diff options
Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | sshsig.c | 1148 |
1 files changed, 1148 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/sshsig.c b/sshsig.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..eb2a931 --- /dev/null +++ b/sshsig.c @@ -0,0 +1,1148 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sshsig.c,v 1.30 2022/08/19 03:06:30 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <stdarg.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <unistd.h> + +#include "authfd.h" +#include "authfile.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "sshsig.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "match.h" +#include "digest.h" + +#define SIG_VERSION 0x01 +#define MAGIC_PREAMBLE "SSHSIG" +#define MAGIC_PREAMBLE_LEN (sizeof(MAGIC_PREAMBLE) - 1) +#define BEGIN_SIGNATURE "-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----\n" +#define END_SIGNATURE "-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----" +#define RSA_SIGN_ALG "rsa-sha2-512" /* XXX maybe make configurable */ +#define RSA_SIGN_ALLOWED "rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256" +#define HASHALG_DEFAULT "sha512" /* XXX maybe make configurable */ +#define HASHALG_ALLOWED "sha256,sha512" + +int +sshsig_armor(const struct sshbuf *blob, struct sshbuf **out) +{ + struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + *out = NULL; + + if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + error_f("sshbuf_new failed"); + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + + if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, BEGIN_SIGNATURE, + sizeof(BEGIN_SIGNATURE)-1)) != 0) { + error_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); + goto out; + } + + if ((r = sshbuf_dtob64(blob, buf, 1)) != 0) { + error_fr(r, "base64 encode signature"); + goto out; + } + + if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, END_SIGNATURE, + sizeof(END_SIGNATURE)-1)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '\n')) != 0) { + error_fr(r, "sshbuf_put"); + goto out; + } + /* success */ + *out = buf; + buf = NULL; /* transferred */ + r = 0; + out: + sshbuf_free(buf); + return r; +} + +int +sshsig_dearmor(struct sshbuf *sig, struct sshbuf **out) +{ + int r; + size_t eoffset = 0; + struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; + struct sshbuf *sbuf = NULL; + char *b64 = NULL; + + if ((sbuf = sshbuf_fromb(sig)) == NULL) { + error_f("sshbuf_fromb failed"); + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + } + + if ((r = sshbuf_cmp(sbuf, 0, + BEGIN_SIGNATURE, sizeof(BEGIN_SIGNATURE)-1)) != 0) { + error("Couldn't parse signature: missing header"); + goto done; + } + + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(sbuf, sizeof(BEGIN_SIGNATURE)-1)) != 0) { + error_fr(r, "consume"); + goto done; + } + + if ((r = sshbuf_find(sbuf, 0, "\n" END_SIGNATURE, + sizeof("\n" END_SIGNATURE)-1, &eoffset)) != 0) { + error("Couldn't parse signature: missing footer"); + goto done; + } + + if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(sbuf, sshbuf_len(sbuf)-eoffset)) != 0) { + error_fr(r, "consume"); + goto done; + } + + if ((b64 = sshbuf_dup_string(sbuf)) == NULL) { + error_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed"); + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto done; + } + + if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + error_f("sshbuf_new() failed"); + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto done; + } + + if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(buf, b64)) != 0) { + error_fr(r, "decode base64"); + goto done; + } + + /* success */ + *out = buf; + r = 0; + buf = NULL; /* transferred */ +done: + sshbuf_free(buf); + sshbuf_free(sbuf); + free(b64); + return r; +} + +static int +sshsig_wrap_sign(struct sshkey *key, const char *hashalg, + const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, const struct sshbuf *h_message, + const char *sig_namespace, struct sshbuf **out, + sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx) +{ + int r; + size_t slen = 0; + u_char *sig = NULL; + struct sshbuf *blob = NULL; + struct sshbuf *tosign = NULL; + const char *sign_alg = NULL; + + if ((tosign = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || + (blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + error_f("sshbuf_new failed"); + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto done; + } + + if ((r = sshbuf_put(tosign, MAGIC_PREAMBLE, MAGIC_PREAMBLE_LEN)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(tosign, sig_namespace)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(tosign, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* reserved */ + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(tosign, hashalg)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(tosign, h_message)) != 0) { + error_fr(r, "assemble message to sign"); + goto done; + } + + /* If using RSA keys then default to a good signature algorithm */ + if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA) + sign_alg = RSA_SIGN_ALG; + + if (signer != NULL) { + if ((r = signer(key, &sig, &slen, + sshbuf_ptr(tosign), sshbuf_len(tosign), + sign_alg, sk_provider, sk_pin, 0, signer_ctx)) != 0) { + error_r(r, "Couldn't sign message (signer)"); + goto done; + } + } else { + if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &sig, &slen, + sshbuf_ptr(tosign), sshbuf_len(tosign), + sign_alg, sk_provider, sk_pin, 0)) != 0) { + error_r(r, "Couldn't sign message"); + goto done; + } + } + + if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, MAGIC_PREAMBLE, MAGIC_PREAMBLE_LEN)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(blob, SIG_VERSION)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_puts(key, blob)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(blob, sig_namespace)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(blob, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* reserved */ + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(blob, hashalg)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(blob, sig, slen)) != 0) { + error_fr(r, "assemble signature object"); + goto done; + } + + if (out != NULL) { + *out = blob; + blob = NULL; + } + r = 0; +done: + free(sig); + sshbuf_free(blob); + sshbuf_free(tosign); + return r; +} + +/* Check preamble and version. */ +static int +sshsig_parse_preamble(struct sshbuf *buf) +{ + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + uint32_t sversion; + + if ((r = sshbuf_cmp(buf, 0, MAGIC_PREAMBLE, MAGIC_PREAMBLE_LEN)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_consume(buf, (sizeof(MAGIC_PREAMBLE)-1))) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, &sversion)) != 0) { + error("Couldn't verify signature: invalid format"); + return r; + } + + if (sversion > SIG_VERSION) { + error("Signature version %lu is larger than supported " + "version %u", (unsigned long)sversion, SIG_VERSION); + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +sshsig_check_hashalg(const char *hashalg) +{ + if (hashalg == NULL || + match_pattern_list(hashalg, HASHALG_ALLOWED, 0) == 1) + return 0; + error_f("unsupported hash algorithm \"%.100s\"", hashalg); + return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED; +} + +static int +sshsig_peek_hashalg(struct sshbuf *signature, char **hashalgp) +{ + struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; + char *hashalg = NULL; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if (hashalgp != NULL) + *hashalgp = NULL; + if ((buf = sshbuf_fromb(signature)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshsig_parse_preamble(buf)) != 0) + goto done; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &hashalg, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0) { + error_fr(r, "parse signature object"); + goto done; + } + + /* success */ + r = 0; + *hashalgp = hashalg; + hashalg = NULL; + done: + free(hashalg); + sshbuf_free(buf); + return r; +} + +static int +sshsig_wrap_verify(struct sshbuf *signature, const char *hashalg, + const struct sshbuf *h_message, const char *expect_namespace, + struct sshkey **sign_keyp, struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_details) +{ + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + struct sshbuf *buf = NULL, *toverify = NULL; + struct sshkey *key = NULL; + const u_char *sig; + char *got_namespace = NULL, *sigtype = NULL, *sig_hashalg = NULL; + size_t siglen; + + debug_f("verify message length %zu", sshbuf_len(h_message)); + if (sig_details != NULL) + *sig_details = NULL; + if (sign_keyp != NULL) + *sign_keyp = NULL; + + if ((toverify = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + error_f("sshbuf_new failed"); + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto done; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put(toverify, MAGIC_PREAMBLE, + MAGIC_PREAMBLE_LEN)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(toverify, expect_namespace)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(toverify, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* reserved */ + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(toverify, hashalg)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(toverify, h_message)) != 0) { + error_fr(r, "assemble message to verify"); + goto done; + } + + if ((r = sshsig_parse_preamble(signature)) != 0) + goto done; + + if ((r = sshkey_froms(signature, &key)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(signature, &got_namespace, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(signature, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(signature, &sig_hashalg, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(signature, &sig, &siglen)) != 0) { + error_fr(r, "parse signature object"); + goto done; + } + + if (sshbuf_len(signature) != 0) { + error("Signature contains trailing data"); + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto done; + } + + if (strcmp(expect_namespace, got_namespace) != 0) { + error("Couldn't verify signature: namespace does not match"); + debug_f("expected namespace \"%s\" received \"%s\"", + expect_namespace, got_namespace); + r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; + goto done; + } + if (strcmp(hashalg, sig_hashalg) != 0) { + error("Couldn't verify signature: hash algorithm mismatch"); + debug_f("expected algorithm \"%s\" received \"%s\"", + hashalg, sig_hashalg); + r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; + goto done; + } + /* Ensure that RSA keys use an acceptable signature algorithm */ + if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA) { + if ((r = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, siglen, &sigtype)) != 0) { + error_r(r, "Couldn't verify signature: unable to get " + "signature type"); + goto done; + } + if (match_pattern_list(sigtype, RSA_SIGN_ALLOWED, 0) != 1) { + error("Couldn't verify signature: unsupported RSA " + "signature algorithm %s", sigtype); + r = SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED; + goto done; + } + } + if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, sig, siglen, sshbuf_ptr(toverify), + sshbuf_len(toverify), NULL, 0, sig_details)) != 0) { + error_r(r, "Signature verification failed"); + goto done; + } + + /* success */ + r = 0; + if (sign_keyp != NULL) { + *sign_keyp = key; + key = NULL; /* transferred */ + } +done: + free(got_namespace); + free(sigtype); + free(sig_hashalg); + sshbuf_free(buf); + sshbuf_free(toverify); + sshkey_free(key); + return r; +} + +static int +hash_buffer(const struct sshbuf *m, const char *hashalg, struct sshbuf **bp) +{ + char *hex, hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; + int alg, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + + *bp = NULL; + memset(hash, 0, sizeof(hash)); + + if ((r = sshsig_check_hashalg(hashalg)) != 0) + return r; + if ((alg = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(hashalg)) == -1) { + error_f("can't look up hash algorithm %s", hashalg); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(alg, m, hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0) { + error_fr(r, "ssh_digest_buffer"); + return r; + } + if ((hex = tohex(hash, ssh_digest_bytes(alg))) != NULL) { + debug3_f("final hash: %s", hex); + freezero(hex, strlen(hex)); + } + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, hash, ssh_digest_bytes(alg))) != 0) { + error_fr(r, "sshbuf_put"); + goto out; + } + *bp = b; + b = NULL; /* transferred */ + /* success */ + r = 0; + out: + sshbuf_free(b); + explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); + return r; +} + +int +sshsig_signb(struct sshkey *key, const char *hashalg, + const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, + const struct sshbuf *message, const char *sig_namespace, + struct sshbuf **out, sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx) +{ + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if (hashalg == NULL) + hashalg = HASHALG_DEFAULT; + if (out != NULL) + *out = NULL; + if ((r = hash_buffer(message, hashalg, &b)) != 0) { + error_fr(r, "hash buffer"); + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshsig_wrap_sign(key, hashalg, sk_provider, sk_pin, b, + sig_namespace, out, signer, signer_ctx)) != 0) + goto out; + /* success */ + r = 0; + out: + sshbuf_free(b); + return r; +} + +int +sshsig_verifyb(struct sshbuf *signature, const struct sshbuf *message, + const char *expect_namespace, struct sshkey **sign_keyp, + struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_details) +{ + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + char *hashalg = NULL; + + if (sig_details != NULL) + *sig_details = NULL; + if (sign_keyp != NULL) + *sign_keyp = NULL; + if ((r = sshsig_peek_hashalg(signature, &hashalg)) != 0) + return r; + debug_f("signature made with hash \"%s\"", hashalg); + if ((r = hash_buffer(message, hashalg, &b)) != 0) { + error_fr(r, "hash buffer"); + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshsig_wrap_verify(signature, hashalg, b, expect_namespace, + sign_keyp, sig_details)) != 0) + goto out; + /* success */ + r = 0; + out: + sshbuf_free(b); + free(hashalg); + return r; +} + +static int +hash_file(int fd, const char *hashalg, struct sshbuf **bp) +{ + char *hex, rbuf[8192], hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; + ssize_t n, total = 0; + struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx = NULL; + int alg, oerrno, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + + *bp = NULL; + memset(hash, 0, sizeof(hash)); + + if ((r = sshsig_check_hashalg(hashalg)) != 0) + return r; + if ((alg = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(hashalg)) == -1) { + error_f("can't look up hash algorithm %s", hashalg); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + if ((ctx = ssh_digest_start(alg)) == NULL) { + error_f("ssh_digest_start failed"); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + for (;;) { + if ((n = read(fd, rbuf, sizeof(rbuf))) == -1) { + if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN) + continue; + oerrno = errno; + error_f("read: %s", strerror(errno)); + errno = oerrno; + r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + goto out; + } else if (n == 0) { + debug2_f("hashed %zu bytes", total); + break; /* EOF */ + } + total += (size_t)n; + if ((r = ssh_digest_update(ctx, rbuf, (size_t)n)) != 0) { + error_fr(r, "ssh_digest_update"); + goto out; + } + } + if ((r = ssh_digest_final(ctx, hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0) { + error_fr(r, "ssh_digest_final"); + goto out; + } + if ((hex = tohex(hash, ssh_digest_bytes(alg))) != NULL) { + debug3_f("final hash: %s", hex); + freezero(hex, strlen(hex)); + } + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, hash, ssh_digest_bytes(alg))) != 0) { + error_fr(r, "sshbuf_put"); + goto out; + } + *bp = b; + b = NULL; /* transferred */ + /* success */ + r = 0; + out: + oerrno = errno; + sshbuf_free(b); + ssh_digest_free(ctx); + explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); + errno = oerrno; + return r; +} + +int +sshsig_sign_fd(struct sshkey *key, const char *hashalg, + const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, + int fd, const char *sig_namespace, struct sshbuf **out, + sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx) +{ + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if (hashalg == NULL) + hashalg = HASHALG_DEFAULT; + if (out != NULL) + *out = NULL; + if ((r = hash_file(fd, hashalg, &b)) != 0) { + error_fr(r, "hash_file"); + return r; + } + if ((r = sshsig_wrap_sign(key, hashalg, sk_provider, sk_pin, b, + sig_namespace, out, signer, signer_ctx)) != 0) + goto out; + /* success */ + r = 0; + out: + sshbuf_free(b); + return r; +} + +int +sshsig_verify_fd(struct sshbuf *signature, int fd, + const char *expect_namespace, struct sshkey **sign_keyp, + struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_details) +{ + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + char *hashalg = NULL; + + if (sig_details != NULL) + *sig_details = NULL; + if (sign_keyp != NULL) + *sign_keyp = NULL; + if ((r = sshsig_peek_hashalg(signature, &hashalg)) != 0) + return r; + debug_f("signature made with hash \"%s\"", hashalg); + if ((r = hash_file(fd, hashalg, &b)) != 0) { + error_fr(r, "hash_file"); + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshsig_wrap_verify(signature, hashalg, b, expect_namespace, + sign_keyp, sig_details)) != 0) + goto out; + /* success */ + r = 0; + out: + sshbuf_free(b); + free(hashalg); + return r; +} + +struct sshsigopt { + int ca; + char *namespaces; + uint64_t valid_after, valid_before; +}; + +struct sshsigopt * +sshsigopt_parse(const char *opts, const char *path, u_long linenum, + const char **errstrp) +{ + struct sshsigopt *ret; + int r; + char *opt; + const char *errstr = NULL; + + if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) + return NULL; + if (opts == NULL || *opts == '\0') + return ret; /* Empty options yields empty options :) */ + + while (*opts && *opts != ' ' && *opts != '\t') { + /* flag options */ + if ((r = opt_flag("cert-authority", 0, &opts)) != -1) { + ret->ca = 1; + } else if (opt_match(&opts, "namespaces")) { + if (ret->namespaces != NULL) { + errstr = "multiple \"namespaces\" clauses"; + goto fail; + } + ret->namespaces = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr); + if (ret->namespaces == NULL) + goto fail; + } else if (opt_match(&opts, "valid-after")) { + if (ret->valid_after != 0) { + errstr = "multiple \"valid-after\" clauses"; + goto fail; + } + if ((opt = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr)) == NULL) + goto fail; + if (parse_absolute_time(opt, &ret->valid_after) != 0 || + ret->valid_after == 0) { + free(opt); + errstr = "invalid \"valid-after\" time"; + goto fail; + } + free(opt); + } else if (opt_match(&opts, "valid-before")) { + if (ret->valid_before != 0) { + errstr = "multiple \"valid-before\" clauses"; + goto fail; + } + if ((opt = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr)) == NULL) + goto fail; + if (parse_absolute_time(opt, &ret->valid_before) != 0 || + ret->valid_before == 0) { + free(opt); + errstr = "invalid \"valid-before\" time"; + goto fail; + } + free(opt); + } + /* + * Skip the comma, and move to the next option + * (or break out if there are no more). + */ + if (*opts == '\0' || *opts == ' ' || *opts == '\t') + break; /* End of options. */ + /* Anything other than a comma is an unknown option */ + if (*opts != ',') { + errstr = "unknown key option"; + goto fail; + } + opts++; + if (*opts == '\0') { + errstr = "unexpected end-of-options"; + goto fail; + } + } + /* final consistency check */ + if (ret->valid_after != 0 && ret->valid_before != 0 && + ret->valid_before <= ret->valid_after) { + errstr = "\"valid-before\" time is before \"valid-after\""; + goto fail; + } + /* success */ + return ret; + fail: + if (errstrp != NULL) + *errstrp = errstr; + sshsigopt_free(ret); + return NULL; +} + +void +sshsigopt_free(struct sshsigopt *opts) +{ + if (opts == NULL) + return; + free(opts->namespaces); + free(opts); +} + +static int +parse_principals_key_and_options(const char *path, u_long linenum, char *line, + const char *required_principal, char **principalsp, struct sshkey **keyp, + struct sshsigopt **sigoptsp) +{ + char *opts = NULL, *tmp, *cp, *principals = NULL; + const char *reason = NULL; + struct sshsigopt *sigopts = NULL; + struct sshkey *key = NULL; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if (principalsp != NULL) + *principalsp = NULL; + if (sigoptsp != NULL) + *sigoptsp = NULL; + if (keyp != NULL) + *keyp = NULL; + + cp = line; + cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); /* skip leading whitespace */ + if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0') + return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; /* blank or all-comment line */ + + /* format: identity[,identity...] [option[,option...]] key */ + if ((tmp = strdelimw(&cp)) == NULL || cp == NULL) { + error("%s:%lu: invalid line", path, linenum); + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if ((principals = strdup(tmp)) == NULL) { + error_f("strdup failed"); + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + /* + * Bail out early if we're looking for a particular principal and this + * line does not list it. + */ + if (required_principal != NULL) { + if (match_pattern_list(required_principal, + principals, 0) != 1) { + /* principal didn't match */ + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; + goto out; + } + debug_f("%s:%lu: matched principal \"%s\"", + path, linenum, required_principal); + } + + if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { + error_f("sshkey_new failed"); + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if (sshkey_read(key, &cp) != 0) { + /* no key? Check for options */ + opts = cp; + if (sshkey_advance_past_options(&cp) != 0) { + error("%s:%lu: invalid options", path, linenum); + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0') { + error("%s:%lu: missing key", path, linenum); + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + *cp++ = '\0'; + skip_space(&cp); + if (sshkey_read(key, &cp) != 0) { + error("%s:%lu: invalid key", path, linenum); + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + } + debug3("%s:%lu: options %s", path, linenum, opts == NULL ? "" : opts); + if ((sigopts = sshsigopt_parse(opts, path, linenum, &reason)) == NULL) { + error("%s:%lu: bad options: %s", path, linenum, reason); + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + /* success */ + if (principalsp != NULL) { + *principalsp = principals; + principals = NULL; /* transferred */ + } + if (sigoptsp != NULL) { + *sigoptsp = sigopts; + sigopts = NULL; /* transferred */ + } + if (keyp != NULL) { + *keyp = key; + key = NULL; /* transferred */ + } + r = 0; + out: + free(principals); + sshsigopt_free(sigopts); + sshkey_free(key); + return r; +} + +static int +cert_filter_principals(const char *path, u_long linenum, + char **principalsp, const struct sshkey *cert, uint64_t verify_time) +{ + char *cp, *oprincipals, *principals; + const char *reason; + struct sshbuf *nprincipals; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, success = 0; + u_int i; + + oprincipals = principals = *principalsp; + *principalsp = NULL; + + if ((nprincipals = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + + while ((cp = strsep(&principals, ",")) != NULL && *cp != '\0') { + /* Check certificate validity */ + if ((r = sshkey_cert_check_authority(cert, 0, 1, 0, + verify_time, NULL, &reason)) != 0) { + debug("%s:%lu: principal \"%s\" not authorized: %s", + path, linenum, cp, reason); + continue; + } + /* Return all matching principal names from the cert */ + for (i = 0; i < cert->cert->nprincipals; i++) { + if (match_pattern(cert->cert->principals[i], cp)) { + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(nprincipals, "%s%s", + sshbuf_len(nprincipals) != 0 ? "," : "", + cert->cert->principals[i])) != 0) { + error_f("buffer error"); + goto out; + } + } + } + } + if (sshbuf_len(nprincipals) == 0) { + error("%s:%lu: no valid principals found", path, linenum); + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; + goto out; + } + if ((principals = sshbuf_dup_string(nprincipals)) == NULL) { + error_f("buffer error"); + goto out; + } + /* success */ + success = 1; + *principalsp = principals; + out: + sshbuf_free(nprincipals); + free(oprincipals); + return success ? 0 : r; +} + +static int +check_allowed_keys_line(const char *path, u_long linenum, char *line, + const struct sshkey *sign_key, const char *principal, + const char *sig_namespace, uint64_t verify_time, char **principalsp) +{ + struct sshkey *found_key = NULL; + char *principals = NULL; + int r, success = 0; + const char *reason = NULL; + struct sshsigopt *sigopts = NULL; + char tvalid[64], tverify[64]; + + if (principalsp != NULL) + *principalsp = NULL; + + /* Parse the line */ + if ((r = parse_principals_key_and_options(path, linenum, line, + principal, &principals, &found_key, &sigopts)) != 0) { + /* error already logged */ + goto done; + } + + if (!sigopts->ca && sshkey_equal(found_key, sign_key)) { + /* Exact match of key */ + debug("%s:%lu: matched key", path, linenum); + } else if (sigopts->ca && sshkey_is_cert(sign_key) && + sshkey_equal_public(sign_key->cert->signature_key, found_key)) { + if (principal) { + /* Match certificate CA key with specified principal */ + if ((r = sshkey_cert_check_authority(sign_key, 0, 1, 0, + verify_time, principal, &reason)) != 0) { + error("%s:%lu: certificate not authorized: %s", + path, linenum, reason); + goto done; + } + debug("%s:%lu: matched certificate CA key", + path, linenum); + } else { + /* No principal specified - find all matching ones */ + if ((r = cert_filter_principals(path, linenum, + &principals, sign_key, verify_time)) != 0) { + /* error already displayed */ + debug_r(r, "%s:%lu: cert_filter_principals", + path, linenum); + goto done; + } + debug("%s:%lu: matched certificate CA key", + path, linenum); + } + } else { + /* Didn't match key */ + goto done; + } + + /* Check whether options preclude the use of this key */ + if (sigopts->namespaces != NULL && sig_namespace != NULL && + match_pattern_list(sig_namespace, sigopts->namespaces, 0) != 1) { + error("%s:%lu: key is not permitted for use in signature " + "namespace \"%s\"", path, linenum, sig_namespace); + goto done; + } + + /* check key time validity */ + format_absolute_time((uint64_t)verify_time, tverify, sizeof(tverify)); + if (sigopts->valid_after != 0 && + (uint64_t)verify_time < sigopts->valid_after) { + format_absolute_time(sigopts->valid_after, + tvalid, sizeof(tvalid)); + error("%s:%lu: key is not yet valid: " + "verify time %s < valid-after %s", path, linenum, + tverify, tvalid); + goto done; + } + if (sigopts->valid_before != 0 && + (uint64_t)verify_time > sigopts->valid_before) { + format_absolute_time(sigopts->valid_before, + tvalid, sizeof(tvalid)); + error("%s:%lu: key has expired: " + "verify time %s > valid-before %s", path, linenum, + tverify, tvalid); + goto done; + } + success = 1; + + done: + if (success && principalsp != NULL) { + *principalsp = principals; + principals = NULL; /* transferred */ + } + free(principals); + sshkey_free(found_key); + sshsigopt_free(sigopts); + return success ? 0 : SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; +} + +int +sshsig_check_allowed_keys(const char *path, const struct sshkey *sign_key, + const char *principal, const char *sig_namespace, uint64_t verify_time) +{ + FILE *f = NULL; + char *line = NULL; + size_t linesize = 0; + u_long linenum = 0; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, oerrno; + + /* Check key and principal against file */ + if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) { + oerrno = errno; + error("Unable to open allowed keys file \"%s\": %s", + path, strerror(errno)); + errno = oerrno; + return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + } + + while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { + linenum++; + r = check_allowed_keys_line(path, linenum, line, sign_key, + principal, sig_namespace, verify_time, NULL); + free(line); + line = NULL; + linesize = 0; + if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND) + continue; + else if (r == 0) { + /* success */ + fclose(f); + return 0; + } else + break; + } + /* Either we hit an error parsing or we simply didn't find the key */ + fclose(f); + free(line); + return r == 0 ? SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND : r; +} + +int +sshsig_find_principals(const char *path, const struct sshkey *sign_key, + uint64_t verify_time, char **principals) +{ + FILE *f = NULL; + char *line = NULL; + size_t linesize = 0; + u_long linenum = 0; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, oerrno; + + if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) { + oerrno = errno; + error("Unable to open allowed keys file \"%s\": %s", + path, strerror(errno)); + errno = oerrno; + return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + } + + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; + while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { + linenum++; + r = check_allowed_keys_line(path, linenum, line, + sign_key, NULL, NULL, verify_time, principals); + free(line); + line = NULL; + linesize = 0; + if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND) + continue; + else if (r == 0) { + /* success */ + fclose(f); + return 0; + } else + break; + } + free(line); + /* Either we hit an error parsing or we simply didn't find the key */ + if (ferror(f) != 0) { + oerrno = errno; + fclose(f); + error("Unable to read allowed keys file \"%s\": %s", + path, strerror(errno)); + errno = oerrno; + return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + } + fclose(f); + return r == 0 ? SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND : r; +} + +int +sshsig_match_principals(const char *path, const char *principal, + char ***principalsp, size_t *nprincipalsp) +{ + FILE *f = NULL; + char *found, *line = NULL, **principals = NULL, **tmp; + size_t i, nprincipals = 0, linesize = 0; + u_long linenum = 0; + int oerrno = 0, r, ret = 0; + + if (principalsp != NULL) + *principalsp = NULL; + if (nprincipalsp != NULL) + *nprincipalsp = 0; + + /* Check key and principal against file */ + if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) { + oerrno = errno; + error("Unable to open allowed keys file \"%s\": %s", + path, strerror(errno)); + errno = oerrno; + return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + } + + while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { + linenum++; + /* Parse the line */ + if ((r = parse_principals_key_and_options(path, linenum, line, + principal, &found, NULL, NULL)) != 0) { + if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND) + continue; + ret = r; + oerrno = errno; + break; /* unexpected error */ + } + if ((tmp = recallocarray(principals, nprincipals, + nprincipals + 1, sizeof(*principals))) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + free(found); + break; + } + principals = tmp; + principals[nprincipals++] = found; /* transferred */ + free(line); + line = NULL; + linesize = 0; + } + fclose(f); + + if (ret == 0) { + if (nprincipals == 0) + ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; + if (principalsp != NULL) { + *principalsp = principals; + principals = NULL; /* transferred */ + } + if (nprincipalsp != 0) { + *nprincipalsp = nprincipals; + nprincipals = 0; + } + } + + for (i = 0; i < nprincipals; i++) + free(principals[i]); + free(principals); + + errno = oerrno; + return ret; +} + +int +sshsig_get_pubkey(struct sshbuf *signature, struct sshkey **pubkey) +{ + struct sshkey *pk = NULL; + int r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; + + if (pubkey == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + if ((r = sshsig_parse_preamble(signature)) != 0) + return r; + if ((r = sshkey_froms(signature, &pk)) != 0) + return r; + + *pubkey = pk; + pk = NULL; + return 0; +} |