diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'sshd.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | sshd.c | 2462 |
1 files changed, 2462 insertions, 0 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,2462 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.596 2023/01/18 01:50:21 millert Exp $ */ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * This program is the ssh daemon. It listens for connections from clients, + * and performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and forwards + * information to/from the application to the user client over an encrypted + * connection. This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and + * authentication agent connections. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * SSH2 implementation: + * Privilege Separation: + * + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/ioctl.h> +#include <sys/socket.h> +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +# include <sys/stat.h> +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# include <sys/time.h> +#endif +#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h" +#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" +#include <sys/wait.h> + +#include <errno.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <netdb.h> +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +#include <paths.h> +#endif +#include <grp.h> +#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H +#include <poll.h> +#endif +#include <pwd.h> +#include <signal.h> +#include <stdarg.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <limits.h> + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +#include <openssl/dh.h> +#include <openssl/bn.h> +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE +#include <sys/security.h> +#include <prot.h> +#endif + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "sshpty.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "match.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "uidswap.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "digest.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "myproposal.h" +#include "authfile.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "atomicio.h" +#include "canohost.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "authfd.h" +#include "msg.h" +#include "dispatch.h" +#include "channels.h" +#include "session.h" +#include "monitor.h" +#ifdef GSSAPI +#include "ssh-gss.h" +#endif +#include "monitor_wrap.h" +#include "ssh-sandbox.h" +#include "auth-options.h" +#include "version.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sk-api.h" +#include "srclimit.h" +#include "dh.h" + +/* Re-exec fds */ +#define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1) +#define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2) +#define REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 3) +#define REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 4) + +extern char *__progname; + +/* Server configuration options. */ +ServerOptions options; + +/* Name of the server configuration file. */ +char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE; + +/* + * Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug + * mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system + * log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing + * the first connection. + */ +int debug_flag = 0; + +/* + * Indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration and keys. + * If test_flag > 1 ("-T" flag), then sshd will also dump the effective + * configuration, optionally using connection information provided by the + * "-C" flag. + */ +static int test_flag = 0; + +/* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */ +static int inetd_flag = 0; + +/* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */ +static int no_daemon_flag = 0; + +/* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */ +static int log_stderr = 0; + +/* Saved arguments to main(). */ +static char **saved_argv; +static int saved_argc; + +/* re-exec */ +static int rexeced_flag = 0; +static int rexec_flag = 1; +static int rexec_argc = 0; +static char **rexec_argv; + +/* + * The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP + * signal handler. + */ +#define MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS 16 +static int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS]; +static int num_listen_socks = 0; + +/* Daemon's agent connection */ +int auth_sock = -1; +static int have_agent = 0; + +/* + * Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this + * structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so + * that the pages do not get written into swap. However, there are some + * problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle) + * have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is + * not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented. + */ +struct { + struct sshkey **host_keys; /* all private host keys */ + struct sshkey **host_pubkeys; /* all public host keys */ + struct sshkey **host_certificates; /* all public host certificates */ + int have_ssh2_key; +} sensitive_data; + +/* This is set to true when a signal is received. */ +static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0; +static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0; + +/* record remote hostname or ip */ +u_int utmp_len = HOST_NAME_MAX+1; + +/* + * startup_pipes/flags are used for tracking children of the listening sshd + * process early in their lifespans. This tracking is needed for three things: + * + * 1) Implementing the MaxStartups limit of concurrent unauthenticated + * connections. + * 2) Avoiding a race condition for SIGHUP processing, where child processes + * may have listen_socks open that could collide with main listener process + * after it restarts. + * 3) Ensuring that rexec'd sshd processes have received their initial state + * from the parent listen process before handling SIGHUP. + * + * Child processes signal that they have completed closure of the listen_socks + * and (if applicable) received their rexec state by sending a char over their + * sock. Child processes signal that authentication has completed by closing + * the sock (or by exiting). + */ +static int *startup_pipes = NULL; +static int *startup_flags = NULL; /* Indicates child closed listener */ +static int startup_pipe = -1; /* in child */ + +/* variables used for privilege separation */ +int use_privsep = -1; +struct monitor *pmonitor = NULL; +int privsep_is_preauth = 1; +static int privsep_chroot = 1; + +/* global connection state and authentication contexts */ +Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL; +struct ssh *the_active_state; + +/* global key/cert auth options. XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */ +struct sshauthopt *auth_opts = NULL; + +/* sshd_config buffer */ +struct sshbuf *cfg; + +/* Included files from the configuration file */ +struct include_list includes = TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(includes); + +/* message to be displayed after login */ +struct sshbuf *loginmsg; + +/* Unprivileged user */ +struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL; + +/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */ +void destroy_sensitive_data(void); +void demote_sensitive_data(void); +static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *); + +static char *listener_proctitle; + +/* + * Close all listening sockets + */ +static void +close_listen_socks(void) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) + close(listen_socks[i]); + num_listen_socks = 0; +} + +static void +close_startup_pipes(void) +{ + int i; + + if (startup_pipes) + for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) + if (startup_pipes[i] != -1) + close(startup_pipes[i]); +} + +/* + * Signal handler for SIGHUP. Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP; + * the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate + * the server key). + */ + +/*ARGSUSED*/ +static void +sighup_handler(int sig) +{ + received_sighup = 1; +} + +/* + * Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP. + * Restarts the server. + */ +static void +sighup_restart(void) +{ + logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting."); + if (options.pid_file != NULL) + unlink(options.pid_file); + platform_pre_restart(); + close_listen_socks(); + close_startup_pipes(); + ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* will be restored after exec */ + execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv); + logit("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0], + strerror(errno)); + exit(1); +} + +/* + * Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon. + */ +/*ARGSUSED*/ +static void +sigterm_handler(int sig) +{ + received_sigterm = sig; +} + +/* + * SIGCHLD handler. This is called whenever a child dies. This will then + * reap any zombies left by exited children. + */ +/*ARGSUSED*/ +static void +main_sigchld_handler(int sig) +{ + int save_errno = errno; + pid_t pid; + int status; + + while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 || + (pid == -1 && errno == EINTR)) + ; + errno = save_errno; +} + +/* + * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired. + */ +/*ARGSUSED*/ +static void +grace_alarm_handler(int sig) +{ + /* + * Try to kill any processes that we have spawned, E.g. authorized + * keys command helpers or privsep children. + */ + if (getpgid(0) == getpid()) { + ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN); + kill(0, SIGTERM); + } + + /* Log error and exit. */ + sigdie("Timeout before authentication for %s port %d", + ssh_remote_ipaddr(the_active_state), + ssh_remote_port(the_active_state)); +} + +/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */ +void +destroy_sensitive_data(void) +{ + u_int i; + + for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { + if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { + sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); + sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; + } + if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) { + sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]); + sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL; + } + } +} + +/* Demote private to public keys for network child */ +void +demote_sensitive_data(void) +{ + struct sshkey *tmp; + u_int i; + int r; + + for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { + if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { + if ((r = sshkey_from_private( + sensitive_data.host_keys[i], &tmp)) != 0) + fatal_r(r, "could not demote host %s key", + sshkey_type(sensitive_data.host_keys[i])); + sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); + sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp; + } + /* Certs do not need demotion */ + } +} + +static void +reseed_prngs(void) +{ + u_int32_t rnd[256]; + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + RAND_poll(); +#endif + arc4random_stir(); /* noop on recent arc4random() implementations */ + arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); /* let arc4random notice PID change */ + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); + /* give libcrypto a chance to notice the PID change */ + if ((RAND_bytes((u_char *)rnd, 1)) != 1) + fatal("%s: RAND_bytes failed", __func__); +#endif + + explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); +} + +static void +privsep_preauth_child(void) +{ + gid_t gidset[1]; + + /* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */ + privsep_challenge_enable(); + +#ifdef GSSAPI + /* Cache supported mechanism OIDs for later use */ + ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(); +#endif + + reseed_prngs(); + + /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ + demote_sensitive_data(); + + /* Demote the child */ + if (privsep_chroot) { + /* Change our root directory */ + if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1) + fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, + strerror(errno)); + if (chdir("/") == -1) + fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno)); + + /* Drop our privileges */ + debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_uid, + (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_gid); + gidset[0] = privsep_pw->pw_gid; + if (setgroups(1, gidset) == -1) + fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + permanently_set_uid(privsep_pw); + } +} + +static int +privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + int status, r; + pid_t pid; + struct ssh_sandbox *box = NULL; + + /* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */ + pmonitor = monitor_init(); + /* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */ + pmonitor->m_pkex = &ssh->kex; + + if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON) + box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor); + pid = fork(); + if (pid == -1) { + fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); + } else if (pid != 0) { + debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid); + + pmonitor->m_pid = pid; + if (have_agent) { + r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock); + if (r != 0) { + error_r(r, "Could not get agent socket"); + have_agent = 0; + } + } + if (box != NULL) + ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(box, pid); + monitor_child_preauth(ssh, pmonitor); + + /* Wait for the child's exit status */ + while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) { + if (errno == EINTR) + continue; + pmonitor->m_pid = -1; + fatal_f("waitpid: %s", strerror(errno)); + } + privsep_is_preauth = 0; + pmonitor->m_pid = -1; + if (WIFEXITED(status)) { + if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) + fatal_f("preauth child exited with status %d", + WEXITSTATUS(status)); + } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) + fatal_f("preauth child terminated by signal %d", + WTERMSIG(status)); + if (box != NULL) + ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(box); + return 1; + } else { + /* child */ + close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); + close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd); + + /* Arrange for logging to be sent to the monitor */ + set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor); + + privsep_preauth_child(); + setproctitle("%s", "[net]"); + if (box != NULL) + ssh_sandbox_child(box); + + return 0; + } +} + +static void +privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) +{ +#ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING + if (1) { +#else + if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) { +#endif + /* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */ + use_privsep = 0; + goto skip; + } + + /* New socket pair */ + monitor_reinit(pmonitor); + + pmonitor->m_pid = fork(); + if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1) + fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); + else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) { + verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid); + sshbuf_reset(loginmsg); + monitor_clear_keystate(ssh, pmonitor); + monitor_child_postauth(ssh, pmonitor); + + /* NEVERREACHED */ + exit(0); + } + + /* child */ + + close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); + pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1; + + /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ + demote_sensitive_data(); + + reseed_prngs(); + + /* Drop privileges */ + do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw); + + skip: + /* It is safe now to apply the key state */ + monitor_apply_keystate(ssh, pmonitor); + + /* + * Tell the packet layer that authentication was successful, since + * this information is not part of the key state. + */ + ssh_packet_set_authenticated(ssh); +} + +static void +append_hostkey_type(struct sshbuf *b, const char *s) +{ + int r; + + if (match_pattern_list(s, options.hostkeyalgorithms, 0) != 1) { + debug3_f("%s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms", s); + return; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s", sshbuf_len(b) > 0 ? "," : "", s)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); +} + +static char * +list_hostkey_types(void) +{ + struct sshbuf *b; + struct sshkey *key; + char *ret; + u_int i; + + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); + for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { + key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i]; + if (key == NULL) + key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i]; + if (key == NULL) + continue; + switch (key->type) { + case KEY_RSA: + /* for RSA we also support SHA2 signatures */ + append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-512"); + append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-256"); + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_ECDSA: + case KEY_ED25519: + case KEY_ECDSA_SK: + case KEY_ED25519_SK: + case KEY_XMSS: + append_hostkey_type(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); + break; + } + /* If the private key has a cert peer, then list that too */ + key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]; + if (key == NULL) + continue; + switch (key->type) { + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + /* for RSA we also support SHA2 signatures */ + append_hostkey_type(b, + "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com"); + append_hostkey_type(b, + "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com"); + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT: + case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT: + case KEY_XMSS_CERT: + append_hostkey_type(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); + break; + } + } + if ((ret = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL) + fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed"); + sshbuf_free(b); + debug_f("%s", ret); + return ret; +} + +static struct sshkey * +get_hostkey_by_type(int type, int nid, int need_private, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + u_int i; + struct sshkey *key; + + for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { + switch (type) { + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT: + case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT: + case KEY_XMSS_CERT: + key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]; + break; + default: + key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i]; + if (key == NULL && !need_private) + key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i]; + break; + } + if (key == NULL || key->type != type) + continue; + switch (type) { + case KEY_ECDSA: + case KEY_ECDSA_SK: + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT: + if (key->ecdsa_nid != nid) + continue; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + default: + return need_private ? + sensitive_data.host_keys[i] : key; + } + } + return NULL; +} + +struct sshkey * +get_hostkey_public_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 0, ssh); +} + +struct sshkey * +get_hostkey_private_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 1, ssh); +} + +struct sshkey * +get_hostkey_by_index(int ind) +{ + if (ind < 0 || (u_int)ind >= options.num_host_key_files) + return (NULL); + return (sensitive_data.host_keys[ind]); +} + +struct sshkey * +get_hostkey_public_by_index(int ind, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + if (ind < 0 || (u_int)ind >= options.num_host_key_files) + return (NULL); + return (sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[ind]); +} + +int +get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *key, int compare, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + u_int i; + + for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { + if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { + if (key == sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] || + (compare && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] && + sshkey_equal(key, + sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]))) + return (i); + } else { + if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i] || + (compare && sensitive_data.host_keys[i] && + sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_keys[i]))) + return (i); + if (key == sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] || + (compare && sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] && + sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i]))) + return (i); + } + } + return (-1); +} + +/* Inform the client of all hostkeys */ +static void +notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct sshbuf *buf; + struct sshkey *key; + u_int i, nkeys; + int r; + char *fp; + + /* Some clients cannot cope with the hostkeys message, skip those. */ + if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS) + return; + + if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); + for (i = nkeys = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { + key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(i, ssh); + if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC || + sshkey_is_cert(key)) + continue; + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, + SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + debug3_f("key %d: %s %s", i, sshkey_ssh_name(key), fp); + free(fp); + if (nkeys == 0) { + /* + * Start building the request when we find the + * first usable key. + */ + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "hostkeys-00@openssh.com")) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* want reply */ + sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: start request", __func__); + } + /* Append the key to the request */ + sshbuf_reset(buf); + if ((r = sshkey_putb(key, buf)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "couldn't put hostkey %d", i); + if ((r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, buf)) != 0) + sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: append key", __func__); + nkeys++; + } + debug3_f("sent %u hostkeys", nkeys); + if (nkeys == 0) + fatal_f("no hostkeys"); + if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send", __func__); + sshbuf_free(buf); +} + +/* + * returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise. + * dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability + * of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until + * all connections are dropped for startups > max_startups + */ +static int +should_drop_connection(int startups) +{ + int p, r; + + if (startups < options.max_startups_begin) + return 0; + if (startups >= options.max_startups) + return 1; + if (options.max_startups_rate == 100) + return 1; + + p = 100 - options.max_startups_rate; + p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin; + p /= options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin; + p += options.max_startups_rate; + r = arc4random_uniform(100); + + debug_f("p %d, r %d", p, r); + return (r < p) ? 1 : 0; +} + +/* + * Check whether connection should be accepted by MaxStartups. + * Returns 0 if the connection is accepted. If the connection is refused, + * returns 1 and attempts to send notification to client. + * Logs when the MaxStartups condition is entered or exited, and periodically + * while in that state. + */ +static int +drop_connection(int sock, int startups, int notify_pipe) +{ + char *laddr, *raddr; + const char msg[] = "Exceeded MaxStartups\r\n"; + static time_t last_drop, first_drop; + static u_int ndropped; + LogLevel drop_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE; + time_t now; + + now = monotime(); + if (!should_drop_connection(startups) && + srclimit_check_allow(sock, notify_pipe) == 1) { + if (last_drop != 0 && + startups < options.max_startups_begin - 1) { + /* XXX maybe need better hysteresis here */ + logit("exited MaxStartups throttling after %s, " + "%u connections dropped", + fmt_timeframe(now - first_drop), ndropped); + last_drop = 0; + } + return 0; + } + +#define SSHD_MAXSTARTUPS_LOG_INTERVAL (5 * 60) + if (last_drop == 0) { + error("beginning MaxStartups throttling"); + drop_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; + first_drop = now; + ndropped = 0; + } else if (last_drop + SSHD_MAXSTARTUPS_LOG_INTERVAL < now) { + /* Periodic logs */ + error("in MaxStartups throttling for %s, " + "%u connections dropped", + fmt_timeframe(now - first_drop), ndropped + 1); + drop_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; + } + last_drop = now; + ndropped++; + + laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock); + raddr = get_peer_ipaddr(sock); + do_log2(drop_level, "drop connection #%d from [%s]:%d on [%s]:%d " + "past MaxStartups", startups, raddr, get_peer_port(sock), + laddr, get_local_port(sock)); + free(laddr); + free(raddr); + /* best-effort notification to client */ + (void)write(sock, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1); + return 1; +} + +static void +usage(void) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n", SSH_RELEASE, SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION); + fprintf(stderr, +"usage: sshd [-46DdeiqTtV] [-C connection_spec] [-c host_cert_file]\n" +" [-E log_file] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]\n" +" [-h host_key_file] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]\n" + ); + exit(1); +} + +static void +send_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf) +{ + struct sshbuf *m = NULL, *inc = NULL; + struct include_item *item = NULL; + int r; + + debug3_f("entering fd = %d config len %zu", fd, + sshbuf_len(conf)); + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (inc = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); + + /* pack includes into a string */ + TAILQ_FOREACH(item, &includes, entry) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(inc, item->selector)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(inc, item->filename)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(inc, item->contents)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "compose includes"); + } + + /* + * Protocol from reexec master to child: + * string configuration + * string included_files[] { + * string selector + * string filename + * string contents + * } + */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, conf)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, inc)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "compose config"); + if (ssh_msg_send(fd, 0, m) == -1) + error_f("ssh_msg_send failed"); + + sshbuf_free(m); + sshbuf_free(inc); + + debug3_f("done"); +} + +static void +recv_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf) +{ + struct sshbuf *m, *inc; + u_char *cp, ver; + size_t len; + int r; + struct include_item *item; + + debug3_f("entering fd = %d", fd); + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (inc = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); + if (ssh_msg_recv(fd, m) == -1) + fatal_f("ssh_msg_recv failed"); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &ver)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "parse version"); + if (ver != 0) + fatal_f("rexec version mismatch"); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cp, &len)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, inc)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "parse config"); + + if (conf != NULL && (r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, len))) + fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put"); + + while (sshbuf_len(inc) != 0) { + item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item)); + if ((item->contents = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->selector, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->filename, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(inc, item->contents)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "parse includes"); + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&includes, item, entry); + } + + free(cp); + sshbuf_free(m); + + debug3_f("done"); +} + +/* Accept a connection from inetd */ +static void +server_accept_inetd(int *sock_in, int *sock_out) +{ + if (rexeced_flag) { + close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD); + *sock_in = *sock_out = dup(STDIN_FILENO); + } else { + *sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO); + *sock_out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO); + } + /* + * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2 + * as our code for setting the descriptors won't work if + * ttyfd happens to be one of those. + */ + if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, !log_stderr) == -1) + error_f("stdfd_devnull failed"); + debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", *sock_in, *sock_out); +} + +/* + * Listen for TCP connections + */ +static void +listen_on_addrs(struct listenaddr *la) +{ + int ret, listen_sock; + struct addrinfo *ai; + char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; + + for (ai = la->addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { + if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) + continue; + if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS) + fatal("Too many listen sockets. " + "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS"); + if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, + ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), + NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) { + error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s", + ssh_gai_strerror(ret)); + continue; + } + /* Create socket for listening. */ + listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, + ai->ai_protocol); + if (listen_sock == -1) { + /* kernel may not support ipv6 */ + verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + continue; + } + if (set_nonblock(listen_sock) == -1) { + close(listen_sock); + continue; + } + if (fcntl(listen_sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) { + verbose("socket: CLOEXEC: %s", strerror(errno)); + close(listen_sock); + continue; + } + /* Socket options */ + set_reuseaddr(listen_sock); + if (la->rdomain != NULL && + set_rdomain(listen_sock, la->rdomain) == -1) { + close(listen_sock); + continue; + } + + /* Only communicate in IPv6 over AF_INET6 sockets. */ + if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) + sock_set_v6only(listen_sock); + + debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop); + + /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */ + if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) { + error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.", + strport, ntop, strerror(errno)); + close(listen_sock); + continue; + } + listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock; + num_listen_socks++; + + /* Start listening on the port. */ + if (listen(listen_sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) == -1) + fatal("listen on [%s]:%s: %.100s", + ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); + logit("Server listening on %s port %s%s%s.", + ntop, strport, + la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain ", + la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : la->rdomain); + } +} + +static void +server_listen(void) +{ + u_int i; + + /* Initialise per-source limit tracking. */ + srclimit_init(options.max_startups, options.per_source_max_startups, + options.per_source_masklen_ipv4, options.per_source_masklen_ipv6); + + for (i = 0; i < options.num_listen_addrs; i++) { + listen_on_addrs(&options.listen_addrs[i]); + freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs[i].addrs); + free(options.listen_addrs[i].rdomain); + memset(&options.listen_addrs[i], 0, + sizeof(options.listen_addrs[i])); + } + free(options.listen_addrs); + options.listen_addrs = NULL; + options.num_listen_addrs = 0; + + if (!num_listen_socks) + fatal("Cannot bind any address."); +} + +/* + * The main TCP accept loop. Note that, for the non-debug case, returns + * from this function are in a forked subprocess. + */ +static void +server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s) +{ + struct pollfd *pfd = NULL; + int i, j, ret, npfd; + int ostartups = -1, startups = 0, listening = 0, lameduck = 0; + int startup_p[2] = { -1 , -1 }, *startup_pollfd; + char c = 0; + struct sockaddr_storage from; + socklen_t fromlen; + pid_t pid; + u_char rnd[256]; + sigset_t nsigset, osigset; + + /* pipes connected to unauthenticated child sshd processes */ + startup_pipes = xcalloc(options.max_startups, sizeof(int)); + startup_flags = xcalloc(options.max_startups, sizeof(int)); + startup_pollfd = xcalloc(options.max_startups, sizeof(int)); + for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) + startup_pipes[i] = -1; + + /* + * Prepare signal mask that we use to block signals that might set + * received_sigterm or received_sighup, so that we are guaranteed + * to immediately wake up the ppoll if a signal is received after + * the flag is checked. + */ + sigemptyset(&nsigset); + sigaddset(&nsigset, SIGHUP); + sigaddset(&nsigset, SIGCHLD); + sigaddset(&nsigset, SIGTERM); + sigaddset(&nsigset, SIGQUIT); + + /* sized for worst-case */ + pfd = xcalloc(num_listen_socks + options.max_startups, + sizeof(struct pollfd)); + + /* + * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or + * the daemon is killed with a signal. + */ + for (;;) { + sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &nsigset, &osigset); + if (received_sigterm) { + logit("Received signal %d; terminating.", + (int) received_sigterm); + close_listen_socks(); + if (options.pid_file != NULL) + unlink(options.pid_file); + exit(received_sigterm == SIGTERM ? 0 : 255); + } + if (ostartups != startups) { + setproctitle("%s [listener] %d of %d-%d startups", + listener_proctitle, startups, + options.max_startups_begin, options.max_startups); + ostartups = startups; + } + if (received_sighup) { + if (!lameduck) { + debug("Received SIGHUP; waiting for children"); + close_listen_socks(); + lameduck = 1; + } + if (listening <= 0) { + sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &osigset, NULL); + sighup_restart(); + } + } + + for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) { + pfd[i].fd = listen_socks[i]; + pfd[i].events = POLLIN; + } + npfd = num_listen_socks; + for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) { + startup_pollfd[i] = -1; + if (startup_pipes[i] != -1) { + pfd[npfd].fd = startup_pipes[i]; + pfd[npfd].events = POLLIN; + startup_pollfd[i] = npfd++; + } + } + + /* Wait until a connection arrives or a child exits. */ + ret = ppoll(pfd, npfd, NULL, &osigset); + if (ret == -1 && errno != EINTR) { + error("ppoll: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + if (errno == EINVAL) + cleanup_exit(1); /* can't recover */ + } + sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &osigset, NULL); + if (ret == -1) + continue; + + for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) { + if (startup_pipes[i] == -1 || + startup_pollfd[i] == -1 || + !(pfd[startup_pollfd[i]].revents & (POLLIN|POLLHUP))) + continue; + switch (read(startup_pipes[i], &c, sizeof(c))) { + case -1: + if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN) + continue; + if (errno != EPIPE) { + error_f("startup pipe %d (fd=%d): " + "read %s", i, startup_pipes[i], + strerror(errno)); + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case 0: + /* child exited or completed auth */ + close(startup_pipes[i]); + srclimit_done(startup_pipes[i]); + startup_pipes[i] = -1; + startups--; + if (startup_flags[i]) + listening--; + break; + case 1: + /* child has finished preliminaries */ + if (startup_flags[i]) { + listening--; + startup_flags[i] = 0; + } + break; + } + } + for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) { + if (!(pfd[i].revents & POLLIN)) + continue; + fromlen = sizeof(from); + *newsock = accept(listen_socks[i], + (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen); + if (*newsock == -1) { + if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK && + errno != ECONNABORTED && errno != EAGAIN) + error("accept: %.100s", + strerror(errno)); + if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) + usleep(100 * 1000); + continue; + } + if (unset_nonblock(*newsock) == -1) { + close(*newsock); + continue; + } + if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) { + error_f("pipe(startup_p): %s", strerror(errno)); + close(*newsock); + continue; + } + if (drop_connection(*newsock, startups, startup_p[0])) { + close(*newsock); + close(startup_p[0]); + close(startup_p[1]); + continue; + } + + if (rexec_flag && socketpair(AF_UNIX, + SOCK_STREAM, 0, config_s) == -1) { + error("reexec socketpair: %s", + strerror(errno)); + close(*newsock); + close(startup_p[0]); + close(startup_p[1]); + continue; + } + + for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++) + if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) { + startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0]; + startups++; + startup_flags[j] = 1; + break; + } + + /* + * Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless + * we are in debugging mode. + */ + if (debug_flag) { + /* + * In debugging mode. Close the listening + * socket, and start processing the + * connection without forking. + */ + debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode."); + close_listen_socks(); + *sock_in = *newsock; + *sock_out = *newsock; + close(startup_p[0]); + close(startup_p[1]); + startup_pipe = -1; + pid = getpid(); + if (rexec_flag) { + send_rexec_state(config_s[0], cfg); + close(config_s[0]); + } + free(pfd); + return; + } + + /* + * Normal production daemon. Fork, and have + * the child process the connection. The + * parent continues listening. + */ + platform_pre_fork(); + listening++; + if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { + /* + * Child. Close the listening and + * max_startup sockets. Start using + * the accepted socket. Reinitialize + * logging (since our pid has changed). + * We return from this function to handle + * the connection. + */ + platform_post_fork_child(); + startup_pipe = startup_p[1]; + close_startup_pipes(); + close_listen_socks(); + *sock_in = *newsock; + *sock_out = *newsock; + log_init(__progname, + options.log_level, + options.log_facility, + log_stderr); + if (rexec_flag) + close(config_s[0]); + else { + /* + * Signal parent that the preliminaries + * for this child are complete. For the + * re-exec case, this happens after the + * child has received the rexec state + * from the server. + */ + (void)atomicio(vwrite, startup_pipe, + "\0", 1); + } + free(pfd); + return; + } + + /* Parent. Stay in the loop. */ + platform_post_fork_parent(pid); + if (pid == -1) + error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + else + debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid); + + close(startup_p[1]); + + if (rexec_flag) { + close(config_s[1]); + send_rexec_state(config_s[0], cfg); + close(config_s[0]); + } + close(*newsock); + + /* + * Ensure that our random state differs + * from that of the child + */ + arc4random_stir(); + arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); + if ((RAND_bytes((u_char *)rnd, 1)) != 1) + fatal("%s: RAND_bytes failed", __func__); +#endif + explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); + } + } +} + +/* + * If IP options are supported, make sure there are none (log and + * return an error if any are found). Basically we are worried about + * source routing; it can be used to pretend you are somebody + * (ip-address) you are not. That itself may be "almost acceptable" + * under certain circumstances, but rhosts authentication is useless + * if source routing is accepted. Notice also that if we just dropped + * source routing here, the other side could use IP spoofing to do + * rest of the interaction and could still bypass security. So we + * exit here if we detect any IP options. + */ +static void +check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh) +{ +#ifdef IP_OPTIONS + int sock_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh); + struct sockaddr_storage from; + u_char opts[200]; + socklen_t i, option_size = sizeof(opts), fromlen = sizeof(from); + char text[sizeof(opts) * 3 + 1]; + + memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); + if (getpeername(sock_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from, + &fromlen) == -1) + return; + if (from.ss_family != AF_INET) + return; + /* XXX IPv6 options? */ + + if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts, + &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) { + text[0] = '\0'; + for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++) + snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3, + " %2.2x", opts[i]); + fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP opts: %.800s", + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text); + } + return; +#endif /* IP_OPTIONS */ +} + +/* Set the routing domain for this process */ +static void +set_process_rdomain(struct ssh *ssh, const char *name) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_SYS_SET_PROCESS_RDOMAIN) + if (name == NULL) + return; /* default */ + + if (strcmp(name, "%D") == 0) { + /* "expands" to routing domain of connection */ + if ((name = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh)) == NULL) + return; + } + /* NB. We don't pass 'ssh' to sys_set_process_rdomain() */ + return sys_set_process_rdomain(name); +#elif defined(__OpenBSD__) + int rtable, ortable = getrtable(); + const char *errstr; + + if (name == NULL) + return; /* default */ + + if (strcmp(name, "%D") == 0) { + /* "expands" to routing domain of connection */ + if ((name = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh)) == NULL) + return; + } + + rtable = (int)strtonum(name, 0, 255, &errstr); + if (errstr != NULL) /* Shouldn't happen */ + fatal("Invalid routing domain \"%s\": %s", name, errstr); + if (rtable != ortable && setrtable(rtable) != 0) + fatal("Unable to set routing domain %d: %s", + rtable, strerror(errno)); + debug_f("set routing domain %d (was %d)", rtable, ortable); +#else /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */ + fatal("Unable to set routing domain: not supported in this platform"); +#endif +} + +static void +accumulate_host_timing_secret(struct sshbuf *server_cfg, + struct sshkey *key) +{ + static struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx; + u_char *hash; + size_t len; + struct sshbuf *buf; + int r; + + if (ctx == NULL && (ctx = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512)) == NULL) + fatal_f("ssh_digest_start"); + if (key == NULL) { /* finalize */ + /* add server config in case we are using agent for host keys */ + if (ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(server_cfg), + sshbuf_len(server_cfg)) != 0) + fatal_f("ssh_digest_update"); + len = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512); + hash = xmalloc(len); + if (ssh_digest_final(ctx, hash, len) != 0) + fatal_f("ssh_digest_final"); + options.timing_secret = PEEK_U64(hash); + freezero(hash, len); + ssh_digest_free(ctx); + ctx = NULL; + return; + } + if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal_f("could not allocate buffer"); + if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(key, buf)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "encode %s key", sshkey_ssh_name(key)); + if (ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)) != 0) + fatal_f("ssh_digest_update"); + sshbuf_reset(buf); + sshbuf_free(buf); +} + +static char * +prepare_proctitle(int ac, char **av) +{ + char *ret = NULL; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) + xextendf(&ret, " ", "%s", av[i]); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Main program for the daemon. + */ +int +main(int ac, char **av) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = NULL; + extern char *optarg; + extern int optind; + int r, opt, on = 1, already_daemon, remote_port; + int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1; + const char *remote_ip, *rdomain; + char *fp, *line, *laddr, *logfile = NULL; + int config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 }; + u_int i, j; + u_int64_t ibytes, obytes; + mode_t new_umask; + struct sshkey *key; + struct sshkey *pubkey; + int keytype; + Authctxt *authctxt; + struct connection_info *connection_info = NULL; + sigset_t sigmask; + +#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE + (void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av); +#endif + __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); + + sigemptyset(&sigmask); + sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &sigmask, NULL); + + /* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */ + saved_argc = ac; + rexec_argc = ac; + saved_argv = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_argv)); + for (i = 0; (int)i < ac; i++) + saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]); + saved_argv[i] = NULL; + +#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE + /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */ + compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av); + av = saved_argv; +#endif + + if (geteuid() == 0 && setgroups(0, NULL) == -1) + debug("setgroups(): %.200s", strerror(errno)); + + /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ + sanitise_stdfd(); + + /* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */ + initialize_server_options(&options); + + /* Parse command-line arguments. */ + while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, + "C:E:b:c:f:g:h:k:o:p:u:46DQRTdeiqrtV")) != -1) { + switch (opt) { + case '4': + options.address_family = AF_INET; + break; + case '6': + options.address_family = AF_INET6; + break; + case 'f': + config_file_name = optarg; + break; + case 'c': + servconf_add_hostcert("[command-line]", 0, + &options, optarg); + break; + case 'd': + if (debug_flag == 0) { + debug_flag = 1; + options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; + } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) + options.log_level++; + break; + case 'D': + no_daemon_flag = 1; + break; + case 'E': + logfile = optarg; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case 'e': + log_stderr = 1; + break; + case 'i': + inetd_flag = 1; + break; + case 'r': + rexec_flag = 0; + break; + case 'R': + rexeced_flag = 1; + inetd_flag = 1; + break; + case 'Q': + /* ignored */ + break; + case 'q': + options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET; + break; + case 'b': + /* protocol 1, ignored */ + break; + case 'p': + options.ports_from_cmdline = 1; + if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) { + fprintf(stderr, "too many ports.\n"); + exit(1); + } + options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg); + if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] <= 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n"); + exit(1); + } + break; + case 'g': + if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) { + fprintf(stderr, "Invalid login grace time.\n"); + exit(1); + } + break; + case 'k': + /* protocol 1, ignored */ + break; + case 'h': + servconf_add_hostkey("[command-line]", 0, + &options, optarg, 1); + break; + case 't': + test_flag = 1; + break; + case 'T': + test_flag = 2; + break; + case 'C': + connection_info = get_connection_info(ssh, 0, 0); + if (parse_server_match_testspec(connection_info, + optarg) == -1) + exit(1); + break; + case 'u': + utmp_len = (u_int)strtonum(optarg, 0, HOST_NAME_MAX+1+1, NULL); + if (utmp_len > HOST_NAME_MAX+1) { + fprintf(stderr, "Invalid utmp length.\n"); + exit(1); + } + break; + case 'o': + line = xstrdup(optarg); + if (process_server_config_line(&options, line, + "command-line", 0, NULL, NULL, &includes) != 0) + exit(1); + free(line); + break; + case 'V': + fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n", + SSH_VERSION, SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION); + exit(0); + default: + usage(); + break; + } + } + if (rexeced_flag || inetd_flag) + rexec_flag = 0; + if (!test_flag && rexec_flag && !path_absolute(av[0])) + fatal("sshd re-exec requires execution with an absolute path"); + if (rexeced_flag) + closefrom(REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD); + else + closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD); + + seed_rng(); + + /* If requested, redirect the logs to the specified logfile. */ + if (logfile != NULL) + log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile); + /* + * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host + * key (unless started from inetd) + */ + log_init(__progname, + options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ? + SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level, + options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ? + SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility, + log_stderr || !inetd_flag || debug_flag); + + /* + * Unset KRB5CCNAME, otherwise the user's session may inherit it from + * root's environment + */ + if (getenv("KRB5CCNAME") != NULL) + (void) unsetenv("KRB5CCNAME"); + + sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0; + + /* + * If we're not doing an extended test do not silently ignore connection + * test params. + */ + if (test_flag < 2 && connection_info != NULL) + fatal("Config test connection parameter (-C) provided without " + "test mode (-T)"); + + /* Fetch our configuration */ + if ((cfg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); + if (rexeced_flag) { + setproctitle("%s", "[rexeced]"); + recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, cfg); + if (!debug_flag) { + startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD); + close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD); + /* + * Signal parent that this child is at a point where + * they can go away if they have a SIGHUP pending. + */ + (void)atomicio(vwrite, startup_pipe, "\0", 1); + } + } else if (strcasecmp(config_file_name, "none") != 0) + load_server_config(config_file_name, cfg); + + parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name, + cfg, &includes, NULL, rexeced_flag); + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + if (options.moduli_file != NULL) + dh_set_moduli_file(options.moduli_file); +#endif + + /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */ + fill_default_server_options(&options); + + /* Check that options are sensible */ + if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL && + (options.authorized_keys_command != NULL && + strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_command, "none") != 0)) + fatal("AuthorizedKeysCommand set without " + "AuthorizedKeysCommandUser"); + if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL && + (options.authorized_principals_command != NULL && + strcasecmp(options.authorized_principals_command, "none") != 0)) + fatal("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand set without " + "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser"); + + /* + * Check whether there is any path through configured auth methods. + * Unfortunately it is not possible to verify this generally before + * daemonisation in the presence of Match block, but this catches + * and warns for trivial misconfigurations that could break login. + */ + if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) { + for (i = 0; i < options.num_auth_methods; i++) { + if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[i], + 1) == 0) + break; + } + if (i >= options.num_auth_methods) + fatal("AuthenticationMethods cannot be satisfied by " + "enabled authentication methods"); + } + + /* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */ + if (optind < ac) { + fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]); + exit(1); + } + + debug("sshd version %s, %s", SSH_VERSION, SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION); + + /* Store privilege separation user for later use if required. */ + privsep_chroot = use_privsep && (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0); + if ((privsep_pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL) { + if (privsep_chroot || options.kerberos_authentication) + fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist", + SSH_PRIVSEP_USER); + } else { + privsep_pw = pwcopy(privsep_pw); + freezero(privsep_pw->pw_passwd, strlen(privsep_pw->pw_passwd)); + privsep_pw->pw_passwd = xstrdup("*"); + } + endpwent(); + + /* load host keys */ + sensitive_data.host_keys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files, + sizeof(struct sshkey *)); + sensitive_data.host_pubkeys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files, + sizeof(struct sshkey *)); + + if (options.host_key_agent) { + if (strcmp(options.host_key_agent, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME)) + setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, + options.host_key_agent, 1); + if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(NULL)) == 0) + have_agent = 1; + else + error_r(r, "Could not connect to agent \"%s\"", + options.host_key_agent); + } + + for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { + int ll = options.host_key_file_userprovided[i] ? + SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR : SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; + + if (options.host_key_files[i] == NULL) + continue; + if ((r = sshkey_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", + &key, NULL)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR) + do_log2_r(r, ll, "Unable to load host key \"%s\"", + options.host_key_files[i]); + if (sshkey_is_sk(key) && + key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) { + debug("host key %s requires user presence, ignoring", + options.host_key_files[i]); + key->sk_flags &= ~SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD; + } + if (r == 0 && key != NULL && + (r = sshkey_shield_private(key)) != 0) { + do_log2_r(r, ll, "Unable to shield host key \"%s\"", + options.host_key_files[i]); + sshkey_free(key); + key = NULL; + } + if ((r = sshkey_load_public(options.host_key_files[i], + &pubkey, NULL)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR) + do_log2_r(r, ll, "Unable to load host key \"%s\"", + options.host_key_files[i]); + if (pubkey != NULL && key != NULL) { + if (!sshkey_equal(pubkey, key)) { + error("Public key for %s does not match " + "private key", options.host_key_files[i]); + sshkey_free(pubkey); + pubkey = NULL; + } + } + if (pubkey == NULL && key != NULL) { + if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &pubkey)) != 0) + fatal_r(r, "Could not demote key: \"%s\"", + options.host_key_files[i]); + } + if (pubkey != NULL && (r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(pubkey, + options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) { + error_fr(r, "Host key %s", options.host_key_files[i]); + sshkey_free(pubkey); + sshkey_free(key); + continue; + } + sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key; + sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = pubkey; + + if (key == NULL && pubkey != NULL && have_agent) { + debug("will rely on agent for hostkey %s", + options.host_key_files[i]); + keytype = pubkey->type; + } else if (key != NULL) { + keytype = key->type; + accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, key); + } else { + do_log2(ll, "Unable to load host key: %s", + options.host_key_files[i]); + sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; + sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = NULL; + continue; + } + + switch (keytype) { + case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_ECDSA: + case KEY_ED25519: + case KEY_ECDSA_SK: + case KEY_ED25519_SK: + case KEY_XMSS: + if (have_agent || key != NULL) + sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 1; + break; + } + if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(pubkey, options.fingerprint_hash, + SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) + fatal("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); + debug("%s host key #%d: %s %s", + key ? "private" : "agent", i, sshkey_ssh_name(pubkey), fp); + free(fp); + } + accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, NULL); + if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) { + logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting."); + exit(1); + } + + /* + * Load certificates. They are stored in an array at identical + * indices to the public keys that they relate to. + */ + sensitive_data.host_certificates = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files, + sizeof(struct sshkey *)); + for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) + sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL; + + for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_cert_files; i++) { + if (options.host_cert_files[i] == NULL) + continue; + if ((r = sshkey_load_public(options.host_cert_files[i], + &key, NULL)) != 0) { + error_r(r, "Could not load host certificate \"%s\"", + options.host_cert_files[i]); + continue; + } + if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) { + error("Certificate file is not a certificate: %s", + options.host_cert_files[i]); + sshkey_free(key); + continue; + } + /* Find matching private key */ + for (j = 0; j < options.num_host_key_files; j++) { + if (sshkey_equal_public(key, + sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[j])) { + sensitive_data.host_certificates[j] = key; + break; + } + } + if (j >= options.num_host_key_files) { + error("No matching private key for certificate: %s", + options.host_cert_files[i]); + sshkey_free(key); + continue; + } + sensitive_data.host_certificates[j] = key; + debug("host certificate: #%u type %d %s", j, key->type, + sshkey_type(key)); + } + + if (privsep_chroot) { + struct stat st; + + if ((stat(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, &st) == -1) || + (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) == 0)) + fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s", + _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR); + +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + if (check_ntsec(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) && + (st.st_uid != getuid () || + (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)) +#else + if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0) +#endif + fatal("%s must be owned by root and not group or " + "world-writable.", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR); + } + + if (test_flag > 1) { + /* + * If no connection info was provided by -C then use + * use a blank one that will cause no predicate to match. + */ + if (connection_info == NULL) + connection_info = get_connection_info(ssh, 0, 0); + connection_info->test = 1; + parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, connection_info); + dump_config(&options); + } + + /* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */ + if (test_flag) + exit(0); + + /* + * Clear out any supplemental groups we may have inherited. This + * prevents inadvertent creation of files with bad modes (in the + * portable version at least, it's certainly possible for PAM + * to create a file, and we can't control the code in every + * module which might be used). + */ + if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0) + debug("setgroups() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); + + if (rexec_flag) { + if (rexec_argc < 0) + fatal("rexec_argc %d < 0", rexec_argc); + rexec_argv = xcalloc(rexec_argc + 2, sizeof(char *)); + for (i = 0; i < (u_int)rexec_argc; i++) { + debug("rexec_argv[%d]='%s'", i, saved_argv[i]); + rexec_argv[i] = saved_argv[i]; + } + rexec_argv[rexec_argc] = "-R"; + rexec_argv[rexec_argc + 1] = NULL; + } + listener_proctitle = prepare_proctitle(ac, av); + + /* Ensure that umask disallows at least group and world write */ + new_umask = umask(0077) | 0022; + (void) umask(new_umask); + + /* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */ + if (debug_flag && (!inetd_flag || rexeced_flag)) + log_stderr = 1; + log_init(__progname, options.log_level, + options.log_facility, log_stderr); + for (i = 0; i < options.num_log_verbose; i++) + log_verbose_add(options.log_verbose[i]); + + /* + * If not in debugging mode, not started from inetd and not already + * daemonized (eg re-exec via SIGHUP), disconnect from the controlling + * terminal, and fork. The original process exits. + */ + already_daemon = daemonized(); + if (!(debug_flag || inetd_flag || no_daemon_flag || already_daemon)) { + + if (daemon(0, 0) == -1) + fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); + + disconnect_controlling_tty(); + } + /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */ + log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); + + /* + * Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be + * unmounted if desired. + */ + if (chdir("/") == -1) + error("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno)); + + /* ignore SIGPIPE */ + ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); + + /* Get a connection, either from inetd or a listening TCP socket */ + if (inetd_flag) { + server_accept_inetd(&sock_in, &sock_out); + } else { + platform_pre_listen(); + server_listen(); + + ssh_signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler); + ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); + ssh_signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler); + ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler); + + /* + * Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler + * is setup and the listen sockets are bound + */ + if (options.pid_file != NULL && !debug_flag) { + FILE *f = fopen(options.pid_file, "w"); + + if (f == NULL) { + error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s", + options.pid_file, strerror(errno)); + } else { + fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid()); + fclose(f); + } + } + + /* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */ + server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out, + &newsock, config_s); + } + + /* This is the child processing a new connection. */ + setproctitle("%s", "[accepted]"); + + /* + * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD + * setlogin() affects the entire process group. We don't + * want the child to be able to affect the parent. + */ + if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() == -1) + error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + + if (rexec_flag) { + debug("rexec start in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d", + sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]); + dup2(newsock, STDIN_FILENO); + dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO); + if (startup_pipe == -1) + close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD); + else if (startup_pipe != REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD) { + dup2(startup_pipe, REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD); + close(startup_pipe); + startup_pipe = REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD; + } + + dup2(config_s[1], REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD); + close(config_s[1]); + + ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* avoid reset to SIG_DFL */ + execv(rexec_argv[0], rexec_argv); + + /* Reexec has failed, fall back and continue */ + error("rexec of %s failed: %s", rexec_argv[0], strerror(errno)); + recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, NULL); + log_init(__progname, options.log_level, + options.log_facility, log_stderr); + + /* Clean up fds */ + close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD); + newsock = sock_out = sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO); + if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, 0) == -1) + error_f("stdfd_devnull failed"); + debug("rexec cleanup in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d", + sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]); + } + + /* Executed child processes don't need these. */ + fcntl(sock_out, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); + fcntl(sock_in, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); + + /* We will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense. */ + ssh_signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); + ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL); + ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); + ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL); + ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); + ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL); + + /* + * Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do + * not have a key. + */ + if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, sock_in, sock_out)) == NULL) + fatal("Unable to create connection"); + the_active_state = ssh; + ssh_packet_set_server(ssh); + + check_ip_options(ssh); + + /* Prepare the channels layer */ + channel_init_channels(ssh); + channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family); + process_channel_timeouts(ssh, &options); + process_permitopen(ssh, &options); + + /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */ + if (options.tcp_keep_alive && ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) && + setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) + error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + + if ((remote_port = ssh_remote_port(ssh)) < 0) { + debug("ssh_remote_port failed"); + cleanup_exit(255); + } + + if (options.routing_domain != NULL) + set_process_rdomain(ssh, options.routing_domain); + + /* + * The rest of the code depends on the fact that + * ssh_remote_ipaddr() caches the remote ip, even if + * the socket goes away. + */ + remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); + +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port); +#endif + + rdomain = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh); + + /* Log the connection. */ + laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock_in); + verbose("Connection from %s port %d on %s port %d%s%s%s", + remote_ip, remote_port, laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh), + rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain \"", + rdomain == NULL ? "" : rdomain, + rdomain == NULL ? "" : "\""); + free(laddr); + + /* + * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side + * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is + * cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero + * indicates no limit. Note that we don't set the alarm in debugging + * mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you + * are about to discover the bug. + */ + ssh_signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler); + if (!debug_flag) + alarm(options.login_grace_time); + + if ((r = kex_exchange_identification(ssh, -1, + options.version_addendum)) != 0) + sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "banner exchange"); + + ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(ssh); + + /* allocate authentication context */ + authctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*authctxt)); + ssh->authctxt = authctxt; + + authctxt->loginmsg = loginmsg; + + /* XXX global for cleanup, access from other modules */ + the_authctxt = authctxt; + + /* Set default key authentication options */ + if ((auth_opts = sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults()) == NULL) + fatal("allocation failed"); + + /* prepare buffer to collect messages to display to user after login */ + if ((loginmsg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); + auth_debug_reset(); + + if (use_privsep) { + if (privsep_preauth(ssh) == 1) + goto authenticated; + } else if (have_agent) { + if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock)) != 0) { + error_r(r, "Unable to get agent socket"); + have_agent = 0; + } + } + + /* perform the key exchange */ + /* authenticate user and start session */ + do_ssh2_kex(ssh); + do_authentication2(ssh); + + /* + * If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers + * the current keystate and exits + */ + if (use_privsep) { + mm_send_keystate(ssh, pmonitor); + ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); + exit(0); + } + + authenticated: + /* + * Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for + * authentication. + */ + alarm(0); + ssh_signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); + authctxt->authenticated = 1; + if (startup_pipe != -1) { + close(startup_pipe); + startup_pipe = -1; + } + +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + audit_event(ssh, SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS); +#endif + +#ifdef GSSAPI + if (options.gss_authentication) { + temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); + ssh_gssapi_storecreds(); + restore_uid(); + } +#endif +#ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) { + do_pam_setcred(1); + do_pam_session(ssh); + } +#endif + + /* + * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare + * file descriptor passing. + */ + if (use_privsep) { + privsep_postauth(ssh, authctxt); + /* the monitor process [priv] will not return */ + } + + ssh_packet_set_timeout(ssh, options.client_alive_interval, + options.client_alive_count_max); + + /* Try to send all our hostkeys to the client */ + notify_hostkeys(ssh); + + /* Start session. */ + do_authenticated(ssh, authctxt); + + /* The connection has been terminated. */ + ssh_packet_get_bytes(ssh, &ibytes, &obytes); + verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes", + (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes); + + verbose("Closing connection to %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port); + +#ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) + finish_pam(); +#endif /* USE_PAM */ + +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE)); +#endif + + ssh_packet_close(ssh); + + if (use_privsep) + mm_terminate(); + + exit(0); +} + +int +sshd_hostkey_sign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *privkey, + struct sshkey *pubkey, u_char **signature, size_t *slenp, + const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg) +{ + int r; + + if (use_privsep) { + if (privkey) { + if (mm_sshkey_sign(ssh, privkey, signature, slenp, + data, dlen, alg, options.sk_provider, NULL, + ssh->compat) < 0) + fatal_f("privkey sign failed"); + } else { + if (mm_sshkey_sign(ssh, pubkey, signature, slenp, + data, dlen, alg, options.sk_provider, NULL, + ssh->compat) < 0) + fatal_f("pubkey sign failed"); + } + } else { + if (privkey) { + if (sshkey_sign(privkey, signature, slenp, data, dlen, + alg, options.sk_provider, NULL, ssh->compat) < 0) + fatal_f("privkey sign failed"); + } else { + if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, pubkey, + signature, slenp, data, dlen, alg, + ssh->compat)) != 0) { + fatal_fr(r, "agent sign failed"); + } + } + } + return 0; +} + +/* SSH2 key exchange */ +static void +do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER }; + struct kex *kex; + char *prop_kex = NULL, *prop_enc = NULL, *prop_hostkey = NULL; + int r; + + myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, + options.kex_algorithms); + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = prop_enc = + compat_cipher_proposal(ssh, options.ciphers); + myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = + myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs; + + if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) { + myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = + myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none"; + } + + if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) + ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit, + options.rekey_interval); + + myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey = + compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, list_hostkey_types()); + + /* start key exchange */ + if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0) + fatal_r(r, "kex_setup"); + kex = ssh->kex; +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server; +# endif +#endif + kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server; + kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server; + kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type; + kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type; + kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index; + kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign; + + ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done); + +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */ + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "markus")) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || + (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "send test"); +#endif + free(prop_kex); + free(prop_enc); + free(prop_hostkey); + debug("KEX done"); +} + +/* server specific fatal cleanup */ +void +cleanup_exit(int i) +{ + if (the_active_state != NULL && the_authctxt != NULL) { + do_cleanup(the_active_state, the_authctxt); + if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth && + pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) { + debug("Killing privsep child %d", pmonitor->m_pid); + if (kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGKILL) != 0 && + errno != ESRCH) { + error_f("kill(%d): %s", pmonitor->m_pid, + strerror(errno)); + } + } + } +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + /* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */ + if (the_active_state != NULL && (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())) + audit_event(the_active_state, SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON); +#endif + _exit(i); +} |