diff options
Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/dns/tsig.cc | 581 |
1 files changed, 581 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/dns/tsig.cc b/src/lib/dns/tsig.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7c85de --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/dns/tsig.cc @@ -0,0 +1,581 @@ +// Copyright (C) 2011-2021 Internet Systems Consortium, Inc. ("ISC") +// +// This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public +// License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this +// file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. + +#include <config.h> + +#include <sys/time.h> + +#include <stdint.h> + +#include <cassert> +#include <vector> + +#include <boost/shared_ptr.hpp> + +#include <exceptions/exceptions.h> + +#include <util/buffer.h> +#include <util/time_utilities.h> + +#include <dns/rdataclass.h> +#include <dns/rrclass.h> +#include <dns/tsig.h> +#include <dns/tsigerror.h> +#include <dns/tsigkey.h> + +#include <cryptolink/cryptolink.h> +#include <cryptolink/crypto_hmac.h> + +using namespace std; +using namespace isc::util; +using namespace isc::cryptolink; +using namespace isc::dns::rdata; + +namespace isc { +namespace dns { +namespace { +typedef boost::shared_ptr<HMAC> HMACPtr; + +// TSIG uses 48-bit unsigned integer to represent time signed. +// Since gettimeWrapper() returns a 64-bit *signed* integer, we +// make sure it's stored in an unsigned 64-bit integer variable and +// represents a value in the expected range. (In reality, however, +// gettimeWrapper() will return a positive integer that will fit +// in 48 bits) +uint64_t +getTSIGTime() { + return (detail::gettimeWrapper() & 0x0000ffffffffffffULL); +} +} + +struct TSIGContext::TSIGContextImpl { + TSIGContextImpl(const TSIGKey& key, + TSIGError error = TSIGError::NOERROR()) : + state_(INIT), key_(key), error_(error), + previous_timesigned_(0), digest_len_(0), + last_sig_dist_(-1) { + if (error == TSIGError::NOERROR()) { + // In normal (NOERROR) case, the key should be valid, and we + // should be able to pre-create a corresponding HMAC object, + // which will be likely to be used for sign or verify later. + // We do this in the constructor so that we can know the expected + // digest length in advance. The creation should normally succeed, + // but the key information could be still broken, which could + // trigger an exception inside the cryptolink module. We ignore + // it at this moment; a subsequent sign/verify operation will try + // to create the HMAC, which would also fail. + try { + hmac_.reset(CryptoLink::getCryptoLink().createHMAC( + key_.getSecret(), key_.getSecretLength(), + key_.getAlgorithm()), + deleteHMAC); + } catch (const isc::Exception&) { + return; + } + size_t digestbits = key_.getDigestbits(); + size_t default_digest_len = hmac_->getOutputLength(); + if (digestbits > 0) { + digest_len_ = (digestbits + 7) / 8; + // sanity (cf. RFC 4635) + if ((digest_len_ < 10) || + (digest_len_ < (default_digest_len / 2)) || + (digest_len_ > default_digest_len)) { + // should emit a warning? + digest_len_ = default_digest_len; + } + } else { + digest_len_ = default_digest_len; + } + } + } + + // This helper method is used from verify(). It's expected to be called + // just before verify() returns. It updates internal state based on + // the verification result and return the TSIGError to be returned to + // the caller of verify(), so that verify() can call this method within + // its 'return' statement. + TSIGError postVerifyUpdate(TSIGError error, const void* digest, + uint16_t digest_len) + { + if (state_ == INIT) { + state_ = RECEIVED_REQUEST; + } else if (state_ == SENT_REQUEST && error == TSIGError::NOERROR()) { + state_ = VERIFIED_RESPONSE; + } + if (digest != NULL) { + previous_digest_.assign(static_cast<const uint8_t*>(digest), + static_cast<const uint8_t*>(digest) + + digest_len); + } + error_ = error; + return (error); + } + + // A shortcut method to create an HMAC object for sign/verify. If one + // has been successfully created in the constructor, return it; otherwise + // create a new one and return it. In the former case, the ownership is + // transferred to the caller; the stored HMAC will be reset after the + // call. + HMACPtr createHMAC() { + if (hmac_) { + HMACPtr ret = HMACPtr(); + ret.swap(hmac_); + return (ret); + } + return (HMACPtr(CryptoLink::getCryptoLink().createHMAC( + key_.getSecret(), key_.getSecretLength(), + key_.getAlgorithm()), + deleteHMAC)); + } + + // The following three are helper methods to compute the digest for + // TSIG sign/verify in order to unify the common code logic for sign() + // and verify() and to keep these callers concise. + // These methods take an HMAC object, which will be updated with the + // calculated digest. + // Note: All methods construct a local OutputBuffer as a work space with a + // fixed initial buffer size to avoid intermediate buffer extension. + // This should be efficient enough, especially for fundamentally expensive + // operation like cryptographic sign/verify, but if the creation of the + // buffer in each helper method is still identified to be a severe + // performance bottleneck, we could have this class a buffer as a member + // variable and reuse it throughout the object's lifetime. Right now, + // we prefer keeping the scope for local things as small as possible. + void digestPreviousMAC(HMACPtr hmac); + void digestTSIGVariables(HMACPtr hmac, uint16_t rrclass, uint32_t rrttl, + uint64_t time_signed, uint16_t fudge, + uint16_t error, uint16_t otherlen, + const void* otherdata, + bool time_variables_only) const; + void digestDNSMessage(HMACPtr hmac, uint16_t qid, const void* data, + size_t data_len) const; + State state_; + const TSIGKey key_; + vector<uint8_t> previous_digest_; + TSIGError error_; + uint64_t previous_timesigned_; // only meaningful for response with BADTIME + size_t digest_len_; + HMACPtr hmac_; + // This is the distance from the last verified signed message. Value of 0 + // means the last message was signed. Special value -1 means there was no + // signed message yet. + int last_sig_dist_; +}; + +void +TSIGContext::TSIGContextImpl::digestPreviousMAC(HMACPtr hmac) { + // We should have ensured the digest size fits 16 bits within this class + // implementation. + assert(previous_digest_.size() <= 0xffff); + + if (previous_digest_.empty()) { + // The previous digest was already used. We're in the middle of + // TCP stream somewhere and we already pushed some unsigned message + // into the HMAC state. + return; + } + + OutputBuffer buffer(sizeof(uint16_t) + previous_digest_.size()); + const uint16_t previous_digest_len(previous_digest_.size()); + buffer.writeUint16(previous_digest_len); + if (previous_digest_len != 0) { + buffer.writeData(&previous_digest_[0], previous_digest_len); + } + hmac->update(buffer.getData(), buffer.getLength()); +} + +void +TSIGContext::TSIGContextImpl::digestTSIGVariables( + HMACPtr hmac, uint16_t rrclass, uint32_t rrttl, uint64_t time_signed, + uint16_t fudge, uint16_t error, uint16_t otherlen, const void* otherdata, + bool time_variables_only) const { + // It's bit complicated, but we can still predict the necessary size of + // the data to be digested. So we precompute it to avoid possible + // reallocation inside OutputBuffer (not absolutely necessary, but this + // is a bit more efficient) + size_t data_size = 8; + if (!time_variables_only) { + data_size += 10 + key_.getKeyName().getLength() + + key_.getAlgorithmName().getLength(); + } + OutputBuffer buffer(data_size); + + if (!time_variables_only) { + key_.getKeyName().toWire(buffer); + buffer.writeUint16(rrclass); + buffer.writeUint32(rrttl); + key_.getAlgorithmName().toWire(buffer); + } + buffer.writeUint16(time_signed >> 32); + buffer.writeUint32(time_signed & 0xffffffff); + buffer.writeUint16(fudge); + + if (!time_variables_only) { + buffer.writeUint16(error); + buffer.writeUint16(otherlen); + } + + hmac->update(buffer.getData(), buffer.getLength()); + if (!time_variables_only && otherlen > 0) { + hmac->update(otherdata, otherlen); + } +} + +// In digestDNSMessage, we exploit some minimum knowledge of DNS message +// format: +// - the header section has a fixed length of 12 octets (MESSAGE_HEADER_LEN) +// - the offset in the header section to the ID field is 0 +// - the offset in the header section to the ARCOUNT field is 10 (and the field +// length is 2 octets) +// We could construct a separate Message object from the given data, adjust +// fields via the Message interfaces and then render it back to a separate +// buffer, but that would be overkilling. The DNS message header has a +// fixed length and necessary modifications are quite straightforward, so +// we do the job using lower level interfaces. +namespace { +const size_t MESSAGE_HEADER_LEN = 12; +} + +void +TSIGContext::TSIGContextImpl::digestDNSMessage(HMACPtr hmac, + uint16_t qid, const void* data, + size_t data_len) const { + OutputBuffer buffer(MESSAGE_HEADER_LEN); + const uint8_t* msgptr = static_cast<const uint8_t*>(data); + + // Install the original ID + buffer.writeUint16(qid); + msgptr += sizeof(uint16_t); + + // Copy the rest of the header except the ARCOUNT field. + buffer.writeData(msgptr, 8); + msgptr += 8; + + // Install the adjusted ARCOUNT (we don't care even if the value is bogus + // and it underflows; it would simply result in verification failure) + buffer.writeUint16(InputBuffer(msgptr, sizeof(uint16_t)).readUint16() - 1); + msgptr += 2; + + // Digest the header and the rest of the DNS message + hmac->update(buffer.getData(), buffer.getLength()); + hmac->update(msgptr, data_len - MESSAGE_HEADER_LEN); +} + +TSIGContext::TSIGContext(const TSIGKey& key) : impl_(new TSIGContextImpl(key)) { +} + +TSIGContext::TSIGContext(const Name& key_name, const Name& algorithm_name, + const TSIGKeyRing& keyring) : impl_(NULL) { + const TSIGKeyRing::FindResult result(keyring.find(key_name, + algorithm_name)); + if (result.code == TSIGKeyRing::NOTFOUND) { + // If not key is found, create a dummy key with the specified key + // parameters and empty secret. In the common scenario this will + // be used in subsequent response with a TSIG indicating a BADKEY + // error. + impl_ = new TSIGContextImpl(TSIGKey(key_name, algorithm_name, + NULL, 0), TSIGError::BAD_KEY()); + } else { + impl_ = new TSIGContextImpl(*result.key); + } +} + +TSIGContext::~TSIGContext() { + delete impl_; +} + +size_t +TSIGContext::getTSIGLength() const { + // + // The space required for an TSIG record is: + // + // n1 bytes for the (key) name + // 2 bytes for the type + // 2 bytes for the class + // 4 bytes for the ttl + // 2 bytes for the rdlength + // n2 bytes for the algorithm name + // 6 bytes for the time signed + // 2 bytes for the fudge + // 2 bytes for the MAC size + // x bytes for the MAC + // 2 bytes for the original id + // 2 bytes for the error + // 2 bytes for the other data length + // y bytes for the other data (at most) + // --------------------------------- + // 26 + n1 + n2 + x + y bytes + // + + // Normally the digest length ("x") is the length of the underlying + // hash output. If a key related error occurred, however, the + // corresponding TSIG will be "unsigned", and the digest length will be 0. + const size_t digest_len = + (impl_->error_ == TSIGError::BAD_KEY() || + impl_->error_ == TSIGError::BAD_SIG()) ? 0 : impl_->digest_len_; + + // Other Len ("y") is normally 0; if BAD_TIME error occurred, the + // subsequent TSIG will contain 48 bits of the server current time. + const size_t other_len = (impl_->error_ == TSIGError::BAD_TIME()) ? 6 : 0; + + return (26 + impl_->key_.getKeyName().getLength() + + impl_->key_.getAlgorithmName().getLength() + + digest_len + other_len); +} + +TSIGContext::State +TSIGContext::getState() const { + return (impl_->state_); +} + +TSIGError +TSIGContext::getError() const { + return (impl_->error_); +} + +ConstTSIGRecordPtr +TSIGContext::sign(const uint16_t qid, const void* const data, + const size_t data_len) { + if (impl_->state_ == VERIFIED_RESPONSE) { + isc_throw(TSIGContextError, + "TSIG sign attempt after verifying a response"); + } + + if (data == NULL || data_len == 0) { + isc_throw(InvalidParameter, "TSIG sign error: empty data is given"); + } + + TSIGError error(TSIGError::NOERROR()); + const uint64_t now = getTSIGTime(); + + // For responses adjust the error code. + if (impl_->state_ == RECEIVED_REQUEST) { + error = impl_->error_; + } + + // For errors related to key or MAC, return an unsigned response as + // specified in Section 4.3 of RFC2845. + if (error == TSIGError::BAD_SIG() || error == TSIGError::BAD_KEY()) { + ConstTSIGRecordPtr tsig(new TSIGRecord( + impl_->key_.getKeyName(), + any::TSIG(impl_->key_.getAlgorithmName(), + now, DEFAULT_FUDGE, 0, NULL, + qid, error.getCode(), 0, NULL))); + impl_->previous_digest_.clear(); + impl_->state_ = SENT_RESPONSE; + return (tsig); + } + + HMACPtr hmac(impl_->createHMAC()); + + // If the context has previous MAC (either the Request MAC or its own + // previous MAC), digest it. + if (impl_->state_ != INIT) { + impl_->digestPreviousMAC(hmac); + } + + // Digest the message (without TSIG) + hmac->update(data, data_len); + + // Digest TSIG variables. + // First, prepare some non constant variables. + const uint64_t time_signed = (error == TSIGError::BAD_TIME()) ? + impl_->previous_timesigned_ : now; + // For BADTIME error, we include 6 bytes of other data. + // (6 bytes = size of time signed value) + const uint16_t otherlen = (error == TSIGError::BAD_TIME()) ? 6 : 0; + OutputBuffer otherdatabuf(otherlen); + if (error == TSIGError::BAD_TIME()) { + otherdatabuf.writeUint16(now >> 32); + otherdatabuf.writeUint32(now & 0xffffffff); + } + const void* const otherdata = + (otherlen == 0) ? NULL : otherdatabuf.getData(); + // Then calculate the digest. If state_ is SENT_RESPONSE we are sending + // a continued message in the same TCP stream so skip digesting + // variables except for time related variables (RFC2845 4.4). + impl_->digestTSIGVariables(hmac, TSIGRecord::getClass().getCode(), + TSIGRecord::TSIG_TTL, time_signed, + DEFAULT_FUDGE, error.getCode(), + otherlen, otherdata, + impl_->state_ == SENT_RESPONSE); + + // Get the final digest, update internal state, then finish. + vector<uint8_t> digest = hmac->sign(impl_->digest_len_); + assert(digest.size() <= 0xffff); // cryptolink API should have ensured it. + ConstTSIGRecordPtr tsig(new TSIGRecord( + impl_->key_.getKeyName(), + any::TSIG(impl_->key_.getAlgorithmName(), + time_signed, DEFAULT_FUDGE, + digest.size(), &digest[0], + qid, error.getCode(), otherlen, + otherdata))); + // Exception free from now on. + impl_->previous_digest_.swap(digest); + impl_->state_ = (impl_->state_ == INIT) ? SENT_REQUEST : SENT_RESPONSE; + return (tsig); +} + +TSIGError +TSIGContext::verify(const TSIGRecord* const record, const void* const data, + const size_t data_len) { + if (impl_->state_ == SENT_RESPONSE) { + isc_throw(TSIGContextError, + "TSIG verify attempt after sending a response"); + } + + if (record == NULL) { + if (impl_->last_sig_dist_ >= 0 && impl_->last_sig_dist_ < 99) { + // It is not signed, but in the middle of TCP stream. We just + // update the HMAC state and consider this message OK. + update(data, data_len); + // This one is not signed, the last signed is one message further + // now. + impl_->last_sig_dist_++; + // No digest to return now. Just say it's OK. + return (impl_->postVerifyUpdate(TSIGError::NOERROR(), NULL, 0)); + } + // This case happens when we sent a signed request and have received an + // unsigned response. According to RFC2845 Section 4.6 this case should be + // considered a "format error" (although the specific error code + // wouldn't matter much for the caller). + return (impl_->postVerifyUpdate(TSIGError::FORMERR(), NULL, 0)); + } + + const any::TSIG& tsig_rdata = record->getRdata(); + + // Reject some obviously invalid data + if (data_len < MESSAGE_HEADER_LEN + record->getLength()) { + isc_throw(InvalidParameter, + "TSIG verify: data length is invalid: " << data_len); + } + if (data == NULL) { + isc_throw(InvalidParameter, "TSIG verify: empty data is invalid"); + } + + // This message is signed and we won't throw any more. + impl_->last_sig_dist_ = 0; + + // Check key: whether we first verify it with a known key or we verify + // it using the consistent key in the context. If the check fails we are + // done with BADKEY. + if (impl_->state_ == INIT && impl_->error_ == TSIGError::BAD_KEY()) { + return (impl_->postVerifyUpdate(TSIGError::BAD_KEY(), NULL, 0)); + } + if (impl_->key_.getKeyName() != record->getName() || + impl_->key_.getAlgorithmName() != tsig_rdata.getAlgorithm()) { + return (impl_->postVerifyUpdate(TSIGError::BAD_KEY(), NULL, 0)); + } + + // Check time: the current time must be in the range of + // [time signed - fudge, time signed + fudge]. Otherwise verification + // fails with BADTIME. (RFC2845 Section 4.6.2) + // Note: for simplicity we don't explicitly catch the case of too small + // current time causing underflow. With the fact that fudge is quite + // small and (for now) non configurable, it shouldn't be a real concern + // in practice. + const uint64_t now = getTSIGTime(); + if (tsig_rdata.getTimeSigned() + DEFAULT_FUDGE < now || + tsig_rdata.getTimeSigned() - DEFAULT_FUDGE > now) { + const void* digest = NULL; + size_t digest_len = 0; + if (impl_->state_ == INIT) { + digest = tsig_rdata.getMAC(); + digest_len = tsig_rdata.getMACSize(); + impl_->previous_timesigned_ = tsig_rdata.getTimeSigned(); + } + return (impl_->postVerifyUpdate(TSIGError::BAD_TIME(), digest, + digest_len)); + } + + // Handling empty MAC. While RFC2845 doesn't explicitly prohibit other + // cases, it can only reasonably happen in a response with BADSIG or + // BADKEY. We reject other cases as if it were BADSIG to avoid unexpected + // acceptance of a bogus signature. This behavior follows the BIND 9 + // implementation. + if (tsig_rdata.getMACSize() == 0) { + TSIGError error = TSIGError(tsig_rdata.getError()); + if (error != TSIGError::BAD_SIG() && error != TSIGError::BAD_KEY()) { + error = TSIGError::BAD_SIG(); + } + return (impl_->postVerifyUpdate(error, NULL, 0)); + } + + HMACPtr hmac(impl_->createHMAC()); + + // If the context has previous MAC (either the Request MAC or its own + // previous MAC), digest it. + if (impl_->state_ != INIT) { + impl_->digestPreviousMAC(hmac); + } + + // Signature length check based on RFC 4635 3.1 + if (tsig_rdata.getMACSize() > hmac->getOutputLength()) { + // signature length too big + return (impl_->postVerifyUpdate(TSIGError::FORMERR(), NULL, 0)); + } + if ((tsig_rdata.getMACSize() < 10) || + (tsig_rdata.getMACSize() < (hmac->getOutputLength() / 2))) { + // signature length below minimum + return (impl_->postVerifyUpdate(TSIGError::FORMERR(), NULL, 0)); + } + if (tsig_rdata.getMACSize() < impl_->digest_len_) { + // (truncated) signature length too small + return (impl_->postVerifyUpdate(TSIGError::BAD_TRUNC(), NULL, 0)); + } + + // + // Digest DNS message (excluding the trailing TSIG RR and adjusting the + // QID and ARCOUNT header fields) + // + impl_->digestDNSMessage(hmac, tsig_rdata.getOriginalID(), + data, data_len - record->getLength()); + + // Digest TSIG variables. If state_ is VERIFIED_RESPONSE, it's a + // continuation of the same TCP stream and skip digesting them except + // for time related variables (RFC2845 4.4). + // Note: we use the constant values for RR class and TTL specified + // in RFC2845, not received values (we reject other values in constructing + // the TSIGRecord). + impl_->digestTSIGVariables(hmac, TSIGRecord::getClass().getCode(), + TSIGRecord::TSIG_TTL, + tsig_rdata.getTimeSigned(), + tsig_rdata.getFudge(), tsig_rdata.getError(), + tsig_rdata.getOtherLen(), + tsig_rdata.getOtherData(), + impl_->state_ == VERIFIED_RESPONSE); + + // Verify the digest with the received signature. + if (hmac->verify(tsig_rdata.getMAC(), tsig_rdata.getMACSize())) { + return (impl_->postVerifyUpdate(TSIGError::NOERROR(), + tsig_rdata.getMAC(), + tsig_rdata.getMACSize())); + } + + return (impl_->postVerifyUpdate(TSIGError::BAD_SIG(), NULL, 0)); +} + +bool +TSIGContext::lastHadSignature() const { + if (impl_->last_sig_dist_ == -1) { + isc_throw(TSIGContextError, "No message was verified yet"); + } + return (impl_->last_sig_dist_ == 0); +} + +void +TSIGContext::update(const void* const data, size_t len) { + HMACPtr hmac(impl_->createHMAC()); + // Use the previous digest and never use it again + impl_->digestPreviousMAC(hmac); + impl_->previous_digest_.clear(); + // Push the message there + hmac->update(data, len); + impl_->hmac_ = hmac; +} + +} // namespace dns +} // namespace isc |