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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-05-04 18:07:14 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-05-04 18:07:14 +0000 |
commit | a175314c3e5827eb193872241446f2f8f5c9d33c (patch) | |
tree | cd3d60ca99ae00829c52a6ca79150a5b6e62528b /sql/password.c | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | mariadb-10.5-upstream.tar.xz mariadb-10.5-upstream.zip |
Adding upstream version 1:10.5.12.upstream/1%10.5.12upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to '')
-rw-r--r-- | sql/password.c | 524 |
1 files changed, 524 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/sql/password.c b/sql/password.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d824e615 --- /dev/null +++ b/sql/password.c @@ -0,0 +1,524 @@ +/* + Copyright (c) 2000, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. + Copyright (c) 2012, Monty Program Ab + + This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + the Free Software Foundation; version 2 of the License. + + This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + GNU General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1335 USA */ + +/* password checking routines */ +/***************************************************************************** + The main idea is that no password are sent between client & server on + connection and that no password are saved in mysql in a decodable form. + + On connection a random string is generated and sent to the client. + The client generates a new string with a random generator inited with + the hash values from the password and the sent string. + This 'check' string is sent to the server where it is compared with + a string generated from the stored hash_value of the password and the + random string. + + The password is saved (in user.password) by using the PASSWORD() function in + mysql. + + This is .c file because it's used in libmysqlclient, which is entirely in C. + (we need it to be portable to a variety of systems). + Example: + update user set password=PASSWORD("hello") where user="test" + This saves a hashed number as a string in the password field. + + The new authentication is performed in following manner: + + SERVER: public_seed=thd_create_random_password() + send(public_seed) + + CLIENT: recv(public_seed) + hash_stage1=sha1("password") + hash_stage2=sha1(hash_stage1) + reply=xor(hash_stage1, sha1(public_seed,hash_stage2) + + // this three steps are done in scramble() + + send(reply) + + + SERVER: recv(reply) + hash_stage1=xor(reply, sha1(public_seed,hash_stage2)) + candidate_hash2=sha1(hash_stage1) + check(candidate_hash2==hash_stage2) + + // this three steps are done in check_scramble() + +*****************************************************************************/ + +#include "mariadb.h" +#include <my_sys.h> +#include <m_string.h> +#include <password.h> +#include <mysql.h> +#include <my_rnd.h> + +/************ MySQL 3.23-4.0 authentication routines: untouched ***********/ + +/* + New (MySQL 3.21+) random generation structure initialization + SYNOPSIS + my_rnd_init() + rand_st OUT Structure to initialize + seed1 IN First initialization parameter + seed2 IN Second initialization parameter +*/ + +/* + Generate binary hash from raw text string + Used for Pre-4.1 password handling + SYNOPSIS + hash_password() + result OUT store hash in this location + password IN plain text password to build hash + password_len IN password length (password may be not null-terminated) +*/ + +void hash_password(ulong *result, const char *password, uint password_len) +{ + ulong nr=1345345333L, add=7, nr2=0x12345671L; + ulong tmp; + const char *password_end= password + password_len; + for (; password < password_end; password++) + { + if (*password == ' ' || *password == '\t') + continue; /* skip space in password */ + tmp= (ulong) (uchar) *password; + nr^= (((nr & 63)+add)*tmp)+ (nr << 8); + nr2+=(nr2 << 8) ^ nr; + add+=tmp; + } + result[0]=nr & (((ulong) 1L << 31) -1L); /* Don't use sign bit (str2int) */; + result[1]=nr2 & (((ulong) 1L << 31) -1L); +} + + +/* + Create password to be stored in user database from raw string + Used for pre-4.1 password handling + SYNOPSIS + my_make_scrambled_password_323() + to OUT store scrambled password here + password IN user-supplied password + pass_len IN length of password string +*/ + +void my_make_scrambled_password_323(char *to, const char *password, + size_t pass_len) +{ + ulong hash_res[2]; + hash_password(hash_res, password, (uint) pass_len); + sprintf(to, "%08lx%08lx", hash_res[0], hash_res[1]); +} + + +/* + Wrapper around my_make_scrambled_password_323() to maintain client lib ABI + compatibility. + In server code usage of my_make_scrambled_password_323() is preferred to + avoid strlen(). + SYNOPSIS + make_scrambled_password_323() + to OUT store scrambled password here + password IN NULL-terminated string with user-supplied password +*/ + +void make_scrambled_password_323(char *to, const char *password) +{ + my_make_scrambled_password_323(to, password, strlen(password)); +} + + +/* + Scramble string with password. + Used in pre 4.1 authentication phase. + SYNOPSIS + scramble_323() + to OUT Store scrambled message here. Buffer must be at least + SCRAMBLE_LENGTH_323+1 bytes long + message IN Message to scramble. Message must be at least + SRAMBLE_LENGTH_323 bytes long. + password IN Password to use while scrambling +*/ + +void scramble_323(char *to, const char *message, const char *password) +{ + struct my_rnd_struct rand_st; + ulong hash_pass[2], hash_message[2]; + + if (password && password[0]) + { + char extra, *to_start=to; + const char *message_end= message + SCRAMBLE_LENGTH_323; + hash_password(hash_pass,password, (uint) strlen(password)); + hash_password(hash_message, message, SCRAMBLE_LENGTH_323); + my_rnd_init(&rand_st,hash_pass[0] ^ hash_message[0], + hash_pass[1] ^ hash_message[1]); + for (; message < message_end; message++) + *to++= (char) (floor(my_rnd(&rand_st)*31)+64); + extra=(char) (floor(my_rnd(&rand_st)*31)); + while (to_start != to) + *(to_start++)^=extra; + } + *to= 0; +} + + +/** + Check scrambled message. Used in pre 4.1 password handling. + + @param scrambled Scrambled message to check. + @param message Original random message which was used for scrambling. + @param hash_pass Password which should be used for scrambling. + + @remark scrambled and message must be SCRAMBLED_LENGTH_323 bytes long. + + @return FALSE if password is correct, TRUE otherwise. +*/ + +my_bool +check_scramble_323(const unsigned char *scrambled, const char *message, + ulong *hash_pass) +{ + struct my_rnd_struct rand_st; + ulong hash_message[2]; + /* Big enough for checks. */ + uchar buff[16], scrambled_buff[SCRAMBLE_LENGTH_323 + 1]; + uchar *to, extra; + const uchar *pos; + + /* Ensure that the scrambled message is null-terminated. */ + memcpy(scrambled_buff, scrambled, SCRAMBLE_LENGTH_323); + scrambled_buff[SCRAMBLE_LENGTH_323]= '\0'; + scrambled= scrambled_buff; + + hash_password(hash_message, message, SCRAMBLE_LENGTH_323); + my_rnd_init(&rand_st,hash_pass[0] ^ hash_message[0], + hash_pass[1] ^ hash_message[1]); + to=buff; + DBUG_ASSERT(sizeof(buff) > SCRAMBLE_LENGTH_323); + for (pos=scrambled ; *pos && to < buff+sizeof(buff) ; pos++) + *to++=(char) (floor(my_rnd(&rand_st)*31)+64); + if (pos-scrambled != SCRAMBLE_LENGTH_323) + return 1; + extra=(char) (floor(my_rnd(&rand_st)*31)); + to=buff; + while (*scrambled) + { + if (*scrambled++ != (uchar) (*to++ ^ extra)) + return 1; /* Wrong password */ + } + return 0; +} + +static inline uint8 char_val(uint8 X) +{ + return (uint) (X >= '0' && X <= '9' ? X-'0' : + X >= 'A' && X <= 'Z' ? X-'A'+10 : X-'a'+10); +} + + +/* + Convert password from hex string (as stored in mysql.user) to binary form. + SYNOPSIS + get_salt_from_password_323() + res OUT store salt here + password IN password string as stored in mysql.user + NOTE + This function does not have length check for passwords. It will just crash + Password hashes in old format must have length divisible by 8 +*/ + +void get_salt_from_password_323(ulong *res, const char *password) +{ + res[0]= res[1]= 0; + if (password) + { + while (*password) + { + ulong val=0; + uint i; + for (i=0 ; i < 8 ; i++) + val=(val << 4)+char_val(*password++); + *res++=val; + } + } +} + + +/* + Convert scrambled password from binary form to asciiz hex string. + SYNOPSIS + make_password_from_salt_323() + to OUT store resulting string password here, at least 17 bytes + salt IN password in salt format, 2 ulongs +*/ + +void make_password_from_salt_323(char *to, const ulong *salt) +{ + sprintf(to,"%08lx%08lx", salt[0], salt[1]); +} + + +/* + **************** MySQL 4.1.1 authentication routines ************* +*/ + + +/* Character to use as version identifier for version 4.1 */ + +#define PVERSION41_CHAR '*' + + +/* + Convert given octet sequence to asciiz string of hex characters; + str..str+len and 'to' may not overlap. + SYNOPSIS + octet2hex() + buf OUT output buffer. Must be at least 2*len+1 bytes + str, len IN the beginning and the length of the input string + + RETURN + buf+len*2 +*/ + +char *octet2hex(char *to, const char *str, size_t len) +{ + const char *str_end= str + len; + for (; str != str_end; ++str) + { + *to++= _dig_vec_upper[((uchar) *str) >> 4]; + *to++= _dig_vec_upper[((uchar) *str) & 0x0F]; + } + *to= '\0'; + return to; +} + + +/* + Convert given asciiz string of hex (0..9 a..f) characters to octet + sequence. + SYNOPSIS + hex2octet() + to OUT buffer to place result; must be at least len/2 bytes + str, len IN begin, length for character string; str and to may not + overlap; len % 2 == 0 +*/ + +static void +hex2octet(uint8 *to, const char *str, uint len) +{ + const char *str_end= str + len; + while (str < str_end) + { + char tmp= char_val(*str++); + *to++= (tmp << 4) | char_val(*str++); + } +} + + +/* + Encrypt/Decrypt function used for password encryption in authentication. + Simple XOR is used here but it is OK as we crypt random strings. Note, + that XOR(s1, XOR(s1, s2)) == s2, XOR(s1, s2) == XOR(s2, s1) + SYNOPSIS + my_crypt() + to OUT buffer to hold crypted string; must be at least len bytes + long; to and s1 (or s2) may be the same. + s1, s2 IN input strings (of equal length) + len IN length of s1 and s2 +*/ + +static void +my_crypt(char *to, const uchar *s1, const uchar *s2, uint len) +{ + const uint8 *s1_end= s1 + len; + while (s1 < s1_end) + *to++= *s1++ ^ *s2++; +} + + +/** + Compute two stage SHA1 hash of the password : + + hash_stage1=sha1("password") + hash_stage2=sha1(hash_stage1) + + @param password [IN] Password string. + @param pass_len [IN] Length of the password. + @param hash_stage1 [OUT] sha1(password) + @param hash_stage2 [OUT] sha1(hash_stage1) +*/ + +inline static +void compute_two_stage_sha1_hash(const char *password, size_t pass_len, + uint8 *hash_stage1, uint8 *hash_stage2) +{ + /* Stage 1: hash password */ + my_sha1(hash_stage1, password, pass_len); + + /* Stage 2 : hash first stage's output. */ + my_sha1(hash_stage2, (const char *) hash_stage1, MY_SHA1_HASH_SIZE); +} + + +/* + MySQL 4.1.1 password hashing: SHA conversion (see RFC 2289, 3174) twice + applied to the password string, and then produced octet sequence is + converted to hex string. + The result of this function is used as return value from PASSWORD() and + is stored in the database. + SYNOPSIS + my_make_scrambled_password() + buf OUT buffer of size 2*MY_SHA1_HASH_SIZE + 2 to store hex string + password IN password string + pass_len IN length of password string +*/ + +void my_make_scrambled_password(char *to, const char *password, + size_t pass_len) +{ + uint8 hash_stage2[MY_SHA1_HASH_SIZE]; + + /* Two stage SHA1 hash of the password. */ + compute_two_stage_sha1_hash(password, pass_len, (uint8 *) to, hash_stage2); + + /* convert hash_stage2 to hex string */ + *to++= PVERSION41_CHAR; + octet2hex(to, (const char*) hash_stage2, MY_SHA1_HASH_SIZE); +} + + +/* + Wrapper around my_make_scrambled_password() to maintain client lib ABI + compatibility. + In server code usage of my_make_scrambled_password() is preferred to + avoid strlen(). + SYNOPSIS + make_scrambled_password() + buf OUT buffer of size 2*MY_SHA1_HASH_SIZE + 2 to store hex string + password IN NULL-terminated password string +*/ + +void make_scrambled_password(char *to, const char *password) +{ + my_make_scrambled_password(to, password, strlen(password)); +} + + +/* + Produce an obscure octet sequence from password and random + string, received from the server. This sequence corresponds to the + password, but password can not be easily restored from it. The sequence + is then sent to the server for validation. Trailing zero is not stored + in the buf as it is not needed. + This function is used by client to create authenticated reply to the + server's greeting. + SYNOPSIS + scramble() + buf OUT store scrambled string here. The buf must be at least + MY_SHA1_HASH_SIZE bytes long. + message IN random message, must be exactly SCRAMBLE_LENGTH long and + NULL-terminated. + password IN users' password +*/ + +void +scramble(char *to, const char *message, const char *password) +{ + uint8 hash_stage1[MY_SHA1_HASH_SIZE]; + uint8 hash_stage2[MY_SHA1_HASH_SIZE]; + + /* Two stage SHA1 hash of the password. */ + compute_two_stage_sha1_hash(password, strlen(password), hash_stage1, + hash_stage2); + + /* create crypt string as sha1(message, hash_stage2) */; + my_sha1_multi((uint8 *) to, message, SCRAMBLE_LENGTH, + (const char *) hash_stage2, MY_SHA1_HASH_SIZE, NULL); + my_crypt(to, (const uchar *) to, hash_stage1, SCRAMBLE_LENGTH); +} + + +/* + Check that scrambled message corresponds to the password; the function + is used by server to check that received reply is authentic. + This function does not check lengths of given strings: message must be + null-terminated, reply and hash_stage2 must be at least MY_SHA1_HASH_SIZE + long (if not, something fishy is going on). + SYNOPSIS + check_scramble() + scramble clients' reply, presumably produced by scramble() + message original random string, previously sent to client + (presumably second argument of scramble()), must be + exactly SCRAMBLE_LENGTH long and NULL-terminated. + hash_stage2 hex2octet-decoded database entry + All params are IN. + + RETURN VALUE + 0 password is correct + !0 password is invalid +*/ + +my_bool +check_scramble(const uchar *scramble_arg, const char *message, + const uint8 *hash_stage2) +{ + uint8 buf[MY_SHA1_HASH_SIZE]; + uint8 hash_stage2_reassured[MY_SHA1_HASH_SIZE]; + + /* create key to encrypt scramble */ + my_sha1_multi(buf, message, SCRAMBLE_LENGTH, + (const char *) hash_stage2, MY_SHA1_HASH_SIZE, NULL); + /* encrypt scramble */ + my_crypt((char *) buf, buf, scramble_arg, SCRAMBLE_LENGTH); + + /* now buf supposedly contains hash_stage1: so we can get hash_stage2 */ + my_sha1(hash_stage2_reassured, (const char *) buf, MY_SHA1_HASH_SIZE); + + return MY_TEST(memcmp(hash_stage2, hash_stage2_reassured, MY_SHA1_HASH_SIZE)); +} + +/* + Convert scrambled password from asciiz hex string to binary form. + + SYNOPSIS + get_salt_from_password() + res OUT buf to hold password. Must be at least MY_SHA1_HASH_SIZE + bytes long. + password IN 4.1.1 version value of user.password +*/ + +void get_salt_from_password(uint8 *hash_stage2, const char *password) +{ + hex2octet(hash_stage2, password+1 /* skip '*' */, MY_SHA1_HASH_SIZE * 2); +} + +/* + Convert scrambled password from binary form to asciiz hex string. + SYNOPSIS + make_password_from_salt() + to OUT store resulting string here, 2*MY_SHA1_HASH_SIZE+2 bytes + salt IN password in salt format +*/ + +void make_password_from_salt(char *to, const uint8 *hash_stage2) +{ + *to++= PVERSION41_CHAR; + octet2hex(to, (const char*) hash_stage2, MY_SHA1_HASH_SIZE); +} + |