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-rw-r--r--ssh-keygen.c3931
1 files changed, 3931 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
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+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.461 2022/12/04 23:50:49 cheloha Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Identity and host key generation and maintenance.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <locale.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "dns.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "krl.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "utf8.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "sshsig.h"
+#include "ssh-sk.h"
+#include "sk-api.h" /* XXX for SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD; remove */
+#include "cipher.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+# define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "rsa"
+#else
+# define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "ed25519"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Default number of bits in the RSA, DSA and ECDSA keys. These value can be
+ * overridden on the command line.
+ *
+ * These values, with the exception of DSA, provide security equivalent to at
+ * least 128 bits of security according to NIST Special Publication 800-57:
+ * Recommendation for Key Management Part 1 rev 4 section 5.6.1.
+ * For DSA it (and FIPS-186-4 section 4.2) specifies that the only size for
+ * which a 160bit hash is acceptable is 1kbit, and since ssh-dss specifies only
+ * SHA1 we limit the DSA key size 1k bits.
+ */
+#define DEFAULT_BITS 3072
+#define DEFAULT_BITS_DSA 1024
+#define DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA 256
+
+static int quiet = 0;
+
+/* Flag indicating that we just want to see the key fingerprint */
+static int print_fingerprint = 0;
+static int print_bubblebabble = 0;
+
+/* Hash algorithm to use for fingerprints. */
+static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
+
+/* The identity file name, given on the command line or entered by the user. */
+static char identity_file[PATH_MAX];
+static int have_identity = 0;
+
+/* This is set to the passphrase if given on the command line. */
+static char *identity_passphrase = NULL;
+
+/* This is set to the new passphrase if given on the command line. */
+static char *identity_new_passphrase = NULL;
+
+/* Key type when certifying */
+static u_int cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER;
+
+/* "key ID" of signed key */
+static char *cert_key_id = NULL;
+
+/* Comma-separated list of principal names for certifying keys */
+static char *cert_principals = NULL;
+
+/* Validity period for certificates */
+static u_int64_t cert_valid_from = 0;
+static u_int64_t cert_valid_to = ~0ULL;
+
+/* Certificate options */
+#define CERTOPT_X_FWD (1)
+#define CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD (1<<1)
+#define CERTOPT_PORT_FWD (1<<2)
+#define CERTOPT_PTY (1<<3)
+#define CERTOPT_USER_RC (1<<4)
+#define CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE (1<<5)
+#define CERTOPT_REQUIRE_VERIFY (1<<6)
+#define CERTOPT_DEFAULT (CERTOPT_X_FWD|CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD| \
+ CERTOPT_PORT_FWD|CERTOPT_PTY|CERTOPT_USER_RC)
+static u_int32_t certflags_flags = CERTOPT_DEFAULT;
+static char *certflags_command = NULL;
+static char *certflags_src_addr = NULL;
+
+/* Arbitrary extensions specified by user */
+struct cert_ext {
+ char *key;
+ char *val;
+ int crit;
+};
+static struct cert_ext *cert_ext;
+static size_t ncert_ext;
+
+/* Conversion to/from various formats */
+enum {
+ FMT_RFC4716,
+ FMT_PKCS8,
+ FMT_PEM
+} convert_format = FMT_RFC4716;
+
+static char *key_type_name = NULL;
+
+/* Load key from this PKCS#11 provider */
+static char *pkcs11provider = NULL;
+
+/* FIDO/U2F provider to use */
+static char *sk_provider = NULL;
+
+/* Format for writing private keys */
+static int private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH;
+
+/* Cipher for new-format private keys */
+static char *openssh_format_cipher = NULL;
+
+/* Number of KDF rounds to derive new format keys. */
+static int rounds = 0;
+
+/* argv0 */
+extern char *__progname;
+
+static char hostname[NI_MAXHOST];
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+/* moduli.c */
+int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *);
+int prime_test(FILE *, FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, char *, unsigned long,
+ unsigned long);
+#endif
+
+static void
+type_bits_valid(int type, const char *name, u_int32_t *bitsp)
+{
+ if (type == KEY_UNSPEC)
+ fatal("unknown key type %s", key_type_name);
+ if (*bitsp == 0) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ int nid;
+
+ switch(type) {
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS_DSA;
+ break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ if (name != NULL &&
+ (nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(name)) > 0)
+ *bitsp = sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(nid);
+ if (*bitsp == 0)
+ *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA;
+ break;
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS;
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ switch (type) {
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ if (*bitsp != 1024)
+ fatal("Invalid DSA key length: must be 1024 bits");
+ break;
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ if (*bitsp < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
+ fatal("Invalid RSA key length: minimum is %d bits",
+ SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
+ else if (*bitsp > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
+ fatal("Invalid RSA key length: maximum is %d bits",
+ OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS);
+ break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ if (sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(*bitsp) == -1)
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
+ fatal("Invalid ECDSA key length: valid lengths are "
+ "256, 384 or 521 bits");
+#else
+ fatal("Invalid ECDSA key length: valid lengths are "
+ "256 or 384 bits");
+#endif
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks whether a file exists and, if so, asks the user whether they wish
+ * to overwrite it.
+ * Returns nonzero if the file does not already exist or if the user agrees to
+ * overwrite, or zero otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+confirm_overwrite(const char *filename)
+{
+ char yesno[3];
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (stat(filename, &st) != 0)
+ return 1;
+ printf("%s already exists.\n", filename);
+ printf("Overwrite (y/n)? ");
+ fflush(stdout);
+ if (fgets(yesno, sizeof(yesno), stdin) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (yesno[0] != 'y' && yesno[0] != 'Y')
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void
+ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt)
+{
+ char buf[1024];
+ char *name = NULL;
+
+ if (key_type_name == NULL)
+ name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA;
+ else {
+ switch (sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name)) {
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA;
+ break;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA;
+ break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA_SK;
+ break;
+#endif
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA;
+ break;
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519;
+ break;
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
+ name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519_SK;
+ break;
+ case KEY_XMSS:
+ case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
+ name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_XMSS;
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("bad key type");
+ }
+ }
+ snprintf(identity_file, sizeof(identity_file),
+ "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, name);
+ printf("%s (%s): ", prompt, identity_file);
+ fflush(stdout);
+ if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL)
+ exit(1);
+ buf[strcspn(buf, "\n")] = '\0';
+ if (strcmp(buf, "") != 0)
+ strlcpy(identity_file, buf, sizeof(identity_file));
+ have_identity = 1;
+}
+
+static struct sshkey *
+load_identity(const char *filename, char **commentp)
+{
+ char *pass;
+ struct sshkey *prv;
+ int r;
+
+ if (commentp != NULL)
+ *commentp = NULL;
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_private(filename, "", &prv, commentp)) == 0)
+ return prv;
+ if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
+ fatal_r(r, "Load key \"%s\"", filename);
+ if (identity_passphrase)
+ pass = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
+ else
+ pass = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ r = sshkey_load_private(filename, pass, &prv, commentp);
+ freezero(pass, strlen(pass));
+ if (r != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "Load key \"%s\"", filename);
+ return prv;
+}
+
+#define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN "---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----"
+#define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END "---- END SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----"
+#define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN "---- BEGIN SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ----"
+#define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC 0x3f6ff9eb
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+static void
+do_convert_to_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b;
+ char comment[61], *b64;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ if ((r = sshkey_putb(k, b)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "put key");
+ if ((b64 = sshbuf_dtob64_string(b, 1)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_dtob64_string failed");
+
+ /* Comment + surrounds must fit into 72 chars (RFC 4716 sec 3.3) */
+ snprintf(comment, sizeof(comment),
+ "%u-bit %s, converted by %s@%s from OpenSSH",
+ sshkey_size(k), sshkey_type(k),
+ pw->pw_name, hostname);
+
+ sshkey_free(k);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+
+ fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN);
+ fprintf(stdout, "Comment: \"%s\"\n%s", comment, b64);
+ fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END);
+ free(b64);
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+static void
+do_convert_to_pkcs8(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) {
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ if (!PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->rsa))
+ fatal("PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY failed");
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ if (!PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->dsa))
+ fatal("PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY failed");
+ break;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ if (!PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY(stdout, k->ecdsa))
+ fatal("PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY failed");
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ fatal_f("unsupported key type %s", sshkey_type(k));
+ }
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+static void
+do_convert_to_pem(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) {
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ if (!PEM_write_RSAPublicKey(stdout, k->rsa))
+ fatal("PEM_write_RSAPublicKey failed");
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ if (!PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->dsa))
+ fatal("PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY failed");
+ break;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ if (!PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY(stdout, k->ecdsa))
+ fatal("PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY failed");
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ fatal_f("unsupported key type %s", sshkey_type(k));
+ }
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+static void
+do_convert_to(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ struct sshkey *k;
+ struct stat st;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!have_identity)
+ ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+ if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_public(identity_file, &k, NULL)) != 0)
+ k = load_identity(identity_file, NULL);
+ switch (convert_format) {
+ case FMT_RFC4716:
+ do_convert_to_ssh2(pw, k);
+ break;
+ case FMT_PKCS8:
+ do_convert_to_pkcs8(k);
+ break;
+ case FMT_PEM:
+ do_convert_to_pem(k);
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal_f("unknown key format %d", convert_format);
+ }
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is almost exactly the bignum1 encoding, but with 32 bit for length
+ * instead of 16.
+ */
+static void
+buffer_get_bignum_bits(struct sshbuf *b, BIGNUM *value)
+{
+ u_int bytes, bignum_bits;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &bignum_bits)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+ bytes = (bignum_bits + 7) / 8;
+ if (sshbuf_len(b) < bytes)
+ fatal_f("input buffer too small: need %d have %zu",
+ bytes, sshbuf_len(b));
+ if (BN_bin2bn(sshbuf_ptr(b), bytes, value) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("BN_bin2bn failed");
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, bytes)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "consume");
+}
+
+static struct sshkey *
+do_convert_private_ssh2(struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ char *type, *cipher;
+ u_char e1, e2, e3, *sig = NULL, data[] = "abcde12345";
+ int r, rlen, ktype;
+ u_int magic, i1, i2, i3, i4;
+ size_t slen;
+ u_long e;
+ BIGNUM *dsa_p = NULL, *dsa_q = NULL, *dsa_g = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *dsa_pub_key = NULL, *dsa_priv_key = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL, *rsa_d = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *rsa_p = NULL, *rsa_q = NULL, *rsa_iqmp = NULL;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &magic)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse magic");
+
+ if (magic != SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC) {
+ error("bad magic 0x%x != 0x%x", magic,
+ SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &type, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cipher, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i2)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i3)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i4)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+ debug("ignore (%d %d %d %d)", i1, i2, i3, i4);
+ if (strcmp(cipher, "none") != 0) {
+ error("unsupported cipher %s", cipher);
+ free(cipher);
+ free(type);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ free(cipher);
+
+ if (strstr(type, "dsa")) {
+ ktype = KEY_DSA;
+ } else if (strstr(type, "rsa")) {
+ ktype = KEY_RSA;
+ } else {
+ free(type);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((key = sshkey_new(ktype)) == NULL)
+ fatal("sshkey_new failed");
+ free(type);
+
+ switch (key->type) {
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ if ((dsa_p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (dsa_q = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (dsa_g = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (dsa_pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (dsa_priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("BN_new");
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_p);
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_g);
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_q);
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_pub_key);
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_priv_key);
+ if (!DSA_set0_pqg(key->dsa, dsa_p, dsa_q, dsa_g))
+ fatal_f("DSA_set0_pqg failed");
+ dsa_p = dsa_q = dsa_g = NULL; /* transferred */
+ if (!DSA_set0_key(key->dsa, dsa_pub_key, dsa_priv_key))
+ fatal_f("DSA_set0_key failed");
+ dsa_pub_key = dsa_priv_key = NULL; /* transferred */
+ break;
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e1)) != 0 ||
+ (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e2)) != 0) ||
+ (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e3)) != 0))
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse RSA");
+ e = e1;
+ debug("e %lx", e);
+ if (e < 30) {
+ e <<= 8;
+ e += e2;
+ debug("e %lx", e);
+ e <<= 8;
+ e += e3;
+ debug("e %lx", e);
+ }
+ if ((rsa_e = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("BN_new");
+ if (!BN_set_word(rsa_e, e)) {
+ BN_clear_free(rsa_e);
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((rsa_n = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (rsa_d = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (rsa_p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (rsa_q = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (rsa_iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("BN_new");
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_d);
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_n);
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_iqmp);
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_q);
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_p);
+ if (!RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, rsa_d))
+ fatal_f("RSA_set0_key failed");
+ rsa_n = rsa_e = rsa_d = NULL; /* transferred */
+ if (!RSA_set0_factors(key->rsa, rsa_p, rsa_q))
+ fatal_f("RSA_set0_factors failed");
+ rsa_p = rsa_q = NULL; /* transferred */
+ if ((r = ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(key, rsa_iqmp)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "generate RSA parameters");
+ BN_clear_free(rsa_iqmp);
+ break;
+ }
+ rlen = sshbuf_len(b);
+ if (rlen != 0)
+ error_f("remaining bytes in key blob %d", rlen);
+
+ /* try the key */
+ if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &sig, &slen, data, sizeof(data),
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+ error_fr(r, "signing with converted key failed");
+ else if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, sizeof(data),
+ NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0)
+ error_fr(r, "verification with converted key failed");
+ if (r != 0) {
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ free(sig);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ free(sig);
+ return key;
+}
+
+static int
+get_line(FILE *fp, char *line, size_t len)
+{
+ int c;
+ size_t pos = 0;
+
+ line[0] = '\0';
+ while ((c = fgetc(fp)) != EOF) {
+ if (pos >= len - 1)
+ fatal("input line too long.");
+ switch (c) {
+ case '\r':
+ c = fgetc(fp);
+ if (c != EOF && c != '\n' && ungetc(c, fp) == EOF)
+ fatal("unget: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return pos;
+ case '\n':
+ return pos;
+ }
+ line[pos++] = c;
+ line[pos] = '\0';
+ }
+ /* We reached EOF */
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static void
+do_convert_from_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey **k, int *private)
+{
+ int r, blen, escaped = 0;
+ u_int len;
+ char line[1024];
+ struct sshbuf *buf;
+ char encoded[8096];
+ FILE *fp;
+
+ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("sshbuf_new failed");
+ if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
+ encoded[0] = '\0';
+ while ((blen = get_line(fp, line, sizeof(line))) != -1) {
+ if (blen > 0 && line[blen - 1] == '\\')
+ escaped++;
+ if (strncmp(line, "----", 4) == 0 ||
+ strstr(line, ": ") != NULL) {
+ if (strstr(line, SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN) != NULL)
+ *private = 1;
+ if (strstr(line, " END ") != NULL) {
+ break;
+ }
+ /* fprintf(stderr, "ignore: %s", line); */
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (escaped) {
+ escaped--;
+ /* fprintf(stderr, "escaped: %s", line); */
+ continue;
+ }
+ strlcat(encoded, line, sizeof(encoded));
+ }
+ len = strlen(encoded);
+ if (((len % 4) == 3) &&
+ (encoded[len-1] == '=') &&
+ (encoded[len-2] == '=') &&
+ (encoded[len-3] == '='))
+ encoded[len-3] = '\0';
+ if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(buf, encoded)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "base64 decode");
+ if (*private) {
+ if ((*k = do_convert_private_ssh2(buf)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("private key conversion failed");
+ } else if ((r = sshkey_fromb(buf, k)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse key");
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ fclose(fp);
+}
+
+static void
+do_convert_from_pkcs8(struct sshkey **k, int *private)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pubkey;
+ FILE *fp;
+
+ if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
+ if ((pubkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) {
+ fatal_f("%s is not a recognised public key format",
+ identity_file);
+ }
+ fclose(fp);
+ switch (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey)) {
+ case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+ if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+ fatal("sshkey_new failed");
+ (*k)->type = KEY_RSA;
+ (*k)->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pubkey);
+ break;
+ case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
+ if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+ fatal("sshkey_new failed");
+ (*k)->type = KEY_DSA;
+ (*k)->dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pubkey);
+ break;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+ if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+ fatal("sshkey_new failed");
+ (*k)->type = KEY_ECDSA;
+ (*k)->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pubkey);
+ (*k)->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid((*k)->ecdsa);
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ fatal_f("unsupported pubkey type %d",
+ EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey));
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
+ return;
+}
+
+static void
+do_convert_from_pem(struct sshkey **k, int *private)
+{
+ FILE *fp;
+ RSA *rsa;
+
+ if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
+ if ((rsa = PEM_read_RSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) {
+ if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+ fatal("sshkey_new failed");
+ (*k)->type = KEY_RSA;
+ (*k)->rsa = rsa;
+ fclose(fp);
+ return;
+ }
+ fatal_f("unrecognised raw private key format");
+}
+
+static void
+do_convert_from(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ struct sshkey *k = NULL;
+ int r, private = 0, ok = 0;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (!have_identity)
+ ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+ if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
+
+ switch (convert_format) {
+ case FMT_RFC4716:
+ do_convert_from_ssh2(pw, &k, &private);
+ break;
+ case FMT_PKCS8:
+ do_convert_from_pkcs8(&k, &private);
+ break;
+ case FMT_PEM:
+ do_convert_from_pem(&k, &private);
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal_f("unknown key format %d", convert_format);
+ }
+
+ if (!private) {
+ if ((r = sshkey_write(k, stdout)) == 0)
+ ok = 1;
+ if (ok)
+ fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+ } else {
+ switch (k->type) {
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ ok = PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->dsa, NULL,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ break;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ ok = PEM_write_ECPrivateKey(stdout, k->ecdsa, NULL,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ break;
+#endif
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ ok = PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->rsa, NULL,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal_f("unsupported key type %s", sshkey_type(k));
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ok)
+ fatal("key write failed");
+ sshkey_free(k);
+ exit(0);
+}
+#endif
+
+static void
+do_print_public(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ struct sshkey *prv;
+ struct stat st;
+ int r;
+ char *comment = NULL;
+
+ if (!have_identity)
+ ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+ if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
+ prv = load_identity(identity_file, &comment);
+ if ((r = sshkey_write(prv, stdout)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "write key");
+ if (comment != NULL && *comment != '\0')
+ fprintf(stdout, " %s", comment);
+ fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+ if (sshkey_is_sk(prv)) {
+ debug("sk_application: \"%s\", sk_flags 0x%02x",
+ prv->sk_application, prv->sk_flags);
+ }
+ sshkey_free(prv);
+ free(comment);
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+static void
+do_download(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ struct sshkey **keys = NULL;
+ int i, nkeys;
+ enum sshkey_fp_rep rep;
+ int fptype;
+ char *fp, *ra, **comments = NULL;
+
+ fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash;
+ rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT;
+
+ pkcs11_init(1);
+ nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, NULL, &keys, &comments);
+ if (nkeys <= 0)
+ fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11");
+ for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
+ if (print_fingerprint) {
+ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], fptype, rep);
+ ra = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint fail");
+ printf("%u %s %s (PKCS11 key)\n", sshkey_size(keys[i]),
+ fp, sshkey_type(keys[i]));
+ if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
+ printf("%s\n", ra);
+ free(ra);
+ free(fp);
+ } else {
+ (void) sshkey_write(keys[i], stdout); /* XXX check */
+ fprintf(stdout, "%s%s\n",
+ *(comments[i]) == '\0' ? "" : " ", comments[i]);
+ }
+ free(comments[i]);
+ sshkey_free(keys[i]);
+ }
+ free(comments);
+ free(keys);
+ pkcs11_terminate();
+ exit(0);
+#else
+ fatal("no pkcs11 support");
+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
+}
+
+static struct sshkey *
+try_read_key(char **cpp)
+{
+ struct sshkey *ret;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((ret = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+ fatal("sshkey_new failed");
+ if ((r = sshkey_read(ret, cpp)) == 0)
+ return ret;
+ /* Not a key */
+ sshkey_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void
+fingerprint_one_key(const struct sshkey *public, const char *comment)
+{
+ char *fp = NULL, *ra = NULL;
+ enum sshkey_fp_rep rep;
+ int fptype;
+
+ fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash;
+ rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT;
+ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
+ ra = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+ mprintf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", sshkey_size(public), fp,
+ comment ? comment : "no comment", sshkey_type(public));
+ if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
+ printf("%s\n", ra);
+ free(ra);
+ free(fp);
+}
+
+static void
+fingerprint_private(const char *path)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+ char *comment = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *privkey = NULL, *pubkey = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_public(path, &pubkey, &comment)) != 0)
+ debug_r(r, "load public \"%s\"", path);
+ if (pubkey == NULL || comment == NULL || *comment == '\0') {
+ free(comment);
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_private(path, NULL,
+ &privkey, &comment)) != 0)
+ debug_r(r, "load private \"%s\"", path);
+ }
+ if (pubkey == NULL && privkey == NULL)
+ fatal("%s is not a key file.", path);
+
+ fingerprint_one_key(pubkey == NULL ? privkey : pubkey, comment);
+ sshkey_free(pubkey);
+ sshkey_free(privkey);
+ free(comment);
+}
+
+static void
+do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ struct sshkey *public = NULL;
+ char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, *line = NULL;
+ size_t linesize = 0;
+ int i, invalid = 1;
+ const char *path;
+ u_long lnum = 0;
+
+ if (!have_identity)
+ ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+ path = identity_file;
+
+ if (strcmp(identity_file, "-") == 0) {
+ f = stdin;
+ path = "(stdin)";
+ } else if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, path, strerror(errno));
+
+ while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
+ lnum++;
+ cp = line;
+ cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0';
+ /* Trim leading space and comments */
+ cp = line + strspn(line, " \t");
+ if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0')
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * Input may be plain keys, private keys, authorized_keys
+ * or known_hosts.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Try private keys first. Assume a key is private if
+ * "SSH PRIVATE KEY" appears on the first line and we're
+ * not reading from stdin (XXX support private keys on stdin).
+ */
+ if (lnum == 1 && strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0 &&
+ strstr(cp, "PRIVATE KEY") != NULL) {
+ free(line);
+ fclose(f);
+ fingerprint_private(path);
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If it's not a private key, then this must be prepared to
+ * accept a public key prefixed with a hostname or options.
+ * Try a bare key first, otherwise skip the leading stuff.
+ */
+ if ((public = try_read_key(&cp)) == NULL) {
+ i = strtol(cp, &ep, 10);
+ if (i == 0 || ep == NULL ||
+ (*ep != ' ' && *ep != '\t')) {
+ int quoted = 0;
+
+ comment = cp;
+ for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' &&
+ *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
+ if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
+ cp++; /* Skip both */
+ else if (*cp == '"')
+ quoted = !quoted;
+ }
+ if (!*cp)
+ continue;
+ *cp++ = '\0';
+ }
+ }
+ /* Retry after parsing leading hostname/key options */
+ if (public == NULL && (public = try_read_key(&cp)) == NULL) {
+ debug("%s:%lu: not a public key", path, lnum);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Find trailing comment, if any */
+ for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+ ;
+ if (*cp != '\0' && *cp != '#')
+ comment = cp;
+
+ fingerprint_one_key(public, comment);
+ sshkey_free(public);
+ invalid = 0; /* One good key in the file is sufficient */
+ }
+ fclose(f);
+ free(line);
+
+ if (invalid)
+ fatal("%s is not a public key file.", path);
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+static void
+do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ struct {
+ char *key_type;
+ char *key_type_display;
+ char *path;
+ } key_types[] = {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ { "rsa", "RSA" ,_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE },
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ { "ecdsa", "ECDSA",_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE },
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ { "ed25519", "ED25519",_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE },
+#ifdef WITH_XMSS
+ { "xmss", "XMSS",_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE },
+#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
+ { NULL, NULL, NULL }
+ };
+
+ u_int32_t bits = 0;
+ int first = 0;
+ struct stat st;
+ struct sshkey *private, *public;
+ char comment[1024], *prv_tmp, *pub_tmp, *prv_file, *pub_file;
+ int i, type, fd, r;
+
+ for (i = 0; key_types[i].key_type; i++) {
+ public = private = NULL;
+ prv_tmp = pub_tmp = prv_file = pub_file = NULL;
+
+ xasprintf(&prv_file, "%s%s",
+ identity_file, key_types[i].path);
+
+ /* Check whether private key exists and is not zero-length */
+ if (stat(prv_file, &st) == 0) {
+ if (st.st_size != 0)
+ goto next;
+ } else if (errno != ENOENT) {
+ error("Could not stat %s: %s", key_types[i].path,
+ strerror(errno));
+ goto failnext;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Private key doesn't exist or is invalid; proceed with
+ * key generation.
+ */
+ xasprintf(&prv_tmp, "%s%s.XXXXXXXXXX",
+ identity_file, key_types[i].path);
+ xasprintf(&pub_tmp, "%s%s.pub.XXXXXXXXXX",
+ identity_file, key_types[i].path);
+ xasprintf(&pub_file, "%s%s.pub",
+ identity_file, key_types[i].path);
+
+ if (first == 0) {
+ first = 1;
+ printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
+ }
+ printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display);
+ fflush(stdout);
+ type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
+ if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
+ error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s",
+ prv_tmp, strerror(errno));
+ goto failnext;
+ }
+ (void)close(fd); /* just using mkstemp() to reserve a name */
+ bits = 0;
+ type_bits_valid(type, NULL, &bits);
+ if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "sshkey_generate failed");
+ goto failnext;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshkey_from_private");
+ snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name,
+ hostname);
+ if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, prv_tmp, "",
+ comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher,
+ rounds)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "Saving key \"%s\" failed", prv_tmp);
+ goto failnext;
+ }
+ if ((fd = mkstemp(pub_tmp)) == -1) {
+ error("Could not save your public key in %s: %s",
+ pub_tmp, strerror(errno));
+ goto failnext;
+ }
+ (void)fchmod(fd, 0644);
+ (void)close(fd);
+ if ((r = sshkey_save_public(public, pub_tmp, comment)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "Unable to save public key to %s",
+ identity_file);
+ goto failnext;
+ }
+
+ /* Rename temporary files to their permanent locations. */
+ if (rename(pub_tmp, pub_file) != 0) {
+ error("Unable to move %s into position: %s",
+ pub_file, strerror(errno));
+ goto failnext;
+ }
+ if (rename(prv_tmp, prv_file) != 0) {
+ error("Unable to move %s into position: %s",
+ key_types[i].path, strerror(errno));
+ failnext:
+ first = 0;
+ goto next;
+ }
+ next:
+ sshkey_free(private);
+ sshkey_free(public);
+ free(prv_tmp);
+ free(pub_tmp);
+ free(prv_file);
+ free(pub_file);
+ }
+ if (first != 0)
+ printf("\n");
+}
+
+struct known_hosts_ctx {
+ const char *host; /* Hostname searched for in find/delete case */
+ FILE *out; /* Output file, stdout for find_hosts case */
+ int has_unhashed; /* When hashing, original had unhashed hosts */
+ int found_key; /* For find/delete, host was found */
+ int invalid; /* File contained invalid items; don't delete */
+ int hash_hosts; /* Hash hostnames as we go */
+ int find_host; /* Search for specific hostname */
+ int delete_host; /* Delete host from known_hosts */
+};
+
+static int
+known_hosts_hash(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
+{
+ struct known_hosts_ctx *ctx = (struct known_hosts_ctx *)_ctx;
+ char *hashed, *cp, *hosts, *ohosts;
+ int has_wild = l->hosts && strcspn(l->hosts, "*?!") != strlen(l->hosts);
+ int was_hashed = l->hosts && l->hosts[0] == HASH_DELIM;
+
+ switch (l->status) {
+ case HKF_STATUS_OK:
+ case HKF_STATUS_MATCHED:
+ /*
+ * Don't hash hosts already already hashed, with wildcard
+ * characters or a CA/revocation marker.
+ */
+ if (was_hashed || has_wild || l->marker != MRK_NONE) {
+ fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
+ if (has_wild && !ctx->find_host) {
+ logit("%s:%lu: ignoring host name "
+ "with wildcard: %.64s", l->path,
+ l->linenum, l->hosts);
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Split any comma-separated hostnames from the host list,
+ * hash and store separately.
+ */
+ ohosts = hosts = xstrdup(l->hosts);
+ while ((cp = strsep(&hosts, ",")) != NULL && *cp != '\0') {
+ lowercase(cp);
+ if ((hashed = host_hash(cp, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
+ fatal("hash_host failed");
+ fprintf(ctx->out, "%s %s\n", hashed, l->rawkey);
+ free(hashed);
+ ctx->has_unhashed = 1;
+ }
+ free(ohosts);
+ return 0;
+ case HKF_STATUS_INVALID:
+ /* Retain invalid lines, but mark file as invalid. */
+ ctx->invalid = 1;
+ logit("%s:%lu: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum);
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default:
+ fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int
+known_hosts_find_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
+{
+ struct known_hosts_ctx *ctx = (struct known_hosts_ctx *)_ctx;
+ enum sshkey_fp_rep rep;
+ int fptype;
+ char *fp = NULL, *ra = NULL;
+
+ fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash;
+ rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT;
+
+ if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_MATCHED) {
+ if (ctx->delete_host) {
+ if (l->marker != MRK_NONE) {
+ /* Don't remove CA and revocation lines */
+ fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Hostname matches and has no CA/revoke
+ * marker, delete it by *not* writing the
+ * line to ctx->out.
+ */
+ ctx->found_key = 1;
+ if (!quiet)
+ printf("# Host %s found: line %lu\n",
+ ctx->host, l->linenum);
+ }
+ return 0;
+ } else if (ctx->find_host) {
+ ctx->found_key = 1;
+ if (!quiet) {
+ printf("# Host %s found: line %lu %s\n",
+ ctx->host,
+ l->linenum, l->marker == MRK_CA ? "CA" :
+ (l->marker == MRK_REVOKE ? "REVOKED" : ""));
+ }
+ if (ctx->hash_hosts)
+ known_hosts_hash(l, ctx);
+ else if (print_fingerprint) {
+ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(l->key, fptype, rep);
+ ra = sshkey_fingerprint(l->key,
+ fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+ mprintf("%s %s %s%s%s\n", ctx->host,
+ sshkey_type(l->key), fp,
+ l->comment[0] ? " " : "",
+ l->comment);
+ if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
+ printf("%s\n", ra);
+ free(ra);
+ free(fp);
+ } else
+ fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else if (ctx->delete_host) {
+ /* Retain non-matching hosts when deleting */
+ if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) {
+ ctx->invalid = 1;
+ logit("%s:%lu: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum);
+ }
+ fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+do_known_hosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *name, int find_host,
+ int delete_host, int hash_hosts)
+{
+ char *cp, tmp[PATH_MAX], old[PATH_MAX];
+ int r, fd, oerrno, inplace = 0;
+ struct known_hosts_ctx ctx;
+ u_int foreach_options;
+ struct stat sb;
+
+ if (!have_identity) {
+ cp = tilde_expand_filename(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE, pw->pw_uid);
+ if (strlcpy(identity_file, cp, sizeof(identity_file)) >=
+ sizeof(identity_file))
+ fatal("Specified known hosts path too long");
+ free(cp);
+ have_identity = 1;
+ }
+ if (stat(identity_file, &sb) != 0)
+ fatal("Cannot stat %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
+
+ memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+ ctx.out = stdout;
+ ctx.host = name;
+ ctx.hash_hosts = hash_hosts;
+ ctx.find_host = find_host;
+ ctx.delete_host = delete_host;
+
+ /*
+ * Find hosts goes to stdout, hash and deletions happen in-place
+ * A corner case is ssh-keygen -HF foo, which should go to stdout
+ */
+ if (!find_host && (hash_hosts || delete_host)) {
+ if (strlcpy(tmp, identity_file, sizeof(tmp)) >= sizeof(tmp) ||
+ strlcat(tmp, ".XXXXXXXXXX", sizeof(tmp)) >= sizeof(tmp) ||
+ strlcpy(old, identity_file, sizeof(old)) >= sizeof(old) ||
+ strlcat(old, ".old", sizeof(old)) >= sizeof(old))
+ fatal("known_hosts path too long");
+ umask(077);
+ if ((fd = mkstemp(tmp)) == -1)
+ fatal("mkstemp: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if ((ctx.out = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ unlink(tmp);
+ fatal("fdopen: %s", strerror(oerrno));
+ }
+ fchmod(fd, sb.st_mode & 0644);
+ inplace = 1;
+ }
+ /* XXX support identity_file == "-" for stdin */
+ foreach_options = find_host ? HKF_WANT_MATCH : 0;
+ foreach_options |= print_fingerprint ? HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY : 0;
+ if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(identity_file, (find_host || !hash_hosts) ?
+ known_hosts_find_delete : known_hosts_hash, &ctx, name, NULL,
+ foreach_options, 0)) != 0) {
+ if (inplace)
+ unlink(tmp);
+ fatal_fr(r, "hostkeys_foreach");
+ }
+
+ if (inplace)
+ fclose(ctx.out);
+
+ if (ctx.invalid) {
+ error("%s is not a valid known_hosts file.", identity_file);
+ if (inplace) {
+ error("Not replacing existing known_hosts "
+ "file because of errors");
+ unlink(tmp);
+ }
+ exit(1);
+ } else if (delete_host && !ctx.found_key) {
+ logit("Host %s not found in %s", name, identity_file);
+ if (inplace)
+ unlink(tmp);
+ } else if (inplace) {
+ /* Backup existing file */
+ if (unlink(old) == -1 && errno != ENOENT)
+ fatal("unlink %.100s: %s", old, strerror(errno));
+ if (link(identity_file, old) == -1)
+ fatal("link %.100s to %.100s: %s", identity_file, old,
+ strerror(errno));
+ /* Move new one into place */
+ if (rename(tmp, identity_file) == -1) {
+ error("rename\"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", tmp, identity_file,
+ strerror(errno));
+ unlink(tmp);
+ unlink(old);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ printf("%s updated.\n", identity_file);
+ printf("Original contents retained as %s\n", old);
+ if (ctx.has_unhashed) {
+ logit("WARNING: %s contains unhashed entries", old);
+ logit("Delete this file to ensure privacy "
+ "of hostnames");
+ }
+ }
+
+ exit (find_host && !ctx.found_key);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform changing a passphrase. The argument is the passwd structure
+ * for the current user.
+ */
+static void
+do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ char *comment;
+ char *old_passphrase, *passphrase1, *passphrase2;
+ struct stat st;
+ struct sshkey *private;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!have_identity)
+ ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+ if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
+ /* Try to load the file with empty passphrase. */
+ r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, "", &private, &comment);
+ if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
+ if (identity_passphrase)
+ old_passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
+ else
+ old_passphrase =
+ read_passphrase("Enter old passphrase: ",
+ RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, old_passphrase,
+ &private, &comment);
+ freezero(old_passphrase, strlen(old_passphrase));
+ if (r != 0)
+ goto badkey;
+ } else if (r != 0) {
+ badkey:
+ fatal_r(r, "Failed to load key %s", identity_file);
+ }
+ if (comment)
+ mprintf("Key has comment '%s'\n", comment);
+
+ /* Ask the new passphrase (twice). */
+ if (identity_new_passphrase) {
+ passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase);
+ passphrase2 = NULL;
+ } else {
+ passphrase1 =
+ read_passphrase("Enter new passphrase (empty for no "
+ "passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ",
+ RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+
+ /* Verify that they are the same. */
+ if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) {
+ explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
+ explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
+ free(passphrase1);
+ free(passphrase2);
+ printf("Pass phrases do not match. Try again.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /* Destroy the other copy. */
+ freezero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
+ }
+
+ /* Save the file using the new passphrase. */
+ if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1,
+ comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "Saving key \"%s\" failed", identity_file);
+ freezero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
+ sshkey_free(private);
+ free(comment);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /* Destroy the passphrase and the copy of the key in memory. */
+ freezero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
+ sshkey_free(private); /* Destroys contents */
+ free(comment);
+
+ printf("Your identification has been saved with the new passphrase.\n");
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Print the SSHFP RR.
+ */
+static int
+do_print_resource_record(struct passwd *pw, char *fname, char *hname,
+ int print_generic)
+{
+ struct sshkey *public;
+ char *comment = NULL;
+ struct stat st;
+ int r;
+
+ if (fname == NULL)
+ fatal_f("no filename");
+ if (stat(fname, &st) == -1) {
+ if (errno == ENOENT)
+ return 0;
+ fatal("%s: %s", fname, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_public(fname, &public, &comment)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "Failed to read v2 public key from \"%s\"", fname);
+ export_dns_rr(hname, public, stdout, print_generic);
+ sshkey_free(public);
+ free(comment);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Change the comment of a private key file.
+ */
+static void
+do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw, const char *identity_comment)
+{
+ char new_comment[1024], *comment, *passphrase;
+ struct sshkey *private;
+ struct sshkey *public;
+ struct stat st;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!have_identity)
+ ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+ if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, "",
+ &private, &comment)) == 0)
+ passphrase = xstrdup("");
+ else if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
+ fatal_r(r, "Cannot load private key \"%s\"", identity_file);
+ else {
+ if (identity_passphrase)
+ passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
+ else if (identity_new_passphrase)
+ passphrase = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase);
+ else
+ passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ",
+ RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ /* Try to load using the passphrase. */
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, passphrase,
+ &private, &comment)) != 0) {
+ freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+ fatal_r(r, "Cannot load private key \"%s\"",
+ identity_file);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (private->type != KEY_ED25519 && private->type != KEY_XMSS &&
+ private_key_format != SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH) {
+ error("Comments are only supported for keys stored in "
+ "the new format (-o).");
+ explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+ sshkey_free(private);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (comment)
+ printf("Old comment: %s\n", comment);
+ else
+ printf("No existing comment\n");
+
+ if (identity_comment) {
+ strlcpy(new_comment, identity_comment, sizeof(new_comment));
+ } else {
+ printf("New comment: ");
+ fflush(stdout);
+ if (!fgets(new_comment, sizeof(new_comment), stdin)) {
+ explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+ sshkey_free(private);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ new_comment[strcspn(new_comment, "\n")] = '\0';
+ }
+ if (comment != NULL && strcmp(comment, new_comment) == 0) {
+ printf("No change to comment\n");
+ free(passphrase);
+ sshkey_free(private);
+ free(comment);
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ /* Save the file using the new passphrase. */
+ if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase,
+ new_comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher,
+ rounds)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "Saving key \"%s\" failed", identity_file);
+ freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+ sshkey_free(private);
+ free(comment);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+ if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshkey_from_private");
+ sshkey_free(private);
+
+ strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file));
+ if ((r = sshkey_save_public(public, identity_file, new_comment)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "Unable to save public key to %s", identity_file);
+ sshkey_free(public);
+ free(comment);
+
+ if (strlen(new_comment) > 0)
+ printf("Comment '%s' applied\n", new_comment);
+ else
+ printf("Comment removed\n");
+
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+static void
+cert_ext_add(const char *key, const char *value, int iscrit)
+{
+ cert_ext = xreallocarray(cert_ext, ncert_ext + 1, sizeof(*cert_ext));
+ cert_ext[ncert_ext].key = xstrdup(key);
+ cert_ext[ncert_ext].val = value == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(value);
+ cert_ext[ncert_ext].crit = iscrit;
+ ncert_ext++;
+}
+
+/* qsort(3) comparison function for certificate extensions */
+static int
+cert_ext_cmp(const void *_a, const void *_b)
+{
+ const struct cert_ext *a = (const struct cert_ext *)_a;
+ const struct cert_ext *b = (const struct cert_ext *)_b;
+ int r;
+
+ if (a->crit != b->crit)
+ return (a->crit < b->crit) ? -1 : 1;
+ if ((r = strcmp(a->key, b->key)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if ((a->val == NULL) != (b->val == NULL))
+ return (a->val == NULL) ? -1 : 1;
+ if (a->val != NULL && (r = strcmp(a->val, b->val)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define OPTIONS_CRITICAL 1
+#define OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS 2
+static void
+prepare_options_buf(struct sshbuf *c, int which)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b;
+ size_t i;
+ int r;
+ const struct cert_ext *ext;
+
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ sshbuf_reset(c);
+ for (i = 0; i < ncert_ext; i++) {
+ ext = &cert_ext[i];
+ if ((ext->crit && (which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS)) ||
+ (!ext->crit && (which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL)))
+ continue;
+ if (ext->val == NULL) {
+ /* flag option */
+ debug3_f("%s", ext->key);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(c, ext->key)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(c, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "prepare flag");
+ } else {
+ /* key/value option */
+ debug3_f("%s=%s", ext->key, ext->val);
+ sshbuf_reset(b);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(c, ext->key)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, ext->val)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c, b)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "prepare k/v");
+ }
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+}
+
+static void
+finalise_cert_exts(void)
+{
+ /* critical options */
+ if (certflags_command != NULL)
+ cert_ext_add("force-command", certflags_command, 1);
+ if (certflags_src_addr != NULL)
+ cert_ext_add("source-address", certflags_src_addr, 1);
+ if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_REQUIRE_VERIFY) != 0)
+ cert_ext_add("verify-required", NULL, 1);
+ /* extensions */
+ if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_X_FWD) != 0)
+ cert_ext_add("permit-X11-forwarding", NULL, 0);
+ if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD) != 0)
+ cert_ext_add("permit-agent-forwarding", NULL, 0);
+ if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PORT_FWD) != 0)
+ cert_ext_add("permit-port-forwarding", NULL, 0);
+ if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PTY) != 0)
+ cert_ext_add("permit-pty", NULL, 0);
+ if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_USER_RC) != 0)
+ cert_ext_add("permit-user-rc", NULL, 0);
+ if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE) != 0)
+ cert_ext_add("no-touch-required", NULL, 0);
+ /* order lexically by key */
+ if (ncert_ext > 0)
+ qsort(cert_ext, ncert_ext, sizeof(*cert_ext), cert_ext_cmp);
+}
+
+static struct sshkey *
+load_pkcs11_key(char *path)
+{
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *public, *private = NULL;
+ int r, i, nkeys;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_public(path, &public, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "Couldn't load CA public key \"%s\"", path);
+
+ nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, identity_passphrase,
+ &keys, NULL);
+ debug3_f("%d keys", nkeys);
+ if (nkeys <= 0)
+ fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11");
+ for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
+ if (sshkey_equal_public(public, keys[i])) {
+ private = keys[i];
+ continue;
+ }
+ sshkey_free(keys[i]);
+ }
+ free(keys);
+ sshkey_free(public);
+ return private;
+#else
+ fatal("no pkcs11 support");
+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
+}
+
+/* Signer for sshkey_certify_custom that uses the agent */
+static int
+agent_signer(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+ const char *alg, const char *provider, const char *pin,
+ u_int compat, void *ctx)
+{
+ int *agent_fdp = (int *)ctx;
+
+ return ssh_agent_sign(*agent_fdp, key, sigp, lenp,
+ data, datalen, alg, compat);
+}
+
+static void
+do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, const char *ca_key_path, int prefer_agent,
+ unsigned long long cert_serial, int cert_serial_autoinc,
+ int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ int r, i, found, agent_fd = -1;
+ u_int n;
+ struct sshkey *ca, *public;
+ char valid[64], *otmp, *tmp, *cp, *out, *comment;
+ char *ca_fp = NULL, **plist = NULL, *pin = NULL;
+ struct ssh_identitylist *agent_ids;
+ size_t j;
+ struct notifier_ctx *notifier = NULL;
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ pkcs11_init(1);
+#endif
+ tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid);
+ if (pkcs11provider != NULL) {
+ /* If a PKCS#11 token was specified then try to use it */
+ if ((ca = load_pkcs11_key(tmp)) == NULL)
+ fatal("No PKCS#11 key matching %s found", ca_key_path);
+ } else if (prefer_agent) {
+ /*
+ * Agent signature requested. Try to use agent after making
+ * sure the public key specified is actually present in the
+ * agent.
+ */
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &ca, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "Cannot load CA public key %s", tmp);
+ if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "Cannot use public key for CA signature");
+ if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &agent_ids)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "Retrieve agent key list");
+ found = 0;
+ for (j = 0; j < agent_ids->nkeys; j++) {
+ if (sshkey_equal(ca, agent_ids->keys[j])) {
+ found = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!found)
+ fatal("CA key %s not found in agent", tmp);
+ ssh_free_identitylist(agent_ids);
+ ca->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
+ } else {
+ /* CA key is assumed to be a private key on the filesystem */
+ ca = load_identity(tmp, NULL);
+ if (sshkey_is_sk(ca) &&
+ (ca->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD)) {
+ if ((pin = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for CA key: ",
+ RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("couldn't read PIN");
+ }
+ }
+ free(tmp);
+
+ if (key_type_name != NULL) {
+ if (sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name) != ca->type) {
+ fatal("CA key type %s doesn't match specified %s",
+ sshkey_ssh_name(ca), key_type_name);
+ }
+ } else if (ca->type == KEY_RSA) {
+ /* Default to a good signature algorithm */
+ key_type_name = "rsa-sha2-512";
+ }
+ ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ca, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+
+ finalise_cert_exts();
+ for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+ /* Split list of principals */
+ n = 0;
+ if (cert_principals != NULL) {
+ otmp = tmp = xstrdup(cert_principals);
+ plist = NULL;
+ for (; (cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL; n++) {
+ plist = xreallocarray(plist, n + 1, sizeof(*plist));
+ if (*(plist[n] = xstrdup(cp)) == '\0')
+ fatal("Empty principal name");
+ }
+ free(otmp);
+ }
+ if (n > SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS)
+ fatal("Too many certificate principals specified");
+
+ tmp = tilde_expand_filename(argv[i], pw->pw_uid);
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &public, &comment)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "load pubkey \"%s\"", tmp);
+ if (sshkey_is_cert(public))
+ fatal_f("key \"%s\" type %s cannot be certified",
+ tmp, sshkey_type(public));
+
+ /* Prepare certificate to sign */
+ if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(public)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "Could not upgrade key %s to certificate", tmp);
+ public->cert->type = cert_key_type;
+ public->cert->serial = (u_int64_t)cert_serial;
+ public->cert->key_id = xstrdup(cert_key_id);
+ public->cert->nprincipals = n;
+ public->cert->principals = plist;
+ public->cert->valid_after = cert_valid_from;
+ public->cert->valid_before = cert_valid_to;
+ prepare_options_buf(public->cert->critical, OPTIONS_CRITICAL);
+ prepare_options_buf(public->cert->extensions,
+ OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS);
+ if ((r = sshkey_from_private(ca,
+ &public->cert->signature_key)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "sshkey_from_private (ca key)");
+
+ if (agent_fd != -1 && (ca->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0) {
+ if ((r = sshkey_certify_custom(public, ca,
+ key_type_name, sk_provider, NULL, agent_signer,
+ &agent_fd)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "Couldn't certify %s via agent", tmp);
+ } else {
+ if (sshkey_is_sk(ca) &&
+ (ca->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) {
+ notifier = notify_start(0,
+ "Confirm user presence for key %s %s",
+ sshkey_type(ca), ca_fp);
+ }
+ r = sshkey_certify(public, ca, key_type_name,
+ sk_provider, pin);
+ notify_complete(notifier, "User presence confirmed");
+ if (r != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "Couldn't certify key %s", tmp);
+ }
+
+ if ((cp = strrchr(tmp, '.')) != NULL && strcmp(cp, ".pub") == 0)
+ *cp = '\0';
+ xasprintf(&out, "%s-cert.pub", tmp);
+ free(tmp);
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_save_public(public, out, comment)) != 0) {
+ fatal_r(r, "Unable to save public key to %s",
+ identity_file);
+ }
+
+ if (!quiet) {
+ sshkey_format_cert_validity(public->cert,
+ valid, sizeof(valid));
+ logit("Signed %s key %s: id \"%s\" serial %llu%s%s "
+ "valid %s", sshkey_cert_type(public),
+ out, public->cert->key_id,
+ (unsigned long long)public->cert->serial,
+ cert_principals != NULL ? " for " : "",
+ cert_principals != NULL ? cert_principals : "",
+ valid);
+ }
+
+ sshkey_free(public);
+ free(out);
+ if (cert_serial_autoinc)
+ cert_serial++;
+ }
+ if (pin != NULL)
+ freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
+ free(ca_fp);
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ pkcs11_terminate();
+#endif
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+static u_int64_t
+parse_relative_time(const char *s, time_t now)
+{
+ int64_t mul, secs;
+
+ mul = *s == '-' ? -1 : 1;
+
+ if ((secs = convtime(s + 1)) == -1)
+ fatal("Invalid relative certificate time %s", s);
+ if (mul == -1 && secs > now)
+ fatal("Certificate time %s cannot be represented", s);
+ return now + (u_int64_t)(secs * mul);
+}
+
+static void
+parse_hex_u64(const char *s, uint64_t *up)
+{
+ char *ep;
+ unsigned long long ull;
+
+ errno = 0;
+ ull = strtoull(s, &ep, 16);
+ if (*s == '\0' || *ep != '\0')
+ fatal("Invalid certificate time: not a number");
+ if (errno == ERANGE && ull == ULONG_MAX)
+ fatal_fr(SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR, "Invalid certificate time");
+ *up = (uint64_t)ull;
+}
+
+static void
+parse_cert_times(char *timespec)
+{
+ char *from, *to;
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+ int64_t secs;
+
+ /* +timespec relative to now */
+ if (*timespec == '+' && strchr(timespec, ':') == NULL) {
+ if ((secs = convtime(timespec + 1)) == -1)
+ fatal("Invalid relative certificate life %s", timespec);
+ cert_valid_to = now + secs;
+ /*
+ * Backdate certificate one minute to avoid problems on hosts
+ * with poorly-synchronised clocks.
+ */
+ cert_valid_from = ((now - 59)/ 60) * 60;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * from:to, where
+ * from := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS | 0x... | "always"
+ * to := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS | 0x... | "forever"
+ */
+ from = xstrdup(timespec);
+ to = strchr(from, ':');
+ if (to == NULL || from == to || *(to + 1) == '\0')
+ fatal("Invalid certificate life specification %s", timespec);
+ *to++ = '\0';
+
+ if (*from == '-' || *from == '+')
+ cert_valid_from = parse_relative_time(from, now);
+ else if (strcmp(from, "always") == 0)
+ cert_valid_from = 0;
+ else if (strncmp(from, "0x", 2) == 0)
+ parse_hex_u64(from, &cert_valid_from);
+ else if (parse_absolute_time(from, &cert_valid_from) != 0)
+ fatal("Invalid from time \"%s\"", from);
+
+ if (*to == '-' || *to == '+')
+ cert_valid_to = parse_relative_time(to, now);
+ else if (strcmp(to, "forever") == 0)
+ cert_valid_to = ~(u_int64_t)0;
+ else if (strncmp(to, "0x", 2) == 0)
+ parse_hex_u64(to, &cert_valid_to);
+ else if (parse_absolute_time(to, &cert_valid_to) != 0)
+ fatal("Invalid to time \"%s\"", to);
+
+ if (cert_valid_to <= cert_valid_from)
+ fatal("Empty certificate validity interval");
+ free(from);
+}
+
+static void
+add_cert_option(char *opt)
+{
+ char *val, *cp;
+ int iscrit = 0;
+
+ if (strcasecmp(opt, "clear") == 0)
+ certflags_flags = 0;
+ else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-x11-forwarding") == 0)
+ certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_X_FWD;
+ else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-x11-forwarding") == 0)
+ certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_X_FWD;
+ else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-agent-forwarding") == 0)
+ certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD;
+ else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0)
+ certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD;
+ else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-port-forwarding") == 0)
+ certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_PORT_FWD;
+ else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0)
+ certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_PORT_FWD;
+ else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-pty") == 0)
+ certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_PTY;
+ else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-pty") == 0)
+ certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_PTY;
+ else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-user-rc") == 0)
+ certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_USER_RC;
+ else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-user-rc") == 0)
+ certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_USER_RC;
+ else if (strcasecmp(opt, "touch-required") == 0)
+ certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE;
+ else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-touch-required") == 0)
+ certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE;
+ else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-verify-required") == 0)
+ certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_REQUIRE_VERIFY;
+ else if (strcasecmp(opt, "verify-required") == 0)
+ certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_REQUIRE_VERIFY;
+ else if (strncasecmp(opt, "force-command=", 14) == 0) {
+ val = opt + 14;
+ if (*val == '\0')
+ fatal("Empty force-command option");
+ if (certflags_command != NULL)
+ fatal("force-command already specified");
+ certflags_command = xstrdup(val);
+ } else if (strncasecmp(opt, "source-address=", 15) == 0) {
+ val = opt + 15;
+ if (*val == '\0')
+ fatal("Empty source-address option");
+ if (certflags_src_addr != NULL)
+ fatal("source-address already specified");
+ if (addr_match_cidr_list(NULL, val) != 0)
+ fatal("Invalid source-address list");
+ certflags_src_addr = xstrdup(val);
+ } else if (strncasecmp(opt, "extension:", 10) == 0 ||
+ (iscrit = (strncasecmp(opt, "critical:", 9) == 0))) {
+ val = xstrdup(strchr(opt, ':') + 1);
+ if ((cp = strchr(val, '=')) != NULL)
+ *cp++ = '\0';
+ cert_ext_add(val, cp, iscrit);
+ free(val);
+ } else
+ fatal("Unsupported certificate option \"%s\"", opt);
+}
+
+static void
+show_options(struct sshbuf *optbuf, int in_critical)
+{
+ char *name, *arg, *hex;
+ struct sshbuf *options, *option = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((options = sshbuf_fromb(optbuf)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_fromb failed");
+ while (sshbuf_len(options) != 0) {
+ sshbuf_free(option);
+ option = NULL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(options, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_froms(options, &option)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse option");
+ printf(" %s", name);
+ if (!in_critical &&
+ (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, "no-touch-required") == 0)) {
+ printf("\n");
+ } else if (in_critical &&
+ (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0)) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(option, &arg, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse critical");
+ printf(" %s\n", arg);
+ free(arg);
+ } else if (in_critical &&
+ strcmp(name, "verify-required") == 0) {
+ printf("\n");
+ } else if (sshbuf_len(option) > 0) {
+ hex = sshbuf_dtob16(option);
+ printf(" UNKNOWN OPTION: %s (len %zu)\n",
+ hex, sshbuf_len(option));
+ sshbuf_reset(option);
+ free(hex);
+ } else
+ printf(" UNKNOWN FLAG OPTION\n");
+ free(name);
+ if (sshbuf_len(option) != 0)
+ fatal("Option corrupt: extra data at end");
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(option);
+ sshbuf_free(options);
+}
+
+static void
+print_cert(struct sshkey *key)
+{
+ char valid[64], *key_fp, *ca_fp;
+ u_int i;
+
+ key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
+ fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ if (key_fp == NULL || ca_fp == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint fail");
+ sshkey_format_cert_validity(key->cert, valid, sizeof(valid));
+
+ printf(" Type: %s %s certificate\n", sshkey_ssh_name(key),
+ sshkey_cert_type(key));
+ printf(" Public key: %s %s\n", sshkey_type(key), key_fp);
+ printf(" Signing CA: %s %s (using %s)\n",
+ sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
+ key->cert->signature_type);
+ printf(" Key ID: \"%s\"\n", key->cert->key_id);
+ printf(" Serial: %llu\n", (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial);
+ printf(" Valid: %s\n", valid);
+ printf(" Principals: ");
+ if (key->cert->nprincipals == 0)
+ printf("(none)\n");
+ else {
+ for (i = 0; i < key->cert->nprincipals; i++)
+ printf("\n %s",
+ key->cert->principals[i]);
+ printf("\n");
+ }
+ printf(" Critical Options: ");
+ if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->critical) == 0)
+ printf("(none)\n");
+ else {
+ printf("\n");
+ show_options(key->cert->critical, 1);
+ }
+ printf(" Extensions: ");
+ if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->extensions) == 0)
+ printf("(none)\n");
+ else {
+ printf("\n");
+ show_options(key->cert->extensions, 0);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ struct stat st;
+ int r, is_stdin = 0, ok = 0;
+ FILE *f;
+ char *cp, *line = NULL;
+ const char *path;
+ size_t linesize = 0;
+ u_long lnum = 0;
+
+ if (!have_identity)
+ ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+ if (strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0 && stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
+
+ path = identity_file;
+ if (strcmp(path, "-") == 0) {
+ f = stdin;
+ path = "(stdin)";
+ is_stdin = 1;
+ } else if ((f = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL)
+ fatal("fopen %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
+
+ while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
+ lnum++;
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ key = NULL;
+ /* Trim leading space and comments */
+ cp = line + strspn(line, " \t");
+ if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0')
+ continue;
+ if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+ fatal("sshkey_new");
+ if ((r = sshkey_read(key, &cp)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "%s:%lu: invalid key", path, lnum);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+ error("%s:%lu is not a certificate", path, lnum);
+ continue;
+ }
+ ok = 1;
+ if (!is_stdin && lnum == 1)
+ printf("%s:\n", path);
+ else
+ printf("%s:%lu:\n", path, lnum);
+ print_cert(key);
+ }
+ free(line);
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ fclose(f);
+ exit(ok ? 0 : 1);
+}
+
+static void
+load_krl(const char *path, struct ssh_krl **krlp)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *krlbuf;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(path, &krlbuf)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "Unable to load KRL %s", path);
+ /* XXX check sigs */
+ if ((r = ssh_krl_from_blob(krlbuf, krlp, NULL, 0)) != 0 ||
+ *krlp == NULL)
+ fatal_r(r, "Invalid KRL file %s", path);
+ sshbuf_free(krlbuf);
+}
+
+static void
+hash_to_blob(const char *cp, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp,
+ const char *file, u_long lnum)
+{
+ char *tmp;
+ size_t tlen;
+ struct sshbuf *b;
+ int r;
+
+ if (strncmp(cp, "SHA256:", 7) != 0)
+ fatal("%s:%lu: unsupported hash algorithm", file, lnum);
+ cp += 7;
+
+ /*
+ * OpenSSH base64 hashes omit trailing '='
+ * characters; put them back for decode.
+ */
+ tlen = strlen(cp);
+ tmp = xmalloc(tlen + 4 + 1);
+ strlcpy(tmp, cp, tlen + 1);
+ while ((tlen % 4) != 0) {
+ tmp[tlen++] = '=';
+ tmp[tlen] = '\0';
+ }
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(b, tmp)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "%s:%lu: decode hash failed", file, lnum);
+ free(tmp);
+ *lenp = sshbuf_len(b);
+ *blobp = xmalloc(*lenp);
+ memcpy(*blobp, sshbuf_ptr(b), *lenp);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+}
+
+static void
+update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw, const char *file, int wild_ca,
+ const struct sshkey *ca, struct ssh_krl *krl)
+{
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ u_long lnum = 0;
+ char *path, *cp, *ep, *line = NULL;
+ u_char *blob = NULL;
+ size_t blen = 0, linesize = 0;
+ unsigned long long serial, serial2;
+ int i, was_explicit_key, was_sha1, was_sha256, was_hash, r;
+ FILE *krl_spec;
+
+ path = tilde_expand_filename(file, pw->pw_uid);
+ if (strcmp(path, "-") == 0) {
+ krl_spec = stdin;
+ free(path);
+ path = xstrdup("(standard input)");
+ } else if ((krl_spec = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL)
+ fatal("fopen %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
+
+ if (!quiet)
+ printf("Revoking from %s\n", path);
+ while (getline(&line, &linesize, krl_spec) != -1) {
+ lnum++;
+ was_explicit_key = was_sha1 = was_sha256 = was_hash = 0;
+ cp = line + strspn(line, " \t");
+ /* Trim trailing space, comments and strip \n */
+ for (i = 0, r = -1; cp[i] != '\0'; i++) {
+ if (cp[i] == '#' || cp[i] == '\n') {
+ cp[i] = '\0';
+ break;
+ }
+ if (cp[i] == ' ' || cp[i] == '\t') {
+ /* Remember the start of a span of whitespace */
+ if (r == -1)
+ r = i;
+ } else
+ r = -1;
+ }
+ if (r != -1)
+ cp[r] = '\0';
+ if (*cp == '\0')
+ continue;
+ if (strncasecmp(cp, "serial:", 7) == 0) {
+ if (ca == NULL && !wild_ca) {
+ fatal("revoking certificates by serial number "
+ "requires specification of a CA key");
+ }
+ cp += 7;
+ cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
+ errno = 0;
+ serial = strtoull(cp, &ep, 0);
+ if (*cp == '\0' || (*ep != '\0' && *ep != '-'))
+ fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial \"%s\"",
+ path, lnum, cp);
+ if (errno == ERANGE && serial == ULLONG_MAX)
+ fatal("%s:%lu: serial out of range",
+ path, lnum);
+ serial2 = serial;
+ if (*ep == '-') {
+ cp = ep + 1;
+ errno = 0;
+ serial2 = strtoull(cp, &ep, 0);
+ if (*cp == '\0' || *ep != '\0')
+ fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial \"%s\"",
+ path, lnum, cp);
+ if (errno == ERANGE && serial2 == ULLONG_MAX)
+ fatal("%s:%lu: serial out of range",
+ path, lnum);
+ if (serial2 <= serial)
+ fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial range "
+ "%llu:%llu", path, lnum,
+ (unsigned long long)serial,
+ (unsigned long long)serial2);
+ }
+ if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl,
+ ca, serial, serial2) != 0) {
+ fatal_f("revoke serial failed");
+ }
+ } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "id:", 3) == 0) {
+ if (ca == NULL && !wild_ca) {
+ fatal("revoking certificates by key ID "
+ "requires specification of a CA key");
+ }
+ cp += 3;
+ cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
+ if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, ca, cp) != 0)
+ fatal_f("revoke key ID failed");
+ } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "hash:", 5) == 0) {
+ cp += 5;
+ cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
+ hash_to_blob(cp, &blob, &blen, file, lnum);
+ r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen);
+ if (r != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "revoke key failed");
+ } else {
+ if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) {
+ cp += 4;
+ cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
+ was_explicit_key = 1;
+ } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "sha1:", 5) == 0) {
+ cp += 5;
+ cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
+ was_sha1 = 1;
+ } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "sha256:", 7) == 0) {
+ cp += 7;
+ cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
+ was_sha256 = 1;
+ /*
+ * Just try to process the line as a key.
+ * Parsing will fail if it isn't.
+ */
+ }
+ if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+ fatal("sshkey_new");
+ if ((r = sshkey_read(key, &cp)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "%s:%lu: invalid key", path, lnum);
+ if (was_explicit_key)
+ r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(krl, key);
+ else if (was_sha1) {
+ if (sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key,
+ SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &blob, &blen) != 0) {
+ fatal("%s:%lu: fingerprint failed",
+ file, lnum);
+ }
+ r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(krl, blob, blen);
+ } else if (was_sha256) {
+ if (sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key,
+ SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, &blob, &blen) != 0) {
+ fatal("%s:%lu: fingerprint failed",
+ file, lnum);
+ }
+ r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen);
+ } else
+ r = ssh_krl_revoke_key(krl, key);
+ if (r != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "revoke key failed");
+ freezero(blob, blen);
+ blob = NULL;
+ blen = 0;
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ }
+ }
+ if (strcmp(path, "-") != 0)
+ fclose(krl_spec);
+ free(line);
+ free(path);
+}
+
+static void
+do_gen_krl(struct passwd *pw, int updating, const char *ca_key_path,
+ unsigned long long krl_version, const char *krl_comment,
+ int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ struct ssh_krl *krl;
+ struct stat sb;
+ struct sshkey *ca = NULL;
+ int i, r, wild_ca = 0;
+ char *tmp;
+ struct sshbuf *kbuf;
+
+ if (*identity_file == '\0')
+ fatal("KRL generation requires an output file");
+ if (stat(identity_file, &sb) == -1) {
+ if (errno != ENOENT)
+ fatal("Cannot access KRL \"%s\": %s",
+ identity_file, strerror(errno));
+ if (updating)
+ fatal("KRL \"%s\" does not exist", identity_file);
+ }
+ if (ca_key_path != NULL) {
+ if (strcasecmp(ca_key_path, "none") == 0)
+ wild_ca = 1;
+ else {
+ tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid);
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &ca, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "Cannot load CA public key %s", tmp);
+ free(tmp);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (updating)
+ load_krl(identity_file, &krl);
+ else if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL)
+ fatal("couldn't create KRL");
+
+ if (krl_version != 0)
+ ssh_krl_set_version(krl, krl_version);
+ if (krl_comment != NULL)
+ ssh_krl_set_comment(krl, krl_comment);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < argc; i++)
+ update_krl_from_file(pw, argv[i], wild_ca, ca, krl);
+
+ if ((kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("sshbuf_new failed");
+ if (ssh_krl_to_blob(krl, kbuf, NULL, 0) != 0)
+ fatal("Couldn't generate KRL");
+ if ((r = sshbuf_write_file(identity_file, kbuf)) != 0)
+ fatal("write %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
+ sshbuf_free(kbuf);
+ ssh_krl_free(krl);
+ sshkey_free(ca);
+}
+
+static void
+do_check_krl(struct passwd *pw, int print_krl, int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ int i, r, ret = 0;
+ char *comment;
+ struct ssh_krl *krl;
+ struct sshkey *k;
+
+ if (*identity_file == '\0')
+ fatal("KRL checking requires an input file");
+ load_krl(identity_file, &krl);
+ if (print_krl)
+ krl_dump(krl, stdout);
+ for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_public(argv[i], &k, &comment)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "Cannot load public key %s", argv[i]);
+ r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, k);
+ printf("%s%s%s%s: %s\n", argv[i],
+ *comment ? " (" : "", comment, *comment ? ")" : "",
+ r == 0 ? "ok" : "REVOKED");
+ if (r != 0)
+ ret = 1;
+ sshkey_free(k);
+ free(comment);
+ }
+ ssh_krl_free(krl);
+ exit(ret);
+}
+
+static struct sshkey *
+load_sign_key(const char *keypath, const struct sshkey *pubkey)
+{
+ size_t i, slen, plen = strlen(keypath);
+ char *privpath = xstrdup(keypath);
+ static const char * const suffixes[] = { "-cert.pub", ".pub", NULL };
+ struct sshkey *ret = NULL, *privkey = NULL;
+ int r, waspub = 0;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ /*
+ * If passed a public key filename, then try to locate the corresponding
+ * private key. This lets us specify certificates on the command-line
+ * and have ssh-keygen find the appropriate private key.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; suffixes[i]; i++) {
+ slen = strlen(suffixes[i]);
+ if (plen <= slen ||
+ strcmp(privpath + plen - slen, suffixes[i]) != 0)
+ continue;
+ privpath[plen - slen] = '\0';
+ debug_f("%s looks like a public key, using private key "
+ "path %s instead", keypath, privpath);
+ waspub = 1;
+ }
+ if (waspub && stat(privpath, &st) != 0 && errno == ENOENT)
+ fatal("No private key found for public key \"%s\"", keypath);
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_private(privpath, "", &privkey, NULL)) != 0 &&
+ (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)) {
+ debug_fr(r, "load private key \"%s\"", privpath);
+ fatal("No private key found for \"%s\"", privpath);
+ } else if (privkey == NULL)
+ privkey = load_identity(privpath, NULL);
+
+ if (!sshkey_equal_public(pubkey, privkey)) {
+ error("Public key %s doesn't match private %s",
+ keypath, privpath);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (sshkey_is_cert(pubkey) && !sshkey_is_cert(privkey)) {
+ /*
+ * Graft the certificate onto the private key to make
+ * it capable of signing.
+ */
+ if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(privkey)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "sshkey_to_certified");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_cert_copy(pubkey, privkey)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "sshkey_cert_copy");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+ /* success */
+ ret = privkey;
+ privkey = NULL;
+ done:
+ sshkey_free(privkey);
+ free(privpath);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+sign_one(struct sshkey *signkey, const char *filename, int fd,
+ const char *sig_namespace, const char *hashalg, sshsig_signer *signer,
+ void *signer_ctx)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL, *abuf = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, wfd = -1, oerrno;
+ char *wfile = NULL, *asig = NULL, *fp = NULL;
+ char *pin = NULL, *prompt = NULL;
+
+ if (!quiet) {
+ if (fd == STDIN_FILENO)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Signing data on standard input\n");
+ else
+ fprintf(stderr, "Signing file %s\n", filename);
+ }
+ if (signer == NULL && sshkey_is_sk(signkey)) {
+ if ((signkey->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD)) {
+ xasprintf(&prompt, "Enter PIN for %s key: ",
+ sshkey_type(signkey));
+ if ((pin = read_passphrase(prompt,
+ RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("couldn't read PIN");
+ }
+ if ((signkey->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) {
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(signkey, fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("fingerprint failed");
+ fprintf(stderr, "Confirm user presence for key %s %s\n",
+ sshkey_type(signkey), fp);
+ free(fp);
+ }
+ }
+ if ((r = sshsig_sign_fd(signkey, hashalg, sk_provider, pin,
+ fd, sig_namespace, &sigbuf, signer, signer_ctx)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "Signing %s failed", filename);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshsig_armor(sigbuf, &abuf)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "sshsig_armor");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((asig = sshbuf_dup_string(abuf)) == NULL) {
+ error_f("buffer error");
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (fd == STDIN_FILENO) {
+ fputs(asig, stdout);
+ fflush(stdout);
+ } else {
+ xasprintf(&wfile, "%s.sig", filename);
+ if (confirm_overwrite(wfile)) {
+ if ((wfd = open(wfile, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC,
+ 0666)) == -1) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ error("Cannot open %s: %s",
+ wfile, strerror(errno));
+ errno = oerrno;
+ r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, wfd, asig,
+ strlen(asig)) != strlen(asig)) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ error("Cannot write to %s: %s",
+ wfile, strerror(errno));
+ errno = oerrno;
+ r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (!quiet) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Write signature to %s\n",
+ wfile);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ free(wfile);
+ free(prompt);
+ free(asig);
+ if (pin != NULL)
+ freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
+ sshbuf_free(abuf);
+ sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
+ if (wfd != -1)
+ close(wfd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+sig_process_opts(char * const *opts, size_t nopts, char **hashalgp,
+ uint64_t *verify_timep, int *print_pubkey)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ time_t now;
+
+ if (verify_timep != NULL)
+ *verify_timep = 0;
+ if (print_pubkey != NULL)
+ *print_pubkey = 0;
+ if (hashalgp != NULL)
+ *hashalgp = NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) {
+ if (hashalgp != NULL &&
+ strncasecmp(opts[i], "hashalg=", 8) == 0) {
+ *hashalgp = xstrdup(opts[i] + 8);
+ } else if (verify_timep &&
+ strncasecmp(opts[i], "verify-time=", 12) == 0) {
+ if (parse_absolute_time(opts[i] + 12,
+ verify_timep) != 0 || *verify_timep == 0) {
+ error("Invalid \"verify-time\" option");
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+ } else if (print_pubkey &&
+ strcasecmp(opts[i], "print-pubkey") == 0) {
+ *print_pubkey = 1;
+ } else {
+ error("Invalid option \"%s\"", opts[i]);
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+ }
+ if (verify_timep && *verify_timep == 0) {
+ if ((now = time(NULL)) < 0) {
+ error("Time is before epoch");
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+ *verify_timep = (uint64_t)now;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int
+sig_sign(const char *keypath, const char *sig_namespace, int require_agent,
+ int argc, char **argv, char * const *opts, size_t nopts)
+{
+ int i, fd = -1, r, ret = -1;
+ int agent_fd = -1;
+ struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL, *privkey = NULL, *signkey = NULL;
+ sshsig_signer *signer = NULL;
+ char *hashalg = NULL;
+
+ /* Check file arguments. */
+ for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(argv[i], "-") != 0)
+ continue;
+ if (i > 0 || argc > 1)
+ fatal("Cannot sign mix of paths and standard input");
+ }
+
+ if (sig_process_opts(opts, nopts, &hashalg, NULL, NULL) != 0)
+ goto done; /* error already logged */
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_public(keypath, &pubkey, NULL)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "Couldn't load public key %s", keypath);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0) {
+ if (require_agent)
+ fatal("Couldn't get agent socket");
+ debug_r(r, "Couldn't get agent socket");
+ } else {
+ if ((r = ssh_agent_has_key(agent_fd, pubkey)) == 0)
+ signer = agent_signer;
+ else {
+ if (require_agent)
+ fatal("Couldn't find key in agent");
+ debug_r(r, "Couldn't find key in agent");
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (signer == NULL) {
+ /* Not using agent - try to load private key */
+ if ((privkey = load_sign_key(keypath, pubkey)) == NULL)
+ goto done;
+ signkey = privkey;
+ } else {
+ /* Will use key in agent */
+ signkey = pubkey;
+ }
+
+ if (argc == 0) {
+ if ((r = sign_one(signkey, "(stdin)", STDIN_FILENO,
+ sig_namespace, hashalg, signer, &agent_fd)) != 0)
+ goto done;
+ } else {
+ for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(argv[i], "-") == 0)
+ fd = STDIN_FILENO;
+ else if ((fd = open(argv[i], O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
+ error("Cannot open %s for signing: %s",
+ argv[i], strerror(errno));
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if ((r = sign_one(signkey, argv[i], fd, sig_namespace,
+ hashalg, signer, &agent_fd)) != 0)
+ goto done;
+ if (fd != STDIN_FILENO)
+ close(fd);
+ fd = -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+done:
+ if (fd != -1 && fd != STDIN_FILENO)
+ close(fd);
+ sshkey_free(pubkey);
+ sshkey_free(privkey);
+ free(hashalg);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+sig_verify(const char *signature, const char *sig_namespace,
+ const char *principal, const char *allowed_keys, const char *revoked_keys,
+ char * const *opts, size_t nopts)
+{
+ int r, ret = -1;
+ int print_pubkey = 0;
+ struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL, *abuf = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *sign_key = NULL;
+ char *fp = NULL;
+ struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL;
+ uint64_t verify_time = 0;
+
+ if (sig_process_opts(opts, nopts, NULL, &verify_time,
+ &print_pubkey) != 0)
+ goto done; /* error already logged */
+
+ memset(&sig_details, 0, sizeof(sig_details));
+ if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(signature, &abuf)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "Couldn't read signature file");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshsig_dearmor(abuf, &sigbuf)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "sshsig_armor");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshsig_verify_fd(sigbuf, STDIN_FILENO, sig_namespace,
+ &sign_key, &sig_details)) != 0)
+ goto done; /* sshsig_verify() prints error */
+
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sign_key, fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+ debug("Valid (unverified) signature from key %s", fp);
+ if (sig_details != NULL) {
+ debug2_f("signature details: counter = %u, flags = 0x%02x",
+ sig_details->sk_counter, sig_details->sk_flags);
+ }
+ free(fp);
+ fp = NULL;
+
+ if (revoked_keys != NULL) {
+ if ((r = sshkey_check_revoked(sign_key, revoked_keys)) != 0) {
+ debug3_fr(r, "sshkey_check_revoked");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (allowed_keys != NULL && (r = sshsig_check_allowed_keys(allowed_keys,
+ sign_key, principal, sig_namespace, verify_time)) != 0) {
+ debug3_fr(r, "sshsig_check_allowed_keys");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ ret = 0;
+done:
+ if (!quiet) {
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sign_key, fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+ if (principal == NULL) {
+ printf("Good \"%s\" signature with %s key %s\n",
+ sig_namespace, sshkey_type(sign_key), fp);
+
+ } else {
+ printf("Good \"%s\" signature for %s with %s key %s\n",
+ sig_namespace, principal,
+ sshkey_type(sign_key), fp);
+ }
+ } else {
+ printf("Could not verify signature.\n");
+ }
+ }
+ /* Print the signature key if requested */
+ if (ret == 0 && print_pubkey && sign_key != NULL) {
+ if ((r = sshkey_write(sign_key, stdout)) == 0)
+ fputc('\n', stdout);
+ else {
+ error_r(r, "Could not print public key.\n");
+ ret = -1;
+ }
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
+ sshbuf_free(abuf);
+ sshkey_free(sign_key);
+ sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details);
+ free(fp);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+sig_find_principals(const char *signature, const char *allowed_keys,
+ char * const *opts, size_t nopts)
+{
+ int r, ret = -1;
+ struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL, *abuf = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *sign_key = NULL;
+ char *principals = NULL, *cp, *tmp;
+ uint64_t verify_time = 0;
+
+ if (sig_process_opts(opts, nopts, NULL, &verify_time, NULL) != 0)
+ goto done; /* error already logged */
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(signature, &abuf)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "Couldn't read signature file");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshsig_dearmor(abuf, &sigbuf)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "sshsig_armor");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshsig_get_pubkey(sigbuf, &sign_key)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "sshsig_get_pubkey");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshsig_find_principals(allowed_keys, sign_key,
+ verify_time, &principals)) != 0) {
+ if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND)
+ error_fr(r, "sshsig_find_principal");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ ret = 0;
+done:
+ if (ret == 0 ) {
+ /* Emit matching principals one per line */
+ tmp = principals;
+ while ((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL && *cp != '\0')
+ puts(cp);
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "No principal matched.\n");
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
+ sshbuf_free(abuf);
+ sshkey_free(sign_key);
+ free(principals);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+sig_match_principals(const char *allowed_keys, char *principal,
+ char * const *opts, size_t nopts)
+{
+ int r;
+ char **principals = NULL;
+ size_t i, nprincipals = 0;
+
+ if ((r = sig_process_opts(opts, nopts, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0)
+ return r; /* error already logged */
+
+ if ((r = sshsig_match_principals(allowed_keys, principal,
+ &principals, &nprincipals)) != 0) {
+ debug_f("match: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ fprintf(stderr, "No principal matched.\n");
+ return r;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < nprincipals; i++) {
+ printf("%s\n", principals[i]);
+ free(principals[i]);
+ }
+ free(principals);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+do_moduli_gen(const char *out_file, char **opts, size_t nopts)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ /* Moduli generation/screening */
+ u_int32_t memory = 0;
+ BIGNUM *start = NULL;
+ int moduli_bits = 0;
+ FILE *out;
+ size_t i;
+ const char *errstr;
+
+ /* Parse options */
+ for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) {
+ if (strncmp(opts[i], "memory=", 7) == 0) {
+ memory = (u_int32_t)strtonum(opts[i]+7, 1,
+ UINT_MAX, &errstr);
+ if (errstr) {
+ fatal("Memory limit is %s: %s",
+ errstr, opts[i]+7);
+ }
+ } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "start=", 6) == 0) {
+ /* XXX - also compare length against bits */
+ if (BN_hex2bn(&start, opts[i]+6) == 0)
+ fatal("Invalid start point.");
+ } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "bits=", 5) == 0) {
+ moduli_bits = (int)strtonum(opts[i]+5, 1,
+ INT_MAX, &errstr);
+ if (errstr) {
+ fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)",
+ opts[i]+12, errstr);
+ }
+ } else {
+ fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for moduli "
+ "generation", opts[i]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((out = fopen(out_file, "w")) == NULL) {
+ fatal("Couldn't open modulus candidate file \"%s\": %s",
+ out_file, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ setvbuf(out, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
+
+ if (moduli_bits == 0)
+ moduli_bits = DEFAULT_BITS;
+ if (gen_candidates(out, memory, moduli_bits, start) != 0)
+ fatal("modulus candidate generation failed");
+#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ fatal("Moduli generation is not supported");
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+}
+
+static void
+do_moduli_screen(const char *out_file, char **opts, size_t nopts)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ /* Moduli generation/screening */
+ char *checkpoint = NULL;
+ u_int32_t generator_wanted = 0;
+ unsigned long start_lineno = 0, lines_to_process = 0;
+ int prime_tests = 0;
+ FILE *out, *in = stdin;
+ size_t i;
+ const char *errstr;
+
+ /* Parse options */
+ for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) {
+ if (strncmp(opts[i], "lines=", 6) == 0) {
+ lines_to_process = strtoul(opts[i]+6, NULL, 10);
+ } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "start-line=", 11) == 0) {
+ start_lineno = strtoul(opts[i]+11, NULL, 10);
+ } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "checkpoint=", 11) == 0) {
+ checkpoint = xstrdup(opts[i]+11);
+ } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "generator=", 10) == 0) {
+ generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum(
+ opts[i]+10, 1, UINT_MAX, &errstr);
+ if (errstr != NULL) {
+ fatal("Generator invalid: %s (%s)",
+ opts[i]+10, errstr);
+ }
+ } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "prime-tests=", 12) == 0) {
+ prime_tests = (int)strtonum(opts[i]+12, 1,
+ INT_MAX, &errstr);
+ if (errstr) {
+ fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)",
+ opts[i]+12, errstr);
+ }
+ } else {
+ fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for moduli "
+ "screening", opts[i]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (have_identity && strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0) {
+ if ((in = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) {
+ fatal("Couldn't open modulus candidate "
+ "file \"%s\": %s", identity_file,
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((out = fopen(out_file, "a")) == NULL) {
+ fatal("Couldn't open moduli file \"%s\": %s",
+ out_file, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ setvbuf(out, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
+ if (prime_test(in, out, prime_tests == 0 ? 100 : prime_tests,
+ generator_wanted, checkpoint,
+ start_lineno, lines_to_process) != 0)
+ fatal("modulus screening failed");
+#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ fatal("Moduli screening is not supported");
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+}
+
+/* Read and confirm a passphrase */
+static char *
+read_check_passphrase(const char *prompt1, const char *prompt2,
+ const char *retry_prompt)
+{
+ char *passphrase1, *passphrase2;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ passphrase1 = read_passphrase(prompt1, RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ passphrase2 = read_passphrase(prompt2, RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) == 0) {
+ freezero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
+ return passphrase1;
+ }
+ /* The passphrases do not match. Clear them and retry. */
+ freezero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
+ freezero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
+ fputs(retry_prompt, stdout);
+ fputc('\n', stdout);
+ fflush(stdout);
+ }
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static char *
+private_key_passphrase(void)
+{
+ if (identity_passphrase)
+ return xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
+ if (identity_new_passphrase)
+ return xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase);
+
+ return read_check_passphrase(
+ "Enter passphrase (empty for no passphrase): ",
+ "Enter same passphrase again: ",
+ "Passphrases do not match. Try again.");
+}
+
+static char *
+sk_suffix(const char *application, const uint8_t *user, size_t userlen)
+{
+ char *ret, *cp;
+ size_t slen, i;
+
+ /* Trim off URL-like preamble */
+ if (strncmp(application, "ssh://", 6) == 0)
+ ret = xstrdup(application + 6);
+ else if (strncmp(application, "ssh:", 4) == 0)
+ ret = xstrdup(application + 4);
+ else
+ ret = xstrdup(application);
+
+ /* Count trailing zeros in user */
+ for (i = 0; i < userlen; i++) {
+ if (user[userlen - i - 1] != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i >= userlen)
+ return ret; /* user-id was default all-zeros */
+
+ /* Append user-id, escaping non-UTF-8 characters */
+ slen = userlen - i;
+ if (asmprintf(&cp, INT_MAX, NULL, "%.*s", (int)slen, user) == -1)
+ fatal_f("asmprintf failed");
+ /* Don't emit a user-id that contains path or control characters */
+ if (strchr(cp, '/') != NULL || strstr(cp, "..") != NULL ||
+ strchr(cp, '\\') != NULL) {
+ free(cp);
+ cp = tohex(user, slen);
+ }
+ xextendf(&ret, "_", "%s", cp);
+ free(cp);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+do_download_sk(const char *skprovider, const char *device)
+{
+ struct sshsk_resident_key **srks;
+ size_t nsrks, i;
+ int r, ret = -1;
+ char *fp, *pin = NULL, *pass = NULL, *path, *pubpath;
+ const char *ext;
+ struct sshkey *key;
+
+ if (skprovider == NULL)
+ fatal("Cannot download keys without provider");
+
+ pin = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for authenticator: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ if (!quiet) {
+ printf("You may need to touch your authenticator "
+ "to authorize key download.\n");
+ }
+ if ((r = sshsk_load_resident(skprovider, device, pin, 0,
+ &srks, &nsrks)) != 0) {
+ if (pin != NULL)
+ freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
+ error_r(r, "Unable to load resident keys");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (nsrks == 0)
+ logit("No keys to download");
+ if (pin != NULL)
+ freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nsrks; i++) {
+ key = srks[i]->key;
+ if (key->type != KEY_ECDSA_SK && key->type != KEY_ED25519_SK) {
+ error("Unsupported key type %s (%d)",
+ sshkey_type(key), key->type);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+ debug_f("key %zu: %s %s %s (flags 0x%02x)", i,
+ sshkey_type(key), fp, key->sk_application, key->sk_flags);
+ ext = sk_suffix(key->sk_application,
+ srks[i]->user_id, srks[i]->user_id_len);
+ xasprintf(&path, "id_%s_rk%s%s",
+ key->type == KEY_ECDSA_SK ? "ecdsa_sk" : "ed25519_sk",
+ *ext == '\0' ? "" : "_", ext);
+
+ /* If the file already exists, ask the user to confirm. */
+ if (!confirm_overwrite(path)) {
+ free(path);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Save the key with the application string as the comment */
+ if (pass == NULL)
+ pass = private_key_passphrase();
+ if ((r = sshkey_save_private(key, path, pass,
+ key->sk_application, private_key_format,
+ openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "Saving key \"%s\" failed", path);
+ free(path);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!quiet) {
+ printf("Saved %s key%s%s to %s\n", sshkey_type(key),
+ *ext != '\0' ? " " : "",
+ *ext != '\0' ? key->sk_application : "",
+ path);
+ }
+
+ /* Save public key too */
+ xasprintf(&pubpath, "%s.pub", path);
+ free(path);
+ if ((r = sshkey_save_public(key, pubpath,
+ key->sk_application)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "Saving public key \"%s\" failed", pubpath);
+ free(pubpath);
+ break;
+ }
+ free(pubpath);
+ }
+
+ if (i >= nsrks)
+ ret = 0; /* success */
+ if (pass != NULL)
+ freezero(pass, strlen(pass));
+ sshsk_free_resident_keys(srks, nsrks);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void
+save_attestation(struct sshbuf *attest, const char *path)
+{
+ mode_t omask;
+ int r;
+
+ if (path == NULL)
+ return; /* nothing to do */
+ if (attest == NULL || sshbuf_len(attest) == 0)
+ fatal("Enrollment did not return attestation data");
+ omask = umask(077);
+ r = sshbuf_write_file(path, attest);
+ umask(omask);
+ if (r != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "Unable to write attestation data \"%s\"", path);
+ if (!quiet)
+ printf("Your FIDO attestation certificate has been saved in "
+ "%s\n", path);
+}
+
+static int
+confirm_sk_overwrite(const char *application, const char *user)
+{
+ char yesno[3];
+
+ printf("A resident key scoped to '%s' with user id '%s' already "
+ "exists.\n", application == NULL ? "ssh:" : application,
+ user == NULL ? "null" : user);
+ printf("Overwrite key in token (y/n)? ");
+ fflush(stdout);
+ if (fgets(yesno, sizeof(yesno), stdin) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (yesno[0] != 'y' && yesno[0] != 'Y')
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "usage: ssh-keygen [-q] [-a rounds] [-b bits] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile]\n"
+ " [-m format] [-N new_passphrase] [-O option]\n"
+ " [-t dsa | ecdsa | ecdsa-sk | ed25519 | ed25519-sk | rsa]\n"
+ " [-w provider] [-Z cipher]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -p [-a rounds] [-f keyfile] [-m format] [-N new_passphrase]\n"
+ " [-P old_passphrase] [-Z cipher]\n"
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ " ssh-keygen -i [-f input_keyfile] [-m key_format]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -e [-f input_keyfile] [-m key_format]\n"
+#endif
+ " ssh-keygen -y [-f input_keyfile]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -c [-a rounds] [-C comment] [-f keyfile] [-P passphrase]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -l [-v] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-f input_keyfile]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile]\n");
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ " ssh-keygen -D pkcs11\n");
+#endif
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ " ssh-keygen -F hostname [-lv] [-f known_hosts_file]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -H [-f known_hosts_file]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -K [-a rounds] [-w provider]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -R hostname [-f known_hosts_file]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -r hostname [-g] [-f input_keyfile]\n"
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ " ssh-keygen -M generate [-O option] output_file\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -M screen [-f input_file] [-O option] output_file\n"
+#endif
+ " ssh-keygen -I certificate_identity -s ca_key [-hU] [-D pkcs11_provider]\n"
+ " [-n principals] [-O option] [-V validity_interval]\n"
+ " [-z serial_number] file ...\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -L [-f input_keyfile]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -A [-a rounds] [-f prefix_path]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -k -f krl_file [-u] [-s ca_public] [-z version_number]\n"
+ " file ...\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -Q [-l] -f krl_file [file ...]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -Y find-principals -s signature_file -f allowed_signers_file\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -Y match-principals -I signer_identity -f allowed_signers_file\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -Y check-novalidate -n namespace -s signature_file\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -Y sign -f key_file -n namespace file [-O option] ...\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -Y verify -f allowed_signers_file -I signer_identity\n"
+ " -n namespace -s signature_file [-r krl_file] [-O option]\n");
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Main program for key management.
+ */
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ char comment[1024], *passphrase = NULL;
+ char *rr_hostname = NULL, *ep, *fp, *ra;
+ struct sshkey *private, *public;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ int r, opt, type;
+ int change_passphrase = 0, change_comment = 0, show_cert = 0;
+ int find_host = 0, delete_host = 0, hash_hosts = 0;
+ int gen_all_hostkeys = 0, gen_krl = 0, update_krl = 0, check_krl = 0;
+ int prefer_agent = 0, convert_to = 0, convert_from = 0;
+ int print_public = 0, print_generic = 0, cert_serial_autoinc = 0;
+ int do_gen_candidates = 0, do_screen_candidates = 0, download_sk = 0;
+ unsigned long long cert_serial = 0;
+ char *identity_comment = NULL, *ca_key_path = NULL, **opts = NULL;
+ char *sk_application = NULL, *sk_device = NULL, *sk_user = NULL;
+ char *sk_attestation_path = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *challenge = NULL, *attest = NULL;
+ size_t i, nopts = 0;
+ u_int32_t bits = 0;
+ uint8_t sk_flags = SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD;
+ const char *errstr;
+ int log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+ char *sign_op = NULL;
+
+ extern int optind;
+ extern char *optarg;
+
+ /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+ sanitise_stdfd();
+
+ __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+
+ seed_rng();
+
+ log_init(argv[0], SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+
+ msetlocale();
+
+ /* we need this for the home * directory. */
+ pw = getpwuid(getuid());
+ if (!pw)
+ fatal("No user exists for uid %lu", (u_long)getuid());
+ pw = pwcopy(pw);
+ if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) == -1)
+ fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ sk_provider = getenv("SSH_SK_PROVIDER");
+
+ /* Remaining characters: dGjJSTWx */
+ while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "ABHKLQUXceghiklopquvy"
+ "C:D:E:F:I:M:N:O:P:R:V:Y:Z:"
+ "a:b:f:g:m:n:r:s:t:w:z:")) != -1) {
+ switch (opt) {
+ case 'A':
+ gen_all_hostkeys = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'b':
+ bits = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT32_MAX,
+ &errstr);
+ if (errstr)
+ fatal("Bits has bad value %s (%s)",
+ optarg, errstr);
+ break;
+ case 'E':
+ fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg);
+ if (fingerprint_hash == -1)
+ fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'F':
+ find_host = 1;
+ rr_hostname = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'H':
+ hash_hosts = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'I':
+ cert_key_id = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'R':
+ delete_host = 1;
+ rr_hostname = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'L':
+ show_cert = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'l':
+ print_fingerprint = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'B':
+ print_bubblebabble = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'm':
+ if (strcasecmp(optarg, "RFC4716") == 0 ||
+ strcasecmp(optarg, "ssh2") == 0) {
+ convert_format = FMT_RFC4716;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PKCS8") == 0) {
+ convert_format = FMT_PKCS8;
+ private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PEM") == 0) {
+ convert_format = FMT_PEM;
+ private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM;
+ break;
+ }
+ fatal("Unsupported conversion format \"%s\"", optarg);
+ case 'n':
+ cert_principals = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'o':
+ /* no-op; new format is already the default */
+ break;
+ case 'p':
+ change_passphrase = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'c':
+ change_comment = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'f':
+ if (strlcpy(identity_file, optarg,
+ sizeof(identity_file)) >= sizeof(identity_file))
+ fatal("Identity filename too long");
+ have_identity = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'g':
+ print_generic = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'K':
+ download_sk = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'P':
+ identity_passphrase = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'N':
+ identity_new_passphrase = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'Q':
+ check_krl = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'O':
+ opts = xrecallocarray(opts, nopts, nopts + 1,
+ sizeof(*opts));
+ opts[nopts++] = xstrdup(optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'Z':
+ openssh_format_cipher = optarg;
+ if (cipher_by_name(openssh_format_cipher) == NULL)
+ fatal("Invalid OpenSSH-format cipher '%s'",
+ openssh_format_cipher);
+ break;
+ case 'C':
+ identity_comment = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'q':
+ quiet = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'e':
+ /* export key */
+ convert_to = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'h':
+ cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST;
+ certflags_flags = 0;
+ break;
+ case 'k':
+ gen_krl = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'i':
+ case 'X':
+ /* import key */
+ convert_from = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'y':
+ print_public = 1;
+ break;
+ case 's':
+ ca_key_path = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 't':
+ key_type_name = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'D':
+ pkcs11provider = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'U':
+ prefer_agent = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'u':
+ update_krl = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'v':
+ if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO)
+ log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+ else {
+ if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 &&
+ log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
+ log_level++;
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'r':
+ rr_hostname = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'a':
+ rounds = (int)strtonum(optarg, 1, INT_MAX, &errstr);
+ if (errstr)
+ fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)",
+ optarg, errstr);
+ break;
+ case 'V':
+ parse_cert_times(optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'Y':
+ sign_op = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'w':
+ sk_provider = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'z':
+ errno = 0;
+ if (*optarg == '+') {
+ cert_serial_autoinc = 1;
+ optarg++;
+ }
+ cert_serial = strtoull(optarg, &ep, 10);
+ if (*optarg < '0' || *optarg > '9' || *ep != '\0' ||
+ (errno == ERANGE && cert_serial == ULLONG_MAX))
+ fatal("Invalid serial number \"%s\"", optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'M':
+ if (strcmp(optarg, "generate") == 0)
+ do_gen_candidates = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(optarg, "screen") == 0)
+ do_screen_candidates = 1;
+ else
+ fatal("Unsupported moduli option %s", optarg);
+ break;
+ default:
+ usage();
+ }
+ }
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL
+ if (sk_provider == NULL)
+ sk_provider = "internal";
+#endif
+
+ /* reinit */
+ log_init(argv[0], log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+
+ argv += optind;
+ argc -= optind;
+
+ if (sign_op != NULL) {
+ if (strncmp(sign_op, "find-principals", 15) == 0) {
+ if (ca_key_path == NULL) {
+ error("Too few arguments for find-principals:"
+ "missing signature file");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (!have_identity) {
+ error("Too few arguments for find-principals:"
+ "missing allowed keys file");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ return sig_find_principals(ca_key_path, identity_file,
+ opts, nopts);
+ } else if (strncmp(sign_op, "match-principals", 16) == 0) {
+ if (!have_identity) {
+ error("Too few arguments for match-principals:"
+ "missing allowed keys file");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (cert_key_id == NULL) {
+ error("Too few arguments for match-principals: "
+ "missing principal ID");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ return sig_match_principals(identity_file, cert_key_id,
+ opts, nopts);
+ } else if (strncmp(sign_op, "sign", 4) == 0) {
+ /* NB. cert_principals is actually namespace, via -n */
+ if (cert_principals == NULL ||
+ *cert_principals == '\0') {
+ error("Too few arguments for sign: "
+ "missing namespace");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (!have_identity) {
+ error("Too few arguments for sign: "
+ "missing key");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ return sig_sign(identity_file, cert_principals,
+ prefer_agent, argc, argv, opts, nopts);
+ } else if (strncmp(sign_op, "check-novalidate", 16) == 0) {
+ /* NB. cert_principals is actually namespace, via -n */
+ if (cert_principals == NULL ||
+ *cert_principals == '\0') {
+ error("Too few arguments for check-novalidate: "
+ "missing namespace");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (ca_key_path == NULL) {
+ error("Too few arguments for check-novalidate: "
+ "missing signature file");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ return sig_verify(ca_key_path, cert_principals,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, opts, nopts);
+ } else if (strncmp(sign_op, "verify", 6) == 0) {
+ /* NB. cert_principals is actually namespace, via -n */
+ if (cert_principals == NULL ||
+ *cert_principals == '\0') {
+ error("Too few arguments for verify: "
+ "missing namespace");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (ca_key_path == NULL) {
+ error("Too few arguments for verify: "
+ "missing signature file");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (!have_identity) {
+ error("Too few arguments for sign: "
+ "missing allowed keys file");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (cert_key_id == NULL) {
+ error("Too few arguments for verify: "
+ "missing principal identity");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ return sig_verify(ca_key_path, cert_principals,
+ cert_key_id, identity_file, rr_hostname,
+ opts, nopts);
+ }
+ error("Unsupported operation for -Y: \"%s\"", sign_op);
+ usage();
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ }
+
+ if (ca_key_path != NULL) {
+ if (argc < 1 && !gen_krl) {
+ error("Too few arguments.");
+ usage();
+ }
+ } else if (argc > 0 && !gen_krl && !check_krl &&
+ !do_gen_candidates && !do_screen_candidates) {
+ error("Too many arguments.");
+ usage();
+ }
+ if (change_passphrase && change_comment) {
+ error("Can only have one of -p and -c.");
+ usage();
+ }
+ if (print_fingerprint && (delete_host || hash_hosts)) {
+ error("Cannot use -l with -H or -R.");
+ usage();
+ }
+ if (gen_krl) {
+ do_gen_krl(pw, update_krl, ca_key_path,
+ cert_serial, identity_comment, argc, argv);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (check_krl) {
+ do_check_krl(pw, print_fingerprint, argc, argv);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (ca_key_path != NULL) {
+ if (cert_key_id == NULL)
+ fatal("Must specify key id (-I) when certifying");
+ for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++)
+ add_cert_option(opts[i]);
+ do_ca_sign(pw, ca_key_path, prefer_agent,
+ cert_serial, cert_serial_autoinc, argc, argv);
+ }
+ if (show_cert)
+ do_show_cert(pw);
+ if (delete_host || hash_hosts || find_host) {
+ do_known_hosts(pw, rr_hostname, find_host,
+ delete_host, hash_hosts);
+ }
+ if (pkcs11provider != NULL)
+ do_download(pw);
+ if (download_sk) {
+ for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) {
+ if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "device=", 7) == 0) {
+ sk_device = xstrdup(opts[i] + 7);
+ } else {
+ fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for "
+ "FIDO authenticator download", opts[i]);
+ }
+ }
+ return do_download_sk(sk_provider, sk_device);
+ }
+ if (print_fingerprint || print_bubblebabble)
+ do_fingerprint(pw);
+ if (change_passphrase)
+ do_change_passphrase(pw);
+ if (change_comment)
+ do_change_comment(pw, identity_comment);
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ if (convert_to)
+ do_convert_to(pw);
+ if (convert_from)
+ do_convert_from(pw);
+#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ if (convert_to || convert_from)
+ fatal("key conversion disabled at compile time");
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ if (print_public)
+ do_print_public(pw);
+ if (rr_hostname != NULL) {
+ unsigned int n = 0;
+
+ if (have_identity) {
+ n = do_print_resource_record(pw, identity_file,
+ rr_hostname, print_generic);
+ if (n == 0)
+ fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
+ exit(0);
+ } else {
+
+ n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
+ _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname,
+ print_generic);
+ n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
+ _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname,
+ print_generic);
+ n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
+ _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname,
+ print_generic);
+ n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
+ _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname,
+ print_generic);
+ n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
+ _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname,
+ print_generic);
+ if (n == 0)
+ fatal("no keys found.");
+ exit(0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (do_gen_candidates || do_screen_candidates) {
+ if (argc <= 0)
+ fatal("No output file specified");
+ else if (argc > 1)
+ fatal("Too many output files specified");
+ }
+ if (do_gen_candidates) {
+ do_moduli_gen(argv[0], opts, nopts);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (do_screen_candidates) {
+ do_moduli_screen(argv[0], opts, nopts);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (gen_all_hostkeys) {
+ do_gen_all_hostkeys(pw);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ if (key_type_name == NULL)
+ key_type_name = DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME;
+
+ type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name);
+ type_bits_valid(type, key_type_name, &bits);
+
+ if (!quiet)
+ printf("Generating public/private %s key pair.\n",
+ key_type_name);
+ switch (type) {
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) {
+ if (strcasecmp(opts[i], "no-touch-required") == 0) {
+ sk_flags &= ~SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD;
+ } else if (strcasecmp(opts[i], "verify-required") == 0) {
+ sk_flags |= SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD;
+ } else if (strcasecmp(opts[i], "resident") == 0) {
+ sk_flags |= SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY;
+ } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "device=", 7) == 0) {
+ sk_device = xstrdup(opts[i] + 7);
+ } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "user=", 5) == 0) {
+ sk_user = xstrdup(opts[i] + 5);
+ } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "challenge=", 10) == 0) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(opts[i] + 10,
+ &challenge)) != 0) {
+ fatal_r(r, "Unable to load FIDO "
+ "enrollment challenge \"%s\"",
+ opts[i] + 10);
+ }
+ } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i],
+ "write-attestation=", 18) == 0) {
+ sk_attestation_path = opts[i] + 18;
+ } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i],
+ "application=", 12) == 0) {
+ sk_application = xstrdup(opts[i] + 12);
+ if (strncmp(sk_application, "ssh:", 4) != 0) {
+ fatal("FIDO application string must "
+ "begin with \"ssh:\"");
+ }
+ } else {
+ fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for "
+ "FIDO authenticator enrollment", opts[i]);
+ }
+ }
+ if ((attest = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("sshbuf_new failed");
+ r = 0;
+ for (i = 0 ;;) {
+ if (!quiet) {
+ printf("You may need to touch your "
+ "authenticator%s to authorize key "
+ "generation.\n",
+ r == 0 ? "" : " again");
+ }
+ fflush(stdout);
+ r = sshsk_enroll(type, sk_provider, sk_device,
+ sk_application == NULL ? "ssh:" : sk_application,
+ sk_user, sk_flags, passphrase, challenge,
+ &private, attest);
+ if (r == 0)
+ break;
+ if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS &&
+ (sk_flags & SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY) != 0 &&
+ (sk_flags & SSH_SK_FORCE_OPERATION) == 0 &&
+ confirm_sk_overwrite(sk_application, sk_user)) {
+ sk_flags |= SSH_SK_FORCE_OPERATION;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
+ fatal_r(r, "Key enrollment failed");
+ else if (passphrase != NULL) {
+ error("PIN incorrect");
+ freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+ passphrase = NULL;
+ }
+ if (++i >= 3)
+ fatal("Too many incorrect PINs");
+ passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for "
+ "authenticator: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ }
+ if (passphrase != NULL) {
+ freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+ passphrase = NULL;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshkey_generate failed");
+ break;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "sshkey_from_private");
+
+ if (!have_identity)
+ ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which to save the key");
+
+ /* Create ~/.ssh directory if it doesn't already exist. */
+ hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir(identity_file, !quiet);
+
+ /* If the file already exists, ask the user to confirm. */
+ if (!confirm_overwrite(identity_file))
+ exit(1);
+
+ /* Determine the passphrase for the private key */
+ passphrase = private_key_passphrase();
+ if (identity_comment) {
+ strlcpy(comment, identity_comment, sizeof(comment));
+ } else {
+ /* Create default comment field for the passphrase. */
+ snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name, hostname);
+ }
+
+ /* Save the key with the given passphrase and comment. */
+ if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase,
+ comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "Saving key \"%s\" failed", identity_file);
+ freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+ sshkey_free(private);
+
+ if (!quiet) {
+ printf("Your identification has been saved in %s\n",
+ identity_file);
+ }
+
+ strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file));
+ if ((r = sshkey_save_public(public, identity_file, comment)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "Unable to save public key to %s", identity_file);
+
+ if (!quiet) {
+ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ ra = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
+ fatal("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+ printf("Your public key has been saved in %s\n",
+ identity_file);
+ printf("The key fingerprint is:\n");
+ printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment);
+ printf("The key's randomart image is:\n");
+ printf("%s\n", ra);
+ free(ra);
+ free(fp);
+ }
+
+ if (sk_attestation_path != NULL)
+ save_attestation(attest, sk_attestation_path);
+
+ sshbuf_free(attest);
+ sshkey_free(public);
+
+ exit(0);
+}