Adding upstream version 3.2.1+dfsg.upstream/3.2.1+dfsgupstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

2 files changed, 1417 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/modules/rlm_pap/all.mk b/src/modules/rlm_pap/all.mk
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..adec9cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/modules/rlm_pap/all.mk
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+SOURCES		:= rlm_pap.c
+TARGET		:= rlm_pap.a
diff --git a/src/modules/rlm_pap/rlm_pap.c b/src/modules/rlm_pap/rlm_pap.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..318e9a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/modules/rlm_pap/rlm_pap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1415 @@
+/*
+ *   This program is is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *   the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at
+ *   your option) any later version.
+ *
+ *   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ *   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ *   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ *   GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ *   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ *   along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ *   Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
+ */
+
+/**
+ * $Id$
+ * @file rlm_pap.c
+ * @brief Hashes plaintext passwords to compare against a prehashed reference.
+ *
+ * @copyright 2001-2012  The FreeRADIUS server project.
+ * @copyright 2012       Matthew Newton <matthew@newtoncomputing.co.uk>
+ * @copyright 2001       Kostas Kalevras <kkalev@noc.ntua.gr>
+ */
+RCSID("$Id$")
+USES_APPLE_DEPRECATED_API
+
+#include <freeradius-devel/radiusd.h>
+#include <freeradius-devel/modules.h>
+#include <freeradius-devel/base64.h>
+#include <freeradius-devel/rad_assert.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#include "../../include/md5.h"
+#include "../../include/sha1.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_H
+#  include <openssl/evp.h>
+#endif
+
+/*
+ *      Define a structure for our module configuration.
+ *
+ *      These variables do not need to be in a structure, but it's
+ *      a lot cleaner to do so, and a pointer to the structure can
+ *      be used as the instance handle.
+ */
+typedef struct rlm_pap_t {
+	char const	*name;	/* CONF_SECTION->name, not strdup'd */
+	int		auth_type;
+	bool		normify;
+} rlm_pap_t;
+
+/*
+ *      A mapping of configuration file names to internal variables.
+ *
+ *      Note that the string is dynamically allocated, so it MUST
+ *      be freed.  When the configuration file parse re-reads the string,
+ *      it free's the old one, and strdup's the new one, placing the pointer
+ *      to the strdup'd string into 'config.string'.  This gets around
+ *      buffer over-flows.
+ */
+static const CONF_PARSER module_config[] = {
+	{ "normalise", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, rlm_pap_t, normify), "yes" },
+	CONF_PARSER_TERMINATOR
+};
+
+
+/*
+ *	For auto-header discovery.
+ *
+ *	@note Header comparison is case insensitive.
+ */
+static const FR_NAME_NUMBER header_names[] = {
+	{ "{clear}",		PW_CLEARTEXT_PASSWORD },
+	{ "{cleartext}",	PW_CLEARTEXT_PASSWORD },
+	{ "{md5}",		PW_MD5_PASSWORD },
+	{ "{base64_md5}",	PW_MD5_PASSWORD },
+	{ "{smd5}",		PW_SMD5_PASSWORD },
+	{ "{crypt}",		PW_CRYPT_PASSWORD },
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_H
+	/*
+	 *	It'd make more sense for the headers to be
+	 *	ssha2-* with SHA3 coming soon but we're at
+	 *	the mercy of directory implementors.
+	 */
+	{ "{sha2}",		PW_SHA2_PASSWORD },
+	{ "{sha224}",		PW_SHA2_PASSWORD },
+	{ "{sha256}",		PW_SHA2_PASSWORD },
+	{ "{sha384}",		PW_SHA2_PASSWORD },
+	{ "{sha512}",		PW_SHA2_PASSWORD },
+	{ "{ssha224}",		PW_SSHA2_224_PASSWORD },
+	{ "{ssha256}",		PW_SSHA2_256_PASSWORD },
+	{ "{ssha384}",		PW_SSHA2_384_PASSWORD },
+	{ "{ssha512}",		PW_SSHA2_512_PASSWORD },
+	{ "{x-pbkdf2}",		PW_PBKDF2_PASSWORD },
+#endif
+	{ "{sha}",		PW_SHA_PASSWORD },
+	{ "{ssha}",		PW_SSHA_PASSWORD },
+	{ "{md4}",		PW_NT_PASSWORD },
+	{ "{nt}",		PW_NT_PASSWORD },
+	{ "{nthash}",		PW_NT_PASSWORD },
+	{ "{x-nthash}",		PW_NT_PASSWORD },
+	{ "{ns-mta-md5}",	PW_NS_MTA_MD5_PASSWORD },
+	{ "{x- orcllmv}",	PW_LM_PASSWORD },
+	{ "{X- orclntv}",	PW_NT_PASSWORD },
+	{ NULL, 0 }
+};
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_H
+static const FR_NAME_NUMBER pbkdf2_crypt_names[] = {
+	{ "HMACSHA1",		PW_SSHA1_PASSWORD },
+	{ "HMACSHA2+224",	PW_SSHA2_224_PASSWORD },
+	{ "HMACSHA2+256",	PW_SSHA2_256_PASSWORD },
+	{ "HMACSHA2+384",	PW_SSHA2_384_PASSWORD },
+	{ "HMACSHA2+512",	PW_SSHA2_512_PASSWORD },
+#  if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L
+	{ "HMACSHA3+224",	PW_SSHA3_224_PASSWORD },
+	{ "HMACSHA3+256",	PW_SSHA3_256_PASSWORD },
+	{ "HMACSHA3+384",	PW_SSHA3_384_PASSWORD },
+	{ "HMACSHA3+512",	PW_SSHA3_512_PASSWORD },
+#  endif
+};
+
+static const FR_NAME_NUMBER pbkdf2_passlib_names[] = {
+	{ "sha1",		PW_SSHA1_PASSWORD },
+	{ "sha256",		PW_SSHA2_256_PASSWORD },
+	{ "sha512",		PW_SSHA2_512_PASSWORD }
+};
+#endif
+
+static int mod_instantiate(CONF_SECTION *conf, void *instance)
+{
+	rlm_pap_t *inst = instance;
+	DICT_VALUE *dval;
+
+	inst->name = cf_section_name2(conf);
+	if (!inst->name) {
+		inst->name = cf_section_name1(conf);
+	}
+
+	dval = dict_valbyname(PW_AUTH_TYPE, 0, inst->name);
+	if (dval) {
+		inst->auth_type = dval->value;
+	} else {
+		inst->auth_type = 0;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/** Hex or base64 or bin auto-discovery
+ *
+ * Here we try and autodiscover what encoding was used for the password/hash, and
+ * convert it back to binary or plaintext.
+ *
+ * @note Earlier versions used a 0x prefix as a hard indicator that the string was
+ *       hex encoded, and would fail if the 0x was present but the string didn't
+ *       consist of hexits. The base64 char set is a superset of hex, and it was
+ *       observed in the wild, that occasionally base64 encoded data really could
+ *       start with 0x. That's why min_len (and decodability) are used as the
+ *       only heuristics now.
+ *
+ * @param[in] request Current request.
+ * @param[in,out] vp to normify.
+ * @param[in] min_len we expect the decoded version to be.
+ */
+static void normify(REQUEST *request, VALUE_PAIR *vp, size_t min_len)
+{
+	uint8_t buffer[256];
+
+	if (min_len >= sizeof(buffer)) return; /* paranoia */
+
+	rad_assert((vp->da->type == PW_TYPE_OCTETS) || (vp->da->type == PW_TYPE_STRING));
+
+	/*
+	 *	Hex encoding. Length is even, and it's greater than
+	 *	twice the minimum length.
+	 */
+	if (!(vp->vp_length & 0x01) && vp->vp_length >= (2 * min_len)) {
+		size_t decoded;
+
+		decoded = fr_hex2bin(buffer, sizeof(buffer), vp->vp_strvalue, vp->vp_length);
+		if (decoded == (vp->vp_length >> 1)) {
+			RDEBUG2("Normalizing %s from hex encoding, %zu bytes -> %zu bytes",
+				vp->da->name, vp->vp_length, decoded);
+			fr_pair_value_memcpy(vp, buffer, decoded);
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Base 64 encoding.  It's at least 4/3 the original size,
+	 *	and we want to avoid division...
+	 */
+	if ((vp->vp_length * 3) >= ((min_len * 4))) {
+		ssize_t decoded;
+		decoded = fr_base64_decode(buffer, sizeof(buffer), vp->vp_strvalue, vp->vp_length);
+		if (decoded < 0) return;
+		if (decoded >= (ssize_t) min_len) {
+			RDEBUG2("Normalizing %s from base64 encoding, %zu bytes -> %zu bytes",
+				vp->da->name, vp->vp_length, decoded);
+			fr_pair_value_memcpy(vp, buffer, decoded);
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Else unknown encoding, or already binary.  Leave it.
+	 */
+}
+
+/** Convert a Password-With-Header attribute to the correct type
+ *
+ * Attribute may be base64 encoded, in which case it will be decoded
+ * first, then evaluated.
+ *
+ * @note The buffer for octets types\ attributes is extended by one byte
+ *	and '\0' terminated, to allow it to be used as a char buff.
+ *
+ * @param request Current request.
+ * @param vp Password-With-Header attribute to convert.
+ * @return a new VALUE_PAIR on success, NULL on error.
+ */
+static VALUE_PAIR *normify_with_header(REQUEST *request, VALUE_PAIR *vp)
+{
+	int		attr;
+	char const	*p, *q;
+	size_t		len;
+
+	uint8_t		digest[257];	/* +1 for \0 */
+	ssize_t		decoded;
+
+	char		buffer[256];
+
+	VALUE_PAIR	*new;
+
+	VERIFY_VP(vp);
+
+	/*
+	 *	Ensure this is only ever called with a
+	 *	string type attribute.
+	 */
+	rad_assert(vp->da->type == PW_TYPE_STRING);
+
+redo:
+	p = vp->vp_strvalue;
+	len = vp->vp_length;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Has a header {...} prefix
+	 */
+	q = strchr(p, '}');
+	if (q) {
+		size_t hlen;
+
+		hlen = (q + 1) - p;
+		if (hlen >= sizeof(buffer)) {
+			REDEBUG("Password header too long.  Got %zu bytes must be less than %zu bytes",
+				hlen, sizeof(buffer));
+			return NULL;
+		}
+
+		memcpy(buffer, p, hlen);
+		buffer[hlen] = '\0';
+
+		attr = fr_str2int(header_names, buffer, 0);
+		if (!attr) {
+			if (RDEBUG_ENABLED3) {
+				RDEBUG3("Unknown header %s in Password-With-Header = \"%s\", re-writing to "
+					"Cleartext-Password", buffer, vp->vp_strvalue);
+			} else {
+				RDEBUG("Unknown header %s in Password-With-Header, re-writing to "
+				       "Cleartext-Password", buffer);
+			}
+			goto unknown_header;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 *	The data after the '}' may be binary, so we copy it via
+		 *	memcpy.  BUT it might be a string (or used as one), so
+		 *	we ensure that there's a trailing zero, too.
+		 */
+		new = fr_pair_afrom_num(request, attr, 0);
+		if (new->da->type == PW_TYPE_OCTETS) {
+			fr_pair_value_memcpy(new, (uint8_t const *) q + 1, (len - hlen) + 1);
+			new->vp_length = (len - hlen);	/* lie about the length */
+		} else {
+			fr_pair_value_strcpy(new, q + 1);
+		}
+
+		if (RDEBUG_ENABLED3) {
+			char *old_value, *new_value;
+
+			old_value = vp_aprints_value(request, vp, '\'');
+			new_value = vp_aprints_value(request, new, '\'');
+			RDEBUG3("Converted: &control:%s = '%s' -> &control:%s = '%s'",
+				vp->da->name, old_value, new->da->name, new_value);
+			talloc_free(old_value);
+			talloc_free(new_value);
+		} else {
+			RDEBUG2("Converted: &control:%s -> &control:%s", vp->da->name, new->da->name);
+		}
+
+		return new;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Doesn't have a header {...} prefix
+	 *
+	 *	See if it's base64, if it is, decode it and check again!
+	 */
+	decoded = fr_base64_decode(digest, sizeof(digest) - 1, vp->vp_strvalue, len);
+	if ((decoded > 0) && (digest[0] == '{') && (memchr(digest, '}', decoded) != NULL)) {
+		RDEBUG2("Normalizing %s from base64 encoding, %zu bytes -> %zu bytes",
+			vp->da->name, vp->vp_length, decoded);
+		/*
+		 *	Password-With-Header is a string attribute.
+		 *	Even though we're handling binary data, the buffer
+		 *	must be \0 terminated.
+		 */
+		digest[decoded] = '\0';
+		fr_pair_value_memcpy(vp, digest, decoded + 1);
+		vp->vp_length = decoded;		/* lie about the length */
+
+		goto redo;
+	}
+
+	if (RDEBUG_ENABLED3) {
+		RDEBUG3("No {...} in Password-With-Header = \"%s\", re-writing to "
+			"Cleartext-Password", vp->vp_strvalue);
+	} else {
+		RDEBUG("No {...} in Password-With-Header, re-writing to Cleartext-Password");
+	}
+
+unknown_header:
+	new = fr_pair_afrom_num(request, PW_CLEARTEXT_PASSWORD, 0);
+	fr_pair_value_strcpy(new, vp->vp_strvalue);
+
+	return new;
+}
+
+/*
+ *	Authorize the user for PAP authentication.
+ *
+ *	This isn't strictly necessary, but it does make the
+ *	server simpler to configure.
+ */
+static rlm_rcode_t CC_HINT(nonnull) mod_authorize(void *instance, REQUEST *request)
+{
+	rlm_pap_t *inst = instance;
+	bool auth_type = false;
+	bool found_pw = false;
+	VALUE_PAIR *vp;
+	vp_cursor_t cursor;
+
+	for (vp = fr_cursor_init(&cursor, &request->config);
+	     vp;
+	     vp = fr_cursor_next(&cursor)) {
+	     	VERIFY_VP(vp);
+	next:
+		switch (vp->da->attr) {
+		case PW_USER_PASSWORD: /* deprecated */
+			RWDEBUG("!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!");
+			RWDEBUG("!!! Ignoring control:User-Password.  Update your        !!!");
+			RWDEBUG("!!! configuration so that the \"known good\" clear text !!!");
+			RWDEBUG("!!! password is in Cleartext-Password and NOT in        !!!");
+			RWDEBUG("!!! User-Password.                                      !!!");
+			RWDEBUG("!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!");
+			break;
+
+		case PW_PASSWORD_WITH_HEADER:	/* preferred */
+		{
+			VALUE_PAIR *new;
+
+			/*
+			 *	Password already exists: use that instead of this one.
+			 */
+			if (fr_pair_find_by_num(request->config, PW_CLEARTEXT_PASSWORD, 0, TAG_ANY)) {
+				RWDEBUG("Config already contains a \"known good\" password "
+					"(&control:Cleartext-Password).  Ignoring &control:Password-With-Header");
+				break;
+			}
+
+			new = normify_with_header(request, vp);
+			if (new) fr_cursor_insert(&cursor, new); /* inserts at the end of the list */
+
+			RDEBUG2("Removing &control:Password-With-Header");
+			vp = fr_cursor_remove(&cursor);	/* advances the cursor for us */
+			talloc_free(vp);
+
+			found_pw = true;
+
+			vp = fr_cursor_current(&cursor);
+			if (vp) goto next;
+		}
+			break;
+
+		case PW_CLEARTEXT_PASSWORD:
+		case PW_CRYPT_PASSWORD:
+		case PW_NS_MTA_MD5_PASSWORD:
+			found_pw = true;
+			break;	/* don't touch these */
+
+		case PW_MD5_PASSWORD:
+		case PW_SMD5_PASSWORD:
+		case PW_NT_PASSWORD:
+		case PW_LM_PASSWORD:
+			if (inst->normify) {
+				normify(request, vp, 16); /* ensure it's in the right format */
+			}
+			found_pw = true;
+			break;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_H
+		case PW_SHA2_PASSWORD:
+			if (inst->normify) {
+				normify(request, vp, 28); /* ensure it's in the right format */
+			}
+			found_pw = true;
+			break;
+
+		case PW_SSHA2_224_PASSWORD:
+			if (inst->normify) {
+				normify(request, vp, 28); /* ensure it's in the right format */
+			}
+			found_pw = true;
+			break;
+
+		case PW_SSHA2_256_PASSWORD:
+			if (inst->normify) {
+				normify(request, vp, 32); /* ensure it's in the right format */
+			}
+			found_pw = true;
+			break;
+
+		case PW_SSHA2_384_PASSWORD:
+			if (inst->normify) {
+				normify(request, vp, 48); /* ensure it's in the right format */
+			}
+			found_pw = true;
+			break;
+
+		case PW_SSHA2_512_PASSWORD:
+			if (inst->normify) {
+				normify(request, vp, 64); /* ensure it's in the right format */
+			}
+			found_pw = true;
+			break;
+#endif
+
+		case PW_SHA_PASSWORD:
+		case PW_SSHA_PASSWORD:
+			if (inst->normify) {
+				normify(request, vp, 20); /* ensure it's in the right format */
+			}
+			found_pw = true;
+			break;
+
+			/*
+			 *	If it's proxied somewhere, don't complain
+			 *	about not having passwords or Auth-Type.
+			 */
+		case PW_PROXY_TO_REALM:
+		{
+			REALM *realm = realm_find(vp->vp_strvalue);
+			if (realm && realm->auth_pool) {
+				return RLM_MODULE_NOOP;
+			}
+			break;
+		}
+
+		case PW_AUTH_TYPE:
+			auth_type = true;
+
+			/*
+			 *	Auth-Type := Accept
+			 *	Auth-Type := Reject
+			 */
+			if ((vp->vp_integer == 254) ||
+			    (vp->vp_integer == 4)) {
+			    found_pw = true;
+			}
+			break;
+
+		default:
+			break;	/* ignore it */
+
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Print helpful warnings if there was no password.
+	 */
+	if (!found_pw) {
+		/*
+		 *	Likely going to be proxied.  Avoid printing
+		 *	warning message.
+		 */
+		if (fr_pair_find_by_num(request->config, PW_REALM, 0, TAG_ANY) ||
+		    (fr_pair_find_by_num(request->config, PW_PROXY_TO_REALM, 0, TAG_ANY))) {
+			return RLM_MODULE_NOOP;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 *	The TLS types don't need passwords.
+		 */
+		vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->packet->vps, PW_EAP_TYPE, 0, TAG_ANY);
+		if (vp &&
+		    ((vp->vp_integer == 13) || /* EAP-TLS */
+		     (vp->vp_integer == 21) || /* EAP-TTLS */
+		     (vp->vp_integer == 25))) {	/* PEAP */
+			return RLM_MODULE_NOOP;
+		}
+
+		if (auth_type) {
+			DEBUG("Not doing PAP as Auth-Type is already set.");
+			return RLM_MODULE_NOOP;
+		}
+
+		RWDEBUG("No \"known good\" password found for the user.  Not setting Auth-Type");
+		RWDEBUG("Authentication will fail unless a \"known good\" password is available");
+		return RLM_MODULE_NOOP;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Don't touch existing Auth-Types.
+	 */
+	if (auth_type) {
+		if (auth_type != inst->auth_type) RWDEBUG2("Auth-Type already set.  Not setting to PAP");
+		return RLM_MODULE_NOOP;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Can't do PAP if there's no password.
+	 */
+	if (!request->password ||
+	    (request->password->da->attr != PW_USER_PASSWORD)) {
+		RDEBUG2("No User-Password attribute in the request.  Cannot do PAP");
+		return RLM_MODULE_NOOP;
+	}
+
+	if (inst->auth_type) {
+		vp = radius_pair_create(request, &request->config,
+				       PW_AUTH_TYPE, 0);
+		vp->vp_integer = inst->auth_type;
+	}
+
+	return RLM_MODULE_UPDATED;
+}
+
+/*
+ *	PAP authentication functions
+ */
+
+static rlm_rcode_t CC_HINT(nonnull) pap_auth_clear(UNUSED rlm_pap_t *inst, REQUEST *request, VALUE_PAIR *vp)
+{
+	if (RDEBUG_ENABLED3) {
+		RDEBUG3("Comparing with \"known good\" Cleartext-Password \"%s\" (%zd)", vp->vp_strvalue, vp->vp_length);
+	} else {
+		RDEBUG("Comparing with \"known good\" Cleartext-Password");
+	}
+
+	if ((vp->vp_length != request->password->vp_length) ||
+	    (rad_digest_cmp(vp->vp_octets,
+			    request->password->vp_octets,
+			    vp->vp_length) != 0)) {
+		REDEBUG("Cleartext password does not match \"known good\" password");
+		return RLM_MODULE_REJECT;
+	}
+	return RLM_MODULE_OK;
+}
+
+static rlm_rcode_t CC_HINT(nonnull) pap_auth_crypt(UNUSED rlm_pap_t *inst, REQUEST *request, VALUE_PAIR *vp)
+{
+	if (RDEBUG_ENABLED3) {
+		RDEBUG3("Comparing with \"known good\" Crypt-Password \"%s\"", vp->vp_strvalue);
+	} else {
+		RDEBUG("Comparing with \"known-good\" Crypt-password");
+	}
+
+	if (fr_crypt_check(request->password->vp_strvalue,
+			   vp->vp_strvalue) != 0) {
+		REDEBUG("Crypt digest does not match \"known good\" digest");
+		return RLM_MODULE_REJECT;
+	}
+	return RLM_MODULE_OK;
+}
+
+static rlm_rcode_t CC_HINT(nonnull) pap_auth_md5(rlm_pap_t *inst, REQUEST *request, VALUE_PAIR *vp)
+{
+	FR_MD5_CTX md5_context;
+	uint8_t digest[128];
+
+	RDEBUG("Comparing with \"known-good\" MD5-Password");
+
+	if (inst->normify) {
+		normify(request, vp, 16);
+	}
+	if (vp->vp_length != 16) {
+		REDEBUG("\"known-good\" MD5 password has incorrect length");
+		return RLM_MODULE_INVALID;
+	}
+
+	fr_md5_init(&md5_context);
+	fr_md5_update(&md5_context, request->password->vp_octets,
+		     request->password->vp_length);
+	fr_md5_final(digest, &md5_context);
+
+	if (rad_digest_cmp(digest, vp->vp_octets, vp->vp_length) != 0) {
+		REDEBUG("MD5 digest does not match \"known good\" digest");
+		return RLM_MODULE_REJECT;
+	}
+
+	return RLM_MODULE_OK;
+}
+
+
+static rlm_rcode_t CC_HINT(nonnull) pap_auth_smd5(rlm_pap_t *inst, REQUEST *request, VALUE_PAIR *vp)
+{
+	FR_MD5_CTX md5_context;
+	uint8_t digest[128];
+
+	RDEBUG("Comparing with \"known-good\" SMD5-Password");
+
+	if (inst->normify) {
+		normify(request, vp, 16);
+	}
+	if (vp->vp_length <= 16) {
+		REDEBUG("\"known-good\" SMD5-Password has incorrect length");
+		return RLM_MODULE_INVALID;
+	}
+
+	fr_md5_init(&md5_context);
+	fr_md5_update(&md5_context, request->password->vp_octets,
+		     request->password->vp_length);
+	fr_md5_update(&md5_context, &vp->vp_octets[16], vp->vp_length - 16);
+	fr_md5_final(digest, &md5_context);
+
+	/*
+	 *	Compare only the MD5 hash results, not the salt.
+	 */
+	if (rad_digest_cmp(digest, vp->vp_octets, 16) != 0) {
+		REDEBUG("SMD5 digest does not match \"known good\" digest");
+		return RLM_MODULE_REJECT;
+	}
+
+	return RLM_MODULE_OK;
+}
+
+static rlm_rcode_t CC_HINT(nonnull) pap_auth_sha(rlm_pap_t *inst, REQUEST *request, VALUE_PAIR *vp)
+{
+	fr_sha1_ctx sha1_context;
+	uint8_t digest[128];
+
+	RDEBUG("Comparing with \"known-good\" SHA-Password");
+
+	if (inst->normify) {
+		normify(request, vp, 20);
+	}
+	if (vp->vp_length != 20) {
+		REDEBUG("\"known-good\" SHA1-password has incorrect length");
+		return RLM_MODULE_INVALID;
+	}
+
+	fr_sha1_init(&sha1_context);
+	fr_sha1_update(&sha1_context, request->password->vp_octets,
+		      request->password->vp_length);
+	fr_sha1_final(digest,&sha1_context);
+
+	if (rad_digest_cmp(digest, vp->vp_octets, vp->vp_length) != 0) {
+		REDEBUG("SHA1 digest does not match \"known good\" digest");
+		return RLM_MODULE_REJECT;
+	}
+
+	return RLM_MODULE_OK;
+}
+
+static rlm_rcode_t CC_HINT(nonnull) pap_auth_ssha(rlm_pap_t *inst, REQUEST *request, VALUE_PAIR *vp)
+{
+	fr_sha1_ctx sha1_context;
+	uint8_t digest[128];
+
+	RDEBUG("Comparing with \"known-good\" SSHA-Password");
+
+	if (inst->normify) {
+		normify(request, vp, 20);
+	}
+	if (vp->vp_length <= 20) {
+		REDEBUG("\"known-good\" SSHA-Password has incorrect length");
+		return RLM_MODULE_INVALID;
+	}
+
+	fr_sha1_init(&sha1_context);
+	fr_sha1_update(&sha1_context, request->password->vp_octets, request->password->vp_length);
+
+	fr_sha1_update(&sha1_context, &vp->vp_octets[20], vp->vp_length - 20);
+	fr_sha1_final(digest, &sha1_context);
+
+	if (rad_digest_cmp(digest, vp->vp_octets, 20) != 0) {
+		REDEBUG("SSHA digest does not match \"known good\" digest");
+		return RLM_MODULE_REJECT;
+	}
+
+	return RLM_MODULE_OK;
+}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_H
+static rlm_rcode_t CC_HINT(nonnull) pap_auth_sha2(rlm_pap_t *inst, REQUEST *request, VALUE_PAIR *vp)
+{
+	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
+	EVP_MD const *md;
+	char const *name;
+	uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+	unsigned int digest_len;
+
+	RDEBUG("Comparing with \"known-good\" SHA2-Password");
+
+	if (inst->normify) normify(request, vp, 28);
+
+	/*
+	 *	All the SHA-2 algorithms produce digests of different lengths,
+	 *	so it's trivial to determine which EVP_MD to use.
+	 */
+	switch (vp->vp_length) {
+	/* SHA-224 */
+	case 28:
+		name = "SHA2-224";
+		md = EVP_sha224();
+		break;
+
+	/* SHA-256 */
+	case 32:
+		name = "SHA2-256";
+		md = EVP_sha256();
+		break;
+
+	/* SHA-384 */
+	case 48:
+		name = "SHA2-384";
+		md = EVP_sha384();
+		break;
+
+	/* SHA-512 */
+	case 64:
+		name = "SHA2-512";
+		md = EVP_sha512();
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		REDEBUG("\"known good\" digest length (%zu) does not match output length of any SHA-2 digests",
+			vp->vp_length);
+		return RLM_MODULE_INVALID;
+	}
+
+	ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+	EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL);
+	EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, request->password->vp_octets, request->password->vp_length);
+	EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, digest, &digest_len);
+	EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
+
+	rad_assert((size_t) digest_len == vp->vp_length);	/* This would be an OpenSSL bug... */
+
+	if (rad_digest_cmp(digest, vp->vp_octets, vp->vp_length) != 0) {
+		REDEBUG("%s digest does not match \"known good\" digest", name);
+		return RLM_MODULE_REJECT;
+	}
+
+	return RLM_MODULE_OK;
+}
+
+static rlm_rcode_t CC_HINT(nonnull) pap_auth_ssha2(rlm_pap_t *inst, REQUEST *request, VALUE_PAIR *vp)
+{
+	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
+	EVP_MD const *md = NULL;
+	char const *name = NULL;
+	uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+	unsigned int digest_len, min_len = 0;
+
+	switch (vp->da->attr) {
+	case PW_SSHA2_224_PASSWORD:
+		name = "SSHA2-224";
+		md = EVP_sha224();
+		min_len = 28;
+		break;
+
+	case PW_SSHA2_256_PASSWORD:
+		name = "SSHA2-256";
+		md = EVP_sha256();
+		min_len = 32;
+		break;
+
+	case PW_SSHA2_384_PASSWORD:
+		name = "SSHA2-384";
+		md = EVP_sha384();
+		min_len = 48;
+		break;
+
+	case PW_SSHA2_512_PASSWORD:
+		name = "SSHA2-512";
+		min_len = 64;
+		md = EVP_sha512();
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		rad_assert(0);
+	}
+
+	RDEBUG("Comparing with \"known-good\" %s-Password", name);
+
+	/*
+	 *	Unlike plain SHA2 we already know what length
+	 *	to expect, so can be more specific with the
+	 *	minimum digest length.
+	 */
+	if (inst->normify) normify(request, vp, min_len + 1);
+
+	if (vp->vp_length <= min_len) {
+		REDEBUG("\"known-good\" %s-Password has incorrect length, got %zu bytes, need at least %u bytes",
+			name, vp->vp_length, min_len + 1);
+		return RLM_MODULE_INVALID;
+	}
+
+	ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+	EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL);
+	EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, request->password->vp_octets, request->password->vp_length);
+	EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, &vp->vp_octets[min_len], vp->vp_length - min_len);
+	EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, digest, &digest_len);
+	EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
+
+	rad_assert((size_t) digest_len == min_len);	/* This would be an OpenSSL bug... */
+
+	/*
+	 *	Only compare digest_len bytes, the rest is salt.
+	 */
+	if (rad_digest_cmp(digest, vp->vp_octets, (size_t)digest_len) != 0) {
+		REDEBUG("%s digest does not match \"known good\" digest", name);
+		return RLM_MODULE_REJECT;
+	}
+
+	return RLM_MODULE_OK;
+}
+
+/** Validates Crypt::PBKDF2 LDAP format strings
+ *
+ * @param[in] request	The current request.
+ * @param[in] str	Raw PBKDF2 string.
+ * @param[in] len	Length of string.
+ * @return
+ *	- RLM_MODULE_REJECT
+ *	- RLM_MODULE_OK
+ */
+static inline rlm_rcode_t CC_HINT(nonnull) pap_auth_pbkdf2_parse(REQUEST *request, const uint8_t *str, size_t len,
+								 const FR_NAME_NUMBER hash_names[],
+								 char scheme_sep, char iter_sep, char salt_sep,
+								 bool iter_is_base64, VALUE_PAIR const *password)
+{
+	rlm_rcode_t		rcode = RLM_MODULE_INVALID;
+
+	uint8_t const		*p, *q, *end;
+	ssize_t			slen;
+
+	EVP_MD const		*evp_md;
+	int			digest_type;
+	size_t			digest_len;
+
+	uint32_t		iterations;
+
+	uint8_t			*salt = NULL;
+	size_t			salt_len;
+	uint8_t			hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+	uint8_t			digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+	char 			hash_token[128];
+
+	RDEBUG2("Comparing with \"known-good\" PBKDF2-Password");
+
+	if (len <= 1) {
+		REDEBUG("PBKDF2-Password is too short");
+		goto finish;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Parse PBKDF string = {hash_algorithm}<scheme_sep><iterations><iter_sep>b64(<salt>)<salt_sep>b64(<hash>)
+	 */
+	p = str;
+	end = p + len;
+
+	q = memchr(p, scheme_sep, end - p);
+	if (!q) {
+		REDEBUG("PBKDF2-Password has no component separators");
+		goto finish;
+	}
+
+	if ((q-p) >= (int)sizeof(hash_token)) {
+		REDEBUG("PBKDF2-Password has invalid hash token");
+		goto finish;
+	}
+
+	strlcpy(hash_token, (char const *)p, (q - p) + 1);
+	digest_type = fr_str2int(hash_names, hash_token, -1);
+	switch (digest_type) {
+	case PW_SSHA1_PASSWORD:
+		evp_md = EVP_sha1();
+		digest_len = SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+		break;
+
+	case PW_SSHA2_224_PASSWORD:
+		evp_md = EVP_sha224();
+		digest_len = SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+		break;
+
+	case PW_SSHA2_256_PASSWORD:
+		evp_md = EVP_sha256();
+		digest_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+		break;
+
+	case PW_SSHA2_384_PASSWORD:
+		evp_md = EVP_sha384();
+		digest_len = SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+		break;
+
+	case PW_SSHA2_512_PASSWORD:
+		evp_md = EVP_sha512();
+		digest_len = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+		break;
+
+#  if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L
+	case PW_SSHA3_224_PASSWORD:
+		evp_md = EVP_sha3_224();
+		digest_len = SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+		break;
+
+	case PW_SSHA3_256_PASSWORD:
+		evp_md = EVP_sha3_256();
+		digest_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+		break;
+
+	case PW_SSHA3_384_PASSWORD:
+		evp_md = EVP_sha3_384();
+		digest_len = SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+		break;
+
+	case PW_SSHA3_512_PASSWORD:
+		evp_md = EVP_sha3_512();
+		digest_len = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+		break;
+#  endif
+
+	default:
+		REDEBUG("Unknown PBKDF2 hash method \"%.*s\"", (int)(q - p), p);
+		goto finish;
+	}
+
+	p = q + 1;
+
+	if (((end - p) < 1) || !(q = memchr(p, iter_sep, end - p))) {
+		REDEBUG("PBKDF2-Password missing iterations component");
+		goto finish;
+	}
+
+	if ((q - p) == 0) {
+		REDEBUG("PBKDF2-Password iterations component too short");
+		goto finish;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	If it's not base64 encoded, assume it's ascii
+	 */
+	if (!iter_is_base64) {
+		char iterations_buff[sizeof("4294967295") + 1];
+		char *qq;
+
+		strlcpy(iterations_buff, (char const *)p, (q - p) + 1);
+
+		iterations = strtoul(iterations_buff, &qq, 10);
+		if (*qq != '\0') {
+			REMARKER(iterations_buff, qq - iterations_buff,
+				 "PBKDF2-Password iterations field contains an invalid character");
+
+			goto finish;
+		}
+		p = q + 1;
+	/*
+	 *	base64 encoded and big endian
+	 */
+	} else {
+		(void)fr_strerror();
+		slen = fr_base64_decode((uint8_t *)&iterations, sizeof(iterations), (char const *)p, q - p);
+		if (slen < 0) {
+			REDEBUG("Failed decoding PBKDF2-Password iterations component (%.*s): %s",
+				(int)(q - p), p, fr_strerror());
+			goto finish;
+		}
+		if (slen != sizeof(iterations)) {
+			REDEBUG("Decoded PBKDF2-Password iterations component is wrong size");
+		}
+
+		iterations = ntohl(iterations);
+
+		p = q + 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Sanitise iterations. Seems OpenSSL 1.0 did this, but at least
+	 *	version 1.1 in RH8 does not, so safest to check ourselves.
+	 */
+	if (iterations == 0) {
+		RWDEBUG("PBKDF2 can not have zero iterations; increasing to 1");
+		iterations = 1;
+	}
+
+	if (((end - p) < 1) || !(q = memchr(p, salt_sep, end - p))) {
+		REDEBUG("PBKDF2-Password missing salt component");
+		goto finish;
+	}
+
+	if ((q - p) == 0) {
+		REDEBUG("PBKDF2-Password salt component too short");
+		goto finish;
+	}
+
+	MEM(salt = talloc_array(request, uint8_t, FR_BASE64_DEC_LENGTH(((size_t)(q - p)))));
+	slen = fr_base64_decode(salt, talloc_array_length(salt), (char const *) p, q - p);
+	if (slen < 0) {
+		REDEBUG("Failed decoding PBKDF2-Password salt component: %s", fr_strerror());
+		goto finish;
+	}
+	salt_len = (size_t)slen;
+
+	p = q + 1;
+
+	if ((q - p) == 0) {
+		REDEBUG("PBKDF2-Password hash component too short");
+		goto finish;
+	}
+
+	slen = fr_base64_decode(hash, sizeof(hash), (char const *)p, end - p);
+	if (slen < 0) {
+		REDEBUG("Failed decoding PBKDF2-Password hash component: %s", fr_strerror());
+		goto finish;
+	}
+
+	if ((size_t)slen != digest_len) {
+		REDEBUG("PBKDF2-Password hash component length is incorrect for hash type, expected %zu, got %zd",
+			digest_len, slen);
+		goto finish;
+	}
+
+	RDEBUG2("PBKDF2 %s: Iterations %d, salt length %zu, hash length %zd",
+		fr_int2str(pbkdf2_crypt_names, digest_type, "<UNKNOWN>"),
+		iterations, salt_len, slen);
+
+	/*
+	 *	Hash and compare
+	 */
+	if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC((char const *)password->vp_octets, (int)password->vp_length,
+			      (unsigned char const *)salt, (int)salt_len,
+			      (int)iterations,
+			      evp_md,
+			      (int)digest_len, (unsigned char *)digest) == 0) {
+		REDEBUG("PBKDF2 digest failure");
+		goto finish;
+	}
+
+	if (rad_digest_cmp(digest, hash, (size_t)digest_len) != 0) {
+		REDEBUG("PBKDF2 digest does not match \"known good\" digest");
+		rcode = RLM_MODULE_REJECT;
+	} else {
+		rcode = RLM_MODULE_OK;
+	}
+
+finish:
+	talloc_free(salt);
+
+	return rcode;
+}
+
+static rlm_rcode_t CC_HINT(nonnull) pap_auth_pbkdf2(UNUSED rlm_pap_t *inst, REQUEST *request, VALUE_PAIR *password)
+{
+	uint8_t const *p = password->vp_octets, *q, *end = p + password->vp_length;
+
+	rad_assert(request->password != NULL);
+	rad_assert(request->password->da->attr == PW_USER_PASSWORD);
+
+	if (end - p < 2) {
+		REDEBUG("PBKDF2-Password too short");
+		return RLM_MODULE_INVALID;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	If it doesn't begin with a $ assume
+	 *	It's Crypt::PBKDF2 LDAP format
+	 *
+	 *	{X-PBKDF2}<digest>:<b64 rounds>:<b64_salt>:<b64_hash>
+	 */
+	if (*p != '$') {
+		/*
+		 *	Strip the header if it's present
+		 */
+		if (*p == '{') {
+			q = memchr(p, '}', end - p);
+			p = q + 1;
+		}
+		return pap_auth_pbkdf2_parse(request, p, end - p,
+					     pbkdf2_crypt_names, ':', ':', ':', true, request->password);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Crypt::PBKDF2 Crypt format
+	 *
+	 *	$PBKDF2$<digest>:<rounds>:<b64_salt>$<b64_hash>
+	 */
+	if ((size_t)(end - p) >= sizeof("$PBKDF2$") && (memcmp(p, "$PBKDF2$", sizeof("$PBKDF2$") - 1) == 0)) {
+		p += sizeof("$PBKDF2$") - 1;
+		return pap_auth_pbkdf2_parse(request, p, end - p,
+					     pbkdf2_crypt_names, ':', ':', '$', false, request->password);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Python's passlib format
+	 *
+	 *	$pbkdf2-<digest>$<rounds>$<alt_b64_salt>$<alt_b64_hash>
+	 *
+	 *	Note: Our base64 functions also work with alt_b64
+	 */
+	if ((size_t)(end - p) >= sizeof("$pbkdf2-") && (memcmp(p, "$pbkdf2-", sizeof("$pbkdf2-") - 1) == 0)) {
+		p += sizeof("$pbkdf2-") - 1;
+		return pap_auth_pbkdf2_parse(request, p, end - p,
+					     pbkdf2_passlib_names, '$', '$', '$', false, request->password);
+	}
+
+	REDEBUG("Can't determine format of PBKDF2-Password");
+
+	return RLM_MODULE_INVALID;
+}
+#endif
+
+static rlm_rcode_t CC_HINT(nonnull) pap_auth_nt(rlm_pap_t *inst, REQUEST *request, VALUE_PAIR *vp)
+{
+	ssize_t len;
+	uint8_t digest[16];
+	uint8_t ucs2_password[512];
+
+	RDEBUG("Comparing with \"known-good\" NT-Password");
+
+	rad_assert(request->password != NULL);
+	rad_assert(request->password->da->attr == PW_USER_PASSWORD);
+
+	if (inst->normify) {
+		normify(request, vp, 16);
+	}
+
+	if (vp->vp_length != 16) {
+		REDEBUG("\"known good\" NT-Password has incorrect length");
+		return RLM_MODULE_INVALID;
+	}
+
+	len = fr_utf8_to_ucs2(ucs2_password, sizeof(ucs2_password), request->password->vp_strvalue, request->password->vp_length);
+	if (len < 0) {
+		REDEBUG("User-Password is not in UCS2 format");
+		return RLM_MODULE_INVALID;
+	}
+
+	fr_md4_calc(digest, (uint8_t *) ucs2_password, len);
+
+	if (rad_digest_cmp(digest, vp->vp_octets, vp->vp_length) != 0) {
+		REDEBUG("NT digest does not match \"known good\" digest");
+		return RLM_MODULE_REJECT;
+	}
+
+	return RLM_MODULE_OK;
+}
+
+
+static rlm_rcode_t CC_HINT(nonnull) pap_auth_lm(rlm_pap_t *inst, REQUEST *request, VALUE_PAIR *vp)
+{
+	uint8_t digest[16];
+	char charbuf[32 + 1];
+	ssize_t len;
+
+	RDEBUG("Comparing with \"known-good\" LM-Password");
+
+	if (inst->normify) {
+		normify(request, vp, 16);
+	}
+	if (vp->vp_length != 16) {
+		REDEBUG("\"known good\" LM-Password has incorrect length");
+		return RLM_MODULE_INVALID;
+	}
+
+	len = radius_xlat(charbuf, sizeof(charbuf), request, "%{mschap:LM-Hash %{User-Password}}", NULL, NULL);
+	if (len < 0){
+		return RLM_MODULE_FAIL;
+	}
+
+	if ((fr_hex2bin(digest, sizeof(digest), charbuf, len) != vp->vp_length) ||
+	    (rad_digest_cmp(digest, vp->vp_octets, vp->vp_length) != 0)) {
+		REDEBUG("LM digest does not match \"known good\" digest");
+		return RLM_MODULE_REJECT;
+	}
+
+	return RLM_MODULE_OK;
+}
+
+static rlm_rcode_t CC_HINT(nonnull) pap_auth_ns_mta_md5(UNUSED rlm_pap_t *inst, REQUEST *request, VALUE_PAIR *vp)
+{
+	FR_MD5_CTX md5_context;
+	uint8_t digest[128];
+	uint8_t buff[MAX_STRING_LEN];
+	uint8_t buff2[MAX_STRING_LEN + 50];
+
+	RDEBUG("Using NT-MTA-MD5-Password");
+
+	if (vp->vp_length != 64) {
+		REDEBUG("\"known good\" NS-MTA-MD5-Password has incorrect length");
+		return RLM_MODULE_INVALID;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Sanity check the value of NS-MTA-MD5-Password
+	 */
+	if (fr_hex2bin(digest, sizeof(digest), vp->vp_strvalue, vp->vp_length) != 16) {
+		REDEBUG("\"known good\" NS-MTA-MD5-Password has invalid value");
+		return RLM_MODULE_INVALID;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Ensure we don't have buffer overflows.
+	 *
+	 *	This really: sizeof(buff) - 2 - 2*32 - strlen(passwd)
+	 */
+	if (request->password->vp_length >= (sizeof(buff) - 2 - 2 * 32)) {
+		REDEBUG("\"known good\" NS-MTA-MD5-Password is too long");
+		return RLM_MODULE_INVALID;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Set up the algorithm.
+	 */
+	{
+		uint8_t *p = buff2;
+
+		memcpy(p, &vp->vp_octets[32], 32);
+		p += 32;
+		*(p++) = 89;
+		memcpy(p, (uint8_t const *)request->password->vp_strvalue, request->password->vp_length);
+		p += request->password->vp_length;
+		*(p++) = 247;
+		memcpy(p, &vp->vp_octets[32], 32);
+		p += 32;
+
+		fr_md5_init(&md5_context);
+		fr_md5_update(&md5_context, buff2, p - buff2);
+		fr_md5_final(buff, &md5_context);
+	}
+
+	if (rad_digest_cmp(digest, buff, 16) != 0) {
+		REDEBUG("NS-MTA-MD5 digest does not match \"known good\" digest");
+		return RLM_MODULE_REJECT;
+	}
+
+	return RLM_MODULE_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ *	Authenticate the user via one of any well-known password.
+ */
+static rlm_rcode_t CC_HINT(nonnull) mod_authenticate(void *instance, REQUEST *request)
+{
+	rlm_pap_t *inst = instance;
+	VALUE_PAIR *vp;
+	rlm_rcode_t rc = RLM_MODULE_INVALID;
+	vp_cursor_t cursor;
+	rlm_rcode_t (*auth_func)(rlm_pap_t *, REQUEST *, VALUE_PAIR *) = NULL;
+
+	if (!request->password ||
+	    (request->password->da->vendor != 0) ||
+	    (request->password->da->attr != PW_USER_PASSWORD)) {
+		REDEBUG("You set 'Auth-Type = PAP' for a request that does not contain a User-Password attribute!");
+		return RLM_MODULE_INVALID;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	The user MUST supply a non-zero-length password.
+	 */
+	if (request->password->vp_length == 0) {
+		REDEBUG("Password must not be empty");
+		return RLM_MODULE_INVALID;
+	}
+
+	if (RDEBUG_ENABLED3) {
+		RDEBUG3("Login attempt with password \"%s\" (%zd)", request->password->vp_strvalue, request->password->vp_length);
+	} else {
+		RDEBUG("Login attempt with password");
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Auto-detect passwords, by attribute in the
+	 *	config items, to find out which authentication
+	 *	function to call.
+	 */
+	for (vp = fr_cursor_init(&cursor, &request->config);
+	     vp;
+	     vp = fr_cursor_next(&cursor)) {
+		if (!vp->da->vendor) switch (vp->da->attr) {
+		case PW_CLEARTEXT_PASSWORD:
+			auth_func = &pap_auth_clear;
+			break;
+
+		case PW_CRYPT_PASSWORD:
+			auth_func = &pap_auth_crypt;
+			break;
+
+		case PW_MD5_PASSWORD:
+			auth_func = &pap_auth_md5;
+			break;
+
+		case PW_SMD5_PASSWORD:
+			auth_func = &pap_auth_smd5;
+			break;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_H
+		case PW_SHA2_PASSWORD:
+			auth_func = &pap_auth_sha2;
+			break;
+
+		case PW_SSHA2_224_PASSWORD:
+		case PW_SSHA2_256_PASSWORD:
+		case PW_SSHA2_384_PASSWORD:
+		case PW_SSHA2_512_PASSWORD:
+			auth_func = &pap_auth_ssha2;
+			break;
+
+		case PW_PBKDF2_PASSWORD:
+			auth_func = &pap_auth_pbkdf2;
+			break;
+#endif
+
+		case PW_SHA_PASSWORD:
+			auth_func = &pap_auth_sha;
+			break;
+
+		case PW_SSHA_PASSWORD:
+			auth_func = &pap_auth_ssha;
+			break;
+
+		case PW_NT_PASSWORD:
+			auth_func = &pap_auth_nt;
+			break;
+
+		case PW_LM_PASSWORD:
+			auth_func = &pap_auth_lm;
+			break;
+
+		case PW_NS_MTA_MD5_PASSWORD:
+			auth_func = &pap_auth_ns_mta_md5;
+			break;
+
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (auth_func != NULL) break;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	No attribute was found that looked like a password to match.
+	 */
+	if (!auth_func) {
+		RDEBUG("No password configured for the user.  Cannot do authentication");
+		return RLM_MODULE_FAIL;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Authenticate, and return.
+	 */
+	rc = auth_func(inst, request, vp);
+
+	if (rc == RLM_MODULE_REJECT) {
+		RDEBUG("Passwords don't match");
+	}
+
+	if (rc == RLM_MODULE_OK) {
+		RDEBUG("User authenticated successfully");
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ *	The module name should be the only globally exported symbol.
+ *	That is, everything else should be 'static'.
+ *
+ *	If the module needs to temporarily modify it's instantiation
+ *	data, the type should be changed to RLM_TYPE_THREAD_UNSAFE.
+ *	The server will then take care of ensuring that the module
+ *	is single-threaded.
+ */
+extern module_t rlm_pap;
+module_t rlm_pap = {
+	.magic		= RLM_MODULE_INIT,
+	.name		= "pap",
+	.type		= RLM_TYPE_HUP_SAFE,
+	.inst_size	= sizeof(rlm_pap_t),
+	.config		= module_config,
+	.instantiate	= mod_instantiate,
+	.methods = {
+		[MOD_AUTHENTICATE]	= mod_authenticate,
+		[MOD_AUTHORIZE]		= mod_authorize
+	},
+};