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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 18:49:45 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 18:49:45 +0000 |
commit | 2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4 (patch) | |
tree | 848558de17fb3008cdf4d861b01ac7781903ce39 /drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.h | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | linux-2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4.tar.xz linux-2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4.zip |
Adding upstream version 6.1.76.upstream/6.1.76
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.h')
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.h | 276 |
1 files changed, 276 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.h b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..78bf56318 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.h @@ -0,0 +1,276 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */ +/* + * Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 + * Author(s): Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> + * Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> + * + * Collection of CCA misc functions used by zcrypt and pkey + */ + +#ifndef _ZCRYPT_CCAMISC_H_ +#define _ZCRYPT_CCAMISC_H_ + +#include <asm/zcrypt.h> +#include <asm/pkey.h> + +/* Key token types */ +#define TOKTYPE_NON_CCA 0x00 /* Non-CCA key token */ +#define TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL 0x01 /* CCA internal sym key token */ +#define TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL_PKA 0x1f /* CCA internal asym key token */ + +/* For TOKTYPE_NON_CCA: */ +#define TOKVER_PROTECTED_KEY 0x01 /* Protected key token */ +#define TOKVER_CLEAR_KEY 0x02 /* Clear key token */ + +/* For TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL: */ +#define TOKVER_CCA_AES 0x04 /* CCA AES key token */ +#define TOKVER_CCA_VLSC 0x05 /* var length sym cipher key token */ + +/* Max size of a cca variable length cipher key token */ +#define MAXCCAVLSCTOKENSIZE 725 + +/* header part of a CCA key token */ +struct keytoken_header { + u8 type; /* one of the TOKTYPE values */ + u8 res0[1]; + u16 len; /* vlsc token: total length in bytes */ + u8 version; /* one of the TOKVER values */ + u8 res1[3]; +} __packed; + +/* inside view of a CCA secure key token (only type 0x01 version 0x04) */ +struct secaeskeytoken { + u8 type; /* 0x01 for internal key token */ + u8 res0[3]; + u8 version; /* should be 0x04 */ + u8 res1[1]; + u8 flag; /* key flags */ + u8 res2[1]; + u64 mkvp; /* master key verification pattern */ + u8 key[32]; /* key value (encrypted) */ + u8 cv[8]; /* control vector */ + u16 bitsize; /* key bit size */ + u16 keysize; /* key byte size */ + u8 tvv[4]; /* token validation value */ +} __packed; + +/* inside view of a variable length symmetric cipher AES key token */ +struct cipherkeytoken { + u8 type; /* 0x01 for internal key token */ + u8 res0[1]; + u16 len; /* total key token length in bytes */ + u8 version; /* should be 0x05 */ + u8 res1[3]; + u8 kms; /* key material state, 0x03 means wrapped with MK */ + u8 kvpt; /* key verification pattern type, should be 0x01 */ + u64 mkvp0; /* master key verification pattern, lo part */ + u64 mkvp1; /* master key verification pattern, hi part (unused) */ + u8 eskwm; /* encrypted section key wrapping method */ + u8 hashalg; /* hash algorithmus used for wrapping key */ + u8 plfver; /* pay load format version */ + u8 res2[1]; + u8 adsver; /* associated data section version */ + u8 res3[1]; + u16 adslen; /* associated data section length */ + u8 kllen; /* optional key label length */ + u8 ieaslen; /* optional extended associated data length */ + u8 uadlen; /* optional user definable associated data length */ + u8 res4[1]; + u16 wpllen; /* wrapped payload length in bits: */ + /* plfver 0x00 0x01 */ + /* AES-128 512 640 */ + /* AES-192 576 640 */ + /* AES-256 640 640 */ + u8 res5[1]; + u8 algtype; /* 0x02 for AES cipher */ + u16 keytype; /* 0x0001 for 'cipher' */ + u8 kufc; /* key usage field count */ + u16 kuf1; /* key usage field 1 */ + u16 kuf2; /* key usage field 2 */ + u8 kmfc; /* key management field count */ + u16 kmf1; /* key management field 1 */ + u16 kmf2; /* key management field 2 */ + u16 kmf3; /* key management field 3 */ + u8 vdata[]; /* variable part data follows */ +} __packed; + +/* inside view of an CCA secure ECC private key */ +struct eccprivkeytoken { + u8 type; /* 0x1f for internal asym key token */ + u8 version; /* should be 0x00 */ + u16 len; /* total key token length in bytes */ + u8 res1[4]; + u8 secid; /* 0x20 for ECC priv key section marker */ + u8 secver; /* section version */ + u16 seclen; /* section length */ + u8 wtype; /* wrapping method, 0x00 clear, 0x01 AES */ + u8 htype; /* hash method, 0x02 for SHA-256 */ + u8 res2[2]; + u8 kutc; /* key usage and translation control */ + u8 ctype; /* curve type */ + u8 kfs; /* key format and security */ + u8 ksrc; /* key source */ + u16 pbitlen; /* length of prime p in bits */ + u16 ibmadlen; /* IBM associated data length in bytes */ + u64 mkvp; /* master key verification pattern */ + u8 opk[48]; /* encrypted object protection key data */ + u16 adatalen; /* associated data length in bytes */ + u16 fseclen; /* formated section length in bytes */ + u8 more_data[]; /* more data follows */ +} __packed; + +/* Some defines for the CCA AES cipherkeytoken kmf1 field */ +#define KMF1_XPRT_SYM 0x8000 +#define KMF1_XPRT_UASY 0x4000 +#define KMF1_XPRT_AASY 0x2000 +#define KMF1_XPRT_RAW 0x1000 +#define KMF1_XPRT_CPAC 0x0800 +#define KMF1_XPRT_DES 0x0080 +#define KMF1_XPRT_AES 0x0040 +#define KMF1_XPRT_RSA 0x0008 + +/* + * Simple check if the token is a valid CCA secure AES data key + * token. If keybitsize is given, the bitsize of the key is + * also checked. Returns 0 on success or errno value on failure. + */ +int cca_check_secaeskeytoken(debug_info_t *dbg, int dbflvl, + const u8 *token, int keybitsize); + +/* + * Simple check if the token is a valid CCA secure AES cipher key + * token. If keybitsize is given, the bitsize of the key is + * also checked. If checkcpacfexport is enabled, the key is also + * checked for the export flag to allow CPACF export. + * Returns 0 on success or errno value on failure. + */ +int cca_check_secaescipherkey(debug_info_t *dbg, int dbflvl, + const u8 *token, int keybitsize, + int checkcpacfexport); + +/* + * Simple check if the token is a valid CCA secure ECC private + * key token. Returns 0 on success or errno value on failure. + */ +int cca_check_sececckeytoken(debug_info_t *dbg, int dbflvl, + const u8 *token, size_t keysize, + int checkcpacfexport); + +/* + * Generate (random) CCA AES DATA secure key. + */ +int cca_genseckey(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, u32 keybitsize, u8 *seckey); + +/* + * Generate CCA AES DATA secure key with given clear key value. + */ +int cca_clr2seckey(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, u32 keybitsize, + const u8 *clrkey, u8 *seckey); + +/* + * Derive proteced key from an CCA AES DATA secure key. + */ +int cca_sec2protkey(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, + const u8 *seckey, u8 *protkey, u32 *protkeylen, + u32 *protkeytype); + +/* + * Generate (random) CCA AES CIPHER secure key. + */ +int cca_gencipherkey(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, u32 keybitsize, u32 keygenflags, + u8 *keybuf, size_t *keybufsize); + +/* + * Derive proteced key from CCA AES cipher secure key. + */ +int cca_cipher2protkey(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, const u8 *ckey, + u8 *protkey, u32 *protkeylen, u32 *protkeytype); + +/* + * Build CCA AES CIPHER secure key with a given clear key value. + */ +int cca_clr2cipherkey(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, u32 keybitsize, u32 keygenflags, + const u8 *clrkey, u8 *keybuf, size_t *keybufsize); + +/* + * Derive proteced key from CCA ECC secure private key. + */ +int cca_ecc2protkey(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, const u8 *key, + u8 *protkey, u32 *protkeylen, u32 *protkeytype); + +/* + * Query cryptographic facility from CCA adapter + */ +int cca_query_crypto_facility(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, + const char *keyword, + u8 *rarray, size_t *rarraylen, + u8 *varray, size_t *varraylen); + +/* + * Search for a matching crypto card based on the Master Key + * Verification Pattern provided inside a secure key. + * Works with CCA AES data and cipher keys. + * Returns < 0 on failure, 0 if CURRENT MKVP matches and + * 1 if OLD MKVP matches. + */ +int cca_findcard(const u8 *key, u16 *pcardnr, u16 *pdomain, int verify); + +/* + * Build a list of cca apqns meeting the following constrains: + * - apqn is online and is in fact a CCA apqn + * - if cardnr is not FFFF only apqns with this cardnr + * - if domain is not FFFF only apqns with this domainnr + * - if minhwtype > 0 only apqns with hwtype >= minhwtype + * - if cur_mkvp != 0 only apqns where cur_mkvp == mkvp + * - if old_mkvp != 0 only apqns where old_mkvp == mkvp + * - if verify is enabled and a cur_mkvp and/or old_mkvp + * value is given, then refetch the cca_info and make sure the current + * cur_mkvp or old_mkvp values of the apqn are used. + * The mktype determines which set of master keys to use: + * 0 = AES_MK_SET - AES MK set, 1 = APKA MK_SET - APKA MK set + * The array of apqn entries is allocated with kmalloc and returned in *apqns; + * the number of apqns stored into the list is returned in *nr_apqns. One apqn + * entry is simple a 32 bit value with 16 bit cardnr and 16 bit domain nr and + * may be casted to struct pkey_apqn. The return value is either 0 for success + * or a negative errno value. If no apqn meeting the criterias is found, + * -ENODEV is returned. + */ +int cca_findcard2(u32 **apqns, u32 *nr_apqns, u16 cardnr, u16 domain, + int minhwtype, int mktype, u64 cur_mkvp, u64 old_mkvp, + int verify); + +#define AES_MK_SET 0 +#define APKA_MK_SET 1 + +/* struct to hold info for each CCA queue */ +struct cca_info { + int hwtype; /* one of the defined AP_DEVICE_TYPE_* */ + char new_aes_mk_state; /* '1' empty, '2' partially full, '3' full */ + char cur_aes_mk_state; /* '1' invalid, '2' valid */ + char old_aes_mk_state; /* '1' invalid, '2' valid */ + char new_apka_mk_state; /* '1' empty, '2' partially full, '3' full */ + char cur_apka_mk_state; /* '1' invalid, '2' valid */ + char old_apka_mk_state; /* '1' invalid, '2' valid */ + char new_asym_mk_state; /* '1' empty, '2' partially full, '3' full */ + char cur_asym_mk_state; /* '1' invalid, '2' valid */ + char old_asym_mk_state; /* '1' invalid, '2' valid */ + u64 new_aes_mkvp; /* truncated sha256 of new aes master key */ + u64 cur_aes_mkvp; /* truncated sha256 of current aes master key */ + u64 old_aes_mkvp; /* truncated sha256 of old aes master key */ + u64 new_apka_mkvp; /* truncated sha256 of new apka master key */ + u64 cur_apka_mkvp; /* truncated sha256 of current apka mk */ + u64 old_apka_mkvp; /* truncated sha256 of old apka mk */ + u8 new_asym_mkvp[16]; /* verify pattern of new asym master key */ + u8 cur_asym_mkvp[16]; /* verify pattern of current asym master key */ + u8 old_asym_mkvp[16]; /* verify pattern of old asym master key */ + char serial[9]; /* serial number (8 ascii numbers + 0x00) */ +}; + +/* + * Fetch cca information about an CCA queue. + */ +int cca_get_info(u16 card, u16 dom, struct cca_info *ci, int verify); + +void zcrypt_ccamisc_exit(void); + +#endif /* _ZCRYPT_CCAMISC_H_ */ |