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Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/payload.c | 1448 |
1 files changed, 1448 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/payload.c b/src/payload.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..04d3a57 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/payload.c @@ -0,0 +1,1448 @@ +/* + * General protocol-agnostic payload-based sample fetches and ACLs + * + * Copyright 2000-2013 Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version + * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. + * + */ + +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <haproxy/acl.h> +#include <haproxy/api.h> +#include <haproxy/arg.h> +#include <haproxy/channel.h> +#include <haproxy/connection.h> +#include <haproxy/htx.h> +#include <haproxy/net_helper.h> +#include <haproxy/pattern.h> +#include <haproxy/payload.h> +#include <haproxy/sample.h> +#include <haproxy/stconn.h> +#include <haproxy/tools.h> + + +/************************************************************************/ +/* All supported sample fetch functions must be declared here */ +/************************************************************************/ + +/* wait for more data as long as possible, then return TRUE. This should be + * used with content inspection. + */ +static int +smp_fetch_wait_end(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) +{ + if (!(smp->opt & SMP_OPT_FINAL)) { + smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE; + return 0; + } + smp->data.type = SMP_T_BOOL; + smp->data.u.sint = 1; + return 1; +} + +/* return the number of bytes in the request buffer */ +static int +smp_fetch_len(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) +{ + if (smp->strm) { + struct channel *chn = ((smp->opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_RES) ? &smp->strm->res : &smp->strm->req; + + /* Not accurate but kept for backward compatibility purpose */ + if (IS_HTX_STRM(smp->strm)) { + struct htx *htx = htxbuf(&chn->buf); + smp->data.u.sint = htx->data - co_data(chn); + } + else + smp->data.u.sint = ci_data(chn); + } + else if (obj_type(smp->sess->origin) == OBJ_TYPE_CHECK) { + struct check *check = __objt_check(smp->sess->origin); + + /* Not accurate but kept for backward compatibility purpose */ + smp->data.u.sint = ((check->sc && IS_HTX_SC(check->sc)) ? (htxbuf(&check->bi))->data: b_data(&check->bi)); + } + else + return 0; + + smp->data.type = SMP_T_SINT; + smp->flags = SMP_F_VOLATILE | SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE; + return 1; +} + +/* Returns 0 if the client didn't send a SessionTicket Extension + * Returns 1 if the client sent SessionTicket Extension + * Returns 2 if the client also sent non-zero length SessionTicket + * Returns SMP_T_SINT data type + */ +static int +smp_fetch_req_ssl_st_ext(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) +{ + int hs_len, ext_len, bleft; + struct channel *chn; + unsigned char *data; + + if (!smp->strm) + goto not_ssl_hello; + + /* meaningless for HTX buffers */ + if (IS_HTX_STRM(smp->strm)) + goto not_ssl_hello; + + chn = ((smp->opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_RES) ? &smp->strm->res : &smp->strm->req; + + + bleft = ci_data(chn); + data = (unsigned char *)ci_head(chn); + + /* Check for SSL/TLS Handshake */ + if (!bleft) + goto too_short; + if (*data != 0x16) + goto not_ssl_hello; + + /* Check for SSLv3 or later (SSL version >= 3.0) in the record layer*/ + if (bleft < 3) + goto too_short; + if (data[1] < 0x03) + goto not_ssl_hello; + + if (bleft < 5) + goto too_short; + hs_len = (data[3] << 8) + data[4]; + if (hs_len < 1 + 3 + 2 + 32 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 2 + 2) + goto not_ssl_hello; /* too short to have an extension */ + + data += 5; /* enter TLS handshake */ + bleft -= 5; + + /* Check for a complete client hello starting at <data> */ + if (bleft < 1) + goto too_short; + if (data[0] != 0x01) /* msg_type = Client Hello */ + goto not_ssl_hello; + + /* Check the Hello's length */ + if (bleft < 4) + goto too_short; + hs_len = (data[1] << 16) + (data[2] << 8) + data[3]; + if (hs_len < 2 + 32 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 2 + 2) + goto not_ssl_hello; /* too short to have an extension */ + + /* We want the full handshake here */ + if (bleft < hs_len) + goto too_short; + + data += 4; + /* Start of the ClientHello message */ + if (data[0] < 0x03 || data[1] < 0x01) /* TLSv1 minimum */ + goto not_ssl_hello; + + ext_len = data[34]; /* session_id_len */ + if (ext_len > 32 || ext_len > (hs_len - 35)) /* check for correct session_id len */ + goto not_ssl_hello; + + /* Jump to cipher suite */ + hs_len -= 35 + ext_len; + data += 35 + ext_len; + + if (hs_len < 4 || /* minimum one cipher */ + (ext_len = (data[0] << 8) + data[1]) < 2 || /* minimum 2 bytes for a cipher */ + ext_len > hs_len) + goto not_ssl_hello; + + /* Jump to the compression methods */ + hs_len -= 2 + ext_len; + data += 2 + ext_len; + + if (hs_len < 2 || /* minimum one compression method */ + data[0] < 1 || data[0] > hs_len) /* minimum 1 bytes for a method */ + goto not_ssl_hello; + + /* Jump to the extensions */ + hs_len -= 1 + data[0]; + data += 1 + data[0]; + + if (hs_len < 2 || /* minimum one extension list length */ + (ext_len = (data[0] << 8) + data[1]) > hs_len - 2) /* list too long */ + goto not_ssl_hello; + + hs_len = ext_len; /* limit ourselves to the extension length */ + data += 2; + + while (hs_len >= 4) { + int ext_type, ext_len; + + ext_type = (data[0] << 8) + data[1]; + ext_len = (data[2] << 8) + data[3]; + + if (ext_len > hs_len - 4) /* Extension too long */ + goto not_ssl_hello; + + /* SesstionTicket extension */ + if (ext_type == 35) { + smp->data.type = SMP_T_SINT; + /* SessionTicket also present */ + if (ext_len > 0) + smp->data.u.sint = 2; + /* SessionTicket absent */ + else + smp->data.u.sint = 1; + smp->flags = SMP_F_VOLATILE; + return 1; + } + + hs_len -= 4 + ext_len; + data += 4 + ext_len; + } + /* SessionTicket Extension not found */ + smp->data.type = SMP_T_SINT; + smp->data.u.sint = 0; + smp->flags = SMP_F_VOLATILE; + return 1; + + too_short: + smp->flags = SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE; + + not_ssl_hello: + return 0; +} + +/* Returns TRUE if the client sent Supported Elliptic Curves Extension (0x000a) + * Mainly used to detect if client supports ECC cipher suites. + */ +static int +smp_fetch_req_ssl_ec_ext(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) +{ + int hs_len, ext_len, bleft; + struct channel *chn; + unsigned char *data; + + if (!smp->strm) + goto not_ssl_hello; + + /* meaningless for HTX buffers */ + if (IS_HTX_STRM(smp->strm)) + goto not_ssl_hello; + + chn = ((smp->opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_RES) ? &smp->strm->res : &smp->strm->req; + bleft = ci_data(chn); + data = (unsigned char *)ci_head(chn); + + /* Check for SSL/TLS Handshake */ + if (!bleft) + goto too_short; + if (*data != 0x16) + goto not_ssl_hello; + + /* Check for SSLv3 or later (SSL version >= 3.0) in the record layer*/ + if (bleft < 3) + goto too_short; + if (data[1] < 0x03) + goto not_ssl_hello; + + if (bleft < 5) + goto too_short; + hs_len = (data[3] << 8) + data[4]; + if (hs_len < 1 + 3 + 2 + 32 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 2 + 2) + goto not_ssl_hello; /* too short to have an extension */ + + data += 5; /* enter TLS handshake */ + bleft -= 5; + + /* Check for a complete client hello starting at <data> */ + if (bleft < 1) + goto too_short; + if (data[0] != 0x01) /* msg_type = Client Hello */ + goto not_ssl_hello; + + /* Check the Hello's length */ + if (bleft < 4) + goto too_short; + hs_len = (data[1] << 16) + (data[2] << 8) + data[3]; + if (hs_len < 2 + 32 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 2 + 2) + goto not_ssl_hello; /* too short to have an extension */ + + /* We want the full handshake here */ + if (bleft < hs_len) + goto too_short; + + data += 4; + /* Start of the ClientHello message */ + if (data[0] < 0x03 || data[1] < 0x01) /* TLSv1 minimum */ + goto not_ssl_hello; + + ext_len = data[34]; /* session_id_len */ + if (ext_len > 32 || ext_len > (hs_len - 35)) /* check for correct session_id len */ + goto not_ssl_hello; + + /* Jump to cipher suite */ + hs_len -= 35 + ext_len; + data += 35 + ext_len; + + if (hs_len < 4 || /* minimum one cipher */ + (ext_len = (data[0] << 8) + data[1]) < 2 || /* minimum 2 bytes for a cipher */ + ext_len > hs_len) + goto not_ssl_hello; + + /* Jump to the compression methods */ + hs_len -= 2 + ext_len; + data += 2 + ext_len; + + if (hs_len < 2 || /* minimum one compression method */ + data[0] < 1 || data[0] > hs_len) /* minimum 1 bytes for a method */ + goto not_ssl_hello; + + /* Jump to the extensions */ + hs_len -= 1 + data[0]; + data += 1 + data[0]; + + if (hs_len < 2 || /* minimum one extension list length */ + (ext_len = (data[0] << 8) + data[1]) > hs_len - 2) /* list too long */ + goto not_ssl_hello; + + hs_len = ext_len; /* limit ourselves to the extension length */ + data += 2; + + while (hs_len >= 4) { + int ext_type, ext_len; + + ext_type = (data[0] << 8) + data[1]; + ext_len = (data[2] << 8) + data[3]; + + if (ext_len > hs_len - 4) /* Extension too long */ + goto not_ssl_hello; + + /* Elliptic curves extension */ + if (ext_type == 10) { + smp->data.type = SMP_T_BOOL; + smp->data.u.sint = 1; + smp->flags = SMP_F_VOLATILE; + return 1; + } + + hs_len -= 4 + ext_len; + data += 4 + ext_len; + } + /* server name not found */ + goto not_ssl_hello; + + too_short: + smp->flags = SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE; + + not_ssl_hello: + + return 0; +} +/* returns the type of SSL hello message (mainly used to detect an SSL hello) */ +static int +smp_fetch_ssl_hello_type(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) +{ + int hs_len; + int hs_type, bleft; + struct channel *chn; + const unsigned char *data; + + if (!smp->strm) + goto not_ssl_hello; + + /* meaningless for HTX buffers */ + if (IS_HTX_STRM(smp->strm)) + goto not_ssl_hello; + + chn = ((smp->opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_RES) ? &smp->strm->res : &smp->strm->req; + bleft = ci_data(chn); + data = (const unsigned char *)ci_head(chn); + + if (!bleft) + goto too_short; + + if ((*data >= 0x14 && *data <= 0x17) || (*data == 0xFF)) { + /* SSLv3 header format */ + if (bleft < 9) + goto too_short; + + /* ssl version 3 */ + if ((data[1] << 16) + data[2] < 0x00030000) + goto not_ssl_hello; + + /* ssl message len must present handshake type and len */ + if ((data[3] << 8) + data[4] < 4) + goto not_ssl_hello; + + /* format introduced with SSLv3 */ + + hs_type = (int)data[5]; + hs_len = ( data[6] << 16 ) + ( data[7] << 8 ) + data[8]; + + /* not a full handshake */ + if (bleft < (9 + hs_len)) + goto too_short; + + } + else { + goto not_ssl_hello; + } + + smp->data.type = SMP_T_SINT; + smp->data.u.sint = hs_type; + smp->flags = SMP_F_VOLATILE; + + return 1; + + too_short: + smp->flags = SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE; + + not_ssl_hello: + + return 0; +} + +/* Return the version of the SSL protocol in the request. It supports both + * SSLv3 (TLSv1) header format for any message, and SSLv2 header format for + * the hello message. The SSLv3 format is described in RFC 2246 p49, and the + * SSLv2 format is described here, and completed p67 of RFC 2246 : + * http://wp.netscape.com/eng/security/SSL_2.html + * + * Note: this decoder only works with non-wrapping data. + */ +static int +smp_fetch_req_ssl_ver(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) +{ + int version, bleft, msg_len; + const unsigned char *data; + struct channel *req; + + if (!smp->strm) + goto not_ssl; + + /* meaningless for HTX buffers */ + if (IS_HTX_STRM(smp->strm)) + goto not_ssl; + + req = &smp->strm->req; + msg_len = 0; + bleft = ci_data(req); + if (!bleft) + goto too_short; + + data = (const unsigned char *)ci_head(req); + if ((*data >= 0x14 && *data <= 0x17) || (*data == 0xFF)) { + /* SSLv3 header format */ + if (bleft < 11) + goto too_short; + + version = (data[1] << 16) + data[2]; /* record layer version: major, minor */ + msg_len = (data[3] << 8) + data[4]; /* record length */ + + /* format introduced with SSLv3 */ + if (version < 0x00030000) + goto not_ssl; + + /* message length between 6 and 2^14 + 2048 */ + if (msg_len < 6 || msg_len > ((1<<14) + 2048)) + goto not_ssl; + + bleft -= 5; data += 5; + + /* return the client hello client version, not the record layer version */ + version = (data[4] << 16) + data[5]; /* client hello version: major, minor */ + } else { + /* SSLv2 header format, only supported for hello (msg type 1) */ + int rlen, plen, cilen, silen, chlen; + + if (*data & 0x80) { + if (bleft < 3) + goto too_short; + /* short header format : 15 bits for length */ + rlen = ((data[0] & 0x7F) << 8) | data[1]; + plen = 0; + bleft -= 2; data += 2; + } else { + if (bleft < 4) + goto too_short; + /* long header format : 14 bits for length + pad length */ + rlen = ((data[0] & 0x3F) << 8) | data[1]; + plen = data[2]; + bleft -= 3; data += 3; + } + + if (*data != 0x01) + goto not_ssl; + bleft--; data++; + + if (bleft < 8) + goto too_short; + version = (data[0] << 16) + data[1]; /* version: major, minor */ + cilen = (data[2] << 8) + data[3]; /* cipher len, multiple of 3 */ + silen = (data[4] << 8) + data[5]; /* session_id_len: 0 or 16 */ + chlen = (data[6] << 8) + data[7]; /* 16<=challenge length<=32 */ + + bleft -= 8; data += 8; + if (cilen % 3 != 0) + goto not_ssl; + if (silen && silen != 16) + goto not_ssl; + if (chlen < 16 || chlen > 32) + goto not_ssl; + if (rlen != 9 + cilen + silen + chlen) + goto not_ssl; + + /* focus on the remaining data length */ + msg_len = cilen + silen + chlen + plen; + } + /* We could recursively check that the buffer ends exactly on an SSL + * fragment boundary and that a possible next segment is still SSL, + * but that's a bit pointless. However, we could still check that + * all the part of the request which fits in a buffer is already + * there. + */ + if (msg_len > channel_recv_limit(req) + b_orig(&req->buf) - ci_head(req)) + msg_len = channel_recv_limit(req) + b_orig(&req->buf) - ci_head(req); + + if (bleft < msg_len) + goto too_short; + + /* OK that's enough. We have at least the whole message, and we have + * the protocol version. + */ + smp->data.type = SMP_T_SINT; + smp->data.u.sint = version; + smp->flags = SMP_F_VOLATILE; + return 1; + + too_short: + smp->flags = SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE; + not_ssl: + return 0; +} + +/* Try to extract the Server Name Indication that may be presented in a TLS + * client hello handshake message. The format of the message is the following + * (cf RFC5246 + RFC6066) : + * TLS frame : + * - uint8 type = 0x16 (Handshake) + * - uint16 version >= 0x0301 (TLSv1) + * - uint16 length (frame length) + * - TLS handshake : + * - uint8 msg_type = 0x01 (ClientHello) + * - uint24 length (handshake message length) + * - ClientHello : + * - uint16 client_version >= 0x0301 (TLSv1) + * - uint8 Random[32] (4 first ones are timestamp) + * - SessionID : + * - uint8 session_id_len (0..32) (SessionID len in bytes) + * - uint8 session_id[session_id_len] + * - CipherSuite : + * - uint16 cipher_len >= 2 (Cipher length in bytes) + * - uint16 ciphers[cipher_len/2] + * - CompressionMethod : + * - uint8 compression_len >= 1 (# of supported methods) + * - uint8 compression_methods[compression_len] + * - optional client_extension_len (in bytes) + * - optional sequence of ClientHelloExtensions (as many bytes as above): + * - uint16 extension_type = 0 for server_name + * - uint16 extension_len + * - opaque extension_data[extension_len] + * - uint16 server_name_list_len (# of bytes here) + * - opaque server_names[server_name_list_len bytes] + * - uint8 name_type = 0 for host_name + * - uint16 name_len + * - opaque hostname[name_len bytes] + */ +static int +smp_fetch_ssl_hello_sni(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) +{ + int hs_len, ext_len, bleft; + struct channel *chn; + unsigned char *data; + + if (!smp->strm) + goto not_ssl_hello; + + /* meaningless for HTX buffers */ + if (IS_HTX_STRM(smp->strm)) + goto not_ssl_hello; + + chn = ((smp->opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_RES) ? &smp->strm->res : &smp->strm->req; + bleft = ci_data(chn); + data = (unsigned char *)ci_head(chn); + + /* Check for SSL/TLS Handshake */ + if (!bleft) + goto too_short; + if (*data != 0x16) + goto not_ssl_hello; + + /* Check for SSLv3 or later (SSL version >= 3.0) in the record layer*/ + if (bleft < 3) + goto too_short; + if (data[1] < 0x03) + goto not_ssl_hello; + + if (bleft < 5) + goto too_short; + hs_len = (data[3] << 8) + data[4]; + if (hs_len < 1 + 3 + 2 + 32 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 2 + 2) + goto not_ssl_hello; /* too short to have an extension */ + + data += 5; /* enter TLS handshake */ + bleft -= 5; + + /* Check for a complete client hello starting at <data> */ + if (bleft < 1) + goto too_short; + if (data[0] != 0x01) /* msg_type = Client Hello */ + goto not_ssl_hello; + + /* Check the Hello's length */ + if (bleft < 4) + goto too_short; + hs_len = (data[1] << 16) + (data[2] << 8) + data[3]; + if (hs_len < 2 + 32 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 2 + 2) + goto not_ssl_hello; /* too short to have an extension */ + + /* We want the full handshake here */ + if (bleft < hs_len) + goto too_short; + + data += 4; + /* Start of the ClientHello message */ + if (data[0] < 0x03 || data[1] < 0x01) /* TLSv1 minimum */ + goto not_ssl_hello; + + ext_len = data[34]; /* session_id_len */ + if (ext_len > 32 || ext_len > (hs_len - 35)) /* check for correct session_id len */ + goto not_ssl_hello; + + /* Jump to cipher suite */ + hs_len -= 35 + ext_len; + data += 35 + ext_len; + + if (hs_len < 4 || /* minimum one cipher */ + (ext_len = (data[0] << 8) + data[1]) < 2 || /* minimum 2 bytes for a cipher */ + ext_len > hs_len) + goto not_ssl_hello; + + /* Jump to the compression methods */ + hs_len -= 2 + ext_len; + data += 2 + ext_len; + + if (hs_len < 2 || /* minimum one compression method */ + data[0] < 1 || data[0] > hs_len) /* minimum 1 bytes for a method */ + goto not_ssl_hello; + + /* Jump to the extensions */ + hs_len -= 1 + data[0]; + data += 1 + data[0]; + + if (hs_len < 2 || /* minimum one extension list length */ + (ext_len = (data[0] << 8) + data[1]) > hs_len - 2) /* list too long */ + goto not_ssl_hello; + + hs_len = ext_len; /* limit ourselves to the extension length */ + data += 2; + + while (hs_len >= 4) { + int ext_type, name_type, srv_len, name_len; + + ext_type = (data[0] << 8) + data[1]; + ext_len = (data[2] << 8) + data[3]; + + if (ext_len > hs_len - 4) /* Extension too long */ + goto not_ssl_hello; + + if (ext_type == 0) { /* Server name */ + if (ext_len < 2) /* need one list length */ + goto not_ssl_hello; + + srv_len = (data[4] << 8) + data[5]; + if (srv_len < 4 || srv_len > hs_len - 6) + goto not_ssl_hello; /* at least 4 bytes per server name */ + + name_type = data[6]; + name_len = (data[7] << 8) + data[8]; + + if (name_type == 0) { /* hostname */ + smp->data.type = SMP_T_STR; + smp->data.u.str.area = (char *)data + 9; + smp->data.u.str.data = name_len; + smp->flags = SMP_F_VOLATILE | SMP_F_CONST; + return 1; + } + } + + hs_len -= 4 + ext_len; + data += 4 + ext_len; + } + /* server name not found */ + goto not_ssl_hello; + + too_short: + smp->flags = SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE; + + not_ssl_hello: + + return 0; +} + +/* Try to extract the Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) protocol + * names that may be presented in a TLS client hello handshake message. As the + * message presents a list of protocol names in descending order of preference, + * it may return iteratively. The format of the message is the following + * (cf RFC5246 + RFC7301) : + * TLS frame : + * - uint8 type = 0x16 (Handshake) + * - uint16 version >= 0x0301 (TLSv1) + * - uint16 length (frame length) + * - TLS handshake : + * - uint8 msg_type = 0x01 (ClientHello) + * - uint24 length (handshake message length) + * - ClientHello : + * - uint16 client_version >= 0x0301 (TLSv1) + * - uint8 Random[32] (4 first ones are timestamp) + * - SessionID : + * - uint8 session_id_len (0..32) (SessionID len in bytes) + * - uint8 session_id[session_id_len] + * - CipherSuite : + * - uint16 cipher_len >= 2 (Cipher length in bytes) + * - uint16 ciphers[cipher_len/2] + * - CompressionMethod : + * - uint8 compression_len >= 1 (# of supported methods) + * - uint8 compression_methods[compression_len] + * - optional client_extension_len (in bytes) + * - optional sequence of ClientHelloExtensions (as many bytes as above): + * - uint16 extension_type = 16 for application_layer_protocol_negotiation + * - uint16 extension_len + * - opaque extension_data[extension_len] + * - uint16 protocol_names_len (# of bytes here) + * - opaque protocol_names[protocol_names_len bytes] + * - uint8 name_len + * - opaque protocol_name[name_len bytes] + */ +static int +smp_fetch_ssl_hello_alpn(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) +{ + int hs_len, ext_len, bleft; + struct channel *chn; + unsigned char *data; + + if (!smp->strm) + goto not_ssl_hello; + + /* meaningless for HTX buffers */ + if (IS_HTX_STRM(smp->strm)) + goto not_ssl_hello; + + chn = ((smp->opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_RES) ? &smp->strm->res : &smp->strm->req; + bleft = ci_data(chn); + data = (unsigned char *)ci_head(chn); + + /* Check for SSL/TLS Handshake */ + if (!bleft) + goto too_short; + if (*data != 0x16) + goto not_ssl_hello; + + /* Check for SSLv3 or later (SSL version >= 3.0) in the record layer*/ + if (bleft < 3) + goto too_short; + if (data[1] < 0x03) + goto not_ssl_hello; + + if (bleft < 5) + goto too_short; + hs_len = (data[3] << 8) + data[4]; + if (hs_len < 1 + 3 + 2 + 32 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 2 + 2) + goto not_ssl_hello; /* too short to have an extension */ + + data += 5; /* enter TLS handshake */ + bleft -= 5; + + /* Check for a complete client hello starting at <data> */ + if (bleft < 1) + goto too_short; + if (data[0] != 0x01) /* msg_type = Client Hello */ + goto not_ssl_hello; + + /* Check the Hello's length */ + if (bleft < 4) + goto too_short; + hs_len = (data[1] << 16) + (data[2] << 8) + data[3]; + if (hs_len < 2 + 32 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 2 + 2) + goto not_ssl_hello; /* too short to have an extension */ + + /* We want the full handshake here */ + if (bleft < hs_len) + goto too_short; + + data += 4; + /* Start of the ClientHello message */ + if (data[0] < 0x03 || data[1] < 0x01) /* TLSv1 minimum */ + goto not_ssl_hello; + + ext_len = data[34]; /* session_id_len */ + if (ext_len > 32 || ext_len > (hs_len - 35)) /* check for correct session_id len */ + goto not_ssl_hello; + + /* Jump to cipher suite */ + hs_len -= 35 + ext_len; + data += 35 + ext_len; + + if (hs_len < 4 || /* minimum one cipher */ + (ext_len = (data[0] << 8) + data[1]) < 2 || /* minimum 2 bytes for a cipher */ + ext_len > hs_len) + goto not_ssl_hello; + + /* Jump to the compression methods */ + hs_len -= 2 + ext_len; + data += 2 + ext_len; + + if (hs_len < 2 || /* minimum one compression method */ + data[0] < 1 || data[0] > hs_len) /* minimum 1 bytes for a method */ + goto not_ssl_hello; + + /* Jump to the extensions */ + hs_len -= 1 + data[0]; + data += 1 + data[0]; + + if (hs_len < 2 || /* minimum one extension list length */ + (ext_len = (data[0] << 8) + data[1]) > hs_len - 2) /* list too long */ + goto not_ssl_hello; + + hs_len = ext_len; /* limit ourselves to the extension length */ + data += 2; + + while (hs_len >= 4) { + int ext_type, name_len, name_offset; + + ext_type = (data[0] << 8) + data[1]; + ext_len = (data[2] << 8) + data[3]; + + if (ext_len > hs_len - 4) /* Extension too long */ + goto not_ssl_hello; + + if (ext_type == 16) { /* ALPN */ + if (ext_len < 3) /* one list length [uint16] + at least one name length [uint8] */ + goto not_ssl_hello; + + /* Name cursor in ctx, must begin after protocol_names_len */ + name_offset = smp->ctx.i < 6 ? 6 : smp->ctx.i; + name_len = data[name_offset]; + + if (name_len + name_offset - 3 > ext_len) + goto not_ssl_hello; + + smp->data.type = SMP_T_STR; + smp->data.u.str.area = (char *)data + name_offset + 1; /* +1 to skip name_len */ + smp->data.u.str.data = name_len; + smp->flags = SMP_F_VOLATILE | SMP_F_CONST; + + /* May have more protocol names remaining */ + if (name_len + name_offset - 3 < ext_len) { + smp->ctx.i = name_offset + name_len + 1; + smp->flags |= SMP_F_NOT_LAST; + } + + return 1; + } + + hs_len -= 4 + ext_len; + data += 4 + ext_len; + } + /* alpn not found */ + goto not_ssl_hello; + + too_short: + smp->flags = SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE; + + not_ssl_hello: + + return 0; +} + +/* Fetch the request RDP cookie identified in <cname>:<clen>, or any cookie if + * <clen> is empty (cname is then ignored). It returns the data into sample <smp> + * of type SMP_T_CSTR. Note: this decoder only works with non-wrapping data. + */ +int +fetch_rdp_cookie_name(struct stream *s, struct sample *smp, const char *cname, int clen) +{ + int bleft; + const unsigned char *data; + + smp->flags = SMP_F_CONST; + smp->data.type = SMP_T_STR; + + bleft = ci_data(&s->req); + if (bleft <= 11) + goto too_short; + + data = (const unsigned char *)ci_head(&s->req) + 11; + bleft -= 11; + + if (bleft <= 7) + goto too_short; + + if (strncasecmp((const char *)data, "Cookie:", 7) != 0) + goto not_cookie; + + data += 7; + bleft -= 7; + + while (bleft > 0 && *data == ' ') { + data++; + bleft--; + } + + if (clen) { + if (bleft <= clen) + goto too_short; + + if ((data[clen] != '=') || + strncasecmp(cname, (const char *)data, clen) != 0) + goto not_cookie; + + data += clen + 1; + bleft -= clen + 1; + } else { + while (bleft > 0 && *data != '=') { + if (*data == '\r' || *data == '\n') + goto not_cookie; + data++; + bleft--; + } + + if (bleft < 1) + goto too_short; + + if (*data != '=') + goto not_cookie; + + data++; + bleft--; + } + + /* data points to cookie value */ + smp->data.u.str.area = (char *)data; + smp->data.u.str.data = 0; + + while (bleft > 0 && *data != '\r') { + data++; + bleft--; + } + + if (bleft < 2) + goto too_short; + + if (data[0] != '\r' || data[1] != '\n') + goto not_cookie; + + smp->data.u.str.data = (char *)data - smp->data.u.str.area; + smp->flags = SMP_F_VOLATILE | SMP_F_CONST; + return 1; + + too_short: + smp->flags = SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE | SMP_F_CONST; + not_cookie: + return 0; +} + +/* Fetch the request RDP cookie identified in the args, or any cookie if no arg + * is passed. It is usable both for ACL and for samples. Note: this decoder + * only works with non-wrapping data. Accepts either 0 or 1 argument. Argument + * is a string (cookie name), other types will lead to undefined behaviour. The + * returned sample has type SMP_T_CSTR. + */ +int +smp_fetch_rdp_cookie(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) +{ + if (!smp->strm) + return 0; + + /* meaningless for HTX buffers */ + if (IS_HTX_STRM(smp->strm)) + return 0; + + return fetch_rdp_cookie_name(smp->strm, smp, + args ? args->data.str.area : NULL, + args ? args->data.str.data : 0); +} + +/* returns either 1 or 0 depending on whether an RDP cookie is found or not */ +static int +smp_fetch_rdp_cookie_cnt(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) +{ + int ret; + + ret = smp_fetch_rdp_cookie(args, smp, kw, private); + + if (smp->flags & SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE) + return 0; + + smp->flags = SMP_F_VOLATILE; + smp->data.type = SMP_T_SINT; + smp->data.u.sint = ret; + return 1; +} + +/* extracts part of a payload with offset and length at a given position */ +static int +smp_fetch_payload_lv(const struct arg *arg_p, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) +{ + unsigned int len_offset = arg_p[0].data.sint; + unsigned int len_size = arg_p[1].data.sint; + unsigned int buf_offset; + unsigned int buf_size = 0; + struct channel *chn = NULL; + char *head = NULL; + size_t max, data; + int i; + + /* Format is (len offset, len size, buf offset) or (len offset, len size) */ + /* by default buf offset == len offset + len size */ + /* buf offset could be absolute or relative to len offset + len size if prefixed by + or - */ + + if (smp->strm) { + /* meaningless for HTX buffers */ + if (IS_HTX_STRM(smp->strm)) + return 0; + chn = ((smp->opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_RES) ? &smp->strm->res : &smp->strm->req; + head = ci_head(chn); + data = ci_data(chn); + } + else if (obj_type(smp->sess->origin) == OBJ_TYPE_CHECK) { + struct check *check = __objt_check(smp->sess->origin); + + /* meaningless for HTX buffers */ + if (check->sc && IS_HTX_SC(check->sc)) + return 0; + head = b_head(&check->bi); + data = b_data(&check->bi); + } + max = global.tune.bufsize; + if (!head) + goto too_short; + + if (len_offset + len_size > data) + goto too_short; + + for (i = 0; i < len_size; i++) { + buf_size = (buf_size << 8) + ((unsigned char *)head)[i + len_offset]; + } + + /* buf offset may be implicit, absolute or relative. If the LSB + * is set, then the offset is relative otherwise it is absolute. + */ + buf_offset = len_offset + len_size; + if (arg_p[2].type == ARGT_SINT) { + if (arg_p[2].data.sint & 1) + buf_offset += arg_p[2].data.sint >> 1; + else + buf_offset = arg_p[2].data.sint >> 1; + } + + if (!buf_size || buf_size > max || buf_offset + buf_size > max) { + /* will never match */ + smp->flags = 0; + return 0; + } + + if (buf_offset + buf_size > data) + goto too_short; + + /* init chunk as read only */ + smp->data.type = SMP_T_BIN; + smp->flags = SMP_F_VOLATILE | SMP_F_CONST; + chunk_initlen(&smp->data.u.str, head + buf_offset, 0, buf_size); + return 1; + + too_short: + smp->flags = SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE | SMP_F_CONST; + return 0; +} + +/* extracts some payload at a fixed position and length */ +static int +smp_fetch_payload(const struct arg *arg_p, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) +{ + unsigned int buf_offset = arg_p[0].data.sint; + unsigned int buf_size = arg_p[1].data.sint; + struct channel *chn = NULL; + char *head = NULL; + size_t max, data; + + if (smp->strm) { + /* meaningless for HTX buffers */ + if (IS_HTX_STRM(smp->strm)) + return 0; + chn = ((smp->opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_RES) ? &smp->strm->res : &smp->strm->req; + head = ci_head(chn); + data = ci_data(chn); + } + else if (obj_type(smp->sess->origin) == OBJ_TYPE_CHECK) { + struct check *check = __objt_check(smp->sess->origin); + + /* meaningless for HTX buffers */ + if (check->sc && IS_HTX_SC(check->sc)) + return 0; + head = b_head(&check->bi); + data = b_data(&check->bi); + } + max = global.tune.bufsize; + if (!head) + goto too_short; + + if (buf_size > max || buf_offset + buf_size > max) { + /* will never match */ + smp->flags = 0; + return 0; + } + if (buf_offset + buf_size > data) + goto too_short; + + /* init chunk as read only */ + smp->data.type = SMP_T_BIN; + smp->flags = SMP_F_VOLATILE | SMP_F_CONST; + chunk_initlen(&smp->data.u.str, head + buf_offset, 0, buf_size ? buf_size : (data - buf_offset)); + + if (!buf_size && chn && channel_may_recv(chn) && !channel_input_closed(chn)) + smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE; + + return 1; + + too_short: + smp->flags = SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE | SMP_F_CONST; + return 0; +} + +/* This function is used to validate the arguments passed to a "payload_lv" fetch + * keyword. This keyword allows two positive integers and an optional signed one, + * with the second one being strictly positive and the third one being greater than + * the opposite of the two others if negative. It is assumed that the types are + * already the correct ones. Returns 0 on error, non-zero if OK. If <err_msg> is + * not NULL, it will be filled with a pointer to an error message in case of + * error, that the caller is responsible for freeing. The initial location must + * either be freeable or NULL. + * + * Note that offset2 is stored with SINT type, but its not directly usable as is. + * The value is contained in the 63 MSB and the LSB is used as a flag for marking + * the "relative" property of the value. + */ +int val_payload_lv(struct arg *arg, char **err_msg) +{ + int relative = 0; + const char *str; + + if (arg[0].data.sint < 0) { + memprintf(err_msg, "payload offset1 must be positive"); + return 0; + } + + if (!arg[1].data.sint) { + memprintf(err_msg, "payload length must be > 0"); + return 0; + } + + if (arg[2].type == ARGT_STR && arg[2].data.str.data > 0) { + long long int i; + + if (arg[2].data.str.area[0] == '+' || arg[2].data.str.area[0] == '-') + relative = 1; + str = arg[2].data.str.area; + i = read_int64(&str, str + arg[2].data.str.data); + if (*str != '\0') { + memprintf(err_msg, "payload offset2 is not a number"); + return 0; + } + chunk_destroy(&arg[2].data.str); + arg[2].type = ARGT_SINT; + arg[2].data.sint = i; + + if (arg[0].data.sint + arg[1].data.sint + arg[2].data.sint < 0) { + memprintf(err_msg, "payload offset2 too negative"); + return 0; + } + if (relative) + arg[2].data.sint = ( arg[2].data.sint << 1 ) + 1; + } + return 1; +} + +/* extracts the parameter value of a distcc token */ +static int +smp_fetch_distcc_param(const struct arg *arg_p, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) +{ + unsigned int match_tok = arg_p[0].data.sint; + unsigned int match_occ = arg_p[1].data.sint; + unsigned int token; + unsigned int param; + unsigned int body; + unsigned int ofs; + unsigned int occ; + struct channel *chn; + int i; + + /* Format is (token[,occ]). occ starts at 1. */ + + if (!smp->strm) + return 0; + + /* meaningless for HTX buffers */ + if (IS_HTX_STRM(smp->strm)) + return 0; + + chn = ((smp->opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_RES) ? &smp->strm->res : &smp->strm->req; + + ofs = 0; occ = 0; + while (1) { + if (ofs + 12 > ci_data(chn)) { + /* not there yet but could it at least fit ? */ + if (!chn->buf.size) + goto too_short; + + if (ofs + 12 <= channel_recv_limit(chn) + b_orig(&chn->buf) - ci_head(chn)) + goto too_short; + + goto no_match; + } + + token = read_n32(ci_head(chn) + ofs); + ofs += 4; + + for (i = param = 0; i < 8; i++) { + int c = hex2i(ci_head(chn)[ofs + i]); + + if (c < 0) + goto no_match; + param = (param << 4) + c; + } + ofs += 8; + + /* these tokens don't have a body */ + if (token != 0x41524743 /* ARGC */ && token != 0x44495354 /* DIST */ && + token != 0x4E46494C /* NFIL */ && token != 0x53544154 /* STAT */ && + token != 0x444F4E45 /* DONE */) + body = param; + else + body = 0; + + if (token == match_tok) { + occ++; + if (!match_occ || match_occ == occ) { + /* found */ + smp->data.type = SMP_T_SINT; + smp->data.u.sint = param; + smp->flags = SMP_F_VOLATILE | SMP_F_CONST; + return 1; + } + } + ofs += body; + } + + too_short: + smp->flags = SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE | SMP_F_CONST; + return 0; + no_match: + /* will never match (end of buffer, or bad contents) */ + smp->flags = 0; + return 0; + +} + +/* extracts the (possibly truncated) body of a distcc token */ +static int +smp_fetch_distcc_body(const struct arg *arg_p, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) +{ + unsigned int match_tok = arg_p[0].data.sint; + unsigned int match_occ = arg_p[1].data.sint; + unsigned int token; + unsigned int param; + unsigned int ofs; + unsigned int occ; + unsigned int body; + struct channel *chn; + int i; + + /* Format is (token[,occ]). occ starts at 1. */ + + if (!smp->strm) + return 0; + + /* meaningless for HTX buffers */ + if (IS_HTX_STRM(smp->strm)) + return 0; + + chn = ((smp->opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_RES) ? &smp->strm->res : &smp->strm->req; + + ofs = 0; occ = 0; + while (1) { + if (ofs + 12 > ci_data(chn)) { + if (!chn->buf.size) + goto too_short; + + if (ofs + 12 <= channel_recv_limit(chn) + b_orig(&chn->buf) - ci_head(chn)) + goto too_short; + + goto no_match; + } + + token = read_n32(ci_head(chn) + ofs); + ofs += 4; + + for (i = param = 0; i < 8; i++) { + int c = hex2i(ci_head(chn)[ofs + i]); + + if (c < 0) + goto no_match; + param = (param << 4) + c; + } + ofs += 8; + + /* these tokens don't have a body */ + if (token != 0x41524743 /* ARGC */ && token != 0x44495354 /* DIST */ && + token != 0x4E46494C /* NFIL */ && token != 0x53544154 /* STAT */ && + token != 0x444F4E45 /* DONE */) + body = param; + else + body = 0; + + if (token == match_tok) { + occ++; + if (!match_occ || match_occ == occ) { + /* found */ + + smp->data.type = SMP_T_BIN; + smp->flags = SMP_F_VOLATILE | SMP_F_CONST; + + if (ofs + body > ci_head(chn) - b_orig(&chn->buf) + ci_data(chn)) { + /* incomplete body */ + + if (ofs + body > channel_recv_limit(chn) + b_orig(&chn->buf) - ci_head(chn)) { + /* truncate it to whatever will fit */ + smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE; + body = channel_recv_limit(chn) + b_orig(&chn->buf) - ci_head(chn) - ofs; + } + } + + chunk_initlen(&smp->data.u.str, ci_head(chn) + ofs, 0, body); + return 1; + } + } + ofs += body; + } + + too_short: + smp->flags = SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE | SMP_F_CONST; + return 0; + no_match: + /* will never match (end of buffer, or bad contents) */ + smp->flags = 0; + return 0; + +} + +/* This function is used to validate the arguments passed to a "distcc_param" or + * "distcc_body" sample fetch keyword. They take a mandatory token name of exactly + * 4 characters, followed by an optional occurrence number starting at 1. It is + * assumed that the types are already the correct ones. Returns 0 on error, non- + * zero if OK. If <err_msg> is not NULL, it will be filled with a pointer to an + * error message in case of error, that the caller is responsible for freeing. + * The initial location must either be freeable or NULL. + */ +int val_distcc(struct arg *arg, char **err_msg) +{ + unsigned int token; + + if (arg[0].data.str.data != 4) { + memprintf(err_msg, "token name must be exactly 4 characters"); + return 0; + } + + /* convert the token name to an unsigned int (one byte per character, + * big endian format). + */ + token = (arg[0].data.str.area[0] << 24) + (arg[0].data.str.area[1] << 16) + + (arg[0].data.str.area[2] << 8) + (arg[0].data.str.area[3] << 0); + + chunk_destroy(&arg[0].data.str); + arg[0].type = ARGT_SINT; + arg[0].data.sint = token; + + if (arg[1].type != ARGT_SINT) { + arg[1].type = ARGT_SINT; + arg[1].data.sint = 0; + } + return 1; +} + +/************************************************************************/ +/* All supported sample and ACL keywords must be declared here. */ +/************************************************************************/ + +/* Note: must not be declared <const> as its list will be overwritten. + * Note: fetches that may return multiple types must be declared as the lowest + * common denominator, the type that can be casted into all other ones. For + * instance IPv4/IPv6 must be declared IPv4. + */ +static struct sample_fetch_kw_list smp_kws = {ILH, { + { "distcc_body", smp_fetch_distcc_body, ARG2(1,STR,SINT), val_distcc, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L6REQ|SMP_USE_L6RES }, + { "distcc_param", smp_fetch_distcc_param, ARG2(1,STR,SINT), val_distcc, SMP_T_SINT, SMP_USE_L6REQ|SMP_USE_L6RES }, + { "payload", smp_fetch_payload, ARG2(2,SINT,SINT), NULL, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L6REQ|SMP_USE_L6RES }, + { "payload_lv", smp_fetch_payload_lv, ARG3(2,SINT,SINT,STR), val_payload_lv, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L6REQ|SMP_USE_L6RES }, + { "rdp_cookie", smp_fetch_rdp_cookie, ARG1(0,STR), NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L6REQ }, + { "rdp_cookie_cnt", smp_fetch_rdp_cookie_cnt, ARG1(0,STR), NULL, SMP_T_SINT, SMP_USE_L6REQ }, + { "rep_ssl_hello_type", smp_fetch_ssl_hello_type, 0, NULL, SMP_T_SINT, SMP_USE_L6RES }, + { "req_len", smp_fetch_len, 0, NULL, SMP_T_SINT, SMP_USE_L6REQ }, + { "req_ssl_hello_type", smp_fetch_ssl_hello_type, 0, NULL, SMP_T_SINT, SMP_USE_L6REQ }, + { "req_ssl_sni", smp_fetch_ssl_hello_sni, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L6REQ }, + { "req_ssl_ver", smp_fetch_req_ssl_ver, 0, NULL, SMP_T_SINT, SMP_USE_L6REQ }, + + { "req.len", smp_fetch_len, 0, NULL, SMP_T_SINT, SMP_USE_L6REQ }, + { "req.payload", smp_fetch_payload, ARG2(2,SINT,SINT), NULL, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L6REQ }, + { "req.payload_lv", smp_fetch_payload_lv, ARG3(2,SINT,SINT,STR), val_payload_lv, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L6REQ }, + { "req.rdp_cookie", smp_fetch_rdp_cookie, ARG1(0,STR), NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L6REQ }, + { "req.rdp_cookie_cnt", smp_fetch_rdp_cookie_cnt, ARG1(0,STR), NULL, SMP_T_SINT, SMP_USE_L6REQ }, + { "req.ssl_ec_ext", smp_fetch_req_ssl_ec_ext, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BOOL, SMP_USE_L6REQ }, + { "req.ssl_st_ext", smp_fetch_req_ssl_st_ext, 0, NULL, SMP_T_SINT, SMP_USE_L6REQ }, + { "req.ssl_hello_type", smp_fetch_ssl_hello_type, 0, NULL, SMP_T_SINT, SMP_USE_L6REQ }, + { "req.ssl_sni", smp_fetch_ssl_hello_sni, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L6REQ }, + { "req.ssl_alpn", smp_fetch_ssl_hello_alpn, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L6REQ }, + { "req.ssl_ver", smp_fetch_req_ssl_ver, 0, NULL, SMP_T_SINT, SMP_USE_L6REQ }, + { "res.len", smp_fetch_len, 0, NULL, SMP_T_SINT, SMP_USE_L6RES }, + { "res.payload", smp_fetch_payload, ARG2(2,SINT,SINT), NULL, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L6RES }, + { "res.payload_lv", smp_fetch_payload_lv, ARG3(2,SINT,SINT,STR), val_payload_lv, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L6RES }, + { "res.ssl_hello_type", smp_fetch_ssl_hello_type, 0, NULL, SMP_T_SINT, SMP_USE_L6RES }, + { "wait_end", smp_fetch_wait_end, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BOOL, SMP_USE_INTRN }, + { /* END */ }, +}}; + +INITCALL1(STG_REGISTER, sample_register_fetches, &smp_kws); + +/* Note: must not be declared <const> as its list will be overwritten. + * Please take care of keeping this list alphabetically sorted. + */ +static struct acl_kw_list acl_kws = {ILH, { + { "payload", "req.payload", PAT_MATCH_BIN }, + { "payload_lv", "req.payload_lv", PAT_MATCH_BIN }, + { "req_rdp_cookie", "req.rdp_cookie", PAT_MATCH_STR }, + { "req_rdp_cookie_cnt", "req.rdp_cookie_cnt", PAT_MATCH_INT }, + { "req_ssl_sni", "req.ssl_sni", PAT_MATCH_STR }, + { "req_ssl_ver", "req.ssl_ver", PAT_MATCH_INT, pat_parse_dotted_ver }, + { "req.ssl_ver", "req.ssl_ver", PAT_MATCH_INT, pat_parse_dotted_ver }, + { /* END */ }, +}}; + +INITCALL1(STG_REGISTER, acl_register_keywords, &acl_kws); + +/* + * Local variables: + * c-indent-level: 8 + * c-basic-offset: 8 + * End: + */ |