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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 16:37:15 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 16:37:15 +0000 |
commit | ae5d181b854d3ccb373b6bc01b4869e44ff4d87a (patch) | |
tree | 91f59efb48c56a84cc798e012fccb667b63d3fee /WWW/Library/Implementation/HTTP.c | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | lynx-ae5d181b854d3ccb373b6bc01b4869e44ff4d87a.tar.xz lynx-ae5d181b854d3ccb373b6bc01b4869e44ff4d87a.zip |
Adding upstream version 2.9.0dev.12.upstream/2.9.0dev.12upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'WWW/Library/Implementation/HTTP.c')
-rw-r--r-- | WWW/Library/Implementation/HTTP.c | 2838 |
1 files changed, 2838 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/WWW/Library/Implementation/HTTP.c b/WWW/Library/Implementation/HTTP.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e3c5a4a --- /dev/null +++ b/WWW/Library/Implementation/HTTP.c @@ -0,0 +1,2838 @@ +/* + * $LynxId: HTTP.c,v 1.183 2022/04/01 00:10:19 tom Exp $ + * + * HyperText Transfer Protocol - Client implementation HTTP.c + * =========================== + * Modified: + * 27 Jan 1994 PDM Added Ari Luotonen's Fix for Reload when using proxy + * servers. + * 28 Apr 1997 AJL,FM Do Proxy Authorisation. + */ + +#include <HTUtils.h> +#include <HTTP.h> +#include <LYUtils.h> + +#ifdef USE_SSL +#include <HTNews.h> +#endif + +#define HTTP_PORT 80 +#define HTTPS_PORT 443 +#define SNEWS_PORT 563 + +#define INIT_LINE_SIZE 1536 /* Start with line buffer this big */ +#define LINE_EXTEND_THRESH 256 /* Minimum read size */ +#define VERSION_LENGTH 20 /* for returned protocol version */ + +#include <HTParse.h> +#include <HTTCP.h> +#include <HTFormat.h> +#include <HTFile.h> +#include <HTAlert.h> +#include <HTMIME.h> +#include <HTML.h> +#include <HTInit.h> +#include <HTAABrow.h> +#include <HTAccess.h> /* Are we using an HTTP gateway? */ + +#include <LYCookie.h> +#include <LYGlobalDefs.h> +#include <GridText.h> +#include <LYStrings.h> +#include <LYUtils.h> +#include <LYrcFile.h> +#include <LYLeaks.h> +#include <LYCurses.h> + +#ifdef USE_SSL + +#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_INCL +#include <openssl/x509v3.h> +#endif + +#if defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) +/* OpenSSL and LibreSSL version numbers do not correspond */ + +#if LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x2060100fL +#define SSL_set_no_TLSV1() SSL_set_min_proto_version(handle, TLS1_1_VERSION) +#endif + +#elif defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) + +#define SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER +#undef SSL_load_error_strings +#undef SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms +#define ASN1_STRING_data ASN1_STRING_get0_data +#define TLS_client_method() SSLv23_client_method() +#define SSL_load_error_strings() /* nothing */ +#define SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms() /* nothing */ +#define SSL_set_no_TLSV1() SSL_set_min_proto_version(handle, TLS1_1_VERSION) + +#elif defined(SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER) + +#define TLS_client_method() SSLv23_client_method() + +#endif + +#ifndef SSL_set_no_TLSV1 +#define SSL_set_no_TLSV1() SSL_set_options(handle, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1) +#endif + +#ifdef USE_GNUTLS_INCL +#include <gnutls/x509.h> +#endif + +#endif /* USE_SSL */ + +BOOLEAN reloading = FALSE; /* Reloading => send no-cache pragma to proxy */ +char *redirecting_url = NULL; /* Location: value. */ +BOOL permanent_redirection = FALSE; /* Got 301 status? */ +BOOL redirect_post_content = FALSE; /* Don't convert to GET? */ + +#ifdef USE_SSL +SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = NULL; /* SSL ctx */ +SSL *SSL_handle = NULL; +static int ssl_okay; + +static void free_ssl_ctx(void) +{ + if (ssl_ctx != NULL) + SSL_CTX_free(ssl_ctx); +} + +static BOOL needs_limit(const char *actual) +{ + return ((int) strlen(actual) > LYcols - 7) ? TRUE : FALSE; +} + +static char *limited_string(const char *source, const char *actual) +{ + int limit = ((int) strlen(source) + - ((int) strlen(actual) - (LYcols - 10))); + char *temp = NULL; + + StrAllocCopy(temp, source); + if (limit < 0) + limit = 0; + strcpy(temp + limit, "..."); + return temp; +} + +/* + * If the error message is too long to fit in the line, truncate that to fit + * within the limits for prompting. + */ +static void SSL_single_prompt(char **target, const char *source) +{ + HTSprintf0(target, SSL_FORCED_PROMPT, source); + if (needs_limit(*target)) { + char *temp = limited_string(source, *target); + + *target = NULL; + HTSprintf0(target, SSL_FORCED_PROMPT, temp); + free(temp); + } +} + +static void SSL_double_prompt(char **target, const char *format, const char + *arg1, const char *arg2) +{ + HTSprintf0(target, format, arg1, arg2); + if (needs_limit(*target)) { + char *parg2 = limited_string(arg2, *target); + + *target = NULL; + HTSprintf0(target, format, arg1, parg2); + if (needs_limit(*target)) { + char *parg1 = limited_string(arg1, *target); + + *target = NULL; + HTSprintf0(target, format, parg1, parg2); + free(parg1); + } + free(parg2); + } +} + +static int HTSSLCallback(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX * x509_ctx GCC_UNUSED) +{ + char *msg = NULL; + int result = 1; + +#ifdef USE_X509_SUPPORT + HTSprintf0(&msg, + gettext("SSL callback:%s, preverify_ok=%d, ssl_okay=%d"), + X509_verify_cert_error_string((long) X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(x509_ctx)), + preverify_ok, ssl_okay); + _HTProgress(msg); + FREE(msg); +#endif + +#ifndef USE_NSS_COMPAT_INCL + if (!(preverify_ok || ssl_okay || ssl_noprompt)) { +#ifdef USE_X509_SUPPORT + SSL_single_prompt(&msg, + X509_verify_cert_error_string((long) + X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(x509_ctx))); + if (HTForcedPrompt(ssl_noprompt, msg, NO)) + ssl_okay = 1; + else + result = 0; +#endif + + FREE(msg); + } +#endif + return result; +} + +SSL *HTGetSSLHandle(void) +{ +#ifdef USE_GNUTLS_INCL + static char *certfile = NULL; +#endif + static char *client_keyfile = NULL; + static char *client_certfile = NULL; + + if (ssl_ctx == NULL) { + /* + * First time only. + */ +#if SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0800 + if ((ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new()) != NULL) { + X509_set_default_verify_paths(ssl_ctx->cert); + } +#else + SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms(); + if ((ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method())) != NULL) { +#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 + SSL_CTX_set_options(ssl_ctx, SSL_OP_ALL | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2); +#else + SSL_CTX_set_options(ssl_ctx, SSL_OP_ALL); +#endif +#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION + SSL_CTX_set_options(ssl_ctx, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION); +#endif +#ifdef SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY + SSL_CTX_set_mode(ssl_ctx, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY); +#endif +#ifdef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS + SSL_CTX_set_mode(ssl_ctx, SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS); +#endif + SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ssl_ctx); + SSL_CTX_set_verify(ssl_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, HTSSLCallback); + } +#endif /* SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0800 */ +#if defined(USE_PROGRAM_DIR) & !defined(USE_GNUTLS_INCL) + if (ssl_ctx != NULL) { + X509_LOOKUP *lookup; + + lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(ssl_ctx->cert_store, + X509_LOOKUP_file()); + if (lookup != NULL) { + char *certfile = NULL; + + HTSprintf0(&certfile, "%s\\cert.pem", program_dir); + X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, certfile, X509_FILETYPE_PEM); + FREE(certfile); + } + } +#endif +#ifdef USE_GNUTLS_INCL + if ((certfile = LYGetEnv("SSL_CERT_FILE")) != NULL) { + CTRACE((tfp, + "HTGetSSLHandle: certfile is set to %s by SSL_CERT_FILE\n", + certfile)); + } else { + if (non_empty(SSL_cert_file)) { + certfile = SSL_cert_file; + CTRACE((tfp, + "HTGetSSLHandle: certfile is set to %s by config SSL_CERT_FILE\n", + certfile)); + } +#if defined(USE_PROGRAM_DIR) + else { + HTSprintf0(&(certfile), "%s\\cert.pem", program_dir); + CTRACE((tfp, + "HTGetSSLHandle: certfile is set to %s by installed directory\n", certfile)); + } +#endif + } +#endif + atexit(free_ssl_ctx); + } + + if (non_empty(SSL_client_key_file)) { + client_keyfile = SSL_client_key_file; + CTRACE((tfp, + "HTGetSSLHandle: client key file is set to %s by config SSL_CLIENT_KEY_FILE\n", + client_keyfile)); + } + + if (non_empty(SSL_client_cert_file)) { + client_certfile = SSL_client_cert_file; + CTRACE((tfp, + "HTGetSSLHandle: client cert file is set to %s by config SSL_CLIENT_CERT_FILE\n", + client_certfile)); + } +#ifdef USE_GNUTLS_INCL + ssl_ctx->certfile = certfile; + ssl_ctx->certfile_type = GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM; + ssl_ctx->client_keyfile = client_keyfile; + ssl_ctx->client_keyfile_type = GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM; + ssl_ctx->client_certfile = client_certfile; + ssl_ctx->client_certfile_type = GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM; +#elif SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0930 + if (client_certfile != NULL) { + if (client_keyfile == NULL) { + client_keyfile = client_certfile; + } + SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ssl_ctx, client_certfile); + SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ssl_ctx, client_keyfile, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM); + } +#endif + ssl_okay = 0; + return (SSL_new(ssl_ctx)); +} + +void HTSSLInitPRNG(void) +{ +#if SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00905100 + if (RAND_status() == 0) { + char rand_file[256]; + time_t t; + long l, seed; + +#ifndef _WINDOWS + pid_t pid; + +#else + DWORD pid; +#endif + + t = time(NULL); + +#ifndef _WINDOWS + pid = getpid(); +#else + pid = GetCurrentThreadId(); +#endif + + RAND_file_name(rand_file, 256L); + CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Seeding PRNG\n")); + /* Seed as much as 1024 bytes from RAND_file_name */ + RAND_load_file(rand_file, 1024L); + /* Seed in time (mod_ssl does this) */ + RAND_seed((unsigned char *) &t, (int) sizeof(time_t)); + + /* Seed in pid (mod_ssl does this) */ + RAND_seed((unsigned char *) &pid, (int) sizeof(pid)); + /* Initialize system's random number generator */ + RAND_bytes((unsigned char *) &seed, (int) sizeof(long)); + + lynx_srand((unsigned) seed); + while (RAND_status() == 0) { + /* Repeatedly seed the PRNG using the system's random number generator until it has been seeded with enough data */ + l = (long) lynx_rand(); + RAND_seed((unsigned char *) &l, (int) sizeof(long)); + } + /* Write a rand_file */ + RAND_write_file(rand_file); + } +#endif /* SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00905100 */ + return; +} + +#define HTTP_NETREAD(sock, buff, size, handle) \ + (handle \ + ? SSL_read(handle, buff, size) \ + : NETREAD(sock, buff, size)) + +#define HTTP_NETWRITE(sock, buff, size, handle) \ + (handle \ + ? SSL_write(handle, buff, size) \ + : NETWRITE(sock, buff, size)) + +#define HTTP_NETCLOSE(sock, handle) \ + { (void)NETCLOSE(sock); \ + if (handle) \ + SSL_free(handle); \ + SSL_handle = handle = NULL; \ + } + +#else +#define HTTP_NETREAD(a, b, c, d) NETREAD(a, b, c) +#define HTTP_NETWRITE(a, b, c, d) NETWRITE(a, b, c) +#define HTTP_NETCLOSE(a, b) (void)NETCLOSE(a) +#endif /* USE_SSL */ + +#ifdef _WINDOWS /* 1997/11/06 (Thu) 13:00:08 */ + +#define BOX_TITLE "Lynx " __FILE__ +#define BOX_FLAG (MB_ICONINFORMATION | MB_SETFOREGROUND) + +typedef struct { + int fd; + char *buf; + int len; +} recv_data_t; + +int ws_read_per_sec = 0; +static int ws_errno = 0; + +static DWORD g_total_times = 0; +static DWORD g_total_bytes = 0; + +/* The same like read, but takes care of EINTR and uses select to + timeout the stale connections. */ + +static int ws_read(int fd, char *buf, int len) +{ + int res; + int retry = 3; + + do { + res = recv(fd, buf, len, 0); + if (WSAEWOULDBLOCK == WSAGetLastError()) { + Sleep(100); + if (retry-- > 0) + continue; + } + } while (res == SOCKET_ERROR && SOCKET_ERRNO == EINTR); + + return res; +} + +#define DWORD_ERR ((DWORD)-1) + +static DWORD __stdcall _thread_func(void *p) +{ + DWORD result; + int i, val; + recv_data_t *q = (recv_data_t *) p; + + i = 0; + i++; + val = ws_read(q->fd, q->buf, q->len); + + if (val == SOCKET_ERROR) { + ws_errno = WSAGetLastError(); +#if 0 + char buff[256]; + + sprintf(buff, "Thread read: %d, error (%ld), fd = %d, len = %d", + i, ws_errno, q->fd, q->len); + MessageBox(NULL, buff, BOX_TITLE, BOX_FLAG); +#endif + result = DWORD_ERR; + } else { + result = val; + } + + return result; +} + +/* The same like read, but takes care of EINTR and uses select to + timeout the stale connections. */ + +int ws_netread(int fd, char *buf, int len) +{ + int i; + char buff[256]; + + /* 1998/03/30 (Mon) 09:01:21 */ + HANDLE hThread; + DWORD dwThreadID; + DWORD exitcode = 0; + DWORD ret_val = DWORD_ERR; + DWORD val, process_time, now_TickCount, save_TickCount; + + static recv_data_t para; + +#define TICK 5 +#define STACK_SIZE 0x2000uL + + EnterCriticalSection(&critSec_READ); + + para.fd = fd; + para.buf = buf; + para.len = len; + + ws_read_per_sec = 0; + save_TickCount = GetTickCount(); + + hThread = CreateThread(NULL, STACK_SIZE, + _thread_func, + (void *) ¶, 0UL, &dwThreadID); + + if (hThread == 0) { + HTInfoMsg("CreateThread Failed (read)"); + goto read_exit; + } + + i = 0; + while (1) { + val = WaitForSingleObject(hThread, 1000 / TICK); + i++; + if (val == WAIT_FAILED) { + HTInfoMsg("Wait Failed"); + ret_val = DWORD_ERR; + break; + } else if (val == WAIT_TIMEOUT) { + i++; + if (i / TICK > (AlertSecs + 2)) { + sprintf(buff, "Read Waiting (%2d.%01d) for %d Bytes", + i / TICK, (i % TICK) * 10 / TICK, len); + SetConsoleTitle(buff); + } + if (win32_check_interrupt() || ((i / TICK) > lynx_timeout)) { + if (CloseHandle(hThread) == FALSE) { + HTInfoMsg("Thread terminate Failed"); + } + WSASetLastError(ETIMEDOUT); + ret_val = HT_INTERRUPTED; + break; + } + } else if (val == WAIT_OBJECT_0) { + if (GetExitCodeThread(hThread, &exitcode) == FALSE) { + exitcode = DWORD_ERR; + } + if (CloseHandle(hThread) == FALSE) { + HTInfoMsg("Thread terminate Failed"); + } + now_TickCount = GetTickCount(); + if (now_TickCount >= save_TickCount) + process_time = now_TickCount - save_TickCount; + else + process_time = now_TickCount + (0xffffffff - save_TickCount); + + if (process_time == 0) + process_time = 1; + g_total_times += process_time; + + /* + * DWORD is unsigned, and could be an error code which is signed. + */ + if ((long) exitcode > 0) + g_total_bytes += exitcode; + + ws_read_per_sec = g_total_bytes; + if (ws_read_per_sec > 2000000) { + if (g_total_times > 1000) + ws_read_per_sec /= (g_total_times / 1000); + } else { + ws_read_per_sec *= 1000; + ws_read_per_sec /= g_total_times; + } + + ret_val = exitcode; + break; + } + } /* end while(1) */ + + read_exit: + LeaveCriticalSection(&critSec_READ); + return ret_val; +} +#endif /* _WINDOWS */ + +/* + * RFC-1738 says we can have user/password using these ASCII characters + * safe = "$" | "-" | "_" | "." | "+" + * extra = "!" | "*" | "'" | "(" | ")" | "," + * hex = digit | "A" | "B" | "C" | "D" | "E" | "F" | + * "a" | "b" | "c" | "d" | "e" | "f" + * escape = "%" hex hex + * unreserved = alpha | digit | safe | extra + * uchar = unreserved | escape + * user = *[ uchar | ";" | "?" | "&" | "=" ] + * password = *[ uchar | ";" | "?" | "&" | "=" ] + * and we cannot have a password without user, i.e., no leading ":" + * and ":", "@", "/" must be encoded, i.e., will not appear as such. + * + * However, in a URL + * //<user>:<password>@<host>:<port>/<url-path> + * valid characters in the host are different, not allowing most of those + * punctuation characters. + * + * RFC-3986 amends this, using + * userinfo = *( unreserved / pct-encoded / sub-delims / ":" ) + * unreserved = ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "." / "_" / "~" + * reserved = gen-delims / sub-delims + * gen-delims = ":" / "/" / "?" / "#" / "[" / "]" / "@" + * sub-delims = "!" / "$" / "&" / "'" / "(" / ")" + * / "*" / "+" / "," / ";" / "=" + * and + * host = IP-literal / IPv4address / reg-name + * reg-name = *( unreserved / pct-encoded / sub-delims ) + */ +char *HTSkipToAt(char *host, int *gen_delims) +{ + char *result = 0; + char *s = host; + int pass = 0; + int ch; + int last = -1; + + *gen_delims = 0; + while ((ch = UCH(*s)) != '\0') { + if (ch == ':') { + if (pass++) + break; + } else if (ch == '@') { + if (s != host && last != ':') + result = s; + break; + } else if (RFC_3986_GEN_DELIMS(ch)) { + *gen_delims += 1; + if (!RFC_3986_GEN_DELIMS(s[1])) + break; + } else if (ch == '%') { + if (!(isxdigit(UCH(s[1])) && isxdigit(UCH(s[2])))) + break; + } else if (!(RFC_3986_UNRESERVED(ch) || + RFC_3986_SUB_DELIMS(ch))) { + break; + } + ++s; + last = ch; + } + return result; +} + +static char *fake_hostname(char *auth) +{ + char *result = NULL; + char *colon = NULL; + + StrAllocCopy(result, auth); + if ((colon = strchr(result, ':')) != 0) + *colon = '\0'; + if (strchr(result, '.') == 0) + FREE(result); + return result; +} + +/* + * Strip any username from the given string so we retain only the host. + */ +void strip_userid(char *host, int parse_only) +{ + int gen_delims = 0; + char *p1 = host; + char *p2 = HTSkipToAt(host, &gen_delims); + + if (p2 != 0) { + char *msg = NULL; + char *auth = NULL; + char *fake = NULL; + char *p3 = p2; + int sub_delims = 0; + int my_delimit = UCH(*p2); + int do_trimming = (my_delimit == '@'); + + *p2++ = '\0'; + + StrAllocCopy(auth, host); + + /* + * Trailing "gen-delims" demonstrates that there is no user/password. + */ + while ((p3 != host) && RFC_3986_GEN_DELIMS(p3[-1])) { + *(--p3) = '\0'; + } + /* + * While legal, punctuation-only user/password is questionable. + */ + while ((p3 != host) && RFC_3986_SUB_DELIMS(p3[-1])) { + ++sub_delims; + *(--p3) = '\0'; + } + /* + * Trim trailing "gen-delims" from the real hostname. + */ + for (p3 = p2; *p3 != '\0'; ++p3) { + if (RFC_3986_GEN_DELIMS(*p3)) { + *p3 = '\0'; + break; + } + } + CTRACE((tfp, "trim auth: result:`%s'\n", host)); + + if (gen_delims || strcmp(host, auth)) { + do_trimming = !gen_delims; + } + if (*host == '\0' && sub_delims) { + HTSprintf0(&msg, + gettext("User/password contains only punctuation: %s"), + auth); + } else if ((fake = fake_hostname(host)) != NULL) { + HTSprintf0(&msg, + gettext("User/password may be confused with hostname: '%s' (e.g, '%s')"), + auth, fake); + } + if (msg != 0 && !parse_only) + HTAlert(msg); + if (do_trimming) { + while ((*p1++ = *p2++) != '\0') { + ; + } + CTRACE((tfp, "trim host: result:`%s'\n", host)); + } + FREE(fake); + FREE(auth); + FREE(msg); + } +} + +/* + * Check if the user's options specified to use the given encoding. Normally + * all encodings with compiled-in support are specified (encodingALL). + */ +static BOOL acceptEncoding(int code) +{ + BOOL result = FALSE; + + if ((code & LYAcceptEncoding) != 0) { + const char *program = 0; + + switch (code) { + case encodingGZIP: + program = HTGetProgramPath(ppGZIP); + break; + case encodingDEFLATE: + program = HTGetProgramPath(ppINFLATE); + break; + case encodingCOMPRESS: + program = HTGetProgramPath(ppCOMPRESS); + break; + case encodingBZIP2: + program = HTGetProgramPath(ppBZIP2); + break; + case encodingBROTLI: + program = HTGetProgramPath(ppBROTLI); + break; + default: + break; + } + /* + * FIXME: if lynx did not rely upon external programs to decompress + * files for external viewers, this check could be relaxed. + */ + result = (BOOL) (program != 0); + } + return result; +} + +#ifdef USE_SSL +static void show_cert_issuer(X509 * peer_cert GCC_UNUSED) +{ +#if defined(USE_OPENSSL_INCL) || defined(USE_GNUTLS_FUNCS) + char ssl_dn[1024]; + char *msg = NULL; + + X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(peer_cert), ssl_dn, (int) sizeof(ssl_dn)); + HTSprintf0(&msg, gettext("Certificate issued by: %s"), ssl_dn); + _HTProgress(msg); + FREE(msg); +#elif defined(USE_GNUTLS_INCL) + /* the OpenSSL "compat" code compiles but dumps core with GNU TLS */ +#endif +} +#endif + +/* + * Remove IPv6 brackets (and any port-number) from the given host-string. + */ +#ifdef USE_SSL +static char *StripIpv6Brackets(char *host) +{ + int port_number; + char *p; + + if ((p = HTParsePort(host, &port_number)) != 0) + *p = '\0'; + + if (*host == '[') { + p = host + strlen(host) - 1; + if (*p == ']') { + *p = '\0'; + for (p = host; (p[0] = p[1]) != '\0'; ++p) { + ; /* EMPTY */ + } + } + } + return host; +} +#endif + +/* + * Remove user/password, if any, from the given host-string. + */ +#ifdef USE_SSL +static char *StripUserAuthents(char *host) +{ + char *p = strchr(host, '@'); + + if (p != NULL) { + char *q = host; + + while ((*q++ = *++p) != '\0') ; + } + return host; +} +#endif + +/* Load Document from HTTP Server HTLoadHTTP() + * ============================== + * + * Given a hypertext address, this routine loads a document. + * + * + * On entry, + * arg is the hypertext reference of the article to be loaded. + * + * On exit, + * returns >=0 If no error, a good socket number + * <0 Error. + * + * The socket must be closed by the caller after the document has been + * read. + * + */ +static int HTLoadHTTP(const char *arg, + HTParentAnchor *anAnchor, + HTFormat format_out, + HTStream *sink) +{ + static char empty[1]; + int s; /* Socket number for returned data */ + const char *url = arg; /* The URL which get_physical() returned */ + bstring *command = NULL; /* The whole command */ + char *eol; /* End of line if found */ + char *start_of_data; /* Start of body of reply */ + int status; /* tcp return */ + off_t bytes_already_read; + char crlf[3]; /* A CR LF equivalent string */ + HTStream *target; /* Unconverted data */ + HTFormat format_in; /* Format arriving in the message */ + BOOL do_head = FALSE; /* Whether or not we should do a head */ + BOOL do_post = FALSE; /* ARE WE posting ? */ + const char *METHOD; + + char *line_buffer = NULL; + char *line_kept_clean = NULL; + +#ifdef SH_EX /* FIX BUG by kaz@maczuka.hitachi.ibaraki.jp */ + int real_length_of_line = 0; +#endif + BOOL extensions; /* Assume good HTTP server */ + char *linebuf = NULL; + char temp[80]; + BOOL first_Accept = TRUE; + BOOL show_401 = FALSE; + BOOL show_407 = FALSE; + BOOL auth_proxy = NO; /* Generate a proxy authorization. - AJL */ + + int length, rawlength, rv; + int server_status = 0; + BOOL doing_redirect, already_retrying = FALSE; + int len = 0; + +#ifdef USE_SSL + unsigned long SSLerror; + BOOL do_connect = FALSE; /* ARE WE going to use a proxy tunnel ? */ + BOOL did_connect = FALSE; /* ARE WE actually using a proxy tunnel ? */ + const char *connect_url = NULL; /* The URL being proxied */ + char *connect_host = NULL; /* The host being proxied */ + SSL *handle = NULL; /* The SSL handle */ + X509 *peer_cert; /* The peer certificate */ + char ssl_dn[1024]; + char *cert_host; + char *ssl_host; + char *p; + char *msg = NULL; + int status_sslcertcheck; + char *ssl_dn_start; + char *ssl_all_cns = NULL; + +#ifdef USE_GNUTLS_INCL + int ret; + unsigned tls_status; +#endif + +#if (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0900) && !defined(USE_GNUTLS_FUNCS) + BOOL try_tls = TRUE; +#endif /* SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0900 */ + SSL_handle = NULL; +#else + void *handle = NULL; +#endif /* USE_SSL */ + + if (anAnchor->isHEAD) + do_head = TRUE; + else if (anAnchor->post_data) + do_post = TRUE; + + if (!url) { + status = -3; + _HTProgress(BAD_REQUEST); + goto done; + } + if (!*url) { + status = -2; + _HTProgress(BAD_REQUEST); + goto done; + } +#ifdef USE_SSL + if (using_proxy && !StrNCmp(url, "http://", 7)) { + int portnumber; + + if ((connect_url = strstr((url + 7), "https://"))) { + do_connect = TRUE; + connect_host = HTParse(connect_url, "https", PARSE_HOST); + if (!HTParsePort(connect_host, &portnumber)) { + sprintf(temp, ":%d", HTTPS_PORT); + StrAllocCat(connect_host, temp); + } + CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: connect_url = '%s'\n", connect_url)); + CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: connect_host = '%s'\n", connect_host)); + } else if ((connect_url = strstr((url + 7), "snews://"))) { + do_connect = TRUE; + connect_host = HTParse(connect_url, "snews", PARSE_HOST); + if (!HTParsePort(connect_host, &portnumber)) { + sprintf(temp, ":%d", SNEWS_PORT); + StrAllocCat(connect_host, temp); + } + CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: connect_url = '%s'\n", connect_url)); + CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: connect_host = '%s'\n", connect_host)); + } + } +#endif /* USE_SSL */ + + sprintf(crlf, "%c%c", CR, LF); + + /* + * At this point, we're talking HTTP/1.0. + */ + extensions = YES; + + try_again: + /* + * All initializations are moved down here from up above, so we can start + * over here... + */ + eol = 0; + length = 0; + doing_redirect = FALSE; + permanent_redirection = FALSE; + redirect_post_content = FALSE; + target = NULL; + line_buffer = NULL; + line_kept_clean = NULL; + +#ifdef USE_SSL + if (!StrNCmp(url, "https", 5)) + status = HTDoConnect(url, "HTTPS", HTTPS_PORT, &s); + else + status = HTDoConnect(url, "HTTP", HTTP_PORT, &s); +#else + if (!StrNCmp(url, "https", 5)) { + HTAlert(gettext("This client does not contain support for HTTPS URLs.")); + status = HT_NOT_LOADED; + goto done; + } + status = HTDoConnect(arg, "HTTP", HTTP_PORT, &s); +#endif /* USE_SSL */ + if (status == HT_INTERRUPTED) { + /* + * Interrupt cleanly. + */ + CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Interrupted on connect; recovering cleanly.\n")); + _HTProgress(CONNECTION_INTERRUPTED); + status = HT_NOT_LOADED; + goto done; + } + if (status < 0) { +#ifdef _WINDOWS + CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Unable to connect to remote host for `%s'\n" + " (status = %d, sock_errno = %d).\n", + url, status, SOCKET_ERRNO)); +#else + CTRACE((tfp, + "HTTP: Unable to connect to remote host for `%s' (errno = %d).\n", + url, SOCKET_ERRNO)); +#endif + HTAlert(gettext("Unable to connect to remote host.")); + status = HT_NOT_LOADED; + goto done; + } +#ifdef USE_SSL + use_tunnel: + /* + * If this is an https document, then do the SSL stuff here. + */ + if (did_connect || !StrNCmp(url, "https", 5)) { + SSL_handle = handle = HTGetSSLHandle(); + SSL_set_fd(handle, s); + /* get host we're connecting to */ + ssl_host = HTParse(url, "", PARSE_HOST); + ssl_host = StripIpv6Brackets(ssl_host); + ssl_host = StripUserAuthents(ssl_host); +#if defined(USE_GNUTLS_FUNCS) + ret = gnutls_server_name_set(handle->gnutls_state, + GNUTLS_NAME_DNS, + ssl_host, strlen(ssl_host)); + CTRACE((tfp, "...called gnutls_server_name_set(%s) ->%d\n", ssl_host, ret)); +#elif SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0900 +#ifndef USE_NSS_COMPAT_INCL + if (!try_tls) { + SSL_set_no_TLSV1(); + CTRACE((tfp, "...adding SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1\n")); + } +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090806fL && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) + else { + int ret = (int) SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(handle, ssl_host); + + CTRACE((tfp, "...called SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(%s) ->%d\n", + ssl_host, ret)); + } +#endif +#endif +#endif /* SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0900 */ + HTSSLInitPRNG(); + status = SSL_connect(handle); + + if (status <= 0) { +#if (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0900) +#if !defined(USE_GNUTLS_FUNCS) + if (try_tls) { + _HTProgress(gettext("Retrying connection without TLS.")); + try_tls = FALSE; + if (did_connect) + HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle); + goto try_again; + } else +#endif + { + CTRACE((tfp, + "HTTP: Unable to complete SSL handshake for '%s', SSL_connect=%d, SSL error stack dump follows\n", + url, status)); + SSL_load_error_strings(); + while ((SSLerror = ERR_get_error()) != 0) { + CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: SSL: %s\n", ERR_error_string(SSLerror, NULL))); + } + HTAlert("Unable to make secure connection to remote host."); + if (did_connect) + HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle); + status = HT_NOT_LOADED; + goto done; + } +#else + unsigned long SSLerror; + + CTRACE((tfp, + "HTTP: Unable to complete SSL handshake for '%s', SSL_connect=%d, SSL error stack dump follows\n", + url, status)); + SSL_load_error_strings(); + while ((SSLerror = ERR_get_error()) != 0) { + CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: SSL: %s\n", ERR_error_string(SSLerror, NULL))); + } + HTAlert("Unable to make secure connection to remote host."); + if (did_connect) + HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle); + status = HT_NOT_LOADED; + goto done; +#endif /* SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0900 */ + } +#ifdef USE_GNUTLS_INCL + gnutls_certificate_set_verify_flags(handle->gnutls_cred, + GNUTLS_VERIFY_DO_NOT_ALLOW_SAME | + GNUTLS_VERIFY_ALLOW_X509_V1_CA_CRT); + ret = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(handle->gnutls_state, &tls_status); + if (ret < 0 || tls_status != 0) { + int flag_continue = 1; + +#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030104 + int type; + gnutls_datum_t out; + + if (ret < 0) { + SSL_single_prompt(&msg, + gettext("GnuTLS error when trying to verify certificate.")); + } else { + type = gnutls_certificate_type_get(handle->gnutls_state); + (void) gnutls_certificate_verification_status_print(tls_status, + type, + &out, 0); + SSL_single_prompt(&msg, (const char *) out.data); + gnutls_free(out.data); + } +#else + char *msg2; + + if (ret == 0 && tls_status & GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND) { + msg2 = gettext("the certificate has no known issuer"); + } else if (tls_status & GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND) { + msg2 = gettext("no issuer was found"); + } else if (tls_status & GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_CA) { + msg2 = gettext("issuer is not a CA"); + } else if (tls_status & GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED) { + msg2 = gettext("the certificate has been revoked"); + } else { + msg2 = gettext("the certificate is not trusted"); + } + SSL_single_prompt(&msg, msg2); +#endif + CTRACE((tfp, "HTLoadHTTP: %s\n", msg)); + if (!ssl_noprompt) { + if (!HTForcedPrompt(ssl_noprompt, msg, NO)) { + flag_continue = 0; + } + } else if (ssl_noprompt == FORCE_PROMPT_NO) { + flag_continue = 0; + } + FREE(msg); + if (flag_continue == 0) { + status = HT_NOT_LOADED; + FREE(msg); + goto done; + } + } +#endif + + peer_cert = (X509 *) SSL_get_peer_certificate(handle); +#if defined(USE_OPENSSL_INCL) || defined(USE_GNUTLS_FUNCS) + X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(peer_cert), + ssl_dn, (int) sizeof(ssl_dn)); +#elif defined(USE_GNUTLS_INCL) + X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(peer_cert), + ssl_dn + 1, (int) sizeof(ssl_dn) - 1); + + /* Iterate over DN in incompatible GnuTLS format to bring it into OpenSSL format */ + ssl_dn[0] = '/'; + ssl_dn_start = ssl_dn; + while (*ssl_dn_start) { + if ((*ssl_dn_start == ',') && (*(ssl_dn_start + 1) == ' ')) { + *ssl_dn_start++ = '/'; + if (*(p = ssl_dn_start) != 0) { + while ((p[0] = p[1]) != 0) + ++p; + } + } else { + ssl_dn_start++; + } + } +#endif + + /* + * X.509 DN validation taking ALL CN fields into account + * (c) 2006 Thorsten Glaser <tg@mirbsd.de> + */ + + /* initialise status information */ + status_sslcertcheck = 0; /* 0 = no CN found in DN */ + ssl_dn_start = ssl_dn; + + /* validate all CNs found in DN */ + CTRACE((tfp, "Validating CNs in '%s'\n", ssl_dn_start)); + while ((cert_host = strstr(ssl_dn_start, "/CN=")) != NULL) { + status_sslcertcheck = 1; /* 1 = could not verify CN */ + /* start of CommonName */ + cert_host += 4; + /* find next part of DistinguishedName */ + if ((p = StrChr(cert_host, '/')) != NULL) { + *p = '\0'; + ssl_dn_start = p; /* yes this points to the NUL byte */ + } else + ssl_dn_start = NULL; + cert_host = StripIpv6Brackets(cert_host); + + /* verify this CN */ + CTRACE((tfp, "Matching\n\tssl_host '%s'\n\tcert_host '%s'\n", + ssl_host, cert_host)); + if (!strcasecomp_asterisk(ssl_host, cert_host)) { + status_sslcertcheck = 2; /* 2 = verified peer */ + /* I think this is cool to have in the logs -TG */ + HTSprintf0(&msg, + gettext("Verified connection to %s (cert=%s)"), + ssl_host, cert_host); + _HTProgress(msg); + FREE(msg); + /* no need to continue the verification loop */ + break; + } + + /* add this CN to list of failed CNs */ + if (ssl_all_cns == NULL) + StrAllocCopy(ssl_all_cns, "CN<"); + else + StrAllocCat(ssl_all_cns, ":CN<"); + StrAllocCat(ssl_all_cns, cert_host); + StrAllocCat(ssl_all_cns, ">"); + /* if we cannot retry, don't try it */ + if (ssl_dn_start == NULL) + break; + /* now retry next CN found in DN */ + *ssl_dn_start = '/'; /* formerly NUL byte */ + } + + /* check the X.509v3 Subject Alternative Name */ +#ifdef USE_GNUTLS_INCL + if (status_sslcertcheck < 2) { + int i; + size_t size; + gnutls_x509_crt_t cert; + static char buf[2048]; + + /* import the certificate to the x509_crt format */ + if (gnutls_x509_crt_init(&cert) == 0) { + + if (gnutls_x509_crt_import(cert, peer_cert, + GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER) < 0) { + gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(cert); + goto done; + } + + ret = 0; + for (i = 0; !(ret < 0); i++) { + size = sizeof(buf); + ret = gnutls_x509_crt_get_subject_alt_name(cert, + (unsigned) i, + buf, &size, + NULL); + + if (strcasecomp_asterisk(ssl_host, buf) == 0) { + status_sslcertcheck = 2; + HTSprintf0(&msg, + gettext("Verified connection to %s (subj=%s)"), + ssl_host, buf); + _HTProgress(msg); + FREE(msg); + break; + } + + } + } + } +#endif +#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_INCL + if (status_sslcertcheck < 2) { + STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) * gens; + int i, numalts; + const GENERAL_NAME *gn; + + gens = (STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *) + X509_get_ext_d2i(peer_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); + + if (gens != NULL) { + numalts = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); + for (i = 0; i < numalts; ++i) { + gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); + if (gn->type == GEN_DNS) + cert_host = (char *) ASN1_STRING_data(gn->d.ia5); + else if (gn->type == GEN_IPADD) { + /* XXX untested -TG */ + size_t j = (size_t) ASN1_STRING_length(gn->d.ia5); + + cert_host = (char *) malloc(j + 1); + MemCpy(cert_host, ASN1_STRING_data(gn->d.ia5), j); + cert_host[j] = '\0'; + } else + continue; + status_sslcertcheck = 1; /* got at least one */ + /* verify this SubjectAltName (see above) */ + cert_host = StripIpv6Brackets(cert_host); + if (!(gn->type == GEN_IPADD ? strcasecomp : + strcasecomp_asterisk) (ssl_host, cert_host)) { + status_sslcertcheck = 2; + HTSprintf0(&msg, + gettext("Verified connection to %s (subj=%s)"), + ssl_host, cert_host); + _HTProgress(msg); + FREE(msg); + if (gn->type == GEN_IPADD) + free(cert_host); + break; + } + /* add to list of failed CNs */ + if (ssl_all_cns == NULL) + StrAllocCopy(ssl_all_cns, "SAN<"); + else + StrAllocCat(ssl_all_cns, ":SAN<"); + if (gn->type == GEN_DNS) + StrAllocCat(ssl_all_cns, "DNS="); + else if (gn->type == GEN_IPADD) + StrAllocCat(ssl_all_cns, "IP="); + StrAllocCat(ssl_all_cns, cert_host); + StrAllocCat(ssl_all_cns, ">"); + if (gn->type == GEN_IPADD) + free(cert_host); + } + sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(gens); + } + } +#endif /* USE_OPENSSL_INCL */ + + /* if an error occurred, format the appropriate message */ + if (status_sslcertcheck == 0) { + SSL_single_prompt(&msg, + gettext("Can't find common name in certificate")); + } else if (status_sslcertcheck == 1) { + SSL_double_prompt(&msg, + gettext("SSL error:host(%s)!=cert(%s)-Continue?"), + ssl_host, ssl_all_cns); + } + + /* if an error occurred, let the user decide how much he trusts */ + if (status_sslcertcheck < 2) { + if (msg == NULL) + StrAllocCopy(msg, gettext("SSL error")); + if (!HTForcedPrompt(ssl_noprompt, msg, NO)) { + status = HT_NOT_LOADED; + FREE(msg); + FREE(ssl_all_cns); + goto done; + } + SSL_double_prompt(&msg, + gettext("UNVERIFIED connection to %s (cert=%s)"), + ssl_host, ssl_all_cns ? ssl_all_cns : "NONE"); + _HTProgress(msg); + FREE(msg); + } + + show_cert_issuer(peer_cert); + + HTSprintf0(&msg, + gettext("Secure %d-bit %s (%s) HTTP connection"), + SSL_get_cipher_bits(handle, NULL), + SSL_get_cipher_version(handle), + SSL_get_cipher(handle)); + _HTProgress(msg); + FREE(msg); + FREE(ssl_all_cns); + FREE(ssl_host); + } +#endif /* USE_SSL */ + + /* Ask that node for the document, omitting the host name & anchor + */ + { + char *p1 = (HTParse(url, "", PARSE_PATH | PARSE_PUNCTUATION)); + +#ifdef USE_SSL + if (do_connect) { + METHOD = "CONNECT"; + BStrCopy0(command, "CONNECT "); + } else +#endif /* USE_SSL */ + if (do_post) { + METHOD = "POST"; + BStrCopy0(command, "POST "); + } else if (do_head) { + METHOD = "HEAD"; + BStrCopy0(command, "HEAD "); + } else { + METHOD = "GET"; + BStrCopy0(command, "GET "); + } + + /* + * If we are using a proxy gateway don't copy in the first slash of + * say: /gopher://a;lkdjfl;ajdf;lkj/;aldk/adflj so that just + * gopher://.... is sent. + */ +#ifdef USE_SSL + if (using_proxy && !did_connect) { + if (do_connect) + BStrCat0(command, connect_host); + else + BStrCat0(command, p1 + 1); + } +#else + if (using_proxy) + BStrCat0(command, p1 + 1); +#endif /* USE_SSL */ + else + BStrCat0(command, p1); + FREE(p1); + } + if (extensions) { + BStrCat0(command, " "); + BStrCat0(command, ((HTprotocolLevel == HTTP_1_0) + ? "HTTP/1.0" + : "HTTP/1.1")); + } + + BStrCat0(command, crlf); /* CR LF, as in rfc 977 */ + + if (extensions) { + int n, i; + char *host = NULL; + + if ((host = HTParse(anAnchor->address, "", PARSE_HOST)) != NULL) { + strip_userid(host, TRUE); + HTBprintf(&command, "Host: %s%c%c", host, CR, LF); + FREE(host); + } + if (HTprotocolLevel >= HTTP_1_1) { + HTBprintf(&command, "Connection: close%c%c", CR, LF); + } + + if (!HTPresentations) + HTFormatInit(); + n = HTList_count(HTPresentations); + + first_Accept = TRUE; + len = 0; + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { + HTPresentation *pres = + (HTPresentation *) HTList_objectAt(HTPresentations, i); + + if (pres->get_accept) { + if (pres->quality < 1.0) { + if (pres->maxbytes > 0) { + sprintf(temp, ";q=%4.3f;mxb=%" PRI_off_t "", + pres->quality, CAST_off_t (pres->maxbytes)); + } else { + sprintf(temp, ";q=%4.3f", pres->quality); + } + } else if (pres->maxbytes > 0) { + sprintf(temp, ";mxb=%" PRI_off_t "", CAST_off_t (pres->maxbytes)); + } else { + temp[0] = '\0'; + } + HTSprintf0(&linebuf, "%s%s%s", + (first_Accept ? + "Accept: " : ", "), + HTAtom_name(pres->rep), + temp); + len += (int) strlen(linebuf); + if (len > 252 && !first_Accept) { + BStrCat0(command, crlf); + HTSprintf0(&linebuf, "Accept: %s%s", + HTAtom_name(pres->rep), + temp); + len = (int) strlen(linebuf); + } + BStrCat0(command, linebuf); + first_Accept = FALSE; + } + } + HTBprintf(&command, "%s*/*;q=0.01%c%c", + (first_Accept ? + "Accept: " : ", "), CR, LF); + + /* + * FIXME: suppressing the "Accept-Encoding" in this case is done to + * work around limitations of the presentation logic used for the + * command-line "-base" option. The remote site may transmit the + * document gzip'd, but the ensuing logic in HTSaveToFile() would see + * the mime-type as gzip rather than text/html, and not prepend the + * base URL. This is less efficient than accepting the compressed data + * and uncompressing it, adding the base URL but is simpler than + * augmenting the dump's presentation logic -TD + */ + if (LYPrependBaseToSource && dump_output_immediately) { + CTRACE((tfp, + "omit Accept-Encoding to work-around interaction with -source\n")); + } else { + char *list = 0; + int j, k; + + for (j = 1; j < encodingALL; j <<= 1) { + if (acceptEncoding(j)) { + for (k = 0; tbl_preferred_encoding[k].name != 0; ++k) { + if (tbl_preferred_encoding[k].value == j) { + if (list != 0) + StrAllocCat(list, ", "); + StrAllocCat(list, tbl_preferred_encoding[k].name); + break; + } + } + } + } + + if (list != 0) { + HTBprintf(&command, "Accept-Encoding: %s%c%c", list, CR, LF); + free(list); + } + } + + if (non_empty(language)) { + HTBprintf(&command, "Accept-Language: %s%c%c", language, CR, LF); + } + + if (non_empty(pref_charset)) { + BStrCat0(command, "Accept-Charset: "); + StrAllocCopy(linebuf, pref_charset); + if (linebuf[strlen(linebuf) - 1] == ',') + linebuf[strlen(linebuf) - 1] = '\0'; + LYLowerCase(linebuf); + if (strstr(linebuf, "iso-8859-1") == NULL) + StrAllocCat(linebuf, ", iso-8859-1;q=0.01"); + if (strstr(linebuf, "us-ascii") == NULL) + StrAllocCat(linebuf, ", us-ascii;q=0.01"); + BStrCat0(command, linebuf); + HTBprintf(&command, "%c%c", CR, LF); + } +#if 0 + /* + * Promote 300 (Multiple Choices) replies, if supported, over 406 (Not + * Acceptable) replies. - FM + * + * This used to be done in versions 2.7 and 2.8*, but violates the + * specs for transparent content negotiation and has the effect that + * servers supporting those specs will send 300 (Multiple Choices) + * instead of a normal response (e.g. 200 OK), since they will assume + * that the client wants to make the choice. It is not clear whether + * there are any servers or sites for which sending this header really + * improves anything. + * + * If there ever is a need to send "Negotiate: trans" and really mean + * it, we should send "Negotiate: trans,trans" or similar, since that + * is semantically equivalent and some servers may ignore "Negotiate: + * trans" as a special case when it comes from Lynx (to work around the + * old faulty behavior). - kw + * + * References: + * RFC 2295 (see also RFC 2296), and mail to lynx-dev and + * new-httpd@apache.org from Koen Holtman, Jan 1999. + */ + if (!do_post) { + HTBprintf(&command, "Negotiate: trans%c%c", CR, LF); + } +#endif /* 0 */ + + /* + * When reloading give no-cache pragma to proxy server to make it + * refresh its cache. -- Ari L. <luotonen@dxcern.cern.ch> + * + * Also send it as a Cache-Control header for HTTP/1.1. - FM + */ + if (reloading) { + HTBprintf(&command, "Pragma: no-cache%c%c", CR, LF); + HTBprintf(&command, "Cache-Control: no-cache%c%c", CR, LF); + } + + if (LYSendUserAgent || no_useragent) { + if (non_empty(LYUserAgent)) { + char *cp = LYSkipBlanks(LYUserAgent); + + /* Won't send it at all if all blank - kw */ + if (*cp != '\0') + HTBprintf(&command, "User-Agent: %.*s%c%c", + INIT_LINE_SIZE - 15, LYUserAgent, CR, LF); + } else { + HTBprintf(&command, "User-Agent: %s/%s libwww-FM/%s%c%c", + HTAppName ? HTAppName : "unknown", + HTAppVersion ? HTAppVersion : "0.0", + HTLibraryVersion, CR, LF); + } + } + + if (non_empty(personal_mail_address) && !LYNoFromHeader) { + HTBprintf(&command, "From: %s%c%c", personal_mail_address, CR, LF); + } + + if (!(LYUserSpecifiedURL || + LYNoRefererHeader || LYNoRefererForThis) && + strcmp(HTLoadedDocumentURL(), "")) { + const char *cp = LYRequestReferer; + + if (!cp) + cp = HTLoadedDocumentURL(); /* @@@ Try both? - kw */ + BStrCat0(command, "Referer: "); + if (isLYNXIMGMAP(cp)) { + char *pound = findPoundSelector(cp); + int nn = (pound ? (int) (pound - cp) : (int) strlen(cp)); + + HTSABCat(&command, cp + LEN_LYNXIMGMAP, nn); + } else { + BStrCat0(command, cp); + } + HTBprintf(&command, "%c%c", CR, LF); + } { + char *abspath; + char *docname; + char *hostname; + char *colon; + int portnumber; + char *auth, *cookie = NULL; + BOOL secure = (BOOL) (StrNCmp(anAnchor->address, "https", 5) + ? FALSE + : TRUE); + + abspath = HTParse(arg, "", PARSE_PATH | PARSE_PUNCTUATION); + docname = HTParse(arg, "", PARSE_PATH); + hostname = HTParse(arg, "", PARSE_HOST); + if (hostname && + NULL != (colon = HTParsePort(hostname, &portnumber))) { + *colon = '\0'; /* Chop off port number */ + } else if (!StrNCmp(arg, "https", 5)) { + portnumber = HTTPS_PORT; + } else { + portnumber = HTTP_PORT; + } + + /* + * Add Authorization, Proxy-Authorization, and/or Cookie headers, + * if applicable. + */ + if (using_proxy) { + /* + * If we are using a proxy, first determine if we should + * include an Authorization header and/or Cookie header for the + * ultimate target of this request. - FM & AJL + */ + char *host2 = NULL, *path2 = NULL; + int port2 = (StrNCmp(docname, "https", 5) ? + HTTP_PORT : HTTPS_PORT); + + host2 = HTParse(docname, "", PARSE_HOST); + path2 = HTParse(docname, "", PARSE_PATH | PARSE_PUNCTUATION); + if ((colon = HTParsePort(host2, &port2)) != NULL) { + /* Use non-default port number */ + *colon = '\0'; + } + + /* + * This composeAuth() does file access, i.e., for the ultimate + * target of the request. - AJL + */ + auth_proxy = NO; + auth = HTAA_composeAuth(host2, port2, path2, auth_proxy); + if (auth == NULL) { + CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Not sending authorization (yet).\n")); + } else if (*auth != '\0') { + /* + * We have an Authorization header to be included. + */ + HTBprintf(&command, "%s%c%c", auth, CR, LF); + CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Sending authorization: %s\n", auth)); + } else { + /* + * The user either cancelled or made a mistake with the + * username and password prompt. + */ + if (!(traversal || dump_output_immediately) && + HTConfirm(CONFIRM_WO_PASSWORD)) { + show_401 = TRUE; + } else { + if (traversal || dump_output_immediately) + HTAlert(FAILED_NEED_PASSWD); +#ifdef USE_SSL + if (did_connect) + HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle); +#endif /* USE_SSL */ + BStrFree(command); + FREE(hostname); + FREE(docname); + FREE(abspath); + FREE(host2); + FREE(path2); + status = HT_NOT_LOADED; + goto done; + } + } + /* + * Add 'Cookie:' header, if it's HTTP or HTTPS document being + * proxied. + */ + if (!StrNCmp(docname, "http", 4)) { + cookie = LYAddCookieHeader(host2, path2, port2, secure); + } + FREE(host2); + FREE(path2); + /* + * The next composeAuth() will be for the proxy. - AJL + */ + auth_proxy = YES; + } else { + /* + * Add cookie for a non-proxied request. - FM + */ + cookie = LYAddCookieHeader(hostname, abspath, portnumber, secure); + auth_proxy = NO; + } + /* + * If we do have a cookie set, add it to the request buffer. - FM + */ + if (cookie != NULL) { + if (*cookie != '$' && USE_RFC_2965) { + /* + * It's a historical cookie, so signal to the server that + * we support modern cookies. - FM + */ + BStrCat0(command, "Cookie2: $Version=\"1\""); + BStrCat0(command, crlf); + CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Sending Cookie2: $Version =\"1\"\n")); + } + if (*cookie != '\0') { + /* + * It's not a zero-length string, so add the header. Note + * that any folding of long strings has been done already + * in LYCookie.c. - FM + */ + BStrCat0(command, "Cookie: "); + BStrCat0(command, cookie); + BStrCat0(command, crlf); + CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Sending Cookie: %s\n", cookie)); + } + FREE(cookie); + } + FREE(abspath); + + /* + * If we are using a proxy, auth_proxy should be YES, and we check + * here whether we want a Proxy-Authorization header for it. If we + * are not using a proxy, auth_proxy should still be NO, and we + * check here for whether we want an Authorization header. - FM & + * AJL + */ + if ((auth = HTAA_composeAuth(hostname, + portnumber, + docname, + auth_proxy)) != NULL && + *auth != '\0') { + /* + * If auth is not NULL nor zero-length, it's an Authorization + * or Proxy-Authorization header to be included. - FM + */ + HTBprintf(&command, "%s%c%c", auth, CR, LF); + CTRACE((tfp, (auth_proxy ? + "HTTP: Sending proxy authorization: %s\n" : + "HTTP: Sending authorization: %s\n"), + auth)); + } else if (auth && *auth == '\0') { + /* + * If auth is a zero-length string, the user either cancelled + * or goofed at the username and password prompt. - FM + */ + if (!(traversal || dump_output_immediately) && HTConfirm(CONFIRM_WO_PASSWORD)) { + if (auth_proxy == TRUE) { + show_407 = TRUE; + } else { + show_401 = TRUE; + } + } else { + if (traversal || dump_output_immediately) + HTAlert(FAILED_NEED_PASSWD); + BStrFree(command); + FREE(hostname); + FREE(docname); + status = HT_NOT_LOADED; + goto done; + } + } else { + CTRACE((tfp, (auth_proxy ? + "HTTP: Not sending proxy authorization (yet).\n" : + "HTTP: Not sending authorization (yet).\n"))); + } + FREE(hostname); + FREE(docname); + } + } + + if ( +#ifdef USE_SSL + !do_connect && +#endif /* USE_SSL */ + do_post) { + CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Doing post, content-type '%s'\n", + anAnchor->post_content_type + ? anAnchor->post_content_type + : "lose")); + HTBprintf(&command, "Content-Type: %s%c%c", + anAnchor->post_content_type + ? anAnchor->post_content_type + : "lose", + CR, LF); + + HTBprintf(&command, "Content-Length: %d%c%c", + !isBEmpty(anAnchor->post_data) + ? BStrLen(anAnchor->post_data) + : 0, + CR, LF); + + BStrCat0(command, crlf); /* Blank line means "end" of headers */ + + BStrCat(command, anAnchor->post_data); + } else + BStrCat0(command, crlf); /* Blank line means "end" of headers */ + + if (TRACE) { + CTRACE((tfp, "Writing:\n")); + trace_bstring(command); +#ifdef USE_SSL + CTRACE((tfp, "%s", + (anAnchor->post_data && !do_connect ? crlf : ""))); +#else + CTRACE((tfp, "%s", + (anAnchor->post_data ? crlf : ""))); +#endif /* USE_SSL */ + CTRACE((tfp, "----------------------------------\n")); + } + + _HTProgress(gettext("Sending HTTP request.")); + +#ifdef NOT_ASCII /* S/390 -- gil -- 0548 */ + { + char *p2; + + for (p2 = BStrData(command); + p2 < BStrData(command) + BStrLen(command); + p2++) + *p2 = TOASCII(*p2); + } +#endif /* NOT_ASCII */ + status = (int) HTTP_NETWRITE(s, + BStrData(command), + BStrLen(command), + handle); + BStrFree(command); + FREE(linebuf); + if (status <= 0) { + if (status == 0) { + CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Got status 0 in initial write\n")); + /* Do nothing. */ + } else if ((SOCKET_ERRNO == ENOTCONN || + SOCKET_ERRNO == ECONNRESET || + SOCKET_ERRNO == EPIPE) && + !already_retrying && + /* Don't retry if we're posting. */ !do_post) { + /* + * Arrrrgh, HTTP 0/1 compatibility problem, maybe. + */ + CTRACE((tfp, + "HTTP: BONZO ON WRITE Trying again with HTTP0 request.\n")); + _HTProgress(RETRYING_AS_HTTP0); + HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle); + extensions = NO; + already_retrying = TRUE; + goto try_again; + } else { + CTRACE((tfp, + "HTTP: Hit unexpected network WRITE error; aborting connection.\n")); + HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle); + status = -1; + HTAlert(gettext("Unexpected network write error; connection aborted.")); + goto done; + } + } + + CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: WRITE delivered OK\n")); + _HTProgress(gettext("HTTP request sent; waiting for response.")); + + /* Read the first line of the response + * ----------------------------------- + */ + { + /* Get numeric status etc */ + BOOL end_of_file = NO; + int buffer_length = INIT_LINE_SIZE; + + line_buffer = typecallocn(char, (size_t) buffer_length); + + if (line_buffer == NULL) + outofmem(__FILE__, "HTLoadHTTP"); + + HTReadProgress(bytes_already_read = 0, (off_t) 0); + do { /* Loop to read in the first line */ + /* + * Extend line buffer if necessary for those crazy WAIS URLs ;-) + */ + if (buffer_length - length < LINE_EXTEND_THRESH) { + buffer_length = buffer_length + buffer_length; + line_buffer = + (char *) realloc(line_buffer, ((unsigned) buffer_length * + sizeof(char))); + + if (line_buffer == NULL) + outofmem(__FILE__, "HTLoadHTTP"); + } + CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Trying to read %d\n", buffer_length - length - 1)); + status = HTTP_NETREAD(s, + line_buffer + length, + (buffer_length - length - 1), + handle); + CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Read %d\n", status)); + if (status <= 0) { + /* + * Retry if we get nothing back too. + * Bomb out if we get nothing twice. + */ + if (status == HT_INTERRUPTED) { + CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Interrupted initial read.\n")); + _HTProgress(CONNECTION_INTERRUPTED); + HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle); + status = HT_NO_DATA; + goto clean_up; + } else if (status < 0 && + (SOCKET_ERRNO == ENOTCONN || +#ifdef _WINDOWS /* 1997/11/09 (Sun) 16:59:58 */ + SOCKET_ERRNO == ETIMEDOUT || +#endif + SOCKET_ERRNO == ECONNRESET || + SOCKET_ERRNO == EPIPE) && + !already_retrying && !do_post) { + /* + * Arrrrgh, HTTP 0/1 compatibility problem, maybe. + */ + CTRACE((tfp, + "HTTP: BONZO Trying again with HTTP0 request.\n")); + HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle); + FREE(line_buffer); + FREE(line_kept_clean); + + extensions = NO; + already_retrying = TRUE; + _HTProgress(RETRYING_AS_HTTP0); + goto try_again; + } +#ifdef USE_SSL + else if ((SSLerror = ERR_get_error()) != 0) { + CTRACE((tfp, + "HTTP: Hit unexpected network read error; aborting connection; status %d:%s.\n", + status, ERR_error_string(SSLerror, NULL))); + HTAlert(gettext("Unexpected network read error; connection aborted.")); + HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle); + status = -1; + goto clean_up; + } +#endif + else { + CTRACE((tfp, + "HTTP: Hit unexpected network read error; aborting connection; status %d.\n", + status)); + HTAlert(gettext("Unexpected network read error; connection aborted.")); + HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle); + status = -1; + goto clean_up; + } + } +#ifdef NOT_ASCII /* S/390 -- gil -- 0564 */ + { + char *p2; + + for (p2 = line_buffer + length; + p2 < line_buffer + length + status; + p2++) + *p2 = FROMASCII(*p2); + } +#endif /* NOT_ASCII */ + + bytes_already_read += status; + HTReadProgress(bytes_already_read, (off_t) 0); + +#ifdef UCX /* UCX returns -1 on EOF */ + if (status == 0 || status == -1) +#else + if (status == 0) +#endif + { + break; + } + line_buffer[length + status] = 0; + + if (line_buffer) { + FREE(line_kept_clean); + line_kept_clean = (char *) malloc((unsigned) buffer_length * + sizeof(char)); + + if (line_kept_clean == NULL) + outofmem(__FILE__, "HTLoadHTTP"); + MemCpy(line_kept_clean, line_buffer, buffer_length); +#ifdef SH_EX /* FIX BUG by kaz@maczuka.hitachi.ibaraki.jp */ + real_length_of_line = length + status; +#endif + } + + eol = StrChr(line_buffer + length, LF); + /* Do we *really* want to do this? */ + if (eol && eol != line_buffer && *(eol - 1) == CR) + *(eol - 1) = ' '; + + length = length + status; + + /* Do we really want to do *this*? */ + if (eol) + *eol = 0; /* Terminate the line */ + } + /* All we need is the first line of the response. If it's a HTTP/1.0 + * response, then the first line will be absurdly short and therefore + * we can safely gate the number of bytes read through this code (as + * opposed to below) to ~1000. + * + * Well, let's try 100. + */ + while (!eol && !end_of_file && bytes_already_read < 100); + } /* Scope of loop variables */ + + /* save total length, in case we decide later to show it all - kw */ + rawlength = length; + + /* We now have a terminated unfolded line. Parse it. + * -------------------------------------------------- + */ + CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Rx: %s\n", line_buffer)); + + /* + * Kludge to work with old buggy servers and the VMS Help gateway. They + * can't handle the third word, so we try again without it. + */ + if (extensions && /* Old buggy server or Help gateway? */ + (0 == StrNCmp(line_buffer, "<TITLE>Bad File Request</TITLE>", 31) || + 0 == StrNCmp(line_buffer, "Address should begin with", 25) || + 0 == StrNCmp(line_buffer, "<TITLE>Help ", 12) || + 0 == strcmp(line_buffer, + "Document address invalid or access not authorised"))) { + FREE(line_buffer); + FREE(line_kept_clean); + extensions = NO; + already_retrying = TRUE; + CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: close socket %d to retry with HTTP0\n", s)); + HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle); + /* print a progress message */ + _HTProgress(RETRYING_AS_HTTP0); + goto try_again; + } { + int fields; + char server_version[VERSION_LENGTH + 1]; + + server_version[0] = 0; + + fields = sscanf(line_buffer, "%20s %d", + server_version, + &server_status); + + CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Scanned %d fields from line_buffer\n", fields)); + + if (non_empty(http_error_file)) { + /* Make the status code externally available */ + FILE *error_file; + +#ifdef SERVER_STATUS_ONLY + error_file = fopen(http_error_file, TXT_W); + if (error_file) { /* Managed to open the file */ + fprintf(error_file, "error=%d\n", server_status); + fclose(error_file); + } +#else + error_file = fopen(http_error_file, TXT_A); + if (error_file) { /* Managed to open the file */ + fprintf(error_file, " URL=%s (%s)\n", url, METHOD); + fprintf(error_file, "STATUS=%s\n", line_buffer); + fclose(error_file); + } +#endif /* SERVER_STATUS_ONLY */ + } + + /* + * Rule out a non-HTTP/1.n reply as best we can. + */ + if (fields < 2 || !server_version[0] || server_version[0] != 'H' || + server_version[1] != 'T' || server_version[2] != 'T' || + server_version[3] != 'P' || server_version[4] != '/' || + server_version[6] != '.') { + /* + * Ugh! An HTTP0 reply, + */ + HTAtom *encoding; + + CTRACE((tfp, "--- Talking HTTP0.\n")); + + format_in = HTFileFormat(url, &encoding, NULL); + /* + * Treat all plain text as HTML. This sucks but its the only + * solution without without looking at content. + */ + if (!StrNCmp(HTAtom_name(format_in), STR_PLAINTEXT, 10)) { + CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: format_in being changed to text/HTML\n")); + format_in = WWW_HTML; + } + if (!IsUnityEnc(encoding)) { + /* + * Change the format to that for "www/compressed". + */ + CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: format_in is '%s',\n", HTAtom_name(format_in))); + StrAllocCopy(anAnchor->content_type, HTAtom_name(format_in)); + StrAllocCopy(anAnchor->content_encoding, HTAtom_name(encoding)); + format_in = HTAtom_for("www/compressed"); + CTRACE((tfp, " Treating as '%s' with encoding '%s'\n", + "www/compressed", HTAtom_name(encoding))); + } + + start_of_data = line_kept_clean; + } else { + /* + * Set up to decode full HTTP/1.n response. - FM + */ + format_in = HTAtom_for("www/mime"); + CTRACE((tfp, "--- Talking HTTP1.\n")); + + /* + * We set start_of_data to "" when !eol here because there will be + * a put_block done below; we do *not* use the value of + * start_of_data (as a pointer) in the computation of length (or + * anything else) when !eol. Otherwise, set the value of length to + * what we have beyond eol (i.e., beyond the status line). - FM + */ + if (eol != 0) { + start_of_data = (eol + 1); + } else { + start_of_data = empty; + } + length = (eol + ? length - (int) (start_of_data - line_buffer) + : 0); + + /* + * Trim trailing spaces in line_buffer so that we can use it in + * messages which include the status line. - FM + */ + while (line_buffer[strlen(line_buffer) - 1] == ' ') + line_buffer[strlen(line_buffer) - 1] = '\0'; + + /* + * Take appropriate actions based on the status. - FM + */ + switch (server_status / 100) { + case 1: + /* + * HTTP/1.1 Informational statuses. + * 100 Continue. + * 101 Switching Protocols. + * > 101 is unknown. + * We should never get these, and they have only the status + * line and possibly other headers, so we'll deal with them by + * showing the full header to the user as text/plain. - FM + */ + HTAlert(gettext("Got unexpected Informational Status.")); + do_head = TRUE; + break; + + case 2: + /* + * Good: Got MIME object! (Successful) - FM + */ + if (do_head) { + /* + * If HEAD was requested, show headers (and possibly bogus + * body) for all 2xx status codes as text/plain - KW + */ + HTProgress(line_buffer); + break; + } + switch (server_status) { + case 204: + /* + * No Content. + */ + HTAlert(line_buffer); + HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle); + HTNoDataOK = 1; + status = HT_NO_DATA; + goto clean_up; + + case 205: + /* + * Reset Content. The server has fulfilled the request but + * nothing is returned and we should reset any form + * content. We'll instruct the user to do that, and + * restore the current document. - FM + */ + HTAlert(gettext("Request fulfilled. Reset Content.")); + HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle); + status = HT_NO_DATA; + goto clean_up; + + case 206: + /* + * Partial Content. We didn't send a Range so something + * went wrong somewhere. Show the status message and + * restore the current document. - FM + */ + HTAlert(line_buffer); + HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle); + status = HT_NO_DATA; + goto clean_up; + + default: + /* + * 200 OK. + * 201 Created. + * 202 Accepted. + * 203 Non-Authoritative Information. + * > 206 is unknown. + * All should return something to display. + */ +#if defined(USE_SSL) /* && !defined(DISABLE_NEWS) _H */ + if (do_connect) { + CTRACE((tfp, + "HTTP: Proxy tunnel to '%s' established.\n", + connect_host)); + do_connect = FALSE; + url = connect_url; + FREE(line_buffer); + FREE(line_kept_clean); +#ifndef DISABLE_NEWS + if (!StrNCmp(connect_url, "snews", 5)) { + CTRACE((tfp, + " Will attempt handshake and snews connection.\n")); + status = HTNewsProxyConnect(s, url, anAnchor, + format_out, sink); + goto done; + } +#endif /* DISABLE_NEWS */ + did_connect = TRUE; + already_retrying = TRUE; + eol = 0; + length = 0; + doing_redirect = FALSE; + permanent_redirection = FALSE; + target = NULL; + CTRACE((tfp, + " Will attempt handshake and resubmit headers.\n")); + goto use_tunnel; + } +#endif /* USE_SSL */ + HTProgress(line_buffer); + } /* case 2 switch */ + break; + + case 3: + /* + * Various forms of Redirection. - FM + * 300 Multiple Choices. + * 301 Moved Permanently. + * 302 Found (temporary; we can, and do, use GET). + * 303 See Other (temporary; always use GET). + * 304 Not Modified. + * 305 Use Proxy. + * 306 Set Proxy. + * 307 Temporary Redirect with method retained. + * > 308 is unknown. + */ + if (no_url_redirection || do_head || keep_mime_headers) { + /* + * If any of these flags are set, we do not redirect, but + * instead show what was returned to the user as + * text/plain. - FM + */ + HTProgress(line_buffer); + break; + } + + if (server_status == 300) { /* Multiple Choices */ + /* + * For client driven content negotiation. The server + * should be sending some way for the user-agent to make a + * selection, so we'll show the user whatever the server + * returns. There might be a Location: header with the + * server's preference present, but the choice should be up + * to the user, someday based on an Alternates: header, + * and a body always should be present with descriptions + * and links for the choices (i.e., we use the latter, for + * now). - FM + */ + HTAlert(line_buffer); + if (traversal) { + HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle); + status = -1; + goto clean_up; + } + if (!dump_output_immediately && + format_out == WWW_DOWNLOAD) { + /* + * Convert a download request to a presentation request + * for interactive users. - FM + */ + format_out = WWW_PRESENT; + } + break; + } + + if (server_status == 304) { /* Not Modified */ + /* + * We didn't send an "If-Modified-Since" header, so this + * status is inappropriate. We'll deal with it by showing + * the full header to the user as text/plain. - FM + */ + HTAlert(gettext("Got unexpected 304 Not Modified status.")); + do_head = TRUE; + break; + } + + if (server_status == 305 || + server_status == 306 || + server_status > 307) { + /* + * Show user the content, if any, for 305, 306, or unknown + * status. - FM + */ + HTAlert(line_buffer); + if (traversal) { + HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle); + status = -1; + goto clean_up; + } + if (!dump_output_immediately && + format_out == WWW_DOWNLOAD) { + /* + * Convert a download request to a presentation request + * for interactive users. - FM + */ + format_out = WWW_PRESENT; + } + break; + } + + /* + * We do not load the file, but read the headers for the + * "Location:", check out that redirecting_url and if it's + * acceptable (e.g., not a telnet URL when we have that + * disabled), initiate a new fetch. If that's another + * redirecting_url, we'll repeat the checks, and fetch + * initiations if acceptable, until we reach the actual URL, or + * the redirection limit set in HTAccess.c is exceeded. If the + * status was 301 indicating that the relocation is permanent, + * we set the permanent_redirection flag to make it permanent + * for the current anchor tree (i.e., will persist until the + * tree is freed or the client exits). If the redirection + * would include POST content, we seek confirmation from an + * interactive user, with option to use 303 for 301 (but not + * for 307), and otherwise refuse the redirection. We also + * don't allow permanent redirection if we keep POST content. + * If we don't find the Location header or it's value is + * zero-length, we display whatever the server returned, and + * the user should RELOAD that to try again, or make a + * selection from it if it contains links, or Left-Arrow to the + * previous document. - FM + */ + { + if ((dump_output_immediately || traversal) && + do_post && + server_status != 303 && + server_status != 302 && + server_status != 301) { + /* + * Don't redirect POST content without approval from an + * interactive user. - FM + */ + HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle); + status = -1; + HTAlert(gettext("Redirection of POST content requires user approval.")); + if (traversal) + HTProgress(line_buffer); + goto clean_up; + } + + HTProgress(line_buffer); + if (server_status == 301) { /* Moved Permanently */ + if (do_post) { + /* + * Don't make the redirection permanent if we have + * POST content. - FM + */ + CTRACE((tfp, + "HTTP: Have POST content. Treating 301 (Permanent) as Temporary.\n")); + HTAlert(gettext("Have POST content. Treating Permanent Redirection as Temporary.\n")); + } else { + permanent_redirection = TRUE; + } + } + doing_redirect = TRUE; + + break; + } + + case 4: + /* + * "I think I goofed!" (Client Error) - FM + */ + switch (server_status) { + case 401: /* Unauthorized */ + /* + * Authorization for origin server required. If show_401 + * is set, proceed to showing the 401 body. Otherwise, if + * we can set up authorization based on the + * WWW-Authenticate header, and the user provides a + * username and password, try again. Otherwise, check + * whether to show the 401 body or restore the current + * document - FM + */ + if (show_401) + break; + if (HTAA_shouldRetryWithAuth(start_of_data, (size_t) + length, s, NO)) { + + HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle); + if (dump_output_immediately && + !HTAA_HaveUserinfo(HTParse(arg, "", PARSE_HOST)) && + !authentication_info[0]) { + fprintf(stderr, + "HTTP: Access authorization required.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, + " Use the -auth=id:pw parameter.\n"); + status = HT_NO_DATA; + goto clean_up; + } + + CTRACE((tfp, "%s %d %s\n", + "HTTP: close socket", s, + "to retry with Access Authorization")); + + _HTProgress(gettext("Retrying with access authorization information.")); + FREE(line_buffer); + FREE(line_kept_clean); +#ifdef USE_SSL + if (using_proxy && !StrNCmp(url, "https://", 8)) { + url = arg; + do_connect = TRUE; + did_connect = FALSE; + } +#endif /* USE_SSL */ + goto try_again; + } else if (!(traversal || dump_output_immediately) && + HTConfirm(gettext("Show the 401 message body?"))) { + break; + } else { + if (traversal || dump_output_immediately) + HTAlert(FAILED_RETRY_WITH_AUTH); + HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle); + status = -1; + goto clean_up; + } + + case 407: + /* + * Authorization for proxy server required. If we are not + * in fact using a proxy, or show_407 is set, proceed to + * showing the 407 body. Otherwise, if we can set up + * authorization based on the Proxy-Authenticate header, + * and the user provides a username and password, try + * again. Otherwise, check whether to show the 401 body or + * restore the current document. - FM & AJL + */ + if (!using_proxy || show_407) + break; + if (HTAA_shouldRetryWithAuth(start_of_data, (size_t) + length, s, YES)) { + + HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle); + if (dump_output_immediately && !proxyauth_info[0]) { + fprintf(stderr, + "HTTP: Proxy authorization required.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, + " Use the -pauth=id:pw parameter.\n"); + status = HT_NO_DATA; + goto clean_up; + } + + CTRACE((tfp, "%s %d %s\n", + "HTTP: close socket", s, + "to retry with Proxy Authorization")); + + _HTProgress(HTTP_RETRY_WITH_PROXY); + FREE(line_buffer); + FREE(line_kept_clean); + goto try_again; + } else if (!(traversal || dump_output_immediately) && + HTConfirm(gettext("Show the 407 message body?"))) { + if (!dump_output_immediately && + format_out == WWW_DOWNLOAD) { + /* + * Convert a download request to a presentation + * request for interactive users. - FM + */ + format_out = WWW_PRESENT; + } + break; + } else { + if (traversal || dump_output_immediately) + HTAlert(FAILED_RETRY_WITH_PROXY); + HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle); + status = -1; + goto clean_up; + } + + case 408: + /* + * Request Timeout. Show the status message and restore + * the current document. - FM + */ + HTAlert(line_buffer); + HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle); + status = HT_NO_DATA; + goto clean_up; + + default: + /* + * 400 Bad Request. + * 402 Payment Required. + * 403 Forbidden. + * 404 Not Found. + * 405 Method Not Allowed. + * 406 Not Acceptable. + * 409 Conflict. + * 410 Gone. + * 411 Length Required. + * 412 Precondition Failed. + * 413 Request Entity Too Large. + * 414 Request-URI Too Long. + * 415 Unsupported Media Type. + * 416 List Response (for content negotiation). + * > 416 is unknown. + * Show the status message, and display the returned text + * if we are not doing a traversal. - FM + */ + HTAlert(line_buffer); + if (traversal) { + HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle); + status = -1; + goto clean_up; + } + if (!dump_output_immediately && + format_out == WWW_DOWNLOAD) { + /* + * Convert a download request to a presentation request + * for interactive users. - FM + */ + format_out = WWW_PRESENT; + } + break; + } /* case 4 switch */ + break; + + case 5: + /* + * "I think YOU goofed!" (server error) + * 500 Internal Server Error + * 501 Not Implemented + * 502 Bad Gateway + * 503 Service Unavailable + * 504 Gateway Timeout + * 505 HTTP Version Not Supported + * > 505 is unknown. + * Should always include a message, which we always should + * display. - FM + */ + HTAlert(line_buffer); + if (traversal) { + HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle); + status = -1; + goto clean_up; + } + if (!dump_output_immediately && + format_out == WWW_DOWNLOAD) { + /* + * Convert a download request to a presentation request for + * interactive users. - FM + */ + format_out = WWW_PRESENT; + } + break; + + default: + /* + * Bad or unknown server_status number. Take a chance and hope + * there is something to display. - FM + */ + HTAlert(gettext("Unknown status reply from server!")); + HTAlert(line_buffer); + if (traversal) { + HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle); + status = -1; + goto clean_up; + } + if (!dump_output_immediately && + format_out == WWW_DOWNLOAD) { + /* + * Convert a download request to a presentation request for + * interactive users. - FM + */ + format_out = WWW_PRESENT; + } + break; + } /* Switch on server_status/100 */ + + } /* Full HTTP reply */ + } /* scope of fields */ + + /* + * The user may have pressed the 'z'ap key during the pause caused by one + * of the HTAlerts above if the server reported an error, to skip loading + * of the error response page. Checking here before setting up the stream + * stack and feeding it data avoids doing unnecessary work, it also can + * avoid unnecessarily pushing a loaded document out of the cache to make + * room for the unwanted error page. - kw + */ + if (HTCheckForInterrupt()) { + HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle); + if (doing_redirect) { + /* + * Impatient user. - FM + */ + CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Interrupted followup read.\n")); + _HTProgress(CONNECTION_INTERRUPTED); + } + status = HT_INTERRUPTED; + goto clean_up; + } + /* + * Set up the stream stack to handle the body of the message. + */ + if (do_head || keep_mime_headers) { + /* + * It was a HEAD request, or we want the headers and source. + */ + start_of_data = line_kept_clean; +#ifdef SH_EX /* FIX BUG by kaz@maczuka.hitachi.ibaraki.jp */ +/* GIF file contains \0, so strlen does not return the data length */ + length = real_length_of_line; +#else + length = rawlength; +#endif + format_in = HTAtom_for(STR_PLAINTEXT); + + } else if (doing_redirect) { + + format_in = HTAtom_for("message/x-http-redirection"); + StrAllocCopy(anAnchor->content_type, HTAtom_name(format_in)); + if (traversal) { + format_out = WWW_DEBUG; + if (!sink) + sink = HTErrorStream(); + } else if (!dump_output_immediately && + format_out == WWW_DOWNLOAD) { + /* + * Convert a download request to a presentation request for + * interactive users. - FM + */ + format_out = WWW_PRESENT; + } + } + + target = HTStreamStack(format_in, + format_out, + sink, anAnchor); + + if (target == NULL) { + char *buffer = NULL; + + HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle); + HTSprintf0(&buffer, CANNOT_CONVERT_I_TO_O, + HTAtom_name(format_in), HTAtom_name(format_out)); + _HTProgress(buffer); + FREE(buffer); + status = -1; + goto clean_up; + } + + /* + * Recycle the first chunk of data, in all cases. + */ + (*target->isa->put_block) (target, start_of_data, length); + + /* + * Go pull the bulk of the data down. + */ + rv = HTCopy(anAnchor, s, (void *) handle, target); + + /* + * If we get here with doing_redirect set, it means that we were looking + * for a Location header. We either have got it now in redirecting_url - + * in that case the stream should not have loaded any data. Or we didn't + * get it, in that case the stream may have presented the message body + * normally. - kw + */ + + if (rv == -1) { + /* + * Intentional interrupt before data were received, not an error + */ + if (doing_redirect && traversal) + status = -1; + else + status = HT_INTERRUPTED; + HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle); + goto clean_up; + } + + if (rv == -2) { + /* + * Aw hell, a REAL error, maybe cuz it's a dumb HTTP0 server + */ + (*target->isa->_abort) (target, NULL); + if (doing_redirect && redirecting_url) { + /* + * Got a location before the error occurred? Then consider it an + * interrupt but proceed below as normal. - kw + */ + /* do nothing here */ + } else { + HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle); + if (!doing_redirect && !already_retrying && !do_post) { + CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Trying again with HTTP0 request.\n")); + /* + * May as well consider it an interrupt -- right? + */ + FREE(line_buffer); + FREE(line_kept_clean); + extensions = NO; + already_retrying = TRUE; + _HTProgress(RETRYING_AS_HTTP0); + goto try_again; + } else { + status = HT_NOT_LOADED; + goto clean_up; + } + } + } + + /* + * Free if complete transmission (socket was closed before return). Close + * socket if partial transmission (was freed on abort). + */ + if (rv != HT_INTERRUPTED && rv != -2) { + (*target->isa->_free) (target); + } else { + HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle); + } + + if (doing_redirect) { + if (redirecting_url) { + /* + * Set up for checking redirecting_url in LYGetFile.c for + * restrictions before we seek the document at that Location. - FM + */ + CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Picked up location '%s'\n", + redirecting_url)); + if (rv == HT_INTERRUPTED) { + /* + * Intentional interrupt after data were received, not an error + * (probably). We take it as a user request to abandon the + * redirection chain. + * + * This could reasonably be changed (by just removing this + * block), it would make sense if there are redirecting + * resources that "hang" after sending the headers. - kw + */ + FREE(redirecting_url); + CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Interrupted followup read.\n")); + status = HT_INTERRUPTED; + goto clean_up; + } + HTProgress(line_buffer); + if (server_status == 305) { /* Use Proxy */ + /* + * Make sure the proxy field ends with a slash. - FM + */ + if (redirecting_url[strlen(redirecting_url) - 1] + != '/') + StrAllocCat(redirecting_url, "/"); + /* + * Append our URL. - FM + */ + StrAllocCat(redirecting_url, anAnchor->address); + CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Proxy URL is '%s'\n", + redirecting_url)); + } + if (!do_post || + server_status == 303 || + server_status == 302) { + /* + * We don't have POST content (nor support PUT or DELETE), or + * the status is "See Other" or "General Redirection" and we + * can convert to GET, so go back and check out the new URL. - + * FM + */ + status = HT_REDIRECTING; + goto clean_up; + } + /* + * Make sure the user wants to redirect the POST content, or treat + * as GET - FM & DK + */ + switch (HTConfirmPostRedirect(redirecting_url, + server_status)) { + /* + * User failed to confirm. Abort the fetch. + */ + case 0: + FREE(redirecting_url); + status = HT_NO_DATA; + goto clean_up; + + /* + * User wants to treat as GET with no content. Go back to + * check out the URL. + */ + case 303: + break; + + /* + * Set the flag to retain the POST content and go back to check + * out the URL. - FM + */ + default: + redirect_post_content = TRUE; + } + + /* Lou's old comment: - FM */ + /* OK, now we've got the redirection URL temporarily stored + in external variable redirecting_url, exported from HTMIME.c, + since there's no straightforward way to do this in the library + currently. Do the right thing. */ + + status = HT_REDIRECTING; + + } else { + status = traversal ? -1 : HT_LOADED; + } + + } else { + /* + * If any data were received, treat as a complete transmission + */ + status = HT_LOADED; + } + + /* + * Clean up + */ + clean_up: + FREE(line_buffer); + FREE(line_kept_clean); + + done: + /* + * Clear out on exit, just in case. + */ + reloading = FALSE; +#ifdef USE_SSL + FREE(connect_host); + if (handle) { + SSL_free(handle); + SSL_handle = handle = NULL; + } +#endif /* USE_SSL */ + dump_server_status = server_status; + return status; +} + +/* Protocol descriptor +*/ +#ifdef GLOBALDEF_IS_MACRO +#define _HTTP_C_GLOBALDEF_1_INIT { "http", HTLoadHTTP, 0} +GLOBALDEF(HTProtocol, HTTP, _HTTP_C_GLOBALDEF_1_INIT); +#define _HTTP_C_GLOBALDEF_2_INIT { "https", HTLoadHTTP, 0} +GLOBALDEF(HTProtocol, HTTPS, _HTTP_C_GLOBALDEF_2_INIT); +#else +GLOBALDEF HTProtocol HTTP = +{"http", HTLoadHTTP, 0}; +GLOBALDEF HTProtocol HTTPS = +{"https", HTLoadHTTP, 0}; +#endif /* GLOBALDEF_IS_MACRO */ |