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Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/drbg.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/drbg.c | 2167 |
1 files changed, 2167 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ff4ebbc68 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/drbg.c @@ -0,0 +1,2167 @@ +/* + * DRBG: Deterministic Random Bits Generator + * Based on NIST Recommended DRBG from NIST SP800-90A with the following + * properties: + * * CTR DRBG with DF with AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 cores + * * Hash DRBG with DF with SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 cores + * * HMAC DRBG with DF with SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 cores + * * with and without prediction resistance + * + * Copyright Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>, 2014 + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety, + * including the disclaimer of warranties. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote + * products derived from this software without specific prior + * written permission. + * + * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of + * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are + * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is + * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and + * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.) + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF + * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF + * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE + * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH + * DAMAGE. + * + * DRBG Usage + * ========== + * The SP 800-90A DRBG allows the user to specify a personalization string + * for initialization as well as an additional information string for each + * random number request. The following code fragments show how a caller + * uses the kernel crypto API to use the full functionality of the DRBG. + * + * Usage without any additional data + * --------------------------------- + * struct crypto_rng *drng; + * int err; + * char data[DATALEN]; + * + * drng = crypto_alloc_rng(drng_name, 0, 0); + * err = crypto_rng_get_bytes(drng, &data, DATALEN); + * crypto_free_rng(drng); + * + * + * Usage with personalization string during initialization + * ------------------------------------------------------- + * struct crypto_rng *drng; + * int err; + * char data[DATALEN]; + * struct drbg_string pers; + * char personalization[11] = "some-string"; + * + * drbg_string_fill(&pers, personalization, strlen(personalization)); + * drng = crypto_alloc_rng(drng_name, 0, 0); + * // The reset completely re-initializes the DRBG with the provided + * // personalization string + * err = crypto_rng_reset(drng, &personalization, strlen(personalization)); + * err = crypto_rng_get_bytes(drng, &data, DATALEN); + * crypto_free_rng(drng); + * + * + * Usage with additional information string during random number request + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * struct crypto_rng *drng; + * int err; + * char data[DATALEN]; + * char addtl_string[11] = "some-string"; + * string drbg_string addtl; + * + * drbg_string_fill(&addtl, addtl_string, strlen(addtl_string)); + * drng = crypto_alloc_rng(drng_name, 0, 0); + * // The following call is a wrapper to crypto_rng_get_bytes() and returns + * // the same error codes. + * err = crypto_drbg_get_bytes_addtl(drng, &data, DATALEN, &addtl); + * crypto_free_rng(drng); + * + * + * Usage with personalization and additional information strings + * ------------------------------------------------------------- + * Just mix both scenarios above. + */ + +#include <crypto/drbg.h> +#include <crypto/internal/cipher.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/jiffies.h> + +/*************************************************************** + * Backend cipher definitions available to DRBG + ***************************************************************/ + +/* + * The order of the DRBG definitions here matter: every DRBG is registered + * as stdrng. Each DRBG receives an increasing cra_priority values the later + * they are defined in this array (see drbg_fill_array). + * + * HMAC DRBGs are favored over Hash DRBGs over CTR DRBGs, and + * the SHA256 / AES 256 over other ciphers. Thus, the favored + * DRBGs are the latest entries in this array. + */ +static const struct drbg_core drbg_cores[] = { +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR + { + .flags = DRBG_CTR | DRBG_STRENGTH128, + .statelen = 32, /* 256 bits as defined in 10.2.1 */ + .blocklen_bytes = 16, + .cra_name = "ctr_aes128", + .backend_cra_name = "aes", + }, { + .flags = DRBG_CTR | DRBG_STRENGTH192, + .statelen = 40, /* 320 bits as defined in 10.2.1 */ + .blocklen_bytes = 16, + .cra_name = "ctr_aes192", + .backend_cra_name = "aes", + }, { + .flags = DRBG_CTR | DRBG_STRENGTH256, + .statelen = 48, /* 384 bits as defined in 10.2.1 */ + .blocklen_bytes = 16, + .cra_name = "ctr_aes256", + .backend_cra_name = "aes", + }, +#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR */ +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH + { + .flags = DRBG_HASH | DRBG_STRENGTH128, + .statelen = 55, /* 440 bits */ + .blocklen_bytes = 20, + .cra_name = "sha1", + .backend_cra_name = "sha1", + }, { + .flags = DRBG_HASH | DRBG_STRENGTH256, + .statelen = 111, /* 888 bits */ + .blocklen_bytes = 48, + .cra_name = "sha384", + .backend_cra_name = "sha384", + }, { + .flags = DRBG_HASH | DRBG_STRENGTH256, + .statelen = 111, /* 888 bits */ + .blocklen_bytes = 64, + .cra_name = "sha512", + .backend_cra_name = "sha512", + }, { + .flags = DRBG_HASH | DRBG_STRENGTH256, + .statelen = 55, /* 440 bits */ + .blocklen_bytes = 32, + .cra_name = "sha256", + .backend_cra_name = "sha256", + }, +#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH */ +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC + { + .flags = DRBG_HMAC | DRBG_STRENGTH128, + .statelen = 20, /* block length of cipher */ + .blocklen_bytes = 20, + .cra_name = "hmac_sha1", + .backend_cra_name = "hmac(sha1)", + }, { + .flags = DRBG_HMAC | DRBG_STRENGTH256, + .statelen = 48, /* block length of cipher */ + .blocklen_bytes = 48, + .cra_name = "hmac_sha384", + .backend_cra_name = "hmac(sha384)", + }, { + .flags = DRBG_HMAC | DRBG_STRENGTH256, + .statelen = 32, /* block length of cipher */ + .blocklen_bytes = 32, + .cra_name = "hmac_sha256", + .backend_cra_name = "hmac(sha256)", + }, { + .flags = DRBG_HMAC | DRBG_STRENGTH256, + .statelen = 64, /* block length of cipher */ + .blocklen_bytes = 64, + .cra_name = "hmac_sha512", + .backend_cra_name = "hmac(sha512)", + }, +#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC */ +}; + +static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg); + +/****************************************************************** + * Generic helper functions + ******************************************************************/ + +/* + * Return strength of DRBG according to SP800-90A section 8.4 + * + * @flags DRBG flags reference + * + * Return: normalized strength in *bytes* value or 32 as default + * to counter programming errors + */ +static inline unsigned short drbg_sec_strength(drbg_flag_t flags) +{ + switch (flags & DRBG_STRENGTH_MASK) { + case DRBG_STRENGTH128: + return 16; + case DRBG_STRENGTH192: + return 24; + case DRBG_STRENGTH256: + return 32; + default: + return 32; + } +} + +/* + * FIPS 140-2 continuous self test for the noise source + * The test is performed on the noise source input data. Thus, the function + * implicitly knows the size of the buffer to be equal to the security + * strength. + * + * Note, this function disregards the nonce trailing the entropy data during + * initial seeding. + * + * drbg->drbg_mutex must have been taken. + * + * @drbg DRBG handle + * @entropy buffer of seed data to be checked + * + * return: + * 0 on success + * -EAGAIN on when the CTRNG is not yet primed + * < 0 on error + */ +static int drbg_fips_continuous_test(struct drbg_state *drbg, + const unsigned char *entropy) +{ + unsigned short entropylen = drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags); + int ret = 0; + + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS)) + return 0; + + /* skip test if we test the overall system */ + if (list_empty(&drbg->test_data.list)) + return 0; + /* only perform test in FIPS mode */ + if (!fips_enabled) + return 0; + + if (!drbg->fips_primed) { + /* Priming of FIPS test */ + memcpy(drbg->prev, entropy, entropylen); + drbg->fips_primed = true; + /* priming: another round is needed */ + return -EAGAIN; + } + ret = memcmp(drbg->prev, entropy, entropylen); + if (!ret) + panic("DRBG continuous self test failed\n"); + memcpy(drbg->prev, entropy, entropylen); + + /* the test shall pass when the two values are not equal */ + return 0; +} + +/* + * Convert an integer into a byte representation of this integer. + * The byte representation is big-endian + * + * @val value to be converted + * @buf buffer holding the converted integer -- caller must ensure that + * buffer size is at least 32 bit + */ +#if (defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH) || defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR)) +static inline void drbg_cpu_to_be32(__u32 val, unsigned char *buf) +{ + struct s { + __be32 conv; + }; + struct s *conversion = (struct s *) buf; + + conversion->conv = cpu_to_be32(val); +} +#endif /* defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH) || defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR) */ + +/****************************************************************** + * CTR DRBG callback functions + ******************************************************************/ + +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR +#define CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR_STRING "CTR " +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("drbg_pr_ctr_aes256"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("drbg_nopr_ctr_aes256"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("drbg_pr_ctr_aes192"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("drbg_nopr_ctr_aes192"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("drbg_pr_ctr_aes128"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("drbg_nopr_ctr_aes128"); + +static void drbg_kcapi_symsetkey(struct drbg_state *drbg, + const unsigned char *key); +static int drbg_kcapi_sym(struct drbg_state *drbg, unsigned char *outval, + const struct drbg_string *in); +static int drbg_init_sym_kernel(struct drbg_state *drbg); +static int drbg_fini_sym_kernel(struct drbg_state *drbg); +static int drbg_kcapi_sym_ctr(struct drbg_state *drbg, + u8 *inbuf, u32 inbuflen, + u8 *outbuf, u32 outlen); +#define DRBG_OUTSCRATCHLEN 256 + +/* BCC function for CTR DRBG as defined in 10.4.3 */ +static int drbg_ctr_bcc(struct drbg_state *drbg, + unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *key, + struct list_head *in) +{ + int ret = 0; + struct drbg_string *curr = NULL; + struct drbg_string data; + short cnt = 0; + + drbg_string_fill(&data, out, drbg_blocklen(drbg)); + + /* 10.4.3 step 2 / 4 */ + drbg_kcapi_symsetkey(drbg, key); + list_for_each_entry(curr, in, list) { + const unsigned char *pos = curr->buf; + size_t len = curr->len; + /* 10.4.3 step 4.1 */ + while (len) { + /* 10.4.3 step 4.2 */ + if (drbg_blocklen(drbg) == cnt) { + cnt = 0; + ret = drbg_kcapi_sym(drbg, out, &data); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + out[cnt] ^= *pos; + pos++; + cnt++; + len--; + } + } + /* 10.4.3 step 4.2 for last block */ + if (cnt) + ret = drbg_kcapi_sym(drbg, out, &data); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * scratchpad usage: drbg_ctr_update is interlinked with drbg_ctr_df + * (and drbg_ctr_bcc, but this function does not need any temporary buffers), + * the scratchpad is used as follows: + * drbg_ctr_update: + * temp + * start: drbg->scratchpad + * length: drbg_statelen(drbg) + drbg_blocklen(drbg) + * note: the cipher writing into this variable works + * blocklen-wise. Now, when the statelen is not a multiple + * of blocklen, the generateion loop below "spills over" + * by at most blocklen. Thus, we need to give sufficient + * memory. + * df_data + * start: drbg->scratchpad + + * drbg_statelen(drbg) + drbg_blocklen(drbg) + * length: drbg_statelen(drbg) + * + * drbg_ctr_df: + * pad + * start: df_data + drbg_statelen(drbg) + * length: drbg_blocklen(drbg) + * iv + * start: pad + drbg_blocklen(drbg) + * length: drbg_blocklen(drbg) + * temp + * start: iv + drbg_blocklen(drbg) + * length: drbg_satelen(drbg) + drbg_blocklen(drbg) + * note: temp is the buffer that the BCC function operates + * on. BCC operates blockwise. drbg_statelen(drbg) + * is sufficient when the DRBG state length is a multiple + * of the block size. For AES192 (and maybe other ciphers) + * this is not correct and the length for temp is + * insufficient (yes, that also means for such ciphers, + * the final output of all BCC rounds are truncated). + * Therefore, add drbg_blocklen(drbg) to cover all + * possibilities. + */ + +/* Derivation Function for CTR DRBG as defined in 10.4.2 */ +static int drbg_ctr_df(struct drbg_state *drbg, + unsigned char *df_data, size_t bytes_to_return, + struct list_head *seedlist) +{ + int ret = -EFAULT; + unsigned char L_N[8]; + /* S3 is input */ + struct drbg_string S1, S2, S4, cipherin; + LIST_HEAD(bcc_list); + unsigned char *pad = df_data + drbg_statelen(drbg); + unsigned char *iv = pad + drbg_blocklen(drbg); + unsigned char *temp = iv + drbg_blocklen(drbg); + size_t padlen = 0; + unsigned int templen = 0; + /* 10.4.2 step 7 */ + unsigned int i = 0; + /* 10.4.2 step 8 */ + const unsigned char *K = (unsigned char *) + "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07" + "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f" + "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17" + "\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f"; + unsigned char *X; + size_t generated_len = 0; + size_t inputlen = 0; + struct drbg_string *seed = NULL; + + memset(pad, 0, drbg_blocklen(drbg)); + memset(iv, 0, drbg_blocklen(drbg)); + + /* 10.4.2 step 1 is implicit as we work byte-wise */ + + /* 10.4.2 step 2 */ + if ((512/8) < bytes_to_return) + return -EINVAL; + + /* 10.4.2 step 2 -- calculate the entire length of all input data */ + list_for_each_entry(seed, seedlist, list) + inputlen += seed->len; + drbg_cpu_to_be32(inputlen, &L_N[0]); + + /* 10.4.2 step 3 */ + drbg_cpu_to_be32(bytes_to_return, &L_N[4]); + + /* 10.4.2 step 5: length is L_N, input_string, one byte, padding */ + padlen = (inputlen + sizeof(L_N) + 1) % (drbg_blocklen(drbg)); + /* wrap the padlen appropriately */ + if (padlen) + padlen = drbg_blocklen(drbg) - padlen; + /* + * pad / padlen contains the 0x80 byte and the following zero bytes. + * As the calculated padlen value only covers the number of zero + * bytes, this value has to be incremented by one for the 0x80 byte. + */ + padlen++; + pad[0] = 0x80; + + /* 10.4.2 step 4 -- first fill the linked list and then order it */ + drbg_string_fill(&S1, iv, drbg_blocklen(drbg)); + list_add_tail(&S1.list, &bcc_list); + drbg_string_fill(&S2, L_N, sizeof(L_N)); + list_add_tail(&S2.list, &bcc_list); + list_splice_tail(seedlist, &bcc_list); + drbg_string_fill(&S4, pad, padlen); + list_add_tail(&S4.list, &bcc_list); + + /* 10.4.2 step 9 */ + while (templen < (drbg_keylen(drbg) + (drbg_blocklen(drbg)))) { + /* + * 10.4.2 step 9.1 - the padding is implicit as the buffer + * holds zeros after allocation -- even the increment of i + * is irrelevant as the increment remains within length of i + */ + drbg_cpu_to_be32(i, iv); + /* 10.4.2 step 9.2 -- BCC and concatenation with temp */ + ret = drbg_ctr_bcc(drbg, temp + templen, K, &bcc_list); + if (ret) + goto out; + /* 10.4.2 step 9.3 */ + i++; + templen += drbg_blocklen(drbg); + } + + /* 10.4.2 step 11 */ + X = temp + (drbg_keylen(drbg)); + drbg_string_fill(&cipherin, X, drbg_blocklen(drbg)); + + /* 10.4.2 step 12: overwriting of outval is implemented in next step */ + + /* 10.4.2 step 13 */ + drbg_kcapi_symsetkey(drbg, temp); + while (generated_len < bytes_to_return) { + short blocklen = 0; + /* + * 10.4.2 step 13.1: the truncation of the key length is + * implicit as the key is only drbg_blocklen in size based on + * the implementation of the cipher function callback + */ + ret = drbg_kcapi_sym(drbg, X, &cipherin); + if (ret) + goto out; + blocklen = (drbg_blocklen(drbg) < + (bytes_to_return - generated_len)) ? + drbg_blocklen(drbg) : + (bytes_to_return - generated_len); + /* 10.4.2 step 13.2 and 14 */ + memcpy(df_data + generated_len, X, blocklen); + generated_len += blocklen; + } + + ret = 0; + +out: + memset(iv, 0, drbg_blocklen(drbg)); + memset(temp, 0, drbg_statelen(drbg) + drbg_blocklen(drbg)); + memset(pad, 0, drbg_blocklen(drbg)); + return ret; +} + +/* + * update function of CTR DRBG as defined in 10.2.1.2 + * + * The reseed variable has an enhanced meaning compared to the update + * functions of the other DRBGs as follows: + * 0 => initial seed from initialization + * 1 => reseed via drbg_seed + * 2 => first invocation from drbg_ctr_update when addtl is present. In + * this case, the df_data scratchpad is not deleted so that it is + * available for another calls to prevent calling the DF function + * again. + * 3 => second invocation from drbg_ctr_update. When the update function + * was called with addtl, the df_data memory already contains the + * DFed addtl information and we do not need to call DF again. + */ +static int drbg_ctr_update(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct list_head *seed, + int reseed) +{ + int ret = -EFAULT; + /* 10.2.1.2 step 1 */ + unsigned char *temp = drbg->scratchpad; + unsigned char *df_data = drbg->scratchpad + drbg_statelen(drbg) + + drbg_blocklen(drbg); + + if (3 > reseed) + memset(df_data, 0, drbg_statelen(drbg)); + + if (!reseed) { + /* + * The DRBG uses the CTR mode of the underlying AES cipher. The + * CTR mode increments the counter value after the AES operation + * but SP800-90A requires that the counter is incremented before + * the AES operation. Hence, we increment it at the time we set + * it by one. + */ + crypto_inc(drbg->V, drbg_blocklen(drbg)); + + ret = crypto_skcipher_setkey(drbg->ctr_handle, drbg->C, + drbg_keylen(drbg)); + if (ret) + goto out; + } + + /* 10.2.1.3.2 step 2 and 10.2.1.4.2 step 2 */ + if (seed) { + ret = drbg_ctr_df(drbg, df_data, drbg_statelen(drbg), seed); + if (ret) + goto out; + } + + ret = drbg_kcapi_sym_ctr(drbg, df_data, drbg_statelen(drbg), + temp, drbg_statelen(drbg)); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* 10.2.1.2 step 5 */ + ret = crypto_skcipher_setkey(drbg->ctr_handle, temp, + drbg_keylen(drbg)); + if (ret) + goto out; + /* 10.2.1.2 step 6 */ + memcpy(drbg->V, temp + drbg_keylen(drbg), drbg_blocklen(drbg)); + /* See above: increment counter by one to compensate timing of CTR op */ + crypto_inc(drbg->V, drbg_blocklen(drbg)); + ret = 0; + +out: + memset(temp, 0, drbg_statelen(drbg) + drbg_blocklen(drbg)); + if (2 != reseed) + memset(df_data, 0, drbg_statelen(drbg)); + return ret; +} + +/* + * scratchpad use: drbg_ctr_update is called independently from + * drbg_ctr_extract_bytes. Therefore, the scratchpad is reused + */ +/* Generate function of CTR DRBG as defined in 10.2.1.5.2 */ +static int drbg_ctr_generate(struct drbg_state *drbg, + unsigned char *buf, unsigned int buflen, + struct list_head *addtl) +{ + int ret; + int len = min_t(int, buflen, INT_MAX); + + /* 10.2.1.5.2 step 2 */ + if (addtl && !list_empty(addtl)) { + ret = drbg_ctr_update(drbg, addtl, 2); + if (ret) + return 0; + } + + /* 10.2.1.5.2 step 4.1 */ + ret = drbg_kcapi_sym_ctr(drbg, NULL, 0, buf, len); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* 10.2.1.5.2 step 6 */ + ret = drbg_ctr_update(drbg, NULL, 3); + if (ret) + len = ret; + + return len; +} + +static const struct drbg_state_ops drbg_ctr_ops = { + .update = drbg_ctr_update, + .generate = drbg_ctr_generate, + .crypto_init = drbg_init_sym_kernel, + .crypto_fini = drbg_fini_sym_kernel, +}; +#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR */ + +/****************************************************************** + * HMAC DRBG callback functions + ******************************************************************/ + +#if defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH) || defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC) +static int drbg_kcapi_hash(struct drbg_state *drbg, unsigned char *outval, + const struct list_head *in); +static void drbg_kcapi_hmacsetkey(struct drbg_state *drbg, + const unsigned char *key); +static int drbg_init_hash_kernel(struct drbg_state *drbg); +static int drbg_fini_hash_kernel(struct drbg_state *drbg); +#endif /* (CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH || CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC) */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC +#define CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC_STRING "HMAC " +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("drbg_pr_hmac_sha512"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("drbg_nopr_hmac_sha512"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("drbg_pr_hmac_sha384"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("drbg_nopr_hmac_sha384"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("drbg_pr_hmac_sha256"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("drbg_nopr_hmac_sha256"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("drbg_pr_hmac_sha1"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("drbg_nopr_hmac_sha1"); + +/* update function of HMAC DRBG as defined in 10.1.2.2 */ +static int drbg_hmac_update(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct list_head *seed, + int reseed) +{ + int ret = -EFAULT; + int i = 0; + struct drbg_string seed1, seed2, vdata; + LIST_HEAD(seedlist); + LIST_HEAD(vdatalist); + + if (!reseed) { + /* 10.1.2.3 step 2 -- memset(0) of C is implicit with kzalloc */ + memset(drbg->V, 1, drbg_statelen(drbg)); + drbg_kcapi_hmacsetkey(drbg, drbg->C); + } + + drbg_string_fill(&seed1, drbg->V, drbg_statelen(drbg)); + list_add_tail(&seed1.list, &seedlist); + /* buffer of seed2 will be filled in for loop below with one byte */ + drbg_string_fill(&seed2, NULL, 1); + list_add_tail(&seed2.list, &seedlist); + /* input data of seed is allowed to be NULL at this point */ + if (seed) + list_splice_tail(seed, &seedlist); + + drbg_string_fill(&vdata, drbg->V, drbg_statelen(drbg)); + list_add_tail(&vdata.list, &vdatalist); + for (i = 2; 0 < i; i--) { + /* first round uses 0x0, second 0x1 */ + unsigned char prefix = DRBG_PREFIX0; + if (1 == i) + prefix = DRBG_PREFIX1; + /* 10.1.2.2 step 1 and 4 -- concatenation and HMAC for key */ + seed2.buf = &prefix; + ret = drbg_kcapi_hash(drbg, drbg->C, &seedlist); + if (ret) + return ret; + drbg_kcapi_hmacsetkey(drbg, drbg->C); + + /* 10.1.2.2 step 2 and 5 -- HMAC for V */ + ret = drbg_kcapi_hash(drbg, drbg->V, &vdatalist); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* 10.1.2.2 step 3 */ + if (!seed) + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* generate function of HMAC DRBG as defined in 10.1.2.5 */ +static int drbg_hmac_generate(struct drbg_state *drbg, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned int buflen, + struct list_head *addtl) +{ + int len = 0; + int ret = 0; + struct drbg_string data; + LIST_HEAD(datalist); + + /* 10.1.2.5 step 2 */ + if (addtl && !list_empty(addtl)) { + ret = drbg_hmac_update(drbg, addtl, 1); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + + drbg_string_fill(&data, drbg->V, drbg_statelen(drbg)); + list_add_tail(&data.list, &datalist); + while (len < buflen) { + unsigned int outlen = 0; + /* 10.1.2.5 step 4.1 */ + ret = drbg_kcapi_hash(drbg, drbg->V, &datalist); + if (ret) + return ret; + outlen = (drbg_blocklen(drbg) < (buflen - len)) ? + drbg_blocklen(drbg) : (buflen - len); + + /* 10.1.2.5 step 4.2 */ + memcpy(buf + len, drbg->V, outlen); + len += outlen; + } + + /* 10.1.2.5 step 6 */ + if (addtl && !list_empty(addtl)) + ret = drbg_hmac_update(drbg, addtl, 1); + else + ret = drbg_hmac_update(drbg, NULL, 1); + if (ret) + return ret; + + return len; +} + +static const struct drbg_state_ops drbg_hmac_ops = { + .update = drbg_hmac_update, + .generate = drbg_hmac_generate, + .crypto_init = drbg_init_hash_kernel, + .crypto_fini = drbg_fini_hash_kernel, +}; +#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC */ + +/****************************************************************** + * Hash DRBG callback functions + ******************************************************************/ + +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH +#define CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH_STRING "HASH " +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("drbg_pr_sha512"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("drbg_nopr_sha512"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("drbg_pr_sha384"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("drbg_nopr_sha384"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("drbg_pr_sha256"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("drbg_nopr_sha256"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("drbg_pr_sha1"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("drbg_nopr_sha1"); + +/* + * Increment buffer + * + * @dst buffer to increment + * @add value to add + */ +static inline void drbg_add_buf(unsigned char *dst, size_t dstlen, + const unsigned char *add, size_t addlen) +{ + /* implied: dstlen > addlen */ + unsigned char *dstptr; + const unsigned char *addptr; + unsigned int remainder = 0; + size_t len = addlen; + + dstptr = dst + (dstlen-1); + addptr = add + (addlen-1); + while (len) { + remainder += *dstptr + *addptr; + *dstptr = remainder & 0xff; + remainder >>= 8; + len--; dstptr--; addptr--; + } + len = dstlen - addlen; + while (len && remainder > 0) { + remainder = *dstptr + 1; + *dstptr = remainder & 0xff; + remainder >>= 8; + len--; dstptr--; + } +} + +/* + * scratchpad usage: as drbg_hash_update and drbg_hash_df are used + * interlinked, the scratchpad is used as follows: + * drbg_hash_update + * start: drbg->scratchpad + * length: drbg_statelen(drbg) + * drbg_hash_df: + * start: drbg->scratchpad + drbg_statelen(drbg) + * length: drbg_blocklen(drbg) + * + * drbg_hash_process_addtl uses the scratchpad, but fully completes + * before either of the functions mentioned before are invoked. Therefore, + * drbg_hash_process_addtl does not need to be specifically considered. + */ + +/* Derivation Function for Hash DRBG as defined in 10.4.1 */ +static int drbg_hash_df(struct drbg_state *drbg, + unsigned char *outval, size_t outlen, + struct list_head *entropylist) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t len = 0; + unsigned char input[5]; + unsigned char *tmp = drbg->scratchpad + drbg_statelen(drbg); + struct drbg_string data; + + /* 10.4.1 step 3 */ + input[0] = 1; + drbg_cpu_to_be32((outlen * 8), &input[1]); + + /* 10.4.1 step 4.1 -- concatenation of data for input into hash */ + drbg_string_fill(&data, input, 5); + list_add(&data.list, entropylist); + + /* 10.4.1 step 4 */ + while (len < outlen) { + short blocklen = 0; + /* 10.4.1 step 4.1 */ + ret = drbg_kcapi_hash(drbg, tmp, entropylist); + if (ret) + goto out; + /* 10.4.1 step 4.2 */ + input[0]++; + blocklen = (drbg_blocklen(drbg) < (outlen - len)) ? + drbg_blocklen(drbg) : (outlen - len); + memcpy(outval + len, tmp, blocklen); + len += blocklen; + } + +out: + memset(tmp, 0, drbg_blocklen(drbg)); + return ret; +} + +/* update function for Hash DRBG as defined in 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 */ +static int drbg_hash_update(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct list_head *seed, + int reseed) +{ + int ret = 0; + struct drbg_string data1, data2; + LIST_HEAD(datalist); + LIST_HEAD(datalist2); + unsigned char *V = drbg->scratchpad; + unsigned char prefix = DRBG_PREFIX1; + + if (!seed) + return -EINVAL; + + if (reseed) { + /* 10.1.1.3 step 1 */ + memcpy(V, drbg->V, drbg_statelen(drbg)); + drbg_string_fill(&data1, &prefix, 1); + list_add_tail(&data1.list, &datalist); + drbg_string_fill(&data2, V, drbg_statelen(drbg)); + list_add_tail(&data2.list, &datalist); + } + list_splice_tail(seed, &datalist); + + /* 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 step 2 and 3 */ + ret = drbg_hash_df(drbg, drbg->V, drbg_statelen(drbg), &datalist); + if (ret) + goto out; + + /* 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 step 4 */ + prefix = DRBG_PREFIX0; + drbg_string_fill(&data1, &prefix, 1); + list_add_tail(&data1.list, &datalist2); + drbg_string_fill(&data2, drbg->V, drbg_statelen(drbg)); + list_add_tail(&data2.list, &datalist2); + /* 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 step 4 */ + ret = drbg_hash_df(drbg, drbg->C, drbg_statelen(drbg), &datalist2); + +out: + memset(drbg->scratchpad, 0, drbg_statelen(drbg)); + return ret; +} + +/* processing of additional information string for Hash DRBG */ +static int drbg_hash_process_addtl(struct drbg_state *drbg, + struct list_head *addtl) +{ + int ret = 0; + struct drbg_string data1, data2; + LIST_HEAD(datalist); + unsigned char prefix = DRBG_PREFIX2; + + /* 10.1.1.4 step 2 */ + if (!addtl || list_empty(addtl)) + return 0; + + /* 10.1.1.4 step 2a */ + drbg_string_fill(&data1, &prefix, 1); + drbg_string_fill(&data2, drbg->V, drbg_statelen(drbg)); + list_add_tail(&data1.list, &datalist); + list_add_tail(&data2.list, &datalist); + list_splice_tail(addtl, &datalist); + ret = drbg_kcapi_hash(drbg, drbg->scratchpad, &datalist); + if (ret) + goto out; + + /* 10.1.1.4 step 2b */ + drbg_add_buf(drbg->V, drbg_statelen(drbg), + drbg->scratchpad, drbg_blocklen(drbg)); + +out: + memset(drbg->scratchpad, 0, drbg_blocklen(drbg)); + return ret; +} + +/* Hashgen defined in 10.1.1.4 */ +static int drbg_hash_hashgen(struct drbg_state *drbg, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned int buflen) +{ + int len = 0; + int ret = 0; + unsigned char *src = drbg->scratchpad; + unsigned char *dst = drbg->scratchpad + drbg_statelen(drbg); + struct drbg_string data; + LIST_HEAD(datalist); + + /* 10.1.1.4 step hashgen 2 */ + memcpy(src, drbg->V, drbg_statelen(drbg)); + + drbg_string_fill(&data, src, drbg_statelen(drbg)); + list_add_tail(&data.list, &datalist); + while (len < buflen) { + unsigned int outlen = 0; + /* 10.1.1.4 step hashgen 4.1 */ + ret = drbg_kcapi_hash(drbg, dst, &datalist); + if (ret) { + len = ret; + goto out; + } + outlen = (drbg_blocklen(drbg) < (buflen - len)) ? + drbg_blocklen(drbg) : (buflen - len); + /* 10.1.1.4 step hashgen 4.2 */ + memcpy(buf + len, dst, outlen); + len += outlen; + /* 10.1.1.4 hashgen step 4.3 */ + if (len < buflen) + crypto_inc(src, drbg_statelen(drbg)); + } + +out: + memset(drbg->scratchpad, 0, + (drbg_statelen(drbg) + drbg_blocklen(drbg))); + return len; +} + +/* generate function for Hash DRBG as defined in 10.1.1.4 */ +static int drbg_hash_generate(struct drbg_state *drbg, + unsigned char *buf, unsigned int buflen, + struct list_head *addtl) +{ + int len = 0; + int ret = 0; + union { + unsigned char req[8]; + __be64 req_int; + } u; + unsigned char prefix = DRBG_PREFIX3; + struct drbg_string data1, data2; + LIST_HEAD(datalist); + + /* 10.1.1.4 step 2 */ + ret = drbg_hash_process_addtl(drbg, addtl); + if (ret) + return ret; + /* 10.1.1.4 step 3 */ + len = drbg_hash_hashgen(drbg, buf, buflen); + + /* this is the value H as documented in 10.1.1.4 */ + /* 10.1.1.4 step 4 */ + drbg_string_fill(&data1, &prefix, 1); + list_add_tail(&data1.list, &datalist); + drbg_string_fill(&data2, drbg->V, drbg_statelen(drbg)); + list_add_tail(&data2.list, &datalist); + ret = drbg_kcapi_hash(drbg, drbg->scratchpad, &datalist); + if (ret) { + len = ret; + goto out; + } + + /* 10.1.1.4 step 5 */ + drbg_add_buf(drbg->V, drbg_statelen(drbg), + drbg->scratchpad, drbg_blocklen(drbg)); + drbg_add_buf(drbg->V, drbg_statelen(drbg), + drbg->C, drbg_statelen(drbg)); + u.req_int = cpu_to_be64(drbg->reseed_ctr); + drbg_add_buf(drbg->V, drbg_statelen(drbg), u.req, 8); + +out: + memset(drbg->scratchpad, 0, drbg_blocklen(drbg)); + return len; +} + +/* + * scratchpad usage: as update and generate are used isolated, both + * can use the scratchpad + */ +static const struct drbg_state_ops drbg_hash_ops = { + .update = drbg_hash_update, + .generate = drbg_hash_generate, + .crypto_init = drbg_init_hash_kernel, + .crypto_fini = drbg_fini_hash_kernel, +}; +#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH */ + +/****************************************************************** + * Functions common for DRBG implementations + ******************************************************************/ + +static inline int __drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct list_head *seed, + int reseed, enum drbg_seed_state new_seed_state) +{ + int ret = drbg->d_ops->update(drbg, seed, reseed); + + if (ret) + return ret; + + drbg->seeded = new_seed_state; + drbg->last_seed_time = jiffies; + /* 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 step 5 */ + drbg->reseed_ctr = 1; + + switch (drbg->seeded) { + case DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED: + /* Impossible, but handle it to silence compiler warnings. */ + fallthrough; + case DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL: + /* + * Require frequent reseeds until the seed source is + * fully initialized. + */ + drbg->reseed_threshold = 50; + break; + + case DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL: + /* + * Seed source has become fully initialized, frequent + * reseeds no longer required. + */ + drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg); + break; + } + + return ret; +} + +static inline int drbg_get_random_bytes(struct drbg_state *drbg, + unsigned char *entropy, + unsigned int entropylen) +{ + int ret; + + do { + get_random_bytes(entropy, entropylen); + ret = drbg_fips_continuous_test(drbg, entropy); + if (ret && ret != -EAGAIN) + return ret; + } while (ret); + + return 0; +} + +static int drbg_seed_from_random(struct drbg_state *drbg) +{ + struct drbg_string data; + LIST_HEAD(seedlist); + unsigned int entropylen = drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags); + unsigned char entropy[32]; + int ret; + + BUG_ON(!entropylen); + BUG_ON(entropylen > sizeof(entropy)); + + drbg_string_fill(&data, entropy, entropylen); + list_add_tail(&data.list, &seedlist); + + ret = drbg_get_random_bytes(drbg, entropy, entropylen); + if (ret) + goto out; + + ret = __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, true, DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL); + +out: + memzero_explicit(entropy, entropylen); + return ret; +} + +static bool drbg_nopr_reseed_interval_elapsed(struct drbg_state *drbg) +{ + unsigned long next_reseed; + + /* Don't ever reseed from get_random_bytes() in test mode. */ + if (list_empty(&drbg->test_data.list)) + return false; + + /* + * Obtain fresh entropy for the nopr DRBGs after 300s have + * elapsed in order to still achieve sort of partial + * prediction resistance over the time domain at least. Note + * that the period of 300s has been chosen to match the + * CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL of the get_random_bytes()' chacha + * rngs. + */ + next_reseed = drbg->last_seed_time + 300 * HZ; + return time_after(jiffies, next_reseed); +} + +/* + * Seeding or reseeding of the DRBG + * + * @drbg: DRBG state struct + * @pers: personalization / additional information buffer + * @reseed: 0 for initial seed process, 1 for reseeding + * + * return: + * 0 on success + * error value otherwise + */ +static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers, + bool reseed) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char entropy[((32 + 16) * 2)]; + unsigned int entropylen = drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags); + struct drbg_string data1; + LIST_HEAD(seedlist); + enum drbg_seed_state new_seed_state = DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL; + + /* 9.1 / 9.2 / 9.3.1 step 3 */ + if (pers && pers->len > (drbg_max_addtl(drbg))) { + pr_devel("DRBG: personalization string too long %zu\n", + pers->len); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (list_empty(&drbg->test_data.list)) { + drbg_string_fill(&data1, drbg->test_data.buf, + drbg->test_data.len); + pr_devel("DRBG: using test entropy\n"); + } else { + /* + * Gather entropy equal to the security strength of the DRBG. + * With a derivation function, a nonce is required in addition + * to the entropy. A nonce must be at least 1/2 of the security + * strength of the DRBG in size. Thus, entropy + nonce is 3/2 + * of the strength. The consideration of a nonce is only + * applicable during initial seeding. + */ + BUG_ON(!entropylen); + if (!reseed) + entropylen = ((entropylen + 1) / 2) * 3; + BUG_ON((entropylen * 2) > sizeof(entropy)); + + /* Get seed from in-kernel /dev/urandom */ + if (!rng_is_initialized()) + new_seed_state = DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL; + + ret = drbg_get_random_bytes(drbg, entropy, entropylen); + if (ret) + goto out; + + if (!drbg->jent) { + drbg_string_fill(&data1, entropy, entropylen); + pr_devel("DRBG: (re)seeding with %u bytes of entropy\n", + entropylen); + } else { + /* + * Get seed from Jitter RNG, failures are + * fatal only in FIPS mode. + */ + ret = crypto_rng_get_bytes(drbg->jent, + entropy + entropylen, + entropylen); + if (fips_enabled && ret) { + pr_devel("DRBG: jent failed with %d\n", ret); + + /* + * Do not treat the transient failure of the + * Jitter RNG as an error that needs to be + * reported. The combined number of the + * maximum reseed threshold times the maximum + * number of Jitter RNG transient errors is + * less than the reseed threshold required by + * SP800-90A allowing us to treat the + * transient errors as such. + * + * However, we mandate that at least the first + * seeding operation must succeed with the + * Jitter RNG. + */ + if (!reseed || ret != -EAGAIN) + goto out; + } + + drbg_string_fill(&data1, entropy, entropylen * 2); + pr_devel("DRBG: (re)seeding with %u bytes of entropy\n", + entropylen * 2); + } + } + list_add_tail(&data1.list, &seedlist); + + /* + * concatenation of entropy with personalization str / addtl input) + * the variable pers is directly handed in by the caller, so check its + * contents whether it is appropriate + */ + if (pers && pers->buf && 0 < pers->len) { + list_add_tail(&pers->list, &seedlist); + pr_devel("DRBG: using personalization string\n"); + } + + if (!reseed) { + memset(drbg->V, 0, drbg_statelen(drbg)); + memset(drbg->C, 0, drbg_statelen(drbg)); + } + + ret = __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, reseed, new_seed_state); + +out: + memzero_explicit(entropy, entropylen * 2); + + return ret; +} + +/* Free all substructures in a DRBG state without the DRBG state structure */ +static inline void drbg_dealloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg) +{ + if (!drbg) + return; + kfree_sensitive(drbg->Vbuf); + drbg->Vbuf = NULL; + drbg->V = NULL; + kfree_sensitive(drbg->Cbuf); + drbg->Cbuf = NULL; + drbg->C = NULL; + kfree_sensitive(drbg->scratchpadbuf); + drbg->scratchpadbuf = NULL; + drbg->reseed_ctr = 0; + drbg->d_ops = NULL; + drbg->core = NULL; + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS)) { + kfree_sensitive(drbg->prev); + drbg->prev = NULL; + drbg->fips_primed = false; + } +} + +/* + * Allocate all sub-structures for a DRBG state. + * The DRBG state structure must already be allocated. + */ +static inline int drbg_alloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg) +{ + int ret = -ENOMEM; + unsigned int sb_size = 0; + + switch (drbg->core->flags & DRBG_TYPE_MASK) { +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC + case DRBG_HMAC: + drbg->d_ops = &drbg_hmac_ops; + break; +#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC */ +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH + case DRBG_HASH: + drbg->d_ops = &drbg_hash_ops; + break; +#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH */ +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR + case DRBG_CTR: + drbg->d_ops = &drbg_ctr_ops; + break; +#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR */ + default: + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; + goto err; + } + + ret = drbg->d_ops->crypto_init(drbg); + if (ret < 0) + goto err; + + drbg->Vbuf = kmalloc(drbg_statelen(drbg) + ret, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!drbg->Vbuf) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto fini; + } + drbg->V = PTR_ALIGN(drbg->Vbuf, ret + 1); + drbg->Cbuf = kmalloc(drbg_statelen(drbg) + ret, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!drbg->Cbuf) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto fini; + } + drbg->C = PTR_ALIGN(drbg->Cbuf, ret + 1); + /* scratchpad is only generated for CTR and Hash */ + if (drbg->core->flags & DRBG_HMAC) + sb_size = 0; + else if (drbg->core->flags & DRBG_CTR) + sb_size = drbg_statelen(drbg) + drbg_blocklen(drbg) + /* temp */ + drbg_statelen(drbg) + /* df_data */ + drbg_blocklen(drbg) + /* pad */ + drbg_blocklen(drbg) + /* iv */ + drbg_statelen(drbg) + drbg_blocklen(drbg); /* temp */ + else + sb_size = drbg_statelen(drbg) + drbg_blocklen(drbg); + + if (0 < sb_size) { + drbg->scratchpadbuf = kzalloc(sb_size + ret, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!drbg->scratchpadbuf) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto fini; + } + drbg->scratchpad = PTR_ALIGN(drbg->scratchpadbuf, ret + 1); + } + + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS)) { + drbg->prev = kzalloc(drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!drbg->prev) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto fini; + } + drbg->fips_primed = false; + } + + return 0; + +fini: + drbg->d_ops->crypto_fini(drbg); +err: + drbg_dealloc_state(drbg); + return ret; +} + +/************************************************************************* + * DRBG interface functions + *************************************************************************/ + +/* + * DRBG generate function as required by SP800-90A - this function + * generates random numbers + * + * @drbg DRBG state handle + * @buf Buffer where to store the random numbers -- the buffer must already + * be pre-allocated by caller + * @buflen Length of output buffer - this value defines the number of random + * bytes pulled from DRBG + * @addtl Additional input that is mixed into state, may be NULL -- note + * the entropy is pulled by the DRBG internally unconditionally + * as defined in SP800-90A. The additional input is mixed into + * the state in addition to the pulled entropy. + * + * return: 0 when all bytes are generated; < 0 in case of an error + */ +static int drbg_generate(struct drbg_state *drbg, + unsigned char *buf, unsigned int buflen, + struct drbg_string *addtl) +{ + int len = 0; + LIST_HEAD(addtllist); + + if (!drbg->core) { + pr_devel("DRBG: not yet seeded\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (0 == buflen || !buf) { + pr_devel("DRBG: no output buffer provided\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (addtl && NULL == addtl->buf && 0 < addtl->len) { + pr_devel("DRBG: wrong format of additional information\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* 9.3.1 step 2 */ + len = -EINVAL; + if (buflen > (drbg_max_request_bytes(drbg))) { + pr_devel("DRBG: requested random numbers too large %u\n", + buflen); + goto err; + } + + /* 9.3.1 step 3 is implicit with the chosen DRBG */ + + /* 9.3.1 step 4 */ + if (addtl && addtl->len > (drbg_max_addtl(drbg))) { + pr_devel("DRBG: additional information string too long %zu\n", + addtl->len); + goto err; + } + /* 9.3.1 step 5 is implicit with the chosen DRBG */ + + /* + * 9.3.1 step 6 and 9 supplemented by 9.3.2 step c is implemented + * here. The spec is a bit convoluted here, we make it simpler. + */ + if (drbg->reseed_threshold < drbg->reseed_ctr) + drbg->seeded = DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED; + + if (drbg->pr || drbg->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED) { + pr_devel("DRBG: reseeding before generation (prediction " + "resistance: %s, state %s)\n", + drbg->pr ? "true" : "false", + (drbg->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL ? + "seeded" : "unseeded")); + /* 9.3.1 steps 7.1 through 7.3 */ + len = drbg_seed(drbg, addtl, true); + if (len) + goto err; + /* 9.3.1 step 7.4 */ + addtl = NULL; + } else if (rng_is_initialized() && + (drbg->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL || + drbg_nopr_reseed_interval_elapsed(drbg))) { + len = drbg_seed_from_random(drbg); + if (len) + goto err; + } + + if (addtl && 0 < addtl->len) + list_add_tail(&addtl->list, &addtllist); + /* 9.3.1 step 8 and 10 */ + len = drbg->d_ops->generate(drbg, buf, buflen, &addtllist); + + /* 10.1.1.4 step 6, 10.1.2.5 step 7, 10.2.1.5.2 step 7 */ + drbg->reseed_ctr++; + if (0 >= len) + goto err; + + /* + * Section 11.3.3 requires to re-perform self tests after some + * generated random numbers. The chosen value after which self + * test is performed is arbitrary, but it should be reasonable. + * However, we do not perform the self tests because of the following + * reasons: it is mathematically impossible that the initial self tests + * were successfully and the following are not. If the initial would + * pass and the following would not, the kernel integrity is violated. + * In this case, the entire kernel operation is questionable and it + * is unlikely that the integrity violation only affects the + * correct operation of the DRBG. + * + * Albeit the following code is commented out, it is provided in + * case somebody has a need to implement the test of 11.3.3. + */ +#if 0 + if (drbg->reseed_ctr && !(drbg->reseed_ctr % 4096)) { + int err = 0; + pr_devel("DRBG: start to perform self test\n"); + if (drbg->core->flags & DRBG_HMAC) + err = alg_test("drbg_pr_hmac_sha256", + "drbg_pr_hmac_sha256", 0, 0); + else if (drbg->core->flags & DRBG_CTR) + err = alg_test("drbg_pr_ctr_aes128", + "drbg_pr_ctr_aes128", 0, 0); + else + err = alg_test("drbg_pr_sha256", + "drbg_pr_sha256", 0, 0); + if (err) { + pr_err("DRBG: periodical self test failed\n"); + /* + * uninstantiate implies that from now on, only errors + * are returned when reusing this DRBG cipher handle + */ + drbg_uninstantiate(drbg); + return 0; + } else { + pr_devel("DRBG: self test successful\n"); + } + } +#endif + + /* + * All operations were successful, return 0 as mandated by + * the kernel crypto API interface. + */ + len = 0; +err: + return len; +} + +/* + * Wrapper around drbg_generate which can pull arbitrary long strings + * from the DRBG without hitting the maximum request limitation. + * + * Parameters: see drbg_generate + * Return codes: see drbg_generate -- if one drbg_generate request fails, + * the entire drbg_generate_long request fails + */ +static int drbg_generate_long(struct drbg_state *drbg, + unsigned char *buf, unsigned int buflen, + struct drbg_string *addtl) +{ + unsigned int len = 0; + unsigned int slice = 0; + do { + int err = 0; + unsigned int chunk = 0; + slice = ((buflen - len) / drbg_max_request_bytes(drbg)); + chunk = slice ? drbg_max_request_bytes(drbg) : (buflen - len); + mutex_lock(&drbg->drbg_mutex); + err = drbg_generate(drbg, buf + len, chunk, addtl); + mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex); + if (0 > err) + return err; + len += chunk; + } while (slice > 0 && (len < buflen)); + return 0; +} + +static int drbg_prepare_hrng(struct drbg_state *drbg) +{ + /* We do not need an HRNG in test mode. */ + if (list_empty(&drbg->test_data.list)) + return 0; + + drbg->jent = crypto_alloc_rng("jitterentropy_rng", 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(drbg->jent)) { + const int err = PTR_ERR(drbg->jent); + + drbg->jent = NULL; + if (fips_enabled) + return err; + pr_info("DRBG: Continuing without Jitter RNG\n"); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * DRBG instantiation function as required by SP800-90A - this function + * sets up the DRBG handle, performs the initial seeding and all sanity + * checks required by SP800-90A + * + * @drbg memory of state -- if NULL, new memory is allocated + * @pers Personalization string that is mixed into state, may be NULL -- note + * the entropy is pulled by the DRBG internally unconditionally + * as defined in SP800-90A. The additional input is mixed into + * the state in addition to the pulled entropy. + * @coreref reference to core + * @pr prediction resistance enabled + * + * return + * 0 on success + * error value otherwise + */ +static int drbg_instantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers, + int coreref, bool pr) +{ + int ret; + bool reseed = true; + + pr_devel("DRBG: Initializing DRBG core %d with prediction resistance " + "%s\n", coreref, pr ? "enabled" : "disabled"); + mutex_lock(&drbg->drbg_mutex); + + /* 9.1 step 1 is implicit with the selected DRBG type */ + + /* + * 9.1 step 2 is implicit as caller can select prediction resistance + * and the flag is copied into drbg->flags -- + * all DRBG types support prediction resistance + */ + + /* 9.1 step 4 is implicit in drbg_sec_strength */ + + if (!drbg->core) { + drbg->core = &drbg_cores[coreref]; + drbg->pr = pr; + drbg->seeded = DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED; + drbg->last_seed_time = 0; + drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg); + + ret = drbg_alloc_state(drbg); + if (ret) + goto unlock; + + ret = drbg_prepare_hrng(drbg); + if (ret) + goto free_everything; + + reseed = false; + } + + ret = drbg_seed(drbg, pers, reseed); + + if (ret && !reseed) + goto free_everything; + + mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex); + return ret; + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex); + return ret; + +free_everything: + mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex); + drbg_uninstantiate(drbg); + return ret; +} + +/* + * DRBG uninstantiate function as required by SP800-90A - this function + * frees all buffers and the DRBG handle + * + * @drbg DRBG state handle + * + * return + * 0 on success + */ +static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg) +{ + if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(drbg->jent)) + crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent); + drbg->jent = NULL; + + if (drbg->d_ops) + drbg->d_ops->crypto_fini(drbg); + drbg_dealloc_state(drbg); + /* no scrubbing of test_data -- this shall survive an uninstantiate */ + return 0; +} + +/* + * Helper function for setting the test data in the DRBG + * + * @drbg DRBG state handle + * @data test data + * @len test data length + */ +static void drbg_kcapi_set_entropy(struct crypto_rng *tfm, + const u8 *data, unsigned int len) +{ + struct drbg_state *drbg = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm); + + mutex_lock(&drbg->drbg_mutex); + drbg_string_fill(&drbg->test_data, data, len); + mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex); +} + +/*************************************************************** + * Kernel crypto API cipher invocations requested by DRBG + ***************************************************************/ + +#if defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH) || defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC) +struct sdesc { + struct shash_desc shash; + char ctx[]; +}; + +static int drbg_init_hash_kernel(struct drbg_state *drbg) +{ + struct sdesc *sdesc; + struct crypto_shash *tfm; + + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(drbg->core->backend_cra_name, 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { + pr_info("DRBG: could not allocate digest TFM handle: %s\n", + drbg->core->backend_cra_name); + return PTR_ERR(tfm); + } + BUG_ON(drbg_blocklen(drbg) != crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm)); + sdesc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!sdesc) { + crypto_free_shash(tfm); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + sdesc->shash.tfm = tfm; + drbg->priv_data = sdesc; + + return crypto_shash_alignmask(tfm); +} + +static int drbg_fini_hash_kernel(struct drbg_state *drbg) +{ + struct sdesc *sdesc = drbg->priv_data; + if (sdesc) { + crypto_free_shash(sdesc->shash.tfm); + kfree_sensitive(sdesc); + } + drbg->priv_data = NULL; + return 0; +} + +static void drbg_kcapi_hmacsetkey(struct drbg_state *drbg, + const unsigned char *key) +{ + struct sdesc *sdesc = drbg->priv_data; + + crypto_shash_setkey(sdesc->shash.tfm, key, drbg_statelen(drbg)); +} + +static int drbg_kcapi_hash(struct drbg_state *drbg, unsigned char *outval, + const struct list_head *in) +{ + struct sdesc *sdesc = drbg->priv_data; + struct drbg_string *input = NULL; + + crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash); + list_for_each_entry(input, in, list) + crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, input->buf, input->len); + return crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, outval); +} +#endif /* (CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH || CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC) */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR +static int drbg_fini_sym_kernel(struct drbg_state *drbg) +{ + struct crypto_cipher *tfm = + (struct crypto_cipher *)drbg->priv_data; + if (tfm) + crypto_free_cipher(tfm); + drbg->priv_data = NULL; + + if (drbg->ctr_handle) + crypto_free_skcipher(drbg->ctr_handle); + drbg->ctr_handle = NULL; + + if (drbg->ctr_req) + skcipher_request_free(drbg->ctr_req); + drbg->ctr_req = NULL; + + kfree(drbg->outscratchpadbuf); + drbg->outscratchpadbuf = NULL; + + return 0; +} + +static int drbg_init_sym_kernel(struct drbg_state *drbg) +{ + struct crypto_cipher *tfm; + struct crypto_skcipher *sk_tfm; + struct skcipher_request *req; + unsigned int alignmask; + char ctr_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; + + tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher(drbg->core->backend_cra_name, 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { + pr_info("DRBG: could not allocate cipher TFM handle: %s\n", + drbg->core->backend_cra_name); + return PTR_ERR(tfm); + } + BUG_ON(drbg_blocklen(drbg) != crypto_cipher_blocksize(tfm)); + drbg->priv_data = tfm; + + if (snprintf(ctr_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "ctr(%s)", + drbg->core->backend_cra_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) { + drbg_fini_sym_kernel(drbg); + return -EINVAL; + } + sk_tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(ctr_name, 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(sk_tfm)) { + pr_info("DRBG: could not allocate CTR cipher TFM handle: %s\n", + ctr_name); + drbg_fini_sym_kernel(drbg); + return PTR_ERR(sk_tfm); + } + drbg->ctr_handle = sk_tfm; + crypto_init_wait(&drbg->ctr_wait); + + req = skcipher_request_alloc(sk_tfm, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!req) { + pr_info("DRBG: could not allocate request queue\n"); + drbg_fini_sym_kernel(drbg); + return -ENOMEM; + } + drbg->ctr_req = req; + skcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | + CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, + crypto_req_done, &drbg->ctr_wait); + + alignmask = crypto_skcipher_alignmask(sk_tfm); + drbg->outscratchpadbuf = kmalloc(DRBG_OUTSCRATCHLEN + alignmask, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!drbg->outscratchpadbuf) { + drbg_fini_sym_kernel(drbg); + return -ENOMEM; + } + drbg->outscratchpad = (u8 *)PTR_ALIGN(drbg->outscratchpadbuf, + alignmask + 1); + + sg_init_table(&drbg->sg_in, 1); + sg_init_one(&drbg->sg_out, drbg->outscratchpad, DRBG_OUTSCRATCHLEN); + + return alignmask; +} + +static void drbg_kcapi_symsetkey(struct drbg_state *drbg, + const unsigned char *key) +{ + struct crypto_cipher *tfm = drbg->priv_data; + + crypto_cipher_setkey(tfm, key, (drbg_keylen(drbg))); +} + +static int drbg_kcapi_sym(struct drbg_state *drbg, unsigned char *outval, + const struct drbg_string *in) +{ + struct crypto_cipher *tfm = drbg->priv_data; + + /* there is only component in *in */ + BUG_ON(in->len < drbg_blocklen(drbg)); + crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, outval, in->buf); + return 0; +} + +static int drbg_kcapi_sym_ctr(struct drbg_state *drbg, + u8 *inbuf, u32 inlen, + u8 *outbuf, u32 outlen) +{ + struct scatterlist *sg_in = &drbg->sg_in, *sg_out = &drbg->sg_out; + u32 scratchpad_use = min_t(u32, outlen, DRBG_OUTSCRATCHLEN); + int ret; + + if (inbuf) { + /* Use caller-provided input buffer */ + sg_set_buf(sg_in, inbuf, inlen); + } else { + /* Use scratchpad for in-place operation */ + inlen = scratchpad_use; + memset(drbg->outscratchpad, 0, scratchpad_use); + sg_set_buf(sg_in, drbg->outscratchpad, scratchpad_use); + } + + while (outlen) { + u32 cryptlen = min3(inlen, outlen, (u32)DRBG_OUTSCRATCHLEN); + + /* Output buffer may not be valid for SGL, use scratchpad */ + skcipher_request_set_crypt(drbg->ctr_req, sg_in, sg_out, + cryptlen, drbg->V); + ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(drbg->ctr_req), + &drbg->ctr_wait); + if (ret) + goto out; + + crypto_init_wait(&drbg->ctr_wait); + + memcpy(outbuf, drbg->outscratchpad, cryptlen); + memzero_explicit(drbg->outscratchpad, cryptlen); + + outlen -= cryptlen; + outbuf += cryptlen; + } + ret = 0; + +out: + return ret; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR */ + +/*************************************************************** + * Kernel crypto API interface to register DRBG + ***************************************************************/ + +/* + * Look up the DRBG flags by given kernel crypto API cra_name + * The code uses the drbg_cores definition to do this + * + * @cra_name kernel crypto API cra_name + * @coreref reference to integer which is filled with the pointer to + * the applicable core + * @pr reference for setting prediction resistance + * + * return: flags + */ +static inline void drbg_convert_tfm_core(const char *cra_driver_name, + int *coreref, bool *pr) +{ + int i = 0; + size_t start = 0; + int len = 0; + + *pr = true; + /* disassemble the names */ + if (!memcmp(cra_driver_name, "drbg_nopr_", 10)) { + start = 10; + *pr = false; + } else if (!memcmp(cra_driver_name, "drbg_pr_", 8)) { + start = 8; + } else { + return; + } + + /* remove the first part */ + len = strlen(cra_driver_name) - start; + for (i = 0; ARRAY_SIZE(drbg_cores) > i; i++) { + if (!memcmp(cra_driver_name + start, drbg_cores[i].cra_name, + len)) { + *coreref = i; + return; + } + } +} + +static int drbg_kcapi_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) +{ + struct drbg_state *drbg = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); + + mutex_init(&drbg->drbg_mutex); + + return 0; +} + +static void drbg_kcapi_cleanup(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) +{ + drbg_uninstantiate(crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm)); +} + +/* + * Generate random numbers invoked by the kernel crypto API: + * The API of the kernel crypto API is extended as follows: + * + * src is additional input supplied to the RNG. + * slen is the length of src. + * dst is the output buffer where random data is to be stored. + * dlen is the length of dst. + */ +static int drbg_kcapi_random(struct crypto_rng *tfm, + const u8 *src, unsigned int slen, + u8 *dst, unsigned int dlen) +{ + struct drbg_state *drbg = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm); + struct drbg_string *addtl = NULL; + struct drbg_string string; + + if (slen) { + /* linked list variable is now local to allow modification */ + drbg_string_fill(&string, src, slen); + addtl = &string; + } + + return drbg_generate_long(drbg, dst, dlen, addtl); +} + +/* + * Seed the DRBG invoked by the kernel crypto API + */ +static int drbg_kcapi_seed(struct crypto_rng *tfm, + const u8 *seed, unsigned int slen) +{ + struct drbg_state *drbg = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm); + struct crypto_tfm *tfm_base = crypto_rng_tfm(tfm); + bool pr = false; + struct drbg_string string; + struct drbg_string *seed_string = NULL; + int coreref = 0; + + drbg_convert_tfm_core(crypto_tfm_alg_driver_name(tfm_base), &coreref, + &pr); + if (0 < slen) { + drbg_string_fill(&string, seed, slen); + seed_string = &string; + } + + return drbg_instantiate(drbg, seed_string, coreref, pr); +} + +/*************************************************************** + * Kernel module: code to load the module + ***************************************************************/ + +/* + * Tests as defined in 11.3.2 in addition to the cipher tests: testing + * of the error handling. + * + * Note: testing of failing seed source as defined in 11.3.2 is not applicable + * as seed source of get_random_bytes does not fail. + * + * Note 2: There is no sensible way of testing the reseed counter + * enforcement, so skip it. + */ +static inline int __init drbg_healthcheck_sanity(void) +{ + int len = 0; +#define OUTBUFLEN 16 + unsigned char buf[OUTBUFLEN]; + struct drbg_state *drbg = NULL; + int ret; + int rc = -EFAULT; + bool pr = false; + int coreref = 0; + struct drbg_string addtl; + size_t max_addtllen, max_request_bytes; + + /* only perform test in FIPS mode */ + if (!fips_enabled) + return 0; + +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR + drbg_convert_tfm_core("drbg_nopr_ctr_aes128", &coreref, &pr); +#elif defined CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH + drbg_convert_tfm_core("drbg_nopr_sha256", &coreref, &pr); +#else + drbg_convert_tfm_core("drbg_nopr_hmac_sha256", &coreref, &pr); +#endif + + drbg = kzalloc(sizeof(struct drbg_state), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!drbg) + return -ENOMEM; + + mutex_init(&drbg->drbg_mutex); + drbg->core = &drbg_cores[coreref]; + drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg); + + /* + * if the following tests fail, it is likely that there is a buffer + * overflow as buf is much smaller than the requested or provided + * string lengths -- in case the error handling does not succeed + * we may get an OOPS. And we want to get an OOPS as this is a + * grave bug. + */ + + max_addtllen = drbg_max_addtl(drbg); + max_request_bytes = drbg_max_request_bytes(drbg); + drbg_string_fill(&addtl, buf, max_addtllen + 1); + /* overflow addtllen with additonal info string */ + len = drbg_generate(drbg, buf, OUTBUFLEN, &addtl); + BUG_ON(0 < len); + /* overflow max_bits */ + len = drbg_generate(drbg, buf, (max_request_bytes + 1), NULL); + BUG_ON(0 < len); + + /* overflow max addtllen with personalization string */ + ret = drbg_seed(drbg, &addtl, false); + BUG_ON(0 == ret); + /* all tests passed */ + rc = 0; + + pr_devel("DRBG: Sanity tests for failure code paths successfully " + "completed\n"); + + kfree(drbg); + return rc; +} + +static struct rng_alg drbg_algs[22]; + +/* + * Fill the array drbg_algs used to register the different DRBGs + * with the kernel crypto API. To fill the array, the information + * from drbg_cores[] is used. + */ +static inline void __init drbg_fill_array(struct rng_alg *alg, + const struct drbg_core *core, int pr) +{ + int pos = 0; + static int priority = 200; + + memcpy(alg->base.cra_name, "stdrng", 6); + if (pr) { + memcpy(alg->base.cra_driver_name, "drbg_pr_", 8); + pos = 8; + } else { + memcpy(alg->base.cra_driver_name, "drbg_nopr_", 10); + pos = 10; + } + memcpy(alg->base.cra_driver_name + pos, core->cra_name, + strlen(core->cra_name)); + + alg->base.cra_priority = priority; + priority++; + /* + * If FIPS mode enabled, the selected DRBG shall have the + * highest cra_priority over other stdrng instances to ensure + * it is selected. + */ + if (fips_enabled) + alg->base.cra_priority += 200; + + alg->base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct drbg_state); + alg->base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE; + alg->base.cra_init = drbg_kcapi_init; + alg->base.cra_exit = drbg_kcapi_cleanup; + alg->generate = drbg_kcapi_random; + alg->seed = drbg_kcapi_seed; + alg->set_ent = drbg_kcapi_set_entropy; + alg->seedsize = 0; +} + +static int __init drbg_init(void) +{ + unsigned int i = 0; /* pointer to drbg_algs */ + unsigned int j = 0; /* pointer to drbg_cores */ + int ret; + + ret = drbg_healthcheck_sanity(); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (ARRAY_SIZE(drbg_cores) * 2 > ARRAY_SIZE(drbg_algs)) { + pr_info("DRBG: Cannot register all DRBG types" + "(slots needed: %zu, slots available: %zu)\n", + ARRAY_SIZE(drbg_cores) * 2, ARRAY_SIZE(drbg_algs)); + return -EFAULT; + } + + /* + * each DRBG definition can be used with PR and without PR, thus + * we instantiate each DRBG in drbg_cores[] twice. + * + * As the order of placing them into the drbg_algs array matters + * (the later DRBGs receive a higher cra_priority) we register the + * prediction resistance DRBGs first as the should not be too + * interesting. + */ + for (j = 0; ARRAY_SIZE(drbg_cores) > j; j++, i++) + drbg_fill_array(&drbg_algs[i], &drbg_cores[j], 1); + for (j = 0; ARRAY_SIZE(drbg_cores) > j; j++, i++) + drbg_fill_array(&drbg_algs[i], &drbg_cores[j], 0); + return crypto_register_rngs(drbg_algs, (ARRAY_SIZE(drbg_cores) * 2)); +} + +static void __exit drbg_exit(void) +{ + crypto_unregister_rngs(drbg_algs, (ARRAY_SIZE(drbg_cores) * 2)); +} + +subsys_initcall(drbg_init); +module_exit(drbg_exit); +#ifndef CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH_STRING +#define CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH_STRING "" +#endif +#ifndef CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC_STRING +#define CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC_STRING "" +#endif +#ifndef CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR_STRING +#define CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR_STRING "" +#endif +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("NIST SP800-90A Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) " + "using following cores: " + CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH_STRING + CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC_STRING + CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR_STRING); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("stdrng"); +MODULE_IMPORT_NS(CRYPTO_INTERNAL); |