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-rw-r--r--sshkey.c3663
1 files changed, 3663 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
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+++ b/sshkey.c
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+/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.134 2022/10/28 02:47:04 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Alexander von Gernler. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2010,2011 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "crypto_api.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+#include <util.h>
+#endif /* HAVE_UTIL_H */
+
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "ssh-sk.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_XMSS
+#include "sshkey-xmss.h"
+#include "xmss_fast.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+/* openssh private key file format */
+#define MARK_BEGIN "-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+#define MARK_END "-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+#define MARK_BEGIN_LEN (sizeof(MARK_BEGIN) - 1)
+#define MARK_END_LEN (sizeof(MARK_END) - 1)
+#define KDFNAME "bcrypt"
+#define AUTH_MAGIC "openssh-key-v1"
+#define SALT_LEN 16
+#define DEFAULT_CIPHERNAME "aes256-ctr"
+#define DEFAULT_ROUNDS 16
+
+/* Version identification string for SSH v1 identity files. */
+#define LEGACY_BEGIN "SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE FORMAT 1.1\n"
+
+/*
+ * Constants relating to "shielding" support; protection of keys expected
+ * to remain in memory for long durations
+ */
+#define SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN (16 * 1024)
+#define SSHKEY_SHIELD_CIPHER "aes256-ctr" /* XXX want AES-EME* */
+#define SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH SSH_DIGEST_SHA512
+
+int sshkey_private_serialize_opt(struct sshkey *key,
+ struct sshbuf *buf, enum sshkey_serialize_rep);
+static int sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *buf,
+ struct sshkey **keyp, int allow_cert);
+
+/* Supported key types */
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ed25519_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ed25519_cert_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ed25519_sk_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ed25519_sk_cert_impl;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+# ifdef ENABLE_SK
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_sk_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_sk_cert_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_sk_webauthn_impl;
+# endif /* ENABLE_SK */
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_nistp256_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_nistp256_cert_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_nistp384_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_nistp384_cert_impl;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_nistp521_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_nistp521_cert_impl;
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_rsa_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_rsa_cert_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_rsa_sha256_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_rsa_sha256_cert_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_rsa_sha512_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_rsa_sha512_cert_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_dss_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_dsa_cert_impl;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+#ifdef WITH_XMSS
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_xmss_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_xmss_cert_impl;
+#endif
+
+const struct sshkey_impl * const keyimpls[] = {
+ &sshkey_ed25519_impl,
+ &sshkey_ed25519_cert_impl,
+#ifdef ENABLE_SK
+ &sshkey_ed25519_sk_impl,
+ &sshkey_ed25519_sk_cert_impl,
+#endif
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ &sshkey_ecdsa_nistp256_impl,
+ &sshkey_ecdsa_nistp256_cert_impl,
+ &sshkey_ecdsa_nistp384_impl,
+ &sshkey_ecdsa_nistp384_cert_impl,
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
+ &sshkey_ecdsa_nistp521_impl,
+ &sshkey_ecdsa_nistp521_cert_impl,
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
+# ifdef ENABLE_SK
+ &sshkey_ecdsa_sk_impl,
+ &sshkey_ecdsa_sk_cert_impl,
+ &sshkey_ecdsa_sk_webauthn_impl,
+# endif /* ENABLE_SK */
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+ &sshkey_dss_impl,
+ &sshkey_dsa_cert_impl,
+ &sshkey_rsa_impl,
+ &sshkey_rsa_cert_impl,
+ &sshkey_rsa_sha256_impl,
+ &sshkey_rsa_sha256_cert_impl,
+ &sshkey_rsa_sha512_impl,
+ &sshkey_rsa_sha512_cert_impl,
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+#ifdef WITH_XMSS
+ &sshkey_xmss_impl,
+ &sshkey_xmss_cert_impl,
+#endif
+ NULL
+};
+
+static const struct sshkey_impl *
+sshkey_impl_from_type(int type)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; keyimpls[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ if (keyimpls[i]->type == type)
+ return keyimpls[i];
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static const struct sshkey_impl *
+sshkey_impl_from_type_nid(int type, int nid)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; keyimpls[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ if (keyimpls[i]->type == type &&
+ (keyimpls[i]->nid == 0 || keyimpls[i]->nid == nid))
+ return keyimpls[i];
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static const struct sshkey_impl *
+sshkey_impl_from_key(const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ if (k == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ return sshkey_impl_from_type_nid(k->type, k->ecdsa_nid);
+}
+
+const char *
+sshkey_type(const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+
+ if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(k)) == NULL)
+ return "unknown";
+ return impl->shortname;
+}
+
+static const char *
+sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(int type, int nid)
+{
+ const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+
+ if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_type_nid(type, nid)) == NULL)
+ return "ssh-unknown";
+ return impl->name;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_type_is_cert(int type)
+{
+ const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+
+ if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_type(type)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ return impl->cert;
+}
+
+const char *
+sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ return sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(k->type, k->ecdsa_nid);
+}
+
+const char *
+sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ return sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(sshkey_type_plain(k->type),
+ k->ecdsa_nid);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_type_from_name(const char *name)
+{
+ int i;
+ const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+
+ for (i = 0; keyimpls[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ impl = keyimpls[i];
+ /* Only allow shortname matches for plain key types */
+ if ((impl->name != NULL && strcmp(name, impl->name) == 0) ||
+ (!impl->cert && strcasecmp(impl->shortname, name) == 0))
+ return impl->type;
+ }
+ return KEY_UNSPEC;
+}
+
+static int
+key_type_is_ecdsa_variant(int type)
+{
+ switch (type) {
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *name)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; keyimpls[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ if (!key_type_is_ecdsa_variant(keyimpls[i]->type))
+ continue;
+ if (keyimpls[i]->name != NULL &&
+ strcmp(name, keyimpls[i]->name) == 0)
+ return keyimpls[i]->nid;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_match_keyname_to_sigalgs(const char *keyname, const char *sigalgs)
+{
+ int ktype;
+
+ if (sigalgs == NULL || *sigalgs == '\0' ||
+ (ktype = sshkey_type_from_name(keyname)) == KEY_UNSPEC)
+ return 0;
+ else if (ktype == KEY_RSA) {
+ return match_pattern_list("ssh-rsa", sigalgs, 0) == 1 ||
+ match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256", sigalgs, 0) == 1 ||
+ match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512", sigalgs, 0) == 1;
+ } else if (ktype == KEY_RSA_CERT) {
+ return match_pattern_list("ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com",
+ sigalgs, 0) == 1 ||
+ match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com",
+ sigalgs, 0) == 1 ||
+ match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com",
+ sigalgs, 0) == 1;
+ } else
+ return match_pattern_list(keyname, sigalgs, 0) == 1;
+}
+
+char *
+sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep)
+{
+ char *tmp, *ret = NULL;
+ size_t i, nlen, rlen = 0;
+ const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+
+ for (i = 0; keyimpls[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ impl = keyimpls[i];
+ if (impl->name == NULL)
+ continue;
+ if (!include_sigonly && impl->sigonly)
+ continue;
+ if ((certs_only && !impl->cert) || (plain_only && impl->cert))
+ continue;
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ ret[rlen++] = sep;
+ nlen = strlen(impl->name);
+ if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) {
+ free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret = tmp;
+ memcpy(ret + rlen, impl->name, nlen + 1);
+ rlen += nlen;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_names_valid2(const char *names, int allow_wildcard)
+{
+ char *s, *cp, *p;
+ const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+ int i, type;
+
+ if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if ((s = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
+ (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+ type = sshkey_type_from_name(p);
+ if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) {
+ if (allow_wildcard) {
+ /*
+ * Try matching key types against the string.
+ * If any has a positive or negative match then
+ * the component is accepted.
+ */
+ impl = NULL;
+ for (i = 0; keyimpls[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ if (match_pattern_list(
+ keyimpls[i]->name, p, 0) != 0) {
+ impl = keyimpls[i];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (impl != NULL)
+ continue;
+ }
+ free(s);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ free(s);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+u_int
+sshkey_size(const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+
+ if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(k)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (impl->funcs->size != NULL)
+ return impl->funcs->size(k);
+ return impl->keybits;
+}
+
+static int
+sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(int type)
+{
+ const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+
+ if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_type(type)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ /* All non-certificate types may act as CAs */
+ return !impl->cert;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ if (k == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ return sshkey_type_is_cert(k->type);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_is_sk(const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ if (k == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) {
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ return 1;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Return the cert-less equivalent to a certified key type */
+int
+sshkey_type_plain(int type)
+{
+ switch (type) {
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ return KEY_RSA;
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ return KEY_DSA;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ return KEY_ECDSA;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ return KEY_ECDSA_SK;
+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ return KEY_ED25519;
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
+ return KEY_ED25519_SK;
+ case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
+ return KEY_XMSS;
+ default:
+ return type;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Return the cert equivalent to a plain key type */
+static int
+sshkey_type_certified(int type)
+{
+ switch (type) {
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ return KEY_RSA_CERT;
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ return KEY_DSA_CERT;
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ return KEY_ECDSA_CERT;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ return KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT;
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ return KEY_ED25519_CERT;
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ return KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT;
+ case KEY_XMSS:
+ return KEY_XMSS_CERT;
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+/* XXX: these are really begging for a table-driven approach */
+int
+sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name)
+{
+ if (strcmp(name, "nistp256") == 0)
+ return NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+ else if (strcmp(name, "nistp384") == 0)
+ return NID_secp384r1;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
+ else if (strcmp(name, "nistp521") == 0)
+ return NID_secp521r1;
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
+ else
+ return -1;
+}
+
+u_int
+sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(int nid)
+{
+ switch (nid) {
+ case NID_X9_62_prime256v1:
+ return 256;
+ case NID_secp384r1:
+ return 384;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
+ case NID_secp521r1:
+ return 521;
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(int bits)
+{
+ switch (bits) {
+ case 256:
+ return NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+ case 384:
+ return NID_secp384r1;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
+ case 521:
+ return NID_secp521r1;
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+const char *
+sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(int nid)
+{
+ switch (nid) {
+ case NID_X9_62_prime256v1:
+ return "nistp256";
+ case NID_secp384r1:
+ return "nistp384";
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
+ case NID_secp521r1:
+ return "nistp521";
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
+ default:
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(int nid)
+{
+ int kbits = sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(nid);
+
+ if (kbits <= 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* RFC5656 section 6.2.1 */
+ if (kbits <= 256)
+ return SSH_DIGEST_SHA256;
+ else if (kbits <= 384)
+ return SSH_DIGEST_SHA384;
+ else
+ return SSH_DIGEST_SHA512;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+static void
+cert_free(struct sshkey_cert *cert)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ if (cert == NULL)
+ return;
+ sshbuf_free(cert->certblob);
+ sshbuf_free(cert->critical);
+ sshbuf_free(cert->extensions);
+ free(cert->key_id);
+ for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++)
+ free(cert->principals[i]);
+ free(cert->principals);
+ sshkey_free(cert->signature_key);
+ free(cert->signature_type);
+ freezero(cert, sizeof(*cert));
+}
+
+static struct sshkey_cert *
+cert_new(void)
+{
+ struct sshkey_cert *cert;
+
+ if ((cert = calloc(1, sizeof(*cert))) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if ((cert->certblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (cert->critical = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (cert->extensions = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ cert_free(cert);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ cert->key_id = NULL;
+ cert->principals = NULL;
+ cert->signature_key = NULL;
+ cert->signature_type = NULL;
+ return cert;
+}
+
+struct sshkey *
+sshkey_new(int type)
+{
+ struct sshkey *k;
+ const struct sshkey_impl *impl = NULL;
+
+ if (type != KEY_UNSPEC &&
+ (impl = sshkey_impl_from_type(type)) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* All non-certificate types may act as CAs */
+ if ((k = calloc(1, sizeof(*k))) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ k->type = type;
+ k->ecdsa_nid = -1;
+ if (impl != NULL && impl->funcs->alloc != NULL) {
+ if (impl->funcs->alloc(k) != 0) {
+ free(k);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (sshkey_is_cert(k)) {
+ if ((k->cert = cert_new()) == NULL) {
+ sshkey_free(k);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return k;
+}
+
+/* Frees common FIDO fields */
+void
+sshkey_sk_cleanup(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ free(k->sk_application);
+ sshbuf_free(k->sk_key_handle);
+ sshbuf_free(k->sk_reserved);
+ k->sk_application = NULL;
+ k->sk_key_handle = k->sk_reserved = NULL;
+}
+
+static void
+sshkey_free_contents(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+
+ if (k == NULL)
+ return;
+ if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_type(k->type)) != NULL &&
+ impl->funcs->cleanup != NULL)
+ impl->funcs->cleanup(k);
+ if (sshkey_is_cert(k))
+ cert_free(k->cert);
+ freezero(k->shielded_private, k->shielded_len);
+ freezero(k->shield_prekey, k->shield_prekey_len);
+}
+
+void
+sshkey_free(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ sshkey_free_contents(k);
+ freezero(k, sizeof(*k));
+}
+
+static int
+cert_compare(struct sshkey_cert *a, struct sshkey_cert *b)
+{
+ if (a == NULL && b == NULL)
+ return 1;
+ if (a == NULL || b == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (sshbuf_len(a->certblob) != sshbuf_len(b->certblob))
+ return 0;
+ if (timingsafe_bcmp(sshbuf_ptr(a->certblob), sshbuf_ptr(b->certblob),
+ sshbuf_len(a->certblob)) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Compares FIDO-specific pubkey fields only */
+int
+sshkey_sk_fields_equal(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b)
+{
+ if (a->sk_application == NULL || b->sk_application == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (strcmp(a->sk_application, b->sk_application) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare public portions of key only, allowing comparisons between
+ * certificates and plain keys too.
+ */
+int
+sshkey_equal_public(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b)
+{
+ const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+
+ if (a == NULL || b == NULL ||
+ sshkey_type_plain(a->type) != sshkey_type_plain(b->type))
+ return 0;
+ if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_type(a->type)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ return impl->funcs->equal(a, b);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_equal(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b)
+{
+ if (a == NULL || b == NULL || a->type != b->type)
+ return 0;
+ if (sshkey_is_cert(a)) {
+ if (!cert_compare(a->cert, b->cert))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return sshkey_equal_public(a, b);
+}
+
+
+/* Serialise common FIDO key parts */
+int
+sshkey_serialize_sk(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->sk_application)) != 0)
+ return r;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+to_blob_buf(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b, int force_plain,
+ enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
+{
+ int type, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ const char *typename;
+ const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+
+ if (key == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ type = force_plain ? sshkey_type_plain(key->type) : key->type;
+
+ if (sshkey_type_is_cert(type)) {
+ if (key->cert == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT;
+ if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB;
+ /* Use the existing blob */
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0)
+ return ret;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_type(type)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+
+ typename = sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(type, key->ecdsa_nid);
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0)
+ return ret;
+ return impl->funcs->serialize_public(key, b, opts);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_putb(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+ return to_blob_buf(key, b, 0, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_puts_opts(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b,
+ enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *tmp;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((tmp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ r = to_blob_buf(key, tmp, 0, opts);
+ if (r == 0)
+ r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, tmp);
+ sshbuf_free(tmp);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_puts(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+ return sshkey_puts_opts(key, b, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_putb_plain(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+ return to_blob_buf(key, b, 1, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
+}
+
+static int
+to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp, int force_plain,
+ enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
+{
+ int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ size_t len;
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = 0;
+ if (blobp != NULL)
+ *blobp = NULL;
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((ret = to_blob_buf(key, b, force_plain, opts)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ len = sshbuf_len(b);
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = len;
+ if (blobp != NULL) {
+ if ((*blobp = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(*blobp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len);
+ }
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp)
+{
+ return to_blob(key, blobp, lenp, 0, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_plain_to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp)
+{
+ return to_blob(key, blobp, lenp, 1, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_fingerprint_raw(const struct sshkey *k, int dgst_alg,
+ u_char **retp, size_t *lenp)
+{
+ u_char *blob = NULL, *ret = NULL;
+ size_t blob_len = 0;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if (retp != NULL)
+ *retp = NULL;
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = 0;
+ if (ssh_digest_bytes(dgst_alg) == 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = to_blob(k, &blob, &blob_len, 1, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT))
+ != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((ret = calloc(1, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(dgst_alg, blob, blob_len,
+ ret, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* success */
+ if (retp != NULL) {
+ *retp = ret;
+ ret = NULL;
+ }
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = ssh_digest_bytes(dgst_alg);
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ free(ret);
+ if (blob != NULL)
+ freezero(blob, blob_len);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static char *
+fingerprint_b64(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len)
+{
+ char *ret;
+ size_t plen = strlen(alg) + 1;
+ size_t rlen = ((dgst_raw_len + 2) / 3) * 4 + plen + 1;
+
+ if (dgst_raw_len > 65536 || (ret = calloc(1, rlen)) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ strlcpy(ret, alg, rlen);
+ strlcat(ret, ":", rlen);
+ if (dgst_raw_len == 0)
+ return ret;
+ if (b64_ntop(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, ret + plen, rlen - plen) == -1) {
+ freezero(ret, rlen);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* Trim padding characters from end */
+ ret[strcspn(ret, "=")] = '\0';
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static char *
+fingerprint_hex(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len)
+{
+ char *retval, hex[5];
+ size_t i, rlen = dgst_raw_len * 3 + strlen(alg) + 2;
+
+ if (dgst_raw_len > 65536 || (retval = calloc(1, rlen)) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ strlcpy(retval, alg, rlen);
+ strlcat(retval, ":", rlen);
+ for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) {
+ snprintf(hex, sizeof(hex), "%s%02x",
+ i > 0 ? ":" : "", dgst_raw[i]);
+ strlcat(retval, hex, rlen);
+ }
+ return retval;
+}
+
+static char *
+fingerprint_bubblebabble(u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len)
+{
+ char vowels[] = { 'a', 'e', 'i', 'o', 'u', 'y' };
+ char consonants[] = { 'b', 'c', 'd', 'f', 'g', 'h', 'k', 'l', 'm',
+ 'n', 'p', 'r', 's', 't', 'v', 'z', 'x' };
+ u_int i, j = 0, rounds, seed = 1;
+ char *retval;
+
+ rounds = (dgst_raw_len / 2) + 1;
+ if ((retval = calloc(rounds, 6)) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ retval[j++] = 'x';
+ for (i = 0; i < rounds; i++) {
+ u_int idx0, idx1, idx2, idx3, idx4;
+ if ((i + 1 < rounds) || (dgst_raw_len % 2 != 0)) {
+ idx0 = (((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) >> 6) & 3) +
+ seed) % 6;
+ idx1 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) >> 2) & 15;
+ idx2 = ((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) & 3) +
+ (seed / 6)) % 6;
+ retval[j++] = vowels[idx0];
+ retval[j++] = consonants[idx1];
+ retval[j++] = vowels[idx2];
+ if ((i + 1) < rounds) {
+ idx3 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1])) >> 4) & 15;
+ idx4 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1]))) & 15;
+ retval[j++] = consonants[idx3];
+ retval[j++] = '-';
+ retval[j++] = consonants[idx4];
+ seed = ((seed * 5) +
+ ((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) * 7) +
+ ((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1])))) % 36;
+ }
+ } else {
+ idx0 = seed % 6;
+ idx1 = 16;
+ idx2 = seed / 6;
+ retval[j++] = vowels[idx0];
+ retval[j++] = consonants[idx1];
+ retval[j++] = vowels[idx2];
+ }
+ }
+ retval[j++] = 'x';
+ retval[j++] = '\0';
+ return retval;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Draw an ASCII-Art representing the fingerprint so human brain can
+ * profit from its built-in pattern recognition ability.
+ * This technique is called "random art" and can be found in some
+ * scientific publications like this original paper:
+ *
+ * "Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security",
+ * Perrig A. and Song D., 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic
+ * Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99)
+ * sparrow.ece.cmu.edu/~adrian/projects/validation/validation.pdf
+ *
+ * The subject came up in a talk by Dan Kaminsky, too.
+ *
+ * If you see the picture is different, the key is different.
+ * If the picture looks the same, you still know nothing.
+ *
+ * The algorithm used here is a worm crawling over a discrete plane,
+ * leaving a trace (augmenting the field) everywhere it goes.
+ * Movement is taken from dgst_raw 2bit-wise. Bumping into walls
+ * makes the respective movement vector be ignored for this turn.
+ * Graphs are not unambiguous, because circles in graphs can be
+ * walked in either direction.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Field sizes for the random art. Have to be odd, so the starting point
+ * can be in the exact middle of the picture, and FLDBASE should be >=8 .
+ * Else pictures would be too dense, and drawing the frame would
+ * fail, too, because the key type would not fit in anymore.
+ */
+#define FLDBASE 8
+#define FLDSIZE_Y (FLDBASE + 1)
+#define FLDSIZE_X (FLDBASE * 2 + 1)
+static char *
+fingerprint_randomart(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len,
+ const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ /*
+ * Chars to be used after each other every time the worm
+ * intersects with itself. Matter of taste.
+ */
+ char *augmentation_string = " .o+=*BOX@%&#/^SE";
+ char *retval, *p, title[FLDSIZE_X], hash[FLDSIZE_X];
+ u_char field[FLDSIZE_X][FLDSIZE_Y];
+ size_t i, tlen, hlen;
+ u_int b;
+ int x, y, r;
+ size_t len = strlen(augmentation_string) - 1;
+
+ if ((retval = calloc((FLDSIZE_X + 3), (FLDSIZE_Y + 2))) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* initialize field */
+ memset(field, 0, FLDSIZE_X * FLDSIZE_Y * sizeof(char));
+ x = FLDSIZE_X / 2;
+ y = FLDSIZE_Y / 2;
+
+ /* process raw key */
+ for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) {
+ int input;
+ /* each byte conveys four 2-bit move commands */
+ input = dgst_raw[i];
+ for (b = 0; b < 4; b++) {
+ /* evaluate 2 bit, rest is shifted later */
+ x += (input & 0x1) ? 1 : -1;
+ y += (input & 0x2) ? 1 : -1;
+
+ /* assure we are still in bounds */
+ x = MAXIMUM(x, 0);
+ y = MAXIMUM(y, 0);
+ x = MINIMUM(x, FLDSIZE_X - 1);
+ y = MINIMUM(y, FLDSIZE_Y - 1);
+
+ /* augment the field */
+ if (field[x][y] < len - 2)
+ field[x][y]++;
+ input = input >> 2;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* mark starting point and end point*/
+ field[FLDSIZE_X / 2][FLDSIZE_Y / 2] = len - 1;
+ field[x][y] = len;
+
+ /* assemble title */
+ r = snprintf(title, sizeof(title), "[%s %u]",
+ sshkey_type(k), sshkey_size(k));
+ /* If [type size] won't fit, then try [type]; fits "[ED25519-CERT]" */
+ if (r < 0 || r > (int)sizeof(title))
+ r = snprintf(title, sizeof(title), "[%s]", sshkey_type(k));
+ tlen = (r <= 0) ? 0 : strlen(title);
+
+ /* assemble hash ID. */
+ r = snprintf(hash, sizeof(hash), "[%s]", alg);
+ hlen = (r <= 0) ? 0 : strlen(hash);
+
+ /* output upper border */
+ p = retval;
+ *p++ = '+';
+ for (i = 0; i < (FLDSIZE_X - tlen) / 2; i++)
+ *p++ = '-';
+ memcpy(p, title, tlen);
+ p += tlen;
+ for (i += tlen; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++)
+ *p++ = '-';
+ *p++ = '+';
+ *p++ = '\n';
+
+ /* output content */
+ for (y = 0; y < FLDSIZE_Y; y++) {
+ *p++ = '|';
+ for (x = 0; x < FLDSIZE_X; x++)
+ *p++ = augmentation_string[MINIMUM(field[x][y], len)];
+ *p++ = '|';
+ *p++ = '\n';
+ }
+
+ /* output lower border */
+ *p++ = '+';
+ for (i = 0; i < (FLDSIZE_X - hlen) / 2; i++)
+ *p++ = '-';
+ memcpy(p, hash, hlen);
+ p += hlen;
+ for (i += hlen; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++)
+ *p++ = '-';
+ *p++ = '+';
+
+ return retval;
+}
+
+char *
+sshkey_fingerprint(const struct sshkey *k, int dgst_alg,
+ enum sshkey_fp_rep dgst_rep)
+{
+ char *retval = NULL;
+ u_char *dgst_raw;
+ size_t dgst_raw_len;
+
+ if (sshkey_fingerprint_raw(k, dgst_alg, &dgst_raw, &dgst_raw_len) != 0)
+ return NULL;
+ switch (dgst_rep) {
+ case SSH_FP_DEFAULT:
+ if (dgst_alg == SSH_DIGEST_MD5) {
+ retval = fingerprint_hex(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg),
+ dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
+ } else {
+ retval = fingerprint_b64(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg),
+ dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSH_FP_HEX:
+ retval = fingerprint_hex(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg),
+ dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
+ break;
+ case SSH_FP_BASE64:
+ retval = fingerprint_b64(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg),
+ dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
+ break;
+ case SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE:
+ retval = fingerprint_bubblebabble(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
+ break;
+ case SSH_FP_RANDOMART:
+ retval = fingerprint_randomart(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg),
+ dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, k);
+ break;
+ default:
+ freezero(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ freezero(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
+ return retval;
+}
+
+static int
+peek_type_nid(const char *s, size_t l, int *nid)
+{
+ const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; keyimpls[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ impl = keyimpls[i];
+ if (impl->name == NULL || strlen(impl->name) != l)
+ continue;
+ if (memcmp(s, impl->name, l) == 0) {
+ *nid = -1;
+ if (key_type_is_ecdsa_variant(impl->type))
+ *nid = impl->nid;
+ return impl->type;
+ }
+ }
+ return KEY_UNSPEC;
+}
+
+/* XXX this can now be made const char * */
+int
+sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp)
+{
+ struct sshkey *k;
+ char *cp, *blobcopy;
+ size_t space;
+ int r, type, curve_nid = -1;
+ struct sshbuf *blob;
+
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if (ret->type != KEY_UNSPEC && sshkey_impl_from_type(ret->type) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ /* Decode type */
+ cp = *cpp;
+ space = strcspn(cp, " \t");
+ if (space == strlen(cp))
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ if ((type = peek_type_nid(cp, space, &curve_nid)) == KEY_UNSPEC)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+
+ /* skip whitespace */
+ for (cp += space; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+ ;
+ if (*cp == '\0')
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ if (ret->type != KEY_UNSPEC && ret->type != type)
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ if ((blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+
+ /* find end of keyblob and decode */
+ space = strcspn(cp, " \t");
+ if ((blobcopy = strndup(cp, space)) == NULL) {
+ sshbuf_free(blob);
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(blob, blobcopy)) != 0) {
+ free(blobcopy);
+ sshbuf_free(blob);
+ return r;
+ }
+ free(blobcopy);
+ if ((r = sshkey_fromb(blob, &k)) != 0) {
+ sshbuf_free(blob);
+ return r;
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(blob);
+
+ /* skip whitespace and leave cp at start of comment */
+ for (cp += space; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+ ;
+
+ /* ensure type of blob matches type at start of line */
+ if (k->type != type) {
+ sshkey_free(k);
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+ if (key_type_is_ecdsa_variant(type) && curve_nid != k->ecdsa_nid) {
+ sshkey_free(k);
+ return SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+ /* Fill in ret from parsed key */
+ sshkey_free_contents(ret);
+ *ret = *k;
+ freezero(k, sizeof(*k));
+
+ /* success */
+ *cpp = cp;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_to_base64(const struct sshkey *key, char **b64p)
+{
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ char *uu = NULL;
+
+ if (b64p != NULL)
+ *b64p = NULL;
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshkey_putb(key, b)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((uu = sshbuf_dtob64_string(b, 0)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Success */
+ if (b64p != NULL) {
+ *b64p = uu;
+ uu = NULL;
+ }
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ free(uu);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_format_text(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ char *uu = NULL;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &uu)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s %s",
+ sshkey_ssh_name(key), uu)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ free(uu);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *key, FILE *f)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshkey_format_text(key, b)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (fwrite(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), 1, f) != 1) {
+ if (feof(f))
+ errno = EPIPE;
+ r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return r;
+}
+
+const char *
+sshkey_cert_type(const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ switch (k->cert->type) {
+ case SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER:
+ return "user";
+ case SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST:
+ return "host";
+ default:
+ return "unknown";
+ }
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_check_rsa_length(const struct sshkey *k, int min_size)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
+ int nbits;
+
+ if (k == NULL || k->rsa == NULL ||
+ (k->type != KEY_RSA && k->type != KEY_RSA_CERT))
+ return 0;
+ RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
+ nbits = BN_num_bits(rsa_n);
+ if (nbits < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE ||
+ (min_size > 0 && nbits < min_size))
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+int
+sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(EC_KEY *k)
+{
+ EC_GROUP *eg;
+ int nids[] = {
+ NID_X9_62_prime256v1,
+ NID_secp384r1,
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
+ NID_secp521r1,
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
+ -1
+ };
+ int nid;
+ u_int i;
+ const EC_GROUP *g = EC_KEY_get0_group(k);
+
+ /*
+ * The group may be stored in a ASN.1 encoded private key in one of two
+ * ways: as a "named group", which is reconstituted by ASN.1 object ID
+ * or explicit group parameters encoded into the key blob. Only the
+ * "named group" case sets the group NID for us, but we can figure
+ * it out for the other case by comparing against all the groups that
+ * are supported.
+ */
+ if ((nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(g)) > 0)
+ return nid;
+ for (i = 0; nids[i] != -1; i++) {
+ if ((eg = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nids[i])) == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ if (EC_GROUP_cmp(g, eg, NULL) == 0)
+ break;
+ EC_GROUP_free(eg);
+ }
+ if (nids[i] != -1) {
+ /* Use the group with the NID attached */
+ EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(eg, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
+ if (EC_KEY_set_group(k, eg) != 1) {
+ EC_GROUP_free(eg);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ return nids[i];
+}
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+int
+sshkey_generate(int type, u_int bits, struct sshkey **keyp)
+{
+ struct sshkey *k;
+ int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+
+ if (keyp == NULL || sshkey_type_is_cert(type))
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ *keyp = NULL;
+ if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_type(type)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ if (impl->funcs->generate == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
+ if ((k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ k->type = type;
+ if ((ret = impl->funcs->generate(k, bits)) != 0) {
+ sshkey_free(k);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ *keyp = k;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_cert_copy(const struct sshkey *from_key, struct sshkey *to_key)
+{
+ u_int i;
+ const struct sshkey_cert *from;
+ struct sshkey_cert *to;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if (to_key == NULL || (from = from_key->cert) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ if ((to = cert_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_putb(to->certblob, from->certblob)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_putb(to->critical, from->critical)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_putb(to->extensions, from->extensions)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ to->serial = from->serial;
+ to->type = from->type;
+ if (from->key_id == NULL)
+ to->key_id = NULL;
+ else if ((to->key_id = strdup(from->key_id)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ to->valid_after = from->valid_after;
+ to->valid_before = from->valid_before;
+ if (from->signature_key == NULL)
+ to->signature_key = NULL;
+ else if ((r = sshkey_from_private(from->signature_key,
+ &to->signature_key)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (from->signature_type != NULL &&
+ (to->signature_type = strdup(from->signature_type)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (from->nprincipals > SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (from->nprincipals > 0) {
+ if ((to->principals = calloc(from->nprincipals,
+ sizeof(*to->principals))) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < from->nprincipals; i++) {
+ to->principals[i] = strdup(from->principals[i]);
+ if (to->principals[i] == NULL) {
+ to->nprincipals = i;
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ to->nprincipals = from->nprincipals;
+
+ /* success */
+ cert_free(to_key->cert);
+ to_key->cert = to;
+ to = NULL;
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ cert_free(to);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_copy_public_sk(const struct sshkey *from, struct sshkey *to)
+{
+ /* Append security-key application string */
+ if ((to->sk_application = strdup(from->sk_application)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey **pkp)
+{
+ struct sshkey *n = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+
+ *pkp = NULL;
+ if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(k)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = impl->funcs->copy_public(k, n)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (sshkey_is_cert(k) && (r = sshkey_cert_copy(k, n)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* success */
+ *pkp = n;
+ n = NULL;
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshkey_free(n);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_is_shielded(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ return k != NULL && k->shielded_private != NULL;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_shield_private(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *prvbuf = NULL;
+ u_char *prekey = NULL, *enc = NULL, keyiv[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ struct sshcipher_ctx *cctx = NULL;
+ const struct sshcipher *cipher;
+ size_t i, enclen = 0;
+ struct sshkey *kswap = NULL, tmp;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: entering for %s\n", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(k));
+#endif
+ if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(SSHKEY_SHIELD_CIPHER)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (cipher_keylen(cipher) + cipher_ivlen(cipher) >
+ ssh_digest_bytes(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Prepare a random pre-key, and from it an ephemeral key */
+ if ((prekey = malloc(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ arc4random_buf(prekey, SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN);
+ if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH,
+ prekey, SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN,
+ keyiv, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: key+iv\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump_data(keyiv, ssh_digest_bytes(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH),
+ stderr);
+#endif
+ if ((r = cipher_init(&cctx, cipher, keyiv, cipher_keylen(cipher),
+ keyiv + cipher_keylen(cipher), cipher_ivlen(cipher), 1)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Serialise and encrypt the private key using the ephemeral key */
+ if ((prvbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshkey_is_shielded(k) && (r = sshkey_unshield_private(k)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize_opt(k, prvbuf,
+ SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_SHIELD)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* pad to cipher blocksize */
+ i = 0;
+ while (sshbuf_len(prvbuf) % cipher_blocksize(cipher)) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(prvbuf, ++i & 0xff)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: serialised\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump(prvbuf, stderr);
+#endif
+ /* encrypt */
+ enclen = sshbuf_len(prvbuf);
+ if ((enc = malloc(enclen)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = cipher_crypt(cctx, 0, enc,
+ sshbuf_ptr(prvbuf), sshbuf_len(prvbuf), 0, 0)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: encrypted\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump_data(enc, enclen, stderr);
+#endif
+
+ /* Make a scrubbed, public-only copy of our private key argument */
+ if ((r = sshkey_from_private(k, &kswap)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Swap the private key out (it will be destroyed below) */
+ tmp = *kswap;
+ *kswap = *k;
+ *k = tmp;
+
+ /* Insert the shielded key into our argument */
+ k->shielded_private = enc;
+ k->shielded_len = enclen;
+ k->shield_prekey = prekey;
+ k->shield_prekey_len = SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN;
+ enc = prekey = NULL; /* transferred */
+ enclen = 0;
+
+ /* preserve key fields that are required for correct operation */
+ k->sk_flags = kswap->sk_flags;
+
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+
+ out:
+ /* XXX behaviour on error - invalidate original private key? */
+ cipher_free(cctx);
+ explicit_bzero(keyiv, sizeof(keyiv));
+ explicit_bzero(&tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+ freezero(enc, enclen);
+ freezero(prekey, SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN);
+ sshkey_free(kswap);
+ sshbuf_free(prvbuf);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* Check deterministic padding after private key */
+static int
+private2_check_padding(struct sshbuf *decrypted)
+{
+ u_char pad;
+ size_t i;
+ int r;
+
+ i = 0;
+ while (sshbuf_len(decrypted)) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(decrypted, &pad)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (pad != (++i & 0xff)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(&pad, sizeof(pad));
+ explicit_bzero(&i, sizeof(i));
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_unshield_private(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *prvbuf = NULL;
+ u_char *cp, keyiv[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ struct sshcipher_ctx *cctx = NULL;
+ const struct sshcipher *cipher;
+ struct sshkey *kswap = NULL, tmp;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: entering for %s\n", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(k));
+#endif
+ if (!sshkey_is_shielded(k))
+ return 0; /* nothing to do */
+
+ if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(SSHKEY_SHIELD_CIPHER)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (cipher_keylen(cipher) + cipher_ivlen(cipher) >
+ ssh_digest_bytes(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* check size of shielded key blob */
+ if (k->shielded_len < cipher_blocksize(cipher) ||
+ (k->shielded_len % cipher_blocksize(cipher)) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Calculate the ephemeral key from the prekey */
+ if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH,
+ k->shield_prekey, k->shield_prekey_len,
+ keyiv, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = cipher_init(&cctx, cipher, keyiv, cipher_keylen(cipher),
+ keyiv + cipher_keylen(cipher), cipher_ivlen(cipher), 0)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: key+iv\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump_data(keyiv, ssh_digest_bytes(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH),
+ stderr);
+#endif
+
+ /* Decrypt and parse the shielded private key using the ephemeral key */
+ if ((prvbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(prvbuf, k->shielded_len, &cp)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* decrypt */
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: encrypted\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump_data(k->shielded_private, k->shielded_len, stderr);
+#endif
+ if ((r = cipher_crypt(cctx, 0, cp,
+ k->shielded_private, k->shielded_len, 0, 0)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: serialised\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump(prvbuf, stderr);
+#endif
+ /* Parse private key */
+ if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(prvbuf, &kswap)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = private2_check_padding(prvbuf)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Swap the parsed key back into place */
+ tmp = *kswap;
+ *kswap = *k;
+ *k = tmp;
+
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+
+ out:
+ cipher_free(cctx);
+ explicit_bzero(keyiv, sizeof(keyiv));
+ explicit_bzero(&tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+ sshkey_free(kswap);
+ sshbuf_free(prvbuf);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+cert_parse(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *certbuf)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *principals = NULL, *crit = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *exts = NULL, *ca = NULL;
+ u_char *sig = NULL;
+ size_t signed_len = 0, slen = 0, kidlen = 0;
+ int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ /* Copy the entire key blob for verification and later serialisation */
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(key->cert->certblob, certbuf)) != 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* Parse body of certificate up to signature */
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->serial)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &key->cert->type)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &key->cert->key_id, &kidlen)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &principals)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->valid_after)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->valid_before)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &crit)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &exts)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &ca)) != 0) {
+ /* XXX debug print error for ret */
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Signature is left in the buffer so we can calculate this length */
+ signed_len = sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) - sshbuf_len(b);
+
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string(b, &sig, &slen)) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER &&
+ key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_UNKNOWN_TYPE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Parse principals section */
+ while (sshbuf_len(principals) > 0) {
+ char *principal = NULL;
+ char **oprincipals = NULL;
+
+ if (key->cert->nprincipals >= SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_get_cstring(principals, &principal,
+ NULL)) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ oprincipals = key->cert->principals;
+ key->cert->principals = recallocarray(key->cert->principals,
+ key->cert->nprincipals, key->cert->nprincipals + 1,
+ sizeof(*key->cert->principals));
+ if (key->cert->principals == NULL) {
+ free(principal);
+ key->cert->principals = oprincipals;
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ key->cert->principals[key->cert->nprincipals++] = principal;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Stash a copies of the critical options and extensions sections
+ * for later use.
+ */
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(key->cert->critical, crit)) != 0 ||
+ (exts != NULL &&
+ (ret = sshbuf_putb(key->cert->extensions, exts)) != 0))
+ goto out;
+
+ /*
+ * Validate critical options and extensions sections format.
+ */
+ while (sshbuf_len(crit) != 0) {
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(crit, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(crit, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
+ sshbuf_reset(key->cert->critical);
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ while (exts != NULL && sshbuf_len(exts) != 0) {
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(exts, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(exts, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
+ sshbuf_reset(key->cert->extensions);
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Parse CA key and check signature */
+ if (sshkey_from_blob_internal(ca, &key->cert->signature_key, 0) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (!sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(key->cert->signature_key->type)) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((ret = sshkey_verify(key->cert->signature_key, sig, slen,
+ sshbuf_ptr(key->cert->certblob), signed_len, NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((ret = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, slen,
+ &key->cert->signature_type)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Success */
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(ca);
+ sshbuf_free(crit);
+ sshbuf_free(exts);
+ sshbuf_free(principals);
+ free(sig);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_deserialize_sk(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key)
+{
+ /* Parse additional security-key application string */
+ if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &key->sk_application, NULL) != 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp,
+ int allow_cert)
+{
+ int type, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ char *ktype = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *copy;
+ const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK /* XXX */
+ sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
+#endif
+ if (keyp != NULL)
+ *keyp = NULL;
+ if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(b)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ type = sshkey_type_from_name(ktype);
+ if (!allow_cert && sshkey_type_is_cert(type)) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_type(type)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshkey_type_is_cert(type)) {
+ /* Skip nonce that preceeds all certificates */
+ if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((ret = impl->funcs->deserialize_public(ktype, b, key)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Parse certificate potion */
+ if (sshkey_is_cert(key) && (ret = cert_parse(b, key, copy)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (key != NULL && sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = 0;
+ if (keyp != NULL) {
+ *keyp = key;
+ key = NULL;
+ }
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(copy);
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ free(ktype);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *blob, size_t blen, struct sshkey **keyp)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((b = sshbuf_from(blob, blen)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ r = sshkey_from_blob_internal(b, keyp, 1);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp)
+{
+ return sshkey_from_blob_internal(b, keyp, 1);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_froms(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **keyp)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_froms(buf, &b)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ r = sshkey_from_blob_internal(b, keyp, 1);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_get_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, char **sigtypep)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ char *sigtype = NULL;
+
+ if (sigtypep != NULL)
+ *sigtypep = NULL;
+ if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &sigtype, NULL)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* success */
+ if (sigtypep != NULL) {
+ *sigtypep = sigtype;
+ sigtype = NULL;
+ }
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ free(sigtype);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ *
+ * Checks whether a certificate's signature type is allowed.
+ * Returns 0 (success) if the certificate signature type appears in the
+ * "allowed" pattern-list, or the key is not a certificate to begin with.
+ * Otherwise returns a ssherr.h code.
+ */
+int
+sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(const struct sshkey *key, const char *allowed)
+{
+ if (key == NULL || allowed == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if (!sshkey_type_is_cert(key->type))
+ return 0;
+ if (key->cert == NULL || key->cert->signature_type == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if (match_pattern_list(key->cert->signature_type, allowed, 0) != 1)
+ return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the expected signature algorithm for a given public key algorithm.
+ */
+const char *
+sshkey_sigalg_by_name(const char *name)
+{
+ const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; keyimpls[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ impl = keyimpls[i];
+ if (strcmp(impl->name, name) != 0)
+ continue;
+ if (impl->sigalg != NULL)
+ return impl->sigalg;
+ if (!impl->cert)
+ return impl->name;
+ return sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(
+ sshkey_type_plain(impl->type), impl->nid);
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verifies that the signature algorithm appearing inside the signature blob
+ * matches that which was requested.
+ */
+int
+sshkey_check_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
+ const char *requested_alg)
+{
+ const char *expected_alg;
+ char *sigtype = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if (requested_alg == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if ((expected_alg = sshkey_sigalg_by_name(requested_alg)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if ((r = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, siglen, &sigtype)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ r = strcmp(expected_alg, sigtype) == 0;
+ free(sigtype);
+ return r ? 0 : SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *key,
+ u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+ const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, u_int compat)
+{
+ int was_shielded = sshkey_is_shielded(key);
+ int r2, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+
+ if (sigp != NULL)
+ *sigp = NULL;
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = 0;
+ if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ if ((r = sshkey_unshield_private(key)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (sshkey_is_sk(key)) {
+ r = sshsk_sign(sk_provider, key, sigp, lenp, data,
+ datalen, compat, sk_pin);
+ } else {
+ if (impl->funcs->sign == NULL)
+ r = SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
+ else {
+ r = impl->funcs->sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen,
+ alg, sk_provider, sk_pin, compat);
+ }
+ }
+ if (was_shielded && (r2 = sshkey_shield_private(key)) != 0)
+ return r2;
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ssh_key_verify returns 0 for a correct signature and < 0 on error.
+ * If "alg" specified, then the signature must use that algorithm.
+ */
+int
+sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
+ const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int compat,
+ struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
+{
+ const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+
+ if (detailsp != NULL)
+ *detailsp = NULL;
+ if (siglen == 0 || dlen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ return impl->funcs->verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen,
+ alg, compat, detailsp);
+}
+
+/* Convert a plain key to their _CERT equivalent */
+int
+sshkey_to_certified(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ int newtype;
+
+ if ((newtype = sshkey_type_certified(k->type)) == -1)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if ((k->cert = cert_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ k->type = newtype;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Convert a certificate to its raw key equivalent */
+int
+sshkey_drop_cert(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ if (!sshkey_type_is_cert(k->type))
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ cert_free(k->cert);
+ k->cert = NULL;
+ k->type = sshkey_type_plain(k->type);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Sign a certified key, (re-)generating the signed certblob. */
+int
+sshkey_certify_custom(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *ca, const char *alg,
+ const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin,
+ sshkey_certify_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx)
+{
+ const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+ struct sshbuf *principals = NULL;
+ u_char *ca_blob = NULL, *sig_blob = NULL, nonce[32];
+ size_t i, ca_len, sig_len;
+ int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ struct sshbuf *cert = NULL;
+ char *sigtype = NULL;
+
+ if (k == NULL || k->cert == NULL ||
+ k->cert->certblob == NULL || ca == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if (!sshkey_is_cert(k))
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ if (!sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(ca->type))
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
+ if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(k)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ /*
+ * If no alg specified as argument but a signature_type was set,
+ * then prefer that. If both were specified, then they must match.
+ */
+ if (alg == NULL)
+ alg = k->cert->signature_type;
+ else if (k->cert->signature_type != NULL &&
+ strcmp(alg, k->cert->signature_type) != 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ /*
+ * If no signing algorithm or signature_type was specified and we're
+ * using a RSA key, then default to a good signature algorithm.
+ */
+ if (alg == NULL && ca->type == KEY_RSA)
+ alg = "rsa-sha2-512";
+
+ if ((ret = sshkey_to_blob(ca, &ca_blob, &ca_len)) != 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
+
+ cert = k->cert->certblob; /* for readability */
+ sshbuf_reset(cert);
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, sshkey_ssh_name(k))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* -v01 certs put nonce first */
+ arc4random_buf(&nonce, sizeof(nonce));
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, nonce, sizeof(nonce))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Public key next */
+ if ((ret = impl->funcs->serialize_public(k, cert,
+ SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Then remaining cert fields */
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->serial)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_u32(cert, k->cert->type)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, k->cert->key_id)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((principals = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < k->cert->nprincipals; i++) {
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(principals,
+ k->cert->principals[i])) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, principals)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->valid_after)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->valid_before)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, k->cert->critical)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, k->cert->extensions)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* Reserved */
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, ca_blob, ca_len)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Sign the whole mess */
+ if ((ret = signer(ca, &sig_blob, &sig_len, sshbuf_ptr(cert),
+ sshbuf_len(cert), alg, sk_provider, sk_pin, 0, signer_ctx)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* Check and update signature_type against what was actually used */
+ if ((ret = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig_blob, sig_len, &sigtype)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (alg != NULL && strcmp(alg, sigtype) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (k->cert->signature_type == NULL) {
+ k->cert->signature_type = sigtype;
+ sigtype = NULL;
+ }
+ /* Append signature and we are done */
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, sig_blob, sig_len)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ if (ret != 0)
+ sshbuf_reset(cert);
+ free(sig_blob);
+ free(ca_blob);
+ free(sigtype);
+ sshbuf_free(principals);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+default_key_sign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+ const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin,
+ u_int compat, void *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ return sshkey_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg,
+ sk_provider, sk_pin, compat);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *ca, const char *alg,
+ const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin)
+{
+ return sshkey_certify_custom(k, ca, alg, sk_provider, sk_pin,
+ default_key_sign, NULL);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_cert_check_authority(const struct sshkey *k,
+ int want_host, int require_principal, int wildcard_pattern,
+ uint64_t verify_time, const char *name, const char **reason)
+{
+ u_int i, principal_matches;
+
+ if (reason == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if (!sshkey_is_cert(k)) {
+ *reason = "Key is not a certificate";
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+ }
+ if (want_host) {
+ if (k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST) {
+ *reason = "Certificate invalid: not a host certificate";
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) {
+ *reason = "Certificate invalid: not a user certificate";
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+ }
+ }
+ if (verify_time < k->cert->valid_after) {
+ *reason = "Certificate invalid: not yet valid";
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+ }
+ if (verify_time >= k->cert->valid_before) {
+ *reason = "Certificate invalid: expired";
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+ }
+ if (k->cert->nprincipals == 0) {
+ if (require_principal) {
+ *reason = "Certificate lacks principal list";
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+ }
+ } else if (name != NULL) {
+ principal_matches = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < k->cert->nprincipals; i++) {
+ if (wildcard_pattern) {
+ if (match_pattern(k->cert->principals[i],
+ name)) {
+ principal_matches = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else if (strcmp(name, k->cert->principals[i]) == 0) {
+ principal_matches = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!principal_matches) {
+ *reason = "Certificate invalid: name is not a listed "
+ "principal";
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_cert_check_authority_now(const struct sshkey *k,
+ int want_host, int require_principal, int wildcard_pattern,
+ const char *name, const char **reason)
+{
+ time_t now;
+
+ if ((now = time(NULL)) < 0) {
+ /* yikes - system clock before epoch! */
+ *reason = "Certificate invalid: not yet valid";
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+ }
+ return sshkey_cert_check_authority(k, want_host, require_principal,
+ wildcard_pattern, (uint64_t)now, name, reason);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_cert_check_host(const struct sshkey *key, const char *host,
+ int wildcard_principals, const char *ca_sign_algorithms,
+ const char **reason)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_cert_check_authority_now(key, 1, 0, wildcard_principals,
+ host, reason)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->critical) != 0) {
+ *reason = "Certificate contains unsupported critical options";
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+ }
+ if (ca_sign_algorithms != NULL &&
+ (r = sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(key, ca_sign_algorithms)) != 0) {
+ *reason = "Certificate signed with disallowed algorithm";
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+size_t
+sshkey_format_cert_validity(const struct sshkey_cert *cert, char *s, size_t l)
+{
+ char from[32], to[32], ret[128];
+
+ *from = *to = '\0';
+ if (cert->valid_after == 0 &&
+ cert->valid_before == 0xffffffffffffffffULL)
+ return strlcpy(s, "forever", l);
+
+ if (cert->valid_after != 0)
+ format_absolute_time(cert->valid_after, from, sizeof(from));
+ if (cert->valid_before != 0xffffffffffffffffULL)
+ format_absolute_time(cert->valid_before, to, sizeof(to));
+
+ if (cert->valid_after == 0)
+ snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "before %s", to);
+ else if (cert->valid_before == 0xffffffffffffffffULL)
+ snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "after %s", from);
+ else
+ snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "from %s to %s", from, to);
+
+ return strlcpy(s, ret, l);
+}
+
+/* Common serialization for FIDO private keys */
+int
+sshkey_serialize_private_sk(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->sk_application)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, key->sk_flags)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_key_handle)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_reserved)) != 0)
+ return r;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_private_serialize_opt(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
+ enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
+{
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ int was_shielded = sshkey_is_shielded(key);
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+
+ if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ if ((r = sshkey_unshield_private(key)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+ if (key->cert == NULL ||
+ sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = impl->funcs->serialize_private(key, b, opts)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /*
+ * success (but we still need to append the output to buf after
+ * possibly re-shielding the private key)
+ */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ if (was_shielded)
+ r = sshkey_shield_private(key);
+ if (r == 0)
+ r = sshbuf_putb(buf, b);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_private_serialize(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+ return sshkey_private_serialize_opt(key, b,
+ SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
+}
+
+/* Shared deserialization of FIDO private key components */
+int
+sshkey_private_deserialize_sk(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((k->sk_key_handle = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (k->sk_reserved = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &k->sk_application, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &k->sk_flags)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(buf, k->sk_key_handle)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(buf, k->sk_reserved)) != 0)
+ return r;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **kp)
+{
+ const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+ char *tname = NULL;
+ char *expect_sk_application = NULL;
+ u_char *expect_ed25519_pk = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *k = NULL;
+ int type, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if (kp != NULL)
+ *kp = NULL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &tname, NULL)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ type = sshkey_type_from_name(tname);
+ if (sshkey_type_is_cert(type)) {
+ /*
+ * Certificate key private keys begin with the certificate
+ * itself. Make sure this matches the type of the enclosing
+ * private key.
+ */
+ if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (k->type != type) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* For ECDSA keys, the group must match too */
+ if (k->type == KEY_ECDSA &&
+ k->ecdsa_nid != sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(tname)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Several fields are redundant between certificate and
+ * private key body, we require these to match.
+ */
+ expect_sk_application = k->sk_application;
+ expect_ed25519_pk = k->ed25519_pk;
+ k->sk_application = NULL;
+ k->ed25519_pk = NULL;
+ /* XXX xmss too or refactor */
+ } else {
+ if ((k = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_type(type)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = impl->funcs->deserialize_private(tname, buf, k)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* XXX xmss too or refactor */
+ if ((expect_sk_application != NULL && (k->sk_application == NULL ||
+ strcmp(expect_sk_application, k->sk_application) != 0)) ||
+ (expect_ed25519_pk != NULL && (k->ed25519_pk == NULL ||
+ memcmp(expect_ed25519_pk, k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ) != 0))) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ if (kp != NULL) {
+ *kp = k;
+ k = NULL;
+ }
+ out:
+ free(tname);
+ sshkey_free(k);
+ free(expect_sk_application);
+ free(expect_ed25519_pk);
+ return r;
+}
+
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+int
+sshkey_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *public)
+{
+ EC_POINT *nq = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *order = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
+ int ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE;
+
+ /*
+ * NB. This assumes OpenSSL has already verified that the public
+ * point lies on the curve. This is done by EC_POINT_oct2point()
+ * implicitly calling EC_POINT_is_on_curve(). If this code is ever
+ * reachable with public points not unmarshalled using
+ * EC_POINT_oct2point then the caller will need to explicitly check.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * We shouldn't ever hit this case because bignum_get_ecpoint()
+ * refuses to load GF2m points.
+ */
+ if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
+ NID_X9_62_prime_field)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Q != infinity */
+ if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, public))
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((x = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (y = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (order = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* log2(x) > log2(order)/2, log2(y) > log2(order)/2 */
+ if (EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, NULL) != 1 ||
+ EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, public,
+ x, y, NULL) != 1) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (BN_num_bits(x) <= BN_num_bits(order) / 2 ||
+ BN_num_bits(y) <= BN_num_bits(order) / 2)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* nQ == infinity (n == order of subgroup) */
+ if ((nq = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EC_POINT_mul(group, nq, NULL, public, order, NULL) != 1) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, nq) != 1)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* x < order - 1, y < order - 1 */
+ if (!BN_sub(tmp, order, BN_value_one())) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (BN_cmp(x, tmp) >= 0 || BN_cmp(y, tmp) >= 0)
+ goto out;
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ BN_clear_free(x);
+ BN_clear_free(y);
+ BN_clear_free(order);
+ BN_clear_free(tmp);
+ EC_POINT_free(nq);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ BIGNUM *order = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
+ int ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE;
+
+ if ((order = BN_new()) == NULL || (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* log2(private) > log2(order)/2 */
+ if (EC_GROUP_get_order(EC_KEY_get0_group(key), order, NULL) != 1) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (BN_num_bits(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)) <=
+ BN_num_bits(order) / 2)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* private < order - 1 */
+ if (!BN_sub(tmp, order, BN_value_one())) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (BN_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key), tmp) >= 0)
+ goto out;
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ BN_clear_free(order);
+ BN_clear_free(tmp);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void
+sshkey_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point)
+{
+ BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL;
+
+ if (point == NULL) {
+ fputs("point=(NULL)\n", stderr);
+ return;
+ }
+ if ((x = BN_new()) == NULL || (y = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: BN_new failed\n", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
+ NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: group is not a prime field\n", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point,
+ x, y, NULL) != 1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp\n",
+ __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ fputs("x=", stderr);
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, x);
+ fputs("\ny=", stderr);
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, y);
+ fputs("\n", stderr);
+ out:
+ BN_clear_free(x);
+ BN_clear_free(y);
+}
+
+void
+sshkey_dump_ec_key(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ const BIGNUM *exponent;
+
+ sshkey_dump_ec_point(EC_KEY_get0_group(key),
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key));
+ fputs("exponent=", stderr);
+ if ((exponent = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)) == NULL)
+ fputs("(NULL)", stderr);
+ else
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key));
+ fputs("\n", stderr);
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+
+static int
+sshkey_private_to_blob2(struct sshkey *prv, struct sshbuf *blob,
+ const char *passphrase, const char *comment, const char *ciphername,
+ int rounds)
+{
+ u_char *cp, *key = NULL, *pubkeyblob = NULL;
+ u_char salt[SALT_LEN];
+ char *b64 = NULL;
+ size_t i, pubkeylen, keylen, ivlen, blocksize, authlen;
+ u_int check;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL;
+ const struct sshcipher *cipher;
+ const char *kdfname = KDFNAME;
+ struct sshbuf *encoded = NULL, *encrypted = NULL, *kdf = NULL;
+
+ if (rounds <= 0)
+ rounds = DEFAULT_ROUNDS;
+ if (passphrase == NULL || !strlen(passphrase)) {
+ ciphername = "none";
+ kdfname = "none";
+ } else if (ciphername == NULL)
+ ciphername = DEFAULT_CIPHERNAME;
+ if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((kdf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (encoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (encrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher);
+ keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher);
+ ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher);
+ authlen = cipher_authlen(cipher);
+ if ((key = calloc(1, keylen + ivlen)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") == 0) {
+ arc4random_buf(salt, SALT_LEN);
+ if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passphrase, strlen(passphrase),
+ salt, SALT_LEN, key, keylen + ivlen, rounds) < 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(kdf, salt, SALT_LEN)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(kdf, rounds)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ } else if (strcmp(kdfname, "none") != 0) {
+ /* Unsupported KDF type */
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen,
+ key + keylen, ivlen, 1)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(encoded, AUTH_MAGIC, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encoded, ciphername)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encoded, kdfname)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(encoded, kdf)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, 1)) != 0 || /* number of keys */
+ (r = sshkey_to_blob(prv, &pubkeyblob, &pubkeylen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(encoded, pubkeyblob, pubkeylen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* set up the buffer that will be encrypted */
+
+ /* Random check bytes */
+ check = arc4random();
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, check)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, check)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* append private key and comment*/
+ if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize_opt(prv, encrypted,
+ SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_FULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encrypted, comment)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* padding */
+ i = 0;
+ while (sshbuf_len(encrypted) % blocksize) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encrypted, ++i & 0xff)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* length in destination buffer */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, sshbuf_len(encrypted))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* encrypt */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(encoded,
+ sshbuf_len(encrypted) + authlen, &cp)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, cp,
+ sshbuf_ptr(encrypted), sshbuf_len(encrypted), 0, authlen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ sshbuf_reset(blob);
+
+ /* assemble uuencoded key */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, MARK_BEGIN, MARK_BEGIN_LEN)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_dtob64(encoded, blob, 1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put(blob, MARK_END, MARK_END_LEN)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(kdf);
+ sshbuf_free(encoded);
+ sshbuf_free(encrypted);
+ cipher_free(ciphercontext);
+ explicit_bzero(salt, sizeof(salt));
+ if (key != NULL)
+ freezero(key, keylen + ivlen);
+ if (pubkeyblob != NULL)
+ freezero(pubkeyblob, pubkeylen);
+ if (b64 != NULL)
+ freezero(b64, strlen(b64));
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+private2_uudecode(struct sshbuf *blob, struct sshbuf **decodedp)
+{
+ const u_char *cp;
+ size_t encoded_len;
+ int r;
+ u_char last;
+ struct sshbuf *encoded = NULL, *decoded = NULL;
+
+ if (blob == NULL || decodedp == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ *decodedp = NULL;
+
+ if ((encoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (decoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* check preamble */
+ cp = sshbuf_ptr(blob);
+ encoded_len = sshbuf_len(blob);
+ if (encoded_len < (MARK_BEGIN_LEN + MARK_END_LEN) ||
+ memcmp(cp, MARK_BEGIN, MARK_BEGIN_LEN) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ cp += MARK_BEGIN_LEN;
+ encoded_len -= MARK_BEGIN_LEN;
+
+ /* Look for end marker, removing whitespace as we go */
+ while (encoded_len > 0) {
+ if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encoded, *cp)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ last = *cp;
+ encoded_len--;
+ cp++;
+ if (last == '\n') {
+ if (encoded_len >= MARK_END_LEN &&
+ memcmp(cp, MARK_END, MARK_END_LEN) == 0) {
+ /* \0 terminate */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encoded, 0)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (encoded_len == 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* decode base64 */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(decoded, (char *)sshbuf_ptr(encoded))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* check magic */
+ if (sshbuf_len(decoded) < sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC) ||
+ memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(decoded), AUTH_MAGIC, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ *decodedp = decoded;
+ decoded = NULL;
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(encoded);
+ sshbuf_free(decoded);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+private2_decrypt(struct sshbuf *decoded, const char *passphrase,
+ struct sshbuf **decryptedp, struct sshkey **pubkeyp)
+{
+ char *ciphername = NULL, *kdfname = NULL;
+ const struct sshcipher *cipher = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ size_t keylen = 0, ivlen = 0, authlen = 0, slen = 0;
+ struct sshbuf *kdf = NULL, *decrypted = NULL;
+ struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL;
+ u_char *key = NULL, *salt = NULL, *dp;
+ u_int blocksize, rounds, nkeys, encrypted_len, check1, check2;
+
+ if (decoded == NULL || decryptedp == NULL || pubkeyp == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ *decryptedp = NULL;
+ *pubkeyp = NULL;
+
+ if ((decrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* parse public portion of key */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decoded, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decoded, &ciphername, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decoded, &kdfname, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_froms(decoded, &kdf)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(decoded, &nkeys)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (nkeys != 1) {
+ /* XXX only one key supported at present */
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_froms(decoded, &pubkey)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(decoded, &encrypted_len)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(kdfname, "none") != 0 && strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(kdfname, "none") == 0 && strcmp(ciphername, "none") != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((passphrase == NULL || strlen(passphrase) == 0) &&
+ strcmp(kdfname, "none") != 0) {
+ /* passphrase required */
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* check size of encrypted key blob */
+ blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher);
+ if (encrypted_len < blocksize || (encrypted_len % blocksize) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* setup key */
+ keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher);
+ ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher);
+ authlen = cipher_authlen(cipher);
+ if ((key = calloc(1, keylen + ivlen)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") == 0) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(kdf, &salt, &slen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(kdf, &rounds)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passphrase, strlen(passphrase), salt, slen,
+ key, keylen + ivlen, rounds) < 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* check that an appropriate amount of auth data is present */
+ if (sshbuf_len(decoded) < authlen ||
+ sshbuf_len(decoded) - authlen < encrypted_len) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* decrypt private portion of key */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(decrypted, encrypted_len, &dp)) != 0 ||
+ (r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen,
+ key + keylen, ivlen, 0)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, dp, sshbuf_ptr(decoded),
+ encrypted_len, 0, authlen)) != 0) {
+ /* an integrity error here indicates an incorrect passphrase */
+ if (r == SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID)
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decoded, encrypted_len + authlen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* there should be no trailing data */
+ if (sshbuf_len(decoded) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* check check bytes */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(decrypted, &check1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(decrypted, &check2)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (check1 != check2) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ *decryptedp = decrypted;
+ decrypted = NULL;
+ *pubkeyp = pubkey;
+ pubkey = NULL;
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ cipher_free(ciphercontext);
+ free(ciphername);
+ free(kdfname);
+ sshkey_free(pubkey);
+ if (salt != NULL) {
+ explicit_bzero(salt, slen);
+ free(salt);
+ }
+ if (key != NULL) {
+ explicit_bzero(key, keylen + ivlen);
+ free(key);
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(kdf);
+ sshbuf_free(decrypted);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+sshkey_parse_private2(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase,
+ struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
+{
+ char *comment = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ struct sshbuf *decoded = NULL, *decrypted = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *k = NULL, *pubkey = NULL;
+
+ if (keyp != NULL)
+ *keyp = NULL;
+ if (commentp != NULL)
+ *commentp = NULL;
+
+ /* Undo base64 encoding and decrypt the private section */
+ if ((r = private2_uudecode(blob, &decoded)) != 0 ||
+ (r = private2_decrypt(decoded, passphrase,
+ &decrypted, &pubkey)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (type != KEY_UNSPEC &&
+ sshkey_type_plain(type) != sshkey_type_plain(pubkey->type)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Load the private key and comment */
+ if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(decrypted, &k)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decrypted, &comment, NULL)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Check deterministic padding after private section */
+ if ((r = private2_check_padding(decrypted)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Check that the public key in the envelope matches the private key */
+ if (!sshkey_equal(pubkey, k)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ if (keyp != NULL) {
+ *keyp = k;
+ k = NULL;
+ }
+ if (commentp != NULL) {
+ *commentp = comment;
+ comment = NULL;
+ }
+ out:
+ free(comment);
+ sshbuf_free(decoded);
+ sshbuf_free(decrypted);
+ sshkey_free(k);
+ sshkey_free(pubkey);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+sshkey_parse_private2_pubkey(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
+ struct sshkey **keyp)
+{
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ struct sshbuf *decoded = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL;
+ u_int nkeys = 0;
+
+ if (keyp != NULL)
+ *keyp = NULL;
+
+ if ((r = private2_uudecode(blob, &decoded)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* parse public key from unencrypted envelope */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decoded, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_skip_string(decoded)) != 0 || /* cipher */
+ (r = sshbuf_skip_string(decoded)) != 0 || /* KDF alg */
+ (r = sshbuf_skip_string(decoded)) != 0 || /* KDF hint */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(decoded, &nkeys)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (nkeys != 1) {
+ /* XXX only one key supported at present */
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Parse the public key */
+ if ((r = sshkey_froms(decoded, &pubkey)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (type != KEY_UNSPEC &&
+ sshkey_type_plain(type) != sshkey_type_plain(pubkey->type)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ if (keyp != NULL) {
+ *keyp = pubkey;
+ pubkey = NULL;
+ }
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(decoded);
+ sshkey_free(pubkey);
+ return r;
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+/* convert SSH v2 key to PEM or PKCS#8 format */
+static int
+sshkey_private_to_blob_pem_pkcs8(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
+ int format, const char *_passphrase, const char *comment)
+{
+ int was_shielded = sshkey_is_shielded(key);
+ int success, r;
+ int blen, len = strlen(_passphrase);
+ u_char *passphrase = (len > 0) ? (u_char *)_passphrase : NULL;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = (len > 0) ? EVP_aes_128_cbc() : NULL;
+ char *bptr;
+ BIO *bio = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *blob;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+
+ if (len > 0 && len <= 4)
+ return SSH_ERR_PASSPHRASE_TOO_SHORT;
+ if ((blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8 && (pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_unshield_private(key)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ switch (key->type) {
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM) {
+ success = PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(bio, key->dsa,
+ cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
+ } else {
+ success = EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa);
+ }
+ break;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM) {
+ success = PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(bio, key->ecdsa,
+ cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
+ } else {
+ success = EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa);
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM) {
+ success = PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bio, key->rsa,
+ cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
+ } else {
+ success = EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa);
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ success = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (success == 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8) {
+ if ((success = PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(bio, pkey, cipher,
+ passphrase, len, NULL, NULL)) == 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((blen = BIO_get_mem_data(bio, &bptr)) <= 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, bptr, blen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ if (was_shielded)
+ r = sshkey_shield_private(key);
+ if (r == 0)
+ r = sshbuf_putb(buf, blob);
+
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ sshbuf_free(blob);
+ BIO_free(bio);
+ return r;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+/* Serialise "key" to buffer "blob" */
+int
+sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
+ const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
+ int format, const char *openssh_format_cipher, int openssh_format_rounds)
+{
+ switch (key->type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ break; /* see below */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+#ifdef WITH_XMSS
+ case KEY_XMSS:
+#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase,
+ comment, openssh_format_cipher, openssh_format_rounds);
+ default:
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ }
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ switch (format) {
+ case SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH:
+ return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase,
+ comment, openssh_format_cipher, openssh_format_rounds);
+ case SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM:
+ case SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8:
+ return sshkey_private_to_blob_pem_pkcs8(key, blob,
+ format, passphrase, comment);
+ default:
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+static int
+translate_libcrypto_error(unsigned long pem_err)
+{
+ int pem_reason = ERR_GET_REASON(pem_err);
+
+ switch (ERR_GET_LIB(pem_err)) {
+ case ERR_LIB_PEM:
+ switch (pem_reason) {
+ case PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ:
+ case PEM_R_PROBLEMS_GETTING_PASSWORD:
+ case PEM_R_BAD_DECRYPT:
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
+ default:
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ }
+ case ERR_LIB_EVP:
+ switch (pem_reason) {
+ case EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT:
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
+#ifdef EVP_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR
+ case EVP_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR:
+#endif
+ case EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR:
+#ifdef EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR
+ case EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR:
+#endif
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ default:
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ }
+ case ERR_LIB_ASN1:
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ }
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+}
+
+static void
+clear_libcrypto_errors(void)
+{
+ while (ERR_get_error() != 0)
+ ;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Translate OpenSSL error codes to determine whether
+ * passphrase is required/incorrect.
+ */
+static int
+convert_libcrypto_error(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * Some password errors are reported at the beginning
+ * of the error queue.
+ */
+ if (translate_libcrypto_error(ERR_peek_error()) ==
+ SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
+ return translate_libcrypto_error(ERR_peek_last_error());
+}
+
+static int
+pem_passphrase_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u)
+{
+ char *p = (char *)u;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if (p == NULL || (len = strlen(p)) == 0)
+ return -1;
+ if (size < 0 || len > (size_t)size)
+ return -1;
+ memcpy(buf, p, len);
+ return (int)len;
+}
+
+static int
+sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
+ const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *prv = NULL;
+ BIO *bio = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if (keyp != NULL)
+ *keyp = NULL;
+
+ if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL || sshbuf_len(blob) > INT_MAX)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if (BIO_write(bio, sshbuf_ptr(blob), sshbuf_len(blob)) !=
+ (int)sshbuf_len(blob)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ clear_libcrypto_errors();
+ if ((pk = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio, NULL, pem_passphrase_cb,
+ (char *)passphrase)) == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * libcrypto may return various ASN.1 errors when attempting
+ * to parse a key with an incorrect passphrase.
+ * Treat all format errors as "incorrect passphrase" if a
+ * passphrase was supplied.
+ */
+ if (passphrase != NULL && *passphrase != '\0')
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
+ else
+ r = convert_libcrypto_error();
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_RSA &&
+ (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_RSA)) {
+ if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ prv->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pk);
+ prv->type = KEY_RSA;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ RSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->rsa, 8);
+#endif
+ if (RSA_blinding_on(prv->rsa, NULL) != 1) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(prv, 0)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ } else if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_DSA &&
+ (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_DSA)) {
+ if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ prv->dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pk);
+ prv->type = KEY_DSA;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ DSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->dsa, 8);
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ } else if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_EC &&
+ (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_ECDSA)) {
+ if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ prv->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pk);
+ prv->type = KEY_ECDSA;
+ prv->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(prv->ecdsa);
+ if (prv->ecdsa_nid == -1 ||
+ sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(prv->ecdsa_nid) == NULL ||
+ sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(prv->ecdsa),
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(prv->ecdsa)) != 0 ||
+ sshkey_ec_validate_private(prv->ecdsa) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+# ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ if (prv != NULL && prv->ecdsa != NULL)
+ sshkey_dump_ec_key(prv->ecdsa);
+# endif
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+ } else {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ r = 0;
+ if (keyp != NULL) {
+ *keyp = prv;
+ prv = NULL;
+ }
+ out:
+ BIO_free(bio);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+ sshkey_free(prv);
+ return r;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+int
+sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
+ const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
+{
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if (keyp != NULL)
+ *keyp = NULL;
+ if (commentp != NULL)
+ *commentp = NULL;
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ case KEY_XMSS:
+ /* No fallback for new-format-only keys */
+ return sshkey_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase,
+ keyp, commentp);
+ default:
+ r = sshkey_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase, keyp,
+ commentp);
+ /* Only fallback to PEM parser if a format error occurred. */
+ if (r != SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT)
+ return r;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ return sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(blob, type,
+ passphrase, keyp);
+#else
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ }
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(struct sshbuf *buffer, const char *passphrase,
+ struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
+{
+ if (keyp != NULL)
+ *keyp = NULL;
+ if (commentp != NULL)
+ *commentp = NULL;
+
+ return sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, KEY_UNSPEC,
+ passphrase, keyp, commentp);
+}
+
+void
+sshkey_sig_details_free(struct sshkey_sig_details *details)
+{
+ freezero(details, sizeof(*details));
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_parse_pubkey_from_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
+ struct sshkey **pubkeyp)
+{
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if (pubkeyp != NULL)
+ *pubkeyp = NULL;
+ /* only new-format private keys bundle a public key inside */
+ if ((r = sshkey_parse_private2_pubkey(blob, type, pubkeyp)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_XMSS
+/*
+ * serialize the key with the current state and forward the state
+ * maxsign times.
+ */
+int
+sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign(struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b,
+ u_int32_t maxsign, int printerror)
+{
+ int r, rupdate;
+
+ if (maxsign == 0 ||
+ sshkey_type_plain(k->type) != KEY_XMSS)
+ return sshkey_private_serialize_opt(k, b,
+ SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
+ if ((r = sshkey_xmss_get_state(k, printerror)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshkey_private_serialize_opt(k, b,
+ SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_STATE)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshkey_xmss_forward_state(k, maxsign)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = 0;
+out:
+ if ((rupdate = sshkey_xmss_update_state(k, printerror)) != 0) {
+ if (r == 0)
+ r = rupdate;
+ }
+ return r;
+}
+
+u_int32_t
+sshkey_signatures_left(const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ if (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_XMSS)
+ return sshkey_xmss_signatures_left(k);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_enable_maxsign(struct sshkey *k, u_int32_t maxsign)
+{
+ if (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) != KEY_XMSS)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ return sshkey_xmss_enable_maxsign(k, maxsign);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_set_filename(struct sshkey *k, const char *filename)
+{
+ if (k == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) != KEY_XMSS)
+ return 0;
+ if (filename == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if ((k->xmss_filename = strdup(filename)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ return 0;
+}
+#else
+int
+sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign(struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b,
+ u_int32_t maxsign, int printerror)
+{
+ return sshkey_private_serialize_opt(k, b, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
+}
+
+u_int32_t
+sshkey_signatures_left(const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_enable_maxsign(struct sshkey *k, u_int32_t maxsign)
+{
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_set_filename(struct sshkey *k, const char *filename)
+{
+ if (k == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_XMSS */