diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/tpm12/tpm_crypto_freebl.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/tpm12/tpm_crypto_freebl.c | 2652 |
1 files changed, 2652 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/tpm12/tpm_crypto_freebl.c b/src/tpm12/tpm_crypto_freebl.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..272c264 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/tpm12/tpm_crypto_freebl.c @@ -0,0 +1,2652 @@ +/********************************************************************************/ +/* */ +/* Platform Dependent Crypto */ +/* Written by Ken Goldman */ +/* IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center */ +/* $Id: tpm_crypto_freebl.c 4655 2011-12-21 21:03:15Z kgoldman $ */ +/* */ +/* (c) Copyright IBM Corporation 2006, 2010. */ +/* */ +/* All rights reserved. */ +/* */ +/* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without */ +/* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are */ +/* met: */ +/* */ +/* Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, */ +/* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. */ +/* */ +/* Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright */ +/* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the */ +/* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. */ +/* */ +/* Neither the names of the IBM Corporation nor the names of its */ +/* contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from */ +/* this software without specific prior written permission. */ +/* */ +/* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS */ +/* "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT */ +/* LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR */ +/* A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT */ +/* HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, */ +/* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT */ +/* LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, */ +/* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY */ +/* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT */ +/* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE */ +/* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ +/********************************************************************************/ + +/* This is the FreeBL implementation + + setenv CVSROOT :pserver:anonymous@cvsmirror.mozilla.org:/cvsroot + cvs co mosilla/nsprpub + gmake nss_build_all +*/ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdarg.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include "blapi.h" +#include <gmp.h> + +#include "tpm_cryptoh.h" +#include "tpm_debug.h" +#include "tpm_error.h" +#include "tpm_key.h" +#include "tpm_io.h" +#include "tpm_load.h" +#include "tpm_memory.h" +#include "tpm_process.h" +#include "tpm_types.h" + +#include "tpm_crypto.h" + +/* The TPM OAEP encoding parameter */ +static const unsigned char tpm_oaep_pad_str[] = { 'T', 'C', 'P', 'A' }; + +/* pre-calculate hash of the constant tpm_oaep_pad_str, used often in the OAEP padding + calculations */ +static const unsigned char pHashConst[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; + +/* ASN.1 industry standard SHA1 with RSA object identifier */ +static unsigned char sha1Oid[] = { + 0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, + 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, 0x05, + 0x00, 0x04, 0x14}; + + +/* + local prototypes +*/ + +static void TPM_RSAPrivateKeyInit(RSAPrivateKey *rsa_pri_key); +static TPM_RESULT TPM_RSAGeneratePublicToken(RSAPublicKey *rsa_pub_key, + unsigned char *narr, + uint32_t nbytes, + unsigned char *earr, + uint32_t ebytes); +static TPM_RESULT TPM_RSAGeneratePrivateToken(RSAPrivateKey *rsa_pri_key, + unsigned char *narr, + uint32_t nbytes, + unsigned char *earr, + uint32_t ebytes, + unsigned char *darr, + uint32_t dbytes); +static TPM_RESULT TPM_RSASignSHA1(unsigned char *signature, + unsigned int *signature_length, + const unsigned char *message, + size_t message_size, + RSAPrivateKey *rsa_pri_key); +static TPM_RESULT TPM_RSASignDER(unsigned char *signature, + unsigned int *signature_length, + const unsigned char *message, + size_t message_size, + RSAPrivateKey *rsa_pri_key); + +static TPM_RESULT TPM_RandomNonZero(BYTE *buffer, size_t bytes); + +static TPM_RESULT TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType1Add(unsigned char *output, + uint32_t outputLength, + const unsigned char *input, + uint32_t inputLength); +static TPM_RESULT TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType1Check(uint32_t *padLength, + unsigned char *input, + uint32_t inputLength); +static TPM_RESULT TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType2Add(unsigned char *encodedMessage, + uint32_t encodedMessageLength, + const unsigned char *message, + uint32_t messageLength); +static TPM_RESULT TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType2Check(unsigned char *outputData, + uint32_t *outputDataLength, + uint32_t outputDataSize, + unsigned char *inputData, + uint32_t inputDataLength); + +static TPM_RESULT TPM_memcpyPad(unsigned char **bin_out, + unsigned char *bin_in, + uint32_t bin_in_length, + uint32_t padBytes); + + +/* TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_DATA is a crypto library platform dependent symmetric key structure + */ + +#ifdef TPM_AES + +/* local prototype and structure for AES */ + +/* AES requires data lengths that are a multiple of the block size */ +#define TPM_AES_BITS 128 +/* The AES block size is always 16 bytes */ +#define TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE 16 + +/* Since the AES key is often derived by truncating the session shared secret, test that it's not + too large +*/ + +#if (TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE > TPM_SECRET_SIZE) +#error TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE larger than TPM_SECRET_SIZE +#endif + +/* The AES initial CTR value is derived from a nonce. */ + +#if (TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE > TPM_NONCE_SIZE) +#error TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE larger than TPM_NONCE_SIZE +#endif + +typedef struct tdTPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_DATA { + TPM_TAG tag; + TPM_BOOL valid; + TPM_BOOL fill; + unsigned char userKey[TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; +} TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_DATA; + +#endif /* TPM_AES */ + +/* + Crypto library Initialization function +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_Crypto_Init() +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + + printf("TPM_Crypto_Init: FreeBL library\n"); + /* initialize the random number generator */ + if (rc == 0) { + printf(" TPM_Crypto_Init: Initializing RNG\n"); + rv = RNG_RNGInit(); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + printf("TPM_Crypto_Init: Error (fatal), RNG_RNGInit rv %d\n", rv); + rc = TPM_FAIL; + } + } + /* add additional seed entropy to the random number generator */ + if (rc == 0) { + printf(" TPM_Crypto_Init: Seeding RNG\n"); + RNG_SystemInfoForRNG(); + } + if (rc == 0) { + rv = BL_Init(); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + printf("TPM_Crypto_Init: Error (fatal), BL_Init rv %d\n", rv); + rc =TPM_FAIL ; + } + } + /* pre-calculate hash of the constant tpm_oaep_pad_str, used often in the OAEP padding + calculations */ + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_SHA1((unsigned char *)pHashConst, /* cast once to precalculate the constant */ + sizeof(tpm_oaep_pad_str), tpm_oaep_pad_str, + 0, NULL); + TPM_PrintFour("TPM_Crypto_Init: pHashConst", pHashConst); + } + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_Crypto_TestSpecific() performs any library specific tests + + For FreeBL +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_Crypto_TestSpecific() +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + + /* Saving the SHA-1 context is fragile code, so test at startup */ + void *context1; + void *context2; + unsigned char buffer1[] = "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq"; + unsigned char expect1[] = {0x84,0x98,0x3E,0x44,0x1C, + 0x3B,0xD2,0x6E,0xBA,0xAE, + 0x4A,0xA1,0xF9,0x51,0x29, + 0xE5,0xE5,0x46,0x70,0xF1}; + TPM_DIGEST actual; + int not_equal; + TPM_STORE_BUFFER sbuffer; + const unsigned char *stream; + uint32_t stream_size; + + printf(" TPM_Crypto_TestSpecific: Test 1 - SHA1 two parts\n"); + context1 = NULL; /* freed @1 */ + context2 = NULL; /* freed @2 */ + TPM_Sbuffer_Init(&sbuffer); /* freed @3 */ + + if (rc== 0) { + rc = TPM_SHA1InitCmd(&context1); /* freed @1 */ + } + /* digest the first part of the array */ + if (rc== 0) { + rc = TPM_SHA1UpdateCmd(context1, buffer1, 16); + } + /* store the SHA1 context */ + if (rc== 0) { + rc = TPM_Sha1Context_Store(&sbuffer, context1); + } + /* load the SHA1 context */ + if (rc== 0) { + TPM_Sbuffer_Get(&sbuffer, &stream, &stream_size); + rc = TPM_Sha1Context_Load + (&context2, (unsigned char **)&stream, &stream_size); /* freed @2 */ + } + /* digest the rest of the array */ + if (rc== 0) { + rc = TPM_SHA1UpdateCmd(context2, buffer1 + 16, sizeof(buffer1) - 17); + } + /* get the digest result */ + if (rc== 0) { + rc = TPM_SHA1FinalCmd(actual, context2); + } + /* check the result */ + if (rc == 0) { + not_equal = memcmp(expect1, actual, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + if (not_equal) { + printf("TPM_Crypto_TestSpecific: Error in test 1\n"); + TPM_PrintFour("\texpect", expect1); + TPM_PrintFour("\tactual", actual); + rc = TPM_FAILEDSELFTEST; + } + } + TPM_SHA1Delete(&context1); /* @1 */ + TPM_SHA1Delete(&context2); /* @2 */ + TPM_Sbuffer_Delete(&sbuffer); /* @3 */ + return rc; +} + +/* + Random Number Functions +*/ + +/* TPM_Random() fills 'buffer' with 'bytes' bytes. + */ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_Random(BYTE *buffer, size_t bytes) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + + printf(" TPM_Random: Requesting %lu bytes\n", (unsigned long)bytes); + /* generate the random bytes */ + if (rc == 0) { + rv = RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(buffer, bytes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + printf("TPM_Random: Error (fatal) in RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes rv %d\n", rv); + rc = TPM_FAIL; + } + } + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_Random() fills 'buffer' with 'bytes' non-zero bytes + + This is used for PKCS padding. +*/ + +static TPM_RESULT TPM_RandomNonZero(BYTE *buffer, size_t bytes) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + size_t i; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + + printf(" TPM_RandomNonZero: Requesting %lu bytes\n", (unsigned long)bytes); + for (i = 0 ; (rc == 0) && (i < bytes) ; ) { + rv = RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(buffer, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + printf("TPM_Random: Error (fatal) in RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes rv %d\n", rv); + rc = TPM_FAIL; + } + else { + if (*buffer != 0x00) { + buffer++; + i++; + } + } + } + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_StirRandomCmd() adds the supplied entropy to the random number generator + */ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_StirRandomCmd(TPM_SIZED_BUFFER *inData) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + + printf(" TPM_StirRandomCmd:\n"); + if (rc == 0) { + /* add the seeding material */ + rv = RNG_RandomUpdate(inData->buffer, inData->size); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + printf("TPM_StirRandom: Error (fatal) in RNG_RandomUpdate rv %d\n", rv); + rc = TPM_FAIL; + } + } + return rc; +} + +/* + RSA Functions +*/ + +/* TPM_RSAPrivateKeyInit() NULLs all the structure members in preparation for constructing an RSA + key token from byte arrays using RSA_PopulatePrivateKey() +*/ + +static void TPM_RSAPrivateKeyInit(RSAPrivateKey *rsa_pri_key) +{ + rsa_pri_key->arena = NULL; + rsa_pri_key->publicExponent.type = siBuffer; + rsa_pri_key->publicExponent.data = NULL; + rsa_pri_key->publicExponent.len = 0; + rsa_pri_key->modulus.type = siBuffer; + rsa_pri_key->modulus.data = NULL; + rsa_pri_key->modulus.len = 0; + rsa_pri_key->privateExponent.type = siBuffer; + rsa_pri_key->privateExponent.data = NULL; + rsa_pri_key->privateExponent.len = 0; + rsa_pri_key->prime1.type = siBuffer; + rsa_pri_key->prime1.data = NULL; + rsa_pri_key->prime1.len = 0; + rsa_pri_key->prime2.type = siBuffer; + rsa_pri_key->prime2.data = NULL; + rsa_pri_key->prime2.len = 0; + rsa_pri_key->exponent1.type = siBuffer; + rsa_pri_key->exponent1.data = NULL; + rsa_pri_key->exponent1.len = 0; + rsa_pri_key->exponent2.type = siBuffer; + rsa_pri_key->exponent2.data = NULL; + rsa_pri_key->exponent2.len = 0; + rsa_pri_key->coefficient.type = siBuffer; + rsa_pri_key->coefficient.data = NULL; + rsa_pri_key->coefficient.len = 0; + return; +} + +/* Generate an RSA key pair of size 'num_bits' using public exponent 'earr' + + 'n', 'p', 'q', 'd' must be freed by the caller +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_RSAGenerateKeyPair(unsigned char **n, /* public key - modulus */ + unsigned char **p, /* private key prime */ + unsigned char **q, /* private key prime */ + unsigned char **d, /* private key (private exponent) */ + int num_bits, /* key size in bits */ + const unsigned char *earr, /* public exponent as an array */ + uint32_t e_size) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + SECItem publicExponent = { 0, 0, 0}; + RSAPrivateKey *rsaPrivateKey = NULL; /* freed @1 */ + unsigned long e; /* public exponent */ + + printf(" TPM_RSAGenerateKeyPair:\n"); + /* initialize in case of error */ + *n = NULL; + *p = NULL; + *q = NULL; + *d = NULL; + /* check that num_bits is a multiple of 16. If not, the primes p and q will not be a multiple + of 8 and will not fit well in a byte */ + if (rc == 0) { + if ((num_bits % 16) != 0) { + printf("TPM_RSAGenerateKeyPair: Error, num_bits %d is not a multiple of 16\n", + num_bits); + rc = TPM_BAD_KEY_PROPERTY; + } + } + /* convert the e array to an unsigned long */ + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_LoadLong(&e, earr, e_size); + } + /* validate the public exponent against a list of legal values. Some values (e.g. even numbers) + can hang the key generator. */ + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_RSA_exponent_verify(e); + } + /* generate the key pair */ + if (rc == 0) { + printf(" TPM_RSAGenerateKeyPair: num_bits %d exponent %08lx\n", num_bits, e); + publicExponent.type = siBuffer; + publicExponent.data = (unsigned char *)earr; + publicExponent.len = e_size; + /* Generate and return a new RSA public and private key token */ + rsaPrivateKey = RSA_NewKey(num_bits, &publicExponent); /* freed @1 */ + if (rsaPrivateKey == NULL) { + printf("TPM_RSAGenerateKeyPair: Error (fatal) calling RSA_NewKey()\n"); + rc = TPM_FAIL; + } + } + /* Key parts can some times have leading zeros, and some crypto libraries truncate. However, + the TPM expects fixed lengths. These calls restore any removed padding */ + /* load n */ + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_memcpyPad(n, /* freed by caller */ + rsaPrivateKey->modulus.data, + rsaPrivateKey->modulus.len, + num_bits/8); /* required length */ + } + /* load p */ + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_memcpyPad(p, /* freed by caller */ + rsaPrivateKey->prime1.data, + rsaPrivateKey->prime1.len, + num_bits/16); /* required length */ + } + /* load q */ + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_memcpyPad(q, /* freed by caller */ + rsaPrivateKey->prime2.data, + rsaPrivateKey->prime2.len, + num_bits/16); /* required length */ + } + /* load d */ + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_memcpyPad(d, /* freed by caller */ + rsaPrivateKey->privateExponent.data, + rsaPrivateKey->privateExponent.len, + num_bits/8); /* required length */ + } + /* on error, free the components and set back to NULL so subsequent free is safe */ + if (rc != 0) { + free(*n); + free(*p); + free(*q); + free(*d); + *n = NULL; + *p = NULL; + *q = NULL; + *d = NULL; + } + if (rsaPrivateKey != NULL) { + PORT_FreeArena(rsaPrivateKey->arena, PR_TRUE); /* @1 */ + } + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_RSAGeneratePublicToken() generates an RSA key token from n and e + */ + +static TPM_RESULT TPM_RSAGeneratePublicToken(RSAPublicKey *rsaPublicKey, + unsigned char *narr, /* public modulus */ + uint32_t nbytes, + unsigned char *earr, /* public exponent */ + uint32_t ebytes) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + + /* simply assign the arrays to the key token */ + if (rc == 0) { + printf(" TPM_RSAGeneratePublicToken: nbytes %u ebytes %u\n", nbytes, ebytes); + rsaPublicKey->arena = NULL; + /* public modulus */ + rsaPublicKey->modulus.type = siBuffer; + rsaPublicKey->modulus.data = narr; + rsaPublicKey->modulus.len = nbytes; + /* public exponent */ + rsaPublicKey->publicExponent.type = siBuffer; + rsaPublicKey->publicExponent.data = earr; + rsaPublicKey->publicExponent.len = ebytes; + } + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_RSAGeneratePrivateToken() generates an RSA key token from n, e, d + */ + +static TPM_RESULT TPM_RSAGeneratePrivateToken(RSAPrivateKey *rsa_pri_key, /* freed by caller */ + unsigned char *narr, /* public modulus */ + uint32_t nbytes, + unsigned char *earr, /* public exponent */ + uint32_t ebytes, + unsigned char *darr, /* private exponent */ + uint32_t dbytes) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + + printf(" TPM_RSAGeneratePrivateToken:\n"); + if (rc == 0) { + rsa_pri_key->arena = NULL; + /* public exponent */ + rsa_pri_key->publicExponent.type = siBuffer; + rsa_pri_key->publicExponent.data = earr; + rsa_pri_key->publicExponent.len = ebytes; + /* public modulus */ + rsa_pri_key->modulus.type = siBuffer; + rsa_pri_key->modulus.data = narr; + rsa_pri_key->modulus.len = nbytes; + /* private exponent */ + rsa_pri_key->privateExponent.type = siBuffer; + rsa_pri_key->privateExponent.data = darr; + rsa_pri_key->privateExponent.len = dbytes; + /* given these key parameters (n,e,d), fill in the rest of the parameters */ + rv = RSA_PopulatePrivateKey(rsa_pri_key); /* freed by caller */ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + printf("TPM_RSAGeneratePrivateToken: Error, RSA_PopulatePrivateKey rv %d\n", rv); + rc = TPM_BAD_PARAMETER; + } + } + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_RSAPrivateDecrypt() decrypts 'encrypt_data' using the private key 'n, e, d'. The OAEP + padding is removed and 'decrypt_data_length' bytes are moved to 'decrypt_data'. + + 'decrypt_data_length' is at most 'decrypt_data_size'. +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_RSAPrivateDecrypt(unsigned char *decrypt_data, /* decrypted data */ + uint32_t *decrypt_data_length, /* length of data put into + decrypt_data */ + size_t decrypt_data_size, /* size of decrypt_data buffer */ + TPM_ENC_SCHEME encScheme, /* encryption scheme */ + unsigned char* encrypt_data, /* encrypted data */ + uint32_t encrypt_data_size, + unsigned char *narr, /* public modulus */ + uint32_t nbytes, + unsigned char *earr, /* public exponent */ + uint32_t ebytes, + unsigned char *darr, /* private exponent */ + uint32_t dbytes) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + RSAPrivateKey rsa_pri_key; + unsigned char *padded_data = NULL; /* freed @2 */ + int padded_data_size = 0; + + printf(" TPM_RSAPrivateDecrypt: Input data size %u\n", encrypt_data_size); + TPM_RSAPrivateKeyInit(&rsa_pri_key); /* freed @1 */ + /* the encrypted data size must equal the public key size */ + if (rc == 0) { + if (encrypt_data_size != nbytes) { + printf("TPM_RSAPrivateDecrypt: Error, Encrypted data size is %u not %u\n", + encrypt_data_size, nbytes); + rc = TPM_DECRYPT_ERROR; + } + } + /* construct the freebl private key object from n,e,d */ + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_RSAGeneratePrivateToken(&rsa_pri_key, /* freed @1 */ + narr, /* public modulus */ + nbytes, + earr, /* public exponent */ + ebytes, + darr, /* private exponent */ + dbytes); + } + /* allocate intermediate buffer for the decrypted but still padded data */ + if (rc == 0) { + /* the size of the decrypted data is guaranteed to be less than this */ + padded_data_size = rsa_pri_key.modulus.len; + rc = TPM_Malloc(&padded_data, padded_data_size); /* freed @2 */ + } + if (rc == 0) { + /* decrypt with private key. Must decrypt first and then remove padding because the decrypt + call cannot specify an encoding parameter */ + rv = RSA_PrivateKeyOp(&rsa_pri_key, /* private key token */ + padded_data, /* to - the decrypted but padded data */ + encrypt_data); /* from - the encrypted data */ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + printf("TPM_RSAPrivateDecrypt: Error in RSA_PrivateKeyOp(), rv %d\n", rv); + rc = TPM_DECRYPT_ERROR; + } + } + if (rc == 0) { + printf(" TPM_RSAPrivateDecrypt: RSA_PrivateKeyOp() success\n"); + printf(" TPM_RSAPrivateDecrypt: Padded data size %u\n", padded_data_size); + TPM_PrintFour(" TPM_RSAPrivateDecrypt: Decrypt padded data", padded_data); + /* check and remove the padding based on the TPM encryption scheme */ + if (encScheme == TPM_ES_RSAESOAEP_SHA1_MGF1) { + /* recovered seed and pHash are not returned */ + unsigned char seed[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; + unsigned char pHash[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; + if (rc == 0) { + /* the padded data skips the first 0x00 byte, since it expects the + padded data to come from a truncated bignum */ + rc = TPM_RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(decrypt_data, /* to */ + decrypt_data_length, /* to length */ + decrypt_data_size, /* to buffer size */ + padded_data + 1, /* from */ + padded_data_size - 1, /* from length */ + pHash, /* 20 bytes */ + seed); /* 20 bytes */ + } + } + else if (encScheme == TPM_ES_RSAESPKCSv15) { + rc = TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType2Check(decrypt_data, /* to */ + decrypt_data_length, /* to length */ + decrypt_data_size, /* to buffer size*/ + padded_data, /* from */ + padded_data_size); /* from length */ + } + else { + printf("TPM_RSAPrivateDecrypt: Error, unknown encryption scheme %04x\n", encScheme); + rc = TPM_INAPPROPRIATE_ENC; + } + } + if (rc == 0) { + printf(" TPM_RSAPrivateDecrypt: RSA_padding_check_PKCS1 recovered %d bytes\n", + *decrypt_data_length); + TPM_PrintFourLimit(" TPM_RSAPrivateDecrypt: Decrypt data", decrypt_data, decrypt_data_size); + } + PORT_FreeArena(rsa_pri_key.arena, PR_TRUE); /* @1 */ + free(padded_data); /* @2 */ + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_RSAPublicEncrypt() PKCS1 pads 'decrypt_data' to 'encrypt_data_size' and encrypts using the + public key 'n, e'. +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_RSAPublicEncrypt(unsigned char *encrypt_data, /* encrypted data */ + size_t encrypt_data_size, /* size of encrypted data buffer */ + TPM_ENC_SCHEME encScheme, /* padding type */ + const unsigned char *decrypt_data, /* decrypted data */ + size_t decrypt_data_size, + unsigned char *narr, /* public modulus */ + uint32_t nbytes, + unsigned char *earr, /* public exponent */ + uint32_t ebytes) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + unsigned char *padded_data = NULL; /* freed @1 */ + + printf(" TPM_RSAPublicEncrypt: Input data size %lu\n", (unsigned long)decrypt_data_size); + /* intermediate buffer for the padded decrypted data */ + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_Malloc(&padded_data, encrypt_data_size); /* freed @1 */ + } + /* pad the decrypted data */ + if (rc == 0) { + /* based on the TPM encryption scheme */ + if (encScheme == TPM_ES_RSAESOAEP_SHA1_MGF1) { + unsigned char seed[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_Random(seed, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + } + if (rc == 0) { + padded_data[0] = 0x00; + rc = TPM_RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(padded_data +1, /* to */ + encrypt_data_size -1, /* to length */ + decrypt_data, /* from */ + decrypt_data_size, /* from length */ + pHashConst, /* 20 bytes */ + seed); /* 20 bytes */ + } + } + else if (encScheme == TPM_ES_RSAESPKCSv15) { + rc = TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType2Add(padded_data, /* to */ + encrypt_data_size, /* to length */ + decrypt_data, /* from */ + decrypt_data_size); /* from length */ + } + else { + printf("TPM_RSAPublicEncrypt: Error, unknown encryption scheme %04x\n", encScheme); + rc = TPM_INAPPROPRIATE_ENC; + } + } + /* raw public key operation on the already padded input data */ + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_RSAPublicEncryptRaw(encrypt_data, /* output */ + encrypt_data_size, /* input, size of enc buffer */ + padded_data, /* input */ + encrypt_data_size, /* input, size of dec buffer */ + narr, /* public modulus */ + nbytes, + earr, /* public exponent */ + ebytes); + } + free(padded_data); /* @1 */ + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_RSAPublicEncryptRaw() does a raw public key operation without any padding. + +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_RSAPublicEncryptRaw(unsigned char *encrypt_data, /* output */ + uint32_t encrypt_data_size, /* input, size of enc buffer */ + unsigned char *decrypt_data, /* input */ + uint32_t decrypt_data_size, /* input, size of dec buffer */ + unsigned char *narr, /* public modulus */ + uint32_t nbytes, + unsigned char *earr, /* public exponent */ + uint32_t ebytes) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + RSAPublicKey rsa_pub_key; + + printf(" TPM_RSAPublicEncryptRaw:\n"); + /* the input data size must equal the public key size (already padded) */ + if (rc == 0) { + if (decrypt_data_size != nbytes) { + printf("TPM_RSAPublicEncryptRaw: Error, decrypt data size is %u not %u\n", + decrypt_data_size, nbytes); + rc = TPM_ENCRYPT_ERROR; + } + } + /* the output data size must equal the public key size */ + if (rc == 0) { + if (encrypt_data_size != nbytes) { + printf("TPM_RSAPublicEncryptRaw: Error, Output data size is %u not %u\n", + encrypt_data_size, nbytes); + rc = TPM_ENCRYPT_ERROR; + } + } + /* construct the freebl public key object */ + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_RSAGeneratePublicToken(&rsa_pub_key, /* freebl public key token */ + narr, /* public modulus */ + nbytes, + earr, /* public exponent */ + ebytes); + } + if (rc == 0) { + TPM_PrintFour(" TPM_RSAPublicEncryptRaw: Public modulus", narr); + TPM_PrintAll(" TPM_RSAPublicEncryptRaw: Public exponent", earr, ebytes); + TPM_PrintFourLimit(" TPM_RSAPublicEncryptRaw: Decrypt data", decrypt_data, decrypt_data_size); + /* raw public key operation, encrypt the decrypt_data */ + rv = RSA_PublicKeyOp(&rsa_pub_key, /* freebl public key token */ + encrypt_data, /* output - the encrypted data */ + decrypt_data); /* input - the clear text data */ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + printf("TPM_RSAPublicEncrypt: Error in RSA_PublicKeyOp, rv %d\n", rv); + rc = TPM_ENCRYPT_ERROR; + } + } + if (rc == 0) { + TPM_PrintFour(" TPM_RSAPublicEncryptRaw: Encrypt data", encrypt_data); +#if 0 /* NOTE: Uncomment as a debug aid for signature verification */ + TPM_PrintAll(" TPM_RSAPublicEncryptRaw: Encrypt data", + encrypt_data, encrypt_data_size); +#endif + } + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_RSASign() signs 'message' of size 'message_size' using the private key n,e,d and the + signature scheme 'sigScheme' as specified in PKCS #1 v2.0. + + 'signature_length' bytes are moved to 'signature'. 'signature_length' is at most + 'signature_size'. signature must point to bytes of memory equal to the public modulus size. +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_RSASign(unsigned char *signature, /* output */ + unsigned int *signature_length, /* output, size of signature */ + unsigned int signature_size, /* input, size of signature buffer */ + TPM_SIG_SCHEME sigScheme, /* input, type of signature */ + const unsigned char *message, /* input */ + size_t message_size, /* input */ + unsigned char *narr, /* public modulus */ + uint32_t nbytes, + unsigned char *earr, /* public exponent */ + uint32_t ebytes, + unsigned char *darr, /* private exponent */ + uint32_t dbytes) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + RSAPrivateKey rsa_pri_key; + + printf(" TPM_RSASign:\n"); + TPM_RSAPrivateKeyInit(&rsa_pri_key); /* freed @1 */ + /* construct the free private key object from n,e,d */ + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_RSAGeneratePrivateToken(&rsa_pri_key, /* freed @1 */ + narr, /* public modulus */ + nbytes, + earr, /* public exponent */ + ebytes, + darr, /* private exponent */ + dbytes); + } + /* sanity check the size of the output signature buffer */ + if (rc == 0) { + if (signature_size < nbytes) { + printf("TPM_RSASign: Error (fatal), buffer %u too small for signature %u\n", + signature_size, nbytes); + rc = TPM_FAIL; /* internal error, should never occur */ + } + } + /* determine the signature scheme for the key */ + if (rc == 0) { + switch(sigScheme) { + case TPM_SS_NONE: + printf("TPM_RSASign: Error, sigScheme TPM_SS_NONE\n"); + rc = TPM_INVALID_KEYUSAGE; + break; + case TPM_SS_RSASSAPKCS1v15_SHA1: + case TPM_SS_RSASSAPKCS1v15_INFO: + rc = TPM_RSASignSHA1(signature, + signature_length, + message, + message_size, + &rsa_pri_key); + break; + case TPM_SS_RSASSAPKCS1v15_DER: + rc = TPM_RSASignDER(signature, + signature_length, + message, + message_size, + &rsa_pri_key); + break; + default: + printf("TPM_RSASign: Error, sigScheme %04hx unknown\n", sigScheme); + rc = TPM_INVALID_KEYUSAGE; + break; + } + } + PORT_FreeArena(rsa_pri_key.arena, PR_TRUE); /* @1 */ + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_RSASignSHA1() performs the following: + prepend a DER encoded algorithm ID (SHA1 and RSA) + prepend a type 1 pad + encrypt with the private key +*/ + +static TPM_RESULT TPM_RSASignSHA1(unsigned char *signature, /* output */ + unsigned int *signature_length, /* output, size of signature */ + const unsigned char *message, /* input */ + size_t message_size, /* input */ + RSAPrivateKey *rsa_pri_key) /* signing private key */ +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + unsigned char *message_der; /* DER padded message, freed @1 */ + + printf(" TPM_RSASignSHA1: key size %d\n", rsa_pri_key->modulus.len); + message_der = NULL; /* freed @1 */ + /* sanity check, SHA1 messages must be 20 bytes */ + if (rc == 0) { + if (message_size != TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) { + printf("TPM_RSASignSHA1: Error, message size %lu not TPM_DIGEST_SIZE\n", + (unsigned long)message_size ); + rc = TPM_DECRYPT_ERROR; + } + } + /* allocate memory for the DER padded message */ + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_Malloc(&message_der, sizeof(sha1Oid) + message_size); /* freed @1 */ + } + if (rc == 0) { + /* copy the OID */ + memcpy(message_der, sha1Oid, sizeof(sha1Oid)); + /* copy the message */ + memcpy(message_der + sizeof(sha1Oid), message, message_size); + /* sign the DER padded message */ + rc = TPM_RSASignDER(signature, /* output */ + signature_length, /* output, size of signature */ + message_der, /* input */ + sizeof(sha1Oid) + message_size, /* input */ + rsa_pri_key); /* signing private key */ + } + free(message_der); /* @1 */ + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_RSASignDER() performs the following: + + prepend a PKCS1 type 1 pad + encrypt with the private key + + The caller must ensure that the signature buffer is >= the key size. +*/ + +static TPM_RESULT TPM_RSASignDER(unsigned char *signature, /* output */ + unsigned int *signature_length, /* output, size of signature */ + const unsigned char *message, /* input */ + size_t message_size, /* input */ + RSAPrivateKey *rsa_pri_key) /* signing private key */ +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + unsigned char *message_pad; /* PKCS1 type 1 padded message, freed @1 */ + + printf(" TPM_RSASignDER: key size %d\n", rsa_pri_key->modulus.len); + message_pad = NULL; /* freed @1 */ + /* the padded message size is the same as the key size */ + /* allocate memory for the padded message */ + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_Malloc(&message_pad, rsa_pri_key->modulus.len); /* freed @1 */ + } + /* PKCS1 type 1 pad the message */ + if (rc == 0) { + printf(" TPM_RSASignDER: Applying PKCS1 type 1 padding, size from %lu to %u\n", + (unsigned long)message_size, rsa_pri_key->modulus.len); + TPM_PrintFourLimit(" TPM_RSASignDER: Input message", message, message_size); + /* This call checks that the message will fit with the padding */ + rc = TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType1Add(message_pad, /* to */ + rsa_pri_key->modulus.len, /* to length */ + message, /* from */ + message_size); /* from length */ + } + /* raw sign with private key */ + if (rc == 0) { + printf(" TPM_RSASignDER: Encrypting with private key, message size %d\n", + rsa_pri_key->modulus.len); + TPM_PrintFour(" TPM_RSASignDER: Padded message", message_pad); + /* sign with private key */ + rv = RSA_PrivateKeyOp(rsa_pri_key, /* freebl key token */ + signature, /* to - the decrypted but padded data */ + message_pad); /* from - the encrypted data */ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + printf("TPM_RSASignDER: Error in RSA_PrivateKeyOp(), rv %d\n", rv); + rc = TPM_DECRYPT_ERROR; + } + } + if (rc == 0) { + TPM_PrintFour(" TPM_RSASignDER: signature", signature); + *signature_length = rsa_pri_key->modulus.len; + } + free(message_pad); /* @1 */ + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_RSAVerifySHA1() performs the following: + decrypt the signature + verify and remove type 1 pad + verify and remove DER encoded algorithm ID + verify the signature on the message +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_RSAVerifySHA1(unsigned char *signature, /* input */ + unsigned int signature_size, /* input, size of signature + buffer */ + const unsigned char *message, /* input */ + uint32_t message_size, /* input */ + unsigned char *narr, /* public modulus */ + uint32_t nbytes, + unsigned char *earr, /* public exponent */ + uint32_t ebytes) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + unsigned char *padded_data = NULL; /* decrypted signature, freed @1 */ + uint32_t padLength; + int irc; + + printf(" TPM_RSAVerifySHA1:\n"); + /* allocate memory for the padded result of the public key operation */ + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_Malloc(&padded_data, nbytes); /* freed @1 */ + } + /* do a raw encrypt of the signature */ + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_RSAPublicEncryptRaw(padded_data, /* output */ + nbytes, /* input, size of message buffer */ + signature, /* input */ + signature_size, /* input, size of signature buffer */ + narr, /* public modulus */ + nbytes, + earr, /* public exponent */ + ebytes); + } + /* check PKCS1 padding and OID */ + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType1Check(&padLength, /* length of the PKCS1 padd and OID */ + padded_data, /* input data */ + nbytes); /* input data length */ + } + /* check message length */ + if (rc == 0) { + if (message_size != (nbytes - padLength)) { + printf("TPM_RSAVerifySHA1: Error, " + "message size %u not equal to size %u after padding removed\n", + message_size, nbytes - padLength); + rc = TPM_BAD_SIGNATURE; + } + } + /* check message */ + if (rc == 0) { + irc = memcmp(message, padded_data + padLength, message_size); + if (irc != 0) { + printf("TPM_RSAVerifySHA1: Error, message mismatch\n"); + TPM_PrintFourLimit(" TPM_RSAVerifySHA1: message", message, message_size); + TPM_PrintFourLimit(" TPM_RSAVerifySHA1: message from signature", padded_data + padLength, message_size); + rc = TPM_BAD_SIGNATURE; + } + } + /* public encrypt is general, here we're doing a signature check, so adjust the error message */ + else { + rc = TPM_BAD_SIGNATURE; + } + free(padded_data); /* @1 */ + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_RSAGetPrivateKey calculates q (2nd prime factor) and d (private key) from n (public key), e + (public exponent), and p (1st prime factor) + + 'qarr', darr' must be freed by the caller. +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_RSAGetPrivateKey(uint32_t *qbytes, unsigned char **qarr, + uint32_t *dbytes, unsigned char **darr, + uint32_t nbytes, unsigned char *narr, + uint32_t ebytes, unsigned char *earr, + uint32_t pbytes, unsigned char *parr) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + RSAPrivateKey rsa_pri_key; + + /* set to NULL so caller can free after failure */ + printf(" TPM_RSAGetPrivateKey:\n"); + TPM_RSAPrivateKeyInit(&rsa_pri_key); /* freed @1 */ + *qarr = NULL; + *darr = NULL; + /* check input parameters */ + if (rc == 0) { + if ((narr == NULL) || (nbytes == 0)) { + printf("TPM_RSAGetPrivateKey: Error, missing n\n"); + rc = TPM_BAD_PARAMETER; + } + } + /* check input parameters */ + if (rc == 0) { + if ((earr == NULL) || (ebytes == 0)) { + printf("TPM_RSAGetPrivateKey: Error, missing e\n"); + rc = TPM_BAD_PARAMETER; + } + } + /* check input parameters */ + if (rc == 0) { + if ((parr == NULL) || (pbytes == 0)) { + printf("TPM_RSAGetPrivateKey: Error, missing p\n"); + rc = TPM_BAD_PARAMETER; + } + } + /* populate the private key token with n, e, p */ + if (rc == 0) { + rsa_pri_key.publicExponent.type = siBuffer; + rsa_pri_key.publicExponent.data = earr; + rsa_pri_key.publicExponent.len = ebytes; + rsa_pri_key.modulus.type = siBuffer; + rsa_pri_key.modulus.data = narr; + rsa_pri_key.modulus.len = nbytes; + rsa_pri_key.prime1.type = siBuffer; + rsa_pri_key.prime1.data = parr; + rsa_pri_key.prime1.len = pbytes; + /* fill in the rest of the freebl key token parameters. */ + rv = RSA_PopulatePrivateKey(&rsa_pri_key); /* freed @1 */ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + printf("TPM_RSAGetPrivateKey: Error in RSA_PopulatePrivateKey rv %d\n", rv); + rc = TPM_BAD_PARAMETER; + } + } + /* extract and pad q */ + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_memcpyPad(qarr, /* freed by caller */ + rsa_pri_key.prime2.data, rsa_pri_key.prime2.len, + pbytes); /* pad to p prime */ + *qbytes = pbytes; + } + /* extract and pad d */ + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_memcpyPad(darr, /* freed by caller */ + rsa_pri_key.privateExponent.data, rsa_pri_key.privateExponent.len, + nbytes); /* pad to public modulus */ + *dbytes = nbytes; + } + if (rc == 0) { + TPM_PrintFour(" TPM_RSAGetPrivateKey: Calculated q", *qarr); + TPM_PrintFour(" TPM_RSAGetPrivateKey: Calculated d", *darr); + printf(" TPM_RSAGetPrivateKey: length of n,p,q,d = %u / %u / %u / %u\n", + nbytes, pbytes, *qbytes, *dbytes); + } + PORT_FreeArena(rsa_pri_key.arena, PR_TRUE); /* @1 */ + return rc; +} + +/* + PKCS1 Padding Functions +*/ + +/* TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType1Add() adds PKCS1 type 1 padding. + + The output buffer is preallocated. +*/ + +static TPM_RESULT TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType1Add(unsigned char *output, /* to */ + uint32_t outputLength, + const unsigned char *input, /* from */ + uint32_t inputLength) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + uint32_t psLength; + uint32_t index; + + /* sanity check the length, this should never fail */ + printf(" TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType1Add:\n"); + if (rc == 0) { + if ((inputLength + 11) > outputLength) { + printf("TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType1Add: Error, input %u too big for output %u\n", + inputLength, outputLength); + rc = TPM_DECRYPT_ERROR; + } + } + if (rc == 0) { + index = 0; + /* psLength is the number of 0xff bytes, subtract 3 for the leading 00,01 and trailing 00 */ + psLength = outputLength - inputLength - 3; + + /* add the PKCS1 pad 01 || PS || 00 || T where PS is at least 8 0xff bytes */ + /* PKCS1 pads to k-1 bytes, implies a leading 0 */ + output[index] = 0x00; + index++; + + output[index] = 0x01; + index++; + + memset(output + index, 0xff, psLength); + index += psLength; + + output[index] = 0x00; + index++; + + /* add the input data */ + memcpy(output + index, input, inputLength); + index += inputLength; + } + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType1Check() checks PKCS1 type 1 padding and the SHA1withRSA OID + and returns their length + + Type 1 is: 00 01 FF's 00 OID message +*/ + +static TPM_RESULT TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType1Check(uint32_t *padLength, + unsigned char *input, + uint32_t inputLength) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + int irc; + + printf(" TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType1Check:\n"); + /* sanity check the length */ + if (rc == 0) { + if ((sizeof(sha1Oid) + 11) > inputLength) { + printf("TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType1Check: Error, " + "sizeof(sha1Oid) %lu + 11 > inputLength %u\n", + (unsigned long)sizeof(sha1Oid), inputLength); + rc = TPM_ENCRYPT_ERROR; + } + } + /* check byte 0 */ + if (rc == 0) { + *padLength = 0; + if (input[*padLength] != 0x00) { + printf("TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType1Check: Error, byte %u %02x not 0x00\n", + *padLength, input[*padLength]); + rc = TPM_ENCRYPT_ERROR; + } + (*padLength)++; + } + /* check byte 1 */ + if (rc == 0) { + if (input[*padLength] != 0x01) { + printf("TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType1Check: Error, byte %u %02x not 0x01\n", + *padLength, input[*padLength]); + rc = TPM_ENCRYPT_ERROR; + } + (*padLength)++; + } + /* check for at least 8 0xff bytes */ + for ( ; (rc == 0) && (*padLength < 10) ; (*padLength)++) { + if (input[*padLength] != 0xff) { + printf("TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType1Check: Error, byte %u %02x not 0xff\n", + *padLength, input[*padLength]); + rc = TPM_ENCRYPT_ERROR; + } + } + /* check for more 0xff bytes */ + for ( ; (rc == 0) && (*padLength < inputLength) ; (*padLength)++) { + if (input[*padLength] != 0xff) { + break; + } + } + /* check for 0x00 byte */ + if (rc == 0) { + if (input[*padLength] != 0x00) { + printf("TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType1Check: Error, byte %u %02x not 0x00\n", + *padLength, input[*padLength]); + rc = TPM_ENCRYPT_ERROR; + } + (*padLength)++; + } + /* check length for OID */ + if (rc == 0) { + if (*padLength + sizeof(sha1Oid) > inputLength) { + printf("TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType1Check: Error, " + "padLength %u + sizeof(sha1Oid) %lu > inputLength %u\n", + *padLength, (unsigned long)sizeof(sha1Oid), inputLength); + rc = TPM_ENCRYPT_ERROR; + } + } + /* check OID */ + if (rc == 0) { + irc = memcmp(input + *padLength, sha1Oid, sizeof(sha1Oid)); + if (irc != 0) { + printf("TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType1Check: Error, OID mismatch\n"); + TPM_PrintAll(" TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType1Check: OID", + input + *padLength, sizeof(sha1Oid)); + rc = TPM_ENCRYPT_ERROR; + } + *padLength += sizeof(sha1Oid); + } + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType2Add() adds the PKCS1 type 2 padding + + The output buffer is preallocated. + + See PKCS1 9.1.2.1 Encoding operation + + This method cheats a bit by adding a leading 00 as well, which is needed for the RSA operation. + + M message to be encoded, an octet string of length at most emLen-10 + emLen intended length in octets of the encoded message + + Output: + EM encoded message, an octet string of length emLen; or "message too long" +*/ + +static TPM_RESULT TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType2Add(unsigned char *encodedMessage, /* to */ + uint32_t encodedMessageLength, /* to length */ + const unsigned char *message, /* from */ + uint32_t messageLength) /* from length */ +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + + printf(" TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType2Add: Message length %u padded length %u\n", + messageLength, encodedMessageLength); + /* 1. If the length of the message M is greater than emLen - 10 octets, output "message too + long" and stop. */ + if (rc == 0) { + if ((messageLength + 11) > encodedMessageLength) { + printf("TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType2Add: Error, message length too big for padded length\n"); + rc = TPM_ENCRYPT_ERROR; + } + } + /* 2. Generate an octet string PS of length emLen-||M||-2 consisting of pseudorandomly generated + nonzero octets. The length of PS will be at least 8 octets. */ + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_RandomNonZero(encodedMessage + 2, encodedMessageLength - messageLength - 3); + } + /* 3. Concatenate PS, the message M, and other padding to form the encoded message EM as: */ + /* EM = 02 || PS || 00 || M */ + if (rc == 0) { + encodedMessage[0] = 0x00; + encodedMessage[1] = 0x02; + encodedMessage[encodedMessageLength - messageLength - 1] = 0x00; + memcpy(encodedMessage + encodedMessageLength - messageLength, message, messageLength); + } + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_PKCS1_Type2PaddingCheck checks the PKCS1 type 2 padding and recovers the message + + The output buffer is preallocated. +*/ + +static +TPM_RESULT TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType2Check(unsigned char *outputData, /* to */ + uint32_t *outputDataLength, /* to length */ + uint32_t outputDataSize, /* pre-allocated to length */ + unsigned char *inputData, /* from - padded data */ + uint32_t inputDataLength) /* from length */ +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + size_t i; + + printf(" TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType2Check:\n"); + /* check the leading bytes for 0x00, 0x02 */ + if (rc == 0) { + if ((inputData[0] != 0x00) || + (inputData[1] != 0x02)) { + printf("TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType2Check: Error, bad leading bytes %02x %02x\n", + inputData[0], inputData[1]); + rc = TPM_DECRYPT_ERROR; + } + } + /* skip the non-zero random PS */ + for (i = 2 ; (rc == 0) && (i < inputDataLength) ; i++) { + if (inputData[i] == 0x00) { + break; + } + } + /* check for the trailing 0x00 */ + if (rc == 0) { + if (i == inputDataLength) { + printf("TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType2Check: Error, missing trailing 0x00\n"); + rc = TPM_DECRYPT_ERROR; + } + } + /* check that PS was at least 8 bytes */ + if (rc == 0) { + if (i < 10) { + printf("TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType2Check: Error, bad PS length %lu\n", (unsigned long)i-2); + rc = TPM_DECRYPT_ERROR; + } + } + /* check that the output can accommodate the message */ + if (rc == 0) { + i++; /* index past the trailing 0x00 */ + *outputDataLength = inputDataLength - i; + if (*outputDataLength > outputDataSize) { + printf("TPM_PKCS1_PaddingType2Check: Error, " + "message %u greater than output data size %u\n", + *outputDataLength, outputDataSize); + rc = TPM_DECRYPT_ERROR; + } + } + /* copy the message */ + if (rc == 0) { + memcpy(outputData, inputData + inputDataLength - *outputDataLength, *outputDataLength); + } + return rc; +} + +/* + GNU MP wrappers do error logging and transformation of errors to TPM type errors +*/ + +/* TPM_BN_num_bytes() wraps the gnump function in a TPM error handler + + Returns number of bytes in the input +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_BN_num_bytes(unsigned int *numBytes, TPM_BIGNUM bn_in) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + mpz_t *bn = (mpz_t *)bn_in; + + /* is the bignum zero */ + int result = mpz_cmp_ui(*bn, 0); + /* mpz_sizeinbase() always returns at least one. If the value is zero, there should really be 0 + bytes */ + if (result == 0) { + *numBytes = 0; + } + /* take the base 2 number and round up to the next byte */ + else { + *numBytes = (mpz_sizeinbase (*bn, 2) +7) / 8; + } + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_BN_is_one() wraps the gnump function in a TPM error handler + + Returns success if input is 1 +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_BN_is_one(TPM_BIGNUM bn_in) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + mpz_t *bn = (mpz_t *)bn_in; + int irc; + + irc = mpz_cmp_ui(*bn, 1); + if (irc != 0) { + printf("TPM_BN_is_one: Error, result is not 1\n"); + rc = TPM_DAA_WRONG_W; + } + return rc; +} + + +/* TPM_BN_mod() wraps the gnump function in a TPM error handler + + r = a mod m +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_BN_mod(TPM_BIGNUM rem_in, + const TPM_BIGNUM a_in, + const TPM_BIGNUM m_in) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + mpz_t *rBignum = (mpz_t *)rem_in; + mpz_t *aBignum = (mpz_t *)a_in; + mpz_t *mBignum = (mpz_t *)m_in; + + /* set r to a mod m */ + mpz_mod(*rBignum, *aBignum, *mBignum); + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_BN_mask_bits() wraps the gnump function in a TPM error handler + + erase all but the lowest n bits of bn + bn = bn mod 2^^n +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_BN_mask_bits(TPM_BIGNUM bn_in, unsigned int n) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + unsigned int numBytes; + mpz_t *bn = (mpz_t *)bn_in; + + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_BN_num_bytes(&numBytes, bn_in); + } + if (rc == 0) { + /* if the BIGNUM is already fewer bits, no need to mask */ + if (numBytes > (n / 8)) { + /* divide and return remainder, divisor is 2^^n */ + mpz_fdiv_r_2exp(*bn, *bn, n); + } + } + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_BN_rshift() wraps the gnump function in a TPM error handler + + Shift a right by n bits (discard the lowest n bits) and label the result r +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_BN_rshift(TPM_BIGNUM *rBignum_in, /* freed by caller */ + TPM_BIGNUM aBignum_in, + int n) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + mpz_t **rBignum = (mpz_t **)rBignum_in; + mpz_t *aBignum = (mpz_t *)aBignum_in; + + printf(" TPM_BN_rshift: n %d\n", n); + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_BN_new(rBignum_in); + } + if (rc == 0) { + /* divide and return quotient, rounded down (floor) */ + mpz_fdiv_q_2exp(**rBignum, *aBignum, n); + } + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_BN_lshift() wraps the gnump function in a TPM error handler + + Shift a left by n bits and label the result r +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_BN_lshift(TPM_BIGNUM *rBignum_in, /* freed by caller */ + TPM_BIGNUM aBignum_in, + int n) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + mpz_t **rBignum = (mpz_t **)rBignum_in; + mpz_t *aBignum = (mpz_t *)aBignum_in; + + printf(" TPM_BN_lshift: n %d\n", n); + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_BN_new(rBignum_in); + } + if (rc == 0) { + /* multiply by 2^^n is is a left shift by n */ + mpz_mul_2exp(**rBignum, *aBignum, n); + } + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_BN_add() wraps the gnump function in a TPM error handler + + r = a + b +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_BN_add(TPM_BIGNUM rBignum_in, + TPM_BIGNUM aBignum_in, + TPM_BIGNUM bBignum_in) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + mpz_t *rBignum = (mpz_t *)rBignum_in; + mpz_t *aBignum = (mpz_t *)aBignum_in; + mpz_t *bBignum = (mpz_t *)bBignum_in; + + printf(" TPM_BN_add:\n"); + /* result = a + b */ + mpz_add(*rBignum, *aBignum, *bBignum); + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_BN_mul() wraps the gnump function in a TPM error handler + + r = a * b +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_BN_mul(TPM_BIGNUM rBignum_in, + TPM_BIGNUM aBignum_in, + TPM_BIGNUM bBignum_in) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + mpz_t *rBignum = (mpz_t *)rBignum_in; + mpz_t *aBignum = (mpz_t *)aBignum_in; + mpz_t *bBignum = (mpz_t *)bBignum_in; + + printf(" TPM_BN_mul:\n"); + /* r = a * b */ + mpz_mul(*rBignum, *aBignum, *bBignum); + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_BN_mod_exp() wraps the gnump function in a TPM error handler + + computes a to the p-th power modulo m (r=a^p % n) +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_BN_mod_exp(TPM_BIGNUM rBignum_in, + TPM_BIGNUM aBignum_in, + TPM_BIGNUM pBignum_in, + TPM_BIGNUM nBignum_in) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + mpz_t *rBignum = (mpz_t *)rBignum_in; + mpz_t *aBignum = (mpz_t *)aBignum_in; + mpz_t *pBignum = (mpz_t *)pBignum_in; + mpz_t *nBignum = (mpz_t *)nBignum_in; + + printf(" TPM_BN_mod_exp:\n"); + mpz_powm(*rBignum, *aBignum, *pBignum, *nBignum); + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_BN_Mod_add() wraps the gnump function in a TPM error handler + + adds a to b modulo m +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_BN_mod_add(TPM_BIGNUM rBignum_in, + TPM_BIGNUM aBignum_in, + TPM_BIGNUM bBignum_in, + TPM_BIGNUM mBignum_in) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + mpz_t *rBignum = (mpz_t *)rBignum_in; + mpz_t *aBignum = (mpz_t *)aBignum_in; + mpz_t *bBignum = (mpz_t *)bBignum_in; + mpz_t *mBignum = (mpz_t *)mBignum_in; + + printf(" TPM_BN_mod_add:\n"); + /* r = a + b */ + mpz_add(*rBignum, *aBignum, *bBignum); + /* set r to r mod m */ + mpz_mod(*rBignum, *rBignum, *mBignum); + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_BN_mod_mul() wraps the gnump function in a TPM error handler + + r = (a * b) mod m +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_BN_mod_mul(TPM_BIGNUM rBignum_in, + TPM_BIGNUM aBignum_in, + TPM_BIGNUM bBignum_in, + TPM_BIGNUM mBignum_in) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + mpz_t *rBignum = (mpz_t *)rBignum_in; + mpz_t *aBignum = (mpz_t *)aBignum_in; + mpz_t *bBignum = (mpz_t *)bBignum_in; + mpz_t *mBignum = (mpz_t *)mBignum_in; + + printf(" TPM_BN_mod_mul:\n"); + /* r = a * b */ + mpz_mul(*rBignum, *aBignum, *bBignum); + /* set r to r mod m */ + mpz_mod(*rBignum, *rBignum, *mBignum); + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_BN_new() wraps the gnump function in a TPM error handler + + Allocates a new bignum +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_BN_new(TPM_BIGNUM *bn_in) /* freed by caller */ +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + mpz_t *bn; + + if (rc== 0) { + rc = TPM_Malloc(bn_in, sizeof(mpz_t)); /* freed by caller */ + } + if (rc== 0) { + bn = (mpz_t *)*bn_in; + mpz_init(*bn); + } + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_BN_free() wraps the gnump function + + Frees the bignum +*/ + +void TPM_BN_free(TPM_BIGNUM bn_in) +{ + mpz_t *bn = (mpz_t *)bn_in; + if (bn != NULL) { + mpz_clear(*bn); + free(bn_in); + } + return; +} + +/* TPM_bn2bin wraps the function in gnump a TPM error handler. + + Converts a bignum to char array + + 'bin' must already be checked for sufficient size. +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_bn2bin(unsigned char *bin, + TPM_BIGNUM bn_in) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + mpz_t *bn = (mpz_t *)bn_in; + + mpz_export(bin, /* output */ + NULL, /* countp */ + 1, /* order, MSB first */ + 1, /* size, char */ + 0, /* endian, native (unused) */ + 0, /* nails, don't discard */ + *bn); /* input */ + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_memcpyPad allocates a buffer 'bin_out' and loads it from 'bin_in'. + + If padBytes is non-zero, 'bin_out' is padded with leading zeros if necessary, so that 'bytes' + will equal 'padBytes'. This is used when TPM data structures expect a fixed length while + the crypto library truncates leading zeros. + + '*bin_out' must be freed by the caller +*/ + +static TPM_RESULT TPM_memcpyPad(unsigned char **bin_out, + unsigned char *bin_in, + uint32_t bin_in_length, + uint32_t padBytes) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + + printf(" TPM_memcpyPad: padBytes %u\n", padBytes); + if (rc == 0) { + /* padBytes 0 says that no padding is required */ + if (padBytes == 0) { + padBytes = bin_in_length; /* setting equal yields no padding */ + } + /* The required output should never be less than the supplied input. Sanity check and + return a fatal error. */ + if (padBytes < bin_in_length) { + printf("TPM_memcpyPad: Error (fatal), " + "padBytes %u less than %u\n", padBytes, bin_in_length); + rc = TPM_FAIL; + } + if (padBytes != bin_in_length) { + printf(" TPM_memcpyPad: padBytes %u bytes %u\n", padBytes, bin_in_length); + } + } + /* allocate memory for the padded output */ + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_Malloc(bin_out, padBytes); + } + if (rc == 0) { + memset(*bin_out, 0, padBytes - bin_in_length); /* leading 0 padding */ + memcpy((*bin_out) + padBytes - bin_in_length, /* start copy after padding */ + bin_in, bin_in_length); + } + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_bin2bn() wraps the gnump function in a TPM error handler + + Converts a char array to bignum + + bn must be freed by the caller. +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_bin2bn(TPM_BIGNUM *bn_in, const unsigned char *bin, unsigned int bytes) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_BN_new(bn_in); + } + if (rc == 0) { + mpz_t *bn = (mpz_t *)*bn_in; + mpz_import(*bn, /* output */ + bytes, /* count */ + 1, /* order, MSB first */ + 1, /* size, char */ + 0, /* endian, native (unused) */ + 0, /* nail, don't discard */ + bin); /* input */ + } + return rc; +} + +/* + Hash Functions +*/ + +/* TPM_SHA1InitCmd() initializes a platform dependent TPM_SHA1Context structure. + + The structure must be freed using TPM_SHA1FinalCmd() +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_SHA1InitCmd(void **context) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + + printf(" TPM_SHA1InitCmd:\n"); + if (rc == 0) { + /* create a new freebl SHA1 context */ + *context = SHA1_NewContext(); + if (*context == NULL) { + printf("TPM_SHA1InitCmd: Error allocating a new context\n"); + rc = TPM_SIZE; + } + } + /* reset the SHA-1 context, preparing it for a fresh round of hashing */ + if (rc== 0) { + SHA1_Begin(*context); + } + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_SHA1UpdateCmd() adds 'data' of 'length' to the SHA-1 context + */ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_SHA1UpdateCmd(void *context, const unsigned char *data, uint32_t length) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + + printf(" TPM_SHA1Update: length %u\n", length); + if (context != NULL) { + SHA1_Update(context, data, length); + } + else { + printf("TPM_SHA1Update: Error, no existing SHA1 thread\n"); + rc = TPM_SHA_THREAD; + } + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_SHA1FinalCmd() extracts the SHA-1 digest 'md' from the context + */ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_SHA1FinalCmd(unsigned char *md, void *context) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + unsigned int digestLen; + + printf(" TPM_SHA1FinalCmd:\n"); + if (rc== 0) { + if (context == NULL) { + printf("TPM_SHA1FinalCmd: Error, no existing SHA1 thread\n"); + rc = TPM_SHA_THREAD; + } + } + if (rc== 0) { + SHA1_End(context, md, &digestLen, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + /* Sanity check. For SHA1 it should always be 20 bytes. */ + if (digestLen != TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) { + printf("TPM_SHA1Final: Error (fatal), SHA1_End returned %u bytes\n", digestLen); + rc = TPM_FAIL; + } + } + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_SHA1Delete() zeros and frees the SHA1 context */ + +void TPM_SHA1Delete(void **context) +{ + if (*context != NULL) { + printf(" TPM_SHA1Delete:\n"); + /* zero because the SHA1 context might have data left from an HMAC */ + SHA1_DestroyContext(*context, PR_TRUE); + *context = NULL; + } + return; +} + +#if defined (__x86_64__) || \ + defined(__amd64__) || \ + defined(__ia64__) || \ + defined(__powerpc64__) || \ + defined(__s390x__) || \ + (defined(__sparc__) && defined(__arch64__)) || \ + defined(__aarch64__) + +#define IS_64 +typedef PRUint64 SHA_HW_t; + +#elif defined (__i386__) || \ + defined (__powerpc__) || \ + defined (__s390__) || \ + defined(__sparc__) || \ + defined(__arm__) + +typedef PRUint32 SHA_HW_t; +#undef IS_64 + +#else +#error "Cannot determine 32 or 64 bit platform" +#endif + +/* The structure returned by the SHA1_Flatten() command and passed to SHA1_Resurrect() + */ + +typedef struct SHA1SaveContextStrtd { + union { + PRUint32 w[16]; /* input buffer */ + PRUint8 b[64]; + } u; + PRUint64 size; /* count of hashed bytes. */ + SHA_HW_t H[22]; /* 5 state variables, 16 tmp values, 1 + extra */ +} SHA1SaveContextStr; + + +/* TPM_Sha1Context_Load() is non-portable code to deserialize the FreeBL SHA1 context. + + If the contextPresent prepended by TPM_Sha1Context_Store() is FALSE, context remains NULL. If + TRUE, context is allocated and loaded. +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_Sha1Context_Load(void **context, + unsigned char **stream, + uint32_t *stream_size) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + TPM_BOOL contextPresent; /* is there a context to be loaded */ + uint32_t flattenSize; /* from the freebl library */ + SHA1Context *tmpContext = NULL; /* temp to get flatten size, freed @1 */ + uint32_t tmp32; /* temp to recreate 64-bit size */ + SHA1SaveContextStr restoreContext; + size_t i; + + printf(" TPM_Sha1Context_Load: FreeBL\n"); + /* TPM_Sha1Context_Store() stored a flag to indicate whether a context was stored */ + if (rc== 0) { + rc = TPM_LoadBool(&contextPresent, stream, stream_size); + printf(" TPM_Sha1Context_Load: contextPresent %u\n", contextPresent); + } + /* check format tag */ + /* In the future, if multiple formats are supported, this check will be replaced by a 'switch' + on the tag */ + if ((rc== 0) && contextPresent) { + rc = TPM_CheckTag(TPM_TAG_SHA1CONTEXT_FREEBL_V1, stream, stream_size); + } + /* check that context is NULL to detect memory leak */ + if ((rc== 0) && contextPresent) { + if (*context != NULL) { + printf("TPM_Sha1Context_Load: Error (fatal), *context %p should be NULL\n", *context ); + rc = TPM_FAIL; + } + } + /* create a temporary context just to get the freebl library size */ + if ((rc== 0) && contextPresent) { + rc = TPM_SHA1InitCmd((void **)&tmpContext); /* freed @1 */ + } + /* get the size of the FreeBL library SHA1 context */ + if ((rc== 0) && contextPresent) { + flattenSize = SHA1_FlattenSize(tmpContext); + /* sanity check that the freebl library and TPM structure here are in sync */ + if (flattenSize != sizeof(SHA1SaveContextStr)) { + printf("TPM_Sha1Context_Load: Error, " + "SHA1 context size %u from SHA1_FlattenSize not equal %lu from structure\n", + flattenSize, (unsigned long)sizeof(SHA1SaveContextStr)); + rc = TPM_BAD_PARAM_SIZE; + } + } + /* + deserialization code to fill in restoreContext + */ + /* b[0..63] <- u.b[0..63] (bytes only, no bytswapping) */ + if ((rc== 0) && contextPresent) { + rc = TPM_Loadn(restoreContext.u.b, 64, stream, stream_size); + } + /* count <- size (this is 64 bits on all platforms) */ + if ((rc== 0) && contextPresent) { + rc = TPM_Load32(&tmp32, stream, stream_size); + restoreContext.size = (uint64_t)tmp32 << 32; /* big endian */ + } + if ((rc== 0) && contextPresent) { + rc = TPM_Load32(&tmp32, stream, stream_size); + restoreContext.size += (uint64_t)tmp32 & 0xffffffff; /* big endian */ + } + for (i = 0 ; (rc == 0) && contextPresent && (i < 5) ; i++) { + rc = TPM_Load32(&tmp32, stream, stream_size); + restoreContext.H[i] = tmp32; /* H can be 32 or 64 bits */ + } + /* load the context */ + if ((rc== 0) && contextPresent) { + /* the size test above ensures that the cast here is safe */ + *context = SHA1_Resurrect((unsigned char *)&restoreContext, NULL); + if (*context == NULL) { + printf("TPM_Sha1Context_Load: Error, could not SHA1_Resurrect\n"); + rc = TPM_SIZE; + } + } + TPM_SHA1Delete((void *)&tmpContext); /* @1 */ + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_Sha1Context_Store() is non-portable code to serialize the FreeBL SHA1 context. context is + not altered. + + It prepends a contextPresent flag to the stream, FALSE if context is NULL, TRUE if not. +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_Sha1Context_Store(TPM_STORE_BUFFER *sbuffer, + void *context) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + size_t i; + unsigned int flattenSize; + SHA1SaveContextStr saveContext; + TPM_BOOL contextPresent; /* is there a context to be stored */ + + printf(" TPM_Sha1Context_Store: FreeBL\n"); + /* store contextPresent */ + if (rc == 0) { + if (context != NULL) { + printf(" TPM_Sha1Context_Store: Storing context\n"); + contextPresent = TRUE; + } + else { + printf(" TPM_Sha1Context_Store: No context to store\n"); + contextPresent = FALSE; + } + printf(" TPM_Sha1Context_Store: contextPresent %u \n", contextPresent); + rc = TPM_Sbuffer_Append(sbuffer, &contextPresent, sizeof(TPM_BOOL)); + } + /* overall format tag */ + if ((rc== 0) && contextPresent) { + rc = TPM_Sbuffer_Append16(sbuffer, TPM_TAG_SHA1CONTEXT_FREEBL_V1); + } + if ((rc== 0) && contextPresent) { + /* get the size of the FreeBL SHA1 context */ + flattenSize = SHA1_FlattenSize(context); /* it will not be NULL here */ + /* sanity check that the freebl library and TPM structure here are in sync */ + if (flattenSize != sizeof(SHA1SaveContextStr)) { + printf("TPM_Sha1Context_Store: Error (fatal), " + "SHA1 context size %u from SHA1_FlattenSize not equal %lu from structure\n", + flattenSize, (unsigned long)sizeof(SHA1SaveContextStr)); + rc = TPM_FAIL; + } + } + /* store into the structure from the library */ + if ((rc== 0) && contextPresent) { + /* the size test above ensures that the cast here is safe */ + rv = SHA1_Flatten(context, (unsigned char *)&saveContext); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + printf("TPM_Sha1Context_Store: Error (fatal), SHA1_Flatten rv %d\n", rv); + rc = TPM_FAIL; + } + } + /* + append the FreeBL SHA1 context to the stream + */ + /* b[0..63] <- u.b[0..63] (bytes only, no byte swapping) */ + if ((rc== 0) && contextPresent) { + rc = TPM_Sbuffer_Append(sbuffer, saveContext.u.b, 64); + } + /* count <- size (this is 64 bits on all platforms) */ + if ((rc== 0) && contextPresent) { + rc = TPM_Sbuffer_Append32(sbuffer, saveContext.size >> 32); /* big endian */ + } + if ((rc== 0) && contextPresent) { + rc = TPM_Sbuffer_Append32(sbuffer, saveContext.size & 0xffffffff); + } + /* SHA_HW_t - NSS uses 64 bits on 64 bit platforms for performance reasons only. The lower 32 + bits are critical, so you can always serialize/deserialize just the lower 32 bits. */ + /* The remainder of the H array is scratch memory and does not need to be preserved or + transmitted. */ + for (i = 0 ; (rc == 0) && contextPresent && (i < 5) ; i++) { + rc = TPM_Sbuffer_Append32(sbuffer, saveContext.H[i] & 0xffffffff); + } + return rc; +} + +/* + TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_DATA +*/ + +#ifdef TPM_AES + +/* TPM_SymmetricKeyData_New() allocates memory for and initializes a TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_DATA token. + */ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_SymmetricKeyData_New(TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_TOKEN *tpm_symmetric_key_data) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + + printf(" TPM_SymmetricKeyData_New:\n"); + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_Malloc(tpm_symmetric_key_data, sizeof(TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_DATA)); + } + if (rc == 0) { + TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Init(*tpm_symmetric_key_data); + } + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Free() initializes the key token to wipe secrets. It then frees the + TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_DATA token and sets it to NULL. +*/ + +void TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Free(TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_TOKEN *tpm_symmetric_key_data) +{ + printf(" TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Free:\n"); + if (*tpm_symmetric_key_data != NULL) { + TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Init(*tpm_symmetric_key_data); + free(*tpm_symmetric_key_data); + *tpm_symmetric_key_data = NULL; + } + return; +} + +/* TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Init() is AES non-portable code to initialize the TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_DATA + + It depends on the TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_DATA declaration. +*/ + +void TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Init(TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_TOKEN tpm_symmetric_key_token) +{ + TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_DATA *tpm_symmetric_key_data = + (TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_DATA *)tpm_symmetric_key_token; + + printf(" TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Init:\n"); + tpm_symmetric_key_data->tag = TPM_TAG_KEY; + tpm_symmetric_key_data->valid = FALSE; + tpm_symmetric_key_data->fill = 0; + /* zero to wipe secrets */ + memset(tpm_symmetric_key_data->userKey, 0, sizeof(tpm_symmetric_key_data->userKey)); + return; +} + +/* TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Load() is AES non-portable code to deserialize the TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_DATA + + It depends on the above TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_DATA declaration. +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Load(TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_TOKEN tpm_symmetric_key_token, + unsigned char **stream, + uint32_t *stream_size) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_DATA *tpm_symmetric_key_data = + (TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_DATA *)tpm_symmetric_key_token; + + printf(" TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Load:\n"); + /* check tag */ + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_CheckTag(TPM_TAG_KEY, stream, stream_size); + } + /* load valid */ + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_LoadBool(&(tpm_symmetric_key_data->valid), stream, stream_size); + } + /* load fill */ + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_Load8(&(tpm_symmetric_key_data->fill), stream, stream_size); + } + /* The AES key is a simple array. */ + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_Loadn(tpm_symmetric_key_data->userKey, sizeof(tpm_symmetric_key_data->userKey), + stream, stream_size); + } + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Store() is AES non-portable code to serialize the TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_DATA + + It depends on the above TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_DATA declaration. +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Store(TPM_STORE_BUFFER *sbuffer, + const TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_TOKEN tpm_symmetric_key_token) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_DATA *tpm_symmetric_key_data = + (TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_DATA *)tpm_symmetric_key_token; + + printf(" TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Store:\n"); + /* store tag */ + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_Sbuffer_Append16(sbuffer, tpm_symmetric_key_data->tag); + } + /* store valid */ + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_Sbuffer_Append(sbuffer, &(tpm_symmetric_key_data->valid), sizeof(TPM_BOOL)); + } + /* store fill */ + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_Sbuffer_Append(sbuffer, &(tpm_symmetric_key_data->fill), sizeof(TPM_BOOL)); + } + /* store AES key */ + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_Sbuffer_Append(sbuffer, + tpm_symmetric_key_data->userKey, + sizeof(tpm_symmetric_key_data->userKey)); + } + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_SymmetricKeyData_GenerateKey() is AES non-portable code to generate a random symmetric key + + tpm_symmetric_key_data should be initialized before and after use +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_SymmetricKeyData_GenerateKey(TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_TOKEN tpm_symmetric_key_token) +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_DATA *tpm_symmetric_key_data = + (TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_DATA *)tpm_symmetric_key_token; + + printf(" TPM_SymmetricKeyData_GenerateKey:\n"); + /* generate a random key */ + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_Random(tpm_symmetric_key_data->userKey, sizeof(tpm_symmetric_key_data->userKey)); + } + if (rc == 0) { + tpm_symmetric_key_data->valid = TRUE; + } + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Encrypt() is AES non-portable code to CBC encrypt 'decrypt_data' to + 'encrypt_data' + + The stream is padded as per PKCS#7 / RFC2630 + + 'encrypt_data' must be free by the caller +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Encrypt(unsigned char **encrypt_data, /* output, caller frees */ + uint32_t *encrypt_length, /* output */ + const unsigned char *decrypt_data, /* input */ + uint32_t decrypt_length, /* input */ + const TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_TOKEN + tpm_symmetric_key_token) /* input */ +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + SECStatus rv; + AESContext *cx; + uint32_t pad_length; + uint32_t output_length; /* dummy */ + unsigned char *decrypt_data_pad; + unsigned char ivec[TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* initial chaining vector */ + TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_DATA *tpm_symmetric_key_data = + (TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_DATA *)tpm_symmetric_key_token; + + printf(" TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Encrypt: Length %u\n", decrypt_length); + decrypt_data_pad = NULL; /* freed @1 */ + cx = NULL; /* freed @2 */ + + /* sanity check that the AES key has previously been generated */ + if (rc == 0) { + if (!tpm_symmetric_key_data->valid) { + printf("TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Encrypt: Error (fatal), AES key not valid\n"); + rc = TPM_FAIL; + } + } + if (rc == 0) { + /* calculate the PKCS#7 / RFC2630 pad length and padded data length */ + pad_length = TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE - (decrypt_length % TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + *encrypt_length = decrypt_length + pad_length; + printf(" TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Encrypt: Padded length %u pad length %u\n", + *encrypt_length, pad_length); + /* allocate memory for the encrypted response */ + rc = TPM_Malloc(encrypt_data, *encrypt_length); + } + /* allocate memory for the padded decrypted data */ + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_Malloc(&decrypt_data_pad, *encrypt_length); + } + if (rc == 0) { + /* set the IV */ + memset(ivec, 0, sizeof(ivec)); + /* create a new AES context */ + cx = AES_CreateContext(tpm_symmetric_key_data->userKey, + ivec, /* CBC initialization vector */ + NSS_AES_CBC, /* CBC mode */ + TRUE, /* encrypt */ + TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, /* key length */ + TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE); /* AES block length */ + if (cx == NULL) { + printf("TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Encrypt: Error creating AES context\n"); + rc = TPM_SIZE; + } + } + /* pad the decrypted clear text data */ + if (rc == 0) { + /* unpadded original data */ + memcpy(decrypt_data_pad, decrypt_data, decrypt_length); + /* last gets pad = pad length */ + memset(decrypt_data_pad + decrypt_length, pad_length, pad_length); + /* encrypt the padded input to the output */ + TPM_PrintFour(" TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Encrypt: Input", decrypt_data_pad); + /* perform the AES encryption */ + rv = AES_Encrypt(cx, + *encrypt_data, &output_length, *encrypt_length, /* output */ + decrypt_data_pad, *encrypt_length); /* input */ + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + printf("TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Encrypt: Error, rv %d\n", rv); + rc = TPM_ENCRYPT_ERROR; + } + } + if (rc == 0) { + TPM_PrintFour(" TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Encrypt: Output", *encrypt_data); + } + free(decrypt_data_pad); /* @1 */ + if (cx != NULL) { + /* due to a FreeBL bug, must zero the context before destroying it */ + unsigned char dummy_key[TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + unsigned char dummy_ivec[TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + memset(dummy_key, 0x00, TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + memset(dummy_ivec, 0x00, TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + rv = AES_InitContext(cx, /* AES context */ + dummy_key, /* AES key */ + TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, /* key length */ + dummy_ivec, /* ivec */ + NSS_AES_CBC, /* CBC mode */ + TRUE, /* encrypt */ + TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE); /* AES block length */ + AES_DestroyContext(cx, PR_TRUE); /* @2 */ + } + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Decrypt() is AES non-portable code to CBC decrypt 'encrypt_data' to + 'decrypt_data' + + The stream must be padded as per PKCS#7 / RFC2630 + + decrypt_data must be free by the caller +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Decrypt(unsigned char **decrypt_data, /* output, caller frees */ + uint32_t *decrypt_length, /* output */ + const unsigned char *encrypt_data, /* input */ + uint32_t encrypt_length, /* input */ + const TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_TOKEN + tpm_symmetric_key_token) /* input */ +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + SECStatus rv; + AESContext *cx; + uint32_t pad_length; + uint32_t output_length; /* dummy */ + uint32_t i; + unsigned char *pad_data; + unsigned char ivec[TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* initial chaining vector */ + TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_DATA *tpm_symmetric_key_data = + (TPM_SYMMETRIC_KEY_DATA *)tpm_symmetric_key_token; + + printf(" TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Decrypt: Length %u\n", encrypt_length); + cx = NULL; /* freed @1 */ + + /* sanity check encrypted length */ + if (rc == 0) { + if (encrypt_length < TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { + printf("TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Decrypt: Error, bad length\n"); + rc = TPM_DECRYPT_ERROR; + } + } + /* sanity check that the AES key has previously been generated */ + if (rc == 0) { + if (!tpm_symmetric_key_data->valid) { + printf("TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Decrypt: Error (fatal), AES key not valid\n"); + rc = TPM_FAIL; + } + } + /* allocate memory for the PKCS#7 / RFC2630 padded decrypted data */ + if (rc == 0) { + rc = TPM_Malloc(decrypt_data, encrypt_length); + } + if (rc == 0) { + /* set the IV */ + memset(ivec, 0, sizeof(ivec)); + /* create a new AES context */ + cx = AES_CreateContext(tpm_symmetric_key_data->userKey, + ivec, /* CBC initialization vector */ + NSS_AES_CBC, /* CBC mode */ + FALSE, /* decrypt */ + TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, /* key length */ + TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE); /* AES block length */ + if (cx == NULL) { + printf("TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Decrypt: Error creating AES context\n"); + rc = TPM_SIZE; + } + } + /* decrypt the input to the PKCS#7 / RFC2630 padded output */ + if (rc == 0) { + TPM_PrintFour(" TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Decrypt: Input", encrypt_data); + /* perform the AES decryption */ + rv = AES_Decrypt(cx, + *decrypt_data, &output_length, encrypt_length, /* output */ + encrypt_data, encrypt_length); /* input */ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + printf("TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Decrypt: Error, rv %d\n", rv); + rc = TPM_DECRYPT_ERROR; + } + } + if (rc == 0) { + TPM_PrintFour(" TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Decrypt: Output", *decrypt_data); + } + /* get the pad length */ + if (rc == 0) { + /* get the pad length from the last byte */ + pad_length = (uint32_t)*(*decrypt_data + encrypt_length - 1); + /* sanity check the pad length */ + printf(" TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Decrypt: Pad length %u\n", pad_length); + if ((pad_length == 0) || + (pad_length > TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) { + printf("TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Decrypt: Error, illegal pad length\n"); + rc = TPM_DECRYPT_ERROR; + } + } + if (rc == 0) { + /* get the unpadded length */ + *decrypt_length = encrypt_length - pad_length; + /* pad starting point */ + pad_data = *decrypt_data + *decrypt_length; + /* sanity check the pad */ + for (i = 0 ; i < pad_length ; i++, pad_data++) { + if (*pad_data != pad_length) { + printf("TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Decrypt: Error, bad pad %02x at index %u\n", + *pad_data, i); + rc = TPM_DECRYPT_ERROR; + } + } + } + if (cx != NULL) { + /* due to a FreeBL bug, must zero the context before destroying it */ + unsigned char dummy_key[TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + unsigned char dummy_ivec[TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + memset(dummy_key, 0x00, TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + memset(dummy_ivec, 0x00, TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + rv = AES_InitContext(cx, /* AES context */ + dummy_key, /* AES key */ + TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, /* key length */ + dummy_ivec, /* ivec */ + NSS_AES_CBC, /* CBC mode */ + TRUE, /* encrypt */ + TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE); /* AES block length */ + AES_DestroyContext(cx, PR_TRUE); /* @1 */ + } + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_SymmetricKeyData_CtrCrypt() does an encrypt or decrypt (they are the same XOR operation with + a CTR mode pad) of 'data_in' to 'data_out'. + + TPM_SymmetricKeyData_CtrCrypt() is a TPM variant of the standard CTR encrypt function that + increments only the low 4 bytes of the counter. + + NOTE: This function looks general, but is currently hard coded to AES128. + + 'symmetric key' is the raw key, not converted to a non-portable form + 'ctr_in' is the initial CTR value before possible truncation +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_SymmetricKeyData_CtrCrypt(unsigned char *data_out, /* output */ + const unsigned char *data_in, /* input */ + uint32_t data_size, /* input */ + const unsigned char *symmetric_key, /* input */ + uint32_t symmetric_key_size, /* input */ + const unsigned char *ctr_in, /* input */ + uint32_t ctr_in_size) /* input */ +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + SECStatus rv; + AESContext *cx = NULL; + unsigned char ctr[TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + unsigned char pad_buffer[TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* the XOR pad */ + uint32_t output_length; /* dummy */ + uint32_t cint; /* counter as a 32-bit integer */ + + printf(" TPM_SymmetricKeyData_CtrCrypt: data_size %u\n", data_size); + symmetric_key_size = symmetric_key_size; + /* check the input CTR size, it can be truncated, but cannot be smaller than the AES key */ + if (rc == 0) { + if (ctr_in_size < sizeof(ctr)) { + printf(" TPM_SymmetricKeyData_CtrCrypt: Error (fatal)" + ", CTR size %u too small for AES key\n", ctr_in_size); + rc = TPM_FAIL; /* should never occur */ + } + } + if (rc == 0) { + /* make a truncated copy of CTR, since this function alters the value */ + memcpy(ctr, ctr_in, sizeof(ctr)); + TPM_PrintFour(" TPM_SymmetricKeyData_CtrCrypt: CTR", ctr); + } + /* create a new AES context */ + if (rc == 0) { + cx = AES_CreateContext(symmetric_key, /* AES key */ + NULL, /* ivec not used in NSS_AES */ + NSS_AES, /* mode */ + TRUE, /* encrypt */ + TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, /* key length */ + TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE); /* AES block length */ + if (cx == NULL) { + printf("TPM_SymmetricKeyData_CtrCrypt: Error creating AES context\n"); + rc = TPM_SIZE; + } + } + while (data_size != 0) { + printf(" TPM_SymmetricKeyData_CtrCrypt : data_size remaining %u\n", data_size); + /* initialize the context each time through the loop */ + if (rc == 0) { + rv = AES_InitContext(cx, /* AES context */ + symmetric_key, /* AES key */ + TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, /* key length */ + NULL, /* ivec not used in NSS_AES */ + NSS_AES, /* mode */ + TRUE, /* encrypt */ + TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE); /* AES block length */ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + printf("TPM_SymmetricKeyData_CtrCrypt: Error, rv %d\n", rv); + rc = TPM_ENCRYPT_ERROR; + } + } + /* get an XOR pad array by encrypting the CTR with the AES key */ + if (rc == 0) { + rv = AES_Encrypt(cx, + pad_buffer, &output_length, TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, /* output */ + ctr, TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE); /* input */ + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + printf("TPM_SymmetricKeyData_CtrCrypt: Error, rv %d\n", rv); + rc = TPM_ENCRYPT_ERROR; + } + } + if (rc == 0) { + /* partial or full last data block */ + if (data_size <= TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { + TPM_XOR(data_out, data_in, pad_buffer, data_size); + data_size = 0; + } + /* full block, not the last block */ + else { + TPM_XOR(data_out, data_in, pad_buffer, TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + data_in += TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + data_out += TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + data_size -= TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + } + /* if not the last block, increment CTR, only the low 4 bytes */ + if (data_size != 0) { + /* CTR is a big endian array, so the low 4 bytes are used */ + cint = LOAD32(ctr, TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE-4); /* byte array to uint32_t */ + cint++; /* increment */ + STORE32(ctr, TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE-4, cint); /* uint32_t to byte array */ + } + } + } + if (cx != NULL) { + /* due to a FreeBL bug, must zero the context before destroying it */ + unsigned char dummy_key[TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + memset(dummy_key, 0x00, TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + rv = AES_InitContext(cx, /* AES context */ + dummy_key, /* AES key */ + TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, /* key length */ + NULL, /* ivec not used in NSS_AES */ + NSS_AES, /* mode */ + TRUE, /* encrypt */ + TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE); /* AES block length */ + AES_DestroyContext(cx, PR_TRUE); /* @2 */ + } + return rc; +} + +/* TPM_SymmetricKeyData_OfbCrypt() does an encrypt or decrypt (they are the same XOR operation with + a OFB mode pad) of 'data_in' to 'data_out' + + NOTE: This function looks general, but is currently hard coded to AES128. + + 'symmetric key' is the raw key, not converted to a non-portable form + 'ivec_in' is the initial IV value before possible truncation +*/ + +TPM_RESULT TPM_SymmetricKeyData_OfbCrypt(unsigned char *data_out, /* output */ + const unsigned char *data_in, /* input */ + uint32_t data_size, /* input */ + const unsigned char *symmetric_key, /* in */ + uint32_t symmetric_key_size, /* in */ + unsigned char *ivec_in, /* input */ + uint32_t ivec_in_size) /* input */ +{ + TPM_RESULT rc = 0; + SECStatus rv; + AESContext *cx = NULL; + unsigned char ivec_loop[TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* ivec input to loop */ + unsigned char pad_buffer[TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* the XOR pad */ + uint32_t output_length; /* dummy */ + + printf(" TPM_SymmetricKeyData_OfbCrypt: data_size %u\n", data_size); + symmetric_key_size = symmetric_key_size; + /* check the input OFB size, it can be truncated, but cannot be smaller than the AES key */ + if (rc == 0) { + if (ivec_in_size < TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { + printf(" TPM_SymmetricKeyData_OfbCrypt: Error (fatal)," + "IV size %u too small for AES key\n", ivec_in_size); + rc = TPM_FAIL; /* should never occur */ + } + } + /* first time through, the ivec_loop will be the input ivec */ + if (rc == 0) { + memcpy(ivec_loop, ivec_in, sizeof(ivec_loop)); + TPM_PrintFour(" TPM_SymmetricKeyData_OfbCrypt: IV", ivec_loop); + } + /* create a new AES context */ + if (rc == 0) { + cx = AES_CreateContext(symmetric_key, + NULL, /* ivec not used in NSS_AES */ + NSS_AES, /* mode */ + TRUE, /* encrypt */ + TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, /* key length */ + TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE); /* AES block length */ + if (cx == NULL) { + printf("TPM_SymmetricKeyData_OfbCrypt: Error creating AES context\n"); + rc = TPM_SIZE; + } + } + while (data_size != 0) { + printf(" TPM_SymmetricKeyData_OfbCrypt: data_size remaining %u\n", data_size); + /* initialize the context each time through the loop */ + if (rc == 0) { + rv = AES_InitContext(cx, /* AES context */ + symmetric_key, /* AES key */ + TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, /* key length */ + NULL, /* ivec not used in NSS_AES */ + NSS_AES, /* mode */ + TRUE, /* encrypt */ + TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE); /* AES block length */ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + printf("TPM_SymmetricKeyData_OfbCrypt: Error, rv %d\n", rv); + rc = TPM_ENCRYPT_ERROR; + } + } + /* get an XOR pad array by encrypting the IV with the AES key */ + if (rc == 0) { + TPM_PrintFour(" TPM_SymmetricKeyData_OfbCrypt: IV", ivec_loop); + rv = AES_Encrypt(cx, + pad_buffer, &output_length, TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, /* output */ + ivec_loop, TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE); /* input */ + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + printf("TPM_SymmetricKeyData_OfbCrypt: Error, rv %d\n", rv); + rc = TPM_ENCRYPT_ERROR; + } + } + if (rc == 0) { + /* partial or full last data block */ + if (data_size <= TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { + TPM_XOR(data_out, data_in, pad_buffer, data_size); + data_size = 0; + } + /* full block, not the last block */ + else { + TPM_XOR(data_out, data_in, pad_buffer, TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + data_in += TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + data_out += TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + data_size -= TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + } + /* if not the last block, wrap the pad_buffer back to ivec_loop (output feed back) */ + memcpy(ivec_loop, pad_buffer, TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + } + } + if (cx != NULL) { + /* due to a FreeBL bug, must zero the context before destroying it */ + unsigned char dummy_key[TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + memset(dummy_key, 0x00, TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + rv = AES_InitContext(cx, /* AES context */ + dummy_key, /* AES key */ + TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, /* key length */ + NULL, /* ivec not used in NSS_AES */ + NSS_AES, /* mode */ + TRUE, /* encrypt */ + TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE); /* AES block length */ + AES_DestroyContext(cx, PR_TRUE); /* @2 */ + } + return rc; +} + +#endif /* TPM_AES */ |