Adding upstream version 6.1.76.upstream/6.1.76

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

8 files changed, 2452 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dbfdd8536
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+config TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM
+	bool "TPM-based trusted keys"
+	depends on TCG_TPM >= TRUSTED_KEYS
+	default y
+	select CRYPTO
+	select CRYPTO_HMAC
+	select CRYPTO_SHA1
+	select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
+	select ASN1_ENCODER
+	select OID_REGISTRY
+	select ASN1
+	help
+	  Enable use of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) as trusted key
+	  backend. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys,
+	  which will be generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM.
+	  The TPM only unseals the keys, if the boot PCRs and other
+	  criteria match.
+
+config TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE
+	bool "TEE-based trusted keys"
+	depends on TEE >= TRUSTED_KEYS
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable use of the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) as trusted
+	  key backend.
+
+config TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM
+	bool "CAAM-based trusted keys"
+	depends on CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_JR >= TRUSTED_KEYS
+	select CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_BLOB_GEN
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable use of NXP's Cryptographic Accelerator and Assurance Module
+	  (CAAM) as trusted key backend.
+
+if !TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM && !TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE && !TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM
+comment "No trust source selected!"
+endif
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..735aa0bc0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Makefile for trusted keys
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o
+trusted-y += trusted_core.o
+trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += trusted_tpm1.o
+
+$(obj)/trusted_tpm2.o: $(obj)/tpm2key.asn1.h
+trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += trusted_tpm2.o
+trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += tpm2key.asn1.o
+
+trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE) += trusted_tee.o
+
+trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM) += trusted_caam.o
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f57f869ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+---
+--- ASN.1 for TPM 2.0 keys
+---
+
+TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE {
+	type		OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({tpm2_key_type}),
+	emptyAuth	[0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL,
+	parent		INTEGER ({tpm2_key_parent}),
+	pubkey		OCTET STRING ({tpm2_key_pub}),
+	privkey		OCTET STRING ({tpm2_key_priv})
+	}
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e3415c520
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Pengutronix, Ahmad Fatoum <kernel@pengutronix.de>
+ */
+
+#include <keys/trusted_caam.h>
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
+#include <linux/build_bug.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <soc/fsl/caam-blob.h>
+
+static struct caam_blob_priv *blobifier;
+
+#define KEYMOD "SECURE_KEY"
+
+static_assert(MAX_KEY_SIZE + CAAM_BLOB_OVERHEAD <= CAAM_BLOB_MAX_LEN);
+static_assert(MAX_BLOB_SIZE <= CAAM_BLOB_MAX_LEN);
+
+static int trusted_caam_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct caam_blob_info info = {
+		.input  = p->key,  .input_len   = p->key_len,
+		.output = p->blob, .output_len  = MAX_BLOB_SIZE,
+		.key_mod = KEYMOD, .key_mod_len = sizeof(KEYMOD) - 1,
+	};
+
+	ret = caam_encap_blob(blobifier, &info);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	p->blob_len = info.output_len;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int trusted_caam_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct caam_blob_info info = {
+		.input   = p->blob,  .input_len  = p->blob_len,
+		.output  = p->key,   .output_len = MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+		.key_mod = KEYMOD,  .key_mod_len = sizeof(KEYMOD) - 1,
+	};
+
+	ret = caam_decap_blob(blobifier, &info);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	p->key_len = info.output_len;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int trusted_caam_init(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	blobifier = caam_blob_gen_init();
+	if (IS_ERR(blobifier))
+		return PTR_ERR(blobifier);
+
+	ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+	if (ret)
+		caam_blob_gen_exit(blobifier);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void trusted_caam_exit(void)
+{
+	unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+	caam_blob_gen_exit(blobifier);
+}
+
+struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_caam_ops = {
+	.migratable = 0, /* non-migratable */
+	.init = trusted_caam_init,
+	.seal = trusted_caam_seal,
+	.unseal = trusted_caam_unseal,
+	.exit = trusted_caam_exit,
+};
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fee1ab2c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
@@ -0,0 +1,394 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
+ * Copyright (c) 2019-2021, Linaro Limited
+ *
+ * See Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
+ */
+
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
+#include <keys/trusted_tee.h>
+#include <keys/trusted_caam.h>
+#include <keys/trusted_tpm.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/static_call.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+
+static char *trusted_rng = "default";
+module_param_named(rng, trusted_rng, charp, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(rng, "Select trusted key RNG");
+
+static char *trusted_key_source;
+module_param_named(source, trusted_key_source, charp, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm, tee or caam)");
+
+static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = {
+#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM)
+	{ "tpm", &trusted_key_tpm_ops },
+#endif
+#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE)
+	{ "tee", &trusted_key_tee_ops },
+#endif
+#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM)
+	{ "caam", &trusted_key_caam_ops },
+#endif
+};
+
+DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_seal, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->seal);
+DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_unseal,
+			*trusted_key_sources[0].ops->unseal);
+DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_get_random,
+			*trusted_key_sources[0].ops->get_random);
+static void (*trusted_key_exit)(void);
+static unsigned char migratable;
+
+enum {
+	Opt_err,
+	Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update,
+};
+
+static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
+	{Opt_new, "new"},
+	{Opt_load, "load"},
+	{Opt_update, "update"},
+	{Opt_err, NULL}
+};
+
+/*
+ * datablob_parse - parse the keyctl data and fill in the
+ *                  payload structure
+ *
+ * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL.
+ */
+static int datablob_parse(char **datablob, struct trusted_key_payload *p)
+{
+	substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+	long keylen;
+	int ret = -EINVAL;
+	int key_cmd;
+	char *c;
+
+	/* main command */
+	c = strsep(datablob, " \t");
+	if (!c)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	key_cmd = match_token(c, key_tokens, args);
+	switch (key_cmd) {
+	case Opt_new:
+		/* first argument is key size */
+		c = strsep(datablob, " \t");
+		if (!c)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		ret = kstrtol(c, 10, &keylen);
+		if (ret < 0 || keylen < MIN_KEY_SIZE || keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		p->key_len = keylen;
+		ret = Opt_new;
+		break;
+	case Opt_load:
+		/* first argument is sealed blob */
+		c = strsep(datablob, " \t");
+		if (!c)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		p->blob_len = strlen(c) / 2;
+		if (p->blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		ret = hex2bin(p->blob, c, p->blob_len);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		ret = Opt_load;
+		break;
+	case Opt_update:
+		ret = Opt_update;
+		break;
+	case Opt_err:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key)
+{
+	struct trusted_key_payload *p = NULL;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = key_payload_reserve(key, sizeof(*p));
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto err;
+	p = kzalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!p)
+		goto err;
+
+	p->migratable = migratable;
+err:
+	return p;
+}
+
+/*
+ * trusted_instantiate - create a new trusted key
+ *
+ * Unseal an existing trusted blob or, for a new key, get a
+ * random key, then seal and create a trusted key-type key,
+ * adding it to the specified keyring.
+ *
+ * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
+ */
+static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
+			       struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	struct trusted_key_payload *payload = NULL;
+	size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
+	char *datablob, *orig_datablob;
+	int ret = 0;
+	int key_cmd;
+	size_t key_len;
+
+	if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	orig_datablob = datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!datablob)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);
+	datablob[datalen] = '\0';
+
+	payload = trusted_payload_alloc(key);
+	if (!payload) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	key_cmd = datablob_parse(&datablob, payload);
+	if (key_cmd < 0) {
+		ret = key_cmd;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	dump_payload(payload);
+
+	switch (key_cmd) {
+	case Opt_load:
+		ret = static_call(trusted_key_unseal)(payload, datablob);
+		dump_payload(payload);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			pr_info("key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+		break;
+	case Opt_new:
+		key_len = payload->key_len;
+		ret = static_call(trusted_key_get_random)(payload->key,
+							  key_len);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		if (ret != key_len) {
+			pr_info("key_create failed (%d)\n", ret);
+			ret = -EIO;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		ret = static_call(trusted_key_seal)(payload, datablob);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			pr_info("key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+		break;
+	default:
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+	}
+out:
+	kfree_sensitive(orig_datablob);
+	if (!ret)
+		rcu_assign_keypointer(key, payload);
+	else
+		kfree_sensitive(payload);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
+{
+	struct trusted_key_payload *p;
+
+	p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu);
+	kfree_sensitive(p);
+}
+
+/*
+ * trusted_update - reseal an existing key with new PCR values
+ */
+static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	struct trusted_key_payload *p;
+	struct trusted_key_payload *new_p;
+	size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
+	char *datablob, *orig_datablob;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (key_is_negative(key))
+		return -ENOKEY;
+	p = key->payload.data[0];
+	if (!p->migratable)
+		return -EPERM;
+	if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	orig_datablob = datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!datablob)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	new_p = trusted_payload_alloc(key);
+	if (!new_p) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);
+	datablob[datalen] = '\0';
+	ret = datablob_parse(&datablob, new_p);
+	if (ret != Opt_update) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		kfree_sensitive(new_p);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* copy old key values, and reseal with new pcrs */
+	new_p->migratable = p->migratable;
+	new_p->key_len = p->key_len;
+	memcpy(new_p->key, p->key, p->key_len);
+	dump_payload(p);
+	dump_payload(new_p);
+
+	ret = static_call(trusted_key_seal)(new_p, datablob);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		pr_info("key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+		kfree_sensitive(new_p);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_p);
+	call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free);
+out:
+	kfree_sensitive(orig_datablob);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * trusted_read - copy the sealed blob data to userspace in hex.
+ * On success, return to userspace the trusted key datablob size.
+ */
+static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer,
+			 size_t buflen)
+{
+	const struct trusted_key_payload *p;
+	char *bufp;
+	int i;
+
+	p = dereference_key_locked(key);
+	if (!p)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (buffer && buflen >= 2 * p->blob_len) {
+		bufp = buffer;
+		for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++)
+			bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]);
+	}
+	return 2 * p->blob_len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * trusted_destroy - clear and free the key's payload
+ */
+static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key)
+{
+	kfree_sensitive(key->payload.data[0]);
+}
+
+struct key_type key_type_trusted = {
+	.name = "trusted",
+	.instantiate = trusted_instantiate,
+	.update = trusted_update,
+	.destroy = trusted_destroy,
+	.describe = user_describe,
+	.read = trusted_read,
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_trusted);
+
+static int kernel_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len)
+{
+	return get_random_bytes_wait(key, key_len) ?: key_len;
+}
+
+static int __init init_trusted(void)
+{
+	int (*get_random)(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len);
+	int i, ret = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(trusted_key_sources); i++) {
+		if (trusted_key_source &&
+		    strncmp(trusted_key_source, trusted_key_sources[i].name,
+			    strlen(trusted_key_sources[i].name)))
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * We always support trusted.rng="kernel" and "default" as
+		 * well as trusted.rng=$trusted.source if the trust source
+		 * defines its own get_random callback.
+		 */
+		get_random = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->get_random;
+		if (trusted_rng && strcmp(trusted_rng, "default")) {
+			if (!strcmp(trusted_rng, "kernel")) {
+				get_random = kernel_get_random;
+			} else if (strcmp(trusted_rng, trusted_key_sources[i].name) ||
+				   !get_random) {
+				pr_warn("Unsupported RNG. Supported: kernel");
+				if (get_random)
+					pr_cont(", %s", trusted_key_sources[i].name);
+				pr_cont(", default\n");
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (!get_random)
+			get_random = kernel_get_random;
+
+		ret = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->init();
+		if (!ret) {
+			static_call_update(trusted_key_seal, trusted_key_sources[i].ops->seal);
+			static_call_update(trusted_key_unseal, trusted_key_sources[i].ops->unseal);
+			static_call_update(trusted_key_get_random, get_random);
+
+			trusted_key_exit = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->exit;
+			migratable = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->migratable;
+		}
+
+		if (!ret || ret != -ENODEV)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * encrypted_keys.ko depends on successful load of this module even if
+	 * trusted key implementation is not found.
+	 */
+	if (ret == -ENODEV)
+		return 0;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void)
+{
+	if (trusted_key_exit)
+		(*trusted_key_exit)();
+}
+
+late_initcall(init_trusted);
+module_exit(cleanup_trusted);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..24f67ca8d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c
@@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2019-2021 Linaro Ltd.
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/tee_drv.h>
+#include <linux/uuid.h>
+
+#include <keys/trusted_tee.h>
+
+#define DRIVER_NAME "trusted-key-tee"
+
+/*
+ * Get random data for symmetric key
+ *
+ * [out]     memref[0]        Random data
+ */
+#define TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM	0x0
+
+/*
+ * Seal trusted key using hardware unique key
+ *
+ * [in]      memref[0]        Plain key
+ * [out]     memref[1]        Sealed key datablob
+ */
+#define TA_CMD_SEAL		0x1
+
+/*
+ * Unseal trusted key using hardware unique key
+ *
+ * [in]      memref[0]        Sealed key datablob
+ * [out]     memref[1]        Plain key
+ */
+#define TA_CMD_UNSEAL		0x2
+
+/**
+ * struct trusted_key_tee_private - TEE Trusted key private data
+ * @dev:		TEE based Trusted key device.
+ * @ctx:		TEE context handler.
+ * @session_id:		Trusted key TA session identifier.
+ * @shm_pool:		Memory pool shared with TEE device.
+ */
+struct trusted_key_tee_private {
+	struct device *dev;
+	struct tee_context *ctx;
+	u32 session_id;
+	struct tee_shm *shm_pool;
+};
+
+static struct trusted_key_tee_private pvt_data;
+
+/*
+ * Have the TEE seal(encrypt) the symmetric key
+ */
+static int trusted_tee_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg;
+	struct tee_param param[4];
+	struct tee_shm *reg_shm = NULL;
+
+	memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg));
+	memset(&param, 0, sizeof(param));
+
+	reg_shm = tee_shm_register_kernel_buf(pvt_data.ctx, p->key,
+					      sizeof(p->key) + sizeof(p->blob));
+	if (IS_ERR(reg_shm)) {
+		dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "shm register failed\n");
+		return PTR_ERR(reg_shm);
+	}
+
+	inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_SEAL;
+	inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id;
+	inv_arg.num_params = 4;
+
+	param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT;
+	param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm;
+	param[0].u.memref.size = p->key_len;
+	param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0;
+	param[1].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT;
+	param[1].u.memref.shm = reg_shm;
+	param[1].u.memref.size = sizeof(p->blob);
+	param[1].u.memref.shm_offs = sizeof(p->key);
+
+	ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param);
+	if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) {
+		dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_SEAL invoke err: %x\n",
+			inv_arg.ret);
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+	} else {
+		p->blob_len = param[1].u.memref.size;
+	}
+
+	tee_shm_free(reg_shm);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Have the TEE unseal(decrypt) the symmetric key
+ */
+static int trusted_tee_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg;
+	struct tee_param param[4];
+	struct tee_shm *reg_shm = NULL;
+
+	memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg));
+	memset(&param, 0, sizeof(param));
+
+	reg_shm = tee_shm_register_kernel_buf(pvt_data.ctx, p->key,
+					      sizeof(p->key) + sizeof(p->blob));
+	if (IS_ERR(reg_shm)) {
+		dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "shm register failed\n");
+		return PTR_ERR(reg_shm);
+	}
+
+	inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_UNSEAL;
+	inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id;
+	inv_arg.num_params = 4;
+
+	param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT;
+	param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm;
+	param[0].u.memref.size = p->blob_len;
+	param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = sizeof(p->key);
+	param[1].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT;
+	param[1].u.memref.shm = reg_shm;
+	param[1].u.memref.size = sizeof(p->key);
+	param[1].u.memref.shm_offs = 0;
+
+	ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param);
+	if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) {
+		dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_UNSEAL invoke err: %x\n",
+			inv_arg.ret);
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+	} else {
+		p->key_len = param[1].u.memref.size;
+	}
+
+	tee_shm_free(reg_shm);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Have the TEE generate random symmetric key
+ */
+static int trusted_tee_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg;
+	struct tee_param param[4];
+	struct tee_shm *reg_shm = NULL;
+
+	memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg));
+	memset(&param, 0, sizeof(param));
+
+	reg_shm = tee_shm_register_kernel_buf(pvt_data.ctx, key, key_len);
+	if (IS_ERR(reg_shm)) {
+		dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm register failed\n");
+		return PTR_ERR(reg_shm);
+	}
+
+	inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM;
+	inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id;
+	inv_arg.num_params = 4;
+
+	param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT;
+	param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm;
+	param[0].u.memref.size = key_len;
+	param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0;
+
+	ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param);
+	if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) {
+		dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM invoke err: %x\n",
+			inv_arg.ret);
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+	} else {
+		ret = param[0].u.memref.size;
+	}
+
+	tee_shm_free(reg_shm);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int optee_ctx_match(struct tee_ioctl_version_data *ver, const void *data)
+{
+	if (ver->impl_id == TEE_IMPL_ID_OPTEE)
+		return 1;
+	else
+		return 0;
+}
+
+static int trusted_key_probe(struct device *dev)
+{
+	struct tee_client_device *rng_device = to_tee_client_device(dev);
+	int ret;
+	struct tee_ioctl_open_session_arg sess_arg;
+
+	memset(&sess_arg, 0, sizeof(sess_arg));
+
+	pvt_data.ctx = tee_client_open_context(NULL, optee_ctx_match, NULL,
+					       NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(pvt_data.ctx))
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	memcpy(sess_arg.uuid, rng_device->id.uuid.b, TEE_IOCTL_UUID_LEN);
+	sess_arg.clnt_login = TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_REE_KERNEL;
+	sess_arg.num_params = 0;
+
+	ret = tee_client_open_session(pvt_data.ctx, &sess_arg, NULL);
+	if ((ret < 0) || (sess_arg.ret != 0)) {
+		dev_err(dev, "tee_client_open_session failed, err: %x\n",
+			sess_arg.ret);
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_ctx;
+	}
+	pvt_data.session_id = sess_arg.session;
+
+	ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out_sess;
+
+	pvt_data.dev = dev;
+
+	return 0;
+
+out_sess:
+	tee_client_close_session(pvt_data.ctx, pvt_data.session_id);
+out_ctx:
+	tee_client_close_context(pvt_data.ctx);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int trusted_key_remove(struct device *dev)
+{
+	unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+	tee_client_close_session(pvt_data.ctx, pvt_data.session_id);
+	tee_client_close_context(pvt_data.ctx);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct tee_client_device_id trusted_key_id_table[] = {
+	{UUID_INIT(0xf04a0fe7, 0x1f5d, 0x4b9b,
+		   0xab, 0xf7, 0x61, 0x9b, 0x85, 0xb4, 0xce, 0x8c)},
+	{}
+};
+MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(tee, trusted_key_id_table);
+
+static struct tee_client_driver trusted_key_driver = {
+	.id_table	= trusted_key_id_table,
+	.driver		= {
+		.name		= DRIVER_NAME,
+		.bus		= &tee_bus_type,
+		.probe		= trusted_key_probe,
+		.remove		= trusted_key_remove,
+	},
+};
+
+static int trusted_tee_init(void)
+{
+	return driver_register(&trusted_key_driver.driver);
+}
+
+static void trusted_tee_exit(void)
+{
+	driver_unregister(&trusted_key_driver.driver);
+}
+
+struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tee_ops = {
+	.migratable = 0, /* non-migratable */
+	.init = trusted_tee_init,
+	.seal = trusted_tee_seal,
+	.unseal = trusted_tee_unseal,
+	.get_random = trusted_tee_get_random,
+	.exit = trusted_tee_exit,
+};
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..aa108bea6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1074 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
+ * Copyright (c) 2019-2021, Linaro Limited
+ *
+ * See Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/sha1.h>
+#include <linux/tpm.h>
+#include <linux/tpm_command.h>
+
+#include <keys/trusted_tpm.h>
+
+static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha1)";
+static const char hash_alg[] = "sha1";
+static struct tpm_chip *chip;
+static struct tpm_digest *digests;
+
+struct sdesc {
+	struct shash_desc shash;
+	char ctx[];
+};
+
+static struct crypto_shash *hashalg;
+static struct crypto_shash *hmacalg;
+
+static struct sdesc *init_sdesc(struct crypto_shash *alg)
+{
+	struct sdesc *sdesc;
+	int size;
+
+	size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(alg);
+	sdesc = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!sdesc)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	sdesc->shash.tfm = alg;
+	return sdesc;
+}
+
+static int TSS_sha1(const unsigned char *data, unsigned int datalen,
+		    unsigned char *digest)
+{
+	struct sdesc *sdesc;
+	int ret;
+
+	sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
+	if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
+		pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
+		return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
+	}
+
+	ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, data, datalen, digest);
+	kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
+		       unsigned int keylen, ...)
+{
+	struct sdesc *sdesc;
+	va_list argp;
+	unsigned int dlen;
+	unsigned char *data;
+	int ret;
+
+	sdesc = init_sdesc(hmacalg);
+	if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
+		pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hmac_alg);
+		return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
+	}
+
+	ret = crypto_shash_setkey(hmacalg, key, keylen);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+	ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	va_start(argp, keylen);
+	for (;;) {
+		dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+		if (dlen == 0)
+			break;
+		data = va_arg(argp, unsigned char *);
+		if (data == NULL) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		}
+		ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, data, dlen);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			break;
+	}
+	va_end(argp);
+	if (!ret)
+		ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, digest);
+out:
+	kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * calculate authorization info fields to send to TPM
+ */
+int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
+			unsigned int keylen, unsigned char *h1,
+			unsigned char *h2, unsigned int h3, ...)
+{
+	unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	struct sdesc *sdesc;
+	unsigned int dlen;
+	unsigned char *data;
+	unsigned char c;
+	int ret;
+	va_list argp;
+
+	if (!chip)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
+	if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
+		pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
+		return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
+	}
+
+	c = !!h3;
+	ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+	va_start(argp, h3);
+	for (;;) {
+		dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+		if (dlen == 0)
+			break;
+		data = va_arg(argp, unsigned char *);
+		if (!data) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		}
+		ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, data, dlen);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			break;
+	}
+	va_end(argp);
+	if (!ret)
+		ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest);
+	if (!ret)
+		ret = TSS_rawhmac(digest, key, keylen, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+				  paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h1,
+				  TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h2, 1, &c, 0, 0);
+out:
+	kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(TSS_authhmac);
+
+/*
+ * verify the AUTH1_COMMAND (Seal) result from TPM
+ */
+int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
+			  const uint32_t command,
+			  const unsigned char *ononce,
+			  const unsigned char *key,
+			  unsigned int keylen, ...)
+{
+	uint32_t bufsize;
+	uint16_t tag;
+	uint32_t ordinal;
+	uint32_t result;
+	unsigned char *enonce;
+	unsigned char *continueflag;
+	unsigned char *authdata;
+	unsigned char testhmac[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	struct sdesc *sdesc;
+	unsigned int dlen;
+	unsigned int dpos;
+	va_list argp;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!chip)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	bufsize = LOAD32(buffer, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
+	tag = LOAD16(buffer, 0);
+	ordinal = command;
+	result = LOAD32N(buffer, TPM_RETURN_OFFSET);
+	if (tag == TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND)
+		return 0;
+	if (tag != TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	authdata = buffer + bufsize - SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
+	continueflag = authdata - 1;
+	enonce = continueflag - TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
+
+	sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
+	if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
+		pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
+		return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
+	}
+	ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+	ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&result,
+				  sizeof result);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+	ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&ordinal,
+				  sizeof ordinal);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+	va_start(argp, keylen);
+	for (;;) {
+		dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+		if (dlen == 0)
+			break;
+		dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+		ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, buffer + dpos, dlen);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			break;
+	}
+	va_end(argp);
+	if (!ret)
+		ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac, key, keylen, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, paramdigest,
+			  TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce,
+			  1, continueflag, 0, 0);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+out:
+	kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(TSS_checkhmac1);
+
+/*
+ * verify the AUTH2_COMMAND (unseal) result from TPM
+ */
+static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
+			  const uint32_t command,
+			  const unsigned char *ononce,
+			  const unsigned char *key1,
+			  unsigned int keylen1,
+			  const unsigned char *key2,
+			  unsigned int keylen2, ...)
+{
+	uint32_t bufsize;
+	uint16_t tag;
+	uint32_t ordinal;
+	uint32_t result;
+	unsigned char *enonce1;
+	unsigned char *continueflag1;
+	unsigned char *authdata1;
+	unsigned char *enonce2;
+	unsigned char *continueflag2;
+	unsigned char *authdata2;
+	unsigned char testhmac1[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	unsigned char testhmac2[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	struct sdesc *sdesc;
+	unsigned int dlen;
+	unsigned int dpos;
+	va_list argp;
+	int ret;
+
+	bufsize = LOAD32(buffer, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
+	tag = LOAD16(buffer, 0);
+	ordinal = command;
+	result = LOAD32N(buffer, TPM_RETURN_OFFSET);
+
+	if (tag == TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND)
+		return 0;
+	if (tag != TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	authdata1 = buffer + bufsize - (SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 1
+			+ SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	authdata2 = buffer + bufsize - (SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	continueflag1 = authdata1 - 1;
+	continueflag2 = authdata2 - 1;
+	enonce1 = continueflag1 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
+	enonce2 = continueflag2 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
+
+	sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
+	if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
+		pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
+		return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
+	}
+	ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+	ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&result,
+				  sizeof result);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+	ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&ordinal,
+				  sizeof ordinal);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	va_start(argp, keylen2);
+	for (;;) {
+		dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+		if (dlen == 0)
+			break;
+		dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+		ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, buffer + dpos, dlen);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			break;
+	}
+	va_end(argp);
+	if (!ret)
+		ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac1, key1, keylen1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+			  paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce1,
+			  TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag1, 0, 0);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (memcmp(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac2, key2, keylen2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+			  paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce2,
+			  TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag2, 0, 0);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+out:
+	kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our
+ * own TPM command packets using the drivers send function.
+ */
+int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!chip)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
+	rc = tpm_send(chip, cmd, buflen);
+	dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
+	if (rc > 0)
+		/* Can't return positive return codes values to keyctl */
+		rc = -EPERM;
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(trusted_tpm_send);
+
+/*
+ * Lock a trusted key, by extending a selected PCR.
+ *
+ * Prevents a trusted key that is sealed to PCRs from being accessed.
+ * This uses the tpm driver's extend function.
+ */
+static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum)
+{
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	return tpm_pcr_extend(chip, pcrnum, digests) ? -EINVAL : 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create an object specific authorisation protocol (OSAP) session
+ */
+static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,
+		const unsigned char *key, uint16_t type, uint32_t handle)
+{
+	unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+	unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = tpm_get_random(chip, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
+		return -EIO;
+
+	tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_OSAP);
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(tb, type);
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, handle);
+	tpm_buf_append(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+
+	ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	s->handle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET);
+	memcpy(s->enonce, &(tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t)]),
+	       TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+	memcpy(enonce, &(tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t) +
+				  TPM_NONCE_SIZE]), TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+	return TSS_rawhmac(s->secret, key, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, TPM_NONCE_SIZE,
+			   enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 0, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create an object independent authorisation protocol (oiap) session
+ */
+int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!chip)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_OIAP);
+	ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	*handle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET);
+	memcpy(nonce, &tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t)],
+	       TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(oiap);
+
+struct tpm_digests {
+	unsigned char encauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	unsigned char pubauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	unsigned char xorwork[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2];
+	unsigned char xorhash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	unsigned char nonceodd[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+};
+
+/*
+ * Have the TPM seal(encrypt) the trusted key, possibly based on
+ * Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). AUTH1 for sealing key.
+ */
+static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
+		    uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth,
+		    const unsigned char *data, uint32_t datalen,
+		    unsigned char *blob, uint32_t *bloblen,
+		    const unsigned char *blobauth,
+		    const unsigned char *pcrinfo, uint32_t pcrinfosize)
+{
+	struct osapsess sess;
+	struct tpm_digests *td;
+	unsigned char cont;
+	uint32_t ordinal;
+	uint32_t pcrsize;
+	uint32_t datsize;
+	int sealinfosize;
+	int encdatasize;
+	int storedsize;
+	int ret;
+	int i;
+
+	/* alloc some work space for all the hashes */
+	td = kmalloc(sizeof *td, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!td)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* get session for sealing key */
+	ret = osap(tb, &sess, keyauth, keytype, keyhandle);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+	dump_sess(&sess);
+
+	/* calculate encrypted authorization value */
+	memcpy(td->xorwork, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	memcpy(td->xorwork + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, sess.enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	ret = TSS_sha1(td->xorwork, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, td->xorhash);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = tpm_get_random(chip, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) {
+		ret = -EIO;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL);
+	datsize = htonl(datalen);
+	pcrsize = htonl(pcrinfosize);
+	cont = 0;
+
+	/* encrypt data authorization key */
+	for (i = 0; i < SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; ++i)
+		td->encauth[i] = td->xorhash[i] ^ blobauth[i];
+
+	/* calculate authorization HMAC value */
+	if (pcrinfosize == 0) {
+		/* no pcr info specified */
+		ret = TSS_authhmac(td->pubauth, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+				   sess.enonce, td->nonceodd, cont,
+				   sizeof(uint32_t), &ordinal, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+				   td->encauth, sizeof(uint32_t), &pcrsize,
+				   sizeof(uint32_t), &datsize, datalen, data, 0,
+				   0);
+	} else {
+		/* pcr info specified */
+		ret = TSS_authhmac(td->pubauth, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+				   sess.enonce, td->nonceodd, cont,
+				   sizeof(uint32_t), &ordinal, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+				   td->encauth, sizeof(uint32_t), &pcrsize,
+				   pcrinfosize, pcrinfo, sizeof(uint32_t),
+				   &datsize, datalen, data, 0, 0);
+	}
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* build and send the TPM request packet */
+	tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_SEAL);
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, keyhandle);
+	tpm_buf_append(tb, td->encauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, pcrinfosize);
+	tpm_buf_append(tb, pcrinfo, pcrinfosize);
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, datalen);
+	tpm_buf_append(tb, data, datalen);
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, sess.handle);
+	tpm_buf_append(tb, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+	tpm_buf_append_u8(tb, cont);
+	tpm_buf_append(tb, td->pubauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+	ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* calculate the size of the returned Blob */
+	sealinfosize = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t));
+	encdatasize = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t) +
+			     sizeof(uint32_t) + sealinfosize);
+	storedsize = sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(uint32_t) + sealinfosize +
+	    sizeof(uint32_t) + encdatasize;
+
+	/* check the HMAC in the response */
+	ret = TSS_checkhmac1(tb->data, ordinal, td->nonceodd, sess.secret,
+			     SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, storedsize, TPM_DATA_OFFSET, 0,
+			     0);
+
+	/* copy the returned blob to caller */
+	if (!ret) {
+		memcpy(blob, tb->data + TPM_DATA_OFFSET, storedsize);
+		*bloblen = storedsize;
+	}
+out:
+	kfree_sensitive(td);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * use the AUTH2_COMMAND form of unseal, to authorize both key and blob
+ */
+static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
+		      uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth,
+		      const unsigned char *blob, int bloblen,
+		      const unsigned char *blobauth,
+		      unsigned char *data, unsigned int *datalen)
+{
+	unsigned char nonceodd[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+	unsigned char enonce1[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+	unsigned char enonce2[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+	unsigned char authdata1[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	unsigned char authdata2[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	uint32_t authhandle1 = 0;
+	uint32_t authhandle2 = 0;
+	unsigned char cont = 0;
+	uint32_t ordinal;
+	int ret;
+
+	/* sessions for unsealing key and data */
+	ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle1, enonce1);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		pr_info("oiap failed (%d)\n", ret);
+		return ret;
+	}
+	ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle2, enonce2);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		pr_info("oiap failed (%d)\n", ret);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL);
+	ret = tpm_get_random(chip, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) {
+		pr_info("tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+	ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata1, keyauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE,
+			   enonce1, nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t),
+			   &ordinal, bloblen, blob, 0, 0);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+	ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata2, blobauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE,
+			   enonce2, nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t),
+			   &ordinal, bloblen, blob, 0, 0);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	/* build and send TPM request packet */
+	tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_UNSEAL);
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, keyhandle);
+	tpm_buf_append(tb, blob, bloblen);
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, authhandle1);
+	tpm_buf_append(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+	tpm_buf_append_u8(tb, cont);
+	tpm_buf_append(tb, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, authhandle2);
+	tpm_buf_append(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+	tpm_buf_append_u8(tb, cont);
+	tpm_buf_append(tb, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+	ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		pr_info("authhmac failed (%d)\n", ret);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	*datalen = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET);
+	ret = TSS_checkhmac2(tb->data, ordinal, nonceodd,
+			     keyauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+			     blobauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+			     sizeof(uint32_t), TPM_DATA_OFFSET,
+			     *datalen, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t), 0,
+			     0);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		pr_info("TSS_checkhmac2 failed (%d)\n", ret);
+		return ret;
+	}
+	memcpy(data, tb->data + TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t), *datalen);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Have the TPM seal(encrypt) the symmetric key
+ */
+static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
+		    struct trusted_key_options *o)
+{
+	struct tpm_buf tb;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = tpm_buf_init(&tb, 0, 0);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	/* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */
+	p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable;
+
+	ret = tpm_seal(&tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth,
+		       p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len,
+		       o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		pr_info("srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+
+	tpm_buf_destroy(&tb);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Have the TPM unseal(decrypt) the symmetric key
+ */
+static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
+		      struct trusted_key_options *o)
+{
+	struct tpm_buf tb;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = tpm_buf_init(&tb, 0, 0);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = tpm_unseal(&tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len,
+			 o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		pr_info("srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+	else
+		/* pull migratable flag out of sealed key */
+		p->migratable = p->key[--p->key_len];
+
+	tpm_buf_destroy(&tb);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+enum {
+	Opt_err,
+	Opt_keyhandle, Opt_keyauth, Opt_blobauth,
+	Opt_pcrinfo, Opt_pcrlock, Opt_migratable,
+	Opt_hash,
+	Opt_policydigest,
+	Opt_policyhandle,
+};
+
+static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
+	{Opt_keyhandle, "keyhandle=%s"},
+	{Opt_keyauth, "keyauth=%s"},
+	{Opt_blobauth, "blobauth=%s"},
+	{Opt_pcrinfo, "pcrinfo=%s"},
+	{Opt_pcrlock, "pcrlock=%s"},
+	{Opt_migratable, "migratable=%s"},
+	{Opt_hash, "hash=%s"},
+	{Opt_policydigest, "policydigest=%s"},
+	{Opt_policyhandle, "policyhandle=%s"},
+	{Opt_err, NULL}
+};
+
+/* can have zero or more token= options */
+static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
+		      struct trusted_key_options *opt)
+{
+	substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+	char *p = c;
+	int token;
+	int res;
+	unsigned long handle;
+	unsigned long lock;
+	unsigned long token_mask = 0;
+	unsigned int digest_len;
+	int i;
+	int tpm2;
+
+	tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip);
+	if (tpm2 < 0)
+		return tpm2;
+
+	opt->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+
+	if (!c)
+		return 0;
+
+	while ((p = strsep(&c, " \t"))) {
+		if (*p == '\0' || *p == ' ' || *p == '\t')
+			continue;
+		token = match_token(p, key_tokens, args);
+		if (test_and_set_bit(token, &token_mask))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		switch (token) {
+		case Opt_pcrinfo:
+			opt->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2;
+			if (opt->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			res = hex2bin(opt->pcrinfo, args[0].from,
+				      opt->pcrinfo_len);
+			if (res < 0)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		case Opt_keyhandle:
+			res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle);
+			if (res < 0)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype;
+			opt->keyhandle = handle;
+			break;
+		case Opt_keyauth:
+			if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			res = hex2bin(opt->keyauth, args[0].from,
+				      SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+			if (res < 0)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		case Opt_blobauth:
+			/*
+			 * TPM 1.2 authorizations are sha1 hashes passed in as
+			 * hex strings.  TPM 2.0 authorizations are simple
+			 * passwords (although it can take a hash as well)
+			 */
+			opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from);
+
+			if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {
+				res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
+					      TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
+				if (res < 0)
+					return -EINVAL;
+
+				opt->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			if (tpm2 && opt->blobauth_len <= sizeof(opt->blobauth)) {
+				memcpy(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
+				       opt->blobauth_len);
+				break;
+			}
+
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+			break;
+
+		case Opt_migratable:
+			if (*args[0].from == '0')
+				pay->migratable = 0;
+			else if (*args[0].from != '1')
+				return -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		case Opt_pcrlock:
+			res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock);
+			if (res < 0)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			opt->pcrlock = lock;
+			break;
+		case Opt_hash:
+			if (test_bit(Opt_policydigest, &token_mask))
+				return -EINVAL;
+			for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) {
+				if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) {
+					opt->hash = i;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+			if (i == HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			if  (!tpm2 && i != HASH_ALGO_SHA1) {
+				pr_info("TPM 1.x only supports SHA-1.\n");
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+			break;
+		case Opt_policydigest:
+			digest_len = hash_digest_size[opt->hash];
+			if (!tpm2 || strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * digest_len))
+				return -EINVAL;
+			res = hex2bin(opt->policydigest, args[0].from,
+				      digest_len);
+			if (res < 0)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			opt->policydigest_len = digest_len;
+			break;
+		case Opt_policyhandle:
+			if (!tpm2)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle);
+			if (res < 0)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			opt->policyhandle = handle;
+			break;
+		default:
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
+{
+	struct trusted_key_options *options;
+	int tpm2;
+
+	tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip);
+	if (tpm2 < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	options = kzalloc(sizeof *options, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (options) {
+		/* set any non-zero defaults */
+		options->keytype = SRK_keytype;
+
+		if (!tpm2)
+			options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
+	}
+	return options;
+}
+
+static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
+{
+	struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
+	int ret = 0;
+	int tpm2;
+
+	tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip);
+	if (tpm2 < 0)
+		return tpm2;
+
+	options = trusted_options_alloc();
+	if (!options)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ret = getoptions(datablob, p, options);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+	dump_options(options);
+
+	if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (tpm2)
+		ret = tpm2_seal_trusted(chip, p, options);
+	else
+		ret = key_seal(p, options);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		pr_info("key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (options->pcrlock) {
+		ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+out:
+	kfree_sensitive(options);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
+{
+	struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
+	int ret = 0;
+	int tpm2;
+
+	tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip);
+	if (tpm2 < 0)
+		return tpm2;
+
+	options = trusted_options_alloc();
+	if (!options)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ret = getoptions(datablob, p, options);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+	dump_options(options);
+
+	if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (tpm2)
+		ret = tpm2_unseal_trusted(chip, p, options);
+	else
+		ret = key_unseal(p, options);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		pr_info("key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+
+	if (options->pcrlock) {
+		ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+out:
+	kfree_sensitive(options);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int trusted_tpm_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len)
+{
+	return tpm_get_random(chip, key, key_len);
+}
+
+static void trusted_shash_release(void)
+{
+	if (hashalg)
+		crypto_free_shash(hashalg);
+	if (hmacalg)
+		crypto_free_shash(hmacalg);
+}
+
+static int __init trusted_shash_alloc(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(hmacalg)) {
+		pr_info("could not allocate crypto %s\n",
+			hmac_alg);
+		return PTR_ERR(hmacalg);
+	}
+
+	hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(hashalg)) {
+		pr_info("could not allocate crypto %s\n",
+			hash_alg);
+		ret = PTR_ERR(hashalg);
+		goto hashalg_fail;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+hashalg_fail:
+	crypto_free_shash(hmacalg);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int __init init_digests(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	digests = kcalloc(chip->nr_allocated_banks, sizeof(*digests),
+			  GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!digests)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < chip->nr_allocated_banks; i++)
+		digests[i].alg_id = chip->allocated_banks[i].alg_id;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init trusted_tpm_init(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	chip = tpm_default_chip();
+	if (!chip)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	ret = init_digests();
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto err_put;
+	ret = trusted_shash_alloc();
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto err_free;
+	ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto err_release;
+	return 0;
+err_release:
+	trusted_shash_release();
+err_free:
+	kfree(digests);
+err_put:
+	put_device(&chip->dev);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void trusted_tpm_exit(void)
+{
+	if (chip) {
+		put_device(&chip->dev);
+		kfree(digests);
+		trusted_shash_release();
+		unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+	}
+}
+
+struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops = {
+	.migratable = 1, /* migratable by default */
+	.init = trusted_tpm_init,
+	.seal = trusted_tpm_seal,
+	.unseal = trusted_tpm_unseal,
+	.get_random = trusted_tpm_get_random,
+	.exit = trusted_tpm_exit,
+};
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bc700f85f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,550 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 IBM Corporation
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Intel Corporation
+ */
+
+#include <linux/asn1_encoder.h>
+#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/tpm.h>
+#include <linux/tpm_command.h>
+
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
+#include <keys/trusted_tpm.h>
+
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+
+#include "tpm2key.asn1.h"
+
+static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = {
+	{HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM_ALG_SHA1},
+	{HASH_ALGO_SHA256, TPM_ALG_SHA256},
+	{HASH_ALGO_SHA384, TPM_ALG_SHA384},
+	{HASH_ALGO_SHA512, TPM_ALG_SHA512},
+	{HASH_ALGO_SM3_256, TPM_ALG_SM3_256},
+};
+
+static u32 tpm2key_oid[] = { 2, 23, 133, 10, 1, 5 };
+
+static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
+			   struct trusted_key_options *options,
+			   u8 *src, u32 len)
+{
+	const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE;
+	u8 *scratch = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	u8 *work = scratch, *work1;
+	u8 *end_work = scratch + SCRATCH_SIZE;
+	u8 *priv, *pub;
+	u16 priv_len, pub_len;
+
+	priv_len = get_unaligned_be16(src) + 2;
+	priv = src;
+
+	src += priv_len;
+
+	pub_len = get_unaligned_be16(src) + 2;
+	pub = src;
+
+	if (!scratch)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	work = asn1_encode_oid(work, end_work, tpm2key_oid,
+			       asn1_oid_len(tpm2key_oid));
+
+	if (options->blobauth_len == 0) {
+		unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool;
+		/* tag 0 is emptyAuth */
+		w = asn1_encode_boolean(w, w + sizeof(bool), true);
+		if (WARN(IS_ERR(w), "BUG: Boolean failed to encode"))
+			return PTR_ERR(w);
+		work = asn1_encode_tag(work, end_work, 0, bool, w - bool);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Assume both octet strings will encode to a 2 byte definite length
+	 *
+	 * Note: For a well behaved TPM, this warning should never
+	 * trigger, so if it does there's something nefarious going on
+	 */
+	if (WARN(work - scratch + pub_len + priv_len + 14 > SCRATCH_SIZE,
+		 "BUG: scratch buffer is too small"))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle);
+	work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len);
+	work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, priv, priv_len);
+
+	work1 = payload->blob;
+	work1 = asn1_encode_sequence(work1, work1 + sizeof(payload->blob),
+				     scratch, work - scratch);
+	if (WARN(IS_ERR(work1), "BUG: ASN.1 encoder failed"))
+		return PTR_ERR(work1);
+
+	return work1 - payload->blob;
+}
+
+struct tpm2_key_context {
+	u32 parent;
+	const u8 *pub;
+	u32 pub_len;
+	const u8 *priv;
+	u32 priv_len;
+};
+
+static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
+			   struct trusted_key_options *options,
+			   u8 **buf)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct tpm2_key_context ctx;
+	u8 *blob;
+
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+
+	ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&tpm2key_decoder, &ctx, payload->blob,
+			       payload->blob_len);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	blob = kmalloc(ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len + 4, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!blob)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	*buf = blob;
+	options->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
+
+	memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len);
+	blob += ctx.priv_len;
+
+	memcpy(blob, ctx.pub, ctx.pub_len);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int tpm2_key_parent(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+		  unsigned char tag,
+		  const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context;
+	const u8 *v = value;
+	int i;
+
+	ctx->parent = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < vlen; i++) {
+		ctx->parent <<= 8;
+		ctx->parent |= v[i];
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int tpm2_key_type(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+		unsigned char tag,
+		const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	enum OID oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
+
+	if (oid != OID_TPMSealedData) {
+		char buffer[50];
+
+		sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+		pr_debug("OID is \"%s\" which is not TPMSealedData\n",
+			 buffer);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int tpm2_key_pub(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+	       unsigned char tag,
+	       const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context;
+
+	ctx->pub = value;
+	ctx->pub_len = vlen;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int tpm2_key_priv(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+		unsigned char tag,
+		const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context;
+
+	ctx->priv = value;
+	ctx->priv_len = vlen;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tpm2_buf_append_auth() - append TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND to the buffer.
+ *
+ * @buf: an allocated tpm_buf instance
+ * @session_handle: session handle
+ * @nonce: the session nonce, may be NULL if not used
+ * @nonce_len: the session nonce length, may be 0 if not used
+ * @attributes: the session attributes
+ * @hmac: the session HMAC or password, may be NULL if not used
+ * @hmac_len: the session HMAC or password length, maybe 0 if not used
+ */
+static void tpm2_buf_append_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 session_handle,
+				 const u8 *nonce, u16 nonce_len,
+				 u8 attributes,
+				 const u8 *hmac, u16 hmac_len)
+{
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + nonce_len + hmac_len);
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, session_handle);
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, nonce_len);
+
+	if (nonce && nonce_len)
+		tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, nonce_len);
+
+	tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, attributes);
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, hmac_len);
+
+	if (hmac && hmac_len)
+		tpm_buf_append(buf, hmac, hmac_len);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tpm2_seal_trusted() - seal the payload of a trusted key
+ *
+ * @chip: TPM chip to use
+ * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
+ * @options: authentication values and other options
+ *
+ * Return: < 0 on error and 0 on success.
+ */
+int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
+		      struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
+		      struct trusted_key_options *options)
+{
+	int blob_len = 0;
+	struct tpm_buf buf;
+	u32 hash;
+	u32 flags;
+	int i;
+	int rc;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); i++) {
+		if (options->hash == tpm2_hash_map[i].crypto_id) {
+			hash = tpm2_hash_map[i].tpm_id;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!options->keyhandle)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE);
+	if (rc) {
+		tpm_put_ops(chip);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, options->keyhandle);
+	tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW,
+			     NULL /* nonce */, 0,
+			     0 /* session_attributes */,
+			     options->keyauth /* hmac */,
+			     TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+	/* sensitive */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4 + options->blobauth_len + payload->key_len);
+
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->blobauth_len);
+	if (options->blobauth_len)
+		tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
+
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, payload->key_len);
+	tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->key, payload->key_len);
+
+	/* public */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 14 + options->policydigest_len);
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH);
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, hash);
+
+	/* key properties */
+	flags = 0;
+	flags |= options->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
+	flags |= payload->migratable ? 0 : (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM |
+					    TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT);
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, flags);
+
+	/* policy */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->policydigest_len);
+	if (options->policydigest_len)
+		tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->policydigest,
+			       options->policydigest_len);
+
+	/* public parameters */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_NULL);
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
+
+	/* outside info */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
+
+	/* creation PCR */
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0);
+
+	if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) {
+		rc = -E2BIG;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "sealing data");
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	blob_len = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
+	if (blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) {
+		rc = -E2BIG;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) < TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4 + blob_len) {
+		rc = -EFAULT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	blob_len = tpm2_key_encode(payload, options,
+				   &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4],
+				   blob_len);
+
+out:
+	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+
+	if (rc > 0) {
+		if (tpm2_rc_value(rc) == TPM2_RC_HASH)
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+		else
+			rc = -EPERM;
+	}
+	if (blob_len < 0)
+		rc = blob_len;
+	else
+		payload->blob_len = blob_len;
+
+	tpm_put_ops(chip);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tpm2_load_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Load command
+ *
+ * @chip: TPM chip to use
+ * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
+ * @options: authentication values and other options
+ * @blob_handle: returned blob handle
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success.
+ *        -E2BIG on wrong payload size.
+ *        -EPERM on tpm error status.
+ *        < 0 error from tpm_send.
+ */
+static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
+			 struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
+			 struct trusted_key_options *options,
+			 u32 *blob_handle)
+{
+	struct tpm_buf buf;
+	unsigned int private_len;
+	unsigned int public_len;
+	unsigned int blob_len;
+	u8 *blob, *pub;
+	int rc;
+	u32 attrs;
+
+	rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob);
+	if (rc) {
+		/* old form */
+		blob = payload->blob;
+		payload->old_format = 1;
+	}
+
+	/* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */
+	if (!options->keyhandle)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */
+	if (payload->blob_len < 4)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	private_len = get_unaligned_be16(blob);
+
+	/* must be big enough for following public_len */
+	if (private_len + 2 + 2 > (payload->blob_len))
+		return -E2BIG;
+
+	public_len = get_unaligned_be16(blob + 2 + private_len);
+	if (private_len + 2 + public_len + 2 > payload->blob_len)
+		return -E2BIG;
+
+	pub = blob + 2 + private_len + 2;
+	/* key attributes are always at offset 4 */
+	attrs = get_unaligned_be32(pub + 4);
+
+	if ((attrs & (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT)) ==
+	    (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT))
+		payload->migratable = 0;
+	else
+		payload->migratable = 1;
+
+	blob_len = private_len + public_len + 4;
+	if (blob_len > payload->blob_len)
+		return -E2BIG;
+
+	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, options->keyhandle);
+	tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW,
+			     NULL /* nonce */, 0,
+			     0 /* session_attributes */,
+			     options->keyauth /* hmac */,
+			     TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+	tpm_buf_append(&buf, blob, blob_len);
+
+	if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) {
+		rc = -E2BIG;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "loading blob");
+	if (!rc)
+		*blob_handle = be32_to_cpup(
+			(__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
+
+out:
+	if (blob != payload->blob)
+		kfree(blob);
+	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+
+	if (rc > 0)
+		rc = -EPERM;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tpm2_unseal_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Unload command
+ *
+ * @chip: TPM chip to use
+ * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
+ * @options: authentication values and other options
+ * @blob_handle: blob handle
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success
+ *         -EPERM on tpm error status
+ *         < 0 error from tpm_send
+ */
+static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
+			   struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
+			   struct trusted_key_options *options,
+			   u32 blob_handle)
+{
+	struct tpm_buf buf;
+	u16 data_len;
+	u8 *data;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, blob_handle);
+	tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf,
+			     options->policyhandle ?
+			     options->policyhandle : TPM2_RS_PW,
+			     NULL /* nonce */, 0,
+			     TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION,
+			     options->blobauth /* hmac */,
+			     options->blobauth_len);
+
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "unsealing");
+	if (rc > 0)
+		rc = -EPERM;
+
+	if (!rc) {
+		data_len = be16_to_cpup(
+			(__be16 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4]);
+		if (data_len < MIN_KEY_SIZE ||  data_len > MAX_KEY_SIZE) {
+			rc = -EFAULT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) < TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 6 + data_len) {
+			rc = -EFAULT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		data = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 6];
+
+		if (payload->old_format) {
+			/* migratable flag is at the end of the key */
+			memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len - 1);
+			payload->key_len = data_len - 1;
+			payload->migratable = data[data_len - 1];
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * migratable flag already collected from key
+			 * attributes
+			 */
+			memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len);
+			payload->key_len = data_len;
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tpm2_unseal_trusted() - unseal the payload of a trusted key
+ *
+ * @chip: TPM chip to use
+ * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
+ * @options: authentication values and other options
+ *
+ * Return: Same as with tpm_send.
+ */
+int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
+			struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
+			struct trusted_key_options *options)
+{
+	u32 blob_handle;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = tpm2_load_cmd(chip, payload, options, &blob_handle);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = tpm2_unseal_cmd(chip, payload, options, blob_handle);
+	tpm2_flush_context(chip, blob_handle);
+
+out:
+	tpm_put_ops(chip);
+
+	return rc;
+}