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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-28 09:49:46 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-28 09:49:46 +0000 |
commit | 50b37d4a27d3295a29afca2286f1a5a086142cec (patch) | |
tree | 9212f763934ee090ef72d823f559f52ce387f268 /src/main/auth.c | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | freeradius-b44c43f84b67b16f7897077658751679f7087fa7.tar.xz freeradius-b44c43f84b67b16f7897077658751679f7087fa7.zip |
Adding upstream version 3.2.1+dfsg.upstream/3.2.1+dfsgupstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/main/auth.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/main/auth.c | 890 |
1 files changed, 890 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/main/auth.c b/src/main/auth.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..76f87b7 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/main/auth.c @@ -0,0 +1,890 @@ +/* + * auth.c User authentication. + * + * Version: $Id$ + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA + * + * Copyright 2000,2006 The FreeRADIUS server project + * Copyright 2000 Miquel van Smoorenburg <miquels@cistron.nl> + * Copyright 2000 Jeff Carneal <jeff@apex.net> + */ +RCSID("$Id$") + +#include <freeradius-devel/radiusd.h> +#include <freeradius-devel/modules.h> +#include <freeradius-devel/state.h> +#include <freeradius-devel/rad_assert.h> + +#include <ctype.h> + +/* + * Return a short string showing the terminal server, port + * and calling station ID. + */ +char *auth_name(char *buf, size_t buflen, REQUEST *request, bool do_cli) +{ + VALUE_PAIR *cli; + VALUE_PAIR *pair; + uint32_t port = 0; /* RFC 2865 NAS-Port is 4 bytes */ + char const *tls = ""; + + if ((cli = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->packet->vps, PW_CALLING_STATION_ID, 0, TAG_ANY)) == NULL) { + do_cli = false; + } + + if ((pair = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->packet->vps, PW_NAS_PORT, 0, TAG_ANY)) != NULL) { + port = pair->vp_integer; + } + + if (request->packet->dst_port == 0) { + if (fr_pair_find_by_num(request->packet->vps, PW_FREERADIUS_PROXIED_TO, 0, TAG_ANY)) { + tls = " via TLS tunnel"; + } else { + tls = " via proxy to virtual server"; + } + } + + snprintf(buf, buflen, "from client %.128s port %u%s%.128s%s", + request->client->shortname, port, + (do_cli ? " cli " : ""), (do_cli ? cli->vp_strvalue : ""), + tls); + + return buf; +} + + + +/* + * Make sure user/pass are clean + * and then log them + */ +static int rad_authlog(char const *msg, REQUEST *request, int goodpass) +{ + int logit; + char const *extra_msg = NULL; + char clean_password[1024]; + char clean_username[1024]; + char buf[1024]; + char extra[1024]; + char *p; + VALUE_PAIR *username = NULL; + + if ((request->reply->code == PW_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT) && !request->root->log_accept) { + return 0; + } + + if ((request->reply->code == PW_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT) && !request->root->log_reject) { + return 0; + } + + /* + * Get the correct username based on the configured value + */ + if (!log_stripped_names) { + username = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->packet->vps, PW_USER_NAME, 0, TAG_ANY); + } else { + username = request->username; + } + + /* + * Clean up the username + */ + if (username == NULL) { + strcpy(clean_username, "<no User-Name attribute>"); + } else { + fr_prints(clean_username, sizeof(clean_username), username->vp_strvalue, username->vp_length, '\0'); + } + + /* + * Clean up the password + */ + if (request->root->log_auth_badpass || request->root->log_auth_goodpass) { + if (!request->password) { + VALUE_PAIR *auth_type; + + auth_type = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->config, PW_AUTH_TYPE, 0, TAG_ANY); + if (auth_type) { + snprintf(clean_password, sizeof(clean_password), + "<via Auth-Type = %s>", + dict_valnamebyattr(PW_AUTH_TYPE, 0, + auth_type->vp_integer)); + } else { + strcpy(clean_password, "<no User-Password attribute>"); + } + } else if (fr_pair_find_by_num(request->packet->vps, PW_CHAP_PASSWORD, 0, TAG_ANY)) { + strcpy(clean_password, "<CHAP-Password>"); + } else { + fr_prints(clean_password, sizeof(clean_password), + request->password->vp_strvalue, request->password->vp_length, '\0'); + } + } + + if (goodpass) { + logit = request->root->log_auth_goodpass; + extra_msg = request->root->auth_goodpass_msg; + } else { + logit = request->root->log_auth_badpass; + extra_msg = request->root->auth_badpass_msg; + } + + if (extra_msg) { + extra[0] = ' '; + p = extra + 1; + if (radius_xlat(p, sizeof(extra) - 1, request, extra_msg, NULL, NULL) < 0) { + return -1; + } + } else { + *extra = '\0'; + } + + RAUTH("%s: [%s%s%s] (%s)%s", + msg, + clean_username, + logit ? "/" : "", + logit ? clean_password : "", + auth_name(buf, sizeof(buf), request, 1), + extra); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Check password. + * + * Returns: 0 OK + * -1 Password fail + * -2 Rejected (Auth-Type = Reject, send Port-Message back) + * 1 End check & return, don't reply + * + * NOTE: NOT the same as the RLM_ values ! + */ +static int CC_HINT(nonnull) rad_check_password(REQUEST *request) +{ + vp_cursor_t cursor; + VALUE_PAIR *auth_type_pair; + int auth_type = -1; + int result; + int auth_type_count = 0; + + /* + * Look for matching check items. We skip the whole lot + * if the authentication type is PW_AUTH_TYPE_ACCEPT or + * PW_AUTH_TYPE_REJECT. + */ + fr_cursor_init(&cursor, &request->config); + while ((auth_type_pair = fr_cursor_next_by_num(&cursor, PW_AUTH_TYPE, 0, TAG_ANY))) { + auth_type = auth_type_pair->vp_integer; + auth_type_count++; + + RDEBUG2("Found Auth-Type = %s", dict_valnamebyattr(PW_AUTH_TYPE, 0, auth_type)); + if (auth_type == PW_AUTH_TYPE_REJECT) { + RDEBUG2("Auth-Type = Reject, rejecting user"); + + return -2; + } + } + + /* + * Warn if more than one Auth-Type was found, because only the last + * one found will actually be used. + */ + if ((auth_type_count > 1) && (rad_debug_lvl) && request->username) { + RERROR("Warning: Found %d auth-types on request for user '%s'", + auth_type_count, request->username->vp_strvalue); + } + + /* + * This means we have a proxy reply or an accept and it wasn't + * rejected in the above loop. So that means it is accepted and we + * do no further authentication. + */ + if ((auth_type == PW_AUTH_TYPE_ACCEPT) +#ifdef WITH_PROXY + || (request->proxy) +#endif + ) { + RDEBUG2("Auth-Type = Accept, accepting the user"); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Check that Auth-Type has been set, and reject if not. + * + * Do quick checks to see if Cleartext-Password or Crypt-Password have + * been set, and complain if so. + */ + if (auth_type < 0) { + if (fr_pair_find_by_num(request->config, PW_CRYPT_PASSWORD, 0, TAG_ANY) != NULL) { + RWDEBUG2("No module configured to handle comparisons with &control:Crypt-Password"); + RWDEBUG2("Add pap to the authorize { ... } and authenticate { ... } sections of this " + "virtual server to handle this \"known good\" password type"); + } + else if (fr_pair_find_by_num(request->config, PW_CLEARTEXT_PASSWORD, 0, TAG_ANY) != NULL) { + RWDEBUG2("No module configured to handle comparisons with &control:Cleartext-Password"); + RWDEBUG2("Add pap or chap to the authorize { ... } and authenticate { ... } sections " + "of this virtual server to handle this \"known good\" password type"); + } + + /* + * The admin hasn't told us how to + * authenticate the user, so we reject them! + * + * This is fail-safe. + */ + + REDEBUG2("No Auth-Type found: rejecting the user via Post-Auth-Type = Reject"); + return -2; + } + + /* + * See if there is a module that handles + * this Auth-Type, and turn the RLM_ return + * status into the values as defined at + * the top of this function. + */ + result = process_authenticate(auth_type, request); + switch (result) { + /* + * An authentication module FAIL + * return code, or any return code that + * is not expected from authentication, + * is the same as an explicit REJECT! + */ + case RLM_MODULE_FAIL: + case RLM_MODULE_INVALID: + case RLM_MODULE_NOOP: + case RLM_MODULE_NOTFOUND: + case RLM_MODULE_REJECT: + case RLM_MODULE_UPDATED: + case RLM_MODULE_USERLOCK: + default: + result = -1; + break; + + case RLM_MODULE_OK: + result = 0; + break; + + case RLM_MODULE_HANDLED: + result = 1; + break; + } + + return result; +} + +/* + * Post-authentication step processes the response before it is + * sent to the NAS. It can receive both Access-Accept and Access-Reject + * replies. + */ +int rad_postauth(REQUEST *request) +{ + int result; + int postauth_type = 0; + VALUE_PAIR *vp; + + if (request->reply->code == PW_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE) { + fr_pair_delete_by_num(&request->config, PW_POST_AUTH_TYPE, 0, TAG_ANY); + vp = pair_make_config("Post-Auth-Type", "Challenge", T_OP_SET); + if (!vp) return RLM_MODULE_OK; + + } else if (request->reply->code == PW_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT) { + fr_pair_delete_by_num(&request->config, PW_POST_AUTH_TYPE, 0, TAG_ANY); + vp = pair_make_config("Post-Auth-Type", "Reject", T_OP_SET); + if (!vp) return RLM_MODULE_OK; + + } else { + vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->config, PW_POST_AUTH_TYPE, 0, TAG_ANY); + } + + /* + * If a method was chosen, use that. + */ + if (vp) { + postauth_type = vp->vp_integer; + RDEBUG2("Using Post-Auth-Type %s", + dict_valnamebyattr(PW_POST_AUTH_TYPE, 0, postauth_type)); + } + + result = process_post_auth(postauth_type, request); + switch (result) { + /* + * The module failed, or said to reject the user: Do so. + */ + case RLM_MODULE_FAIL: + case RLM_MODULE_INVALID: + case RLM_MODULE_REJECT: + case RLM_MODULE_USERLOCK: + default: + /* + * We WERE going to have a nice reply, but + * something went wrong. So we've got to run + * Post-Auth-Type Reject. + */ + if (request->reply->code != PW_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT) { + RDEBUG("Using Post-Auth-Type Reject"); + + request->reply->code = PW_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT; + process_post_auth(PW_POST_AUTH_TYPE_REJECT, request); + } + + /* + * Only discard session state when we're sending + * packets to the network. The State attribute + * is use both for the outer session and copied + * to the inner-tunnel session for (e.g.) PEAP. + * So we don't want to delete the information in + * the inner tunnel, and then have it no longer + * accessible from the outer session. + */ + if (!request->parent) fr_state_discard(request, request->packet); + result = RLM_MODULE_REJECT; + break; + /* + * The module handled the request, cancel the reply. + */ + case RLM_MODULE_HANDLED: + /* FIXME */ + break; + /* + * The module had a number of OK return codes. + */ + case RLM_MODULE_NOOP: + case RLM_MODULE_NOTFOUND: + case RLM_MODULE_OK: + case RLM_MODULE_UPDATED: + result = RLM_MODULE_OK; + + if (request->reply->code == PW_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE) { + fr_state_put_vps(request, request->packet, request->reply); + + } else { + fr_state_discard(request, request->packet); + } + break; + } + + /* + * Rejects during authorize, etc. are handled by the + * earlier code, which logs a reason for the rejection. + * If the packet is rejected in post-auth, we need to log + * that as a separate reason. + */ + if (result == RLM_MODULE_REJECT) { + if (request->reply->code != RLM_MODULE_REJECT) { + rad_authlog("Rejected in post-auth", request, 0); + } + request->reply->code = PW_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT; + } + + if (request->reply->code == PW_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT) { + if ((vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->packet->vps, PW_MODULE_FAILURE_MESSAGE, 0, TAG_ANY)) != NULL) { + char msg[MAX_STRING_LEN+19]; + + snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "Login incorrect (%s)", + vp->vp_strvalue); + rad_authlog(msg, request, 0); + } else { + rad_authlog("Login incorrect", request, 0); + } + } + + /* + * If we're still accepting the user, say so. + */ + if (request->reply->code == PW_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT) { + if ((vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->packet->vps, PW_MODULE_SUCCESS_MESSAGE, 0, TAG_ANY)) != NULL) { + char msg[MAX_STRING_LEN+12]; + + snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "Login OK (%s)", + vp->vp_strvalue); + rad_authlog(msg, request, 1); + } else { + rad_authlog("Login OK", request, 1); + } + } + + return result; +} + +/* + * Process and reply to an authentication request + * + * The return value of this function isn't actually used right now, so + * it's not entirely clear if it is returning the right things. --Pac. + */ +int rad_authenticate(REQUEST *request) +{ +#ifdef WITH_SESSION_MGMT + VALUE_PAIR *check_item; +#endif + VALUE_PAIR *module_msg; + VALUE_PAIR *tmp = NULL; + int result; + char autz_retry = 0; + int autz_type = 0; + +#ifdef WITH_PROXY + /* + * If this request got proxied to another server, we need + * to check whether it authenticated the request or not. + * + * request->proxy gets set only AFTER authorization, so + * it's safe to check it here. If it exists, it means + * we're doing a second pass through rad_authenticate(). + */ + if (request->proxy) { + int code = 0; + + if (request->proxy_reply) code = request->proxy_reply->code; + + switch (code) { + /* + * Reply of ACCEPT means accept, thus set Auth-Type + * accordingly. + */ + case PW_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT: + tmp = radius_pair_create(request, + &request->config, + PW_AUTH_TYPE, 0); + if (tmp) tmp->vp_integer = PW_AUTH_TYPE_ACCEPT; + goto authenticate; + + /* + * Challenges are punted back to the NAS without any + * further processing. + */ + case PW_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE: + request->reply->code = PW_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE; + fr_state_put_vps(request, request->packet, request->reply); + return RLM_MODULE_OK; + + /* + * ALL other replies mean reject. (this is fail-safe) + * + * Do NOT do any authorization or authentication. They + * are being rejected, so we minimize the amount of work + * done by the server, by rejecting them here. + */ + case PW_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT: + request->reply->code = PW_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT; + rad_authlog("Login incorrect (Home Server says so)", + request, 0); + return RLM_MODULE_REJECT; + + default: + rad_authlog("Login incorrect (Home Server failed to respond)", + request, 0); + return RLM_MODULE_REJECT; + } + } +#endif + /* + * Look for, and cache, passwords. + */ + if (!request->password) { + request->password = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->packet->vps, PW_USER_PASSWORD, 0, TAG_ANY); + } + if (!request->password) { + request->password = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->packet->vps, PW_CHAP_PASSWORD, 0, TAG_ANY); + } + + /* + * Grab the VPS associated with the State attribute. + */ + fr_state_get_vps(request, request->packet); + + /* + * Get the user's authorization information from the database + */ +autz_redo: + result = process_authorize(autz_type, request); + switch (result) { + case RLM_MODULE_NOOP: + case RLM_MODULE_NOTFOUND: + case RLM_MODULE_OK: + case RLM_MODULE_UPDATED: + break; + case RLM_MODULE_HANDLED: + return result; + case RLM_MODULE_FAIL: + case RLM_MODULE_INVALID: + case RLM_MODULE_REJECT: + case RLM_MODULE_USERLOCK: + default: + request->reply->code = PW_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT; + if ((module_msg = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->packet->vps, PW_MODULE_FAILURE_MESSAGE, 0, TAG_ANY)) != NULL) { + char msg[MAX_STRING_LEN + 16]; + snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "Invalid user (%s)", + module_msg->vp_strvalue); + rad_authlog(msg,request,0); + } else { + rad_authlog("Invalid user", request, 0); + } + return result; + } + if (!autz_retry) { + tmp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->config, PW_AUTZ_TYPE, 0, TAG_ANY); + if (tmp) { + autz_type = tmp->vp_integer; + RDEBUG2("Using Autz-Type %s", + dict_valnamebyattr(PW_AUTZ_TYPE, 0, autz_type)); + autz_retry = 1; + goto autz_redo; + } + } + + /* + * If we haven't already proxied the packet, then check + * to see if we should. Maybe one of the authorize + * modules has decided that a proxy should be used. If + * so, get out of here and send the packet. + */ +#ifdef WITH_PROXY + if (request->proxy == NULL) +#endif + { + if ((tmp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->config, PW_PROXY_TO_REALM, 0, TAG_ANY)) != NULL) { + REALM *realm; + + realm = realm_find2(tmp->vp_strvalue); + + /* + * Don't authenticate, as the request is going to + * be proxied. + */ + if (realm && realm->auth_pool) { + return RLM_MODULE_OK; + } + + /* + * Catch users who set Proxy-To-Realm to a LOCAL + * realm (sigh). But don't complain if it is + * *the* LOCAL realm. + */ + if (realm && (strcmp(realm->name, "LOCAL") != 0)) { + RWDEBUG2("You set Proxy-To-Realm = %s, but it is a LOCAL realm! Cancelling proxy request.", realm->name); + } + + if (!realm) { + RWDEBUG2("You set Proxy-To-Realm = %s, but the realm does not exist! Cancelling invalid proxy request.", tmp->vp_strvalue); + } + } else if (((tmp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->config, PW_HOME_SERVER_POOL, 0, TAG_ANY)) != NULL) || + ((tmp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->config, PW_PACKET_DST_IP_ADDRESS, 0, TAG_ANY)) != NULL) || + ((tmp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->config, PW_PACKET_DST_IPV6_ADDRESS, 0, TAG_ANY)) != NULL) || + ((tmp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->config, PW_HOME_SERVER_NAME, 0, TAG_ANY)) != NULL)) { + RDEBUG("Proxying due to %s", tmp->da->name); + return RLM_MODULE_OK; + } + } + +#ifdef WITH_PROXY +authenticate: +#endif + + /* + * Validate the user + */ + do { + result = rad_check_password(request); + if (result > 0) { + return RLM_MODULE_HANDLED; + } + + } while(0); + + /* + * Failed to validate the user. + * + * We PRESUME that the code which failed will clean up + * request->reply->vps, to be ONLY the reply items it + * wants to send back. + */ + if (result < 0) { + RDEBUG2("Failed to authenticate the user"); + request->reply->code = PW_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT; + + if (request->password) { + VERIFY_VP(request->password); + /* double check: maybe the secret is wrong? */ + if ((rad_debug_lvl > 1) && (request->password->da->attr == PW_USER_PASSWORD)) { + uint8_t const *p; + + p = (uint8_t const *) request->password->vp_strvalue; + while (*p) { + int size; + + size = fr_utf8_char(p, -1); + if (!size) { + RWDEBUG("Unprintable characters in the password. Double-check the " + "shared secret on the server and the NAS!"); + break; + } + p += size; + } + } + } + } + +#ifdef WITH_SESSION_MGMT + if (result >= 0 && + (check_item = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->config, PW_SIMULTANEOUS_USE, 0, TAG_ANY)) != NULL) { + int r, session_type = 0; + char logstr[1024]; + char umsg[MAX_STRING_LEN + 1]; + + tmp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->config, PW_SESSION_TYPE, 0, TAG_ANY); + if (tmp) { + session_type = tmp->vp_integer; + RDEBUG2("Using Session-Type %s", + dict_valnamebyattr(PW_SESSION_TYPE, 0, session_type)); + } + + /* + * User authenticated O.K. Now we have to check + * for the Simultaneous-Use parameter. + */ + if (request->username && + (r = process_checksimul(session_type, request, check_item->vp_integer)) != 0) { + char mpp_ok = 0; + + if (r == 2){ + /* Multilink attempt. Check if port-limit > simultaneous-use */ + VALUE_PAIR *port_limit; + + if ((port_limit = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->reply->vps, PW_PORT_LIMIT, 0, TAG_ANY)) != NULL && + port_limit->vp_integer > check_item->vp_integer){ + RDEBUG2("MPP is OK"); + mpp_ok = 1; + } + } + if (!mpp_ok){ + if (check_item->vp_integer > 1) { + snprintf(umsg, sizeof(umsg), "%s (%u)", main_config.denied_msg, + check_item->vp_integer); + } else { + strlcpy(umsg, main_config.denied_msg, sizeof(umsg)); + } + + request->reply->code = PW_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT; + + /* + * They're trying to log in too many times. + * Remove ALL reply attributes. + */ + fr_pair_list_free(&request->reply->vps); + pair_make_reply("Reply-Message", umsg, T_OP_SET); + + snprintf(logstr, sizeof(logstr), "Multiple logins (max %d) %s", + check_item->vp_integer, + r == 2 ? "[MPP attempt]" : ""); + rad_authlog(logstr, request, 1); + + result = -1; + } + } + } +#endif + + /* + * Result should be >= 0 here - if not, it means the user + * is rejected, so we just process post-auth and return. + */ + if (result < 0) { + return RLM_MODULE_REJECT; + } + + /* + * Set the reply to Access-Accept, if it hasn't already + * been set to something. (i.e. Access-Challenge) + */ + if (request->reply->code == 0) { + request->reply->code = PW_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT; + } + + return result; +} + +/* + * Run a virtual server auth and postauth + * + */ +int rad_virtual_server(REQUEST *request) +{ + VALUE_PAIR *vp; + int result; + + RDEBUG("Virtual server %s received request", request->server); + rdebug_pair_list(L_DBG_LVL_1, request, request->packet->vps, NULL); + + if (!request->username) { + request->username = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->packet->vps, PW_USER_NAME, 0, TAG_ANY); + } + + /* + * Complain about possible issues related to tunnels. + */ + if (request->parent && request->parent->username && request->username) { + /* + * Look at the full User-Name with realm. + */ + if (request->parent->username->da->attr == PW_STRIPPED_USER_NAME) { + vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->parent->packet->vps, PW_USER_NAME, 0, TAG_ANY); + rad_assert(vp != NULL); + } else { + vp = request->parent->username; + } + + /* + * If the names aren't identical, we do some detailed checks. + */ + if (strcmp(vp->vp_strvalue, request->username->vp_strvalue) != 0) { + char const *outer, *inner; + + outer = strchr(vp->vp_strvalue, '@'); + + /* + * If there's no realm, or there's a user identifier before + * the realm name, check the user identifier. + * + * It SHOULD be "anonymous", or "anonymous@realm" + */ + if (outer) { + if ((outer != vp->vp_strvalue) && + ((vp->vp_length < 10) || (memcmp(vp->vp_strvalue, "anonymous@", 10) != 0))) { + RWDEBUG("Outer User-Name is not anonymized. User privacy is compromised."); + } /* else it is anonymized */ + + /* + * Check when there's no realm, and without the trailing '@' + */ + } else if ((vp->vp_length < 9) || (memcmp(vp->vp_strvalue, "anonymous", 9) != 0)) { + RWDEBUG("Outer User-Name is not anonymized. User privacy is compromised."); + + } /* else the user identifier is anonymized */ + + /* + * Look for an inner realm, which may or may not exist. + */ + inner = strchr(request->username->vp_strvalue, '@'); + if (outer && inner) { + outer++; + inner++; + + /* + * The realms are different, do + * more detailed checks. + */ + if (strcmp(outer, inner) != 0) { + size_t outer_len, inner_len; + + outer_len = vp->vp_length; + outer_len -= (outer - vp->vp_strvalue); + + inner_len = request->username->vp_length; + inner_len -= (inner - request->username->vp_strvalue); + + /* + * Inner: secure.example.org + * Outer: example.org + */ + if (inner_len > outer_len) { + char const *suffix; + + suffix = inner + (inner_len - outer_len) - 1; + + if ((*suffix != '.') || + (strcmp(suffix + 1, outer) != 0)) { + RWDEBUG("Possible spoofing: Inner realm '%s' is not a subdomain of the outer realm '%s'", inner, outer); + } + + } else { + RWDEBUG("Possible spoofing: Inner realm and outer realms are different"); + } + } + } + + } else { + RWDEBUG("Outer and inner identities are the same. User privacy is compromised."); + } + } + + RDEBUG("server %s {", request->server); + RINDENT(); + + /* + * We currently only handle AUTH packets here. + * This could be expanded to handle other packets as well if required. + */ + rad_assert(request->packet->code == PW_CODE_ACCESS_REQUEST); + + result = rad_authenticate(request); + + /* + * Allow bare "accept" and "reject" policies in the inner + * tunnel. + */ + if (!request->reply->code && + (vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->config, PW_AUTH_TYPE, 0, TAG_ANY)) != NULL) { + switch (vp->vp_integer) { + case PW_AUTH_TYPE_ACCEPT: + request->reply->code = PW_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT; + break; + + case PW_AUTH_TYPE_REJECT: + request->reply->code = PW_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT; + break; + + default: + break; + } + } + + if (request->reply->code == PW_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT) { + fr_pair_delete_by_num(&request->config, PW_POST_AUTH_TYPE, 0, TAG_ANY); + vp = pair_make_config("Post-Auth-Type", "Reject", T_OP_SET); + if (vp) rad_postauth(request); + } + + if (request->reply->code == PW_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT) { + /* + * Check that there is a name which can be used + * to identify the user. The configuration + * depends on User-Name or Stripped-User-Name + * existing, and being (mostly) unique to that + * user. + */ + if (!request->parent && request->username && + (request->username->da->attr == PW_USER_NAME) && + (request->username->vp_strvalue[0] == '@') && + !fr_pair_find_by_num(request->packet->vps, PW_STRIPPED_USER_NAME, 0, TAG_ANY)) { + RWDEBUG("User-Name is anonymized, and no Stripped-User-Name exists."); + RWDEBUG("It may be difficult or impossible to identify the user"); + RWDEBUG("Please update Stripped-User-Name with information which identifies the user"); + } + + rad_postauth(request); + } + + REXDENT(); + RDEBUG("} # server %s", request->server); + + RDEBUG("Virtual server sending reply"); + rdebug_pair_list(L_DBG_LVL_1, request, request->reply->vps, NULL); + + return result; +} |