if (auth_request_import_auth(request, name, arg))
+ ;
+ else if (strcmp(name, "resp") == 0) {
+ initial_resp = arg;
+ /* this must be the last parameter */
+ list++;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (*list != NULL) {
+ e_error(handler->conn->event,
+ "BUG: Authentication client %u "
+ "sent AUTH parameters after 'resp'",
+ handler->client_pid);
+ auth_request_unref(&request);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if (request->fields.service == NULL) {
+ e_error(handler->conn->event,
+ "BUG: Authentication client %u "
+ "didn't specify service in request",
+ handler->client_pid);
+ auth_request_unref(&request);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ if (hash_table_lookup(handler->requests, POINTER_CAST(id)) != NULL) {
+ e_error(handler->conn->event,
+ "BUG: Authentication client %u "
+ "sent a duplicate ID %u", handler->client_pid, id);
+ auth_request_unref(&request);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ auth_request_init(request);
+
+ request->to_abort = timeout_add(MASTER_AUTH_SERVER_TIMEOUT_SECS * 1000,
+ auth_request_timeout, request);
+ hash_table_insert(handler->requests, POINTER_CAST(id), request);
+
+ if (request->set->ssl_require_client_cert &&
+ !request->fields.valid_client_cert) {
+ /* we fail without valid certificate */
+ auth_request_handler_auth_fail(handler, request,
+ "Client didn't present valid SSL certificate");
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+
+ if (request->set->ssl_require_client_cert &&
+ request->set->ssl_username_from_cert &&
+ !request->fields.cert_username) {
+ auth_request_handler_auth_fail(handler, request,
+ "SSL certificate didn't contain username");
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+
+ /* Handle initial respose */
+ if (initial_resp == NULL) {
+ /* No initial response */
+ request->initial_response = NULL;
+ request->initial_response_len = 0;
+ } else if (handler->conn->version_minor < 2 && *initial_resp == '\0') {
+ /* Some authentication clients like Exim send and empty initial
+ response field when it is in fact absent in the
+ authentication command. This was allowed for older versions
+ of the Dovecot authentication protocol. */
+ request->initial_response = NULL;
+ request->initial_response_len = 0;
+ } else if (*initial_resp == '\0' || strcmp(initial_resp, "=") == 0 ) {
+ /* Empty initial response - Protocols that use SASL often
+ use '=' to indicate an empty initial response; i.e., to
+ distinguish it from an absent initial response. However, that
+ should not be conveyed to the SASL layer (it is not even
+ valid Base64); only the empty string should be passed on.
+ Still, we recognize it here anyway, because we used to make
+ the same mistake. */
+ request->initial_response = uchar_empty_ptr;
+ request->initial_response_len = 0;
+ } else {
+ size_t len = strlen(initial_resp);
+
+ /* Initial response encoded in Bas64 */
+ buf = t_buffer_create(MAX_BASE64_DECODED_SIZE(len));
+ if (base64_decode(initial_resp, len, NULL, buf) < 0) {
+ auth_request_handler_auth_fail_code(handler, request,
+ AUTH_CLIENT_FAIL_CODE_INVALID_BASE64,
+ "Invalid base64 data in initial response");
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+ initial_resp_data =
+ p_malloc(request->pool, I_MAX(buf->used, 1));
+ memcpy(initial_resp_data, buf->data, buf->used);
+ request->initial_response = initial_resp_data;
+ request->initial_response_len = buf->used;
+ }
+
+ /* handler is referenced until auth_request_handler_reply()
+ is called. */
+ handler->refcount++;
+ request->handler_pending_reply = TRUE;
+
+ /* before we start authenticating, see if we need to wait first */
+ auth_penalty_lookup(auth_penalty, request, auth_penalty_callback);
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+bool auth_request_handler_auth_continue(struct auth_request_handler *handler,
+ const char *args)
+{
+ struct auth_request *request;
+ const char *data;
+ size_t data_len;
+ buffer_t *buf;
+ unsigned int id;
+
+ data = strchr(args, '\t');
+ if (data == NULL || str_to_uint(t_strdup_until(args, data), &id) < 0) {
+ e_error(handler->conn->event,
+ "BUG: Authentication client sent broken CONT request");
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ data++;
+
+ request = hash_table_lookup(handler->requests, POINTER_CAST(id));
+ if (request == NULL) {
+ const char *reply = t_strdup_printf(
+ "FAIL\t%u\treason=Authentication request timed out", id);
+ handler->callback(reply, handler->conn);
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+
+ /* accept input only once after mechanism has sent a CONT reply */
+ if (!request->accept_cont_input) {
+ auth_request_handler_auth_fail(handler, request,
+ "Unexpected continuation");
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+ request->accept_cont_input = FALSE;
+
+ data_len = strlen(data);
+ buf = t_buffer_create(MAX_BASE64_DECODED_SIZE(data_len));
+ if (base64_decode(data, data_len, NULL, buf) < 0) {
+ auth_request_handler_auth_fail_code(handler, request,
+ AUTH_CLIENT_FAIL_CODE_INVALID_BASE64,
+ "Invalid base64 data in continued response");
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+
+ /* handler is referenced until auth_request_handler_reply()
+ is called. */
+ handler->refcount++;
+ auth_request_continue(request, buf->data, buf->used);
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+static void auth_str_append_userdb_extra_fields(struct auth_request *request,
+ string_t *dest)
+{
+ str_append_c(dest, '\t');
+ auth_fields_append(request->fields.userdb_reply, dest,
+ AUTH_FIELD_FLAG_HIDDEN, 0);
+
+ if (request->fields.master_user != NULL &&
+ !auth_fields_exists(request->fields.userdb_reply, "master_user")) {
+ auth_str_add_keyvalue(dest, "master_user",
+ request->fields.master_user);
+ }
+ auth_str_add_keyvalue(dest, "auth_mech", request->mech->mech_name);
+ if (*request->set->anonymous_username != '\0' &&
+ strcmp(request->fields.user, request->set->anonymous_username) == 0) {
+ /* this is an anonymous login, either via ANONYMOUS
+ SASL mechanism or simply logging in as the anonymous
+ user via another mechanism */
+ str_append(dest, "\tanonymous");
+ }
+ /* generate auth_token when master service provided session_pid */
+ if (request->request_auth_token &&
+ request->session_pid != (pid_t)-1) {
+ const char *auth_token =
+ auth_token_get(request->fields.service,
+ dec2str(request->session_pid),
+ request->fields.user,
+ request->fields.session_id);
+ auth_str_add_keyvalue(dest, "auth_token", auth_token);
+ }
+ if (request->fields.master_user != NULL) {
+ auth_str_add_keyvalue(dest, "auth_user",
+ request->fields.master_user);
+ } else if (request->fields.original_username != NULL &&
+ strcmp(request->fields.original_username,
+ request->fields.user) != 0) {
+ auth_str_add_keyvalue(dest, "auth_user",
+ request->fields.original_username);
+ }
+}
+
+static void userdb_callback(enum userdb_result result,
+ struct auth_request *request)
+{
+ struct auth_request_handler *handler = request->handler;
+ string_t *str;
+ const char *value;
+
+ i_assert(request->state == AUTH_REQUEST_STATE_USERDB);
+
+ auth_request_set_state(request, AUTH_REQUEST_STATE_FINISHED);
+
+ if (request->userdb_lookup_tempfailed)
+ result = USERDB_RESULT_INTERNAL_FAILURE;
+
+ str = t_str_new(128);
+ switch (result) {
+ case USERDB_RESULT_INTERNAL_FAILURE:
+ str_printfa(str, "FAIL\t%u", request->id);
+ if (request->userdb_lookup_tempfailed) {
+ value = auth_fields_find(request->fields.userdb_reply,
+ "reason");
+ if (value != NULL)
+ auth_str_add_keyvalue(str, "reason", value);
+ }
+ break;
+ case USERDB_RESULT_USER_UNKNOWN:
+ str_printfa(str, "NOTFOUND\t%u", request->id);
+ break;
+ case USERDB_RESULT_OK:
+ str_printfa(str, "USER\t%u\t", request->id);
+ str_append_tabescaped(str, request->fields.user);
+ auth_str_append_userdb_extra_fields(request, str);
+ break;
+ }
+ handler->master_callback(str_c(str), request->master);
+
+ auth_master_connection_unref(&request->master);
+ auth_request_unref(&request);
+ auth_request_handler_unref(&handler);
+}
+
+static bool
+auth_master_request_failed(struct auth_request_handler *handler,
+ struct auth_master_connection *master,
+ unsigned int id)
+{
+ if (handler->master_callback == NULL)
+ return FALSE;
+ handler->master_callback(t_strdup_printf("FAIL\t%u", id), master);
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+bool auth_request_handler_master_request(struct auth_request_handler *handler,
+ struct auth_master_connection *master,
+ unsigned int id, unsigned int client_id,
+ const char *const *params)
+{
+ struct auth_request *request;
+ struct net_unix_cred cred;
+
+ request = hash_table_lookup(handler->requests, POINTER_CAST(client_id));
+ if (request == NULL) {
+ e_error(master->event, "Master request %u.%u not found",
+ handler->client_pid, client_id);
+ return auth_master_request_failed(handler, master, id);
+ }
+
+ auth_request_ref(request);
+ auth_request_handler_remove(handler, request);
+
+ for (; *params != NULL; params++) {
+ const char *name, *param = strchr(*params, '=');
+
+ if (param == NULL) {
+ name = *params;
+ param = "";
+ } else {
+ name = t_strdup_until(*params, param);
+ param++;
+ }
+
+ (void)auth_request_import_master(request, name, param);
+ }
+
+ /* verify session pid if specified and possible */
+ if (request->session_pid != (pid_t)-1 &&
+ net_getunixcred(master->fd, &cred) == 0 &&
+ cred.pid != (pid_t)-1 && request->session_pid != cred.pid) {
+ e_error(master->event,
+ "Session pid %ld provided by master for request %u.%u "
+ "did not match peer credentials (pid=%ld, uid=%ld)",
+ (long)request->session_pid,
+ handler->client_pid, client_id,
+ (long)cred.pid, (long)cred.uid);
+ return auth_master_request_failed(handler, master, id);
+ }
+
+ if (request->state != AUTH_REQUEST_STATE_FINISHED ||
+ !request->fields.successful) {
+ e_error(master->event,
+ "Master requested unfinished authentication request "
+ "%u.%u", handler->client_pid, client_id);
+ handler->master_callback(t_strdup_printf("FAIL\t%u", id),
+ master);
+ auth_request_unref(&request);
+ } else {
+ /* the request isn't being referenced anywhere anymore,
+ so we can do a bit of kludging.. replace the request's
+ old client_id with master's id. */
+ auth_request_set_state(request, AUTH_REQUEST_STATE_USERDB);
+ request->id = id;
+ request->master = master;
+
+ /* master and handler are referenced until userdb_callback i
+ s called. */
+ auth_master_connection_ref(master);
+ handler->refcount++;
+ auth_request_lookup_user(request, userdb_callback);
+ }
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+void auth_request_handler_cancel_request(struct auth_request_handler *handler,
+ unsigned int client_id)
+{
+ struct auth_request *request;
+
+ request = hash_table_lookup(handler->requests, POINTER_CAST(client_id));
+ if (request != NULL)
+ auth_request_handler_remove(handler, request);
+}
+
+void auth_request_handler_flush_failures(bool flush_all)
+{
+ struct auth_request **auth_requests, *auth_request;
+ unsigned int i, j, count;
+ time_t diff;
+
+ count = aqueue_count(auth_failures);
+ if (count == 0) {
+ timeout_remove(&to_auth_failures);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ auth_requests = array_front_modifiable(&auth_failures_arr);
+ /* count the number of requests that we need to flush */
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ auth_request = auth_requests[aqueue_idx(auth_failures, i)];
+
+ /* FIXME: assumes that failure_delay is always the same. */
+ diff = ioloop_time - auth_request->last_access;
+ if (diff < (time_t)auth_request->set->failure_delay &&
+ !flush_all)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* shuffle these requests to try to prevent any kind of timing attacks
+ where attacker performs multiple requests in parallel and attempts
+ to figure out results based on the order of replies. */
+ count = i;
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ j = random() % (count - i) + i;
+ auth_request = auth_requests[aqueue_idx(auth_failures, i)];
+
+ /* swap i & j */
+ auth_requests[aqueue_idx(auth_failures, i)] =
+ auth_requests[aqueue_idx(auth_failures, j)];
+ auth_requests[aqueue_idx(auth_failures, j)] = auth_request;
+ }
+
+ /* flush the requests */
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ auth_request = auth_requests[aqueue_idx(auth_failures, 0)];
+ aqueue_delete_tail(auth_failures);
+
+ i_assert(auth_request != NULL);
+ i_assert(auth_request->state == AUTH_REQUEST_STATE_FINISHED);
+ auth_request_handler_reply(auth_request,
+ AUTH_CLIENT_RESULT_FAILURE,
+ uchar_empty_ptr, 0);
+ auth_request_unref(&auth_request);
+ }
+}
+
+static void auth_failure_timeout(void *context ATTR_UNUSED)
+{
+ auth_request_handler_flush_failures(FALSE);
+}
+
+void auth_request_handler_init(void)
+{
+ i_array_init(&auth_failures_arr, 128);
+ auth_failures = aqueue_init(&auth_failures_arr.arr);
+}
+
+void auth_request_handler_deinit(void)
+{
+ auth_request_handler_flush_failures(TRUE);
+ array_free(&auth_failures_arr);
+ aqueue_deinit(&auth_failures);
+
+ timeout_remove(&to_auth_failures);
+}