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-rw-r--r--crypto/testmgr.c5931
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diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c
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+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Algorithm testing framework and tests.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 James Morris <jmorris@intercode.com.au>
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Jean-Francois Dive <jef@linuxbe.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2007 Nokia Siemens Networks
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
+ *
+ * Updated RFC4106 AES-GCM testing.
+ * Authors: Aidan O'Mahony (aidan.o.mahony@intel.com)
+ * Adrian Hoban <adrian.hoban@intel.com>
+ * Gabriele Paoloni <gabriele.paoloni@intel.com>
+ * Tadeusz Struk (tadeusz.struk@intel.com)
+ * Copyright (c) 2010, Intel Corporation.
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/aead.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/fips.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/once.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/uio.h>
+#include <crypto/rng.h>
+#include <crypto/drbg.h>
+#include <crypto/akcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/kpp.h>
+#include <crypto/acompress.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/cipher.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+MODULE_IMPORT_NS(CRYPTO_INTERNAL);
+
+static bool notests;
+module_param(notests, bool, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(notests, "disable crypto self-tests");
+
+static bool panic_on_fail;
+module_param(panic_on_fail, bool, 0444);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
+static bool noextratests;
+module_param(noextratests, bool, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(noextratests, "disable expensive crypto self-tests");
+
+static unsigned int fuzz_iterations = 100;
+module_param(fuzz_iterations, uint, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(fuzz_iterations, "number of fuzz test iterations");
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS
+
+/* a perfect nop */
+int alg_test(const char *driver, const char *alg, u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#else
+
+#include "testmgr.h"
+
+/*
+ * Need slab memory for testing (size in number of pages).
+ */
+#define XBUFSIZE 8
+
+/*
+* Used by test_cipher()
+*/
+#define ENCRYPT 1
+#define DECRYPT 0
+
+struct aead_test_suite {
+ const struct aead_testvec *vecs;
+ unsigned int count;
+
+ /*
+ * Set if trying to decrypt an inauthentic ciphertext with this
+ * algorithm might result in EINVAL rather than EBADMSG, due to other
+ * validation the algorithm does on the inputs such as length checks.
+ */
+ unsigned int einval_allowed : 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Set if this algorithm requires that the IV be located at the end of
+ * the AAD buffer, in addition to being given in the normal way. The
+ * behavior when the two IV copies differ is implementation-defined.
+ */
+ unsigned int aad_iv : 1;
+};
+
+struct cipher_test_suite {
+ const struct cipher_testvec *vecs;
+ unsigned int count;
+};
+
+struct comp_test_suite {
+ struct {
+ const struct comp_testvec *vecs;
+ unsigned int count;
+ } comp, decomp;
+};
+
+struct hash_test_suite {
+ const struct hash_testvec *vecs;
+ unsigned int count;
+};
+
+struct cprng_test_suite {
+ const struct cprng_testvec *vecs;
+ unsigned int count;
+};
+
+struct drbg_test_suite {
+ const struct drbg_testvec *vecs;
+ unsigned int count;
+};
+
+struct akcipher_test_suite {
+ const struct akcipher_testvec *vecs;
+ unsigned int count;
+};
+
+struct kpp_test_suite {
+ const struct kpp_testvec *vecs;
+ unsigned int count;
+};
+
+struct alg_test_desc {
+ const char *alg;
+ const char *generic_driver;
+ int (*test)(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver,
+ u32 type, u32 mask);
+ int fips_allowed; /* set if alg is allowed in fips mode */
+
+ union {
+ struct aead_test_suite aead;
+ struct cipher_test_suite cipher;
+ struct comp_test_suite comp;
+ struct hash_test_suite hash;
+ struct cprng_test_suite cprng;
+ struct drbg_test_suite drbg;
+ struct akcipher_test_suite akcipher;
+ struct kpp_test_suite kpp;
+ } suite;
+};
+
+static void hexdump(unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
+{
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_CONT, "", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET,
+ 16, 1,
+ buf, len, false);
+}
+
+static int __testmgr_alloc_buf(char *buf[XBUFSIZE], int order)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < XBUFSIZE; i++) {
+ buf[i] = (char *)__get_free_pages(GFP_KERNEL, order);
+ if (!buf[i])
+ goto err_free_buf;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+err_free_buf:
+ while (i-- > 0)
+ free_pages((unsigned long)buf[i], order);
+
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+static int testmgr_alloc_buf(char *buf[XBUFSIZE])
+{
+ return __testmgr_alloc_buf(buf, 0);
+}
+
+static void __testmgr_free_buf(char *buf[XBUFSIZE], int order)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < XBUFSIZE; i++)
+ free_pages((unsigned long)buf[i], order);
+}
+
+static void testmgr_free_buf(char *buf[XBUFSIZE])
+{
+ __testmgr_free_buf(buf, 0);
+}
+
+#define TESTMGR_POISON_BYTE 0xfe
+#define TESTMGR_POISON_LEN 16
+
+static inline void testmgr_poison(void *addr, size_t len)
+{
+ memset(addr, TESTMGR_POISON_BYTE, len);
+}
+
+/* Is the memory region still fully poisoned? */
+static inline bool testmgr_is_poison(const void *addr, size_t len)
+{
+ return memchr_inv(addr, TESTMGR_POISON_BYTE, len) == NULL;
+}
+
+/* flush type for hash algorithms */
+enum flush_type {
+ /* merge with update of previous buffer(s) */
+ FLUSH_TYPE_NONE = 0,
+
+ /* update with previous buffer(s) before doing this one */
+ FLUSH_TYPE_FLUSH,
+
+ /* likewise, but also export and re-import the intermediate state */
+ FLUSH_TYPE_REIMPORT,
+};
+
+/* finalization function for hash algorithms */
+enum finalization_type {
+ FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL, /* use final() */
+ FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINUP, /* use finup() */
+ FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST, /* use digest() */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Whether the crypto operation will occur in-place, and if so whether the
+ * source and destination scatterlist pointers will coincide (req->src ==
+ * req->dst), or whether they'll merely point to two separate scatterlists
+ * (req->src != req->dst) that reference the same underlying memory.
+ *
+ * This is only relevant for algorithm types that support in-place operation.
+ */
+enum inplace_mode {
+ OUT_OF_PLACE,
+ INPLACE_ONE_SGLIST,
+ INPLACE_TWO_SGLISTS,
+};
+
+#define TEST_SG_TOTAL 10000
+
+/**
+ * struct test_sg_division - description of a scatterlist entry
+ *
+ * This struct describes one entry of a scatterlist being constructed to check a
+ * crypto test vector.
+ *
+ * @proportion_of_total: length of this chunk relative to the total length,
+ * given as a proportion out of TEST_SG_TOTAL so that it
+ * scales to fit any test vector
+ * @offset: byte offset into a 2-page buffer at which this chunk will start
+ * @offset_relative_to_alignmask: if true, add the algorithm's alignmask to the
+ * @offset
+ * @flush_type: for hashes, whether an update() should be done now vs.
+ * continuing to accumulate data
+ * @nosimd: if doing the pending update(), do it with SIMD disabled?
+ */
+struct test_sg_division {
+ unsigned int proportion_of_total;
+ unsigned int offset;
+ bool offset_relative_to_alignmask;
+ enum flush_type flush_type;
+ bool nosimd;
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct testvec_config - configuration for testing a crypto test vector
+ *
+ * This struct describes the data layout and other parameters with which each
+ * crypto test vector can be tested.
+ *
+ * @name: name of this config, logged for debugging purposes if a test fails
+ * @inplace_mode: whether and how to operate on the data in-place, if applicable
+ * @req_flags: extra request_flags, e.g. CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP
+ * @src_divs: description of how to arrange the source scatterlist
+ * @dst_divs: description of how to arrange the dst scatterlist, if applicable
+ * for the algorithm type. Defaults to @src_divs if unset.
+ * @iv_offset: misalignment of the IV in the range [0..MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK+1],
+ * where 0 is aligned to a 2*(MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK+1) byte boundary
+ * @iv_offset_relative_to_alignmask: if true, add the algorithm's alignmask to
+ * the @iv_offset
+ * @key_offset: misalignment of the key, where 0 is default alignment
+ * @key_offset_relative_to_alignmask: if true, add the algorithm's alignmask to
+ * the @key_offset
+ * @finalization_type: what finalization function to use for hashes
+ * @nosimd: execute with SIMD disabled? Requires !CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP.
+ */
+struct testvec_config {
+ const char *name;
+ enum inplace_mode inplace_mode;
+ u32 req_flags;
+ struct test_sg_division src_divs[XBUFSIZE];
+ struct test_sg_division dst_divs[XBUFSIZE];
+ unsigned int iv_offset;
+ unsigned int key_offset;
+ bool iv_offset_relative_to_alignmask;
+ bool key_offset_relative_to_alignmask;
+ enum finalization_type finalization_type;
+ bool nosimd;
+};
+
+#define TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN 192
+
+/*
+ * The following are the lists of testvec_configs to test for each algorithm
+ * type when the basic crypto self-tests are enabled, i.e. when
+ * CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS is unset. They aim to provide good test
+ * coverage, while keeping the test time much shorter than the full fuzz tests
+ * so that the basic tests can be enabled in a wider range of circumstances.
+ */
+
+/* Configs for skciphers and aeads */
+static const struct testvec_config default_cipher_testvec_configs[] = {
+ {
+ .name = "in-place (one sglist)",
+ .inplace_mode = INPLACE_ONE_SGLIST,
+ .src_divs = { { .proportion_of_total = 10000 } },
+ }, {
+ .name = "in-place (two sglists)",
+ .inplace_mode = INPLACE_TWO_SGLISTS,
+ .src_divs = { { .proportion_of_total = 10000 } },
+ }, {
+ .name = "out-of-place",
+ .inplace_mode = OUT_OF_PLACE,
+ .src_divs = { { .proportion_of_total = 10000 } },
+ }, {
+ .name = "unaligned buffer, offset=1",
+ .src_divs = { { .proportion_of_total = 10000, .offset = 1 } },
+ .iv_offset = 1,
+ .key_offset = 1,
+ }, {
+ .name = "buffer aligned only to alignmask",
+ .src_divs = {
+ {
+ .proportion_of_total = 10000,
+ .offset = 1,
+ .offset_relative_to_alignmask = true,
+ },
+ },
+ .iv_offset = 1,
+ .iv_offset_relative_to_alignmask = true,
+ .key_offset = 1,
+ .key_offset_relative_to_alignmask = true,
+ }, {
+ .name = "two even aligned splits",
+ .src_divs = {
+ { .proportion_of_total = 5000 },
+ { .proportion_of_total = 5000 },
+ },
+ }, {
+ .name = "uneven misaligned splits, may sleep",
+ .req_flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
+ .src_divs = {
+ { .proportion_of_total = 1900, .offset = 33 },
+ { .proportion_of_total = 3300, .offset = 7 },
+ { .proportion_of_total = 4800, .offset = 18 },
+ },
+ .iv_offset = 3,
+ .key_offset = 3,
+ }, {
+ .name = "misaligned splits crossing pages, inplace",
+ .inplace_mode = INPLACE_ONE_SGLIST,
+ .src_divs = {
+ {
+ .proportion_of_total = 7500,
+ .offset = PAGE_SIZE - 32
+ }, {
+ .proportion_of_total = 2500,
+ .offset = PAGE_SIZE - 7
+ },
+ },
+ }
+};
+
+static const struct testvec_config default_hash_testvec_configs[] = {
+ {
+ .name = "init+update+final aligned buffer",
+ .src_divs = { { .proportion_of_total = 10000 } },
+ .finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL,
+ }, {
+ .name = "init+finup aligned buffer",
+ .src_divs = { { .proportion_of_total = 10000 } },
+ .finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINUP,
+ }, {
+ .name = "digest aligned buffer",
+ .src_divs = { { .proportion_of_total = 10000 } },
+ .finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST,
+ }, {
+ .name = "init+update+final misaligned buffer",
+ .src_divs = { { .proportion_of_total = 10000, .offset = 1 } },
+ .finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL,
+ .key_offset = 1,
+ }, {
+ .name = "digest buffer aligned only to alignmask",
+ .src_divs = {
+ {
+ .proportion_of_total = 10000,
+ .offset = 1,
+ .offset_relative_to_alignmask = true,
+ },
+ },
+ .finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST,
+ .key_offset = 1,
+ .key_offset_relative_to_alignmask = true,
+ }, {
+ .name = "init+update+update+final two even splits",
+ .src_divs = {
+ { .proportion_of_total = 5000 },
+ {
+ .proportion_of_total = 5000,
+ .flush_type = FLUSH_TYPE_FLUSH,
+ },
+ },
+ .finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL,
+ }, {
+ .name = "digest uneven misaligned splits, may sleep",
+ .req_flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
+ .src_divs = {
+ { .proportion_of_total = 1900, .offset = 33 },
+ { .proportion_of_total = 3300, .offset = 7 },
+ { .proportion_of_total = 4800, .offset = 18 },
+ },
+ .finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST,
+ }, {
+ .name = "digest misaligned splits crossing pages",
+ .src_divs = {
+ {
+ .proportion_of_total = 7500,
+ .offset = PAGE_SIZE - 32,
+ }, {
+ .proportion_of_total = 2500,
+ .offset = PAGE_SIZE - 7,
+ },
+ },
+ .finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST,
+ }, {
+ .name = "import/export",
+ .src_divs = {
+ {
+ .proportion_of_total = 6500,
+ .flush_type = FLUSH_TYPE_REIMPORT,
+ }, {
+ .proportion_of_total = 3500,
+ .flush_type = FLUSH_TYPE_REIMPORT,
+ },
+ },
+ .finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL,
+ }
+};
+
+static unsigned int count_test_sg_divisions(const struct test_sg_division *divs)
+{
+ unsigned int remaining = TEST_SG_TOTAL;
+ unsigned int ndivs = 0;
+
+ do {
+ remaining -= divs[ndivs++].proportion_of_total;
+ } while (remaining);
+
+ return ndivs;
+}
+
+#define SGDIVS_HAVE_FLUSHES BIT(0)
+#define SGDIVS_HAVE_NOSIMD BIT(1)
+
+static bool valid_sg_divisions(const struct test_sg_division *divs,
+ unsigned int count, int *flags_ret)
+{
+ unsigned int total = 0;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < count && total != TEST_SG_TOTAL; i++) {
+ if (divs[i].proportion_of_total <= 0 ||
+ divs[i].proportion_of_total > TEST_SG_TOTAL - total)
+ return false;
+ total += divs[i].proportion_of_total;
+ if (divs[i].flush_type != FLUSH_TYPE_NONE)
+ *flags_ret |= SGDIVS_HAVE_FLUSHES;
+ if (divs[i].nosimd)
+ *flags_ret |= SGDIVS_HAVE_NOSIMD;
+ }
+ return total == TEST_SG_TOTAL &&
+ memchr_inv(&divs[i], 0, (count - i) * sizeof(divs[0])) == NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether the given testvec_config is valid. This isn't strictly needed
+ * since every testvec_config should be valid, but check anyway so that people
+ * don't unknowingly add broken configs that don't do what they wanted.
+ */
+static bool valid_testvec_config(const struct testvec_config *cfg)
+{
+ int flags = 0;
+
+ if (cfg->name == NULL)
+ return false;
+
+ if (!valid_sg_divisions(cfg->src_divs, ARRAY_SIZE(cfg->src_divs),
+ &flags))
+ return false;
+
+ if (cfg->dst_divs[0].proportion_of_total) {
+ if (!valid_sg_divisions(cfg->dst_divs,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(cfg->dst_divs), &flags))
+ return false;
+ } else {
+ if (memchr_inv(cfg->dst_divs, 0, sizeof(cfg->dst_divs)))
+ return false;
+ /* defaults to dst_divs=src_divs */
+ }
+
+ if (cfg->iv_offset +
+ (cfg->iv_offset_relative_to_alignmask ? MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK : 0) >
+ MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK + 1)
+ return false;
+
+ if ((flags & (SGDIVS_HAVE_FLUSHES | SGDIVS_HAVE_NOSIMD)) &&
+ cfg->finalization_type == FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST)
+ return false;
+
+ if ((cfg->nosimd || (flags & SGDIVS_HAVE_NOSIMD)) &&
+ (cfg->req_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP))
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+struct test_sglist {
+ char *bufs[XBUFSIZE];
+ struct scatterlist sgl[XBUFSIZE];
+ struct scatterlist sgl_saved[XBUFSIZE];
+ struct scatterlist *sgl_ptr;
+ unsigned int nents;
+};
+
+static int init_test_sglist(struct test_sglist *tsgl)
+{
+ return __testmgr_alloc_buf(tsgl->bufs, 1 /* two pages per buffer */);
+}
+
+static void destroy_test_sglist(struct test_sglist *tsgl)
+{
+ return __testmgr_free_buf(tsgl->bufs, 1 /* two pages per buffer */);
+}
+
+/**
+ * build_test_sglist() - build a scatterlist for a crypto test
+ *
+ * @tsgl: the scatterlist to build. @tsgl->bufs[] contains an array of 2-page
+ * buffers which the scatterlist @tsgl->sgl[] will be made to point into.
+ * @divs: the layout specification on which the scatterlist will be based
+ * @alignmask: the algorithm's alignmask
+ * @total_len: the total length of the scatterlist to build in bytes
+ * @data: if non-NULL, the buffers will be filled with this data until it ends.
+ * Otherwise the buffers will be poisoned. In both cases, some bytes
+ * past the end of each buffer will be poisoned to help detect overruns.
+ * @out_divs: if non-NULL, the test_sg_division to which each scatterlist entry
+ * corresponds will be returned here. This will match @divs except
+ * that divisions resolving to a length of 0 are omitted as they are
+ * not included in the scatterlist.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 or a -errno value
+ */
+static int build_test_sglist(struct test_sglist *tsgl,
+ const struct test_sg_division *divs,
+ const unsigned int alignmask,
+ const unsigned int total_len,
+ struct iov_iter *data,
+ const struct test_sg_division *out_divs[XBUFSIZE])
+{
+ struct {
+ const struct test_sg_division *div;
+ size_t length;
+ } partitions[XBUFSIZE];
+ const unsigned int ndivs = count_test_sg_divisions(divs);
+ unsigned int len_remaining = total_len;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(partitions) != ARRAY_SIZE(tsgl->sgl));
+ if (WARN_ON(ndivs > ARRAY_SIZE(partitions)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Calculate the (div, length) pairs */
+ tsgl->nents = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < ndivs; i++) {
+ unsigned int len_this_sg =
+ min(len_remaining,
+ (total_len * divs[i].proportion_of_total +
+ TEST_SG_TOTAL / 2) / TEST_SG_TOTAL);
+
+ if (len_this_sg != 0) {
+ partitions[tsgl->nents].div = &divs[i];
+ partitions[tsgl->nents].length = len_this_sg;
+ tsgl->nents++;
+ len_remaining -= len_this_sg;
+ }
+ }
+ if (tsgl->nents == 0) {
+ partitions[tsgl->nents].div = &divs[0];
+ partitions[tsgl->nents].length = 0;
+ tsgl->nents++;
+ }
+ partitions[tsgl->nents - 1].length += len_remaining;
+
+ /* Set up the sgl entries and fill the data or poison */
+ sg_init_table(tsgl->sgl, tsgl->nents);
+ for (i = 0; i < tsgl->nents; i++) {
+ unsigned int offset = partitions[i].div->offset;
+ void *addr;
+
+ if (partitions[i].div->offset_relative_to_alignmask)
+ offset += alignmask;
+
+ while (offset + partitions[i].length + TESTMGR_POISON_LEN >
+ 2 * PAGE_SIZE) {
+ if (WARN_ON(offset <= 0))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ offset /= 2;
+ }
+
+ addr = &tsgl->bufs[i][offset];
+ sg_set_buf(&tsgl->sgl[i], addr, partitions[i].length);
+
+ if (out_divs)
+ out_divs[i] = partitions[i].div;
+
+ if (data) {
+ size_t copy_len, copied;
+
+ copy_len = min(partitions[i].length, data->count);
+ copied = copy_from_iter(addr, copy_len, data);
+ if (WARN_ON(copied != copy_len))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ testmgr_poison(addr + copy_len, partitions[i].length +
+ TESTMGR_POISON_LEN - copy_len);
+ } else {
+ testmgr_poison(addr, partitions[i].length +
+ TESTMGR_POISON_LEN);
+ }
+ }
+
+ sg_mark_end(&tsgl->sgl[tsgl->nents - 1]);
+ tsgl->sgl_ptr = tsgl->sgl;
+ memcpy(tsgl->sgl_saved, tsgl->sgl, tsgl->nents * sizeof(tsgl->sgl[0]));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that a scatterlist crypto operation produced the correct output.
+ *
+ * @tsgl: scatterlist containing the actual output
+ * @expected_output: buffer containing the expected output
+ * @len_to_check: length of @expected_output in bytes
+ * @unchecked_prefix_len: number of ignored bytes in @tsgl prior to real result
+ * @check_poison: verify that the poison bytes after each chunk are intact?
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if correct, -EINVAL if incorrect, -EOVERFLOW if buffer overrun.
+ */
+static int verify_correct_output(const struct test_sglist *tsgl,
+ const char *expected_output,
+ unsigned int len_to_check,
+ unsigned int unchecked_prefix_len,
+ bool check_poison)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tsgl->nents; i++) {
+ struct scatterlist *sg = &tsgl->sgl_ptr[i];
+ unsigned int len = sg->length;
+ unsigned int offset = sg->offset;
+ const char *actual_output;
+
+ if (unchecked_prefix_len) {
+ if (unchecked_prefix_len >= len) {
+ unchecked_prefix_len -= len;
+ continue;
+ }
+ offset += unchecked_prefix_len;
+ len -= unchecked_prefix_len;
+ unchecked_prefix_len = 0;
+ }
+ len = min(len, len_to_check);
+ actual_output = page_address(sg_page(sg)) + offset;
+ if (memcmp(expected_output, actual_output, len) != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (check_poison &&
+ !testmgr_is_poison(actual_output + len, TESTMGR_POISON_LEN))
+ return -EOVERFLOW;
+ len_to_check -= len;
+ expected_output += len;
+ }
+ if (WARN_ON(len_to_check != 0))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static bool is_test_sglist_corrupted(const struct test_sglist *tsgl)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tsgl->nents; i++) {
+ if (tsgl->sgl[i].page_link != tsgl->sgl_saved[i].page_link)
+ return true;
+ if (tsgl->sgl[i].offset != tsgl->sgl_saved[i].offset)
+ return true;
+ if (tsgl->sgl[i].length != tsgl->sgl_saved[i].length)
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+struct cipher_test_sglists {
+ struct test_sglist src;
+ struct test_sglist dst;
+};
+
+static struct cipher_test_sglists *alloc_cipher_test_sglists(void)
+{
+ struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls;
+
+ tsgls = kmalloc(sizeof(*tsgls), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tsgls)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (init_test_sglist(&tsgls->src) != 0)
+ goto fail_kfree;
+ if (init_test_sglist(&tsgls->dst) != 0)
+ goto fail_destroy_src;
+
+ return tsgls;
+
+fail_destroy_src:
+ destroy_test_sglist(&tsgls->src);
+fail_kfree:
+ kfree(tsgls);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void free_cipher_test_sglists(struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+{
+ if (tsgls) {
+ destroy_test_sglist(&tsgls->src);
+ destroy_test_sglist(&tsgls->dst);
+ kfree(tsgls);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Build the src and dst scatterlists for an skcipher or AEAD test */
+static int build_cipher_test_sglists(struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls,
+ const struct testvec_config *cfg,
+ unsigned int alignmask,
+ unsigned int src_total_len,
+ unsigned int dst_total_len,
+ const struct kvec *inputs,
+ unsigned int nr_inputs)
+{
+ struct iov_iter input;
+ int err;
+
+ iov_iter_kvec(&input, ITER_SOURCE, inputs, nr_inputs, src_total_len);
+ err = build_test_sglist(&tsgls->src, cfg->src_divs, alignmask,
+ cfg->inplace_mode != OUT_OF_PLACE ?
+ max(dst_total_len, src_total_len) :
+ src_total_len,
+ &input, NULL);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /*
+ * In-place crypto operations can use the same scatterlist for both the
+ * source and destination (req->src == req->dst), or can use separate
+ * scatterlists (req->src != req->dst) which point to the same
+ * underlying memory. Make sure to test both cases.
+ */
+ if (cfg->inplace_mode == INPLACE_ONE_SGLIST) {
+ tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr = tsgls->src.sgl;
+ tsgls->dst.nents = tsgls->src.nents;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (cfg->inplace_mode == INPLACE_TWO_SGLISTS) {
+ /*
+ * For now we keep it simple and only test the case where the
+ * two scatterlists have identical entries, rather than
+ * different entries that split up the same memory differently.
+ */
+ memcpy(tsgls->dst.sgl, tsgls->src.sgl,
+ tsgls->src.nents * sizeof(tsgls->src.sgl[0]));
+ memcpy(tsgls->dst.sgl_saved, tsgls->src.sgl,
+ tsgls->src.nents * sizeof(tsgls->src.sgl[0]));
+ tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr = tsgls->dst.sgl;
+ tsgls->dst.nents = tsgls->src.nents;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Out of place */
+ return build_test_sglist(&tsgls->dst,
+ cfg->dst_divs[0].proportion_of_total ?
+ cfg->dst_divs : cfg->src_divs,
+ alignmask, dst_total_len, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Support for testing passing a misaligned key to setkey():
+ *
+ * If cfg->key_offset is set, copy the key into a new buffer at that offset,
+ * optionally adding alignmask. Else, just use the key directly.
+ */
+static int prepare_keybuf(const u8 *key, unsigned int ksize,
+ const struct testvec_config *cfg,
+ unsigned int alignmask,
+ const u8 **keybuf_ret, const u8 **keyptr_ret)
+{
+ unsigned int key_offset = cfg->key_offset;
+ u8 *keybuf = NULL, *keyptr = (u8 *)key;
+
+ if (key_offset != 0) {
+ if (cfg->key_offset_relative_to_alignmask)
+ key_offset += alignmask;
+ keybuf = kmalloc(key_offset + ksize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!keybuf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ keyptr = keybuf + key_offset;
+ memcpy(keyptr, key, ksize);
+ }
+ *keybuf_ret = keybuf;
+ *keyptr_ret = keyptr;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Like setkey_f(tfm, key, ksize), but sometimes misalign the key */
+#define do_setkey(setkey_f, tfm, key, ksize, cfg, alignmask) \
+({ \
+ const u8 *keybuf, *keyptr; \
+ int err; \
+ \
+ err = prepare_keybuf((key), (ksize), (cfg), (alignmask), \
+ &keybuf, &keyptr); \
+ if (err == 0) { \
+ err = setkey_f((tfm), keyptr, (ksize)); \
+ kfree(keybuf); \
+ } \
+ err; \
+})
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
+
+/*
+ * The fuzz tests use prandom instead of the normal Linux RNG since they don't
+ * need cryptographically secure random numbers. This greatly improves the
+ * performance of these tests, especially if they are run before the Linux RNG
+ * has been initialized or if they are run on a lockdep-enabled kernel.
+ */
+
+static inline void init_rnd_state(struct rnd_state *rng)
+{
+ prandom_seed_state(rng, get_random_u64());
+}
+
+static inline u8 prandom_u8(struct rnd_state *rng)
+{
+ return prandom_u32_state(rng);
+}
+
+static inline u32 prandom_u32_below(struct rnd_state *rng, u32 ceil)
+{
+ /*
+ * This is slightly biased for non-power-of-2 values of 'ceil', but this
+ * isn't important here.
+ */
+ return prandom_u32_state(rng) % ceil;
+}
+
+static inline bool prandom_bool(struct rnd_state *rng)
+{
+ return prandom_u32_below(rng, 2);
+}
+
+static inline u32 prandom_u32_inclusive(struct rnd_state *rng,
+ u32 floor, u32 ceil)
+{
+ return floor + prandom_u32_below(rng, ceil - floor + 1);
+}
+
+/* Generate a random length in range [0, max_len], but prefer smaller values */
+static unsigned int generate_random_length(struct rnd_state *rng,
+ unsigned int max_len)
+{
+ unsigned int len = prandom_u32_below(rng, max_len + 1);
+
+ switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4)) {
+ case 0:
+ return len % 64;
+ case 1:
+ return len % 256;
+ case 2:
+ return len % 1024;
+ default:
+ return len;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Flip a random bit in the given nonempty data buffer */
+static void flip_random_bit(struct rnd_state *rng, u8 *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ size_t bitpos;
+
+ bitpos = prandom_u32_below(rng, size * 8);
+ buf[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos % 8);
+}
+
+/* Flip a random byte in the given nonempty data buffer */
+static void flip_random_byte(struct rnd_state *rng, u8 *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ buf[prandom_u32_below(rng, size)] ^= 0xff;
+}
+
+/* Sometimes make some random changes to the given nonempty data buffer */
+static void mutate_buffer(struct rnd_state *rng, u8 *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ size_t num_flips;
+ size_t i;
+
+ /* Sometimes flip some bits */
+ if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) {
+ num_flips = min_t(size_t, 1 << prandom_u32_below(rng, 8),
+ size * 8);
+ for (i = 0; i < num_flips; i++)
+ flip_random_bit(rng, buf, size);
+ }
+
+ /* Sometimes flip some bytes */
+ if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) {
+ num_flips = min_t(size_t, 1 << prandom_u32_below(rng, 8), size);
+ for (i = 0; i < num_flips; i++)
+ flip_random_byte(rng, buf, size);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Randomly generate 'count' bytes, but sometimes make them "interesting" */
+static void generate_random_bytes(struct rnd_state *rng, u8 *buf, size_t count)
+{
+ u8 b;
+ u8 increment;
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (count == 0)
+ return;
+
+ switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 8)) { /* Choose a generation strategy */
+ case 0:
+ case 1:
+ /* All the same byte, plus optional mutations */
+ switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4)) {
+ case 0:
+ b = 0x00;
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ b = 0xff;
+ break;
+ default:
+ b = prandom_u8(rng);
+ break;
+ }
+ memset(buf, b, count);
+ mutate_buffer(rng, buf, count);
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ /* Ascending or descending bytes, plus optional mutations */
+ increment = prandom_u8(rng);
+ b = prandom_u8(rng);
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++, b += increment)
+ buf[i] = b;
+ mutate_buffer(rng, buf, count);
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Fully random bytes */
+ prandom_bytes_state(rng, buf, count);
+ }
+}
+
+static char *generate_random_sgl_divisions(struct rnd_state *rng,
+ struct test_sg_division *divs,
+ size_t max_divs, char *p, char *end,
+ bool gen_flushes, u32 req_flags)
+{
+ struct test_sg_division *div = divs;
+ unsigned int remaining = TEST_SG_TOTAL;
+
+ do {
+ unsigned int this_len;
+ const char *flushtype_str;
+
+ if (div == &divs[max_divs - 1] || prandom_bool(rng))
+ this_len = remaining;
+ else
+ this_len = prandom_u32_inclusive(rng, 1, remaining);
+ div->proportion_of_total = this_len;
+
+ if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0)
+ div->offset = prandom_u32_inclusive(rng,
+ PAGE_SIZE - 128,
+ PAGE_SIZE - 1);
+ else if (prandom_bool(rng))
+ div->offset = prandom_u32_below(rng, 32);
+ else
+ div->offset = prandom_u32_below(rng, PAGE_SIZE);
+ if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 8) == 0)
+ div->offset_relative_to_alignmask = true;
+
+ div->flush_type = FLUSH_TYPE_NONE;
+ if (gen_flushes) {
+ switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4)) {
+ case 0:
+ div->flush_type = FLUSH_TYPE_REIMPORT;
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ div->flush_type = FLUSH_TYPE_FLUSH;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (div->flush_type != FLUSH_TYPE_NONE &&
+ !(req_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP) &&
+ prandom_bool(rng))
+ div->nosimd = true;
+
+ switch (div->flush_type) {
+ case FLUSH_TYPE_FLUSH:
+ if (div->nosimd)
+ flushtype_str = "<flush,nosimd>";
+ else
+ flushtype_str = "<flush>";
+ break;
+ case FLUSH_TYPE_REIMPORT:
+ if (div->nosimd)
+ flushtype_str = "<reimport,nosimd>";
+ else
+ flushtype_str = "<reimport>";
+ break;
+ default:
+ flushtype_str = "";
+ break;
+ }
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(TEST_SG_TOTAL != 10000); /* for "%u.%u%%" */
+ p += scnprintf(p, end - p, "%s%u.%u%%@%s+%u%s", flushtype_str,
+ this_len / 100, this_len % 100,
+ div->offset_relative_to_alignmask ?
+ "alignmask" : "",
+ div->offset, this_len == remaining ? "" : ", ");
+ remaining -= this_len;
+ div++;
+ } while (remaining);
+
+ return p;
+}
+
+/* Generate a random testvec_config for fuzz testing */
+static void generate_random_testvec_config(struct rnd_state *rng,
+ struct testvec_config *cfg,
+ char *name, size_t max_namelen)
+{
+ char *p = name;
+ char * const end = name + max_namelen;
+
+ memset(cfg, 0, sizeof(*cfg));
+
+ cfg->name = name;
+
+ p += scnprintf(p, end - p, "random:");
+
+ switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4)) {
+ case 0:
+ case 1:
+ cfg->inplace_mode = OUT_OF_PLACE;
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ cfg->inplace_mode = INPLACE_ONE_SGLIST;
+ p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " inplace_one_sglist");
+ break;
+ default:
+ cfg->inplace_mode = INPLACE_TWO_SGLISTS;
+ p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " inplace_two_sglists");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (prandom_bool(rng)) {
+ cfg->req_flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
+ p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " may_sleep");
+ }
+
+ switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4)) {
+ case 0:
+ cfg->finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL;
+ p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " use_final");
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ cfg->finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINUP;
+ p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " use_finup");
+ break;
+ default:
+ cfg->finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST;
+ p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " use_digest");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!(cfg->req_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP) && prandom_bool(rng)) {
+ cfg->nosimd = true;
+ p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " nosimd");
+ }
+
+ p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " src_divs=[");
+ p = generate_random_sgl_divisions(rng, cfg->src_divs,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(cfg->src_divs), p, end,
+ (cfg->finalization_type !=
+ FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST),
+ cfg->req_flags);
+ p += scnprintf(p, end - p, "]");
+
+ if (cfg->inplace_mode == OUT_OF_PLACE && prandom_bool(rng)) {
+ p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " dst_divs=[");
+ p = generate_random_sgl_divisions(rng, cfg->dst_divs,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(cfg->dst_divs),
+ p, end, false,
+ cfg->req_flags);
+ p += scnprintf(p, end - p, "]");
+ }
+
+ if (prandom_bool(rng)) {
+ cfg->iv_offset = prandom_u32_inclusive(rng, 1,
+ MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK);
+ p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " iv_offset=%u", cfg->iv_offset);
+ }
+
+ if (prandom_bool(rng)) {
+ cfg->key_offset = prandom_u32_inclusive(rng, 1,
+ MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK);
+ p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " key_offset=%u", cfg->key_offset);
+ }
+
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!valid_testvec_config(cfg));
+}
+
+static void crypto_disable_simd_for_test(void)
+{
+ migrate_disable();
+ __this_cpu_write(crypto_simd_disabled_for_test, true);
+}
+
+static void crypto_reenable_simd_for_test(void)
+{
+ __this_cpu_write(crypto_simd_disabled_for_test, false);
+ migrate_enable();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given an algorithm name, build the name of the generic implementation of that
+ * algorithm, assuming the usual naming convention. Specifically, this appends
+ * "-generic" to every part of the name that is not a template name. Examples:
+ *
+ * aes => aes-generic
+ * cbc(aes) => cbc(aes-generic)
+ * cts(cbc(aes)) => cts(cbc(aes-generic))
+ * rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305) => rfc7539(chacha20-generic,poly1305-generic)
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, or -ENAMETOOLONG if the generic name would be too long
+ */
+static int build_generic_driver_name(const char *algname,
+ char driver_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME])
+{
+ const char *in = algname;
+ char *out = driver_name;
+ size_t len = strlen(algname);
+
+ if (len >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+ goto too_long;
+ do {
+ const char *in_saved = in;
+
+ while (*in && *in != '(' && *in != ')' && *in != ',')
+ *out++ = *in++;
+ if (*in != '(' && in > in_saved) {
+ len += 8;
+ if (len >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+ goto too_long;
+ memcpy(out, "-generic", 8);
+ out += 8;
+ }
+ } while ((*out++ = *in++) != '\0');
+ return 0;
+
+too_long:
+ pr_err("alg: generic driver name for \"%s\" would be too long\n",
+ algname);
+ return -ENAMETOOLONG;
+}
+#else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */
+static void crypto_disable_simd_for_test(void)
+{
+}
+
+static void crypto_reenable_simd_for_test(void)
+{
+}
+#endif /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */
+
+static int build_hash_sglist(struct test_sglist *tsgl,
+ const struct hash_testvec *vec,
+ const struct testvec_config *cfg,
+ unsigned int alignmask,
+ const struct test_sg_division *divs[XBUFSIZE])
+{
+ struct kvec kv;
+ struct iov_iter input;
+
+ kv.iov_base = (void *)vec->plaintext;
+ kv.iov_len = vec->psize;
+ iov_iter_kvec(&input, ITER_SOURCE, &kv, 1, vec->psize);
+ return build_test_sglist(tsgl, cfg->src_divs, alignmask, vec->psize,
+ &input, divs);
+}
+
+static int check_hash_result(const char *type,
+ const u8 *result, unsigned int digestsize,
+ const struct hash_testvec *vec,
+ const char *vec_name,
+ const char *driver,
+ const struct testvec_config *cfg)
+{
+ if (memcmp(result, vec->digest, digestsize) != 0) {
+ pr_err("alg: %s: %s test failed (wrong result) on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ type, driver, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (!testmgr_is_poison(&result[digestsize], TESTMGR_POISON_LEN)) {
+ pr_err("alg: %s: %s overran result buffer on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ type, driver, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return -EOVERFLOW;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int check_shash_op(const char *op, int err,
+ const char *driver, const char *vec_name,
+ const struct testvec_config *cfg)
+{
+ if (err)
+ pr_err("alg: shash: %s %s() failed with err %d on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, err, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return err;
+}
+
+/* Test one hash test vector in one configuration, using the shash API */
+static int test_shash_vec_cfg(const struct hash_testvec *vec,
+ const char *vec_name,
+ const struct testvec_config *cfg,
+ struct shash_desc *desc,
+ struct test_sglist *tsgl,
+ u8 *hashstate)
+{
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm = desc->tfm;
+ const unsigned int alignmask = crypto_shash_alignmask(tfm);
+ const unsigned int digestsize = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+ const unsigned int statesize = crypto_shash_statesize(tfm);
+ const char *driver = crypto_shash_driver_name(tfm);
+ const struct test_sg_division *divs[XBUFSIZE];
+ unsigned int i;
+ u8 result[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE + TESTMGR_POISON_LEN];
+ int err;
+
+ /* Set the key, if specified */
+ if (vec->ksize) {
+ err = do_setkey(crypto_shash_setkey, tfm, vec->key, vec->ksize,
+ cfg, alignmask);
+ if (err) {
+ if (err == vec->setkey_error)
+ return 0;
+ pr_err("alg: shash: %s setkey failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, flags=%#x\n",
+ driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error, err,
+ crypto_shash_get_flags(tfm));
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (vec->setkey_error) {
+ pr_err("alg: shash: %s setkey unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d\n",
+ driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Build the scatterlist for the source data */
+ err = build_hash_sglist(tsgl, vec, cfg, alignmask, divs);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("alg: shash: %s: error preparing scatterlist for test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /* Do the actual hashing */
+
+ testmgr_poison(desc->__ctx, crypto_shash_descsize(tfm));
+ testmgr_poison(result, digestsize + TESTMGR_POISON_LEN);
+
+ if (cfg->finalization_type == FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST ||
+ vec->digest_error) {
+ /* Just using digest() */
+ if (tsgl->nents != 1)
+ return 0;
+ if (cfg->nosimd)
+ crypto_disable_simd_for_test();
+ err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, sg_virt(&tsgl->sgl[0]),
+ tsgl->sgl[0].length, result);
+ if (cfg->nosimd)
+ crypto_reenable_simd_for_test();
+ if (err) {
+ if (err == vec->digest_error)
+ return 0;
+ pr_err("alg: shash: %s digest() failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, vec_name, vec->digest_error, err,
+ cfg->name);
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (vec->digest_error) {
+ pr_err("alg: shash: %s digest() unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, vec_name, vec->digest_error, cfg->name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ goto result_ready;
+ }
+
+ /* Using init(), zero or more update(), then final() or finup() */
+
+ if (cfg->nosimd)
+ crypto_disable_simd_for_test();
+ err = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+ if (cfg->nosimd)
+ crypto_reenable_simd_for_test();
+ err = check_shash_op("init", err, driver, vec_name, cfg);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tsgl->nents; i++) {
+ if (i + 1 == tsgl->nents &&
+ cfg->finalization_type == FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINUP) {
+ if (divs[i]->nosimd)
+ crypto_disable_simd_for_test();
+ err = crypto_shash_finup(desc, sg_virt(&tsgl->sgl[i]),
+ tsgl->sgl[i].length, result);
+ if (divs[i]->nosimd)
+ crypto_reenable_simd_for_test();
+ err = check_shash_op("finup", err, driver, vec_name,
+ cfg);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ goto result_ready;
+ }
+ if (divs[i]->nosimd)
+ crypto_disable_simd_for_test();
+ err = crypto_shash_update(desc, sg_virt(&tsgl->sgl[i]),
+ tsgl->sgl[i].length);
+ if (divs[i]->nosimd)
+ crypto_reenable_simd_for_test();
+ err = check_shash_op("update", err, driver, vec_name, cfg);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ if (divs[i]->flush_type == FLUSH_TYPE_REIMPORT) {
+ /* Test ->export() and ->import() */
+ testmgr_poison(hashstate + statesize,
+ TESTMGR_POISON_LEN);
+ err = crypto_shash_export(desc, hashstate);
+ err = check_shash_op("export", err, driver, vec_name,
+ cfg);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ if (!testmgr_is_poison(hashstate + statesize,
+ TESTMGR_POISON_LEN)) {
+ pr_err("alg: shash: %s export() overran state buffer on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return -EOVERFLOW;
+ }
+ testmgr_poison(desc->__ctx, crypto_shash_descsize(tfm));
+ err = crypto_shash_import(desc, hashstate);
+ err = check_shash_op("import", err, driver, vec_name,
+ cfg);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (cfg->nosimd)
+ crypto_disable_simd_for_test();
+ err = crypto_shash_final(desc, result);
+ if (cfg->nosimd)
+ crypto_reenable_simd_for_test();
+ err = check_shash_op("final", err, driver, vec_name, cfg);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+result_ready:
+ return check_hash_result("shash", result, digestsize, vec, vec_name,
+ driver, cfg);
+}
+
+static int do_ahash_op(int (*op)(struct ahash_request *req),
+ struct ahash_request *req,
+ struct crypto_wait *wait, bool nosimd)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ if (nosimd)
+ crypto_disable_simd_for_test();
+
+ err = op(req);
+
+ if (nosimd)
+ crypto_reenable_simd_for_test();
+
+ return crypto_wait_req(err, wait);
+}
+
+static int check_nonfinal_ahash_op(const char *op, int err,
+ u8 *result, unsigned int digestsize,
+ const char *driver, const char *vec_name,
+ const struct testvec_config *cfg)
+{
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("alg: ahash: %s %s() failed with err %d on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, err, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (!testmgr_is_poison(result, digestsize)) {
+ pr_err("alg: ahash: %s %s() used result buffer on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Test one hash test vector in one configuration, using the ahash API */
+static int test_ahash_vec_cfg(const struct hash_testvec *vec,
+ const char *vec_name,
+ const struct testvec_config *cfg,
+ struct ahash_request *req,
+ struct test_sglist *tsgl,
+ u8 *hashstate)
+{
+ struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
+ const unsigned int alignmask = crypto_ahash_alignmask(tfm);
+ const unsigned int digestsize = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm);
+ const unsigned int statesize = crypto_ahash_statesize(tfm);
+ const char *driver = crypto_ahash_driver_name(tfm);
+ const u32 req_flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | cfg->req_flags;
+ const struct test_sg_division *divs[XBUFSIZE];
+ DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
+ unsigned int i;
+ struct scatterlist *pending_sgl;
+ unsigned int pending_len;
+ u8 result[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE + TESTMGR_POISON_LEN];
+ int err;
+
+ /* Set the key, if specified */
+ if (vec->ksize) {
+ err = do_setkey(crypto_ahash_setkey, tfm, vec->key, vec->ksize,
+ cfg, alignmask);
+ if (err) {
+ if (err == vec->setkey_error)
+ return 0;
+ pr_err("alg: ahash: %s setkey failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, flags=%#x\n",
+ driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error, err,
+ crypto_ahash_get_flags(tfm));
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (vec->setkey_error) {
+ pr_err("alg: ahash: %s setkey unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d\n",
+ driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Build the scatterlist for the source data */
+ err = build_hash_sglist(tsgl, vec, cfg, alignmask, divs);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("alg: ahash: %s: error preparing scatterlist for test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /* Do the actual hashing */
+
+ testmgr_poison(req->__ctx, crypto_ahash_reqsize(tfm));
+ testmgr_poison(result, digestsize + TESTMGR_POISON_LEN);
+
+ if (cfg->finalization_type == FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST ||
+ vec->digest_error) {
+ /* Just using digest() */
+ ahash_request_set_callback(req, req_flags, crypto_req_done,
+ &wait);
+ ahash_request_set_crypt(req, tsgl->sgl, result, vec->psize);
+ err = do_ahash_op(crypto_ahash_digest, req, &wait, cfg->nosimd);
+ if (err) {
+ if (err == vec->digest_error)
+ return 0;
+ pr_err("alg: ahash: %s digest() failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, vec_name, vec->digest_error, err,
+ cfg->name);
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (vec->digest_error) {
+ pr_err("alg: ahash: %s digest() unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, vec_name, vec->digest_error, cfg->name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ goto result_ready;
+ }
+
+ /* Using init(), zero or more update(), then final() or finup() */
+
+ ahash_request_set_callback(req, req_flags, crypto_req_done, &wait);
+ ahash_request_set_crypt(req, NULL, result, 0);
+ err = do_ahash_op(crypto_ahash_init, req, &wait, cfg->nosimd);
+ err = check_nonfinal_ahash_op("init", err, result, digestsize,
+ driver, vec_name, cfg);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ pending_sgl = NULL;
+ pending_len = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < tsgl->nents; i++) {
+ if (divs[i]->flush_type != FLUSH_TYPE_NONE &&
+ pending_sgl != NULL) {
+ /* update() with the pending data */
+ ahash_request_set_callback(req, req_flags,
+ crypto_req_done, &wait);
+ ahash_request_set_crypt(req, pending_sgl, result,
+ pending_len);
+ err = do_ahash_op(crypto_ahash_update, req, &wait,
+ divs[i]->nosimd);
+ err = check_nonfinal_ahash_op("update", err,
+ result, digestsize,
+ driver, vec_name, cfg);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ pending_sgl = NULL;
+ pending_len = 0;
+ }
+ if (divs[i]->flush_type == FLUSH_TYPE_REIMPORT) {
+ /* Test ->export() and ->import() */
+ testmgr_poison(hashstate + statesize,
+ TESTMGR_POISON_LEN);
+ err = crypto_ahash_export(req, hashstate);
+ err = check_nonfinal_ahash_op("export", err,
+ result, digestsize,
+ driver, vec_name, cfg);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ if (!testmgr_is_poison(hashstate + statesize,
+ TESTMGR_POISON_LEN)) {
+ pr_err("alg: ahash: %s export() overran state buffer on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return -EOVERFLOW;
+ }
+
+ testmgr_poison(req->__ctx, crypto_ahash_reqsize(tfm));
+ err = crypto_ahash_import(req, hashstate);
+ err = check_nonfinal_ahash_op("import", err,
+ result, digestsize,
+ driver, vec_name, cfg);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (pending_sgl == NULL)
+ pending_sgl = &tsgl->sgl[i];
+ pending_len += tsgl->sgl[i].length;
+ }
+
+ ahash_request_set_callback(req, req_flags, crypto_req_done, &wait);
+ ahash_request_set_crypt(req, pending_sgl, result, pending_len);
+ if (cfg->finalization_type == FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL) {
+ /* finish with update() and final() */
+ err = do_ahash_op(crypto_ahash_update, req, &wait, cfg->nosimd);
+ err = check_nonfinal_ahash_op("update", err, result, digestsize,
+ driver, vec_name, cfg);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ err = do_ahash_op(crypto_ahash_final, req, &wait, cfg->nosimd);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("alg: ahash: %s final() failed with err %d on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, err, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* finish with finup() */
+ err = do_ahash_op(crypto_ahash_finup, req, &wait, cfg->nosimd);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("alg: ahash: %s finup() failed with err %d on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, err, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return err;
+ }
+ }
+
+result_ready:
+ return check_hash_result("ahash", result, digestsize, vec, vec_name,
+ driver, cfg);
+}
+
+static int test_hash_vec_cfg(const struct hash_testvec *vec,
+ const char *vec_name,
+ const struct testvec_config *cfg,
+ struct ahash_request *req,
+ struct shash_desc *desc,
+ struct test_sglist *tsgl,
+ u8 *hashstate)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ /*
+ * For algorithms implemented as "shash", most bugs will be detected by
+ * both the shash and ahash tests. Test the shash API first so that the
+ * failures involve less indirection, so are easier to debug.
+ */
+
+ if (desc) {
+ err = test_shash_vec_cfg(vec, vec_name, cfg, desc, tsgl,
+ hashstate);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ return test_ahash_vec_cfg(vec, vec_name, cfg, req, tsgl, hashstate);
+}
+
+static int test_hash_vec(const struct hash_testvec *vec, unsigned int vec_num,
+ struct ahash_request *req, struct shash_desc *desc,
+ struct test_sglist *tsgl, u8 *hashstate)
+{
+ char vec_name[16];
+ unsigned int i;
+ int err;
+
+ sprintf(vec_name, "%u", vec_num);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_hash_testvec_configs); i++) {
+ err = test_hash_vec_cfg(vec, vec_name,
+ &default_hash_testvec_configs[i],
+ req, desc, tsgl, hashstate);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
+ if (!noextratests) {
+ struct rnd_state rng;
+ struct testvec_config cfg;
+ char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN];
+
+ init_rnd_state(&rng);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations; i++) {
+ generate_random_testvec_config(&rng, &cfg, cfgname,
+ sizeof(cfgname));
+ err = test_hash_vec_cfg(vec, vec_name, &cfg,
+ req, desc, tsgl, hashstate);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
+/*
+ * Generate a hash test vector from the given implementation.
+ * Assumes the buffers in 'vec' were already allocated.
+ */
+static void generate_random_hash_testvec(struct rnd_state *rng,
+ struct shash_desc *desc,
+ struct hash_testvec *vec,
+ unsigned int maxkeysize,
+ unsigned int maxdatasize,
+ char *name, size_t max_namelen)
+{
+ /* Data */
+ vec->psize = generate_random_length(rng, maxdatasize);
+ generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->plaintext, vec->psize);
+
+ /*
+ * Key: length in range [1, maxkeysize], but usually choose maxkeysize.
+ * If algorithm is unkeyed, then maxkeysize == 0 and set ksize = 0.
+ */
+ vec->setkey_error = 0;
+ vec->ksize = 0;
+ if (maxkeysize) {
+ vec->ksize = maxkeysize;
+ if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0)
+ vec->ksize = prandom_u32_inclusive(rng, 1, maxkeysize);
+ generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->key, vec->ksize);
+
+ vec->setkey_error = crypto_shash_setkey(desc->tfm, vec->key,
+ vec->ksize);
+ /* If the key couldn't be set, no need to continue to digest. */
+ if (vec->setkey_error)
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* Digest */
+ vec->digest_error = crypto_shash_digest(desc, vec->plaintext,
+ vec->psize, (u8 *)vec->digest);
+done:
+ snprintf(name, max_namelen, "\"random: psize=%u ksize=%u\"",
+ vec->psize, vec->ksize);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test the hash algorithm represented by @req against the corresponding generic
+ * implementation, if one is available.
+ */
+static int test_hash_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver,
+ unsigned int maxkeysize,
+ struct ahash_request *req,
+ struct shash_desc *desc,
+ struct test_sglist *tsgl,
+ u8 *hashstate)
+{
+ struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
+ const unsigned int digestsize = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm);
+ const unsigned int blocksize = crypto_ahash_blocksize(tfm);
+ const unsigned int maxdatasize = (2 * PAGE_SIZE) - TESTMGR_POISON_LEN;
+ const char *algname = crypto_hash_alg_common(tfm)->base.cra_name;
+ const char *driver = crypto_ahash_driver_name(tfm);
+ struct rnd_state rng;
+ char _generic_driver[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+ struct crypto_shash *generic_tfm = NULL;
+ struct shash_desc *generic_desc = NULL;
+ unsigned int i;
+ struct hash_testvec vec = { 0 };
+ char vec_name[64];
+ struct testvec_config *cfg;
+ char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN];
+ int err;
+
+ if (noextratests)
+ return 0;
+
+ init_rnd_state(&rng);
+
+ if (!generic_driver) { /* Use default naming convention? */
+ err = build_generic_driver_name(algname, _generic_driver);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ generic_driver = _generic_driver;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(generic_driver, driver) == 0) /* Already the generic impl? */
+ return 0;
+
+ generic_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(generic_driver, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(generic_tfm)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(generic_tfm);
+ if (err == -ENOENT) {
+ pr_warn("alg: hash: skipping comparison tests for %s because %s is unavailable\n",
+ driver, generic_driver);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ pr_err("alg: hash: error allocating %s (generic impl of %s): %d\n",
+ generic_driver, algname, err);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ cfg = kzalloc(sizeof(*cfg), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!cfg) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ generic_desc = kzalloc(sizeof(*desc) +
+ crypto_shash_descsize(generic_tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!generic_desc) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ generic_desc->tfm = generic_tfm;
+
+ /* Check the algorithm properties for consistency. */
+
+ if (digestsize != crypto_shash_digestsize(generic_tfm)) {
+ pr_err("alg: hash: digestsize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n",
+ driver, digestsize,
+ crypto_shash_digestsize(generic_tfm));
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (blocksize != crypto_shash_blocksize(generic_tfm)) {
+ pr_err("alg: hash: blocksize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n",
+ driver, blocksize, crypto_shash_blocksize(generic_tfm));
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now generate test vectors using the generic implementation, and test
+ * the other implementation against them.
+ */
+
+ vec.key = kmalloc(maxkeysize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ vec.plaintext = kmalloc(maxdatasize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ vec.digest = kmalloc(digestsize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!vec.key || !vec.plaintext || !vec.digest) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations * 8; i++) {
+ generate_random_hash_testvec(&rng, generic_desc, &vec,
+ maxkeysize, maxdatasize,
+ vec_name, sizeof(vec_name));
+ generate_random_testvec_config(&rng, cfg, cfgname,
+ sizeof(cfgname));
+
+ err = test_hash_vec_cfg(&vec, vec_name, cfg,
+ req, desc, tsgl, hashstate);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+ err = 0;
+out:
+ kfree(cfg);
+ kfree(vec.key);
+ kfree(vec.plaintext);
+ kfree(vec.digest);
+ crypto_free_shash(generic_tfm);
+ kfree_sensitive(generic_desc);
+ return err;
+}
+#else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */
+static int test_hash_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver,
+ unsigned int maxkeysize,
+ struct ahash_request *req,
+ struct shash_desc *desc,
+ struct test_sglist *tsgl,
+ u8 *hashstate)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */
+
+static int alloc_shash(const char *driver, u32 type, u32 mask,
+ struct crypto_shash **tfm_ret,
+ struct shash_desc **desc_ret)
+{
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+ struct shash_desc *desc;
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(driver, type, mask);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ if (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) {
+ /*
+ * This algorithm is only available through the ahash
+ * API, not the shash API, so skip the shash tests.
+ */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ pr_err("alg: hash: failed to allocate shash transform for %s: %ld\n",
+ driver, PTR_ERR(tfm));
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ }
+
+ desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!desc) {
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ desc->tfm = tfm;
+
+ *tfm_ret = tfm;
+ *desc_ret = desc;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __alg_test_hash(const struct hash_testvec *vecs,
+ unsigned int num_vecs, const char *driver,
+ u32 type, u32 mask,
+ const char *generic_driver, unsigned int maxkeysize)
+{
+ struct crypto_ahash *atfm = NULL;
+ struct ahash_request *req = NULL;
+ struct crypto_shash *stfm = NULL;
+ struct shash_desc *desc = NULL;
+ struct test_sglist *tsgl = NULL;
+ u8 *hashstate = NULL;
+ unsigned int statesize;
+ unsigned int i;
+ int err;
+
+ /*
+ * Always test the ahash API. This works regardless of whether the
+ * algorithm is implemented as ahash or shash.
+ */
+
+ atfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(driver, type, mask);
+ if (IS_ERR(atfm)) {
+ pr_err("alg: hash: failed to allocate transform for %s: %ld\n",
+ driver, PTR_ERR(atfm));
+ return PTR_ERR(atfm);
+ }
+ driver = crypto_ahash_driver_name(atfm);
+
+ req = ahash_request_alloc(atfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!req) {
+ pr_err("alg: hash: failed to allocate request for %s\n",
+ driver);
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If available also test the shash API, to cover corner cases that may
+ * be missed by testing the ahash API only.
+ */
+ err = alloc_shash(driver, type, mask, &stfm, &desc);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ tsgl = kmalloc(sizeof(*tsgl), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tsgl || init_test_sglist(tsgl) != 0) {
+ pr_err("alg: hash: failed to allocate test buffers for %s\n",
+ driver);
+ kfree(tsgl);
+ tsgl = NULL;
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ statesize = crypto_ahash_statesize(atfm);
+ if (stfm)
+ statesize = max(statesize, crypto_shash_statesize(stfm));
+ hashstate = kmalloc(statesize + TESTMGR_POISON_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!hashstate) {
+ pr_err("alg: hash: failed to allocate hash state buffer for %s\n",
+ driver);
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_vecs; i++) {
+ if (fips_enabled && vecs[i].fips_skip)
+ continue;
+
+ err = test_hash_vec(&vecs[i], i, req, desc, tsgl, hashstate);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+ err = test_hash_vs_generic_impl(generic_driver, maxkeysize, req,
+ desc, tsgl, hashstate);
+out:
+ kfree(hashstate);
+ if (tsgl) {
+ destroy_test_sglist(tsgl);
+ kfree(tsgl);
+ }
+ kfree(desc);
+ crypto_free_shash(stfm);
+ ahash_request_free(req);
+ crypto_free_ahash(atfm);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int alg_test_hash(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver,
+ u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+ const struct hash_testvec *template = desc->suite.hash.vecs;
+ unsigned int tcount = desc->suite.hash.count;
+ unsigned int nr_unkeyed, nr_keyed;
+ unsigned int maxkeysize = 0;
+ int err;
+
+ /*
+ * For OPTIONAL_KEY algorithms, we have to do all the unkeyed tests
+ * first, before setting a key on the tfm. To make this easier, we
+ * require that the unkeyed test vectors (if any) are listed first.
+ */
+
+ for (nr_unkeyed = 0; nr_unkeyed < tcount; nr_unkeyed++) {
+ if (template[nr_unkeyed].ksize)
+ break;
+ }
+ for (nr_keyed = 0; nr_unkeyed + nr_keyed < tcount; nr_keyed++) {
+ if (!template[nr_unkeyed + nr_keyed].ksize) {
+ pr_err("alg: hash: test vectors for %s out of order, "
+ "unkeyed ones must come first\n", desc->alg);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ maxkeysize = max_t(unsigned int, maxkeysize,
+ template[nr_unkeyed + nr_keyed].ksize);
+ }
+
+ err = 0;
+ if (nr_unkeyed) {
+ err = __alg_test_hash(template, nr_unkeyed, driver, type, mask,
+ desc->generic_driver, maxkeysize);
+ template += nr_unkeyed;
+ }
+
+ if (!err && nr_keyed)
+ err = __alg_test_hash(template, nr_keyed, driver, type, mask,
+ desc->generic_driver, maxkeysize);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int test_aead_vec_cfg(int enc, const struct aead_testvec *vec,
+ const char *vec_name,
+ const struct testvec_config *cfg,
+ struct aead_request *req,
+ struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ const unsigned int alignmask = crypto_aead_alignmask(tfm);
+ const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
+ const unsigned int authsize = vec->clen - vec->plen;
+ const char *driver = crypto_aead_driver_name(tfm);
+ const u32 req_flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | cfg->req_flags;
+ const char *op = enc ? "encryption" : "decryption";
+ DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
+ u8 _iv[3 * (MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK + 1) + MAX_IVLEN];
+ u8 *iv = PTR_ALIGN(&_iv[0], 2 * (MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK + 1)) +
+ cfg->iv_offset +
+ (cfg->iv_offset_relative_to_alignmask ? alignmask : 0);
+ struct kvec input[2];
+ int err;
+
+ /* Set the key */
+ if (vec->wk)
+ crypto_aead_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS);
+ else
+ crypto_aead_clear_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS);
+
+ err = do_setkey(crypto_aead_setkey, tfm, vec->key, vec->klen,
+ cfg, alignmask);
+ if (err && err != vec->setkey_error) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: %s setkey failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, flags=%#x\n",
+ driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error, err,
+ crypto_aead_get_flags(tfm));
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (!err && vec->setkey_error) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: %s setkey unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d\n",
+ driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* Set the authentication tag size */
+ err = crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, authsize);
+ if (err && err != vec->setauthsize_error) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: %s setauthsize failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d\n",
+ driver, vec_name, vec->setauthsize_error, err);
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (!err && vec->setauthsize_error) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: %s setauthsize unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d\n",
+ driver, vec_name, vec->setauthsize_error);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (vec->setkey_error || vec->setauthsize_error)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* The IV must be copied to a buffer, as the algorithm may modify it */
+ if (WARN_ON(ivsize > MAX_IVLEN))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (vec->iv)
+ memcpy(iv, vec->iv, ivsize);
+ else
+ memset(iv, 0, ivsize);
+
+ /* Build the src/dst scatterlists */
+ input[0].iov_base = (void *)vec->assoc;
+ input[0].iov_len = vec->alen;
+ input[1].iov_base = enc ? (void *)vec->ptext : (void *)vec->ctext;
+ input[1].iov_len = enc ? vec->plen : vec->clen;
+ err = build_cipher_test_sglists(tsgls, cfg, alignmask,
+ vec->alen + (enc ? vec->plen :
+ vec->clen),
+ vec->alen + (enc ? vec->clen :
+ vec->plen),
+ input, 2);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s: error preparing scatterlists for test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /* Do the actual encryption or decryption */
+ testmgr_poison(req->__ctx, crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm));
+ aead_request_set_callback(req, req_flags, crypto_req_done, &wait);
+ aead_request_set_crypt(req, tsgls->src.sgl_ptr, tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr,
+ enc ? vec->plen : vec->clen, iv);
+ aead_request_set_ad(req, vec->alen);
+ if (cfg->nosimd)
+ crypto_disable_simd_for_test();
+ err = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req) : crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
+ if (cfg->nosimd)
+ crypto_reenable_simd_for_test();
+ err = crypto_wait_req(err, &wait);
+
+ /* Check that the algorithm didn't overwrite things it shouldn't have */
+ if (req->cryptlen != (enc ? vec->plen : vec->clen) ||
+ req->assoclen != vec->alen ||
+ req->iv != iv ||
+ req->src != tsgls->src.sgl_ptr ||
+ req->dst != tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr ||
+ crypto_aead_reqtfm(req) != tfm ||
+ req->base.complete != crypto_req_done ||
+ req->base.flags != req_flags ||
+ req->base.data != &wait) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s corrupted request struct on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ if (req->cryptlen != (enc ? vec->plen : vec->clen))
+ pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->cryptlen'\n");
+ if (req->assoclen != vec->alen)
+ pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->assoclen'\n");
+ if (req->iv != iv)
+ pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->iv'\n");
+ if (req->src != tsgls->src.sgl_ptr)
+ pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->src'\n");
+ if (req->dst != tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr)
+ pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->dst'\n");
+ if (crypto_aead_reqtfm(req) != tfm)
+ pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->base.tfm'\n");
+ if (req->base.complete != crypto_req_done)
+ pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->base.complete'\n");
+ if (req->base.flags != req_flags)
+ pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->base.flags'\n");
+ if (req->base.data != &wait)
+ pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->base.data'\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (is_test_sglist_corrupted(&tsgls->src)) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s corrupted src sgl on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr != tsgls->src.sgl &&
+ is_test_sglist_corrupted(&tsgls->dst)) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s corrupted dst sgl on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* Check for unexpected success or failure, or wrong error code */
+ if ((err == 0 && vec->novrfy) ||
+ (err != vec->crypt_error && !(err == -EBADMSG && vec->novrfy))) {
+ char expected_error[32];
+
+ if (vec->novrfy &&
+ vec->crypt_error != 0 && vec->crypt_error != -EBADMSG)
+ sprintf(expected_error, "-EBADMSG or %d",
+ vec->crypt_error);
+ else if (vec->novrfy)
+ sprintf(expected_error, "-EBADMSG");
+ else
+ sprintf(expected_error, "%d", vec->crypt_error);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%s, actual_error=%d, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, expected_error, err,
+ cfg->name);
+ return err;
+ }
+ pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, expected_error, cfg->name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (err) /* Expectedly failed. */
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check for the correct output (ciphertext or plaintext) */
+ err = verify_correct_output(&tsgls->dst, enc ? vec->ctext : vec->ptext,
+ enc ? vec->clen : vec->plen,
+ vec->alen,
+ enc || cfg->inplace_mode == OUT_OF_PLACE);
+ if (err == -EOVERFLOW) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s overran dst buffer on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s test failed (wrong result) on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int test_aead_vec(int enc, const struct aead_testvec *vec,
+ unsigned int vec_num, struct aead_request *req,
+ struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+{
+ char vec_name[16];
+ unsigned int i;
+ int err;
+
+ if (enc && vec->novrfy)
+ return 0;
+
+ sprintf(vec_name, "%u", vec_num);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_cipher_testvec_configs); i++) {
+ err = test_aead_vec_cfg(enc, vec, vec_name,
+ &default_cipher_testvec_configs[i],
+ req, tsgls);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
+ if (!noextratests) {
+ struct rnd_state rng;
+ struct testvec_config cfg;
+ char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN];
+
+ init_rnd_state(&rng);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations; i++) {
+ generate_random_testvec_config(&rng, &cfg, cfgname,
+ sizeof(cfgname));
+ err = test_aead_vec_cfg(enc, vec, vec_name,
+ &cfg, req, tsgls);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
+
+struct aead_extra_tests_ctx {
+ struct rnd_state rng;
+ struct aead_request *req;
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm;
+ const struct alg_test_desc *test_desc;
+ struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls;
+ unsigned int maxdatasize;
+ unsigned int maxkeysize;
+
+ struct aead_testvec vec;
+ char vec_name[64];
+ char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN];
+ struct testvec_config cfg;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Make at least one random change to a (ciphertext, AAD) pair. "Ciphertext"
+ * here means the full ciphertext including the authentication tag. The
+ * authentication tag (and hence also the ciphertext) is assumed to be nonempty.
+ */
+static void mutate_aead_message(struct rnd_state *rng,
+ struct aead_testvec *vec, bool aad_iv,
+ unsigned int ivsize)
+{
+ const unsigned int aad_tail_size = aad_iv ? ivsize : 0;
+ const unsigned int authsize = vec->clen - vec->plen;
+
+ if (prandom_bool(rng) && vec->alen > aad_tail_size) {
+ /* Mutate the AAD */
+ flip_random_bit(rng, (u8 *)vec->assoc,
+ vec->alen - aad_tail_size);
+ if (prandom_bool(rng))
+ return;
+ }
+ if (prandom_bool(rng)) {
+ /* Mutate auth tag (assuming it's at the end of ciphertext) */
+ flip_random_bit(rng, (u8 *)vec->ctext + vec->plen, authsize);
+ } else {
+ /* Mutate any part of the ciphertext */
+ flip_random_bit(rng, (u8 *)vec->ctext, vec->clen);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Minimum authentication tag size in bytes at which we assume that we can
+ * reliably generate inauthentic messages, i.e. not generate an authentic
+ * message by chance.
+ */
+#define MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE 8
+
+static void generate_aead_message(struct rnd_state *rng,
+ struct aead_request *req,
+ const struct aead_test_suite *suite,
+ struct aead_testvec *vec,
+ bool prefer_inauthentic)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
+ const unsigned int authsize = vec->clen - vec->plen;
+ const bool inauthentic = (authsize >= MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE) &&
+ (prefer_inauthentic ||
+ prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0);
+
+ /* Generate the AAD. */
+ generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->assoc, vec->alen);
+ if (suite->aad_iv && vec->alen >= ivsize)
+ /* Avoid implementation-defined behavior. */
+ memcpy((u8 *)vec->assoc + vec->alen - ivsize, vec->iv, ivsize);
+
+ if (inauthentic && prandom_bool(rng)) {
+ /* Generate a random ciphertext. */
+ generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->ctext, vec->clen);
+ } else {
+ int i = 0;
+ struct scatterlist src[2], dst;
+ u8 iv[MAX_IVLEN];
+ DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
+
+ /* Generate a random plaintext and encrypt it. */
+ sg_init_table(src, 2);
+ if (vec->alen)
+ sg_set_buf(&src[i++], vec->assoc, vec->alen);
+ if (vec->plen) {
+ generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->ptext, vec->plen);
+ sg_set_buf(&src[i++], vec->ptext, vec->plen);
+ }
+ sg_init_one(&dst, vec->ctext, vec->alen + vec->clen);
+ memcpy(iv, vec->iv, ivsize);
+ aead_request_set_callback(req, 0, crypto_req_done, &wait);
+ aead_request_set_crypt(req, src, &dst, vec->plen, iv);
+ aead_request_set_ad(req, vec->alen);
+ vec->crypt_error = crypto_wait_req(crypto_aead_encrypt(req),
+ &wait);
+ /* If encryption failed, we're done. */
+ if (vec->crypt_error != 0)
+ return;
+ memmove((u8 *)vec->ctext, vec->ctext + vec->alen, vec->clen);
+ if (!inauthentic)
+ return;
+ /*
+ * Mutate the authentic (ciphertext, AAD) pair to get an
+ * inauthentic one.
+ */
+ mutate_aead_message(rng, vec, suite->aad_iv, ivsize);
+ }
+ vec->novrfy = 1;
+ if (suite->einval_allowed)
+ vec->crypt_error = -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate an AEAD test vector 'vec' using the implementation specified by
+ * 'req'. The buffers in 'vec' must already be allocated.
+ *
+ * If 'prefer_inauthentic' is true, then this function will generate inauthentic
+ * test vectors (i.e. vectors with 'vec->novrfy=1') more often.
+ */
+static void generate_random_aead_testvec(struct rnd_state *rng,
+ struct aead_request *req,
+ struct aead_testvec *vec,
+ const struct aead_test_suite *suite,
+ unsigned int maxkeysize,
+ unsigned int maxdatasize,
+ char *name, size_t max_namelen,
+ bool prefer_inauthentic)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
+ const unsigned int maxauthsize = crypto_aead_maxauthsize(tfm);
+ unsigned int authsize;
+ unsigned int total_len;
+
+ /* Key: length in [0, maxkeysize], but usually choose maxkeysize */
+ vec->klen = maxkeysize;
+ if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0)
+ vec->klen = prandom_u32_below(rng, maxkeysize + 1);
+ generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->key, vec->klen);
+ vec->setkey_error = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, vec->key, vec->klen);
+
+ /* IV */
+ generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->iv, ivsize);
+
+ /* Tag length: in [0, maxauthsize], but usually choose maxauthsize */
+ authsize = maxauthsize;
+ if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0)
+ authsize = prandom_u32_below(rng, maxauthsize + 1);
+ if (prefer_inauthentic && authsize < MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE)
+ authsize = MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE;
+ if (WARN_ON(authsize > maxdatasize))
+ authsize = maxdatasize;
+ maxdatasize -= authsize;
+ vec->setauthsize_error = crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, authsize);
+
+ /* AAD, plaintext, and ciphertext lengths */
+ total_len = generate_random_length(rng, maxdatasize);
+ if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0)
+ vec->alen = 0;
+ else
+ vec->alen = generate_random_length(rng, total_len);
+ vec->plen = total_len - vec->alen;
+ vec->clen = vec->plen + authsize;
+
+ /*
+ * Generate the AAD, plaintext, and ciphertext. Not applicable if the
+ * key or the authentication tag size couldn't be set.
+ */
+ vec->novrfy = 0;
+ vec->crypt_error = 0;
+ if (vec->setkey_error == 0 && vec->setauthsize_error == 0)
+ generate_aead_message(rng, req, suite, vec, prefer_inauthentic);
+ snprintf(name, max_namelen,
+ "\"random: alen=%u plen=%u authsize=%u klen=%u novrfy=%d\"",
+ vec->alen, vec->plen, authsize, vec->klen, vec->novrfy);
+}
+
+static void try_to_generate_inauthentic_testvec(
+ struct aead_extra_tests_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
+ generate_random_aead_testvec(&ctx->rng, ctx->req, &ctx->vec,
+ &ctx->test_desc->suite.aead,
+ ctx->maxkeysize, ctx->maxdatasize,
+ ctx->vec_name,
+ sizeof(ctx->vec_name), true);
+ if (ctx->vec.novrfy)
+ return;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate inauthentic test vectors (i.e. ciphertext, AAD pairs that aren't the
+ * result of an encryption with the key) and verify that decryption fails.
+ */
+static int test_aead_inauthentic_inputs(struct aead_extra_tests_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ int err;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations * 8; i++) {
+ /*
+ * Since this part of the tests isn't comparing the
+ * implementation to another, there's no point in testing any
+ * test vectors other than inauthentic ones (vec.novrfy=1) here.
+ *
+ * If we're having trouble generating such a test vector, e.g.
+ * if the algorithm keeps rejecting the generated keys, don't
+ * retry forever; just continue on.
+ */
+ try_to_generate_inauthentic_testvec(ctx);
+ if (ctx->vec.novrfy) {
+ generate_random_testvec_config(&ctx->rng, &ctx->cfg,
+ ctx->cfgname,
+ sizeof(ctx->cfgname));
+ err = test_aead_vec_cfg(DECRYPT, &ctx->vec,
+ ctx->vec_name, &ctx->cfg,
+ ctx->req, ctx->tsgls);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test the AEAD algorithm against the corresponding generic implementation, if
+ * one is available.
+ */
+static int test_aead_vs_generic_impl(struct aead_extra_tests_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm = ctx->tfm;
+ const char *algname = crypto_aead_alg(tfm)->base.cra_name;
+ const char *driver = crypto_aead_driver_name(tfm);
+ const char *generic_driver = ctx->test_desc->generic_driver;
+ char _generic_driver[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+ struct crypto_aead *generic_tfm = NULL;
+ struct aead_request *generic_req = NULL;
+ unsigned int i;
+ int err;
+
+ if (!generic_driver) { /* Use default naming convention? */
+ err = build_generic_driver_name(algname, _generic_driver);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ generic_driver = _generic_driver;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(generic_driver, driver) == 0) /* Already the generic impl? */
+ return 0;
+
+ generic_tfm = crypto_alloc_aead(generic_driver, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(generic_tfm)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(generic_tfm);
+ if (err == -ENOENT) {
+ pr_warn("alg: aead: skipping comparison tests for %s because %s is unavailable\n",
+ driver, generic_driver);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ pr_err("alg: aead: error allocating %s (generic impl of %s): %d\n",
+ generic_driver, algname, err);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ generic_req = aead_request_alloc(generic_tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!generic_req) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Check the algorithm properties for consistency. */
+
+ if (crypto_aead_maxauthsize(tfm) !=
+ crypto_aead_maxauthsize(generic_tfm)) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: maxauthsize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n",
+ driver, crypto_aead_maxauthsize(tfm),
+ crypto_aead_maxauthsize(generic_tfm));
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm) != crypto_aead_ivsize(generic_tfm)) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: ivsize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n",
+ driver, crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm),
+ crypto_aead_ivsize(generic_tfm));
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (crypto_aead_blocksize(tfm) != crypto_aead_blocksize(generic_tfm)) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: blocksize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n",
+ driver, crypto_aead_blocksize(tfm),
+ crypto_aead_blocksize(generic_tfm));
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now generate test vectors using the generic implementation, and test
+ * the other implementation against them.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations * 8; i++) {
+ generate_random_aead_testvec(&ctx->rng, generic_req, &ctx->vec,
+ &ctx->test_desc->suite.aead,
+ ctx->maxkeysize, ctx->maxdatasize,
+ ctx->vec_name,
+ sizeof(ctx->vec_name), false);
+ generate_random_testvec_config(&ctx->rng, &ctx->cfg,
+ ctx->cfgname,
+ sizeof(ctx->cfgname));
+ if (!ctx->vec.novrfy) {
+ err = test_aead_vec_cfg(ENCRYPT, &ctx->vec,
+ ctx->vec_name, &ctx->cfg,
+ ctx->req, ctx->tsgls);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (ctx->vec.crypt_error == 0 || ctx->vec.novrfy) {
+ err = test_aead_vec_cfg(DECRYPT, &ctx->vec,
+ ctx->vec_name, &ctx->cfg,
+ ctx->req, ctx->tsgls);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+ err = 0;
+out:
+ crypto_free_aead(generic_tfm);
+ aead_request_free(generic_req);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int test_aead_extra(const struct alg_test_desc *test_desc,
+ struct aead_request *req,
+ struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+{
+ struct aead_extra_tests_ctx *ctx;
+ unsigned int i;
+ int err;
+
+ if (noextratests)
+ return 0;
+
+ ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ init_rnd_state(&ctx->rng);
+ ctx->req = req;
+ ctx->tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ ctx->test_desc = test_desc;
+ ctx->tsgls = tsgls;
+ ctx->maxdatasize = (2 * PAGE_SIZE) - TESTMGR_POISON_LEN;
+ ctx->maxkeysize = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < test_desc->suite.aead.count; i++)
+ ctx->maxkeysize = max_t(unsigned int, ctx->maxkeysize,
+ test_desc->suite.aead.vecs[i].klen);
+
+ ctx->vec.key = kmalloc(ctx->maxkeysize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ ctx->vec.iv = kmalloc(crypto_aead_ivsize(ctx->tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
+ ctx->vec.assoc = kmalloc(ctx->maxdatasize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ ctx->vec.ptext = kmalloc(ctx->maxdatasize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ ctx->vec.ctext = kmalloc(ctx->maxdatasize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx->vec.key || !ctx->vec.iv || !ctx->vec.assoc ||
+ !ctx->vec.ptext || !ctx->vec.ctext) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ err = test_aead_vs_generic_impl(ctx);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ err = test_aead_inauthentic_inputs(ctx);
+out:
+ kfree(ctx->vec.key);
+ kfree(ctx->vec.iv);
+ kfree(ctx->vec.assoc);
+ kfree(ctx->vec.ptext);
+ kfree(ctx->vec.ctext);
+ kfree(ctx);
+ return err;
+}
+#else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */
+static int test_aead_extra(const struct alg_test_desc *test_desc,
+ struct aead_request *req,
+ struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */
+
+static int test_aead(int enc, const struct aead_test_suite *suite,
+ struct aead_request *req,
+ struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ int err;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < suite->count; i++) {
+ err = test_aead_vec(enc, &suite->vecs[i], i, req, tsgls);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int alg_test_aead(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver,
+ u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+ const struct aead_test_suite *suite = &desc->suite.aead;
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm;
+ struct aead_request *req = NULL;
+ struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls = NULL;
+ int err;
+
+ if (suite->count <= 0) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: empty test suite for %s\n", driver);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_aead(driver, type, mask);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: failed to allocate transform for %s: %ld\n",
+ driver, PTR_ERR(tfm));
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ }
+ driver = crypto_aead_driver_name(tfm);
+
+ req = aead_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!req) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: failed to allocate request for %s\n",
+ driver);
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ tsgls = alloc_cipher_test_sglists();
+ if (!tsgls) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: failed to allocate test buffers for %s\n",
+ driver);
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ err = test_aead(ENCRYPT, suite, req, tsgls);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ err = test_aead(DECRYPT, suite, req, tsgls);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ err = test_aead_extra(desc, req, tsgls);
+out:
+ free_cipher_test_sglists(tsgls);
+ aead_request_free(req);
+ crypto_free_aead(tfm);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int test_cipher(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, int enc,
+ const struct cipher_testvec *template,
+ unsigned int tcount)
+{
+ const char *algo = crypto_tfm_alg_driver_name(crypto_cipher_tfm(tfm));
+ unsigned int i, j, k;
+ char *q;
+ const char *e;
+ const char *input, *result;
+ void *data;
+ char *xbuf[XBUFSIZE];
+ int ret = -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (testmgr_alloc_buf(xbuf))
+ goto out_nobuf;
+
+ if (enc == ENCRYPT)
+ e = "encryption";
+ else
+ e = "decryption";
+
+ j = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < tcount; i++) {
+
+ if (fips_enabled && template[i].fips_skip)
+ continue;
+
+ input = enc ? template[i].ptext : template[i].ctext;
+ result = enc ? template[i].ctext : template[i].ptext;
+ j++;
+
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ if (WARN_ON(template[i].len > PAGE_SIZE))
+ goto out;
+
+ data = xbuf[0];
+ memcpy(data, input, template[i].len);
+
+ crypto_cipher_clear_flags(tfm, ~0);
+ if (template[i].wk)
+ crypto_cipher_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS);
+
+ ret = crypto_cipher_setkey(tfm, template[i].key,
+ template[i].klen);
+ if (ret) {
+ if (ret == template[i].setkey_error)
+ continue;
+ pr_err("alg: cipher: %s setkey failed on test vector %u; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, flags=%#x\n",
+ algo, j, template[i].setkey_error, ret,
+ crypto_cipher_get_flags(tfm));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (template[i].setkey_error) {
+ pr_err("alg: cipher: %s setkey unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %u; expected_error=%d\n",
+ algo, j, template[i].setkey_error);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (k = 0; k < template[i].len;
+ k += crypto_cipher_blocksize(tfm)) {
+ if (enc)
+ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, data + k,
+ data + k);
+ else
+ crypto_cipher_decrypt_one(tfm, data + k,
+ data + k);
+ }
+
+ q = data;
+ if (memcmp(q, result, template[i].len)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "alg: cipher: Test %d failed "
+ "on %s for %s\n", j, e, algo);
+ hexdump(q, template[i].len);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+out:
+ testmgr_free_buf(xbuf);
+out_nobuf:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_skcipher_vec_cfg(int enc, const struct cipher_testvec *vec,
+ const char *vec_name,
+ const struct testvec_config *cfg,
+ struct skcipher_request *req,
+ struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+{
+ struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+ const unsigned int alignmask = crypto_skcipher_alignmask(tfm);
+ const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm);
+ const char *driver = crypto_skcipher_driver_name(tfm);
+ const u32 req_flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | cfg->req_flags;
+ const char *op = enc ? "encryption" : "decryption";
+ DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
+ u8 _iv[3 * (MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK + 1) + MAX_IVLEN];
+ u8 *iv = PTR_ALIGN(&_iv[0], 2 * (MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK + 1)) +
+ cfg->iv_offset +
+ (cfg->iv_offset_relative_to_alignmask ? alignmask : 0);
+ struct kvec input;
+ int err;
+
+ /* Set the key */
+ if (vec->wk)
+ crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS);
+ else
+ crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(tfm,
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS);
+ err = do_setkey(crypto_skcipher_setkey, tfm, vec->key, vec->klen,
+ cfg, alignmask);
+ if (err) {
+ if (err == vec->setkey_error)
+ return 0;
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s setkey failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, flags=%#x\n",
+ driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error, err,
+ crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm));
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (vec->setkey_error) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s setkey unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d\n",
+ driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* The IV must be copied to a buffer, as the algorithm may modify it */
+ if (ivsize) {
+ if (WARN_ON(ivsize > MAX_IVLEN))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (vec->generates_iv && !enc)
+ memcpy(iv, vec->iv_out, ivsize);
+ else if (vec->iv)
+ memcpy(iv, vec->iv, ivsize);
+ else
+ memset(iv, 0, ivsize);
+ } else {
+ if (vec->generates_iv) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s has ivsize=0 but test vector %s generates IV!\n",
+ driver, vec_name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ iv = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Build the src/dst scatterlists */
+ input.iov_base = enc ? (void *)vec->ptext : (void *)vec->ctext;
+ input.iov_len = vec->len;
+ err = build_cipher_test_sglists(tsgls, cfg, alignmask,
+ vec->len, vec->len, &input, 1);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s: error preparing scatterlists for test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /* Do the actual encryption or decryption */
+ testmgr_poison(req->__ctx, crypto_skcipher_reqsize(tfm));
+ skcipher_request_set_callback(req, req_flags, crypto_req_done, &wait);
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, tsgls->src.sgl_ptr, tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr,
+ vec->len, iv);
+ if (cfg->nosimd)
+ crypto_disable_simd_for_test();
+ err = enc ? crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req) : crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
+ if (cfg->nosimd)
+ crypto_reenable_simd_for_test();
+ err = crypto_wait_req(err, &wait);
+
+ /* Check that the algorithm didn't overwrite things it shouldn't have */
+ if (req->cryptlen != vec->len ||
+ req->iv != iv ||
+ req->src != tsgls->src.sgl_ptr ||
+ req->dst != tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr ||
+ crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req) != tfm ||
+ req->base.complete != crypto_req_done ||
+ req->base.flags != req_flags ||
+ req->base.data != &wait) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s corrupted request struct on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ if (req->cryptlen != vec->len)
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: changed 'req->cryptlen'\n");
+ if (req->iv != iv)
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: changed 'req->iv'\n");
+ if (req->src != tsgls->src.sgl_ptr)
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: changed 'req->src'\n");
+ if (req->dst != tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr)
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: changed 'req->dst'\n");
+ if (crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req) != tfm)
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: changed 'req->base.tfm'\n");
+ if (req->base.complete != crypto_req_done)
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: changed 'req->base.complete'\n");
+ if (req->base.flags != req_flags)
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: changed 'req->base.flags'\n");
+ if (req->base.data != &wait)
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: changed 'req->base.data'\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (is_test_sglist_corrupted(&tsgls->src)) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s corrupted src sgl on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr != tsgls->src.sgl &&
+ is_test_sglist_corrupted(&tsgls->dst)) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s corrupted dst sgl on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* Check for success or failure */
+ if (err) {
+ if (err == vec->crypt_error)
+ return 0;
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, vec->crypt_error, err, cfg->name);
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (vec->crypt_error) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, vec->crypt_error, cfg->name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* Check for the correct output (ciphertext or plaintext) */
+ err = verify_correct_output(&tsgls->dst, enc ? vec->ctext : vec->ptext,
+ vec->len, 0, true);
+ if (err == -EOVERFLOW) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s overran dst buffer on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s test failed (wrong result) on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /* If applicable, check that the algorithm generated the correct IV */
+ if (vec->iv_out && memcmp(iv, vec->iv_out, ivsize) != 0) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s test failed (wrong output IV) on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ hexdump(iv, ivsize);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int test_skcipher_vec(int enc, const struct cipher_testvec *vec,
+ unsigned int vec_num,
+ struct skcipher_request *req,
+ struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+{
+ char vec_name[16];
+ unsigned int i;
+ int err;
+
+ if (fips_enabled && vec->fips_skip)
+ return 0;
+
+ sprintf(vec_name, "%u", vec_num);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_cipher_testvec_configs); i++) {
+ err = test_skcipher_vec_cfg(enc, vec, vec_name,
+ &default_cipher_testvec_configs[i],
+ req, tsgls);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
+ if (!noextratests) {
+ struct rnd_state rng;
+ struct testvec_config cfg;
+ char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN];
+
+ init_rnd_state(&rng);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations; i++) {
+ generate_random_testvec_config(&rng, &cfg, cfgname,
+ sizeof(cfgname));
+ err = test_skcipher_vec_cfg(enc, vec, vec_name,
+ &cfg, req, tsgls);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
+/*
+ * Generate a symmetric cipher test vector from the given implementation.
+ * Assumes the buffers in 'vec' were already allocated.
+ */
+static void generate_random_cipher_testvec(struct rnd_state *rng,
+ struct skcipher_request *req,
+ struct cipher_testvec *vec,
+ unsigned int maxdatasize,
+ char *name, size_t max_namelen)
+{
+ struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+ const unsigned int maxkeysize = crypto_skcipher_max_keysize(tfm);
+ const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm);
+ struct scatterlist src, dst;
+ u8 iv[MAX_IVLEN];
+ DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
+
+ /* Key: length in [0, maxkeysize], but usually choose maxkeysize */
+ vec->klen = maxkeysize;
+ if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0)
+ vec->klen = prandom_u32_below(rng, maxkeysize + 1);
+ generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->key, vec->klen);
+ vec->setkey_error = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, vec->key, vec->klen);
+
+ /* IV */
+ generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->iv, ivsize);
+
+ /* Plaintext */
+ vec->len = generate_random_length(rng, maxdatasize);
+ generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->ptext, vec->len);
+
+ /* If the key couldn't be set, no need to continue to encrypt. */
+ if (vec->setkey_error)
+ goto done;
+
+ /* Ciphertext */
+ sg_init_one(&src, vec->ptext, vec->len);
+ sg_init_one(&dst, vec->ctext, vec->len);
+ memcpy(iv, vec->iv, ivsize);
+ skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, crypto_req_done, &wait);
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src, &dst, vec->len, iv);
+ vec->crypt_error = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), &wait);
+ if (vec->crypt_error != 0) {
+ /*
+ * The only acceptable error here is for an invalid length, so
+ * skcipher decryption should fail with the same error too.
+ * We'll test for this. But to keep the API usage well-defined,
+ * explicitly initialize the ciphertext buffer too.
+ */
+ memset((u8 *)vec->ctext, 0, vec->len);
+ }
+done:
+ snprintf(name, max_namelen, "\"random: len=%u klen=%u\"",
+ vec->len, vec->klen);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test the skcipher algorithm represented by @req against the corresponding
+ * generic implementation, if one is available.
+ */
+static int test_skcipher_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver,
+ struct skcipher_request *req,
+ struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+{
+ struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+ const unsigned int maxkeysize = crypto_skcipher_max_keysize(tfm);
+ const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm);
+ const unsigned int blocksize = crypto_skcipher_blocksize(tfm);
+ const unsigned int maxdatasize = (2 * PAGE_SIZE) - TESTMGR_POISON_LEN;
+ const char *algname = crypto_skcipher_alg(tfm)->base.cra_name;
+ const char *driver = crypto_skcipher_driver_name(tfm);
+ struct rnd_state rng;
+ char _generic_driver[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+ struct crypto_skcipher *generic_tfm = NULL;
+ struct skcipher_request *generic_req = NULL;
+ unsigned int i;
+ struct cipher_testvec vec = { 0 };
+ char vec_name[64];
+ struct testvec_config *cfg;
+ char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN];
+ int err;
+
+ if (noextratests)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Keywrap isn't supported here yet as it handles its IV differently. */
+ if (strncmp(algname, "kw(", 3) == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ init_rnd_state(&rng);
+
+ if (!generic_driver) { /* Use default naming convention? */
+ err = build_generic_driver_name(algname, _generic_driver);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ generic_driver = _generic_driver;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(generic_driver, driver) == 0) /* Already the generic impl? */
+ return 0;
+
+ generic_tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(generic_driver, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(generic_tfm)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(generic_tfm);
+ if (err == -ENOENT) {
+ pr_warn("alg: skcipher: skipping comparison tests for %s because %s is unavailable\n",
+ driver, generic_driver);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: error allocating %s (generic impl of %s): %d\n",
+ generic_driver, algname, err);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ cfg = kzalloc(sizeof(*cfg), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!cfg) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ generic_req = skcipher_request_alloc(generic_tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!generic_req) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Check the algorithm properties for consistency. */
+
+ if (crypto_skcipher_min_keysize(tfm) !=
+ crypto_skcipher_min_keysize(generic_tfm)) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: min keysize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n",
+ driver, crypto_skcipher_min_keysize(tfm),
+ crypto_skcipher_min_keysize(generic_tfm));
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (maxkeysize != crypto_skcipher_max_keysize(generic_tfm)) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: max keysize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n",
+ driver, maxkeysize,
+ crypto_skcipher_max_keysize(generic_tfm));
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (ivsize != crypto_skcipher_ivsize(generic_tfm)) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: ivsize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n",
+ driver, ivsize, crypto_skcipher_ivsize(generic_tfm));
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (blocksize != crypto_skcipher_blocksize(generic_tfm)) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: blocksize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n",
+ driver, blocksize,
+ crypto_skcipher_blocksize(generic_tfm));
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now generate test vectors using the generic implementation, and test
+ * the other implementation against them.
+ */
+
+ vec.key = kmalloc(maxkeysize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ vec.iv = kmalloc(ivsize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ vec.ptext = kmalloc(maxdatasize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ vec.ctext = kmalloc(maxdatasize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!vec.key || !vec.iv || !vec.ptext || !vec.ctext) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations * 8; i++) {
+ generate_random_cipher_testvec(&rng, generic_req, &vec,
+ maxdatasize,
+ vec_name, sizeof(vec_name));
+ generate_random_testvec_config(&rng, cfg, cfgname,
+ sizeof(cfgname));
+
+ err = test_skcipher_vec_cfg(ENCRYPT, &vec, vec_name,
+ cfg, req, tsgls);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ err = test_skcipher_vec_cfg(DECRYPT, &vec, vec_name,
+ cfg, req, tsgls);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+ err = 0;
+out:
+ kfree(cfg);
+ kfree(vec.key);
+ kfree(vec.iv);
+ kfree(vec.ptext);
+ kfree(vec.ctext);
+ crypto_free_skcipher(generic_tfm);
+ skcipher_request_free(generic_req);
+ return err;
+}
+#else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */
+static int test_skcipher_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver,
+ struct skcipher_request *req,
+ struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */
+
+static int test_skcipher(int enc, const struct cipher_test_suite *suite,
+ struct skcipher_request *req,
+ struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ int err;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < suite->count; i++) {
+ err = test_skcipher_vec(enc, &suite->vecs[i], i, req, tsgls);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int alg_test_skcipher(const struct alg_test_desc *desc,
+ const char *driver, u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+ const struct cipher_test_suite *suite = &desc->suite.cipher;
+ struct crypto_skcipher *tfm;
+ struct skcipher_request *req = NULL;
+ struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls = NULL;
+ int err;
+
+ if (suite->count <= 0) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: empty test suite for %s\n", driver);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(driver, type, mask);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: failed to allocate transform for %s: %ld\n",
+ driver, PTR_ERR(tfm));
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ }
+ driver = crypto_skcipher_driver_name(tfm);
+
+ req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!req) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: failed to allocate request for %s\n",
+ driver);
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ tsgls = alloc_cipher_test_sglists();
+ if (!tsgls) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: failed to allocate test buffers for %s\n",
+ driver);
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ err = test_skcipher(ENCRYPT, suite, req, tsgls);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ err = test_skcipher(DECRYPT, suite, req, tsgls);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ err = test_skcipher_vs_generic_impl(desc->generic_driver, req, tsgls);
+out:
+ free_cipher_test_sglists(tsgls);
+ skcipher_request_free(req);
+ crypto_free_skcipher(tfm);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int test_comp(struct crypto_comp *tfm,
+ const struct comp_testvec *ctemplate,
+ const struct comp_testvec *dtemplate,
+ int ctcount, int dtcount)
+{
+ const char *algo = crypto_tfm_alg_driver_name(crypto_comp_tfm(tfm));
+ char *output, *decomp_output;
+ unsigned int i;
+ int ret;
+
+ output = kmalloc(COMP_BUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!output)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ decomp_output = kmalloc(COMP_BUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!decomp_output) {
+ kfree(output);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ctcount; i++) {
+ int ilen;
+ unsigned int dlen = COMP_BUF_SIZE;
+
+ memset(output, 0, COMP_BUF_SIZE);
+ memset(decomp_output, 0, COMP_BUF_SIZE);
+
+ ilen = ctemplate[i].inlen;
+ ret = crypto_comp_compress(tfm, ctemplate[i].input,
+ ilen, output, &dlen);
+ if (ret) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "alg: comp: compression failed "
+ "on test %d for %s: ret=%d\n", i + 1, algo,
+ -ret);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ilen = dlen;
+ dlen = COMP_BUF_SIZE;
+ ret = crypto_comp_decompress(tfm, output,
+ ilen, decomp_output, &dlen);
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_err("alg: comp: compression failed: decompress: on test %d for %s failed: ret=%d\n",
+ i + 1, algo, -ret);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (dlen != ctemplate[i].inlen) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "alg: comp: Compression test %d "
+ "failed for %s: output len = %d\n", i + 1, algo,
+ dlen);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(decomp_output, ctemplate[i].input,
+ ctemplate[i].inlen)) {
+ pr_err("alg: comp: compression failed: output differs: on test %d for %s\n",
+ i + 1, algo);
+ hexdump(decomp_output, dlen);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < dtcount; i++) {
+ int ilen;
+ unsigned int dlen = COMP_BUF_SIZE;
+
+ memset(decomp_output, 0, COMP_BUF_SIZE);
+
+ ilen = dtemplate[i].inlen;
+ ret = crypto_comp_decompress(tfm, dtemplate[i].input,
+ ilen, decomp_output, &dlen);
+ if (ret) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "alg: comp: decompression failed "
+ "on test %d for %s: ret=%d\n", i + 1, algo,
+ -ret);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (dlen != dtemplate[i].outlen) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "alg: comp: Decompression test %d "
+ "failed for %s: output len = %d\n", i + 1, algo,
+ dlen);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(decomp_output, dtemplate[i].output, dlen)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "alg: comp: Decompression test %d "
+ "failed for %s\n", i + 1, algo);
+ hexdump(decomp_output, dlen);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+out:
+ kfree(decomp_output);
+ kfree(output);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_acomp(struct crypto_acomp *tfm,
+ const struct comp_testvec *ctemplate,
+ const struct comp_testvec *dtemplate,
+ int ctcount, int dtcount)
+{
+ const char *algo = crypto_tfm_alg_driver_name(crypto_acomp_tfm(tfm));
+ unsigned int i;
+ char *output, *decomp_out;
+ int ret;
+ struct scatterlist src, dst;
+ struct acomp_req *req;
+ struct crypto_wait wait;
+
+ output = kmalloc(COMP_BUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!output)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ decomp_out = kmalloc(COMP_BUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!decomp_out) {
+ kfree(output);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ctcount; i++) {
+ unsigned int dlen = COMP_BUF_SIZE;
+ int ilen = ctemplate[i].inlen;
+ void *input_vec;
+
+ input_vec = kmemdup(ctemplate[i].input, ilen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!input_vec) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ memset(output, 0, dlen);
+ crypto_init_wait(&wait);
+ sg_init_one(&src, input_vec, ilen);
+ sg_init_one(&dst, output, dlen);
+
+ req = acomp_request_alloc(tfm);
+ if (!req) {
+ pr_err("alg: acomp: request alloc failed for %s\n",
+ algo);
+ kfree(input_vec);
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ acomp_request_set_params(req, &src, &dst, ilen, dlen);
+ acomp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+ crypto_req_done, &wait);
+
+ ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_acomp_compress(req), &wait);
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_err("alg: acomp: compression failed on test %d for %s: ret=%d\n",
+ i + 1, algo, -ret);
+ kfree(input_vec);
+ acomp_request_free(req);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ilen = req->dlen;
+ dlen = COMP_BUF_SIZE;
+ sg_init_one(&src, output, ilen);
+ sg_init_one(&dst, decomp_out, dlen);
+ crypto_init_wait(&wait);
+ acomp_request_set_params(req, &src, &dst, ilen, dlen);
+
+ ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_acomp_decompress(req), &wait);
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_err("alg: acomp: compression failed on test %d for %s: ret=%d\n",
+ i + 1, algo, -ret);
+ kfree(input_vec);
+ acomp_request_free(req);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (req->dlen != ctemplate[i].inlen) {
+ pr_err("alg: acomp: Compression test %d failed for %s: output len = %d\n",
+ i + 1, algo, req->dlen);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ kfree(input_vec);
+ acomp_request_free(req);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(input_vec, decomp_out, req->dlen)) {
+ pr_err("alg: acomp: Compression test %d failed for %s\n",
+ i + 1, algo);
+ hexdump(output, req->dlen);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ kfree(input_vec);
+ acomp_request_free(req);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
+ crypto_init_wait(&wait);
+ sg_init_one(&src, input_vec, ilen);
+ acomp_request_set_params(req, &src, NULL, ilen, 0);
+
+ ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_acomp_compress(req), &wait);
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_err("alg: acomp: compression failed on NULL dst buffer test %d for %s: ret=%d\n",
+ i + 1, algo, -ret);
+ kfree(input_vec);
+ acomp_request_free(req);
+ goto out;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ kfree(input_vec);
+ acomp_request_free(req);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < dtcount; i++) {
+ unsigned int dlen = COMP_BUF_SIZE;
+ int ilen = dtemplate[i].inlen;
+ void *input_vec;
+
+ input_vec = kmemdup(dtemplate[i].input, ilen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!input_vec) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ memset(output, 0, dlen);
+ crypto_init_wait(&wait);
+ sg_init_one(&src, input_vec, ilen);
+ sg_init_one(&dst, output, dlen);
+
+ req = acomp_request_alloc(tfm);
+ if (!req) {
+ pr_err("alg: acomp: request alloc failed for %s\n",
+ algo);
+ kfree(input_vec);
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ acomp_request_set_params(req, &src, &dst, ilen, dlen);
+ acomp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+ crypto_req_done, &wait);
+
+ ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_acomp_decompress(req), &wait);
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_err("alg: acomp: decompression failed on test %d for %s: ret=%d\n",
+ i + 1, algo, -ret);
+ kfree(input_vec);
+ acomp_request_free(req);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (req->dlen != dtemplate[i].outlen) {
+ pr_err("alg: acomp: Decompression test %d failed for %s: output len = %d\n",
+ i + 1, algo, req->dlen);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ kfree(input_vec);
+ acomp_request_free(req);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(output, dtemplate[i].output, req->dlen)) {
+ pr_err("alg: acomp: Decompression test %d failed for %s\n",
+ i + 1, algo);
+ hexdump(output, req->dlen);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ kfree(input_vec);
+ acomp_request_free(req);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
+ crypto_init_wait(&wait);
+ acomp_request_set_params(req, &src, NULL, ilen, 0);
+
+ ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_acomp_decompress(req), &wait);
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_err("alg: acomp: decompression failed on NULL dst buffer test %d for %s: ret=%d\n",
+ i + 1, algo, -ret);
+ kfree(input_vec);
+ acomp_request_free(req);
+ goto out;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ kfree(input_vec);
+ acomp_request_free(req);
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+out:
+ kfree(decomp_out);
+ kfree(output);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_cprng(struct crypto_rng *tfm,
+ const struct cprng_testvec *template,
+ unsigned int tcount)
+{
+ const char *algo = crypto_tfm_alg_driver_name(crypto_rng_tfm(tfm));
+ int err = 0, i, j, seedsize;
+ u8 *seed;
+ char result[32];
+
+ seedsize = crypto_rng_seedsize(tfm);
+
+ seed = kmalloc(seedsize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!seed) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "alg: cprng: Failed to allocate seed space "
+ "for %s\n", algo);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tcount; i++) {
+ memset(result, 0, 32);
+
+ memcpy(seed, template[i].v, template[i].vlen);
+ memcpy(seed + template[i].vlen, template[i].key,
+ template[i].klen);
+ memcpy(seed + template[i].vlen + template[i].klen,
+ template[i].dt, template[i].dtlen);
+
+ err = crypto_rng_reset(tfm, seed, seedsize);
+ if (err) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "alg: cprng: Failed to reset rng "
+ "for %s\n", algo);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (j = 0; j < template[i].loops; j++) {
+ err = crypto_rng_get_bytes(tfm, result,
+ template[i].rlen);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "alg: cprng: Failed to obtain "
+ "the correct amount of random data for "
+ "%s (requested %d)\n", algo,
+ template[i].rlen);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ err = memcmp(result, template[i].result,
+ template[i].rlen);
+ if (err) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "alg: cprng: Test %d failed for %s\n",
+ i, algo);
+ hexdump(result, template[i].rlen);
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ kfree(seed);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int alg_test_cipher(const struct alg_test_desc *desc,
+ const char *driver, u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+ const struct cipher_test_suite *suite = &desc->suite.cipher;
+ struct crypto_cipher *tfm;
+ int err;
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher(driver, type, mask);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "alg: cipher: Failed to load transform for "
+ "%s: %ld\n", driver, PTR_ERR(tfm));
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ }
+
+ err = test_cipher(tfm, ENCRYPT, suite->vecs, suite->count);
+ if (!err)
+ err = test_cipher(tfm, DECRYPT, suite->vecs, suite->count);
+
+ crypto_free_cipher(tfm);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int alg_test_comp(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver,
+ u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+ struct crypto_comp *comp;
+ struct crypto_acomp *acomp;
+ int err;
+ u32 algo_type = type & CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_ACOMPRESS_MASK;
+
+ if (algo_type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_ACOMPRESS) {
+ acomp = crypto_alloc_acomp(driver, type, mask);
+ if (IS_ERR(acomp)) {
+ pr_err("alg: acomp: Failed to load transform for %s: %ld\n",
+ driver, PTR_ERR(acomp));
+ return PTR_ERR(acomp);
+ }
+ err = test_acomp(acomp, desc->suite.comp.comp.vecs,
+ desc->suite.comp.decomp.vecs,
+ desc->suite.comp.comp.count,
+ desc->suite.comp.decomp.count);
+ crypto_free_acomp(acomp);
+ } else {
+ comp = crypto_alloc_comp(driver, type, mask);
+ if (IS_ERR(comp)) {
+ pr_err("alg: comp: Failed to load transform for %s: %ld\n",
+ driver, PTR_ERR(comp));
+ return PTR_ERR(comp);
+ }
+
+ err = test_comp(comp, desc->suite.comp.comp.vecs,
+ desc->suite.comp.decomp.vecs,
+ desc->suite.comp.comp.count,
+ desc->suite.comp.decomp.count);
+
+ crypto_free_comp(comp);
+ }
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int alg_test_crc32c(const struct alg_test_desc *desc,
+ const char *driver, u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+ __le32 val;
+ int err;
+
+ err = alg_test_hash(desc, driver, type, mask);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(driver, type, mask);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ if (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) {
+ /*
+ * This crc32c implementation is only available through
+ * ahash API, not the shash API, so the remaining part
+ * of the test is not applicable to it.
+ */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ printk(KERN_ERR "alg: crc32c: Failed to load transform for %s: "
+ "%ld\n", driver, PTR_ERR(tfm));
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ }
+ driver = crypto_shash_driver_name(tfm);
+
+ do {
+ SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, tfm);
+ u32 *ctx = (u32 *)shash_desc_ctx(shash);
+
+ shash->tfm = tfm;
+
+ *ctx = 420553207;
+ err = crypto_shash_final(shash, (u8 *)&val);
+ if (err) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "alg: crc32c: Operation failed for "
+ "%s: %d\n", driver, err);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (val != cpu_to_le32(~420553207)) {
+ pr_err("alg: crc32c: Test failed for %s: %u\n",
+ driver, le32_to_cpu(val));
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ }
+ } while (0);
+
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int alg_test_cprng(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver,
+ u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+ struct crypto_rng *rng;
+ int err;
+
+ rng = crypto_alloc_rng(driver, type, mask);
+ if (IS_ERR(rng)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "alg: cprng: Failed to load transform for %s: "
+ "%ld\n", driver, PTR_ERR(rng));
+ return PTR_ERR(rng);
+ }
+
+ err = test_cprng(rng, desc->suite.cprng.vecs, desc->suite.cprng.count);
+
+ crypto_free_rng(rng);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+
+static int drbg_cavs_test(const struct drbg_testvec *test, int pr,
+ const char *driver, u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+ int ret = -EAGAIN;
+ struct crypto_rng *drng;
+ struct drbg_test_data test_data;
+ struct drbg_string addtl, pers, testentropy;
+ unsigned char *buf = kzalloc(test->expectedlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ drng = crypto_alloc_rng(driver, type, mask);
+ if (IS_ERR(drng)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "alg: drbg: could not allocate DRNG handle for "
+ "%s\n", driver);
+ kfree_sensitive(buf);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ test_data.testentropy = &testentropy;
+ drbg_string_fill(&testentropy, test->entropy, test->entropylen);
+ drbg_string_fill(&pers, test->pers, test->perslen);
+ ret = crypto_drbg_reset_test(drng, &pers, &test_data);
+ if (ret) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "alg: drbg: Failed to reset rng\n");
+ goto outbuf;
+ }
+
+ drbg_string_fill(&addtl, test->addtla, test->addtllen);
+ if (pr) {
+ drbg_string_fill(&testentropy, test->entpra, test->entprlen);
+ ret = crypto_drbg_get_bytes_addtl_test(drng,
+ buf, test->expectedlen, &addtl, &test_data);
+ } else {
+ ret = crypto_drbg_get_bytes_addtl(drng,
+ buf, test->expectedlen, &addtl);
+ }
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "alg: drbg: could not obtain random data for "
+ "driver %s\n", driver);
+ goto outbuf;
+ }
+
+ drbg_string_fill(&addtl, test->addtlb, test->addtllen);
+ if (pr) {
+ drbg_string_fill(&testentropy, test->entprb, test->entprlen);
+ ret = crypto_drbg_get_bytes_addtl_test(drng,
+ buf, test->expectedlen, &addtl, &test_data);
+ } else {
+ ret = crypto_drbg_get_bytes_addtl(drng,
+ buf, test->expectedlen, &addtl);
+ }
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "alg: drbg: could not obtain random data for "
+ "driver %s\n", driver);
+ goto outbuf;
+ }
+
+ ret = memcmp(test->expected, buf, test->expectedlen);
+
+outbuf:
+ crypto_free_rng(drng);
+ kfree_sensitive(buf);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+static int alg_test_drbg(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver,
+ u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+ int pr = 0;
+ int i = 0;
+ const struct drbg_testvec *template = desc->suite.drbg.vecs;
+ unsigned int tcount = desc->suite.drbg.count;
+
+ if (0 == memcmp(driver, "drbg_pr_", 8))
+ pr = 1;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tcount; i++) {
+ err = drbg_cavs_test(&template[i], pr, driver, type, mask);
+ if (err) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "alg: drbg: Test %d failed for %s\n",
+ i, driver);
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return err;
+
+}
+
+static int do_test_kpp(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const struct kpp_testvec *vec,
+ const char *alg)
+{
+ struct kpp_request *req;
+ void *input_buf = NULL;
+ void *output_buf = NULL;
+ void *a_public = NULL;
+ void *a_ss = NULL;
+ void *shared_secret = NULL;
+ struct crypto_wait wait;
+ unsigned int out_len_max;
+ int err = -ENOMEM;
+ struct scatterlist src, dst;
+
+ req = kpp_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!req)
+ return err;
+
+ crypto_init_wait(&wait);
+
+ err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm, vec->secret, vec->secret_size);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto free_req;
+
+ out_len_max = crypto_kpp_maxsize(tfm);
+ output_buf = kzalloc(out_len_max, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!output_buf) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto free_req;
+ }
+
+ /* Use appropriate parameter as base */
+ kpp_request_set_input(req, NULL, 0);
+ sg_init_one(&dst, output_buf, out_len_max);
+ kpp_request_set_output(req, &dst, out_len_max);
+ kpp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+ crypto_req_done, &wait);
+
+ /* Compute party A's public key */
+ err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(req), &wait);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("alg: %s: Party A: generate public key test failed. err %d\n",
+ alg, err);
+ goto free_output;
+ }
+
+ if (vec->genkey) {
+ /* Save party A's public key */
+ a_public = kmemdup(sg_virt(req->dst), out_len_max, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!a_public) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto free_output;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Verify calculated public key */
+ if (memcmp(vec->expected_a_public, sg_virt(req->dst),
+ vec->expected_a_public_size)) {
+ pr_err("alg: %s: Party A: generate public key test failed. Invalid output\n",
+ alg);
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto free_output;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Calculate shared secret key by using counter part (b) public key. */
+ input_buf = kmemdup(vec->b_public, vec->b_public_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!input_buf) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto free_output;
+ }
+
+ sg_init_one(&src, input_buf, vec->b_public_size);
+ sg_init_one(&dst, output_buf, out_len_max);
+ kpp_request_set_input(req, &src, vec->b_public_size);
+ kpp_request_set_output(req, &dst, out_len_max);
+ kpp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+ crypto_req_done, &wait);
+ err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(req), &wait);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("alg: %s: Party A: compute shared secret test failed. err %d\n",
+ alg, err);
+ goto free_all;
+ }
+
+ if (vec->genkey) {
+ /* Save the shared secret obtained by party A */
+ a_ss = kmemdup(sg_virt(req->dst), vec->expected_ss_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!a_ss) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto free_all;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Calculate party B's shared secret by using party A's
+ * public key.
+ */
+ err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm, vec->b_secret,
+ vec->b_secret_size);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto free_all;
+
+ sg_init_one(&src, a_public, vec->expected_a_public_size);
+ sg_init_one(&dst, output_buf, out_len_max);
+ kpp_request_set_input(req, &src, vec->expected_a_public_size);
+ kpp_request_set_output(req, &dst, out_len_max);
+ kpp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+ crypto_req_done, &wait);
+ err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(req),
+ &wait);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("alg: %s: Party B: compute shared secret failed. err %d\n",
+ alg, err);
+ goto free_all;
+ }
+
+ shared_secret = a_ss;
+ } else {
+ shared_secret = (void *)vec->expected_ss;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * verify shared secret from which the user will derive
+ * secret key by executing whatever hash it has chosen
+ */
+ if (memcmp(shared_secret, sg_virt(req->dst),
+ vec->expected_ss_size)) {
+ pr_err("alg: %s: compute shared secret test failed. Invalid output\n",
+ alg);
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+free_all:
+ kfree(a_ss);
+ kfree(input_buf);
+free_output:
+ kfree(a_public);
+ kfree(output_buf);
+free_req:
+ kpp_request_free(req);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int test_kpp(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const char *alg,
+ const struct kpp_testvec *vecs, unsigned int tcount)
+{
+ int ret, i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tcount; i++) {
+ ret = do_test_kpp(tfm, vecs++, alg);
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_err("alg: %s: test failed on vector %d, err=%d\n",
+ alg, i + 1, ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int alg_test_kpp(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver,
+ u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+ struct crypto_kpp *tfm;
+ int err = 0;
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_kpp(driver, type, mask);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ pr_err("alg: kpp: Failed to load tfm for %s: %ld\n",
+ driver, PTR_ERR(tfm));
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ }
+ if (desc->suite.kpp.vecs)
+ err = test_kpp(tfm, desc->alg, desc->suite.kpp.vecs,
+ desc->suite.kpp.count);
+
+ crypto_free_kpp(tfm);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static u8 *test_pack_u32(u8 *dst, u32 val)
+{
+ memcpy(dst, &val, sizeof(val));
+ return dst + sizeof(val);
+}
+
+static int test_akcipher_one(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm,
+ const struct akcipher_testvec *vecs)
+{
+ char *xbuf[XBUFSIZE];
+ struct akcipher_request *req;
+ void *outbuf_enc = NULL;
+ void *outbuf_dec = NULL;
+ struct crypto_wait wait;
+ unsigned int out_len_max, out_len = 0;
+ int err = -ENOMEM;
+ struct scatterlist src, dst, src_tab[3];
+ const char *m, *c;
+ unsigned int m_size, c_size;
+ const char *op;
+ u8 *key, *ptr;
+
+ if (testmgr_alloc_buf(xbuf))
+ return err;
+
+ req = akcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!req)
+ goto free_xbuf;
+
+ crypto_init_wait(&wait);
+
+ key = kmalloc(vecs->key_len + sizeof(u32) * 2 + vecs->param_len,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!key)
+ goto free_req;
+ memcpy(key, vecs->key, vecs->key_len);
+ ptr = key + vecs->key_len;
+ ptr = test_pack_u32(ptr, vecs->algo);
+ ptr = test_pack_u32(ptr, vecs->param_len);
+ memcpy(ptr, vecs->params, vecs->param_len);
+
+ if (vecs->public_key_vec)
+ err = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, key, vecs->key_len);
+ else
+ err = crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(tfm, key, vecs->key_len);
+ if (err)
+ goto free_key;
+
+ /*
+ * First run test which do not require a private key, such as
+ * encrypt or verify.
+ */
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ out_len_max = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm);
+ outbuf_enc = kzalloc(out_len_max, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!outbuf_enc)
+ goto free_key;
+
+ if (!vecs->siggen_sigver_test) {
+ m = vecs->m;
+ m_size = vecs->m_size;
+ c = vecs->c;
+ c_size = vecs->c_size;
+ op = "encrypt";
+ } else {
+ /* Swap args so we could keep plaintext (digest)
+ * in vecs->m, and cooked signature in vecs->c.
+ */
+ m = vecs->c; /* signature */
+ m_size = vecs->c_size;
+ c = vecs->m; /* digest */
+ c_size = vecs->m_size;
+ op = "verify";
+ }
+
+ err = -E2BIG;
+ if (WARN_ON(m_size > PAGE_SIZE))
+ goto free_all;
+ memcpy(xbuf[0], m, m_size);
+
+ sg_init_table(src_tab, 3);
+ sg_set_buf(&src_tab[0], xbuf[0], 8);
+ sg_set_buf(&src_tab[1], xbuf[0] + 8, m_size - 8);
+ if (vecs->siggen_sigver_test) {
+ if (WARN_ON(c_size > PAGE_SIZE))
+ goto free_all;
+ memcpy(xbuf[1], c, c_size);
+ sg_set_buf(&src_tab[2], xbuf[1], c_size);
+ akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src_tab, NULL, m_size, c_size);
+ } else {
+ sg_init_one(&dst, outbuf_enc, out_len_max);
+ akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src_tab, &dst, m_size,
+ out_len_max);
+ }
+ akcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+ crypto_req_done, &wait);
+
+ err = crypto_wait_req(vecs->siggen_sigver_test ?
+ /* Run asymmetric signature verification */
+ crypto_akcipher_verify(req) :
+ /* Run asymmetric encrypt */
+ crypto_akcipher_encrypt(req), &wait);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("alg: akcipher: %s test failed. err %d\n", op, err);
+ goto free_all;
+ }
+ if (!vecs->siggen_sigver_test && c) {
+ if (req->dst_len != c_size) {
+ pr_err("alg: akcipher: %s test failed. Invalid output len\n",
+ op);
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto free_all;
+ }
+ /* verify that encrypted message is equal to expected */
+ if (memcmp(c, outbuf_enc, c_size) != 0) {
+ pr_err("alg: akcipher: %s test failed. Invalid output\n",
+ op);
+ hexdump(outbuf_enc, c_size);
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto free_all;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Don't invoke (decrypt or sign) test which require a private key
+ * for vectors with only a public key.
+ */
+ if (vecs->public_key_vec) {
+ err = 0;
+ goto free_all;
+ }
+ outbuf_dec = kzalloc(out_len_max, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!outbuf_dec) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto free_all;
+ }
+
+ if (!vecs->siggen_sigver_test && !c) {
+ c = outbuf_enc;
+ c_size = req->dst_len;
+ }
+
+ err = -E2BIG;
+ op = vecs->siggen_sigver_test ? "sign" : "decrypt";
+ if (WARN_ON(c_size > PAGE_SIZE))
+ goto free_all;
+ memcpy(xbuf[0], c, c_size);
+
+ sg_init_one(&src, xbuf[0], c_size);
+ sg_init_one(&dst, outbuf_dec, out_len_max);
+ crypto_init_wait(&wait);
+ akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src, &dst, c_size, out_len_max);
+
+ err = crypto_wait_req(vecs->siggen_sigver_test ?
+ /* Run asymmetric signature generation */
+ crypto_akcipher_sign(req) :
+ /* Run asymmetric decrypt */
+ crypto_akcipher_decrypt(req), &wait);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("alg: akcipher: %s test failed. err %d\n", op, err);
+ goto free_all;
+ }
+ out_len = req->dst_len;
+ if (out_len < m_size) {
+ pr_err("alg: akcipher: %s test failed. Invalid output len %u\n",
+ op, out_len);
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto free_all;
+ }
+ /* verify that decrypted message is equal to the original msg */
+ if (memchr_inv(outbuf_dec, 0, out_len - m_size) ||
+ memcmp(m, outbuf_dec + out_len - m_size, m_size)) {
+ pr_err("alg: akcipher: %s test failed. Invalid output\n", op);
+ hexdump(outbuf_dec, out_len);
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ }
+free_all:
+ kfree(outbuf_dec);
+ kfree(outbuf_enc);
+free_key:
+ kfree(key);
+free_req:
+ akcipher_request_free(req);
+free_xbuf:
+ testmgr_free_buf(xbuf);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int test_akcipher(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, const char *alg,
+ const struct akcipher_testvec *vecs,
+ unsigned int tcount)
+{
+ const char *algo =
+ crypto_tfm_alg_driver_name(crypto_akcipher_tfm(tfm));
+ int ret, i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tcount; i++) {
+ ret = test_akcipher_one(tfm, vecs++);
+ if (!ret)
+ continue;
+
+ pr_err("alg: akcipher: test %d failed for %s, err=%d\n",
+ i + 1, algo, ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int alg_test_akcipher(const struct alg_test_desc *desc,
+ const char *driver, u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+ struct crypto_akcipher *tfm;
+ int err = 0;
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher(driver, type, mask);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ pr_err("alg: akcipher: Failed to load tfm for %s: %ld\n",
+ driver, PTR_ERR(tfm));
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ }
+ if (desc->suite.akcipher.vecs)
+ err = test_akcipher(tfm, desc->alg, desc->suite.akcipher.vecs,
+ desc->suite.akcipher.count);
+
+ crypto_free_akcipher(tfm);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int alg_test_null(const struct alg_test_desc *desc,
+ const char *driver, u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define ____VECS(tv) .vecs = tv, .count = ARRAY_SIZE(tv)
+#define __VECS(tv) { ____VECS(tv) }
+
+/* Please keep this list sorted by algorithm name. */
+static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = {
+ {
+ .alg = "adiantum(xchacha12,aes)",
+ .generic_driver = "adiantum(xchacha12-generic,aes-generic,nhpoly1305-generic)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(adiantum_xchacha12_aes_tv_template)
+ },
+ }, {
+ .alg = "adiantum(xchacha20,aes)",
+ .generic_driver = "adiantum(xchacha20-generic,aes-generic,nhpoly1305-generic)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(adiantum_xchacha20_aes_tv_template)
+ },
+ }, {
+ .alg = "aegis128",
+ .test = alg_test_aead,
+ .suite = {
+ .aead = __VECS(aegis128_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ansi_cprng",
+ .test = alg_test_cprng,
+ .suite = {
+ .cprng = __VECS(ansi_cprng_aes_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "authenc(hmac(md5),ecb(cipher_null))",
+ .test = alg_test_aead,
+ .suite = {
+ .aead = __VECS(hmac_md5_ecb_cipher_null_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(aes))",
+ .test = alg_test_aead,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha1_aes_cbc_tv_temp)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(des))",
+ .test = alg_test_aead,
+ .suite = {
+ .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha1_des_cbc_tv_temp)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(des3_ede))",
+ .test = alg_test_aead,
+ .suite = {
+ .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha1_des3_ede_cbc_tv_temp)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha1),ctr(aes))",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha1),ecb(cipher_null))",
+ .test = alg_test_aead,
+ .suite = {
+ .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha1_ecb_cipher_null_tv_temp)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha1),rfc3686(ctr(aes)))",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha224),cbc(des))",
+ .test = alg_test_aead,
+ .suite = {
+ .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha224_des_cbc_tv_temp)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha224),cbc(des3_ede))",
+ .test = alg_test_aead,
+ .suite = {
+ .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha224_des3_ede_cbc_tv_temp)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))",
+ .test = alg_test_aead,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha256_aes_cbc_tv_temp)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(des))",
+ .test = alg_test_aead,
+ .suite = {
+ .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha256_des_cbc_tv_temp)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(des3_ede))",
+ .test = alg_test_aead,
+ .suite = {
+ .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha256_des3_ede_cbc_tv_temp)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha256),ctr(aes))",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha256),rfc3686(ctr(aes)))",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha384),cbc(des))",
+ .test = alg_test_aead,
+ .suite = {
+ .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha384_des_cbc_tv_temp)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha384),cbc(des3_ede))",
+ .test = alg_test_aead,
+ .suite = {
+ .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha384_des3_ede_cbc_tv_temp)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha384),ctr(aes))",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha384),rfc3686(ctr(aes)))",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha512),cbc(aes))",
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .test = alg_test_aead,
+ .suite = {
+ .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha512_aes_cbc_tv_temp)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha512),cbc(des))",
+ .test = alg_test_aead,
+ .suite = {
+ .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha512_des_cbc_tv_temp)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha512),cbc(des3_ede))",
+ .test = alg_test_aead,
+ .suite = {
+ .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha512_des3_ede_cbc_tv_temp)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha512),ctr(aes))",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha512),rfc3686(ctr(aes)))",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "blake2b-160",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .fips_allowed = 0,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(blake2b_160_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "blake2b-256",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .fips_allowed = 0,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(blake2b_256_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "blake2b-384",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .fips_allowed = 0,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(blake2b_384_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "blake2b-512",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .fips_allowed = 0,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(blake2b_512_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "cbc(aes)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(aes_cbc_tv_template)
+ },
+ }, {
+ .alg = "cbc(anubis)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(anubis_cbc_tv_template)
+ },
+ }, {
+ .alg = "cbc(aria)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(aria_cbc_tv_template)
+ },
+ }, {
+ .alg = "cbc(blowfish)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(bf_cbc_tv_template)
+ },
+ }, {
+ .alg = "cbc(camellia)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(camellia_cbc_tv_template)
+ },
+ }, {
+ .alg = "cbc(cast5)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(cast5_cbc_tv_template)
+ },
+ }, {
+ .alg = "cbc(cast6)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(cast6_cbc_tv_template)
+ },
+ }, {
+ .alg = "cbc(des)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(des_cbc_tv_template)
+ },
+ }, {
+ .alg = "cbc(des3_ede)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(des3_ede_cbc_tv_template)
+ },
+ }, {
+ /* Same as cbc(aes) except the key is stored in
+ * hardware secure memory which we reference by index
+ */
+ .alg = "cbc(paes)",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ /* Same as cbc(sm4) except the key is stored in
+ * hardware secure memory which we reference by index
+ */
+ .alg = "cbc(psm4)",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "cbc(serpent)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(serpent_cbc_tv_template)
+ },
+ }, {
+ .alg = "cbc(sm4)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(sm4_cbc_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "cbc(twofish)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(tf_cbc_tv_template)
+ },
+ }, {
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_PAES_S390)
+ .alg = "cbc-paes-s390",
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(aes_cbc_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+#endif
+ .alg = "cbcmac(aes)",
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(aes_cbcmac_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "cbcmac(sm4)",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(sm4_cbcmac_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ccm(aes)",
+ .generic_driver = "ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))",
+ .test = alg_test_aead,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .aead = {
+ ____VECS(aes_ccm_tv_template),
+ .einval_allowed = 1,
+ }
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ccm(sm4)",
+ .generic_driver = "ccm_base(ctr(sm4-generic),cbcmac(sm4-generic))",
+ .test = alg_test_aead,
+ .suite = {
+ .aead = {
+ ____VECS(sm4_ccm_tv_template),
+ .einval_allowed = 1,
+ }
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "cfb(aes)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(aes_cfb_tv_template)
+ },
+ }, {
+ .alg = "cfb(aria)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(aria_cfb_tv_template)
+ },
+ }, {
+ .alg = "cfb(sm4)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(sm4_cfb_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "chacha20",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(chacha20_tv_template)
+ },
+ }, {
+ .alg = "cmac(aes)",
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(aes_cmac128_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "cmac(des3_ede)",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(des3_ede_cmac64_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "cmac(sm4)",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(sm4_cmac128_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "compress_null",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "crc32",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(crc32_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "crc32c",
+ .test = alg_test_crc32c,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(crc32c_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "crc64-rocksoft",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(crc64_rocksoft_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "crct10dif",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(crct10dif_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ctr(aes)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(aes_ctr_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ctr(aria)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(aria_ctr_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ctr(blowfish)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(bf_ctr_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ctr(camellia)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(camellia_ctr_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ctr(cast5)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(cast5_ctr_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ctr(cast6)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(cast6_ctr_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ctr(des)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(des_ctr_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ctr(des3_ede)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(des3_ede_ctr_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ /* Same as ctr(aes) except the key is stored in
+ * hardware secure memory which we reference by index
+ */
+ .alg = "ctr(paes)",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+
+ /* Same as ctr(sm4) except the key is stored in
+ * hardware secure memory which we reference by index
+ */
+ .alg = "ctr(psm4)",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ctr(serpent)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(serpent_ctr_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ctr(sm4)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(sm4_ctr_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ctr(twofish)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(tf_ctr_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_PAES_S390)
+ .alg = "ctr-paes-s390",
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(aes_ctr_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+#endif
+ .alg = "cts(cbc(aes))",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(cts_mode_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ /* Same as cts(cbc((aes)) except the key is stored in
+ * hardware secure memory which we reference by index
+ */
+ .alg = "cts(cbc(paes))",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "curve25519",
+ .test = alg_test_kpp,
+ .suite = {
+ .kpp = __VECS(curve25519_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "deflate",
+ .test = alg_test_comp,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .comp = {
+ .comp = __VECS(deflate_comp_tv_template),
+ .decomp = __VECS(deflate_decomp_tv_template)
+ }
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "dh",
+ .test = alg_test_kpp,
+ .suite = {
+ .kpp = __VECS(dh_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "digest_null",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "drbg_nopr_ctr_aes128",
+ .test = alg_test_drbg,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .drbg = __VECS(drbg_nopr_ctr_aes128_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "drbg_nopr_ctr_aes192",
+ .test = alg_test_drbg,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .drbg = __VECS(drbg_nopr_ctr_aes192_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "drbg_nopr_ctr_aes256",
+ .test = alg_test_drbg,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .drbg = __VECS(drbg_nopr_ctr_aes256_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ /*
+ * There is no need to specifically test the DRBG with every
+ * backend cipher -- covered by drbg_nopr_hmac_sha256 test
+ */
+ .alg = "drbg_nopr_hmac_sha1",
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "drbg_nopr_hmac_sha256",
+ .test = alg_test_drbg,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .drbg = __VECS(drbg_nopr_hmac_sha256_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ /* covered by drbg_nopr_hmac_sha256 test */
+ .alg = "drbg_nopr_hmac_sha384",
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "drbg_nopr_hmac_sha512",
+ .test = alg_test_drbg,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .drbg = __VECS(drbg_nopr_hmac_sha512_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "drbg_nopr_sha1",
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "drbg_nopr_sha256",
+ .test = alg_test_drbg,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .drbg = __VECS(drbg_nopr_sha256_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ /* covered by drbg_nopr_sha256 test */
+ .alg = "drbg_nopr_sha384",
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "drbg_nopr_sha512",
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "drbg_pr_ctr_aes128",
+ .test = alg_test_drbg,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .drbg = __VECS(drbg_pr_ctr_aes128_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ /* covered by drbg_pr_ctr_aes128 test */
+ .alg = "drbg_pr_ctr_aes192",
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "drbg_pr_ctr_aes256",
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "drbg_pr_hmac_sha1",
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "drbg_pr_hmac_sha256",
+ .test = alg_test_drbg,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .drbg = __VECS(drbg_pr_hmac_sha256_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ /* covered by drbg_pr_hmac_sha256 test */
+ .alg = "drbg_pr_hmac_sha384",
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "drbg_pr_hmac_sha512",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "drbg_pr_sha1",
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "drbg_pr_sha256",
+ .test = alg_test_drbg,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .drbg = __VECS(drbg_pr_sha256_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ /* covered by drbg_pr_sha256 test */
+ .alg = "drbg_pr_sha384",
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "drbg_pr_sha512",
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ecb(aes)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(aes_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ecb(anubis)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(anubis_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ecb(arc4)",
+ .generic_driver = "ecb(arc4)-generic",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(arc4_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ecb(aria)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(aria_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ecb(blowfish)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(bf_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ecb(camellia)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(camellia_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ecb(cast5)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(cast5_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ecb(cast6)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(cast6_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ecb(cipher_null)",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ecb(des)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(des_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ecb(des3_ede)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(des3_ede_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ecb(fcrypt)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = {
+ .vecs = fcrypt_pcbc_tv_template,
+ .count = 1
+ }
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ecb(khazad)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(khazad_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ /* Same as ecb(aes) except the key is stored in
+ * hardware secure memory which we reference by index
+ */
+ .alg = "ecb(paes)",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ecb(seed)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(seed_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ecb(serpent)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(serpent_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ecb(sm4)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(sm4_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ecb(tea)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(tea_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ecb(twofish)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(tf_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ecb(xeta)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(xeta_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ecb(xtea)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(xtea_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_PAES_S390)
+ .alg = "ecb-paes-s390",
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(aes_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+#endif
+ .alg = "ecdh-nist-p192",
+ .test = alg_test_kpp,
+ .suite = {
+ .kpp = __VECS(ecdh_p192_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ecdh-nist-p256",
+ .test = alg_test_kpp,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .kpp = __VECS(ecdh_p256_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ecdh-nist-p384",
+ .test = alg_test_kpp,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .kpp = __VECS(ecdh_p384_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ecdsa-nist-p192",
+ .test = alg_test_akcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .akcipher = __VECS(ecdsa_nist_p192_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ecdsa-nist-p256",
+ .test = alg_test_akcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .akcipher = __VECS(ecdsa_nist_p256_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ecdsa-nist-p384",
+ .test = alg_test_akcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .akcipher = __VECS(ecdsa_nist_p384_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ecrdsa",
+ .test = alg_test_akcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .akcipher = __VECS(ecrdsa_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),sha256)",
+ .test = alg_test_aead,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .aead = __VECS(essiv_hmac_sha256_aes_cbc_tv_temp)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "essiv(cbc(aes),sha256)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(essiv_aes_cbc_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS)
+ .alg = "ffdhe2048(dh)",
+ .test = alg_test_kpp,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .kpp = __VECS(ffdhe2048_dh_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ffdhe3072(dh)",
+ .test = alg_test_kpp,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .kpp = __VECS(ffdhe3072_dh_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ffdhe4096(dh)",
+ .test = alg_test_kpp,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .kpp = __VECS(ffdhe4096_dh_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ffdhe6144(dh)",
+ .test = alg_test_kpp,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .kpp = __VECS(ffdhe6144_dh_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ffdhe8192(dh)",
+ .test = alg_test_kpp,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .kpp = __VECS(ffdhe8192_dh_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS */
+ .alg = "gcm(aes)",
+ .generic_driver = "gcm_base(ctr(aes-generic),ghash-generic)",
+ .test = alg_test_aead,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .aead = __VECS(aes_gcm_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "gcm(aria)",
+ .generic_driver = "gcm_base(ctr(aria-generic),ghash-generic)",
+ .test = alg_test_aead,
+ .suite = {
+ .aead = __VECS(aria_gcm_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "gcm(sm4)",
+ .generic_driver = "gcm_base(ctr(sm4-generic),ghash-generic)",
+ .test = alg_test_aead,
+ .suite = {
+ .aead = __VECS(sm4_gcm_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ghash",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(ghash_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "hctr2(aes)",
+ .generic_driver =
+ "hctr2_base(xctr(aes-generic),polyval-generic)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(aes_hctr2_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "hmac(md5)",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(hmac_md5_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "hmac(rmd160)",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(hmac_rmd160_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "hmac(sha1)",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(hmac_sha1_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "hmac(sha224)",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(hmac_sha224_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "hmac(sha256)",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(hmac_sha256_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "hmac(sha3-224)",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(hmac_sha3_224_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "hmac(sha3-256)",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(hmac_sha3_256_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "hmac(sha3-384)",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(hmac_sha3_384_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "hmac(sha3-512)",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(hmac_sha3_512_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "hmac(sha384)",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(hmac_sha384_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "hmac(sha512)",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(hmac_sha512_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "hmac(sm3)",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(hmac_sm3_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "hmac(streebog256)",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(hmac_streebog256_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "hmac(streebog512)",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(hmac_streebog512_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "jitterentropy_rng",
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kw(aes)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(aes_kw_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "lrw(aes)",
+ .generic_driver = "lrw(ecb(aes-generic))",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(aes_lrw_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "lrw(camellia)",
+ .generic_driver = "lrw(ecb(camellia-generic))",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(camellia_lrw_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "lrw(cast6)",
+ .generic_driver = "lrw(ecb(cast6-generic))",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(cast6_lrw_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "lrw(serpent)",
+ .generic_driver = "lrw(ecb(serpent-generic))",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(serpent_lrw_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "lrw(twofish)",
+ .generic_driver = "lrw(ecb(twofish-generic))",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(tf_lrw_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "lz4",
+ .test = alg_test_comp,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .comp = {
+ .comp = __VECS(lz4_comp_tv_template),
+ .decomp = __VECS(lz4_decomp_tv_template)
+ }
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "lz4hc",
+ .test = alg_test_comp,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .comp = {
+ .comp = __VECS(lz4hc_comp_tv_template),
+ .decomp = __VECS(lz4hc_decomp_tv_template)
+ }
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "lzo",
+ .test = alg_test_comp,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .comp = {
+ .comp = __VECS(lzo_comp_tv_template),
+ .decomp = __VECS(lzo_decomp_tv_template)
+ }
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "lzo-rle",
+ .test = alg_test_comp,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .comp = {
+ .comp = __VECS(lzorle_comp_tv_template),
+ .decomp = __VECS(lzorle_decomp_tv_template)
+ }
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "md4",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(md4_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "md5",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(md5_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "michael_mic",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(michael_mic_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "nhpoly1305",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(nhpoly1305_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ofb(aes)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(aes_ofb_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ /* Same as ofb(aes) except the key is stored in
+ * hardware secure memory which we reference by index
+ */
+ .alg = "ofb(paes)",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ofb(sm4)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(sm4_ofb_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "pcbc(fcrypt)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(fcrypt_pcbc_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "pkcs1pad(rsa,sha224)",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "pkcs1pad(rsa,sha256)",
+ .test = alg_test_akcipher,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .akcipher = __VECS(pkcs1pad_rsa_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "pkcs1pad(rsa,sha384)",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "pkcs1pad(rsa,sha512)",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "poly1305",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(poly1305_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "polyval",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(polyval_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "rfc3686(ctr(aes))",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(aes_ctr_rfc3686_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "rfc3686(ctr(sm4))",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(sm4_ctr_rfc3686_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "rfc4106(gcm(aes))",
+ .generic_driver = "rfc4106(gcm_base(ctr(aes-generic),ghash-generic))",
+ .test = alg_test_aead,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .aead = {
+ ____VECS(aes_gcm_rfc4106_tv_template),
+ .einval_allowed = 1,
+ .aad_iv = 1,
+ }
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "rfc4309(ccm(aes))",
+ .generic_driver = "rfc4309(ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic)))",
+ .test = alg_test_aead,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .aead = {
+ ____VECS(aes_ccm_rfc4309_tv_template),
+ .einval_allowed = 1,
+ .aad_iv = 1,
+ }
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "rfc4543(gcm(aes))",
+ .generic_driver = "rfc4543(gcm_base(ctr(aes-generic),ghash-generic))",
+ .test = alg_test_aead,
+ .suite = {
+ .aead = {
+ ____VECS(aes_gcm_rfc4543_tv_template),
+ .einval_allowed = 1,
+ .aad_iv = 1,
+ }
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305)",
+ .test = alg_test_aead,
+ .suite = {
+ .aead = __VECS(rfc7539_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "rfc7539esp(chacha20,poly1305)",
+ .test = alg_test_aead,
+ .suite = {
+ .aead = {
+ ____VECS(rfc7539esp_tv_template),
+ .einval_allowed = 1,
+ .aad_iv = 1,
+ }
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "rmd160",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(rmd160_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "rsa",
+ .test = alg_test_akcipher,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .akcipher = __VECS(rsa_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "sha1",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(sha1_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "sha224",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(sha224_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "sha256",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(sha256_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "sha3-224",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(sha3_224_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "sha3-256",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(sha3_256_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "sha3-384",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(sha3_384_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "sha3-512",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(sha3_512_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "sha384",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(sha384_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "sha512",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(sha512_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "sm2",
+ .test = alg_test_akcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .akcipher = __VECS(sm2_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "sm3",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(sm3_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "streebog256",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(streebog256_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "streebog512",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(streebog512_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "vmac64(aes)",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(vmac64_aes_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "wp256",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(wp256_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "wp384",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(wp384_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "wp512",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(wp512_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "xcbc(aes)",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(aes_xcbc128_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "xchacha12",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(xchacha12_tv_template)
+ },
+ }, {
+ .alg = "xchacha20",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(xchacha20_tv_template)
+ },
+ }, {
+ .alg = "xctr(aes)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(aes_xctr_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "xts(aes)",
+ .generic_driver = "xts(ecb(aes-generic))",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(aes_xts_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "xts(camellia)",
+ .generic_driver = "xts(ecb(camellia-generic))",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(camellia_xts_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "xts(cast6)",
+ .generic_driver = "xts(ecb(cast6-generic))",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(cast6_xts_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ /* Same as xts(aes) except the key is stored in
+ * hardware secure memory which we reference by index
+ */
+ .alg = "xts(paes)",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "xts(serpent)",
+ .generic_driver = "xts(ecb(serpent-generic))",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(serpent_xts_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "xts(twofish)",
+ .generic_driver = "xts(ecb(twofish-generic))",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(tf_xts_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_PAES_S390)
+ .alg = "xts-paes-s390",
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(aes_xts_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+#endif
+ .alg = "xts4096(paes)",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "xts512(paes)",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "xxhash64",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(xxhash64_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "zlib-deflate",
+ .test = alg_test_comp,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .comp = {
+ .comp = __VECS(zlib_deflate_comp_tv_template),
+ .decomp = __VECS(zlib_deflate_decomp_tv_template)
+ }
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "zstd",
+ .test = alg_test_comp,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .comp = {
+ .comp = __VECS(zstd_comp_tv_template),
+ .decomp = __VECS(zstd_decomp_tv_template)
+ }
+ }
+ }
+};
+
+static void alg_check_test_descs_order(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 1; i < ARRAY_SIZE(alg_test_descs); i++) {
+ int diff = strcmp(alg_test_descs[i - 1].alg,
+ alg_test_descs[i].alg);
+
+ if (WARN_ON(diff > 0)) {
+ pr_warn("testmgr: alg_test_descs entries in wrong order: '%s' before '%s'\n",
+ alg_test_descs[i - 1].alg,
+ alg_test_descs[i].alg);
+ }
+
+ if (WARN_ON(diff == 0)) {
+ pr_warn("testmgr: duplicate alg_test_descs entry: '%s'\n",
+ alg_test_descs[i].alg);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void alg_check_testvec_configs(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_cipher_testvec_configs); i++)
+ WARN_ON(!valid_testvec_config(
+ &default_cipher_testvec_configs[i]));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_hash_testvec_configs); i++)
+ WARN_ON(!valid_testvec_config(
+ &default_hash_testvec_configs[i]));
+}
+
+static void testmgr_onetime_init(void)
+{
+ alg_check_test_descs_order();
+ alg_check_testvec_configs();
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
+ pr_warn("alg: extra crypto tests enabled. This is intended for developer use only.\n");
+#endif
+}
+
+static int alg_find_test(const char *alg)
+{
+ int start = 0;
+ int end = ARRAY_SIZE(alg_test_descs);
+
+ while (start < end) {
+ int i = (start + end) / 2;
+ int diff = strcmp(alg_test_descs[i].alg, alg);
+
+ if (diff > 0) {
+ end = i;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (diff < 0) {
+ start = i + 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ return i;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int alg_fips_disabled(const char *driver, const char *alg)
+{
+ pr_info("alg: %s (%s) is disabled due to FIPS\n", alg, driver);
+
+ return -ECANCELED;
+}
+
+int alg_test(const char *driver, const char *alg, u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+ int i;
+ int j;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!fips_enabled && notests) {
+ printk_once(KERN_INFO "alg: self-tests disabled\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ DO_ONCE(testmgr_onetime_init);
+
+ if ((type & CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK) == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER) {
+ char nalg[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+
+ if (snprintf(nalg, sizeof(nalg), "ecb(%s)", alg) >=
+ sizeof(nalg))
+ return -ENAMETOOLONG;
+
+ i = alg_find_test(nalg);
+ if (i < 0)
+ goto notest;
+
+ if (fips_enabled && !alg_test_descs[i].fips_allowed)
+ goto non_fips_alg;
+
+ rc = alg_test_cipher(alg_test_descs + i, driver, type, mask);
+ goto test_done;
+ }
+
+ i = alg_find_test(alg);
+ j = alg_find_test(driver);
+ if (i < 0 && j < 0)
+ goto notest;
+
+ if (fips_enabled) {
+ if (j >= 0 && !alg_test_descs[j].fips_allowed)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (i >= 0 && !alg_test_descs[i].fips_allowed)
+ goto non_fips_alg;
+ }
+
+ rc = 0;
+ if (i >= 0)
+ rc |= alg_test_descs[i].test(alg_test_descs + i, driver,
+ type, mask);
+ if (j >= 0 && j != i)
+ rc |= alg_test_descs[j].test(alg_test_descs + j, driver,
+ type, mask);
+
+test_done:
+ if (rc) {
+ if (fips_enabled || panic_on_fail) {
+ fips_fail_notify();
+ panic("alg: self-tests for %s (%s) failed in %s mode!\n",
+ driver, alg,
+ fips_enabled ? "fips" : "panic_on_fail");
+ }
+ pr_warn("alg: self-tests for %s using %s failed (rc=%d)",
+ alg, driver, rc);
+ WARN(rc != -ENOENT,
+ "alg: self-tests for %s using %s failed (rc=%d)",
+ alg, driver, rc);
+ } else {
+ if (fips_enabled)
+ pr_info("alg: self-tests for %s (%s) passed\n",
+ driver, alg);
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+
+notest:
+ printk(KERN_INFO "alg: No test for %s (%s)\n", alg, driver);
+
+ if (type & CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL)
+ return alg_fips_disabled(driver, alg);
+
+ return 0;
+non_fips_alg:
+ return alg_fips_disabled(driver, alg);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS */
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(alg_test);
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-04 15:26:35 +0000