diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'net/mac80211/fils_aead.c')
-rw-r--r-- | net/mac80211/fils_aead.c | 333 |
1 files changed, 333 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/mac80211/fils_aead.c b/net/mac80211/fils_aead.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e1d4cfd99 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/mac80211/fils_aead.c @@ -0,0 +1,333 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * FILS AEAD for (Re)Association Request/Response frames + * Copyright 2016, Qualcomm Atheros, Inc. + */ + +#include <crypto/aes.h> +#include <crypto/algapi.h> +#include <crypto/hash.h> +#include <crypto/skcipher.h> + +#include "ieee80211_i.h" +#include "aes_cmac.h" +#include "fils_aead.h" + +static void gf_mulx(u8 *pad) +{ + u64 a = get_unaligned_be64(pad); + u64 b = get_unaligned_be64(pad + 8); + + put_unaligned_be64((a << 1) | (b >> 63), pad); + put_unaligned_be64((b << 1) ^ ((a >> 63) ? 0x87 : 0), pad + 8); +} + +static int aes_s2v(struct crypto_shash *tfm, + size_t num_elem, const u8 *addr[], size_t len[], u8 *v) +{ + u8 d[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], tmp[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = {}; + SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm); + size_t i; + + desc->tfm = tfm; + + /* D = AES-CMAC(K, <zero>) */ + crypto_shash_digest(desc, tmp, AES_BLOCK_SIZE, d); + + for (i = 0; i < num_elem - 1; i++) { + /* D = dbl(D) xor AES_CMAC(K, Si) */ + gf_mulx(d); /* dbl */ + crypto_shash_digest(desc, addr[i], len[i], tmp); + crypto_xor(d, tmp, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + } + + crypto_shash_init(desc); + + if (len[i] >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { + /* len(Sn) >= 128 */ + /* T = Sn xorend D */ + crypto_shash_update(desc, addr[i], len[i] - AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + crypto_xor(d, addr[i] + len[i] - AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + } else { + /* len(Sn) < 128 */ + /* T = dbl(D) xor pad(Sn) */ + gf_mulx(d); /* dbl */ + crypto_xor(d, addr[i], len[i]); + d[len[i]] ^= 0x80; + } + /* V = AES-CMAC(K, T) */ + crypto_shash_finup(desc, d, AES_BLOCK_SIZE, v); + + return 0; +} + +/* Note: addr[] and len[] needs to have one extra slot at the end. */ +static int aes_siv_encrypt(const u8 *key, size_t key_len, + const u8 *plain, size_t plain_len, + size_t num_elem, const u8 *addr[], + size_t len[], u8 *out) +{ + u8 v[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + struct crypto_shash *tfm; + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm2; + struct skcipher_request *req; + int res; + struct scatterlist src[1], dst[1]; + u8 *tmp; + + key_len /= 2; /* S2V key || CTR key */ + + addr[num_elem] = plain; + len[num_elem] = plain_len; + num_elem++; + + /* S2V */ + + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) + return PTR_ERR(tfm); + /* K1 for S2V */ + res = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, key, key_len); + if (!res) + res = aes_s2v(tfm, num_elem, addr, len, v); + crypto_free_shash(tfm); + if (res) + return res; + + /* Use a temporary buffer of the plaintext to handle need for + * overwriting this during AES-CTR. + */ + tmp = kmemdup(plain, plain_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!tmp) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* IV for CTR before encrypted data */ + memcpy(out, v, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + + /* Synthetic IV to be used as the initial counter in CTR: + * Q = V bitand (1^64 || 0^1 || 1^31 || 0^1 || 1^31) + */ + v[8] &= 0x7f; + v[12] &= 0x7f; + + /* CTR */ + + tfm2 = crypto_alloc_skcipher("ctr(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(tfm2)) { + kfree(tmp); + return PTR_ERR(tfm2); + } + /* K2 for CTR */ + res = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm2, key + key_len, key_len); + if (res) + goto fail; + + req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm2, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!req) { + res = -ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } + + sg_init_one(src, tmp, plain_len); + sg_init_one(dst, out + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, plain_len); + skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src, dst, plain_len, v); + res = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req); + skcipher_request_free(req); +fail: + kfree(tmp); + crypto_free_skcipher(tfm2); + return res; +} + +/* Note: addr[] and len[] needs to have one extra slot at the end. */ +static int aes_siv_decrypt(const u8 *key, size_t key_len, + const u8 *iv_crypt, size_t iv_c_len, + size_t num_elem, const u8 *addr[], size_t len[], + u8 *out) +{ + struct crypto_shash *tfm; + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm2; + struct skcipher_request *req; + struct scatterlist src[1], dst[1]; + size_t crypt_len; + int res; + u8 frame_iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u8 check[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + crypt_len = iv_c_len - AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + key_len /= 2; /* S2V key || CTR key */ + addr[num_elem] = out; + len[num_elem] = crypt_len; + num_elem++; + + memcpy(iv, iv_crypt, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + memcpy(frame_iv, iv_crypt, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + + /* Synthetic IV to be used as the initial counter in CTR: + * Q = V bitand (1^64 || 0^1 || 1^31 || 0^1 || 1^31) + */ + iv[8] &= 0x7f; + iv[12] &= 0x7f; + + /* CTR */ + + tfm2 = crypto_alloc_skcipher("ctr(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(tfm2)) + return PTR_ERR(tfm2); + /* K2 for CTR */ + res = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm2, key + key_len, key_len); + if (res) { + crypto_free_skcipher(tfm2); + return res; + } + + req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm2, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!req) { + crypto_free_skcipher(tfm2); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + sg_init_one(src, iv_crypt + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, crypt_len); + sg_init_one(dst, out, crypt_len); + skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src, dst, crypt_len, iv); + res = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req); + skcipher_request_free(req); + crypto_free_skcipher(tfm2); + if (res) + return res; + + /* S2V */ + + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) + return PTR_ERR(tfm); + /* K1 for S2V */ + res = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, key, key_len); + if (!res) + res = aes_s2v(tfm, num_elem, addr, len, check); + crypto_free_shash(tfm); + if (res) + return res; + if (memcmp(check, frame_iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) != 0) + return -EINVAL; + return 0; +} + +int fils_encrypt_assoc_req(struct sk_buff *skb, + struct ieee80211_mgd_assoc_data *assoc_data) +{ + struct ieee80211_mgmt *mgmt = (void *)skb->data; + u8 *capab, *ies, *encr; + const u8 *addr[5 + 1]; + const struct element *session; + size_t len[5 + 1]; + size_t crypt_len; + + if (ieee80211_is_reassoc_req(mgmt->frame_control)) { + capab = (u8 *)&mgmt->u.reassoc_req.capab_info; + ies = mgmt->u.reassoc_req.variable; + } else { + capab = (u8 *)&mgmt->u.assoc_req.capab_info; + ies = mgmt->u.assoc_req.variable; + } + + session = cfg80211_find_ext_elem(WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_SESSION, + ies, skb->data + skb->len - ies); + if (!session || session->datalen != 1 + 8) + return -EINVAL; + /* encrypt after FILS Session element */ + encr = (u8 *)session->data + 1 + 8; + + /* AES-SIV AAD vectors */ + + /* The STA's MAC address */ + addr[0] = mgmt->sa; + len[0] = ETH_ALEN; + /* The AP's BSSID */ + addr[1] = mgmt->da; + len[1] = ETH_ALEN; + /* The STA's nonce */ + addr[2] = assoc_data->fils_nonces; + len[2] = FILS_NONCE_LEN; + /* The AP's nonce */ + addr[3] = &assoc_data->fils_nonces[FILS_NONCE_LEN]; + len[3] = FILS_NONCE_LEN; + /* The (Re)Association Request frame from the Capability Information + * field to the FILS Session element (both inclusive). + */ + addr[4] = capab; + len[4] = encr - capab; + + crypt_len = skb->data + skb->len - encr; + skb_put(skb, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + return aes_siv_encrypt(assoc_data->fils_kek, assoc_data->fils_kek_len, + encr, crypt_len, 5, addr, len, encr); +} + +int fils_decrypt_assoc_resp(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, + u8 *frame, size_t *frame_len, + struct ieee80211_mgd_assoc_data *assoc_data) +{ + struct ieee80211_mgmt *mgmt = (void *)frame; + u8 *capab, *ies, *encr; + const u8 *addr[5 + 1]; + const struct element *session; + size_t len[5 + 1]; + int res; + size_t crypt_len; + + if (*frame_len < 24 + 6) + return -EINVAL; + + capab = (u8 *)&mgmt->u.assoc_resp.capab_info; + ies = mgmt->u.assoc_resp.variable; + session = cfg80211_find_ext_elem(WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_SESSION, + ies, frame + *frame_len - ies); + if (!session || session->datalen != 1 + 8) { + mlme_dbg(sdata, + "No (valid) FILS Session element in (Re)Association Response frame from %pM", + mgmt->sa); + return -EINVAL; + } + /* decrypt after FILS Session element */ + encr = (u8 *)session->data + 1 + 8; + + /* AES-SIV AAD vectors */ + + /* The AP's BSSID */ + addr[0] = mgmt->sa; + len[0] = ETH_ALEN; + /* The STA's MAC address */ + addr[1] = mgmt->da; + len[1] = ETH_ALEN; + /* The AP's nonce */ + addr[2] = &assoc_data->fils_nonces[FILS_NONCE_LEN]; + len[2] = FILS_NONCE_LEN; + /* The STA's nonce */ + addr[3] = assoc_data->fils_nonces; + len[3] = FILS_NONCE_LEN; + /* The (Re)Association Response frame from the Capability Information + * field to the FILS Session element (both inclusive). + */ + addr[4] = capab; + len[4] = encr - capab; + + crypt_len = frame + *frame_len - encr; + if (crypt_len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { + mlme_dbg(sdata, + "Not enough room for AES-SIV data after FILS Session element in (Re)Association Response frame from %pM", + mgmt->sa); + return -EINVAL; + } + res = aes_siv_decrypt(assoc_data->fils_kek, assoc_data->fils_kek_len, + encr, crypt_len, 5, addr, len, encr); + if (res != 0) { + mlme_dbg(sdata, + "AES-SIV decryption of (Re)Association Response frame from %pM failed", + mgmt->sa); + return res; + } + *frame_len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + return 0; +} |