From c8bae7493d2f2910b57f13ded012e86bdcfb0532 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Baumann Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2024 16:47:53 +0200 Subject: Adding upstream version 1:2.39.2. Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann --- Documentation/RelNotes/2.30.6.txt | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 60 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/RelNotes/2.30.6.txt (limited to 'Documentation/RelNotes/2.30.6.txt') diff --git a/Documentation/RelNotes/2.30.6.txt b/Documentation/RelNotes/2.30.6.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d649071 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/RelNotes/2.30.6.txt @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +Git v2.30.6 Release Notes +========================= + +This release addresses the security issues CVE-2022-39253 and +CVE-2022-39260. + +Fixes since v2.30.5 +------------------- + + * CVE-2022-39253: + When relying on the `--local` clone optimization, Git dereferences + symbolic links in the source repository before creating hardlinks + (or copies) of the dereferenced link in the destination repository. + This can lead to surprising behavior where arbitrary files are + present in a repository's `$GIT_DIR` when cloning from a malicious + repository. + + Git will no longer dereference symbolic links via the `--local` + clone mechanism, and will instead refuse to clone repositories that + have symbolic links present in the `$GIT_DIR/objects` directory. + + Additionally, the value of `protocol.file.allow` is changed to be + "user" by default. + + * CVE-2022-39260: + An overly-long command string given to `git shell` can result in + overflow in `split_cmdline()`, leading to arbitrary heap writes and + remote code execution when `git shell` is exposed and the directory + `$HOME/git-shell-commands` exists. + + `git shell` is taught to refuse interactive commands that are + longer than 4MiB in size. `split_cmdline()` is hardened to reject + inputs larger than 2GiB. + +Credit for finding CVE-2022-39253 goes to Cory Snider of Mirantis. The +fix was authored by Taylor Blau, with help from Johannes Schindelin. + +Credit for finding CVE-2022-39260 goes to Kevin Backhouse of GitHub. +The fix was authored by Kevin Backhouse, Jeff King, and Taylor Blau. + + +Jeff King (2): + shell: add basic tests + shell: limit size of interactive commands + +Kevin Backhouse (1): + alias.c: reject too-long cmdline strings in split_cmdline() + +Taylor Blau (11): + builtin/clone.c: disallow `--local` clones with symlinks + t/lib-submodule-update.sh: allow local submodules + t/t1NNN: allow local submodules + t/2NNNN: allow local submodules + t/t3NNN: allow local submodules + t/t4NNN: allow local submodules + t/t5NNN: allow local submodules + t/t6NNN: allow local submodules + t/t7NNN: allow local submodules + t/t9NNN: allow local submodules + transport: make `protocol.file.allow` be "user" by default -- cgit v1.2.3