Adding upstream version 6.1.76.upstream/6.1.76

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

21 files changed, 6306 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/Kconfig b/arch/s390/crypto/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..06ee706b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+menu "Accelerated Cryptographic Algorithms for CPU (s390)"
+
+config CRYPTO_CRC32_S390
+	tristate "CRC32c and CRC32"
+	depends on S390
+	select CRYPTO_HASH
+	select CRC32
+	help
+	  CRC32c and CRC32 CRC algorithms
+
+	  Architecture: s390
+
+	  It is available with IBM z13 or later.
+
+config CRYPTO_SHA512_S390
+	tristate "Hash functions: SHA-384 and SHA-512"
+	depends on S390
+	select CRYPTO_HASH
+	help
+	  SHA-384 and SHA-512 secure hash algorithms (FIPS 180)
+
+	  Architecture: s390
+
+	  It is available as of z10.
+
+config CRYPTO_SHA1_S390
+	tristate "Hash functions: SHA-1"
+	depends on S390
+	select CRYPTO_HASH
+	help
+	  SHA-1 secure hash algorithm (FIPS 180)
+
+	  Architecture: s390
+
+	  It is available as of z990.
+
+config CRYPTO_SHA256_S390
+	tristate "Hash functions: SHA-224 and SHA-256"
+	depends on S390
+	select CRYPTO_HASH
+	help
+	  SHA-224 and SHA-256 secure hash algorithms (FIPS 180)
+
+	  Architecture: s390
+
+	  It is available as of z9.
+
+config CRYPTO_SHA3_256_S390
+	tristate "Hash functions: SHA3-224 and SHA3-256"
+	depends on S390
+	select CRYPTO_HASH
+	help
+	  SHA3-224 and SHA3-256 secure hash algorithms (FIPS 202)
+
+	  Architecture: s390
+
+	  It is available as of z14.
+
+config CRYPTO_SHA3_512_S390
+	tristate "Hash functions: SHA3-384 and SHA3-512"
+	depends on S390
+	select CRYPTO_HASH
+	help
+	  SHA3-384 and SHA3-512 secure hash algorithms (FIPS 202)
+
+	  Architecture: s390
+
+	  It is available as of z14.
+
+config CRYPTO_GHASH_S390
+	tristate "Hash functions: GHASH"
+	depends on S390
+	select CRYPTO_HASH
+	help
+	  GCM GHASH hash function (NIST SP800-38D)
+
+	  Architecture: s390
+
+	  It is available as of z196.
+
+config CRYPTO_AES_S390
+	tristate "Ciphers: AES, modes: ECB, CBC, CTR, XTS, GCM"
+	depends on S390
+	select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
+	select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
+	help
+	  Block cipher: AES cipher algorithms (FIPS 197)
+	  AEAD cipher: AES with GCM
+	  Length-preserving ciphers: AES with ECB, CBC, XTS, and CTR modes
+
+	  Architecture: s390
+
+	  As of z9 the ECB and CBC modes are hardware accelerated
+	  for 128 bit keys.
+
+	  As of z10 the ECB and CBC modes are hardware accelerated
+	  for all AES key sizes.
+
+	  As of z196 the CTR mode is hardware accelerated for all AES
+	  key sizes and XTS mode is hardware accelerated for 256 and
+	  512 bit keys.
+
+config CRYPTO_DES_S390
+	tristate "Ciphers: DES and Triple DES EDE, modes: ECB, CBC, CTR"
+	depends on S390
+	select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
+	select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
+	select CRYPTO_LIB_DES
+	help
+	  Block ciphers: DES (FIPS 46-2) cipher algorithm
+	  Block ciphers: Triple DES EDE (FIPS 46-3) cipher algorithm
+	  Length-preserving ciphers: DES with ECB, CBC, and CTR modes
+	  Length-preserving ciphers: Triple DES EDED with ECB, CBC, and CTR modes
+
+	  Architecture: s390
+
+	  As of z990 the ECB and CBC mode are hardware accelerated.
+	  As of z196 the CTR mode is hardware accelerated.
+
+config CRYPTO_CHACHA_S390
+	tristate "Ciphers: ChaCha20"
+	depends on S390
+	select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
+	select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC
+	select CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA
+	help
+	  Length-preserving cipher: ChaCha20 stream cipher (RFC 7539)
+
+	  Architecture: s390
+
+	  It is available as of z13.
+
+endmenu
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/Makefile b/arch/s390/crypto/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1b1cc478f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Cryptographic API
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1_S390) += sha1_s390.o sha_common.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256_S390) += sha256_s390.o sha_common.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512_S390) += sha512_s390.o sha_common.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3_256_S390) += sha3_256_s390.o sha_common.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3_512_S390) += sha3_512_s390.o sha_common.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DES_S390) += des_s390.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_S390) += aes_s390.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_PAES_S390) += paes_s390.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA_S390) += chacha_s390.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_S390_PRNG) += prng.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_GHASH_S390) += ghash_s390.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32_S390) += crc32-vx_s390.o
+obj-y += arch_random.o
+
+crc32-vx_s390-y := crc32-vx.o crc32le-vx.o crc32be-vx.o
+chacha_s390-y := chacha-glue.o chacha-s390.o
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7b66e81e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1061 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ *
+ * s390 implementation of the AES Cipher Algorithm.
+ *
+ * s390 Version:
+ *   Copyright IBM Corp. 2005, 2017
+ *   Author(s): Jan Glauber (jang@de.ibm.com)
+ *		Sebastian Siewior (sebastian@breakpoint.cc> SW-Fallback
+ *		Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
+ *		Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * Derived from "crypto/aes_generic.c"
+ */
+
+#define KMSG_COMPONENT "aes_s390"
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KMSG_COMPONENT ": " fmt
+
+#include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
+#include <crypto/ghash.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/cipher.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/fips.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <crypto/xts.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+
+static u8 *ctrblk;
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(ctrblk_lock);
+
+static cpacf_mask_t km_functions, kmc_functions, kmctr_functions,
+		    kma_functions;
+
+struct s390_aes_ctx {
+	u8 key[AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
+	int key_len;
+	unsigned long fc;
+	union {
+		struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher;
+		struct crypto_cipher *cip;
+	} fallback;
+};
+
+struct s390_xts_ctx {
+	u8 key[32];
+	u8 pcc_key[32];
+	int key_len;
+	unsigned long fc;
+	struct crypto_skcipher *fallback;
+};
+
+struct gcm_sg_walk {
+	struct scatter_walk walk;
+	unsigned int walk_bytes;
+	u8 *walk_ptr;
+	unsigned int walk_bytes_remain;
+	u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	unsigned int buf_bytes;
+	u8 *ptr;
+	unsigned int nbytes;
+};
+
+static int setkey_fallback_cip(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+		unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	sctx->fallback.cip->base.crt_flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK;
+	sctx->fallback.cip->base.crt_flags |= (tfm->crt_flags &
+			CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+
+	return crypto_cipher_setkey(sctx->fallback.cip, in_key, key_len);
+}
+
+static int aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+		       unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	unsigned long fc;
+
+	/* Pick the correct function code based on the key length */
+	fc = (key_len == 16) ? CPACF_KM_AES_128 :
+	     (key_len == 24) ? CPACF_KM_AES_192 :
+	     (key_len == 32) ? CPACF_KM_AES_256 : 0;
+
+	/* Check if the function code is available */
+	sctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0;
+	if (!sctx->fc)
+		return setkey_fallback_cip(tfm, in_key, key_len);
+
+	sctx->key_len = key_len;
+	memcpy(sctx->key, in_key, key_len);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void crypto_aes_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	if (unlikely(!sctx->fc)) {
+		crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(sctx->fallback.cip, out, in);
+		return;
+	}
+	cpacf_km(sctx->fc, &sctx->key, out, in, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}
+
+static void crypto_aes_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	if (unlikely(!sctx->fc)) {
+		crypto_cipher_decrypt_one(sctx->fallback.cip, out, in);
+		return;
+	}
+	cpacf_km(sctx->fc | CPACF_DECRYPT,
+		 &sctx->key, out, in, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}
+
+static int fallback_init_cip(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+	const char *name = tfm->__crt_alg->cra_name;
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	sctx->fallback.cip = crypto_alloc_cipher(name, 0,
+						 CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK);
+
+	if (IS_ERR(sctx->fallback.cip)) {
+		pr_err("Allocating AES fallback algorithm %s failed\n",
+		       name);
+		return PTR_ERR(sctx->fallback.cip);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void fallback_exit_cip(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	crypto_free_cipher(sctx->fallback.cip);
+	sctx->fallback.cip = NULL;
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg aes_alg = {
+	.cra_name		=	"aes",
+	.cra_driver_name	=	"aes-s390",
+	.cra_priority		=	300,
+	.cra_flags		=	CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER |
+					CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
+	.cra_blocksize		=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.cra_ctxsize		=	sizeof(struct s390_aes_ctx),
+	.cra_module		=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_init               =       fallback_init_cip,
+	.cra_exit               =       fallback_exit_cip,
+	.cra_u			=	{
+		.cipher = {
+			.cia_min_keysize	=	AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+			.cia_max_keysize	=	AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+			.cia_setkey		=	aes_set_key,
+			.cia_encrypt		=	crypto_aes_encrypt,
+			.cia_decrypt		=	crypto_aes_decrypt,
+		}
+	}
+};
+
+static int setkey_fallback_skcipher(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
+				    unsigned int len)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(sctx->fallback.skcipher,
+				    CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	crypto_skcipher_set_flags(sctx->fallback.skcipher,
+				  crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm) &
+				  CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	return crypto_skcipher_setkey(sctx->fallback.skcipher, key, len);
+}
+
+static int fallback_skcipher_crypt(struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx,
+				   struct skcipher_request *req,
+				   unsigned long modifier)
+{
+	struct skcipher_request *subreq = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
+
+	*subreq = *req;
+	skcipher_request_set_tfm(subreq, sctx->fallback.skcipher);
+	return (modifier & CPACF_DECRYPT) ?
+		crypto_skcipher_decrypt(subreq) :
+		crypto_skcipher_encrypt(subreq);
+}
+
+static int ecb_aes_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+			   unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	unsigned long fc;
+
+	/* Pick the correct function code based on the key length */
+	fc = (key_len == 16) ? CPACF_KM_AES_128 :
+	     (key_len == 24) ? CPACF_KM_AES_192 :
+	     (key_len == 32) ? CPACF_KM_AES_256 : 0;
+
+	/* Check if the function code is available */
+	sctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0;
+	if (!sctx->fc)
+		return setkey_fallback_skcipher(tfm, in_key, key_len);
+
+	sctx->key_len = key_len;
+	memcpy(sctx->key, in_key, key_len);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int ecb_aes_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, unsigned long modifier)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	unsigned int nbytes, n;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (unlikely(!sctx->fc))
+		return fallback_skcipher_crypt(sctx, req, modifier);
+
+	ret = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+	while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes) != 0) {
+		/* only use complete blocks */
+		n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+		cpacf_km(sctx->fc | modifier, sctx->key,
+			 walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, n);
+		ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes - n);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int ecb_aes_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return ecb_aes_crypt(req, 0);
+}
+
+static int ecb_aes_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return ecb_aes_crypt(req, CPACF_DECRYPT);
+}
+
+static int fallback_init_skcipher(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+	const char *name = crypto_tfm_alg_name(&tfm->base);
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	sctx->fallback.skcipher = crypto_alloc_skcipher(name, 0,
+				CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK | CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+
+	if (IS_ERR(sctx->fallback.skcipher)) {
+		pr_err("Allocating AES fallback algorithm %s failed\n",
+		       name);
+		return PTR_ERR(sctx->fallback.skcipher);
+	}
+
+	crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct skcipher_request) +
+				    crypto_skcipher_reqsize(sctx->fallback.skcipher));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void fallback_exit_skcipher(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	crypto_free_skcipher(sctx->fallback.skcipher);
+}
+
+static struct skcipher_alg ecb_aes_alg = {
+	.base.cra_name		=	"ecb(aes)",
+	.base.cra_driver_name	=	"ecb-aes-s390",
+	.base.cra_priority	=	401,	/* combo: aes + ecb + 1 */
+	.base.cra_flags		=	CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
+	.base.cra_blocksize	=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.base.cra_ctxsize	=	sizeof(struct s390_aes_ctx),
+	.base.cra_module	=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.init			=	fallback_init_skcipher,
+	.exit			=	fallback_exit_skcipher,
+	.min_keysize		=	AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+	.max_keysize		=	AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+	.setkey			=	ecb_aes_set_key,
+	.encrypt		=	ecb_aes_encrypt,
+	.decrypt		=	ecb_aes_decrypt,
+};
+
+static int cbc_aes_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+			   unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	unsigned long fc;
+
+	/* Pick the correct function code based on the key length */
+	fc = (key_len == 16) ? CPACF_KMC_AES_128 :
+	     (key_len == 24) ? CPACF_KMC_AES_192 :
+	     (key_len == 32) ? CPACF_KMC_AES_256 : 0;
+
+	/* Check if the function code is available */
+	sctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0;
+	if (!sctx->fc)
+		return setkey_fallback_skcipher(tfm, in_key, key_len);
+
+	sctx->key_len = key_len;
+	memcpy(sctx->key, in_key, key_len);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cbc_aes_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, unsigned long modifier)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	unsigned int nbytes, n;
+	int ret;
+	struct {
+		u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+		u8 key[AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
+	} param;
+
+	if (unlikely(!sctx->fc))
+		return fallback_skcipher_crypt(sctx, req, modifier);
+
+	ret = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+	memcpy(param.iv, walk.iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	memcpy(param.key, sctx->key, sctx->key_len);
+	while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes) != 0) {
+		/* only use complete blocks */
+		n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+		cpacf_kmc(sctx->fc | modifier, &param,
+			  walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, n);
+		memcpy(walk.iv, param.iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes - n);
+	}
+	memzero_explicit(&param, sizeof(param));
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int cbc_aes_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return cbc_aes_crypt(req, 0);
+}
+
+static int cbc_aes_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return cbc_aes_crypt(req, CPACF_DECRYPT);
+}
+
+static struct skcipher_alg cbc_aes_alg = {
+	.base.cra_name		=	"cbc(aes)",
+	.base.cra_driver_name	=	"cbc-aes-s390",
+	.base.cra_priority	=	402,	/* ecb-aes-s390 + 1 */
+	.base.cra_flags		=	CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
+	.base.cra_blocksize	=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.base.cra_ctxsize	=	sizeof(struct s390_aes_ctx),
+	.base.cra_module	=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.init			=	fallback_init_skcipher,
+	.exit			=	fallback_exit_skcipher,
+	.min_keysize		=	AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+	.max_keysize		=	AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+	.ivsize			=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.setkey			=	cbc_aes_set_key,
+	.encrypt		=	cbc_aes_encrypt,
+	.decrypt		=	cbc_aes_decrypt,
+};
+
+static int xts_fallback_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
+			       unsigned int len)
+{
+	struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(xts_ctx->fallback, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	crypto_skcipher_set_flags(xts_ctx->fallback,
+				  crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm) &
+				  CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	return crypto_skcipher_setkey(xts_ctx->fallback, key, len);
+}
+
+static int xts_aes_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+			   unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	unsigned long fc;
+	int err;
+
+	err = xts_fallback_setkey(tfm, in_key, key_len);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* In fips mode only 128 bit or 256 bit keys are valid */
+	if (fips_enabled && key_len != 32 && key_len != 64)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Pick the correct function code based on the key length */
+	fc = (key_len == 32) ? CPACF_KM_XTS_128 :
+	     (key_len == 64) ? CPACF_KM_XTS_256 : 0;
+
+	/* Check if the function code is available */
+	xts_ctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0;
+	if (!xts_ctx->fc)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Split the XTS key into the two subkeys */
+	key_len = key_len / 2;
+	xts_ctx->key_len = key_len;
+	memcpy(xts_ctx->key, in_key, key_len);
+	memcpy(xts_ctx->pcc_key, in_key + key_len, key_len);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int xts_aes_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, unsigned long modifier)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	unsigned int offset, nbytes, n;
+	int ret;
+	struct {
+		u8 key[32];
+		u8 tweak[16];
+		u8 block[16];
+		u8 bit[16];
+		u8 xts[16];
+	} pcc_param;
+	struct {
+		u8 key[32];
+		u8 init[16];
+	} xts_param;
+
+	if (req->cryptlen < AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (unlikely(!xts_ctx->fc || (req->cryptlen % AES_BLOCK_SIZE) != 0)) {
+		struct skcipher_request *subreq = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
+
+		*subreq = *req;
+		skcipher_request_set_tfm(subreq, xts_ctx->fallback);
+		return (modifier & CPACF_DECRYPT) ?
+			crypto_skcipher_decrypt(subreq) :
+			crypto_skcipher_encrypt(subreq);
+	}
+
+	ret = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+	offset = xts_ctx->key_len & 0x10;
+	memset(pcc_param.block, 0, sizeof(pcc_param.block));
+	memset(pcc_param.bit, 0, sizeof(pcc_param.bit));
+	memset(pcc_param.xts, 0, sizeof(pcc_param.xts));
+	memcpy(pcc_param.tweak, walk.iv, sizeof(pcc_param.tweak));
+	memcpy(pcc_param.key + offset, xts_ctx->pcc_key, xts_ctx->key_len);
+	cpacf_pcc(xts_ctx->fc, pcc_param.key + offset);
+
+	memcpy(xts_param.key + offset, xts_ctx->key, xts_ctx->key_len);
+	memcpy(xts_param.init, pcc_param.xts, 16);
+
+	while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes) != 0) {
+		/* only use complete blocks */
+		n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+		cpacf_km(xts_ctx->fc | modifier, xts_param.key + offset,
+			 walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, n);
+		ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes - n);
+	}
+	memzero_explicit(&pcc_param, sizeof(pcc_param));
+	memzero_explicit(&xts_param, sizeof(xts_param));
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int xts_aes_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return xts_aes_crypt(req, 0);
+}
+
+static int xts_aes_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return xts_aes_crypt(req, CPACF_DECRYPT);
+}
+
+static int xts_fallback_init(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+	const char *name = crypto_tfm_alg_name(&tfm->base);
+	struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	xts_ctx->fallback = crypto_alloc_skcipher(name, 0,
+				CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK | CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+
+	if (IS_ERR(xts_ctx->fallback)) {
+		pr_err("Allocating XTS fallback algorithm %s failed\n",
+		       name);
+		return PTR_ERR(xts_ctx->fallback);
+	}
+	crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct skcipher_request) +
+				    crypto_skcipher_reqsize(xts_ctx->fallback));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void xts_fallback_exit(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	crypto_free_skcipher(xts_ctx->fallback);
+}
+
+static struct skcipher_alg xts_aes_alg = {
+	.base.cra_name		=	"xts(aes)",
+	.base.cra_driver_name	=	"xts-aes-s390",
+	.base.cra_priority	=	402,	/* ecb-aes-s390 + 1 */
+	.base.cra_flags		=	CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
+	.base.cra_blocksize	=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.base.cra_ctxsize	=	sizeof(struct s390_xts_ctx),
+	.base.cra_module	=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.init			=	xts_fallback_init,
+	.exit			=	xts_fallback_exit,
+	.min_keysize		=	2 * AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+	.max_keysize		=	2 * AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+	.ivsize			=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.setkey			=	xts_aes_set_key,
+	.encrypt		=	xts_aes_encrypt,
+	.decrypt		=	xts_aes_decrypt,
+};
+
+static int ctr_aes_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+			   unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	unsigned long fc;
+
+	/* Pick the correct function code based on the key length */
+	fc = (key_len == 16) ? CPACF_KMCTR_AES_128 :
+	     (key_len == 24) ? CPACF_KMCTR_AES_192 :
+	     (key_len == 32) ? CPACF_KMCTR_AES_256 : 0;
+
+	/* Check if the function code is available */
+	sctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0;
+	if (!sctx->fc)
+		return setkey_fallback_skcipher(tfm, in_key, key_len);
+
+	sctx->key_len = key_len;
+	memcpy(sctx->key, in_key, key_len);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static unsigned int __ctrblk_init(u8 *ctrptr, u8 *iv, unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	unsigned int i, n;
+
+	/* only use complete blocks, max. PAGE_SIZE */
+	memcpy(ctrptr, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	n = (nbytes > PAGE_SIZE) ? PAGE_SIZE : nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+	for (i = (n / AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - 1; i > 0; i--) {
+		memcpy(ctrptr + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, ctrptr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		crypto_inc(ctrptr + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		ctrptr += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	}
+	return n;
+}
+
+static int ctr_aes_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], *ctrptr;
+	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	unsigned int n, nbytes;
+	int ret, locked;
+
+	if (unlikely(!sctx->fc))
+		return fallback_skcipher_crypt(sctx, req, 0);
+
+	locked = mutex_trylock(&ctrblk_lock);
+
+	ret = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+	while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes) >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+		n = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+		if (nbytes >= 2*AES_BLOCK_SIZE && locked)
+			n = __ctrblk_init(ctrblk, walk.iv, nbytes);
+		ctrptr = (n > AES_BLOCK_SIZE) ? ctrblk : walk.iv;
+		cpacf_kmctr(sctx->fc, sctx->key, walk.dst.virt.addr,
+			    walk.src.virt.addr, n, ctrptr);
+		if (ctrptr == ctrblk)
+			memcpy(walk.iv, ctrptr + n - AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			       AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		crypto_inc(walk.iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes - n);
+	}
+	if (locked)
+		mutex_unlock(&ctrblk_lock);
+	/*
+	 * final block may be < AES_BLOCK_SIZE, copy only nbytes
+	 */
+	if (nbytes) {
+		memset(buf, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		memcpy(buf, walk.src.virt.addr, nbytes);
+		cpacf_kmctr(sctx->fc, sctx->key, buf, buf,
+			    AES_BLOCK_SIZE, walk.iv);
+		memcpy(walk.dst.virt.addr, buf, nbytes);
+		crypto_inc(walk.iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, 0);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static struct skcipher_alg ctr_aes_alg = {
+	.base.cra_name		=	"ctr(aes)",
+	.base.cra_driver_name	=	"ctr-aes-s390",
+	.base.cra_priority	=	402,	/* ecb-aes-s390 + 1 */
+	.base.cra_flags		=	CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
+	.base.cra_blocksize	=	1,
+	.base.cra_ctxsize	=	sizeof(struct s390_aes_ctx),
+	.base.cra_module	=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.init			=	fallback_init_skcipher,
+	.exit			=	fallback_exit_skcipher,
+	.min_keysize		=	AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+	.max_keysize		=	AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+	.ivsize			=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.setkey			=	ctr_aes_set_key,
+	.encrypt		=	ctr_aes_crypt,
+	.decrypt		=	ctr_aes_crypt,
+	.chunksize		=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+};
+
+static int gcm_aes_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,
+			  unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+
+	switch (keylen) {
+	case AES_KEYSIZE_128:
+		ctx->fc = CPACF_KMA_GCM_AES_128;
+		break;
+	case AES_KEYSIZE_192:
+		ctx->fc = CPACF_KMA_GCM_AES_192;
+		break;
+	case AES_KEYSIZE_256:
+		ctx->fc = CPACF_KMA_GCM_AES_256;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(ctx->key, key, keylen);
+	ctx->key_len = keylen;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int gcm_aes_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm, unsigned int authsize)
+{
+	switch (authsize) {
+	case 4:
+	case 8:
+	case 12:
+	case 13:
+	case 14:
+	case 15:
+	case 16:
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void gcm_walk_start(struct gcm_sg_walk *gw, struct scatterlist *sg,
+			   unsigned int len)
+{
+	memset(gw, 0, sizeof(*gw));
+	gw->walk_bytes_remain = len;
+	scatterwalk_start(&gw->walk, sg);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int _gcm_sg_clamp_and_map(struct gcm_sg_walk *gw)
+{
+	struct scatterlist *nextsg;
+
+	gw->walk_bytes = scatterwalk_clamp(&gw->walk, gw->walk_bytes_remain);
+	while (!gw->walk_bytes) {
+		nextsg = sg_next(gw->walk.sg);
+		if (!nextsg)
+			return 0;
+		scatterwalk_start(&gw->walk, nextsg);
+		gw->walk_bytes = scatterwalk_clamp(&gw->walk,
+						   gw->walk_bytes_remain);
+	}
+	gw->walk_ptr = scatterwalk_map(&gw->walk);
+	return gw->walk_bytes;
+}
+
+static inline void _gcm_sg_unmap_and_advance(struct gcm_sg_walk *gw,
+					     unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	gw->walk_bytes_remain -= nbytes;
+	scatterwalk_unmap(gw->walk_ptr);
+	scatterwalk_advance(&gw->walk, nbytes);
+	scatterwalk_done(&gw->walk, 0, gw->walk_bytes_remain);
+	gw->walk_ptr = NULL;
+}
+
+static int gcm_in_walk_go(struct gcm_sg_walk *gw, unsigned int minbytesneeded)
+{
+	int n;
+
+	if (gw->buf_bytes && gw->buf_bytes >= minbytesneeded) {
+		gw->ptr = gw->buf;
+		gw->nbytes = gw->buf_bytes;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (gw->walk_bytes_remain == 0) {
+		gw->ptr = NULL;
+		gw->nbytes = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!_gcm_sg_clamp_and_map(gw)) {
+		gw->ptr = NULL;
+		gw->nbytes = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!gw->buf_bytes && gw->walk_bytes >= minbytesneeded) {
+		gw->ptr = gw->walk_ptr;
+		gw->nbytes = gw->walk_bytes;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	while (1) {
+		n = min(gw->walk_bytes, AES_BLOCK_SIZE - gw->buf_bytes);
+		memcpy(gw->buf + gw->buf_bytes, gw->walk_ptr, n);
+		gw->buf_bytes += n;
+		_gcm_sg_unmap_and_advance(gw, n);
+		if (gw->buf_bytes >= minbytesneeded) {
+			gw->ptr = gw->buf;
+			gw->nbytes = gw->buf_bytes;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (!_gcm_sg_clamp_and_map(gw)) {
+			gw->ptr = NULL;
+			gw->nbytes = 0;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	return gw->nbytes;
+}
+
+static int gcm_out_walk_go(struct gcm_sg_walk *gw, unsigned int minbytesneeded)
+{
+	if (gw->walk_bytes_remain == 0) {
+		gw->ptr = NULL;
+		gw->nbytes = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!_gcm_sg_clamp_and_map(gw)) {
+		gw->ptr = NULL;
+		gw->nbytes = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (gw->walk_bytes >= minbytesneeded) {
+		gw->ptr = gw->walk_ptr;
+		gw->nbytes = gw->walk_bytes;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	scatterwalk_unmap(gw->walk_ptr);
+	gw->walk_ptr = NULL;
+
+	gw->ptr = gw->buf;
+	gw->nbytes = sizeof(gw->buf);
+
+out:
+	return gw->nbytes;
+}
+
+static int gcm_in_walk_done(struct gcm_sg_walk *gw, unsigned int bytesdone)
+{
+	if (gw->ptr == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (gw->ptr == gw->buf) {
+		int n = gw->buf_bytes - bytesdone;
+		if (n > 0) {
+			memmove(gw->buf, gw->buf + bytesdone, n);
+			gw->buf_bytes = n;
+		} else
+			gw->buf_bytes = 0;
+	} else
+		_gcm_sg_unmap_and_advance(gw, bytesdone);
+
+	return bytesdone;
+}
+
+static int gcm_out_walk_done(struct gcm_sg_walk *gw, unsigned int bytesdone)
+{
+	int i, n;
+
+	if (gw->ptr == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (gw->ptr == gw->buf) {
+		for (i = 0; i < bytesdone; i += n) {
+			if (!_gcm_sg_clamp_and_map(gw))
+				return i;
+			n = min(gw->walk_bytes, bytesdone - i);
+			memcpy(gw->walk_ptr, gw->buf + i, n);
+			_gcm_sg_unmap_and_advance(gw, n);
+		}
+	} else
+		_gcm_sg_unmap_and_advance(gw, bytesdone);
+
+	return bytesdone;
+}
+
+static int gcm_aes_crypt(struct aead_request *req, unsigned int flags)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
+	unsigned int taglen = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
+	unsigned int aadlen = req->assoclen;
+	unsigned int pclen = req->cryptlen;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	unsigned int n, len, in_bytes, out_bytes,
+		     min_bytes, bytes, aad_bytes, pc_bytes;
+	struct gcm_sg_walk gw_in, gw_out;
+	u8 tag[GHASH_DIGEST_SIZE];
+
+	struct {
+		u32 _[3];		/* reserved */
+		u32 cv;			/* Counter Value */
+		u8 t[GHASH_DIGEST_SIZE];/* Tag */
+		u8 h[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];	/* Hash-subkey */
+		u64 taadl;		/* Total AAD Length */
+		u64 tpcl;		/* Total Plain-/Cipher-text Length */
+		u8 j0[GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE];/* initial counter value */
+		u8 k[AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE];	/* Key */
+	} param;
+
+	/*
+	 * encrypt
+	 *   req->src: aad||plaintext
+	 *   req->dst: aad||ciphertext||tag
+	 * decrypt
+	 *   req->src: aad||ciphertext||tag
+	 *   req->dst: aad||plaintext, return 0 or -EBADMSG
+	 * aad, plaintext and ciphertext may be empty.
+	 */
+	if (flags & CPACF_DECRYPT)
+		pclen -= taglen;
+	len = aadlen + pclen;
+
+	memset(&param, 0, sizeof(param));
+	param.cv = 1;
+	param.taadl = aadlen * 8;
+	param.tpcl = pclen * 8;
+	memcpy(param.j0, req->iv, ivsize);
+	*(u32 *)(param.j0 + ivsize) = 1;
+	memcpy(param.k, ctx->key, ctx->key_len);
+
+	gcm_walk_start(&gw_in, req->src, len);
+	gcm_walk_start(&gw_out, req->dst, len);
+
+	do {
+		min_bytes = min_t(unsigned int,
+				  aadlen > 0 ? aadlen : pclen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		in_bytes = gcm_in_walk_go(&gw_in, min_bytes);
+		out_bytes = gcm_out_walk_go(&gw_out, min_bytes);
+		bytes = min(in_bytes, out_bytes);
+
+		if (aadlen + pclen <= bytes) {
+			aad_bytes = aadlen;
+			pc_bytes = pclen;
+			flags |= CPACF_KMA_LAAD | CPACF_KMA_LPC;
+		} else {
+			if (aadlen <= bytes) {
+				aad_bytes = aadlen;
+				pc_bytes = (bytes - aadlen) &
+					   ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+				flags |= CPACF_KMA_LAAD;
+			} else {
+				aad_bytes = bytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+				pc_bytes = 0;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (aad_bytes > 0)
+			memcpy(gw_out.ptr, gw_in.ptr, aad_bytes);
+
+		cpacf_kma(ctx->fc | flags, &param,
+			  gw_out.ptr + aad_bytes,
+			  gw_in.ptr + aad_bytes, pc_bytes,
+			  gw_in.ptr, aad_bytes);
+
+		n = aad_bytes + pc_bytes;
+		if (gcm_in_walk_done(&gw_in, n) != n)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		if (gcm_out_walk_done(&gw_out, n) != n)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		aadlen -= aad_bytes;
+		pclen -= pc_bytes;
+	} while (aadlen + pclen > 0);
+
+	if (flags & CPACF_DECRYPT) {
+		scatterwalk_map_and_copy(tag, req->src, len, taglen, 0);
+		if (crypto_memneq(tag, param.t, taglen))
+			ret = -EBADMSG;
+	} else
+		scatterwalk_map_and_copy(param.t, req->dst, len, taglen, 1);
+
+	memzero_explicit(&param, sizeof(param));
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int gcm_aes_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	return gcm_aes_crypt(req, CPACF_ENCRYPT);
+}
+
+static int gcm_aes_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	return gcm_aes_crypt(req, CPACF_DECRYPT);
+}
+
+static struct aead_alg gcm_aes_aead = {
+	.setkey			= gcm_aes_setkey,
+	.setauthsize		= gcm_aes_setauthsize,
+	.encrypt		= gcm_aes_encrypt,
+	.decrypt		= gcm_aes_decrypt,
+
+	.ivsize			= GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - sizeof(u32),
+	.maxauthsize		= GHASH_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	.chunksize		= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+
+	.base			= {
+		.cra_blocksize		= 1,
+		.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct s390_aes_ctx),
+		.cra_priority		= 900,
+		.cra_name		= "gcm(aes)",
+		.cra_driver_name	= "gcm-aes-s390",
+		.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,
+	},
+};
+
+static struct crypto_alg *aes_s390_alg;
+static struct skcipher_alg *aes_s390_skcipher_algs[4];
+static int aes_s390_skciphers_num;
+static struct aead_alg *aes_s390_aead_alg;
+
+static int aes_s390_register_skcipher(struct skcipher_alg *alg)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = crypto_register_skcipher(alg);
+	if (!ret)
+		aes_s390_skcipher_algs[aes_s390_skciphers_num++] = alg;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void aes_s390_fini(void)
+{
+	if (aes_s390_alg)
+		crypto_unregister_alg(aes_s390_alg);
+	while (aes_s390_skciphers_num--)
+		crypto_unregister_skcipher(aes_s390_skcipher_algs[aes_s390_skciphers_num]);
+	if (ctrblk)
+		free_page((unsigned long) ctrblk);
+
+	if (aes_s390_aead_alg)
+		crypto_unregister_aead(aes_s390_aead_alg);
+}
+
+static int __init aes_s390_init(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	/* Query available functions for KM, KMC, KMCTR and KMA */
+	cpacf_query(CPACF_KM, &km_functions);
+	cpacf_query(CPACF_KMC, &kmc_functions);
+	cpacf_query(CPACF_KMCTR, &kmctr_functions);
+	cpacf_query(CPACF_KMA, &kma_functions);
+
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_AES_128) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_AES_192) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_AES_256)) {
+		ret = crypto_register_alg(&aes_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+		aes_s390_alg = &aes_alg;
+		ret = aes_s390_register_skcipher(&ecb_aes_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_AES_128) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_AES_192) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_AES_256)) {
+		ret = aes_s390_register_skcipher(&cbc_aes_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_XTS_128) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_XTS_256)) {
+		ret = aes_s390_register_skcipher(&xts_aes_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_AES_128) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_AES_192) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_AES_256)) {
+		ctrblk = (u8 *) __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!ctrblk) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out_err;
+		}
+		ret = aes_s390_register_skcipher(&ctr_aes_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&kma_functions, CPACF_KMA_GCM_AES_128) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&kma_functions, CPACF_KMA_GCM_AES_192) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&kma_functions, CPACF_KMA_GCM_AES_256)) {
+		ret = crypto_register_aead(&gcm_aes_aead);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+		aes_s390_aead_alg = &gcm_aes_aead;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+out_err:
+	aes_s390_fini();
+	return ret;
+}
+
+module_cpu_feature_match(S390_CPU_FEATURE_MSA, aes_s390_init);
+module_exit(aes_s390_fini);
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("aes-all");
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Rijndael (AES) Cipher Algorithm");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_IMPORT_NS(CRYPTO_INTERNAL);
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/arch_random.c b/arch/s390/crypto/arch_random.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1f2d40993
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/arch_random.c
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * s390 arch random implementation.
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2017, 2020
+ * Author(s): Harald Freudenberger
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/static_key.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(s390_arch_random_available);
+
+atomic64_t s390_arch_random_counter = ATOMIC64_INIT(0);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(s390_arch_random_counter);
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/chacha-glue.c b/arch/s390/crypto/chacha-glue.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5fae187f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/chacha-glue.c
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * s390 ChaCha stream cipher.
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2021
+ */
+
+#define KMSG_COMPONENT "chacha_s390"
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KMSG_COMPONENT ": " fmt
+
+#include <crypto/internal/chacha.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/sizes.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
+#include "chacha-s390.h"
+
+static void chacha20_crypt_s390(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+				unsigned int nbytes, const u32 *key,
+				u32 *counter)
+{
+	struct kernel_fpu vxstate;
+
+	kernel_fpu_begin(&vxstate, KERNEL_VXR);
+	chacha20_vx(dst, src, nbytes, key, counter);
+	kernel_fpu_end(&vxstate, KERNEL_VXR);
+
+	*counter += round_up(nbytes, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) / CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
+}
+
+static int chacha20_s390(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	struct chacha_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	u32 state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS] __aligned(16);
+	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	unsigned int nbytes;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+	chacha_init_generic(state, ctx->key, req->iv);
+
+	while (walk.nbytes > 0) {
+		nbytes = walk.nbytes;
+		if (nbytes < walk.total)
+			nbytes = round_down(nbytes, walk.stride);
+
+		if (nbytes <= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+			chacha_crypt_generic(state, walk.dst.virt.addr,
+					     walk.src.virt.addr, nbytes,
+					     ctx->nrounds);
+		} else {
+			chacha20_crypt_s390(state, walk.dst.virt.addr,
+					    walk.src.virt.addr, nbytes,
+					    &state[4], &state[12]);
+		}
+		rc = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes - nbytes);
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+void hchacha_block_arch(const u32 *state, u32 *stream, int nrounds)
+{
+	/* TODO: implement hchacha_block_arch() in assembly */
+	hchacha_block_generic(state, stream, nrounds);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(hchacha_block_arch);
+
+void chacha_init_arch(u32 *state, const u32 *key, const u8 *iv)
+{
+	chacha_init_generic(state, key, iv);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_init_arch);
+
+void chacha_crypt_arch(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+		       unsigned int bytes, int nrounds)
+{
+	/* s390 chacha20 implementation has 20 rounds hard-coded,
+	 * it cannot handle a block of data or less, but otherwise
+	 * it can handle data of arbitrary size
+	 */
+	if (bytes <= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE || nrounds != 20 || !MACHINE_HAS_VX)
+		chacha_crypt_generic(state, dst, src, bytes, nrounds);
+	else
+		chacha20_crypt_s390(state, dst, src, bytes,
+				    &state[4], &state[12]);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_crypt_arch);
+
+static struct skcipher_alg chacha_algs[] = {
+	{
+		.base.cra_name		= "chacha20",
+		.base.cra_driver_name	= "chacha20-s390",
+		.base.cra_priority	= 900,
+		.base.cra_blocksize	= 1,
+		.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct chacha_ctx),
+		.base.cra_module	= THIS_MODULE,
+
+		.min_keysize		= CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
+		.max_keysize		= CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
+		.ivsize			= CHACHA_IV_SIZE,
+		.chunksize		= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.setkey			= chacha20_setkey,
+		.encrypt		= chacha20_s390,
+		.decrypt		= chacha20_s390,
+	}
+};
+
+static int __init chacha_mod_init(void)
+{
+	return IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SKCIPHER) ?
+		crypto_register_skciphers(chacha_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(chacha_algs)) : 0;
+}
+
+static void __exit chacha_mod_fini(void)
+{
+	if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SKCIPHER))
+		crypto_unregister_skciphers(chacha_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(chacha_algs));
+}
+
+module_cpu_feature_match(S390_CPU_FEATURE_VXRS, chacha_mod_init);
+module_exit(chacha_mod_fini);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ChaCha20 stream cipher");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("chacha20");
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/chacha-s390.S b/arch/s390/crypto/chacha-s390.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9b0336221
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/chacha-s390.S
@@ -0,0 +1,907 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Original implementation written by Andy Polyakov, @dot-asm.
+ * This is an adaptation of the original code for kernel use.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2006-2019 CRYPTOGAMS by <appro@openssl.org>. All Rights Reserved.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-insn.h>
+#include <asm/vx-insn.h>
+
+#define SP	%r15
+#define FRAME	(16 * 8 + 4 * 8)
+
+.data
+.align	32
+
+.Lsigma:
+.long	0x61707865,0x3320646e,0x79622d32,0x6b206574	# endian-neutral
+.long	1,0,0,0
+.long	2,0,0,0
+.long	3,0,0,0
+.long	0x03020100,0x07060504,0x0b0a0908,0x0f0e0d0c	# byte swap
+
+.long	0,1,2,3
+.long	0x61707865,0x61707865,0x61707865,0x61707865	# smashed sigma
+.long	0x3320646e,0x3320646e,0x3320646e,0x3320646e
+.long	0x79622d32,0x79622d32,0x79622d32,0x79622d32
+.long	0x6b206574,0x6b206574,0x6b206574,0x6b206574
+
+.previous
+
+	GEN_BR_THUNK %r14
+
+.text
+
+#############################################################################
+# void chacha20_vx_4x(u8 *out, counst u8 *inp, size_t len,
+#		      counst u32 *key, const u32 *counter)
+
+#define	OUT		%r2
+#define	INP		%r3
+#define	LEN		%r4
+#define	KEY		%r5
+#define	COUNTER		%r6
+
+#define BEPERM		%v31
+#define CTR		%v26
+
+#define K0		%v16
+#define K1		%v17
+#define K2		%v18
+#define K3		%v19
+
+#define XA0		%v0
+#define XA1		%v1
+#define XA2		%v2
+#define XA3		%v3
+
+#define XB0		%v4
+#define XB1		%v5
+#define XB2		%v6
+#define XB3		%v7
+
+#define XC0		%v8
+#define XC1		%v9
+#define XC2		%v10
+#define XC3		%v11
+
+#define XD0		%v12
+#define XD1		%v13
+#define XD2		%v14
+#define XD3		%v15
+
+#define XT0		%v27
+#define XT1		%v28
+#define XT2		%v29
+#define XT3		%v30
+
+ENTRY(chacha20_vx_4x)
+	stmg	%r6,%r7,6*8(SP)
+
+	larl	%r7,.Lsigma
+	lhi	%r0,10
+	lhi	%r1,0
+
+	VL	K0,0,,%r7		# load sigma
+	VL	K1,0,,KEY		# load key
+	VL	K2,16,,KEY
+	VL	K3,0,,COUNTER		# load counter
+
+	VL	BEPERM,0x40,,%r7
+	VL	CTR,0x50,,%r7
+
+	VLM	XA0,XA3,0x60,%r7,4	# load [smashed] sigma
+
+	VREPF	XB0,K1,0		# smash the key
+	VREPF	XB1,K1,1
+	VREPF	XB2,K1,2
+	VREPF	XB3,K1,3
+
+	VREPF	XD0,K3,0
+	VREPF	XD1,K3,1
+	VREPF	XD2,K3,2
+	VREPF	XD3,K3,3
+	VAF	XD0,XD0,CTR
+
+	VREPF	XC0,K2,0
+	VREPF	XC1,K2,1
+	VREPF	XC2,K2,2
+	VREPF	XC3,K2,3
+
+.Loop_4x:
+	VAF	XA0,XA0,XB0
+	VX	XD0,XD0,XA0
+	VERLLF	XD0,XD0,16
+
+	VAF	XA1,XA1,XB1
+	VX	XD1,XD1,XA1
+	VERLLF	XD1,XD1,16
+
+	VAF	XA2,XA2,XB2
+	VX	XD2,XD2,XA2
+	VERLLF	XD2,XD2,16
+
+	VAF	XA3,XA3,XB3
+	VX	XD3,XD3,XA3
+	VERLLF	XD3,XD3,16
+
+	VAF	XC0,XC0,XD0
+	VX	XB0,XB0,XC0
+	VERLLF	XB0,XB0,12
+
+	VAF	XC1,XC1,XD1
+	VX	XB1,XB1,XC1
+	VERLLF	XB1,XB1,12
+
+	VAF	XC2,XC2,XD2
+	VX	XB2,XB2,XC2
+	VERLLF	XB2,XB2,12
+
+	VAF	XC3,XC3,XD3
+	VX	XB3,XB3,XC3
+	VERLLF	XB3,XB3,12
+
+	VAF	XA0,XA0,XB0
+	VX	XD0,XD0,XA0
+	VERLLF	XD0,XD0,8
+
+	VAF	XA1,XA1,XB1
+	VX	XD1,XD1,XA1
+	VERLLF	XD1,XD1,8
+
+	VAF	XA2,XA2,XB2
+	VX	XD2,XD2,XA2
+	VERLLF	XD2,XD2,8
+
+	VAF	XA3,XA3,XB3
+	VX	XD3,XD3,XA3
+	VERLLF	XD3,XD3,8
+
+	VAF	XC0,XC0,XD0
+	VX	XB0,XB0,XC0
+	VERLLF	XB0,XB0,7
+
+	VAF	XC1,XC1,XD1
+	VX	XB1,XB1,XC1
+	VERLLF	XB1,XB1,7
+
+	VAF	XC2,XC2,XD2
+	VX	XB2,XB2,XC2
+	VERLLF	XB2,XB2,7
+
+	VAF	XC3,XC3,XD3
+	VX	XB3,XB3,XC3
+	VERLLF	XB3,XB3,7
+
+	VAF	XA0,XA0,XB1
+	VX	XD3,XD3,XA0
+	VERLLF	XD3,XD3,16
+
+	VAF	XA1,XA1,XB2
+	VX	XD0,XD0,XA1
+	VERLLF	XD0,XD0,16
+
+	VAF	XA2,XA2,XB3
+	VX	XD1,XD1,XA2
+	VERLLF	XD1,XD1,16
+
+	VAF	XA3,XA3,XB0
+	VX	XD2,XD2,XA3
+	VERLLF	XD2,XD2,16
+
+	VAF	XC2,XC2,XD3
+	VX	XB1,XB1,XC2
+	VERLLF	XB1,XB1,12
+
+	VAF	XC3,XC3,XD0
+	VX	XB2,XB2,XC3
+	VERLLF	XB2,XB2,12
+
+	VAF	XC0,XC0,XD1
+	VX	XB3,XB3,XC0
+	VERLLF	XB3,XB3,12
+
+	VAF	XC1,XC1,XD2
+	VX	XB0,XB0,XC1
+	VERLLF	XB0,XB0,12
+
+	VAF	XA0,XA0,XB1
+	VX	XD3,XD3,XA0
+	VERLLF	XD3,XD3,8
+
+	VAF	XA1,XA1,XB2
+	VX	XD0,XD0,XA1
+	VERLLF	XD0,XD0,8
+
+	VAF	XA2,XA2,XB3
+	VX	XD1,XD1,XA2
+	VERLLF	XD1,XD1,8
+
+	VAF	XA3,XA3,XB0
+	VX	XD2,XD2,XA3
+	VERLLF	XD2,XD2,8
+
+	VAF	XC2,XC2,XD3
+	VX	XB1,XB1,XC2
+	VERLLF	XB1,XB1,7
+
+	VAF	XC3,XC3,XD0
+	VX	XB2,XB2,XC3
+	VERLLF	XB2,XB2,7
+
+	VAF	XC0,XC0,XD1
+	VX	XB3,XB3,XC0
+	VERLLF	XB3,XB3,7
+
+	VAF	XC1,XC1,XD2
+	VX	XB0,XB0,XC1
+	VERLLF	XB0,XB0,7
+	brct	%r0,.Loop_4x
+
+	VAF	XD0,XD0,CTR
+
+	VMRHF	XT0,XA0,XA1		# transpose data
+	VMRHF	XT1,XA2,XA3
+	VMRLF	XT2,XA0,XA1
+	VMRLF	XT3,XA2,XA3
+	VPDI	XA0,XT0,XT1,0b0000
+	VPDI	XA1,XT0,XT1,0b0101
+	VPDI	XA2,XT2,XT3,0b0000
+	VPDI	XA3,XT2,XT3,0b0101
+
+	VMRHF	XT0,XB0,XB1
+	VMRHF	XT1,XB2,XB3
+	VMRLF	XT2,XB0,XB1
+	VMRLF	XT3,XB2,XB3
+	VPDI	XB0,XT0,XT1,0b0000
+	VPDI	XB1,XT0,XT1,0b0101
+	VPDI	XB2,XT2,XT3,0b0000
+	VPDI	XB3,XT2,XT3,0b0101
+
+	VMRHF	XT0,XC0,XC1
+	VMRHF	XT1,XC2,XC3
+	VMRLF	XT2,XC0,XC1
+	VMRLF	XT3,XC2,XC3
+	VPDI	XC0,XT0,XT1,0b0000
+	VPDI	XC1,XT0,XT1,0b0101
+	VPDI	XC2,XT2,XT3,0b0000
+	VPDI	XC3,XT2,XT3,0b0101
+
+	VMRHF	XT0,XD0,XD1
+	VMRHF	XT1,XD2,XD3
+	VMRLF	XT2,XD0,XD1
+	VMRLF	XT3,XD2,XD3
+	VPDI	XD0,XT0,XT1,0b0000
+	VPDI	XD1,XT0,XT1,0b0101
+	VPDI	XD2,XT2,XT3,0b0000
+	VPDI	XD3,XT2,XT3,0b0101
+
+	VAF	XA0,XA0,K0
+	VAF	XB0,XB0,K1
+	VAF	XC0,XC0,K2
+	VAF	XD0,XD0,K3
+
+	VPERM	XA0,XA0,XA0,BEPERM
+	VPERM	XB0,XB0,XB0,BEPERM
+	VPERM	XC0,XC0,XC0,BEPERM
+	VPERM	XD0,XD0,XD0,BEPERM
+
+	VLM	XT0,XT3,0,INP,0
+
+	VX	XT0,XT0,XA0
+	VX	XT1,XT1,XB0
+	VX	XT2,XT2,XC0
+	VX	XT3,XT3,XD0
+
+	VSTM	XT0,XT3,0,OUT,0
+
+	la	INP,0x40(INP)
+	la	OUT,0x40(OUT)
+	aghi	LEN,-0x40
+
+	VAF	XA0,XA1,K0
+	VAF	XB0,XB1,K1
+	VAF	XC0,XC1,K2
+	VAF	XD0,XD1,K3
+
+	VPERM	XA0,XA0,XA0,BEPERM
+	VPERM	XB0,XB0,XB0,BEPERM
+	VPERM	XC0,XC0,XC0,BEPERM
+	VPERM	XD0,XD0,XD0,BEPERM
+
+	clgfi	LEN,0x40
+	jl	.Ltail_4x
+
+	VLM	XT0,XT3,0,INP,0
+
+	VX	XT0,XT0,XA0
+	VX	XT1,XT1,XB0
+	VX	XT2,XT2,XC0
+	VX	XT3,XT3,XD0
+
+	VSTM	XT0,XT3,0,OUT,0
+
+	la	INP,0x40(INP)
+	la	OUT,0x40(OUT)
+	aghi	LEN,-0x40
+	je	.Ldone_4x
+
+	VAF	XA0,XA2,K0
+	VAF	XB0,XB2,K1
+	VAF	XC0,XC2,K2
+	VAF	XD0,XD2,K3
+
+	VPERM	XA0,XA0,XA0,BEPERM
+	VPERM	XB0,XB0,XB0,BEPERM
+	VPERM	XC0,XC0,XC0,BEPERM
+	VPERM	XD0,XD0,XD0,BEPERM
+
+	clgfi	LEN,0x40
+	jl	.Ltail_4x
+
+	VLM	XT0,XT3,0,INP,0
+
+	VX	XT0,XT0,XA0
+	VX	XT1,XT1,XB0
+	VX	XT2,XT2,XC0
+	VX	XT3,XT3,XD0
+
+	VSTM	XT0,XT3,0,OUT,0
+
+	la	INP,0x40(INP)
+	la	OUT,0x40(OUT)
+	aghi	LEN,-0x40
+	je	.Ldone_4x
+
+	VAF	XA0,XA3,K0
+	VAF	XB0,XB3,K1
+	VAF	XC0,XC3,K2
+	VAF	XD0,XD3,K3
+
+	VPERM	XA0,XA0,XA0,BEPERM
+	VPERM	XB0,XB0,XB0,BEPERM
+	VPERM	XC0,XC0,XC0,BEPERM
+	VPERM	XD0,XD0,XD0,BEPERM
+
+	clgfi	LEN,0x40
+	jl	.Ltail_4x
+
+	VLM	XT0,XT3,0,INP,0
+
+	VX	XT0,XT0,XA0
+	VX	XT1,XT1,XB0
+	VX	XT2,XT2,XC0
+	VX	XT3,XT3,XD0
+
+	VSTM	XT0,XT3,0,OUT,0
+
+.Ldone_4x:
+	lmg	%r6,%r7,6*8(SP)
+	BR_EX	%r14
+
+.Ltail_4x:
+	VLR	XT0,XC0
+	VLR	XT1,XD0
+
+	VST	XA0,8*8+0x00,,SP
+	VST	XB0,8*8+0x10,,SP
+	VST	XT0,8*8+0x20,,SP
+	VST	XT1,8*8+0x30,,SP
+
+	lghi	%r1,0
+
+.Loop_tail_4x:
+	llgc	%r5,0(%r1,INP)
+	llgc	%r6,8*8(%r1,SP)
+	xr	%r6,%r5
+	stc	%r6,0(%r1,OUT)
+	la	%r1,1(%r1)
+	brct	LEN,.Loop_tail_4x
+
+	lmg	%r6,%r7,6*8(SP)
+	BR_EX	%r14
+ENDPROC(chacha20_vx_4x)
+
+#undef	OUT
+#undef	INP
+#undef	LEN
+#undef	KEY
+#undef	COUNTER
+
+#undef BEPERM
+
+#undef K0
+#undef K1
+#undef K2
+#undef K3
+
+
+#############################################################################
+# void chacha20_vx(u8 *out, counst u8 *inp, size_t len,
+#		   counst u32 *key, const u32 *counter)
+
+#define	OUT		%r2
+#define	INP		%r3
+#define	LEN		%r4
+#define	KEY		%r5
+#define	COUNTER		%r6
+
+#define BEPERM		%v31
+
+#define K0		%v27
+#define K1		%v24
+#define K2		%v25
+#define K3		%v26
+
+#define A0		%v0
+#define B0		%v1
+#define C0		%v2
+#define D0		%v3
+
+#define A1		%v4
+#define B1		%v5
+#define C1		%v6
+#define D1		%v7
+
+#define A2		%v8
+#define B2		%v9
+#define C2		%v10
+#define D2		%v11
+
+#define A3		%v12
+#define B3		%v13
+#define C3		%v14
+#define D3		%v15
+
+#define A4		%v16
+#define B4		%v17
+#define C4		%v18
+#define D4		%v19
+
+#define A5		%v20
+#define B5		%v21
+#define C5		%v22
+#define D5		%v23
+
+#define T0		%v27
+#define T1		%v28
+#define T2		%v29
+#define T3		%v30
+
+ENTRY(chacha20_vx)
+	clgfi	LEN,256
+	jle	chacha20_vx_4x
+	stmg	%r6,%r7,6*8(SP)
+
+	lghi	%r1,-FRAME
+	lgr	%r0,SP
+	la	SP,0(%r1,SP)
+	stg	%r0,0(SP)		# back-chain
+
+	larl	%r7,.Lsigma
+	lhi	%r0,10
+
+	VLM	K1,K2,0,KEY,0		# load key
+	VL	K3,0,,COUNTER		# load counter
+
+	VLM	K0,BEPERM,0,%r7,4	# load sigma, increments, ...
+
+.Loop_outer_vx:
+	VLR	A0,K0
+	VLR	B0,K1
+	VLR	A1,K0
+	VLR	B1,K1
+	VLR	A2,K0
+	VLR	B2,K1
+	VLR	A3,K0
+	VLR	B3,K1
+	VLR	A4,K0
+	VLR	B4,K1
+	VLR	A5,K0
+	VLR	B5,K1
+
+	VLR	D0,K3
+	VAF	D1,K3,T1		# K[3]+1
+	VAF	D2,K3,T2		# K[3]+2
+	VAF	D3,K3,T3		# K[3]+3
+	VAF	D4,D2,T2		# K[3]+4
+	VAF	D5,D2,T3		# K[3]+5
+
+	VLR	C0,K2
+	VLR	C1,K2
+	VLR	C2,K2
+	VLR	C3,K2
+	VLR	C4,K2
+	VLR	C5,K2
+
+	VLR	T1,D1
+	VLR	T2,D2
+	VLR	T3,D3
+
+.Loop_vx:
+	VAF	A0,A0,B0
+	VAF	A1,A1,B1
+	VAF	A2,A2,B2
+	VAF	A3,A3,B3
+	VAF	A4,A4,B4
+	VAF	A5,A5,B5
+	VX	D0,D0,A0
+	VX	D1,D1,A1
+	VX	D2,D2,A2
+	VX	D3,D3,A3
+	VX	D4,D4,A4
+	VX	D5,D5,A5
+	VERLLF	D0,D0,16
+	VERLLF	D1,D1,16
+	VERLLF	D2,D2,16
+	VERLLF	D3,D3,16
+	VERLLF	D4,D4,16
+	VERLLF	D5,D5,16
+
+	VAF	C0,C0,D0
+	VAF	C1,C1,D1
+	VAF	C2,C2,D2
+	VAF	C3,C3,D3
+	VAF	C4,C4,D4
+	VAF	C5,C5,D5
+	VX	B0,B0,C0
+	VX	B1,B1,C1
+	VX	B2,B2,C2
+	VX	B3,B3,C3
+	VX	B4,B4,C4
+	VX	B5,B5,C5
+	VERLLF	B0,B0,12
+	VERLLF	B1,B1,12
+	VERLLF	B2,B2,12
+	VERLLF	B3,B3,12
+	VERLLF	B4,B4,12
+	VERLLF	B5,B5,12
+
+	VAF	A0,A0,B0
+	VAF	A1,A1,B1
+	VAF	A2,A2,B2
+	VAF	A3,A3,B3
+	VAF	A4,A4,B4
+	VAF	A5,A5,B5
+	VX	D0,D0,A0
+	VX	D1,D1,A1
+	VX	D2,D2,A2
+	VX	D3,D3,A3
+	VX	D4,D4,A4
+	VX	D5,D5,A5
+	VERLLF	D0,D0,8
+	VERLLF	D1,D1,8
+	VERLLF	D2,D2,8
+	VERLLF	D3,D3,8
+	VERLLF	D4,D4,8
+	VERLLF	D5,D5,8
+
+	VAF	C0,C0,D0
+	VAF	C1,C1,D1
+	VAF	C2,C2,D2
+	VAF	C3,C3,D3
+	VAF	C4,C4,D4
+	VAF	C5,C5,D5
+	VX	B0,B0,C0
+	VX	B1,B1,C1
+	VX	B2,B2,C2
+	VX	B3,B3,C3
+	VX	B4,B4,C4
+	VX	B5,B5,C5
+	VERLLF	B0,B0,7
+	VERLLF	B1,B1,7
+	VERLLF	B2,B2,7
+	VERLLF	B3,B3,7
+	VERLLF	B4,B4,7
+	VERLLF	B5,B5,7
+
+	VSLDB	C0,C0,C0,8
+	VSLDB	C1,C1,C1,8
+	VSLDB	C2,C2,C2,8
+	VSLDB	C3,C3,C3,8
+	VSLDB	C4,C4,C4,8
+	VSLDB	C5,C5,C5,8
+	VSLDB	B0,B0,B0,4
+	VSLDB	B1,B1,B1,4
+	VSLDB	B2,B2,B2,4
+	VSLDB	B3,B3,B3,4
+	VSLDB	B4,B4,B4,4
+	VSLDB	B5,B5,B5,4
+	VSLDB	D0,D0,D0,12
+	VSLDB	D1,D1,D1,12
+	VSLDB	D2,D2,D2,12
+	VSLDB	D3,D3,D3,12
+	VSLDB	D4,D4,D4,12
+	VSLDB	D5,D5,D5,12
+
+	VAF	A0,A0,B0
+	VAF	A1,A1,B1
+	VAF	A2,A2,B2
+	VAF	A3,A3,B3
+	VAF	A4,A4,B4
+	VAF	A5,A5,B5
+	VX	D0,D0,A0
+	VX	D1,D1,A1
+	VX	D2,D2,A2
+	VX	D3,D3,A3
+	VX	D4,D4,A4
+	VX	D5,D5,A5
+	VERLLF	D0,D0,16
+	VERLLF	D1,D1,16
+	VERLLF	D2,D2,16
+	VERLLF	D3,D3,16
+	VERLLF	D4,D4,16
+	VERLLF	D5,D5,16
+
+	VAF	C0,C0,D0
+	VAF	C1,C1,D1
+	VAF	C2,C2,D2
+	VAF	C3,C3,D3
+	VAF	C4,C4,D4
+	VAF	C5,C5,D5
+	VX	B0,B0,C0
+	VX	B1,B1,C1
+	VX	B2,B2,C2
+	VX	B3,B3,C3
+	VX	B4,B4,C4
+	VX	B5,B5,C5
+	VERLLF	B0,B0,12
+	VERLLF	B1,B1,12
+	VERLLF	B2,B2,12
+	VERLLF	B3,B3,12
+	VERLLF	B4,B4,12
+	VERLLF	B5,B5,12
+
+	VAF	A0,A0,B0
+	VAF	A1,A1,B1
+	VAF	A2,A2,B2
+	VAF	A3,A3,B3
+	VAF	A4,A4,B4
+	VAF	A5,A5,B5
+	VX	D0,D0,A0
+	VX	D1,D1,A1
+	VX	D2,D2,A2
+	VX	D3,D3,A3
+	VX	D4,D4,A4
+	VX	D5,D5,A5
+	VERLLF	D0,D0,8
+	VERLLF	D1,D1,8
+	VERLLF	D2,D2,8
+	VERLLF	D3,D3,8
+	VERLLF	D4,D4,8
+	VERLLF	D5,D5,8
+
+	VAF	C0,C0,D0
+	VAF	C1,C1,D1
+	VAF	C2,C2,D2
+	VAF	C3,C3,D3
+	VAF	C4,C4,D4
+	VAF	C5,C5,D5
+	VX	B0,B0,C0
+	VX	B1,B1,C1
+	VX	B2,B2,C2
+	VX	B3,B3,C3
+	VX	B4,B4,C4
+	VX	B5,B5,C5
+	VERLLF	B0,B0,7
+	VERLLF	B1,B1,7
+	VERLLF	B2,B2,7
+	VERLLF	B3,B3,7
+	VERLLF	B4,B4,7
+	VERLLF	B5,B5,7
+
+	VSLDB	C0,C0,C0,8
+	VSLDB	C1,C1,C1,8
+	VSLDB	C2,C2,C2,8
+	VSLDB	C3,C3,C3,8
+	VSLDB	C4,C4,C4,8
+	VSLDB	C5,C5,C5,8
+	VSLDB	B0,B0,B0,12
+	VSLDB	B1,B1,B1,12
+	VSLDB	B2,B2,B2,12
+	VSLDB	B3,B3,B3,12
+	VSLDB	B4,B4,B4,12
+	VSLDB	B5,B5,B5,12
+	VSLDB	D0,D0,D0,4
+	VSLDB	D1,D1,D1,4
+	VSLDB	D2,D2,D2,4
+	VSLDB	D3,D3,D3,4
+	VSLDB	D4,D4,D4,4
+	VSLDB	D5,D5,D5,4
+	brct	%r0,.Loop_vx
+
+	VAF	A0,A0,K0
+	VAF	B0,B0,K1
+	VAF	C0,C0,K2
+	VAF	D0,D0,K3
+	VAF	A1,A1,K0
+	VAF	D1,D1,T1		# +K[3]+1
+
+	VPERM	A0,A0,A0,BEPERM
+	VPERM	B0,B0,B0,BEPERM
+	VPERM	C0,C0,C0,BEPERM
+	VPERM	D0,D0,D0,BEPERM
+
+	clgfi	LEN,0x40
+	jl	.Ltail_vx
+
+	VAF	D2,D2,T2		# +K[3]+2
+	VAF	D3,D3,T3		# +K[3]+3
+	VLM	T0,T3,0,INP,0
+
+	VX	A0,A0,T0
+	VX	B0,B0,T1
+	VX	C0,C0,T2
+	VX	D0,D0,T3
+
+	VLM	K0,T3,0,%r7,4		# re-load sigma and increments
+
+	VSTM	A0,D0,0,OUT,0
+
+	la	INP,0x40(INP)
+	la	OUT,0x40(OUT)
+	aghi	LEN,-0x40
+	je	.Ldone_vx
+
+	VAF	B1,B1,K1
+	VAF	C1,C1,K2
+
+	VPERM	A0,A1,A1,BEPERM
+	VPERM	B0,B1,B1,BEPERM
+	VPERM	C0,C1,C1,BEPERM
+	VPERM	D0,D1,D1,BEPERM
+
+	clgfi	LEN,0x40
+	jl	.Ltail_vx
+
+	VLM	A1,D1,0,INP,0
+
+	VX	A0,A0,A1
+	VX	B0,B0,B1
+	VX	C0,C0,C1
+	VX	D0,D0,D1
+
+	VSTM	A0,D0,0,OUT,0
+
+	la	INP,0x40(INP)
+	la	OUT,0x40(OUT)
+	aghi	LEN,-0x40
+	je	.Ldone_vx
+
+	VAF	A2,A2,K0
+	VAF	B2,B2,K1
+	VAF	C2,C2,K2
+
+	VPERM	A0,A2,A2,BEPERM
+	VPERM	B0,B2,B2,BEPERM
+	VPERM	C0,C2,C2,BEPERM
+	VPERM	D0,D2,D2,BEPERM
+
+	clgfi	LEN,0x40
+	jl	.Ltail_vx
+
+	VLM	A1,D1,0,INP,0
+
+	VX	A0,A0,A1
+	VX	B0,B0,B1
+	VX	C0,C0,C1
+	VX	D0,D0,D1
+
+	VSTM	A0,D0,0,OUT,0
+
+	la	INP,0x40(INP)
+	la	OUT,0x40(OUT)
+	aghi	LEN,-0x40
+	je	.Ldone_vx
+
+	VAF	A3,A3,K0
+	VAF	B3,B3,K1
+	VAF	C3,C3,K2
+	VAF	D2,K3,T3		# K[3]+3
+
+	VPERM	A0,A3,A3,BEPERM
+	VPERM	B0,B3,B3,BEPERM
+	VPERM	C0,C3,C3,BEPERM
+	VPERM	D0,D3,D3,BEPERM
+
+	clgfi	LEN,0x40
+	jl	.Ltail_vx
+
+	VAF	D3,D2,T1		# K[3]+4
+	VLM	A1,D1,0,INP,0
+
+	VX	A0,A0,A1
+	VX	B0,B0,B1
+	VX	C0,C0,C1
+	VX	D0,D0,D1
+
+	VSTM	A0,D0,0,OUT,0
+
+	la	INP,0x40(INP)
+	la	OUT,0x40(OUT)
+	aghi	LEN,-0x40
+	je	.Ldone_vx
+
+	VAF	A4,A4,K0
+	VAF	B4,B4,K1
+	VAF	C4,C4,K2
+	VAF	D4,D4,D3		# +K[3]+4
+	VAF	D3,D3,T1		# K[3]+5
+	VAF	K3,D2,T3		# K[3]+=6
+
+	VPERM	A0,A4,A4,BEPERM
+	VPERM	B0,B4,B4,BEPERM
+	VPERM	C0,C4,C4,BEPERM
+	VPERM	D0,D4,D4,BEPERM
+
+	clgfi	LEN,0x40
+	jl	.Ltail_vx
+
+	VLM	A1,D1,0,INP,0
+
+	VX	A0,A0,A1
+	VX	B0,B0,B1
+	VX	C0,C0,C1
+	VX	D0,D0,D1
+
+	VSTM	A0,D0,0,OUT,0
+
+	la	INP,0x40(INP)
+	la	OUT,0x40(OUT)
+	aghi	LEN,-0x40
+	je	.Ldone_vx
+
+	VAF	A5,A5,K0
+	VAF	B5,B5,K1
+	VAF	C5,C5,K2
+	VAF	D5,D5,D3		# +K[3]+5
+
+	VPERM	A0,A5,A5,BEPERM
+	VPERM	B0,B5,B5,BEPERM
+	VPERM	C0,C5,C5,BEPERM
+	VPERM	D0,D5,D5,BEPERM
+
+	clgfi	LEN,0x40
+	jl	.Ltail_vx
+
+	VLM	A1,D1,0,INP,0
+
+	VX	A0,A0,A1
+	VX	B0,B0,B1
+	VX	C0,C0,C1
+	VX	D0,D0,D1
+
+	VSTM	A0,D0,0,OUT,0
+
+	la	INP,0x40(INP)
+	la	OUT,0x40(OUT)
+	lhi	%r0,10
+	aghi	LEN,-0x40
+	jne	.Loop_outer_vx
+
+.Ldone_vx:
+	lmg	%r6,%r7,FRAME+6*8(SP)
+	la	SP,FRAME(SP)
+	BR_EX	%r14
+
+.Ltail_vx:
+	VSTM	A0,D0,8*8,SP,3
+	lghi	%r1,0
+
+.Loop_tail_vx:
+	llgc	%r5,0(%r1,INP)
+	llgc	%r6,8*8(%r1,SP)
+	xr	%r6,%r5
+	stc	%r6,0(%r1,OUT)
+	la	%r1,1(%r1)
+	brct	LEN,.Loop_tail_vx
+
+	lmg	%r6,%r7,FRAME+6*8(SP)
+	la	SP,FRAME(SP)
+	BR_EX	%r14
+ENDPROC(chacha20_vx)
+
+.previous
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/chacha-s390.h b/arch/s390/crypto/chacha-s390.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..733744ce3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/chacha-s390.h
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * s390 ChaCha stream cipher.
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2021
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CHACHA_S390_H
+#define _CHACHA_S390_H
+
+void chacha20_vx(u8 *out, const u8 *inp, size_t len, const u32 *key,
+		 const u32 *counter);
+
+#endif /* _CHACHA_S390_H */
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/crc32-vx.c b/arch/s390/crypto/crc32-vx.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..017143e9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/crc32-vx.c
@@ -0,0 +1,310 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Crypto-API module for CRC-32 algorithms implemented with the
+ * z/Architecture Vector Extension Facility.
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2015
+ * Author(s): Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+ */
+#define KMSG_COMPONENT	"crc32-vx"
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)	KMSG_COMPONENT ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <linux/crc32.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
+
+
+#define CRC32_BLOCK_SIZE	1
+#define CRC32_DIGEST_SIZE	4
+
+#define VX_MIN_LEN		64
+#define VX_ALIGNMENT		16L
+#define VX_ALIGN_MASK		(VX_ALIGNMENT - 1)
+
+struct crc_ctx {
+	u32 key;
+};
+
+struct crc_desc_ctx {
+	u32 crc;
+};
+
+/* Prototypes for functions in assembly files */
+u32 crc32_le_vgfm_16(u32 crc, unsigned char const *buf, size_t size);
+u32 crc32_be_vgfm_16(u32 crc, unsigned char const *buf, size_t size);
+u32 crc32c_le_vgfm_16(u32 crc, unsigned char const *buf, size_t size);
+
+/*
+ * DEFINE_CRC32_VX() - Define a CRC-32 function using the vector extension
+ *
+ * Creates a function to perform a particular CRC-32 computation. Depending
+ * on the message buffer, the hardware-accelerated or software implementation
+ * is used.   Note that the message buffer is aligned to improve fetch
+ * operations of VECTOR LOAD MULTIPLE instructions.
+ *
+ */
+#define DEFINE_CRC32_VX(___fname, ___crc32_vx, ___crc32_sw)		    \
+	static u32 __pure ___fname(u32 crc,				    \
+				unsigned char const *data, size_t datalen)  \
+	{								    \
+		struct kernel_fpu vxstate;				    \
+		unsigned long prealign, aligned, remaining;		    \
+									    \
+		if (datalen < VX_MIN_LEN + VX_ALIGN_MASK)		    \
+			return ___crc32_sw(crc, data, datalen);		    \
+									    \
+		if ((unsigned long)data & VX_ALIGN_MASK) {		    \
+			prealign = VX_ALIGNMENT -			    \
+				  ((unsigned long)data & VX_ALIGN_MASK);    \
+			datalen -= prealign;				    \
+			crc = ___crc32_sw(crc, data, prealign);		    \
+			data = (void *)((unsigned long)data + prealign);    \
+		}							    \
+									    \
+		aligned = datalen & ~VX_ALIGN_MASK;			    \
+		remaining = datalen & VX_ALIGN_MASK;			    \
+									    \
+		kernel_fpu_begin(&vxstate, KERNEL_VXR_LOW);		    \
+		crc = ___crc32_vx(crc, data, aligned);			    \
+		kernel_fpu_end(&vxstate, KERNEL_VXR_LOW);		    \
+									    \
+		if (remaining)						    \
+			crc = ___crc32_sw(crc, data + aligned, remaining);  \
+									    \
+		return crc;						    \
+	}
+
+DEFINE_CRC32_VX(crc32_le_vx, crc32_le_vgfm_16, crc32_le)
+DEFINE_CRC32_VX(crc32_be_vx, crc32_be_vgfm_16, crc32_be)
+DEFINE_CRC32_VX(crc32c_le_vx, crc32c_le_vgfm_16, __crc32c_le)
+
+
+static int crc32_vx_cra_init_zero(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+	struct crc_ctx *mctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	mctx->key = 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int crc32_vx_cra_init_invert(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+	struct crc_ctx *mctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	mctx->key = ~0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int crc32_vx_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+	struct crc_ctx *mctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
+	struct crc_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+	ctx->crc = mctx->key;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int crc32_vx_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *newkey,
+			   unsigned int newkeylen)
+{
+	struct crc_ctx *mctx = crypto_shash_ctx(tfm);
+
+	if (newkeylen != sizeof(mctx->key))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	mctx->key = le32_to_cpu(*(__le32 *)newkey);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int crc32be_vx_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *newkey,
+			     unsigned int newkeylen)
+{
+	struct crc_ctx *mctx = crypto_shash_ctx(tfm);
+
+	if (newkeylen != sizeof(mctx->key))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	mctx->key = be32_to_cpu(*(__be32 *)newkey);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int crc32le_vx_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+{
+	struct crc_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+	*(__le32 *)out = cpu_to_le32p(&ctx->crc);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int crc32be_vx_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+{
+	struct crc_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+	*(__be32 *)out = cpu_to_be32p(&ctx->crc);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int crc32c_vx_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+{
+	struct crc_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+	/*
+	 * Perform a final XOR with 0xFFFFFFFF to be in sync
+	 * with the generic crc32c shash implementation.
+	 */
+	*(__le32 *)out = ~cpu_to_le32p(&ctx->crc);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __crc32le_vx_finup(u32 *crc, const u8 *data, unsigned int len,
+			      u8 *out)
+{
+	*(__le32 *)out = cpu_to_le32(crc32_le_vx(*crc, data, len));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __crc32be_vx_finup(u32 *crc, const u8 *data, unsigned int len,
+			      u8 *out)
+{
+	*(__be32 *)out = cpu_to_be32(crc32_be_vx(*crc, data, len));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __crc32c_vx_finup(u32 *crc, const u8 *data, unsigned int len,
+			     u8 *out)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Perform a final XOR with 0xFFFFFFFF to be in sync
+	 * with the generic crc32c shash implementation.
+	 */
+	*(__le32 *)out = ~cpu_to_le32(crc32c_le_vx(*crc, data, len));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+#define CRC32_VX_FINUP(alg, func)					      \
+	static int alg ## _vx_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,  \
+				   unsigned int datalen, u8 *out)	      \
+	{								      \
+		return __ ## alg ## _vx_finup(shash_desc_ctx(desc),	      \
+					      data, datalen, out);	      \
+	}
+
+CRC32_VX_FINUP(crc32le, crc32_le_vx)
+CRC32_VX_FINUP(crc32be, crc32_be_vx)
+CRC32_VX_FINUP(crc32c, crc32c_le_vx)
+
+#define CRC32_VX_DIGEST(alg, func)					      \
+	static int alg ## _vx_digest(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data, \
+				     unsigned int len, u8 *out)		      \
+	{								      \
+		return __ ## alg ## _vx_finup(crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm),    \
+					      data, len, out);		      \
+	}
+
+CRC32_VX_DIGEST(crc32le, crc32_le_vx)
+CRC32_VX_DIGEST(crc32be, crc32_be_vx)
+CRC32_VX_DIGEST(crc32c, crc32c_le_vx)
+
+#define CRC32_VX_UPDATE(alg, func)					      \
+	static int alg ## _vx_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data, \
+				     unsigned int datalen)		      \
+	{								      \
+		struct crc_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);	      \
+		ctx->crc = func(ctx->crc, data, datalen);		      \
+		return 0;						      \
+	}
+
+CRC32_VX_UPDATE(crc32le, crc32_le_vx)
+CRC32_VX_UPDATE(crc32be, crc32_be_vx)
+CRC32_VX_UPDATE(crc32c, crc32c_le_vx)
+
+
+static struct shash_alg crc32_vx_algs[] = {
+	/* CRC-32 LE */
+	{
+		.init		=	crc32_vx_init,
+		.setkey		=	crc32_vx_setkey,
+		.update		=	crc32le_vx_update,
+		.final		=	crc32le_vx_final,
+		.finup		=	crc32le_vx_finup,
+		.digest		=	crc32le_vx_digest,
+		.descsize	=	sizeof(struct crc_desc_ctx),
+		.digestsize	=	CRC32_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		.base		=	{
+			.cra_name	 = "crc32",
+			.cra_driver_name = "crc32-vx",
+			.cra_priority	 = 200,
+			.cra_flags	 = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
+			.cra_blocksize	 = CRC32_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			.cra_ctxsize	 = sizeof(struct crc_ctx),
+			.cra_module	 = THIS_MODULE,
+			.cra_init	 = crc32_vx_cra_init_zero,
+		},
+	},
+	/* CRC-32 BE */
+	{
+		.init		=	crc32_vx_init,
+		.setkey		=	crc32be_vx_setkey,
+		.update		=	crc32be_vx_update,
+		.final		=	crc32be_vx_final,
+		.finup		=	crc32be_vx_finup,
+		.digest		=	crc32be_vx_digest,
+		.descsize	=	sizeof(struct crc_desc_ctx),
+		.digestsize	=	CRC32_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		.base		=	{
+			.cra_name	 = "crc32be",
+			.cra_driver_name = "crc32be-vx",
+			.cra_priority	 = 200,
+			.cra_flags	 = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
+			.cra_blocksize	 = CRC32_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			.cra_ctxsize	 = sizeof(struct crc_ctx),
+			.cra_module	 = THIS_MODULE,
+			.cra_init	 = crc32_vx_cra_init_zero,
+		},
+	},
+	/* CRC-32C LE */
+	{
+		.init		=	crc32_vx_init,
+		.setkey		=	crc32_vx_setkey,
+		.update		=	crc32c_vx_update,
+		.final		=	crc32c_vx_final,
+		.finup		=	crc32c_vx_finup,
+		.digest		=	crc32c_vx_digest,
+		.descsize	=	sizeof(struct crc_desc_ctx),
+		.digestsize	=	CRC32_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		.base		=	{
+			.cra_name	 = "crc32c",
+			.cra_driver_name = "crc32c-vx",
+			.cra_priority	 = 200,
+			.cra_flags	 = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
+			.cra_blocksize	 = CRC32_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			.cra_ctxsize	 = sizeof(struct crc_ctx),
+			.cra_module	 = THIS_MODULE,
+			.cra_init	 = crc32_vx_cra_init_invert,
+		},
+	},
+};
+
+
+static int __init crc_vx_mod_init(void)
+{
+	return crypto_register_shashes(crc32_vx_algs,
+				       ARRAY_SIZE(crc32_vx_algs));
+}
+
+static void __exit crc_vx_mod_exit(void)
+{
+	crypto_unregister_shashes(crc32_vx_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(crc32_vx_algs));
+}
+
+module_cpu_feature_match(S390_CPU_FEATURE_VXRS, crc_vx_mod_init);
+module_exit(crc_vx_mod_exit);
+
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com>");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("crc32");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("crc32-vx");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("crc32c");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("crc32c-vx");
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/crc32be-vx.S b/arch/s390/crypto/crc32be-vx.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6b3d1009c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/crc32be-vx.S
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Hardware-accelerated CRC-32 variants for Linux on z Systems
+ *
+ * Use the z/Architecture Vector Extension Facility to accelerate the
+ * computing of CRC-32 checksums.
+ *
+ * This CRC-32 implementation algorithm processes the most-significant
+ * bit first (BE).
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2015
+ * Author(s): Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-insn.h>
+#include <asm/vx-insn.h>
+
+/* Vector register range containing CRC-32 constants */
+#define CONST_R1R2		%v9
+#define CONST_R3R4		%v10
+#define CONST_R5		%v11
+#define CONST_R6		%v12
+#define CONST_RU_POLY		%v13
+#define CONST_CRC_POLY		%v14
+
+.data
+.align 8
+
+/*
+ * The CRC-32 constant block contains reduction constants to fold and
+ * process particular chunks of the input data stream in parallel.
+ *
+ * For the CRC-32 variants, the constants are precomputed according to
+ * these definitions:
+ *
+ *	R1 = x4*128+64 mod P(x)
+ *	R2 = x4*128    mod P(x)
+ *	R3 = x128+64   mod P(x)
+ *	R4 = x128      mod P(x)
+ *	R5 = x96       mod P(x)
+ *	R6 = x64       mod P(x)
+ *
+ *	Barret reduction constant, u, is defined as floor(x**64 / P(x)).
+ *
+ *	where P(x) is the polynomial in the normal domain and the P'(x) is the
+ *	polynomial in the reversed (bitreflected) domain.
+ *
+ * Note that the constant definitions below are extended in order to compute
+ * intermediate results with a single VECTOR GALOIS FIELD MULTIPLY instruction.
+ * The righmost doubleword can be 0 to prevent contribution to the result or
+ * can be multiplied by 1 to perform an XOR without the need for a separate
+ * VECTOR EXCLUSIVE OR instruction.
+ *
+ * CRC-32 (IEEE 802.3 Ethernet, ...) polynomials:
+ *
+ *	P(x)  = 0x04C11DB7
+ *	P'(x) = 0xEDB88320
+ */
+
+.Lconstants_CRC_32_BE:
+	.quad		0x08833794c, 0x0e6228b11	# R1, R2
+	.quad		0x0c5b9cd4c, 0x0e8a45605	# R3, R4
+	.quad		0x0f200aa66, 1 << 32		# R5, x32
+	.quad		0x0490d678d, 1			# R6, 1
+	.quad		0x104d101df, 0			# u
+	.quad		0x104C11DB7, 0			# P(x)
+
+.previous
+
+	GEN_BR_THUNK %r14
+
+.text
+/*
+ * The CRC-32 function(s) use these calling conventions:
+ *
+ * Parameters:
+ *
+ *	%r2:	Initial CRC value, typically ~0; and final CRC (return) value.
+ *	%r3:	Input buffer pointer, performance might be improved if the
+ *		buffer is on a doubleword boundary.
+ *	%r4:	Length of the buffer, must be 64 bytes or greater.
+ *
+ * Register usage:
+ *
+ *	%r5:	CRC-32 constant pool base pointer.
+ *	V0:	Initial CRC value and intermediate constants and results.
+ *	V1..V4:	Data for CRC computation.
+ *	V5..V8:	Next data chunks that are fetched from the input buffer.
+ *
+ *	V9..V14: CRC-32 constants.
+ */
+ENTRY(crc32_be_vgfm_16)
+	/* Load CRC-32 constants */
+	larl	%r5,.Lconstants_CRC_32_BE
+	VLM	CONST_R1R2,CONST_CRC_POLY,0,%r5
+
+	/* Load the initial CRC value into the leftmost word of V0. */
+	VZERO	%v0
+	VLVGF	%v0,%r2,0
+
+	/* Load a 64-byte data chunk and XOR with CRC */
+	VLM	%v1,%v4,0,%r3		/* 64-bytes into V1..V4 */
+	VX	%v1,%v0,%v1		/* V1 ^= CRC */
+	aghi	%r3,64			/* BUF = BUF + 64 */
+	aghi	%r4,-64			/* LEN = LEN - 64 */
+
+	/* Check remaining buffer size and jump to proper folding method */
+	cghi	%r4,64
+	jl	.Lless_than_64bytes
+
+.Lfold_64bytes_loop:
+	/* Load the next 64-byte data chunk into V5 to V8 */
+	VLM	%v5,%v8,0,%r3
+
+	/*
+	 * Perform a GF(2) multiplication of the doublewords in V1 with
+	 * the reduction constants in V0.  The intermediate result is
+	 * then folded (accumulated) with the next data chunk in V5 and
+	 * stored in V1.  Repeat this step for the register contents
+	 * in V2, V3, and V4 respectively.
+	 */
+	VGFMAG	%v1,CONST_R1R2,%v1,%v5
+	VGFMAG	%v2,CONST_R1R2,%v2,%v6
+	VGFMAG	%v3,CONST_R1R2,%v3,%v7
+	VGFMAG	%v4,CONST_R1R2,%v4,%v8
+
+	/* Adjust buffer pointer and length for next loop */
+	aghi	%r3,64			/* BUF = BUF + 64 */
+	aghi	%r4,-64			/* LEN = LEN - 64 */
+
+	cghi	%r4,64
+	jnl	.Lfold_64bytes_loop
+
+.Lless_than_64bytes:
+	/* Fold V1 to V4 into a single 128-bit value in V1 */
+	VGFMAG	%v1,CONST_R3R4,%v1,%v2
+	VGFMAG	%v1,CONST_R3R4,%v1,%v3
+	VGFMAG	%v1,CONST_R3R4,%v1,%v4
+
+	/* Check whether to continue with 64-bit folding */
+	cghi	%r4,16
+	jl	.Lfinal_fold
+
+.Lfold_16bytes_loop:
+
+	VL	%v2,0,,%r3		/* Load next data chunk */
+	VGFMAG	%v1,CONST_R3R4,%v1,%v2	/* Fold next data chunk */
+
+	/* Adjust buffer pointer and size for folding next data chunk */
+	aghi	%r3,16
+	aghi	%r4,-16
+
+	/* Process remaining data chunks */
+	cghi	%r4,16
+	jnl	.Lfold_16bytes_loop
+
+.Lfinal_fold:
+	/*
+	 * The R5 constant is used to fold a 128-bit value into an 96-bit value
+	 * that is XORed with the next 96-bit input data chunk.  To use a single
+	 * VGFMG instruction, multiply the rightmost 64-bit with x^32 (1<<32) to
+	 * form an intermediate 96-bit value (with appended zeros) which is then
+	 * XORed with the intermediate reduction result.
+	 */
+	VGFMG	%v1,CONST_R5,%v1
+
+	/*
+	 * Further reduce the remaining 96-bit value to a 64-bit value using a
+	 * single VGFMG, the rightmost doubleword is multiplied with 0x1. The
+	 * intermediate result is then XORed with the product of the leftmost
+	 * doubleword with R6.	The result is a 64-bit value and is subject to
+	 * the Barret reduction.
+	 */
+	VGFMG	%v1,CONST_R6,%v1
+
+	/*
+	 * The input values to the Barret reduction are the degree-63 polynomial
+	 * in V1 (R(x)), degree-32 generator polynomial, and the reduction
+	 * constant u.	The Barret reduction result is the CRC value of R(x) mod
+	 * P(x).
+	 *
+	 * The Barret reduction algorithm is defined as:
+	 *
+	 *    1. T1(x) = floor( R(x) / x^32 ) GF2MUL u
+	 *    2. T2(x) = floor( T1(x) / x^32 ) GF2MUL P(x)
+	 *    3. C(x)  = R(x) XOR T2(x) mod x^32
+	 *
+	 * Note: To compensate the division by x^32, use the vector unpack
+	 * instruction to move the leftmost word into the leftmost doubleword
+	 * of the vector register.  The rightmost doubleword is multiplied
+	 * with zero to not contribute to the intermediate results.
+	 */
+
+	/* T1(x) = floor( R(x) / x^32 ) GF2MUL u */
+	VUPLLF	%v2,%v1
+	VGFMG	%v2,CONST_RU_POLY,%v2
+
+	/*
+	 * Compute the GF(2) product of the CRC polynomial in VO with T1(x) in
+	 * V2 and XOR the intermediate result, T2(x),  with the value in V1.
+	 * The final result is in the rightmost word of V2.
+	 */
+	VUPLLF	%v2,%v2
+	VGFMAG	%v2,CONST_CRC_POLY,%v2,%v1
+
+.Ldone:
+	VLGVF	%r2,%v2,3
+	BR_EX	%r14
+ENDPROC(crc32_be_vgfm_16)
+
+.previous
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/crc32le-vx.S b/arch/s390/crypto/crc32le-vx.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..71caf0f4e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/crc32le-vx.S
@@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Hardware-accelerated CRC-32 variants for Linux on z Systems
+ *
+ * Use the z/Architecture Vector Extension Facility to accelerate the
+ * computing of bitreflected CRC-32 checksums for IEEE 802.3 Ethernet
+ * and Castagnoli.
+ *
+ * This CRC-32 implementation algorithm is bitreflected and processes
+ * the least-significant bit first (Little-Endian).
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2015
+ * Author(s): Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-insn.h>
+#include <asm/vx-insn.h>
+
+/* Vector register range containing CRC-32 constants */
+#define CONST_PERM_LE2BE	%v9
+#define CONST_R2R1		%v10
+#define CONST_R4R3		%v11
+#define CONST_R5		%v12
+#define CONST_RU_POLY		%v13
+#define CONST_CRC_POLY		%v14
+
+.data
+.align 8
+
+/*
+ * The CRC-32 constant block contains reduction constants to fold and
+ * process particular chunks of the input data stream in parallel.
+ *
+ * For the CRC-32 variants, the constants are precomputed according to
+ * these definitions:
+ *
+ *	R1 = [(x4*128+32 mod P'(x) << 32)]' << 1
+ *	R2 = [(x4*128-32 mod P'(x) << 32)]' << 1
+ *	R3 = [(x128+32 mod P'(x) << 32)]'   << 1
+ *	R4 = [(x128-32 mod P'(x) << 32)]'   << 1
+ *	R5 = [(x64 mod P'(x) << 32)]'	    << 1
+ *	R6 = [(x32 mod P'(x) << 32)]'	    << 1
+ *
+ *	The bitreflected Barret reduction constant, u', is defined as
+ *	the bit reversal of floor(x**64 / P(x)).
+ *
+ *	where P(x) is the polynomial in the normal domain and the P'(x) is the
+ *	polynomial in the reversed (bitreflected) domain.
+ *
+ * CRC-32 (IEEE 802.3 Ethernet, ...) polynomials:
+ *
+ *	P(x)  = 0x04C11DB7
+ *	P'(x) = 0xEDB88320
+ *
+ * CRC-32C (Castagnoli) polynomials:
+ *
+ *	P(x)  = 0x1EDC6F41
+ *	P'(x) = 0x82F63B78
+ */
+
+.Lconstants_CRC_32_LE:
+	.octa		0x0F0E0D0C0B0A09080706050403020100	# BE->LE mask
+	.quad		0x1c6e41596, 0x154442bd4		# R2, R1
+	.quad		0x0ccaa009e, 0x1751997d0		# R4, R3
+	.octa		0x163cd6124				# R5
+	.octa		0x1F7011641				# u'
+	.octa		0x1DB710641				# P'(x) << 1
+
+.Lconstants_CRC_32C_LE:
+	.octa		0x0F0E0D0C0B0A09080706050403020100	# BE->LE mask
+	.quad		0x09e4addf8, 0x740eef02			# R2, R1
+	.quad		0x14cd00bd6, 0xf20c0dfe			# R4, R3
+	.octa		0x0dd45aab8				# R5
+	.octa		0x0dea713f1				# u'
+	.octa		0x105ec76f0				# P'(x) << 1
+
+.previous
+
+	GEN_BR_THUNK %r14
+
+.text
+
+/*
+ * The CRC-32 functions use these calling conventions:
+ *
+ * Parameters:
+ *
+ *	%r2:	Initial CRC value, typically ~0; and final CRC (return) value.
+ *	%r3:	Input buffer pointer, performance might be improved if the
+ *		buffer is on a doubleword boundary.
+ *	%r4:	Length of the buffer, must be 64 bytes or greater.
+ *
+ * Register usage:
+ *
+ *	%r5:	CRC-32 constant pool base pointer.
+ *	V0:	Initial CRC value and intermediate constants and results.
+ *	V1..V4:	Data for CRC computation.
+ *	V5..V8:	Next data chunks that are fetched from the input buffer.
+ *	V9:	Constant for BE->LE conversion and shift operations
+ *
+ *	V10..V14: CRC-32 constants.
+ */
+
+ENTRY(crc32_le_vgfm_16)
+	larl	%r5,.Lconstants_CRC_32_LE
+	j	crc32_le_vgfm_generic
+ENDPROC(crc32_le_vgfm_16)
+
+ENTRY(crc32c_le_vgfm_16)
+	larl	%r5,.Lconstants_CRC_32C_LE
+	j	crc32_le_vgfm_generic
+ENDPROC(crc32c_le_vgfm_16)
+
+ENTRY(crc32_le_vgfm_generic)
+	/* Load CRC-32 constants */
+	VLM	CONST_PERM_LE2BE,CONST_CRC_POLY,0,%r5
+
+	/*
+	 * Load the initial CRC value.
+	 *
+	 * The CRC value is loaded into the rightmost word of the
+	 * vector register and is later XORed with the LSB portion
+	 * of the loaded input data.
+	 */
+	VZERO	%v0			/* Clear V0 */
+	VLVGF	%v0,%r2,3		/* Load CRC into rightmost word */
+
+	/* Load a 64-byte data chunk and XOR with CRC */
+	VLM	%v1,%v4,0,%r3		/* 64-bytes into V1..V4 */
+	VPERM	%v1,%v1,%v1,CONST_PERM_LE2BE
+	VPERM	%v2,%v2,%v2,CONST_PERM_LE2BE
+	VPERM	%v3,%v3,%v3,CONST_PERM_LE2BE
+	VPERM	%v4,%v4,%v4,CONST_PERM_LE2BE
+
+	VX	%v1,%v0,%v1		/* V1 ^= CRC */
+	aghi	%r3,64			/* BUF = BUF + 64 */
+	aghi	%r4,-64			/* LEN = LEN - 64 */
+
+	cghi	%r4,64
+	jl	.Lless_than_64bytes
+
+.Lfold_64bytes_loop:
+	/* Load the next 64-byte data chunk into V5 to V8 */
+	VLM	%v5,%v8,0,%r3
+	VPERM	%v5,%v5,%v5,CONST_PERM_LE2BE
+	VPERM	%v6,%v6,%v6,CONST_PERM_LE2BE
+	VPERM	%v7,%v7,%v7,CONST_PERM_LE2BE
+	VPERM	%v8,%v8,%v8,CONST_PERM_LE2BE
+
+	/*
+	 * Perform a GF(2) multiplication of the doublewords in V1 with
+	 * the R1 and R2 reduction constants in V0.  The intermediate result
+	 * is then folded (accumulated) with the next data chunk in V5 and
+	 * stored in V1. Repeat this step for the register contents
+	 * in V2, V3, and V4 respectively.
+	 */
+	VGFMAG	%v1,CONST_R2R1,%v1,%v5
+	VGFMAG	%v2,CONST_R2R1,%v2,%v6
+	VGFMAG	%v3,CONST_R2R1,%v3,%v7
+	VGFMAG	%v4,CONST_R2R1,%v4,%v8
+
+	aghi	%r3,64			/* BUF = BUF + 64 */
+	aghi	%r4,-64			/* LEN = LEN - 64 */
+
+	cghi	%r4,64
+	jnl	.Lfold_64bytes_loop
+
+.Lless_than_64bytes:
+	/*
+	 * Fold V1 to V4 into a single 128-bit value in V1.  Multiply V1 with R3
+	 * and R4 and accumulating the next 128-bit chunk until a single 128-bit
+	 * value remains.
+	 */
+	VGFMAG	%v1,CONST_R4R3,%v1,%v2
+	VGFMAG	%v1,CONST_R4R3,%v1,%v3
+	VGFMAG	%v1,CONST_R4R3,%v1,%v4
+
+	cghi	%r4,16
+	jl	.Lfinal_fold
+
+.Lfold_16bytes_loop:
+
+	VL	%v2,0,,%r3		/* Load next data chunk */
+	VPERM	%v2,%v2,%v2,CONST_PERM_LE2BE
+	VGFMAG	%v1,CONST_R4R3,%v1,%v2	/* Fold next data chunk */
+
+	aghi	%r3,16
+	aghi	%r4,-16
+
+	cghi	%r4,16
+	jnl	.Lfold_16bytes_loop
+
+.Lfinal_fold:
+	/*
+	 * Set up a vector register for byte shifts.  The shift value must
+	 * be loaded in bits 1-4 in byte element 7 of a vector register.
+	 * Shift by 8 bytes: 0x40
+	 * Shift by 4 bytes: 0x20
+	 */
+	VLEIB	%v9,0x40,7
+
+	/*
+	 * Prepare V0 for the next GF(2) multiplication: shift V0 by 8 bytes
+	 * to move R4 into the rightmost doubleword and set the leftmost
+	 * doubleword to 0x1.
+	 */
+	VSRLB	%v0,CONST_R4R3,%v9
+	VLEIG	%v0,1,0
+
+	/*
+	 * Compute GF(2) product of V1 and V0.	The rightmost doubleword
+	 * of V1 is multiplied with R4.  The leftmost doubleword of V1 is
+	 * multiplied by 0x1 and is then XORed with rightmost product.
+	 * Implicitly, the intermediate leftmost product becomes padded
+	 */
+	VGFMG	%v1,%v0,%v1
+
+	/*
+	 * Now do the final 32-bit fold by multiplying the rightmost word
+	 * in V1 with R5 and XOR the result with the remaining bits in V1.
+	 *
+	 * To achieve this by a single VGFMAG, right shift V1 by a word
+	 * and store the result in V2 which is then accumulated.  Use the
+	 * vector unpack instruction to load the rightmost half of the
+	 * doubleword into the rightmost doubleword element of V1; the other
+	 * half is loaded in the leftmost doubleword.
+	 * The vector register with CONST_R5 contains the R5 constant in the
+	 * rightmost doubleword and the leftmost doubleword is zero to ignore
+	 * the leftmost product of V1.
+	 */
+	VLEIB	%v9,0x20,7		  /* Shift by words */
+	VSRLB	%v2,%v1,%v9		  /* Store remaining bits in V2 */
+	VUPLLF	%v1,%v1			  /* Split rightmost doubleword */
+	VGFMAG	%v1,CONST_R5,%v1,%v2	  /* V1 = (V1 * R5) XOR V2 */
+
+	/*
+	 * Apply a Barret reduction to compute the final 32-bit CRC value.
+	 *
+	 * The input values to the Barret reduction are the degree-63 polynomial
+	 * in V1 (R(x)), degree-32 generator polynomial, and the reduction
+	 * constant u.	The Barret reduction result is the CRC value of R(x) mod
+	 * P(x).
+	 *
+	 * The Barret reduction algorithm is defined as:
+	 *
+	 *    1. T1(x) = floor( R(x) / x^32 ) GF2MUL u
+	 *    2. T2(x) = floor( T1(x) / x^32 ) GF2MUL P(x)
+	 *    3. C(x)  = R(x) XOR T2(x) mod x^32
+	 *
+	 *  Note: The leftmost doubleword of vector register containing
+	 *  CONST_RU_POLY is zero and, thus, the intermediate GF(2) product
+	 *  is zero and does not contribute to the final result.
+	 */
+
+	/* T1(x) = floor( R(x) / x^32 ) GF2MUL u */
+	VUPLLF	%v2,%v1
+	VGFMG	%v2,CONST_RU_POLY,%v2
+
+	/*
+	 * Compute the GF(2) product of the CRC polynomial with T1(x) in
+	 * V2 and XOR the intermediate result, T2(x), with the value in V1.
+	 * The final result is stored in word element 2 of V2.
+	 */
+	VUPLLF	%v2,%v2
+	VGFMAG	%v2,CONST_CRC_POLY,%v2,%v1
+
+.Ldone:
+	VLGVF	%r2,%v2,2
+	BR_EX	%r14
+ENDPROC(crc32_le_vgfm_generic)
+
+.previous
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/des_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/des_s390.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8e75b83a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/des_s390.c
@@ -0,0 +1,502 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ *
+ * s390 implementation of the DES Cipher Algorithm.
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2003, 2011
+ * Author(s): Thomas Spatzier
+ *	      Jan Glauber (jan.glauber@de.ibm.com)
+ */
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/fips.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/des.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+
+#define DES3_KEY_SIZE	(3 * DES_KEY_SIZE)
+
+static u8 *ctrblk;
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(ctrblk_lock);
+
+static cpacf_mask_t km_functions, kmc_functions, kmctr_functions;
+
+struct s390_des_ctx {
+	u8 iv[DES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	u8 key[DES3_KEY_SIZE];
+};
+
+static int des_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key,
+		      unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	int err;
+
+	err = crypto_des_verify_key(tfm, key);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	memcpy(ctx->key, key, key_len);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int des_setkey_skcipher(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
+			       unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	return des_setkey(crypto_skcipher_tfm(tfm), key, key_len);
+}
+
+static void s390_des_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in)
+{
+	struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	cpacf_km(CPACF_KM_DEA, ctx->key, out, in, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}
+
+static void s390_des_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in)
+{
+	struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	cpacf_km(CPACF_KM_DEA | CPACF_DECRYPT,
+		 ctx->key, out, in, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg des_alg = {
+	.cra_name		=	"des",
+	.cra_driver_name	=	"des-s390",
+	.cra_priority		=	300,
+	.cra_flags		=	CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER,
+	.cra_blocksize		=	DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.cra_ctxsize		=	sizeof(struct s390_des_ctx),
+	.cra_module		=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_u			=	{
+		.cipher = {
+			.cia_min_keysize	=	DES_KEY_SIZE,
+			.cia_max_keysize	=	DES_KEY_SIZE,
+			.cia_setkey		=	des_setkey,
+			.cia_encrypt		=	s390_des_encrypt,
+			.cia_decrypt		=	s390_des_decrypt,
+		}
+	}
+};
+
+static int ecb_desall_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, unsigned long fc)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	unsigned int nbytes, n;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+	while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes) != 0) {
+		/* only use complete blocks */
+		n = nbytes & ~(DES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+		cpacf_km(fc, ctx->key, walk.dst.virt.addr,
+			 walk.src.virt.addr, n);
+		ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes - n);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int cbc_desall_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, unsigned long fc)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	unsigned int nbytes, n;
+	int ret;
+	struct {
+		u8 iv[DES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+		u8 key[DES3_KEY_SIZE];
+	} param;
+
+	ret = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+	memcpy(param.iv, walk.iv, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	memcpy(param.key, ctx->key, DES3_KEY_SIZE);
+	while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes) != 0) {
+		/* only use complete blocks */
+		n = nbytes & ~(DES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+		cpacf_kmc(fc, &param, walk.dst.virt.addr,
+			  walk.src.virt.addr, n);
+		memcpy(walk.iv, param.iv, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes - n);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int ecb_des_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return ecb_desall_crypt(req, CPACF_KM_DEA);
+}
+
+static int ecb_des_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return ecb_desall_crypt(req, CPACF_KM_DEA | CPACF_DECRYPT);
+}
+
+static struct skcipher_alg ecb_des_alg = {
+	.base.cra_name		=	"ecb(des)",
+	.base.cra_driver_name	=	"ecb-des-s390",
+	.base.cra_priority	=	400,	/* combo: des + ecb */
+	.base.cra_blocksize	=	DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.base.cra_ctxsize	=	sizeof(struct s390_des_ctx),
+	.base.cra_module	=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.min_keysize		=	DES_KEY_SIZE,
+	.max_keysize		=	DES_KEY_SIZE,
+	.setkey			=	des_setkey_skcipher,
+	.encrypt		=	ecb_des_encrypt,
+	.decrypt		=	ecb_des_decrypt,
+};
+
+static int cbc_des_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return cbc_desall_crypt(req, CPACF_KMC_DEA);
+}
+
+static int cbc_des_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return cbc_desall_crypt(req, CPACF_KMC_DEA | CPACF_DECRYPT);
+}
+
+static struct skcipher_alg cbc_des_alg = {
+	.base.cra_name		=	"cbc(des)",
+	.base.cra_driver_name	=	"cbc-des-s390",
+	.base.cra_priority	=	400,	/* combo: des + cbc */
+	.base.cra_blocksize	=	DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.base.cra_ctxsize	=	sizeof(struct s390_des_ctx),
+	.base.cra_module	=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.min_keysize		=	DES_KEY_SIZE,
+	.max_keysize		=	DES_KEY_SIZE,
+	.ivsize			=	DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.setkey			=	des_setkey_skcipher,
+	.encrypt		=	cbc_des_encrypt,
+	.decrypt		=	cbc_des_decrypt,
+};
+
+/*
+ * RFC2451:
+ *
+ *   For DES-EDE3, there is no known need to reject weak or
+ *   complementation keys.  Any weakness is obviated by the use of
+ *   multiple keys.
+ *
+ *   However, if the first two or last two independent 64-bit keys are
+ *   equal (k1 == k2 or k2 == k3), then the DES3 operation is simply the
+ *   same as DES.  Implementers MUST reject keys that exhibit this
+ *   property.
+ *
+ *   In fips mode additionally check for all 3 keys are unique.
+ *
+ */
+static int des3_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key,
+		       unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	int err;
+
+	err = crypto_des3_ede_verify_key(tfm, key);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	memcpy(ctx->key, key, key_len);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int des3_setkey_skcipher(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
+				unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	return des3_setkey(crypto_skcipher_tfm(tfm), key, key_len);
+}
+
+static void des3_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
+{
+	struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	cpacf_km(CPACF_KM_TDEA_192, ctx->key, dst, src, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}
+
+static void des3_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
+{
+	struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	cpacf_km(CPACF_KM_TDEA_192 | CPACF_DECRYPT,
+		 ctx->key, dst, src, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg des3_alg = {
+	.cra_name		=	"des3_ede",
+	.cra_driver_name	=	"des3_ede-s390",
+	.cra_priority		=	300,
+	.cra_flags		=	CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER,
+	.cra_blocksize		=	DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.cra_ctxsize		=	sizeof(struct s390_des_ctx),
+	.cra_module		=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_u			=	{
+		.cipher = {
+			.cia_min_keysize	=	DES3_KEY_SIZE,
+			.cia_max_keysize	=	DES3_KEY_SIZE,
+			.cia_setkey		=	des3_setkey,
+			.cia_encrypt		=	des3_encrypt,
+			.cia_decrypt		=	des3_decrypt,
+		}
+	}
+};
+
+static int ecb_des3_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return ecb_desall_crypt(req, CPACF_KM_TDEA_192);
+}
+
+static int ecb_des3_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return ecb_desall_crypt(req, CPACF_KM_TDEA_192 | CPACF_DECRYPT);
+}
+
+static struct skcipher_alg ecb_des3_alg = {
+	.base.cra_name		=	"ecb(des3_ede)",
+	.base.cra_driver_name	=	"ecb-des3_ede-s390",
+	.base.cra_priority	=	400,	/* combo: des3 + ecb */
+	.base.cra_blocksize	=	DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.base.cra_ctxsize	=	sizeof(struct s390_des_ctx),
+	.base.cra_module	=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.min_keysize		=	DES3_KEY_SIZE,
+	.max_keysize		=	DES3_KEY_SIZE,
+	.setkey			=	des3_setkey_skcipher,
+	.encrypt		=	ecb_des3_encrypt,
+	.decrypt		=	ecb_des3_decrypt,
+};
+
+static int cbc_des3_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return cbc_desall_crypt(req, CPACF_KMC_TDEA_192);
+}
+
+static int cbc_des3_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return cbc_desall_crypt(req, CPACF_KMC_TDEA_192 | CPACF_DECRYPT);
+}
+
+static struct skcipher_alg cbc_des3_alg = {
+	.base.cra_name		=	"cbc(des3_ede)",
+	.base.cra_driver_name	=	"cbc-des3_ede-s390",
+	.base.cra_priority	=	400,	/* combo: des3 + cbc */
+	.base.cra_blocksize	=	DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.base.cra_ctxsize	=	sizeof(struct s390_des_ctx),
+	.base.cra_module	=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.min_keysize		=	DES3_KEY_SIZE,
+	.max_keysize		=	DES3_KEY_SIZE,
+	.ivsize			=	DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.setkey			=	des3_setkey_skcipher,
+	.encrypt		=	cbc_des3_encrypt,
+	.decrypt		=	cbc_des3_decrypt,
+};
+
+static unsigned int __ctrblk_init(u8 *ctrptr, u8 *iv, unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	unsigned int i, n;
+
+	/* align to block size, max. PAGE_SIZE */
+	n = (nbytes > PAGE_SIZE) ? PAGE_SIZE : nbytes & ~(DES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+	memcpy(ctrptr, iv, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	for (i = (n / DES_BLOCK_SIZE) - 1; i > 0; i--) {
+		memcpy(ctrptr + DES_BLOCK_SIZE, ctrptr, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		crypto_inc(ctrptr + DES_BLOCK_SIZE, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		ctrptr += DES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	}
+	return n;
+}
+
+static int ctr_desall_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, unsigned long fc)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	u8 buf[DES_BLOCK_SIZE], *ctrptr;
+	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	unsigned int n, nbytes;
+	int ret, locked;
+
+	locked = mutex_trylock(&ctrblk_lock);
+
+	ret = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+	while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes) >= DES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+		n = DES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+		if (nbytes >= 2*DES_BLOCK_SIZE && locked)
+			n = __ctrblk_init(ctrblk, walk.iv, nbytes);
+		ctrptr = (n > DES_BLOCK_SIZE) ? ctrblk : walk.iv;
+		cpacf_kmctr(fc, ctx->key, walk.dst.virt.addr,
+			    walk.src.virt.addr, n, ctrptr);
+		if (ctrptr == ctrblk)
+			memcpy(walk.iv, ctrptr + n - DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+				DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		crypto_inc(walk.iv, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes - n);
+	}
+	if (locked)
+		mutex_unlock(&ctrblk_lock);
+	/* final block may be < DES_BLOCK_SIZE, copy only nbytes */
+	if (nbytes) {
+		cpacf_kmctr(fc, ctx->key, buf, walk.src.virt.addr,
+			    DES_BLOCK_SIZE, walk.iv);
+		memcpy(walk.dst.virt.addr, buf, nbytes);
+		crypto_inc(walk.iv, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, 0);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int ctr_des_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return ctr_desall_crypt(req, CPACF_KMCTR_DEA);
+}
+
+static struct skcipher_alg ctr_des_alg = {
+	.base.cra_name		=	"ctr(des)",
+	.base.cra_driver_name	=	"ctr-des-s390",
+	.base.cra_priority	=	400,	/* combo: des + ctr */
+	.base.cra_blocksize	=	1,
+	.base.cra_ctxsize	=	sizeof(struct s390_des_ctx),
+	.base.cra_module	=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.min_keysize		=	DES_KEY_SIZE,
+	.max_keysize		=	DES_KEY_SIZE,
+	.ivsize			=	DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.setkey			=	des_setkey_skcipher,
+	.encrypt		=	ctr_des_crypt,
+	.decrypt		=	ctr_des_crypt,
+	.chunksize		=	DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+};
+
+static int ctr_des3_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return ctr_desall_crypt(req, CPACF_KMCTR_TDEA_192);
+}
+
+static struct skcipher_alg ctr_des3_alg = {
+	.base.cra_name		=	"ctr(des3_ede)",
+	.base.cra_driver_name	=	"ctr-des3_ede-s390",
+	.base.cra_priority	=	400,	/* combo: des3 + ede */
+	.base.cra_blocksize	=	1,
+	.base.cra_ctxsize	=	sizeof(struct s390_des_ctx),
+	.base.cra_module	=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.min_keysize		=	DES3_KEY_SIZE,
+	.max_keysize		=	DES3_KEY_SIZE,
+	.ivsize			=	DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.setkey			=	des3_setkey_skcipher,
+	.encrypt		=	ctr_des3_crypt,
+	.decrypt		=	ctr_des3_crypt,
+	.chunksize		=	DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+};
+
+static struct crypto_alg *des_s390_algs_ptr[2];
+static int des_s390_algs_num;
+static struct skcipher_alg *des_s390_skciphers_ptr[6];
+static int des_s390_skciphers_num;
+
+static int des_s390_register_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = crypto_register_alg(alg);
+	if (!ret)
+		des_s390_algs_ptr[des_s390_algs_num++] = alg;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int des_s390_register_skcipher(struct skcipher_alg *alg)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = crypto_register_skcipher(alg);
+	if (!ret)
+		des_s390_skciphers_ptr[des_s390_skciphers_num++] = alg;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void des_s390_exit(void)
+{
+	while (des_s390_algs_num--)
+		crypto_unregister_alg(des_s390_algs_ptr[des_s390_algs_num]);
+	while (des_s390_skciphers_num--)
+		crypto_unregister_skcipher(des_s390_skciphers_ptr[des_s390_skciphers_num]);
+	if (ctrblk)
+		free_page((unsigned long) ctrblk);
+}
+
+static int __init des_s390_init(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	/* Query available functions for KM, KMC and KMCTR */
+	cpacf_query(CPACF_KM, &km_functions);
+	cpacf_query(CPACF_KMC, &kmc_functions);
+	cpacf_query(CPACF_KMCTR, &kmctr_functions);
+
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_DEA)) {
+		ret = des_s390_register_alg(&des_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+		ret = des_s390_register_skcipher(&ecb_des_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+	}
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_DEA)) {
+		ret = des_s390_register_skcipher(&cbc_des_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+	}
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_TDEA_192)) {
+		ret = des_s390_register_alg(&des3_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+		ret = des_s390_register_skcipher(&ecb_des3_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+	}
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_TDEA_192)) {
+		ret = des_s390_register_skcipher(&cbc_des3_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_DEA) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_TDEA_192)) {
+		ctrblk = (u8 *) __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!ctrblk) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out_err;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_DEA)) {
+		ret = des_s390_register_skcipher(&ctr_des_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+	}
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_TDEA_192)) {
+		ret = des_s390_register_skcipher(&ctr_des3_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+out_err:
+	des_s390_exit();
+	return ret;
+}
+
+module_cpu_feature_match(S390_CPU_FEATURE_MSA, des_s390_init);
+module_exit(des_s390_exit);
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("des");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("des3_ede");
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("DES & Triple DES EDE Cipher Algorithms");
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/ghash_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/ghash_s390.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0800a2a57
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/ghash_s390.c
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ *
+ * s390 implementation of the GHASH algorithm for GCM (Galois/Counter Mode).
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2011
+ * Author(s): Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+
+#define GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE	16
+#define GHASH_DIGEST_SIZE	16
+
+struct ghash_ctx {
+	u8 key[GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+};
+
+struct ghash_desc_ctx {
+	u8 icv[GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	u8 key[GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	u8 buffer[GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	u32 bytes;
+};
+
+static int ghash_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+	struct ghash_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+	struct ghash_ctx *ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
+
+	memset(dctx, 0, sizeof(*dctx));
+	memcpy(dctx->key, ctx->key, GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int ghash_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm,
+			const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	struct ghash_ctx *ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(tfm);
+
+	if (keylen != GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	memcpy(ctx->key, key, GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int ghash_update(struct shash_desc *desc,
+			 const u8 *src, unsigned int srclen)
+{
+	struct ghash_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+	unsigned int n;
+	u8 *buf = dctx->buffer;
+
+	if (dctx->bytes) {
+		u8 *pos = buf + (GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - dctx->bytes);
+
+		n = min(srclen, dctx->bytes);
+		dctx->bytes -= n;
+		srclen -= n;
+
+		memcpy(pos, src, n);
+		src += n;
+
+		if (!dctx->bytes) {
+			cpacf_kimd(CPACF_KIMD_GHASH, dctx, buf,
+				   GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		}
+	}
+
+	n = srclen & ~(GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+	if (n) {
+		cpacf_kimd(CPACF_KIMD_GHASH, dctx, src, n);
+		src += n;
+		srclen -= n;
+	}
+
+	if (srclen) {
+		dctx->bytes = GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - srclen;
+		memcpy(buf, src, srclen);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int ghash_flush(struct ghash_desc_ctx *dctx)
+{
+	u8 *buf = dctx->buffer;
+
+	if (dctx->bytes) {
+		u8 *pos = buf + (GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - dctx->bytes);
+
+		memset(pos, 0, dctx->bytes);
+		cpacf_kimd(CPACF_KIMD_GHASH, dctx, buf, GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		dctx->bytes = 0;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int ghash_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *dst)
+{
+	struct ghash_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = ghash_flush(dctx);
+	if (!ret)
+		memcpy(dst, dctx->icv, GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static struct shash_alg ghash_alg = {
+	.digestsize	= GHASH_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	.init		= ghash_init,
+	.update		= ghash_update,
+	.final		= ghash_final,
+	.setkey		= ghash_setkey,
+	.descsize	= sizeof(struct ghash_desc_ctx),
+	.base		= {
+		.cra_name		= "ghash",
+		.cra_driver_name	= "ghash-s390",
+		.cra_priority		= 300,
+		.cra_blocksize		= GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct ghash_ctx),
+		.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,
+	},
+};
+
+static int __init ghash_mod_init(void)
+{
+	if (!cpacf_query_func(CPACF_KIMD, CPACF_KIMD_GHASH))
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	return crypto_register_shash(&ghash_alg);
+}
+
+static void __exit ghash_mod_exit(void)
+{
+	crypto_unregister_shash(&ghash_alg);
+}
+
+module_cpu_feature_match(S390_CPU_FEATURE_MSA, ghash_mod_init);
+module_exit(ghash_mod_exit);
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("ghash");
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("GHASH hash function, s390 implementation");
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/paes_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/paes_s390.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d84d87349
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/paes_s390.c
@@ -0,0 +1,804 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ *
+ * s390 implementation of the AES Cipher Algorithm with protected keys.
+ *
+ * s390 Version:
+ *   Copyright IBM Corp. 2017,2020
+ *   Author(s): Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
+ *		Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+#define KMSG_COMPONENT "paes_s390"
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KMSG_COMPONENT ": " fmt
+
+#include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/delay.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/xts.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+#include <asm/pkey.h>
+
+/*
+ * Key blobs smaller/bigger than these defines are rejected
+ * by the common code even before the individual setkey function
+ * is called. As paes can handle different kinds of key blobs
+ * and padding is also possible, the limits need to be generous.
+ */
+#define PAES_MIN_KEYSIZE 16
+#define PAES_MAX_KEYSIZE MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE
+
+static u8 *ctrblk;
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(ctrblk_lock);
+
+static cpacf_mask_t km_functions, kmc_functions, kmctr_functions;
+
+struct key_blob {
+	/*
+	 * Small keys will be stored in the keybuf. Larger keys are
+	 * stored in extra allocated memory. In both cases does
+	 * key point to the memory where the key is stored.
+	 * The code distinguishes by checking keylen against
+	 * sizeof(keybuf). See the two following helper functions.
+	 */
+	u8 *key;
+	u8 keybuf[128];
+	unsigned int keylen;
+};
+
+static inline int _key_to_kb(struct key_blob *kb,
+			     const u8 *key,
+			     unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	struct clearkey_header {
+		u8  type;
+		u8  res0[3];
+		u8  version;
+		u8  res1[3];
+		u32 keytype;
+		u32 len;
+	} __packed * h;
+
+	switch (keylen) {
+	case 16:
+	case 24:
+	case 32:
+		/* clear key value, prepare pkey clear key token in keybuf */
+		memset(kb->keybuf, 0, sizeof(kb->keybuf));
+		h = (struct clearkey_header *) kb->keybuf;
+		h->version = 0x02; /* TOKVER_CLEAR_KEY */
+		h->keytype = (keylen - 8) >> 3;
+		h->len = keylen;
+		memcpy(kb->keybuf + sizeof(*h), key, keylen);
+		kb->keylen = sizeof(*h) + keylen;
+		kb->key = kb->keybuf;
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* other key material, let pkey handle this */
+		if (keylen <= sizeof(kb->keybuf))
+			kb->key = kb->keybuf;
+		else {
+			kb->key = kmalloc(keylen, GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!kb->key)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+		memcpy(kb->key, key, keylen);
+		kb->keylen = keylen;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void _free_kb_keybuf(struct key_blob *kb)
+{
+	if (kb->key && kb->key != kb->keybuf
+	    && kb->keylen > sizeof(kb->keybuf)) {
+		kfree(kb->key);
+		kb->key = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+struct s390_paes_ctx {
+	struct key_blob kb;
+	struct pkey_protkey pk;
+	spinlock_t pk_lock;
+	unsigned long fc;
+};
+
+struct s390_pxts_ctx {
+	struct key_blob kb[2];
+	struct pkey_protkey pk[2];
+	spinlock_t pk_lock;
+	unsigned long fc;
+};
+
+static inline int __paes_keyblob2pkey(struct key_blob *kb,
+				     struct pkey_protkey *pk)
+{
+	int i, ret;
+
+	/* try three times in case of failure */
+	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+		if (i > 0 && ret == -EAGAIN && in_task())
+			if (msleep_interruptible(1000))
+				return -EINTR;
+		ret = pkey_keyblob2pkey(kb->key, kb->keylen, pk);
+		if (ret == 0)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static inline int __paes_convert_key(struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct pkey_protkey pkey;
+
+	ret = __paes_keyblob2pkey(&ctx->kb, &pkey);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock);
+	memcpy(&ctx->pk, &pkey, sizeof(pkey));
+	spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int ecb_paes_init(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	ctx->kb.key = NULL;
+	spin_lock_init(&ctx->pk_lock);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void ecb_paes_exit(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	_free_kb_keybuf(&ctx->kb);
+}
+
+static inline int __ecb_paes_set_key(struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	int rc;
+	unsigned long fc;
+
+	rc = __paes_convert_key(ctx);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* Pick the correct function code based on the protected key type */
+	fc = (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? CPACF_KM_PAES_128 :
+		(ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192) ? CPACF_KM_PAES_192 :
+		(ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256) ? CPACF_KM_PAES_256 : 0;
+
+	/* Check if the function code is available */
+	ctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0;
+
+	return ctx->fc ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int ecb_paes_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+			    unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	_free_kb_keybuf(&ctx->kb);
+	rc = _key_to_kb(&ctx->kb, in_key, key_len);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return __ecb_paes_set_key(ctx);
+}
+
+static int ecb_paes_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, unsigned long modifier)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	unsigned int nbytes, n, k;
+	int ret;
+	struct {
+		u8 key[MAXPROTKEYSIZE];
+	} param;
+
+	ret = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock);
+	memcpy(param.key, ctx->pk.protkey, MAXPROTKEYSIZE);
+	spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock);
+
+	while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes) != 0) {
+		/* only use complete blocks */
+		n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+		k = cpacf_km(ctx->fc | modifier, &param,
+			     walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, n);
+		if (k)
+			ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes - k);
+		if (k < n) {
+			if (__paes_convert_key(ctx))
+				return skcipher_walk_done(&walk, -EIO);
+			spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock);
+			memcpy(param.key, ctx->pk.protkey, MAXPROTKEYSIZE);
+			spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock);
+		}
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int ecb_paes_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return ecb_paes_crypt(req, 0);
+}
+
+static int ecb_paes_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return ecb_paes_crypt(req, CPACF_DECRYPT);
+}
+
+static struct skcipher_alg ecb_paes_alg = {
+	.base.cra_name		=	"ecb(paes)",
+	.base.cra_driver_name	=	"ecb-paes-s390",
+	.base.cra_priority	=	401,	/* combo: aes + ecb + 1 */
+	.base.cra_blocksize	=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.base.cra_ctxsize	=	sizeof(struct s390_paes_ctx),
+	.base.cra_module	=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.base.cra_list		=	LIST_HEAD_INIT(ecb_paes_alg.base.cra_list),
+	.init			=	ecb_paes_init,
+	.exit			=	ecb_paes_exit,
+	.min_keysize		=	PAES_MIN_KEYSIZE,
+	.max_keysize		=	PAES_MAX_KEYSIZE,
+	.setkey			=	ecb_paes_set_key,
+	.encrypt		=	ecb_paes_encrypt,
+	.decrypt		=	ecb_paes_decrypt,
+};
+
+static int cbc_paes_init(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	ctx->kb.key = NULL;
+	spin_lock_init(&ctx->pk_lock);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void cbc_paes_exit(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	_free_kb_keybuf(&ctx->kb);
+}
+
+static inline int __cbc_paes_set_key(struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	int rc;
+	unsigned long fc;
+
+	rc = __paes_convert_key(ctx);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* Pick the correct function code based on the protected key type */
+	fc = (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? CPACF_KMC_PAES_128 :
+		(ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192) ? CPACF_KMC_PAES_192 :
+		(ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256) ? CPACF_KMC_PAES_256 : 0;
+
+	/* Check if the function code is available */
+	ctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0;
+
+	return ctx->fc ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int cbc_paes_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+			    unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	_free_kb_keybuf(&ctx->kb);
+	rc = _key_to_kb(&ctx->kb, in_key, key_len);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return __cbc_paes_set_key(ctx);
+}
+
+static int cbc_paes_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, unsigned long modifier)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	unsigned int nbytes, n, k;
+	int ret;
+	struct {
+		u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+		u8 key[MAXPROTKEYSIZE];
+	} param;
+
+	ret = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	memcpy(param.iv, walk.iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock);
+	memcpy(param.key, ctx->pk.protkey, MAXPROTKEYSIZE);
+	spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock);
+
+	while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes) != 0) {
+		/* only use complete blocks */
+		n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+		k = cpacf_kmc(ctx->fc | modifier, &param,
+			      walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, n);
+		if (k) {
+			memcpy(walk.iv, param.iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+			ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes - k);
+		}
+		if (k < n) {
+			if (__paes_convert_key(ctx))
+				return skcipher_walk_done(&walk, -EIO);
+			spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock);
+			memcpy(param.key, ctx->pk.protkey, MAXPROTKEYSIZE);
+			spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock);
+		}
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int cbc_paes_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return cbc_paes_crypt(req, 0);
+}
+
+static int cbc_paes_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return cbc_paes_crypt(req, CPACF_DECRYPT);
+}
+
+static struct skcipher_alg cbc_paes_alg = {
+	.base.cra_name		=	"cbc(paes)",
+	.base.cra_driver_name	=	"cbc-paes-s390",
+	.base.cra_priority	=	402,	/* ecb-paes-s390 + 1 */
+	.base.cra_blocksize	=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.base.cra_ctxsize	=	sizeof(struct s390_paes_ctx),
+	.base.cra_module	=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.base.cra_list		=	LIST_HEAD_INIT(cbc_paes_alg.base.cra_list),
+	.init			=	cbc_paes_init,
+	.exit			=	cbc_paes_exit,
+	.min_keysize		=	PAES_MIN_KEYSIZE,
+	.max_keysize		=	PAES_MAX_KEYSIZE,
+	.ivsize			=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.setkey			=	cbc_paes_set_key,
+	.encrypt		=	cbc_paes_encrypt,
+	.decrypt		=	cbc_paes_decrypt,
+};
+
+static int xts_paes_init(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct s390_pxts_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	ctx->kb[0].key = NULL;
+	ctx->kb[1].key = NULL;
+	spin_lock_init(&ctx->pk_lock);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void xts_paes_exit(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct s390_pxts_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	_free_kb_keybuf(&ctx->kb[0]);
+	_free_kb_keybuf(&ctx->kb[1]);
+}
+
+static inline int __xts_paes_convert_key(struct s390_pxts_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	struct pkey_protkey pkey0, pkey1;
+
+	if (__paes_keyblob2pkey(&ctx->kb[0], &pkey0) ||
+	    __paes_keyblob2pkey(&ctx->kb[1], &pkey1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock);
+	memcpy(&ctx->pk[0], &pkey0, sizeof(pkey0));
+	memcpy(&ctx->pk[1], &pkey1, sizeof(pkey1));
+	spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int __xts_paes_set_key(struct s390_pxts_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	unsigned long fc;
+
+	if (__xts_paes_convert_key(ctx))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (ctx->pk[0].type != ctx->pk[1].type)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Pick the correct function code based on the protected key type */
+	fc = (ctx->pk[0].type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? CPACF_KM_PXTS_128 :
+		(ctx->pk[0].type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256) ?
+		CPACF_KM_PXTS_256 : 0;
+
+	/* Check if the function code is available */
+	ctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0;
+
+	return ctx->fc ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int xts_paes_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+			    unsigned int xts_key_len)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct s390_pxts_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	u8 ckey[2 * AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
+	unsigned int ckey_len, key_len;
+
+	if (xts_key_len % 2)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	key_len = xts_key_len / 2;
+
+	_free_kb_keybuf(&ctx->kb[0]);
+	_free_kb_keybuf(&ctx->kb[1]);
+	rc = _key_to_kb(&ctx->kb[0], in_key, key_len);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	rc = _key_to_kb(&ctx->kb[1], in_key + key_len, key_len);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = __xts_paes_set_key(ctx);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * xts_check_key verifies the key length is not odd and makes
+	 * sure that the two keys are not the same. This can be done
+	 * on the two protected keys as well
+	 */
+	ckey_len = (ctx->pk[0].type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ?
+		AES_KEYSIZE_128 : AES_KEYSIZE_256;
+	memcpy(ckey, ctx->pk[0].protkey, ckey_len);
+	memcpy(ckey + ckey_len, ctx->pk[1].protkey, ckey_len);
+	return xts_verify_key(tfm, ckey, 2*ckey_len);
+}
+
+static int xts_paes_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, unsigned long modifier)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	struct s390_pxts_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	unsigned int keylen, offset, nbytes, n, k;
+	int ret;
+	struct {
+		u8 key[MAXPROTKEYSIZE];	/* key + verification pattern */
+		u8 tweak[16];
+		u8 block[16];
+		u8 bit[16];
+		u8 xts[16];
+	} pcc_param;
+	struct {
+		u8 key[MAXPROTKEYSIZE];	/* key + verification pattern */
+		u8 init[16];
+	} xts_param;
+
+	ret = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	keylen = (ctx->pk[0].type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? 48 : 64;
+	offset = (ctx->pk[0].type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? 16 : 0;
+
+	memset(&pcc_param, 0, sizeof(pcc_param));
+	memcpy(pcc_param.tweak, walk.iv, sizeof(pcc_param.tweak));
+	spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock);
+	memcpy(pcc_param.key + offset, ctx->pk[1].protkey, keylen);
+	memcpy(xts_param.key + offset, ctx->pk[0].protkey, keylen);
+	spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock);
+	cpacf_pcc(ctx->fc, pcc_param.key + offset);
+	memcpy(xts_param.init, pcc_param.xts, 16);
+
+	while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes) != 0) {
+		/* only use complete blocks */
+		n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+		k = cpacf_km(ctx->fc | modifier, xts_param.key + offset,
+			     walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, n);
+		if (k)
+			ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes - k);
+		if (k < n) {
+			if (__xts_paes_convert_key(ctx))
+				return skcipher_walk_done(&walk, -EIO);
+			spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock);
+			memcpy(xts_param.key + offset,
+			       ctx->pk[0].protkey, keylen);
+			spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int xts_paes_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return xts_paes_crypt(req, 0);
+}
+
+static int xts_paes_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return xts_paes_crypt(req, CPACF_DECRYPT);
+}
+
+static struct skcipher_alg xts_paes_alg = {
+	.base.cra_name		=	"xts(paes)",
+	.base.cra_driver_name	=	"xts-paes-s390",
+	.base.cra_priority	=	402,	/* ecb-paes-s390 + 1 */
+	.base.cra_blocksize	=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.base.cra_ctxsize	=	sizeof(struct s390_pxts_ctx),
+	.base.cra_module	=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.base.cra_list		=	LIST_HEAD_INIT(xts_paes_alg.base.cra_list),
+	.init			=	xts_paes_init,
+	.exit			=	xts_paes_exit,
+	.min_keysize		=	2 * PAES_MIN_KEYSIZE,
+	.max_keysize		=	2 * PAES_MAX_KEYSIZE,
+	.ivsize			=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.setkey			=	xts_paes_set_key,
+	.encrypt		=	xts_paes_encrypt,
+	.decrypt		=	xts_paes_decrypt,
+};
+
+static int ctr_paes_init(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	ctx->kb.key = NULL;
+	spin_lock_init(&ctx->pk_lock);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void ctr_paes_exit(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	_free_kb_keybuf(&ctx->kb);
+}
+
+static inline int __ctr_paes_set_key(struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	int rc;
+	unsigned long fc;
+
+	rc = __paes_convert_key(ctx);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* Pick the correct function code based on the protected key type */
+	fc = (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_128 :
+		(ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192) ? CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_192 :
+		(ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256) ?
+		CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_256 : 0;
+
+	/* Check if the function code is available */
+	ctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0;
+
+	return ctx->fc ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int ctr_paes_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+			    unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	_free_kb_keybuf(&ctx->kb);
+	rc = _key_to_kb(&ctx->kb, in_key, key_len);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return __ctr_paes_set_key(ctx);
+}
+
+static unsigned int __ctrblk_init(u8 *ctrptr, u8 *iv, unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	unsigned int i, n;
+
+	/* only use complete blocks, max. PAGE_SIZE */
+	memcpy(ctrptr, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	n = (nbytes > PAGE_SIZE) ? PAGE_SIZE : nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+	for (i = (n / AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - 1; i > 0; i--) {
+		memcpy(ctrptr + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, ctrptr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		crypto_inc(ctrptr + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		ctrptr += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	}
+	return n;
+}
+
+static int ctr_paes_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], *ctrptr;
+	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	unsigned int nbytes, n, k;
+	int ret, locked;
+	struct {
+		u8 key[MAXPROTKEYSIZE];
+	} param;
+
+	ret = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock);
+	memcpy(param.key, ctx->pk.protkey, MAXPROTKEYSIZE);
+	spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock);
+
+	locked = mutex_trylock(&ctrblk_lock);
+
+	while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes) >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+		n = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+		if (nbytes >= 2*AES_BLOCK_SIZE && locked)
+			n = __ctrblk_init(ctrblk, walk.iv, nbytes);
+		ctrptr = (n > AES_BLOCK_SIZE) ? ctrblk : walk.iv;
+		k = cpacf_kmctr(ctx->fc, &param, walk.dst.virt.addr,
+				walk.src.virt.addr, n, ctrptr);
+		if (k) {
+			if (ctrptr == ctrblk)
+				memcpy(walk.iv, ctrptr + k - AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+				       AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+			crypto_inc(walk.iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+			ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes - k);
+		}
+		if (k < n) {
+			if (__paes_convert_key(ctx)) {
+				if (locked)
+					mutex_unlock(&ctrblk_lock);
+				return skcipher_walk_done(&walk, -EIO);
+			}
+			spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock);
+			memcpy(param.key, ctx->pk.protkey, MAXPROTKEYSIZE);
+			spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock);
+		}
+	}
+	if (locked)
+		mutex_unlock(&ctrblk_lock);
+	/*
+	 * final block may be < AES_BLOCK_SIZE, copy only nbytes
+	 */
+	if (nbytes) {
+		memset(buf, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		memcpy(buf, walk.src.virt.addr, nbytes);
+		while (1) {
+			if (cpacf_kmctr(ctx->fc, &param, buf,
+					buf, AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+					walk.iv) == AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+				break;
+			if (__paes_convert_key(ctx))
+				return skcipher_walk_done(&walk, -EIO);
+			spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock);
+			memcpy(param.key, ctx->pk.protkey, MAXPROTKEYSIZE);
+			spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock);
+		}
+		memcpy(walk.dst.virt.addr, buf, nbytes);
+		crypto_inc(walk.iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static struct skcipher_alg ctr_paes_alg = {
+	.base.cra_name		=	"ctr(paes)",
+	.base.cra_driver_name	=	"ctr-paes-s390",
+	.base.cra_priority	=	402,	/* ecb-paes-s390 + 1 */
+	.base.cra_blocksize	=	1,
+	.base.cra_ctxsize	=	sizeof(struct s390_paes_ctx),
+	.base.cra_module	=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.base.cra_list		=	LIST_HEAD_INIT(ctr_paes_alg.base.cra_list),
+	.init			=	ctr_paes_init,
+	.exit			=	ctr_paes_exit,
+	.min_keysize		=	PAES_MIN_KEYSIZE,
+	.max_keysize		=	PAES_MAX_KEYSIZE,
+	.ivsize			=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.setkey			=	ctr_paes_set_key,
+	.encrypt		=	ctr_paes_crypt,
+	.decrypt		=	ctr_paes_crypt,
+	.chunksize		=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+};
+
+static inline void __crypto_unregister_skcipher(struct skcipher_alg *alg)
+{
+	if (!list_empty(&alg->base.cra_list))
+		crypto_unregister_skcipher(alg);
+}
+
+static void paes_s390_fini(void)
+{
+	__crypto_unregister_skcipher(&ctr_paes_alg);
+	__crypto_unregister_skcipher(&xts_paes_alg);
+	__crypto_unregister_skcipher(&cbc_paes_alg);
+	__crypto_unregister_skcipher(&ecb_paes_alg);
+	if (ctrblk)
+		free_page((unsigned long) ctrblk);
+}
+
+static int __init paes_s390_init(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	/* Query available functions for KM, KMC and KMCTR */
+	cpacf_query(CPACF_KM, &km_functions);
+	cpacf_query(CPACF_KMC, &kmc_functions);
+	cpacf_query(CPACF_KMCTR, &kmctr_functions);
+
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_PAES_128) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_PAES_192) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_PAES_256)) {
+		ret = crypto_register_skcipher(&ecb_paes_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_PAES_128) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_PAES_192) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_PAES_256)) {
+		ret = crypto_register_skcipher(&cbc_paes_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_PXTS_128) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_PXTS_256)) {
+		ret = crypto_register_skcipher(&xts_paes_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_128) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_192) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_256)) {
+		ctrblk = (u8 *) __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!ctrblk) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out_err;
+		}
+		ret = crypto_register_skcipher(&ctr_paes_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+out_err:
+	paes_s390_fini();
+	return ret;
+}
+
+module_init(paes_s390_init);
+module_exit(paes_s390_fini);
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("paes");
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Rijndael (AES) Cipher Algorithm with protected keys");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/prng.c b/arch/s390/crypto/prng.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a077087bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/prng.c
@@ -0,0 +1,911 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2006, 2015
+ * Author(s): Jan Glauber <jan.glauber@de.ibm.com>
+ *	      Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>
+ * Driver for the s390 pseudo random number generator
+ */
+
+#define KMSG_COMPONENT "prng"
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KMSG_COMPONENT ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/fips.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+
+#include <asm/debug.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <asm/timex.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("IBM Corporation");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("s390 PRNG interface");
+
+
+#define PRNG_MODE_AUTO	  0
+#define PRNG_MODE_TDES	  1
+#define PRNG_MODE_SHA512  2
+
+static unsigned int prng_mode = PRNG_MODE_AUTO;
+module_param_named(mode, prng_mode, int, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(prng_mode, "PRNG mode: 0 - auto, 1 - TDES, 2 - SHA512");
+
+
+#define PRNG_CHUNKSIZE_TDES_MIN   8
+#define PRNG_CHUNKSIZE_TDES_MAX   (64*1024)
+#define PRNG_CHUNKSIZE_SHA512_MIN 64
+#define PRNG_CHUNKSIZE_SHA512_MAX (64*1024)
+
+static unsigned int prng_chunk_size = 256;
+module_param_named(chunksize, prng_chunk_size, int, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(prng_chunk_size, "PRNG read chunk size in bytes");
+
+
+#define PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_TDES		 4096
+#define PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_TDES_LOWER	 4096
+#define PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_SHA512       100000
+#define PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_SHA512_LOWER	10000
+
+static unsigned int prng_reseed_limit;
+module_param_named(reseed_limit, prng_reseed_limit, int, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(prng_reseed_limit, "PRNG reseed limit");
+
+static bool trng_available;
+
+/*
+ * Any one who considers arithmetical methods of producing random digits is,
+ * of course, in a state of sin. -- John von Neumann
+ */
+
+static int prng_errorflag;
+
+#define PRNG_GEN_ENTROPY_FAILED  1
+#define PRNG_SELFTEST_FAILED	 2
+#define PRNG_INSTANTIATE_FAILED  3
+#define PRNG_SEED_FAILED	 4
+#define PRNG_RESEED_FAILED	 5
+#define PRNG_GEN_FAILED		 6
+
+struct prng_ws_s {
+	u8  parm_block[32];
+	u32 reseed_counter;
+	u64 byte_counter;
+};
+
+struct prno_ws_s {
+	u32 res;
+	u32 reseed_counter;
+	u64 stream_bytes;
+	u8  V[112];
+	u8  C[112];
+};
+
+struct prng_data_s {
+	struct mutex mutex;
+	union {
+		struct prng_ws_s prngws;
+		struct prno_ws_s prnows;
+	};
+	u8 *buf;
+	u32 rest;
+	u8 *prev;
+};
+
+static struct prng_data_s *prng_data;
+
+/* initial parameter block for tdes mode, copied from libica */
+static const u8 initial_parm_block[32] __initconst = {
+	0x0F, 0x2B, 0x8E, 0x63, 0x8C, 0x8E, 0xD2, 0x52,
+	0x64, 0xB7, 0xA0, 0x7B, 0x75, 0x28, 0xB8, 0xF4,
+	0x75, 0x5F, 0xD2, 0xA6, 0x8D, 0x97, 0x11, 0xFF,
+	0x49, 0xD8, 0x23, 0xF3, 0x7E, 0x21, 0xEC, 0xA0 };
+
+
+/*** helper functions ***/
+
+/*
+ * generate_entropy:
+ * This function fills a given buffer with random bytes. The entropy within
+ * the random bytes given back is assumed to have at least 50% - meaning
+ * a 64 bytes buffer has at least 64 * 8 / 2 = 256 bits of entropy.
+ * Within the function the entropy generation is done in junks of 64 bytes.
+ * So the caller should also ask for buffer fill in multiples of 64 bytes.
+ * The generation of the entropy is based on the assumption that every stckf()
+ * invocation produces 0.5 bits of entropy. To accumulate 256 bits of entropy
+ * at least 512 stckf() values are needed. The entropy relevant part of the
+ * stckf value is bit 51 (counting starts at the left with bit nr 0) so
+ * here we use the lower 4 bytes and exor the values into 2k of bufferspace.
+ * To be on the save side, if there is ever a problem with stckf() the
+ * other half of the page buffer is filled with bytes from urandom via
+ * get_random_bytes(), so this function consumes 2k of urandom for each
+ * requested 64 bytes output data. Finally the buffer page is condensed into
+ * a 64 byte value by hashing with a SHA512 hash.
+ */
+static int generate_entropy(u8 *ebuf, size_t nbytes)
+{
+	int n, ret = 0;
+	u8 *pg, pblock[80] = {
+		/* 8 x 64 bit init values */
+		0x6A, 0x09, 0xE6, 0x67, 0xF3, 0xBC, 0xC9, 0x08,
+		0xBB, 0x67, 0xAE, 0x85, 0x84, 0xCA, 0xA7, 0x3B,
+		0x3C, 0x6E, 0xF3, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x94, 0xF8, 0x2B,
+		0xA5, 0x4F, 0xF5, 0x3A, 0x5F, 0x1D, 0x36, 0xF1,
+		0x51, 0x0E, 0x52, 0x7F, 0xAD, 0xE6, 0x82, 0xD1,
+		0x9B, 0x05, 0x68, 0x8C, 0x2B, 0x3E, 0x6C, 0x1F,
+		0x1F, 0x83, 0xD9, 0xAB, 0xFB, 0x41, 0xBD, 0x6B,
+		0x5B, 0xE0, 0xCD, 0x19, 0x13, 0x7E, 0x21, 0x79,
+		/* 128 bit counter total message bit length */
+		0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+		0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00 };
+
+	/* allocate one page stckf buffer */
+	pg = (u8 *) __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!pg) {
+		prng_errorflag = PRNG_GEN_ENTROPY_FAILED;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	/* fill the ebuf in chunks of 64 byte each */
+	while (nbytes) {
+		/* fill lower 2k with urandom bytes */
+		get_random_bytes(pg, PAGE_SIZE / 2);
+		/* exor upper 2k with 512 stckf values, offset 4 bytes each */
+		for (n = 0; n < 512; n++) {
+			int offset = (PAGE_SIZE / 2) + (n * 4) - 4;
+			u64 *p = (u64 *)(pg + offset);
+			*p ^= get_tod_clock_fast();
+		}
+		/* hash over the filled page */
+		cpacf_klmd(CPACF_KLMD_SHA_512, pblock, pg, PAGE_SIZE);
+		n = (nbytes < 64) ? nbytes : 64;
+		memcpy(ebuf, pblock, n);
+		ret += n;
+		ebuf += n;
+		nbytes -= n;
+	}
+
+	memzero_explicit(pblock, sizeof(pblock));
+	memzero_explicit(pg, PAGE_SIZE);
+	free_page((unsigned long)pg);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+
+/*** tdes functions ***/
+
+static void prng_tdes_add_entropy(void)
+{
+	__u64 entropy[4];
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+		cpacf_kmc(CPACF_KMC_PRNG, prng_data->prngws.parm_block,
+			  (char *) entropy, (char *) entropy,
+			  sizeof(entropy));
+		memcpy(prng_data->prngws.parm_block, entropy, sizeof(entropy));
+	}
+}
+
+
+static void prng_tdes_seed(int nbytes)
+{
+	char buf[16];
+	int i = 0;
+
+	BUG_ON(nbytes > sizeof(buf));
+
+	get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
+
+	/* Add the entropy */
+	while (nbytes >= 8) {
+		*((__u64 *)prng_data->prngws.parm_block) ^= *((__u64 *)(buf+i));
+		prng_tdes_add_entropy();
+		i += 8;
+		nbytes -= 8;
+	}
+	prng_tdes_add_entropy();
+	prng_data->prngws.reseed_counter = 0;
+}
+
+
+static int __init prng_tdes_instantiate(void)
+{
+	int datalen;
+
+	pr_debug("prng runs in TDES mode with "
+		 "chunksize=%d and reseed_limit=%u\n",
+		 prng_chunk_size, prng_reseed_limit);
+
+	/* memory allocation, prng_data struct init, mutex init */
+	datalen = sizeof(struct prng_data_s) + prng_chunk_size;
+	prng_data = kzalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!prng_data) {
+		prng_errorflag = PRNG_INSTANTIATE_FAILED;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	mutex_init(&prng_data->mutex);
+	prng_data->buf = ((u8 *)prng_data) + sizeof(struct prng_data_s);
+	memcpy(prng_data->prngws.parm_block, initial_parm_block, 32);
+
+	/* initialize the PRNG, add 128 bits of entropy */
+	prng_tdes_seed(16);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+static void prng_tdes_deinstantiate(void)
+{
+	pr_debug("The prng module stopped "
+		 "after running in triple DES mode\n");
+	kfree_sensitive(prng_data);
+}
+
+
+/*** sha512 functions ***/
+
+static int __init prng_sha512_selftest(void)
+{
+	/* NIST DRBG testvector for Hash Drbg, Sha-512, Count #0 */
+	static const u8 seed[] __initconst = {
+		0x6b, 0x50, 0xa7, 0xd8, 0xf8, 0xa5, 0x5d, 0x7a,
+		0x3d, 0xf8, 0xbb, 0x40, 0xbc, 0xc3, 0xb7, 0x22,
+		0xd8, 0x70, 0x8d, 0xe6, 0x7f, 0xda, 0x01, 0x0b,
+		0x03, 0xc4, 0xc8, 0x4d, 0x72, 0x09, 0x6f, 0x8c,
+		0x3e, 0xc6, 0x49, 0xcc, 0x62, 0x56, 0xd9, 0xfa,
+		0x31, 0xdb, 0x7a, 0x29, 0x04, 0xaa, 0xf0, 0x25 };
+	static const u8 V0[] __initconst = {
+		0x00, 0xad, 0xe3, 0x6f, 0x9a, 0x01, 0xc7, 0x76,
+		0x61, 0x34, 0x35, 0xf5, 0x4e, 0x24, 0x74, 0x22,
+		0x21, 0x9a, 0x29, 0x89, 0xc7, 0x93, 0x2e, 0x60,
+		0x1e, 0xe8, 0x14, 0x24, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x03, 0xf1,
+		0x65, 0x5d, 0x08, 0x22, 0x72, 0xd5, 0xad, 0x95,
+		0xe1, 0x23, 0x1e, 0x8a, 0xa7, 0x13, 0xd9, 0x2b,
+		0x5e, 0xbc, 0xbb, 0x80, 0xab, 0x8d, 0xe5, 0x79,
+		0xab, 0x5b, 0x47, 0x4e, 0xdd, 0xee, 0x6b, 0x03,
+		0x8f, 0x0f, 0x5c, 0x5e, 0xa9, 0x1a, 0x83, 0xdd,
+		0xd3, 0x88, 0xb2, 0x75, 0x4b, 0xce, 0x83, 0x36,
+		0x57, 0x4b, 0xf1, 0x5c, 0xca, 0x7e, 0x09, 0xc0,
+		0xd3, 0x89, 0xc6, 0xe0, 0xda, 0xc4, 0x81, 0x7e,
+		0x5b, 0xf9, 0xe1, 0x01, 0xc1, 0x92, 0x05, 0xea,
+		0xf5, 0x2f, 0xc6, 0xc6, 0xc7, 0x8f, 0xbc, 0xf4 };
+	static const u8 C0[] __initconst = {
+		0x00, 0xf4, 0xa3, 0xe5, 0xa0, 0x72, 0x63, 0x95,
+		0xc6, 0x4f, 0x48, 0xd0, 0x8b, 0x5b, 0x5f, 0x8e,
+		0x6b, 0x96, 0x1f, 0x16, 0xed, 0xbc, 0x66, 0x94,
+		0x45, 0x31, 0xd7, 0x47, 0x73, 0x22, 0xa5, 0x86,
+		0xce, 0xc0, 0x4c, 0xac, 0x63, 0xb8, 0x39, 0x50,
+		0xbf, 0xe6, 0x59, 0x6c, 0x38, 0x58, 0x99, 0x1f,
+		0x27, 0xa7, 0x9d, 0x71, 0x2a, 0xb3, 0x7b, 0xf9,
+		0xfb, 0x17, 0x86, 0xaa, 0x99, 0x81, 0xaa, 0x43,
+		0xe4, 0x37, 0xd3, 0x1e, 0x6e, 0xe5, 0xe6, 0xee,
+		0xc2, 0xed, 0x95, 0x4f, 0x53, 0x0e, 0x46, 0x8a,
+		0xcc, 0x45, 0xa5, 0xdb, 0x69, 0x0d, 0x81, 0xc9,
+		0x32, 0x92, 0xbc, 0x8f, 0x33, 0xe6, 0xf6, 0x09,
+		0x7c, 0x8e, 0x05, 0x19, 0x0d, 0xf1, 0xb6, 0xcc,
+		0xf3, 0x02, 0x21, 0x90, 0x25, 0xec, 0xed, 0x0e };
+	static const u8 random[] __initconst = {
+		0x95, 0xb7, 0xf1, 0x7e, 0x98, 0x02, 0xd3, 0x57,
+		0x73, 0x92, 0xc6, 0xa9, 0xc0, 0x80, 0x83, 0xb6,
+		0x7d, 0xd1, 0x29, 0x22, 0x65, 0xb5, 0xf4, 0x2d,
+		0x23, 0x7f, 0x1c, 0x55, 0xbb, 0x9b, 0x10, 0xbf,
+		0xcf, 0xd8, 0x2c, 0x77, 0xa3, 0x78, 0xb8, 0x26,
+		0x6a, 0x00, 0x99, 0x14, 0x3b, 0x3c, 0x2d, 0x64,
+		0x61, 0x1e, 0xee, 0xb6, 0x9a, 0xcd, 0xc0, 0x55,
+		0x95, 0x7c, 0x13, 0x9e, 0x8b, 0x19, 0x0c, 0x7a,
+		0x06, 0x95, 0x5f, 0x2c, 0x79, 0x7c, 0x27, 0x78,
+		0xde, 0x94, 0x03, 0x96, 0xa5, 0x01, 0xf4, 0x0e,
+		0x91, 0x39, 0x6a, 0xcf, 0x8d, 0x7e, 0x45, 0xeb,
+		0xdb, 0xb5, 0x3b, 0xbf, 0x8c, 0x97, 0x52, 0x30,
+		0xd2, 0xf0, 0xff, 0x91, 0x06, 0xc7, 0x61, 0x19,
+		0xae, 0x49, 0x8e, 0x7f, 0xbc, 0x03, 0xd9, 0x0f,
+		0x8e, 0x4c, 0x51, 0x62, 0x7a, 0xed, 0x5c, 0x8d,
+		0x42, 0x63, 0xd5, 0xd2, 0xb9, 0x78, 0x87, 0x3a,
+		0x0d, 0xe5, 0x96, 0xee, 0x6d, 0xc7, 0xf7, 0xc2,
+		0x9e, 0x37, 0xee, 0xe8, 0xb3, 0x4c, 0x90, 0xdd,
+		0x1c, 0xf6, 0xa9, 0xdd, 0xb2, 0x2b, 0x4c, 0xbd,
+		0x08, 0x6b, 0x14, 0xb3, 0x5d, 0xe9, 0x3d, 0xa2,
+		0xd5, 0xcb, 0x18, 0x06, 0x69, 0x8c, 0xbd, 0x7b,
+		0xbb, 0x67, 0xbf, 0xe3, 0xd3, 0x1f, 0xd2, 0xd1,
+		0xdb, 0xd2, 0xa1, 0xe0, 0x58, 0xa3, 0xeb, 0x99,
+		0xd7, 0xe5, 0x1f, 0x1a, 0x93, 0x8e, 0xed, 0x5e,
+		0x1c, 0x1d, 0xe2, 0x3a, 0x6b, 0x43, 0x45, 0xd3,
+		0x19, 0x14, 0x09, 0xf9, 0x2f, 0x39, 0xb3, 0x67,
+		0x0d, 0x8d, 0xbf, 0xb6, 0x35, 0xd8, 0xe6, 0xa3,
+		0x69, 0x32, 0xd8, 0x10, 0x33, 0xd1, 0x44, 0x8d,
+		0x63, 0xb4, 0x03, 0xdd, 0xf8, 0x8e, 0x12, 0x1b,
+		0x6e, 0x81, 0x9a, 0xc3, 0x81, 0x22, 0x6c, 0x13,
+		0x21, 0xe4, 0xb0, 0x86, 0x44, 0xf6, 0x72, 0x7c,
+		0x36, 0x8c, 0x5a, 0x9f, 0x7a, 0x4b, 0x3e, 0xe2 };
+
+	u8 buf[sizeof(random)];
+	struct prno_ws_s ws;
+
+	memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws));
+
+	/* initial seed */
+	cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_SEED,
+		   &ws, NULL, 0, seed, sizeof(seed));
+
+	/* check working states V and C */
+	if (memcmp(ws.V, V0, sizeof(V0)) != 0
+	    || memcmp(ws.C, C0, sizeof(C0)) != 0) {
+		pr_err("The prng self test state test "
+		       "for the SHA-512 mode failed\n");
+		prng_errorflag = PRNG_SELFTEST_FAILED;
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	/* generate random bytes */
+	cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN,
+		   &ws, buf, sizeof(buf), NULL, 0);
+	cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN,
+		   &ws, buf, sizeof(buf), NULL, 0);
+
+	/* check against expected data */
+	if (memcmp(buf, random, sizeof(random)) != 0) {
+		pr_err("The prng self test data test "
+		       "for the SHA-512 mode failed\n");
+		prng_errorflag = PRNG_SELFTEST_FAILED;
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int __init prng_sha512_instantiate(void)
+{
+	int ret, datalen, seedlen;
+	u8 seed[128 + 16];
+
+	pr_debug("prng runs in SHA-512 mode "
+		 "with chunksize=%d and reseed_limit=%u\n",
+		 prng_chunk_size, prng_reseed_limit);
+
+	/* memory allocation, prng_data struct init, mutex init */
+	datalen = sizeof(struct prng_data_s) + prng_chunk_size;
+	if (fips_enabled)
+		datalen += prng_chunk_size;
+	prng_data = kzalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!prng_data) {
+		prng_errorflag = PRNG_INSTANTIATE_FAILED;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	mutex_init(&prng_data->mutex);
+	prng_data->buf = ((u8 *)prng_data) + sizeof(struct prng_data_s);
+
+	/* selftest */
+	ret = prng_sha512_selftest();
+	if (ret)
+		goto outfree;
+
+	/* generate initial seed, we need at least  256 + 128 bits entropy. */
+	if (trng_available) {
+		/*
+		 * Trng available, so use it. The trng works in chunks of
+		 * 32 bytes and produces 100% entropy. So we pull 64 bytes
+		 * which gives us 512 bits entropy.
+		 */
+		seedlen = 2 * 32;
+		cpacf_trng(NULL, 0, seed, seedlen);
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * No trng available, so use the generate_entropy() function.
+		 * This function works in 64 byte junks and produces
+		 * 50% entropy. So we pull 2*64 bytes which gives us 512 bits
+		 * of entropy.
+		 */
+		seedlen = 2 * 64;
+		ret = generate_entropy(seed, seedlen);
+		if (ret != seedlen)
+			goto outfree;
+	}
+
+	/* append the seed by 16 bytes of unique nonce */
+	store_tod_clock_ext((union tod_clock *)(seed + seedlen));
+	seedlen += 16;
+
+	/* now initial seed of the prno drng */
+	cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_SEED,
+		   &prng_data->prnows, NULL, 0, seed, seedlen);
+	memzero_explicit(seed, sizeof(seed));
+
+	/* if fips mode is enabled, generate a first block of random
+	   bytes for the FIPS 140-2 Conditional Self Test */
+	if (fips_enabled) {
+		prng_data->prev = prng_data->buf + prng_chunk_size;
+		cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN,
+			   &prng_data->prnows,
+			   prng_data->prev, prng_chunk_size, NULL, 0);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+outfree:
+	kfree(prng_data);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+
+static void prng_sha512_deinstantiate(void)
+{
+	pr_debug("The prng module stopped after running in SHA-512 mode\n");
+	kfree_sensitive(prng_data);
+}
+
+
+static int prng_sha512_reseed(void)
+{
+	int ret, seedlen;
+	u8 seed[64];
+
+	/* We need at least 256 bits of fresh entropy for reseeding */
+	if (trng_available) {
+		/* trng produces 256 bits entropy in 32 bytes */
+		seedlen = 32;
+		cpacf_trng(NULL, 0, seed, seedlen);
+	} else {
+		/* generate_entropy() produces 256 bits entropy in 64 bytes */
+		seedlen = 64;
+		ret = generate_entropy(seed, seedlen);
+		if (ret != sizeof(seed))
+			return ret;
+	}
+
+	/* do a reseed of the prno drng with this bytestring */
+	cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_SEED,
+		   &prng_data->prnows, NULL, 0, seed, seedlen);
+	memzero_explicit(seed, sizeof(seed));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int prng_sha512_generate(u8 *buf, size_t nbytes)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	/* reseed needed ? */
+	if (prng_data->prnows.reseed_counter > prng_reseed_limit) {
+		ret = prng_sha512_reseed();
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	}
+
+	/* PRNO generate */
+	cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN,
+		   &prng_data->prnows, buf, nbytes, NULL, 0);
+
+	/* FIPS 140-2 Conditional Self Test */
+	if (fips_enabled) {
+		if (!memcmp(prng_data->prev, buf, nbytes)) {
+			prng_errorflag = PRNG_GEN_FAILED;
+			return -EILSEQ;
+		}
+		memcpy(prng_data->prev, buf, nbytes);
+	}
+
+	return nbytes;
+}
+
+
+/*** file io functions ***/
+
+static int prng_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return nonseekable_open(inode, file);
+}
+
+
+static ssize_t prng_tdes_read(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf,
+			      size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	int chunk, n, ret = 0;
+
+	/* lock prng_data struct */
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&prng_data->mutex))
+		return -ERESTARTSYS;
+
+	while (nbytes) {
+		if (need_resched()) {
+			if (signal_pending(current)) {
+				if (ret == 0)
+					ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
+				break;
+			}
+			/* give mutex free before calling schedule() */
+			mutex_unlock(&prng_data->mutex);
+			schedule();
+			/* occupy mutex again */
+			if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&prng_data->mutex)) {
+				if (ret == 0)
+					ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
+				return ret;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * we lose some random bytes if an attacker issues
+		 * reads < 8 bytes, but we don't care
+		 */
+		chunk = min_t(int, nbytes, prng_chunk_size);
+
+		/* PRNG only likes multiples of 8 bytes */
+		n = (chunk + 7) & -8;
+
+		if (prng_data->prngws.reseed_counter > prng_reseed_limit)
+			prng_tdes_seed(8);
+
+		/* if the CPU supports PRNG stckf is present too */
+		*((unsigned long long *)prng_data->buf) = get_tod_clock_fast();
+
+		/*
+		 * Beside the STCKF the input for the TDES-EDE is the output
+		 * of the last operation. We differ here from X9.17 since we
+		 * only store one timestamp into the buffer. Padding the whole
+		 * buffer with timestamps does not improve security, since
+		 * successive stckf have nearly constant offsets.
+		 * If an attacker knows the first timestamp it would be
+		 * trivial to guess the additional values. One timestamp
+		 * is therefore enough and still guarantees unique input values.
+		 *
+		 * Note: you can still get strict X9.17 conformity by setting
+		 * prng_chunk_size to 8 bytes.
+		 */
+		cpacf_kmc(CPACF_KMC_PRNG, prng_data->prngws.parm_block,
+			  prng_data->buf, prng_data->buf, n);
+
+		prng_data->prngws.byte_counter += n;
+		prng_data->prngws.reseed_counter += n;
+
+		if (copy_to_user(ubuf, prng_data->buf, chunk)) {
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		nbytes -= chunk;
+		ret += chunk;
+		ubuf += chunk;
+	}
+
+	/* unlock prng_data struct */
+	mutex_unlock(&prng_data->mutex);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+
+static ssize_t prng_sha512_read(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf,
+				size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	int n, ret = 0;
+	u8 *p;
+
+	/* if errorflag is set do nothing and return 'broken pipe' */
+	if (prng_errorflag)
+		return -EPIPE;
+
+	/* lock prng_data struct */
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&prng_data->mutex))
+		return -ERESTARTSYS;
+
+	while (nbytes) {
+		if (need_resched()) {
+			if (signal_pending(current)) {
+				if (ret == 0)
+					ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
+				break;
+			}
+			/* give mutex free before calling schedule() */
+			mutex_unlock(&prng_data->mutex);
+			schedule();
+			/* occopy mutex again */
+			if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&prng_data->mutex)) {
+				if (ret == 0)
+					ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
+				return ret;
+			}
+		}
+		if (prng_data->rest) {
+			/* push left over random bytes from the previous read */
+			p = prng_data->buf + prng_chunk_size - prng_data->rest;
+			n = (nbytes < prng_data->rest) ?
+				nbytes : prng_data->rest;
+			prng_data->rest -= n;
+		} else {
+			/* generate one chunk of random bytes into read buf */
+			p = prng_data->buf;
+			n = prng_sha512_generate(p, prng_chunk_size);
+			if (n < 0) {
+				ret = n;
+				break;
+			}
+			if (nbytes < prng_chunk_size) {
+				n = nbytes;
+				prng_data->rest = prng_chunk_size - n;
+			} else {
+				n = prng_chunk_size;
+				prng_data->rest = 0;
+			}
+		}
+		if (copy_to_user(ubuf, p, n)) {
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+			break;
+		}
+		memzero_explicit(p, n);
+		ubuf += n;
+		nbytes -= n;
+		ret += n;
+	}
+
+	/* unlock prng_data struct */
+	mutex_unlock(&prng_data->mutex);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+
+/*** sysfs stuff ***/
+
+static const struct file_operations prng_sha512_fops = {
+	.owner		= THIS_MODULE,
+	.open		= &prng_open,
+	.release	= NULL,
+	.read		= &prng_sha512_read,
+	.llseek		= noop_llseek,
+};
+static const struct file_operations prng_tdes_fops = {
+	.owner		= THIS_MODULE,
+	.open		= &prng_open,
+	.release	= NULL,
+	.read		= &prng_tdes_read,
+	.llseek		= noop_llseek,
+};
+
+/* chunksize attribute (ro) */
+static ssize_t prng_chunksize_show(struct device *dev,
+				   struct device_attribute *attr,
+				   char *buf)
+{
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%u\n", prng_chunk_size);
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR(chunksize, 0444, prng_chunksize_show, NULL);
+
+/* counter attribute (ro) */
+static ssize_t prng_counter_show(struct device *dev,
+				 struct device_attribute *attr,
+				 char *buf)
+{
+	u64 counter;
+
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&prng_data->mutex))
+		return -ERESTARTSYS;
+	if (prng_mode == PRNG_MODE_SHA512)
+		counter = prng_data->prnows.stream_bytes;
+	else
+		counter = prng_data->prngws.byte_counter;
+	mutex_unlock(&prng_data->mutex);
+
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%llu\n", counter);
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR(byte_counter, 0444, prng_counter_show, NULL);
+
+/* errorflag attribute (ro) */
+static ssize_t prng_errorflag_show(struct device *dev,
+				   struct device_attribute *attr,
+				   char *buf)
+{
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", prng_errorflag);
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR(errorflag, 0444, prng_errorflag_show, NULL);
+
+/* mode attribute (ro) */
+static ssize_t prng_mode_show(struct device *dev,
+			      struct device_attribute *attr,
+			      char *buf)
+{
+	if (prng_mode == PRNG_MODE_TDES)
+		return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "TDES\n");
+	else
+		return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "SHA512\n");
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR(mode, 0444, prng_mode_show, NULL);
+
+/* reseed attribute (w) */
+static ssize_t prng_reseed_store(struct device *dev,
+				 struct device_attribute *attr,
+				 const char *buf, size_t count)
+{
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&prng_data->mutex))
+		return -ERESTARTSYS;
+	prng_sha512_reseed();
+	mutex_unlock(&prng_data->mutex);
+
+	return count;
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR(reseed, 0200, NULL, prng_reseed_store);
+
+/* reseed limit attribute (rw) */
+static ssize_t prng_reseed_limit_show(struct device *dev,
+				      struct device_attribute *attr,
+				      char *buf)
+{
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%u\n", prng_reseed_limit);
+}
+static ssize_t prng_reseed_limit_store(struct device *dev,
+				       struct device_attribute *attr,
+				       const char *buf, size_t count)
+{
+	unsigned limit;
+
+	if (sscanf(buf, "%u\n", &limit) != 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (prng_mode == PRNG_MODE_SHA512) {
+		if (limit < PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_SHA512_LOWER)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else {
+		if (limit < PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_TDES_LOWER)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	prng_reseed_limit = limit;
+
+	return count;
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR(reseed_limit, 0644,
+		   prng_reseed_limit_show, prng_reseed_limit_store);
+
+/* strength attribute (ro) */
+static ssize_t prng_strength_show(struct device *dev,
+				  struct device_attribute *attr,
+				  char *buf)
+{
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "256\n");
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR(strength, 0444, prng_strength_show, NULL);
+
+static struct attribute *prng_sha512_dev_attrs[] = {
+	&dev_attr_errorflag.attr,
+	&dev_attr_chunksize.attr,
+	&dev_attr_byte_counter.attr,
+	&dev_attr_mode.attr,
+	&dev_attr_reseed.attr,
+	&dev_attr_reseed_limit.attr,
+	&dev_attr_strength.attr,
+	NULL
+};
+ATTRIBUTE_GROUPS(prng_sha512_dev);
+
+static struct attribute *prng_tdes_dev_attrs[] = {
+	&dev_attr_chunksize.attr,
+	&dev_attr_byte_counter.attr,
+	&dev_attr_mode.attr,
+	NULL
+};
+ATTRIBUTE_GROUPS(prng_tdes_dev);
+
+static struct miscdevice prng_sha512_dev = {
+	.name	= "prandom",
+	.minor	= MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR,
+	.mode	= 0644,
+	.fops	= &prng_sha512_fops,
+	.groups = prng_sha512_dev_groups,
+};
+
+static struct miscdevice prng_tdes_dev = {
+	.name	= "prandom",
+	.minor	= MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR,
+	.mode	= 0644,
+	.fops	= &prng_tdes_fops,
+	.groups = prng_tdes_dev_groups,
+};
+
+
+/*** module init and exit ***/
+
+static int __init prng_init(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	/* check if the CPU has a PRNG */
+	if (!cpacf_query_func(CPACF_KMC, CPACF_KMC_PRNG))
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	/* check if TRNG subfunction is available */
+	if (cpacf_query_func(CPACF_PRNO, CPACF_PRNO_TRNG))
+		trng_available = true;
+
+	/* choose prng mode */
+	if (prng_mode != PRNG_MODE_TDES) {
+		/* check for MSA5 support for PRNO operations */
+		if (!cpacf_query_func(CPACF_PRNO, CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN)) {
+			if (prng_mode == PRNG_MODE_SHA512) {
+				pr_err("The prng module cannot "
+				       "start in SHA-512 mode\n");
+				return -ENODEV;
+			}
+			prng_mode = PRNG_MODE_TDES;
+		} else
+			prng_mode = PRNG_MODE_SHA512;
+	}
+
+	if (prng_mode == PRNG_MODE_SHA512) {
+
+		/* SHA512 mode */
+
+		if (prng_chunk_size < PRNG_CHUNKSIZE_SHA512_MIN
+		    || prng_chunk_size > PRNG_CHUNKSIZE_SHA512_MAX)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		prng_chunk_size = (prng_chunk_size + 0x3f) & ~0x3f;
+
+		if (prng_reseed_limit == 0)
+			prng_reseed_limit = PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_SHA512;
+		else if (prng_reseed_limit < PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_SHA512_LOWER)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		ret = prng_sha512_instantiate();
+		if (ret)
+			goto out;
+
+		ret = misc_register(&prng_sha512_dev);
+		if (ret) {
+			prng_sha512_deinstantiate();
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+	} else {
+
+		/* TDES mode */
+
+		if (prng_chunk_size < PRNG_CHUNKSIZE_TDES_MIN
+		    || prng_chunk_size > PRNG_CHUNKSIZE_TDES_MAX)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		prng_chunk_size = (prng_chunk_size + 0x07) & ~0x07;
+
+		if (prng_reseed_limit == 0)
+			prng_reseed_limit = PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_TDES;
+		else if (prng_reseed_limit < PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_TDES_LOWER)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		ret = prng_tdes_instantiate();
+		if (ret)
+			goto out;
+
+		ret = misc_register(&prng_tdes_dev);
+		if (ret) {
+			prng_tdes_deinstantiate();
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+
+static void __exit prng_exit(void)
+{
+	if (prng_mode == PRNG_MODE_SHA512) {
+		misc_deregister(&prng_sha512_dev);
+		prng_sha512_deinstantiate();
+	} else {
+		misc_deregister(&prng_tdes_dev);
+		prng_tdes_deinstantiate();
+	}
+}
+
+module_cpu_feature_match(S390_CPU_FEATURE_MSA, prng_init);
+module_exit(prng_exit);
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/sha.h b/arch/s390/crypto/sha.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..65ea12fc8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/sha.h
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ *
+ * s390 generic implementation of the SHA Secure Hash Algorithms.
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2007
+ * Author(s): Jan Glauber (jang@de.ibm.com)
+ */
+#ifndef _CRYPTO_ARCH_S390_SHA_H
+#define _CRYPTO_ARCH_S390_SHA_H
+
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <crypto/sha1.h>
+#include <crypto/sha2.h>
+#include <crypto/sha3.h>
+
+/* must be big enough for the largest SHA variant */
+#define SHA3_STATE_SIZE			200
+#define CPACF_MAX_PARMBLOCK_SIZE	SHA3_STATE_SIZE
+#define SHA_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE		SHA3_224_BLOCK_SIZE
+
+struct s390_sha_ctx {
+	u64 count;		/* message length in bytes */
+	u32 state[CPACF_MAX_PARMBLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
+	u8 buf[SHA_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	int func;		/* KIMD function to use */
+};
+
+struct shash_desc;
+
+int s390_sha_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data, unsigned int len);
+int s390_sha_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/sha1_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/sha1_s390.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bc3a22704
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/sha1_s390.c
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ *
+ * s390 implementation of the SHA1 Secure Hash Algorithm.
+ *
+ * Derived from cryptoapi implementation, adapted for in-place
+ * scatterlist interface.  Originally based on the public domain
+ * implementation written by Steve Reid.
+ *
+ * s390 Version:
+ *   Copyright IBM Corp. 2003, 2007
+ *   Author(s): Thomas Spatzier
+ *		Jan Glauber (jan.glauber@de.ibm.com)
+ *
+ * Derived from "crypto/sha1_generic.c"
+ *   Copyright (c) Alan Smithee.
+ *   Copyright (c) Andrew McDonald <andrew@mcdonald.org.uk>
+ *   Copyright (c) Jean-Francois Dive <jef@linuxbe.org>
+ */
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <crypto/sha1.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+
+#include "sha.h"
+
+static int s390_sha1_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+	sctx->state[0] = SHA1_H0;
+	sctx->state[1] = SHA1_H1;
+	sctx->state[2] = SHA1_H2;
+	sctx->state[3] = SHA1_H3;
+	sctx->state[4] = SHA1_H4;
+	sctx->count = 0;
+	sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int s390_sha1_export(struct shash_desc *desc, void *out)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+	struct sha1_state *octx = out;
+
+	octx->count = sctx->count;
+	memcpy(octx->state, sctx->state, sizeof(octx->state));
+	memcpy(octx->buffer, sctx->buf, sizeof(octx->buffer));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int s390_sha1_import(struct shash_desc *desc, const void *in)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+	const struct sha1_state *ictx = in;
+
+	sctx->count = ictx->count;
+	memcpy(sctx->state, ictx->state, sizeof(ictx->state));
+	memcpy(sctx->buf, ictx->buffer, sizeof(ictx->buffer));
+	sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct shash_alg alg = {
+	.digestsize	=	SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	.init		=	s390_sha1_init,
+	.update		=	s390_sha_update,
+	.final		=	s390_sha_final,
+	.export		=	s390_sha1_export,
+	.import		=	s390_sha1_import,
+	.descsize	=	sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx),
+	.statesize	=	sizeof(struct sha1_state),
+	.base		=	{
+		.cra_name	=	"sha1",
+		.cra_driver_name=	"sha1-s390",
+		.cra_priority	=	300,
+		.cra_blocksize	=	SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.cra_module	=	THIS_MODULE,
+	}
+};
+
+static int __init sha1_s390_init(void)
+{
+	if (!cpacf_query_func(CPACF_KIMD, CPACF_KIMD_SHA_1))
+		return -ENODEV;
+	return crypto_register_shash(&alg);
+}
+
+static void __exit sha1_s390_fini(void)
+{
+	crypto_unregister_shash(&alg);
+}
+
+module_cpu_feature_match(S390_CPU_FEATURE_MSA, sha1_s390_init);
+module_exit(sha1_s390_fini);
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("sha1");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("SHA1 Secure Hash Algorithm");
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/sha256_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/sha256_s390.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6f1ccdf93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/sha256_s390.c
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ *
+ * s390 implementation of the SHA256 and SHA224 Secure Hash Algorithm.
+ *
+ * s390 Version:
+ *   Copyright IBM Corp. 2005, 2011
+ *   Author(s): Jan Glauber (jang@de.ibm.com)
+ */
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <crypto/sha2.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+
+#include "sha.h"
+
+static int s390_sha256_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+	sctx->state[0] = SHA256_H0;
+	sctx->state[1] = SHA256_H1;
+	sctx->state[2] = SHA256_H2;
+	sctx->state[3] = SHA256_H3;
+	sctx->state[4] = SHA256_H4;
+	sctx->state[5] = SHA256_H5;
+	sctx->state[6] = SHA256_H6;
+	sctx->state[7] = SHA256_H7;
+	sctx->count = 0;
+	sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_256;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sha256_export(struct shash_desc *desc, void *out)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+	struct sha256_state *octx = out;
+
+	octx->count = sctx->count;
+	memcpy(octx->state, sctx->state, sizeof(octx->state));
+	memcpy(octx->buf, sctx->buf, sizeof(octx->buf));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sha256_import(struct shash_desc *desc, const void *in)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+	const struct sha256_state *ictx = in;
+
+	sctx->count = ictx->count;
+	memcpy(sctx->state, ictx->state, sizeof(ictx->state));
+	memcpy(sctx->buf, ictx->buf, sizeof(ictx->buf));
+	sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_256;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct shash_alg sha256_alg = {
+	.digestsize	=	SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	.init		=	s390_sha256_init,
+	.update		=	s390_sha_update,
+	.final		=	s390_sha_final,
+	.export		=	sha256_export,
+	.import		=	sha256_import,
+	.descsize	=	sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx),
+	.statesize	=	sizeof(struct sha256_state),
+	.base		=	{
+		.cra_name	=	"sha256",
+		.cra_driver_name=	"sha256-s390",
+		.cra_priority	=	300,
+		.cra_blocksize	=	SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.cra_module	=	THIS_MODULE,
+	}
+};
+
+static int s390_sha224_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+	sctx->state[0] = SHA224_H0;
+	sctx->state[1] = SHA224_H1;
+	sctx->state[2] = SHA224_H2;
+	sctx->state[3] = SHA224_H3;
+	sctx->state[4] = SHA224_H4;
+	sctx->state[5] = SHA224_H5;
+	sctx->state[6] = SHA224_H6;
+	sctx->state[7] = SHA224_H7;
+	sctx->count = 0;
+	sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_256;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct shash_alg sha224_alg = {
+	.digestsize	=	SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	.init		=	s390_sha224_init,
+	.update		=	s390_sha_update,
+	.final		=	s390_sha_final,
+	.export		=	sha256_export,
+	.import		=	sha256_import,
+	.descsize	=	sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx),
+	.statesize	=	sizeof(struct sha256_state),
+	.base		=	{
+		.cra_name	=	"sha224",
+		.cra_driver_name=	"sha224-s390",
+		.cra_priority	=	300,
+		.cra_blocksize	=	SHA224_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.cra_module	=	THIS_MODULE,
+	}
+};
+
+static int __init sha256_s390_init(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!cpacf_query_func(CPACF_KIMD, CPACF_KIMD_SHA_256))
+		return -ENODEV;
+	ret = crypto_register_shash(&sha256_alg);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+	ret = crypto_register_shash(&sha224_alg);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		crypto_unregister_shash(&sha256_alg);
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void __exit sha256_s390_fini(void)
+{
+	crypto_unregister_shash(&sha224_alg);
+	crypto_unregister_shash(&sha256_alg);
+}
+
+module_cpu_feature_match(S390_CPU_FEATURE_MSA, sha256_s390_init);
+module_exit(sha256_s390_fini);
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("sha256");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("sha224");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("SHA256 and SHA224 Secure Hash Algorithm");
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/sha3_256_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/sha3_256_s390.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e1350e033
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/sha3_256_s390.c
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ *
+ * s390 implementation of the SHA256 and SHA224 Secure Hash Algorithm.
+ *
+ * s390 Version:
+ *   Copyright IBM Corp. 2019
+ *   Author(s): Joerg Schmidbauer (jschmidb@de.ibm.com)
+ */
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <crypto/sha3.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+
+#include "sha.h"
+
+static int sha3_256_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+	memset(sctx->state, 0, sizeof(sctx->state));
+	sctx->count = 0;
+	sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA3_256;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sha3_256_export(struct shash_desc *desc, void *out)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+	struct sha3_state *octx = out;
+
+	octx->rsiz = sctx->count;
+	memcpy(octx->st, sctx->state, sizeof(octx->st));
+	memcpy(octx->buf, sctx->buf, sizeof(octx->buf));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sha3_256_import(struct shash_desc *desc, const void *in)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+	const struct sha3_state *ictx = in;
+
+	sctx->count = ictx->rsiz;
+	memcpy(sctx->state, ictx->st, sizeof(ictx->st));
+	memcpy(sctx->buf, ictx->buf, sizeof(ictx->buf));
+	sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA3_256;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sha3_224_import(struct shash_desc *desc, const void *in)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+	const struct sha3_state *ictx = in;
+
+	sctx->count = ictx->rsiz;
+	memcpy(sctx->state, ictx->st, sizeof(ictx->st));
+	memcpy(sctx->buf, ictx->buf, sizeof(ictx->buf));
+	sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA3_224;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct shash_alg sha3_256_alg = {
+	.digestsize	=	SHA3_256_DIGEST_SIZE,	   /* = 32 */
+	.init		=	sha3_256_init,
+	.update		=	s390_sha_update,
+	.final		=	s390_sha_final,
+	.export		=	sha3_256_export,
+	.import		=	sha3_256_import,
+	.descsize	=	sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx),
+	.statesize	=	sizeof(struct sha3_state),
+	.base		=	{
+		.cra_name	 =	"sha3-256",
+		.cra_driver_name =	"sha3-256-s390",
+		.cra_priority	 =	300,
+		.cra_blocksize	 =	SHA3_256_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.cra_module	 =	THIS_MODULE,
+	}
+};
+
+static int sha3_224_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+	memset(sctx->state, 0, sizeof(sctx->state));
+	sctx->count = 0;
+	sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA3_224;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct shash_alg sha3_224_alg = {
+	.digestsize	=	SHA3_224_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	.init		=	sha3_224_init,
+	.update		=	s390_sha_update,
+	.final		=	s390_sha_final,
+	.export		=	sha3_256_export, /* same as for 256 */
+	.import		=	sha3_224_import, /* function code different! */
+	.descsize	=	sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx),
+	.statesize	=	sizeof(struct sha3_state),
+	.base		=	{
+		.cra_name	 =	"sha3-224",
+		.cra_driver_name =	"sha3-224-s390",
+		.cra_priority	 =	300,
+		.cra_blocksize	 =	SHA3_224_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.cra_module	 =	THIS_MODULE,
+	}
+};
+
+static int __init sha3_256_s390_init(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!cpacf_query_func(CPACF_KIMD, CPACF_KIMD_SHA3_256))
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	ret = crypto_register_shash(&sha3_256_alg);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = crypto_register_shash(&sha3_224_alg);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		crypto_unregister_shash(&sha3_256_alg);
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void __exit sha3_256_s390_fini(void)
+{
+	crypto_unregister_shash(&sha3_224_alg);
+	crypto_unregister_shash(&sha3_256_alg);
+}
+
+module_cpu_feature_match(S390_CPU_FEATURE_MSA, sha3_256_s390_init);
+module_exit(sha3_256_s390_fini);
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("sha3-256");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("sha3-224");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("SHA3-256 and SHA3-224 Secure Hash Algorithm");
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/sha3_512_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/sha3_512_s390.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..06c142ed9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/sha3_512_s390.c
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ *
+ * s390 implementation of the SHA512 and SHA384 Secure Hash Algorithm.
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2019
+ * Author(s): Joerg Schmidbauer (jschmidb@de.ibm.com)
+ */
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <crypto/sha3.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+
+#include "sha.h"
+
+static int sha3_512_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+	memset(sctx->state, 0, sizeof(sctx->state));
+	sctx->count = 0;
+	sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA3_512;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sha3_512_export(struct shash_desc *desc, void *out)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+	struct sha3_state *octx = out;
+
+	octx->rsiz = sctx->count;
+	octx->rsizw = sctx->count >> 32;
+
+	memcpy(octx->st, sctx->state, sizeof(octx->st));
+	memcpy(octx->buf, sctx->buf, sizeof(octx->buf));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sha3_512_import(struct shash_desc *desc, const void *in)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+	const struct sha3_state *ictx = in;
+
+	if (unlikely(ictx->rsizw))
+		return -ERANGE;
+	sctx->count = ictx->rsiz;
+
+	memcpy(sctx->state, ictx->st, sizeof(ictx->st));
+	memcpy(sctx->buf, ictx->buf, sizeof(ictx->buf));
+	sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA3_512;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sha3_384_import(struct shash_desc *desc, const void *in)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+	const struct sha3_state *ictx = in;
+
+	if (unlikely(ictx->rsizw))
+		return -ERANGE;
+	sctx->count = ictx->rsiz;
+
+	memcpy(sctx->state, ictx->st, sizeof(ictx->st));
+	memcpy(sctx->buf, ictx->buf, sizeof(ictx->buf));
+	sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA3_384;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct shash_alg sha3_512_alg = {
+	.digestsize	=	SHA3_512_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	.init		=	sha3_512_init,
+	.update		=	s390_sha_update,
+	.final		=	s390_sha_final,
+	.export		=	sha3_512_export,
+	.import		=	sha3_512_import,
+	.descsize	=	sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx),
+	.statesize	=	sizeof(struct sha3_state),
+	.base		=	{
+		.cra_name	 =	"sha3-512",
+		.cra_driver_name =	"sha3-512-s390",
+		.cra_priority	 =	300,
+		.cra_blocksize	 =	SHA3_512_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.cra_module	 =	THIS_MODULE,
+	}
+};
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("sha3-512");
+
+static int sha3_384_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+	memset(sctx->state, 0, sizeof(sctx->state));
+	sctx->count = 0;
+	sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA3_384;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct shash_alg sha3_384_alg = {
+	.digestsize	=	SHA3_384_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	.init		=	sha3_384_init,
+	.update		=	s390_sha_update,
+	.final		=	s390_sha_final,
+	.export		=	sha3_512_export, /* same as for 512 */
+	.import		=	sha3_384_import, /* function code different! */
+	.descsize	=	sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx),
+	.statesize	=	sizeof(struct sha3_state),
+	.base		=	{
+		.cra_name	 =	"sha3-384",
+		.cra_driver_name =	"sha3-384-s390",
+		.cra_priority	 =	300,
+		.cra_blocksize	 =	SHA3_384_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.cra_ctxsize	 =	sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx),
+		.cra_module	 =	THIS_MODULE,
+	}
+};
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("sha3-384");
+
+static int __init init(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!cpacf_query_func(CPACF_KIMD, CPACF_KIMD_SHA3_512))
+		return -ENODEV;
+	ret = crypto_register_shash(&sha3_512_alg);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+	ret = crypto_register_shash(&sha3_384_alg);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		crypto_unregister_shash(&sha3_512_alg);
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void __exit fini(void)
+{
+	crypto_unregister_shash(&sha3_512_alg);
+	crypto_unregister_shash(&sha3_384_alg);
+}
+
+module_cpu_feature_match(S390_CPU_FEATURE_MSA, init);
+module_exit(fini);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("SHA3-512 and SHA3-384 Secure Hash Algorithm");
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/sha512_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/sha512_s390.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..04f11c407
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/sha512_s390.c
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ *
+ * s390 implementation of the SHA512 and SHA38 Secure Hash Algorithm.
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2007
+ * Author(s): Jan Glauber (jang@de.ibm.com)
+ */
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/sha2.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+
+#include "sha.h"
+
+static int sha512_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[0] = SHA512_H0;
+	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[2] = SHA512_H1;
+	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[4] = SHA512_H2;
+	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[6] = SHA512_H3;
+	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[8] = SHA512_H4;
+	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[10] = SHA512_H5;
+	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[12] = SHA512_H6;
+	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[14] = SHA512_H7;
+	ctx->count = 0;
+	ctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_512;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sha512_export(struct shash_desc *desc, void *out)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+	struct sha512_state *octx = out;
+
+	octx->count[0] = sctx->count;
+	octx->count[1] = 0;
+	memcpy(octx->state, sctx->state, sizeof(octx->state));
+	memcpy(octx->buf, sctx->buf, sizeof(octx->buf));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sha512_import(struct shash_desc *desc, const void *in)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+	const struct sha512_state *ictx = in;
+
+	if (unlikely(ictx->count[1]))
+		return -ERANGE;
+	sctx->count = ictx->count[0];
+
+	memcpy(sctx->state, ictx->state, sizeof(ictx->state));
+	memcpy(sctx->buf, ictx->buf, sizeof(ictx->buf));
+	sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_512;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct shash_alg sha512_alg = {
+	.digestsize	=	SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	.init		=	sha512_init,
+	.update		=	s390_sha_update,
+	.final		=	s390_sha_final,
+	.export		=	sha512_export,
+	.import		=	sha512_import,
+	.descsize	=	sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx),
+	.statesize	=	sizeof(struct sha512_state),
+	.base		=	{
+		.cra_name	=	"sha512",
+		.cra_driver_name=	"sha512-s390",
+		.cra_priority	=	300,
+		.cra_blocksize	=	SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.cra_module	=	THIS_MODULE,
+	}
+};
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("sha512");
+
+static int sha384_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[0] = SHA384_H0;
+	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[2] = SHA384_H1;
+	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[4] = SHA384_H2;
+	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[6] = SHA384_H3;
+	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[8] = SHA384_H4;
+	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[10] = SHA384_H5;
+	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[12] = SHA384_H6;
+	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[14] = SHA384_H7;
+	ctx->count = 0;
+	ctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_512;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct shash_alg sha384_alg = {
+	.digestsize	=	SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	.init		=	sha384_init,
+	.update		=	s390_sha_update,
+	.final		=	s390_sha_final,
+	.export		=	sha512_export,
+	.import		=	sha512_import,
+	.descsize	=	sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx),
+	.statesize	=	sizeof(struct sha512_state),
+	.base		=	{
+		.cra_name	=	"sha384",
+		.cra_driver_name=	"sha384-s390",
+		.cra_priority	=	300,
+		.cra_blocksize	=	SHA384_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.cra_ctxsize	=	sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx),
+		.cra_module	=	THIS_MODULE,
+	}
+};
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("sha384");
+
+static int __init init(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!cpacf_query_func(CPACF_KIMD, CPACF_KIMD_SHA_512))
+		return -ENODEV;
+	if ((ret = crypto_register_shash(&sha512_alg)) < 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((ret = crypto_register_shash(&sha384_alg)) < 0)
+		crypto_unregister_shash(&sha512_alg);
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void __exit fini(void)
+{
+	crypto_unregister_shash(&sha512_alg);
+	crypto_unregister_shash(&sha384_alg);
+}
+
+module_cpu_feature_match(S390_CPU_FEATURE_MSA, init);
+module_exit(fini);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("SHA512 and SHA-384 Secure Hash Algorithm");
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/sha_common.c b/arch/s390/crypto/sha_common.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..686fe7aa1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/sha_common.c
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ *
+ * s390 generic implementation of the SHA Secure Hash Algorithms.
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2007
+ * Author(s): Jan Glauber (jang@de.ibm.com)
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+#include "sha.h"
+
+int s390_sha_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data, unsigned int len)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+	unsigned int bsize = crypto_shash_blocksize(desc->tfm);
+	unsigned int index, n;
+
+	/* how much is already in the buffer? */
+	index = ctx->count % bsize;
+	ctx->count += len;
+
+	if ((index + len) < bsize)
+		goto store;
+
+	/* process one stored block */
+	if (index) {
+		memcpy(ctx->buf + index, data, bsize - index);
+		cpacf_kimd(ctx->func, ctx->state, ctx->buf, bsize);
+		data += bsize - index;
+		len -= bsize - index;
+		index = 0;
+	}
+
+	/* process as many blocks as possible */
+	if (len >= bsize) {
+		n = (len / bsize) * bsize;
+		cpacf_kimd(ctx->func, ctx->state, data, n);
+		data += n;
+		len -= n;
+	}
+store:
+	if (len)
+		memcpy(ctx->buf + index , data, len);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(s390_sha_update);
+
+static int s390_crypto_shash_parmsize(int func)
+{
+	switch (func) {
+	case CPACF_KLMD_SHA_1:
+		return 20;
+	case CPACF_KLMD_SHA_256:
+		return 32;
+	case CPACF_KLMD_SHA_512:
+		return 64;
+	case CPACF_KLMD_SHA3_224:
+	case CPACF_KLMD_SHA3_256:
+	case CPACF_KLMD_SHA3_384:
+	case CPACF_KLMD_SHA3_512:
+		return 200;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+}
+
+int s390_sha_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+{
+	struct s390_sha_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+	unsigned int bsize = crypto_shash_blocksize(desc->tfm);
+	u64 bits;
+	unsigned int n;
+	int mbl_offset;
+
+	n = ctx->count % bsize;
+	bits = ctx->count * 8;
+	mbl_offset = s390_crypto_shash_parmsize(ctx->func);
+	if (mbl_offset < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	mbl_offset = mbl_offset / sizeof(u32);
+
+	/* set total msg bit length (mbl) in CPACF parmblock */
+	switch (ctx->func) {
+	case CPACF_KLMD_SHA_1:
+	case CPACF_KLMD_SHA_256:
+		memcpy(ctx->state + mbl_offset, &bits, sizeof(bits));
+		break;
+	case CPACF_KLMD_SHA_512:
+		/*
+		 * the SHA512 parmblock has a 128-bit mbl field, clear
+		 * high-order u64 field, copy bits to low-order u64 field
+		 */
+		memset(ctx->state + mbl_offset, 0x00, sizeof(bits));
+		mbl_offset += sizeof(u64) / sizeof(u32);
+		memcpy(ctx->state + mbl_offset, &bits, sizeof(bits));
+		break;
+	case CPACF_KLMD_SHA3_224:
+	case CPACF_KLMD_SHA3_256:
+	case CPACF_KLMD_SHA3_384:
+	case CPACF_KLMD_SHA3_512:
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	cpacf_klmd(ctx->func, ctx->state, ctx->buf, n);
+
+	/* copy digest to out */
+	memcpy(out, ctx->state, crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm));
+	/* wipe context */
+	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof *ctx);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(s390_sha_final);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("s390 SHA cipher common functions");