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Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h | 99 |
1 files changed, 99 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..11203a9fe --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +#ifndef _ASM_X86_ENTRY_COMMON_H +#define _ASM_X86_ENTRY_COMMON_H + +#include <linux/randomize_kstack.h> +#include <linux/user-return-notifier.h> + +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> +#include <asm/io_bitmap.h> +#include <asm/fpu/api.h> + +/* Check that the stack and regs on entry from user mode are sane. */ +static __always_inline void arch_enter_from_user_mode(struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY)) { + /* + * Make sure that the entry code gave us a sensible EFLAGS + * register. Native because we want to check the actual CPU + * state, not the interrupt state as imagined by Xen. + */ + unsigned long flags = native_save_fl(); + unsigned long mask = X86_EFLAGS_DF | X86_EFLAGS_NT; + + /* + * For !SMAP hardware we patch out CLAC on entry. + */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMAP) || + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64BIT) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV))) + mask |= X86_EFLAGS_AC; + + WARN_ON_ONCE(flags & mask); + + /* We think we came from user mode. Make sure pt_regs agrees. */ + WARN_ON_ONCE(!user_mode(regs)); + + /* + * All entries from user mode (except #DF) should be on the + * normal thread stack and should have user pt_regs in the + * correct location. + */ + WARN_ON_ONCE(!on_thread_stack()); + WARN_ON_ONCE(regs != task_pt_regs(current)); + } +} +#define arch_enter_from_user_mode arch_enter_from_user_mode + +static inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(struct pt_regs *regs, + unsigned long ti_work) +{ + if (ti_work & _TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY) + fire_user_return_notifiers(); + + if (unlikely(ti_work & _TIF_IO_BITMAP)) + tss_update_io_bitmap(); + + fpregs_assert_state_consistent(); + if (unlikely(ti_work & _TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD)) + switch_fpu_return(); + +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT + /* + * Compat syscalls set TS_COMPAT. Make sure we clear it before + * returning to user mode. We need to clear it *after* signal + * handling, because syscall restart has a fixup for compat + * syscalls. The fixup is exercised by the ptrace_syscall_32 + * selftest. + * + * We also need to clear TS_REGS_POKED_I386: the 32-bit tracer + * special case only applies after poking regs and before the + * very next return to user mode. + */ + current_thread_info()->status &= ~(TS_COMPAT | TS_I386_REGS_POKED); +#endif + + /* + * Ultimately, this value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(), + * but not enough for x86 stack utilization comfort. To keep + * reasonable stack head room, reduce the maximum offset to 8 bits. + * + * The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler when + * applying stack alignment constraints (see cc_stack_align4/8 in + * arch/x86/Makefile), which will remove the 3 (x86_64) or 2 (ia32) + * low bits from any entropy chosen here. + * + * Therefore, final stack offset entropy will be 5 (x86_64) or + * 6 (ia32) bits. + */ + choose_random_kstack_offset(rdtsc() & 0xFF); +} +#define arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare + +static __always_inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode(void) +{ + mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers(); + amd_clear_divider(); +} +#define arch_exit_to_user_mode arch_exit_to_user_mode + +#endif |